NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
NAVAL WARFARE 
 
 ITS RULING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
 HISTORICALLY TREATED 
 
 VICE-ADMIRAL P. H. COLOMB, 
 
 GOLD MEDALIST EOYAXi UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, 
 
 AND SOMETIME LECTURER ON NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE ROTAL NAVAL 
 
 COLLEGE AT GREENWICH. 
 
 Author of " Essays on Naval Defence," dx. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 Bevised and Corrected, with Additional Chapter on Becent Illustrations, and new 
 Maps and Plans, including Spanish-American War of 1898-9. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 W. H. .\LLEN AND CO., LIMITED, 
 
 4 & 5, ADAM STREET, W.C. 
 
 1899. 
 
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The following extract from the Preface to the First Edition so fully 
 expresses the intention of the work, that I cannot do better than 
 reproduce it here : — 
 
 " In writing this book I have kept in mind the double object of 
 showing that there are laws governing the conduct of naval war 
 which cannot be transgressed with impunity ; and that there is no 
 reason to believe them abrogated by any of the chaiiges of recent years. 
 
 " I was induced to undertake it from observing, with some sur- 
 prise, a widespread conception that either there never had been any 
 laws governing naval war, or that if there had been such in the days 
 of sailing ships, they had been entirely swept away and destroyed by 
 the advent of steam, steel ships, armour, breech-loading rifled guns, 
 and torpedoes. This belief appeared to me the more singular, as no 
 one ventured to suggest that railways, the electric telegraph, breech- 
 loading rifled ordnance, and small arms, had altered the well estab- 
 lished rules of war upon the land. But in considering the existence 
 of such antithetical ideas side by side, it appeared to me that the 
 cause might not improbably be found in the differences of method 
 pursued by writers of naval and of military history. There did not 
 exist, I beheved, in any language a book written with the object of 
 discriminating between the possible and impossible, the prudent and 
 the imprudent, the wise and the foolish, in the conduct of naval war. 
 But books describing war upon land with these objects in view were 
 abundant in all languages, and I had been much struck with a more 
 recent and powerful contribution to such literature — Sir Edward 
 Hamley's Operations of War. Yet even the title chosen for this 
 work seemed to confirm my view, in apparently inferring the 
 opinion that war upon the land was, if not the only war of conse- 
 quence to the world, at least the only war which would bear syste- 
 matic analysis and treatment. 
 
 229631 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 " I had long been aware that ordinary naval histories, especially 
 works in English near our own time, were, as histories, quite the 
 most unsatisfactory productions existing. They all ran in two 
 grooves; the one contenting itself in a mere chronological narrative 
 of events, having no other connections but those of time and place ; 
 the other being written for the glorification or condemnation ot 
 iudivitluals whose characters were judged from isolated and discon- 
 nected acts. Perhaps no stronger illustration of my meaning can 
 be drawn than by mentioning that while James is the recognised 
 historian of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic naval wars, he 
 did not think it necessary to furnish his volumes with more than a 
 personal intlex. 
 
 " Historians then had generally neglected to give any attention to 
 the causes of success or failure in naval war ; they did not connect 
 the facts or events which were necessary for that purpose. Naval 
 commanders, on the other hand, seem to have been so entirely con- 
 vinced of the force of causes beyond their control, and so satisfied 
 of their obviousness, that the}^ seldom alluded to them. Of writers 
 on naval strategy there were absolutely none ; writers on naval tac- 
 tics were few and far between ; they generally wrote as if the tactics 
 of manoeuvring embraced the whole subject; and the elaborate 
 simplicity of Clerk of Eldin got an extensive hearing because he 
 stood almost alone as a writer in applying to the naval battle con- 
 siderations which no writer could omit in treating of the battle on 
 land. 
 
 " I held this condition of the literature of naval war to be mainly 
 responsible for the want of its study, which was common ; and thus 
 for the existing belief that nothing was to be got from it either in 
 lessons for the present, or guidance for the future. 
 
 " It was the conviction that no state of mind could well be more 
 dangerous for this Empire, that led me to think I might usefully 
 employ my very moderate powers in writing a study of some of the 
 larger phases of naval war, from the strategical point of view. The 
 book may, I hope, be a pioneer. It is no more than the study for 
 what in abler hands might become a great picture. I have not pre- 
 tended to re-write the histories I have used. My original research 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 has been but small, indeed the scope of the work did not admit of it. 
 But I have trusted to create an interest by not only giving the 
 narratives as I find them, but by endeavouring always to extract the 
 reasons for each event, and to bring out the causes which here con- 
 duced to success, and there determined failure. 
 
 "I have a firm belief that the great laws of naval war, wliich I 
 have endeavoured to trace throughout the centuries in which Eng- 
 land has been building up her power, would be absolutely dominant 
 in any naval war which now arose ; and that they may be depended 
 on for forecasting its course and preparing for it. Not that I assume 
 to have, in all cases, arrived at just conclusions, but rather that there 
 are, in the history of the past, ample materials for forming them and 
 acting on them." 
 
 In preparing the Second Edition for the press, a certain temptation 
 to re-write portions of the work presented itself. It arose from two 
 causes; namely, that here and there discussion on the subject had 
 thrown new historical light upon it ; and that the publication of the 
 book having had the full effect expected from it, the public point of 
 view may be said to have changed for the better on all that relates 
 to the strategy of war on th e sea, since it was written. 
 
 But I soon found that any re-writing would necessitate a change 
 in the whole character of the work, and that I should present the 
 public with a new work and not with the second edition of an old 
 one. I have therefore been obliged to content myself with minor 
 corrections, including misprints. 
 
 But there are two cases of possible re-writing, which are of suffi- 
 cient importance to deserve special mention here. An article in the 
 Quarterly Review for April, 1893, and Professor Laughton in the 
 Army and Navy Gazette for May 21st, 1892, by appeals to new works 
 and to original documents, have thrown fresh light on the Battle of 
 La Hogue. Amongst other points, it seems to be made out that the 
 whole of the ninety-nine ships given by the histories on which my 
 narrative rests, were not present under Eussell at the battle ; some 
 seventeen of them were, in all probability, absent refitting. The 
 correction of the data has, however, no effect upon the general view 
 taken in the text. 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 Far more important was the question of any alterations of text 
 arising out of criticisms on my treatment of the strategical aspects of 
 the Battle of Beachy Head. I restored in my text that which was 
 unquestionably the English, and most probably the French, naval 
 view of the transactions, and of the conduct of Torrington at the 
 time, but which subsequent historians — and notably Macaulay — had 
 thrust altogether aside. By a powerful body of critics, including, 
 I understand, Captain Mahan, my views have been fully adopted, 
 and Torrington's phrase " A fleet in being," has come into general 
 use to denote what, in naval affairs, corresponds to " a relieving 
 army " in military affairs. That is to say, a fleet which is able and 
 willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent upon territory which 
 that force has it in charge to protect. 
 
 In my narrative, adhering to the limitations mentioned in the 
 last paragraph but one in the extract from my Preface given above, 
 I followed Lediard in supposing that the French Government, in 
 the event of the complete suppression of Torrington's fleet by de 
 Tourville, intended it should be followed up by an advance up the 
 Thames, and a descent with a substantial body of troops upon our 
 southern coast. Lediard's account is written in the belief that the 
 French regarded a rising to welcome them as the friends of King 
 James to be certain. That is to say, he believed that the utter- 
 ances of King William, and the proclamations and acts of the Court 
 against definite conspiracies and against alleged conspirators who 
 were named, rested on a basis of fact. I, on my part, in. accepting 
 Lediard and Entick committed myself to the belief that de Tour- 
 ville's action was an attempt to gain the command of the sea with a 
 definite ulterior object, and that his failure to annihilate Torrington's 
 fleet was, if not the only cause, yet a predominating cause, in pre- 
 venting the ascent of the Thames, the invasion of the south coast, 
 and the insurrection of James's adherents. I did, in short, accept 
 the view that Torrington and his naval supporters understood the 
 real situation better than the English Statesmen of the time, and than 
 most of the historians who subsequently wrote upon the subject. 
 
 A considerable body of critics have challenged my position gener- 
 ally ; and some have cliallenged it in particulars. 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 Many, if not most of the former body, have seemed to me to speak 
 under an entire misapprehension of the case I designed to make 
 of the Battle of Beachy Head in relation to doctrine of " the 
 fleet in being." It has been said in plain terms, for instance, that I 
 use the occurrences in question as the foundation, almost the sole 
 foundation, of the doctrine. This is an extremely perverted view of 
 all that I have said on the subject. No rule of war could possibly 
 rest on a single instance, and the doctrine of "the fleet in being" 
 arises first from the reason of the thing, and secondly from applying 
 the methods of agreement and difference to the actual occurrences 
 of war, which show that while descents on territory are common 
 when there is no " fleet in being," they are absent whenever there is 
 a fleet capable of interfering. This general argument is confirmed 
 when it is found that in what might be called doubtful cases, the 
 descent or attempted descent is more political than military ; when 
 leaders undertaking such descents almost invariably express the con- 
 viction that any " fleet in being " must be put out of being before 
 the descent can be made ; and because each of the two notable 
 attempts to invade in defiance of the doctrine were disastrously frus- 
 trated by the " fleet in being " which it was sought to ignore. 
 
 Hence Torrington's operations are no more, and can be taken as 
 no more, than one of a great group of occurrences whose cumulative 
 evidence proves the rule. 
 
 But what gave prominence to Torrington's action, and what has 
 more than anything else concentrated the attention of critics on that 
 part of my work, are Torrington's words. He has given us the first 
 and the best definition of that rule of war which ought to deter- 
 mine the action of the inferior fleet when a descent on territory is 
 threatened, including in it an expression of the defensive power 
 which resides in even the inferior fleet in such cases, and which was 
 so completely vindicated by the Austrian fleet at Lissa. 
 
 This sort of misapprehension, if it had arisen out of the text, 
 might have demanded re-writing, but as it certainly arose in spite 
 of the text, the latter can only be left to work its way in the end. 
 
 Far more important has been the friendly criticism expressing 
 belief that my principal authority, Lediard (1735), has misled me 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 into classin;:; the events surrounding the Battle of Beachy Head 
 amongst the "attempts to gain the command of the sea with 
 definite ulterior purpose," when they should have been placed as an 
 illustration of " the struggle for the command of the sea " pure and 
 simple. It is thought by those friends, amongst whom my acknow- 
 ledgments are due to Professor Laughton, that there was no in- 
 tention, at any rate no definite intention, on the part of the French 
 Government to follow up the anticipated success of de Tourville over 
 Torrington, by the ascent of the Thames, and -a landing of French 
 troops. This view, if it is a correct one, would of course condemn 
 Torrington as absolutely as his enemies did, and would justify 
 Macaulay's judgment. If I had been brought over to it, I must 
 have re-written the whole story. But the conclusion I have come to 
 is that no sufficient grounds that are easily accessible exist for doubt- 
 ing that the Battle of Beachy Head was an " attempt to gain the 
 command of the sea with definite ulterior purpose." 
 
 Professor Laughton justly lays great stress upon the evidence 
 offered by Eugene Sue's Histoire de la Marine Frangaise, published 
 in 1845, which largely uses and quotes from original documents in 
 the French naval archives. Many letters from de Tourville are 
 given in full which relate to the Battle of Beachy Head and the sub- 
 sequent operations, and it must be confessed that if negative evidence 
 would suffice, the absence of all mention of ulterior objects might 
 lead to the belief that there were none. 
 
 But an enquirer speedily finds that negative evidence in a mat- 
 ter of this sort goes a very short way. Lediard has no idea of 
 Torrington's defence; not a single historian that I have consulted 
 mentions it, except Entick, from whose folio I have disentombed 
 it. Would it ever be supposed by any reader who had not Entick 
 or Entick's documents before him, that Torrington's conduct was 
 dictated by a firm belief that he had received dangerously mis- 
 taken orders ? 
 
 But Eugene Sue gives proof in a memoir of de Tourville's, sub- 
 mitted to Louis in the early part of 1690, that he most thoroughly 
 comprehended the doctrine of the " fleet in being," the power of 
 such a fleet, and the necessity of leaving force enough to mask it 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 before the descent could be undertaken. " If the enemy," he said, 
 speaking of a possible descent on the coast of France, " had 30 ships 
 of war more than your Majesty's fleet, he could effect his landing by 
 leaving 10 ships of war with the transports, and coming with the 
 rest of his fleet before that of your Majesty to engage it." 
 
 Nor did he, in his caution, make the absurd little demonstration 
 against Teignmouth, without sending a squadron to cruise in the 
 Straits of Dover to watch the Anglo-Dutch fleet. 
 
 Lediard bases himself on Boyer (Hist, of K. Will. III.), who pub- 
 lished in 1702. Boyer is followed by Kennet, who published in 1719. 
 Then there is Burnet and Tindal, who published in 1746. Entick is 
 later than them all, publishing in 1757. Lediard simply copies 
 Boyer's statements as to the designs of the French, and the other 
 historians mentioned are full of the conspiracies that they suppose 
 existed, and of the plots which hinged upon help from France by 
 way of descent. It is perfectly certain that before King William left 
 for Ireland he spoke distinctly of his knowledge of these things and 
 of the men who were mixed up in them. The acts of the Queen in 
 his absence were ostensibly based on her belief in proposed landings 
 of the French. Tindal (Continuation of Kapin), quotes an inter- 
 cepted letter from James about August 1689, speaking of " contra- 
 band goods ready to be shipped off in order to be run into such places 
 where they might not be seized by the Custom House officers," which, 
 thinks Tindal, " sufficiently discovered the design of invasion.'' 
 
 On the other side there is Kalj)h, who, publishing in 1746, con- 
 demns Kennet, Burchett, Boyer, Tindal, and other writers who, he 
 declares, in the matter of conspiracies and prospective invasions, all 
 adopted " the forgeries of a party." He seems to declare that the 
 Court party supported the forgeries, if they did not propagate the 
 false beliefs, for the purpose of putting their feet on the necks of 
 their enemies. Obviously he must include the King in his charges, 
 though in the face of his own words he exempts him, and says if he 
 had had intelligence of these things, he could never have left the 
 Queen to cope with them. 
 
 But Ralph is only attacking Tindal, who tells us that at the very 
 time when, in his opinion, the fears of invasion and insurrection 
 
xii PREFACE. 
 
 were justified : " All pretended discoveries were laughed at and 
 looked upon as fictions of the Court, and upon this, the City of 
 London was generally possessed with a very ill opinion of the 
 King." 
 
 Yet again, on the other side, and more recently. Lord Wolseley 
 quotes a letter from Marlborough, dated July 16th, 1690, expressing 
 his belief that a force assembled at St, Omer ostensibly for reinforc- 
 ing the Duke of Luxembourg, was really prepared for the invasion of 
 England. 
 
 Lord Wolseley also quotes a MS. letter from James dated 10th- 
 20th August, 1690, urging Louis to invade ; asking for 10,000 troops 
 for the attack on London, which had not more than 10,000 — Lord 
 Wolseley says not more than 7,000 — available to defend it. 
 
 The French naval historian, Comte de Lapeyrouse Boniils (1845), 
 speaking of the preparations for the campaign of Beachy Head, says, 
 " Pour I'execution de ce plan, des troupes furent cantonn^es sur les 
 cotes de France." 
 
 I think I have probably said enough to show that unless and until 
 some historian writes a fuller and more complete treatise to upset my 
 original authority than now exists, I can only leave my text as it 
 stands, and believe that I truly prove the case. 
 
 The chapter which I have added on the Chilian Civil War and 
 the Korean War is necessarily a mere sketch, but I hope it is suffi- 
 ciently full and sufficiently accurate to bring my subject up to date. 
 
 May, 1895. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 A THIRD edition of this work being called for, I have taken the 
 opportunity of examining and discussing the events of the 
 Spanish-American War of 1898, so far as they relate to those 
 " ruling principles " of naval warfare which it has been the object 
 of the book to set forth and elucidate. 
 
 Most of what can be said on the conduct of this war in relation 
 to its larger aspects has been said in the chapter itself. But my 
 conviction may here be emphasised that whatever rules can be 
 legitimately deduced from the operations of naval warfare when 
 it was conducted in reliance upon the propulsive power of the 
 wind, are shown by this latest of steam-wars to be much less 
 subject to variation than was the case in former days. I doubt 
 if any one doing me the honour to read my examination of the 
 war can avoid some surprise at the conclusiveness of arguments 
 gathered from wars under such very different conditions. 
 
 As, in writing some earlier chapters I endeavoured to develop 
 the extraordinarily defensive powers of fleets in protecting out- 
 lying territories otherwise liable to attack, and generally in 
 preventing invasions not otherwise preventable, I became more 
 and more struck with the almost mathematical action of that 
 power, so, on the evidence of the Spanish- American War, I think 
 we must certainly pronounce that steam fleets are more defensive^ 
 of territory than ever sailing fleets were, or could have been. I 
 suppose it is the calculated certainty of a steam fleet's progress, 
 and the almost necessary suddenness of its stroke when it comes 
 within sight of its quarry that makes it so impossible to move in 
 the matter of invasion, or of any military operation conducted 
 over sea, when there is even a possibility of such a stroke being 
 struck. 
 
 Though the war was full of lessons, as I have endeavoured to 
 show, the unequalness of the contest has left many problems of 
 which the naval world has longed for the solution, unsolved. 
 This is particularly the case with all torpedo questions. With 
 regard to these Admiral Sampson made a shrewd remark which 
 requires to be kept in mind. It was to the effect that the non- 
 
xiv PREFACE TO THE THIBD EDITION. 
 
 employment of the torpedo would tend to set it back in naval 
 estimation, but that such a frame of mind would be illogical, 
 because the torpedo was really in the same position now as it 
 occupied before the war was declared. 
 
 Perhaps my apologies are due to my friends and brother officers 
 across the Atlantic for the extreme freedom of my criticisms, and 
 for what may be called the coldness with which I have written a 
 sketch history of transactions which in so many cases showed the 
 fine qualities of the officers engaged in them. But I may be 
 pardoned and excused if it is remembered that the scope of the 
 book is scientific ; and if in any cases it has fallen into personali- 
 ties, it has by so much fallen short of its ideal. 
 
 Every historian of this war cannot but return his sincere 
 thanks to the Government of the United States for the full and 
 free publication of the official documents respecting it. There 
 may be, possibly, something to be said against a practice which 
 is almost peculiar to the great Eepublic, but I scarcely doubt its 
 substantial wisdom. AVhat is most required after the close of a 
 war is not only right thinking in regard to it, but general right 
 thinking. I suspect that by far the best way to obtain this is by 
 free exposure of its history as soon as possible after it closes. 
 When official documents are scarce and difficult to come by, great 
 principles which are elucidated in them become missed or per- 
 verted, and there is seldom any means of correcting misappre- 
 hensions. But now, if, as is probable, I may mistake in anything 
 I have said, an appeal to the publications of the United States 
 can always be relied on to correct me. 
 
 Besides offering my thanks to Mr. F. E. Hesse of the Great 
 Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, upon whose information 
 I have based much of my view of the status of telegraph cables in 
 war, I have to thank the English pubhshers — Messrs. Hutchinson 
 and Co. — of Mr. Charles Morris' excellent sketch of The American 
 War loith Spain, for the use of some of his maps. 
 
 June 17, 1899. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Natuee of Naval War 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 The Struggle for the Command of the Sea - - - 25 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — continued - 44 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — concluded - G5 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 The Differentiation of Naval Force - • . - -80 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Attempts to gain Command of the Sea with Definite 
 
 Ulterior Purpose 107 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — continued - - 129 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — continued - - 149 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK IX. 
 
 FACE 
 
 Attempts to gain Command of the Sea — concluded - -173 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from 
 
 THE Sea succeed or fail 203 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 227 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued • - 252 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - - 279 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued • • 304 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued • - 327 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued - • 349 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — continued • « 876 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 Attacks on Territory from the Sea — concluded - - 399 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 Recent Illustrations of the Principles of Naval Warfare 431 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 The Spanish-American War Appendix 
 
 Index 
 
 453 
 
LIST OP 
 
 MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Outline Chart of the British Seas ... ... 
 
 Hull of the "Speaker" 
 
 Ship of Henry VITI... 
 
 Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1665, 1672 ... 
 
 The "Royal Prince" 
 
 Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1665, 1672 ... 
 
 Theatre of the Dutch Wars, 1652, 1666, 1672 ... 
 
 Naval Action between Dutch, Englisk and French, 1673... 
 
 Ships in Commission from 1793 to 1813 
 
 Line-of-Battle Ships in Commission from 1793 to 1813... 
 
 Cruisers in Commission from 1793 to 1813 
 
 Theatre of Operations, 1690-92 
 
 Ships of the Line in Action, close of 17th Century 
 
 Theatre of the French Plans of Invasion, 1695, 1744, 1759 
 
 The Movements of the Opposing Fleets in 1779 
 
 Theatre of the Operations, trom 1797 to 1801... 
 
 Position of Naval Forces after Outbreak of the War, 1803 
 
 Chart of the West India Islands 
 
 European Theatre of the Operations, 1805 
 
 Road and Harbour of Chagre, 1779 ... 
 
 Fortifications of Grenada, 1779 
 
 Chart of the West India Islands 
 
 Outline Coast of St. Christopher's 
 
 Guadeloupe, with Adjacent Islands 
 
 Carte de ITsle de la Martinique 
 
 The Island of Gorec 
 
 The Coast about Bust 
 
 1* 
 
 7o face 
 
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 2 
 
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 9 
 
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 9 
 
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xviii MAPS, PLANS, AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Sketch Chart of Cadiz Harbour 
 
 Sketch Chart of Vigo Bay 
 
 Chart of Mediterranean Coasts 
 
 Cette in 1842 
 
 Chart of Gulf of St. Lawrence 
 
 Sketch Plan of Porto Bello in 1817 ... 
 
 Sketch Plan of La Guaira in 18S8 
 
 Sketch Plan of the Harbour of Cartagena 
 
 Sketch Plan of Puerto Cabello in 171)1 
 
 Sketch Plan of Louisburg, 1857-,58 ... 
 
 Sketch Map of Minorca in 1812 
 
 Sketch Plan of Gibraltar in 1812 
 
 Part of the Island of Ste. Lucie 
 
 Plan de la Rade du Fort Royal 
 
 Plan of the French Attacks upon the Island of Grenada 
 
 Bombardment of Bomarsund ... 
 
 Plan of Algiers, 1816 
 
 Plan of Acre 
 
 Bombardment of Sveaborg 
 
 Map of Charleston Harbou'*, South Carolina -,, 
 
 Theatre of the Civil War in Cliili 
 
 Theatre of the Korean War 
 
 Sketch Map of Tnang-Tung Peninsula 
 
 Sketch Mnp of Wei-hai-wei and District 
 
 Map of the Atlantic Ocean ... ... ... A^jp. 
 
 Map of Cuba ... ... ... ... ,, 
 
 Map of West Indies 
 
 n face 
 
 jKuje 
 
 283 
 287 
 312 
 318 
 322 
 332 
 351 
 
 
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 335 
 
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 pcujc 
 
 352 
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 e page 
 
 ■ ii 
 viit 
 
NAVAL WARFAEE 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 The Nature of Naval War, 
 
 True naval war cannot be carried on until commerce bears a largo proportion to the 
 riches of a country, and till ships are able to keep the sea. — It could not, consequently, 
 have existed before the time of Elizabeth. — But it was only as the Spanish war grew 
 that the true principles were perceived, and a want of perception on the part of Spain 
 was one of the causes of her failure. — At and after the close of the war, the true 
 principles were, to a great extent, understood by Sir William Monson and Sir Walter 
 Raleigh, as may not only be drawn from the language they used, but from the practice 
 they recommended, and, in some caces, put in force. — The primary aim of naval war is 
 the command of the sea. — Any other aim is an acceptance of the position of the 
 inferior naval power, and the abnegation of all hopes of ultimate success. 
 
 Unlike its military congener, of which the principles descend 
 from times immemorial, naval warfare is of comparative modern 
 origin. Sea fights there were, no doubt, in very ancient times, 
 but sea fights do not of themselves constitute naval warfare. 
 With possible exceptions here and there, iu early Grecian or 
 perhaps Koman days, the ancient sea-fights were the result of 
 military expeditions by sea and not of naval considerations. 
 
 The operations of military warfare have at all timeg been 
 conducted with a view to territorial conquest ; the field of battle 
 was struggled for by the combatants as a possession to be either 
 temporarily held as a basis for further operations, or as part of the 
 territory which was to be permanently occupied. The sea-fight of 
 ancient times was but the contention of armies on the water, not 
 to hold the field of battle and surrounding waters, but simply as 
 the encounter of one army with another which was barring its 
 v.ay to the conquest of territory. Permanent occupation of the 
 \\at8r, as of the land, was a thing undreamt of, because impossible 
 
 1 
 
2 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 to the trireme of the ancients, or to the galley of the Middle Ages. 
 Nothing that was then huilt was what we now call a sea-going or 
 a sea-keeping ship, and there was, in fact, nothing to call for such 
 structures. It was not till the frequented water areas became 
 greatly extended, and till the oar ceased to be a propulsive power 
 in the ordinary ship, that it was possible to build her so that 
 she should remain in permanent occupation of the sea. 
 
 And yet, if we look back to what may be called the early days of 
 naval warfare under sail, we shall observe that there was little or 
 no contention for occupation of, or command over, the sea, such as 
 was exercised and claimed over territory on land. Neither riches, 
 nor renown, nor any other advantages could be gathered directly 
 from the sea. Commerce was absolutely small, but relatively to 
 the power of nations possessing sea coasts, even smaller. The 
 advantage of the sea was its convenience as a medium of transport, 
 and it seemed one common to two neighbouring nations at war. 
 Coasts were open, and the small attacks capable of being organized 
 were sudden, and could not well be prepared against. The great 
 value of the sea was the easy means it presented for getting at the 
 enemy's territory and ravaging it. 
 
 England had for a long course of years put in a claim for what 
 she called "the sovereignty of the seas " surrounding her. But 
 this was chiefly a civil claim, not a military one. It was as nearly 
 as possible a claim to extend what are now our admitted rights in 
 our territorial waters — a belt three miles wide from the shore — over 
 very large water areas indeed.* The whole claim being solemnly 
 denied by the Dutch, and the denial formulated by the learned 
 writer Grotius, Charles I. employed Selden to write a counterblast, 
 reasserting the claim, and for the first time fitted out a fleet to 
 enforce it. 
 
 But the claim had to do with rights of fishery, rights of traffic, 
 anchorages, and so on. It was apart from any ideas of water 
 command for military purposes, even so late as Charles' days. At 
 an earlier time the sea was regarded as a common highway for 
 military expeditions, there being but little attempt to secure it for 
 the use of one side only. 
 
 Out of this view of the sea grew what I have ventured to christen 
 
 * The British seas, or the Four Seas, as they were indifferently termed, over which 
 this sovereignty was claimed, began at the point where the 63rd parallel touches the 
 coast of Norway. Then the boundary ran down all the coasts to Cape Finisterre ; in 
 that latitude to the meridian of 23° W. Then along this meridian, to the 63rd parallel 
 and to Norway again See Burchett's Naval History, p. 34. 
 
2|0° 
 
 OUTLINE CHART 
 
 of tlie 
 
 BRITISH SEAS 
 
 Approximate limits thus 
 
 ToFacePa^e2. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 3 
 
 " cross-ravaging," a system of retaliatory expeditions attacking 
 territory, destroying towns, burning property, and laying waste 
 with fire and sword. This is a system to which we are early 
 introduced, but which is not confined to very early dates. It is a 
 system out of which not much advantage to either side has ever 
 come ; but down to the latest periods we can find it where there is 
 no distinct aim of purely naval warfare, that is to say, uo distinct 
 aim on either side to assert and maintain a control over the water, 
 such as in military warfare is asserted and maintained over the 
 land. 
 
 Thus, in 1512, Sir Edward Howard crossed to Brest with a fleet 
 from which forces landed and burnt Conquet. A reinforcement 
 being sent out, the new fleet met and defeated the French fleet just 
 as it came out of port. That operation finished a year's cam- 
 paign ; but next spring Howard again proceeded to Brest, and the 
 French, pending the arrival of some galleys from the Mediter- 
 ranean, remained in port, and permitted Howard to sail up the 
 harbour, to burn and ravage the country opposite to Brest, but 
 without attempting anything against the town itself, or the fleet 
 there. The galleys then arrived at Conquet, where Howard, 
 coming out of Brest, attacked them, but unfortunately lost his life 
 in the encounter. Our fleet then returned home. But the French 
 in their turn fitted out a fleet, ravaged the coast of Sussex and 
 burnt Brighton. Sir Thomas Howard, brother of Sir Edward, 
 fitted out another fleet before which the French retired, and he in 
 his turn took an army over to Calais, and captured Terouenne and 
 Tournay. 
 
 In 1522, the Emperor Charles V. joined Henry VIII. in an 
 expedition to Cherbourg, which place, falling into the hands of 
 the allies, became the base of operations for ravaging and destroy- 
 ing all the adjacent country. This done, the expedition returned 
 to Portland. Sailing thence again, Howard took Morlaix by 
 storm. 
 
 Next summer (1523), however, we meet a condition of things 
 more closely suggesting the form which naval war was ultimately 
 to take, for Sir William Fitz-William passed over to the coast of 
 France with a fleet of thirty-six sail, for the purpose of intercepting 
 a French fleet which was understood to be escorting the Duke of 
 Albany back to his Regency in Scotland. He met and drove back 
 this escort to Dieppe and Boulogne, and then Fitz-William, 
 having thus gained the naval control of the surrounding waters, 
 left a portion of his fleet to watch and mask the French in their 
 
 1* 
 
4 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ports, while he himself proceeded to ravage and destroy the coast 
 as far as Treport, where he burnt the suburbs, and all the ships in 
 the harbour. 
 
 There were in our history no more expeditions by sea till 1544, 
 when war broke out with Scotland, and then with France. King 
 Henry landed an army at Calais, and marched to Boulogne, which 
 fell into his hands after an investment by sea and land. 
 
 The French, in their turn, fitted out a fleet and made for 
 St. Helens, where, after a partial action, rendered memorable only 
 by the loss of the Mary Ruse which preceded it, they landed and 
 attempted to hold the Isle of Wight. Failing in this, they 
 landed in Sussex, where they were repulsed with loss. Eetiring 
 to their own coasts, the French landed part of their army near 
 Boulogne, presumably with the design of recovering it. But a 
 change of wind either compelling it, or facilitating it, the French 
 crossed again over to the English coast, where they were met and 
 defeated by the English fleet. As a reply to this last attempt of 
 the French, the English passed over to their coast and again 
 burnt Treport and thirty ships which were found in the harbour."^ 
 
 In 1547, the French made an attack on Guernsey and Jersey, 
 but ships and troops being sent from England, the attack was 
 abandoned after the enemy had suffered considerable loss. 
 
 Calais fell to the French early in Mary's reign (1558), and not 
 impossibly altered the general view of naval war by removing our 
 last permanent foothold on the soil of France. 
 
 But our immediate reprisal was a projected attack on Brest, which, 
 however, dwindled down ultimately to the re-burning of Conquet, 
 and the ravaging of the adjacent coasts in the usual manner. 
 
 The whole system, it is readily seen, was one of military 
 reprisals, always more or less open to interruption by the naval 
 forces of the power attacked. There is hardly any idea present 
 on either side of getting such a control of the sea as would prevent 
 the other side from undertaking these ravaging expeditions. The 
 reply to landing and ravaging on one side is generally the attempt 
 at cross-ravaging on the other. The sea is a convenient medium 
 for the transport of armies, and the sea-fight proper only comes 
 in incidentally, as when the French fleet issues from Brest to meet 
 a force proposing to land in the vicinity, or as when Henry VIII. 
 
 * It is not necessary to quote authorities specifically for these early illustrations, as 
 to which Burchett (1720), Lediard (1735), Berkley (1756), and Entick (1757) are all 
 pretty 'well agreed. Lediard and Entick quote the original authorities, Burchett and 
 Berkley do not. I have also consulted MM. Troude and Levot on the French sid3. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 5 
 
 collects his ships at Spithead to interrupt the French in their 
 proposed capture of the Isle of Wight. Naval war this is not, 
 and neither to facilitate the attack, nor to strengthen the defence, 
 is direct possession of the sea sought. 
 
 Two things were wanting to alter this condition of military war 
 carried on by water. On the sea itself was not to be found 
 property of the enemy sufficient to make it an object of attack. 
 Although sea-borne commerce was growing, it was not yet of a 
 character or extent sufficiently important on any side to render 
 its suppression a serious injury to the nation carrying it on. An 
 hour or two's burning of a coast town probably offered greater 
 prizes to the descending foe, and wrought greater distress in the 
 nation attacked, than weeks or months of preying on the small and 
 occasional cargoes which were to be found actually at sea. 
 
 The other want was ships capable of keeping the sea. If the 
 sea was to be controlled, it was absolutely necessary that the ships 
 assuming to control should be able to maintain their position at 
 sea continuously. So long as it was necessary to return to port 
 after a very short stay at sea ; so long as ships were so mastered 
 by the weather as to be continually driven back by it, with 
 endeavours or intentions frustrated ; it was always open to the 
 enemy to reassume, if only for a time, that control of the sea 
 which had been challenged. This condition was not reached by 
 mere change of season. Winter voyages or cruises were forbidden 
 to both sides for centuries, for neither had ships competent to face 
 the dangers of winter weather. War by sea ceased in winter, just 
 as it did upon land, and therefore neither side could gain an 
 advantage until the summer came round again. But the summer 
 gale which drove a fleet before it into the shelter of safe havens, 
 might not be felt in the enemy's locality, or might help him over 
 to his enemy's coast. If one fleet ran short of water, of provisions, 
 or of munitions ; or if its crews became sickly and demanded the 
 recruitment of a stay in the quiet of harbour, it by no means 
 followed that the other hostile fleet would be in the same condi- 
 tion at the same time. If they were in condition to put to sea 
 when the first fleet was obliged to return to port, they were entirely 
 free to use the water as the medium of transport, and to carry out 
 their ravaging expeditions by its means. Miscalculations might 
 occur ; the fleet which had been compelled to retire into port, 
 might be again ready for sea sooner than was anticipated, and 
 there might be a sea-fight in consequence. But had the fleet 
 which first retired into port been able to maintain its place at 
 
6 NAVAL WARFAliE. 
 
 sea, or had it been at least understood to be ready to act at sea, 
 the ravaging expedition could not have been carried out until the 
 sea-keeping fleet had been in some way disposed of, or forced to 
 withdraw. 
 
 The supply of both these necessary ingredients of naval war 
 was gradual, and as a consequence the change from the practice 
 of cross-ravaging over a theoretically free sea to systematic naval 
 war with rules deduced from experience, and settled axioms which 
 had become instinctive from continued and forced acceptance, was 
 gradual too. 
 
 So far as this country is concerned, the sea-borne commerce 
 question, either as one of defence or attack, did not come into 
 material notice until the time of Elizabeth. But quite early in 
 her reign, we begin to hear of the making of prizes in the Channel. 
 Then we hear of French and Dutch privateers contemporaneous 
 with, and perhaps, in cases, anticipating, the commencement of our 
 partly legitimate and partly piratical war upon the rich commerce 
 of Spain. 
 
 Thus Burchett " says, speaking of the years 1560-62, and of the 
 Queen's efforts to increase and improve the naval force : 
 
 In imitation of this laudable example of the Queen's, many of her wealthy stibjects, 
 who lived near the sea coasts, set themselves to building of ships, so that in a short 
 time those of the Crown and of private persons were become so numerous as, on 
 occasion of any naval war, might employ 20,000 men. The good effects of these 
 preparations were shortly after seen in the war the Queen undertook in behalf of 
 the Protestants of France, wherein, besides the land forces she sent over to Normandj- 
 to their assistance, her ships, scouring the seas, sorely distressed their enemies bj' 
 taking great numbers of prizes from them, and at length totally interrupting their 
 trade. 
 
 Lediardjf quoting earlier authorities, says that when in 1561 
 Elizabeth fitted a fleet out to intercept Mary Queen of Scots on 
 her return from France, she gave out that it was intended to clear 
 the sea of pirates ; which indicates that a sea harvest was already 
 beginning to be reaped. 
 
 Entick particularizes more closely, and says — quoting several 
 authorities — that as the French Court commissioned privateers 
 
 to prey upon our ships, Elizabeth was obliged to follow their example, and by 
 proclamation she gave leave to her subjects to make reprisals ; which was attended 
 with such success, that one Clarke, with three frigates only, for his share carried 
 into Xewbaven, within a cruise of sis weeks, eighteen prizes, valued at £50,000 
 sterling."} ^ 
 
 * Burchett, p. 34.3. 
 
 t Lediard, vol. i. p. 1.^3. 
 
 } Entick, p. 208. 
 
THE NATUBE OF NAVAL WAR. 7 
 
 From about this time, the attack and defence of commerce) 
 begins to take form and position as a regular element of naval war.! 
 The trade of England was pushing out in various quarters, under 
 the ausi^ices of the Company of Merchant Adventurers, Jenkinson 
 opened it up with Russia and Persia ; John Hawkins, using the 
 trade in slaves as his instrument, drew the West Coast of Africa 
 and the Western Indies together. The Portuguese and the Dutch 
 were actively pursuing trade in the East Indies and in South 
 America. Spain had a practical monopoly of commerce with the 
 West Indies and the Pacific, which she was neither strong enough 
 nor intelligent enough to hold. 
 
 An early indication of the advent of a regular system of naval 
 war is offered by the attacks of Danish freebooters on our Russian 
 commerce. In 1570 the Danes were worsted, and five of their 
 ships captured by the squadron of thirteen of the Merchant Adven- 
 turers' ships in the Baltic. A formal report of the action was made 
 to the Emperor of Russia by Christopher Hodsdon and William 
 Burrough, who commanded the English ships.* About 1573 the 
 French Protestants, having taken to the sea as privateers or pirates, 
 for the purpose of injuring their Catholic countrymen, extended 
 their now lucrative operations so as even to include the ships of 
 their English friends. And later, again, the Dutch, privateering 
 ostensibly against the ships of their Spanish enemies, were in the 
 same way tempted out of the legitimate line of their proceedings by 
 the richness of possible English prizes. Under the pretext — which 
 was very likely no pretext, but a truth, in some cases — that our 
 ships brought supplies and succour to the Spaniards by way of 
 Dunkirk, they fell upon our commerce to its serious detriment. Sir 
 Thos. Holstock, who was then Comptroller of the Navy, was 
 employed to suppress this loose piracy, and succeeded in both 
 cases.f 
 
 But, perhaps, the real opening of the new phase, the source, as 
 it were, from which the river of naval war was ever after to flow, 
 was the treacherous attack by the Spaniards on Hawkins at St. 
 Juan de Ulloa in 1567. All the world seems to have thereafter 
 become alive to two things — the enormous value of sea-borne com- 
 merce to the countries which carried it on, and the tremendous 
 risks attending its prosecution in war on the one hand, as well as 
 the great advantages arising from its attack on the other. 
 
 As the growth of commerce can be inferred from the continued 
 
 * Lediard, vol. i., p. 152; Berkley, p. 307. 
 + Bmchett, p. ZU ; Berkley, p. 312. 
 
8 NAVAL WAUFAllE, 
 
 mention of its attack ^ncl defence, so the capacity of ships to keep 
 the sea can be as well /nferred from the numbers and length of the 
 voyages now undertaken. English commerce had arisen before 
 there were English ships to conduct it, and in the early part of the 
 sixteenth century Candiots, Eagusans, Sicilians, Genoese, and 
 Venetians carried English cargoes to and from London and the 
 Mediterranean ports.* But there must have been a very rapid and 
 complete change as the century drew on. For the service of the 
 Queen, in repelling the Armada, the City of London, on its own 
 account, fitted out 38 shij)s of the average tonnage as then counted, 
 of 161 tons, and average crews of 71 menf ; 197 ships, averaging 
 151 tons each, and carrying on an average 89 men per ship, were 
 got together on that occasion under the different leaders on the 
 English side. J And as the voyages to the Coasts of Guinea, to the 
 Levant, and to the ports of the Baltic were now freely prosecuted, 
 it is obvious that there was an abundant shipping of sea-going 
 capacity. As to size, amongst the war-ships of Elizabeth, Lord 
 Howard of Effingham had under him the 2'riumph, of 1,100 tons 
 and 500 men ; the White Bear, of 1,000 tons and 500 men ; the 
 Ark Royal, of 800 tons and 425 men ; the Victory, of the like ton- 
 nage and 400 men ; the EUzaheth-Bonaventiire, the Mary Rose, the 
 Hope, and the galley Bonasolia, all of 600 tons and 250 men ; 
 besides six ships of 500 tons, and a considerable number of about 
 300 tons. 
 
 The change in the character of the ships, and their greater sea 
 worthiness, must be left more to inference than to proof, as there is 
 very little that is authentic as to how ships were really constructed, 
 rigged, and armed before the reign of Charles I. and the era of the 
 Petts. Accurate marine artists scarcely existed before the times of 
 the Vandevelds, the father born in 1610 and the son in 1633. Yet 
 it is probable that the ships of Henry VIH. bore a not remote re- 
 semblance to that given in the illustration, and if we compare it 
 with the certainly authentic outlines of the Speaker, a Common- 
 wealth ship of 1653, and suppose the change from the one type to 
 
 * Hakluyt, quoted in Charnock, vol. ii.. p. 7. 
 
 + It is, perhaps, better to go by the number of men than by the tonnage as given. 
 Monson gives tonnage as length x breadth X depth, which would give much more 
 than the displacement. But if, as Mr. W. H. White thinks, the tonnage was the numbei 
 of butts or " tuns " which could be stowed, the tonnage was much less than the dis- 
 placement. See j\Ionson's Nucal Tracts, Book iii., and Manual of Naval Architecture, 
 First Edition, p. 3i). 
 
 X Entick, p. 2:;i. 
 
SHIP OF HENEV VIII 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAIL 9 
 
 the other to have been gradual, we can picture the intermediate 
 types which occupied the field in the reign of Elizabeth. 
 
 So that, as the century approached its close, we had the two 
 things necessary to establish purely naval war — abundant sea- 
 borne commerce, and abundance of sea-going and sea-keeping war- 
 ships. The inevitable result follows, that cross-ravaging from land 
 to land falls into the back-ground ; the sea is regarded more and 
 more as a territory necessary to be held by the nation which desires 
 to win in naval war ; and it begins to be understood that if attacks 
 on territory, to make which the forces must cross the sea, are to be 
 resisted, the enemy must be met before he leaves the water. 
 
 But yet was it a new thiug, and so considered for some scores of 
 
 ixULL OF THE •• SrEAlvEIi. 
 
 years, to have war upon the water alone. So new, that one of the 
 chief actors in these times of change, writing long after the change 
 had fully established itself, mentioned with something like con- 
 tempt, as "a mere action at sea," the dispatch of a squadron in 
 1590 under Sir John Hawkins and Frobisher, which, though it 
 made no captures, stopped the whole trade from the West Indies 
 to Spain in that year. 
 
 Yet, though the fact was not thoroughly perceived at the time, 
 the vast amount of Spanish riches which were afloat forced tho 
 war with Spain and made it a naval one. The ravaging of Spanish 
 territory by the English no doubt hurt Spain, but the capture of 
 the Spanish galleons not only hurt Spain more, but enriched the 
 captors and the nation to wliich they belonged. Spain, however, 
 
10 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 wns even less conscious than England of the change which was 
 being effected in maritime warfare. She attempted to work on the 
 lines which had been possible three-quarters of a century earlier, in 
 the absence of commerce and sea-going ships ; and her grand and 
 crowning error of the Armada was simply the embodiment of false 
 notions as to the inevitable character of naval war. 
 
 It is curious and interesting to trace the form of naval war, 
 emerging confusedly and gradually during the eighteen years that 
 covered the struggle between England and Spain ; but it is still 
 more impressive to read the words of the chief actors in this 
 struggle after it was over, and to observe how entirely they had 
 accepted the new conditions and enunciated the line of policy, 
 even in those early years, which successful naval war has ever 
 since followed. I shall, therefore, run lightly through the principal 
 incidents of the Spanish war, commenting as may be necessary 
 while I proceed, and I shall then quote the emphatic language of 
 Sir William Monson in 1640, when he was a retired officer, and of 
 the unfortunate Sir Walter Ealeigh during his twelve years' 
 imprisonment in the Tower. 
 
 Drake's first expedition to the West Indies was in 1585, and this 
 was entirely on the military reprisal plan, or on the system of 
 cross-ravaging ; so he sacked San Domingo, Cartagena, Santa 
 Justina in Florida, and then returned home. But in 1587 we 
 begin to see a change. Drake proceeds to Cadiz, not for the pur- 
 pose of cross-ravaging, but to destroy the shipping which con- 
 stituted the supply of the great armada preparing at Lisbon. 
 Having succeeded in this enterprize, he fell somewhat back into 
 the older grooves by assaulting certain castles on the coast of 
 Spain ; but, becoming aware of the real ineffectiveness of such 
 proceedings, he steered for the Western Islands for the interrup- 
 tion of the enemy's commerce, then represented by an immense 
 and valuable carrack expected from Mozambique. He succeeded 
 in his ol)ject, and brought his great prize to England. Monson, 
 not yet wholly alive to the real nature of naval war, but still in 
 part comprehending, says of the first voyage : — 
 
 And though this voyage proved both fortunate and victorious, yet considering it was 
 rather an awakening than a weakening of him (the King of Spain), it had been far 
 better to have wholly declined than to have undertaken it upon such slender grounds 
 and with so inconsiderable forces. 
 
 Of the second voyage, the Admiral says : — 
 
 This voyage proceeded prosperously, and without exception, for there was both 
 houLur and wualth gained, and the enemy greatly endamaged.* 
 * Monson's Naval Tracts, Book i. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 11 
 
 The next year, 1588, was the Armada year, as to which nothmg 
 need here be said ; but 1589 witnessed two expeditions, one under 
 Drake, with land forces, as an attempt to replace the King of 
 Portugal on his throne, which was of a wholly public character ; 
 and the other under the Earl of Cumberland, which was almost 
 wholly an attack on the commerce of the Koman Catholic League 
 against Henry IV., and of Spain. This was of the partly royal 
 and partly commercial character which the state of the times 
 favoured. Drake's expedition was a failure, due, it is said, to 
 having wasted time in an abortive attempt on Corunna, or the 
 Groyne, as it was then called. But it must be remembered that 
 this was an entirely legitimate expedition, inasmuch as it was per- 
 fectly certain that the terrible defeat of the Armada had cleared 
 the sea of Spanish war ships for some time to come. The Earl of 
 Cumberland began by capturing three of the League ships in the 
 Channel. Then he took ^£7,000 worth of spices belonging to Spain 
 out of Portuguese ships off the coast of Portugal. Then he pro- 
 ceeded to the island of Flores, where he ca]3tured an outward- 
 bound Spaniard. Then, in the Eoad of Fayal, he made prize of 
 Spanish ships. Later, he took a French League ship returning 
 home from Canada. Then he forced the little island of Graciosa 
 to afford him provisions and refreshment. Off Terceira, he took a 
 Spanish ship worth ^100,000, and then, on his return towards the 
 coast of Spain, he made two prizes, each worth £7,000, and a third 
 he drew out from under the guns of the castle of St. Mary's, worth a 
 like sum. The only thing this expedition undertook which was in 
 the nature of cross-ravaging, but which was, in the absence of any 
 possible interruption from Spanish ships, an act always found 
 proper to be performed in like circumstances, was the sacking of 
 the town of Fayal. 
 
 In 1590 was the expedition of Hawkins and Frobisher to the 
 coasts of Spain and the Western Islands, to destroy the Spanish 
 trade. This squadron was seven months at sea, and did not make 
 a single capture of importance, and was what Monson charac- 
 terized it, half in contempt and half understanding how com- 
 pletely it had fulfilled its mission, " a bare action at sea." Spain 
 was recovering from the blow of 1588, and even got so far as to 
 propose to meet the fleet of Hawkins and Frobisher at sea. But 
 realising the disaster that would follow a second defeat, and not 
 having force enough to make success certain, Philip recalled his 
 ships and left the English fleet free to lie across the Spanish trade 
 route and to hold it. But as the least of two evils, consequent on 
 
12 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 this i30sition of his enemj% the King of Spain forbade the saihng of 
 the ships from the West Indies, and so abandoned the whole of 
 the nation's sea-borne foreign commerce for one year. This 
 was really a blow of the heaviest character to Spain, and, as we 
 shall see, is the penalty that must be paid by the weaker naval 
 power. But in this case it was still worse for Spain, as, in the then 
 unsheathed state of ships' bottoms, lying in tropical waters for a 
 summer produced weakness of structure almost amounting to dis- 
 ablement, from the ravages of the worm. As a consequence, about 
 a hundred of these detained ships were lost, with their rich 
 cargoes, on the return voyage to Spain next year. 
 
 In 1591 Lord Thomas Howard took command of a fleet to the 
 Western Islands, with the single intention of preying on Spanish 
 commerce as before. But at this time the King of Spain had so 
 far recovered himself as to send to sea a still larger and more 
 powerful fleet than that of Lord Thomas Howard ; this he did, 
 and what took place is of the essence and being of naval war. In 
 those days — though a change was even then understood to be 
 necessary — Lord Thomas Howard's absence left the Channel un- 
 covered, and had things been as they were, cross-raiding on English 
 territory might have been effected by the Spaniards. But at what 
 price? At that of the probable loss of the whole West India 
 commercial fleet. Any damage that could possibly be done to the 
 shores of England would have been paid for, over and over again, 
 by the vast prize that would fall unguarded into Lord Thomas 
 Howard's hands, while the loss to Spain by this great transfer of 
 property would have been entirely uncompensated. Before any 
 attacks on English soil could be thought of, Spanish commerce 
 must be protected ; and Don Alonzo de Bazan sailed to the 
 Western Islands instead of to the Channel. 
 
 Don Alonzo' s fleet was greatly superior to that of Lord Thomas, 
 and had the latter not been warned in time, all his ships might 
 have suffered the fate of the Revenge with Sir Eichard Grenville 
 in command. Howard just escaped, and the Spanish Plate Fleet 
 was saved. But so close was the issue, that had that fleet arrived 
 at Flores one day sooner, or had Don Alonzo arrived one day later, 
 Howard would have made the complete success he desired. But 
 even though the main purpose of the expedition was a failure, 
 Howard made sufficient captures in the course of his voyage to 
 pay all its expenses, and Spain suffered not only to that extent, 
 but also in the loss, already detailed, of the greater part of the 
 rescued Plate Fleet on the way Lome, on account of the decayed 
 condition of the ships. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 13 
 
 In the same j'ear, 1591, the Earl of Cumherland macle a voyage 
 to the Spanish coast, wholly intent on the attack on Spanish 
 commerce. Slight tangible success alone attended his exertions, 
 but while intelligence of Don Alonzo's preparations drove him 
 home, the fact of the Earl's being on the Spanish coast enabled 
 him to despatch that warning to Lord Thomas Howard which 
 allowed him to draw off his fleet in time — all but the Revenge. 
 
 In 1592 Frobisher, in succession to Ealeigh, took a squadron to 
 the coast of Spain and to the Islands, but this broke up and acted 
 more or less independently, some ships on the coast and some at 
 the Islands. Don Alonzo de Bazan, on his part, being ordered to 
 cover the West India fleet, by so much disobeyed his instructions 
 as to allow captures to be made which he might have prevented. 
 But he was at sea in superior force to the English, and they 
 were perforce driven home. 
 
 The Earl of Cumberland, in 1593, repeated the practice which 
 was now established of warring on Spanish commerce, first on the 
 coast of Spain, and then, at the right season, amongst the Western 
 Islands. Captures were made, of course, but Spain repeated her 
 practice of appearing in superior force at the Islands, and neces- 
 sitating thereby the retirement of the English. 
 
 This was now the third year, during which neither side had 
 gained much advantage, and when the guard of Spain on her com- 
 merce had been nearly complete. Such proceedings were hardly 
 of the essence of naval war, and might have progressed for an 
 indefinite time. If Spain was able to show superior force at sea 
 for three successive years, she should have pushed it farther. To 
 get any advantage, she should have followed the English fleet up 
 and mastered it. Then she would not only have protected her 
 commerce, but would have been a position to push her attacks closer 
 home. The Spanish error was that they did not understand this ; 
 but possibly the question of season governed the Spanish naval 
 policy to a greater extent than we can now easily realise. 
 
 The English, on their part, if they had rightly understood the 
 position, would have acted with the sole j)urpose of mastering the 
 Spanish fleet as a necessary preliminary to the destruction of her 
 commerce. But probably no one then perceived what was axio- 
 matic a century later. 
 
 Not improbably the failure to comprehend the exact position, 
 however simple it may seem to us who have assimilated all past 
 experience without knowing it, dictated the changed proceedings of 
 the next few years. 
 
14 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The Spaniards had joined the Eoman Catholic League, and in 
 1594 had ships in Brest, which was held in the interest of the 
 faction. Three thousand English troops had been for some time 
 operating in Brittany, in alliance with the troops of Henry IV., and 
 Frobisher was now despatched with four ships to co-operate 
 against the Spaniards, who at Brest were a threat to the security 
 of the Channel. This operation was effectively concluded. 
 
 But cross-raiding was again uppermost in the English mind ; foi 
 in the same year, 1594, Drake and Hawkins sailed for the West 
 Indies with the intention of landing at Nombre de Dios, marching 
 across to Panama, and possessing themselves of all the plunder 
 which the sacking of that entrepot for silver was likely to afford. 
 This expedition was late in sailing, because a certain fear of attacks 
 at home grew out of the presence of Spanish ships at Brest and on 
 the coast of Brittany. But a home squadron being fitted out, 
 Drake and Hawkins sailed. 
 
 The fears of cross-ravaging, though exaggerated, were not without 
 foundation, for in this year four Spanish galleys ran over from 
 France into Mount's Bay ; their crews landed and burnt Penzance, 
 Mouse-hole, Newlin, and a neighbouring church. Then they re- 
 embarked, and made off as suddenly and as secretly as they had 
 come. Not a drop of English blood was shed, and all the his- 
 torians agree that it was a mere piece of bravado, without sensible 
 aim and object ; and the galleys were seen by no one, either during 
 their approach or on their retirement. 
 
 Before Drake and Hawkins sailed, news had reached England 
 that a valuable Spanish carrack had put into Porto Eico damaged, 
 and the Queen ordered them to make sure of this prize before 
 attempting anything further. In this order, we had again a 
 legitimate operation in the circumstances of the case. It was a, 
 worthy object ; not requiring time to achieve, and therefore not 
 liable to interruption from the sea. The march across to Panama 
 required the occupation of Nombre de Dios and the security of 
 their ships, not only to lie there, but to pass freely to sea laden 
 with the spoils gathered from the shores of the Pacific. Clear 
 ideas on such simple points were often wanting in those days, and 
 even in the minds of Drake and Hawkins they could hardly have 
 been present. The ships lingered at Guadaloupe, and allowed the 
 Spaniards both information and time enough so to secure the 
 treasure-ship that the English attack at Porto Eico was repulsed 
 with loss, and Hawkins died, it is said, half of this trouble. Drake 
 proceeded to Nombre de Dios, but found the march across 
 impracticable, and he died, too, near hand, at Porto Bello. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 15 
 
 That which was to be expected had meantmie hai:)pened ; and 
 Easkerville, who succeeded to the command, only just escaped, 
 after a partial action, the superior fleet which Spain had sent out 
 to interrupt, in the only way possible, the operations of the 
 English. Most probably, the failure of the march across the 
 isthmus was the real saving of our fleet, which might otherwise 
 have been caught half-manned at Nombre de Dios by the more 
 powerful Spaniards. 
 
 Monson remarks on the risen sea-power of Spain since 1591, and 
 how, in this year, she had secured herself by two strong fleets, one 
 of twenty sail in the West Indies and another of twenty-four sail at 
 the Western Islands. As a consequence, so far, her commerce 
 passed in security, though the ships saw neither a friend nor an 
 enemy before their safe arrival at Lisbon. 
 
 She was now really mistress at sea, and had she known what was 
 proper to be done, she would have pushed up into the Channel 
 with all her force before the English could have got out. By so 
 doing she would have left her commerce and all her ports free 
 behind her, for even if she failed to meet and beat the English in 
 their own waters, her threat must have kept them at home. Bui 
 if she could meet, and could beat them, it was impossible to limit 
 the advantages to her which would immediately follow. She would 
 have passed the period of naval defence, and would have been 
 ready to take up the role of attack from the sea, which was secure 
 behind her. 
 
 She was slow to read the lesson of the time, slower even than 
 we were ; and though thus really superior at sea, she left herself 
 entirely open to the secret, sudden, and powerful attack which was 
 made upon Cadiz by the Lord Admiral Howard in command of 
 the sea forces, and of Essex in command of the land forces, yet 
 with some joint commission, in this year, 1596. 
 
 The expedition did not sail till June 1st, and it was simply 
 fatuous on the part of Philip, that with galleys raiding on our 
 coast the year before, he should have had absolutely nothing by 
 way of look-out, or avant-garde, to give him notice that a hundred 
 and fifty ships were preparing to embark over seven thousand land 
 forces, and that the Dutch were incorporating themselves in the 
 grand design. But Spain was swelling with ideas of a repetition of 
 her great cross-raiding designs of 1588. She was not in -the least 
 conscious that her breach of all the growing principles of naval 
 war was the primary cause of her former failure, and would be, 
 over and over again, the causes of her future failures as long as 
 
It) NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 she continued them. She had heen driving English fleets out of 
 her own waters for four years running, and yet had not understood 
 that water was water, and that if an Enghsh fleet fled before a 
 Spanish one at Flores and off Cuba, the same fleet would be hard 
 put to it off Plymouth or the Isle of Wight. But the thought was 
 not in the Spanish Councils ; they set out great ideas for the inva- 
 sion of a heretic England, and the support of a rebellious yet 
 orthodox Ireland, and they left the main body of their prepara- 
 tions open to the stroke of any one who chose to cross ibe sea to 
 strike it. 
 
 Howard and Essex sailed, as I have ?aid, on the 1st of June. 
 They took the most singular precautions by means of wide- 
 spread videttes, which captured or detained every sail that was 
 seen, so that early in the morning of the 20th June the vast fleet 
 was off Cadiz, with nothing to prevent them sailing right up and 
 making themselves masters of the great assemblage of war and 
 merchant ships that lay in unsuspecting tranquillity before them. 
 But a day was lost in divided counsels, and notwithstanding the 
 clearness of their instructions to master the ships in the first 
 instance, and Monson's urgency as a leading naval adviser, it was 
 not till night that the determination to attack the ships was come 
 to. The result was that though many ships were taken, and 
 many burnt to prevent them falling into our hands, the lesser 
 value — the occupation of the town for fourteen days, and its 
 ransom for 120,000 ducats — assumed the most golden hue, and 
 the blow was not as complete as it otherwise might have been. 
 
 A point which is not cleared up in any of the histories before 
 me, is tiie disposition of the Spanish fleet at this time. There 
 were a considerable number of war-ships at Cadiz, no doubt, and 
 some of the heaviest class. There was also at least a squadron at 
 Lisbon, under Siriago, for six of them attacked a private expedition 
 of the Earl of Cumberland off the Eock. But I do not gather 
 whether the fleets of the previous year were guarding commerce 
 this year in the West Indies and at the Azores. The English 
 commanders knew some days before their arrival at Cadiz what 
 ships they would find there, but it was not known to the home 
 Government what the disposition of the Spanish fleet was, for the 
 ascertainment of this was one of the duties enjoined upon the 
 English commanders. Unless these had some knowledge that 
 the sea was free behind them, they could hardly have made the 
 serious attack they did, and would certainly not have remained as 
 much as fourteen days in possession of the town of Cadiz. 
 
THE NATURE OF XAVAL irAIl. 17 
 
 It was a part of the Lords Generals' instructions to take the 
 usual measures at the Western Islands for intercepting the 
 Spanish trade, but disputes and discontents had arisen over the 
 possible objections which might be taken at home, and no detach- 
 ment westward was made. Essex was forbidden to attack Lisbon, 
 and intelligence from Ferrol showed that no ships were there. 
 So, as provisions were, as usual, running short, and there was no i 
 further operation open, the great fleet returned to England, 
 arriving at Plymouth on August 8th. 
 
 Even this reverse at Cadiz, due as it was to a wholly 
 mistaken naval policy, had no sort of legitimate effect on the 
 Spanish mind, at least in the early part of 1597. The invasion 
 idea was so far uppermost, that an assemblage in force began to 
 be made at Ferrol, and the commerce at the Western Islands was 
 left open. That could be protected only on the spot, or by a close 
 threat in the Channel. An assemblage at Ferrol, which could 
 hardly be in great force after the destruction at Cadiz, was not a 
 strong threat, though in the rebellious condition of Ireland it 
 certainly did require more notice than it had. 
 
 Essex took a fleet off the port, but having been very late in 
 sailing— he only left Plymouth on August 17th — owing both to 
 late preparations and to adverse weather, the Spaniards were amply 
 secured against the simple raiding attack by part of the fleet, which 
 was alone practicable. A determination was now come to which 
 was only justified by want of full comprehension of what naval 
 war necessitated. Essex sailed for the Western Islands, leaving 
 it quite open to the Spanish fleet to follow him there, and 
 perhaps fall on him at the least opportune moment, or else to deal 
 such blows in our home waters as might be open to him. This 
 move of Essex would have been entirely a false one had the 
 English commerce been abreast of that of Spain in value, or near 
 it, for then the Spanish ships might not only have fallen upon 
 the English property at sea, and sent it securely into their own 
 ports, but they were in a position to recapture the English prizes 
 in rt-turning to their home ports, if not to give battle to the 
 returning war-ships in a presumably weakened state. The course 
 taken was only less blamable, because English commerce did not 
 approach the value of that of Spain. 
 
 But the operations suggested were open to the Spaniards, and they 
 were at sea the day after Essex left.* Their plan was to use their 
 
 * Berkley, p. 420. 
 
 2* 
 
18 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 local control of the sea in order to seize Falmouth or some western 
 English port, and to use it as a base in which to rest and await the 
 return of the fleet of Essex. Had their seamanship been equal to 
 their strategy they might have done great things, and perhaps 
 turned the tables on this occasion ; but a heavy gale off Scilly 
 dispersed the Spanish fleet when on its way to fulfil the mission, 
 and the ships returned to their own ports, allowing Essex to bring 
 home in safety the few prizes he had picked up to the westward. 
 
 We can easily trace the growing laws of naval war, unalterable 
 and immutable if it is to be carried on with a view to the certain 
 advantage of either side, and thereby to a speedy conclusion. We 
 have seen Spain on her side able to guard and protect her trade 
 by appearing in force at the point of attack ; and we have seen hei 
 leave her chief port and source of greatness wholly open to the sudden 
 attack of a fleet of whose approach she had no dreams. Now we 
 see her making one forward step in advancing her base to Ferrol, 
 and meditating operations in British waters. But as late as 
 the middle of August, that is, when the season of naval operations 
 is drawing to a close, the Spanish fleet has made no effort, and 
 lies in its own port, masked by that of Essex. Only, therefore, by 
 beating this fleet of Essex, or by some strategical error on the part 
 of its commander, could the Spanish fleet have achieved its pur- 
 pose. Meantime, unless there was a second fleet on the Spanish 
 coast, and a third at the Western Islands, Spain is left open to 
 attack by a second English fleet, sujDposing there was one, either on 
 her commerce or on her territory. 
 
 But Essex commits the only error open to him. On the chance 
 that he may do more damage to Spain in the Western Islands 
 than Spain can do in the Channel, he sails away to that quarter, 
 leaving everything open behind him. Because little or nothing 
 was done on either side, we must not suppose that such breaches 
 of plain law could be committed with impunity. It was only by 
 error and mismanagement that Essex failed to possess himself 
 of the whole of the Spanish West Indian ships at one grand coup. 
 The attack on Falmouth would perhaps have been made, and all 
 that was to follow it carried out, had it not been for the heavy 
 weather which occurred so opportunely to save the credit of 
 Essex.* 
 
 But the reason of the whole matter is simple, and can be simply 
 
 * It may bo stated that the English had the belief that the Spanish fleet would, as. 
 usual, fly to protect its trade, but in the later yeai's of naval war no such belief would 
 Lave been allowed to operate. 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL WAR. 19 
 
 put. Supposing that the EngUsh damage to Spanish trade, and 
 Spanish damage in the Channel, were of equal moment to each of 
 the nations at war, how was either to be advantaged if both 
 damages were done, any more than if neither were done ? Such 
 cross-damaging can be of no force in bringing either nation to 
 terms, and was much more calculated to exasperate and prolong 
 the war. If Spain, then, committed the error of being too late in 
 the Channel, and not in strength to have fought Essex fairly at 
 sea, Essex should have held her fleet masked at Ferrol till the end 
 of the season, and it would have been possible that a small detach- 
 ment might have operated successfully upon the Spanish trade. 
 The Spaniards were hardly wrong to have proceeded to carry out 
 their intention of intercepting Essex on his return, rather than of 
 following him to the Islands, though, as in former years, they 
 might have secured their trade directly by the earlier despatch 
 westward of the necessary force. 
 
 It would almost seem as if these simple but great principles were 
 now forcing themselves into men's minds as new light. For the 
 Queen sent out no fleet next year (1598), and Spain made no move. 
 There was but a private raiding expedition of the Earl of Cumber- 
 land, which, after blocking, and so killing, the outward trade of 
 Spain, made descents on the Canaries and Porto Eico. 
 
 The transactions of the year 1599 were of a nature to give 
 further form and substahce to rules and maxims which, though 
 congealing in parts, were still soft and unstable. 
 
 I cannot -write [says Monson] of anything done in this year of 1599, for there \s-as 
 never greater expectation of war -with less performance. Whether it was a mistrust 
 the one nation had of the other, or a policy held on both sides to make peace with 
 sword in hand, a treaty being entertained by consent of each prince, I am not to 
 examine ; but siire I am, the preparation was on both sides very great, as if the one 
 expected an invasion from the other, and yet it was generally conceived not to be 
 intended by either; but that ours had only relation to my Lord of Esses, who was 
 then in England, and had a design to try his friends in England, and to be revenged of 
 his enemies, as he pretended, and as it proved afterwards by his fall. Howsoever it 
 was, the change was not so great as necessary, for it was commonly known that the 
 Adelentado had drawn both his ships and galleys to the Groyne ; which was not 
 usually done, but for some action intended upon England or Ireland, though he 
 converted them afterwards to another use ; for the gallej's were sent into the Low 
 Countries, and passed the narrow seas whilst our ships lay there. And with the fleet, 
 the Adelentado pursued the Hollanders to the Islands, whither he suspected they were 
 gone. This fleet of Hollanders, which consisted of 73 sail, were the first ships that 
 ever displayed their colours in warlike sort against the Spaniards in any action of their 
 own, for how cruel soever the war seemed to be in Holland, they maintained a peace- 
 able trade in Spain, and abused us. This first action of the Hollanders at sea proved 
 not very successful; for after the spoil of a town in the Canaries, and some hurt done 
 to the Island of St. Tome, they kept the sea for seven or eight months, in which time 
 
20 NAVAL WAUFAUE. 
 
 their General and most of their men siclsenecl and died, and the rest relurned with loss 
 and shame. Another benefit which we received by this preparation was, that our men 
 were now taught suddenly to arm, every man knowing his command, and how to be 
 commanded, which before they were ignorant of ; and who knows not that sudden and 
 false alarms in an ai*my are sometimes necessary? To say the truth, the expedition 
 which was then used in drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging so 
 great and royal a navy to sea, in so little a space of time, was so admirable in other 
 countries, that thej' received a terror by it ; and many that came from beyond sea, 
 said the Queen was never more dreaded abroad for anything she ever did. 
 
 Frenchmen that came aboard our ships did wonder (as at a thing incredible) that 
 Her Majesty had rigged, victualled, and furnished her royal ships to sea in twelve 
 days' time ; and Spain, as an encm}-, had reason to fear and grieve to sec this sudden 
 preparation.* 
 
 The armament consisted of nineteen Queen's ships under Lord 
 Thomas Howard ; they assembled in the Downs, but after a month 
 there, the threat had presumably done its work, for the ships were 
 recalled and dismantled. 
 
 But the assemblage, following on a year's inaction, and that 
 again following on the experienced dangers of certain strategical 
 operations, dangers which it does not appear were recognized 
 before, would seem to indicate the working of a leaven which would 
 ultimately leaven the whole lump, and fix in men's minds the 
 nature of the inherent principles of naval war. 
 
 The year 1600 witnessed the founding of the East India Com- 
 pany, and the sailing of three of their merchant ships under 
 the guidance of James Lancaster, and thus the further develop- 
 ment of the strength of a maritime nation in peace and of its 
 weakness in w^ar. The only naval operation was the despatch by 
 England of a small squadron to attack Spanish trade at the 
 Western Islands, and its being driven off by the threat of a much 
 larger Spanish squadron. The Spanish trade however avoided all 
 chances of capture by pursuing a route altogether clear of the 
 Islands, so that Sir Eichard Lewson, who commanded the English 
 squadron, saw not a hostile sail. 
 
 But the next year, 1601, again saw some relapse into the 
 practice of cross-raiding, for while the English devoted themselves 
 to assisting the Low Countries against the Spaniards, they left the 
 sea so open that late in the year, when indeed, according to usage, 
 fleets should be seeking their home ports, the Spaniards made for 
 the port of Kinsale in Ireland with forty- eight ships and four 
 thousand troops, and landed there. 
 
 But it cannot be said that this operation w^as a complete 
 restoration of the practice of cross-raiding, for the Spaniards 
 
 • Naval Tracts, Book i., lott'J. 
 
THE NATUllE OF NAVAL WAIL 2L 
 
 were in alliance with the rebel Earl Tyrone, and might plausibly 
 adventure a flying column into what might prove a friendly 
 country. Yet did the result yield its experience, and add to the 
 accumulating evidence of the existence of rule in naval war. 
 
 Tyrone, on his side, failed to effect the junction which was 
 sought. The Spaniards found themselves shut up in the town of 
 Kinsale by the army of Mountjoy, which had already defeated 
 Tyrone, while on the sea side they were blocked by Sir Kichard 
 Lewson. Yielding was a necessity, in the absence of all control 
 of the sea, and the Spanish army was carefully conducted back to 
 its own country, never again to illustrate their failure to appre- 
 hend the possible in conducting war with a maritime power. 
 
 But England, on her side, was more receptive of the lessons to 
 be learnt. In March 1602, Lewson and Monson sailed " to infest 
 the Spanish coast with a continual fleet,'"'' and, with an interval of 
 return, this " infesting " was pushed far into the autumn, and 
 Monson did not quit the Spanish waters till the 21st October ; a 
 feat proving not only the capacity of the man, but his growing 
 knowledge of the art of naval war, and the capabilities of the 
 instruments for waging it. His attacks were wholly confined to 
 shipping, and were very successful. The Spanish fleet was, how- 
 ever, much superior to his own ; it was at sea, but never succeeded 
 in coming into contact with this consummate seaman, who could 
 think and act. 
 
 It was as if all the outlmes of naval war had been marked 
 when the Queen died next year (1603), for her fleet was prepared 
 to start for the coast of Spain as early as February, and to 
 remain there till November ; a policy which would have held the 
 naval forces of Spain in absolute check, unless she could have 
 faced and beaten the English ; while the latter would have had the 
 free sea behind them either to prosecute their own commerce in 
 peace or to stifle that of the enemy. 
 
 It had taken all these eighteen years to learn the lesson that 
 nothing can be done of consequence in naval war till one side 
 secures the control of the water area. But even then it was not 
 clear to men's minds that this control must either be acknow- 
 ledged by the side which has it not, and all its disabilities ad- 
 mitted ; or else it must be fought for by all the naval strength 
 either side is capable of putting forth. 
 
 Yet were the main principles partly apprehended and partly 
 set forth by the two authorities, whose opinions I now quote in 
 
 * Naval Tracts, Book i., 1C02. 
 
22 NAVAL WARFARE 
 
 fulfilment of my promise at the beginning of the chapter. Thus 
 writes Sir William Monson : — 
 
 Whilst the Spaniards were employed at homo by our yearly fleets, they never had 
 opportunity nor leisure either to make an attempt upon us, or to divert the wars from 
 themselves ; by which means we were secured from any attempt of theirs, as will 
 appear by what follows. 
 
 The Spaniards stood so much in awe of Her Majesty's ships, that when a few of them 
 appeared on the coast they commonly diverted their enterprises — as, namely, in the 
 year 1587, when Sir Francis Drake, with twenty-five ships, prevented an expedition 
 that summer out of Cadiz Road for England, which the next year after they attempted 
 in 1588, because not molested as the year before. 
 
 Our action in Portugal, following so quick upon the overthrow in 1588, made the 
 King of Spain so far unable to offend, that if the undertaking had been prosecuted 
 with judgment, he had been in ill circumstances to defend it, or his other kingdoms. 
 
 From that year to the year 1591 he grew great by sea, because he was not busied by 
 us as before ; which appeared by the fleet that took the Revenge ; which armada of 
 his. it is very likely, had been employed against England had it not been diverted 
 that year by mj' Lord Thomas Howard. 
 
 And for four years together after this the King employed his ships to the Islands, 
 to guard his merchants from the Indies, which made him have no leisure to think of 
 England. 
 
 The voyage to Cadiz in 1596 did not only frustrate his intended action against 
 England, but we destroyed many of his ships and provisions that should have been 
 employed on that Service. 
 
 He designed the second revenge upon England, but was prevented by my Lord of 
 Essex to the islands ; which action of his, if it had been well carried, and that my lord 
 would have believed good advice, it had utterly ruined the King of Spain. 
 
 The next year that gave cause of fear to the Queen, was 1599, the King of Spain 
 having a whole year, by our sufferance, to make his provisions, and broughthis ships 
 and army down to the Groyne ; which put the Queen to a more chargeable defensive war 
 than the value our offensive fleet would have been maintained with upon his coast. 
 
 This great expedition was diverted by the fleet of Holland, which the Adelentando 
 pursued to the Islands. 
 
 The following years, IGOO and 1601, there was hope of peace, and nothing was 
 attempted on either side till the latter end of 1601 that he invaded Ireland ; but with 
 ill-success, as you have heard. 
 
 The last summer, 1602, he was braved by Her Majesty's ships in the mouth of his 
 harbour with the loss of a carrack, and rendered unable to prosecute his designs 
 against Ireland, for no sooner was Sir Richard Lowson returned but Sir William 
 Monson was sent back again upon that coast, as you have heard, who kept the King's 
 forces so employed, that he betook himself only to the guard of his shores. 
 
 It is not the meanest mischief we shall do to the King of Spain, if we thus war upon 
 him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and guarded, to the infinite vexation, 
 charge, and discontent of his subjects ; for no time or place can secure them so long as 
 they see or know us to be upon that coast. 
 
 The sequel of all these actions being duly considered, we may hi confident that 
 whilst we busy the Spaniards at home, they dare not think of invailing England or ' 
 Ireland ; for by their absence their fleet from the Indies may be endangered, and in 
 their attempts they have as little hope of prevailing.* 
 
 Surely I hold [says Sir Walter Raleigh] that the best way is to keep our enemies 
 from treading upon our ground ; wherein, if we fail, then must we seek to make him 
 
 ♦ Naval Tracts, Book i., 1603 
 
THE NATURE OF NAVAL JVAR. £3 
 
 wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it should happen, our 
 judgments are to weigh many particular circumstances, that belongs not to this 
 discourse. But making the question general, the position, whether England, without 
 the help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing, I hold that it is unable 
 to do so ; and, therefore, I think it most dangerous to make the adventure. For the 
 encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten 
 to the invaded, ma}' draw after it a most perilous consequence. 
 
 Great difference, I know there is, and diverse consideration to be had, between such 
 a country as France is, strengthened witli many fortified jjlaces, and this of ours, where 
 our ramparts are but the bodies of men. But I say that an army to be transported 
 over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice 
 of the invader cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to impeach it ; 
 no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except every creek, port, or 
 sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition. . . . For there 
 is no man ignorant that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily 
 outrun the soldiers that coast them. 
 
 " Zres armees ne vol ent point en poste — armies neither flye nor run post," saith a 
 marshal of France. And I know it to be true that a fleet of ships may be seen at 
 sunset and after it, at the Lizard, and yet by nest morning they may recover Portland : 
 whereas an army of foot shall not be able to march it in six dayes. Again, when those 
 troops lodged on the sea shores should be forced to run from pla»ce to place in vain, 
 after a fleet of ships, they will at length sit down in the midway, and leave all at 
 adventure.* 
 
 If we regard the utterances of these leaders of the Ehzabethan 
 era, and remember that what they wTote was not to set forth the 
 principles of naval war in the abstract, but as they applied to the 
 circumstances of their own country at the time, we shall under- 
 stand to some extent how far they went towards full comprehension, 
 and w^here they stopped short of it. 
 
 Both laid stress on the paramount importance of operations by 
 sea. In Monson's opinion it was only by transferring the war to 
 the sea coasts of Spain that an advantage could be gained in attack ; 
 while Ealeigh was clear that an attack coming over sea could only 
 be met at sea. Neither leader gives any countenance to the old 
 idea that the attack of one power on the territory of the other 
 could be met by a counter attack of the same character. It 
 follows that in both their minds the age of cross-raiding had passed 
 away, and that the age of naval war as such, naval war absolutely 
 on the sea, had taken its place. 
 
 In both their eyes, the policy of Spain must have been a mis- 
 taken one, unless she was driven to it by a clear sense of her 
 inferiority at sea. But then, if she were clearly inferior at sea, both 
 
 * Raleigh, History of the World. Quoted by Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles, &c., 
 p. 365. I only possess the abridgement of Raleigh's works published by his grandson 
 Philip Raleigh. But it is remarkable how completely that great man relies on ancient 
 examples for modern guidance The Roman and Greek experiences serve him continu- 
 ally with lessons for the English of James's time. 
 
24 NAVAL WAUFAIIE. 
 
 men would have held that all her attempted raids on territory were 
 practically useless. If she was not absolutely inferior at sea, and 
 Monson was clearly of opinion that she was not so from 1591 to 
 1595, then her course of policy was from Monson's own showing a 
 wrong one, except upon the ground of the enormous superiority of 
 her commerce to ours. ** The King employed his ships to the 
 islands, to guard his merchants from the Indies, which made him 
 have no leisure to think of England." Quite so. But if English 
 commerce offered as important a field of attack as that of Spain, 
 when looked at from the point of view of national importance, a 
 Spanish attack upon Enghsh commerce would have left England 
 " with no leisure to think of " Spain. 
 
 But in any case, the appearance of Spanish fleets in the Channel 
 must, in Monson's opinion, have had just the same paralyzing 
 effect on the English fleets — as far as any attack on Spain was 
 concerned — as the presence of English fleets in Spanish waters 
 confessedly had on those of Spain. Monson must have been per- 
 fectly clear on this abstract proposition or he could not have urged, 
 as he did, the importance of the English fleet's getting away for 
 Spain as early as February. To be first in the field was the point. 
 And the force that was first in the field must hold all the 
 superiority of that position until it was beaten at sea. 
 
 The control of the sea, or what I shall now and hereafter call 
 by its established title, the " Command of the Sea," was hence- 
 forth to be understood as the aim of naval war. A power striving 
 for anything else, such as evasions, or surprises of ports or terri- 
 tories, or merely defensive guardings of commerce, accepted the 
 position of the inferior and beaten naval power, and could never 
 hope, so long as she maintained that attitude, of seriously 
 damaging her opponent. 
 
CIIAPTEK II. 
 
 The Struggle for the Command of the Sea. 
 
 True naval wai" is established when there is sufficient property at sea to make its 
 loss of serious importance to the State owning it ; and when there are sea-keeping war- 
 ships to attack it. — It may be attacked directly and defended directly, as in the earlier 
 phases of the first Dutch war ; or sea-borne commerce may be destroyed if the com- 
 mand of the sea is first obtained by the direct defeat of the enemy's war fleets, as in 
 the later phases of the war. — Single victories cannot, however, give command of the 
 sea for any time unless the naval force defeated has also been annihilated. — Though 
 both the Dutch and English gained victories, they were merely steps towards the 
 command of the sea, and the struggle was really still in progress when peace was 
 made. 
 
 In the last chapter I endeavoured to show how, m consequence of 
 the presence of two requirements, large sea-borne commerce and 
 war-ships capable of keeping the sea, naval Avarfare was settling 
 into form at the close of the reign of Elizabeth. Its necessities, 
 and the fixed rules arising out of those necessities, were becoming 
 clear to English seamen who had full experience of the actualities 
 surrounding and controlling it. But though knowledge of the 
 subject had greatly advanced, it was probably the few and not 
 the many who could look forward to a complete method in naval 
 warfare. 
 
 Commerce, I have observed, was chiefly on one side in the 
 Spanish war, and the side which owned it was that which had the 
 least clear views of the right way to keep it and to defend it. The 
 war-ships were still not of a wholly sea-keei)ing character, and the 
 question of their supply was one which nearly always governed 
 their movements and their capacity for keeping the sea. 
 
 In the peaceful years that followed through the reigns of James 
 I. and Charles I. two things went on side by side, a wider distribu- 
 tion of sea-borne commerce, and a continual improvement in the 
 character of the war-ships as well as of others. These were the 
 
2G NAVAL WAEFAliE. 
 
 things which governed the nature of naval war, and as they grew 
 towards a standard of completeness they necessarily tended to 
 define and harden the rules under which naval war would in 
 future he carried on. Perhaps the hest idea of these growths may 
 be gathered from the perusal of a nearly complete quotation from 
 the latter part of Ealeigh's Discourse of the First Invention oj 
 Ships, and the several parts thereof. 
 
 Whosoever were the inventers, we find that every age hath added somewhat to 
 ships, and to all things else. And in mine own time the shape of our English ships 
 hath heen greatly bettered. It is not long since the striking of the topmast (a wonder- 
 ful ease to great ships, both at sea and in harbour) hath been devised, together with 
 the chain pump, which takes up twice as much water as the ordinary did. We have 
 lately added the Bonnet and the Drabler. To the courses we have devised studding- 
 sails, topgallant-sails, spritsails, topsails. The weij,4iing of anchors by the capstone is 
 also new. We have fallen into consideration of the length of cables, and by it we resist 
 the malice of the greatest winds that can blow. Witness our small Milbrooke men of 
 Cornwal, that ride it out at anchor half seas over between England and Ireland, all the 
 winter quarter. And witness the Hollanders that were wont to ride before Dunkirk 
 with the wind at North- West, making a lee-shoar in all weathers. For true it is, that 
 the length of the cable is the life of the ship in all extremities, and the reason is, because 
 it makes so many bondings and waves, as the ship, riding at that length, is not able to 
 stretch it; and nothing breaks that is not strotcht in extremity. We carry our 
 ordnance better than we wore wont, because our nether over-loops* are raised commonly 
 from the water, to wit, between the lower port and the sea. 
 
 In King Henry the Eighth's time, and in his presence, at Portsmouth, the Mary Rose, 
 by a little sway of the ship in tacking about, her ports being within sixteen inches of 
 the water, was overset and lost. . . . 
 
 We have also raised our second decks, and given more vent thereby to our ordnance 
 lying on our nether-loop. We have added cross pillars in our royal ships to strengthen 
 them, which be fastened from the keelson to the beam of the second deck to keep them 
 from setting or from giving way in all distresses. 
 
 We have given longer floors to our ships than in elder times, and better bearing 
 under water, whereby they never fall into the sea after the head and shake the whole 
 body, nor sink stern, nor stoop upou a wind, by which the breaking loose of our 
 ordnance, or of the not use of them, with many other discommodities are avoided. 
 
 And, to say the truth, a miserable shame and dishonour it were for our shipwrights 
 if they did not exceed all others in the setting up our Royal ships, the errors of other 
 nations being far more excusable than ours. For the Kings of England have for many 
 years been at the charge to build and fui'nish a navy of powerful ships for their own 
 defence, and for the wars only. Whereas the French, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, 
 and the Hollanders (till of late) have had no proper fleet belonging to their Princes or 
 States. Only the Venetians for a long time have maintained their arsenal of gallies. 
 And the Kings of Denmark and Sweden have had good ships for these last fifty years. 
 
 I say that the aforenamed kings, especially the Spaniards and Portugals, have 
 ships of great bulk, but fitter for the merchant than for the man-of-war, for burthen 
 than for battel. But as Popelimire well observeth, the forces of Princes by sea are 
 inarqiies de grandeux d'estate — marks of the greatness of an estate — for whosoever 
 commands the sea, commands the trade ; whosoever commands the trade of the world, 
 
 * IMcaning the lower gun-deck. The term "over-loop " (German, iibaiuuf) became 
 lost in the term orlop, as applied to the deck below the lower gun-deck. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SFA. 27 
 
 commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself. Yet can I not 
 deny but that the Spaniards, being afraid of their Indian fleets, have built some few 
 very good ships ; but he hath no ships in garrison, as his Majesty hath ; and to say 
 the truth, no sure place to keep them in, but in all invasions he is driven to take up of 
 all nations which come into his ports for trade. 
 
 The Venetians, while they attended their fleets and imployed themselves in their 
 Eastern conquest, were great and powerful Princes, and commanded the maritime 
 ports of Croatia, Dalmatia, Albania, and Epirus ; were lords of Peloponnessus and 
 the islands adjoyniug ; of Cyprus, Candia, and many other places. But after they 
 sought to greaten themselves in Italj' itself, using strangers for the commanders 
 of their armies, the Turks by degrees beat them out of all their goodly countries, 
 and have now confined them (Candia excepted) to a few small Grecian islands, which, 
 with great charge and diSiculty they enjoy. 
 
 The first honour they obtained was by making war upon the Istrii by sea; and had 
 they been true to their spouse, to meet the sea, which once a year they marry, the 
 Turk had never prevailed against them nor never been able to besiege any place of 
 theirs, to which he must have transported his armies by his gallies. 
 
 The Genoeses were also exceeding powerful b3' sea, and held many places in the 
 East, and contended often with the Venetians for superiority, destroying each other in 
 a long-continued sea war. Yea. the Genoeses were the most famous mercenaries of all 
 Europe, both by sea and land for many years. 
 
 The French assisted themselves by land with the cross-bowers of Genoa against the 
 English ; namely, at the battel of Cressy the French had 12,000 cross-bowers. By 
 sea also v.ith their great ships, called the carrecks of Genoa, they always strengthened 
 their fleets against the English. But after Mahomet the Second had taken Constanti- 
 nople, they lost CatYa, and all Taurica Chersonesus, with the whole trade of the 
 Euxine Sea. And although they sent many supplies by the Hellespont, yet having 
 often felt the smart of the Turk's cannon, they began to slack their succours, and 
 were soon after supplanted. Yet do the Venetians to this day well maintain their 
 estate by their sea forces ; and a great loss it is to the Christian commonwealth in 
 general that they are less than they were ; and a precipitate counsel it was of those 
 Christian kings, their neighbours, when they joyned in league against them ; seeing 
 they then were, and they yet are, the strongest rampiers of Europe against the Turks. 
 
 But the Genoeses have now but a few gallies, being altogether degenerate, and 
 become merchants of money, and the Spanish king's backers. 
 
 But all the states and kingdoms of the world have changed form and j^olicy. 
 
 The Empire itself, which gave light to all princij^alities like a Pharoa, or high tower 
 to all sea-men, is now sunk down to the level of the soil . . . insomuch as it is now 
 become the most confused estate in the world, consisting of an Empire in title without 
 territory, who can ordain nothing of importance but by a Dyet, or Assembly of the 
 Estates of many free princes, ecclesiastical and temporal, in effect of equal force, 
 diverse in religion and faction ; and of Free Cities and Hanse towns, whom the princes 
 do not more desire to command, thau they scorn to obe}". Notwithstanding, being far 
 less than they were in number, and less in force and reputation ; as they are not greatly 
 able to offend others, so they have enough to do (being seated far asunder) to defend 
 themselves 
 
 The Castilians in the meanwhile are grown great, and (by mistaking) esteemed the 
 greatest; having by marriage, conquest, practice, and purchase, devoured all the king- 
 doms within Spain, with Naples, Sicily, Millain, and the Netherlands ; and many 
 places belonging to the Empire, and the princes thereof, besides the Indies. East and 
 West, the islands of the West Ocean, and many places in Barbary, Guinea, Congo, and 
 elsewhei'e. 
 
 France hath also enlarged itself b' the one-half, and reduced Normandy. Britany, 
 
23 NAVAL WAHFAIIE. 
 
 Aqaiitaino. with all that the English hail on that siflo the sea, together with Langue 
 dock, Foix, Arminach, Bierne, and Dauphinio. For this kingdom of Great Britain, it 
 hath had of His Majesty a strong addition. The postern by -which we were so often 
 heretofore entered and surprized is now made up ; and we shall not hereafter need the 
 double face of Janus, to look north and south at once. 
 
 But there's no estate grown in haste but that of the United Provinces, and especially 
 in their sea forces, and by a contrary way to that of France and Spain ; the latter by 
 invasion, the former by oppression. F'or I myself may remember when one ship of 
 Her Majesty's would have made forty Hollanders strike sail and come to an anchor. 
 They did not then dispute de Mari Libera, but readily acknowledged the English to be 
 Domini Maris Britannici. That w<} are less powerful than we were, I do hardly believe 
 it ; for, although we have not at this time !?.."> ships belonging to the subject of 500 tons 
 each ship, as it is said we had in the twenty-fourth year of Queen Elizabeth ; at which 
 time also, uj^on a general view and muster, there were found in England of able men 
 fit to bear arms, 1,172,000, yet are our merchant ships now far more warlike and better 
 appointed than they were, and the navy royal double as strong as it thou was. For 
 these were the ships of Her Majesty's navy at that time: 
 
 1. The Triumph. 8. The Revencje. 
 
 2. The Elizabeth Jonas. !). The Hope. 
 
 3. The White Bear. 10. The Mar jf Rose. 
 
 4. The Philip and Mary. 11. The Dreadnought. 
 o. The Bonadventure. 12. The Minion. 
 
 G. The Golden Lyon. 13. The Swiftsure. 
 
 7. The Victory. 
 
 To which tlicre have been added : — 
 
 14. The Antilope. '20. The Aijde. 
 
 ].■). The Foresiyht. 21. The Ac] i ate s 
 
 . IG. The Swallow. 22. The Falcon 
 
 17. The Handmaid. 23. The Tyger. 
 
 18. The Jennett. 24. The Btdl. 
 
 19. The Bark of Bullein. 
 
 We have not, therefore, less force than we had, the fashion, and furnishing of cir 
 ships considered, for there are in England at this time 400 sail of merchants, and tit 
 for the wars, which the Spaniards would call gallions ; to which we may add 200 sail of 
 crumsters, or hoys, of Newcastle, which, each of them, will bear six Demi-culverins* 
 and four Sakers,t needing no other addition of building than a slight spar deck fore and 
 aft, as the seamen call it, which is a slight deck throughout. The 200 which may be 
 chosen out of 400, by reason of their ready staying and turning, by reason of their 
 windwardncss, and by reason of their drawing of little water, they are of extream 
 advantage near the shear, and in all bays and rivers, to turn in and out. These, I say, 
 alone, and well manned and well conducted, would trouble the greatest Prince in 
 Europe to encounter them in our seas ; for they stay and turn so readily, as ordering 
 them into small squadrons, thnt three of them at once may give their broadside upon 
 any one great ship, or upon any angle or side of an enemy's fleet, they shall be able to 
 continue a perpetual volley of Demi-culverins without intermission, and either sink and 
 slaughter the men, or utterly disorder any Hect of cross-sails with which they 
 encouuler.J 
 
 * A 9. J -pounder of 30 cwt. 
 t A. 5J-pounder of 12J cwt. 
 
 J Presumably the vessels Raleigh speaks of were fore-and-aft rigged ; and the 
 " cross -sails " were square-rigged ships. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 2'J 
 
 I say, then, if a vanguard be ordainorl of tho>e h^yes, who will easily recover the 
 wind of any other sort of ships, with a battle of 400 other warlike ships, and a Rear of 
 thirty of Ilis Majesty's ships to sustain, relieve, and countenance the rest (if God 
 beat them not) I know not what strength can be gathered in all Europe to beat them. 
 And if it be objected that the States can furnish a far greater number, I answer that 
 His I\Iajesty's 40 ships, added to COO before named, are of incomparable greater 
 force than all that Holland and Zealand can furnish for the wars. As also, that a 
 greater number would breed the same confusion that was found in Xerxes' land army 
 of seventeen hundred thousand soldiers ; for there is a certain proportion, both by sea 
 and land, beyond which the excess brings nothing but disorder and amazement. 
 
 Of these hoyes, carvils, or crumsters, (call them what you will) there was a notable 
 experience made in the year 1574, in the river of Antwerp near Rumerswael, where 
 the Admiral Boysott with his crumsters overthrew the Spanish fleet of great ships 
 conducted by Julian Romero ; so contrary to the expectation of Don Lewis, the great 
 Commander and Lieutenant of the Netherlands for the King of Spain, as he came to the 
 banks of Bergen to behold the slaughter of the Zealanders ; but contrary to his 
 expectation he beheld his comrades, some of them sunk, some of them thrust on the 
 shear, and most of the rest mastered and possessed by his enemies ; insomuch as his 
 great Captain, Romero, with great difficulty, some say in a skiff, some say by swim- 
 ming, saved himself. 
 
 The like success had Captain Wrest of Zealand against the fleet which transported 
 the Duke of Jledina Cell, wh» was sent out of Spain by sea to govern the Netherlands 
 in place of the Duke of Alva, for with twelve crumsters or hoyes, of the first troop 
 of 21 sail, he took all but three, and forced the second, being twelve great ships filled 
 with 2,0C0 soldiers, to run under the Rammekins, being then in the Spaniard's 
 possession. 
 
 But whence comes this disjiute ? Not from the increase of numbers, not because 
 our neighbours breed more marmers than we do ; nor from the greatness of their trade 
 in all parts of the world. For the French creep into all corners of America and Africa 
 as they do, and the Spaniards and Portugals employ more ships by many, (the fishinu- 
 trade excepted) than the Netherlands do ; but it comes from the detestable covetous- 
 ness of such particular persons as have gotten Hcenses, and given way to the trans- 
 portation of our English ordnance. 
 
 Here Raleigh goes on to complain of the manufacture and exjiort 
 from this country for foreign nations, declaring that unless Spain 
 had had large quantities of our iron guns she could not have 
 removed the brass pieces from her ports to arm the ships of 1588 
 with, and then goes on : — 
 
 Certainly the advantage which the English had by their bows and arrows in former 
 times was never so gi'eat as we might now have had by our iron ordnance, if we had 
 either kept it within the land, kept it from our enemies, or imparted it to our friends 
 moderately. For as by the former we obtained many notable victories, and made 
 ourselves masters of many parts of France, so by the latter we might have commanded 
 the seas, and thereby the trade of the world itself. But we have now to our future 
 prejudice, and how far to our prejudice I know not, forged hammers, and delivered 
 them out of our hands, to break our own bones withal. 
 
 For the conclusion of this dispute there are five manifest causes of the upgrowing of 
 the Hollanders and Zealanders. 
 
 The first is, the favoiir and assistance of Queen Elizabeth, and the King's Majesty, 
 which the late worthy and famous Prince of Orange did always acknowledge, and in 
 the year 1582, when I took n.y leave of him at Antwerp, after the return of the Earl of 
 
CO NAVAL WARFABE. 
 
 Leicester into England, and Monsieur's arrival there, wlio-.i he delivered me his letters 
 to Her Majesty, he praj'od me to say to the Queen from him, sub umbra alarum tuarum 
 protegimur ; for certainly they had withered in the bud, and sunk in the beginning of 
 their navigation, had not Her Majesty assisted them. 
 
 The second cause was the employing of their own people in their trades and fishing, 
 and the entertainment of strangers to serve them in their armies by land. 
 
 The third, the fidelity of the House of Nassau, and their services done them, especi- 
 ally of their renowned Prince Maurice, now living. 
 
 The fourth, the withdrawing of the Duke of Parma twice into France, while in his 
 absence he recovered those strong places of Friezland, Deventer, Zutphen, &c. 
 
 And the fifth, the embarguing and confiscation of their ships in Spain, which 
 constrained them and gave them courage to trade by force with the East and West 
 India, and in Africa, in which they employ 180 ships and 8,700 mariners. 
 
 The success of a counsel so contrary to their wisdom that gave it, as all the wit and 
 all the force the Spaniards have, will hardly (if ever) recover the damage thereby 
 received. 
 
 For to repair that ruin of the Hollander's trade into both Indies, the Spaniards did 
 not only labour the truce ; but the King was content to quit the soveraignty of the 
 United Provinces, and to acknowledge them for free States, neither holding nor depending 
 on the crown of Spain. 
 
 But be their estate what it will, let them not deceive themselves, in believing that 
 they can make themselves masters of the sea. For certainly the shipping of England, 
 with the great squadron of His Majesty's Navy Royal, are able, in despight of any Prince 
 or State in Europe, to command the great and large fields of the ocean. But as I shall 
 ncTer think him a lover of this land, or of the King, that shall persuade His Majesty 
 from embracing the amity of the States of the United Provinces (for His Majesty is no 
 less safe by them than they invincible by him). So I would wish them (because after 
 my duty to mine own soveraign, and the love of my country, I honour them most) that 
 they remember and consider it, that seeing their passage and re-passage lies through 
 the British seas ; that there is no port in France, from Calais to Vlushing, that can 
 receive their ships, that many times outward, by westerly winds, and ordinarily 
 homeward, not only from the East Indies, but from the Streights and from Spain, all 
 southerly winds (the breezes of our climate) thrust them of necessity into the King's 
 ports, how much His Majesty's favour doth concern them: for if (as themselves confess 
 in their last treaty of truce with the Spaniards) they subsist by their trade, the dis- 
 turbance of their trade (which England only can disturb) will also disturb their 
 subsistence. The rest I will omit, because I can never doubt either their gratitudes or 
 their wisdoms. 
 
 For our Newcastle trade, from which I have digressed, I refer the reader to the 
 author of the Trades Increase, a gentleman to me unknown, but so far as I can jud^e, 
 he hath many things very considerable in that short treatise of his ; yea, both con- 
 siderable and praiseworthy ; and, among the rest, the advice which he hath given for 
 the maintenance of our hoyes and carvils of Newcastle, which may serve us (besides the 
 breeding of mariners) for good ships of war, and of exceeding advantage. And cer- 
 tainly I cannot but admire why the imposition of 5s. should any waj' dishearten them, 
 seeing there is not one company in England iipon whose trade any new payments 
 are laid but they on whom it is laid raise profit by it. 
 
 The silk-men, if they pay His Majesty 12d. upon a yard of sattin, they not only raise 
 that 12d., but they impose 12d. or 2s. more, upon the subject. So they do upon all 
 they sell, of what kind soever, as all other retailers do, of what quality or profession 
 soever. And seeing all the maritime provinces of France and Flanders, all Holland, 
 and Zealand, Embden, Breame, &c. cannot want* our Newcastle or our Welsh coals, 
 
 * i.fi. " Cannot do without." 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 31 
 
 the imposition cannot impoverish the transporter, but that the buyer must make pay- 
 ment accordingly. And if the imposition laid on those things whereof the kingdom 
 liath no necessary use, as upon silks, velvets, gold and silver lace, cloath of gold and 
 silver, cut works, cambricks and a world of other trumpery, doth in nothing hinder 
 their vent here, but that they are more used than ever they were, to the utter im- 
 poverishing of the land in general, and of those popinjays that value themselves by their 
 outsides, and by their player's coats. Certainly imposing upon coals, which other 
 nations cannot want, can be no hindrance at all to the Newcastle men, but that thoy 
 must raise it again upon the French and other nations, as those nations themselves do 
 which fetch them from us with their own shipping 
 
 For conclusion of this chapter, I say that it is exceeding lamentable, that for any 
 respect in the world, seeing the preservation of the State and Monarchy doth surmount 
 all other respects, strangers should be permitted to eat us out, by exporting and im- 
 porting, both of our own commodities and those of foreign nations ; for it is no wonder 
 that we are overtopped in all the trades we have abroad and far off, seeing we have the 
 grass cut under our feet, in our own fields and pastures at home.* 
 
 This general statement of the condition of shipping, both of 
 war and commerce, and of the world's trade by sea, was written 
 between 1609 and 1617, that is between forty-three and thirty-five 
 years before the naval war between England and the United 
 Provinces, which Raleigh foresaw but did not fear, broke out. We 
 can see that even at the earlier date all the materials for naval 
 war were present, and judging from what happened at the later 
 date, we can but suppose that development in all* directions ulti- 
 mately conducive to naval war went on. The disputes relative to 
 the sovereignty of the British seas, which spent themselves in the 
 blasts and counterblasts of literary champions in Charles the First's 
 unfortunate reign, wanted not the sanction of preparation on the 
 sovereign's part for the war to come. Little has been done towards 
 elucidating the share which Charles' understanding of the naval 
 conditions of the kingdom, and the want of understanding on the 
 part of his opposing subjects, may have had in producing the civil 
 war, but it seems to be certain that the chief part of the money 
 question was a naval one, and that the superior classes of ships 
 which Charles prepared and built had a most material effect on 
 the course of the Dutch wars. In the first war the complaints of 
 the Dutch admirals were unceasing as to the inferiority of the 
 Dutch ships to those of the English. 
 
 But in any case it is certain that when the first Dutch war broke 
 
 out in 1652, those two elements — a great sea-borne commerce, and 
 
 sea-keeping war-ships — which I have spoken of as fundamental in 
 
 I naval war, were abundantly present on both sides. And so far as 
 
 i the sea-keeping element in the war-ships went, not only had it 
 
 made great advances, but owing to the neighbourhood of the two 
 
 • An Abridgment of Sir Walter Fialeir/h's History oj the World, &g. 1702. 
 
02 NAVAL WAUFAUE. 
 
 states at war, and the confined theatre upon the stage of which 
 the drama was played out, this sea-keeping quality was of less 
 importance. 
 
 The struggle was for the mastery at sea, whether territorial 
 conquest was or was not to follow success in this respect. As both 
 sides had a large commerce, each was necessitated to protect its own 
 in the first instance. What was its strength in peace was its 
 weakness in war, and naval force was necessary to prevent the 
 enemy from taking advantage of such weakness. On the other 
 hand, it would be a principal object for each state, after securing 
 the safety of her own sea-borne commerce, to fall upon, to 
 interrupt, and destroy that of her enemy, as being the part of the 
 nation most readily got at, and as counting double advantage in 
 all cases of capture. The mere destruction of a merchant ship 
 was a loss to her owning state, but no gain to the capturing state. 
 The capture of a merchant ship was equally a loss to the owning 
 state, but it was a similar and direct gain to the capturing state. 
 
 This great double object of preserving your own sea-borne com- 
 merce and destroying that of the enemy might be aimed at 
 directly or indirectly. The naval force might be divided, one half 
 to guard the State's commerce and protect it from the attacks of 
 the enemy, the other half to break through the commerce-guard 
 of the enemy and attack that which had been guarded. In this 
 case there would be battles between the forces which were guard- 
 ing and the forces which were attacking. There would be two 
 wars going on side by side. The English, to put the case into a 
 concrete and practical form, would be found attacking the Dutch 
 force which was guarding Dutch commerce, and the Dutch 
 would be found attacking the English force which was guarding 
 English commerce. 
 
 But the two separate plans of war might be brought together in 
 this way : — that the whole English force might be employed to see 
 its commerce into what were assumed to be safe waters, free from 
 the incursions of the enemy, and might then turn upon the whole 
 Dutch force which had been endeavouring to do the same for its 
 own commerce. Or the plan might be carried out vice versa. 
 
 Otherwise, the objects of preserving our own commerce and 
 destroying that of the enemy might be attained indirectly. If one 
 power could beat the other power off the sea and into his ports — 
 that is, considering war-ships only — it is obvious that the commerce 
 of the conquering state would proceed and flourish, and that that 
 of the conquered state would disappear. There might then be 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 33 
 
 simply a series of great battles at sea, in which the element of 
 merchant ships was absent, one fleet attacking the other in the 
 hope of mastering it merely as a means to an end ; the end 
 being a free sea for the commerce of the winner, and the power 
 of capturing, destroying, or simply hindering the flow of the 
 commerce of the loser. 
 
 There may be all these varieties in the struggle for the command 
 of the sea. That struggle is a phase or condition of naval war- 
 fare, and when the command of the sea is achieved by one of the 
 combatants a new phase sets in, as then one side will try to regain 
 a position which it has lost, and the other side will be bent on 
 holding the position it has gained. 
 
 We are now, however, only concerned with the previous phase, 
 the struggle for the command of the sea ; and it is nowhere so well 
 offered for investigation and study as in the three great naval wars 
 between the English and the Dutch, beginning in 1652, 1665, and 
 1672. We have seen that descents on the coast of the enemy, 
 which formed the staple of that war by water which, I think, can- 
 not be classed as naval war, became less and less the staple up to 
 dates when the military seamen quoted were able to lay it down 
 that such descents were preventible by sea, but not in any other 
 way. We must not lose sight of this fact on entering upon the 
 principles and practice which governed the three wars mentioned 
 above. 
 
 A principal source of Dutch wealth was her fisheries, chiefly 
 carried on off the north-eastern coasts of Scotland. Charles I. had 
 successfully enforced British rights over these waters, and the non- 
 payment of the i^30,000 annually, which had been fixed by Charles 
 as license dues, was, in fact, one of the causes of the war. In 
 order to avoid the troubles of search and other interruptions at 
 the hands of the English, a great part of the Dutch commerce, both 
 outward and homeward, passed up north by the Shetland Islands. 
 Other parts came up the Channel towards the Straits of Dover. 
 When the negociations in London finally fell through early in July 
 1652, the points of attack on the Dutch at once open to England, 
 were the great herring fleet in the Moray Firth ; the homeward- 
 bound ships passing Shetland; and the commerce up Channel. 
 Accordingly the very first move on the part of the English was the 
 dispatch of Blake at the head of sixty- six or sixty-eight sail to 
 the North for the purpose of capturing or destroying the 
 Dutch herring fleet, understood to be somewhere off the Moray 
 Firth under convoy and guard of Dutch war-ships. The next open 
 
 3* 
 
34 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 action was the despatch of Sir George Ayscue to Plymouth ; there tc 
 complete a fleet and to block the Channel against the homeward- 
 bound Dutch merchant ships, and to guard our own trade. 
 
 Ayscue had not long returned from the reduction of the Island 
 of Barbadoes, one of the many acts of reprisal which had been 
 going on between the two nations — and which were to all intents 
 and purposes acts of war — for a long time previous to its formal 
 declaration. On the declaration of war, Ayscue was lying with 
 twenty-one sail in the Downs, and the Dutch Ambassadors quitting 
 the Thames on the final failure of the negotiations, fell in, off the 
 Schelde, with Tromp, at the head of seventy-nine sail, and inform- 
 ing him of the general naval condition of England, particularly 
 recommended to his notice the twenty-one sail that were then 
 lying in the Downs.^ Tromp (Martin, the father of Cornelius) 
 proceeded immediately to act on the hints given, but owing to the 
 occurrence of calms was unable to reach the Downs in time to 
 effect a surprise, and thereupon bore away North after Blake. 
 
 Blake on his side sighted the Dutch fleet of herring busses ofif 
 Buchan'Ness (where th^ figure 1 is placed on the chart), under the 
 guard of twelve or thirteen war-ships, carrying from twenty to 
 thirty guns each. He detached twenty ships of his van to attack 
 them, and after a fight, lasting three hours, about 100 of the busses 
 were taken, two sunk, and twelve war-ships made prizes of. The 
 remainder of the Dutch fled to their own ports. Blake kept some 
 of the busses with him, sent three with the wounded to Inverness, 
 but after unloading them, sent the greater part of the captured 
 busses to Holland with the released prisoners. He then pro- 
 ceeded North to the neighbourhood of Foula and Fair Islands, 
 between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands, for the purpose of 
 carrying out the second part of his orders, the interception of the 
 Dutch merchant ships homeward-bound from the West Indies. 
 
 There (see 2 on the chart), on the 26th of July, Tromp sighted 
 him, and both sides prepared for battle, when a gale of wind 
 springing up from the southward and ending at N.N.W., shattered 
 and dispersed Tromp's fleet during the night, while Blake's ships, 
 getting to leeward of the Shetland Islands, remained comparatively 
 
 • The authorities on which 1 chiefly rely for this chapter are The Life of Cornelius 
 Van Tromp, published in 1697. in London; and Columna Rostrata, by Samuel Golliber, 
 the second edition published in London in 1739. The second work constantly refers to 
 the first, and both are works largely used by subsequent historians to whose accounts I 
 nave referred for clearing up discrepancies, of which there are a good many, especially 
 u^ to dates. The dates I yive are 0. S. 
 
^ 
 
 «^ 
 
 Kieuport 
 
 W Cr 01* -E~ 5r. ' 
 
 THEATRE 
 OF THE 
 
 DUTCH WARS, 
 
 1652 — 65—72 
 
STRUGGLE FOB COMMAND OF THE SEA. 35 
 
 unharmed. Tromp with part of his fleet fell back to the Meuse, 
 again followed, but hardly pursued, by Blake. The remainder of 
 Tromp's ships, except two war-ships that were wrecked on the 
 rocks of Shetland, and three fire-ships that appear to have 
 foundered, got safely into the Vlie and the Texel in the beginning 
 of September. 
 
 In the meantime, a second Dutch fleet had been fitting out in the 
 Texel under the command of De Euiter. By August 1st, it had 
 grown to 15 sail and 2 fire-ships ; and then later, with a force 
 made up to 22 sail and 4 fire-ships, De Ruiter put to sea and 
 sailed towards the Straits of Dover. The object was to pass to 
 the southward, gathering the outward-bound trade together 
 eastward of the Straits of Dover, and then to convoy them down 
 Channel, and so far to the westward as to place them presumably 
 beyond danger of attack from the British ships. De Euiter, 
 accordingly, got as far as Gravelines by the 10th of August, where 
 he was joined by the convoy of 50 merchant ships and a reinforce- 
 ment of 8 war-ships. He proceeded with great caution and with 
 abundant scouts and look-outs, no doubt supposing that he might 
 at any moment be met by the fleet of Ayscue, whom Tromp had 
 failed to get hold of in the Downs. 
 
 On the 16th of August the Dutch had got as far as the longitude 
 of Plymouth, but well to the southward towards the French coast ; 
 and there, sure enough, was the expected British fleet of 40 sail, 
 12 of them of great size, 2 being of 60, and 8 of from 36 to 40 
 guns, with 5 fire-ships. It is claimed for De Euiter that he had 
 ))ut 30 ships of war, of which only two carried as many as 40 guns, 
 and the rest not more than 30 each. He, too, was hampered 
 with the convoy, now grown to 60 merchant ships.* 
 
 There was a heavy engagement, which was only put an end to 
 by the approach of night, and it was disputed as to the side on 
 which the victory lay. But the results remained clear enough. 
 The fight took place somewhere about the position marked by the 
 figure 3 on the chart. Ayscue after it, fell back to Plymouth, while 
 De Ruiter next day, the 17th of August, was able to send his 
 merchant ships away on their voyage under convoy of two men-of- 
 war only, and he also followed up the English with some intention 
 of attacking them m Plymouth Sound itself; but, having got 
 
 " Columnu Rostrata admits the heavier British ships, but makes the forces mr^e 
 numericall}' equal, and claims that twenty merchant ships were capable of tightiug, and 
 did tixiit. 
 
36 NAVAL JVARFABE. 
 
 within a couple of miles of the Start, a gale drove him off, and 
 caused the abandonment of the idea. 
 
 De Ruiter kept well to the westward for a week or two, having 
 information of Blake's return to the south and of his appearance in 
 great strength to the eastward in the Channel. He and Penn were, 
 in fact, preying heavily on the Dutch homeward-bound merchant 
 ships, of which the one brought in eleven and the other six, all 
 ships of great value, and which De Euiter had obviously proved 
 powerless to protect. He presently made his way in safety to the 
 Straits of Dover, and between Dunkirk and Nieuport came under 
 the command of De Witt, who joined him with the refitted and 
 repaired fleet of Tromp, now forty-five sail strong. 
 
 When we review the operations to this point, we can easily 
 separate their distinguishing features. At the first moment of 
 the war the English assumed the attacking, and the Dutch the 
 defending, position. It may perhaps be said that this came 
 about chiefly because, if the idea of cross-raiding upon territory 
 had now passed away as one impracticable in this more advanced 
 stage of naval war, the Dutch had more to defend in the way of 
 sea-borne commerce than the English had. But something may 
 also be said on the side of a belief that the rules of naval war, 
 the boundaries of the probable and improbable, or even of the 
 possible and impossible, were not traced, but ^Yere only in process 
 of being traced. 
 
 When Blake passed north with a great fleet to do that which 
 did not of itself require a great fleet, he left, as we have seen, 
 Ayscue in the Downs with quite a small force — only seven war- 
 ships — exposed to annihilation by the whole naval power of 
 Holland. It would have been a bad beginning for the war on the 
 English side had there been the destruction of Ayscue, and 
 even an indecisive action afterwards between Tromp and Blake ; 
 so that it seems probable that the English took up the atti- 
 tude of attack, more from a sort of eagerness to damage the 
 Dutch, than to conduct the war to a speedy conclusion. For sup- 
 posing that England had, at the outset, concentrated her whole 
 strength and thrown it upon Tromp, she would, if then successful, 
 have had everything else in her own hands. 
 
 But we see her only solicitous to injure the commerce and the 
 property of Holland at sea. Ayscue, equally with Blake, left all 
 exposed when he passed to Plymouth, leaving the Dutch fleet 
 beixind him ; and all that remains pretty certain is that the idea 
 
STRUGGLE FOB COMMAND OF THE SEA. ?>7 
 
 of a Dutch raid on the Thames or on any of the niiinerous ports 
 and harbours left exposed by the departure of Blake north, and of 
 Ayscue west, could have had hardly any place m the minds of the 
 statesmen or commanders of the time. 
 
 The Dutch took up, just at the first moment, the role of an 
 attacking force ; but when the operation against the Downs squad- 
 ron was abandoned, the Dutch attitude became wholly defensive. 
 Tromp's voyage to the North was only secondarily the attack 
 on Blake's fleet ; primarily it was an attempt to protect the 
 herring fleet and then the north-about homeward commerce. 
 If, in process of carrying out these objects, Blake's fleet was 
 attacked, it did not follow that it would have been so dealt with 
 had there been no fishery and no commerce to defend. The 
 action of De Kuiter's fleet was more obviously defensive. It cen- 
 tred wholly round the necessity for protecting and convoying 
 outwards the sixty merchant ships, and for drawing together and 
 protecting homewards the up-channel trade. Ayscue's attitude 
 may perhaps have been in some respects defensive, as guarding a 
 possible homeward-bound trade, but the main object was clearly 
 the attack on the Dutch trade, which was foiled by the strength of 
 the defending force under De Euiter. 
 
 The conclusion of this first phase of the war left De Witt 
 with the Dutch force concentrated near Gravelines, but reduced 
 in numbers, owing to so many ships having required repair and 
 refit after the battle with Ayscue. The English, at the same 
 time, were concentrated about the Thames, and expecting still 
 greater concentration by the junction of Ayscue from the west. 
 De Witt determined, against the advice of his Council, to attack 
 with his sixty-four sail, Blake with sixty-eight ; that is to say, the 
 Dutch intended to reverse the former case, and not only to resume 
 the offensive, but to make the attack directly on the war force of 
 the enemy, with the view of the ulterior advantages which a 
 victory would give them. 
 
 The battle took place near the Kentish Knock, where the figure 
 4 appears on the chart, on September 28th, and the Dutch, 
 fighting till night, were worsted and began to think of retreat. 
 Blake's reinforcement then, by sixteen sail under Ayscue, confirmed 
 the intention, and the Dutch retired to Helvoetsluys, but only 
 pursued for a part of the way by the English.* 
 
 Here we may say that the whole naval power of each nation 
 was brought to bear on the one spot, in order to decide by one 
 
38 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 supreme effort, which was to remain in command of the sea, and 
 which was henceforth to accept the defensive attitude that was 
 alone available. The result of the battle produced a result which 
 might be anticipated. The Dutch fell back on defensively protect- 
 ing their commerce, and Martin Tromp in November put to sea 
 with 73 sail guarding a convoy of 300 outward-bound merchant 
 ships. 
 
 The Englisli were no longer concentrated. Blake had, for the 
 most part, separated his fleet ; 20 of his ships he had detached to 
 convoy a fleet of colliers to Newcastle ; 12 others had gone to 
 Plymouth — the historian does not say why, but probably for the 
 double purpose of attacking the enemy's passing commerce at the 
 entrance of the channel, and defending our own — 12 more had 
 gone up the Thames to repair and refit. When Tromp put to sea, 
 Blake was in the Downs with only thirty-seven sail besides tenders, 
 and he was therefore open to the destruction which Tromp, hearing 
 of his situation, proposed to inflict on him. 
 
 The battle took place on November 20th, near where the figure 
 5 is placed on the chart, and the English, as might have been 
 expected, were worsted. The fight raged with a fury which only 
 these Anglo-Dutch battles can parallel, from one in the afternoon 
 till night, after which Blake retired up the Thames and left 
 Tromp for the moment master of the sea. He thereupon made 
 some captures of merchant ships, and landed some men in Kent 
 on a cattle-raiding expedition. The party had, however, to leave 
 behind them the greater part of the cattle they had seized, and 
 to fly to their boats with the loss of 100 prisoners. 
 
 But as a matter of course Tromp had been successful in his 
 defensive business, and the whole of his immense convoy passed 
 down and out of the channel in safety. He himself followed as 
 far as He de Khe, where, such had been the action of the English 
 upon the Dutch trade, 250 merchant ships had congregated, wait- 
 ing till a naval force strong enough to protect them up Channel 
 should arrive and release them. Tromp stayed there seven days 
 and then sailed with his convoy for the Channel.^ 
 
 But the command of the sea, and the consequent freedom of the 
 sea to the victorious power, is not gained by a single battle in 
 which strategical failure has been the cause of defeat. On the 
 18th of February 1653 (old style) Tromp found Blake watching 
 
 * Burchett says that it was on the voyage to the He de Rlie tliat he hoisted tlie 
 traditional l)rnom. 
 
STRUGGLE FOB COMMAND OF THE SEA. 39 
 
 for him off Portland at the head of a fleet of 60 sail. The Dutch 
 admit that they had 70 sail of war-ships ; the English aver that 
 they had 80 ; but they were necessarily much hampered by the 
 presence of the 250 sail of merchant ships. There followed a 
 violent and bloody fight which lasted three days, passing gradually 
 up Channel from the spot marked with the figure 6 on the chart. 
 There were heavy losses on both sides ; ships were taken and 
 retaken, and numbers of the merchant ships fell victims in their 
 endeavours to get away. The Dutch confessed to a loss of 24 
 of these ships ; the EngHsh claimed to have captured 40. The 
 Dutch further admitted that 4 war-ships were captured and 
 carried to Plymouth and Dover ; that 3 more were sunk, and 1 
 blown up. The Dutch on their side claimed to have taken or 
 sunk six or seven men-of-war, but the English only confessed to 
 one, which, being disabled, they sank themselves. But they 
 allowed that one ship was actually taken, though afterwards 
 recovered. 
 
 On the evening of the third day Blake retired to the English 
 coast, leaving Tromp to gather together his scattered forces off 
 Dunkirk, whence they separated into their ports. 
 
 Negociations for peace were now set up, but neither side was yet 
 ready for it, and the struggle for the command of the sea went on. 
 The result of the war had not been such as to alter the original 
 attitudes of the combatants. It was indeed otherwise ; for whereas 
 the attitude of attack taken up by the English had, as I have 
 already observed, been displayed indirectly upon the enemy's 
 commerce, and not directly on his war ships, so that the battles 
 came about in English waters as a consequence of the Dutch 
 offering protection to their passing convoys, it was now proposed 
 to make a direct attack on the enemy on his own coasts. 
 
 Tromp, renewing the bitter complaints as to the inferiority of 
 the Dutch ships, was directed notwithstanding, to convoy 200 
 merchant ships, bound for France and Spain, to the north of 
 Scotland, and to convoy back the homeward trade assembled in 
 those waters. 
 
 Dean and Monk, with Penn and Lawson, being at the head of a 
 fleet which, according to the Dutch, numbered 105 sail, including 
 26 new frigates, and carrying 2,840 guns, manned by 16,269 men, 
 heard of these orders, and proposed to attack Tromp, or at least, 
 to prevent his getting away from the Texel without a battle. 
 But he was beforehand with them. Pie got clear away ; took his 
 
40 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 convoy safe, and though he missed the homeward trade, those 
 ships, to the number of 300, arrived safely in their ports without 
 seeing an enemy. Tliis was towards the end of May 1653. 
 
 But Tromp had run great risks. While he was in the Texel 
 with the major part of his fleet, a portion was also in Zealand, in 
 the Maas or the Schelde. Dean and Monk's design was to prevent 
 the junction, but though they were late for that purpose they 
 were, on May 15th, actually within five miles of Tromp and his 
 convoy without seeing them. The English captured or destroyed 
 a good many fishing and other vessels on the coast, and even went 
 so far as to land a few men, but with no result. They claimed, 
 chiefly, to have kept the whole coast in a state of alarm. 
 
 When Tromp returned, he was reinforced by seventeen sail and 
 a fire-ship, and hearing that a squadron of eight sail and eight 
 merchant ships was in the Downs (it was the squadron of Com- 
 modore Bodley from the Mediterranean), it was determined to 
 surround and attack them there, Tromp approaching from the 
 northward and De Witt from the southward. Monk and Dean 
 were at this time in Yarmouth Eoads, at the head of the bulk of 
 the English fleet. Bodley's squadron had news of the Dutch 
 approach, and got way into the Thames ; Monk had also news, and 
 put to sea after Tromp. The Dutch failing in their primary object, 
 captured a few merchant ships which had got in shore under 
 cover of the forts of Dover and Deal ; but though fire was exchanged 
 between the forts and the ships, that was more by way of 
 bravado and insult than of systematic attack, for ships which got 
 close under Dover Castle escaped capture. 
 
 Monk and Dean, at the head of some ninety-five sail and five fire- 
 ships, came up with Tromp, now commanding some ninety- eight 
 sail and six fire-ships, in the neighbourhood of Nieuport, and a 
 general action ensued, beginning about 11 a.m. on June 3rd, and 
 lasting till night. Dean was killed during the first day's battle. 
 The fight was renewed next day, June 4th, and the Dutch, 
 thoroughly beaten in the end, retired behind the shoals between 
 Ostend and Sluis, then called the Wielings. The whereabouts of 
 the action is shown by the figure 7 on the chart. 
 
 It was after this battle that Vice-Admiral De Witt made his 
 celebrated declaration before the Assembly of the States General : — 
 "Why should I keep any longer silence? I am here before my 
 sovereigns, and am free to speak ; and I can say that the English 
 are at present masters both of us and of the seas." 
 
 These operations, first the appearance of the Dutch on the 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COAfMAND OF THE SEA. 41 
 
 English coasts, and now the appearance of the English on the 
 Dutch coasts, were clearly parts of a direct contest for the com- 
 mand of the sea, resulting in its being left, at least for a time, in 
 the hands of the English. The effect of such command was, in 
 the words of the Dutch historian, that the English " held the 
 coasts of Holland as 'twere besieged, after they had stopt up (by 
 blockade) the mouth of the Texel, which obliged the States, to 
 prevent any descent from them, to post some troops on the isles 
 and on the coasts. During which distress, three ships returning 
 from the East Indies richly laden, unfortunately fell into the 
 hands of the English, as did likewise two others coming from 
 Portugal, and three more from Swedeland, whereof two were 
 burnt and the rest taken. And towards the Straits of Callis 
 Captain Wight likewise was taken, with four ships laden with 
 salt." * 
 
 But the Dutch, though conquered, were not subdued, and were 
 not yet prepared to wholly abandon the struggle for the command 
 of the sea. They moved heaven and earth to re-fit and re-complete 
 their fleet ; but the trouble was that, as the 80 or 90 sail under 
 Tromp were in the Southern Zealand ports, and the 27 sail under 
 De Witt wei-e in the Texel to the northward, while the great, and 
 so far victorious, English fleet lay between and ready to fall on 
 that part of the Dutch force which first put to sea, there was much 
 doubt whether the Dutch could ever draw together in sufficient 
 force at the same time and place to face the enemy. 
 
 Nevertheless Tromp put to sea on July 27th with his 80 odd 
 ships, with the intention of bringing on a very partial action with 
 the 106 sail under Monk, Penn, and Lawson. The hostile fleets 
 sighted each other off Egmond, twenty miles south of the Texel, on 
 the 29th July, and Tromp stood away to W.S.W. to draw the 
 English after him and to free De Witt. The engagement was 
 more general than Tromp intended, but when night put a pause 
 to the fighting, he wrote not altogether hopelessly of the ultimate 
 result, if only the squadron under De Witt could get out and join 
 him. 
 
 The engagement was very partially renewed on the morning of 
 the 30th of July, on account of the heavy weather ; but Tromp's 
 strategy had succeeded so well that De Witt had crawled out of 
 the Texel about midnight on the night before, and Tromp began to 
 
 * Life oj Cornelius Tromp, p. 131, Columna Roatrata says the English took twenty- 
 rich ships at the mouth of the Texel, and then the Baltic and the East India ships 
 dared not sail. 
 
42 NAVAL WABFAEE. 
 
 see his ships approaching ahoiit noon, and hy 5 in the afternoon 
 the two fleets had formed a junction and turned to seek the enemy 
 once more. 
 
 There was a tremendous encounter on the 1st August near ahout 
 where the figure 8 is placed on the chart, which lasted all day, and 
 the veteran leader, Tromp, being killed, fortune turned finally and 
 decidedly against the Dutch, and they made for the shelter of their 
 ports. They acknowledged to a loss of 9 ships, taken or burnt, 
 of 500 men killed and 700 wounded. But the English claimed 
 that the Dutch loss was between 20 and 30 men-of-war, burnt or 
 sunk, and between 5,000 and 6,000 men ; while admitting their 
 own loss to be two ships burnt, 400 men killed or drowned, and 
 700 wounded ; no less than 8 captains being amongst the former, 
 and 5 amongst the latter. But the English made no captures, 
 and were themselves not in a condition to keep the sea. 
 
 As a consequence of the undoubted fact that it became necessary 
 for the English to return to their own ports, the Dutch claimed 
 the accomplishment of their design to free their ports from blockade, 
 and next month De Witt, now in supreme command, proved his 
 case by escorting a considerable convoy towards the Sound, and 
 conducting back a similarly large fleet of merchant ships into the 
 Texel towards the end of October. But the Dutch carried bravado 
 rather too far ; for, determining to keep outside their ports, 
 their fleet was met at anchor oft' the coast by a furious three 
 days' gale, which shattered the Dutch and forced the English into 
 their harbours, so that all thought of a further struggle was 
 abandoned. 
 
 Then too, political necessities caused Cromwell to listen more 
 favourably to the Dutch proposals for peace ; and a final treaty 
 was signed in April 1654. The Dutch got easier terms than had 
 before been entertained. They were not now called on to admit the 
 right of search ; to open free trade in the Schelde, to limit the 
 number of their war-ships, or to renew the license dues for their 
 fishery; but they agreed to admit the English dominion of the 
 seas, that is, of the British seas, by striking to the English flag ; 
 to accept the Parliament's Navigation Act, and to promise other 
 reparations and acts which had not to do with the naval aspect 
 of the question. 
 
 The English claimed, as the result of this war, which had lasted 
 just one year and eleven months, that they had been victorious in 
 five general actions, and had made 1,700 prizes valued at £6,000,000 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 43 
 
 sterling; while they did not allow that Holland had made one 
 quarter of their captures, either in number or value. 
 
 But what concerns us here is not so much the facts of the war 
 as the principles which underlay the action taken, and the practical 
 issues which such principles bring to light. 
 
 In the first place, the war was wholly naval, wholly on the water, 
 and yet brought Holland to her knees almost as effectually as an 
 invasion could have done ; and yet at nothing like the cost to the 
 English, either in blood or treasure, which an invasion would have 
 entailed. This is strikingly brought to mind by recalling that the 
 value of the captures made in two years or so (for they had begun 
 before war was formally declared) came to about twice the whole 
 revenue of the country for the same period. 
 
 Then we see that it was probably commerce which kept it as a 
 naval war, and that in the early stages, commerce, its protection 
 over defined trade routes, and its attack at suitable points, governed 
 almost absolutely the movements of the fleets of both nations. But 
 as the war went on, and doubtless, we may say, became more 
 understood, we have greater concentrations of force and more 
 direct attempts to master the force. Because the Dutch trade must 
 be mainly conducted past the British coasts, the English fleets are 
 found there, and the battles take place there. But as the struggle 
 develops and, I believe we may say, is better comprehended, the 
 attack by the power which has slowly been gaining, is made in- 
 directly on commerce by successful direct attacks upon the enemy's 
 lieet near his own coasts. 
 
 The vast concentrations of naval force merely for naval opera- 
 tions were not to be found in previous wars. They were a feature 
 of all the Dutch wars, but in later wars were more the exception 
 than the rule. The broad reasons for such concentrations have been 
 shown with sufficient clearness by the course of the narrative, but 
 there are some inner causes which will require future treatment. 
 For the present we shall probably do well to consider them as 
 arising directly from the necessities of a struggle for the command 
 of the sea, and to observe how very small a share the attack upon 
 territory occupies while this great struggle is going on. 
 
U NAVAL JVAHFARE, 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 The Struggle for the Command of the Sea — {continued). 
 
 The power which is weakest finds it impossible to defend commerce and struggle for 
 the command of the sea at the same time. — On the opening of the second war the 
 Dutch give up the defence of commerce, and prohibit it. — The attack on both sides 
 is concentrated and direct upon the naval force. — When command of the sea becomes 
 at all secure, attacks on shipping in harbours follow, as at the Vlie, and in the Thames 
 and Medway ; and troops for landing are embarked. 
 
 In the first Dutch war, the leading events of which were sketched 
 in my last chapter, we had an excellent example of the struggle 
 for the command of the sea, carried on between two maritime 
 powers of not very unequal naval force, but one of which, Holland, 
 appeared to be much weaker on the sea because of her great 
 dependence on sea-borne commerce, and the necessity she was 
 under of protecting it. 
 
 This defensive attitude, which she must latterly have known to 
 be a weak one, was forced upon her in a war carried on at sea, 
 by the necessities of her national life, unless she were possessed of 
 sufficient naval force to have defended her commerce by one part 
 of it, and to have directly attacked the forces of her enemy with 
 the other part of it. But not having such a sufficiency of naval 
 force, or at any rate acting as though she had not, she suffered 
 heavily in the loss of ships and cargoes, and disproportionately 
 with the English loss in that way. I have not had means of com- 
 paring the actual amount of the sea-borne commerce of Holland 
 and of Great Britain during the period of the war, but I think we 
 may infer from its transactions, that Great Britain had not nearly 
 so much property on the water as Holland had, and was con- 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 45 
 
 sequently not nearly so much hampered by the necessity of pro- 
 tecting it as Holland was, and that we may fairly argue that the 
 greater success on our side was as much due to the weakness of 
 Holland's naval position, on account of her greater commerce, as it 
 was to our greater naval force. 
 
 At least we may say of the first Dutch war, that it was, on a 
 very extended scale, that sort of "bare action at sea," of which 
 we have seen Sir William Monson speak somewhat slightingly at 
 an earlier date. Yet the Dutch themselves admitted that they 
 were brought to greater straits by this twenty-three months of 
 sea war than by the eighty years of land war which they carried 
 on against the Crown of Spain.* But we shall see presently that 
 just as the Spanish contest taught us what the nature of naval 
 war really was, and started us, as it were, on the new footing when 
 we came to take up a new war, so this first Dutch war confirmed 
 the belief, hinted at by Monson and Ealeigh, that a great struggle 
 may begin and end on the sea ; and went a step further in 
 establishing rules of naval warfare. 
 
 I am not concerned in this treatise to go much into the causes 
 of the wars I use for illustrations, and I shall pass over 
 those which led to the second Dutch war. It was the 
 practice in those days to begin early in the way of what 
 men were pleased to call reprisals ; and long before the formal 
 declaration of war by the Dutch in January, and by the English 
 in March 1665, f there had been covert attacks going on between 
 the two nations, both on territory and shipping. In the matter 
 of shipping, the most notable ** reprisal " was the attack by Sir T. 
 Allen, with eight or nine men-of-war on some forty Dutch 
 merchant ships off Cadiz, which were under convoy of four war- 
 ships commanded by Commodore Brackel ; several merchant ships 
 were taken or sunk, and the Dutch commodore was killed. This 
 was on the 29th December 1664, consequently before the actual 
 declaration of war. A great seizure was also made of 130 
 merchant ships from Bordeaux, but many of them were reclaimed 
 by France and released as not being good prize. 
 
 But this indication of how the war would run was sufficient, 
 with other causes, to determine the Dutch in making a great 
 change in their method of carrying it on. They had laid to heart 
 the lesson of the former war, and now saw the impossibility of 
 
 * Columna Rostrata, p. 139. 
 
 t Columna Rotstrata says February, but the Life of Cornelius Tromp says March 
 14/4. 
 
46 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 continuing the struggle for the command of the sea, which was to 
 be done by means of attack, and attempting to protect a great 
 commerce, which was a defensive operation, at the same time. 
 The case was this with them. If they could muster strength 
 enough to make a direct attack on the British fleet, then that fleet 
 could not afford to separate heavy detachments from it for the 
 purpose of attacking commerce, or in fact for any other purpose, 
 the danger of such detachments having been clearly shown by the 
 battle of November 20th, 1652, between Blake and Tromp. They 
 had no hopes of producing a force considerable enough to make 
 this attack, if part of it was to be dissipated in defensive duties 
 which would not be required to any extent if the general naval 
 forces of the British could be overcome, and the command of the 
 sea in the hands of the Dutch thereby established. There was 
 another thing to be said. The men who were employed in carry- 
 ing on a commerce certain to disappear if it could not be pro- 
 tected, would be uselessly employed in the Mercantile Marine if 
 the War Marine lacked power to maintain its superiority at sea. 
 They were at the same time much wanted to complete the com- 
 plement of the numbers of ships which must be fitted out if the 
 war was to be conducted with any hopes of success. The cessa- 
 tion of commerce and trade for a time might be a heavy blow to 
 the United Provinces, but at least the enemy was not directly 
 benefited as he would be if, as in the last war, he made such very 
 numerous and rich captures at sea. If the States began the war 
 })y accepting and facing a loss, it at least left their hands more 
 free to engage in the direct struggle for victory. 
 
 This reasoning determined the action of the States General. 
 An ordinance was issued absolutely "prohibiting all subjects of 
 the United Provinces to stir out of their ports upon pain of 
 confiscation of their ships and merchandises." They likewise 
 ordered that the fisheries of all kinds should be put a stop to, and 
 the more certainly to secure obedience, they forbade the importa- 
 tion of herrings and other salt fish.* 
 
 This act was no doubt an admission of inferiority, but not a 
 submission to the superior force. 
 
 In my first chapter I drew attention to the prohibition of the 
 West Indian commerce for one year by the King of Spain. Antici- 
 pating, as I shall constantly do for the sake of illustrating princi- 
 ples, I here note how Prussia, in 1870, prohibited her merchant 
 
 • Life of Cornelius Tramp, p. 261. Columna Rostratcif p. 213. 
 
STRUGGLE FOE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 47 
 
 ships all over the world from putting to sea, lest they sliould fall 
 into the hands of France. In these two cases, the nations giving 
 up their sea commerce for the time were simply doing what they 
 could not help. Neither Spain nor Prussia had the power to 
 protect their commerce, and they had the choice of two evils when 
 the choice was plain. It was better that their commerce should 
 suffer a pause than that it should simply fall into the hands of 
 the enemy and enrich him. 
 
 The case was different with Holland. She dropped her commerce 
 for a time, not because she could not hope to protect it, but 
 because she could not make a struggle for the command of the 
 sea, and protect her commerce at the same time. She was like a 
 tigress pausing in her spring and gathering all her forces together 
 to make it with effect. 
 
 But though commerce was thus strictly prohibited, there were a 
 large number of Dutch ships on their way home when the order 
 was given, and I think, too, that it is not impossible that the order 
 was not completely obeyed. The Government having, by the 
 ordinance, shaken themselves clear, as it were, from all responsi- 
 bility in the protection of merchant ships, was the less likely to 
 have interfered with the more venturous of the merchants. Thus, 
 though in this war the protection of commerce ceases to occupy 
 the prominent place it took up in the first war, and the Dutch 
 fleets no longer hamper themselves with great strings of vessels 
 neither very able nor very willing to offer defence, yet commerce 
 still remains to some extent an object of attack to the English, and 
 is, in cases, defended by the Dutch war-ships. 
 
 But that the English were somewhat of the same mind as the 
 Dutch may be inferred from Pepys^ note of January 15th, 1664-5. 
 He records Sir G. Ayscue declaring in Council, that "the war and 
 trade could not be supported together."* 
 
 The English, in consequence of false information respecting the 
 Dutch movements, hurried their fleet to sea while still short of 
 stores, provisions, and men. James, Duke of York, having Sir 
 William Penn on board him as his Captain of the Fleet, with 
 Prince Eupert -joud the Earl of Sandwich as his vice and rear- 
 idmirals, appeared off the Texel on the 24th April. His fleet 
 consisted of 109 "men-of-war and frigates," and 28 fire-ships and 
 ketches, manned by 21,000 men. Immediate captures followed 
 of several merchant ships, which the Dutch made no effort to 
 
 • Quoted in G. Penn's Life o/Fenn, vol. ii., p. 312. 
 
48 NAVAL WARFAHE, 
 
 prevent. Even had the Dutch been ready for sea, which they were 
 not, they were really paralysed by the position of the English 
 fleet. It was understood in England that James had " used all 
 possible means to provoke the Dutch to a battle,"* but this was 
 impossible, because of the divided state of the Dutch fleet, and the 
 concentrated state of the English fleet. Thirty-one of the Dutch 
 were in Zealand in the Maas and the Schelde, the remainder were 
 in Holland and Friesland, in the Texel and the Vlie. The English 
 fleet off the Texel was lying across them all, and threatening any 
 that put to sea with destruction. 
 
 But what the strategy of the English prevented, the conditions 
 of weather and the incomplete state of the ships allowed. A heavy 
 gale drove the whole of the English forces off the coast, and the 
 damages received, as well as the necessity of completing the fleet 
 compelled a return to an anchorage off Harwich, where the store- 
 ships and victuallers made their appearance. 
 
 Thus left free, the Zealand part of the fleet put to sea and 
 formed a junction with the Holland and Friesland parts from the 
 Vlie and the Texel, on May 12th. The fleet so assembled, consisted 
 of 103 "men-of-war," 7 yachts, 11 fire-ships, and 12 galliots, 
 carrying 4,869 guns, and manned with 21,631 men.f The whole 
 were under the command of Admiral Opdam, and were gathered 
 into seven squadrons, each under its admiral. They made sail 
 across the North Sea to seek the English fleet in its own waters. 
 
 The Dutch made a great prize as they neared our shores, 
 capturing nine rich Hamburgh ships, valued at between £200,000 
 and iS 300,000, which were under convoy of but one frigate of 
 forty -four guns. J 
 
 James, in his anchorage off Harwich, still half manned and busy 
 with his victuallers and store-ships, heard of the sailing of the 
 Dutch and of their capture of the Hamburgh ships. Fearing to be 
 caught amongst the shoals about Harwich, and to be thereby 
 powerless to avert the mischief which might ensue, James pro- 
 ceeded, with his victuallers and store-ships, to the more open 
 anchorage of Sole, or Southwold, Bay. Here he brought up on 
 June 1st in the early morning, about five miles off shore. The 
 storing and victualling went on, and also by perhaps a happy 
 fortune, the supply of men arrived in the nick of time.§ The 
 
 * Life of Penn, vol. ii. , p. 325. 
 
 t Life of Cornelius Tromp, p. 268. 
 
 X The Good Hope. Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 32G. 
 
 § Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 323. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMA XT) OF THE SEA. 49 
 
 sume aiternoon the Dutch were seen eighteen miles E.S.E. The 
 victuallers were sent to Harwich, and the fleet shifted further out, 
 want of wind compelling a second anchorage, which was finally 
 quitted at 10 o'clock at night. All next day, June 2nd,* the 
 fleets manoeuvred in sight of each other, but it was not till 
 about half-past three on the morning of June 3rd that fire was 
 opened. 
 
 The fleets met off Lowestoft, and the battle lasted the whole 
 day, turning, as night approached, into a retreat by the Dutch and 
 a pursuit by the English. During the chase many prizes were 
 taken by the English, but the pursuit was slackened in the night 
 by the mysterious interference of one of the Duke's suite while he 
 slept ; and though the chase was continued during daylight of the 
 4th, the Dutch were able to anchor amongst the shoals off the 
 Texel, where the English dared not follow for want of knowledge 
 of the locality, without further molestation. James saw the Hol- 
 landers pass into the Texel, and then returned to England to repair 
 and refit. 
 
 The English in this battle claimed to have captured eighteen 
 sail of the Dutch — though some were recovered by them — to have 
 sunk fourteen, and to have burnt others. The Dutch allowed that 
 nine ships were taken, one blown up,t seven or eight burnt. The 
 English lost the Earl of Marlborough and Admiral Sampson 
 killed, and Lawson mortally wounded ; and 250 others killed, 
 with 340 wounded ; and the Dutch carried off a 46-gun ship, the 
 €ha7%ty. 
 
 In this first phase of the war we have the complete abandonment 
 of every other idea but a direct and equal struggle for the command 
 of the sea. The English, by their promptitude in getting to sea, 
 were able to repeat the strategy of the close of the former war, and 
 by placing themselves in force off the Texel, they lay between the 
 Zealand and Holland branches of the fleet, and prevented their 
 junction. We know not how things might have progressed had the 
 weather permitted the Duke of York to maintain the position ; nor 
 •can we say what might have taken place had the Dutch been able 
 to put to sea earlier, and to have followed up the English with 
 greater speed than they did, so as to have attacked them in their 
 
 * There is often the difficulty of one day in the dates, the civil day beginning at 
 j midnight and the nautical day at noon ; so that one writer may call the forenoon of a 
 I day June 2nd and another June 3rd, according as he used civil or nautical time. 
 j t Admiral Opdam's ship, with the admiral in her. The locality of the battle is 
 ,| «hown bv the figure 1 in the chart. 
 
r)0 NAVAL U'AIIFAUE. 
 
 disordered state. As it was, we simply see complete concentration 
 of the naval power of each nation, with a clear conviction on both 
 sides that until one or other fleet has proved victorious, the war 
 can fall into no other phases. 
 
 Master of the sea for the time, but apparently not so wholly re- 
 covered, or ready, as to be able to transfer the war to the Dutch coast 
 and keep it there, the Earl of Sandwich, now at the head of the 
 English fleet, proceeded to undertake two enterprizes which the 
 victory had left him free to do. In the matter of the reprisals 
 before the war actually began. Sir Eobert Holms had attacked and 
 reduced several settlements of the Dutch on the West African 
 coast, had then passed over to New Netherlands (now New York), 
 and had brought that province into subjection. But De Ruiter had 
 followed on his heels, re-capturing to a great extent after him, and 
 making many captures of English merchant ships in the West 
 Indies. 
 
 From this expedition De Ruiter was now returning round the 
 North of Scotland, and Sandwich, hearing of it, made a push 
 towards the Dutch coast to intercept him, but failed ; for De 
 Euiter, by keeping far to the northward, and touching at Bergen, 
 in Norway, got safe into the Ems. This was the first attempt 
 which Sandwich was free to make in overwhelming force, so that 
 had he succeeded in meeting De Ruiter's small squadron,"^ he 
 would have made short work of it ; for he had with him some 
 seventy sail.t The second attempt was what the Dutch became 
 open to so soon as they had been forced into their own harbours.' 
 
 Sandwich got news that some seventy sail of Dutch merchant 
 ships, including the Turkey fleet and ten East India ships, had 
 taken refuge at Bergen. Still being free from fear of molestation 
 by a superior fleet, he detached Sir John Tiddiman with twelve or 
 fourteen men-of-war and three fire-ships to attack them. But the 
 Dutch had made good use of the time at their disposal to prepare a 
 defence, and partly by mooring the heaviest ships so as to keep their 
 guns bearing, and partly by landing guns and erecting temporary 
 works, they had made their position a very strong one. So that 
 Tiddiman's attack, much hindered as it was by the wind, which 
 kept him from advancing and blinded him with smoke, was a 
 complete failure. 
 
 Sandwich does not appear to have made any attempt to keep 
 permanently at sea on the Dutch coast. The idea of a strict and 
 
 * De Ruiter had originally twelve sail with him. Life uj t'orntliua Tiouqj, p. 2o'i. 
 t Life of Fenn, vol. ii., p. 301. 
 
STRUGGLE FOI! CO.UMAXD OF THE SEA. CI 
 
 continued blockade of the Dutch ports must either have been 
 absent from the minds of the commanders, or else the ships in 
 their interior economies and arrangements were still unable to 
 keep the sea for any continuance.* Perhaps both causes operated. 
 At a later date the " great ships " were still of a tender sort, not 
 fit to be trusted at sea in the winter months, both from their 
 tendency to labour and leak in a sea-way, and also from their un- 
 handiness and the consequent dangers they ran of lee shores and 
 other dangers of navigation. But again, it seems certain that 
 commercial blockade was not understood. If the Dutch ports 
 could be watched closely it was certain there were no better posi- 
 tions for making sure of the homeward trade. Yet it seems that 
 when Sandwich detached Tiddiman to operate against the ships in 
 Bergen, he himself took the rest of the fleet to the Shetland 
 Islands, and was there watching for the returning Dutch ships on 
 the 8th of August. t 
 
 The Dutch ports were in this way left open, and their fleets left 
 free to reassemble and combine. This was done, and on informa- 
 tion of the divided state of the English, the Hollanders sailed 
 towards Bergen in hopes of falling on Tiddiman' s squadron 
 Seeing no signs of him, they took the Bergen merchant fleet under 
 convoy about the end of August, hoping to bring the 70 ships 
 safe into their ports. But here the great enemy of naval opera- 
 tions, the wind, put itself en evidence, and scattered both merchant 
 fleet and war ships. Sandwich was back again now, in the middle 
 of the North Sea, and on the 5th September was 90 miles NNW 
 from the Tesel, having been for the two previous days picking up 
 largely amongst the scattered Dutch war, and merchant, ships. He 
 had then taken four men-of-war of 40 to 54 guns each, three East 
 Indiamen, and seven other merchant ships. Several other great 
 prizes fell into the hands of the English at the same time, 
 but both fleets appear to have been a good deal broken up and 
 detached, the Dutch not having recovered their dispersion, and 
 
 * Pepys records Sir Wm. Coventry as " dlslikiug our staying with the fleet on tie 
 Dutch coast, believing that the Dutch will come out in fourteen days, and then we with 
 our unready fleet, by reason of some of the ships being maimed, shall be in a bad 
 condition to fight them on their twn coast." (July 30, lG6t!). Life of Ptnv., vol. ii., 
 p. 412.» 
 
 t It is diflicult to say now, how much the contention between the soldier and the 
 sailor element in our fleets at this time had to do with the apparent want of system. 
 Penn's influence was very great, but the military fleet commanders, such as Monk and 
 Sandwich, were bitterly jealous of him and may — as 5Ionk certainly did— have scorned 
 the sailor's advice 
 
52 NAVAL IVAUFAUE. 
 
 the English devoting themselves to prize-making, so that no 
 general action took place. 
 
 Sandwich, with but 18 sail about him, and his prizes, got 
 back to Sole Bay on the 11th of September, while most part of 
 the Dutch sought refuge in Goree a few daj^s later, and the scat- 
 tered squadrons of the English soon found their way home also. 
 
 In England everything was now disorganised, as the plague was 
 at its worst all through the months of August and September. 
 The war ships returned into port, and there was no heart to refit 
 them for fresh operations. It was otherwise with the Dutch. Not- 
 withstanding further damages from wind, they managed to get a 
 fleet of 90 sail to sea on the 1st of October, with the intention of 
 falling in great force on the detached squadrons which they hoped 
 to find at anchor in Sole Bay, off Harwich, in the Downs, or at the 
 mouth of the Thames. On the 5th, the Dutch appeared off Yarmouth 
 and Lowestoft, but neither there nor at Sole Bay were there any 
 war ships to be seen. In fact, no traffic of any kind appears to 
 have been stirring, for they seem to have captured only one small 
 vessel. "While they were thus to the northward, however, and 
 now working to the southward w'ith light winds, 16 men-of-war 
 lying off Harwich got news of their presence, and instantly 
 weighed and ran up the Thames, where they were seen by the 
 Dutch on the 7th, but too far off to be got at. At the mouth of the 
 Thames the Dutch anchored for the night, and next morning made 
 for the Downs, in hopes of surprising some vessels said to be 
 there. But calms and light winds frustrated their intentions, and 
 gave the ships time to escape. From their anchorage at the 
 mouth of the Thames, they reconnoitred and sounded higher up, 
 and might possibly have concerted some other design in the 
 apparent total absence of anything to oppose them. But their 
 crews became terribly and unaccountably sickl}', and the sickness 
 showed every tendency of increase. The position was also that 
 there was nothing to be done. All possible prizes were in the 
 harbours and up the rivers ; there was nothing going in and 
 nothing coming, or likely to come, out. A determination was arrived 
 at to break up the fleet and send it home. But a small group of 
 six light frigates and four galliots were left to watch the mouth 
 of the Thames for three days, simply to notify to any Dutch war 
 ships arriving, that the fleet had retired. A squadron of 18 of 
 the healthiest ships under Admiral Sweers was also told off to 
 keep the sea for three w^eeks longer, and to cruise oft' the Dogger 
 Bank, as well to offer convo}' to any homeward-bound Dutch 
 
STRUGGLE FOB COMMAND OF THE SEA. 53 
 
 merchant ships coming north about, as to lie across the EngHsh 
 trade to Hamburgh and the Baltic, and to attack it. But nothing 
 noticeable came of the proceeding, and the war ceased for the 
 winter months. 
 
 The only point of principle which it here seems necessary to 
 take note of, is the small result to either side of a mere temporary 
 command of the sea. The greatest successes of the English 
 against merchant ships were when the war fleets were all but in 
 sight of one another ; the greatest successes of the Dutch in the 
 same way were just before the battle of Lowestoft. When the 
 English by their promptitude obliged the Dutch to remain in port, 
 little or nothing came of it. When the English, broken up 
 and disheartened by the Plague, left the sea free to the Dutch, 
 they themselves sum up the result as follows : *' The Dutch fleet 
 then did nothing that expedition but cause some alarms upon the 
 coast of England, and all the honour they gained by it was only 
 that of having offered battle to the English fleet whilst they kept 
 themselves within their harbours, as being debarred by a raging 
 and pestilent distemper from accepting it, and having interrupted 
 the commerce of the English merchants, by keeping the mouth of 
 the Thames blocked up for about sixteen days together."* It 
 would appear, so far, as if something more than mere temporary 
 command of the sea is required before full advantage can be taken 
 of it. 
 
 Early in 1666, a new element was introduced into the war by 
 the alliance of France with Holland, the French declaration of war 
 against England, and her threatened junction of a fleet of thirty 
 men-of-war with the Dutch. t Further difficulties for England 
 developed in the declaration of war against her by Denmark and 
 Brandenberg. This French fleet put to sea from Toulon on the 
 9th January 1666, and was under the command of the Duke of 
 Beaufort, but it did not get as far as Eochelle till near the end 
 of August ; it was at Dieppe on the 14th of September, but made 
 no further effort to join the Dutch, and not finding them there, 
 it returned to Brest and nothing more was heard by sea of the 
 French alliance with Holland. 
 
 But when the English fleet was ready for sea, towards the end 
 of May, the French fleet, which had been joined by six Hollanders 
 
 * Life of Cornelius Troiiip, p. 324. 
 
 t 0. Troude, Battailles Ncioalex de France, vol. i., p. 107, makes the force 13 ships 
 of from 56 to 84 gum ; 16 of from 36 to 42 guns ; 3 of 26 and 28 guns, and a small 
 vessel. This was a very heavy force for the time. 
 
54 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 witli fire ships and ketches, was still a threat, and to meet it Prince 
 EuiDert was detached to the Isle of Wight, probably to St. Helens, 
 to bar the passage and prevent the junction with the Dutch. 
 
 The English fleet put to sea towards the end of May> and bafore 
 Prince Rupert was detached, it consisted of 81 men-of-war, mount- 
 ing 4,460 guns, and manned by 21,085 men. Prince Rupert's 
 detachment left it about 61 sail in strength. 
 
 The Dutch having put to sea about the 21st of May with a fleet 
 of 96 sail, carrying 4,716 guns and 20,642 men, had anchored 
 before the 1st of June between Dunkirk and the North Foreland, 
 and there Monk, now Duke of Albemarle, proposed to attack them 
 with only two out of the three divisions of his fleet. 
 
 It was blowing hard when the English sighted the Dutch, and 
 the naval officers were strongly against an attack, not only because 
 of the inferiority of force, but because in such a stormy wind, they 
 being to windward, they were unable to use the lower deck guns 
 — the heaviest tier. But Monk overbore all opposition to his will, 
 and ran down upon the Dutch without preserving that order which 
 was becoming recognized as a necessity in a sea-fight. The result 
 was a four days' combat of the severest and bloodiest character. 
 The English were throughout the attacking force, but a large 
 balance of victory remained in the enemy's hands. -i= The first day's 
 battle ended at 10 o'clock at night, when the English claimed to 
 have bui nt two Dutch ships, but to have lost three by capture, and 
 to have had Vice-Admiral Sir William Berkeley killed. The night 
 was spent in preparing for the next day's battle, when the Dutch 
 lost one or two ships burnt, and Vice-Admiral Van der Hulst killed. 
 Nevertheless, the Dutch having received a reinforcement,t Albe- 
 marle began to fall back to have the support of Prince Rupert, who 
 was coming to his assistance. The retreat was made in good order, 
 but Monk was obliged to burn certain disabled ships, to prevent 
 them from falling into the enemy's hands. The Dutch followed, 
 but not closely. 
 
 On the third day, June 3rd, the Royal Prince, bearing the flag 
 of Sir George Ayscue, the largest and heaviest ship in the English 
 fleet, ran on the Galloper shoal, and being threatened by fire-ships, 
 surrendered.! The ship was burnt, and the crew, incliuling the 
 admiral, made prisoners. 
 
 * The site of the first day's battle is shown by the fifjfure 2 on the chart, 
 t " Sixteen great ships." Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. a89. 
 
 X The Rayal Prince was the work of Phineas Pett. She was launched at Woolwich 
 in IGIO in the presence of King James the Queen, Prince of Wales, Duke of York 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 55 
 
 Prince Eupert had been warned to quit St. Helens and rejoin 
 the main fieet, and it was known that he had sailed on the after- 
 noon of the 1st. He appeared on the evening of the 8rd, and 
 joining Albemarle, the battle was renewed till night. Next morn- 
 ing, the fourth day of the fight, the Dutch were seen a long way oft", 
 and the English making sail for them, the battle was renewed at 
 8 A.M. and lasted till 7 p.m., when a fog put a stop, and as it turned 
 out a final stop, to the combat. 
 
 Each fleet returned to its own harbours ; ours was in a terrible 
 plight. " The sad spectacle," says Evelyn ; " more than half that 
 gallant bulwark of the kingdom miserably shattered ; hardly a 
 vessel entire, but appearing so many wrecks and hulls, so cruelly 
 had the Dutch mangled us."'^ We lost nine or ten ships, beside 
 the Royal Prince; had nearly GOO men killed, 1,100 wounded, and 
 2,000 prisoners. The Dutch admitted that they had lost from 
 four to six men-of-war. 
 
 The Dutch had so far gained a victory, but they were under the 
 impression not only that the victory was more complete, but that 
 its effects were more permanent and far reaching than they really 
 were. In their mistaken view they not only hurried their fleet ol 
 sixty sail out of the Texel on the 25th of June, but prepared with 
 it a fleet of transports carrying troops, in order to made a descent 
 on our coasts, having by their victory, as they supposed, secured 
 themselves from interruption at sea. With this fleet, considerably 
 reinforced from other ports, they appeared at the mouth of the 
 Thames. But at the Nore, to their disappointed astonishment, lay 
 a new English fleet computed at eighiiy-eight sail, with fire-ships 
 and ketches. These ships were the repaired and refitted remains 
 of the beaten fleet, with additions, all collected and approaching 
 completion, by the great exertions of Sir William Penn, now one of 
 the Commissioners of the navy. 
 
 The Dutch hopes were entirely frustrated by this unexpected 
 sight, and they found themselves reduced to carrying out the simple 
 operation of blocking the Thames, which they did till the 19th or 
 20th of July, when the English fleet put to sea after them.t This 
 
 and other royal and noble personages. She was 114 feet long, 44: feet broad, and -vras 
 pierced for 64 guns, though carrying but 55. She was estimated to measure 1,200 
 tons. The actual armament was, two 30-pr9., sis 24-prs., twelve IS-prs., eighteen 
 9-prs., thirteen 6-prs., and four " port-pieces." See Charnock's History of Miaine 
 Architecture, vol. ii., passim. The cut is taken from his plate. 
 
 * Life of Penn, vol. ii., 395. 
 
 t The reasons given by the Dutch avithor for making no attack are rather confused 
 and obscure. '• The English fleet, who had advice of the setting out of the Holland 
 
5G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 latter was now composed of eighty-nine men-of-war, with eighteen 
 to twenty fire-ships ; and the Dutch fleet was of the same force. 
 
 The English came up with the Dutch at a point N.E. by E. of the 
 North Foreland on the 25th of July, and a desperate battle of the 
 usual type ensued.* Prince Eupert and Albemarle held a joint 
 command (in one ship) of the Red Squadron, while Sir Thomas 
 Allen, commanded the White, and Sir .Jeremiah Smith the Blue. 
 The Dutch were under the command of De Euiter. The fight 
 began about noon and continued all day, the Dutch retreating to- 
 wards their own coast, and the English following. The pursuit 
 was maintained all night and through the next day, with very light 
 winds. The Dutch ultimately found shelter behind the shoals 
 which lie off Ostend, then called the Wielings; while the English, 
 fearing the dangers of shoal water, anchored to the northward, in 
 the Schoonevelde, watching them. The Dutch necessarily admitted 
 the English victory ; the usual counter-claims made the English 
 lose either one ship or four ships, and the English clai.ned that 
 the Dutch had lost twenty ships, sunk or burnt, and 7,000 men 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 The Dutch, unable to renew the battle, betook themselves to 
 repairing their losses and refitting. The English, thus free, 
 " passed along the whole coast of Holland, taking ships at the very 
 mouths of the harbours, and causing a hot alarm wherever they 
 appeared. "t On arriving near the Vlie, they heard that a great fleet 
 of merchant ships was lying in an exposed position in that river, 
 and also that there were certaiti unprotected magazines of stores 
 on the Islands of Vlie and Schelling. It was determined to make 
 an attack, and Sir Eobert Holms, at the head of nine frigates, five 
 fire-ships, and seven ketches was despatched for the purpose. He 
 anchored at the mouth of the Vlie on the 8th of August, and send- 
 ing in a ketch to reconnoitre, received from her the intelligence that 
 there were about 200 merchant ships thus open to him. He pro- 
 posed to attack the ships first, and sent the Pembroke — the frigate 
 which drew least water of any in his squadron — with five fire-ships, 
 to burn the merchant fleet. Several ships were destroyed in this 
 
 fleet, knew so well how to secure themselves of all the posts where any descent could 
 be made, by placing there both burse and foot, that they quite broke all the designs of 
 the Hollanders, who saw themselves thereby disabled to attempt anything for want of 
 good sounders." L?'/e of Cornelius Tromp, p. 374. 
 
 * The locality is marked by the figure 3 on the chart. It was often the case tnat 
 the sound of the guns in these great battles were heard in London, and it was so on 
 this occasion. See Life of Fenn, vol. ii., p. 409. 
 
 J- Cohimna l-lostrata, p. 182. 
 
To Face Pdpc S6 
 
STRUGGLE FOE COMMAND OB' THE SEA. 57 
 
 way, and the rest cut their cables and ran into shoal water. There- 
 upon Holms sent in twenty pinnaces, which followed up the unfor- 
 tunate merchant vessels and burnt all of them except three or four 
 privateers, one trader to Guinea, and a few of the Baltic traders. 
 
 Having thus finished with the ships, Sir Robert despatched two 
 frigates and some ketches to make a descent on the Island of Vlie. 
 But this proved a failure in consequence of the rain rendering the 
 fire-arms useless. 
 
 There was better success on the island of Schelling, where the 
 men, divided into eleven companies, landed and laid the town of 
 Brandaries, containing 600 or 700 houses, in ashes. Sir Robert 
 had thoughts of repeating the operation on other towns, but having 
 to wait twenty-four hours for tide to suit the time, and fearing a 
 change of wind, he rejoined the main fleet, which, after capturing 
 twelve or fourteen more Dutch merchantmen, returned home. 
 It was supposed that the value of the ships and cargoes destroj'ed 
 in the Vlie came to more than i;l,100,000, without counting the 
 damage done on shore. If we are at all justified in drawing con- 
 clusions as to what this sum meant in that age, by comparing it 
 with the public revenue then, and assuming a proportionate sum 
 now, the result is rather startling. The British revenue then was 
 a million and a half; it is now ninety millions. If we can suppose 
 ;£65,000,000 w^orth of our shipping property being now destroyed 
 at one coup, w^e may perhaps realize what the loss meant to the 
 Dutch in 1666. 
 
 But it is important to recall the conditions under which such 
 attack and destruction became possible. The Dutch fleets had 
 been beaten into their ports in such condition that for the time 
 they dared not present themselves at sea. The English fleet was 
 in full control, for the time, of the Dutch waters off the coast. It 
 was in a position to entirely prevent Sir Robert Holms' operations 
 from being interfered with by any force arriving over sea. The 
 English force detached from the main fleet was a very small one, 
 and only a single ship, and that the lightest of the nine frigates, 
 was actually engaged. Quite conceivably, the presence of only a 
 couple of Dutch frigates in the Vlie would have sufficed to preserve 
 this vast property in safety.* 
 
 • "I had an opportunity of much talk with Sir W. Penn to- daj' (he being newly 
 come from the fleet)," writes Pepys, on August 22nd, 16GG, "and ho do much under- 
 value the honour that is given to the conduct of the late business of Holms in burning 
 the ships and town, saying, it was a great thing indeed, and of great profit to us in 
 being of great loss to the enemy ; but that it was wholly a business of cliance." — Lrje 
 of Penn, vol. ii. n. 415 
 
53 NAVAL W A UFA BE, 
 
 As some sort of reply to this, four or live Dutch men-of-war fell 
 upon some seventeen English ships in the Elbe, near Gliickstadt, 
 and drove them, with loss, up to Hamburgh. But this was 
 obviously, not a legitimate operation of war. 
 
 The French alliance had been as yet of no manner of use to the 
 Hollanders. Contemporary historians say that the terms of the 
 alliance were such as could only issue in making France strong by 
 sea, both in providing her with ships built in Holland and by 
 Dutch skill, and b}^ giving her the benefit of Dutch nautical ex- 
 perience. But negociations were now (August 1666) in progress 
 to bring the Duke of Beaufort up from Portugal in order to form a 
 junction with the Dutch somewhere between Boulogne and Dieppe. 
 
 To effect the object, De Euiter got to sea with a replenished and 
 refitted fleet of 71 men-of-war and 27 fire-ships, having as his 
 second and third in command. Admirals de Gent and Bankert. On 
 the 29th of August the fleet anchored between Dunkirk and Nieu- 
 port, and then, hearing that the Duke of Beaufort had got so far 
 on his way to join him as to have arrived at and left Bochelle, De 
 Euiter weighed on the 1st September, and made sail through the 
 Straits of Dover. 
 
 From remarks in Pepys' diary it seems certain that our fleet 
 was at this moment not at all complete. It was particularly 
 deficient in fire-ships. " But, Lord ! " cries Pepys, " to see how 
 ray Lord Brouncker undertakes the despatch of the fire-ships when 
 he is no more fit for it than a porter ! " * This and other deficien- 
 cies may account for what followed, and may tend to reconcile the 
 otherwise irreconcilable stories of the Dutch and English 
 recorders. The Dutch story, which presents a good deal of per- 
 plexity, even by itself, is that near Boulogne the English fleet 
 came in sight, advanced on the Dutch, then fled, pursued by the 
 Hollanders, who were unable to bring them to action. The English 
 story is that they made every effort to bring the Dutch to action, 
 but that the latter hauled into shoal water where they could not be 
 got at, and then a gale of wind sprang up and drove the English 
 off the coast. All that seems certain is that nothing was done ; 
 that the Duke of Beaufort never advanced beyond Dieppe. 
 
 The Dutch, however, captured an English ship, the Eoynl 
 Charles, of 56 guns and 200 men.f But on the other hand Sir 
 
 * Life of Penn, vol. ii. , p. 415. 
 
 t I suppose this was a merchant ship. There was a Royal Charles, carrjnng the 
 flag of Admiral Hubbard in the English fleet, but she carried 82 guns and 700 men. 
 Sec Charnock's HUtory of Marine Architecture, vol. ii., p. 398. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 5U 
 
 Thomas Allen, who commanded the White squadron of the English 
 fleet, met a part of the French fleet, captured the Ruby, of 70 
 guns and 500 men, drove ashore and burnt some others, and 
 forced the rest up the Seine. It seems probable, on the whole, 
 that the threat of the English fleet was sufficient to prevent the 
 junction, and that very possibly Eupert and Albemarle felt that 
 if that end could be secured by the threat, it was a safer plan than 
 attacking the Dutch in the immediate vicinity of so large and 
 powerful a division as the French fleet composed. 
 
 There is at this point an indication of a change in the conduct 
 of naval war which subsequently became a permanent charac- 
 teristic, the features of which must be dealt with later on. Practi- 
 cally, up to this time, we have heard little or nothing of detached 
 cruisers. But now we hear that while the main fleets of both 
 nations were in the Channel to the southward, there was an action 
 between a squadron of five Dutch cruisers, and another of English 
 cruisers under Commodore Eobertson near the Texel. Three of 
 the Dutch were captured or destroyed. 
 
 We come now near the most curious episode, and also the best 
 known of all that occurred in the three Dutch wars — the Dutch 
 raid on the Medway and Thames. 
 
 Negociations for peace had been set up as early as July in 1666, 
 and they continued with increasing hopes of result through 
 September, October, and November. Then Breda was agreed on 
 as the place where the plenipotentiaries should meet to settle terms 
 finally. 
 
 Apparently, at first, the possible approach of peace had no in- 
 fluence on the naval preparation, as on the 2nd October 1666, the 
 Duke of York gave directions for arranging the winter service : 
 an immediate convoy to Gottenberg to bring home our merchant 
 ships, another to guard the merchant fleet to the Mediterranean, 
 and to bring home the ships at Leghorn ; winter guards for the 
 narrow seas to secure the trade between Newcastle and London, a 
 few ships in the Downs, and " the chief station at Portsmouth, 
 which may require a good strength, since no man knows what 
 either Dutch or French may attempt for passing the Channel for a 
 a conjunction," a guard " for securing the trade at the Land's 
 End and soundings, which, if the French lie about Brest (whither 
 they are gone), may require good ships."* But in a few days there 
 was a great question of money, with heat and strong language in 
 the Coincil between Prince Eupert and Mr. Pepys. The former 
 
 * Sir W. Coventry to Sir W. Penn. Soe Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 422. 
 
()0 NAVAL irAUFABE. 
 
 declared no fleet was ever brought home in so good a state as the 
 last ; the latter averred that Sir William Penn, who was making 
 the inquiry at Sheerness, had written that he dreaded the reports 
 he was to receive from the surveyors of the defects of the fleet.* 
 And then Pepys and the Court and everyone else seemed to forget 
 all the grave issues surrounding them, and to be concerned only 
 in attiring themselves " solemnly in the Persian manner," t and 
 were ready to listen to the artfully arranged suggestions of the 
 Dutch, that the war was over, that peace was virtually certain, and 
 that they were disbanding and dismantling their fleet. 
 
 Pepys' diary is so curiously illustrative of the circumstances out 
 of which the raid arose, that I cannot do better than quote, as 
 I find it quoted, in the Life of Penn. 
 
 March 6th, 1GG7. — To Whitohall ; and here the Duke of York did aquaint us (and 
 the King did the like also afterwards, coming in) with his resolution of altering the 
 manner of the war this year ; that is, we shall keep what fleet we have abroad, in 
 several squadrons. So that now all is come out ; but we are to keep it as close as we 
 can, without hindering the work that is to be done in preparation to this. Great pre- 
 parations there are to fortify Sheerness and the yard at Portsmouth, and forces are 
 drawing down to both those places, and elsewhere by the sea-side ; so that we have 
 some fear of an invasion ; and the Duke of York did himself declare his expectation of 
 the enemy's blocking us up here in the river, and therefore directed that we should 
 send away all the ships that we have to fit out hence. 
 
 What had happened is told by the Duke of York himself. " The 
 Parliament," he says, " giving but weak supplies for the war, the 
 King, to save charges, is persuaded by the Lord Chancellor 
 (Clarendon), the Lord Treasurer (Southampton), the Duke of 
 Albemarle, and the other Ministers, to lay up the first and 
 second-rate ships, and make only a defensive war in the next 
 campaign. The Duke of York opposed this, but was over- 
 ruled. "J 
 
 Pepys goes on : — 
 
 March 2ird. — At the office, where Sir W. Penn came, being returned from Chatham, 
 from considering the means of fortifying the river Medway, by a chain at the Stakes 
 and ships laid there with guns, to keep the enemy from coming up to burn our ships ; 
 all our care being now to fortify ourselves against their invading us. 
 
 March 'IWi. — To the Duke of York, where we all met, and there was the King 
 also ; and all our discourse was about fortifying of the Medway, and Harwich (which is 
 to be entrenched quite round) and Portsmouth. And here they advised with Sir 
 Godfrey Lloyd and Sir Bernard de Gunn, the two great engineers, and had the plates 
 drawn before them ; and, indeed, all their care they now take is to fortify themselves, 
 and are not ashamed of it ; for when, by and by, my Lord Arlington came in with 
 
 • Sir "W. Coventry to Sir W. Penn. See Life of Penn, vol. ii., 424. 
 
 t Evelyn on the 18th October, quoted in the Life' of Penn, vol. II., p. 425. 
 
 X Life of King James II., vol. i., p. 425, quoted in the Life of Penn, vol. ii.. p. 4r)l 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 61 
 
 letters, and seeing the King and D. of York give us, and the ofEcors of the Ordnance, 
 directions in this^matter, he did move, that wo might do it as privately as we could, 
 that it might not come into the Dutch Gazette presently : as the King's and D. of 
 York's going down the other day to Sheerness was, the week after, in the Harlem 
 Gazette. The King and D. of York both laughed at it, and made no matter, but said, 
 •' Let us be safe, and let them talk ; for there is nothing will trouble them more than to 
 hear that we are fortifying ourselves." And the D. of York said, " What said Marshal 
 Tourenne, when some in vanity said that the enemies were afraid, for they entrenched 
 themselves ? ' Well,' says he, ' I would they were not afraid, for then they would 
 not entrench themselves, and so we could deal with them the better.' " 
 
 What appears remarkable in all this is the clear forecast of what 
 would happen, two months before it did happen. It cannot be 
 said that there was any surprise in the Dutch action, nor does it 
 appear that there was much deception on their part. Every one 
 seems to have known perfectly well that if the fleet was not kept 
 up, the enemy would take advantage of it, and sail up the Thames 
 to do what mischief might be done. 
 
 The Dutch fell in completely with the expectation. With a fleet 
 of 60 sail and a body of troops, De Euiter put to sea on the 1st of 
 June and made straight for the Thames, designing not only to 
 copy the example set by the English in the Vlie the year before, 
 but being supplied with troops, to make a much heavier descent 
 upon the country. They anchored at the mouth of the Thames 
 on the 7th, and hearing that 10 or 12 English frigates, with 
 a convoy of 20 merchant ships bound to Barbadoes, were in 
 the Hope,* a detachment of 17 light frigates, with fire-ships 
 and small vessels, was prepared and despatched up the river under 
 the command of Admiral de Gent, on the 9th of June. 
 
 It is worthy of remark at this point, how precisely, so far, the 
 practice followed that pursued in the Vlie. The main fleet lies 
 outside keeping guard ; the shipping is made the first object of 
 attack, and a detachment of light ships is sent to conduct it. 
 The descent upon the land comes afterwards in both cases, even 
 though in the latter there was military force which there was not 
 in the former.f In the case of the Vlie, the attack is planned and 
 made after the sea has been cleared of fleets capable of interfering ; 
 in the case of the Thames, it is undertaken with the knowledge 
 that no naval force exists which is capable of interfering. 
 
 De Gent met with foul and light winds, and was never able to 
 reach a higher point than a mile and a half below the Lower Hope 
 (that would be somewhere off Thames Haven), and meanwhile the 
 
 * The Lower Hope, above Tiiames Haven and below Tilbury Fort. 
 
 t The whole of the troops, however, were not immediately available. See nex*; p 
 
62 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ships there all escaped to the upper reaches of the river. This 
 part of the expedition having miscarried, attention was turned to 
 Sheerness and its newly arranged and apparently incomplete 
 defences. 
 
 However to-daj' [observes yoiin^' Cornelius De Witt, the son of the Pensioner, who 
 was attached to the fleet in a civil capacity], about noon* (the 10th June), as the tide 
 began to come in, we advanced as far as the mouth of the river of Chattam. We 
 presently gave orders to the land troops and marine soldiers to make a descent, and 
 to attack the fort of Sheerness. In the meanwhile we advanced with our men-of-war, 
 and anchored before the same fort. At our approach, one of the King's frigates with 
 some other vessels, and some fire-ships that were there, betook themselves to flight, 
 and the men in the fort ran away likewise before our troops got thither ; so that after 
 the fort had been cannonaded about an hour and a half, our seamen scaled it to pull 
 down from thence the English banner. We found there fifteen pieces of cannon, 
 which we carried off to our ships ; and a great magazine of masts, yards, and in 
 general of all necessaries for the rigging of ships, valued at near 400,000 livers. We 
 gave order to all our captains to carry, each of them, on board a good quantity, and to 
 set fii'e to the rest. Because the most part of the troops were separated from us by 
 ioul weather, the general officers thought not fit to engage themselves too far up the 
 country with so few people, or else they might have done a great deal of mischief. 
 We are, however, of opinion to keep the river of London blocked up, and to hinder 
 the passage of ships there, as much as 'tis possible for us. And to that effect Lieu- 
 tenant Admiral De Ruiter is to come up and joyn us with the main body of the fleet.f 
 
 Since my last letter of the 10th [he again writes to the States-General] by which I 
 informed your High and Mightyneses of the taking of Sheerness, we have received 
 fresh marks of God's protection by several glorious advantages we have newly 
 obtained. After we had detached away some advice-yachts, and several boats armed, 
 to go and sound the passage from hence to Chattam, we resolved to send up thither 
 to-day Lieutenant- Admiral de Gent's squadron; and accordingly by the favour of a 
 good N.E. wind, we unmoored from Sheerness at six in the morning (of June 12th). 
 About noon we arrived near some English men-of-war, having on board them very 
 large guns, and being very well manned, who made a show at first as if they would 
 make a brisk defence ; but as soon as we had burnt four or five of them, some of the 
 others were deserted, so that we took them. I cannot at present give you a particular 
 account of what ships perished in the flames ; but I know very well the Royal Charles, 
 carrying ninety brass guns, and another carrying a like number, fell into our hands. 
 There are still four or five more a little above us, against which we sent some of ours, 
 and because thei-e is a very great consternation among the English, we doubt not but 
 to take them. According to the advices we have had of the enemy, they liave sunk 
 sixteen or eighteen ships, the most part fire-ships, to block the passage of the river 
 against us. Lut, in spite of all these precautions, our ships are passed up, and we 
 flatter ourselves with the hopes to bring along with us those which we shall have 
 taken. J 
 
 Alhemarle was in command at Chatham, and was an eye-witness 
 of all the destruction wrought, which, no douht, was minimized as 
 much as possible in his official report, which was presented to Par- 
 
 * -'Up;" says Pepys, »• and news brought us that the Dutch are come as high as 
 the Nore, and more pressing orders for tire-ships.'' Lift of Pain, vol. ii., p. 441. 
 t Life of Cornelius Tramp, p. 425, 
 J Ibid., p. 426. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. t5'6 
 
 liament in February 1G68. He complained bitterly of everything. 
 Nothing was complete. Batteries ordered were incomplete ; the 
 Royal Charles, which had been ordered uj) the river three months 
 before, was left below to be captured. The ships sunk were not 
 sunk in the right place, and ships ordered to be sunk were not 
 sunk. He " could not get a carpenter but two that were running 
 away." He " had no assistance from Commissioner Pett, nor no 
 gunners nor men to draw on the guns, except the two masters of 
 attendance." And so on, with the usual string of excuses made by 
 those who have failed. But he had seen the guard-ships burnt, 
 and the Royal Charles (82) carried off on the 12th, and the Great 
 James (S'i) — otherwise the RoyalJames — the Royal Oak (76), and the 
 Loyal London (90) burnt on the 13th, while he looked helplessly 
 on, which was enough to set a man throwing the blame on some- 
 body else, and particularly so to him as one of the advisers of this 
 " defensive war." For the ships were all flag-ships, the very finest 
 in the navy, and had carried admirals' flags at sea under his 
 command only a very few months before. 
 
 This act of destruction completed the work in the Medway. The 
 Dutch fell back to the mouth of the river again, blocking it and 
 putting a stop to all commerce by their presence. But troops were 
 landed in Sheppy, and foraged indiscriminately for the use of the 
 fleet. Be Gent was also detached on the 15th of June to the 
 Shetland Islands to pick up and convoy home the Dutch East 
 India ships. Attempts were also made to send a light squadron 
 up to Gravesend, but between newly-sunken ships and newly- 
 erected batteries the defences were sufficient to frustrate the plan. 
 
 The Dutch being reinforced by fresh troops, it was determined to 
 make an attack on Landguard Fort, Harwich, and the plan settled 
 was as follows: — 1,600 soldiers and 400 seamen were landed — I think 
 it must have been on the beach towards Felixstowe — out of fire from 
 the fort. Vice- Admiral Evertz was, with fourteen men-of-war, to 
 attack the fort on the sea-side, while Eear-Admiral Van Nes was 
 to enter the harbour and attack from that side. Then, when the 
 fire was subdued, the land force was to advance and complete the 
 capture. But they had reckoned without their host ; for the shoal 
 water prevented either squadron from operating ; only a distant 
 and useless fire being opened by Evertz. The troops made some 
 attempts to advance on the fort in the open, but seeing that without 
 the supporting fire of the ships it would be impossible to succeed, 
 they re-embarked. 
 
 The Dutch now set about more regularly blockading the Thames 
 
 5* 
 
64 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 by smaller force higher up, while detachments watched off Harwich 
 and the North Foreland to guard against surprise either from 
 north or south. 
 
 The news of the conclusion of peace reached the Dutch on the 
 4th of July, but such was the elation of the States at their success, 
 that, on the plea that the treaty was not fully ratified, De Euiter. 
 was ordered into the Channel to prey upon the English commerce 
 and to alarm the southern ports ; while Van Nes was directed to 
 push up the Thames again to do what mischief he might. De 
 Kuiter, very possibly because of his knowledge of the situation, did 
 little but to create alarm. But there was a sharp encounter 
 between Van Nes and Sir Edward Spragge, who had got together 
 some naval force and a good provision of fire-ships. The Dutch 
 failed to make any iippression, and in the end resumed the blockade 
 of the Thames until the ratification of the treaty of peace relieved 
 them from tliat di-ity. 
 
 :£3S!2J;^ — 
 
65 
 
 CHAPTEE IV, 
 
 Thk STRuaaT.-n: for the Command of tii" 9^Ei—(rnn finned). 
 
 Experience has taught that a superior commerce cannot bo protected by only aji ' 
 equal fleet ; and the Dutch, in the third war, still abandon commerce till greatei- 
 strength is gained. — The direct struggle for the command of the sea is resumed at 
 Sole Bay. — It is useless to prepare for making descents on the enemy's coast unless his 
 fleet is first disposed of. — The embai-kation of troops by the Allies is of no serv.ice. 
 — The great powers of naval forces on distant expeditious if not met by like forces. 
 
 The Dutch, througbout the whole of their second war with 
 England, had carried it out on the principle of a simple and 
 direct struggle for the command of the sea. They had nerved 
 themselves for it by the abandonment of their commerce for the 
 time, in order that neither their attention nor their forces should 
 be diverted for a moment from the attainment of the main object 
 in view. The result was that the protection of commerce dropped 
 out of the regular programme, and great battles no longer hinged 
 on the necessity of protecting convoy. 
 
 The completeness of the change of system between the first and 
 second Dutch wars is easily lost sight of from the confused, un- 
 dramatic, and pointless way in which the stories have generally 
 been told. But we note it when we observe that out of the seven 
 battles which marked the progress of the first Dutch war, four arose 
 directly out of the necessity of protecting commerce, and that 
 three times, if not four, it was chance which prevented the occur- 
 rence of battles under similar circumstances ; and in the second 
 war, though there were captures of merchant ships on both sides, 
 no battle came about in consequence of an endeavour to protect 
 them. Thus, in the first war, we see it begin in July 1652 with 
 an attack on the large squadron protecting the Dutch herring 
 busses. Immediately afterwards, the accident of a gale of wind 
 
CG ' NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 prevents Trorap from bringino- Blake to action near the Shetland 
 Islands, as a means of securing the return of the homeward-bound 
 West India ships. In August, De Kuiter fights Ayscue off Ply- 
 mouth, in defence of his convoy of 60 ships. In November, 
 Tromp attacks Blake near the Straits of Dover, in order to leave 
 the Channel free for the passage of 300 outward-bound Dutch 
 ships. In February 1653, Blake in the Channel endeavours to 
 intercept Tromp's convoy of 250 homeward-bound ships. In May, 
 Dean and Monk all but bring Tromp to action off the Dutch coast, 
 in order to make themselves masters of the 200 ships he was 
 convoying outward ; and in June, Evertz was only prevented by 
 the accident of wind from attacking Bodley in the Downs, when he 
 was in charge of eight merchant-ships. 
 
 In the second war, all this had passed away. Not a single battle 
 arose out of commerce protection, and no outward-bound convoy 
 left the ports of Holland. There were attacks, and very heavy 
 ones, upon merchant shipping, but the heaviest were made upon 
 ships at anchor in port ; as at Bergen, and in the Vlie, on the 
 English side, and as at Gliickstadt, and the attempt on the ships 
 in the Lower Hope on the Dutch side. It was more by chance than 
 of set purpose that the Dutch captured nine English merchant 
 ships on their way to fight the battle of Sole Bay ; and that the 
 English possessed themselves at sea of some of the scattered 
 merchant ships, which they had failed to master at Bergen. 
 
 On both sides, again, we may observe a tendency to push the 
 advantages even of a temporary command of the sea. This is 
 shown principally in the successful and unsuccessful attacks on 
 shipping in harbour ; but more strongly in the descents upon the 
 land, as at the islands of Vlie and Schelling, where the English 
 appeared to land with their ordinary crews only ; and at Sheerness 
 and Harwich, where the Dutch employed regular troops. Still we 
 have to note that these descents, as they were called, were only 
 made when temporary command of the sea had been gained, and 
 then only by detachments, the main body of the fleet being in all 
 cases, as it were, securing the rear of the attacking parties. 
 
 Naval war had, in fact, found its limits and settled down into 
 its bearings. The things which could and the things which could 
 not be done with reasonable hopes of success were making them- 
 selves manifest, and it was being seen in what direction the ulti- 
 mate appeal to naval force lay. 
 
 In both wars the English had had, on the whole, the best of it, 
 and the Dutch, on the whole, the worst of it ; and things at 
 
 I 
 
To face Pa^ 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SKA. 67 
 
 the end of the second war remained so much as they had been at 
 the beginning of it — the raid on the Medway and Thames being 
 quite understood on both sides to have been dehberately courted 
 by the English — that the third Dutch war was laid out on the same 
 principles as the second. 
 
 There were the usual reprisals before war was declared, and 
 England, taking advantage of her position as lying across the 
 stream of Dutch commerce, fell upon it in March 1672 at the back 
 of the Isle of Wight (No. 1 on the chart), and the small force that 
 could be got together under Sir Eobert Holms was sufficient to 
 levy a heavy contribution upon the unfortunate and unprepared 
 Dutchmen. 
 
 France, which had failed to make herself of any use to Holland 
 as an ally in the second war, was very much of the same mind 
 towards England in the third war. But not quite ; for she now 
 brought a contingent of 36 men-of-war and 22 fire-ships 
 under Count D'Estrees, and formed a junction with the Dake 
 of York at the back of the Isle of Wight on the 14th of May, the 
 united fleets sailing immediately to the favourite open anchorage 
 of Southwold, or Sole Bay, on the coast of Suffolk. But it may be 
 usefully pointed out that the French alliance was employed, not to 
 produce an overwhelming force at sea, but merely to relieve 
 England from some part of the expense of the war. The Dutch 
 generally sent to sea a fleet as large as that of the Allies. 
 
 On the outbreak of the war, the Hollanders prohibited sea-borne 
 commerce in much the same terms as in 1665 and 1666. They 
 were eager to contest directly the great point at issue, and during 
 the hours of darkness before day broke on May 28th, the cannon 
 of the look-out ships announced to the allied fleet then at anchor, 
 the approach of the enemy (No. 2 on the chart). 
 
 The Allies were 65 sail of English and 36 sail of French, with 
 22 fire-ships, besides small vessels. The Duke of York com- 
 manded in chief, under the red flag ; the white squadron was 
 wholly French, under D'Estrees ; and the blue was commanded by 
 the Earl of Sandwich. The Dutch were 91 sail of men-of-war, 
 and 44 fire-ships, besides 23 yachts and small vessels. Their fleet 
 was also in three squadrons, De Euiter commanding in chief with 
 the red flag ; Admiral Bankert commanding the white squadron ; 
 and Admiral De Gent the blue. 
 
 The Allies were practically surprised. Many ships had to cut 
 their cables to get into action, and the battle began between 7 
 and 8 a.m. De Euiter said of it that he had never been in so 
 
08 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 continuous and obstinate a fight. The whole French squadron held 
 back, and took as little part as they possibly could in the action.. 
 They retired out of the way to the southward, but were followed 
 up to some extent, and lost two of their ships. Sandwich in the 
 Royal James was determinedly attacked by fire-ships. The ship 
 was fired and burnt, and Sandwich was drowned in attempting to 
 escape from her. But notwithstanding this loss, and notwith- 
 standing the defection of the French squadron, the Dutch were 
 worsted, and fell back towards their own coasts, followed up by 
 the English and by the French, who rejoined next day. The 
 Dutch claimed to have burnt the Royal James, to have sunk two 
 first-rates, and to have destroyed two other ships. They admitted 
 tliat one of their ships was taken and another sunk. 
 
 The Allies now appeared off the Dutch coast with some intention 
 of making a descent somewhere in Zealand, but in the near 
 presence of the Dutch fleet found it would not be feasible. They 
 then made some preparation for a descent on the island of Texel, 
 but circumstances of tide caused the abandonment of the idea, 
 and the squadrons were employed in the simple blockade of the 
 Maas and the Texel. 
 
 The Dutch at this time were terribly pressed by the advance 
 of the French armies by land, and the alarmed state of the sea- 
 coasts. They sued for peace without success, but did not feel 
 themselves strong enough to attempt another sea-fight with the 
 Allies. But their privateers were in operation, and one of them 
 carried an English East India ship as a prize into Bergen. The 
 English also made prizes, and hearing at length that fourteen 
 East India ships were on their way home north of Scotland, they 
 cruized by the Dogger Bank in hopes of intercepting them. The 
 merchant-ships, however, got safely into Bergen without having 
 been seen, and as winter approached, all the war forces returned 
 into their respective ports. 
 
 At the beginning of 1673 the Dutch were full of a novel device, 
 the idea of which has more than once since proved attractive, 
 though I believe it has never been put in practice. They thought 
 it might be feasible to block up the Thames by sinking vessels 
 there, and for this purpose prepared eight ships with stones at 
 Amsterdam, which were afterwards taken into the Texel. I assume 
 that the early appearance of the English fleet at sea prevented 
 any attempts to carry this design into execution. I can find no 
 reason stated, only that the attempt was not made. 
 
 In the early part of May, the Dutch fleet began to assemble in 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. G9 
 
 the Schooneveld, the anchorage off the mouth of the Schelde. De 
 Euiter is said to have failed in a design to intercept the EngHsh 
 Canary, Bordeaux, and Newcastle merchant fleets in their passage 
 into the Thames, and had then returned to the Schooneveld,''^ but 
 it is not mentioned by my earlier and fuller authority. However 
 this may be, there they were on the 22nd of May. 
 
 The Allies had joined their forces off Rye, and they, too, had 
 new ideas as to what was before them, for they took on board a 
 body of troops with the intention of effecting a landing some- 
 where in Zealand. They had 84 men-of-warr, and 26 fire-ships 
 and small vessels. In order to prevent the tendency to hang back 
 which had been displayed at Sole Bay the year berfore, the French 
 were now distributed in the fleet, and not drawn together in a 
 separate squadron as had before been the case. Ruper.t com- 
 manded the Bed Squadron, D'Estrees the White, and Spragge, 
 who had distinguished himself in the Thames in 1667, commanded 
 the Blue. 
 
 The Dutch were 70 men-of-war besides fire-ships, under De 
 Euiter, Tromp, and Bankert ; but their fleet was not complete, and 
 was being gradually augmented. The Allies came in sight of the 
 Dutch fleet thus anchored, on the 22nd May ; but the weather 
 was foggy, and the lie of the shoals thereabouts was not known to 
 the former fleet. Soundings gained could not be fixed in conse- 
 quence of the fog, and the advance on the Dutch was delayed, the 
 allied fleet anchoring in the neighbourhood. Bad weather followed 
 for two or three days, and still further postponed action ; but on 
 the 28th of May, the anniversay of the Battle of Sole Bay, both 
 fleets were under way and came to action (No. 3 on the chart). 
 
 The battle began about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and it lasted 
 in the usual confused formf until 10 o'clock at night, when the 
 Dutch claimed a victory, but anchored under cover of their 
 shoals. 
 
 Great slaughter had been done on the English ships in conse- 
 quence of their behig- crowded with troops ; and it must be added 
 that it could only have been by entire miscalculation that these 
 troops were on board, as taking ships crowded with useless men 
 
 * Burchett, p. 403. Lediard, vol. ii., p. 600, who also seems to speak as if Dc 
 Ruiter, with 42 sail and his stone vessels, was off the Thames on the 2nd May, and 
 frightened off by news of a fleet in the river. 
 
 t " The two Royal Fleets made a motion, and having cast their squadrons into the 
 form of a crescent made up directly towards the Dutch." — Z?/e oj' Cornelius Troinp, 
 p. 464. 
 
70 NAVAL IVARFAUE. 
 
 into a fleet action must have been well understood to be a needless 
 sacrifice of life. It seems clear that the Allies must have assumed 
 that the Dutch fleet would not appear at sea, and that they could 
 have made their contemplated descent without interruption. Thej- 
 were now in this position, that while they had lost but two men-of- 
 war, both French, and the Dutch had lost one, which was disabled, 
 and sank during the night with great loss of life, they claimed 
 a victory without being able to follow it up, and so disprove th3 
 Dutch claim in the same direction ; for crowded with wounded, 
 and embarrassed with the troops, they were not at all desirous to 
 renew the action, however much it might be necessary to keep a 
 watch on the movements of the Dutch fleet. 
 
 As a consequence of this inaction the Dutch recovered their 
 spirits and hopes, and on the 4th of June they made good 
 their claims by putting to sea to assume the offensive directly. 
 They were near the Allies by noon, but these drew off so persis- 
 tently to the north-westward, that it was not till 5 o'clock in the 
 evening that the battle began (No. 4 on the chart). The various 
 historians are in direct contradiction over the chief events of the 
 battle, which were, whether the Dutch, as Cornelius Tromj) dis- 
 tinctly says they did, chased the Allies to within five miles of Sole 
 Bay, and were only prevented by darkness from continuing the 
 battle,^ or whether the English turned and drove the Dutch back 
 to Schooneveld, which is the English statement. f It may be noted 
 as something in dispute which cannot be settled here. What is 
 material to note is that there was a second battle nine days after 
 the first, in which the Dutch assumed the offensive, and that after 
 it each fleet retired to its own shores. 
 
 Perhaps it may here be usefully remarked that one of the his- 
 torian sj not only admits the unwillingness of the Allies to come to 
 action on account of their being hampered with their wounded, but 
 claims that the Dutch, after their stay on their own coast, were re- 
 inforced and refitted in a way which was impracticable for the 
 Allies at sea. This is, no doubt, possible, though it is denied by 
 the Dutch so far as any reinforcement goes ; but it illustrates the 
 position taken up by a competent authority, not from his knowledge 
 as a seaman, for he was not one, but from his experience as a naval 
 statesman. This was the Duke of York's secretary, Sir William 
 
 • Li/e of Cornelius Tromp, p. 476. 
 
 t Berkley, p. 514. Biirchett, p. 403. Lediard esjilains it, vol. ii., }>. (JUL', by saying 
 the Dutch hciny to windward were able to hold off, and did so. 
 X Lediard, vol. ii., p. GOl. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 71 
 
 Coventry, and Pepys records his opinion in the following words : — 
 " 30th (July 1666).— To Sir W. Coventry, at St. James'. I find 
 him speaking very slightly of the late victory (the victory off the 
 North Foreland, which was followed by the cruise upon the Dutch 
 coast) ; dislikes their staying with their fleet up their coast, be- 
 lieving that the Dutch will come out in fourteen days, and then 
 we, with our unready fleet, by reason of some of the ships being 
 maimed, shall be in bad condition to fight them upon their own 
 coast. "^ Not precisely contemplating the same circumstances, but 
 still with a tendency to the same line of thought, Lord Howe wrote 
 in a similar strain a hundred and thirty years later. Doubtless 
 these views operated on both sides of the North Sea, and militated 
 against any attempt at that persistent watching of Dutch or 
 English ports which was so much enforced in later wars, and so 
 notably on this very Dutch coast by Duncan. Both in liability to 
 damage by weather, and in defective victualling, it must probably 
 be admitted that the ships of the middle of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury and those of the end of the eighteenth differed largely, and 
 v,ith disadvantage in the former period. The practice after this 
 1 tattle, and after so many others, of both sides retiring into port 
 and leaving the sea open, must to some extent be assigned to these 
 causes, though possibly more to mere custom existing till another 
 custom supervened. 
 
 No ships were lost on either side in the encounter of the 4th of 
 June ; but the Dutch authority states that the Allies admitted a 
 loss of over 3,000 men, and this, if true, confirms the account of 
 the crowded state of the ships, and supplies further proof of the 
 reasons why they were not keen about close action. But, notwith- 
 standing the lessons to the contrary which they would seem to have 
 received, as to the great difficulty of making a descent on the 
 enemy's shore until his fleet had been fully and finally dealt with, 
 the Allies were still full of the project ; and having landed their 
 wounded, they took on board 7,000 fresh troops, and put to sea 
 again on the 17th of June. 
 
 But the Dutch meanwhile showed an advance in the art of naval 
 war by detaching a small squadron of observation to the Thames, 
 under Eear- Admiral de Haan, who, on his return, was able to report 
 having seen some 70 men-of-war at anchor off Sheerness, and 
 of having heard that 30,000 troops were to be embarked at Tilbury 
 Hope in preparation for a descent on Zealand. The Dutch found 
 
 * Quoted in Life of Pfi-n, sol. ii., p. -112. ah-cady quoted in chap, iii 
 
72 NAVAL WAIIFAIIE. 
 
 themselves unable to bring together sufficient naval force to make 
 sure of fighting on something of an equality with the 60 English 
 and 30 French ships of war which appeared before the Maas 
 and Schevelling* on the 23rd and 24th of June. In proximity to 
 the 70 Dutch ships ready in the waters of Zealand, no descent 
 was attempted, and the Allies passed to the northward off the 
 Texel, along the coasts of Holland and Friesland to Vlie, Ameland 
 and the Western Ems, and then back to the Texel again. 
 
 The only claim made by the English historians to success in this 
 demonstration is that it harassed the enemy's troops on the coast, 
 and kept them continually alert ; that it blocked up his ports, and 
 endangered his returning East India merchant fleet, of which, 
 however, but one was taken. On the other hand, a fleet crowded 
 up with troops, which were made no use of whatever, was in almost 
 a critical condition in case even the inferior Dutch fleet should 
 come upon it. 
 
 The Dutch stood these insults and threatenings to their coast for 
 n fortnight, and then, about the 3rd of August, about the time that 
 the Allies got back off the Texel, they put to sea, and stood along- 
 shore to the northward. Foul winds, and possibly great caution, 
 hindered their progress, so that it was not till the 10th of August 
 that the fleets sighted each other, and about eight o'clock in the 
 morning joined in a furious and final battle for that command of 
 the sea which had never yet fallen, and was not now to fall, fully 
 into the hands of either power. 
 
 The Allies were, as before observed, 90 strong under the former 
 commanders — Rupert, D'Estrees, and Spragge. But a trust was 
 once more placed in the French, which they were once more and 
 finally to betray. D'Estrees commanded the white squadron, which 
 was composed entirely of his own ships. The Dutch were 70 strong, 
 under De Euiter, Cornelius Tromp, and Bankert. The fight that 
 ensued is said by the author of Colwmia Rostrata to hav§ been 
 •* like a general war of the elements," and it lasted tin after sunset 
 (No. 5 on the' chart). This could not have been, considering 
 the great numerical inferiority of the Dutch, had not D'Estrees 
 from the very first held aloof and left the English and Dutch to 
 fight it out while he looked on. Tromp was in the Golden Lion, 
 and Spragge in the Prince.f These tvvo fell upon one another, 
 until both ships were so disabled that they shifted their flags to 
 
 * Scheveningen, the port of the Hague. 
 
 + The historians say the Roi/al Prince, but it was probably the Prince, UO, built at 
 Chatham in 1670. See Charnock, vol. ii., p. 42G. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 1^\ 
 
 the Comet and St. George, and fell upon one another again. The 
 St. George became a second ship disabled under the feet of the 
 English admiral, and he then passed into a boat to go on board the 
 Royal Charles ; but on his way a shot cut his boat in two, and he 
 was drowned. In other parts of the fleet equally stubborn contests 
 were carried out, but in the end it does not seem to have been con- 
 tested that the Dutch were victors. There was very slight loss of 
 ships on either side ; the English admitted a yacht sunk, and the 
 Dutch only allow a loss of a few fire-ships, either sunk or " uselessly 
 spent ; " but there was great loss of men and officers. The English, 
 besides Spragge, lost four captains, and the Dutch lost two vice- 
 admirals, de Liefde, and Sweers, with two captains, and many 
 superior officers wounded. The destruction of men in the English 
 fleet was said to be very heavy, no doubt from their crowded con- 
 dition. The Dutch claim to have kept the sea till the 12th Sep- 
 tember, without sign of any attempt by the English to contest their 
 substantial victory. 
 
 This was the last act of the war. The English nation was sick 
 of a Catholic alliance against a Protestant State, and the navy was 
 heartily sick of consorts in battle whose policy it was to induce 
 them to enter into action with inferior forces of their own, and 
 then to leave them to do the best they could. Peace was concluded 
 in February 1664, and the next time destiny brought English and 
 Dutch into hostile naval operations, she brought them in side by 
 side in the third possible change of alliance between the three 
 great European nations. It had been first Dutch and French 
 against the English, out of which very little had come. It was 
 next French and English against the Dutch, out of which only a 
 little more had come. It was next to be English and Dutch 
 against the French, out of which a great deal was to come. 
 
 I have, perhaps, sufficiently remarked upon the leading charac- 
 teristics of the first and second Dutch wars, and how the first was 
 carried on with the idea that the command of the sea was not a 
 primary necessity ; that an extensive commerce, which was in a 
 sense the life-food of the State, might be protected by forces which 
 were only large enough to contend on a fair equality with the 
 enemy's war-ships bent on the capture or destruction of the very 
 thing which the Dutch forces were assembled to protect ; how the 
 enemy, the English, with a smaller commerce, and consequently 
 less distractions, were able to devote themselves almost completely 
 to assuming the offensive ; how, after pursuing this policy through- 
 out the first war, the Dutch, learning their lesson, wholly changed 
 
n NAVAL WAHFARE. 
 
 it on the outbreak of the second war, and practically held their 
 own, though with marked signs of inferiority, in a direct contention 
 for the command of the sea, throughout it ; and then, having 
 reached firm ground in the wanderings of experience, held to it 
 on the outbreak of the third war, and maintained it with really 
 improved success throughout its course. 
 
 These are broad principles which lie, as it were, in prominent 
 boulders on the plain landscape, as we survey, in the brief and not 
 keenly critical or too closely investigating way we have done in 
 these chapters, the further formation of the rules of naval war. As 
 to what may specially come from a comparison of the general con- 
 duct of the third war with that which characterized the second, I 
 think we may almost say that impatience with the method adopted 
 in the second war was manifested on both sides in the third. There 
 had been a descent on the shipping in the Vlie, which had been 
 extraordinarily successful to the English and extraordinarily 
 damaging to the Dutch. There had been a descent by the Dutch 
 on the dismantled war-ships of the English at Chatham, which, 
 though quite as successful to the Dutch, could only have been made 
 up by the counters representing insult, to the damage they had 
 suffered in the Vlie. Then, again, there had been Tiddiman's un- 
 successful attempt on the merchant fleet at Bergen, and men must 
 have considered that probably a heavier force would have suc- 
 ceeded. 
 
 Altogether, when the third war broke out, there must have been 
 a good deal of floating feeling about in favour of something more 
 dramatic and telling than a continuation of the long string of 
 pitched battles, which wound its way back through twenty years of 
 remembrance ; and so there is soon on the side of the Dutch the 
 idea of snatching an advantage, not by necessary exertion and 
 sacrifice, but by something with a preponderating element of chance 
 in it. So the stone ships to block the Thames are prepared, and 
 so, if some of the historians are right, does the scheme come to 
 nothing, because the presence of superior English force eliminates 
 chance. So do the English take on board troops for a descent on 
 the Dutch shores, as it seems, on the chance that the Dutch fleet 
 would not interfere ; and then, after it is found how ranch the 
 Dutch fleet does interfere, and has to be fought off the Schooneveld 
 twice ; and how heavy the loss of life has been in consequence, so 
 far as we may gather, of too great reliance upon chance, even then 
 this desire of a descent favoured by chance is not weakened. Fresh 
 troops are embarked, who appear to have been useful as targets 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 75 
 
 for the Dutch chiefly in the one operation — a general action of 
 the old type — in which it was found feasible to engage. 
 
 It may be difficult to say with the materials before me — there 
 may be none, in fact, which would give us the exact truth — but yet 
 there is ground for believing that men did not lay sufficient stress 
 on the circumstances surrounding the successes of the Vlie and 
 the Medway, and hoped for the successes without the presence of 
 like conditions. 
 
 Sandwich need have had no apprehensions in detaching Tiddi- 
 man early in August, for he was there himself with a full and 
 victorious fleet, the Dutch having been, not two months before, 
 frightfully beaten back into their ports, and full of the confusions, 
 bickerings, and divided counsels, that the beaten side is prone to. 
 
 When Eupert and Albemarle detached Sir Kobert Holms on the 
 peculiarly successful enterprise in the Vlie, it was but a fortnight 
 after the Dutch, thoroughly beaten in the battle off the North 
 Foreland, had been driven behind the shelter of their shoals, 
 leaving the victorious English entirely unopposed at sea ; and when 
 the Dutch made their appearance in the Medway, and carried off 
 and burnt some of our finest war-ships, it was because the English 
 had deliberately disarmed and unmanned those ships, clearly anti- 
 cipating, and recording their anticipation three months before, that 
 they would be attacked in the way they were. And on such 
 grounds, the Dutch would have shown greater wisdom and pre- 
 science had they postponed all idea of blocking up the Thames in 
 1673 until they were assured of being able to protect the detach- 
 ment employed in the duty ; and the Allies would have shown a 
 clearer apprehension of the situation had they been fully prepared 
 to guarantee a landing without interruption from the Dutch fleet, 
 without loss of communication with their own ships after landing, 
 and with security for their re-embarkation. The histories do not 
 tell us why these troops were so uselessly and so slaughterously 
 carried about for two weeks on the Dutch coast, but reading 
 between the lines, we seem to see that it was the want of these 
 guarantees that enforced it. 
 
 One of the earlier historians considers that the advance of the 
 Dutch to fight the battle of the 4th of June was an unusual proceed- 
 ing on their part, ** for, from the first action against the English in 
 these seas, anno 1652, till this time, they had seldom voluntarily 
 engaged out of sight of their own coast ; nor had they ever been 
 the aggressors in any one considerable fight, except twice, when 
 they had the fortune to surprise the English, first in the Downs, 
 
76 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 in the time of Blake, and then in Souldbay, the former year 
 (1672)."^ I hardly think we can say that this was so, unless we 
 injudiciously mingle the question of strategy which would deter- 
 mine the locality of the battle, and the question of tactics which 
 would determine its conduct. At present I hardly touch at all 
 upon the tactics pursued in these wars, and may dismiss Colli- 
 ber's observation with the remark that inasmuch as it generally 
 happened that the Dutch were to leeward, not by their choice, 
 but by the accident of wind, it was hardly in their power in 
 those days to become tactically the aggressors. Strategically, I 
 think, we must rather accept the opposite view, and say that the 
 Dutch in the three wars showed latterly a greater and not a 
 less tendency to fight near home. In the first war, the last 
 battle off the Texel was the only one which could properly be said 
 to have been fought on the Dutch coast, and in the second war, 
 the capture of the cruisers by Eobertson off the Texel was the only 
 fight on that side of the water. In the third war, on the other 
 hand, three out of the four great battles were fought on the Dutch 
 side of the North Sea ; and I hardly think it was choice on the 
 part of the Hollanders. I should say rather that a review of all 
 the circumstances would show that they felt a decreasing power as 
 each war went on, so that if the English had of themselves been 
 as determined to beat the Dutch off the sea in 1672-73 as they 
 had been in 1652-54, the war might have taken a different form, 
 and the Dutch might have been pressed closer home than they 
 were ; but the third war was distasteful to the prevailing opinion 
 in England, and the alliance with France served as an economy, 
 not as an increase of force. 
 
 "Without going more thoroughly into statistics than is conform- 
 able to the scope of this work, I cannot say how the question of 
 the protection and loss of commerce may have affected exactly 
 the conduct of the war and its popularity. My principal autho- 
 rity tells me that in the third war the loss of merchant ships by 
 capture on both sides was considerable, but that it was greater 
 on the side of the English than on that of the Dutch, simply 
 because the Dutch prohibition left only the homeward-bound ships 
 open to the English attack.f The immense destruction at the 
 Vhe, and the considerable captures of the ships from Bergen, had 
 in the second war probably far over-balanced the scale as against 
 the Dutch ; while in the first Dutch war we might almost say 
 
 • Columna Rostrnta, p. 'JSS. t Colmnna liostn/ta, p. 2.".0. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 77 
 
 that the main efifort had been immediately directed upon their 
 enemy's commerce by the English. But if, while the battles of 
 the war fleets, in consequence of the defections of the French, were 
 fought without adequate result, and if English commerce had been 
 suffering to a greater extent than that of the Dutch, there was 
 some business objection to join to the moral one, and demand a 
 cessation of the third war. English merchant shipping was 
 immensely on the increase, as in 1688 it was estimated to have 
 doubled since 1666, and if the Dutch by the prohibition of their 
 own commerce were able to make the English losses proportion- 
 ately the greater, the gain in so acting could be demonstrated. 
 
 All these wars were begun and ended on the sea. Even the 
 successful raids that were made into territory extended hardly 
 beyond the water territory, and the prizes drawn were water 
 prizes. We may say it was the near equality of the combatants 
 in every way which kept the battles off the land. When it was 
 found difficult to get through with arrangements for even mere 
 rushes at the land, the organizing of great expeditions such as 
 Spain had set her heart on was out of the question. The wars 
 adhered to the more unstable element simply, perhaps, because 
 neither side could get off it. 
 
 While all that was really important in the drama was played in 
 Fu opean waters, the byplot circulated in more distant parts of 
 the world, wherever there were English or Dutch interests to 
 attack or defend. In the first war. Van Galen on the one side 
 and Commodore Bodley on the other fought in the Mediterranean 
 over the right to carry on their own commerce unmolested, and to 
 prevent the other from carrying on any at all, and did it with 
 varying fortunes. 
 
 And then the old system of cross-raiding, begun in an irregular 
 war of reprisals, was ushered in and continued amongst the 
 distant possessions of both States in Africa and in the West 
 Indies. Sir Eobert Holms, entirely unopposed because no attempt 
 or preparation to oppose him was or could have been made, ravaged 
 down the West Coast of Africa, as already mentioned, to Cape 
 Verd, Goree, Elmina, which withstood him, and Cape Coast 
 Castle. Then he passed over to New Netherlaud, as New York 
 was then called, and reduced it, because there was nothing to 
 prevent him doing so. And then came the other side ; for news 
 reaching Holland of the mischief that had been quietly done, 
 the Dutch Government proceeded to undo it again, or to do it 
 over again equally secretly. De Kuiter, then at Cadiz, slipped 
 
78 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 away quietly in Sir Eobert Holms' footsteps, to retake, if possible, 
 all that had been taken. He was, in some cases, successful, and 
 he took the original English post of Fort Cormantin, though Cape 
 Coast Castle and Chama held out against him. Then passing 
 over to Barbados, he found himself not strong enough for more 
 than the capture of merchant ships which were there, and at 
 Monserrat, Nevis, and Newfoundland, after which he returned 
 home to be placed in command of the home fleet as we have 
 Seen. 
 
 But later on, in 1666-67, we had that tranfer and re-transfer of 
 islands in the West Indies from State to State which, from 
 beginning to end, seems to have been characteristic of war in 
 those latitudes. The English began by taking St. Eustace, 
 Tobago, and other places from the Dutch. Then the Dutch, 
 under Commodore Quiryns, made themselves masters of Surinam. 
 Next the French and Dutch together all but possessed themselves 
 of half the Island of St. Christopher's. A naval expedition from 
 Barbados, to restore things at the former island, failed on account 
 of dispersal by wind. The Dutch still gaining strength, Evertson 
 recovered Tobago, and made many prizes on the coast of Virginia. 
 But then Sir John Harman arrived f.*om England at St. Christo- 
 pher's with twelve frigates, in March 1667. This made a concen- 
 tration of the French and Dutch necessary, and stopped the 
 raiding till it was decided which nation was to have the control in 
 these waters. There was a general action in May off St. Christo- 
 pher's, as to which the immediate results are disputed ; but the 
 ultimate result was the separation of the French and Dutch, 
 leaving the English in command of the sea, and enabling them to 
 retake Surinam. 
 
 An early operation of the third war was the recapture of Tobago 
 by five or six ships and a regiment of foot from Barbados, under 
 Sir Thomas Bridger. On the other side, the Dutch population 
 possessed themselves of the Island of St. Helena, and drove the 
 English Governor and people into the ships at anchor. But 
 Commodore Mondy with four ships-of-war, on his way to offer 
 convoy to the East India fleet, wanting fresh water and perceiving 
 he must retake the Island to get it, proceeded to that business and 
 concluded it. 
 
 These special features of naval war will probably have to be 
 reconsidered in some detail before we have done with them, in 
 order to get more closely at their principles. We may say that in 
 all the wai's where tlie command of the sea was incomplete, and 
 
STRUGGLE FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA. 79 
 
 where territories which might be captured were tenable after 
 capture, this kind of thing went on. I beHeve, so far as I can see, 
 that at the moment all that is before us is to note how closely 
 conquest_ follows the naval steps, and how all other power is, as it 
 were, swallowed up by naval power. It is not, of course, that even 
 in this very early stage, we do not see how naval force may be 
 rendered unable to effect its purpose ; but the general result 
 seems to give great preponderance to him who has the power over 
 the water, and each possessor of this power seems to sweep all 
 up as it progresses, leaving it to be again swept up by the next 
 naval possessor of the broom. 
 
 'rrj^-y^ 
 
8C NAVAL WAPxFARR. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Differentiation of Naval Force. 
 
 The promiscuous system of fij^bting in the early days of naval warfare did not tend 
 to the production of any particular classes of ships. — ^The rise of the line of battle- 
 tended to increase the force of the ships forming part of it, and to equalize their power. 
 — At the same time the pursuit and defence of commerce tended to develop a lighter 
 class of ships. — The necessities of a fleet in having proper look-outs demanded a third 
 class. — The results of these tendencies are traced down to 1813. 
 
 In the previous chapters I have endeavoured to trace the rise 
 of true naval war and its nature ; and then to show how, owing 
 to the position which sea-borne commerce takes as the major 
 part of the wealth and stability of nations, there may be, and 
 have been, wars wholly naval — wars where the oj)erations on the 
 land, or against the land, have been insignificant, or else wholly 
 absent, in comparison with the operations on the water. 
 
 But as naval war arose and developed without premeditation,, 
 and even without knowledge at first of what it really meant, it 
 followed that it was only by degrees that men came to understand 
 what kinds of naval force were required in the economies of naval 
 war, and how these kinds of force could be most effectively dis- 
 tributed. If the first Anglo-Dutch war exhibited itself on a wholly 
 new plan, a plan which had never been seen in the world before, 
 it was quite possible to regard it as something exceptional, and to 
 suppose that earlier types of war might revive. It did not follow 
 at once that maritime nations should prepare for that kind of war, 
 and no other ; it was not certain that this struggle for the com- 
 mand of the sea was for ever after to be the one aim of naval 
 nations, in the first instance ; and that unless there was at the 
 outbreak of the war excess of power on one side sufficient to assert. 
 and maintain it, the Anglo-Dutch type of war was permanent. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 81 
 
 But when a second and a third war succeeded, of which the Unes 
 were, if anything, marked out in deeper cuts than ever, it could 
 not but follow that all who had control over naval services should 
 endeavour to prepare them for that kind of war and no other. 
 
 And what, so far, was this kind of war ? It was, doubtless, chiefly 
 a series of general actions between the most powerful forces that 
 each side could bring to bear against the other. Secondarily, it 
 was the defence and attack of commerce at sea. Thirdly, it was 
 the attack and defence of commerce in port, supplemented here 
 and there by attempts to damage the sources of naval strength, 
 and to a very small extent by attempts to damage property on 
 land. It had been made clear that the defence and attack of 
 commerce could, and sometimes must, go on side by side with the 
 direct struggle for the command of the sea ; but equally clear that 
 the power against which the balance turned by ever so little in the 
 great primary contest, was terribly handicapped as to the defence 
 of its commerce. It had also been fully demonstrated that it was 
 entirely hopeless to think of making attacks on shipping in port, 
 on sources of war supply, or on property on land, unless there 
 were at least an assured local command of the sea surrounding 
 the point attacked. This was possibly the lesson least easy to 
 learn, seeing that until the advent of the Dutch wars the system 
 of cross-raiding had not been abandoned. 
 
 Almost obviously some differentiation of naval force should have 
 followed the determination of the Dutch in the second and third 
 wars to abandon all attempts to defend their commerce, and by 
 consequence to suppress it for the time. On the Dutch side, their 
 whole power would be thrown into the form which was considered 
 most suitable for the great fleet action, but they might also have 
 looked to a small expenditure on vessels most suitable for attack- 
 ing the commerce of the enemy at sea. On the English side, the 
 knowledge that the Dutch were determined to throw their whole 
 energies into the general fleet action, as a direct endeavour to get 
 such a command of the sea as would enable them to restore their 
 commerce, would compel special attention to the preparation of the 
 fleet for general action. The absence of Dutch commerce would 
 equally divert attention from the provision of means for commerce 
 attack, and there would remain commerce defence. But even here 
 the attitude of the Dutch would have been such as not to arouse 
 great apprehension, and, therefore, even commerce defence might 
 have held in general estimation a subordinate place. 
 
 Strategically, the effect was on both sides towards a dif- 
 
82 NAVAL WAllFAUE. 
 
 ferentiation of force into that wliicli was considered most 
 suitable for the general fleet action, and that supposed most 
 efficient for the attack and defence of commerce, apart from those 
 great efforts which had characterized the first Dutch war, but 
 which were eliminated from the second and third by reason of the 
 Dutch withdrawal of their merchant ships from sea. Further, the 
 strategical effect of the time was to minimise the force set apart 
 for the secondary object. 
 
 The practice of privateering may be supposed to have tended 
 still more to minimise the provision of public force for the attack 
 on commerce. We have seen already* that, in the reign of 
 Elizabeth, the practice of allowing subjects to fit out war-ships 
 for preying on the enemy's commerce was in full force. The 
 historians speak less of it in the Dutch wars, but still say enough 
 to assure us that it was in effective force. To some extent, it 
 relieved the states on both sides from the provision of a large force 
 of vessels for the attack on commerce. 
 
 But if the strategical conditions of naval war thus tended to a 
 differentiation, the tactical conditions tended even more strongly 
 that way. When the general action — the purely naval action of 
 ships under sail— took, in the first Dutch war, its place as a revival 
 of the military battle of the ancients and of the middle ages 
 on the water, it was a novelty, and there was little sense either 
 that it would ultimately require particular classes of ships or 
 assume any particular form. Preparations for a sea-fight had not, 
 before this time, assumed either characteristic. There was no 
 differentiation of force, and hardly any adoption of form. 
 
 We have seen that on the part of Spain, in 1588, the idea of a 
 regular sea-fight appears to have been altogether absent. There 
 was in the Spanish Armada, in fact, no differentiation of force^ 
 and no established order of fight. 
 
 But neither was there on our own side. We collected an im- 
 mense force, but in the lists handed down to us there is no sign of 
 any classification, of any gathering together of classes of ships for 
 the purpose of concerted action. There were several lists or 
 groupings of the ships, but all of them without classification. There 
 were 34 ships serving with the Lord High Admiral, all apparently 
 Queen's ships, and their gradations went steadily down from the 
 Triumph, of 1,100 tons and 500 men, to the Signet, of 30 tons and 
 20 men. Of 10 ships " serving by tonnage with the Lord Admiral," 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 83 
 
 the gradation of class descended pretty evenly, from the Edward 
 of Maldon, of 180 tons and 30 men, to the Pepjnn, of 20 tons and 
 8 men. With Sir Francis Drake were 32 ships, from the galleon 
 Leicester, of 400 tons and 160 men, to the Carvel, of 30 tons and 
 24 men; and so on through several other divisions consisting of 
 smaller ships, but each list offering a gradual fall in the force of 
 the ships from the highest to the lowest."^ 
 
 An analysis of the lists gives us 197 ships in all, manned by 
 15,785 men. The tonnage of some are omitted, but that of 175 of 
 them came to 29,744 tons, and their sizes were thus distributed : — 
 
 Ships, Tons. Sbijis. Tons. 
 
 1 
 
 - 1,100 
 
 5 
 
 - 300 
 
 1 
 
 - 1,000 
 
 7 
 
 - 250 
 
 2 
 
 800 
 
 26 
 
 - about 200 
 
 3 
 
 . 600 
 
 33 
 
 - 150 
 
 G 
 
 500 
 
 19 
 
 - 100 
 
 5 
 
 400 
 
 66 
 
 - under 100 
 
 1 
 
 360 
 
 
 
 There are thus no gaps, no points at which we can say, here are 
 a group of ships suited to one purpose, and here a group suited to 
 another. All the traces of classification fall into the one fact that 
 as the ships grow smaller so they grow more numerous. 
 
 A list of the navy at the Queen's death in 1603, handed down to 
 us by Sir William Monson, supplies the following analysis : — 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 2 
 
 - 1,000 
 
 2 
 
 - 400 
 
 3 
 
 900 
 
 3 
 
 - about 300 
 
 3 
 
 800 
 
 7 
 
 - 200 
 
 2 
 
 700 
 
 3 
 
 - 100 
 
 4 
 
 - 600 
 
 8 
 
 - under 100 
 
 4 
 
 500 
 
 
 
 In this list we have the same steady gradation downwards, from 
 the most to the least powerful ships, but with the difference that 
 the smaller ships are not so numerous, there being 20 ships 
 of 400 tons and upwards and only 21 below that size. This is 
 probably explained by the practice, which then obtained so largely, 
 of mingling private enterprise with that of the State ;, so that de- 
 pendence was placed on 4he merchants to supply the smaller vessp'is 
 required. 
 
 * See Charnock's History of Marine Architecture, vol. n.. p. ^'•^• 
 
 J 
 
 I 
 
84 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 Take, again, the list of the Queen's ships in the expedition of 
 Essex to Cadiz,* and we find 17 ships which, as the fighting force, 
 did not carry soldiers. There were 3 ships with crews of 340 men, 
 6 with 200 to 300 men, 2 with from 100 to 200 men, and 6 carry- 
 ing under 100. Here still is the regular gradation from large to 
 small, without any sign of classification or grouping such as would 
 lead us to infer adaptation to particular purposes. 
 
 But in the early part of the seventeenth century there was a 
 tendency to group the ships, which afterwards developed into the 
 well-known system of rating which has only fallen out of use 
 in our own day. But the proposal of Sir Kohert Dudley (Duke of 
 Northumberland), referred to, and the subsequent systems of classi- 
 fication and rating, were not prompted by considerations either 
 strategical or tactical, having to do apparently only with conve- 
 nient nomenclature, account, and finance. 
 
 Dudley's classification was as follows: — (1) The galleon, oi 80 
 guns ; (2) the ramhargo, a light frigate or pinnace ; (3) the gali- 
 zahra, a galleas ; (4) the frigata ; (5) the galeron, a galley ; (6) 
 the galerata, a small galley ; (7) the imssa-volante, a dispatch 
 vessel. 
 
 From the nature of this grouping, it is plain that the attempted 
 classification was no more than a desire to put into order that 
 which had no order, and to group several diverse classes into one 
 or two which fairly represented the mean of them. This plan of 
 grouping was not adopted, though it may have hastened the adop- 
 tion of another one. This was the one adopted by His Majesty's 
 Commissioners originally appointed to report on the state of the 
 navy on the 12th February 1618. They reported on the numbers 
 and tonnage of the ships they found, but it was not till they came 
 to propose what the navy should be that they used any classification, 
 or found any necessary. Then that which they used, and which re- 
 mained the official classification for many years, had nothing to do 
 with strategy or tactics, but was solely an administrative device. 
 The navy proposed to be maintained and classed was : — 
 
 4 •' Ships Koyall," 800 to 1,200 tons. 
 14 " Great Ships," 600 to 800 „ 
 6 "Middling Ships," 450 „ 
 
 2 " Small Ships," 350 „ 
 
 4 "Pinnaces," 80 to 250 tons.f 
 
 Not only do we detect no strategical or tactical idea in the names, 
 
 * See Charnock, vol. ii., p. 151. f Ibid., vol. ii., p. 247. 
 
 \ 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 85 
 
 but the descending dimensions are regular, and all that we can 
 certainly assure ourselves of is that there was, for some reason or 
 another, a preference for ships of nearly, but not quite, the largest 
 class. 
 
 In a list of the navy at the close of James I.'s reign, 33 ships are 
 given ; but except for the increase in the numbers of ships of from 
 600 to 900 tons, the descent is steady from 1,200 tons and 55 guns 
 to 80 tons, as if there were an equal use for all sorts of ships, 
 except for those carrying 32 to 44 guns, and of from 600 to 900 
 tons.* 
 
 The system of dividing the larger ships of the British Navy into 
 six rates appears to have been introduced during the Common- 
 wealth. It was certainly fully adopted as early as 1660. About 
 this time it was recognized that first rates carried over 70 guns ; 
 second rates, 60 to 70 ; third rates, 50 to 60 ; fourth rates, 38 to 
 50 ; fifth rates, 22 to 30 ; and sixth rates, 10 to 20. What we have 
 to observe is that the divisions and classes are all administrative 
 and financial. Nearly every man's pay, from the captain down- 
 wards, was regulated by the rate of the ship he happened to be 
 serving in. But apart from this, there was the convenience — 
 largely used — of speaking of the rate instead of the ship ; and for 
 years the master shipwrights at the yards received orders to build 
 such and such a rate, and they were not expected to ask for any 
 directions after receiving this simple order. 
 
 But if we reflect for a moment over this early constitution of the 
 " rates," we can see that it not only omits to notice what strategy 
 and tactics might demand, but it is the negation of it, supposing 
 strategy and tactics should demand anything but a regular grada- 
 tion of force. On the face of it, if we have such a classification as 
 is just described, the inference is that we are going to build an 
 equal number of each class. The last thing we should think of is 
 that, for the purposes of war, some of these classes will require to 
 be immensely swelled, and some reduced to a minimum, if not 
 eliminated altogether. So the establishment of a series of rates or 
 ranks, which lasted all through our wars, and which existed, in 
 theory at least, till some seven years ago, may have been a direct 
 hindrance to naval progress, which experience, indeed, perceived 
 and threw off, but which was, nevertheless, a hindrance as long as 
 it lasted. 
 
 The system of rating in a regular gradation downwards seems to 
 
 * Charnoek, vol. ii., p. 274. 
 
80 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 have been common to several nations during the latter part of the 
 seventeenth centm-y. My chief authority, Charnock, is sometimes 
 not quite satisfactory as to accuracy in minor matters, and I think he 
 would be guilty of interpolating into original documents, by way of 
 explaining them, without giving full notice that he has done so. 
 Therefore, when he gives us, without quoting his authority, a table 
 of the strength of the French Navy in 1681, under the head of five 
 " rates " and four smaller groups, we are not altogether certain 
 whether or no the rates are an interpolation. However, as given, 
 the first rates average 90 guns, the second 72 guns, the third 53 
 guns, the fourth 42 guns, the fifth 30 guns ; and then there are 
 *' small frigates," fire-ships, barca-longas, and pinks.* 
 
 But it may be said that navies and fleets about the time of the 
 outbreak of the first Dutch war — that is, about the middle of the 
 seventeenth century — pretty fairly conformed to the ideal put for- 
 ward in the system of rating, and ships were built less with the 
 view of definite duties corresponding to their size and strength, than 
 with the view of completing the tale of each particular rate in some 
 approach to numerical symmetry. 
 
 The British Navy stood thus on the 27th December 1G53 : — 
 
 1st Bates: 3 of 891 to 1,556 tons, 61 to 104 guns, and 350 to 
 700 men. 
 
 2nd Bates : 11 of 721 to 875 tons, 54 to iJQ guns, and 2G0 to 400 
 men. 
 
 3rd Bates : 11 of 532 to 800 tons, 44 to 60 guns, and 200 to 300 
 men. 
 
 4th Bates : 63 of 301 to 700 tons, 28 to 50 guns, and 100 to 220 
 men. 
 
 5th Bates : 35 of 105 to 500 tons, 12 to 36 guns, and 30 to 200 
 men. 
 
 6th Bates : 9 of 55 to 255 tons, 6 to 36 guns, and 25 to 130 men. 
 
 4 fire-ships of 10 guns and 30 men. 
 
 8 victuallers of 10 to 12 guns, and 30 to 40 men. 
 
 In this list, though the mass of the ships are absorbed in the 
 fourth and fifth rates, these rates themselves cover a very wide field, 
 being as high as 50-gun ships, and as low as 12, pointing still more 
 clearly towards the administrative rather than the tactical or 
 strategical origin of the system of rating. 
 
 But this date, 1653, was one where already the experience of war 
 had had its effect. Two years and a half before, there had been the 
 same number of first and second rates, but only 7 third rates, and 
 
 * Charnock, vol. ii., p. 310. 
 
THE DU FERES TLATIOS OF NAVAL FOliCE. 87 
 
 20 fourth rates, and only 4 fifth rates. The result of the experience 
 of war had been, therefore, to increase the numbers of the middle- 
 class ships. We must remember what we have seen the nature of 
 this war to be — namely, one where the attack and defence of a 
 commerce which was collected in great masses formed the moving 
 principle. It does not seem impossible to connect the increase of 
 middle-sized ships directly with such a method of carrying on the 
 war ; but, then, I think we must allow that the fleet action, pure 
 and simple, fell into the second place. And there was as yet little 
 in the fleet action to cause the clear differentiation which it after- 
 wards did. 
 
 I am not now going into the tactical question more than to trace 
 its bearing on the differentiation of force ; but it is essential that 
 we should keep in mind that up to the end of the first Dutch war 
 the tactics employed were of a kind that allowed all classes of 
 ships, without distinction, to take part in a general action. We 
 have already seen that this was so, and it is made clear to us, from 
 the numbers of ships employed, that the whole navy on each side, 
 ships large and small, fought together. 
 
 Sir William Monson, writing between 1635 and 1640 probably, 
 gives us a very fair view of the tactical ideas in his earlier days, 
 and the point at which they had arrived when he wrote ; and we 
 can see all through that there was nothing to lead the men of that 
 day to set apart particular classes of ships for the general action. 
 Indiscriminate numbers rather than selected types would probably 
 have represented the idea of force in the naval mind under the 
 circumstances. 
 
 The strict ordering of battles by ships [says Sir William Monson] was before the 
 invention of the bowline, for then there was no sailing but before the wind, nor no 
 fighting but by boarding ; whereas, now, a ship will sail within six points of thirty-two, 
 and by the advantage of wind may rout any fleet that is placed in that (the half-moon) 
 form of battle. 
 
 The weather at sea is never certain, the winds variable, ships unequal in sailing: 
 and when they strictly seek to keep their order, commonly they fall foul one of 
 another ; and in such cases they are more careful to observe their directions than to 
 offend the enemy, whereby they will be brought into disorder amongst themselves. 
 
 Suppose a fleet to be placed in the form of a half moon, or other proportion to fight. 
 if an enemy charge them home in any of the corners of the half-moon, they will be 
 f'jrced to bear up room into their main battle ; and there will ensue dangers and 
 disorders of boarding one another, insomuch that it will not be possible for a general 
 to give new dii-ections, but every ship must light at its will, not by command. 
 
 For the avoiding of such confusion, the instructions of a general ought not to consist 
 of many words, for the greatest adva,ntage in a sea-fight is to get the wind of ono 
 another; for he that has the wind is out of danger of being boarded, and has tLo 
 advantage where to board, and how to attempt the enemv. . . . 
 
 The wind being thus gotten, a general need give no other directions than to every 
 
88 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 adniinil of a squiiJron to draw together their squadrons, and everyone to undertake 
 nis opposite squadron, or where he shall do it for his greatest advantage but to be sure 
 to take a good distance from one another, and to relieve that squadron that shall be 
 over-charged or distressed. 
 
 Let them give warning to their ships not to venture so far as to bring themselves to 
 leeward of the enemy ; for so shall they either dishonour themselves, to see such a ship 
 taken in their view, or in seeking to relieve her they shall bring themselves to leeward, 
 and lose the advantage they had formerly gotten ; for it will be in the power of the 
 enemy to board them, and they not to avoid it which was the only thing coveted by 
 the Spaniards in our time of vrar by reason of the advantage of their ships, as I have 
 before es,pressed.* 
 
 Confirmatory of these views as to the methods of fighting wliich 
 were in vogue when the first Dutch war broke out, we have the 
 orders of the Earl of Lindsey to tlie captains of his fleet which he 
 fitted out in 1635. 
 
 If we happen [he says] to descry any fleet at sea, which we may probably know or 
 conjecture designs to oppose, encounter, or affront us, I will first strive to get the 
 wind (if I be to leeward), and so shall the whole fleet in due order do the like, and when 
 we come to join battle, no ship shall presume to assault the admiral, vice-admiral, or 
 rear-admiral, but only myself, my vice-admiral, or rear-admiral, if we be able to reach 
 them ; and the other ships are to match themselves accordingly as they can, and to 
 secure one another as cause shall require, not wasting their powder at small vessels or 
 victuallers, nor fii'ing till they come side to side.f 
 
 This promiscuous sort of fighting, which is fairly well exhibited 
 in the plate opposite, might take in ships of every class, and 
 (lid not tend to set up any one class over any other. But the 
 opening of the Dutch wars brought the fire-ship into prominence, 
 and in the early battles it was a terrible weapon. But, this being 
 so, it was only natural that some measures should be taken to 
 reduce its power. One great source of this power was the way in 
 which the ships during a fight were distributed in masses, for a 
 fire-ship drifting down from to windward upon such a mass was 
 certain to grapple some ship. Again, it was soon discovered that 
 a promiscuous attack and defence was a very uncertain and a very 
 unsatisfactory one. We have seen how much all the great actions 
 in the Dutch wars partook of the character of pitched battles, and 
 the fact must have appealed with double force to those who had 
 the conduct of naval affairs in charge at the time. 
 
 The Dutch seem to have been earliest in devising means both to 
 weaken the power of the fire-ships, and to bring the fleet not only 
 under better cor.trol, but into such form as would insure the 
 exertion of its collective power. This was the establishment of the 
 Line as the fighting formation, and we get it in the English navy 
 
 * IMonson in ChnrchiWs Voyages, vol. iii , p. 320. 
 t Itjid., vol. iii., p. 297. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 89 
 
 as early as March 31st, 1655. Probably no doubt exists to prevent 
 us giving to Sir William Penn the full credit of commencing the 
 great tactical revolution. We have it in the " Instructions for the 
 better ordering of the fleet in fighting," issued at that date by 
 Blake, Monk, Disbrowe, and Penn ; but it will be seen that, though 
 we have the Line introduced, it is done, as it were, tentatively, and 
 without any of that conviction which gave it in after years so rigid 
 a position in naval tactics. Article 2 ssiys : — 
 
 At siglit of the said fleet (an enemy's fleet), the viee-admii-al, or he that commands 
 in chief in the second place, and his squadron, as also the rear-admiral, or he that 
 commands in chief in the third place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can 
 to come up to the admiral on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right, and the rear- 
 admiral on the left ; giving a competent distance for the admiral's squadron, if the wind 
 will permit, and there be sea-room enough.* 
 
 Here we have the old idea of promiscuous fighting in squadrons 
 prevailing, an idea which would admit of all classes of ships taking 
 their share in the fight, the notion — traceable in previous quotations, 
 and in this, so far — being that ships would seek out their matches 
 and fight the battle out in a series of duels. But in Article 3 we 
 have, faintly and tentatively, the new idea. 
 
 As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a signal by firing two guns, 
 and putting out a i-ed flag on the fore-topmast head, that then each squadron shall take 
 the best advantage they can to engage the enemy next to them ; and, in order hereunto, 
 all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with the chief, unless 
 the chief of their squadron be either lamed, or otherwise disabled (which God forbid), 
 whereby the said ship which wears the flag shall not come in to do the service which is 
 requisite. Then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to get in a line with 
 the admiral, or the commander-in-chief next to him and nearest the enemy f 
 
 These instructions formed the basis of those issued by James 
 Duke of York when he took command of the fleet, and dated 27th 
 April 1665.$ These latter show the greater precision in the order 
 of lighting, which had been at least theoretically arrived at. The 
 second instruction changes its form, and runs : — 
 
 At sight of the said fleet, the vice-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the 
 second place), with his squadron; and the rear-admiral (or he who commands in chief 
 in the third squadron), with his squadron; are to make what sail they can to come up, 
 ■and to put themselves into that order of battle which shall be given them; for which 
 the signal shall be the Union flag put on the mizen peak of the admiral's ship ; at 
 sight whereof, as well the vice and rear-admirals of the red squadron, as the admirals, 
 vice-admirals, and rear-admirals of the other squadrons, are to answer it by doing the 
 like. 
 
 Here is, in some sort, the abandonment of promiscuous fighting. 
 
 * Life of Sir William Pom, vol. ii.. p. 77. 
 t Ihid. 
 
 X I quote from the Life of Prnn, vol. ii. , app. L. There is an undoubted copy 'of the 
 Duke of York's instructions in the library of the Royal U.S. Institution. 
 
90 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 A precise order of battle is in the background, and to be put in 
 force by signal. The third instruction runs thus : — 
 
 In case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and fleet, and they have sea-rcom 
 enough, then they are to keep the wind as close as they can lie, until such time as they 
 see an opportunity, hj gaining their wakes, to divide the enemy's fleet; and if the van 
 of His Majesty's fleet find that they have the wake of any considerable part of them, 
 they are to tack and stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body ; and that squad- 
 ron that shall pass first, being got to windward, is to bear down on those ships to 
 leeward of them ; and the middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the 
 motion of the enemy's van, which the last squadron is to second ; and both of these 
 squadrons are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron that divided the 
 enemy's fleet.* 
 
 The other instructions Avhich, for our present purpose, it is im- 
 portant to note are numbers IV., VIL, and VIII. Number IV., 
 stands thus :— 
 
 If the enemy have the wind of His Majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the com- 
 manders of His Majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves in one line, close 
 upon a wind, according to the order of battle. 
 
 Instruction VII. runs thus : — 
 
 In case His j\Iajesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stand 
 towards them, and they towards the enemy, then the van of His Majesty's fleet shall 
 keep the wind ; and when they are come within a convenient distance from the enemy's 
 rear they shall stay, until their own whole line is come up within the same distance 
 from the enemy's van ; and then their whole line is to tack (every ship in his own 
 placej, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can (without endangering their loss 
 of wind) ; and to stand along with them, the same tacks aboard, still keeping the 
 enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van ; and in case the enemy 
 tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of His Majesty's fleet, is to tack first, with 
 as many ships, divisions, or squadrons, as are those of the enemy's ; and if all the 
 enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks 
 aboard as the enemy doth. 
 
 Instruction VIII. runs : — 
 
 If the enemy stay to fight (His Majesty's fleet having the wind), the headmost squad- 
 ron of His Majesty's fleet shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's shijjs. 
 
 It may be said of these instructions, that their spirit, if not their 
 letter, governed the conduct of sea fights as long as they were 
 carried out under sail. But we must not suppose that because 
 the Line was thus set out on paper as the fighting formation, not 
 par excellence, but alone, that it at once assumed its full position 
 in fact. It was slow in accomplishing its destiny. According to 
 Pere Hoste, it was the formation taken up by both English and 
 Dutch in the battle of the 29th of July 1653 ; and according to the- 
 same authority it was fully employed by the Duke of York in the 
 
 * It is strange that, with these words in existence, there should have been thought. 
 ^.Q y^^ novelty in Clerk of Eldin's plan of " breaking the line." The author of the Life- 
 of Penn juS'^^y remarks upon the case. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 91 
 
 battle off the Texel, in June KUJS. But it was dropped again by 
 Albemarle in the battle of June 1666 ; and by the way Sir 
 William Penn speaks of it, it seems clear that there was still con- 
 troversy as to whether a line was, or was not, the best form in 
 which to throw a fleet for fighting purposes. Pepys reports what 
 Penn said of the light, a few days after its unfortunate results were 
 made known : — " He says three things must be remedied, or else 
 we shall be undone by this fleet. That we must fight in a line, 
 whereas we fought promiscuously, to our utter and demonstrable 
 ruin ; the Dutch fight otherwise, and we whenever we beat 
 them.* 
 
 So that though the line was established on paper as the fighting 
 formation soon after the outbreak of the first Dutch war, and 
 though it was very precisely spoken of in authoritative instructions 
 at the beginning of the second Dutch war, it had probably not got 
 an absolutely firm hold in the third Dutch war. The term " line 
 of battle " does not occur in the Duke of York's instructions. It is 
 not used by Lord Torrington in 1690, who, when he writes de- 
 scribing the French fleet then in sight, does not speak of " line-of- 
 battle ships," but of ships " fit to lie in a line."t 
 
 The advantages of the line were, however, certain to give it per- 
 manence. It was, in the first place, the great defence against fire- 
 ships ; for when the fleet to leeward was drawn out in one thin 
 line, it was comparatively easy to open out so as to let the fire- 
 ships drift harmlessly through. I suppose that it was this fact 
 that ultimately abolished the fire-ship as a weapon. It was at the 
 height of its value when fleets fought in masses, as I have said ; 
 but the more certain it became that both fleets would draw out 
 into line, the less was the hope of an eftective use of the fire-ship. 
 As I am now on the differentiation of naval force, I may as well finish 
 with the fire-ship at once, its reign really coinciding with the date 
 before and during the line of battle. We have seen what a promi- 
 nent part the fire-ship played all through the Dutch wars, though 
 it is not always easy to say what numbers were employed in each 
 fleet. But in 1678 there were 6 fire-ships to a fleet of 77 rated 
 ships. Ten years later there were 26 fire-ships to 52 rated ships 
 ready for sea. At King William's death there were 87 fire-ships 
 to 123 ships of the line. In 1714 there were about 50 fire-ships to 
 about 125 sail of the line. In 1727 the fire-ship had become less 
 
 * See Life of Penn, vol. ii., p. 399. Two other things were mentioned, 
 t Entick, p 548. The earliest use I find of the term is in the Life oj Cornelius Vun 
 Tromp, printed in 1697. 
 
 7 
 
iJ2 NAVAL WAHFAHE. 
 
 popular, as there were only 3 or 4 to 123 sail of the line. In 1741 
 there were fire-ships at home, in the West Indies, and in the 
 Mediterranean, but there were only 17 to a total of 180 rated ships, 
 129 of which were in commission. At the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 (1748) we had but 5 fire-ships against a total of 174 rated ships. 
 At the peace of Paris (1763) there were 8 fire-ships in commission 
 at home to 55 sail of the line. At the peace of 1783 we have fur- 
 ther hints of the decadence of the fire-ship, as there were only 7 
 then serviceable, though there were 273 rated ships afloat. After 
 the outbreak of the revolutionary war we cease to hear of them as 
 parts of an ordinary fleet, and at the peace of Amiens (1802) we 
 only find 9 or 10 ships spoken of at a time when the navy contained 
 nearly 1,000 ships of all classes. The number of fire-ships in 
 commission during the revolutionary war was 3 only, from 1794 to 
 1799. Then it rose to 7 for that year and for 1800, falling again 
 to 3 in 1801, and to 1 only in 1802. In 1804 and 1805 there was 
 1 tire- ship in commission, but after this they disappear altogether 
 as an effective weapon. 
 
 The history of the fire-ship does not lack parallels in naval 
 annals. It springs into favour as a weapon because the method oi 
 fighting in masses of ships clustered together offered peculiar 
 facilities for its employment, but almost at once, the defence ol 
 drawing the fleets out into a long single line becoming established, 
 the position of thefire-ship was weakened, and it was a less important 
 weapon than it had been. But the impetus it had received originally 
 pushed it on, so that, though it was really weakened, it was held in 
 higher estimation, and increased its numbers to a maximum at the 
 end of William III.'s reign. Then experience begins to offer 
 counteracting resistance to the waning impetus, and the weapon 
 becomes gradually discredited. Yet it hangs on for years, after 
 all thought of using it as it was originally used has passed 
 away. 
 
 Taking the rise, progress, and fall of the fire-ship as an illustra- 
 tion of the differentiation of naval force, and the rules which govern 
 it, we can recur to the line of battle and trace its effects. I have 
 already pointed out how, in promiscuous fighting between two fleets, 
 every class of ship was admitted, because, as there was no special 
 order or rank of the ships, each could generally, and did generally, 
 seek out her match and fight the battle out in a series of duels. 
 But as soon as the single line became established, each ship had 
 her fixed place which she could not quit, and hence, if there were 
 great diversities in the strength of ships forming the line, the 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 93 
 
 weakest was quite likely to find herself opposite the strongest in the 
 ensuing battle. The action of the establishment of the line-of- 
 battle tended, therefore, in the first place, to. the excision of the 
 weaker ships from their place in the line, and to the embodiment of 
 Lord Torrington's idea of having only " ships fit to lie in a line " 
 — that is, of having what afterwards came to be called line-of-battle 
 ships. , 
 
 But, further, the tendency of the Line must have been to increase 
 the power of the individual line-of-battle ship, so as to reduce the 
 numbers, as a line of great extent would be unmanageable, and, 
 in fact, could not be maintained as a line in view of changes of the 
 wind. But on the other hand, the increase in the force of the 
 individual ship would not have been carried to an extreme. The 
 fear of putting too many eggs in one basket might always be 
 expected to operate, and though it might not prevent the occasional 
 building of a ship which was gigantic by comparison, it would 
 prevent the reduction of the line-of-battle ships to a very small 
 number of very powerful ships. But just the same causes which 
 prolonged the life of the fire-ship beyond the period when it 
 could be usefully employed, would tend to prevent its being seen, 
 even through some courses of years, that the real line-of-battle 
 ship was a medium ship, neither descending to the lowest nor 
 ascending to the highest rank in the scale of force. The custom 
 which had obtained in the days of promiscuous fighting of building 
 ships of all classes, with the idea that all classes could fight side 
 by side in the general action, might be expected to prevail long 
 after the reason of the thing had demanded a uniform pattern 
 line-of-battle ship of medium power. 
 
 But as the general action to be fought out in two opposing lines 
 of ships became established, the attack and defence of commerce, 
 which had existed before this time, called for suitable war-ships to 
 carry it out. The establishment of the line-of-battle not only 
 differentiated a powei/ful class of ships for taking part in that 
 fighting formation, but as it excluded the smaller classes of ships 
 from partaking in the general action it met half way the demand 
 for special ships for looking after commerce, either by way of attack 
 or defence. 
 
 It would appear probable that the commerce protectors or 
 attackers would be naturally the smaller class of vessels, because, 
 in the case of great convoys, what happened in the first Dutch war 
 would most naturally repeat itself, and that a line-of-battle force 
 would be employed on both sides. Where the convoy was small, 
 
94 NAVAL rVARFAHE. 
 
 the economy of war would not permit of weakening the main line 
 of battle for so inferior a service ; and while a lighter force might 
 serve for the attack, so would a lighter force form a sutBcient 
 defence. The mere fact that a defence by way of convoy was 
 furnished might put aside all idea of attack. For though it might 
 be possible to furnish inferior force to attack unguarded merchant 
 ships, it might be difficult to withdraw from the main force enough 
 to make itself distinctly superior to the light force which was 
 guarding a merchant convoy. Then, too, there must always have 
 been the two words about convoy. A large concourse of merchant- 
 ships would make a tempting prize, which it would be worth an 
 effort to secure ; a proportionately powerful force might not safely 
 be found to guard it. The alternative would be to break up the 
 convoy into several sections, each under a light guard. It would 
 be unlikely that all should be attacked, and those that were at- 
 tacked, a light guard might be sufficient to defend. The general 
 tendency on the whole would be to have a very numerous and very 
 light set of ships, for the especial purpose of protecting their own 
 commerce and attacking that of the enemy. 
 
 We thus get a tendency towards such a differentiation of naval 
 force as would set apart as line-of-battle ships those specially de- 
 signed to fight in a line, and to act in concert, as the main strength 
 of the naval position ; the citadel as it were of naval power ; that 
 arrangement of naval force before which every other nature of 
 naval force must bow, and which could not be overcome but by a 
 greater quantity of like force. The necessity for this setting apart 
 of a special class of ships to fight in the line of battle was fully 
 admitted in 1744, and Admiral Lestock's anonymously published 
 pamphlet against Mathews contains language forcibly pointing to 
 the position the line of battle had taken, and to the certainty that 
 sooner or later uniformity in the ships composing the line-of- 
 battle would be established as the necessary outcome of sea-fights 
 so conducted. 
 
 A line of battle [says the anonymous pamphleteer] is the basis and foundation of all 
 discipline in sea-fights, and is universally practised by all nations that are masters 
 7f any power at sea ; it has had the test of a long experience, and stood before the 
 stroke of time, pure and unaltered, handed down by our predecessors as the most 
 prudentiai and best concerted disposition that can possibly be used at sea. This order 
 consists in a fleet of ships being extended in a straight line either ahead or abreast 
 one ship of another, to keep as close together as the weather will permit, that at all 
 times every ship may be ready to sustain, relieve, or succoui' one another It is 
 
 directed that each ship in the line of battle shall keep within half a cable's length of 
 one another, which is about 50 fathoms ; that if His Majesty's fleet should have the 
 vjind of the enemy, the van shall steer with the van of the enemy, and there engage 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 95 
 
 tbem. b}' which moans every ship knows her adversary, and from the foremost in the 
 van to the rear, attacks them successively.* 
 
 Thus the line-of-hattle promised to estabhsh uniformity, and also 
 that the Hne-of-battle ship would approach this uniformity on the 
 lines not of ships of extreme force, for then there would be too few 
 of them, nor yet of a very low force, for then a fleet to be strong 
 must be too numerous to handle. This was what was before the 
 line-of-battle ship, and yet not of early accomplishment because of 
 the force of custom and the tradition of the promiscuous manner of 
 lighting. 
 
 Biit as the line-of-battle ship was thus differentiated and parted 
 from every other sort of war- ship, it followed that the fleet would 
 require adjuncts in the shape of lighter ships to serve the purpose 
 of look-outs or scouts. These ships would naturally be of much 
 weaker force than the line-of-battle ship, for they would not take 
 part in the fight ; but they would require to be of good size so as to 
 be able to keep company with the fleet, and so as to have a speed 
 greater than the fleet itself in order to out-sail it and return to it 
 in the exercise of the functions of the look-out. These duties 
 pointed to the heavy frigate, but to a ship as far below the line-of- 
 battle ship in force as would allow of her carrying out the special 
 role of attending on the fleet. 
 
 Lastly, there was the much lighter attendant on commerce 
 either by way of attack or defence, and if the practice of largo 
 convoys should fall, as it might, into disrepute, the tendency of 
 these lighter and smaller vessels — not of the smallest size, but still 
 low down in the scale of force — would be to grow. 
 
 This differentiation of naval force into three classes : (1) the 
 line-of-battle ship, (2) the frigate, and (3) the light cruiser, seems 
 to grow naturally out of the conditions of naval warfare which we 
 have seen established ; and yet judging by the progress we have 
 seen, we should expect the differentiation to be of slow growth. It 
 must, I think, be admitted as a fact that the naval mind is 
 unaccustomed to project itself onward. It is so practical that it 
 will not move until it is pushed ; and thus, though I think we can 
 clearly trace the progress of differentiation of force, it never was 
 complete ; and all we can say is that as years went on it grew 
 nearer and nearer to the ideal, so that at the close of naval war 
 about 1813, we get the remarkable results which will be seen. 
 
 * A Narrative of the Proceedings of His Majesty's Fleet m the Mediterranean, and 
 the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, from the Year 17^1 to March 1744. London. 
 17H 
 
96 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 I have already shown that in the earlier parts of the Dutch wars 
 the dififerentiation was not marked. I will take as a later instance, 
 the composition of the fleet of August 1666, commanded by Prince 
 Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle.* That fleet stood as follows : — 
 
 Ships 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guna. 
 
 1 
 
 of 102 
 
 4 of 
 
 64 
 
 5 of 
 
 42 
 
 1 
 
 „ 90 
 
 6 „ 
 
 60 
 
 2 „ 
 
 44 
 
 2 
 
 „ 82 
 
 12 „ 
 
 58 
 
 3 „ 
 
 42 
 
 1 
 
 „ 80 
 
 1 „ 
 
 56 
 
 5 „ 
 
 40 
 
 2 
 
 „ 76 
 
 2 „ 
 
 54 
 
 4 ,, 
 
 88 
 
 2 
 
 „ 72 
 
 6 „ 
 
 52 
 
 1 „ 
 
 ;m 
 
 2 
 
 M 70 
 
 9 „ 
 
 50 
 
 1 „ 
 
 30 
 
 1 
 
 „ 06 
 
 14 „ 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 Perhaps the absence of differentiation is as well marked in this 
 fleet as it could be, but it is also well marked in a list of the 
 whole navy drawn up by a Eoyal Commission in 1686.t 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. Guns. 
 
 5 of 100 
 
 2 of 
 
 04 
 
 6 of 42 
 
 3 ; 
 
 „ 96 
 
 5 „ 
 
 02 
 
 1 „ 38 
 
 10 
 
 „ 90 
 
 3 „ 
 
 60 
 
 6 „ 32 
 
 2 ., 
 
 „ 82 
 
 9 „ 
 
 54 
 
 6 „ 30 
 
 1 
 
 „ 80 
 
 1 „ 
 
 50 
 
 2 „ 28 
 
 4 
 
 „ 72 
 
 19 ,. 
 
 48 
 
 1 „ 18 
 
 28 
 
 „ 70 
 
 3 „ 
 
 46 
 
 5 „ 16 
 
 1 
 
 „ 6Q 
 
 1 „ 
 
 44 
 
 
 Then, at 
 
 the death of 
 
 Wilham III. 
 
 (1702), the na 
 
 thusj :— 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ships. Gur.s, 
 
 8 of 96 to 110 
 
 2 of 
 
 66 
 
 1 of 44 
 
 12 
 
 „ 90 
 
 1 „ 
 
 64 
 
 1 „ 40 
 
 16 
 
 „ 80 
 
 17 „ 
 
 60 
 
 28 „ 32 
 
 1 
 
 „ 74 
 
 3 „ 
 
 54 
 
 16 „ 24 
 
 2 
 
 „ 72 
 
 1 „ 
 
 53 
 
 
 22 
 
 „ 70 
 
 38 „ 
 
 48 
 
 
 We hardly trace any definite objects in the changes shown in 
 the second list, the result of sixteen years' experience. There is 
 some simplification and reduction in the number of types, a slight 
 increase in the number of the heaviest line-of-battle ships, an 
 
 • See Charnoek, vol. il., p. 397. 
 
 t Entick. p. 0:51. 
 
 t Schombery^s JSI<iral C/ironoloqi/^ vol. iv., p. 4. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 97 
 
 increase in the 60-, 48-, and 32-gun ships, but we can hardly say 
 that the real wants of the navy were being met. It is more as if 
 opinion was swaying about, uncertain of its own aims, and acting 
 in one way at one time and in another at another time. According 
 to Schomberg, all the ships down to and including those of 48 
 guns were considered as proper to form the line of battle, but if 
 this were so, it is only an evidence how little advance had been 
 made in the true direction, for nothing could exceed the incon- 
 gruity of so arranging a sea fight that a 48-gun ship should find 
 herself matched against a 90-gun ship, or a 5o-gun ship against 
 alio. 
 
 The navy of 1727 begins, in more than one way, to show the 
 influences on differentiation of the causes enumerated. And there 
 is besides an increased simplification in the matter of reduction in 
 the number of types. The iiavy stood thus '' : — 
 
 Ships. Gnns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guna 
 
 7 of 100 23 of 70 24 of 40 
 
 13 „ 90 24 „ 60 1 „ 30 
 
 16 „ 80 40 „ 50 28 „ 20 
 
 13 sloops of 4 to 10 guns. 
 
 Schomberg now excludes all ships below 60 guns from place in the 
 line of battle, which, if he has contemporary authority to justify 
 the statement, shows the action of causes which would raise the 
 force of the individual line-of-battle ship and make the type 
 uniform. Then, too, we have the exhibition of the gap between 
 the force of the smallest line-of-battle ship, and the largest 
 frigate, in the sudden drop of from 50 guns in the one case, to no 
 more than 40 in the other. The admission of the new class, the 
 Sloop, with no more than 10 guns, is a distinct effect of the causes 
 sketched out, and certain to operate sooner or later. 
 
 We may now take the ships in commission in different parts of 
 the world in 1741, through which we can trace still more clearly 
 the tendencies of differentiation. At home the force in commission 
 is stated as foUowsf ;~ 
 
 Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Gun? 
 
 3 of 100 7 of 70 4 of 40 
 
 6 „ 90 2 „ 60 15 „ 20 
 
 10 „ 80 13 „ 50 
 
 10 sloops 4 to 10 guns. 
 
 * Schomberg. vol. iv., p. 10. 
 f Ibid., vol. iv., p. 17 
 
98 NAVAL WARFARE 
 
 In the West Inclies the force was : — 
 
 Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 
 
 8 of 80 16 of 60 8 of 40 
 
 7 „ 7C 3 „ 50 G „ 20 
 
 3 sloops of 8 guns. 
 
 In the Mediterranean we had . — 
 
 Ships. Guns Ships Guns 
 
 2 of 80 3 of 20 
 
 5 „ 60 1 „ 8 
 
 2 „ 50 
 In these three fleets we can in some sort discern an increase 
 in line-of-battle ships of what might be called upper middle 
 strength, as — counting the 50-gun ships as of the line of battle, 
 but nothing below that — we have 67 line-of-battle ships of from 
 10 to 80 guns, and only nine of more than 80, and only 18 of less 
 fhan 60. And also in the ships below the rank of line-of-battle 
 ship, we only get 7 of 40 guns, that is of the heavy frigate 
 class we have spoken of, but 38 of a much smaller class, not 
 carrying more than 20 guns. Here is distinct approach to that 
 differentiation which reason leads us up to when we are able to 
 look calmly back on the naval warfare of the past and to discuss its 
 principles. But we can note that our ancestors saw through a 
 glass darkly, and in the struggles of constant wars estabhshed 
 principles without pausing to identify them, and without know- 
 ing, perhaps, how much they were unconsciously guided by 
 them, 
 
 A further illustration can be drawn from the navy as it was 
 found in commission at the death of George II., in 1700, with its 
 dii tribution on the different stations. 
 
 
 At Home. 
 
 
 Ships. Guns. 
 
 Ships. Guns 
 
 Ships. Gutii. 
 
 7 of 90 
 
 10 of 64 
 
 6 of 32 
 
 2 „ 80 
 
 2 „ 60 
 
 5 „ 28 
 
 24 „ 74 
 
 3 „ 50 
 
 3 „ 18 
 
 2 ,. 70 
 
 1 „ 36 
 
 11 „ 10 to 14 
 
 In this home fleet we see quite plainly the growth of the upper 
 middle strength of the line-of-battle ships ; the widening of the 
 gap between the weakest line-of-battle ship and the heaviest 
 frigate ; and the distinct proportionate increase in the numbers of 
 the lighter cruisers, 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 99 
 
 In the East Indie f^. 
 
 Sbi^.s. Guns. Ships. Guns. Sliip^f. G-ans. 
 
 1 of 50 1 of 28 1 cf 24 
 
 1 „ 20 2 „ 14 
 
 In this squadron we have the 50-gun ship passing out of the line 
 of battle as it were, and becoming a heavy cruiser for distant and 
 detached service. She is then accompanied not by ships in a 
 regular descending scale, as she would have bean during the period 
 of the Dutch wars, but by a group of very much lighter cruisers, 
 the heaviest of which has not, perhaps, half her force. 
 
 In the West Indies. 
 
 Ships. Giins. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 
 
 2 of 50 1 of 32 2 of 28 
 
 4 „ 20 1 „ 14 
 
 Where the characteristics of the squadron — which was divided 
 into two between Jamaica and the Leeward Islands— are similar 
 to those in the East Indies. 
 
 In the Mediterranean. 
 
 Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. 
 
 1 of 50 1 of 32 2 of 28 
 
 1 „ 14 1 „ 10 
 
 Where we have still the same thing. 
 
 In North America. 
 
 Ships. Guns. Ships. Guns. Ships Guns. 
 
 6 of 64 15 of 32 15 of 14 to 18. 
 
 5 „ 50 11 „ 28 9 „ 8 to 12. 
 
 3 „ 44 14 „ 20 
 
 In this squadron there is less of the marked differentiation we 
 are beginning to see. But if we look at the three 44-guu ships as 
 what I mr.y call " border ships," being almost strong enough for 
 the line of battle and unnecessarily heavy for the duties of a 
 frigate, we still have the three classes of line-of-battle ship, frigate, 
 and light cruiser; the multitude of the latter being entirely in 
 accordance with the forecast which could have been made at the 
 date of the third Dutch war. Nothing was gained by such varieties 
 in force as 64, 50, and 44-gun ships. A stronger hne of battle 
 could have been produced of fewer and heavier ships all of one 
 class ; and although progress towards this ideal is slow, I think the 
 reader will now see that we are on the high way to its realisation. 
 
Ships. 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 7 
 
 Guua. 
 
 of 20 
 „ 14 to IG 
 ,, 10 to 12. 
 
 
 
 this 
 rule, 
 
 squadron may be 
 , and to assimilate 
 
 seen to 
 to that 
 
 100 A^.IF^IL WAUFAEE. 
 
 The Newfoundland Squadron. 
 
 Ships. Guns 
 
 1 of ('.4 
 
 1 „ '"'"^ 
 
 2 „ 28 
 
 The differentiation of force in 
 conform more to the approaching 
 found in the East and West India Squadrons, 
 
 We may now pass at once to the Eevolutionary and Napoleonic 
 Wars, of which the length and persistence may be supposed to have 
 brought all the rules and principles of naval war to a climax. I 
 have thought that the best way of exhibiting the operation of the 
 causes we have seen at work in differentiating naval force is by 
 using the graphic method, and exhibiting curves which show the 
 proportions of each kind of force, and the quantities during each 
 year from 1793. We have pretty well seen what was coming, and 
 had our forefathers, in 1794, had before them in a clear light all 
 the points we have been discussing, I think we may fairly assume 
 that they would have done at first what they did at last, and so 
 conducted the war with a greater economy. 
 
 For what is plain to be seen, I think, is, that for naval warfare 
 not a great many types of ships are required. Whether there be 
 or be not a line of battle, there must be some fighting formation 
 which is under all circumstances better than any other. The fact 
 that a form of battle is established compels a uniformity of type of 
 ship, because form prescribes place and prevents ships seeking 
 their match. Therefore it becomes waste to produce a few exces- 
 sively powerful ships to fight in a general action, while it is a 
 danger to allow weak ships to take part in it. In the one case the 
 excess of power may be, most probably will be, wasted against an 
 inferior adversary ; in the other case, ships of greatly inferior force 
 may be hopelessly beaten by those of medium or average strength. 
 
 Then I think we can see that there should be an immense fall in 
 the strength of the strongest cruiser below that of the weakest 
 battle-ship. It should seem also that this strongest cruiser has 
 her place as the eyes of the fleet, even as set forth by James Duke 
 of York in his instructions. Then would come another heavy fall 
 in the strength of the light cruiser, of which the special function 
 is guarding our own commerce and attacking that of the enemy. 
 I do not see that anything is gained by great variety in type. 
 There is always the consideration present that there is no guarantee 
 that even with the infinite variety of type, such as we see com- 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE . 101 
 
 posed our navy in 1686, the particular ship most suited to the 
 service will be where time and place requires her. Much more 
 likely is it that the wrong types will be everywhere. In one ease 
 the ships available will be too weak, and risks will be run ; in 
 another case the ships available will be too strong, and money will 
 be wasted. 
 
 These thoughts spring from our study of the nature of naval 
 war as far as we have carried it. I offer circumstantial evidence of 
 their correctness in the growth of differentiation as we have traced 
 it, best seen above all, in Plates I., II., III. 
 
 Plate I. show^s us the nature of the whole navy in commission, year 
 by year, from 1793 till 1813. It impresses on us two points ; the 
 
 79Z ^ 
 
 S6 97 98 99/80001 02 03 04- OS 06 07 08 09 /O // ^^ K 
 
 PLATE I. — SHIPS IN COMMISSION FKOM 1793 TO 1813. 
 
 Vertical ccale for numbers of each class. 
 
102 NAV/iL WARFABE. 
 
 f^radual elimination of what I call the *' border ships," the ships 
 that were and were not line-of-battle ships. There is evidence 
 enough that the navy did not like them ; they came steadily down 
 from the Dutch days of promiscuous fighting, and we had con- 
 tinued to produce them because our fathers had done so. Custom 
 went on with them as an essential pr.rt of naval force until about 
 1796, but the practical experience of war eliminated them. They 
 were found in constantly diminishing numbers year by year, when 
 they closed at a minimum in 1813. 
 
 This plate also exhibits in a striking manner the way in which 
 the pressure of war experience demanded increase in the number 
 of cruisers. The line-of-battle force once estabhshed in superority 
 required no further increase. But the demand for increase of 
 cruisers, nearly all of which were engaged in the attack of the 
 enemy's commerce and the defence of our own, sprang up imme- 
 diately, rose to a great height during the Eevolutionary war, but 
 sprang to its greatest and almost fabulous height when our line-of- 
 battle strength was unimpeached in any part of the world. 
 
 Plate II. gives us, with great force and clearness, the interior 
 changes in the line-of-battle force and its differentiation. We have 
 seen it coming, no doubt, through what has before been said, yet the 
 precision of the result has in it the nature of a surprise when 
 plotted out in such a plate. 
 
 From the year 1793 to 1796 the tendency would almost seem to 
 belie teaching, and to reverse the processes which had gone on in 
 former wars. Up to 1796 there was an increase of each class of 
 line-of-battle ships, that is to say, a swinging off from the 
 uniformity which reason would have pronounced for, and in 1796, 
 there wei'e in commission 22 ships ol from 90 to 120 guns ; 5 of 
 80 guns, 54 of 74, 24 of 64, and 25 border ships of from 44 to 56 
 guns on two decks. This was really an approach to the old thing, 
 and an advance in an altogether wrong direction, if the subject were 
 to be reasoned out. But no sooner was this point reached than 
 the reason of the case— still, possibly, without consciousness — 
 began to prevail. By 1801, the border ships had fallen to 15, the 
 heaviest types of the line-of-battle ships, those from 80 to 120 
 guns had diminished by 4. The Cl's on the otherside had dimi- 
 nished in number by 4, while the 74's had increased by 4. Practi- 
 cally the Napoleonic war was simply a development of right reason, 
 stimulated by the spur of experience. The heavy and the light 
 line-of-battle ships continually diminished in number, while the 
 upper middle rank of that class of ship, the 74, continually 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. lOf^ 
 
 '7 S3 54 o^ ge gy 98 99 /dOO 01 OZ 05 04- OS 06 07 O-^ 09 /O // (2 /3 
 »»LATE ir.— tINE-OP-BATTLB SHIPS IN COMMISSION FROM 1703 TO 1813. 
 
 Vertical scale for iMiiiOcru oj eacii clasis. 
 
 10 
 
 20 
 
 50 
 
104 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 increased. When the naval war practically came to an end in 
 1813, the 74 occupied almost the whole field. The border ships 
 and the 64's had practically disappeared on the one side, there 
 being but 4 of the former, and 2 of the latter. On the other side, 
 the heavy line-of-battle ships of 80 guns and upwards had 
 dwindled to a minimum, there being but 14 of them in commission. 
 Their function was less a question of force than of accommodation, 
 and the chief reason for their existence was the space they afforded 
 to the admiral and his staff. But the 74'8 were no less than 85 
 in number, and if we regard the tendency of the curves as drawn, 
 it is not too much to suppose that a continuance of the war would 
 have seen the line of battle reach its ideal, and beheld it composed 
 of a single type of ship, that ship being of the upper middle class. 
 
 Plate III. does for the cruisers what Plate II. has ^done for the 
 line-of-battle ships ; it shows their growing interior differentiation. 
 And here, in observing that the tables are all prepared from the 
 elaborate " Abstracts " furnished by James in his naval history, 
 we must note that James does not make the clear distinction 
 between ships of the line and cruisers till the year 1803. It is as 
 if the absolute wall which ought to exist between the two classes 
 of ships and their function, had not struck him at an earlier part 
 of his work. This, again, was a portion of the ancient inheritance, 
 the ideal of promiscuous fighting, which these plates show to have 
 been so utterly swept away in the long sea wars with France and 
 Spain. 
 
 In Plate III. we can trace all the general tendencies of differen- 
 tiation amongst the cruisers with great ease. Just as the weaker 
 line-of-battle ship is seen to disappear gradually, carrying with it 
 the border ship, so does the very heavy frigate of 40 to 44 guns, 
 never very numerous, give place so as to increase and emphasize 
 the impassable gap which separates the battle- ship from the 
 cruiser. But when the gap is marked enough, that class of cruiser 
 which should be specially the attendant on the fleet, and which is 
 nearest to the gap, begins to grow. All through both wars there 
 is a tendency in the 38- and 36-gun frigates to aggrandise and 
 swell in their position. In the year 1809, when our navy reached 
 its maximum force, there were 44 38-gun, and 36 36-gun frigates 
 in commission, and next year they reached their highest develop- 
 ment, there being 48 38-gun, and 49 36-gun frigates. 
 
 But side by side with this growth was the diminution m the 
 number of ships carrying from 20 to 32 guns. While the propor- 
 tion of these lighter frigates to the heavier had been in 1798, 74 
 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF NAVAL FORCE. 105 
 
 O' 94- 9S S6 S7 98 &S /BOOOt 02 03 Of- OS OS 07 OQ 09 lO // IS /3 
 
 PLATE III. — CRUISERS IN COMMISSION FROM 1793 TO 1813. 
 
 N.P- - The Hue which extends part of the way above the bombs represents fire-sbu 
 
 Vertical scale for numbers of each class. 
 
 50 
 
lOG NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 to 55, in 1810 it had altered to 54 to 97, and in 1813 to 38 to 86. 
 That is to say, that just as the gap between the line-of-battle ship 
 and tlie frigate had distinctly established itself, so was the natural 
 and proper gap between the frigate and the light cruiser in course 
 of establishing itself. And then, as to these light cruisers, Plate 
 III. shows U6 that it was there that the enormous increase in our 
 navy took place. 
 
 In 1809 the cruisers ol 20 guns and over in commission 
 numbered 147, but, excluding bombs and special ships, the 
 cruisers carrying less than 20 guns numbered no less than 403. 
 And if we are to judge by the curves exhibited, there was from the 
 first a continued demand for the services of these vessels, a demand 
 which did not cease till the enormous total just given was reached. 
 After 1809-10 we may presume that we had not only secured the 
 command of the sea by the impregnable front of our line of battle, 
 but we had everywhere so overspread the sea with these light 
 cruisers that our own commerce threaded a safe way through 
 them ; the enemy's commerce could not show, and so great were 
 the risks, that the attempts upon our own commerce collapsed. 
 
 I have now traced the differentiation of naval force through all 
 its changes in England, and I think a case is made out to show 
 that the state of the classes of ships continuallv developing, and 
 brought nearly to complete perfection at tlie close of the Napo- 
 leonic war, is a permanent one ; that it is of the essence of naval 
 war that there should be battle-ships of uniform type, neither the 
 most powerful that can be produced nor yet greatly below that 
 type ; that there should then be a class of ships altogether 
 incapp.ble of facing a battle-shii? in fight, and in no way armed to 
 attempt it, but of substantial character, with speed in a sea-way, 
 the chief duties of which would be attendance on the fleet. There 
 appears no reason in what has here been discussed why this type 
 also should not be uniform. Then it looks as if the next type 
 might fall to a great inferiority below the class just mentioned, but 
 should ma.ke up for its individual weakness by its number. 
 
 The Crimean war was hardly a naval one ; and if it had been 
 otherwise, the changes from sail to steam, and from the paddle to 
 the screw, both of which it brought to a head, would vitiate the 
 results of any continuation of the statistics for that period ; but it 
 is not unworthy of remark that the war followed the example of 
 Table III. in producing 155 small steamers, gun-boats, a class 
 unknown before. 
 
10^ 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ATTliMPTS TO GAIN THE CoMMAND OF THE SeA WITH DEFINITE 
 
 Ulterior Purpose. 
 
 There is a difference between attempting to gain the command of the sea as an 
 end, and as a means for achieving some ulterior purpose. — The best examples are the 
 Dutch -wars on one side, and the various attempts of France to invade England on the 
 other. — But invasions are at least rarely planned in the absence of command of the sea, 
 unless help is hoped for within the country to be invaded. — The transactions of HVM 
 show that partial command of the sea will not permit invasion, and that a partially 
 beaten fleet is still to be reckoned with in such operations. — The transactions of 1692 
 show the difficulties of the attempts, and of the great risks that are run in seeking for 
 a temporary command of the sea. 
 
 There being no example of the attempt to secure the command 
 of the sea as an end so complete as that of the Anglo-Dutch 
 wars, I traced pretty fully their history, and drew special atten- 
 tion to the methods employed on both sides. It is important 
 to remember that in these wars there was no ulterior object in 
 the aims either of Dutch or English. Both nations depended 
 largely on sea-borne commerce for their prosperity, and if one 
 nation should succeed in obtaining such a command of the sea 
 as would enable it to control the commerce of the other, the 
 latter would certainly be brought to her knees. Holland was 
 so well aware of this, that in the second and third wars she 
 felt it necessary to temporarily suspend her commerce, in order 
 the more freely to contend for the direct command of the sea, 
 ^r at least to prevent England from obtaining such a command 
 as might give her a permanent control over the Dutch commerce. 
 Her policy was so far successful that she did prevent the com- 
 mand of the sea being thoroughly gained against her, and 
 shortened the wars by the firm and resisting front which she 
 was ever able to show. 
 But we have seen that both nations were desirous of jpusliing 
 
 8 
 
108 NAVAL WABFARE, 
 
 the war off the sea, whenever even temporary command of it 
 promised to permit the attempt. Troops were embarked at 
 different times hy both nations, and v/ere actually landed by the 
 Dutch when a mistaken policy on the English part allowed the 
 Dutch sufficient command of the soa to undertake it. It is true 
 that on neither side of the North Sea did the idea of operations 
 on land extend beyond harrying, alarming, and destroying, within 
 the immediate neighbourhood of the coast. But supposing the 
 command of the sea had beeii absolutely in the hands of one side, 
 and' that that did not suffice to obtain the terms demanded, it is 
 conceivable that the side in power might have aimed at iLore 
 permanent occupation of the enemy's territory, resting on the sea 
 base for supplies. If the population of one nation had been 
 greatly in excess of the other, and its land forces proportionately 
 stronger, the ultimate aim of this nation might have been a 
 military expedition. Conquest of territory might have been the 
 aim of the war, and the command of the sea might have been 
 looked at not as the end, but only as the means to an end. Con- 
 ceivably, if the military power were immensely greater on one side 
 than on the other, the more powerful nation might hope to end 
 the war by that sort of sudden conquest, which, when undertaken 
 on a large scale, is called invasion, and this without much care as 
 to the permanent command of the sea. The attempt might even 
 go further ; the idea might be that the greatness of the force, 
 and the suddenness of its landing, might achieve conquest, and 
 conclude the war with such speed as to render sea communications 
 unnecessary and therefore to leave out of question the command 
 of the sea even for a time, the invasion being conducted by way 
 of surprise or evasion. 
 
 There are not wanting examples of this kind of operation, or 
 attempted operation. The Spanish Armada, Hoche's expedition to 
 Bantry, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, and the Italian attack on 
 the Island of Lissa are all cases in point, though not encouraging 
 in their results, as to that particular method of conducting war. 
 I shall have to treat of these and other operations of like nature 
 in subsequent chapters, but I only advert to them to make clear 
 the distinction which exists between that form of operation and 
 the one of which I am about to treat. This is the case where the 
 naval and the military operations are separate, and where a purely 
 naval war, however short it may be, is carried on simply to clear 
 the way for the military operation which is to follow. 
 
 The operation is nearer akin to that which will also require to 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 109 
 
 be inveptigatccl, where a power having ah-eady the command of 
 tne sea, and intendmg a military expedition for the success of 
 which command of the sea is necessary, sets apart a naval force 
 to mask the naval force of the enemy, and, therefore, to make 
 assurance doubly sure. 
 
 There are no more perfect illustrations of the operations I have 
 in view than the several great endeavours of France to secure the 
 command of the sea, in order to pass across the Channel a military 
 force large enough to effect the conquest of the country before 
 sufficient time had elapsed to change again the face of the naval 
 supremacy. 
 
 But I think it should be observed that in every case of Invasion, 
 either of this kind or of the kind above spoken of, the invading 
 power hoped for assistance in the country invaded. In one case, 
 that of the invasion of the Prince of Orange, the certainty of 
 help in the invaded country was so complete, and the doubt of 
 possible naval opposition so marked, that we must almost leave it 
 out of any class of naval operations possible to be formed. The 
 balance of political opinion, far more than of force, either naval 
 ou military, determined the conduct of the design. But it m:iy 
 be taken as the extreme type of invasion, and as differing from 
 other invasions more in degree than in kind. In every one of the 
 French attempts on England, France believed that the landing 
 of her troops would be the signal for insurrections in her favour all 
 over the country, and of a great rallying to her standard of a 
 disaffected population. In her attempts on Ireland, it was the 
 same. In the case of Spain, Philip was confident that a vast body 
 of oppressed Catholics would support him as soon as his troops 
 disembarked, and was only depending on that help coming to him 
 on a large scale which in the landing at Kinsale his troops 
 received on a small scale. Even in Egypt and the East the fana- 
 ticism of the French led them to suppose they would be received 
 as friends and deliverers, and would find a home and a base for 
 farther operations against the English possessions in the East, 
 even in the very probable contingency of being cut off from France. 
 
 Certainly this view, that the French troops, if they succeeded 
 in landing on the English shores, would be sufficiently supported 
 by the people to effect the intended purpose of restoring James to 
 his throne, completely governed the operations which led to the 
 abortive battle of Beachy Head. 
 
 A considerable French army had been landed in Ireland, and 
 the ex-king James had gained such power there that large forcea 
 
 8* 
 
no NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 had departed from England to make head against him, William 
 himself quitting the country on the 11th June 1690 to take the 
 head of his army in Ireland. England itself was, therefore, left 
 to the government of Mary as Regent, and to a military defence 
 of which the chief strength was a hastily called-out militia. The 
 naval defence was so backward, and so much delayed, that Lord 
 Torrington, that Admiral Herbert who had escorted King William 
 to Torbay, had resigned his office at the Admiralty sooner than 
 be a party to the unpreparedness for events by sea which was 
 thtn the uppermost policy.* Nottingham, the Secretary of State 
 and Torrington's enemy, was able to overrule prudent counsels, 
 and by despising the French as an enemy at sea, really left the 
 country open to grave dangers. 
 
 The French were no doubt well informed, through James's 
 partisans, of the opportunity that was opening to them. They 
 had a full belief that, in the absence of William and the English 
 army in Ireland, a success in the Channel which would enable them 
 to carry a small military force across would bring about a general 
 rising and restore the ex-King. Indeed, arrangements had gone 
 so far as to fix the 18th of June as the date for the outbreak of 
 the insurrection. 
 
 The French intention was then to appear in the Channel in 
 greatly superior force to any that the English and Dutch were 
 likely to produce. A part of the fleet was to make for the Thames 
 to support the Jacobite rising in the capital ; while the other part 
 was to join the galleys, and land 8,000 men in Torbay with arms 
 for a much greater number. After so landing them, this part of 
 the fleet was to sail into the Irish Sea and prevent the return of 
 King William and his troops.f 
 
 The main body of the French assembled at Brest under the 
 command of Vice-Admiral Comte de Tourville, and the ships at 
 Toulon under the orders of Vice-Admiral Chateaurenault were 
 ordered to join him 
 
 * "Lest any of these matters should be laid to my chr.rge, I think it necessary to 
 acquaint this honourable court that not seeing matters so well in the Admiralty as I 
 thought the service re'quired, and that it was not in my power to prevent it, I humbly 
 begged and obtained the King's leave to be dismissed from that commission and giving 
 any further attendance at that Board ; that since I could not prevent the mischief, I 
 might have no share in the blame." Torrington's defence, quoted by Entick, p. 548. 
 His quitting of the Board, and being succeeded by the Earl of Pembroke, took placo 
 January 20th, 1G89, according to Schomborg's Naval Chronolwjy, vol. v., ]>. I'Jl, but 
 this must be a mistake for 17'J0. 
 f Ltiliard, vol. ii., p. G.J4. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. Ill 
 
 On the English side, the fitting out of a suitable fleet was not 
 only delayed but postponed ; but some slight comprehension of 
 the danger was shown in the orders which had been given to Vice- 
 Admiral Killigrew in the early spring. This officer sailed from 
 Torbay with a squadron and convoy for the Mediterranean on the 
 7th of March, making first for Cadiz. He had with him one 
 second-rate, four third-rates, seven fourth-rates, one fifth-rate, and 
 two fire-ships, besides apparently four Dutch ships, two of which 
 unfortunately foundered on the way out. According to the reckon- 
 ing of those days, this gave Killigrew, when he sailed, sixteen ships 
 "fit to lie in a line." His orders were to proceed to Cadiz, and 
 to forward the trade to its different destinations up the Medi- 
 terranean, and then with the remainder of his squadron, which 
 would be seven ships and the Dutch, to watch the motions of the 
 Toulon fleet, and if it passed the Straits of Gibraltar westward, he 
 was to follow it. 
 
 He was much delayed in every way; took the usual month, 
 which a century later was still the usual month, to reach Cadiz, 
 but there was considerably hampered by the hindrances placed in 
 his way by the Spanish authorities. He was still there with most 
 of his ships on the 9th of May when expresses reached him from 
 several quarters that the Toulon fleet of ten sail, three of them 
 carrying 80 guns each, had been seen off Alicante, Malaga, and 
 Gibraltar successively. Killigrew sailed next morning for Gibraltar, 
 where he not only picked up the rest of his ships, but heard that 
 fourteen ships, presumably the French squadron, had been seen 
 at anchor in the Bay of Tetuan near Ceuta, and just opposite 
 Gibraltar, the night before. He at once made for this point, 
 having with him ten sail of English, " fit to lie in a line," beside 
 two fifth-rates and two fire-ships, as well as five Dutch ships. 
 
 None of the French fleet were found at anchor, but in a short 
 time they were all seen to the northward, and sail was made 
 in chase. The French and English historians have squabbled a 
 good deal over whether either side was willing or unwilling for an 
 encounter. Presumably, Chateaurenault would have shown a 
 singular want of sense had he courted a battlo, which might have 
 prevented that great concentration of force which he was about to 
 complete at Brest. Anyhow, there was no action. The French 
 passed the Straits, and Killigrew, having apparently little compre- 
 hension of the French strategy, or of the possibly momentous 
 results of his delay, proceeded to Cadiz, and busied himself in 
 arranging for convoys and such like matters of inferior import. 
 
112 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 He had been ordered to follow the French if they passed tlio 
 Straits ; he certainly obeyed his orders, but so leisurely that whdn 
 he reached Plymouth Sound, after the 30th of June, it was only to 
 learn that Torrington had been beaten, that the French were in 
 command, though not in undisputed command, of the Channel, and 
 that it behoved him to get his very inferior force right up into 
 Ilamoaze, and out of harm's way, with as little delay as might be. 
 
 Beside the main force of the English and Dutch, slowly — very 
 slowly — assembling at St. Helens, and this force of Killigrew's, 
 which I have traced out and home, the only other English force 
 of importance was that under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, which, how- 
 ever, had only amounted to six men-of-war under his immediate 
 command when De Tourville's preparations were complete.''^ 
 
 As to the main fleet, I have already spoken of its delay. Of 
 the fact of this delay, there is but little doubt. As to the causes, 
 they seem to have been a point for bitter argument between the 
 navy and the politicians. Torrington's defence makes it quite 
 clear that he had been urging all through the winter the necessity 
 of hastening and increasing the preparations, and had been as 
 steadily withstood by the Earl of Nottingham. " I appeal to 
 him," said the prisoner on his trial, " whether I did not tell him, 
 when I had urged many reasons for strengthening our fleet, which 
 he only answered with, * You will be strong enough for the French,' 
 ' My Lord, I know my business, and will do my best with what I 
 have ; but pray remember it is not my fault that the fleet is no 
 ctronger. I own I am afraid now, in winter, whilst the danger may 
 be remedied ; and you will be afraid in summer, when it is past 
 rcmedy."t Burnett accuses Torrington of being "a man of 
 pleasure," and that he delayed joining the fleet. It seems impos- 
 sible that this can be true, for Torrington in his defence expressly 
 charges some of the wrongdoings on the fact that he did not join 
 the fleet till the 30th May-t As the court-martial honourably 
 acquitted Lord Torrington, and as the King made it extremely hard 
 for all who had defended him, it seems pretty clear what the navy 
 of the day thought about it all, and what view the politicians took. 
 
 However, the result of all was that on the 23rd June 1690 
 
 * Ships at Plymouth are also mentioned, but I have no account of their number or 
 force. 
 
 t Entick, ID. 548. 
 
 1 Burnett, however, had but a hazy notion of anything that took place. He evidently 
 thinks our ships assembled at Plymouth, -whereas they assembled in the Downs, and 
 Torrington found them there. See Memoirs of Lord Torrington (then Captain Byng, 
 in command of the i7o;je, 70), p. 43. Torrington in his defence states that his orders 
 ■were not signed till the 26th May. Entick, p. o50, 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 113 
 
 Torrini^ton found himself at St. Helen's at the head of no more 
 than 50 men-of-war and 20 fire-ships in the face of a sudden 
 announcement that the French, 120 strong, were at the back of 
 the Isle of Wight. 
 
 The Comte de Tourville at Brest, being joined by the Toulon 
 fleet which Killigrew had failed to follow, found himself at the 
 head of 70 ships fit for the lino, 5 frigates, 16 fire-ships, and 15 
 galleys. He was totally unwatched, as one of the clever things 
 the Eegency had done, and for which it blamed its subordinate, the 
 Commander-in-Chief, was absolutely and entirely to omit the 
 making of any attempt to gain intelligence. Not a cruiser 
 watched the port of Brest, not a cutter even guarded the 
 approaches to the Channel. 
 
 " All very well," said Torrington, " to blame me for thi<i.'* 
 
 Some think that in some measure I am chargeable with it. Surely they do not mean 
 before I came to the fleet, which was not till the 30th of May I And from that time 
 forward we had always ships at sea, not only as scouts, but some ever iipon the coast 
 of France. It is said, we had no scouts out when the French appeared, and it is very 
 truo ; nor is it my fault. For all our ships' boats being employed to fetch the Earl 
 of Pembroke's regiment, I desired the Dutch, who had the outguard, to take that care 
 upon them; and it seems those that Vice-Admiral Callemberg had appointed for that 
 service delayed it, to take in some necessaries at the Isle of ^Yight. And it is certain 
 that the first notice I had of the French was by the appearance of five of their scouts. 
 
 1 thought, and still think, that tho material intelligence is the strength of an 
 enemy's preparation and how that is to be employed. If we had any such intelligence 
 it has been concealed from me ; for the first notice I had of Monsieur de Chatteau 
 Renaut's joining the French tleet, was the sight of his flag flying oil the Isle of 
 Wight.* 
 
 Chateaurenault, as we have seen, had been able to evade Killi- 
 grew, who had not followed him up as he should have done, and 
 he had consequently been able to form his junction with de 
 Tourville unnoticed and unmolested, t The Comte de Tourville 
 consequently was able to sail from Brest on the 13th June at the 
 head of the force mentioned, | and he proceeded at once for the 
 Isle of Wight. 
 
 * Entick, p. 548. 
 
 t One of the reasons given why Killigrew was x nable to bring him to action wa^ 
 the foulness of his ships' bottoms. They had been seventeen months " off the 
 ground," whereas the Frenchmen were just out of Toulon " clean." 
 
 t III reference to the last chapter, it may be useful to give the exact force of 
 
 the ships in the line: — 
 
 no guns - 
 
 104 ,, .. 
 
 'JO „ - 
 
 «G ,, - 
 
 84 ,, . 
 
 80 j, . 
 
 T(i ,. - 
 
 1 
 
 74 guns 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 2 
 
 58 c 
 
 "•uns 
 
 
 
 - G 
 
 1 
 
 72 ,, 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 ,, 
 
 
 
 - 1 
 
 2 
 
 70 ,, 
 
 . 
 
 - 
 
 
 I 
 
 54 
 
 ,, 
 
 
 
 - 3 
 
 2 
 
 OS ., 
 
 - 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 5 
 
 52 
 
 „ 
 
 
 
 - 3 
 
 2 
 
 G(3 „ 
 
 
 „ 
 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 .J 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 G4 „ 
 
 . 
 
 „ 
 
 
 1 
 
 44 
 
 ,^ 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 GJ '.', 
 
 _ 
 
 ■• 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 A.) 
 
 'J 
 
 
 
 
114 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 However startling it may have been for an admiral lying at 
 St. Helen's to learn, after hardly any warning, that an enemy's 
 fleet of 120 sail, twice his strength at least, was quietly at anchor 
 in Freshwater Bay, Lord Torrington does not seem to have lost 
 his head for a moment. A profound strategist as well as a most 
 experienced seaman, he saw exactly how the land lay, and at once 
 proposed to make the best of the very bad job which the neglect of 
 his advice and warnings had led up to. He had had on the 22nd 
 of June his earliest intimation that the French had put to sea 
 for the eastward ; and now, at 8 o'clock in the morning on this 
 23rd, he received the astounding intelligence above noted. Ho at 
 once weighed, but the wind was so light as to leave his fleet chiefly 
 at the mercy of the tides, and being no further than off Dunose 
 he wrote to Lord Nottingham : — 
 
 Wo sailed this morning, but tho wind taking us snort wc arc not far from Donoso. 
 If tho French havo continued thoir station, we are not above five leagues asunder. 
 Our fleet consists of 50 men-of-war, and 20 fire-ships ; the odds are great, and you 
 know it is not my fault. To-norrow will probalily be the deciding day. Lot thorn 
 tremble at the consequence whose fault it was the fleet is no stronger; for my part, I 
 will, with God Almighty's help, do my duty, and I hope everybody here will do so too. 
 If wo are to exjicct any more Dutch, I hope thoy will bo hastened to us ; it is not 
 impossible thoy may come time enough for a share, because tho sea is subject to 
 accidents. We havo as yet but 18 Dutch with us, after ell De Witt's great promises. 
 
 The lightness of the wind compelled the Admiral to anchor for 
 the night off Dunose, and next day was reinforced by three Dutch 
 and two English men-of-war. At daylight on the 25th Torrington 
 weighed with his 55 sail to a light N.E. wind, and with the inten- 
 tion of bringing the I'^rench to battle if possible, but it became so 
 thick that he had to anchor again; but presently, the wind shifting 
 to the S.W., it cleared, and then he saw the French about twelve 
 miles to the S.W., in a line on the port tack, standing, that is, to 
 the W.N.W. Torrington weighed, and forming his line stood 
 to the S.S.E. on the starboard tack, the French thus growing 
 more and more on their starboard beam as they advanced ; being 
 also to windward, and having therefore full opportunity of bringing 
 on a general action, which their undoubtedly great superiority of 
 force justified, nay urged, them in doing. I need not particularize 
 in this place the movements of the respective fleets, beyond esta- 
 blishing the point, distinctly stated by Lord Torrington, that the 
 French might have brought him to action on this 25tb of June, 
 
 Showing that though the necessary dififerentiation of force was approaching, the French 
 idea was yet a long way from understanding what a " line-of-battle " ship really meant. 
 —See 0. Troude, vol. i. p. 198. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 115 
 
 V. !id did not.* But on this day Lord Torrington got near enough 
 to observe with his own eyes the strength of the French force, and 
 even to count the ships with some approach to accuracy. The 
 prospect was njt reassuring for an Admiral who knew that there 
 were no reserves behind him, and that his country was divided 
 against itself. The two fleets anchored for the night, and on the 
 morning of the 26th Lord Torrington wrote to Nottingham as 
 follows : — 
 
 It is unaccountable why the French shunned us : for though they had many ships to 
 leeward, and scattered, they had enough in a body to have given us more than 
 sufficient work. I do acknowledge my first attention of attacking them a rashness 
 that will admit of no better excuse than that, though I did believe them stronger than 
 wo are, I did not believe it to so great a degree. I find by their manner of working, 
 that notwithstanding their strength, they act with some caution, and seem to be 
 willing to add to the advantage of force that of wind too. Their great strength and 
 caution have put soberer thoughts into my head, and have made mo very heartily give 
 God thanks they declined the battle yesterday. And, indeed, I shall not think myself 
 very unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon equaller 
 terms than for the present I see any prospect- of. I find I am not the only man of that 
 opinion, for a Council of War I called this morning unanimously agreed we are by all 
 manner of means to shun tigliting with them, especially if they have the wind of us, 
 and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gunfieet, the only place wo can 
 with any manner of probability make our party good with them in the condition we 
 are in.f We have now had a pretty good view of their fleet, which consists of 
 near, if not quite, 80 men-of-war, fit to lie in a line, and 30 fire-ships, a strength that 
 puts me beside the hopes of success, if we should fight, and really may not only endanger 
 the losing of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our country too ; for if we are beaten, 
 they being absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things 
 they dare not attempt whilst we observe them, and arc in a possibility of joining Vice- 
 Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the westward. If I find a possibility, I will get 
 by them to the westward to join those ships ; if not, I mean to follow the result of the' 
 council of wax-. In the meantime, I wish there might be speedy orders given to fit out 
 with speed whatever ships of war are in the river of Chatham, and that the ships to 
 the westward proceed to Portsmouth, and from thence, if the French come before the 
 river, they may join us over the flats. This is the best advice I can give at present ; 
 
 * Sometimes there is nothing more puzzling than to make out, from the accounts of 
 historians, what fleets actually did. In this case Lediard and Entick have followed 
 Burchett, not perceiving that Torrington's statements do not agree with their own 
 vague ones. Berkeley gives a mere paragraph to the whole thing. The author of the 
 MS. Memoirs of Lord Torrington (Byng), now printed by the Camden Society and edited 
 by Professor Laughton, distinctly states that when Torrington" (Herbert) sighted the 
 French fleet they were to leeward of him, and then " drawing into a line of battle," he 
 •bore down upon them." But this neither agrees with the wind as given by Lord 
 Torrington in his letter, nor with the movements he described himself to have made. 
 Speaker Onslow, in a note on Burnett's History of his own Times, says — speaking pre- 
 sumably of these Memoirs — that they give the best account of the battle of Beachey 
 Head which he had seen. 
 
 t The Gunfleet is a bank running out from Foulness, north of the Thames, in an 
 E.N.E. direction, in part covering Harwich, and affording anchorage to a large fleet 
 behind it. 
 
116 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 but had I been beliovod in winter, the kin^alom had not received this inFinlt. Tour 
 Lordship now Icnows the opinion of the flag-officers of botli Dutcli a-ul Enj^dish fleets, 
 which I desire you will lay before Her Majesty, and to assure her that if she has other 
 considerations, whenever she pleases to signify her pleasure, her commands shall bo 
 punctually obeyed, let the consequence bo what it will.* 
 
 Nothing could be plainer or more straightfor\Yard than this cool 
 exposition of the situation. As far as he could see, he was, with a 
 force 55 men-of-war, opposed to a force of 80; and though if 
 it were the mere winning or losing of a battle, the risk of one 
 might be properly run, yet, considering what was behind— the 
 army over in Ireland with the King, a large disaffected population 
 ready to welcome the French, the considerable detachments of 
 naral force, under Killigrew and under Cloudesley Shovel, open 
 to annihilation — the risk of being beaten became disproportionably 
 great. Y/hile if he could altogther avoid fighting, and merely 
 wait and watch, he v/ould render the great French armament 
 pov/crless, and entirely defeat its ends. It could do absolutely 
 nothing if Torrington declined to be drawn into a battle, because 
 the moment it attempted anything by way of a landing, or an 
 attack upon the shore, it would give to the British admiral exactly 
 that advantage which was required to made his attack successful. 
 
 But his letter makes it perfectly clear that he proposed to 
 abandon nothing, unless he was forced to do so. He was ready, 
 rather than risk a battle at such immense disadvantage, even to 
 retire behind the Gunflect. For there, amongst the shoals, his 
 lleet was secure ; and while he was there, the very utmost the 
 . French could do would be to lie off the Thames and blockade it. 
 But their inability to thread the intricate navigation of the 
 entrance to the river was the very circumstance which would 
 enable reinforcements to reach him "over the flats." In his mind, 
 the Gunfleet choal was to do for him just what, more than a 
 century later, the Duke of Wellington rightly calculated that the 
 lines of Torres Vedras would do for him. 
 
 Short-sighted people in 1690 and in 1810 thought just in Vaq 
 same way. To them, a retirement behind the Gunfleet was an 
 abandonment of the country to the Allies of the ex- King ; and the 
 retreat upon Lisbon was to give up Portugal to the French. 
 
 But Torrington had no intention of making for the Gunfleet 
 except in the last resort. If he could win past the French fleet 
 to the westward, he might pick up Killigrew and Shovel, and then 
 returning with his augmented force, he would be able to deal 
 satisfactorily with de Tourville, who was just as much m-evented 
 
 * Entick, p. 548, 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 117 
 
 from meddling with the shore- when Torrington was west as when 
 he was east of him. The plan then was (1) at all hazards to 
 avoid fighting with the odds so greatly against him ; (2) to endea- 
 vour to pass the French to the westward ; and (3) if this could not be 
 accomplished, and the French forced him to the eastward, then he 
 would secure himsolf finally behind the Gunfleet, where it was 
 difficult to attack him at an advantage, but whence he could issue 
 at any moment, and therefore could hold the French completely 
 in check. Where also he could be reinforced until strong enough 
 to take the offensive. 
 
 Nottingham, at the elbow of the Queen, either could not or 
 would not understand anything of this. " Sir William Jennings,"* 
 he wrote to Torrington, "is on board of the French Admiral, and 
 examined some prisoners (whom they took o^f of Weymouth, and 
 set on shore in the Isle of Wight) what the number of our fleet 
 was ; and they saying 90 sail of men-of-war, he was in a great rage, 
 and threatened to hang them for lying, for that he was sure we had 
 but 30 ships together ; for the Dutch were not come, Killigrew in 
 the Straits, and Shovel in the Irish seas ; and that they came to 
 destroy our fleet thus divided, first at Portsmouth, and then in the 
 river. And they were extremely discouraged upon hearing the 
 salutes, when they were told that it must be upon the arrival of 
 the Dutch ships. f And we have further information that they 
 arc very ill manned. And though your lordship, that has seen 
 them, may better judge of their number than we can by any advice 
 from France, yet I have seen letters from one who, in company 
 with others, was very near their fleet ; and they all say, that they 
 counted them twelve times, and could never make them more than 
 103 or 101 of all rates ; of which they say positively there was not 
 about GO ships that could stand in a line. "J 
 
 Tho ships from Plymouth [Nottingham continues] sailed thence on Monday morning 
 last, so that if they are not already with you they must bo very near. 
 
 Sir Cloudesley Shovel sailed from Belfast at three of the clock in the morning of 
 the 18th instant, so that he also cannot be far from you. 
 
 * One of James's adherents. 
 
 t Not impossibly it was this information reaching the French, and the hearing tho 
 salutes on the 24th, which disinclined them from coming to action on the 25th of June. 
 It will have been observed that Torrington failed to count the French accurately, and 
 somewhat over-rated their force. The French, perhaps, failed in the same way, 
 proximity not being close enough for accurate counting. 
 
 J This, it will be observed, was as much under-counting as Torrington's over-counting. 
 There were cei'tainly 70 ships fit for the lii;o, and if tho galleys were then with them, 
 which, however, I doubt, there were lOG sail all told. Torrington might easily have 
 been deceived if the 15 galleys, the 5 frigates, and the 16 fire-ships were all present. 
 
118 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 By letters from Vicc-Adiniral Killigrcw, dated May L'Gtb from Cadiz, I find ho 
 intended to sail in a few days, and return according to his orders. 
 
 So that upon the whole, if you should retire to the Gunfleot, the ships from Ply- 
 mouth, if not joined with you and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and all the ships returning 
 from Ireland, and Vice- Admiral Killigrew, with that squadron and a rich fleet of 
 merchantmen, will all be exposed to inevitable ruin. And besides, the French may 
 have opportunity of going with their whole fleet, or sending such part as they may 
 think fit to Scotland, whore they are espsctcd ; and we have too good reason to 
 apprehend disturbances.* 
 
 This would be a perverse enough misunderstanding of the situa- 
 tion, and of Torrington's view of it, if it stood alone. But the 
 non-sequitur of the enclosure almost takes one's breath away. 
 Nottingham was in the main only repeating what Torrington had 
 put in his mind, but with the inferences turned inside out. The 
 importance of joining, or at least of securing the safety of Killigrew 
 and Shovel, was the matter which dwelt in the foremost place in 
 Torrington's mind, and his main effort, as sketched out, was the 
 endeavour to join them. If he could not pass the French to the 
 westward, but could keep in observation of them to the eastward, 
 his colleagues would be safe enough. For if de Tourville should 
 go west after them, Torrington would follow him up ; if he should 
 detach force sufficient for their destruction, he would weaken 
 himself so much that Torrington might engage him at an 
 advantage. 
 
 It was just the same with regard to Scotland. If Torrington 
 was forced back — in order to avoid a battle — to the Gunfleet, the 
 French could neither proceed to Scotland in full force nor send a 
 detachment there. First, because they would be unable to shake 
 off Torrington ; and, secondly, because if they weakened themselves 
 by detaching, Torrington would fall on the remamder. 
 
 The one thing certain, both from Torrington's words and Notting- 
 ham's, was that the French wished of all things for a general action 
 with the odds in their favour, and this alone was sufficient to prescribe 
 a refusal. The one point on which Nottingham could hang a grain 
 of justification for the extraordinary enclosure which his letter con- 
 tained, was his estimate of the relative forces watching each other. 
 He assumed them nearly equal, Torrington and his brother 
 admirals, looking at both fleets when they so decided, were of 
 opinion that the odds were too great to give reasonable hopes of 
 success. What right had any statesman or politician in London to 
 treat as fallacious estimates of force so arrived at ? 
 
 But Nottingham did it ; for his letter, written in such haste 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 119 
 
 that he was unable to take a copy of it, enclosed a positive order 
 fiom the Queen to Torrington to bring the French fleet to action. 
 The order ran : — 
 
 Makie n. 
 
 Right trusty and well-beloved cousin and counsellor, we greet you well. 
 We have heard your letter dated June 26, to our Secretary of State, and do 
 not doubt of your skill and conduct in this important conjuncture, to take all 
 opportunities of advantage against the enemy. But we apprehend the consequences 
 of your retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we chuse rather you should upon 
 any advantage of the wind give battle to the enemy than retreat further than is neces- 
 sary to get an advantage upon the enemy. But in case you find it necessary to go to 
 the westward of the French fleet, in order to the better joining with our ships from 
 Plymouth, or any others coming from the westward, we leave it to your discretion, so 
 as you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they may have oppor- 
 tunities of making attempts upon the shore, or in the rivers of Medway or Thames, or 
 get away without fighting. And so we bid you heartily farewell.* 
 
 This order was, of course, Nottingham's, and its wrongheadedness 
 may possibly show itself to the reader who has followed me thus 
 far. There is no sign in it of an understanding of the possibly 
 overwhelming consequences of a lost battle, for it assumes it to be 
 a bad thing to let the French ^' get away without fighting." 
 Nottingham must have got it into his mind, and carried it into the 
 mind of the Queen and her council, that the well-tried Herbert and 
 his colleague flag-officers were incompetent cowards, fearing a 
 battle where there were at least fair chances of success, and 
 nothing to follow defeat if it should come. But as has often 
 happened since, the statesman was found on the quarter-deck, 
 and the rash blunderer at the seat of Government. There was 
 al)Solutely nothing to be gained by a battle which could not 
 possibly be a decisive victory, and over which from the great 
 numbers engaged, and the limits placed on manoeuvring by the 
 character of the ships and the lightness of the wind, the 
 admirals could have no real control. A complete victory to the 
 enemy on- the other hand, would, at the very least, have sent 
 the Dutch King back to Holland, if it did not place this kingdom 
 under the orders of the Pope and of Louis. The sailors saw it all 
 well enough. The statesmen neither saw it then nor afterwards. 
 
 While Torrington's report of the 26th was on its way to town, 
 and while Nottingham's despatch and its ruinous enclosure were 
 on their way back, the British fleet had been pressed eastwards as 
 far as Beachy Head. Torrington received the Queen's order on 
 the 29th, and at once sat down to acklowledge the receipt of it to 
 Nottingham. / 
 
 • Entick, p. 549. / 
 
120 NAVAL WyiRFARE. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 I this minuto received Her Majesty's orders, -which I will (so soon as I can 
 get the fla^'-officerH on board), communicate to them: I am very certain that they 
 all will, with myself, with great cheerfulness give due obedience to her commands. 
 
 Now in answer to your Lordship's, I infer from the examination of the prisoners 
 they took off Weymouth, and set on shore at the Isle of Wight, that the French are as 
 strong as wo take them to be ; for were they not so strong, or under any consternation, 
 I cannot think they would have put anybody ashore to bring us the news of it, but 
 quietly have retired. For if they do not think they have the advantage, I am yet to 
 learn what can move them to stay, having for several days had a fair wind to carry 
 them off. And, my Lord, notwithstanding your advice from France, I take them to be 
 80 men-of-war strong. How they are manned indeed, I am not able to judge ; but I 
 am credibly informed by some French prisoners, who were taken in a small bark, that 
 they are well manned, and that the Toulon ships are now with them. Had we had 
 Killigrew with us, the match had been a little more equal. I cannot comprehend that 
 Killigrew, the merchant ships. Shovel, or the Plymouth ships, can run much hazard 
 if they take any care of themselves. For whilst wc observe the French, they cannot 
 make any attempt either upon ships or shore, without running a great hazard ; and if 
 we are beaten; all is exposed to their mercy. 'Tis very possible I reason wrong, but I 
 do assure you I can, and will, obey. Pray God direct all for the best, I send your 
 Lordship a copy enclosed of your letter to me. Pray, my Lord, assure Her Majesty 
 that all that can be done by men in our circumstances shall be done for her service.* 
 
 In accordance with the Queen's orders and this decision, Tor- 
 ilngton, at dayhght next morning, proceeded to draw his fleet into 
 Hne. The wind appears to have been from the eastward, and very 
 hght, and the hne was formed on the starboard tack, with the 
 ships' heads to the northward. The Dutch formed the van, 
 Torrington, according to usage, commanded the centre, and Delaval 
 the rear. About eight on the morning of June 30th, signal was made 
 to engage, the allied line bore down on the French to leeward, who 
 lay to with their head-yards aback and waited for the onset.f 
 
 * Entick, p. 0-19. 
 
 t The composition of Torrington's fleet is given in the Memoirs of Lord Torrington 
 (Byng), already quoted, and I have not met it elsewhere. The Dutch van consisted of 
 '•'2 sail, as follows : — 
 
 fcjbips. Guns. 
 1 of 'J J 
 1 ,, 82 
 
 1 ,, 7-t 
 
 2 „ 72 
 1 ,, 70 
 1 „ 08 
 
 The English centre and rear of 35 ships :- 
 
 Ships. Guns. 
 
 1 of 100 
 
 1 „ OG 
 
 "• - . 5 „ 90 
 
 1 ,, 82 
 
 1 72 
 
 IG 70 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 2 of 
 
 M 
 
 1 
 
 C2 
 
 4 „ 
 
 GO 
 
 2 „ 
 
 52 
 
 ^ „ 
 
 50 
 
 1 ,. 
 
 44: 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Guns, 
 
 1 of 
 
 G6 
 
 1 „ 
 
 G4 
 
 3 ,, 
 
 GO 
 
 1 „ 
 
 54 
 
 1 .. 
 
 50 
 
 2 „ 
 
 48 
 
 I 
 
 ?,G 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 121 
 
 Here, I do not examine the tactics of the battle that followed. It 
 is sufficient to mention that the Dutch in the van got into close 
 action with the rear part of the French van, and were doubled on 
 by the nine leading ships of the latter.* The British rear also got 
 into action, but not so close, with the French rear. The ships in the 
 French centre were to leeward of the van and rear, and Torrington 
 in the British centre, attached them only at long range, and left 
 for some time a gap between himself and the Dutch. The Dutch 
 were badly damaged, but saved themselves, or were saved by 
 Torrington's orders, in consequence of their dropping their anchors 
 when the ebb made, which the French not perceiving, drifted away 
 to the westward out of gun-shot. t One of the Dutch ships, from 
 inability to anchor, drifted away with the French and was 
 captured. 
 
 In the evening, Torrington weighed, and taking in tow the 
 disabled ships, beat to the eastward against the light foul winds 
 that prevailed, taking the precaution to drop his anchors when 
 the ebb-tide made against him. The French followed, not in 
 general chase, but in line of battle, the contemporary opinion 
 being that the desire to maintain the fighting formation saved our 
 fleet from destruction. At any rate, the council of war which sat 
 on the 1st July, decided that things were so bad with them that if 
 they were pressed by the French, it would be necessary to destroy 
 the disabled ships and retire, rather than face a renewal of the 
 fight. 
 
 The French pursued, but not strenuously, for four days, by 
 which time the Allies had reached Dover, and had left the enemy 
 so far in the rear that the pursuit was abandoned, and the French 
 drew off to the westward. The Allies suffered losses in the pursuit, 
 four Dutch and one English ship having either been burnt or run 
 ashore in a disabled state. 
 
 Naturally, the alarm was great in England on the news of this 
 defeat spreading. Immediate invasion was the least that was 
 expected. But it should seem that Torrington was entirely right 
 in his strategical judgment. The French made for their original 
 destination, Torbay, where they anchored and landed a party to 
 burn the village of Teignmouth, which was easily driven off by 
 
 * Memoirs relatinrj to Lord Torrinrjton, p. 4G. 
 
 f Not only were numbers of ships against the Dutch, but the individual power of 
 their ships was less than that of the French. The average force of tlie 22 ships 
 forming the Dutch van was but Gl-S guns, while of the 25 leading ships of the French 
 it was G4-7. 
 
122 NAVAL WARFABE. 
 
 the hastily assembled militia. They also destroyed one or two 
 vessels of little value in the harbour, and later retired to Brest ; 
 some ruined houses atTeignniouth,some burnt small craft, and a 
 single captured man-of-war being the insignificant trophies of the 
 great expedition. 
 
 Torrington's defence of his conduct was the strategical condition 
 he had to contend with. He was greatly inferior to the French, 
 but they were powerless for mischief as long as his fleet existed. 
 When forced by the Queen's order to fight a battle which there 
 was no hope of winning against ships not only more numerous 
 but of greater individual force, it behoved him to take care 
 that he ran no risks of being beaten. 
 
 That our fighting upon so great a disadvantage as we did was of the last conse- 
 quence to the kingdom, is as certain as that the Queen could not have been prevailed 
 ■with to sign an order for it, had not both our weakness, and the strength of the 
 enemy, been disguised to her. . . . 
 
 It is true, the French made no great advantage of their victory, tho' they put us 
 to a great charge in keeping up the militia ; but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had 
 been totally lost, and the kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What then would 
 have become of us in the absence of His Majesty, and most of the land forces ? As it 
 was, most men were in fear that the French would invade ; but I was always of 
 another opinion ; for I always said, that whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not 
 dare to make an attempt. 
 
 In my letter of the 29th .June, the matter is stated pretty plain : whilst we observe 
 the French, they can make no attempt either on sea or shore, but with great disad- 
 vantages : and if we are beaten all is exposed to their mercy. This I dare bo bold to 
 say, that if the management of the fleet had been loft to the discretion of the council 
 of war, there would have been no need of the excessive charge the kingdom was put 
 to in keeping up the militia, nor would the French have gone off so much at their 
 ease.* 
 
 So that, even though the beaten Allied fleet had come " to an 
 anchor at the Nore in great confusion ; and expecting that the 
 French might attack them, all the buoys were taken up, and other 
 necessary dispositions made as soon as they got there, "t yet the 
 strategy of the conditions was such as to leave and keep the 
 great French fleet powerless. If, indeed, the enemy had followed 
 up and beaten the fleet at the Nore absolutely, "all would have 
 been at his mercy." But "a fleet in being," even though it was 
 discredited, inferior, and shut up behind unbuoyed sandbanks, 
 was such a power in observation as to paralyze the action of an 
 apparently victorious fleet either against " sea or shore." 
 
 This is the part of the battle of Beachy Head which consti- 
 tutes its chief interest, but which is hardly touched by the 
 
 * Torrington's defence, Entick, p. 549. 
 
 ♦ Memoirs relating to Lord Torrington, p. 47. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 123 
 
 different historians who have related the story. The first attempt 
 of the French to gain the command of the sea with a definite 
 ulterior purpose failed, because, as a fact, they were not enter- 
 prising or persevering enough to secure the preliminary condition. 
 They had beaten our fleet, yet not to the point of annihilation 
 which was necessary if the command of the sea was to be gained. 
 Lord Torrington's acquittal by the court-martial which 4ried him, 
 in the face of very strong influences on the other side, is a signi- 
 ficant reminder of the naval views of that day.* 
 
 Both countries had now studied in the school of experience 
 But if the French had hardly got to understand what sort of a com- 
 mand of the sea would be necessary before invasion could be 
 thought of ; the English had taken some warning as to the dangers 
 of delay and parsimony in the preparation of naval defence. 
 
 The French plan for 1692 was as follows. By arrangement 
 with the disaffected party in England, an attempt was to be made 
 to land an army of 20,000 menf on the coast of Sussex, the 
 arrival of which should be the signal for a general rising in the 
 country on behalf of James. This army, assembling with the neces- 
 sary sea-transport at La Hague, Cherbourg, and Havre, consisted 
 of 14 battalions of English, Scotch, and Irish, and 9,000 French, 
 was joined by the ex-King.| No doubt it was originally intended 
 that the French fleet of 1692 should be as superior to that of the 
 Allied English and Dutch as it had been in 1690, and equally 
 beforehand in beginning hostilities. The authorities at Brest were 
 ordered to prepare the whole of the ships there for sea, and orders 
 were given that a contingent of 13 sail-of-the-line should join them 
 from Toulon. Then the precedent of 1690 was taken up, and it 
 was hoped that de Tourville — again in command — might be able 
 to fall upon and destroy the British home fleet before it could be 
 joined by the Dutch, and that then the invading military force 
 might cross and encourage a successful rising of the Jacobites. 
 
 But two things happened, or rather three, which marred and 
 rendered abortive the otherwise reasonable plans of the French. 
 The Toulon contingent, approaching the Straits of Gibraltar on the 
 18th of May, was met by a gale of wind, which drove two of the 
 
 A matter not touched on by any of the historians, which would deserve comment 
 if I dealt with the tactical part of the subject, is the non-use by Torrington of his 
 fire-ships. I have not observed that anyone says a word about them. 
 
 t Forbin, quoted by Lediard, vol. ii., p. 665. 
 
 X Eatick, p. 555. 0. Troude, vol. i., p. 209. Troude says there were but 12,000 
 men, but this is a mistake. 
 
 9 
 
124 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ships ashore at Ceuta, and so dispersed and damaged the remainder 
 that they were not able to reach Brest till the end of the month of 
 July, by which time many things had happened. 
 
 The second misfortmie which the French suffered was the per- 
 sistent advice from English Jacobites, that many of the captains of 
 the British fleet had been gained over to the cause of James, and 
 would desert to the enemy at the first opportunity. 
 
 The third misfortune was that the Dutch were more prompt and 
 earlier than usual in joining the English fleet, and that Louis 
 information on this head had failed him.''^ 
 
 James pressed upon Louis the certainty of his information with 
 regard to the disaffected English captains, and the relative weak- 
 ness of the English fleet alone ; and in an evil hour for the French 
 success, Louis sent orders to de Tourville to put to sea with the 
 45 ships of the line and the 7 fire-ships which were ready at Brest, 
 and to fall upon the English before the junction of the Dutch, 
 whether they were strong or weak. De Tourville sailed, but foul 
 north-easterly winds delayed his progress up Channel, and facili- 
 tated the passage of the English down Channel, and the approach 
 of the Dutch to join them. Cruisers were despatched after de 
 Tourville, from Barfleur and elsewhere, to countermand the pre- 
 vious orders, but the despatches never reached him, and he went 
 on towards the point where the army for invasion was assembled. 
 
 The English had, as I have observed, profited by experience. 
 They do not seem to have had any accurate information of the 
 French complete design, for they were, down to the last moment, 
 proposing a descent on St. Malo, and the necessary troops were 
 called together at Portsmouth for the purpose. But they were well 
 aware that a great sea force early in the field was the double 
 necessity under the knowledge that some design was in preparation 
 in France. Admiral Kussell was appointed to the command of the 
 Home fleet as early as the 3rd of December 1691, and great activity 
 was displayed in pushing on the fitment of the ships. 
 
 Look-out ships were sent out to observe the movements of the 
 French, and as the ships grew towards readiness, two strong 
 squadrons were despatched into the Channel with orders so 
 curiously inconsequent as almost to show that the real designs of 
 the French were quite misunderstood. 
 
 Sir Ralph Delaval had arrived in the Downs with a squadron 
 in the beginning of March, after successful convoy service from 
 the Mediterranean, and was now ordered to reconnoitre the French 
 
 * O. Troude, vol. i., p. 20d,et seq. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 125 
 
 coast as far as Cape La Hague, with scouts out to give him due 
 ■warning of the enemy's approach. Then he was to cross over to 
 the Isle of Wight, whence, if no orders reached him, he was to 
 return along the French coast to Dover, and again, if no orders 
 reached him, he was to repair to the flats off the North Foreland. 
 
 Admiral Carter, with a considerable squadron, including 11 ships 
 for the line, had orders on the 14th of April to sail to the Channel 
 Islands, and to cruise near St. Malo for eight-and-forty hours, un- 
 less " an opportunity of doing service " should recommend a longer 
 stay. Then he was to look in at Havre, and if no service could be 
 done there, he was to return to Spithead.* 
 
 It is not very easy to understand what was in the mind of the 
 authorities dictating these orders. Mere reconnoitring a part of 
 the French coast, where either no heavy ships or the whole naval 
 force of France might be expected to be met, could have been much 
 better carried out by a few very light and insignificant ships ; and 
 it does not appear that mere collection of intelligence was the 
 object. But if not, then what ivas the object ? Dangers were run 
 in separating such considerable bodies from the main fleet, and 
 leaving them liable to be taken at a disadvantage. I do not per- 
 ceive that value, compensating for the risk, was aimed at. And, 
 indeed, this view seems to have been speedily taken, for counter- 
 manding orders to both Admirals almost immediately followed, 
 resulting in general directions to Eussell, Delaval, and Carter to 
 concentrate south of the Isle of Wight. t 
 
 Admiral Eussell, with the main body of the English fleet, arrived 
 off Eye on the 8th of May, where some of the Dutch ships were 
 already at anchor. The joined forces seem to have anchored there- 
 abouts, and on the 10th a council of war decided, on considering the 
 orders given to Sir Kalph Delaval, that it would be prudent to make 
 a further delay off Eye, so as to secure his junction. :{: The fleet, 
 however, sailed for St. Helen's on the 11th, and on the 13th, 
 Delaval and Carter, who had already formed a junction at sea, 
 joined Eussell at St. Helen's. 
 
 The British admiral now found himself at the head of an 
 enormous fleet. The Eed squadron, under Eussell. with Sir Ealph 
 
 * Lediard, voL ii., p. 656. 
 
 t Lediard (vol. il,, p. 656, note) considers that the first countermanding orders 
 followed on inteUigence that the French were preparing for sea (at Brest ?). The 
 dates were 20th and 2ord of April. Creasy, Invasions of England, says Russell was 
 playing false, if so, many things are explained. 
 
 I Burchett, p. 463 ; Lediard follows. 
 
 9* 
 
12G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Delaval and Sir Cloudesley Shovel as vice- and rear-admirals^ 
 consisted of 5 first-rates, 3 second, IG third, and 7 fourth. The 
 Blue squadron, under Admiral Sir John Ashby, Vice-Admiral Hon. 
 George Kooke, and Eear-Admiral Hon. Richard Carter, consisted 
 of 1 first-rate, 7 second, 18 third, and 6 fourth-rates. The English 
 part of the fleet consisted thus of 63 ships of the line, carrying 
 27,725 men, and 4,500 guns. Besides these were 23 frigates and 
 fire-ships. 
 
 The Dutch formed the White squadron, under Admiral Alle- 
 monde and two Vice-admirals, and consisted of 36 ships-of-the- 
 line, namely, 9 first, 10 second, 9 third, and 8 fourth-rates. The 
 division carried 12,950 men, and 2,494 guns. Attached to the 
 division were 14 frigates and fire-ships. The total line-of-battle 
 force was therefore 99 sail, carrying 40,675 men, and 6,994 guns. 
 I suppose that never before or since has such a tremendous naval 
 force been assembled under one admiral, and yet from want of 
 proper intelligence, the French admiral at the head of less than 
 half the force, was quietly sailing up channel to be destroyed by it.^ 
 
 Russell seems to have had no advices of the near approach of 
 the French. Th* Allies were full of the intended descent on St. 
 Malo, and Russell's proposal was that, guarded by the whole dect 
 to the westward, the descent should be made by the troops pre- 
 pare! at Portsmouth. But as a preliminary a squadron of 6 light 
 frigates was despatched towards Havre and that part of the French 
 coast, to reconnoitre ; and on the 18th of May the whole fleet 
 weighed, and stood directly over towards Cape Barfleur. 
 
 It does not appear that either side was aware of the immediate 
 proximity of the enemy. The weather was thick, and the wind 
 light from the westward, and the Allied fleet stood on, on the 
 starboard tack, till about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th May. 
 Then guns were heard from the look-outs to the westward, and 
 soon, out of the fog, two of them appeared with the signals flying de- 
 noting the presence of the enemy. Russell at once made the signal 
 for the rear to tack, so as to meet the French if it should turn out 
 that they were on the port tack. But as the sun rose, the weather 
 cleared, and the French were seen to be forming their line on the 
 starboard tack with their heads to the southward. Russell ran to 
 leeward, and then, his line fairly well formed from S.S.W. to N.N.E., 
 
 *■ Lediard gives the names and guns of Go French ships, and says there were 55 small 
 j:raft attached. Cut he admits he maj' over-state. Troude f<ives names of captains as 
 well, and I accept his statement, the more so as Russell himself m-.'.Lcs the number a» 
 under 50. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 127 
 
 lay to and awaited the attack of the French, the Dutch White 
 -squadron forming the van, the Red squadron the centre, and the 
 Bhie the rear, as the signal to tack had been annulled. 
 
 What concerns us, now that we have brought the French fleet 
 all but into contact with the Allied fleet of twice its force, is less 
 any close investigation of its disastrous defeat which most in- 
 evitably followed, than those general reflections which naturally 
 arise on such a complete failure of strategy. Let us first bear in 
 mind th-i we have a set of conditions just opposite to those 
 which had, two years before, surrounded the battle of Beachy 
 Head. The superiorities of the attacking and defending fleets 
 were reversed, and the attacking fleet was to windward, barred 
 therefore from all chances of escape, because the propulsive force 
 on which escape depended, was adverse. De Tourville had fallen 
 into this horrible trap, not of choice, but from want of intelligence. 
 Hoping, in the fog, that the enemy, of whose presence he possibly 
 had warning for the first time by the sound of our look-out ship's 
 guns, was at most -the whole English, or the whole Dutch fleet, 
 the lifting of the fog left him in face of a combination such as 
 would have in any case kept him at Brest had he known of it. 
 Close to him was the army of invasion and its transport. The 
 -cruising squadrons of the English had, up to this time, made it 
 impossible for the force at La Hague to dream of moving. Now, 
 it was quite certain that, whatever happened, the game of 
 invasion was up. It was not a question of de Tourville's being 
 beaten, it was only one of escaping total annihilation, if such 
 escape were possible. The invasion project so far had come to 
 this, that there had been all the expense of collecting a useless 
 army in Normandy, besides the certainty that such a collection 
 was about to involve the greater or less destruction of the French 
 fleet. 
 
 We are not told how the tide was when the two fleets sighted 
 one another. Had it been flood, de Tourville might have profited 
 by the example of Torrington, and by dropping his anchors imme- 
 diately, suffered the enemy to drift away from him. Had it been 
 ebb, I know not what he could have done other than what he did 
 do, that is, to put the boldest possible face on it, and bear down to 
 the attack. 
 
 But of course it was hopeless. In the thick weather that again 
 set m, it was impossible to say exactly wdiat happened, but that 
 the unhappy French were everywhere beaten and dispersed. The 
 wind had shifted to the N.W. by W. in the afternoon, which facili- 
 
1-2G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 tatecl the attempts of the French to escape south and south-west 
 indiscrhnmately, which they did. Later on the wind changed to 
 the eastward and freshened. Next day (the 20th May) Eussell 
 wrote that it had continued cahn all night. There had, during 
 the day's calm, heen an engagement to the westward of him, 
 " which he supposed to be the Blue." "I can give," he said, *' no 
 particular account of things ; but the French were beaten, and I 
 am now steering away for Conquet Roads, having a fresh gale 
 easterly, but extremely foggy. I suppose that is the place they 
 design for.* If it please God to send us a little clear weather, I 
 (.io not doubt but we shall destroy their whole fleet. I saw in the 
 night three or four ships blow up ; but I know not what they 
 were."t 
 
 There was nothing now to be done but to pursue and destroy. 
 Some of the beaten enemy made for St. Malo, and secured them- 
 selves ; but some that escaped to Cherbourg and others to La 
 Hague were fallen upon and burnt by Delaval and Eussell himself. 
 There were no less than 15 ships of from 60 to 104 guns destroyed. 
 Sat Cherbourg, and 12 at La Hague. The French attempt to 
 gain the command of the sea had a second time failed, but now 
 disastrously. 
 
 * He was still 21 miles N.E. of Cape Barfleur ■when ho wrote. Conquet Roads are 
 close to Brest. 
 
 •f I have taken for illustration of battle at this date a sketch of a pictm-e which hanga 
 in the house of the Admiral Superintendent at Devonport, and of which no history 
 exists, but to which I have had access through the kindness of Sir Walter Hunt-Grubbe, 
 when he was superintendent. Tlie painting has suffered from decayed portions of 
 it having passed through the hands of some audacious master painter in the yard, but 
 what has not been touched is of exceeding beauty and truth. It is impossible to say 
 who was the artist, but internal evidence points irresistibly to the conclusion that it is 
 nearly as old as the yard itself, which was founded in 1691, or is a copy of a picture of 
 that date. The single reefs in the top-sails, the colouring of the hulls, the shape of the 
 tops, shortness of the mast-heads, cut of the sails, and other thing's all fix the date of 
 the ships represented as close to that of La Hague. 
 
120 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 Attempts to Gain the Command of the Sea with Drftnitb 
 Ulteeior Purpose. — (Continued.) 
 
 The consequences of failure to gain command of the sea for an ulterior purpose. — 
 The attempt of the French in 1G95 to pass an army over to England, and its collapse. — 
 The attempt of 1744 hardly to be classed under the subject of the chapter. — Its daring 
 and rashness. — Its absurd ending. — Jlistaken strategy of France in 1756-59. — Countries 
 unable to protect their own seaboard can scarcely hope to attack those of other 
 countries. — N'arrative of the operations of 1759, and the destruction of every attempt at 
 invasion. — Causes of French failure to be found in false strategical principles. 
 
 It is proper that we should glance for a moment, before passing 
 on, at the consequences likely to arise from a complete failure 
 to obtain the command of the sea for an ulterior purpose : the 
 consequences, that is, of making naval warfare a means rather 
 than an end. In 1690 the French attempt had been frustrated 
 by the sound policy of the Earl of Torrington operating under 
 very disadvantageous conditions, but governed by a profound 
 conviction of the tremendous risks which, would be run if the 
 rash adoption of any other policy should land the allied fleets 
 in a serious disaster. In 1692 the French may be said to 
 have adopted the opposite view. They were prepared to stake 
 their maritime life upon a cast, and to stand the hazard of 
 the die. De Tourville's orders were, practically, to go through 
 with it without regard to consequences. The naval war was 
 made subordinate to the military war which was ready to be 
 launched from La Hague, and so overwhelmingly important 
 did this military war seem, that any mere naval risk was not 
 to stand for a moment in the way of it. So the die was cast, 
 the battle of La Hague was fought, and the French navy was de- 
 stroyed, scattered, and dispersed, and the consequences had to be 
 taken, which, however, as will bo related in the proper place, the 
 
180 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 French, by a return to the principles of legitimate naval war, were 
 able in some degree to discount in 1G93. 
 
 The Anglo-Dutch fleets may be said to have been quite unprepared 
 for the absolute collapse which French maritime enterprise suffered 
 on the defeat of de Tourville. Practically, the rest of the year 1692 
 and the whole of 1693 were spent in considering what was to be 
 done, without coming to any definite conclusions. But in 1694 the 
 notorious powerlessness of the enemy at sea determined an attack 
 upon Brest by land and sea. There was, however, no heart in it, 
 nor were the land forces nearly sufficient for so considerable an 
 enterprise. It was in no degree surprising that on the failure of 
 an attack on a fort in Camaret Bay the whole thing should have 
 been abandoned ; yet the cool audacity of the attack was a direct 
 consequence of the defeat of La Hague, and the sense of Torring- 
 ton's language in relation to a broken-up fleet — if it is beaten, all 
 is exposed to the mercy of the enemy — came home to the mind of 
 the English Government. They provided abundance of mortar 
 boats — bombs, as they were then called — and laid in good store of 
 shells. 
 
 This being done, Dieppe was heavily bombarded on the 13th 
 July 1694. Havre was bombarded on the 16th, and burnt steadily 
 for two days. An audacious endeavour was made to smoke the 
 inhabitants out of Dunkirk with a certain inventor's " smoak- 
 boats," in September. 
 
 The Allies quietly took up a permanent position in the Mediter- 
 ranean, and wintering for the first time in these latitudes, lay 
 across French trade, watched French ports, and hampered every 
 effort of France by sea. 
 
 The year 1695 was but one series of bombardments. St. Malo, 
 in July, was fired by *' machines," and had 900 shells and carcases 
 thrown into it. Granville was destroyed. Dunkirk was attacked 
 again, but again unsuccessfully, in August. Calais was bombarded 
 with 600 shells, and next year with 300 shells again ; while further 
 down the coast, Belleisle, Houat, and Haedic were ravaged and 
 harried. Palamos, captured by the French land- ways, was, in 
 August 1695, bombarded by the Allies sea-ways ; and, in fact, it 
 was from 1692 to 1697 a mere question with the victorious powers 
 what sort of mischief might be most conveniently and economically 
 carried out. The French navy was thrown into such a state of 
 demoralization for those five years by the break-up off the coast of 
 Normandy that most of what was done in the maritime war way 
 was the work of private enterprise. These were the days of Jean 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 131 
 
 Bart in the North Sea, as a private adventurer under Government 
 control, and of the practice of hiring out as to contractors the 
 ships, officers, and men of the Eoyal Navy of France.* Practi- 
 cally, it may be said that the failure of de Tourville to gain the 
 command of the sea for the temporary advantage of getting the 
 army across the Channel, involved the close of the naval war and 
 the leaving every spot of French coast open to the descents of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In the absence of any possible attempt to recover the naval posi- 
 tion, France in 1695 was minded to try the feasibility of rushing 
 an army across, in the absence of the British fleet. The practice 
 of laying up the great body of the fleet in the winter seemed to 
 offer such an opportunity, and preparations were made for embark- 
 ing an army at Dunkirk, Calais, and adjacent ports in the month 
 of February. But intelligence to this effect having reached the 
 English Government, orders were instantly given, on the 21st of 
 that month, to mobilise the navy. So expeditiously was the busi- 
 ness conducted that Eussell found himself, on the 28th, off Grave- 
 lines, at the head of 40 sail of the line of English ships, and 12 
 Dutch, beside fire-ships and small craft. The mere appearance of 
 such a fleet put to flight all ideas of any descent. 
 
 The next attempt of the French was not made until 1744 ; and 
 though it can hardly be classed as one where the command of the 
 sea was sought, yet as the intention was to provide sufficient naval 
 force to escort the army over, it cannot properly be passed by ; the 
 less so as the expedition was prepared in peace, and its dis- 
 charge upon our shores was intended to form the declaration of 
 war. 
 
 The i^reparations were made in the winter of 1743-44 with great 
 secrecy ; 15,000 troops in Flanders and Picardy were assembled 
 at Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, commanded by Count de Saxe, 
 and accompanied by the Young Pretender and a body of his 
 Scotch and Irish supporters. Transports for this force were col- 
 lected at the ports, and a fleet of 18 sail of the line, under 
 de Koquefeuille was fitted out at Brest and Eochefort, and entered 
 the Channel on the 3rd of February.! The British Government 
 
 * La guerre de detail, la guerre de course avait seule oecupe la Marine de la France. 
 Les batiments de I'etat et les ofEciers de vaisseau etaient pretes, sous certaines condi- 
 tions, aux armateurs ou aux compagnies qui voulaient tenter ce gendre d'entreprise?, 
 auxquelles, du reste, les ministres eux-memes ne dedaignaient pas de s'associer. — 
 0. Troude, vol. i., p. 235. 
 
 t According to Schomberg, 19 ships of 44 to 76 guns, and 4 of 26 guns. Vol. v., 
 P- 207. 0. Troude says simply 26 vessels. Vol. i., p. 296. / 
 
132 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 does not appear to have been early apprised of the designs of 
 France. The general preparations for carrying on the war with 
 Spain, and guarding against a coming war with France were con- 
 siderable, but more perhaps in the way of attack than of defence 
 against a particular form of it. 
 
 But the Phoenix 24, Captain T. Brodrick, was watching Brest, 
 and saw the squadron on the same day that it put to sea. She at 
 once made sail for Plymouth, arriving there on the 3rd of Feb- 
 ruary, and sent off express to the Admiralty with the news. The 
 whole of the ships available were at once whipped up. Admiral 
 Sir John Norris was placed in command ; he started for Spit- 
 head, picked up the ships there on the 6th of February, and 
 sailed for the Downs, where the whole fleet was ordered to rendez- 
 vous. There he soon found himself at the head of 49 sail, of 
 which 21 carried not less than 60 guns, and 11 not less than 44, 
 a fleet therefore greatly superior to that which was approaching 
 under de Eoquefeuille. 
 
 This was seen at the entrance to the Channel by the Bideford 
 and Kinsale, which were in charge of a convoy for Jamaica, on the 
 3rd of February, the day on which the Phoenix had arrived at 
 Plymouth. Captain Young, who commanded the latter ship, 
 judged that a higher duty was before him; he quitted the convoy, 
 and made all speed to Plymouth with the news. The Admiralty 
 were thus kept well informed of the progress and strength of the 
 enemy. At Dunkirk the embarkation of the troops was proceeded 
 with, though it is said that the process could only be made 
 tasteful to the remainder of the troops by the execution of a 
 recalcitrant member of the body on the beach, and in presence of 
 his comrades. 
 
 The French fleet met foul winds and weather, and did not 
 reach the back of the Isle of Wight until the 17th. The Admiral 
 sent forward a look-out ship to examine St. Helen's and Spithead, 
 and on the report that nothing was there, conceived the remark- 
 able idea that the British fleet had retired into Portsmouth 
 harbour. He thereupon despatched Commodore Bareil with 5 
 sail to Dunkirk to hasten the embarkation, as if under the im- 
 pression that the coast was clear. He himself fell into a three 
 days' furious gale off the Isle of Wight, and suffered much 
 damage; but on the 22nd of February the wind changed to 
 the westward and the weather cleared. The French Admiral 
 took a/^vantage of the change and anchored that evening off 
 Dungeuv/SS. 
 
ATTEMPT.^ TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 133 
 
 It is easy at this point to take notice of the daring, as well as 
 of the rashness of such proceedings as these. They can hardly 
 be counted as naval warfare, and more clearly represent naval 
 gambling. To assume, as de Eoquefeuille had done, that because 
 there were no ships at Spithead, therefore Great Britain at an 
 hour of peculiar da.nger and anxiety would leave her coasts so 
 unguarded that a force of a score of line-of-battle ships might 
 become master of the British seas, was to place an abnormal faith 
 in the stupidity of the islanders. He was about to conduct an 
 attack which had been long in preparation, and which was vital 
 to Great Britain, and yet his force was relatively small, how- 
 ever looked at. It was true that England had a great fleet de- 
 tached to the Mediterranean, and a considerable force in the West 
 Indies at the time, but it was hardly to be supposed that she 
 would have denuded her own shores to such an extent as not to be 
 able to match de Eoquefeuille's force. But unless she had done 
 so, his position was perilous in the extreme. The method was 
 not really an advance on that adopted in 1695, and which was so 
 easily and so completely made absurd. The present attempt 
 might just as easily turn out to be absurd, and something else, 
 unless the very unlikely contingency of the absence of the British 
 fleet could be calculated on. 
 
 And some such ideas were very forcibly impressed on de Eoqua^ 
 feuille's mind when he saw, the next day, the 23rd of February, 
 the great fleet under Sir John Norris " tiding it round the South 
 Foreland." At that moment, though the French were to wind- 
 ward, they were apparently embayed to the eastward of Dun- 
 geness, and powerless to escape from the superior fleet slowly 
 approaching them. But fortune favoured the audacious squadron 
 of the enemy. The tide failed Sir John Norris when he had got 
 within six miles of the French, and the wind remaining foul and 
 light, compelled him to drop his anchors. Upon ascertaining this 
 respite, de Eoquefeuille called a council of war, which determined 
 that the sooner they got out of their critical position the better, 
 and orders were accordingly given to weigh at sunset and to make 
 sail with the tide at seven in the evening. This was done, and 
 fortune still befriending them, a furious gale sprang up whieh 
 drove them down Channel at the rate of 12 knots, and safely, 
 though in some disorder, into Brest. Sir John Norris findinr;, 
 when day broke, that the French had disappeared, returned to tl.o 
 Downs so soon as the weather permitted, and arrived there once 
 
134 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 more on the 27th of February, though somewhat damaged by the 
 heavy gale."^ 
 
 Thus absurdly ended an expedition in which the chances were 
 so much against the attacking side that it could not be ranged 
 under the head of legitimate naval warfare. The French were 
 only fortunate in escaping intact ; for any impartial judge ac- 
 quainted with all the circumstances of the early days of February 
 must have predicted certain ruin to the French fleet. The 
 attempt was and was not one to gain command of the sea for the 
 ulterior purpose of invasion. Undertaken while the two nations 
 were as yet at peace, and prepared in secret, it was to operate by 
 way of surprise, although it was all but impossible that surprise 
 could be effective. The naval force was insufficient to completely 
 break up and disorganize anything but a very small force of the 
 British, and it had been shown in 1690 that anything short of 
 complete demoralization of the defending forces would be of no 
 avail to permit the invading army to cross. Therefore, if full 
 thought had been given to the matter, it must have been con- 
 sidered that the English Government w^ould prove so extra- 
 ordinarily supine as to leave practically no force in defence of 
 its shores. But it could not have been unknown to the French 
 Government that there never was a time when the English 
 Government could be less accused of supineness, for in the 
 previous December it had carried a vote appropriating 40,000 men 
 for the sea, and 52,000 for the army and marines. The whole 
 idea of the expedition betrayed a want of comprehension of the 
 naval problem which pointed to the sinister influence of the most 
 ignorant. 
 
 War with France, being again formally declared in 1756, tended 
 to put a stop to a sort of disgraceful panic fear of invasion which 
 had possessed the country, and to turn attention towards direct 
 measures for preventing such a thing. France on her part 
 mistaking, with the instincts of a military nation, the true points 
 of naval policy, was full of invasion projects, and notwithstanding 
 the several lessons she had already received, was bent upon making 
 the naval subordinate to the military view ; bent upon attempts to 
 gain the temporary command of the sea with the ulterior purpose 
 X)f passing armies over it if not going further, and supposing 
 
 * The chief authorities for my description are Entick's Naval History ; Hervey's 
 Naval History, 1779; Campbell's Lives of the Ad.i.irah; Butailles Navales de 
 Fiance, 0, Troude, 18G7 j Schomberg's Naval ChroHohyy, 1815. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 135 
 
 armies could be effectually guarded, and safely landed, under the 
 protection of a mere escort. 
 
 The success of a somewhat contrary policy resulting in the 
 capture of Minorca, and the general ill success of every other 
 operation, instead of turning the attention of men of influence 
 •wholly to the concentration of naval force in order to wrest the 
 command of the sea from the English, seemed to have directed 
 attention more closely than ever to the idea of a military invasion. 
 It was the more strange that such ideas should have prevailed 
 at a time when the impotence of the French navy to protect its 
 own shores was so very marked. Eochefort had been in September 
 1757 the object of a cool attack, in the absence of any French 
 naval force competent to prevent it. In the following April (1758) 
 Hawke broke up, in the inner waters of the Basque Eoads, the 
 convoys destined for the protection and sustenance of the French 
 North American Colonies ; and in June Anson assisted at another 
 rehearsal of a favourite naval play — the partial destruction of 
 St. Malo. In August the whole of the public works of Cher- 
 bourg were demolished under the protecting wing of Commodore 
 Howe. 
 
 So far as experience had gone, only one way of preventing this 
 kind of thing had been discovered ; this was the neighbourhood 
 of a sufficient naval force. The establishment and maintenance 
 of such forces, which it was understood were prepared to meet 
 equal forces of the enemy face to face at sea, had hitherto been 
 found sufficient to frustrate all intention of territorial attack. 
 France had fallen into the belief that though she could not protect 
 her own shores, she might attack those of her enemy with naval 
 forces which were at least doubtful about their being able to 
 obtain such a command of the sea as they might hold. There 
 was, in effect, a doubt as to whether the forthcoming invasion was 
 to be conducted by force or by stratagem ; by open defiance or 
 secret evasion. And when the time came for putting such of it 
 as remained possible into action, there wr.s a difference of opinion 
 between the Minister of Marine and the naval commander on the 
 fundamental principles which were to govern proceedings. 
 Strangely and ominously, it was the naval commander who held 
 the view which was opposed to the teaching of experience so far. 
 I shall advert to this point a little further on. 
 
 In the beginning of 1759, the French had three main fleets in 
 existence. There were twelve sail of the line at Toulon under 
 
1C3 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ^lear- Admiral de la Cluo.* At Bre.t, under Vice- Admiral Mar- 
 shal de Conilans, was a force which was counted up to 17 sail 
 by the British scouts in June, and proved to bs 20 or 21 sail of 
 the line strong in November ; and in the West Indies a squadron 
 of 9 sail of the line under Eear-Admiral Bompart.f 
 
 This made up a total force of 38 sail of the line capable of being 
 concentrated, had the command of the sea been aimed at, on the 
 English force off Toulon, not exceeding 14 or 15 sail of the line ; or 
 on that off Brest, never exceeding 25 sail of the line, but seldom 
 reaching that strength at any given moment. 
 
 Commpnd of the sea as an end was not, however, thought of. 
 Such concentration as was contemplated did not pass beyond the 
 object of convoy or escort for the armies. One of these was col- 
 lected with complete transport about Morbihan, a district com- 
 prising a group of estuaries opening into Quiberon Bay ; it consisted 
 of 19,000 men under the command of the Duke d'Aiguillon, and 
 was originally intended to be convoyed to Irvine near Ardrossan 
 on the Firth of Clyde, by Captain de Morogues with 5 sail-of-thc- 
 line and frigates. Preparations were also made for the embarka- 
 tion of another army at Havre, in fiat boats and small craft, and 
 a diversion was to be made by a third force sailing from Dunkirk 
 under Thurot, acting against some point on the north-eastern 
 coasts of England or Scotland, or possibly Ireland. Great differ- 
 ences of opinion existed in France on the methods to be pursued, 
 and no doubt as the months went on, and the preparations became 
 more and more complete, changes in the programme took place. 
 
 The English Government, animated by the genius of the elder 
 Pitt, took a practical view of the situation. The Dunkirk invading 
 squadron which consisted of 5 frigates, was watched by 12 sail 
 of from 50 to 12 guns under Commodore Boys. Commodore Sir 
 Piercy Brett lay in the Downs or Yarmouth Pioads with another 
 squadron of 8 sail, to guard against the chances of Thurot eluding 
 Boys. An equal or superior fleet to that of de la Clue watched 
 him in Toulon, and to Sir Edward Hawke was confided a fleet of 
 25 sail of the line and a powerful force of 50-gun ships and frigatest 
 for the purpose of watching Conflans and guarding Morbihan, 
 Piochefort and the Basque Koads, and preventing the unobserved 
 escape of any French forces from these points. 
 
 This is not the place to discuss the causes of the advance which 
 
 * 1 give the name as we generally liear it. JI. Troude gives it as " de Lacluo." 
 \ This is the usual spelling, but Troude spells it •• Boinpard." 
 + Sixteen, according to Schombur^'. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 137 
 
 had been made in the powers of defence by naval force, as shown 
 in this distribution of the British fleets. We have hitherto seen 
 them, when the attack on our shores was imminant, concentrated 
 close at home to await it. Now we see the poinio of resistance 
 moved away from our own shores, and transferred to the immediate 
 neighbourhood of the enemy's ports. The change was chiefly due, 
 no doubt, to the improvements in naval architecture which had 
 continually progressed, and also to the improved quality and 
 quantity of the provisions carried, as well as to a better state of 
 hj'giene"^' on board ship. But, undoubtedly, the change was also 
 due to altered conceptions of the principles of naval war and to a 
 more general acceptation of Lord Torrington's maxim that an 
 intact defending fleet was an absolute bar to territorial attack. To 
 the superficial strategist, the absence of great fleets in the Bay of 
 Biscay and the Mediterranean was leaving the shores of England 
 e ;posed. To the sound mind of Pitt and the instructed intellects 
 of his naval supporters and advisers, the mere existence of those 
 fleets was full projection to the coasts of the United Kingdom in 
 the first instance, and afterwards cover for the more direct de- 
 struction of the enemy's invading material, and immediate pre- 
 vention of even the issue of invading forces from the watched 
 ports. Not, of course, that danger did not arise, but that it came 
 more from the division of the naval force into several groups, 
 which might be incapable of supporting one another, than from 
 any removal of the bulk of the naval force to the immediate neigh- 
 bourhood of the enemy. 
 
 As a direct employment of the cover gained by the masking of 
 the French fleet at Brest, Eear-Admiral Rodney, with a squadron 
 of 60- and 50-gun ships and bomb vessels, proceeded in July to 
 bombard Havre and to destroy the invasion flotilla. Shells were 
 poured into the place for fifty-two hours, and the flat boats en- 
 deavouring to escape out of it were pursued, driven on shore, and 
 afterwards ordered by the victorious admiral to be burnt by their 
 own crews under penalty that otherwise the town of Port Bassin, 
 where they had sought shelter, should suffer the fate of Havre. 
 
 The main naval object of the French was the junclion of the 
 fleet of de la Clue with that of Conflans at Brest, and the prc- 
 
 * Hawke was able to maintain a winter blockade of Brest, but still bitterly com- 
 plained of the badness of provisions, especially bread and beer, and had men constantly 
 " falling down with scurvy," but this was a wonderful improvement on 1695, when 
 the mere fitting out of a winter fleet put 500 men on shore sick, and still left the fleet 
 unhealthy. See Burrows' IJ/e of Ucnvke, pas-im, and Burchett, p. 511. 
 
 10 
 
138 NAVAL WAEFAllE. 
 
 vention of this was the special object of Admiral Boscawen off 
 Toulon. The means emj^loyed were not at all the confining of 
 de la Clue in his port, b it rather the bringing him to action at 
 sea. The underlying princii^le was plain enough. If the French 
 fleet could be brought to battle, come what come would of it, all 
 immediate idea of a concentration at Brest must be given up. 
 Even were Boscawen thoroughly beaten, which was not at all 
 likely considering the relative strength of the forces, a return to 
 Toulon by the French to refit and repair would be imperative after 
 the action. The success of the French plan, however, chiefly 
 depended on de la Clue's avoidance of battle ; he was not to be 
 drawn out, and he trusted to time to force Boscawen to retire for 
 a space. 
 
 The British Admiral kept watch till the beginning of July, and 
 was then compelled by want of water and provisions, and by certain 
 damage to some of his ships to fall back upon Gibraltar. The 
 coast being so far clear, de la Clue weighed from Toulon on the 
 5th of August, with his fleet of 12 sail of the line and 3 frigates, 
 in hopes of passing the Straits of Gibraltar unnoticed. But 
 Boscawen had placed a look-out ship off Malaga, and another, the 
 Gibraltar, between Estepona on the Spanish and Ceuta on the 
 African shore. On the 17th of August, Boscawen's ships were still 
 in the middle of refitting : their sails_ were unbent, and some of 
 them had their topmasts down.* Towards evening the French 
 fleet drew near the straits, and running before a strong easterly 
 breeze, found themselves off Cape Spartel at midnight, in a pitch 
 dark atmosphere, and with no sign that they were in any way 
 followed, perhaps with no belief that they had been even seen. 
 
 De la Clue was happy in the supposed success of his movements. 
 No ship had shown a light, and the game was played and won ; 
 Boscawen was outwitted, the blockade of Brest and Morbihan 
 would be raised, and the Scotch invasion at least would proceed. 
 But there was a fatal flaw in his own conduct, of which he was far 
 from perceiving the consequences. He had thought much of 
 pushing on himself, and had been less careful of the order in 
 which he maintained the fleet astern of him. He had made Cadiz 
 the rendezvous of his ships, and when darkness fell and pre- 
 cluded the establishment of a fresh rendezvous, or even of any 
 very definite communication of orders, by reason of the defective 
 signal systems of those days, all the captains believed that Cadiz 
 
 * Schomberg, vol. i., p. 232. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 139 
 
 was the destinp ion. Now at midnight, the course to Cadiz was, 
 perhaps, N.N.W., while the course to pass Cape St. Vincent and 
 proceed up the coast of Portugal was, perhaps, W.N.W. At mid- 
 night M. de la Ohis began to think of pulling his fleet together, 
 and began also to think that the rendezvous at Cadiz was a 
 mistake. He would simply be blocked there, as he had been 
 blocked at Toulon. He could never expect again such a chance as 
 was now before iiim. He shortened sail to allow the fleet to close 
 up; he exhibit d his stern lights to show his position, and he 
 made, or attempted to make, a night signal which would direct 
 the fleet to co:itinue to steer to the westward. '■= Then, fearing 
 that Boscawen'rf look-out ships might see the lights, and assuming 
 that his ships had all seen and understood the intended signal, he 
 complacently extinguished his lights and made sail for Cape St. 
 Vincent. At daylight he had but six ships with him, and it was 
 not until 8 o'clock that the report of 8 sail to the eastward gave 
 him hopes that the stragglers were rejoining. He was then 30 
 or 40 miles to the E.S.E. of Cape St. Vincent, and he took staps 
 to let this rema aider of his fleet come up with him. 
 
 Now let us see what had been going on in the English fleet during 
 this time. I do not think I can more clearly or forcibly tell the 
 story than by qaoLing verbatim the language of the journal of the 
 Captain of the A'amur, Captain Buckle, Boscawen's flag-captain. t 
 
 Friday, 17th August 1759, moored in Gibraltar Bay. Wind E.S.E. to East. First 
 part moderate and fmr, middle and latter part a fresh gale, and hazy. P.M., received 
 a long-boat load of water. At 8 heard the report of several guns, soon after saw a 
 ship in the offing with several lights, then we sent our barge, who returned and in- 
 formed us taat the ship we saw was the Gibraltar, who had seen fifteen large ships at 
 the back of the hill. At 9 made the signal to unmoor. Bont the sails and hove up 
 the best bower anchor. At 10 made signal and slipped ; the long-boat being made 
 fast to the end of the cable, got athwart hawse, broke the slip-rope and went adrift. 
 At 11 Cabritta Point bore west, three or four miles. Brought to, and hoisted in the 
 boats. Employed clearing the ship. At midnight made sail. At 1 a.m. out all reefs 
 and set top gallant sails. Cape Spartel W. by S., seven or eight miles. At 6 
 saw seven sail to the >\'estward. At 7 made the Gibraltar's signal to come within hail, 
 and ordered him to make sail ahead and see what the strangers were. At 8 six 
 Sweeds passed by to the southward. Made the signal for a general chase to the N.W. 
 At 9 made the signal for the ships astern to make more sail, soon after repeated it. At 
 noon all the £cet in chase. 
 
 * Troude, vol. i., pp. 873-379. M. de Lapeyrouse, quoted by Troude, says the 
 Admiral made the si;!ril to steer to the westward. But even as late as 1832 there was 
 no such night-signal ui the French navy ; the nearest signal was "sail large" on the 
 starboard or port ta' k. 
 
 t The journal, wit a great numbers of others, is preserved in the jUoyal Victoria Yard, 
 Deptford. The daj j^'ins at noon, 
 
 10^ 
 
140 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Saturday 18th, at noon Cape St. Vincent N.W. by W., distant eight or nine leagues 
 Winds East, E.N.E,, and E.S.E. First part moderate and fair, middle and latter little 
 wind. At 1 I'.M. the strangers hoisted French colours, then we showed ours. Twenty 
 minutes after made the signal to engage. At 50 minutes past made the Ain^'i-ica's 
 signal to make more sail. At 2 repeated it ; the enemy began to fire, as did the 
 Culloden at 25 minutes past 2. At three-quarters past 2, the America backed her 
 mizzen topsail and topgallant-sail and hauled up her mainsail. Then made her signal 
 to make more sail. At 10 minutes past 3, made the Guernsey' i signal to make more 
 sail, which she not observing we soon after repeated it. At a quarter-past 
 changed the chasing signal from N.W. to N.E. At 4 ran alongside the Ocean,* having 
 a flag at the mizzen topmast head, and engaged her and two other ships of the enemy 
 till quartor-past 7, when they made sail and shot ahead of us. The mizzen-stay being 
 shot away the mast went overboard. The fore and main topsail yards likewise shot 
 away, and all our sails and rigging much damaged ; then the Admiral went on board the 
 Newark and hoisted his flag there. Soon after one of the French ships struck, being 
 the Centaur, of 74 guns and 750 men, whom the Edgar lay by. Wo had six men killed 
 in the action and upwards of forty wounded. People employed repairing the damages. 
 At 10 Thomas Quinnell, Thomas Cattness, and John Williams, seamen, died of their 
 wounds. At 5 a.m. saw our fleet in the S.W. and made sail after them- 
 
 Sunday, August 19th, 1759. Noon, Cape St. Vincent N.W. J W. throe or four 
 leagues, winds West, N.W. by N., N.N.E., N.N. W., Norlh, light airs and fair. At 2 p.m. 
 saw three of the French ships at anchor to the eastward of Cape St. Vincent, and one on 
 shore without any masts, being the Ocean, of 84 guns, who struck to the St. Alban's, 
 as did one of the others to the Warapite. At 7 saw one of the remaining two on fire. 
 The IFrtr.^jzVe brought her prize into the fleet, being the Temeraire of 74 guns and 750 
 men. Unbent the foresail and fore-topsail and bent new ones. At half-past 9, the 
 ship (tliat) was on fire blew up. At 10, saw the Ocean on fire. At midnight our ships 
 brought in the other French ship, called the Modeste of G4 guns and 700 men. A.M. 
 got up a new main topgallant mast and yard. Employed setting up a pair of sheers to 
 raise the mlzzen-mast. N.B. — The ship which blew up was the RedouhtaUe, of 
 74 guns. 
 
 Monday, August 20th, Cape St. Vincent distant twelve leagues. Winds N.W. , N., 
 N.E. Moderate and clear. At 4 p.m. Cape St. Vincent bore N.W. by N., eight or nine 
 leagues. Admiral Boscawen returned from the Newark and hoisted his flag here. 
 Raised the mizzen mast, and stepped it on the upper deck. 
 
 Such was the first battle of St. Vincent, as described in the cool 
 and terse language of the official record. It is easy to understand 
 what had happened in the French fleet. M. de la Clue, who paid 
 with his life the forfeit of his error, small as it might have seemed 
 at the time, had not been justified in assuming that his signals at 
 midnight on the 17th had been seen and their purport understood. 
 However he might have thought of it, his captains had no oppor- 
 tunity of looking into his mind and noting what was going on 
 there. Five of the line-of-battle ships, and all the frigates, miss- 
 ing the rest of the fleet, had obeyed their orders and proceeded to 
 Cadiz. The ships, which de la Clue did not see till 8 a.m. on the 
 18th, and which he for a time drew near to, supposing them to be 
 
 • De la Clue's flag-ship 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 141 
 
 friends, were in fact the leaders of Boscawen's fleet, which were 
 even then preparing for a general chase. The danger of playing 
 fast and loose with a rendezvous had even then been inWy recog- 
 nized in the English navy, and it is highly improbable that any 
 English admiral would have acted as de la Clue did. The impor- 
 tance attached to the thing is well illustrated in this very journal 
 of Captain Buckle, in which a new rendezvous being given out 
 on the afternoon of the 20th, and a lieutenant from each ship 
 summoned to receive it, the names of the officers thus made 
 responsible are entered. 
 
 The result of the error was a loss to the French of two line-of- 
 battle ships burnt, and three captured, out of the total of seven. 
 Two made their escape on the night of the 18th, and one reached 
 Eochefort and the other the Canaries in safety. Poor de la Clue 
 was landed badly wounded, and died of his wounds soon afterwards. 
 The conjunction of the Toulon and Brest fleets wiis entirely aban- 
 doned, and those French ships which had got into Cadiz, only 
 thought themselves too happy in escaping to Toulon as late as the 
 17th of December. 
 
 There was still the combination of Admiral Bompart's squadron 
 with that of de Conflans, and against this Hawke was taking all 
 possible steps. He was primarily concerned in a close watch upon 
 Brest, in order that the fleet there should not be able to put to sea 
 unwatched and unfollowed. The secondary object was as close a 
 watch on the invading force assembled at Morbihan. But the 
 greater danger was the junction of the Toulon fleet with the Brest 
 fleet, and even after he had heard from Boscawen of the result of 
 the battle of the 18th and 19th of August, he saw no cause to 
 relax his vigilance. Boscawen wrote on the 20th, and did not then 
 know that the half of the French fleet was in Cadiz, and capable 
 of being masked. So that when Hawke in the latter end of 
 August heard that Bompart had actually sailed from America, 
 there was a possible combination at or near Brest of an exceed- 
 ingly serious character. Bompart might make for Eochefort, and 
 the moiety of de la Clue's fleet also, as a preliminary, and if Brest 
 were opened, by heavy weather driving Hawke off, a junction'might 
 prove to be easy. He had not force enough to watch Eochefort as 
 well as Brest. " If," he wrote on the 28th of August, " M. Bom- 
 part's destination should be Brest, I shall do my utmost to inter- 
 rupt him. But should he be bound to Eochefort I must not think 
 of him " — for the reason that a detachment to Eochefort, though 
 enough to meet Bompart's nine sail of the line, would leave him 
 
142 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 too weak even for Couflaiis, certainly too weak for the missing 
 ships of de la Clue's fleet and that of Conflans' together.* 
 
 But later on, when Hawke was probably relieved of all 
 apprehension on the score of the ships shut up in Cadiz, 
 he did despatch Admiral Geary with a squadron to bar Bompart's 
 entry into Rochefort, while another squadron, under Captain Duff, 
 lay in Quiberon Bay watching Morbihan. And then, on the 10th 
 of October, the Admiralty having informed him that Bompart was 
 not likely to sail for Europe at present, Geary was recalled. 
 
 Hawke's plans were thus very simple ; he would watch Brest as 
 long as the weather would let him, and when driven off he would 
 invariably make for the then safe anchorage of Torbay, where the 
 store-ships and victuallers could always meet him, and where the 
 whole efforts of the fleet would be concentrated on getting ready 
 to put to sea the instant the wind changed. 
 
 On the same 10th of October Hawke, being off Brest, wrote : — 
 
 Their lordships will pardon me for observing that from the present disposition of 
 the squadron I think there is little cause for alarm while the weather continues toler- 
 able. As to Brest, I may safely affirm that, except the few ships that took shelter in 
 Conquet, hardly a vessel of any kind has been able to come out of that port these four 
 months. We are as vigilant as ever, though we have not as much daylight. ... It 
 must be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of them escape. f 
 
 The fault of the weather, however, showed itself immediately, 
 for on the 11th so heavy a westerly gale sprang up that the fleet 
 sought shelter in Plymouth, whence Hawke wrote on the 13th : — 
 
 Yesterday and this day, the gale rather increasing, I thought it better to bear up 
 for Plj'mouth than run the risk of being scattered and driven to the eastward. While 
 this wind shall continue, it is impossible for the enemy to stir. . . . The instant it shall 
 be moderate, I shall sail again. J 
 
 Then next day, he says : — 
 
 Their lordships may rest assured there is little foundation for the pi-esent alarms 
 While the wind is fair for the enemy's coming out, it is also favourable for our keeping 
 them in ; and while we are obliged to keep off. they cannot stir.§ 
 
 The Admiral got back to his watch, now from the lateness of the 
 season become one of desperate anxiety and hazard, by the 23rd 
 of October, and the commanders of the inshore squadrons, break- 
 ing down in health as they were from the strain, are only warned 
 that there must be less relaxation than ever. By the beginning of 
 November, Hawke was informed that Conflans was under orders to 
 put to sea and engage the English fleet at once ; but probably the 
 
 * Burrows' Life of Hawke, p. 380. 
 
 t Ibid. , p. 383. 
 
 i Ibid. 
 
 § Ibid., p. 3S-i. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 143 
 
 Aclmiral's wisdom doubted the fact, as thcro was no such 
 superiority of numbers on the French side as would lead to hopes 
 of victory. This, however, might be as it would, for on the 
 9th of November another westerly gale, which had been blowing 
 three days, so increased that it drove the English fleet back into 
 Torbay again, whence it was not possible to put to sea finally till 
 the 13th. 
 
 It is necessary, as we now approach the denouement, to look at 
 the French part in this momentous drama. I have already said 
 that there was a doubt over the whole of these invasion operations, 
 as to whether they were to be carried out by force or stratagem. 
 Indeed, considerable doubt has existed in my own mind as to 
 whether I can properly class them as an attempt to gain the com- 
 mand of the sea with an ulterior object. The military preparations 
 occupy so great a field, when I look across the Channel, that I 
 cannot make up my mind whether there was anywhere in France 
 such a real idea of gaining the command of the sea, as there had 
 been in 1690 and 1692. The plans seem disjointed and mixed, 
 without a consciousness running through them that the invading 
 forces must pass unprotected through an enemy's country, unless 
 that water-country was first conquered. The French idea of the 
 whole matter departs from simplicity, and is difficult to realise. 
 Neither de la Clue, Conflans, nor Bompart, seem to have been 
 clear about what they were going to do — de la Clue, by his fixing 
 a rendezvous at Cadiz, when he should have wanted to push on to 
 Brest at all hazards and speed ; Bompart by his delayed return ; 
 and both he and Conflans by their subsequent conduct. As far as 
 Conflans was concerned, he certainly had no clear ideas of what 
 was before him. 
 
 The timidity of our navy afflicts and humiliates me (wrote the Marshal de Belle- 
 Isle to the Duke d'Aiguillon) ; above all, after the state in which I saw it at the 
 beginning of the century. The King must give positive orders to M. de Conflans. He 
 will not desire anything better, according to what I hear ; but this is not enough. 
 Many sad reflections arise upon it, but we may possibly hope that when things are once 
 decided and ordered, they will stand on their honour.* 
 
 Conflans distinctly proposed to escort the convoy with his whole 
 fleet. 
 
 The Marshal (Berryer, the Minister of Marine, wrote to the Duke d'Aiguillon) is 
 not a suSiciently good tactician to have any hopes of holding the enemy in check by his 
 skill, and I regard a battle as inevitable ; then it would be much better to fight it 
 before the convoy puts to sea. If we gain the victory, we shall easily push it over ; if 
 it is doubtful, it will still facilitate the passage over; if our fleet is destroyed, the army 
 will not be lost.f 
 
 * Troude, quoting the Archives of the French Marine, vol. i., p. 331. t ^'^"i- 
 
144 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 But de Conflans was urgent with bis own views, and the Minister 
 of Marine at length submitted. Yet is the Marshal's conduct in- 
 explicable, for between the 9th and the 14th of November, when 
 the coast was clear by reason of Hawke's absence in Torbay, 
 Bompart arrived with his squadron and passed into Brest without 
 difficulty. Notwithstanding that, and apparently without seeing 
 how much this reinforcement of nine sail of the line^ should have 
 strengthened the views of the Minister of Marine and weakened 
 his own, Conflans put to sea with his original 21 sail of the line on 
 the 14th of November. His destination was Quiberon Bay, what- 
 ever he might have intended to do when he got there ; but a 
 strong easterly gale carried him 180 miles west of Belleisle.t 
 Calms and light air then fell upon the fleet, so that when the wind 
 changed to the westward at 11 p.m. on the 19th of November, 
 de Conflans was still 70 miles S.W. i W. from the island. He 
 then filled and stood on, intending to go to the southward of the 
 island, and to pass up Quiberon Bay next day. The wind, however, 
 began to blow so strong from the W.N.W., that it was necessary to 
 shorten sail in order not to overrun the distance. At daybreak on 
 the 20th, several sail were seen ahead, and the signals were made 
 to close up and clear for action. As the light came, seven or eight 
 of these ships were made out to be the squadron of Captain Duff,, 
 which had been lying in Quiberon Bay watching the armament, and 
 were now making all speed to escape from the superior fleet of the 
 French. De Conflans thereupon made the signal for a general 
 chase. 
 
 The same easterly wind which had carried de Conflans out of 
 Brest, on the same day took Hawke out of Torbay, J and on the 
 15th he learned from Captain McCleverty of the Gibraltar, the 
 same ofQcer who had had the honour of announcing de la Clue's 
 approach to Boscawen, that the French fleet had been seen seventy 
 miles to the N.W. of Belleisle, steering to the S.E.§ Hawke there- 
 upon shaped his course for Quiberon Bay, but the wind beginning 
 to blow hard from S. by E. and S., drove the English fleet, as it wari 
 driving the French, far to the westward. On the 18th and 19th 
 wind and weather mended, and Hawke pushed on to pass Belleisle 
 
 * The seamen of Bompart's squadron, as being more experienced, were substituted 
 for those of de Conflans, but this only implied that the whole thing had been hopoless 
 before. What was wanted was a superior fleet, and Bompart's ships would havo 
 made one. 
 
 t De Conflans to the Duke ti'Aig lillon, quoted by Troude, vol. v., p. 402. 
 
 X Schomberg, vol. i., p. 327; Hervey, vol. v., p. 184 ; Hawke's despatch. 
 
 § Schomberg, vol. i. p. 327. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 145 
 
 on his left hand. The Maidstone and Coventry frigates were sent 
 ahead to look out, but nothing was seen until half-past eight on the 
 morning of the 20th when the Maidstone made the signal for 
 seeing a fleet. Hawke at once made the signal to form line 
 abreast. 
 
 This was the moment when de Conflans, full of his chase of 
 Duff, and hailing the Tonnant, " that he was resolved to attack 
 the enemy smartly and without any order,"^ found himself per- 
 fectly satisfied that no superior force could be present, and yet 
 counting 23 ships of the line, clearly British, which had just hove 
 in sight to windward " in very good order." 
 
 Marshal de Conflans had issued, before he left Brest, a curiously 
 verbose order as to how he proposed to meet the enemy, and 
 especially how he would be satisfied with nothing short of engaging 
 at musket range. The plans were very elaborate, but they all 
 seemed to hinge on the point that the meeting of the fleets would 
 take place in a particular way. Nothing was provided for the 
 case now before him. So little had such a meeting been con- 
 templated that there were no look-outs astern, although it was 
 from the northward and westward alone that any hostile force 
 could be expected to make its appearance. Yet there was but one 
 thing before the French admiral ; that was to turn and give the 
 British battle in the open sea. To do anything else was to give 
 up bodily the whole plan of invasion, and to leave it open to the 
 enemy to shell the expedition to pieces in Quiberon Bay, as another 
 branch of it had already been shelled to pieces in the Eoads of 
 Havre. The very best that could happen if de Conflans did not 
 give battle at sea, was that the whole of the French would hence- 
 forth be blockaded in Quiberon Bay, a much easier task than their 
 blockade in Brest. 
 
 But the whole plan from beginning to end was confused and 
 without definite principle, and it was not possible to turn round 
 full of principle at a moment's notice. Quiberon Bay is studded 
 with rocks and shoals ; the thought uppermost in de Conflans' mind 
 was that if he could only get his ships into the Bay before those of 
 the British, these rocks and shoals would prove in some sort a 
 protection to the French ; at any rate their danger would be less 
 to the latter than to the former. Out of it all came the short story 
 as told by Sir Edward Hawke : — 
 
 All the day we had very fresh gales at N.W. and W.N. W. with heavy squalls. M. 
 Coniiaus kept going off under such sail as all his si-juadrou could cany and at the 
 
 * Do Conflans' despatch, quoted by Troude. 
 
146 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 same timo Koop topfetlior; while we crowded after him with every sail oiir ships could 
 bear. At half-past 2 p.m., the fire beginning ahead, I made the signal for engaging. We 
 were then to the southward of Belleisle ; and the French Admiral headmost, soon 
 after led round the Cardinals,* while his rear was in action. About 4 o'clock the 
 Formidahle struck, and a little after, the Thexea and Superbe were sunk. About 5, the 
 Heros struck, and came to an anchor; but, it blowing hard, no boat could be sent on 
 board her. Night was now come, and being on a part of the coast among islands and 
 shoals, of which we were totally ignorant, without a pilot, as was the greatest part of 
 the squadron, and blowing hard on a lee shore, I made the signal to anchor, and came 
 to in 15 fathoms of water. . . . 
 
 The French fleet, in short, was totally broken up and destroyed. 
 Of the 21 sail of the line that had left Brest a week before, 2 were 
 driven ashore and burnt ; 2 were sunk ; 1 was wrecked off the 
 Loire ; 1 was taken ; 11 saved themselves by throwing all their 
 guns and stores overboard and escaping into the shallow waters of 
 the river Vilaine ; while 8 only made good their retreat to 
 Eochefort. 
 
 This terrible but decisive battle necessarily put the finishing 
 stroke to the collapse of the French plans, which had indeed set in 
 as soon as they came to be formulated. It is only necessary to add 
 to the narrative the statement that M. Thurot's expedition proved 
 itself the most successful of all, inasmuch as on the 12th of 
 October he escaped to sea with his squadron, taking advantage of 
 a gale which drove Commodore Boys off his station. His good 
 fortune followed him so far as to permit him to gain the neutral 
 port of Gottenburg in Sweden, and afterwards that of Bergen in 
 Norway, where the squadron lay till next year.f 
 
 When from the singularly abortive character of all these plans 
 on the part of the French in the year 1759, we turn to the question 
 of whether they failed through bad management, faulty principles, 
 or want of enterprise, I think we can say that while the first and 
 last elements were present, they could hardly be absent when 
 
 * A peninsula and then a group of islands surrounded by rocks — of which Ilouat and 
 Haedick are the chief — run down from the N.W. to the S.E. and form the Bay of 
 Quiberon ; the Cardinals are the rocks at the extreme S.E. point. 
 
 f Naval history has hitherto been so written that simple as the story of the opera- 
 tions of 1759 is respecting the invasions proposed, it is hardly to be drawn from any 
 single narrative. My sketch leaves much uncKplained which it would be of the highest 
 interest to enlarge upon and to seek for in those MS. authorities where alone the 
 answers are to be found. But such things are altogether beyond the scope of my 
 present purpose. I have drawn my narrative from comparisons of Schomberg's Naval 
 Chronology 1815 ; Campbell's Lives of the Admirals 1813 ; Hervey's excellent but little 
 known History of the Navy 1779 ; 0. Troude's Batailles Nava/es de la France 1867, 
 and above all, for what relates to Hawke, Burrows' Life of Lord Hawke, beyond 
 measure the most interesting naval work of our time. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 147 
 
 attemi:)ts to set up and enforce such faulty principles were also 
 present. 
 
 I think it becomes more and more clear as we proceed, that the 
 sea is not, and cannot be made, neutral ground. For the purposes 
 of passage it is almost always in the hands of one side or the 
 other in war, and if undisputed passage across it is desired by 
 one side, it must be obtained by conquest of the water territory. 
 
 France in the year 1759, was, it seems to me, entirely mistaken 
 on this fundamental principle. The only chance she could ever 
 have had of successful invasion must have come after, and not side 
 by side with, conquest at sea. With squadrons at Toulon, Brest, 
 Eochefort, and the West Indies, which were all possible to her, 
 she had so magnificent a strategic position that, barring mismanage- 
 ment and the chapter of accidents, there was a possibility of her 
 beating the British fleets in detail, as it was a necessity of the 
 position that their naval forces should be divided. 
 
 This being so, it should have been her sole object to make such 
 combinations as would have enabled her to fall on British 
 detached fleets with superior force. If she were able to effect 
 this purpose, and to gradually weaken her opponent thereby, there 
 would be no possible difficulties in the way of invasion on any 
 scale thereafter. But her attention, which should have been thus 
 simply directed, was split up into two parts, one in preparing to 
 invade, and the other in preparing fleets of which the employ- 
 ment was doubtful. Had she concentrated her mind wholly on 
 the defeat of the British by sea, who is now to say that she might 
 not have affected her purpose supposing her enterprise to cor- 
 respond with her resolution ? If her enterprise was unequal to 
 the task, surely it must have been much more unequEiI to con- 
 veying armies across, and landing them in the face of naval forces 
 admittedly superior. Or if it be said that it was hoped to escape 
 the notice of these superior forces at sea, where was the ad- 
 vantage of adding great naval forces to accompany the transports ? 
 So that in whatever way the French ulans be regarded, we see a 
 •want of clear comprehension of the strategical problem, and cease 
 to wonder at the want of principle which governed every detail of 
 the proceedings. 
 
 It was manifestly weak to' prepare the transports, as in the case 
 of Havre, in so exposed a position as to leave them open to de- 
 struction by shells and carcases.^ No less clear was de la Clue's 
 
 • The bombardment lasted a2 hours, during which 1,900 shells, and 1,100 carcases 
 were thrown into the place. 
 
148 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 mistake in maldng Ccidiz the rendezvous when eveijthing de- 
 pended on his evading Boscawen, and making all speed to join de 
 Conflans. Out of this primary error arose the others, which led 
 directly to the catastrophe of Lagos Bay. 
 
 Why de Conflans should ever have made for Quiberon Bay is at 
 present to me an unfathomed mystery. His clear plan was to 
 have engaged Hawke as far as possible from the army transports, 
 which were already in possession of a stout convoy under de Mo- 
 rogues. Had he followed Hawke up into Torbay and there 
 engaged his attention, de Morogues would have had a clear field 
 up the St. George's Channel. But drawing Hawke down upon 
 the transports was an effective means of preventing their sailing ; 
 and as already observed, to withdraw from the security of Brest to 
 the open position of Quiberon Bay, was to court the destruction 
 which came upon him. And, then, the final error of not proceeding 
 to meet Hawke with the 9 sail of Bompart's squadron incorporated 
 with his own, is but the key-stone of the series. If anything 
 would have given the project success, it would have been the 
 display of 30 sail of the line east of Ushant, and even the defeat of 
 such a force might have crippled Hawke for the time so as to 
 compel him to let the army pass. 
 
 No doubt this history, like so much other naval history, 
 requires re- writing. Explanations of steps in themselves inex- 
 plicable might then be forthcoming, but it is hardly possible that 
 we should not still pronounce that the plain principles of naval 
 warfare were everywhere disregarded by the French nation in the 
 year 1759, 
 
149 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Attempts to Gain the Command of the Sea with Definite 
 Ulterior Purpose. — (continued) . 
 
 The entertainment of an idea of gaining the command of the sea merely for a par- 
 ticular purpose tends to reconcile a nation to the place of the inferior naval power, and 
 to make it unable to desist from attempts almost necessarily abortive. — So France 
 renews in 1779 her old schemes, but in concentrating a great combined fleet in the 
 Channel, fails to take advantage of the inferior British fleet which was opposed 
 to her. — The same ideas begin to work in France as early as 1796, and either directly 
 or indirectly govern the movements of the enemy's fleets till the close of the war. — The 
 consequent waste of naval force at St. Vincent and Camperdown. — The openness of 
 the invasion flotilla to attack from the sea. — The indefinite and abortive combinations 
 and mancEuvres up to the close of the war. 
 
 It was twenty years after the failure of 1759, before France made 
 another attemi^t to gain the command of the sea for the purpose 
 of transporting an invading army across it. But the state of 
 things was such on the approach of the year 1779, that slie began, 
 as it were, to see her way to another undertaking of the same nature, 
 but bolder and grander. I think we cannot have avoided observing 
 how very marked is the difference between the attempt to gain the 
 command of the sea as an end and as a means, when we have 
 before us the practical effect as exemplified in the Dutch wars and 
 these successive failures on the part of France. Looking back on 
 the ground we have passed over, it does seem as if there were a 
 possibility that had France thought nothing of invasion, but had 
 devoted herself wholly, as Holland did, to wresting from us the 
 command of the sea, she might always have maintained a better 
 naval position than she actually did. But wasting her energies 
 on a double design, she fell more and more at the opening of each 
 war, into the position of an assuredly inferior naval power, which 
 could only look to better her position by some stroke of fortune 
 much more to be hoped for than expected. 
 
150 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Nothing ever seems to have turned the French commanders and 
 statesmen from the repetition of these hitherto abortive double 
 measures. In 1767, two French officers were in this country 
 drawing up plana for invading it in the manner most likely to be 
 successful. Their report proposed a sudden descent during peace 
 time, as only parallel with the common practice very freely 
 indulged in by this country, of making war by sea long before 
 its formal declaration. The army to be prepared was to consist 
 of 40,000 infantry, 6,000 dragoons, and 4,000 light troops (cavalry) 
 with a proportionate detachment of artillery. The light cavalry 
 were to embark with their horses, but the heavy cavalry were to 
 pick up their mounts as they penetrated up country. The selectted 
 point of landing was Deal beach.* 
 
 It must be supposed that these reports were laid up in the 
 archives at Paris awaiting opportunity, but as there could have 
 been no hopes of carrying out such a scheme in absolute secrecy, 
 so that the immense force could be slipped across without convoy 
 or protection, it ultimately fell into the old groove, w'ith the hope 
 that it might be carried out when the command of the sea could 
 be temporarily secured on purpose. 
 
 It was not till 1779 that opportunity seemed to offer, when 
 France, allied \Yith our revolted colonies in North America, and 
 pressing Great Britain heavily as a consequence, drew Spain to 
 her side. It then became possible to show, by combining the 
 fleets of both powers, a greatly superior force than any which this 
 country could at the moment produce. But France, as usual, was 
 unable to pursue the simple policy of attempting to gain the 
 command of the sea. The project was now, in fact, three-fold. 
 The fleets were to be combined as one object, an attack on 
 Gibraltar by Spain was a second, and 40,000 men were assembled 
 along the coasts of Normandy and Brittany,ready to cross the sea 
 and invade the country, as a third. 
 
 In the spring were collected at Brest more than 30 sail of the 
 line, and 10 frigates, and at Cadiz and other Spanish ports were 
 about 36 sail of the line and 10 or 12 frigates. After some weeks 
 warning, the whole available force of England came to only 37 
 sail of the line and 24 frigates, fire-ships, and small craft. 
 
 The French fleet, unhindered and almost unwatched by us, 
 quitted Brest on June 3rd, to join the Spaniards on their own 
 coast, but a month elapsed before the junction even began to be 
 
 • See Lord Mahon's History of Emjland, vol. v., Ajjp. xix. Sir E. Creasy notices it 
 in his Invasions of Emjl-ind. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 151 
 
 effected. Spanish pride was hurt at the idea of serving in a fleet 
 commanded by a French admiral — d'Orvilliers — and the ships were 
 slow in making their appearance. It was not till the 2nd of July 
 that 8 ships of the line and 2 frigates under Vice-Admiral Don 
 Antonio Darce, joined the French from Ferrol, and twenty more 
 days passed before the remaining division joined from Cadiz, 
 consisting of 28 sail of the line with 7 frigates and small vessels, 
 under Vice-Admiral Don Luis de Cordova. This made a total 
 force of 66 sail of the line and 14 frigates and small vessels ; but 
 the force was not united, as Cordova took 16 sail of the line under 
 his separate command as a "squadron of observation."* Tac- 
 tically the division was sound enough, as it was known that the 
 combined portion was of greater force than any likely to be met 
 in the Channel, and the neighbourhood of a fresh fleet would 
 almost make victory over the English secure. But possibly 
 national jealousy and not tactics was the moving principle. 
 d'Orvilliers on his side did a superficially wise thing in separating 
 5 line-of-battle ships, under La Touche Treville, to form a light 
 squadron. 
 
 All was therefore well outwardly with this immense armament 
 in the first week in July, and presumably the 40,000 men were 
 ready and waiting for the order to embark and cross. Let us see 
 how England stood in the way of preparation. t 
 
 On June 16th, proclamation was made to begin hostilities 
 against Spain, and on the same day Sir Charles Hardy sailed 
 from St. Helens with the 37 sail of the line and 24 smaller vessels 
 already mentioned. He stood away at once to the westward and 
 was cruising off Ushant, 30 or 40 miles to the westward of it, 
 until he 26th. Then he stood away north, and was to the v/est- 
 ward of Scilly till July 2nd. On that day he was twenty miles 
 nearly due south of the Land's End, making his way to Torbay, 
 where he moored on the 6th and remained till the 14th. 
 
 On quitting Torbay, on the 14th of July, Sir Charles again stood 
 to the westward, and again cruised to the northward and westward 
 of Ushant for two or three days. On the 23rd he was back again 
 on the English coast, and was cruising between Plymouth and 
 Scilly until the 11th of August, without apparently any intelli- 
 gence whatever. 
 
 * I am following Troudc, vol. ii., p. 81. Schomberg's nusibers are slightly different. 
 
 f It was not a good omen that on the 11th July there were 1,035 sick, and 174 
 convalescent in the French fleet alone, and since leaving Brest they had lost 48 men by 
 death, and sent 412 to hospital at Corumia. See Troude, vol. ii.,p. oa. 
 
152 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 On the 12tli of August he was 34 miles S.S.E. of Scilly, 
 with a westerly wind which continued to blow for several days. 
 Sir Charles not only maintained his position against it, but was 
 getting farther to the westward. On the 15th his position was 
 well to the northward, Scilly bearing about E. by N. 47 miles.* 
 
 The whole of these movements seem rather aimless and vague, 
 in the absence of information regarding the combined fleets. If it 
 had been intended to intercept the enemy in his WTiy up Channel, 
 the position off Ushant might have been maintained with look-outs 
 to the northward, or the position off Scilly might have been held 
 with look-outs to the southward. But in the absence of assigned 
 reasons, it is a complete puzzle to discover why Sir Charles Hardy 
 should at one time have taken the one position and at another 
 time the other. If, again, the invasion was apprehended, and the 
 great strength of the enemy's fleet was known, this cruising to the 
 westward with such a very inferior force would appear to have been 
 exactly what the enemy would have most wished for. It placed 
 him in the position of forcing battle, and then, on the defeat of the 
 British force, the carrying out of the plan of invasion. The only 
 reasonable strategy for Sir Charles Hardy was that adopted so 
 long before by Lord Torrington, a policy of observation and 
 threatening ; and such a policy would have left the British fleet at 
 Torbay if not at St. Helens, with abundant scouts — of which 
 we must remember Sir Charles had 24 — to give the earliest 
 information of the enemy's approach. What is at any rate clear, 
 from a glance at the map, is that the approach to the Channel was 
 quite open from the 12th of August, and as the wind was then 
 and until the 19th from the westward, this leaving of the Channel 
 uncovered, was deliberate. t 
 
 We have seen that it was not until the 22nd of July that the 
 French and Spanish fleets were combined at and off Ferrol, 
 probably some time was occupied in the different arrangements for 
 proceeding, and for dividing of the fleet already mentioned. 
 After that, sail was made for Ushant, and after sighting it, a course 
 
 * I have taken the positions from the Flag-Captain's journal, now at the Royal 
 Victoria Yard, Deptford. 
 
 t It is a misfortune that the naval history of this time is the most defective of anj'. 
 Entick closes his with the execution of ByuLf. Harvey with the appointment of Sir C. 
 Hardy to command the Channel fleet in 1779 ; Schomberg, Beatson, and Campbell have 
 but a few notes, the latter supposing that there never was anything eerious contem- 
 plated by the enemy. Schomberg supposes the strong easterly winds forced the 
 enemy out of the Channel, and prevented Sir Charles Hardy from getting in; an 
 entirely erroneous idea. Troudo and Chevalier are a little better. 
 
ToFa^ePaqe/52. 
 
THE MOVEMENTS oFTHE OPPOSING FLEETS 
 1779. ^ 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 153 
 
 was shaped for the English Channel. The great fleet, besides 
 suffering heavily from sickness, as mentioned, was already short of 
 water and provisions.* 
 
 The intention of d'Orvilliers was to proceed in the first instance 
 to Torbay, to anchor there and to more equally distribute the 
 provisions remaining in the fleet, as well as to receive the 
 supplies which had been demanded from Brest. Following out 
 this intention, the great fleet swept up Channel, and on the 15th 
 of August was in sight of Plymouth without having seen a sign of 
 a British look-out ship or a shadow of opposition. The English 
 historians who record these transactions think it was *' by some 
 unaccountable event " that the combined fleet was able to evade 
 that of Sir Charles Hardy. A glance at the map shows us that 
 there was nothing unaccountable in the matter, but that, as we 
 have already seen, the way might be said to have been specially 
 left open for d'Orvilliers to approach. As early as the 12th of August 
 Hardy had passed to the westward of any reasonable strategical 
 position, not driven thither by stress of weather or want of wind. 
 The westernmost strategical line was the Ushant-Lizard line, and 
 if the guarding of the Channel were the object in view, no position 
 to the west of it was a right one. But it is clear that from the 
 12th to the 20th of August, at least. Sir Charles Hardy was always 
 where he should not have been, and d'Orvilliers was quietly sailing 
 up Channel to the southward of him. On the 15th of August, the 
 enemies were 120 miles apart, the combined fleets off Plymouth, 
 and the British fleet nearly 50 miles beyond Scilly. 
 
 On the outside of things, it is not easy to imagine a position of 
 greater peril to this country than was now exhibited. There was 
 enough Franco-Spanish force to have allowed of such a division 
 as would have kept Sir Charles Hardy in check, and, if necessary, 
 to have brought him to action at a great disadvantage, while leaving 
 an ample strength to convoy the troops over and protect their 
 landing. Or, if still safer tactics were employed, it would have 
 been easy to have completely destroyed Sir Charles Hardy's fleet 
 by means of the overwhelming odds at hand, and then with all ease 
 and leisure to have passed over as many armies as might have been 
 necessary for the subjugation of the United Kingdom. 
 
 It was not until the 19th of August that a change of wind to the 
 eastward put it out of the power of Sir Charles Hardy to return 
 immediately to his proper position, and it was not until the 20th 
 
 * Troude, vol. ii., p. Zo. 
 
 11 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 153 
 
 was shaped for the English Channel. The great fleet, besides 
 suffering heavily from sickness, as mentioned, was already short of 
 water and provisions.* 
 
 The intention of d'Orvilliers was to proceed in the first instance 
 to Torbay, to anchor there and to more equally distribute the 
 provisions remaining in the fleet, as well as to receive the 
 supplies which had been demanded from Brest. Following out 
 this intention, the great fleet swept up Channel, and on the 15th 
 of August was in sight of Plj^mouth without having seen a sign of 
 a British look-out ship or a shadow of opposition. The English 
 historians who record these transactions think it was " by some 
 unaccountable event " that the combined fleet was able to evade 
 that of Sir Charles Hardy. A glance at the map shows us that 
 there was nothing unaccountable in the matter, but that, as we 
 have already seen, the way might be said to have been specially 
 left open for d'Orvilliers to approach. As early as the 12th of August 
 Hardy had passed to the westward of any reasonable strategical 
 position, not driven thither by stress of weather or want of wind. 
 The westernmost strategical line was the Ushant-Lizard line, and 
 if the guarding of the Channel were the object in view, no position 
 to the west of it was a right one. But it is clear that from the 
 12th to the 20th of August, at least. Sir Charles Hardy was always 
 where he should not have been, and d'Orvilliers was quietly sailing 
 up Channel to the southward of him. On the 15th of August, the 
 enemies were 120 miles apart, the combined fleets off Plymouth, 
 and the British fleet nearly 50 miles beyond Scilly. 
 
 On the outside of things, it is not easy to imagine a position of 
 greater peril to this country than was now exhibited. There was 
 enough Franco-Spanish force to have allowed of such a division 
 as would have kept Sir Charles Hardy in check, and, if necessary, 
 to have brought him to action at a great disadvantage, while leaving 
 an ample strength to convoy the troops over and protect their 
 landing. Or, if still safer tactics were employed, it would have 
 been easy to have completely destroyed Sir Charles Hardy's fleet 
 by means of the overwhelming odds at hand, and then with all ease 
 and leisure to have passed over as many armies as might have been 
 necessary for the subjugation of the United Kingdom. 
 
 It was not until the 19th of August that a change of wind to the 
 eastward put it out of the power of Sir Charles Hardy to return 
 immediately to his proper position, and it was not until the 20th 
 
 - Troude, vol. ii., p. ^Z. 
 
 11 
 
154 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 that he got any news of the enemy. The easterly wind, however, 
 reached the combined fleets before it did that of the British. The 
 wind was easterly off Plymouth on the 16th, and the strength of it 
 was so gradually increasing that Torbay was no longer a safe 
 anchorage, and the idea of going there had, in fact, to be given 
 up.* This not only prevented the combined fleets from going to 
 the eastward of Plymouth, but as the wind increased, tended to 
 drive them to the westward. It was probably on this account that 
 one of Sir Charles Hardy's ships was able to report to him on the 
 20th that she had seen 15 sail to the N.E. The Porcupine was 
 ordered to chase in that direction, but she returned without seeing 
 anything of the enemy. 
 
 And now set in a period of aimless cruising on both sides. Sir 
 Charles being generally 60 to 80 miles to the south-westward of 
 Scilly, and d'Orvilliers, apparently with his fleet somewhat scattered, 
 south of the Lizard. The winds were fresh from the East, N.E. , 
 and S.E., not seemingly either in direction or force so persistent 
 as to prevent Sir Charles Hardy from making some easterly 
 progress had he been so minded, nor yet to prevent d'Orvilliers 
 from holding his own. 
 
 On the 28th of August, Sir Charles Hardy had crept up to a 
 position south of Scilly, and about 22 miles off; the wind was 
 light, and the weather growing from hazy to thick, and very thick. 
 Thus it was on the 29th, when the following entry appears in the 
 captain's journal: — "6 p.m., the bumboat informed us she had 
 counted 28 large ships to the S.E., which she was certain were part 
 of the combined fleet." It still continued very thick, but Hardy 
 was able to make signals for calling in the cruisers. On the 30th 
 it was moderate and clear, and at noon the British fleet was in the 
 position marked on the chart ; a part, at least, of the combined 
 fleet were also where I have noted their position, for 16 sail of 
 them were in sight from Hardy's flagship near that spot at 7 a.m. 
 Hardy, it will be observed by his position on the 31st, S.S.W. from 
 the Lizard, was making no attempt to approach the combined 
 fleet, which, in its turn, was but languidly following up the British. 
 At half-past four on the morning of the 1st September, the Duke 
 made the signal for seeing the enemy to the S.W., and then Hardy, 
 apparently for the first time, made sail to reconnoitre. At five they 
 
 * I get the winds from the mimttes of the court-mnrtial on the ofBcers of the Ardent, 
 Qi, which ran into the^midst of the combined fleet, and was captured on the ICth, nine 
 miles from Plymouth. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 155 
 
 counted GO sail of large ships, and later were near enough to dis- 
 tinguish some of the flags displayed. Two frigates were now sent 
 down to reconnoitre more closely, but some of the enemy's ships 
 appearing to bear down on them, they were recalled. At noon 
 on September 1st, the admiral had been informed by signal from 
 some of his look-outs that the enemy was in superior force ; the 
 whole of his own fleet was in company, steering to the eastward, 
 the enemy being visible astern. At half-past 5 p.m., 38 sail of the 
 enemy's fleet w^ere still visible to the westward, but only from the 
 mast-head. They were still in sight at 5 a.m., on the morning of 
 the '2nd of September, and continued so all the forenoon. At 11 
 A.M., Hardy anchored his fleet 6 miles S.W. of the Ramhead, on 
 account of the ebb tide making, and so as to widen his distance 
 from the enemy. After this, no more mention is made of them, 
 except that after the fleet weighed next evening, one of the look- 
 outs reported 7 sail to the S.W. Hardy made sail to the eastward, 
 and anchored at Spithead next evening. 
 
 The French account is in agreement with all this. Finding, 
 when as far up Channel as Torbay, on the 17th of August, the 
 wind strong from the eastward, not only was it necessary to beat 
 up to it, but it became an impossible anchorage as entirely open to 
 that wind. The weather continued bad for several days. On the 
 25th, d'Orvilliers, having had precise intelligence as to Sir Charles 
 Hardy's fleet, called a council of war to deliberate on the situation. 
 It w^as shown that some ships had 300 sick, and neither doctors 
 nor medicines on board ; that others were so short of water that 
 they were obliged to borrow from day to day from their neighbours ; 
 that several, and notably the Bretagne, were provisioned only till 
 the 25th of September. The council of war unanimously decided 
 either to seek the British fleet in the Soundings, or to wait for it 
 there. The council further decided that it would be necessary in 
 any case to terminate the cruise on the 8th of September, and that 
 then, conformably to the orders received by the Spanish admiral, 
 the Allies should separate as soon as convenient. The com- 
 bined fleet thereupon made sail to the westward for the 
 Soundings. 
 
 The British fleet does not appear to have been seen until the 
 31st of August, and was followed up languidly as described, until 
 the Ist of September, when, believing it to be 18 or 20 miles to 
 windward, and in a position to enter Plymouth, and having also 
 intelligence of the appearance of a great number of sail to the west- 
 ward, which afterwards turned out to be a Dutch convoy, the pur- 
 
 11* 
 
156 A^^IT'^L WARFARE 
 
 suit, if such it can be called, was finally abandoned, and the great 
 fleet steered for Brest. "^ 
 
 Thus ended quite the most promisinp; attempt for our enemies, 
 and the most threatening for us, of these attempts to gain the 
 command of the sea for the purpose of invasion. My authority 
 attributes its complete failure to the delay of the Spaniards in 
 forming their junction with the French. Such delay bred sickness, 
 want of provisions and water, but more, perhaps, loss of temper 
 and heart in the business. But I think while we admit the want 
 of enterprise in not bringing to an issue so fair an opportunity, we 
 must allow that a fatal double purpose reigned in the combined 
 councils. Had there been but the single idea under which we 
 have seen that the Dutch always acted, it is almost inconceivable 
 that with such an ample force. Sir Charles Hardy's fleet would 
 not have been sought, found, and possibly mastered early in 
 August. The half idea of acting by way of invasion in the face of 
 Hardy's fleet, and the other half idea of attacking the fleet, left 
 divided decisions, and councils thinking more of getting home 
 again. There is really no clear explanation of what the fleet meant 
 to do, but whatever intentions it may have had were paralyzed by 
 the neighbourhood of the very inferior fleet of the British. 
 
 I pass now to consider the preliminaries which led up to the 
 greatest, most persistent, and best-arranged of all the attempts of 
 France to gain the command of the sea for an ulterior object. 
 
 The period from 1797 to 1805 was one during which the naval 
 operations in the Channel, in the North Seas, oft' the coasts of 
 France, Spain, and Portugal, in the Mediterranean, and even, 
 perhaps, in the West Indies, were all dominated more or less by a 
 single idea ; that of gaining sufficient command of the sea to get 
 an army across the Channel. 
 
 Although preparations for the great business were in progress 
 as early as the autumn of 1796 certainly, and though some at- 
 tempt at systematic invasion was as early as that date expected in 
 England, it remained for the mind of Napoleon to comprehend 
 the whole field of w-ar, and to see the immense possibilities of the 
 strategic position held by France and her Allies or subordinates.f 
 
 ♦ See Troude, vol. ii. , pp. 33-36. 
 
 t Lord Grenville writes to the Marquis of Buckingham, January 30th, 17Li4, •• The 
 French seem certainl}"- disposed to try their scheme of invasion. . . . Our best 
 defence is unquestionably our water-guard, which is very strong, and will. I think, 
 every day got stronger. — Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George 111. 
 
 Lord Malmesbury landing in France, in 179G, on the abortive peace negotiations of 
 that date, notes in his diary : " October 19th. Calais. Report of an iuteuded iu- 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 157 
 
 In 1796, though the beginning of the great Boulogne flotilla had 
 been made, and ideas of repeating on a greater scale the method of 
 invasion adopted by William the Conqueror — embarkation from one 
 beach, and disembarkation on the other in a host of small vessels — 
 were current, the immediate proposals for invasion were of a more 
 desultory kind : invasions which were to be carried out by com- 
 paratively small bodies of troops, sustained and supported by 
 squadrons of ships not sufficiently large to attempt gaining 
 command of the sea, but only capable of repelling the attack of 
 comparatively small squadrons. 
 
 These ideas were focused in the expedition of Hoche from 
 Brest to Bantry Bay in December 1796, and the intended ex- 
 pedition of the Dutch from the Texel to the North of England, or 
 Scotland, which, after lying ready for many weeks, was broken up 
 and abandoned in the autumn of 1797. It is by no means 
 necessary at this stage to discuss these plans in detail, but a brief 
 notice of them is desirable, as it cannot be doubted but that their 
 failure produced in the mind of Napoleon the conviction that naval 
 war could not be carried on in that way with any hopes of success 
 against the United Kingdom, but that an absolute command of 
 the sea was a prior necessity if invasion were to be carried out 
 at all. 
 
 The attempt of Hoche, which became abortive from a variety of 
 causes, was nevertheless a proof of the inefficiency of the 
 blockade of Brest in the face of an enemy ready from moment to 
 moment to put to sea. But on the other hand, the inner life of 
 Hoche's forces, naval and military, as told by the rebel Theobald 
 Wolfe Tone, the long delay after all was ready for a start, and the 
 weary watching of the signal stations from day to day for the 
 announcement that the coast was clear, are equally a proof of the 
 extreme difficulty of getting to sea unobserved, and the likelihood 
 that an expedition might break up simply as a consequence of 
 the delay.* This moral is even more strongly pointed by the 
 
 vasion." On the 20th he has " Troops at St. Valery. Gtin-boats of a new construc- 
 tion at Boulogne; 25 men, 2 24-poun(lers, and 2 horses; to slip out on rollers." — 
 Diaries and Correspondence of Jaims Harris, First Earl of Malmeshury. VoL iii., 
 p. 276. 
 
 * The embarkation of the troops was going on at Brest on November 17th. On the 
 23rd, Tone "could not imagine what delaj's them now." On the 2Jth Colonel Shee 
 tells him they will be off in six days. Tone himself embarked on December 1st, 
 Hoche and the staff embarked on the 12th. The fleet put to sea on the night of the 
 16th, and next morning 25 out of the 43 sail that should have been in company were 
 missing. See Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone. Washington, lb26. 
 
153 NAVAL WAIIFARE. 
 
 result of the intended invasion from the Texel, and it is again 
 Wolfe Tone who gives us the inner life of the blockaded fleet and 
 its difficulties. 
 
 The Dutch fleet consisted of 15 sail of the line, 10 frigates and 
 sloops, and 27 transports, carrying some 13,500 men. Two things 
 were wanting to enable them to pass to sea : a fair wind and an 
 absent enemy. The two never came together; provisions and 
 stores wasted and disappeared ; the troops were disembarked, and 
 the whole expedition given over.* 
 
 These two failures were hardly a part of any general scheme. 
 The troops embarked were mere flying columns, intended to trust 
 themselves to their own resources, and to the supposed friendliness 
 of parts of the invaded populations. They were without hopes, or 
 should have been without hopes, of communications with their own 
 country after landing. 
 
 But could nothing be done beyond these desultory failures? 
 France, in 1797, was not France alone, but for the purpose of 
 those naval operations by which the invasion of England might 
 be made possible was perhaps France, Holland, and Spain ; with 
 it might be other naval powers thrown in, such as Hussia and 
 Denmark. 
 
 The whole coast, from Nice along the French and Spanish shores 
 of the Mediterranean, out into the Atlantic as far as the river 
 Guadiana, was hostile ; then, after the interval of the Portuguese 
 coast, the hostile line began again at the river Minho, and was traced 
 round the Bay of Biscay, along the Channel coasts of France, out 
 into the North Sea, along the coast of Holland as far as Oldenberg. 
 Then, after a short interval of the coast of Hanover, began the 
 doubtful shores of Denmark and of the Baltic. 
 
 Along this line, the principal hostile ports where the enemy 
 could collect and arm, and whence he might be expected to issue, 
 were Toulon, Cartagena, Cadiz, Ferrol, Eocliefort, Brest, and the 
 Texel. In 179G it was understood that the Spanish Alliance with 
 France might array against us the following line-of-battle fleets, 
 distributed somewhat as given below : — 
 
 Toulon - 15 French 
 
 Cartagena - - - - 18 Spanish 
 
 • All had been some time ready to start when Tone arrived on July 8th 1797. 
 From that time till September 3rd, when he left the fleet, knowing that the expedition 
 had collapsed, the days were passed in watching the weather-cock and the British 
 fleet, which was generally in easy view from the anchorage. The Dutch seem to have 
 been perfectly well informed of everything as it went on in England ; of the mutiny, 
 and of the exact strength of Duncan's force from day to day. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 159 
 
 Cadiz ------ 3 Spanish 
 
 FeiTol ------ 2f) Spanish 
 
 Guarnizo* ^ = . ^ - 7 Spanish 
 
 Brest 21 French 
 
 Texel 21 Dutch 
 
 Newfoundland - - - . 7 French 
 
 Havannah - - - - - 18 Spanish 
 
 In many respects, especially on the Spanish side, this was no 
 
 doubt a paper force, but a grand total of 136 sail of the line was 
 
 one from which many deductions might be allowed and yet leave 
 
 a very imposing array behind them. 
 
 A glance at the chart will show the immense strategical power 
 in the hands of the French Government, moving all these forces 
 from such a central position as Paris, Blockade at this time, 
 though much more complete than it had been, was still but an 
 intermittent power, subject to the vagaries of the weather and 
 to the necessities of provisioning and watering the blockading 
 ships in sheltered spots, which could generally be found at only 
 a distance from the port to be watched. However heroic and 
 persistent the attempt of the blockading forces might be, it was 
 always uncertain whether a watched force might not be able to 
 escape unseen, and to bury itself at sea, no one knew where. 
 
 Under such circumstances, a superior force on the side of the 
 British might prove very inferior in defence. If it concentrated 
 on the shores of the United Kingdom, it might certainly i^rove 
 a sufficient defence against invasion, but then it abandoned not 
 only the commerce of the Empire, but most of its outlying terri- 
 tories. If it was divided into numerous squadrons, each employed 
 in watching one of these great war ports from Toulon to the 
 Texel, what was to prevent even several squadrons of the enemy 
 from escaping, forming a junction, and falling in vastly superior 
 force upon any selected one of the British squadrons at the 
 moment most inopportune for it ? Paris could despatch orders to 
 Brest, Eochefort, and Toulon, so that they would reach those ports 
 certainly and simultaneously, in a few days. Horse expresses to 
 Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena, were in a measure certain and 
 speedy, t 
 
 London was at the extreme end of the chain of forces to be 
 moved and governed. It was impossible to warn blockading 
 
 • A port on the north coast of Spain, now of no importance. 
 
 t Napoleon at Boulogne received a dispatch from Lauriston at Ferrol on tV^o 22nd of 
 August, which probably left the latter place on the 10th. 
 
IGO NAVAL WARFAUE. 
 
 sqnarlrons simultaneously. The Toulon squadron could not possibly 
 know till weeks had passed what news had been given to the 
 squadron off Brest on a certain day. And even when messages 
 were sent and reached the intended spot, it was never certain that 
 the ships would not have been driven off by a gale of wind, or have 
 fallen back to some point on the strength of a true or a false 
 alarm. 
 
 But Great Britain's duties and necessities were such that she 
 
 could never guarantee having superior forces stationed off each 
 
 port. Speaking generally of the date mentioned, her line-of- 
 
 battle forces were in quantity and distribution as follows : — 
 
 In the North Sea - - - - - 26 
 
 In the Channel -„.... 29 
 
 On the coast of Ireland . . _ . 2 
 
 In the Mediterranean - •■ - 31 
 
 In the West Indies 20 
 
 North America 5 
 
 At the Cape of Good Hope - - - - 8 
 In the East Indies ----- 5 
 
 126* 
 So that not only were the total forces nominally 10 sail short 
 of the numbers set out by the enemy, but the British Colonial 
 necessities took away from the European war theatre 38 sail of 
 the line against the 25 only which were withdrawn from the 
 enemy's European forces. 
 
 Speaking in general terms, then, and not troubling ourselves 
 with those changes of distribution which were so constantly going 
 on that it is difficult to be accurate at any given moment, the 
 position was this. There was a possibility of the French finding 
 111 sail of the line at command, strategically disposed in secure 
 ports in Europe, and capable of reinforcement by 25 sail more 
 from the other side of the Atlantic. There was a probability that 
 as a defence against these, the British would be able to bring no 
 more than 88 sail, broken up into squadrons generally inferior 
 to the forces in port opposed to them, and everywhere open to be 
 overwhelmed by concentrations initiated and ordered from Paris, of 
 which the British could have no conception whatever until it was 
 too late. 
 
 Some sort of picture of this kind must have early presented 
 itself n the mind of Napoleon, as it possibly did to other French- 
 
 * This total includes all ships with guns on two decks, one ship having but 44 guns 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAXD OF THE SEA 161 
 
 men, as early perhaps as 1796. The central idea wliich grew out 
 cf it was the formation of a great army along the shores of France 
 nearest to those of England, from Ostend to Staples, the provision 
 of a special kind of transport in the form of gmi-boats, flat-boats, 
 and horse-boats, repeating in some measure the characteristics of 
 that flotilla which had brought over in a former age the army of 
 Duke William. 
 
 Very possibly this flotilla had been originally destined to move 
 alone, or at least that there had been no original idea of making 
 use of the full strategical resources of the alliance in the sudden 
 concentration from different paints of an immense naval force in 
 the Straits of Dover, sufficient to hold the waters against all 
 comers and to cover and protect the crossing and landing. 
 
 On the other hand, the possibilities of these strategic combina- 
 tions were already well known on both sides of the Channel. 
 What is not so easy to understand is the object of many of the 
 combinations made and operations undertaken previous to the 
 time when Napoleon, as Consul and Emperor, took the matter 
 wholly into his own hands. 
 
 The first combination was a powerful one, had it been employed 
 directly to wrest the command of the whole sea from our hands, 
 
 Reference to Chart of Theatre of the Opekatioxs, 17'.i7 to 1601. 
 
 1.— Place of Battle of St. Vincent, Feb. 14th, 17i)7. 
 
 •J.— Place of Battle of Camperdown, Oct. llth. 1797. 
 
 3. — Position of Lord Bridport's Fleet (1(5 sail of the line) on April 30th. 1700. 
 
 4.— Position of French Fleet (25 sail of the line) at same date. 
 
 5. — Lord Keith's Fleet (15 sail of the line) in presence of French Fleet, on May 4th, 
 
 17!I9. 
 <3. — French Fleet at the same date. 
 
 7. — Duckworth's Squadron (4 sail of the line) at same date. 
 
 8.— Lord St. Vincent's Fleet (now 21 sail of the line) on May 30th, 1799, with news 
 that the Spanish Fleet (17 sail of the line) was at Cartagena, and that the 
 French Fleet (22 sail of the line) had left Toulon three days before. 
 9. — French Fleet in Vado Bay on same date. 
 10. — Spanish Fleet at Cartagena, same date. 
 11.— Position of Lord Keith's Fleet (20 sail of the line) on June 8th, 1709, when he 
 
 turned back in obedience to Lord St. Vincent's order. 
 12. — Position of French Fleet (22 sail of the line) at same date. 
 13.— Position of Lord Keith's Fleet (19 sail of the line) on June lilth. 
 14. — Approximate jjosition of French Fleet (22 sail of the line) at the same date, on 
 
 its way to Cartagena. 
 ! 5. —Lord Keith's Fleet (now 31 sail of the line) in pursuit of the Combined Fleets on 
 
 .Tilly 2Gth, putting into Tetuan for water. 
 Iti. — Approximate position of the Combined Fleets (40 sail of the line) on their way to 
 Crest, at same date. 
 
162 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 that is, had it been engaged in for the simple object of destroying 
 and capturing our ships. Langara, shortly after the declaration 
 of war by Spain, that is in October 1796, passed into the Medi- 
 terranean from Cadiz with 19 sail of the line and 10 frigates. At 
 the time there were 7 sail of Spaniards at Cartagena, and 12 
 sail of French at Toulon. Langara picked up the 7 sail at 
 Cartagena and then effected his junction with the French at 
 Toulon, where the combined fleet amounted to 38 sail of the line 
 and 18 or 20 frigates. 
 
 Sir John Jervis commanded a fleet in the Mediterranean of no 
 more than 15 sail of the line, while Mann had been watching 
 Cadiz with no more than 6 sail. Instead of joining Jervis, as he 
 should have done, this officer took on himself to fall back into the 
 Channel, leaving Jervis wholly in the power of the combined fleet, 
 had its objects been simple and definite. No attack or attempted 
 attack was made on him, and he fell back to Gibraltar and Lisbon, 
 leaving the Allies masters of the Mediterranean sea. 
 
 Of course, had real command of the sea been aimed at, the 
 Allies should have fallen on Sir John at all hazards, following him 
 out of the Mediterranean, if necessary, with that object. But with 
 an infirmity of purpose which requires explanation, the combina- 
 tion made was broken up, and the Spaniards alone and undesignedly 
 fell into the hands of Jervis on the 14th of February next year, 
 and suffered the penalty, off Cape St. Vincent, of deliberately 
 neglecting the first principles of war. 
 
 Equally wasteful of naval force, and unmeaning as to any 
 possible advantage to be gained, was the battle of Camperdown at 
 the other end of the strategic line on the 11th of October following. 
 The Dutch fleet of 15 sail had, as we have seen, landed all the 
 troops and abandoned the idea of invasion, so that when it was 
 determined to put to sea in the face of a known superior fleet of 
 British ships, the enterprise was objectless. In the Mediterranean, 
 the French and Spanish admirals, with a fair chance of breaking 
 up Jervis's force, neglected to do it, and lost their opportunity. 
 In the North Sea, the Dutch, without any hopes beyond destruction 
 and bloodshed, proceeded to engage the British force. Both 
 mistakes were equally grave and obvious, so that there is some 
 difficulty in understanding whether there was any single intelligence 
 actuating the operations. 
 
 All the possibilities, and both these errors, were necessarily in 
 the mind of Napoleon, when, a month before he sailed for Egypt — 
 that is in the middle of April 1798 — he wrote his celebrated 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 163 
 
 Memorandum on the Invasion of England, and aupposed that the 
 expedition he was about to undertake was to be directly instru- 
 mental in securing a superior naval force in the Channel.* 
 
 He calculated then, that by the month of September there 
 might be 35 sail of the line at Brest, and 400 gun-boats at 
 Boulogne, with troops at hand that had spent the whole summer 
 in becoming inured to these vessels and sea life in them. The 
 Dutch at the same time, he thought, would have sufficiently 
 recovered the blow of Camperdown to be ready with 12 sail of the 
 line in the Texel. There were in the Mediterranean 12 French 
 sail of the line, which might be augmented to 14 by September, 
 and there were also in French hands 9 sail of the line which had 
 belonged to the Venetian Kepublic. The 14 French ships Napo- 
 leon thought might go to Brest, so as by the month of October or 
 November to show a force of 50 sail of the line in the western 
 part of the Channel beside the 12 sail in the eastern part. It 
 might then be possible to carry out the invasion upon three 
 selected points of attack : — namely, 40,000 men coming by long 
 sea to be landed at some point to be determined ; 40,000 men 
 to cross in the invasion flotilla, and 10,000 men to be landed in 
 Scotland by the Dutch. 
 
 The expedition to the East would oblige England, Napoleon 
 thought, to send 6 additional sail of the line to India, and 
 perhaps 12 frigates to the entrance of the Red Sea, She would 
 be obliged to have 22 to 25 ships of the line at the entrance to 
 the Mediterranean, 60 before Brest, and 12 before the Texel. 
 Napoleon, or his copyists for him, fall at this point into some 
 loose arithmetic, for he says this would make a total of 300 ships 
 of war,t without counting what the British already had abroad, or 
 the ten or twelve 50-gun ships and score of frigates which she must 
 keep to oppose the invasion flotilla. " The invasion of England," 
 he said, " put in practice in this manner, in the months of No- 
 vember and December, would be almost certain. England would 
 waste herself by immense efforts, but these would not secure her 
 from our invasion." 
 
 This was the theory of it, but Napoleon did not perceive that he 
 was about to violate a clear rule of naval war in the first instance 
 in his own person, and that the whole arrangements were too 
 
 • " Soldiers ! you are one of the wings of the army of England ! " Address to hia 
 troops, see Victoires, Conquetes, Sfc, vol. x., p. 375. 
 
 t James translates " line-of-battie ships " in error. The mistake vras great enough 
 as it stood. 
 
1G4 XAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 vague and indeterminate, even without the absurd arithmetic, to 
 promise any success. If, as he somewhat wildly conceived, the 
 passage to India was open to him through Egypt, and that it was 
 by means of evasion and not by command in the " T\Iediterranean 
 sea that he hoped to get there, he should have left the 13 — not 14 — 
 sail of the line safe under the batteries of Toulon. Taking them 
 Avith him, he deliberately exposed them to the fate tliey met at 
 the hands of Nelson in the following August. And if he, by his 
 occupation of E^ypt, had compelled the British to send ships to 
 India, they could now afford to do it, having captured and destroyed 
 11 of their opiDonents at home. 
 
 The enemy also wasted his forces in subsidiary attacks, almost 
 bound to be failures if the matter had been rightly considered. 
 Thus in August 1798 Commodore Savary took a body of 1,150 
 troops, under General Humbert, on board a small squadron 
 escaping from Aix, which landed in Killala Bay in Mayo and duly 
 surrendered soon after. A larger expedition under Commodore 
 Bompart sailed from Brest for the North of Ireland on the 16th 
 of September. He was followed up by British look-out frigates, 
 and news of his progress was duly sent on to the Commander-in- 
 Chief on the Irish coast. As a consequence, Sir John Warren met 
 him off Lough Swilly, on the 11th of October, and captured the 
 main part of his squadron. 
 
 But the invasion flotilla itself was under considerable difficulties. 
 The British in commana of the sea were interfering with it all 
 along the line. In July 1795, Sir Sydney Smith had made a 
 beginning by capturing and garrisonmg the little Islands of 
 Marcouf which lie four miles off-shore south of Cape Barfleur. 
 The islands were found a convenient spot for interfering with the 
 flotilla arrangements, and were held against attack both without 
 and with assistance from the sea. 
 
 On May 19, 1798, Osiend was shelled ; 1,140 troops were landed, 
 who destroyed the canal lock and gates, and several gun-boats in 
 the basin, though they were afterwards obliged to surrender to the 
 superior force which the French had had time to collect. 
 
 On the 30th and 31st of the same year, a frigate and corvette 
 belonging to the flotilla were driven on shore by the British near 
 Havre, and the frigate was burnt. 
 
 In June 1800, a British squadron attacked the frigates lying in 
 the anchorage of Dunkirk, and one of them, the Dcsiree, was 
 cut out and brought away. 
 
 And then, as the time seemed to be approaching when decided 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 165 
 
 steps were to be taken with regard to the flotilla, Lord Nelson was 
 placed, in July 1801, in command of the operations against it, 
 which was followed by the shelling of Boulogne on the 4th of 
 August, and an audacious attempt to break up the flotilla there 
 on the 15 til. 
 
 The operations of 1799 were on a great strategic scale, but yet 
 they only serve to show how divided purposes and diverse aims 
 fritter away the golden opportunities in naval warfare. 
 
 By the month of April, France had 25 sail of the line at Brest 
 under Bruix, watched by a force under Lord Bridport which did not 
 exceed 16 sail of the line. The French were industriously spreading 
 reports there that they had now a design on Ireland ; and taking 
 advantage of Bridport's withdrawal to a distance, and of thick 
 weather occurring simultaneously, put to sea on the 25th of 
 April with the whole force of 25 sail of the line, and were ofl", no 
 one knew where. Bridport, after despatching cruisers to Lord 
 Keith, ofi" Cadiz with 15 sail of the line, and to Lord St. Vincent 
 at Gibraltar, and also homewards to convey the news, fell back 
 himself to Bantry Bay, where he was presently reinforced, and 
 found himself a match for the enemy, and at the head of 26 sail 
 of the line. 
 
 But Ireland was at the moment far from the thoughts of the 
 French. On the 3rd of May, Lord Keith, at the head of his 15 sail 
 of the line oft' Cadiz, was made acquainted with the fact that the 
 Brest fleet was coming down on him, having been most probably 
 joined by 5 Spanish ships which had sailed from Ferrol. The 17 
 or 18 Spanish ships in Cadiz which Lord Keith was watching, 
 shewed no signs of movement, yet practically he was being brought 
 into the presence of a fleet of 48 sail of the line, to which he could 
 oppose no more than 15. 
 
 The fleets were in sight of one another on the 4th and 5th of 
 May, but it was then blowing a westerly gale, which would have 
 prevented the Cadiz Spaniards from coming out, had such been 
 their intention, and the result was that the French, who had not, 
 after all, been joined by the Ferrol Spaniards, ran before the gale 
 into the Mediterranean.* 
 
 Lord Keith then, after counting, as he supposed, 22 sail of 
 the line in the harbour of Cadiz, fell back and joined Lord St. 
 Vincent at Gibraltar. Despatches of warning were then sent off 
 
 * Troude says, vol. iii., p. 157, that Bruis was ordered to join the Spaniards at 
 Cadiz, but that the state of the weather, with his untrained crews, forbid him either to 
 fight or to make for Cadiz, 
 
1G6 NAVAL WARFABE. 
 
 to Duckworth, who had 4 sail of the line at Minorca ; to Nelson at 
 Palermo, whose 12 sail of the line and 4 Portuguese ships were 
 scattered over the Mediterranean, at Naj^les, at Alexandria, and at 
 Malta. 
 
 On the 11th of May, Lord St. Vincent, meeting combination by 
 combination, and endeavouring at any rate to guard Minorca as 
 the point most obviously threatened, made for that island with his 
 16 sail of the line, where, being joined by Duckworth's 4, he now 
 found himself at the head of 20 sail of the line. 
 
 The withdrawal of Lord Keith from Cadiz enabled the Spaniards 
 to send 17 sail of the line to sea on the 14th of May, and these, 
 notwithstanding some mishaps in a gale of wind, found their way 
 safely into Cartagena on the 20th, just a week after the Brest 
 fleet had put into Toulon. 
 
 As a consequence of these circumstances, Lord St. Vincent was 
 driven to place himself between Toulon and Cartagena, in order 
 that, by preventing a junction between the French and Spanish 
 ships, he might avoid the risk of finding himself in presence of a 
 combined fleet of more than double his strength. But he was in 
 this difliculty. Either the Spaniards from Cartagena, or the 
 French from Toulon, might suddenly issue forth and strike at the 
 greatly inferior force of Nelson on the coast of Sicily. AVhen this 
 contingency presented itself so forcibly to the mind of St. Vincent 
 as to make him weaken his own fleet by 4 sail of the line in order 
 to strengthen Nelson at Palermo, we can well understand the 
 straits he was in, even if he knew, which he probably did, that a 
 reinforcement of 5 sail of the line was close at hand to join him. 
 Having made these arrangements. Lord St. Vincent, whose health 
 was completely shattered, gave up the command to Lord Keith 
 and prepared to return to England. 
 
 The general station of the British fleet was now off Cape St. 
 Sebastian, and there, on the 30th of May, Lord Keith heard that 
 the French fleet of 22 sail of the line, under Admiral Bruix, had 
 put to sea from Toulon on the 27th. Lord Keith now took the 
 strange step of proceeding to Toulon himself; I say the strange 
 step, because if the thing to be feared were the junction at Car- 
 tagena, this movement left it open more than ever. To close 
 with the port of Cartagena, with, the hope of meeting and 
 fighting the French before they could be succoured by the 
 Spanish, had an obvious promise of advantage, which drawing near 
 to Toulon after the French had left it could certainly not have 
 had. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 1G7 
 
 While the obvious course was not taken by the British, the 
 French missed a course equally obvious ; that was, to make a 
 detour to the eastward, and passing round Lord Keith's fleet, 
 make for Cartagena from the westward rather than from the 
 northward. Occasions took them to Vado Bay, near Genoa, and 
 this especially favoured the eastern detour, which was not taken. 
 
 Lord Keith stood past Toulon as far as Frejus, where, on the 
 5th of June, he heard that the French were at anchor in Vado 
 Bay, and at once made sail in that direction. He reached within 
 90 miles of the place, where, on the 8th, he received imperative 
 orders from St. Vincent, who had not yet quitted Minorca on his 
 homeward voyage, to return to Eosas Bay, near Cape St. Sebastian, 
 for the purpose of intercepting the French fleet. This order is one 
 of those which we meet sometimes, and must admit to be inexpli- 
 cable, for how Lord Keith was thus to intercept a French fleet known 
 to be at sea, and supposed to be steering for Cartagena, a glance at 
 the chart fails to give the slightest hint. It is still more perplex- 
 ing that Lord Keith, with his good information as to the presence 
 of the French only 90 miles from him in Vado Bay, and with his 
 knowledge that St. Vincent could not be aware of this, should have 
 so promptly obeyed the order, in so far as it concerned his aban- 
 donment of that pursuit of the French, but not in so far as con- 
 cerned his proceeding as directed to Eosas Bay. For he steered, in 
 point of fact, for Minorca. On the day that he turned thus to 
 partly obey St. Vincent's orders, the French fleet weighed from 
 Genoa, to which point they had meantime moved, for Cartagena ; 
 but instead of steering the safe course well to the eastward, it fol- 
 lowed directly on Lord Keith's track, sighting Toulon, and the 
 pursued became the unconscious pursuer. 
 
 The result of this backward movement of Lord Keith's was that 
 the blunder of Bruix in sighting Toulon brought him no harm."^ 
 He crossed the path of Lord Keith behind him, and got safe into 
 Cartagena on the 23rd of June. On the 24th, then, there was a 
 force of some 40 sail of the line ready for sea in that port. 
 
 Meanwhile, Lord Keith, after rather aimlessly wandering about 
 in the Gulf of Lyons for weeks, was compelled to fall back on 
 Minorca for water. There he was joined on the 7th of July by a 
 detachment from the Channel, which augmented his force to 31 
 
 • James reads the French accounts as if Bruis was credited with the determination 
 to attack the British, of whose advance he had heard. Troude, vol. iii., p. 158, says 
 distinctly that Brms was forbidden to fight until joined with the Spanish, and that he 
 weighed to avoid the British. 
 
168 NAVAL WARFABE. 
 
 sail of the line ; and there he learnt how, a fortnight hefore, that 
 which it should have been his sole aim to prevent had occurred, 
 and that the combined French and Spanish fleets were in his rear 
 at Cartagena ; not only this, but that on the 24th of June this 
 same combined fleet had sailed, and was on its way out of the 
 ]\Iediterranean. 
 
 So here was failure upon failure. The very reinforcement which 
 had been detached from the Channel was a dead loss. It had been 
 taken away from the point to be defended, and sent to a point 
 where no attack was to be apprehended ; 40 sail of the enemy, and a 
 proportion of frigates, were bowling away to take the command of 
 the Channel and carry the great invasion scheme into execution 
 rolling up the feeble British squadrons as they went, and the 
 only force of a size even to observe him was a fortnight behind the 
 enemy. There was nothing for it but to follow with all speed, and 
 this Lord Keith set himself to do. 
 
 The combined fleets, with the fine start which fortune and error 
 more than skill had given them, got into Cadiz on the 12th of July, 
 and were out again on the 21st, making a goodly show of 59 sail, 
 of w^ich 40 were of the line. 
 
 Lord Keith's fleet having only partially watered at Port Mahon, 
 was obliged to put into Tetuan to complete with that necessary, 
 and so did not reach Gibraltar until the 29th of July, just three 
 weeks behind the Franco-Spanish fleet, and a week after it had 
 quitted Cadiz for Brest. 
 
 While these early and aimless movements had been carried out 
 by the British in the Mediterranean, Lord Bridport had been lying 
 unemployed in Bantry Bay with his 26 sail, waiting for the fleet 
 which never came his way. And thus the retirement north-west of 
 one part, and the retirement south-west of the other part, rendered 
 it an easy matter for the 5 Spanish ships which had got out of 
 Ferrol at the end of April to find their way into Eochefort. But 
 here fortune, which had so far befriended the enemy, deserted hiii. 
 These 5 ships were never able to rejoin their companions in Brest, 
 and though there were 90 pendants flying there, the little reinforce- 
 ment of 5 Spaniards was forced back into the port it had sailed 
 from, and lay in Ferrol for the remainder of the year. 
 
 The condition of things was now, however, that there was a 
 force at Brest absolutely overwhelming should any ulterior ideas of 
 invasion set it in motion, and far away at the other end oi' the line 
 the genius which was alone supposed competent to wield it was 
 hurrying back to France, where he did not set foot until the 9th of 
 
L.RUPERT ST LOHDOJI 
 
 To Face Page /6S. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 169 
 
 October, wliicb may account for the quiet ^Ybieh subsisted all along 
 tbe line till tbe close of tbe year, 
 
 Tbe Britisb were fortunate at tbe nortbern end. In spite of tbe 
 losses of Camperdown, the Dutch fleet remained very strong. 
 There were 8 sail of tbe line in tbe Texel, 6 at Amsterdam, and 8 
 in tbe Meuse, besides frigates and small vessels. But it was known, 
 on tbe other band, that there was a large and growing party in 
 Holland absolutely inimical to Eepublicanism and French domina- 
 tion. Tbe fleet was less willing than it had been to waste its 
 strength in the endeavour to achieve an object for which it had no 
 bking. Tbe result of these conditions was that when, in tbe months 
 of August and September, an English land force possessed itself of 
 tbe Helder, the 8 line-of-battlc ships and 2 frigates which were 
 ying in the Texel surrendered to Admiral Mitchell as representing 
 the Prince of Orange, without firing a shot. 
 
 Tbe simile which occurs to my mind as best illustrating the 
 various operations all along the enemy's coast, from Toulon to the 
 Helder, is that of a smouldering fire, every now and then breaking 
 out in a fresh quarter, and as often being stamped out by the fire- 
 men who were watching it. It was all over at tbe close of 1799, 
 and all through 1800 it remained apparently subdued, but to be 
 alone likely to break out at Brest, where its real strength lay. 
 
 But while men turned their attention in this direction, the fire 
 suddenly blazed in a place altogether beyond tbe bounds of the 
 old fire. There sprang up a confederacy between tbe Nortbern 
 Powers — Eussia, Denmark, and Sweden — against England, which 
 was nearly tbe most alarming incident that bad yet developed 
 itself in the course of tbe great struggle. It is not necessary here 
 to dwell upon tbe policy and events which brought about tbe battle 
 of Copenhagen, and broke tbe confederacy up as rapidly as it bad 
 been formed. 
 
 This being done, the enemy concentrated his endeavours upon 
 augmenting and improving the invasion flotilla, and in preparing, 
 by exercise and experiment, as far as they could be carried out in 
 the face of constant interruption from crowds of Britisb cruisers, 
 for tbe day when tbe great force might cross. Tbe Peace of 
 Amiens, however, put an end for the time to the whole of the 
 operations of every kind, and left this country still uninvaded, still 
 secure, and still in command of the sea. 
 
 As I observed on introducing the consideration of tbe operations 
 on both sides from 1797 to 1805, they were more or less governed 
 by tbe invasion idea. It is quite possible that the control of this 
 
 12 
 
170 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 idea may have been more indirect than direct, hut I have felt that 
 if this is even so, some brief study of them is a necessary introduc- 
 tion to the undoubted invasion movements of 1805. 
 
 I think that if the outline story I have told be regarded not so 
 much by way of detail as of general effect, it will be seen that the 
 enemy's views were indefinite and generally fallacious throughout ; 
 that, having a strong position, he misused it, and that the main 
 cause of his misusing it was the prevalence of the double idea of 
 command of the sea and of something to follow it, as if the com- 
 mand of the sea were not itself all in all. There was, I think, in 
 the mind of the enemy the inconsequent belief that though he 
 might not be strong enough to gain and to hold the command of 
 the sea by direct and simple attack on the forces which then held 
 it, he might be strong enough to achieve purposes which only the 
 command of the sea could enable him to achieve. 
 
 And with his mind fixed on these remote and misty purposes, he 
 failed to play the simple but powerful game which a great strate- 
 gical position and many fortunate chances put into his hands. 
 
 AVe begin with the Franco-Spanish combination in the Mediter- 
 ranean in 1797, when, by the strange defection of Admiral Mann, 
 St. Vincent was left with only 15 sail face to face with 38. Unless 
 we credit the Allies with a condition of panic fear which should 
 have kept them in their ports, we have nothing to fall back on but 
 some more or less indefinite ulterior purposes for an explanation of 
 why St. Vincent was not instantly fallen upon, or at least followed 
 up and fallen upon, when such very superior force was available. 
 It seems impossible to suppose that had there been a single eye to 
 conquest at sea, such as we have seen to pervade the whole of the 
 Dutch operations in those earlier wars, St. Vincent could have 
 escaped disaster. 
 
 And then how can we account for the waste of Spanish force off 
 Cape St. Vincent on the 14th of February ? The histories tell us 
 that the Spanish fleet was really bound for Cadiz, and conse- 
 quently the meeting with the British was for it an untoward 
 accident. But it is exceedingly difficult to believe that any 
 accident could have taken the Spaniards so very far west of their 
 intended port. The battle of St. Vincent appears more likely to 
 have arisen out of the vague and unsettled views which seem to 
 have characterized the whole proceedings of the Allies. 
 
 In like manner there is no explanation forthcoming which bears 
 sound sense in its wake for the waste of Dutch force at the battle 
 of Camperdown. It was ajyrojws of nothing, and could lead to 
 
attempt;^ tg gain cgmmand of the sea. 171 
 
 nothing more than mutual loss and bloodshed, and the causes of 
 it seem to lie more amongst passionate reactions after the collapse 
 of the invasion idea, than amongst any of the cold designs of a 
 reasonable State policy. 
 
 In a somewhat wild way, Napoleon's adventure to Egypt with a 
 "wing of the army of England" was intended to have a direct 
 effect on ultimate command of the Channel, but in drawing the 
 fleet with the land expedition, Napoleon was repeating the mistake 
 of Medina Sidonia, and the intended mistake of Conflans. Force 
 enough to cover the landing, which would probably have been a 
 frigate force, was all that was necessary. The French may be 
 said to have courted the fate which overtook them at the Nile, 
 which was a much less severe one than would have overtaken the 
 whole force had Nelson only followed up the sight he got of them 
 on the evening of the 22nd of June, after leaving Cape Passaro.^ 
 Had the French line-of-battle fleet been left at Toulon, Nelson 
 would probably have been unable to quit his watch of them, and 
 the whole course of affairs might have been changed. At the 
 most, the proper employment of the French line-of-battle force 
 would have been masking the British near Gibraltar or Cadiz. 
 
 Passing on to the exit of Admiral Bruix from Brest in April 
 1799, and the movements and combinations that followed, a single 
 eye to the destruction of any one of the three British squadrons, 
 Lord Keith's, Duckworth's, or Nelson's, must certainly have brought 
 about an attack which should have promised success. Bruix 
 arranged his orders as Minister of Marine and carried them out as 
 Commander-in-Chief. What those orders actually were has not 
 yet, I believe, been shown, but they certainly involved a number of 
 possibilities. Possibly Keith was to be attacked ; so, possibly, 
 was Minorca and Duckworth ; so also, possibly, was Nelson. 
 Possibly Malta was to be relieved. Possibly Napoleon, in Egypt, 
 was to be succoured. Something of the total failure to do any- 
 thing whatever no doubt followed on the want of seamanship, which 
 was general in both of the Allied fleets ; but, to my mind, much 
 more lies on the shoulders of the false notions of naval warfare 
 which pervaded the minds of the Continental nations. If there 
 had been a single design of crushing the 15 sail of Lord Keith off 
 Cadiz, with the 25 sail outside him and the 17 or 18 sail inside 
 him, might it not have been carried out ? Though a gale of wind 
 was blowing, it was not necessary that it should have carried the 
 French up to and past Cadiz ; care might have been taken to delay 
 
 * 'Nelson's Despatches, vol. iii., p. 43. 
 
 12* 
 
172 NAVAL WAllFAliE. 
 
 the approach, by lying-to till the wind abated. Or when the junc- 
 tion was ultimately effected at Cartagena, what was there but 
 these same ulterior purposes to have prevented the carrying out 
 of any decided programme which had for its obiect the destruction 
 of British naval force in the Mediterranean ? 
 
 And then, the last movement of all, the combined return to 
 Brest, was clearly a false one. The strength of the strategic 
 position consisted wholly in the division of the Allied fleets in 
 secure ports whence, under direction from a central station, they 
 could issue and strike in combination on the isolated squadrons 
 which their presence in [port compelled the masters of the sea to 
 keep in watch upon them. It was their sudden issue and their 
 unexpected stroke which gave them their power ; as soon as their 
 fleets were concentrated in one port, the danger to the masters of 
 the sea had passed away, for they could concentrate too, and were 
 no longer open to unexpected attacks by superior forces. Quite 
 possibly this knowledge only arrived to those who were directing 
 the movements of the Allied fleets when too late, and when it was 
 clear that by their concentration in one port they had ceased to 
 become of any account during the remainder of the war. 
 
IVD 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Attejipts to xjtain the Command of the Sea with Definite 
 Ulterior Purpose {Continued). — The Last Attempt of 
 France. 
 
 Preparation from 1803 to 1803 to gain temporary command of the sea.— The British 
 defence. — Napoleon's plans and orders. — Invasion does not occupy the first place — The 
 early failures of 1805. — Villeneuve's West Indian Expedition, and Nelson's prevention 
 of its success. — Varying and indefinite orders to Yilleneuve. — Return of the British 
 and French squadrons to Europe.— Villeneuve's failure and the final abandonment of 
 the invasion scheme. — Doubts whether it was ever really intended. — Attempts to 
 gain command of the sea too serious and difficult to be considered side by side witjr 
 any other design. 
 
 When Napoleon dismissed the British ambassador at the out- 
 break of hostilities in 1803, he informed him frankly that hil 
 main object would be to invade the country, but at the same 
 time expressed a sense of the recklessness of the idea, and a 
 belief that a great disaster to the French arms might follow 
 the attempt. Ostensibly, from the outbreak of war in May 1803 
 until the 23rd of August 1805, every naval preparation and 
 every naval movement had to do with obtaining the command of 
 the Channel for a sufficient time to allow an immense army, 
 embarked in an immense flotilla of small vessels, to cross from 
 the French to the English coast. 
 
 Lord St. Vincent was then at the head of the Admiralty, and 
 the nature of the situation as it was understood in England, 
 together with the naval arrangements for meeting it, may be shortly 
 stated. 
 
 At Toulon and Cadiz there were known to be of French not more 
 than 10 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 2 smaller vessels. To look 
 after them was Nelson, with 14 sail of the line, 11 frigates, and 21 
 smaller vessels. 
 
174 NAVAL IVAEFARE. 
 
 At Fcrrol wore 5 sail of the line and 2 frigates, and to mask 
 tliem were despatched of British ships, 7 sail of the line, 2 frigates, 
 and 2 smaller vessels. 
 
 At Ptochefort, and near it, were 4 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 
 2 smaller vessels. To watch them were stationed 5 sail of the 
 line, 1 frigate, and 1 smaller vessel. 
 
 At Brest, the enemy mustered 18 sail of the line, 6 frigates, and 
 
 I smaller vessel. Lord Cornwallis was here with 20 sail of the 
 line, 5 frigates, and 6 smaller vessels. 
 
 This coast and these ports were famished with the naval forces 
 of the enemy in the usual character. From St. Malo to the Texel, 
 the ports, hesides containing the usual war vessels, were full of the 
 invasion flotilla, which had now heen in preparation for about eight 
 years and was in a pretty forward state. 
 
 In the Texel were 4 Dutch sail of the line, with a frigate and 120 
 of the flotilla vessels ; and in the various ports, as far as Dunkirlc, 
 there was 1 line-of-battle ship, 4 frigates, 7 smaller vessels, and 
 G45 of the invasion flotilla. 
 
 To watch these various ports, the British stationed 9 sail of the 
 line, 7 frigates, and 14 small vessels. 
 
 In the more westerly ports, including Boulogne, Havre, Cher- 
 bourg, &c., the enemy had 2 frigates, 7 smaller vessels, and 120 
 gun brigs for the service of the invasion, and about 1,450 of the 
 flotilla itself. 
 
 The British watched these with 2 sail of the line (small 50's), 
 
 I I frigates, and 40 smaller vessels. 
 
 As an inner defence, 6 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 19 smaller 
 vessels were stationed in the Downs. Six frigates, and 11 smaller 
 vessels were stationed to guard the coasts of Ireland, while at 
 Hollesley Bay, at Yarmouth, the Humber, Leith, and generally 
 along the coasts of England and Scotland were 4 line-of-battle 
 ships, 2 frigates, and 20 smaller vessels.* 
 
 In July 1804, the French plans were drawing to completion, 
 and Vice- Admiral Latouche-Treville was appointed to command 
 the entire force. Napoleon then began to sketch out roughly and 
 vaguely what was before his Commander-in-Chief to accomplish. 
 Apparently, this object was more direct than it afterwards became, 
 Latouche-Treville was to complete his squadron at Toulon, and to 
 man it by disarming corvettes, by pressing men at Marseilles, and 
 by embarking 1,600 soldiers to serve afloat. He was to reflect on 
 the great enterprise which he was about to carry out, and before 
 
 ♦ Sec Tucker's Life of Earl Si. Vincent, vol. ii., p. 218. 
 
ToFacePa(}e /74. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 175 
 
 Napoleon signed his definitive orders he was to lot him know 
 what he considered to he the most effective way of executing them. 
 
 The squadron at Kochefort, according to Napoleon, consisted of 
 5 sail of the line and 4 frigates, ready to weigh at a moment, and 
 there were only five of the enemy's vessels before the port. 
 
 The Brest squadron was 21 sail of the line, under orders to 
 harass the enemy, and oblige him to keep a great number of ships 
 before the port. The enemy had six ships before the Texel, 
 blockading the Dutch squadron of 3 ships of the line, 4 frigates, 
 and a convoy of 30 ships, on board of which Marmont had his 
 army embarked. 
 
 Between Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, there 
 were 1,800 gun-boats, gun-vessels, peniches, &c., carr^ang 120,000' 
 men and 10,000 horses. " Lot us be masters of the Straits for 
 six hours," was Napoleon's dictum, ** and we shall be masters of 
 the world." 
 
 The enemy had before Ostend, before Boulogne, and in the Downs,, 
 two 74's, three 64's, and two 50' s. Until now, Cornwallis had not 
 had more than 15 sail of the line with him, but all the reserves 
 in Portsmouth and Plymouth would be sent to reinforce him before 
 Brest. The enemy had at Cork four or five war-ships, not to men- 
 tion frigates and small vessels, of which there were great numbers. 
 
 If [said Napoleon to Latouche-Treville] you evade Nelson, he will go to Sicily, or 
 to Egypt, or to Ferrol, I do not think it will be necessary for you to go to Ferrol. Of 
 the five vessels now in port there, four only are ready ; the fifth, however, will be ready bj' 
 the middle of August ; but I think that Ferrol is too clearly pointed at ; it is so natural 
 to suppose that if your squadron passes out of the Mediterranean into the ocean, it is 
 intended to raise the blockade of Ferrol. It appears better, therefore, to pass wide 
 of it, and to arrive off Rochefort. This will make your squadron up to 16 sail of the 
 line and 11 frigates, and then, without anchoring, without losing a single instant, 
 whether in passing round Ireland, keeping well clear of it, or in executing the first 
 plan, to present yourself before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron, 23 sail of the line 
 strong, will have an army embarked, and will be always ready to sail ; so that Corn- 
 wallis will be compelled to hug the coast of Brittany to prevent its escape. For tha 
 rest, to fix my ideas on this operation, which has its risks, but of which the success 
 offers such immense results, I wait for the plan which you have mentioned to me, and 
 which you will send me by the return of my courier. You must take on board aa 
 much provisions as possible, so that under no circumstances shall you be hindered. 
 
 At the end of the month a new line-of-battle ship will be launched at Rochefort, and 
 one at Lorient. It may be possible that they will be ready ; there is no question 
 about the one at Rochefort, but if the one at Lorient should be in the Roads and has 
 not been able to pass out before your appearance off the Isle d'Ais, I wish to know if 
 you think you should go out of your way to pick her up. Nevertheless, I think that 
 if you get out with a good northerly wind, it is preferable on all grounds to carry out 
 the operation before the winter ; for, in the bad season it is possible you may have 
 more chances of ai-riving, but there may be several days such that advantage cannot 
 be taken of your arrival. Supposing that you can put to sea before the 29th of July, 
 
176 JSAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 it is probable that j-ou will appear before Boulogne in the course of September, -when 
 the nights are already reasonably long, and the weather does not continue bad for any 
 time.* 
 
 The Toulon squadron, however, did not get to sea as Napoleon 
 hoped, Latouche-Treville died on the 10th of August, but as late 
 as the 2Sth no successor had been named, and Napoleon was hesi- 
 tating between Bruix, Villeneuve, and Rosily, and considering it 
 most urgent to come to a decision which ultimately dictated the 
 choice of Villeneuve. 
 
 Presumably the delay had put aside all thoughts of proceeding 
 according to the plans of Latouche-Treville during this year ; 
 not only so, but the plans seem to have become entirely altered, 
 and the main design of gaining the command of the Channel 
 began to take a co-ordinate i^lace, if not indeed a subordinate 
 place, with designs against St. Helena and the West Coast of 
 Africa, against the British possessions in the West Indies, and 
 against Ireland. 
 
 We have [said Napoleon, writing to Decres. the ^Minister of Jlarine, on the 20th of 
 September 1804] three expeditions to carry out. 
 
 First Expedition. — (I) To put Martinique, Guadaloupe, and St. Lucia, in a position 
 of safety under all circumstances. For this purpose a reinforcement of 1,500 men is 
 required, with 4,000 muskets and 100,000 cartridges. (2) To take possession of 
 Dominica and St. Lucia, which will materially assist in placing Guadaloupe an. I 
 IMartinique in safety. A thousand men will be required for the garrison of these two 
 islands. Total for the first expedition, 3,500 men. The Rochefort squadron is 
 ■destined for this expedition, which will be commanded by General of Division 
 Lagrange. 
 
 Second Expedition. — (1) To take Surinam and the other Dutch colonies ; I think we 
 cannot send from Europe less than 4,000 men for this service, who cannot reasonably 
 be expected to be more than 3, GOO when we shall have completed the conquest. (2) 
 To take succours to St. Domingo. For this, 3,200 men, 2,000 muskets, and 25.000 
 •cartridges will be required. If the Dutch colonies resist, and we lose more men than 
 we expect, the succours to be taken to St. Domingo will be less. Total for the second 
 expedition, from 5,200 to 5,600 men. 
 
 Third Expedition. — To take St. Helena, and to establish a station there for several 
 months. For this purpose 1,200 to 1,500 men will be required. The expedition to 
 St. Helena will take 200 men to the support of Senegal, will retake Goree, will follow 
 up all the British establishments along the coast of Africa, which will be put under 
 contribution and burnt. 
 
 For this purpose, the fleet at Toulon, comprising 11 or 12 sail of the line, including 
 the ship which is at Cadiz, will start first. Reaching the ocean, it will detach 2 ships 
 of the line, 4 frigates, and 2 brigs, the best sailers, for the expedition to St. Helena 
 (these 2 line-of-battle sGTps, 4 frigates, and 2 brigs will carr}' 1,800 men, of whom 
 200 will be left at Goree and Senegal), and 9 or 10 sail of the line and 3 frigates, 
 carrying 5,000 or 6,000 men will proceed direct to Guiana, where they will find Victor 
 Hugues, and then proceed to Surinam. 
 
 ♦ Precis des Ecenemens Militaires. ifOiV M. le Comte Mathieu Dumas, vol. xi., 
 p. 198. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. Ill 
 
 As soon as it is known that the fleet at Toulon has put to sea, the Rochefort 
 squadron will receive orders to sail. It will proceed direct to ^Martinique, take posses- 
 sion of St. Lucia and Dominica, and put itself under the orders of the commander of 
 the squadron destined for Surinam. This squadron, now consisting of 14 or 15 sail of 
 the line and 7 or 8 frigates, will put all the British islands under contribution, take all 
 the prizes possible, presenting itself before every roadstead, arrive before St. Domin:,'o, 
 put ashore there 1,000 or 1,200 men, arms and ammunition according to requirement, 
 carry out its return to Ferrol, raise the blockade of our 5 sail of the line, and with 
 20 sail of line proceed to Rochefort. 
 
 It appears to me that all is ready for these expeditions. To the squadron at Toulon, 
 to the expedition to Surinam and to the squadron at Rochefort, there should be added 
 a certain number of brigs and small vessels, as much for tho service of the expeditions 
 as to be left at Martinique and Surinam. Thus, supposing the expeditions should be 
 able to start during Brumaire (October 22nd to November 20th), it may be hoped that 
 before Germinal (March 20th to April 19Lh) our fleet may effect its return to 
 Rochefort. 
 
 Admiral Villcneuve will command the expedition to Surinam ; Rear- Admiral 
 Missiessy will command that to Martinique ; choose a good rear-admiral to command 
 that to St. Helena 
 
 The English will find themselves attacked simultaneously in Asia,* Africa, and 
 America; and accustomed as they are for so long to feel none of the effects of war, 
 these succesive shocks at their various centres of commerce will make them experience 
 the evidence of their weakness f 
 
 I have made you acquainted with the manner in which I regard my three expe- 
 ditions — Surinam, Demarara, Esquibo, St. Helena, and Dominica. In this dispatch I give 
 you my views on Ireland. One of the six transports must be withdrawn and replaced 
 by the armed store-ships La Fense'e or La Romaine ; the Ocean must be completed by 
 working, if necessary, by torchlight. I think it is the only way of being able to carry 
 18,000 men, of which 3,000 are cavalry, artillery, engineers, and non-combatants, and 
 15,000 infantry ; 500 horses, of which 200 are for the cavalry, 200 for the artillery, 
 and 100 for the staff. Less than this would not form a corps d'armee. 
 
 The place of landing which you indicate, appears to me the most convenient. The 
 north of the Bay of Lou::h Swilly is, in my view, the most advantageous point. We 
 must quit Brest, pass round Ireland, out of sight of the coast, and make it again as a 
 ship coming from Newfoundland would. In speaking thus, I speak politically, not 
 nautically, for the currents must decide the point at which the land is to be attacked. 
 Politically, it would be better to threaten [.s'eayjosc?-] to attack Scotland than to attack 
 farther south. This plan will disconcert the enemy. Thirty-six hours after anchoring 
 they must put to sea again, leaving the brigs and all the transports. ... On all these 
 matters I am in accord with you ; but the landing in Ireland is only a preliminary act. 
 If it were an operation by itself alone, we should run great risks. The squadron 
 should then, after strengthening itself with all the good seamen in the six transports, 
 enter the Channel and appear before Cherbourg, there to receive information as to the 
 pituation of the ships before Boulogne, and cover \_favoriser'\ the passage of the flotilla. 
 If, on arrival at Boiilogne, the winds should be unfavourable for several daj's and 
 oblige the squadron to pass the Straits, it should proceed to the Tesel. There it would 
 iind 7 Dutch sail of the line with 27,000 men embarked ; it should take them under 
 its escort, and convey them to Ireland. 
 
 One of these two operations ought to succeed, and then, whether I have 30,000 or 
 40,000 men in Ireland, or whether I am both in England and Ireland, the success of the 
 war IS with us. 
 
 * Alluding to the operations of Admiral Linois. 
 t Precis des Evenemens Militaires, vol. xi., p. 205. 
 
178 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 When tho squadron shall have left Brest, Lord Cornwalli3 -will go to watch for it in 
 Ireland. When ho knows of the landing in the north, he will return to await the 
 squadron at Brest. Wo must not return thither. If, in leaving Ireland, our fleet 
 should find the wind favourable, it might double Scotland, and so present itself at the 
 Texcl. When it leaves Brest, the 120,000 men will be embarked at Boulogne, and the 
 25,000 in the Texel. They should remain embarked during the whole period of 
 the expedition to Ireland. 
 
 It is in this way that I look on the expedition to Ireland. Thus I approve the whole 
 of the first part of the project up to the landing in Ireland. I shall await the report 
 which I have asked you for, to come to a decision on the laying up of the other parts 
 of the flotilla. 
 
 The second part of the project should be the subject of your consideration, and that 
 of the Admiral. 
 
 I think that the starting of the expedition from Toulon, and of the expedition from 
 Rochefort, should precede the departure of that for Ireland ; for the escajie of these 
 20 ships will oblige them (the English) to dispatch more than 30. The departure of 
 10,000 or 12,000 men, which they will well know to have gone, will oblige them to 
 send troops to the most important points. If things turn out according to our wishes, 
 I desire that the Toulon fleet should put to sea on October 12th ; that of Rochefort 
 before November 1st ; and that of Brest before November 21st.* 
 
 In these two despatches of Napoleon, written on the same day, 
 we have a second set of plans, in which on the one side the ex- 
 peditions to the West Indies have their objective there, and 
 apparently little or no connection with the invasion project, which 
 is made to hang upon the success of a considerable landing in 
 the north of Ireland. f But shining through both schemes there 
 is the principle of an endeavour to occupy the attention of the 
 British in distant quarters, so that a comparatively small naval 
 force will suffice to command the Channel for a time long enough 
 to permit the flotilla to cross. 
 
 We have seen that the July plan, under which the Toulon 
 fleet was directly to act as cover to the flotilla, has wholly dis- 
 appeared. We must now note that the Irish plan of September, 
 above sketched, was also given up, possibly in view of the ap- 
 proaching Spanish alliance, possibly because it was found not 
 so easy for the Brest fleet to get to sea unwatched, as it had been 
 supposed. 
 
 A convention was agreed to on the 4th of January 1805 be- 
 tween the Emperor and the King of Spain, in which the former 
 set out the forces under his hand as follows : — 
 
 In the Texel, 30,000 men, with the necessary war-ships and 
 transports. 
 
 ♦ Napoleon to Decrcs, September 20th, 180i. Precis des Evenemens Militaires 
 vol. xi., p. 212. 
 
 t James (Naval Bistort/, vol. iii., p. 213) assumes that Napoleon intended that 
 Villeneuve, after his return to Rochefort, should join the Brest fleet so as together to 
 cover the invasion. I cannot find any grounds for such an assumption. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 179 
 
 At Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, a flotilla and 
 transport suitable to 120,000 men and 25,000 horses. 
 
 At Brest, a fleet of 21 sail of the line, several frigates and 
 transports, prepared to embark 25,000 men in camp at Brest. 
 
 At Piochefort, 6 sail of the line and 4 frigates, anchored in Aix 
 Eoads, and having on board 4,000 troops. 
 
 At Toulon, 11 sail of the line, 8 frigates, and transports, having 
 on board 9,000 troops. 
 
 Spain was asked to provide :— 
 
 At Ferrol, 8 sail of the line, or 7 at least, and 4 frigates, de- 
 signed to combine their operations with the 5 French sail of the 
 line and 2 frigates which were then in that port ; 2,000 infantry, 
 and 200 artillery, with 10 guns, were to be assembled, and the 
 whole were to be ready for sea on the 20th of March, or, at 
 latest, by the 30th of March. 
 
 At Cadiz, 15 sail of the line, or at least 12, were to be pre- 
 pared ready to sail on March 30th, with 2,000 infantry, 100 
 artillery, and 400 cavalry, without their horses. 
 
 At Cartagena, 6 sail of the line were to be ready by the same 
 date. 
 
 The Spanish ambassador, while signing the convention, was of 
 opinion that though the ships could be got ready by the time 
 named, they would neither be manned nor provisioned so soon. 
 
 Villeneuve's instructions were now modified to admit of his 
 being joined by the Spanish ships at Cadiz, and also, as it 
 appears, in abandoning the St. Helena expedition. Otherwise, the 
 views of the Emperor, as expressed in his dispatch of 29th Sep- 
 tember 1804, regarding the Toulon and Piochefort squadrons, 
 remained in force. The destination of the Brest squadron, now 
 under Vice-Admiral Ganteaume, was however altered, and Ville- 
 neuve was to expect to meet it in the West Indies.* 
 
 * James has not noticed this. But it is clear from several of the Emperor's 
 dispatches. On the 21st April 1805, he wrote to Decres : " The non-departure of 
 Ganteaume troubles me much." On the 23rd of April he says he has sent a courier 
 to Brest, to inform Ganteaume that Nelson had gone to seek Villeneuye in Egypt, and 
 he says : " Pray God that my courier may not find him at Brest I " On the same day, 
 having heard that Ganteaume had not yet sailed, he expresses his impatience, and 
 recommends sending out a succession of advice brigs and schooners to keep Villeneuve 
 informed, and to recommend him "to do all the harm he can to the enemy, pending the 
 arrival of General Ganteaume. . . . You perceive that the squadron of Admiral 
 Ganteaume arriving, the force will be augmented by more than 2,000 men, which will 
 keep me master in all those countries." It was only when the impossibility of Gan- 
 teaume's avoidance of Cornwallis became manifest that the plan was changed, and that 
 Villeneuve was to relieve him bj' raising the blockade. On Jlay 8tb, Napoleon settled 
 
180 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The first moves under these conditions were made in January. 
 Villeneuve at Toulon, with his 11 sail of the line and his (3,500 
 troops, taking advantage of Nelson's absence at the Madalena 
 Islands,* put to sea on the 17th of the month. Missiessy, 
 evading the blockading squadron of Sir Thomas Graves, got away 
 with his 5 sail of the line and his 3,400 troops eight days later, 
 and made straight for Martinique, in the West Indies. He ravaged 
 the British West India Islands with ease and impunity, and loaded 
 himself with their spoils. f 
 
 But early in March, at Martinique, he got a piece of news which 
 told him that Villeneuve's move had miscarried ; and also orders 
 to return to Europe. He made sail there and then, and, being 
 the luckiest of all the French admirals, voyaged home as he had 
 voyaged out, without the least check or impediment, and anchored 
 in Aix Eoads on the 20th of May. 
 
 But his move had been an absolutely useless one, so far as the 
 general current of the game went. He had taken a pawn and 
 returned to his own square. Allemand succeeded him in the 
 command, and thenceforward tliat squadron had no influence on 
 events. 
 
 Ganteaume, with his 21 sail of the line and his 3,500 troops, 
 made more than one attempt to get away from Brest, but the 
 British, being augmented to an equal or even superior force to his 
 own, and he himself being under necessarily positive orders not 
 to get into action, he never made a real move, but lay blocked on 
 his own square from the first to the last. 
 
 The interest of the game at once centres on the false move 
 which Villeneuve made from Toulon on the 17th of January, and 
 it must be told how it came to be false. 
 
 Nelson had a horror of the Gulf of Lyons and the coasts about 
 Toulon. He knew no spot so subject to gales of wind, and was in 
 a constant dread of being caught with disabled ships by the enemy 
 issuing from Toulon. Discovery had been made of an excellent 
 anchorage, thereupon named Agincourt Eoad, sheltered by the 
 Madalena Islands. The Road was not 200 miles from Toulon, and 
 there Nelson, on the 11th of January, had retired to refit and pro- 
 vision, leaving a couple of frigates to look out on Toulon. On the 
 
 that if Ganteaume could not get out before the 20th of May he -was not to attempt to 
 move, but to wait for the appearance of Villeneuve. — See Precis cles Eveiiemens 
 Militaires, vol. si. Pieces Justijicatives, passim. 
 
 * A group forming part of the southern shore of the Straits of Bonifacio. 
 
 ■)• 100,000 fr. from Roseau (Charlotte-town), 192,000 fr. from St. Kitts, 89,000 fr. 
 from Monscrat. Troude, vol. iii,, p. .3.'j4. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 181 
 
 19tli, one of these frigates ran off Madalcna, and reported, by 
 signal, that Villeneuve was at sea. The British fleet was under 
 way in a couple of hours after the receipt of the signal, and 
 running down the east coast of Sardinia. 
 
 No one on the English side had yet fathomed Napoleon's plans. 
 Nelson's mind was full of his old trials and difficulties — Naples, 
 Sicily, and Egypt ; these were, with him, the only places to which 
 the enemy could be bound, and though he did not entirely ex- 
 clude from his mind the possibility that Villeneuve meant to pass 
 out of the Mediterranean, he did not give that possibility its full 
 weight.* 
 
 It blew a furious south-westerly gale on the 20th of January, 
 so that, though the ships were sheltered by a weather shore, they 
 were under storm sails. I am not clear how it was that this cir- 
 cumstance, combined with others, did not put Nelson's mind into 
 the right channel, and so save him a weary and heart-breaking 
 journey. The gale ceased and the wind shifted, but Nelson was 
 still off the south end of Sardinia, dispatching his limited numbers 
 of frigates in all directions in search of intelligence. But there 
 was none until the 26th, and then word was brought that on the 
 19th one of Villeneuve' s line-of-battle ships, with her topmasts 
 gone, had been seen making for shelter off the west coast of 
 Corsica. The inference to be drawn from this piece of news was 
 not drawn, and Nelson steered for Stromboli, off which island he 
 spent a wakeful night on the 28th, watching its fires of unusual 
 brilliancy. Still persuaded that history was repeating itself in 
 his case, and being assured of the safety of Naples, he passed on 
 to Palernio and Messina. Then, admitting the possibility of an 
 alternative, and finding no evidence beyond a total absence of 
 intelligence, he stood over to the Morea, and afterwards saw the 
 land of Egypt on the 4th of February. 
 
 He now found himself utterly wrong. Not in Egypt, not in 
 any part of the Eastern Mediterranean was the prey he was sigh- 
 ing for. This was worse than the first visit to Egypt, for he had 
 pushed on there this time without a shred of real evidence to guide 
 him. No one had seen or heard of the French fleet east of Sar- 
 dinia, and it was now certain that it had never been in that 
 direction at all. There was nothing for it but to retrace his steps, 
 with all the speed possible. At Malta, on the 19th of February, 
 Nelson learnt that Villeneuve, having put to sea on the 17th of 
 
 * Napoleon's prescience of Nelson's views and probable proceedings, mentioned on a 
 previous page, is a striking illu=itration of his genius. 
 
182 NAVAL WABFAUE. 
 
 January, had passed but a very little way to the southward when 
 he was met by the furious south-westerly gale which Nelson had 
 felt off the east coast of Sardinia, and had been driven back into 
 Toulon, where he had anchored on the 20th. 
 
 Nelson's return journey was pursued, and on the 27th of 
 February he anchored at Cagliari to water his fleet. On the 
 12th of March he was off Toulon again, making sure that the 
 enemy was actually in port. A few days later he detached a 
 single line-of-battle ship to Barcelona, to give colour to a report 
 that he was off the Spanish coast, while he himself turned to the 
 south-eastward to Palmas Bay, in the south of Sardinia, where the 
 victuallers and store ships had been ordered to assemble to supply 
 the wants of the exhausted ^^uadron. 
 
 There, or in a neighbouring anchorage, the British lay from the 
 27th of March till the 3rd of April. They then weighed and stood 
 to the southward. The next day, when the squadron had made 
 but very little way, the wind shifted to the N.N.W., and very soon 
 one of the frigates which had been left to watch Toulon, the 
 Pha'be, hove in sight with the signal ilying that the enemy was 
 again at sea. Nelson, still full of Sardinia, Naples, and Egypt, 
 hove to midway between Sardinia and the African coast for the 
 night, spreading his look-out ships north and south, t-o prevent 
 the French passing to the eastward without his knowing it. The 
 other frigate available, the Active, had been left by the Phoshe to 
 follow up the French and bring word of their movements. She 
 missed them on the night of the 31st of March. They v/ere then 
 sixty miles only from Toulon, steering S.S.W. for Minorca. This 
 news had no effect on Nelson's pre-conceptions. He was back at 
 Palermo on the 10th of April, but the absence of intelligence theie 
 at length awoktj him to the possibility that the design of the 
 French had ne\er been eastwards at all, and that they might 
 already have passed out of the Mediterranean, have swallowed up 
 Sir John Orde's detachment off Cadiz, and have done whatever 
 mischief it was their intention to do. But the wind now turned 
 and blew from the westward, and then on the 16th of April Nelson 
 received certain intelligence that on the 7th of x\pril the French 
 had been seen off Cape de Gata, steering towards the Straits of 
 Gibraltar. 
 
 On the 18th Nelson made up his mind to follow the French fleet, 
 wherever it had gone to. He now learnt that Villenzuve had 
 actually passed the Straits on the 8th ; but, owing to the per- 
 sistent foul wind, the British did not see Gibraltar until the 30th, 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 183 
 
 and it -was not till the 4th of May that they were able to anchor 
 at the usual watering-place, Tetuan, on the African coast, to fill 
 up with that necessary. A change of wind next day brought out 
 all Nelson's eagerness, and with ships unsupplied he made sail 
 for Lagos Bay, where it was expected to meet victuallers and 
 store ships. That anchorage was reached on the 10th of May, 
 and there Nelson learnt that Yilleneuve's destination was certainly 
 the West Indies. Nelson, remarking that " Salt beef and the 
 French fleet was preferable to roast beef and champagne without 
 them,'"* started after the enemy for Barbados on the 11th of 
 May. 
 
 I may now usefally bring together chronologically the move- 
 ments of this duel, up to the time of Yilleneuve's arrival in the 
 West Indies. 
 
 March 29th. — Villeneuve sails from Toulon.'^ Nelson is at 
 anchor in Palmas Bay. 
 
 March dlst. — The Phcehe and Active see the French fleet thirty- 
 five miles south of Toulon; they follow it, steering S.S.W. till 
 sunset, when the Phcehe leaves the Active to follow up the French, 
 and herself makes for Palmas Bay to report to Nelson. Nelson 
 still at Palmas Bay. 
 
 Ajpril 1st. — The Active having steered S.W. during the night, 
 finds herself alone in the morning, and makes sail after Nelson. 
 Villeneuve having been under the impression — created by Nelson's 
 ruse of sending a ship off Barcelona— that he was off the Spanish 
 Coast, now learns that he was off the south end of Sardinia on 
 the 27th of March ; he thereupon alters his course so as to pass 
 inside of the Balearic Islands. Nelson moves from Palmas Bay to 
 Pula for water. 
 
 April 3rd. — Nelson puts to sea with the intention of proceeding 
 to Toulon. Villeneuve is steering for Cartagena. 
 
 Ajjril Ath. — Nelson is off the south end of Sardinia ; the wind 
 has shifted to N.N.W., and the Phcehe makes her report. Nelson 
 spreads his ships between the south point of Sardinia and the 
 coast of Africa. 
 
 April 6th. — Villeneuve arrives off Cartagena ; offers to escort 
 the six Spanish sail there to Cadiz ; the Spaniards decline. 
 Nelson still watching between Sardinia and Africa. 
 
 Ajml 1th. — "Villeneuve, with a fresh easterly breeze, starts for 
 the Straits of Gibraltar. Nelson makes for Palermo. 
 
 * Troude says 30th; and that the troops carried were reduced to 3,350 men. Vol. iii., 
 D. 310. 
 
18 i NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 April 8tJi. — Yilleneuve passes through the Straits, and anchors 
 at Cadiz. Nelson on his way to Palermo. 
 
 Ajvil 9th. — Yilleneuve sails from Cadiz with 12 French and 5 
 Spanish sail of the line, leaving a sixth Spanish line-of-battle- 
 ship, which had been on shore, to follow. Nelson still on his way 
 to Palermo. 
 
 Ajyril 10th. — Yilleneuve at sea, on his way to Martinique. 
 Nelson off Palermo, with no news. 
 
 Ajjril l(jth. — Yilleneuve at sea. Nelson, beating to the westward 
 round the south point of Sardinia, gets news that the French had 
 passed the Straits on the 8th. 
 
 May 4th. — Yilleneuve within nine days' sail of Martinique. 
 Nelson anchors in Mazarri Bay, Tetuan. 
 
 May 5th. — Yilleneuve within eight days' sail of Martinique. 
 Nelson sails from Mazarri Bay, with no more news. 
 
 May 10//i.— Yilleneuve within three days' sail of Martinique. 
 Nelson anchors in Lagos Bay. 
 
 May 12th. — Yilleneuve within a day's sail of Martinique. Nel- 
 son sails from Lagos Bay for Barbados. 
 
 May 13lh. — Yilleneuve arrives at Martinique. Nelson is within 
 two days' sail of Madeira. 
 
 Nelson was in sight of Madeira on the 15th of May. The fleet 
 had been going 10 knots, and he thought they had been very 
 fortunate since quitting Cape St. Yincent, and would be in time to 
 secure Jamaica, which he considered the objective of the French. 
 Others thought of Surinam and Trinidad ; but no one had any 
 conception of the great strategic plan which was formulated, or 
 the least idea that Nelson might be doing that which more than 
 anything else tended, on the face of things, to further Napoleon's 
 schemes. The points most against the Emperor were Nelson's 
 speed and its moral effect. 
 
 It would appear that Yilleneuve's orders must have been modified 
 between his first and second sailing from Toulon. 
 
 I have re-read [writes the Emperor to Decres on the 30th April] with attention the 
 instructions given to Admiral Yilleneuve. I suppose that he will arrive at Martinique 
 the 15th of this month,* and that then he will leave to proceed to St. Domingo, from 
 thence to the bay of St. lago on June 9th, remain there 20 days, and afterwards go to 
 Cadiz. t If Admiral Mazon sails before the 10th or 15th of May he will take him 
 orders to wait 35 days, and then to proceed by the shortest route to Ferrol. Admiral 
 Mazon will not arrive before the 4th or 'Jth of June, and Admiral Villoneuve would 
 
 * Flordal. That is the 5th of May. 
 
 t I can find no explanation for this curious statement, which seems ''■ontradictory to 
 most of what had gone before and came after. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 185 
 
 hare to wait till the 19th of July, and would not appear before Ferrol until the 18th 
 of August. ... If Admiral Mazon has not yet sailed, you must write to him that in 
 the letter which Admiral Mazon takes it is said that he should remain 35 days ; but it 
 was hoped that Admiral Mazon would have left a fortnight earlier ; that my intention 
 is that he should not stay at Martinique beyond July 4th.* 
 
 On the 8th of May, Napoleon drew up two sets of draft instruc- 
 tions for Villeneuve ; and it is only for the first time in these 
 instructions that the idea of gaining the command of the Channel 
 seems to take that overwhelming position which, if it really 
 occupied the Emperor's mind, was all along its due. 
 
 The direction which you should take after your junction at Ferrol depends on so 
 many different circumstances, that I can only leave it to your experience at sea and 
 your zeal for my service. In fact, many things have come to pass since your departure 
 for Martinique ; the knowledge of the enemy's force which you have drawn to America, 
 the strength of the squadron at Ferrol, and of the enemy's fleet before the port, the 
 condition of your fleet, are so many necessary elements regulating imperiously your 
 ulterior destination. 
 
 The principal end of the whole operation is to give us, for some days, a superiority 
 before Boulogne. Masters of the Straits for four days, 150,000 men embarked in 
 2,000 vessels will entirely complete the expedition. To achieve this great end. 
 immediately after your appearance at Ferrol you will have four courses open to you. 
 
 The first, to proceed to Rochefort, and to join the 5 sail of the line which I have in 
 that roadstead, f I have sent instructions to the Regulus, which is at Lorient, to join 
 you, and thus with 25 French and 15 Spanish sail of the line, to make your junction 
 with the Brest squadron, and then with 60 sail of the line to pass into the Channel. 
 
 The second plan is to pass by the Rochefort squadron, which engages the attention 
 of an equal number of the enemy, and to direct your steps as promptly as possible on 
 Brest to effect your junction with Admiral Ganteaume. 
 
 The third plan would be, after your junction with' the squadron at Ferrol, to pass 
 round Ireland to join with the squadron in the Tesel, seven sail of the line strong, with 
 its convoy, and to proceed before Boulogne. 
 
 The fourth plan appears to be to make for the Lizard, and when 30 leagues off it to 
 take advantage of a westerly wind to run along the coast of England to avoid 
 encountering the squadron which blockades Brest, and to arrive at Boulogne four or 
 five days before it. 
 
 For either of these operations, in taking account of the provisions which you will find 
 on board the French and Spanish ships, and those which you will find at Rochefort, 
 you will be sufHciently provided ; and having long foreseen your expedition, I have 
 caused a great quantity to be prepared at Brest, Cherbourg, and Boulogne. 
 
 If you adopt the plan of forming a junction with the Brest squadron, you should 
 endeavour to do so without fighting ; but if this proves too difficult, arrange to 
 fight as near Brest as possible, and to this end deceive the enemy by false move- 
 ments, should he, on learning your arrival at Ferrol adopt the plan of advancing 
 20 leagues or so to encounter you. If, on the contrary, you adopt the plan of 
 passing round Ireland, you should pass out of sight of the coast, and keep your 
 route as much from the knowledge of the enemy as possible, who will for a time believe 
 
 • Precis des Ev€ne7nens Militairps, vol. xi., p. 237. 
 
 t Nevertheless on the 13th of May, when he believed that this squadron had returned 
 from the West Indies, Napoleon was urgent on Decres to send it back again. Pie'cis 
 des Evenemens Militaires, vol. xi., p. 260. 
 
 13 
 
18G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 you have returned to the Mediterranean, -which report we shall not fail to nso all 
 means to spread. 
 
 Admiral Ganteanme, -with 21 sail of the line provisioned for six months, is anchored 
 outside the Goulet, between Bertheaume andCamaret, under the protection of batteries 
 mounting more than 100 guns. From the moment of your arrival at Ferrol, he will 
 be ready to sail ; he is more ready to do so than from any other position inside tho 
 Goulet. ... i 
 
 If you pass round Ireland, you will go to the Texol. Posilis-e instructions have been 
 sent there, as well as in relation to tho position of the enemy in these waters. 
 
 If by events occurring in America, or in the course of your cruise, you should find 
 yourself in a position which does not permit you to carry out your instructions, and 
 that you might not be able to think of any new operation, you v^ill despatch tho 
 squadron of Admiral Gourdon with three or four of the fastest Spanish ships from 
 Ferrol, to undertake a cruise in conformity with the accompanying instructions : Our 
 intention is that you should raise the blockade of Rochefort, and that j'ou should give 
 the accompanying instructions to Captain AUemand, whose exit j^ou will cover ; and 
 that this being done, you should take my fleet to Cadiz with the Ferrol ships ; that 
 you cover the entry into Cadiz of the squadron from Cartagena ; that you occupy tho 
 Straits ; that you ravage the Roads of Gibraltar, and that you should comjilcte thero 
 with provisions,* 
 
 I do not know when the text of the instructions, according to 
 this draft, reached Villeneuve. It is possible that the orders may 
 have gone out by the Didon frigate, which out-sailed Mazon's 
 squadron, and was with Villeneuve at Martinique before the 4th of 
 June. Otherwise it does not appear that he could have received 
 them before his arrival at Vigo. That he had them at some time 
 seems clear, from an observation in his letter of explanation after 
 bearing up for Cadiz. 
 
 I proceed now to complete the narrative. 
 
 On the 29th of May, being within a week's sail of Barbados, 
 Nelson detached a frigate to warn Admiral Cochrane, supposed to 
 be with 6 sail of the line at Barbados, of his approach. On the 
 3rd of June he heard for certain of Villeneuve's arrival at Mar- 
 tinique, and the next day he anchored at Carlisle Bay, Barbados. 
 Here he found Cochrane, but with only 2 sail of the line, the 
 remaining 4 having been detained at Jamaica by Admiral Dacres. 
 There was not a doubt in the minds of the authorities but that tho 
 French had gone south to attack Tobago and Trinidad. And 
 when the general in command offered to embark himself, with 
 2,000 troops, to frustrate the French design. Nelson, though with 
 much hesitation, accepted the offer. 
 
 The squadron, now of 12 sail of the line, sailed from Barbados 
 for Trinidad on the 5th of June, and on the 7th arrived at the 
 Gulf of Paria, only to learn that the French were not there, and 
 
 • Ftecis lies Ecciicmcns Il_lU^'l(ii,cSf vol. xi., p. 230. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 187 
 
 that there were no tidings of them. Instantly the steps were 
 retraced. On the 9th Nelson, off Grenada, learnt that the 
 enemy had passed Dominique on the 6th, and was steering north. 
 
 Following north, the British admiral was at Antigua on the 
 12th. He disembarked the troops there, and passed a moment in 
 debate as to what was to be done. First, he must not quit the 
 West Indies until he was certain the French had left ; secondly, 
 this meant inaction, and waiting for intelligence which was 
 generally wrong, and had already proved to be the ruin of his 
 hopes ; thirdly, were there not good grounds for supposing that 
 Villeneuve had already turned homewards ? A frigate from France 
 had certainly communicated with Villeneuve on the 31st May, and 
 from that moment all had been hurry. Nelson believed that the 
 Fiiret had informed Villeneuve of his being on passage after him."^ 
 If Barbados was the point of attack, why had it not been made 
 long ago ? If Tobago or Trinidad had been the objects, these two 
 might have been approached before this, and neither to reach 
 Ihcm nor St. Lucia, St. Vincent, or Grenada, was it necessary to 
 stand to the northward in the first instance. If any of the 
 i.?lands were in view, the game the French fleet was playing was 
 incomprehensible. t What impression could they hope to make on 
 Jamaica with only 4,000 or 5,000 men ? But if they did mean 
 Jamaica, what was to prevent their steering' thither direct from 
 Martinique ? Some thought they might be going to Porto Pdco to 
 wait for reinforcements ; but the season was past, and if 15 sail of 
 the line were coming out to join them, there would be no need to 
 hide themselves. 
 
 The admiral's opinion was as firm as a rock that some cause, 
 orders, or inability to perform any service in these seas, had made 
 them resolve to proceed direct to Europe, sending the Spanish 
 ships to the Havannah.l 
 
 But, fourthly, if they were not then on their way home, they 
 certainly would be presently, if they believed that Nelson was still 
 
 • The Diclon -was the frigate spoken of. She mot Villeneuve at Fort Royal, Mar- 
 tinique. Villeneuve seems to have first learnt the arrival of Nelson from prisoners 
 taken out of the sugar ships captured on the Sth of June near Antigua. 
 
 t Troude leaves it partly incomprehensible, as he makes Villeneuve take on board 
 700 troops at Martinique, and 600 at Guadaloupe, and still proceed north to Antigua, 
 with the intention of attacking Barbados. Vol. iii., p. 346. 
 
 X I have given Nelson's reasoning almost verbatim. It all seems conclusive enough, 
 except the answer to the Porto Rico prohability. There must, I think, have been some 
 decisive matter in the news received at 8 p.bi. on the 12th of June, and which he 
 gave to Captain Bettesworth to take to tne Admiralty. j 
 
 I 
 
 'l8* 
 
188 NAVAL IVARFABE. 
 
 in the West Indies ; and it might be a month before his departure 
 would be known. 
 
 Good or bad, Nelson's reasoning generally concluded in favour 
 of action. He sent Bettesworth in the Curieux to the Admiralty, to 
 inform them of what he believed, and what his intentions were.* 
 He quitted Antigua finally on the 13th of June, taking one of 
 Cochrane's ships with him, and thus bringing his force up to 11 
 sail of the line. He made straight for Cape St. Vincent, and was 
 in sight of it on the 17th of July. 
 
 Villeneuve, meanwhile, as we. know, had arrived at Martinique 
 on the 13th of May, 21 days before Nelson arrived at Barbados. 
 He lay there till the very day of Nelson arrived at Barbados, when 
 having embarked a number of troops, he put to sea with the com- 
 bined fleet. 
 
 It is not easy to say exactly what he intended to do, or why he 
 had spent so long a time inactive — except for the capture of the 
 Diamond Eock by a detachment — in the harbour of Fort Eoyal. 
 The English accounts are silent as to his intentions. The French 
 account, which I generally follow, says distinctly that an attack on 
 Barbados was intended, in consequence of the certainty that neither 
 Ganteaume nor Missiessy could join him at Martinique. But why 
 should he then have stood away to the northward ? However this 
 may be, he did actually stand away east of Monserat and west of 
 Antigua. On the 8th of June he captured a valuable fleet of sugar- 
 laden ships off Antigua, and from them he learnt that 14 sail of 
 the line had arrived at Barbados. This arrival, in the French 
 Admiral's opinion, made it impossible to think of an attack either 
 on Barbados or on any other British possessions in the West 
 Indies. To return to Martinique, in order to wait the specified 
 time for the arrival of the squadrons from Europe, seemed likely to 
 
 * Brenton, in his Life of St. Vincent, has an anecdote of Nelson, the point of 
 which rests on the assumed fact that Bettesworth disobeyed his orders in going to 
 Enghind. Nelson's memo, of June 12th, 8 p.m., is conclusive against the fact and the 
 storv- 
 
 Explanation of Pi.atk 
 
 1. — Villeneuve leaving Martinique, June 4. 
 '_>.- Nelson arriving at Barbados, same 
 
 date. 
 .". — Villeneuve, June 7 
 'I. — Nelson, same date. 
 'j. — Villeneuve, June 8. 
 
 7. — Villeneuve, June 9. 
 
 8. — Nelson, same date. 
 
 9. — Villeneuve steering for Western 
 
 Islands, June 10. 
 10. — Nelson, same date. 
 11 — Nelson sailing for Capo St. Vincent, 
 
 <>. — Nelson, .same date I Juno 13. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 189 
 
 produce no other result than to increase the number of sick on 
 board, which was already considerable.* 
 
 His resolution was taken immediately. He put the whole of the 
 West Indian troops into four frigates, with orders to land them at 
 Guadaloupe. He sent two more frigates to convoy the prize sugar 
 ships to the nearest port, and directed the whole six to rejoin him 
 at a rendezvous 60 miles N.E. of CorvOj in the Azores. He then 
 made sail for that rendezvous himself. 
 
 The condition of things in Europe was now this : Ganteaiime, 
 with his 21 sail of the line and his troops, had been trying all these 
 months to get away, but being too closely watched by Cornwallis 
 with 18 or 20 sail had been unable to do so, and was still in the 
 Eoads of Brest. 
 
 Missiessy, with his squadron, it will be remembered, had returned 
 from the West Indies, and had got safe into Eochefort on the 20th of 
 May. There he found orders waiting him which might have been 
 put in force had he returned earlier. They were to the effect that 
 if he could get away by the 15th of May, he was to return to the 
 West Indies and join Villeneuve. If, however, the latter had left, 
 he was to follow him direct to Ferrol, and to put into port there if 
 Villeneuve was not met. If Ferrol was blockaded, this would pre- 
 suppose the non-arrival of Villeneuve, and Missiessy was to cruise 
 in the offing for a sufficient time to allow for Villeneuve's arrival, 
 and to return to Eochefort if he failed to appear.t 
 
 The late arrival of Missiessy, and the extensive repairs which his 
 ships required, prevented his being soon ready for sea, and fresh 
 instructions were issued to him. 
 
 He was now directed to make a demonstration on the coast of 
 Ireland, in order to distract the attention of the British, and to 
 cause them to detach forces to that coast. He was, however, to 
 keep away from the coast until the 4th to the 9th of July, burning 
 or sinking every neutral or enemy's ship which might otherwise 
 give note of his whereabouts. Between those dates he was to 
 appear off the Shannon and Cape Clear, then to disappear again at 
 sea, and finally to rendezvous 120 miles west of Ferrol from the 
 29th of July to the 3rd of August pending the arrival of Vice- 
 Admiral Villeneuve, under whose orders he was then to place him- 
 self. If this meeting did not take place before the 13th of August, 
 Missiessy was to proceed to Vigo. If, however, Ferrol was found 
 
 • Villeneuve thought that with Oochrane's ships there would be 16 against him ; the 
 number, as we have seen, was exaggerated. — Xfoude, vol. iii., p. 34(j. 
 t Troude, vol. iii., p. a34. 
 
190 NAVAL WARFABE. 
 
 to bo not blockaded when Missiessy appeared off it, he ^Yas to take 
 the division formed there under his orders, and remain at a con- 
 venient rendezvous near at hand.* 
 
 On the 2Gth of June, the health of Missiessy had so broken down 
 as to make it necessary that he should resign his command to 
 Commodore Allemand. 
 
 This officer, with his 5 sail of the line, was now blockaded at 
 Piochefort by Eear-Admiral Stirling with an equal force. 
 
 In Ferrol were still the Franco-Spanish squadron of 10 sail of 
 the line, but now increased to 14 sail, and these ships were watched 
 by Vice-Admiral Sir Eobert Calder, with only 10 sail of the 
 line. 
 
 It is easy to see how portentous to the issue of the war Ville- 
 neuve's return across the Atlantic in June 1805 actually was. 
 Before the 11th of July, the only thing known to Cornwallis and 
 his outlying squadrons was that Villeneuve had actually arrived at 
 Martinique about two months before, and that Nelson was on his 
 way after him ; but what was about to happen, and when Ville- 
 neuve would appear in European waters, was entirely hidden from 
 knowledge. Only it was, on the face of things, probable that 
 Nelson's arrival in the West Indies would drive Villeneuve home 
 again. 
 
 But if Villeneuve reached Ferrol at the head of 18 or 20 sail of 
 the line, what could Calder do, except retire ? Such retirement 
 would release the Ferrol ships, and Villcneuve's fleet would be 
 augmented to 34 sail of the line. There was then nothing to 
 prevent him from appearing off Eochefort, driving Stirling away, 
 and augmenting his fleet to 39 sail of the line by the addition of 
 Allemand's squadron. 
 
 Cornwallis, oft' Brest, would only have some 28 sail of the line 
 under his command when Calder and Stirling had fallen back 
 and joined him. Would it be possible for him to face Villeneuve's 
 89 sail of the line, when Ganteaume was pressing out of Brest with 
 21 sail of the line behind him ? It would have been a desperate 
 venture, but, short of power to beat both fleets in succession, there 
 was nothing to prevent Villeneuve's sailing leisurely up the 
 Channel from Ushant at the head of his 60 sail of the line, and 
 covering the passage of Napoleon's vast array to the shores of 
 Kent and Sussex. 
 
 Such speed had been made by Bettesworth in the Curieux, that 
 Cornwallis got news of Villeneuve's being on his way home, an4 
 
 * Troudo, vol. iii., p o^'J. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA, 191 
 
 Admiralty orders tlicrcupon, on the 11th of July, five days before 
 Nelson reached Cape St. Vmcent. 
 
 In obedience to the order, he sent to Admiral Stirling to raise 
 the blockade of Rochefort, and to join Calder off Ferrol. 
 
 Calder, with his force thus augmented to 15 sail of the line, was 
 ordered to take his post 100 miles west of Ferrol, and to wait for 
 Yilleneuve, who was supposed to have not more than 16 sail with 
 him, whereas, as we have seen, he was at the head of 20 sail of the 
 line. Calder was on this station when Nelson arrived at Cape St. 
 Vincent. 
 
 It will be well here to repeat the former process of assembling 
 together the contemporary events, in order to get a clearer view of 
 what was actually taking place. 
 
 June 4:th, 1805. — Yilleneuve sails from Fort Eoyal, Martinique, 
 with 20 sail of the line. Nelson arrives at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 
 and is joined by 2 sail of the line, making 12 in all. 
 
 June 5th. — Yilleneuve on his way to Antigua. Nelson sails for 
 Trinidad. 
 
 June 7th. — Yilleneuve to the eastward of Antigua. Nelson 
 arrives at Paria Bay, Trinidad ; finds he has been misled, and turns 
 his head north. 
 
 June Sth. — Yilleneuve passing round the north part of Antigua, 
 hears of the Sugar Convoy to theN.N.E.; chases and captures 
 15 sugar ships valued at 500,000 francs ; hears also of Nelson's 
 arrival at Barbados, and supposes him to have 16 sail under his 
 command. Nelson is approaching Grenada. 
 
 June 9th. — Yilleneuve, north of Antigua, puts the West Indian 
 troops into six frigates to be landed at Guadaloupe. Nelson, off 
 Grenada, learns that Yilleneuve was seen to pass Dominica on 
 the Gth. 
 
 June 10th. — Yilleneuve sails for the rendezvous off the Western 
 Islands. Nelson is steering north for Antigua. 
 
 June 12th. — Yilleneuve is at sea on his way home. Nelson, at 
 Antigua, disembarks his troops ; receives important intelligence at 
 8 P.M. ; despatches Bettesworth in the Curieux to the Admiralty, 
 and sails, on 13th, with 11 line-of-battle ships for Cape St. 
 Yincent. 
 
 Jane SOth. — Yilleneuve, at the rendezvous off Corvo, is joined by 
 his frigates. Nelson is at sea on his way home. 
 
 Juhj 3rd. — Yilleneuve re-captures a Spanish galleon valued at 
 15,000,000 francs, which had been taken by the British priva,teQi' 
 Mars. Nelson still at sea. 
 
ilj2 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 July nth. — Villeneuve within five days' sail of Calder's rendez- 
 vous. Nelson arrives off Cape St. Vincent. 
 
 Nelson had now been chasing and continually missing Villeneuve 
 for three months and thirteen days. His last run after him had 
 covered more than 7,000 miles of sea, at the rate of 93 miles a day. 
 There was now the choice before bim of going east to Cadiz, or 
 north to Ferrol, and under the spell of ill-fortune which ever 
 pursued him he chose the former route. Collingwood was watching 
 Cadiz, but Nelson did not now meet with him ; they only corre- 
 sponded on the state of affairs, while Nelson put first into Gibraltar 
 for stores and refitting, and then into Tetuan for water. He 
 finally weighed from this latter place, with the intention of going 
 north, on the 24th of July. 
 
 Collingwood had been writing to Nelson, putting to him the 
 dangers of the position, and the probable plans of Napoleon. 
 He penetrated parts of the Emperor's apparent design, but 
 he considered Ireland the main point about to be struck 
 at. Nelson now received a second letter, in which Collingwood 
 said : — 
 
 The flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, -which ia the great 
 impediment to their undertaking. The Rochefort squadron's return confirmed me. I 
 think they will now collect their forces at Ferrol — which Calder tells me are in motion 
 
 pick up those at Rochefort, who, I am told, are equally ready, and will make them 
 
 about 30 sail : and then, without going near Ushant or the Channel fleet, proceed to 
 Ireland, when the Brest fleet — 21, I believe, of them — will sail either to another part 
 of Ireland (.r up the Channel; a sort of force that bus not been seen in those seas 
 perhaps ever. 
 
 On the 25th of July, Nelson saw Collingwood, and talked matters 
 over with him. He learnt then, also, that the Franco- Spanish 
 fleet had actually been seen about half way between the West 
 Indies and the Azores, steering for Europe on the previous 19th of 
 June. 
 
 Nelson stood again to the northward. He was 400 miles 
 west of Lisbon on the 3rd of August. He crossed the Bay of 
 Biscay without intelligence, and without meeting anything worth 
 notice, and then finally jomed the squadron of Cornwallis off 
 Ushant on the 16th. 
 
 Meanwhile, this is what had been happening elsewhere. Calder 
 was, as we have seen, on his rendezvous 100 miles west of Ferrol, 
 with 15 sail of the line, in hourly expectation of seeing an enemy's 
 fleet only larger by one line-of-battle ship than his own. His 
 health was bad. The constant anxiety of his situation was wearing 
 hiui down. But he was able, zealous, and willing. He had been 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. Wd 
 
 captain of the fleet under Jervis on Valentine's Day, and was not a 
 likely man to fail. 
 
 The morning of the 22nd of July was very thick, with a light 
 breeze from W.N.W. Calder's ships were on the starboard tack, 
 standing therefore, no doubt, under very easy sail to the south-west- 
 ward. The Defiance was stationed as a look-out ship nine or ten 
 miles to windward of the main squadron, and between eleven and 
 twelve o'clock in the forenoon, during a momentary lifting of the 
 fog, this ship signalled an enemy's fleet to the south-west. This 
 was Villeneuve's 20 sail ; they were in three columns, steering 
 straight for Ferrol, and nearly straight for the British fleet. 
 
 Calder thereupon formed in line of battle, and Villeneuve did 
 the same ; but the fog was too dense for either fleet to see what 
 was done by the other, or even to count their numbers. As a fact, 
 they were presently in the position of passing one another on 
 opposite tacks, starboard side to starboard side, and as much as 
 seven miles apart. It was not until 3 p.m. or thereabouts, that the 
 Sirius frigate, having been sent to reconnoitre, reported by signal 
 the exact number — 20 — of the enemy's sail of the line. 
 
 Calder thereupon made the signal to " engage the enemy," and 
 immediately afterwards the signal to tack, the object being the 
 natural one to close with the enemy on the same tack with him, 
 but to leeward. It was still too foggy to see what was going on, 
 but when the Hero, which was Calder's leading ship, got a little 
 nearer, she found that the combined fleet itself had tacked, and 
 was standing to the S.W. The Hero immediately tacked, and was 
 followed by the rest of the British ships in succession. So the 
 battle was joined very much in the old way. Both fleets were on 
 the starboard tack, the British to leeward, engaging with their 
 starboard guns, while the combined fleet engaged with their port 
 guns. But what between the fog and the smoke, it was difiicult 
 to say what was happening, or almost what was being fired at. 
 
 In this somewhat confused state, the firing went on as steadily 
 as was possible, till about 8 o'clock, when it was found that two 
 Spanish ships, the San Rafael and the Firine, had struck to the 
 British fleet. 
 
 It was growing dark at half-past 8, and the fleets were drawing 
 rather apart. Calder made the night signal to discontinue the 
 action, but the general state of things was such that the firing did 
 not altogether cease till an hour later. It had lasted altogether 
 about four hours and a half, and it had left the two Spanish prizes 
 in the hands of the British, at a loss of 39 killed and 159 wounded. 
 
191 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 while the comhined fleet had suffered a loss of 476 in killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 Calder's squadron now lay-to all night with their heads to the 
 S. W., repairing damages, and the combined fleet remained in the 
 fcame condition. 
 
 At daylight on the 23rd of July it was almost as foggy as ever ; 
 the two fleets were some 17 miles apart, and each was in more or 
 less disorder. The British were hampered by the presence of the 
 disabled prizes, and also by one of their own ships, the Windsor 
 Castle, which was also disabled. Yet it was so thick that Calder 
 could hardly tell what the situation of his fleet really was, and 
 a movement to close up his ships was taken by Villeneuve to 
 be a sign of weakness, who bore up with an intention, which he 
 did not carry out, of reopening the engagement. Being to wind- 
 ward, Villeneuve always had the opportunity, had he wished it, 
 of bringing on the action again. Calder could certainly make 
 attempts in that way, but only at some disadvantage. 
 
 Villeneuve, however, was from his orders necessarily disinclined 
 for more decisive action. His purposes would have been much better 
 fulfilled had he never seen Calder at all, even if he had beaten him. 
 
 Calder, on his part, had to remember that there were 14 ships 
 from Ferrol, and 5 from Piochefort, which might be close upon 
 him. The combined fleet was still 18 sail strong, while his own, on 
 account of the disabled Windsor Castle, was reduced to 14 sail. 
 The odds were heavy, when 19 additional enemies might be in sight 
 as soon as the fog lifted. 
 
 The two fleets passed out of each other's view on the 24th of 
 July.* Villeneuve made for Vigo, and anchored there on the 
 26th. t Calder conveyed his prizes towards the Channel, then 
 
 * At T) A.M. on the 2r>rd, according to nautical time. 
 
 •)• " In the first moment after the battle, Villeneuve was almost bappy that he had met 
 the English without experiencing a disaster ; but having left the scene of action, and 
 having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened 
 into a profound grief. ... To complete his misfortune, the wind which for two days 
 had been favourable had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers 
 had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary 
 refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or six days. Thus situated, 
 he again wanted to proceed to Cadiz, Lauriston again ojiposed this course ; they split 
 the difference and ran into Vigo." — Thiers' History of the Consulate and the Empire 
 (Anthorizod Translation), vol. v., pp. 236-7. 
 
 Troude, vol. iii., p. 356, makes Villeneuve's decision to rest entirely on the 
 wind, and his anxiety to land his sick and wounded. When the wind set in from the 
 N.E. he steered for Cadiz ; then after six hours, on a change to S.S.W., he made for 
 Ferrol ; then, on a change back to N.E., for Vigo. 
 
 .Jamfls {Naval History, vol. iv., p. 16) dates the arrival at Vigo as given in X\q test, 
 but Tioudc (vol, iii., p. o.jG) makes it the 2Sth. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 195 
 
 steered back for Ferrol, and finding on arrival off the port on the 
 29th of July that Villeneuve had not put in there, he resumed 
 the blockade of it, and awaited orders. 
 
 On the next day, the 30th of July, Villeneuve sailed from Vigo 
 for Ferrol, but now with only 15 sail, having left three behind him 
 at Vigo.* On the 1st of August a strong south-westerly gale 
 sprang up, which drove Calder away to the north-east, and enabled 
 Villeneuve to pass into Ferrol unobserved. And thus, in spite of 
 his mishaps and difficulties, the French admiral again found 
 himself at the head of a fleet (29 sail of the line) so numerically 
 superior to anything he was likely to meet, that had the quality 
 been equal to the quantity, what had passed would have been mere 
 incidental circumstances, in no degree troubling or hindering the 
 main action of the great plan which was now working towards the 
 daioument.f 
 
 Calder had detached Stirling with 4 sail of the line to resume 
 the blockade of Eochefort, and now, when the wind moderated, 
 and he reappeared off Ferrol on the 9th of August, with only 9 
 sail of the line, and found 29 enemy's ships ready to leave port, 
 there was no possible course open to him but to fall back and 
 join Lord Cornwallis off Usliant, which he did on the 14th. 
 
 There was still one thing wanting to complete Villeneuve's 
 arrangements before he proceeded to roll up the blockading fleet 
 at Brest, to set Ganteaume free, and to sweep into the Channel 
 in his company unopposed. When Stirling should get to Eoche- 
 fort, he was sure to find it empty, for Allemand had put to sea 
 
 * The Atlas, French, and the America and Espana, Spanish. They had not suffered 
 much in the action, but were said to be slow sailers, and likely to delay the fleet. 
 They remained as hospital ships to accommodate the 1,200 sick and wounded which 
 were discharged from the combined fleet. Villeneuve was only too glad of any excuse 
 to be quit of the Spanish ships. " They have always," he wrote to Decres, "brought 
 us to the lowest depths of misfortune." — Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 238. 
 
 I It was in this sense that Napoleon affected to write to Villeneuve at Ferrol, 
 endeavouring to encourage him in the belief that all was as it should be (see the letter 
 of August 13th at p. 242, vol. v., Consulate and Empire'). Villeneuve, however, was 
 not to be encouraged. "I am about to sail," he wrote to Decres from Ferrol. . . . 
 '• No doubt it is thought that sailing hence with 29 ships, I am considered able to fight 
 vessels of an5'thing like the same number ; I am not afraid to confess to you that I 
 should be sorry to meet with 20. Our naval tactics are out of date ; we only know 
 how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely wiuit the encmj' wishes for. I 
 have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of 
 the vessels of the two nations. ... I foresaw all this before I left Toulon ; but all my 
 delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are 
 joined to mine . . . then I w?,s obliged to despair of everything. "rTT^CoHSH/afe and 
 Empire, vol. v., p. 2-10. 
 
196 NAVAL VVARFAliE. 
 
 directly after the blockade had been raised nearly a month before. 
 Villeneuve was bound, if he could, to pick up Allemand before he went 
 on, and he seems to have had some idea of doing it off Cape Ortegal.* 
 However this may be, Villeneuve sailed on the 11th of August, and 
 was on the 13th and 14th off Cape Ortegal. The Rochefort 
 squadron was, in fact, then close to him, but not actually seeing 
 him, made for Vigo, and anchored there on the 16th of August. 
 Villeneuve's latest orders from Napoleon had urged him to proceed 
 to Brest, and give battle to the British fleet off that port at all 
 hazards, even at the loss of his own fleet, in order to enable Gan- 
 teaume to put to sea. That was all that was necessary, in the 
 opinion of the Emperor, to allow the 150,000 men in the 2,000 
 vessels lying ready, from Etaples to Cape Grisnez, to cross the 
 Channel. t I must allow the French Admiral to make his own 
 statement in explanation, or justification, of the fact that on the 
 15th of August he bore up and steered for Cadiz. 
 
 I was observed, on the day I quitted Ferrol, and the next morning also, by the 
 frigates and by 2 sail of the line of the enemy, which I chased by the fastest ships in 
 the fleet without being able to approach them. Having found the winds from the N.E. 
 set in, and having stretched to the W.N.W. during the whole of the 14th and 15th 
 without any appearance of change ; having no confidence in the state of the armaments 
 of my ships, or in their speed, or in the precision of their mancBuvres ; the reunion of 
 the forces of the enemy, their knowledge of all my proceedings since my arrival on 
 the coast of Spain, left me no hope of being able to carry out the great object for 
 which the fleet was destined. In struggling longer against foul winds, I should ex- 
 perience irreparable damage and inevitable separations, the Spanish ship San Francisco 
 de Asis having already lost her main topmast. Convinced that the state of affairs was 
 essentially changed since the issue of His Majesty's orders, who, in directing the main 
 part of his naval forces on the Colonies, had for his object to divide those of the enemy 
 
 * Allemand's various orders, as stated, do not correspond with his acts. According 
 to Troude (vol. iii., pp. 335-6), he should have made Ferrol as soon as ho was free to 
 put to sea, and only to cruise if he was prevented from doing so. At Vigo, he found 
 orders from Villeneuve to rendezvous at the Penmarks. James (vol. iv., p. 27) says 
 Allemand did not tiud any instructions at Vigo. 
 
 t Troude, vol. iii., p. 357. 
 
 Explanation of Plate III. 
 
 1.— Nelson, April 6, 1805. 
 2. — Villeneuve, same date. 
 3. — Villeneuve, April 8. 
 4. — Nelson, April 10. 
 5. — Nelson, May 5. 
 G. — Nelson, May 12. 
 7. — Calder's action, June 2^ 
 Nelson again at 5, 
 
 8. — Villeneuve, August 12 (approx.). 
 
 9. — Allemand, same date (approx.). 
 10. — Nelson, same date. 
 11. — Gaidar, same date. 
 12. — Point where Villeneuve bore up, 
 
 August 15th. 
 13. — Nelson same date. 
 14 — Cornwallis and Calder, same date. 
 
r ij ii i JL ILL 
 
 Tn Fnrp. Farte /96 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 197 
 
 liv <li-nwing his attention to his distant possessions, in order to surprise him, and to 
 strike at his heart by their sudden return to Europe and their combined reunion ; that 
 this plan not having succeeded, being, in fact, upset by the time which had elapsed, and 
 by the calculations to which the speed of the squadron had given occasion, the enemy 
 was placed in a position to defend it : and that the junction of his forces, at this moment 
 was greater than under any preceding circumstances, and was such that they might 
 prove superior to the united fleets of Toulon ; seeing, therefore, no chance of success 
 in this state of affairs, and, conformably to my instructions, I determined, on the third 
 day after my departure, on the evening of the loth, being then 80 leagues W.N.W. of 
 Cape Finisterre, to bear up for Cadiz.* 
 
 Let me now, finally, set out the contemporary events side by side, 
 that the flow of the story up to the denoument may be the better 
 comprehended. 
 
 Jiih/ 22nd. — Villeneuve's and Calder's fleets in action west of 
 Ferrol ; Allemand's squadron within a day's sail of the spot. 
 Nelson anchors in Mazarri Bay. 
 
 July Mth. — Villeneuve and Calder lose sight of each other. 
 Nelson sails from Mazarri Bay. 
 
 Jidy 2Qth. — Villeneuve anchors at Vigo. Calder convoying his 
 prizes to the northward. Allemand at sea looking for Villeneuve. 
 Nelson off the coast of Portugal, steering to the northward. 
 
 Jidy 29th. — Villeneuve at Vigo ; Allemand at sea, looking for 
 him. Calder off Ferrol, with 13 sail ; Nelson below the latitude 
 of Lisbon, with 11 sail, steering to the northward. 
 
 August 1st. — Calder driven from Ferrol to the N.E. by a gale of 
 wind. Villeneuve sails from Vigo with 15 sail, and anchors at 
 Corunna ; is now at the head of 29 sail ; Allemand still at sea 
 looking for him. Nelson still south of Lisbon. 
 
 August 9th. — Villeneuve still at Corunna; Allemand still at sea. 
 Calder arriving off Ferrol with 9 sail, finds Villeneuve there, 
 and falls back to join Cornwallis oft' Brest ; Nelson within six days 
 of Ushant. 
 
 August 11th. — Villeneuve quits Corunna with 29 sail; Allemand 
 in the neighbourhood of Cape Ortegal with 5 sail. Nelson within 
 four days of Ushant. 
 
 August ISth. — Villeneuve off Cape Ortegal, standing W.N.W., 
 with 29 sail ; Allemand close to, but not in sight. Nelson, 11 sail, 
 within two days of Ushant ; Calder, 9 sail, within one day's sail 
 of Ushant. 
 
 August 15th. — Villeneuve, being 240 miles W.N.W. of Cape Finis- 
 
 * Troude, vol. iii., p. 360. He says (vol. iii., p. 551) that before leaving the West 
 Indies, Villeneuve received orders which would have justified his going to Cadiz. I 
 am disposed to think, however, that he was relying on the latter part of Napoleon's 
 draft of May 8th, already quoted. 
 
198 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 terrc, with a N.E. wind, bears up for Cadiz ; Allcmand within 
 one day's sail of Vigo. Nelson joins Cornwallis off Brest. 
 
 Avfjust \Qth. — Villeneuve on his way south ; Allemand anchors 
 fit Yigo. Nelson on his way home with only Victory and Superb. 
 
 While these transactions were in progress at sea, Napoleon had 
 been apparently fully persuaded of the ultimate success of his 
 plans, and fully determined to push his army across, so soon as 
 the sails of the combined fleets gfcould appear. He arrived at 
 Boulogne on the 3rd of August reviewed a lino of infantry 
 nine miles long, and. said: •*lne English know not what 
 awaits them. If we have the power of crossing but for twelve 
 hours, England will be no more.""^ He heard of Caldcr's action 
 about the 13th of August, and on that day wrote to Villeneuve 
 the commendatory letter already noticed, in which he said : — 
 
 Tho English are not so numerous as you seem to imagine. They are everywhere in 
 a state of uncertainty and alarm. Should you make your appearance for three days — 
 nay, even for 24 hours — your mission would be fulfilled. Make the moment of your 
 departure known to Admiral Ganteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a 
 f,'rander object did a squadron run such risks. . . , For this great object of forwarding 
 the descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we may all 
 die without regretting the sacrifice of life. . . '. England has in tho Downs only 4 sljips 
 of the line, which we daily harass with our joraams and our flotillas, f 
 
 On the 14th he wrote to Lauriston, who still remained on board 
 Villcncuve's flagship, saying : — 
 
 V.'o are ready everywhere. Your presence in tho Channel for 24 hours will sudloc.J 
 
 On the 22nd of August the courier who had been despatelicd 
 with the news of Villeneuve's having quitted Ferrol, arrived at 
 Boulogne. The Emperor and the Minister of Marine were quar- 
 tered some distance apart, and each received separate letters from 
 Villeneuve's flag-ship. The Emperor heard from Lauriston, 
 expressing full confidence that the fleet was on its way to Brest. 
 The Minister Decres, received a letter from Villeneuve, which gave 
 him strong reason to believe that Villeneuve would never appear 
 at Brest. 
 
 Before he saw Decres, the Emperor wrote to Ganteaume and to 
 Villeneuve, supposing both would be at Brest when his letters 
 reached. To Ganteaume he said, " Set out, and come hither." 
 "To Villeneuve he said, " I hope that you are at Brest. Set out ; 
 lose not a moment. Bring my united squadrons into the Channel, 
 
 • Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 222, ct seq. 
 t Consulate and Empire, vol. T., p. 243. 
 J Ibid., p. 242. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 199 
 
 and England is ours ! We are all ready ; everything is embarked. 
 Be here but for 24 hours and all is ended."* 
 
 But presently Decres waited on him vath the expression not only 
 of his doubts about Villcneuve, and his conviction that he would 
 next appear at Cadiz, but of his own view that the whole plan was 
 a mistake — "horribly dangerous." Napoleon, apparently furious, 
 pondered for twenty-four hours, and then accepting as certainty 
 the Minister's belief, sent for his Secretary, Daru, and enacted 
 with him that scene told with such dramatic effect by Thiers and 
 Alison, from a paper left by Daru himself ; but over which Alison 
 makes such a strange mistake. Daru being sent for, found the 
 Emperor in his cabinet in a transport of rage, rushing up and 
 down in a fury, and breaking out into exclamations: " What a 
 navy ! What sacrifices for nothing ! What an admiral ! All hope 
 is gone ! That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has 
 taken refuge in Cadiz. He will be blockaded there ! Daru, sit 
 
 down and write ." What was written there and then were the 
 
 preliminary directions for the Campaign of Austerlitz, and the 
 linal abandonment of the design of invading England. f 
 
 In reviewing the nature and prospects of this last and appa- 
 rently gigantic and complex effort of France, we are met by a very 
 strong sensation of difficulty resting on the doubt— which I may own 
 to operate with much force on my mind — whether Napoleon ever 
 really meant to try the hazard of invasion. M. Thiers is quite 
 satisfied that he did fully mean it, and he certainly seemed to do 
 so. But with a mind such as Napoleon's, so firmly persuaded of 
 the value of untruth, we never know where we are. Anyone 
 reading the " Pieces Justificatives " given by Dumas in the 
 eleventh volume of his Precis des Evcnemens Militaires, where are set 
 out in a continued series Napoleon's orders and observations on the 
 movements and combinations of the Franco- Spanish fleets up to 
 the 26th of June, cannot fail to be struck with the very large space 
 which is given to the West Indian arrangements, and the small 
 space which the notion of command in the Channel occupies. 
 
 And then the changes in the plans and their want of complete- 
 ness require some explanation, if the Emperor was really earnest in 
 that which, ostensibly, he was full of. It was only, apparently, 
 
 * Consulate and Empire, vol. v., p. 245. 
 
 t Alison's mistake is that he makes this scene occur on the 11th instead of the 23rd 
 of August ; and that he substitutes Ferrol for Cadiz. He -n-as probably misled by his 
 knowledge that Villeneuve was forbidden to enter Ferrol, not understanding that this 
 only meant the harbour of Ferrol, not the roadstead, and that the objection rested 
 solely on the diCQculty of getting out again except with a north-cast wind. 
 
200 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 when the impossibility of the Brest fleet's putting to sea heoame 
 manifest that the ultimate plan of Villeneuve's combining with 
 the forces at Ferrol and Eochefort, and then passing up Channel 
 to release Ganteaume at Brest was finally adopted. 
 
 And then we have two statements by Napoleon himself : first, 
 that half the flotilla was sham, and then, that the whole of it was 
 sham. In his note on the flotilla, dictated after his return from 
 Boulogne, he says the whole provision of armed vessels, praams, 
 gun-boats, flat boats, and peniches, were perfectly useless ; they 
 were a mere blind, to deceive the English into the belief that he 
 meant to attempt to cross without the cover of a fleet — a thing 
 which he very well knew could not be done.''^ 
 
 Prince Metternich, in his autobiography, says : ** By far the 
 greater part of the political prophets, the camp at Boulogne was 
 regarded as a preparation for a landing in England. Some 
 better instructed observers saw in this camp a French army held 
 in readiness to cross the Rhine, and that was my opinion. In 
 one of my longer conversations with Napoleon in the journey to 
 Cambray, whither I accompanied the Emperor in 1810, the con- 
 versation turned upon the great military preparations which he 
 had made in the years 1803-5 in Boulogne. I frankly confessed 
 to him that even at the time I could not regard these offensive 
 measures as directed against England. 'You are very right,' said 
 the Emperor, smiling. ' Never would I have been such a fool as 
 to make a descent upon England, unless, indeed, a revolution had 
 taken place within the country. The army assembled at Bou- 
 logne was always an army against Austria. I could not place it 
 anywhere else without giving offence ; and, being obliged to form 
 it somewhere, I did so at Boulogne, where I could, whilst collect- 
 ing it, also disquiet England. The very day of an insurrection in 
 England, I should have sent over a detachment of my army to 
 support the insurrection. I should not the less have fallen on 
 you, for my forces were echeloned for that purpose. Thus you 
 saw, in 1805, how near Boulogne was to Vienna.' "t 
 
 There is another incidental argument in favour of Prince 
 Metternich's view, which is the varied and vague way in which 
 Napoleon spoke of the length of time during which he required 
 CO" <-id of the sea to get his forces over. In July 1804 he said : 
 " Lt. us be masters of the Straits for six hours, and we shall be 
 
 • See Precis des Evenemens Militnires, vol. xii., p. 816. 
 
 t Memoirs oj Prince Aletlernich. Translated by Mrs. A. Napier. 1880. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO GAIN COMMAND OF THE SEA. 201 
 
 masters of the world."* In di-aft instructions to Villeneuve, of 
 May 8th, 1805, he says : " If your presence makes us masters 
 of the sea for three days off Boulogne, we shall be able to make 
 our expedition, composed of 160,000 men in 2,000 vessels. "t In 
 the second draft on the same day, the time is four days and the 
 number of men 150,000. J 
 
 But, on the other hand, these direct statements, and these 
 loose expressions seem to be outweighed by the distinctly anxious 
 iittitude of mind which Napoleon displayed as the time drew 
 near when the arrival of Villeneuve off Brest was to be ex- 
 pected. 
 
 But if we are to believe that Napoleon was as much in earnest 
 in the matter of a descent on the shores of England as he was in 
 the matter of a concentration upon Ulm, then we must, I think, 
 say that, confused by the double issue of a command of the sea, 
 which was, after all, to be but an evasion of the enemy, Napoleon 
 lost himself. The plans were too complex, too varied, and too 
 indeterminate to have presented any real prospect of success. We 
 are very generally accustomed to hear it said that Napoleon 
 "decoyed " Nelson to the West Indies, and we seem generally to 
 suppose that Collingwood exactly fathomed the Emperor's drift. 
 But the West Indian Expeditions were no feints ; nor do we gather 
 that though, as a general principle, the idea was to draw the 
 enemy's forces abroad. Napoleon distinctly contemplated that his 
 admirals would be followed to the West Indies. Moreover, sup- 
 posing it were otherwise, the idea of strategy would be somewhat 
 lacking if we suppose that Villeneuve's main object in going to 
 the West Indies was to draw Nelson after him.' The fact proves 
 it, for we see Nelson outsailing Villeneuve on the return voyage. 
 If the main object had been to draw a British squadron away, the 
 voyage to the West Indies should have been a pretended one, and 
 Villeneuve, taking care that Nelson was duly informed of his sup- 
 posed West Indian destination, should have turned back on the 
 limited Ferroi blockading squadron and annihilated it, while 
 forming his junction with the ships in the port. It was the same 
 with Missiessy's squadron. If command of the Channel had 
 been primarily aimed at, a rendezvous at sea with V^'^er'^uve 
 would have been properly appointed, and not the distant .it 
 
 Surinam. 
 
 * Napoleon to Latouche-Treville. Precis <ks Eveneiiicns Militaires, vol. xi., p. 200 
 I- Ibid., p. 249. 
 + Ibid., p. 251. 
 
 14 
 
202 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 On the whole, I think that in some way or other, faihire might 
 nave been predicted for designs which were too great, too complex, 
 and too full of risk. The mere embarkation of bodies of troops on 
 board the ships was against success in the supposed ulterior design, 
 for it meant sickness and short supplies in the ships. Nor can we, 
 in forming a calm judgment, omit to notice that Napoleon seems 
 to have been acting all along in the very teeth of his naval advice. 
 We know that both Villeneuve and Decres remonstrated with him, 
 and the strong language of the Minister of Marine on the 22nd of 
 August is not to be forgotten : 
 
 A.nd to speak the whole truWi, a Minister of Marine, subjugated by your Majesty in 
 naval affairs, serves you badly and becomes useless to yoiir arms, if not actually 
 iujurious to them.* 
 
 Thus once more, but finally, we seem to draw the lesson from 
 this last ©ffort of France that it is unavailing to attempt to obtain 
 the command of the sea by any other means than by fighting for 
 it, and that that is so tremendous an undertaking that it will not 
 bear consideration side by side with any other object. 
 
 * Coniiuidle and J£injnrr, vol. v., p. 247. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 The CoNDiTioNis under which Attacks on Territory from the 
 Sea Succeed or Fail. 
 
 The gradations in completeness of command of the sea in relation to attacks upon 
 territory. — Special state of West and East Indian waters on account of trade-winds and 
 monsoons. — Powers of holding places supplied over a commanded sea. — Limits of these 
 powers. — Two objects in attack : (1) Ravage and desti-uction ; (2) occupation and 
 conquest. — Time at disposal a measure of success in each over a doubtfully com- 
 manded sea. — An expedition must either be accompanied by overwhelming naval force, 
 or else naval force should be absent. — Attacks without troops rare ; confined to bom- 
 bardment and forcing purposes.— .System of citadels usual in fortification last centurj-. 
 — The philosophy of the system and its disadvantages to the power with superior naval 
 force. — Superiority of naval defence. — Recapitulation, 
 
 In the last four chapters I have dealt with the history of the 
 principal attempts of one naval power to wrest from the hands of 
 another — but only for a time, and for a particular purpose — that 
 command of the sea which the latter admittedly possessed. It 
 has been seen that such attempts tend to become failures chiefly 
 because attention, which ought to be wholly concentrated on a 
 single class of operations of supreme moment, is dissipated and 
 lost between two objects. So divided does the attention become, 
 that whereas, ostensibly, the object is to get at least a local com- 
 mand of the sea for a limited time, and at all hazards, actually, 
 the great naval preparations are thrown away, and the ulterior 
 purpose of descent upon territory is seen to rest for success, after 
 all, much more on the evasion of probably opposing forces, than' 
 of beating them by superior force upon the spot. 
 
 It has thus been seen that the dividing line between attempts to 
 gain the command of the sea in order to facilitate a descent upon 
 the land, and descents upon the land with an admitted want of 
 command of the sea, is an exceedingly fine one. So fine, that it is 
 the apparent magnitude of the naval preparations on the part of 
 
 14* 
 
204 NAVAL 'rVAIlFAUE. 
 
 the attacking force, in pursuance of the first object, which chiefly 
 remains to distinguish them. 
 
 And then we further observe that the term " command of the 
 sea," as applied to denote power to prevent the passage of an 
 enemy intending to descend upon the land, is necessarily indefinite. 
 Command may be absolutely complete, not only for that, but for 
 all other purposes. It may be sufticiently complete to secure an 
 expedition proceeding over sea for the attack of territory, from 
 any sort of interruption either then, or at the point of attack ; and 
 yet it may not be liufticiently complete to make communications 
 with the base from the point of attack absolutely secure. It may 
 then be found by fine gradations, less and less complete, until 
 command of the sea is wholly lost, and the enemy roves at will 
 across the water routes which lead to the point of attack. 
 
 Of this absolute command of the sea we have but the single 
 historical instance of our own position in the Crimean War. It 
 was in part the result of the peculiar position of the enemy's naval 
 ports, opening into seas which were themselves narrowed into 
 easily-guarded outlets — the Bosphorus and Dardanelles ; the 
 Sound and the Belts. These narrow passages formed, as it were, 
 outer gates to the prisons within which the enemy was confined, 
 and were as a warning to him of the double risks he ran in any 
 attempts to escape. But it is quite possible that but for the 
 agency of steam propulsion in our hands, that absolute command 
 of the sea which geographical conditions favoured us in holding, 
 might have been incomplete. When ships were propelled by the 
 wind, nature constantly stepped in to confound the designs of art, 
 and to put into the hands of one side, advantages which to it were 
 as unlooked for as to the other side they were prohibitive. But it 
 may be fairly argued that had steam been as much at command of 
 the Bussian fleet as it was at command of that of the Allies, it is 
 possible that even in the Baltic and Black Seas the control of the 
 latter Powers might have "been to some extent disputed. 
 
 From this absolute command of the sea, which left the Allies in 
 their attack upon the Crimea entirely at ease with regard to their 
 communications, we go forward a step to the Franco-German War, 
 where the command of the sea was at least threatened, and v/here 
 operations on the line of communications, if in a very insignificant 
 degree; actually took place =* In the American Civil War, although 
 the Confederate naval forces were never strong enough to interfere 
 
 * I allude to the captures made by the Amjuiftii off the mouth of the Orironde duriii;,' 
 the hei'4it of the war 
 
ATTACKS ON TKIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 205 
 
 from seaward with any of the Federal attacks on Confederate 
 ports, they were occasionally in a position to operate on the 
 Federal water communications with their bases. That they did 
 not do so, arose in the usual way, from a consideration of the 
 balance of risks and advantages. In the Chilo-Peruvian War we find 
 that the inferior naval power, while not strong enough to dispute 
 the command of the sea, did operate on the communications most 
 effectually in certainly one case."'^ In the Austro-Italian War of 
 1866, the Italian command of the sea was so ill estimated, that the 
 inferior Austrian fleet was able to defeat the attempt to capture the 
 Island of Lissa by a victory over the superior Italian fleet. 
 
 Passing back from these modern illustrations, we ascend the 
 stream of time to a set of conditions where each of the forces at 
 M'ar held a simultaneous command of the sea within the immediate 
 sphere of the operations of its fleets, but not beyond it. Each side 
 had forces on the open sea, intact and threatening. If attacks on 
 the land were to be made by either side under such conditions, 
 they were made by admittedly inferior naval forces, trusting 
 entirely to evasion — to carrying out the work of surprise, and 
 completing it so quickly as to preclude, the probable arrival of 
 superior relieving naval force ; or else they were made under cover 
 of a locally superior naval force — a force which defied the inter- 
 ference of the enemy at sea. 
 
 We shall see this phase of the command of the sea abundantly 
 illustrated in the history of naval war, and we shall compare, in 
 numerous instances, the two methods of treating it in relation to 
 attacks upon territory. 
 
 Passing through this period or phase of the strategical position 
 of the sea, considered as territory over which military forces march 
 for the purposes of conquest at particular localities, we come to 
 that very early phase which I have described in my first chapter, 
 where neither side has, or attempts to have, any command 
 of the sea; where the water may be considered a desert — in- 
 different territory not subject to offensive and defensive operations 
 —but a mere marching ground or medium for the transmission of 
 military force from any one point to &,ny other. 
 
 I have endeavoured to show, in my first chapter, that the 
 passage from this earliest phase of indifferent sea, to the second 
 phase of sea of which the command may be disputed at any time 
 
 * I allude to the capture of the Chilian transport Riinac, having on board 300 
 cavalrj' with their horses, bj' the Pernvian Hua^cur and Union. — Markham's Tlie War 
 hetivri'H Peru umf G/u'li, 1870-1882., p. 117. • 
 
306 XAVAL WARl^ARE. 
 
 and in any locaJilv. has depecie*?. ~<ti!?!7 '^'^ 
 meat in uav^&l architeecnre. a 
 
 ?pac6 b-^r? on the re int. j? " 
 
 gr Teloped into v 
 
 ~ _ IS Of V": 
 
 Th» contlicion of the war-? 
 
 waters^ '^.■•- -•• ''^ '^it all "Wdu:— i- .■_.r...t. 
 for fih«? ::l?. 
 
 ■ "" Ted tike access: 
 
 - -sston. is- i vti.- 
 
 - -1^ Tihert? Wis i viuSi 
 
 i£ay ; atio. luu. e*!^. tajj.y s&nji; _; 
 
 if:^r ±^j lit :l liS':^:. - - ■ 
 
 on, it was al^ivays a chance which fleet got 
 
 mere iatit chac an English lieec. ••- •"~-- 
 dii^ proceed oft an enemy'* pert; : 
 sea^ masc have pac she idea of tiz ;.;<r:u:c 
 very &r in t:he baekaroand in this eomiD-y.* 
 
 ^0 doubt there -^ - 
 charged with guns 
 they were. les-c shey r^. , 
 Bttt tdiis was ; t!:-; 
 authorities. 
 
 rates— the *c-:-__: . ._ _...— .. 
 
 sail in heavy wea±.er. It; was noc 3^ 
 position wher: v- '"^ • •• - -~ - -• 
 And time wa.- 
 
 • 3«w a'jtatx. g. Jww> 
 
ATTACKS ON TKHIlITOIiY FJIOM TIIK SKA. 207 
 
 in the middle of the English Channel in a northerly or Houtherly 
 gale. It waB known that in the northerly gale the southern shore 
 would become, by reason of the ship's driving, a lee shore in six 
 hours ; or that in the southerly gale the north shore would become 
 a lee shore in the same time." 
 
 1'his throws a flood of light on the position. If ships could not 
 be trusted even as near the shore as a mid-channel station would 
 put them, they could not be trusted near an enemy's port, except 
 under special and exceptional circumstances. And this is just 
 what we observe. Most of the danger to our command of the 
 sea was to be found at Brest, yet when the danger was to be faced 
 in these earlier wars, the station of the facing fleet was never 
 nearer than thirty miles from Ushant, unless there existed the 
 intention of attacking the French ships in their own ports. Then 
 indeed the English fleet went into Camaret and Berteaume Bays 
 and anchored. 
 
 Under such conditions, the seas from the mouth of the English 
 Channel to a line drawn from Cape Clear to Cape Finisterre were 
 long in an indifferent 8tate,t but yet the geographical conditions 
 were such that territorial attacks on either side, coming over sea, 
 were rare. 
 
 Long after the European waters, as a consequence of the 
 improvements in ships, had passed the stage of indifference into 
 that of disputed command, the waters on the other side of the 
 Atlantic, in the West Indies and on the coasts of America, were 
 often indifferent. And where this was so, we find a system of 
 warfare carried on between the hostile territories very closely 
 resemliling the " cross-raiding " which I have shown in my first 
 chapter to be characteristic of our home waters before the estab- 
 lishment of systematic naval war, and before therefore any rules 
 for its effective conduct could have been conceived. 
 
 The causes of this condition in Western waters were twofold. 
 Naval force was not indigenous to those seas ; it was necessary to 
 import it. The supply of it was consequently intermittent, so that 
 often there was on neither side any naval force competent to take 
 even a limited command of the sea. Another cause was the 
 
 • There is nothing more calculated to show the diiference in the power of ships to 
 keep the sea at early and late epochs, than to compare the blockad'? of Brest in 1805 
 with what was done off the port at earlier dates, remembering that the existing Victory 
 took part in the lat<;r operations 
 
 f I have to give to this term the technical meaning denoting a sea orer which 
 neither side att^impts to hold command, and, therefore, which neither side threatens. 
 
208 NAVAL WAEFABE. ' 
 
 steady character of the ^Yind in the West Indies. The duration 
 of the passages from point to point were not, as in European 
 waters, sometimes half and sometimes double the average length in 
 time. The individual passage was, on the contrary, always 
 close to the average, and therefore if a descent from one island 
 upon another was designed, and the whereabouts of the possibly 
 opposing naval force was known, something like accurate calcu- 
 lation could be made as to the time at disposal before the 
 admittedly superior Heet could possibly put in an appearance to 
 stop or destroy the expedition. If the complete intention of the 
 descent could be fulfilled within this time, the waters over which 
 it had to pass were certainly indifferent, and there was no such 
 chance as evasion to be taken into account. If, on the contrary, 
 there were a possibility, or a probability, that the opposing fleet 
 might be in a position to oppose before there was reasonable hope 
 of completing the objects of the expedition, then, if it sailed, it did 
 not voyage over indifferent water, but within the area of disputed 
 command of the sea, and it must depend upon evasion for success. 
 
 The approximately fixed direction from the eastward, and 
 approximately fixed force of the wind, gave the easternmost posi- 
 tions in the West Indies always an advantage over the western. 
 The distance from Antigua to Jamaica is, roughly, 850 miles. A 
 well-found sailing ship of thirty or forty years ago would run 
 from the first to the last place in seven or eight days, but the 
 return voyage, made by beating against the wind south of Hispaniola 
 and Porto Eico, would occupy three times that amount of time. 
 Two hundred years ago both passages were longer, in consequence 
 of the inferior character of the ships ; and both then and later, a 
 squadron would be slower than a single ship over both passages, 
 but proportionately over each passage. 
 
 This special condition of the West India Islands, brought about 
 by the trade-winds, was so far recognized that, almost from the 
 beginning, and up to the close of the Napoleonic wars. West 
 Indian waters were divided into two naval commands, embracing 
 the weathermost and the leewardmost waters. But the names 
 given to the two stations, " The Jamaica Station " and " The Lee- 
 ward Islands Station," were not calculated to bring out the 
 significance of the fact. The Leeward Islands station was properly 
 the Windward Islands station, but I suppose it took its name from 
 the fact that its port of supply, English Harbour, Antigua, was 
 accurately one of the Leeward Islands, that name embracing all 
 the islands from Porto Piico to Dominica inclusive. 
 
ATTACKS OX TKIUIITOUY FROM THE SEA. 209 
 
 If the authorities of "NFartinique therefore had the necessary 
 transport and troops for an attack, say on St. Lucia, but were 
 unpossessed of naval force to secure command of the sea over 
 which the expedition was to pass, and if they had knowledge that 
 the only naval force capable of interfering with them was at 
 Jamaica, they would know that for four or five weeks, certainly for 
 four weeks, the sea which concerned them would be indifferent. 
 Possessed of the necessary land force, and bent on attaining an 
 object which it was reasonable to hope such force might fully attain 
 in less than four weeks, there would exist no reason why success 
 should not be assumed. At the same time as this was going on, 
 there might be no naval force at Hispaniola to interfere with an 
 expedition against it, fitted out at Jamaica ; and we might therefore 
 have at the same time, raiding going on by the French at Mar- 
 tinique against the English at St. Lucia; and raids going on by 
 the English at Jamaica against the French at Hispaniola. That 
 is to say that while there was naval force enough in the hands of 
 the English in the West Indies to command the sea in any locality 
 where it might put in an appearance, we should still see enacted 
 in those w'aters "cross-raiding" practices only possible over an 
 indifferent sea, and not found in use in European waters since a 
 time before the days of Elizabeth. 
 
 But if we wish to come to the historical aspects of war across 
 the water carried on in this way, we must be perfectly clear about 
 the conditions which bring it about. In these cross-raids in 
 European waters before Elizabeth's time, there was no conquest, 
 properly so called, intended or attempted. One great country was 
 divided from another great country by a strip of sea over -which 
 neither country had, or could have, the control. The raiding 
 expeditions were small, and confined their operations almost 
 to the water's edge of the enemy's shore. They were minor affairs 
 not launched with the object of holding territory, and of a much 
 lower strategic character than the operations of the smallest 
 advanced guard on land with an army in its rear. 
 
 Time in these cases was nothing. All that had to be calculated 
 was the transport of sufficient force to effect the object in view. 
 If the force was rightly calculated, it effected its purpose on the 
 land, and embarked again. If it was wrongly calculated, the 
 enemy on land met it on or after its landing and beat it oft' 
 again. 
 
 In the absence of naval force in the West Indies we had all the 
 old conditions on a smaller scale : the islands at war, the one 
 
•210 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 with the other, because the mother countries were at war, were 
 separated by small strips of indifferent water. Time was not of 
 importance. If the force sent on the expedition was sufficient and 
 properly handled, it obviously effected its purpose. If it was not 
 sufficient or was improperly handled, it was beaten back on shore 
 by the land forces of the invaded island. 
 
 But there was this difference between the case of European and 
 West Indian waters when no properly called naval force was pre- 
 sent. Expeditions could pass from one island to another with the 
 intention of conquest, and they might succeed. The military 
 forces were generally small, the territory invaded was generally 
 small, and in proportion to its size was usually more easily 
 conquered. When the waters therefore were really indifferent, the 
 invasion, pure and simple, of one island by another, was usually 
 a possibility, and was, as we shall see, not infrequent. 
 
 But just as the expeditions were small, so was any naval force 
 large in disproportion to its actual size. Expeditions which might 
 naturally have succeeded when pushed over really indifferent 
 waters, were postponed, abandoned, or defeated, even on the mere 
 show of very small opposing naval force. Not infrequently the 
 simple report of the vicinity of opposing naval force would cause 
 the abandonment of an enterprise ; and we shall hear of hurried 
 re-embarkations of expeditions already landed and progressing, on 
 advice — true or false — of approaching naval force. ». 
 
 When opposing naval force was known to be in certain localities, 
 the question of time became always important. In the suppositi- 
 tious case spoken of, of a projected attack by forces from the island 
 of Martinique on the island of St. Lucia while there was ample 
 opposing force at Jamaica, the expedition could only be undertaken 
 if its completion might be reasonably calculated on well within the 
 four weeks. Of course, if it were a mere harrying raid it would 
 appear on a diminished scale, and would attempt nothing involving 
 time, for time would bring the presumed superior land forces of 
 St. Lucia up to defeat the object of the raid. But if the conquest 
 of the island were the object, it must not only be completed before 
 the four weeks had expired, but the conquered island must be 
 settled within that time and prepared to resist all attempts to 
 retake it. In this respect there is a difference between absolutely 
 and relatively indifferent waters. 
 
 Again, in the West Indies, it could never be said that the waters 
 were at any point absolutely indifferent, for an importation of 
 naval force on the one side or the other from Europe might at 
 
ATTACKS ON TEEmTORY FROM THE SEA. 211 
 
 any unexpected moment occm\ Generally siDeaking, the student 
 of naval history may be reasonably struck by the rarity of the 
 unexpected appearance of naval force. The unlooked-for appari- 
 tion of single hostile ships, or even of small squadrons, to con- 
 found the designs of commanders looking for success to the 
 permanence of an indifferent sea, may here and there be noticed, 
 but this was seldom the case with squadrons of any force, and rare 
 indeed, in the case of powerful fleets. But the mere fact that 
 naval forces from Europe might present themselves at the most 
 inopportune moment, was always a check upon expeditions cross- 
 ing the water without the cover of a purely naval force. 
 
 There was a condition operating in the West Indies in a manner 
 such as to closely resemble the effect of the winter season. The 
 so-called "hurricane months/' the months of August and Septem- 
 ber, were so dreaded, that the war-ships on both sides were accus- 
 tomed to pass into Northern waters in July, and not to return 
 till October. There was, therefore, a time corresponding to 
 the European spring, when the early advent to the spot of even 
 an inferior naval force might give a temporary command of the 
 sea capable of being taken advantage of by the enterprising 
 possessor of it. Just as in European waters the fleet which first 
 " put to sea " after the enforced rest in port of the winter months, 
 was always understood to have gained an advantage. 
 
 On the coasts of North America the conditions were not unlike 
 those of the West Indian Islands, if we except the regularity of the 
 winds. For centuries there were posts and settlements of English 
 and French within easy, or comparativly easy, reach of one 
 another by sea. And though these settlements were on the Con- 
 tinent, or on very large islands, they were often limited in area 
 and in their population. Absolute conquest of one settlement by 
 an expedition coming over sea from another, was not always out 
 of the question by a comparatively small force, and capable of 
 being effected, therefore, in a comparatively short time. Hence, 
 for these particular purposes, there were sometimes found indiffe- 
 rent waters, especially in earlier days. 
 
 On the west coast of Africa, where stations, ports, or trading 
 posts, were sometimes in the hands of opposing nations, the same 
 conditions prevailed as those on the American coast, of an in- 
 different sea, and forces transported over it to the attack. 
 
 In the East Indies, the monsoons played the same part aS/ the 
 trade-winds in the West Indies, and put into the hands of they force 
 which was to windward certainties of calculation which iy could 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
212 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 use to its profit. We shall have at least one memorahle and 
 remarkable instance of the successful use of this advantage. But 
 in the East Indies, settlement hardly made war over sea against 
 settlement, for the reason that the settlers were few, though the 
 populations were large. Naval force, and often a considerable 
 amount of naval force, was necessary to conduct expeditions which 
 could not he small. And hence, in the East Indies, when the 
 state of affairs was such as to prompt the opposing powers to 
 attack one another's territories by way of expeditions over sea, the 
 state of the sea was not often indifferent. It was more commonly 
 a condition of disputed command, or of command nearly com- 
 plete. 
 
 We see, therefore, these three states of the sea considered as a 
 strategic surface or medium for transport : the state of Indiference, 
 of Disjmted Command, and of Assured Command. And evidently 
 there must be a continual passing from one state into a higher, 
 and back again. 
 
 It must always be remembered that these terms apply only to 
 possible or contemplated descents upon the land. They have 
 nothing to do with the freedom or otherwise of sea-borne commerce, 
 for this is, 'prima facie, defenceless, and therefore open to the 
 attacks of that which is not properly naval force at all, being of 
 too insignificant a character to be so classed. The attacks on 
 commerce in fact have, historically, had little or no connection 
 with the condition of the sea in the matter of command, unless 
 that has been, as it was in the Crimean war, absolute. All through 
 every stage of our naval wars since those of the Commonwealth, 
 the capture of merchant ships has been kept on both sides as a 
 sort of debtor and creditor account. I believe I am right in saying 
 that only in the Crimean war was this not so. The condition was 
 exceedingly marked in the American Civil War, and even in the 
 Franco- Grerman war there was just a retaliation by the German 
 navy on French commerce for the grievous injuries suffered by the 
 German commerce. In these wars, all stages of the sea were 
 found ; and sometimes the proportionate success was greatest 
 against the Power which had an assured command of the sea so 
 far as any attacks on territory over sea were concerned. 
 
 And if we take these three states of the sea into our contem- 
 f.-)lation as conditions under which expeditions across it succeed or 
 faifj, we may note that over a commanded sea no such expedition 
 can be put in force at all by the inferior naval Power, except by 
 evasioji, else must we admit a sea which is of disputed command, 
 
ATTACKS OX TEUULTOllY FROM TllK SKA. 213 
 
 or one which is indifferent. On the other side, the Power in com- 
 mand of the sea ought never to fail in any attack it undertakes, 
 so long as it does not cut itself off from its sea communications. 
 
 Transport by land and supply by land have never been able to 
 compete on anything like equal terms with similar operations by 
 sea. It M'as so when naval war began ; it has been proved so down 
 to our own day in the operations of war.* Even though railway 
 
 * The words of Sir Walter Raleigh are woi-th quoting on this head, not only for 
 their truth, but as an illustration of how the great seamen of a long past ago were 
 accustomed to draw their lessons from ages still more remote. Speaking of the ill- 
 luck of the Roman consuls Servius and Sempronius at sea after their success by land 
 against the Carthaginians, and of the endeavour to maintain themselves without using 
 the sea, he says : " But this late resolution of forsaking the seas lasted not long ; for 
 it was impossible for them to succour those places which they held in Sicily without a 
 navy, much less to maintain the war in Africa. For whereas the Romans were to send 
 forces from INIessina to Egesta, to Lilybseum, and to other parts in the extreme west 
 parts of Sicily, making sometimes a march of above one hundred and forty English 
 miles by land, which could not be performed with an army and the provisions that 
 followed it, in less than fourteen days, the Carthaginians would pass it with their 
 gallics in forty-eight hours. 
 
 " An old example we have of transporting armies by water between Canutus and 
 Edmund Ironside. For Canutus, when ho had entered the Thames with his navy and 
 army and could not prevail against London, suddenly embarked and sailing to the west, 
 landed in Dorsetshire, so drawing Edmund and his army thither. There finding ill 
 entertainment, he again shipped his men and entered the Severn, making Edmund 
 mai'ch after him to the succour of Worcestershire, by him greatly spoiled. But when 
 he had Edmund there, he sailed back again to London ; by means whereof ho botli 
 wearied the King and spoiled where he pleased, ere succour could arrive. And this 
 was not the least help which the Netherlands have had against the Sjjaniards in the 
 defence of their liberty, that being masters of the sea, they could pass their armj- from 
 place to place, unwearied and entire, with all the munition and artillery belonging 
 unto it, in the tenth part of the time wherein their enemies have been able to do it. * 'f 
 this an instance or two. The Count jNIaurice of Nassau, now living, one of the greatest 
 captains and worthiest princes that either the present or preceding ages have Ijrought 
 foi'th, in the year 1590 carried his army by sea, with forty cannons, to Breda, making 
 countenance either to besiege Bois-le-Duc or Gertrudenberg, Avhich the enemy (in 
 prevention) filled with soldiers and victuals. But as soon as the wind served, he 
 suddenly set sail, and arriving in the mouth of the Meuse, turned up the Rhino and 
 thence to Yssel, and sat down before Zutphen. So before the Spaniards could march 
 overland round about Holland, above eighty miles, and over many great rivers, with 
 their cannon and carriage, Zutjjhen was taken. Again, when the Spanish army had 
 overcome this wearisome march and were now far from home, the Prince Maurice, 
 making countenance to sail up the Rhino, changed his course in the night, and sailing 
 down the stream, he was set down before Hulst, in Brabant, ere the Spaniards had 
 knowledge Avhat had become of him. So this town he took before the Spanish army 
 could return. Lastly, the Spanish army was no sooner arrived in Brabant than the 
 Prinee Maurice, attended by his good fleet, having fortified Hulst, set sail again, and 
 presented himself before Nimeguen in Gueiders, a city of notable importance, and 
 mastered it. . . . 
 
 •' For there is no man so ignorant, that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, 
 will easily outrun the soldiers that coast them. •• Les arme'es ne volent noint en poste " 
 
214 NAVAL WAllFAUE. 
 
 trains pass at a nominally higher speed than steam ships, their 
 limit of speed has long heen reached, while no one can yet say 
 what is the limit of the speed of the latter. The railway also 
 must be constructed, and is limited in carrying area ; the sea is 
 always ready and as unlimited as the land is. If a landing, there- 
 fore, can be effected on any point from which communication with 
 the ships is secure, the occupation of the point is only a question 
 of sufficient force, and the holding of it against any land forces 
 can be made a matter of certainty, as being only one of reinforce- 
 ment and supply, both of which are free to come over sea, freer 
 than either can be to come over land. 
 
 But though this doctrine is true in the abstract, it has obvious 
 limitations. It pre-suppose® that the base or bases from which 
 supplies and reinforcements 'Come are at approximately .equal 
 distances by land and by sea. Although it be true that their 
 transport is very much quicker by sea than by land, yet the sea 
 bases may be so much farther off in distance than the land bases 
 as to equalise the time intervals, or even to turn the scale very 
 much in favour of the land. The abstract truth, therefore is 
 limited by the geographical conditions, and every historical case 
 of this kind must be considered under the actual conditions which 
 limit the principle. 
 
 We shall see instances of failure to capture ports or places 
 when the attack has been made over a practically commanded sea. 
 These we can at once set down to insufficient force or insufficient 
 perseverance in employing the force. We shall also find instances 
 of failure to hold places captured, or otherwise obtahied, and then 
 left dependent on the sea for reinforcement and supply. There 
 we shall note that the cause of the failure has really been the 
 length in time of the sea-voyage between the bases of reinforce- 
 ment and supply and the port or place to be held. The result has 
 been that the supply and reinforcement of the investing forces by 
 land has been far in advance of the supply and reinforcement of 
 the invested forces by sea. 
 
 Such cases range themselves side by side with those where the 
 communications of the landed forces with the sea have been cut, 
 either by circumstances of weather or too great an advance into 
 
 (armies neither liy, nor run post), saitli a marshal of France. And I know it to be 
 true that a fleet of ships may be seen at sunset and after it at the Lizard, yet by next 
 morning they may recover Porthmd ; wTiereas an army of foot shall not be able to 
 march it in six days.— T^Ae History of the World, by Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight. 
 Edinburgh, 1820. Vol. v., pp. 53-09, 
 
ATTACKS ON TKIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 215 
 
 the country ; but they do not properly come into the class of those 
 cases where these communications have been cut by the enemy. 
 We then admit a sea either of doubtful command or of one 
 commanded by the Power which holds the land on which the 
 descent has been made, and the causes of the failure are due to 
 either fact. 
 
 If the command of the sea is disputed, expeditions across it 
 from the base or bases to the point to be attacked must, to be 
 successful, take means to get a local command of the sea, or else 
 risk evasion, and if it is intended to hold the place attacked, it 
 must be made self- su^jpor ting, as there can be no guarantee that 
 the communications will not at any moment be cut. This, again, 
 is often a question of time, as a place may be non-productive as 
 regards supplies, and dependent, therefore, upon accumulated 
 stores which necessarily diminish by the lapse of time. Such 
 places fall if the communications are cut for a sufficient length of 
 time. It follows from this that all places supplied from over sea 
 fall ultimately to the holder of the command of the sea in war. 
 The fall may be delayed according to the proportion of supplies 
 stored, but sooner or later the fall is certain. 
 
 The condition of an indifferent sea is, we shall observe, one 
 that passes more and more out of consideration as history goes on. 
 With every improvement in marine architecture, especially with 
 every improvement in marine propulsion, distances are measured 
 by shorter times ; and as time is the real measure of distance in 
 war, shorter times mean shorter distances, or, in other words, 
 that the area commanded by any given naval force continually 
 extends. 
 
 If, in the kind of operations we have been discussing, relative 
 times in passing over the sea were the only times to be taken into 
 account, the improvements in marine architecture spoken of would 
 have little modifying effect on the art of naval war. But, ob- 
 viously, this is not so in all cases of attacks over sea upon 
 territory, unless the necessary duration of attack has diminished 
 in like ratio. During the period over which naval history extends, 
 it is not easy to show that there was any change in this respect ; 
 and perhaps in the steam wars of the later dates, the only 
 manifest advance has been the use of small steam-boats in towing 
 troops and stores to land. 
 
 But if the process of attack on any place by forces coming 
 over "^ea has not been hastened in like proportion to the in- 
 
21G NAVAL U'AliFAIiE. 
 
 croiiscd rapidity of the passaj^e over sea, then it follows that 
 what used to be indifferent seas may have beco7ne of doubtful 
 command, and local command of the sea may have become less 
 assured. 
 
 Taking the hypothetical example already used, of Jamaica, 
 ]\Iartinique, and St. Lucia : if we suppose the ships of an -earlier 
 date took four or five weeks to beat up from Jamaica to St. Lucia 
 against the trade-wind, and ships of a later date only three 
 weeks, the result would be that if there were a naval force at 
 Jamaica in both cases, success by the expedition from Martinique 
 would be less assured at the later date than at the earlier. For 
 while the force required to overcome and occupy St. Lucia may 
 be assumed equal in both cases, and the time during which the 
 conquest is proceeding, and, therefore, during which the conquer- 
 ing force is dependent on the sea for supply and reinforcement, 
 may also be assumed equal in both cases, the time is shortened 
 within which the invading expedition is safe from interruption 
 by the Jamaica force. And coming to steam wars, the very much 
 shortened passage from Jamaica must tend to put it out of the 
 power of Martinique to calculate at all on having an indifferent 
 sea to pass over. 
 
 The general result of improved marine architecture, therefore, 
 must be to put a check upon all territorial attacks which depend 
 upon an indifferent sea. As the same cause must tend to make a 
 doubtful command of the sea more doubtful, and a command of 
 the sea more assured, the general result would appear to be, rarer 
 opportunities for territorial attacks across a sea which is not com- 
 manded, but much more certainty in the results of expeditions 
 carried on by the power which holds a command of the sea that 
 cannot be challenged. I think it will appear that the general 
 course of naval history bears out in practice these propositions 
 which we accept in theory. 
 
 It is important, before we begin the study of particular cases of 
 success or failure in attacks on territory from over sea, that we 
 should have not only some fairly clear conceptions of the conditions 
 under which expeditions pass over aea with regard to their possible 
 interruption by naval force during passage, and the cutting of 
 communications by like forces after the attack has developed or 
 been completed, but also some classified notions of the natures of 
 attacks and defences. 
 
 Broadly these fall into two categories — (1) where the object is 
 ravage and destruction, (2) where the object is conquest and oucu- 
 
ATTACKS ON TEliUITORY FROM THE SEA. 217 
 
 pation. These are really chiefly distinguished by the question of 
 time, but as usual in all classifications the two run into one 
 another in what is sometimes a perplexing way. The bombard- 
 ment of Algiers, for instance, like the bombardments of Sweaborg 
 and Odessa, as well as those numerous attacks on the French 
 coast towns and ports which I have shown in previous chapters to 
 follow our command in the Channel, fall without question into the 
 first category. So does that landing of troops at Ostend in 1798 
 mentioned in chapter viii. But the attack on Sevastopol was made 
 with a simply destructive object, and yet developed into a long 
 occupation of the country south of the harbour. The distinctions 
 between the attacks on Ostend and Sevastopol are only to be found 
 in the differences in the magnitudes of the undertakings, and of 
 the times occupied. And the importance of the time question as 
 a classifier comes in when we remember that the Ostend expedition 
 might have been conducted to success, though there had been a 
 vastly superior French naval force at Brest ; whilst if there had 
 been in any part of the world a superior Russian naval force, it 
 would have been impossible for success to have attended the 
 expedition to the Crimea. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that these merely ravaging and destructive 
 attacks, if made with any prospects of success, must, if made across 
 a doubtfully commanded sea, take time into account. They cannot 
 be attempted at all unless it is known that a local and temporary 
 command of the sea is secure. They cannot be made, as it were, 
 in the dark, with the possibility of running into the jaws of a 
 superior naval force on the spot. But more than this, the where- 
 abouts and power of the nearest naval force must be ascertained, 
 and there must be a comparison between the time the destructive 
 action will occupy and that within which relieving naval force can 
 arrive. And to have reasonable hope of success there must be 
 margin of two kinds. The probable time that the destructive 
 operation will occupy must be over-estimated ; that which the re- 
 lieving force will require before it can come on the spot must be 
 under-estimated. And again there must be a margin in estimating 
 the strength of the possible relieving force. It does not follow that 
 the destructive operation will not be interrupted, even disastrously, 
 by inferior naval force. 
 
 Missiessy's ravaging and destructive expedition to the West 
 Indies in 1805, which has been noticed in the previous chapter, was 
 a remarkable success. It was undertaken in view of the fact that 
 
 15 
 
218 NAVAL IVAliFAIiE. 
 
 there was no naval force in the West Indies'^ to oppose his 5 sail of 
 the line, and that it was not prohahle that a superior naval force 
 would arrive in time to interfere with him. So far as Villeneuve's 
 expedition in the same year was designed for ravaging and destruc- 
 tion it was a failure, hecause the sufficient, though inferior, force of 
 Lord Nelson arrived in those waters hefore time permitted even the 
 commencement of the operations. 
 
 But it is manifest that as practically time and the magnitude of 
 the forces engaged are measures of each other, light attacks for the 
 purpose of ravaging and destruction have always much more 
 chances of success across a doubtfully commanded sea than those 
 of magnitude and importance. And it would seem from a general 
 survey of naval history that as the doubtful command of the sea 
 becomes less and less doubtful, as passing more and more com- 
 pletely into the hands of one power, so do ravaging and destructive 
 attacks at the hands of the gradually weakening naval power tend 
 to grow more and more insignificant until they cease altogether, as 
 either being impossible to conduct to success, or as involving risks 
 of failure which outweigh the prospects of success. 
 
 Another difficulty in the strict classification is that expeditions 
 intending conquest are of two kinds ; one requiring time and open 
 communications, and the other requiring neither, and therefore 
 falling, as regards its chances of success or failure, under the same 
 set of conditions as surround an expedition which is merely 
 ravaging and destructive. The first class need not be dilated on. 
 It is obvious that if time enters, as we have seen, into the con- 
 ditions of success or failure in mere ravaging and destructive 
 attacks over a doubtfully commanded sea, time must enter still 
 more largely into the conditions which make conquest and occupa- 
 tion after attack possible. Take Gibraltar as an apposite and 
 familiar instance. The place was captured by a small part of 
 Sir George Eooke's fleet in a very short time. But the sea was 
 doubtfully commanded, and had the remainder of Sir George 
 Eooke's fleet not been able to hold its own, and to beat the French 
 fleet three weeks after at the battle of Malaga, Gibraltar must 
 have immediately passed out of our hands again, as it was in 
 no state to have resisted so soon after occupation. Supposing, 
 
 * Cochrane's squadron of 7 sail of the line, 5 of which afterwards proceeded to the 
 West Indies, was watching Ferrol until February 2Sth, 1805, and did not reach 
 Barbados till April 3rd. There were then only 2 sail of the lino in the West Indies, 1 
 at Jamaica and 1 at Bardados. Missiessy sailed on January 17th from Rochefort. He 
 had finished his raiding expeditions by the IGth March, and probably quitted the West 
 Indies just ns Cochruiiu urrlvcd there. 
 
ATTACKS ON TElilUTORY FlloM THE SEA. 219 
 
 tlierefore, that only sufficient force had been sent to attack and 
 cai)ture Gibraltar, there was time enough for its capture, but not 
 time enough to make sure of holding it, even against attack, but 
 certainly not against investment.^'' 
 
 Perhaps Napoleon's descent upon Egypt, already mentioned, is 
 an illustration of the same case. Carried out over a doubtfully 
 commanded sea as that expedition was, the descent itself — though 
 by the narrowest possible margin, as the sails of the arriving 
 French and departing English were seen from Alexandria on the 
 same day — was concluded with speed and facility. But the enter- 
 prize was a failure, because the army could not secure itself in the 
 country before its communications were cut. 
 
 But where the expedition, bent on conquest and occupation, 
 expects assistance in the territory which it proceeds to occupy, the 
 whole case is altered. Once the descent is made, the naval opera- 
 tion is complete, and the communication over sea of the landed 
 forces may be cut without injury to them because reinforcement 
 and supply are not expected over sea, but are designed to come 
 from the territory on which the descent is made. Of course this 
 expectation may be falsified, and then the expedition is a failure. 
 If it is not falsified, there is nothing on the water to prevent its 
 being a success. Prominent and familiar illustrations of these 
 points are readily drawn from naval history. The descent of the 
 Dutch, under the Prince of Orange, on the south coast of England, 
 was a success because the invaders were welcomed by a majority 
 of the people, and because in consequence, the naval operation 
 was complete as soon as the last man had landed. Nothing that 
 the English fleet could do after this landing, could in the least 
 affect the issue, and consequently that fleet did nothing.f Had 
 there been a miscalculation of the support likely to be given to the 
 Prince, the case would have been on all fours with that of Napoleon 
 
 * Minor illustrations are often more forcible, because less extraneous matter creeps 
 in, than great ones. The following passage relating to one of the operations of the 
 Count do Grasse in the West Indies, in May 1781, puts a complete case exactly. " Le 
 meme jour^ I'escadre se plafa au vent do Sainte- Lucie afin d'etre en mesure de com- 
 battre les Anglais, si ceus-ci se presentaient au vent de I'ilo, et de les joindre, s'ils 
 arrivaient par dessus le vent. Le Marquis de Bouille de'barqua, dans la nuit, au Gros- 
 Ilet, avec douze cents hommes. Apres avoir reconnu rimpossibilite do terminer, en 
 quelques semaines, les travaux de defence necessaires pour mettre cette position a 
 I'abri de toute attaque, 11 se rembarqua avec ses troupes. " — Histoire de la Marine 
 Franraise pendant la Guerre de I'lndifpendance Am^ricaine, Par E. Chevalier, Capitaine 
 de Vaisseau. 
 
 t I am of course mindful of the political aspect of the question, but did not tho 
 militnrv conditions make tho politics as far as llio fleet was concerned? 
 
 15* 
 
'110 KAVAL U'AIIFAUE. 
 
 in Egypt ; and a battle of Torbay migbt have sealed the fate of 
 the invaders by cutting their communications with Holland. 
 
 Nearly similar was the landing of French troops in Ireland for 
 the support of James. The naval work of the French was over 
 before Herbert met them in Bantry Bay, and even had he beaten 
 them thorougbly the issue would have been little affected. This 
 illustration is only incomplete, because it was not possible in those 
 days for the English fleet to cut the communications between 
 Ireland and France. 
 
 Ireland furnishes illustrations on the other side also, as, for 
 instance, in the case of the Spanish landing at Kinsale in 1(501, 
 mentioned in my first chapter. Here the expected support failed, 
 and the Spaniards found themselves invested by land with their 
 sea communications cut. An ignominous surrender was the only 
 course open to them. So, again, with the landing of the French 
 in Killala Bay, in 1798, referred to in my eighth chapter. The 
 expected support was not received, and the forces, having their sea 
 communications cut, necessarily surrendered. 
 
 We see then, generally, that what may be done by way of expe- 
 dition over a sea which is not commanded by the Power making 
 the descent on the land, depends on the time required to achieve 
 success, supposing there is no interruption. Lighter attacks can 
 l)e undertaken when heavy and serious ones could not be thought 
 of. But it necessarily follows that heavy forces cannot be used for 
 light attacks. Confessedly, the risks of the light attacks must be 
 great, and these risks are not lessened by attaching to the attacking 
 force a defending or covering naval force which, though strong, is 
 not master of the sea passed over. The success of the light attack 
 is wholly resting on the evasion of possible naval defending force. 
 Ever}' addition to it lessens the chances of successful evasion, and 
 attracts, as it were, increased defending force. When Bompart's 
 squadron left Brest for Lough Swill}^ in September 1798, the force 
 was so large that it was worth following up by the look-out frigates, 
 and the result was its destruction by Sir John Warren.'^ Had the 
 troops for landing gone away in transports entirely unprotected by 
 naval force, the war-ships that actually convoyed them might have 
 engaged the attention of the look-out frigates, and the troops might 
 have been landed without Sir John Warren's knowing anything about 
 it. Unless the convoying force was certain of a local command of 
 the sea — unless a naval force large enough to defy Sir John Warren 
 was sent — it was mere waste of naval force to send any at alL 
 
 • .Soo Chap, VIII, 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 221 
 
 Success was no nearer by sending a comparatively weak naval force, 
 but failure would certainly be much more severe and bitter. So, 
 as I have already observed, Napoleon's taking the fleet with him to 
 Egypt was a mistake in strategy. He courted, in a sense, the 
 battle of the Nile ; for if the fleet could not secure him the com- 
 mand of the sea, it could do nothing, and if — as, in fact, was the 
 case — he was depending on an indifferent sea, the taking of his 
 fleet with him was the very thing to convert the sea he passed over 
 into one doubtfully commanded, as not only attracting the British 
 naval force in that direction, but leaving it free to go there. If the 
 strength of Napoleon's naval force had been left at Toulon, Nelson 
 could not possibly have quitted his watch on that port. 
 
 This brings us to consider that if an expedition of magnitude, 
 with an object of attack which requires time to elapse before sur- 
 render can be expected, be undertaken with any reasonable hopes 
 of success across a doubtfully commanded sea, it must be protected 
 by a naval force sufficiently large either to mask the possibly in- 
 tercepting naval force in his port or ports, or a covering force, quite 
 apart from the expeditionary force, and sufiiciently large to defy, 
 at least on equal terms, any possible naval force which the enemy 
 may bring to bear, must accompany it. To be really secure, both 
 things will be done. There will be, at a distance from the scene of 
 the attacking operations, naval force masking the enemy, and there 
 will be at the scene of operations, a covering naval force prepared 
 to act in case of the unexpected happening. 
 
 We shall see, in the course of our investigations, fairly abundant 
 illustrations of all these different points. We shall class the illus- 
 trations as we go on, and when the outlines of the great variety of 
 cases necessary to be studied are complete, we ought to be in a 
 very fair position to judge of the chances of failure or success in 
 any hypothetical proposition of this kind which may be put to us 
 as determining the conduct of a future naval war. 
 
 Of the natures of these attacks, and the sort of forces employed, 
 I must say a word or two. We shall find the attacks made by 
 ships unassisted by troops extremely rare, and almost confined to 
 cases of bombardment by the Power in unquestioned command of 
 the sea. Bombardments, by way of reprisal on the part of the 
 admittedly inferior naval Power, are almost absent ; but especially 
 in the later epochs of naval history, they tend to frequency on the 
 part of the Power in command of the sea, and are sometimes the 
 object of special preparation. Of this last class are the periodical 
 bombardments of French seaports opening into the Channel, which 
 
222 NAVAL WARFAliE. 
 
 have already been alluded to in passing ; the bombardment of 
 Gibraltar by the Spaniards, the bombardment of Svveaborg, and, 
 to some extent, bombardments of Confederate works by the Federals 
 in the American Civil War. 
 
 Of bombardments by ordinary men-of-war, practically unassisted 
 by any special appliances, we have the notable instance of Copen- 
 hagen, although the regular forts bombarded were less powerful, 
 perhaps, than those extemporized out of ships. Then we might 
 instance Algiers, Acre, and, in our own time, Odessa and Alexandria. 
 
 A class of attack by ships alone, which had an early example in 
 Sir John Duckworth's operations in 1807, in forcing the passage of 
 the Dardanelles, had a high development in the American Civil 
 War, and sometimes possessed there a special interest from the 
 employment of sub-marine mines. In these cases the bombard- 
 ment of the opi^osing forts was a means to an end— namely, the 
 securing of a passage to an object of attack beyond them. To some 
 extent, the attack by ships on the Peiho Forts in 1859 may be said 
 to belong to this class of operations ; but if so, it must take its 
 place among the few failures. 
 
 Simply destructive bombardments, without any immediate ob- 
 ject beyond destruction, whether conducted on a large or a small 
 scale, are found to be rare. And the kind of destructive bom- 
 bardment by even a single ship, of which we shall find examples 
 in the Chilo-Peruvian war, seem to be modern in conception and 
 execution, but still only competent to the power in command of 
 the sea. 
 
 Bombardments by ships in assistance of troops attacking by 
 land are more frequent, although they may be said generally to 
 occupy a strictly subordinate place ; such, for instance, as was 
 exemplified in the bombardment of the Sevastopol forts by our 
 ships during the progress of the siege. 
 
 The main attack being thus in nearly all cases military, we shall 
 note the part that fortifications and works generally bear in the 
 defence. The landings, it will be seen, are never made, if the 
 thing can be avoided, under fire of the works. On the other hand, 
 it is extremely rare to find works so perfectly arranged that the 
 assault must be, as it were, delivered direct from the sea. To 
 some degree at least, the situation of Gibraltar and its capture by 
 direct assault from the sea is unique. In considering the case, it 
 will be necessary to dwell upon the astonishing power of resistance 
 offered by works that cannot be assaulted except on their sea faces. 
 
ATTACKS ON TFAUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 223 
 
 ^ The rellection may be found to have led to the general system of 
 fortification adopted in a bygone ago. 
 
 It seems to have been understood that direct assault from the 
 sea was so inherently difficult, that very slight works guarding 
 against it would always be sufficient to turn the attention of the 
 enemy away from that kind of attack, to one more certain and 
 more easy from the land side. And this being so, the idea of a 
 " citadel," descending apparently in a direct line from the mediseval 
 " keep," seems to have nearly always governed the system of forti- 
 fication adopted, and we shall meet instances where the policy bore 
 its expected fruit.* 
 
 This policy of preparing a complete fortress as a citadel, supplied 
 to stand investment and siege, obviously presupposed the occupa- 
 tion by the enemy of the surrounding country, and therefore 
 assumed that his hands would be left free for whatever ravage and 
 destruction could be compassed. This condition again implied the 
 presence on the territory of an enemy's force superior to the garri- 
 son, for if the force landed were inferior to the garrison it would 
 be met and beaten before it was able to ravage or destroy ; unless, 
 indeed, its operations were so swift that they could be concluded 
 before the garrison was able to put in an appearance. The provi- 
 sion of a citadel therefore assumed the successful landing of a 
 superior force, and did not assume powers of preventing destruc- 
 tion and ravage beyond a very small area surrounding the fortress. 
 But it assumed the possibility of so delaying the final success of 
 the enemy that either relief might come, or that the supply and 
 reinforcement of the enemy might fail, before the fortress fell, and 
 in that case the garrison recovered possession of the territory. 
 The citadel, however, if it was found competent to hold out until 
 relief arrived, or the enemy's supplies failed, might prevent 
 material ravage if all that was most precious and most necessary 
 to preserve from ravage were assembled either inside the citadel 
 or within the area protected by its guns. The existence of such 
 
 * The system is illustrated by the accompanying plans of the fortifications of Chagre 
 on the mainland of South America, and of Grenada in the island of that name. The 
 originals from which the plans were traced are in the library of the United Service 
 Institution. The citadels were generally on, or close to the coast, but not always ; but 
 whether they were on the coast or inland, the object seems to have been to make them 
 at least as strong on the land side as they were on the sea side. Generally, too, as in 
 both these instances, the citadels may have covered, but did not enclose the town. 
 Sometimes we meet towns well protected on the land side and hardly at all on tho sea 
 side, and on looking over a number of plans one does not detect as much anxiety for 
 the sr.fety of the sea side as desire to be prepared for a land attack. It could hardly 
 hav.;; been otlierwise, if experience of attack was to be any guide. 
 
2-24 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 an aiTan.cjement would naturally tend to preclude attacks unless 
 there was ample time for the reduction of the fortress by the usual 
 methods. But this is only another way of saying that the heart 
 of the invaded country lies in the citadel. If it is otherwise, and 
 occupation is intended, and the country may be held without the 
 possession of the citadel, the latter may be neglected, as it will 'fall 
 by the mere lapse of time. 
 
 An apposite reflection may here be ^made. If the possession of 
 the citadel involves the possession of the territory, and it falls, the 
 new possessors of it become as strong as the old ones. In other 
 words, any defence of this kind — as we shall see in many 
 examples — cuts both ways. A place difficult to take is difficult to 
 retake, if the defence is fixed on the land ; but a place depending 
 on naval force for its defence ; that is to say, a place difficult to 
 take in the presence of naval force, and only to be possessed by 
 the holder of the superior naval force, may be much easier to 
 retake than it w^as to take, as the naval force which allowed the 
 capture may prove inferior to that which" comes to recapture. 
 The superior naval power may suffer more prolonged losses of 
 territory which he has fortified and garrisoned, than of territory 
 which he has only garrisoned, and which is without a citadel. 
 The naval defence, that is, the command of the sea over which 
 alone a hostile approach can be made, is therefore on all grounds 
 the most perfect. Apart from it, the territory can only be pro- 
 tected by a garrison, or by a garrison with a citadel. Supposing 
 a temporary loss of command of the sea, conquest of the garrison 
 may be made by landing a superior force. On resumption of the 
 command of the sea, and consequent stoppage of reinforcements 
 and supplies to the new garrison, the territory is easily retaken. 
 But if the new garrison has possessed itself of a supplied citadel, 
 the task of recapture becomes as much more difficult as the 
 works of the citadel have added to the resisting strength of the 
 new garrison. Supposing the superior naval power then admits 
 the possibility of forces being landed on portions of its territory, 
 it may be a question of policy whether the citadel as a substitute 
 for a stronger garrison — which is its real character and offfce — is 
 really a wise and economical institution. Many occasions will 
 arise in the next few chapters when these reflections will naturally 
 present themselves. 
 
 But we shall hardly avoid the conviction, I think, especially 
 after a study of West Indian history, that command of the sea is 
 the only real defence for territory which can be captured by 
 
FORTIFICATIONS 
 of 
 
 GRENADA, 
 
 1779. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUHTOHY FROM THE SEA. 225 
 
 expeditions over it. Wlietlier our forefathers, or our forefathers' 
 enemies, wisely spent their money over garrisons and works which 
 generally failed when the time came, rather than over simply 
 driving the enemy off those seas, and keeping them out of them 
 by a superiority of naval force, which never failed, is perhaps a 
 question not to be determined so long as we are unaware of the 
 relative proportions of the sums so spent. 
 
 If the garrisons and works were wholly insignificant in cost 
 'compared with the sums spent on the endeavour to obtain and 
 keep the command of the sea, we might possibly say that the 
 minority of instances in which garrisons and works prevented the 
 West Indian islands from changing hands justified the policy. 
 But if the former expenditure bore any considerable proportion 
 to the latter, it might be possible to found an argument on the 
 other side. 
 
 In all attacks made over sea against territory, we shall note 
 one almost universal rule. No attacks of magnitude are ever 
 known direct from a distant base. The desire for sheltered, 
 but not necessarily protected waters, forming a naval base near at 
 hand for any operations against territory, has apparently never 
 blackened from the beginning, and is best illustrated by the 
 conduct of the Federals in the Civil War. Bases in their own 
 territory being inconveniently distant from the scene of th<3ir 
 operations against Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, they 
 wrested ports — as at Cape Ilatteras and Port Royal — from the 
 hands of their enemy, and employed them for their own purposes 
 as bases of naval operations. 
 
 Recapitulating, then, we have before us in the remaining 
 eight chapters the investigation by the light of naval history of 
 the circumstances and conditions under which expeditions 
 designed for the descent upon tne land pass over the sea, and 
 succeed or fail in their objects. We shall note that the strategical 
 condition of the sea to be passed over is a primary element to be 
 taken into consideration, and that it falls naturally under three 
 heads : — 
 
 (1.) Where the sea is indifferent; no naval force, properly so 
 called, enters either into attack or defence ; where both are 
 essentially military and conducted entirely on land. 
 
 (2.) Where the command of the sea is doubtful. That is, where 
 the expedition may be interfered with by naval force either on 
 its way to the point of attack, at the point of attack, or by the 
 bubbCiiuent cutting of its communications by sea. 
 
22G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 (3.) Vv'herc the command of the sea is assured. That is, where 
 it is either impossible that any naval force can interfere as above, 
 or at least where there is reasonable probability that no naval 
 force capable of interfering by sea can make its appearance before 
 the completion of all the objects aimed at in the attack. 
 
 We are to note cases of failure where the causes have been 
 purely military, occurring after the landing has been completed. 
 Of some, where causes of failure have been moral, as where the 
 naval and military authorities have disagreed. Of some where 
 the mere appearance, or even the rumour, of naval force has 
 prevented, or caused the abandonment of the expedition ; and of 
 others where the cutting of the communications by sea has brought 
 about a failure when ostensibly the work was completed. 
 
 In most cases we shall be able to see what it was that conduced 
 to success, what it was .that enforced failure; and when our 
 historical survey is concluded we shall probably have some idea, 
 more or less founded on evidence, of what is impossible, possible, 
 probable, and certain, in those operations of naval war which 
 are mentioned at the head of this chapter. 
 
 — w-^i-.s^«rj>.- 
 
227 
 
 CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 TnB Conditions under which Attacks on Terhitory from the 
 Sea succeed or fail, 
 
 Tho two most conspicuous examples of failure, the Armada and the Battle of Lissa 
 are found at the beginning and end of naval history. — The Annada expcditiou de- 
 scribed. — Causes of its failure parallel to those bringing about the failure of the 
 Italians at Lissa. — And of Napoleon in Egypt. — Descents conducted over a doubtful 
 soa must be expected to fail. — Descents upon friendly shores illustrated by those on 
 Ireland in IGSO, &c. — The commencement of the long series of captures and recaptures 
 of the West India Islands in 1G30, exhibits all the elements of success in commanded 
 sea, and co-operation between army and navy on the understanding that the navy 
 places the army in position and then takes but a minor share in the attack. 
 
 It is not a little remarkable that the two failures of attacks on 
 territory most conspicuous from their magnitude and complete- 
 ness should lie, the one near the very beginning of the his- 
 torical record, and the other near the end of it. The whole naval 
 force of Spain, and a great part of her military force, were con- 
 centrated for a descent on the shores of England in the year 
 1588. The whole naval force of Italy, and some part of her 
 military force were brought together for the conquest of the 
 island of Lissa in the year 1866. Both undertakings were utter 
 failures, and palpably from the same cause. The strategical error 
 committed was the same that Napoleon committed in his descent 
 upon Egypt, and that de Conflans intended tu commit, had 
 Ilawke not interfered with him too much beforehand. I do not 
 here propose to describe the failure of the Italians at Lissa, as 
 that will come in its due chronological order, but it is necessary 
 to mention it in juxtaposition with the failure of the Armada, as 
 each throws light upon the other, and enables us to understand 
 more clearly where the fundamental error lay. 
 
 In describing the events surrounding the sailing, voyage, and 
 dispersal of the Armada, I have found that I cannot possibly do 
 
 / 
 I 
 J 
 
228 
 
 NAVAL ]VAIiFARE. 
 
 better than to quote largely from a paper by Professor Langbton, 
 read at tbe Koyal Institution of Great Britain on May 4, 1888, 
 and entitled " The Invincible Armada, a Tercentenary Eetrospect." 
 In preparing his paper, Mr. Laughton has consulted the best 
 authorities, and its value is of no passing character. 
 
 " Drake's brilliant raid through the West Indies determined 
 Philip on a decided course. For the past fifteen years the inva- 
 sion of England had been mooted ^s a thing desirable and not 
 impossible. It had been proposed by the Duke of Alva in 1569, 
 and more recently in 1583, after his victory over Strozzi and his 
 scratch fleet — mostly of French adventurers — at Tercera ; the 
 Marquis of Santa Cruz had urged it as a necessary step towards 
 the reduction of the rebellious Netherlands. •' The Duke of Parma 
 had written to the same effect, repeating that English soldiers 
 were of little count in presence of the Spanish veterans, and 
 adding a statement which seems to have obtained general 
 credence among the Spaniards, that the English ships at Tercera 
 had been the first to fly ; had, in fact, played a part somewhat 
 resemblnig that of the Egyptian ships at Actium. It is quite 
 possible that there were some English ships at Tercera, though it 
 is doubtful ; if there were, they certainly did not imitate Strozzi's 
 ill-judged and suicidal manuiuvre of closing with the Spaniards, 
 and, small blame to them, effected their escape. True or not, 
 however, it appears certain that this reported flight of the English 
 ships did have very considerable weight with many of the King's 
 advisers ; and so advised, and at the same time impelled by wrath, 
 he determined on the attempt. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was 
 called on for his scheme, which extended to gigantic proportions. 
 Everything was to be done from Spain. The whole shipping of 
 the empire was to be collected. Every available soldier was to be 
 mustered. According to the very detailed project submitted by 
 Santa Cruz on 22nd March, 1586, the numbers amounted to : — 
 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons. Sailors. 
 
 Soldiers. 
 
 Great ships of war 
 
 - 150 
 
 77,250| 
 8,000 [ 16,612 
 
 
 Store ships 
 
 - 40 
 
 55,000 
 
 Smaller vessels - 
 
 - 320 
 
 25,000) 
 
 
 ssides — 
 
 
 Sailors and Fighting 
 
 
 
 No. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Rowers. 
 
 Galeasses 
 
 6 
 
 720 
 
 1,800 
 
 Galleys 
 
 - 40 
 
 3,200 
 
 8,000 
 
 L« Annada Invjuible, porel Cauitan do Navio C. Foruandoz Dure Tom. i., p. l\i. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 229 
 
 Giving a total of 556 ships of all kinds, and 85,332 men, to which 
 were to be added cavalry, artillerymen, volunteers, and non- 
 combatants, bringing up the number of men to a gross total of 
 94,222.- 
 
 "A project so vast and so costly did not come within the King's 
 idea of * practical jiolitics ' ; he resolved on the expedition, but 
 conceived the idea of doing it at a cheaper rate by utilizing the 
 army in the Low Countries. From this grew up the scheme which 
 ultimately took form. The Duke of Parma was to prepare an 
 army of invaders in the Netherlands, and a number of fl&i;- 
 bottomed boats to carry it across the sea. The Marquis of Santa 
 Cruz was to bring up the Channel a fleet powerful enough to crush 
 any possible opposition, and carrying with it a body of troops 
 which, when joined with those under Parma, would form an 
 army at least as numerous as that which Santa Cruz had detailed 
 as sufficient. 
 
 " The necessary preparations were extensive, and it is not quite 
 clear that, as they became more definite, Philip's ardour did not 
 somewhat slacken. The cost was certain, the issue was doubtful ; 
 and even if successful, the result might perhaps not be exactly what 
 was desired. Philip had always posed as a supporter of the Queen 
 of Scots, but the doubt must have suggested itself whether it was 
 worth while, at this great cost, to conquer a kingdom for her, a 
 kingdom which, with her French blood and French proclivities, 
 would become virtually a French province. The death of the 
 Queen of Scots, on 8-18 February 1587, removed this difficulty. 
 Even if the conquered kingdom was to be handed over to James, 
 James was not bound to France as his mother had been. Placed 
 on the throne of England by Spanish arms, he might be 
 expected, or even constrained, to hold it virtually as a Spanish 
 fief. 
 
 " Preparations were therefore now hurried on in earnest. Ships 
 were collected at the several ports, and especially at Lisbon and 
 Cadiz. It seemed probable that the invasion would be attempted 
 in the summer of 1587, when, some months before, Drake, with a 
 fleet of twenty-four ships, all told, appeared on the coast. The 
 orders under which he sailed from England on 2nd April were to 
 prevent the different Spanish squadrons from joining, and where 
 he found their shipci to destroy them. It was a grand and master- 
 ful step, but it had scarcely been ordered before the Queen repented 
 
 * Duro, vol. i., p. 2:3. 
 
 16 
 
230 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 of it. Counter orders were sent post haste to Plymouth, but Drake 
 had ah-eady sailed. They followed him, but never found him ; 
 perhaps the bearer of them was not too eager to find him. At any 
 rate, Drake never got these orders, and acting on those first given, 
 with which he had sailed, he did, at Cadiz, singe the King of 
 Spain's beard in a most effective manner. Thirty-seven ships 
 there collected were sunk, burnt, or brought away. They were as 
 yet unarmed, unmanned, and when the forts were once passed, 
 could ofi'er no resistance. Other damage Drake did, insulting 
 Santa Cruz in the very port of Lisbon, offering battle, which Santa 
 Cruz was in no position to accept. 
 
 " The destruction of shipping and stores at Cadiz necessarily 
 delayed the equipment of the Spanish fleet ; the year passed away, 
 and it was not ready. The following February (1588) the Marquis 
 of Santa Cruz died. The loss to Spain was incalculable, for he 
 was the only man who by birth was entitled, and by experience was 
 competent, to command such an expedition as he had set on foot. 
 Curiously, however, the King and his couvt do not seem to have 
 realised their loss, and with a light heart appointed Don Alonso 
 Perez de Guzman el Bueno, Duke of Medina-Sidonia, to the vacant 
 command. Medina-Sidonia, now in his 38th year, was a man with 
 no qualification for the post except his distinguished birth, and a 
 gentleness of temper which, it was perhaps thought, would fit 
 better with the idea of making him subordinate to the Duke of 
 Parma, . . . His answer to the King on being ordered to take on 
 himself the command is in itself a curiosity. ' The business,' he 
 wrote, 'was so great, so important, that he could not conscientiously 
 undertake it, being, as he was, altogether without experience or 
 knowledge of either the sea or of war.' His objections were, how- 
 ever, overruled ; and in an evil hour for his reputation, he con- 
 sented. The equipment of the fleet was pushed on, and by the 
 middle of May it was ready to sail from the Tagus. It did actually 
 sail on 20th-80th May." 
 
 A certain amount of alarm, even of terror, was created in Eng- 
 land by the approach of the Armada, but " There was one class of 
 Her Majesty's subjects, the members of which had not this exaltod 
 opinion of Spanish power and Spanish prowess. For the last 
 twenty years English sailors had been, in their own irregular way, 
 fighting the Spaniards on every sea where they were to be met, 
 and had come to the conclusion that, whatever the Spaniard might 
 be ashore, afloat he was but a poor creature ; the experiences of 
 Drake, Hawkyns, Fenton, Fenner, and a score of others whose 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 231 
 
 names are less familiar, had proved that, even with great apparent 
 odds in their favour, Spaniards were not invincible. . . . What 
 English sailors thought of them may be judged from a letter 
 written by Fenner, who was with Drake when he burnt the 
 shipping at Cadiz. ' Twelve of Her Majesty's ships,' he said, 
 * were a match for all the galleys in the King of Spain's 
 dominions.' 
 
 " But the power of Spain, the tavern gossip and braggadocio of 
 Lisbon, and the reports of spies who felt in honour bound to give 
 full value for their hire, grossly exaggerated the size, the might, 
 the armament, and the equipment of the fleet as it sailed from 
 Lisbon. Of the numbers, size, and armament I shall have to 
 speak presently. The equipment, with which we are just now 
 concerned, was so well arranged and so perfect, that by the time 
 the fleet reached Cape Finisterre, vast quantities of the provisions 
 were found to be bad, putrid, and fit for nothing but to be thrown 
 overboard. The ships were shorty of water, probably because the 
 casks were leaky. The ships themselves were also leaking — 
 strained, it was said, by the heavy weather, but really from being 
 over-masted. Several of them were with difficulty kept afloat ; 
 some were dismasted ; and the distress was so general that Medina- 
 Sidonia determined to put into Corunna to refit. This he did, but 
 without taking any precautions to let his intention be known 
 through the fleet. The Scilly Isles had been given out as the ren- 
 dezvous in case of separation, and some dozen of the ships, finding 
 they had lost sight of the Admiral, did accordingly go to the 
 neighbourhood of the Scilly Isles, where they were duly seen and 
 reported at Plymouth. Their recall, the collecting the fleet at 
 Corunna, the refitting, the re-provisioning, all took time. The 
 damage was so great, the number of sick so large, the season 
 getting so advanced, that a council of war urgently recommended 
 postponing the expedition till next year. The King's orders were, 
 however, imperative; and the fleet finally sailed from Corunna on 
 the 12th-22nd of July. 
 
 •' The main part of the English fleet was meantime mustered at 
 Plymouth, under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham, the 
 Lord Admiral of England, with wliom were Drake and Hawkyns as 
 Vice and Piear- Admirals ; several noblemen, including Lord 
 Thomas Howard, the Admiral's nephew, his two sons-in-law, Lord 
 Sheffield and Sir Robert Southwell, and that quaint mixture of 
 courtier, adventurer, and buccaneer, the Earl of Cumberland ; 
 ■together with many genuine sea dogs, of whom the best known 
 
 IG* 
 
232 NAVAL W A UFA HE. 
 
 are Frobiser, Fenner, and Fenton. Large numbers of merchant 
 ships, levied by the Queen or by their own towns, had joined the 
 fleet, which, as it lay at Plymouth consisted of about 80 sail, all 
 told. From the time of his return from ihe coast of Spain in the 
 previous summer, Drake had been urgent that he should be sent 
 out again, with a still more powerful squadron, to repeat the blow. 
 Hawkyns, Frobiser, Fenner — all seamen of experience — were of 
 the same opinion. Howard, guided by their advice, repeatedly 
 pressed the importance of the step ; but Elizabeth steadfastly 
 refused. She hoped perhaps for peace ; more probably perhaps, 
 she hoped that the war might continue to be carried on in the 
 same cheap and desultory fashion as during the last three years, 
 and was unwilling to set Philip the example of more sustained 
 efforts. And so, notwithstanding the prayers and entreaties of 
 Howard and Drake, backed up by the opinion of every man of 
 experience, no further attempt was made on the Spanish ports. It 
 is probable enough that had Drake been permitted, he would have 
 kindled such a blaze in the Tagus, or in the harbour of Corunna, 
 as would have effectually prevented the invasion which was now 
 on foot. 
 
 "It has been said over and over again"' that the Duke of 
 Medina- Sidonia was ordered by Philip to hug the French coast, 
 so as to avoid the English fleet, and to reach the Straits of Dover 
 with his force intact. Nothing can well be more inaccurate. He 
 was on the contrary, ordered, if he met Drake near the mouth of 
 the Channel to fall on him and destroy him ; it would be easier 
 and more certain to destroy the English fleet piecemeal, than to 
 allow it to collect in one. Nor do his instructions contain one 
 word about hugging the French coast ; on the contrary, they 
 advise the Scilly Isles or the Lizard as a rendezvous, and sugges-t 
 the propriety of seizing on some unfortified port in the south of 
 England.f As a matter of fact, a position south of the Scilly 
 Isles was given out as a rendezvous in the first instance ; in the 
 second, on sailing from Corunna, the rendezvous was Mounts 
 Bay.t 
 
 " In crossing the Bay of Biscay the Spaniards experienced bad 
 weather, and were a good deal scattered : barely two-thirds of the 
 
 ♦ Monsonin ChurchiU's Voyages, vol iii., p. 149., Lediard's Naval History, vol. i., 
 p. 253. As, at any rate, Medina-Siaonia, by the testimony of both these authorities, 
 acted in accordance with the determination of a council of war, the original orders ar* 
 of less moment. 
 
 t Duro, vol. ii., p. 8. 
 
 X Ibid.,\o\. ii.,pp. 27, 1C8. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 283 
 
 fleet were in company when Medina- Sidonia sighted the Lizard 
 on the morning of the 19th July, according to the EngUsh 
 calendar, which I shall henceforth follow. 
 
 "Whilst the Duke of Medina- Sidonia wasl3-ing-to off the Lizard, 
 on the 19th July, he was sighted by one of the English cruisers, 
 the Golden Hind, commanded by Thomas Flemyng, who forth- 
 with carried the news to the Admiral ; * and, according to the 
 familiar story, which I see no reason to doubt, found him, with 
 the admirals and captains of the fleet, playing bowls on the 
 Iloe. 
 
 " The following day, Saturday, the 20th, the Spanish fleet was 
 collected off the Lizard and moved slowly eastwards. A council 
 of war was held. They had learned that the English fleet was at 
 Plymouth, and the great weight of opinion among the Spanish 
 leaders was that they ought to attack it there. It has always been 
 said that jNIedina- Sidonia was prevented from doing this by his 
 instructions. The statement is inaccurate. The letter of his 
 instructions distinctly permitted him to attack the English fleet ; 
 the spirit of them enjoined his doing it.f Fortunately, he 
 misunderstood his instructions ; he conceived that he was bound 
 to go up Channel, turning neither to the right hand nor to the 
 left until he could effect a junction with the Duke of Parma. 
 Had he, on the 19th, when he first learned that the EngHsh fleet 
 was at Plymouth, crowded sail with even such ships as he had 
 with him, he might have entered the Sound that evening. The 
 Avind was from the S.W., and the English ships, penned in 
 between the Spaniards and the shore, would have been forced to 
 fight hand to hand ; the result might easily have been disaster. 
 The Spaniards neglected their chance, and it never recurred ; for 
 during Saturday the English got out of the Sound, and stretched 
 along the coast to the westward. On Sunday morning, when the 
 two fleets were first in presence of each other, the English were to 
 windward, and by the weatherly qualities of their ships had no 
 difficulty in keeping the advantage they had gained. 
 
 " And now, before the fighting begins, it is time to speak of the 
 comparative force of the opposing fleets. We have all known 
 from our infancy that the Spanish ships, as compared with the 
 
 • State Papem, Domestic, ccxx.,G2. 
 
 t Monson has a curious paragraph whioh Mr. Laujjhton does not seem to have 
 noticed. He says (Churchill, vol. iii., p. 304): " In 1588, when the Duke of Medina 
 came for England, had he been furnished with a pilot that knew the Lizard, when he 
 made it for the Ramhead, he had the nest morning given an attempt upon our ships at 
 Phmouth when he was not sui-pected or looked for." 
 
234 NAVAL WAUFAPiE. 
 
 English, were stupendous in point of size, marvellous in their 
 strength ; in guns and in number of men beyond all proportion. 
 The numbers I give here, from the official Spanish record,* agree 
 very well with those reported in England. t 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Men. 
 
 130 
 
 57,8G8 
 
 2,431 
 
 8,050 Seamen. 
 18,973 Soldiers. 
 1,382 Volunteers, &c. 
 2,088 Rowers. 
 
 Total - - • 30,493 
 
 " In one point alone of this statement is the difference from the 
 English account worth noticing. Barrow gives the number of 
 Spanish guns as 3,165. To this I shall presently recur. Mean- 
 time, I have to point out that these numbers refer to the fleet as 
 it left Lisbon. They had suffered a marked decrease before the 
 fleet left Corunna, and a still further decrease before the fleet 
 came into the Channel. Of the ships left behind I have no 
 account. Some— and some large ships amongst them — certainly 
 did not come on. Some, again, appear to have parted company 
 on the voyage ; and of four galleys, from which much had been 
 expected, one was driven ashore and wrecked near Bayonne : the 
 other three making very bad weather of it, returned to Spain. f 
 Allowing for these losses, I think it doubtful whether even 120 
 ships of all sizes came into the Channel ; the number of men did 
 certainly not exceed 24,000 ; and, in the council of war held at 
 Corunna, it was estimated as low as 22,500. On the other hand, 
 the number of men borne in the English ships, when all collected 
 together, is officially given as 15,925, to which ought to be added 
 many more who were sent off from Plymouth on 21st July, or who 
 joined as volunteers during the passage up Channel. It is difficult 
 to estimate the gross total as less than from 17,000 to 18,000 
 men. 
 
 "Our idea of the Spanish ships has been also somewhat ex- 
 aggerated. According to Barrow : ' The best of the Queen's ships 
 placed alongside one of the first class of Spaniards would have 
 been like a sloop of war by the side of a first rate.' In point of 
 tonnage they were, in fact, the same. The largest Spaniard, the 
 
 * Duro, vol. ii., pp. GG, 83. 
 
 f Barrow's Life of Drake, p. 270. 
 
 J Duro, vol. i., p. 05 ; vol. ii., pp. 190, 112. 
 
ATTACKS OX TERUITOItY FROM THE SEA. 205 
 
 Ilcgazona of the Levant squadron, is given as of 1,219 tons. The 
 largest English ship, the Triumph, was of 1,100 tons, and many 
 circumstances lead me to believe that the English mode of reckon- 
 ing tonnage gave a smaller result than the Spanish."^ There is 
 no doubt, however, that the Spanish ships looked larger. Their 
 jioops and forecastles, rising tier above tier to a great height, 
 towered far above the lower-built English. Not that the larger 
 English ships were by any means flush-decked ; but they were not 
 so high-charged as the Spanish. The difference offered a great 
 advantage to the Spaniards in hand-to-hand fighting ; it made 
 their ships leewardly and unmanageable even in a moderate 
 breeze, and, added to the Spanish neglect of recent improvements 
 in rig, rendered them ver}^ inferior to the English in the open 
 sea.f 
 
 " And not only was there this inferiority of the ships ; there was 
 at least a corresponding inferiority of the seamen. The Spaniards 
 were, in fact, to a^ great extent fair weather sailors. Some there 
 doubtless were who had doubled Cape Horn or the Cape of Good 
 Plope, but by far the greater number had little experience beyond 
 the Mediterranean, or the equable run down the trades to the 
 West Indies. To the English, on the other hand, accustomed 
 from boyhood to the Irish or Iceland fisheries, in manhood to 
 the voyages to the North-West with Frobiser or Davys, or round 
 the world with Drake, the summer gales of the Channel were, by 
 comparison, passing trifles — things to be warded off' but not to be 
 feared. Even if the men had been equal in quality, the Spanish 
 ships were terribly under-manned. The seamen habitually gave 
 place to the soldiers, and soldiers commanded; the seamen did 
 the drudgery, and not one was borne in excess of what their 
 soldier masters thought necessary. The absolute numbers speak 
 for themselves, and one comparison will be sufficient. The San 
 Martin, of 1,000 tons, the flag-ship of the Duke of Medina, had 
 177 seamen and 300 soldiers. The Ark, of 800 tons, the flag-ship 
 of Lord Howard, appears to have had something like 300 seamen 
 and 125 soldiers. 
 
 *' More important, however, than even this inferiority of the 
 Spanish ships and sailors was the inferiority of their guns and 
 gunners. Now here I come on to what is, I believe, to most of 
 you, new ground. You have always been accustomed to hear of 
 
 * Other modes of reckoning tonnage adopted in the following reign gave results 
 varying from 20 to 50 per cent. more. — State Pajiers, Domestic, ccxxxvii., G4. 
 '+ Compare ilonson in Churchill, vol. lii., up. 312, 319. 
 
236 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 the niiniber and size of the Spanish guns. The statements to that 
 effect are absolutely incorrect. The Spanish guns were, as a rule, 
 small — 4, 6, or 10-pounders ; they were comparatively few, and 
 they were execrably worked.* The simplest way to show this is 
 by a comparative table of armaments. It is not perfect, it is not 
 rigidly accurate ; the means to construct a perfect or accurate 
 table do not, I fear, exist ; but, so far as it goes, the table em- 
 bodies the best information attainable. 
 
 " The English armaments shown in it are from a list dated 1595- 
 99, t and may possibly show some improvement on the armament 
 of the ships carried in 1588. I see no reason, however, to sus- 
 pect such. I have not been able to trace the original from which 
 this paper was printed, but I have found of the same date, 1595, 
 estimates for the armament of three ships now in building,! the 
 ordnance for the first mentioned being described as * answerable 
 to the pieces that are in the Mer Honour.' I, therefore, show 
 here also the armament of the Mer Hononr, as^given in the paper 
 in the Archaolofiia already referred to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Desci-iption of gnns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ghix's' names. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Men. 
 
 No. 
 of 
 
 Weight of 
 broadside 
 
 
 
 
 Small 
 
 
 
 i 1 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 guns. 
 
 in lbs. 
 
 60 
 
 30 
 
 24 1 18 j 12 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 
 
 Spanish — 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. Lorenzo . 
 
 
 'd^ii^y 
 
 50 
 
 .370 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 
 6 ... 
 
 (J 
 
 !() 
 
 16 
 
 N. S. d. Rosario . 
 
 1,150 
 
 422 
 
 41 
 
 195 
 
 ... 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 4 ... 
 
 1 
 
 
 26 
 
 Annunciada . 
 
 703 
 
 275 
 
 24 
 
 67 
 
 
 
 
 3 ... 
 
 3 
 
 
 18 
 
 Sta. Mar. d. Visaii 
 
 666 
 
 307 
 
 18 
 
 54 
 
 
 ... 
 
 ... 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 English — 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Triumph 
 
 1,100 
 
 500 
 
 68 
 
 402 
 
 4 
 
 3 ... 
 
 17 j ... 
 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 30 
 
 Ark . 
 
 800 
 
 425 
 
 0.) 
 
 377 
 
 4 
 
 4 ... 
 
 12 ... 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 17 
 
 Nonpareil . 
 
 500 
 
 250 
 
 i)i\ 
 
 264 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 7 ... 
 
 8 
 
 12 
 
 24 
 
 J:''oi-esight . . 
 
 300 
 
 160 
 
 37 
 
 102 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 8 
 
 15 
 
 Tiger . 
 
 liOO 
 
 100 
 
 22 
 
 83 
 
 
 ... ... 
 
 . i ... 
 
 (J 
 
 U 
 
 2 
 
 Tramontana . 
 
 150 
 
 70 
 
 21 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 ... 1 ... 
 
 
 12 
 
 9 
 
 Achates 
 
 100 
 
 60 
 
 13 
 
 36 
 
 
 -I-,-!- 
 
 6 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 Si:(, 
 
 ONu Tap. 
 
 KK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jler Honour . , 
 
 8C0 
 
 
 41 
 
 281 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 15 
 
 ... j 16 
 
 4 
 
 ., 
 
 Sept. 1595 . 
 
 •i 
 
 ... 
 
 44 
 
 299 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 16 
 
 ... ! 18 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 Oct. 1595 I. . 
 
 ? 
 
 ... 
 
 44 
 
 I' 8 2 
 
 
 
 ... 
 
 LO 
 
 
 20 
 
 4 
 
 
 „ II. . 
 
 y 
 
 ... 
 
 36 
 
 222 
 
 
 ... 
 
 
 16 
 
 ... 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 ... 
 
 Another estimate that seems entitled to credit is that given of 
 
 • Duro, vol. ii., p. 237. 
 
 f Arrhwoloyid, vol. siii., p. 27; PoiTick's lliae and Progress of the lioijal Nary, 
 p. 31. 
 
 X iitate Papers, Boinestic, ccVm, il4; ccliv., 43. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 2;J7 
 
 the armament of the Rcverujc — a ship of the same size and number 
 of men as the Nonpareil, which was taken by the Spaniards in 
 1591, and was reported by them to have 43 brass guns, 20 on the 
 lower deck, of from 4,000 to 6,000 lbs. weight, and the rest from 
 2,000 to 3,000.* The greater weights corresponded to 60, 30, 
 or 18-pounders ; the smaller to the 9, and 6-pounders. 
 
 " Of the Spanish armament we cannot speak with the same 
 absolute knowledge ; but it seems admitted that the galeasses were 
 the most heavily-armed ships of the fleet, and of these the San 
 Lorenzo, which was taken off Calais, was the largest and heaviest. 
 The report of her armament, given by people who had posses- 
 sion of her for some time, corresponds fairly well with the official 
 statement.f The Niiestra Scilora del Rosario was the largest ship 
 captured by Drake and sent into Torbay.J Her armament is given 
 from the official inventory taken at Torquay. She is spoken of by 
 Duro as one of the most powerful and best ships of the fleet. § The 
 other two ships do not seem distinguished in any way from the 
 others of the same size ; they belonged to the Levant squadron, 
 and are classed with the San Juan de Sicilia of 800 tons and 26 
 guns, which is spoken of as having taken a prominent part in the 
 action of 29th July. I have not met with any account of the 
 armament of the ships of the Portuguese squadron, including the 
 San Martin, San Felipe, and San Mateo, of which all three were in 
 the thickest of the fight, and the two last were driven ashore in a 
 sinking state. Neither have I met with any inventory of the 
 Nuestra Scnora de la Rosa, the ship that was partially blown up 
 and was sent into Weymouth. I do not, of course, suppose that 
 the more effective fighting ships of the fleet were armed like the 
 Annunciada or Santa Maria de Visarl ; but I do believe that the 
 armament of these is a fair representative of that of a very large 
 proportion of ships that have been counted as effective. 
 
 " I must note also, that whereas the Spanish ships of below 300 
 tons burden carried four or six small guns — a merely nominal 
 armament — English ships of 200 tons carried a very respectable 
 armament, and ships even still smaller were not altogether despic- 
 able. Of the way in which the English merchant ships were 
 armed, we have no knowledge ; but considering that the fitting 
 them out for purposes of war was no novelty, that many of them 
 had probably been on privateering cruises before, and that the 
 
 * Duro, vol. i., p. 7(3. 
 
 t Siatr. Pitpers, Domestic, ocxiii., G7. Duro, vol. i., ^j. oOO. 
 
 J State Pitpers, Domestic, ccxv., 671. 
 
 § Duro, vol. i. , p. 834. 
 
238 NAVAL WAEFAEE. 
 
 Pelican or Golden Hind in which Drake went round the world — a 
 ship of nominally 100 tons — had 14 guns, I would distinctly question 
 Barrow's judgment that, "looking at their tonnage, two-thirds of 
 them, at least, would have been of little service, and indeed must 
 have required uncommon vigilance to keep them out of harm's 
 way.'* They were not, in('e3 1, the ships that were to be found in 
 the forefront of the fight — no more were the Euryalus or Naiad at 
 Trafalgar — but I see no reason to doubt that they did, in their 
 own way, render good and efficient service. 
 
 " It was not only in the number and weight of guns that the 
 English had a great comparative advantage ; they were immensely 
 superior in the working of them. I may quote here from Captain 
 Duro a very remarkable statement, which, however, is fully corro- 
 borated by original writers and by known facts. By the Spaniards, 
 he says,t ' The cannon was held to be an ignoble arm ; well 
 enough for the beginning of the fray, and to pass away the time 
 till the moment of engaging hand to hand, that is, of boarding. 
 Actuated by such notions, the gunners were recommended to aim 
 high, so as to dismantle the enemy and prevent his escape ; but 
 as a vertical stick is a difticult thing to hit, the result was that 
 shot were expended harmlessly in the sea, or at best made some 
 holes in the sails, or cut a few ropes of no great consequence.' On 
 the other hand, the gun was the weapon which the English sailors 
 had early learned to trust to. Their practice might appear con- 
 temptible enough to an E.vcellenfs gun's crew, but everything 
 must have a beginning. With no disparts or side scales, with no 
 aid beyond, possibly, a marked quoin to lay the gun horizontal, and 
 with shot which — perhaps a good inch less in diameter than the 
 bore of the gun — wobbled from side to side, or from top to bottom, 
 leaving the gun at an angle that chance dictated, the hitting the 
 object aimed at was excessively doubtful. Still, by firing a great 
 many shot, they did manage to get home with sufiicient to do a 
 good deal of damage. The Spanish accounts speaking of the 
 quickness of the English fire, estimate the English expenditure of 
 shot as about three times their own. J 
 
 " There is another point v^-hich may very probably have also 
 stood in the way of the Spanish gunners. Through the greater 
 part of the last century, the ports of Spanish line-of-battle ships 
 were made much too small, with the idea, apparently, of keeping 
 out the enemy's musketry shot, but with the actual result that 
 their guns could neither be trained, depressed, or elevated. lu 
 
 * Life of Drake, p. 270. f Puio, vol. i., p. 77. J Ibid., vol. ii., p. 377. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEmUTORY FROM THE SEA. 239 
 
 this way was possible such an action as that between the GloriosOf 
 a 70-gun ship, and the Kinr/ George, a frigate-built privateer of 
 32 guns, in 1747, in which the two ships engaged broadside to 
 broadside for several hours without the privateer receiving any 
 proportionate damage. In the beginning, some such fault was 
 general, and to a very great extent the gun was brought to bear 
 by the action of the helm ; but it is at least probable that Spanish 
 ships carried it to a still greater degree, and that this might, to 
 some extent, exaggerate the badness of the Spanish gunnery 
 practice, which was very bad indeed. 
 
 " All this was quite well known to Philip, and therefore to the 
 principal oflicers in the fleet, before they left Lisbon. The King's 
 instructions to Medina-Sidonia ran : — ' You are especially to take 
 notice that the enemy's object will be to engage at a distance, on 
 account of the advantage which they have from their artillery and 
 the offensive fireworks with which they will be provided ; and, on 
 the other hand, the object on our side should be to close and 
 grapple and engage hand to hand.'* This, perhaps, may partly 
 explain the comparatively small quantity of shot per gun provided 
 for such a vast undertaking ; a quantity so small that, notwithstand- 
 ing the slowness of their fire, they ran short even after the 
 skirmishes in the Channel. 
 
 "In estimating the opposing forces, this great superiority of the 
 English armament must be taken into account. Of Spanish ships 
 of 300 tons and upwards the number that left Lisbon was officially 
 stated at 80, but of these 18 were rated as ships of burden {ureas 
 de carc/a), and, though they carried troops and some guns, coukl 
 not be counted as effective ships of war. Of the remaining 62, 
 many ought to be reckoned in the same category. An armament 
 such as that of the Annunciada or Sta. Maria speaks for itself. 
 From the number of soldiers they carried, and from their lofty 
 poops and forecastles, such ships would be dangerous enough in a 
 hand-to-hand fight, but were perfectly harmless as long as they 
 were kept at a distance. But counting all these, we have the 
 following comparison of the fleets : — 
 
 Spanish, English. 
 
 1.. Tons. ..- Tons. 
 
 ^«^- Average. ^°^- Average. 
 
 Of 300 tons and upwards - G2 727 23 552 
 Of 200 to 300 tons . . _ _ 26 210 
 
 49 
 
 I)uro, vol. i:., p. 9, 
 
240 NAVAL WAUFAPiE, 
 
 "The English ships of 200 tons being inchided as unquestionably 
 superior as fighting machines to many of the much larger Spanish 
 ships. 
 
 " I am dwelling upon these points, to many of which I do not 
 think sufficient attention has been paid, not as in any way detract- 
 ing from the superlative merit of the Englishmen who fought and 
 won in this great battle, but as showing that their achievement, 
 however great, was still within the bounds of human prowess. 
 The Spaniards of that time were among the most splendid soldiers 
 that the world has seen ; and to speak of our men engaging them 
 and defeating them, against such tremendous odds as are com- 
 monly shown, is not to exalt our heroes, but to travesty them into 
 paladins of impossible romance, or, in spite of abundant evidence 
 to the contrary, to represent them and the land they defended as 
 saved from extermination only by the direct interposition of pro- 
 vidence, and by a heaven-sent gale of wind. 
 
 *' Time will not permit me, nor do I think it necessary, to 
 describe to you in detail the fight of that eventful week ; to tell 
 you how on Sunday morning, 21st July, the English, having gained 
 the wind, fell on the ships of the Spanish rear-guard, under the 
 command of Don Juan Martinez de Eecalde in the Santa Ana, and 
 without permitting them to close, as they vainly tried to do, 
 pounded them with their great guns for the space of three hours, 
 with such eliect that Eecalde sent to Don Pedro de Valdes for 
 assistance, his ship having been hulled several times and her 
 foremast badly Avounded ; how Don Pedro's ship, the Nuestra 
 Seilora del Eosario, in going to his assistance, fouled first one and 
 then another of her consorts, lost her bowsprit, foremast and 
 maintopmast, and was left by INIedina-Sidonia, who conceived it to 
 be his duty to push on to Dunkirk, even at the sacrifice of this 
 large and valuable ship, which was taken possession of by Drake 
 the next morning and sent into Torbay ; how another ship, the 
 Nuestra Scfiora de la Rosa, of 945 tons, was partially blown up 
 and was similarly left to be taken possession of by order of the 
 Admiral, and to be sent into Weymouth ; how on the Tuesday 
 there was another sharp action off Portland, and again a third on 
 the Thursday off the Isle of Wight, when Eecalde's ship, the Santa 
 Ana of 7G8 tons, received so much further damage that she left 
 the fleet and ran herself ashore near Havre; how the English, 
 joined as they passed along by many small vessels full of men, 
 but finding their store of shot running short, were content for the 
 next day with closely following up the Spaniards, who on Saturday 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 241 
 
 afternoon anchored off Calais, whilst the English anchored about 
 a mile to the westward and to windward of them. Here Howard 
 was joined by the squadron of the narrow seas, under Lord Henry 
 Seymour and Sir William Wynter, by the contingent of the city 
 of London, under Nicholas Gorges, and by many private ships, 
 bringing the number up to a gross total of nearly 200, a large 
 portion of which were very small, but of which, as I have already 
 said, 49 were effective ships of war. The Spanish numbers had 
 been reduced by the loss of three, if not four, of their largest 
 and best ships, and were further reduced off Calais by the loss of 
 the San Lorenzo, the largest and most heavily armed of the 
 galleons. For on Sunday night Howard sent eight fire-ships in 
 amongst the Spanish fleet ; the Spaniards, panic-struck, cut their 
 cables, and by wind and tide were swept far to leeward. In the 
 confusion the San Lorenzo damaged her rudder, and in the morn- 
 ing was driven ashore, and after a sharp fight captured by the 
 boats of the Ark and some of the smaller ships. But the fleet 
 was away off Gravelines, and there on that Monday, 29th July, 
 was fought the great battle which, more distinctly perhaps than 
 any battle of modern times, has moulded the history of Europe; 
 the battle which curbed the gigantic power of Spain, which 
 shattered the Spanish prestige, and established the basis of 
 England's empire. 
 
 " It would be pleasant to dwell on the details of this great fight, 
 to tell you how the Spaniards, having formed themselves in a 
 half moon, convexity in front, were charged on the wings and 
 centre by our fleet ; on the westernmost or larboard wing by 
 Drake, with Hawkyns, Frobiser, Fenton, Fenner, and others ; in 
 the centre by Howard and his kinsmen, with the Earl of Cumber- 
 land ; and on the starboard wing by Seymour, with Wynter and 
 the squadron of the narrow seas ; how the wings were driven in 
 on their centre ; how the ships, thus driven together, fouled each 
 other, and lay a helpless and inert mass, whilst the English 
 pounded them in comparative safety. ' The fight,' Wynter 
 wrote, ' continued from nine of the clock until six of the clock at 
 night, in the which time the Spanish array bore away N.N.E., or 
 north by east as much as they could, keeping company one with 
 another. ... I deliver it to your honour upon the credit of a 
 poor gentleman, that out of my ship there was shot, 500 shot of 
 demi-cannon (30| lbs.), culverin (17J lbs.), and demi-culverin 
 (9^ lbs.) ; and when I was furthest off in discharging any of the 
 pieces, I was not out of the shot of their harquebus, and most 
 
242 NAVAL WAUFAIIE. 
 
 times within speech one of another ; and surely every man did 
 well. No doubt the slaughter and hurt they received was great, as 
 time will discover it ; and when every man was weary with labour, 
 and our. cartridges spent, and munitions wasted — I think in some 
 altogether — we ceased, and followed the enemy.'* 
 
 " The subject is one that tempts to pursue it still further, but 
 time warms me to draw to a close. It must be enough then to 
 say that the Spaniards were terribly beaten ; that two of their 
 largest ships, ships of the crack Portugal squadron, the San Felipe 
 and San Mateo, ran themselves ashore on the Netherlands coast 
 to escape foundering in the open sea. Howard says that three 
 were sunk, and four or five driven ashore. In one case he can 
 scarcely have been mistaken. ' On the 80th,' he says, * one of the 
 enemy's great ships was espied to be in great distress by the 
 Captain (Eobert Cross) of Her Majesty's ship called the Hope, who, 
 being in speech of yielding unto the said Captain, before they 
 could agree on certain conditions, sank presently before their eyes.' 
 This may have been the San Juan de Sicilia, which was severely 
 beaten in the fight and never returned to Spain, though it was not 
 known how she was lost. The actual loss of life was certainly 
 very great — how great was never known, for the pursuit of the 
 English and the terrible passage round the west of Ireland pre- 
 vented any attempt at official returns. Of the losses among the 
 isles of Scotland and on the coast of Ireland, I do not intend now 
 to speak. It is sufficient for my purpose to say that, according to 
 the best Spanish accounts, which, in such an overwhelming disaster, 
 are rather mixed, about half the original 130 got home again ; 
 some apparently by the simple process of not going farther than 
 Corunna, some, as three of the galleys, by turning back before 
 they crossed the Bay of Biscay." 
 
 Mr. Laughton does not touch, in this excellent sketch, on a 
 material element in the failure of the Armada. The 19,000 
 soldiers that it was intended should be conveyed in the fleet did 
 not form by any means the whole of tlie invading army. The 
 main portion v/as to have been formed from the Duke of Parma's 
 army, and was prepared to embark at Dunkirk, the Duke himself 
 being indeed the real commander of the expedition. But our Allies, 
 the Hollanders and Zealanders, took effective measures to prevent 
 any junction between the two wings of the Spanish force, by inter- 
 posing their own superior fleet. As Barchett puts it : — 
 
 The twenty-seventh of July the Spanish fleet came to an anchor before Calais, and 
 • Wynter to 'Walsingham, 1st August loSS. ^Slata Papers, Domestic, ecxiv., 7. 
 
ATTACKS Oy TFAUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 243 
 
 not far from them anchored the English Admiral, who, by the accession of the ships 
 under the Lord Seymour and Sir William Winter, had now a hundred and forty sail, 
 all stout ships, though the main stress of the engagement lay not upon more than 
 fifteen of them. The Spaniards were now very importunate with the Duke of Parma 
 to send out forty fly-boats to their assistance, for that otherwise, by the unwieldiness 
 of their ships, they could not engage the light and active vessels of the English. They 
 also desired him to use all speed in embarking his army, and be ready to take the first 
 opportunity, under their protection, of landing in England. But, besides that his flat- 
 bottomed boats were become leaky, and that he was not in other respects in that 
 readiness which had been concerted, he was prevented from complj-ing with these 
 demands by the ships of Holland and Zealand, which, under the command of Count 
 Justin of Nassau, continued to block up the harbours of Dunkirk and Newport, the only 
 ports from whence he could put to sea.* 
 
 Thus it is seen that even supposing there had been no encounters 
 between the English and Spanish ships, or supposing the EngUsh 
 had proved less superior than they were, still the great Armada was 
 a palpable failure. Mr, Laughton does very rightly in pressing the 
 point that in the collapse of the Armada there were no miracles, 
 nor any special interpositions of Providence by gales of wind or 
 otherwise. The case was simply that if Philip had been either 
 better advised, or, being well advised, had been less headstrong, he 
 would have known that not only was the task one most probably 
 beyond his powers, but that it was impossible that he could suc- 
 ceed as he went about it. And it may be further observed that if 
 Medina- Sidonia was not justified by the letter of his orders in pur- 
 suing the course which he did — and Mr. Laughton certainly seems 
 to show that this was so — the arrangement of his force was such 
 as to lead him to interpret the spirit of his orders in the way that 
 he did. If Burchett is correctly informed, the same idea seems to 
 have possessed Medina-Sidonia up to the moment of his final defeat 
 at sea — namely, that it was a possibility in naval strategy to pro- 
 ceed with a territorial attack over sea in presence of a hostile 
 fieet. 
 
 This was the primary error of the King of Spain ; and the great 
 advantage of bringing the defeat of Medina-Sidonia and of Persano 
 together is that the parallelism of the cases so emphatically con- 
 firms the rule of strategy. Medina-Sidonia in 1588 fails to land a 
 man, except as a fugitive, on the territory selected for descent, just 
 as Persano does in 1866 ; and both suft"er the overwhelming defeat 
 of their fleets. 
 
 It should not have been possible for the King of Spain to regard 
 the English fleet as insignificant after the transactions at Cadiz in 
 the year before. Had it been ever so insignificant, it was necessary 
 
 ♦ Burchett, p. 353. 
 
2U NAVAL WAUFAUE. 
 
 to paralyse its action in some way before any descent on tlie terri- 
 tory it guarded could be attempted. Just in the same way, the 
 Italian Government, or Persano for them, might have been justified 
 in despising the Austrian force at Pola; but, however little its 
 strength might have been esteemed, it was an absolute necessity to 
 paralyse its action if the capture of the island of Lissa was to be 
 accomplished. If neither Medina-Sidonia nor Persano had naval 
 force enough for the double operation of paralysing the defending 
 naval force, and covering the landing at the same time, and yet 
 attempted to pursue the descent, they each courted the fate they 
 met, and fully deserved it. 
 
 In all cases of descent liable to be even watched by hostile fleets, 
 we shall meet failure unless the descending forces are divided into 
 two perfectly distinct parts ; one to paralyse the possibly interfer- 
 ing naval force, and the other to conduct the descent itself. But 
 Philip had a heavier task before him than Persano, inasmuch as 
 there were three distinct opposing fleets which must be paralysed, 
 and one of them, as lying between the two wings of the descending 
 force, which must be defeated. There was, as we have seen. Lord 
 Howard's fleet at Plymouth, Lord Henry Seymour's in the "narrow 
 seas," by the Straits of Dover, and Count Justin's, blockading 
 Dunkirk and Nieuport. Had Philip ever looked this matter in the 
 face ? Had he in any way prepared his naval forces for division 
 into the necessary four parts, each of sufficient strength — one to 
 mask Lord Howard, one to mask Lord Henry Seymour, a third to 
 defeat and then to mask Count Justin of Nassau, and a fourth to 
 conduct and cover the landing ? There is no sign anywhere that 
 ideas so obviously pressing found a place in his mind ; and if 
 Medina-Sidonia in any way represented the mind of his master, 
 there must have been a firm belief that in some way or other the 
 descent could proceed to success in the very face of three opposing 
 fleets. 
 
 Persano had but the one fleet to paralyse, but he must have been 
 possessed with the same idea as Medina-Sidonia, that in some way 
 or other the appearance of the Austrian fleet would not interfere 
 with the regular conduct of the descent about to be undertaken on 
 the island of Lissa, nor in any way hinder its ultimate success. 
 But that an Admiral was found to act on such an idea, belief of its. 
 entrance into an Admiral's mind would be well-nigh impossible. 
 
 The failure, then, of the descent upon England in 1588, and 
 upon Lissa in 18G6, as well as the collapse of Napoleon's accom- 
 plished descent.upon Egypt, can all be set down to the one cause — 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITOUY FROM THE SEA. 215 
 
 defiance of plain rules of naval strategy. If there was naval 
 force enough to [do it, division should have been made so as to 
 employ one part in paralysing possibly opponent fleets, and the 
 other in covering the descent. If there was not naval force 
 enough for this division, the expeditions ought never to have 
 started, for, short of miracle, they were bound to fail, as all such 
 must fail when conducted over a doubtfully commanded sea. I 
 have adverted in my fourth chapter to the commencement of these 
 descents and counter descents on outlying territories, which were 
 begun by Sir Eobert Holms against the Dutch possessions on the 
 coasts of Africa and America, and followed up on the other side by 
 De Euiter. I have also noticed the beginnings of those transfers 
 and re-transfers of the West India Islands in 1666-67, which 
 afterwards became so common between naval belligerents. I need 
 not further advert to these remote events, as more recent 
 examples of the same things are so numerous and so much more 
 capable of treatment from the philosophical standpoint. 
 
 But a few words as to certain expeditions to Ireland in James 
 11. 's interest in 1689-90 and 1691 may be useful, as they form 
 examples of the class of descents which I have spoken of in the 
 previous chapter as not involving the element of time, and 
 depending for their success on the reception which is given to 
 them in the country itself. In such expeditions the navy is not 
 concerned, except as convoy. There is no landing to be covered, 
 nor footing to be made good and held. It is therefore legitimate 
 to proceed by the method of tiasion, though it is more consistent 
 with promise of success that a possibly intercepting naval force 
 should be watched and masked, or at least occupied, and that only 
 Q small convoying force should be directly employed in protecting 
 the transports. 
 
 In 1689 the English naval forces were disorganized, and beside 
 the practical inefficiency of the ships for obtaining and keeping any 
 adequate command of the sea, the necessary preparations were all 
 in arrear, so that Admiral Herbert never had any hopes of inter- 
 fering, nor ever made any attempt to interfere with the landing 
 of James, which took place at Kinsale on the 12th March. When 
 Herbert received the news, he was only in course of getting his 
 fleet together, and all his hopes only extended to a possible inter- 
 ception of the French convoy on its return. Even when he sailed 
 for the westward, it was with but a portion of his fleet, and in the 
 expectation that the rest of it might join him. 
 
 Here, then, we have a clear case of landing od a friendly coast, 
 
 17 
 
246 NAVAL WAItFAllE. 
 
 in •which the naval work was done when the military forces were 
 landed ; and where therefore the question of the command of the 
 sea did not arise, except during the passage over. But even here, 
 the necessity for recruitment and supply followed.^ 
 
 Herbert arrived off Cork on the 17th April, and learning there 
 that further supplies were expected from Brest, he cruised down in 
 that direction, and then in the Soundings, in hopes that fortune 
 might favour him with a sight of the French convoy in crossing. 
 In more modern times, with ships that it was safe to trust close off 
 an enemy's port, Herbert would certainly have at once invested 
 Brest by sea, and prevented any extensive sailings therefrom, as 
 Cornwallis afterwards was able to do in 1805. But Herbert's 
 ships were not of a character to be trusted in the way Cornwallis 
 trusted his. As a consequence of this inability, 24 sail of the line, 2 
 frigates, and 6 fire-ships with 6,000 troops on board, all under the 
 command of Lieut. -General Chateaurenault sailed from Brest on 
 the 2Gth April (6th May), and reached the coast of Ireland unseen 
 by Herbert, anchoring in Bantry Bay, on the 29th April (9th 
 May).t 
 
 Herbert, disappointed at seeing nothing of the enemy, re- 
 turned to Ireland, and saw the French, counting with the 
 transports 44 sail, off Kinsale, apparently in fact, at the moment 
 of their arrival. He lost sight of them 'on their entry into 
 Bantry, and was misled by a report of their entry into Balti- 
 more. 
 
 The French having anchored, proceeded at once with the land- 
 ing of the troops. This was nearly completed, when about 
 4 o'clock in the afternoon (30th April or 1st May) the French 
 counted 22 English line-of-battle ships and 6 small vessels 
 approaching against the easterly wind, which blew down the bay.J 
 Safe in his position, the French admiral went on with the dis- 
 embarkation, but next morning got under sail and brought Herbert 
 to action. The battle was indecisive. The English were in 
 decided inferiority of strength, but yet not so weak as to offer any 
 good prospect of complete defeat. The French admiral had 
 landed his troops and fulfilled his mission; there was no par- 
 
 * I do not gatlicr what number of men landed \Yith James at Kinsale. He ■(vas 
 conducted over by Commodore Gabarct, who left Cai^tain Duquesno 31osnier with 
 3 frigates at James' disposition. — Troude, toI. i., p. 190. 
 
 t Troude, vol. i., p. 190. The dates given do not accurately correspond with the 
 English ones, nautical and civil time very likely conflicting. 
 
 i Historians do not agree as to Herbert's numbers. Entick gives only IS 
 
A'^TACKS ON TEnRITORY FROM THE SEA. 247 
 
 ticular advantage to be gained by following up the English. 
 Herbert, on his part, could not hope for decisive success against 
 the French, and nothing could now undo the work of the landing. 
 He made for his rendezvous, thirty miles west of Scilly, in hopes 
 of meeting reinforcements, but failing in this he returned to 
 Spithead, leaving the sea behind him free for the operations of the 
 French. 
 
 We may observe of these transactions that the lessons they 
 convey are not very important. The French successes began 
 because the English were wanting in the naval force which was 
 necessary to prevent them. They continued because the landings 
 were on a practically friendly shore, as if, indeed, there had been 
 a transfer of troops from one port in France to another ; and 
 because marine architecture was not sufficiently advanced to make 
 the cutting of communications more than an operation of the most 
 uncertain character ; and, lastly, because the French were in such 
 superior force as really to defy the attacks of the English. Under 
 such conditions, the arguments put forward in the last chapter 
 almost guaranteed the French success. 
 
 Like arguments fully account for the French successful landing 
 in the Shannon in 1691 ; and the ineffectiveness of the blockade, or 
 watching of the French naval forces by way of cutting communi- 
 cations, is shown by the station taken up by the English fleet for 
 watching Brest. It was no nearer than 24 miles west of Ushant, 
 and this, although it must have been remembered that in 1689 
 de Tourville, favoured by the wind, had taken a very inferior 
 French fleet into Brest in full view of the greatly superior but 
 still powerless English fleet, powerless because it was unsafe to 
 maintain a position closer to the entrance of the port.* 
 
 I pass now to that prolific field for examples ot the kind 
 required, the West Indies. 
 
 King William " sent frequent orders and directions to the 
 governors of the several plantations in America to annoy the 
 French in those parts to the utmost of their power. And that 
 they might be the better able to do this, and be at the same time 
 secured from any insults from the French side, he had frequently 
 sent them small squadrons of men-of-war, to be always ready, 
 and at their direction, on such occasions as they should find 
 necessary to employ them in. . . . The French, however, were so 
 numerous in their colonies, and by the riches of their plantations 
 
 • Entick, p. 554. Troude, vol i., p. 195. 
 
 17* 
 
248 
 
 liAVAL WARFARE. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITOIIY FROM THE SEA. 249 
 
 were so able to fit out privatcors to infest the western islands, that 
 a small force was not only insufficient to disturb them, but also 
 unable to protect the English settlements." '•' 
 
 As a consequence of these conditions, Captain Wright was placed, 
 towards the close of 1689, in command of a squadron, strong for 
 those days, and consisting of 1 third-rate, 7 fourth, and 2 fifth- 
 rates, with 2 fire-ships and a ketch. He was to assemble his ships 
 at Plymouth, there to embark a regiment of foot, and then to sail 
 for Barbados. His orders were to consult with the Governor of 
 Barbados as to securing the English plantations, and recovering 
 such as might have fallen into the hands of the French, but not to 
 remain longer there than \vas necessary to refresh his people, and 
 to take troops on board. He was then to make for such of the 
 Leeward Islands as, from intelligence of the enemy's proceedings, 
 might most promise success. At the Leeward Islands he was to 
 apply himself to General Codrington, and in all things relating to 
 the land service to act according to his directions and the opinion 
 of a council of war, eitlier for landing the regiment or attacking 
 the French colonies, recovering an}^ of our islands, or annoying the 
 enemy in any other manner. In enterprises at sea he was to act 
 as should be advised by the Governor and Councils of War, when 
 he had opportunity of consulting them, and, when it was necessary, 
 to spare as many seamen as he could with regard to the safety of 
 the ships ; and that the islands might not be exposed to insults, he 
 was forbid to send any ship from the squadron until the Governor 
 and Council were informed of it, and satisfied that the service did 
 not require their immediate attendance. t 
 
 Wright sailed from Plymouth on March 8th, 1690, with a large 
 convoy ; but before he arrived at Madeira, 5 of his war- ships and 
 some part of his convoy was missing. He was happy, however, in 
 finding them all at Madeira, and in reaching Carlisle Bay, in Bar- 
 bados, on the 11th May without casualty, but with his men, after 
 the too common fashion of those days, greatly reduced by weakness 
 and sickness. However, being landed and cared for on shore, they 
 speedily recovered and enabled him to put to sea on the 27th. 
 On the 30th he arrived at Antigua, and being sworn a member of 
 the Council presided over by General Codrington, proceeded to 
 consult over future proceedings. 
 
 It appears as if nothing was settled by the Council, but that the 
 -General and the Commodore themselves agreed on the outline of a 
 
 * Eiitick, p. 577. t ^'ji^l- 
 
250 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 programme, in accordance with which the Commodore sailed on 
 June 3rd to Monserrat, where he was joined by the General with 
 additional trooi:)s, and together they sailed to Nevis. Here, on the 
 17th of June, they came to a determination to recover St. Chris- 
 tophers from the French. The condition of this island had been 
 that of a joint possession between English and French settlers. On 
 the occurrence of the war the French settlers had been able to over- 
 power the English, and now held the island. 
 
 The first operations in the attack were that Sir Timothy Thorn- 
 hill, with about 500 men, landed eastwards of " Frigate Bay." 
 He was opposed by the French, but twice defeated them and 
 marched towards Basse Terre, again defeating the enemy who 
 designed to bar his progrcas. The General then landed with 3,000 
 men and marched upon Basse Terre, while the fleet prepared to 
 co-operate by bombarding the town and forts. The fleet's inter- 
 ference was not, however, necessary, for the enemy quitted their 
 works and fled to the mountains. The army, continuing their 
 march, burnt all before them, and finally encamped about a mile 
 from the town. Fort Charles, however, was still held by the 
 enemy. The fleet moved to the Old Eoad and anchored, awaiting 
 the arrival of the army. On the 30th two guns were mounted in 
 battery to play on the fort, while the fleet assisted by bombarding 
 it from the sea, keeping under sail. On the 2nd of July the fort 
 still held out, and nine 12-pounders were landed and placed in 
 battery. This brought about the fall of the fort ; a flag of truce 
 ofl'ering to surrender on terms came out on the 12th, and on the 
 13th the place was given up. 
 
 On the 17th it was determined to attack St. Eustatia, and Sir 
 T. Thornhillwas landed there with his regiment without opposition, 
 and the same evening the fleet anchored there. The citadel fort, 
 however, though garrisoned by only eighty men, held out until 
 the 24th. It was the only citadel in the island, and when it fell 
 the conquest was complete. 
 
 After finishing these two conquests the fleet returned to Fort 
 Charles in St. Christophers to re-embark its guns and stores that 
 had been landed. Then a council of war decided that, owing to 
 the sickliness of the army, and the near approach of the hurricane 
 season, nothing more .could then be undertaken. The troops not 
 left in garrison in the conquered islands, were relanded at Antigua, 
 and the fleet returned to Barbados. 
 
 These commencements of a long series of captures and recap- 
 tures of islands in the West India group, are no doubt of a minor 
 
These . 
 tures of isla. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 251 
 
 character ; but I liave already observed that principles are some- 
 times mach more apparent in war when the surroundings are 
 simple, than when a vast entovrage distracts the attention. 
 
 In these two small conquests we have all the elements of 
 success and none of those of failure. There is, first, a fully 
 commanded sea, for there is nowhere any hint of even a small 
 French naval force. There is agreement between the admiral and 
 the general. There is sufficient military force. The work of 
 placing the army in a position to operate is done by the navy, 
 which supplies and recruits it. The army is the attacking force, 
 and where the navy is brought in, it is merely as an assistant to 
 the main attack. Its powers are measured against Fort Charles, 
 and it is found that eleven light guns mounted on shore, in the 
 hands of the army, but under the guarantee of a sea commanded 
 by the navy, are found of more account than all the broadsides 
 of the fleet. 
 
253 NAVAL U'AllFAUE. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Conditions under which Attacks on TERrjTORY from the 
 Sea Succeed or Fail. — {Continued.) 
 
 Capture of Marie-Galante in March IGOl. — Landing at Guadaloupe. — Siege of the 
 forts at Basse Terre abandoned hastily in consequence of neighbourhood of French 
 squadron. — Contemjjorary errors as to Commodore Wright's strategic position. — Suc- 
 cessful attacks upon Nova Scotia from New England across an indifferent sea. — Failure 
 of attack on Quebec from delay and insuflicient force. — Impossibility of territorial 
 attacks over a doubtfully commanded sea, illustrated by the operations of Commodore 
 Wren and Count de Blanac in the West Indies in 1G92. — Failure of the attack on Mar- 
 tinique in 1G93 and its causes — Successes on West Coast of Africa and their causes. — 
 Remarkable parados as to Goree. — Failure of attack on Brest and its causes. — Russell's 
 operations in the Mediterranean in 1691-95. — The mere rumour -of a French fleet forces 
 abandonment of siege of Palamos. — Wilmot's operations in St. Domingo inlGDo. — Success 
 in spite of adverse conditions. — Various attacks on French Coast in lG'JI-95-96. — 
 Reflections. 
 
 The hurricane season being over, Commodore Wright returned 
 with his squadron to Antigua, with the view of arranging with 
 General Codrington for some further offensive operations against 
 the enemy. The naval and military commanders met at St. 
 Christopher's, and it was decided, in a Council of War, to make 
 an attempt to carry Guadaloupe. But this conclusion had no 
 sooner been arrived at than the Commodore received orders to 
 sail for England with part of his squadron. Before this could be 
 done, it was requisite to return to Barbados to obtain necessary 
 provisions and stores which were expected there from England ; 
 but, in any case, the attack on Guadaloupe must be abandoned. 
 Wright ^accordingly sailed from St. Christopher's on the 15lh 
 December 1690, and arrived at Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on the 
 30 th. 
 
 Here he began to disperse his squadron, presumably according 
 to orders ; two ships to Jamaica, to be stationed there, and another 
 
ATTACKS ON TERHrTOUY FROM THE SEA. 253 
 
 to convoy the trade thence homewards. It was necessary' to 
 detach a fourth to collect the trade from Barbados and the Lee- 
 ward Islands, and these detachments left the Commodore with but 
 seven ships, and these in many ways defective. 
 
 Not many days had the Commodore lain at Barbados when 
 counter-orders reached him from home, and on the 20th January 
 1691 the Jersey, 48, arrived, convoying the desired victuallers and 
 store ships. This reversal of his orders naturally reproduced the 
 designs for offensive operations, and especially the idea of an attack 
 on Guadaloupe. In preparation for this, the Commodore took up 
 six merchant-men, and converted them into men-of-war.* With a 
 lleet thus made up to 14 sail, Wright sailed, on 12th February, for 
 the Leeward Islands to concert measures with General Codrington. 
 Some disagreements arising between the commanders led to delays, 
 but in the end it was determined to proceed against Guadaloupe, 
 and to make capture of its dependency, the island of Marie-Galante, 
 as a preliminary. t 
 
 The expedition started on the 21st March, and on the 28th 900 
 men being landed under Colonel Nott possessed themselves with- 
 out opposition of the town and fort, the authorities retiring intij» 
 the country, but soon surrendering themselves as prisoners. 
 
 At this point it is convenient to note that we have had to do with 
 a chain of successes, the capture of St. Christopher's, St. Eustasia, 
 and Marie-Galante, where in each case the landings were effected 
 without opposition, away from the cover of the forts, which all fell 
 to the land attack either at once or after resistance for a certain 
 time. The conditions of success were a sufficient military force, 
 covered, or ready to be covered, in its landing by a naval force, and 
 assisted where it was possible by the fire of the fleet in its subse- 
 quent operations. There was agreement between the commanders 
 by land and by sea, and the latter was absolutely unthreatened by 
 the interference of any other sea force. 
 
 Apparently there was no special design of holding Marie-Galante, 
 for we read of our men having, while awaiting the arrival of General 
 Codrington with the rest of the troops, " ruined the plantations 
 and ravaged the country of Marie-Galante " ; but on the General's 
 making his appearance, it was determined to proceed against 
 Guadaloupe. The troops landed at Marie-Galante, being re- 
 
 * One of 40 guns, two of 32, and three of 30 guns each. Lediard, vol. ii., p. G4(>. 
 
 t Burchett (p. 45G) says that, allowing 350 men for the garrison of the new conquest, 
 .St. Christopher's, the available army was not more than 1,500 men, coUeelcd from 
 Nevis, Monscrrat, and Antigua. 
 
254 NAVAL WAIIFAEE. 
 
 embarked, the whole army was landed in a bay on the east side 
 of the island, probably near Capesterre, on the 21st April, and 
 marched round the south part of the island towards Basse Terre. 
 The French met them on their route, but were defeated and driven 
 back after a sharp action. The British continued their march to 
 Basse Terre, where they arrived on the 23rd, and burnt the town. 
 " But there were two strong forts in the neighbourhood thereof 
 which would require some time to reduce."* The fleet had followed 
 np the troops in their march, no doubt covering and supporting 
 tliem as they skirted the shore, and the ships now anchored off 
 Basse Terre, landing ammunition and equipment for the intended 
 siege of the forts. But it was determined to try the effect of the 
 fire of the ships upon them in the first instance. Wind and cur- 
 rent operated unfavourably, however, and the ships were set nine 
 miles and more to leeward — that is, to the northward of their 
 intended battering position. Two batteries were now erected on 
 shore, supplied with guns and a mortar from the ships, and the 
 siege proceeded, after the example of that of Fort Charles. But 
 some disquieting news arrived while this business was being con- 
 ducted. The Commodore learnt that M. du Casse had arrived in 
 the West Indies with a squadron from France, and that conse- 
 quently his operations were at any moment liable to be interrupted 
 — that, in fact, he was no longer in assured command of the sea. 
 The operations were not, however, at once interrupted ; but when, on 
 the 14th May, one of the Commodore's look-out ships c-ame in and 
 reported 11 sail of French ships, supposed to be coming from Mar- 
 tinique for the relief of Guadaloupe, the commander by land 
 agreed with the commander by sea that the entire design must be 
 instantly abandoned. The same night the whole of the troops were 
 re-embarked, and so hurriedly that the mortar and all the siege 
 appliances were left behind on shore. Next morning the squadron 
 sailed for the eastward, against the trade wind and in blowing 
 weather. In two days they saw the French squadron to windward, 
 and it was supposed, from their situation, that the ships had landed 
 a reinforcement at Guadaloupe. Wright gave chase to a portion 
 of the French squadron, which, however, declined to be met, and 
 the next day the whole British force anchored under Marie-Galante. 
 There, taking the presence of the French squadron into considera- 
 tion (it is said), wiih the sudden outbreak of illness among the 
 soldiers and sailors, it was determined to disperse the expedition. t 
 
 * BurclicU, p ioi}. t J^i^ 
 
To Face Page 2 54- 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 255 
 
 Codrington went back to Antigua with some of the troops and 
 men-of-war, while Wright, with the rest, made for Barbados. 
 
 This is the first clear instance we have of the abandonment of 
 an attack on territory as the direct consequence of threatened 
 interruption from the sea. That the attack could not go on when 
 the immediate vicinity of a relieving naval force was assumed, 
 may in this case seem obvious enough. It was not even necessary 
 to this end that the two squadrons should meet, ' for the whole 
 chance of success rested on the superiority in the field of the 
 British force landed. The moment this scale was turned, the 
 British troops must either have re-embarked or surrendered, and 
 it was only reasonable to suppose that the French squadron re- 
 ported would begin its operations by landing troops on the east 
 side of the island sufficient to turn the scale against the British 
 as soon as they marched across, just as the British had done, and 
 as, indeed, the colleague commanders believed the French had done 
 when they saw them. Whatever way we look at it, we can see that 
 it was impossible to go on with the attack. Supposing the British 
 squadron to have been powerful enough to have met the French 
 on an equality, could it have sailed away to do so, leaving the 
 troops without a base either of supply or support, and with the 
 doubt whether they might not at any moment find themselves 
 between the old garrison in the forts and the new reinforcements 
 just landed? Could the attack have gone on, when at any moment 
 a strong hostile fleet might advance on the British squadron 
 simultaneously with a strong body of troops by land upon the 
 besiegers ? But it is remarkable that neither the contemporary 
 witnesses — not being sea officers — nor the subsequent historians, 
 appear to have understood the Commodore's position. Everyone 
 turns upon him as having done something cowardly and despicable, 
 some placing the appearance of the French squadron only on a 
 level with the appearance of sickness amongst the men, and 
 evidently supposing that the one might have been got over as 
 easily as the other. Commodore Wright having gone home sick 
 from Barbados, all the historians cut at him as if the sickness 
 was feigned to avoid deserved disgrace, and one of them declar- 
 ing that, " for his negligence and cowardice, he was sent home a 
 prisoner."* Two letters from contemporary members of the Bar- 
 bados Council, Colonel Farmer and Mr. Keid, are given by Entick, 
 
 • British Empire in America, vol. ii., p. 54, quoted by Lediard, vol. il., p. 647. The 
 ciise illustrates the impossibility of the naval commander shaking off his responsibility 
 
 for territorial failures. 
 
•256 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 which ilhistrate the sort of uninstructed views which can be taken 
 of the operations of the naval commander. We must recollect that 
 the man written of had enabled the troops to capture the islands 
 of St. Christopher's, St. Eustasia, and Marie- Galante without a 
 hitch, and in agreeing to abandon the attack on Guadaloupe was 
 only doing what all subsequent commanders found themselves 
 obliged to do. 
 
 Colonel Farmer says : — 
 
 Captain Wright, with all the King's ships, reinforced -with 6 of our best merchant- 
 men, equal to 4th and 5th rates, well manned, has been this seven weelis down there 
 (at the Leeward Islands) ; and though great matters were talked of here before he went, 
 as of taking and destroj'ing all the French islands in a short time ; j-et talking is all that 
 has hitherto been done, except the taking a small fisher-boat. But the French have 
 been more active ; for while these mighty things were performing by our fleets, in the 
 roads and bays of St. Christopher's, Antigua and Mevis, they, with sloops and other 
 small vessels, are busied in taking (both windward and leeward of this island) our 
 vessels inward and outward bound, of which we have advice of 13 of all sorts already 
 taken by them ; so that in a very short time we shall be in a miserable condition for 
 want of provisions. 
 
 Mr. Eeid writes :— 
 
 Our crops this year have been very small ; in all probability the next will be smaller, 
 we not having had the usual seasons to plant. We have been annoj'ed extremely by 
 a little French snow, who has, notwithstanding the King's fleet, taken, by report, 
 28 or 30 of our small vessels to leeward of this island, which has occasioned provisions 
 to be scarce and dear. Our admiral, of whom we are like to be happily rid, has been 
 slothful in their Majesties service ; he and General Codrington deserted Guadaloupe 
 without any i-eason, only their own jealousies and fears of the French fleet, when we 
 had three times the number of men that the French had. They left their mortar piece 
 behind, though the French at the same time deserted the island also,* concluding we 
 were going to attack Martinico. This expedition is one of the most unaccountable 
 things I ever heard of. 
 
 Neither of these writers at all understands that the whole matter 
 was the appearance of the French squadron having changed the 
 strategic conditions ; that while, in the absence of a French 
 squadron, a sufficient military force landed under cover of ships, 
 and properly handled afterwards, was certain to effect its object, 
 the very gravest uncertainty and risk surrounded the whole o^Dera- 
 tion in the presence of a French squadron. The letters are also 
 useful as showing the difference between a commanded sea, as re- 
 gards territorial attacks, and as regards commerce protection — the 
 certainty of the one, and the uncertainty of the other, unless the 
 ports whence commerce destroyers may issue can be sealed up by 
 blockade. These writers were clearly of opinion that there was no 
 difference between these strategical conditions, and were quite uu- 
 
 * I have met no corroboration of Ihis statemc t, wlvc'i is not very conseqne."t. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEPdUTORY FROM THE SEA. 257 
 
 aware that the forces proper for gaining command of the sea might 
 be quite useless for protecting commerce. 
 
 Two instances of expeditions conducted over an indifferent sea 
 drawn from the coasts of North America, and as occurring in 1691, 
 follow here in natural order. The one was a success and the other 
 a failure, but the sea being indifferent neither depended on naval 
 defence. 
 
 At this time the French, to the number of 6,000 or 7,000, were 
 in possession of Nova Scotia, or, as it w'as then called, Acadia, 
 and on the outbreak of war occupied themselves in raiding upon 
 the English settlements on the New England coast, chiefly those 
 about Casco Bay and Wells. The strong place of Acadia was Port 
 Royal, now Annapolis, on the north-west coast, and against this the 
 Government of New England determined to send an expedition. 
 Seven hundred men were despatched from Nantasket Bay near 
 Boston, under the command of Sir William Phipps, and the force 
 being sufficient. Port Eoyal surrendered after a few days' resistance. 
 On his return voyage Sir William Phipps conducted some further 
 raiding, as at St. John's Eiver Settlement, west of Port Eoyal, on 
 the Acadian coast. 
 
 An attack was now prepared on a larger scale against Quebec. 
 Thirty sail, carrying 2,000 troops, left Hull, near Boston, on 
 August 6th, 1691, under Sir William Phipps, bound for the St. 
 Lawrence. It Avas intended that this attack from the sea was to 
 be supplemented by one of 1,000 Englishmen and 1,500 Indians 
 marching overland upon Mount-Eoyal (Montreal), but this branch 
 of the operations falling through, left the Count de Frontenac with 
 the full strength of his garrieon to oppose Sir William Phipps. 
 Foul winds greatly delayed the progress of the expedition over sea, 
 and three weeks were occupied in ascending the St. Lawrence. It 
 was not till the 8th of October, in the most bitter weather, that 
 Lieut. -General Whalley was landed for an assault on Quebec with 
 but the 1,400 men which sickness had left available. The inten- 
 tion was, that the ships with their guns should support on the 
 west side^the assault of the troops upon the east side of the City. 
 Sir William Phipps waited in vain, however, for the movement of 
 the troops, and sending on shore for explanations, found them 
 paralyzed wdth the cold, and with the information that De 
 Frontenac had 4,000 men with him. There w^as nothing for it but 
 to re-embark the troops and abandon the enterprise, which was 
 accordingly done. Some doubts seem to hang over the extent to 
 which both troops and ships were actually engaged, but none sur- 
 
2u8 NAVyiL WARFARE. 
 
 round the fact of the faikire. Its causes are plain enough. The 
 expedition started too late in the season, and was not in sufficient 
 force to begin with, being further wasted by the sickness which, at 
 least in those remote days, was always the concomitant of combined 
 operations. The historian in his recital recognizes the business 
 character of war, by reducing the English loss to a money standard, 
 and sighingly concluding with the observation that " thus ended 
 this fruitless expedition, which cost the colony of New England 
 forty thousand pounds."* 
 
 In October 1691 Commodore Wren, in the Nonrich, a fourth-rate 
 of 48 guns, was ordered to take under his command two other 
 fourth-rates, transports containing reinforcements for the troops 
 in the West Indies, victuallers, and a merchant convoy. He 
 was to proceed to Barbados and assume the command of the 
 single third-rate, the Mary, of probably 70 guns, with four other 
 fourth-rates, and a fire-ship. He was to detach one of these eight 
 fighting ships to carry out convoy duty from Jamaica, and to 
 employ the remaining seven sail in securing the British territories 
 and annoying the enemy until the spring of the year, when he 
 was to bring the ships home. 
 
 On his arrival at Barbados on the 16th January 1692, he was 
 instantly warned that nine French war-ships were in the vicinity 
 of the island ; that they had captured one of his fourth-rates, the 
 Jersey, and that only the Mary and Antelope and the fire-ship 
 could immediately join him, the remaining two ships being at the 
 Leeward Islands. 
 
 We have here a clear example of the doubtfully commanded sea, 
 and may note what the consequences were. We hear nothing on 
 either side of territorial attacks. The first proposal was that the 
 Commodore should proceed wdth his ships to Antigua so as to con- 
 centrate his forces ; but before this step was taken news arrived 
 that the French had actually 18 sail in the West Indies, 8 of them 
 cruising off Barbados, and the rest either fitted or fitting at 
 Martinique. There was no hope then but to take advantage of the 
 enemy's divided state, and two merchant ships fitted as war-ships, 
 with two privateers, being added to the Commodore's five ships, the 
 squadron of 9 sailed on the 30th January with the intention of 
 bringing the 8 or 9 French men-of-war to action. 
 
 The enemy had, however, proceeded to the north in the meantime, 
 80 the Commodore returned to Barbados without getting sight of 
 them. The French being thus concentrated, there was necessity 
 
 * Lcdiard, vol. ii., p. G48. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 259 
 
 for a like concentration on the part of the British, and accordingly 
 the squadron sailed for Antigua on the 17th February, detaching 
 small lookout vessels to Martinique for intelligence. 
 
 On arrival near the island of Desirada, close to Guadaloupe, 
 Wren came in sight of 18 sail of French fighting ships, with 2 
 fire-ships and 5 or 6 small vessels. This was the squadron of 
 Count de Blanac, and he had with him three prizes taken from 
 the British, namely, the Jersey, 48, already mentioned, the 
 Constant Warwick, probably 48, and the Mary Rose. The Com- 
 modore's squadron was much scattered at this moment, and was, 
 besides, hampered by the care of a merchant convoy. But by the 
 exercise of great prudence and skill. Wren managed to avoid 
 anything but a partial action with the French, and though he was 
 obliged entirely to give up the design of concentrating his whole 
 force in the West Indies, he managed to return to Carlisle Bay, 
 Barbados, without the loss of one ship, on the 25th February. 
 
 Though the French were thus in clear superiority of force at sea, 
 they do not appear to have considered themselves strong enough in 
 presence of Wren's squadron to undertake any territorial expedi- 
 tions of moment, but Commodore Wren dying, Captain Boteler 
 succeeded to the command, and, in compliance with the orders 
 under which his predecessor acted, he detached certain ships for 
 the local guard of the different ports in the islands, and sailed 
 with the rest for England on the 14th June 1692, thus leaving the 
 French practically in undisputed command of the West Indian 
 seas.* 
 
 Not impossibly the great perils to which our West Indian pos- 
 sessions were left open by this withdrawal of the English squadron 
 was quite understood by the Government, but the battle of La 
 Hogue not having then given the quietus ro French designs of 
 command in the Channel, there was a natural desire to be strong 
 at home. But, though the French do not appear to have taken 
 full advantage of their command of the sea to carry any important 
 British possession, trade suffered so much from the superiority of 
 the enemy, that a determined effort was set on foot to suppress 
 him. For this purpose a squadron was fitted out in the month of 
 November 1692 under the command of Bear- Admiral of the Blue 
 Sir Francis Wheeler, who had already distinguished himself in 
 command of the Albemarle at the battle of Beachy Head. This 
 squadron consisted of 11 ships of and above the fifth rate, with 
 three fire-ships and store-ships, hospital and transport ships; 
 
 * Curciiett, p. 4G0. 
 
 18 
 
260 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 1,500 men were embarked under the command of Colonel 
 Fowlkes. 
 
 There was some new ground broken in the orders under which 
 this squadron acted, inasmuch as it left England with the dej&nite 
 purpose of attacking the French island of Martinique ; and, on its 
 arrival at Barbados, orders were sent to General Codrington at 
 the Leeward Islands, to prepare the troops under his command for 
 co-operation, while arrangements were made for landing a battalion 
 of seamen from the fleet, of which the Admiral was to be himself 
 in command. None of the historians I have been able to consult, 
 give any account of the French naval force in the West Indies, nor 
 is there mention of any such in the subsequent operations. I 
 think the facts may be explained by what I have said as to the 
 strategical effect of the hurricane season in the West Indies. 
 Wren's orders, when he left England in the winter of 1692, were 
 to return in the spring, and the approach of the hurricane season 
 may have determined this return in conjunction with the cause 
 suggested above. The same cause would naturally have operated 
 as to the return of the French, and the disaster of La Hogue 
 might well have disinclined them from making any immediate 
 exertions to take the command in the West Indian seas again 
 when the season opened. At any rate, Sir Francis Wheeler's 
 instructions, as summarized by the historians, give no hint of any 
 probable opposition by sea. 
 
 Wheeler reached Barbados on March 1st, 1693, and beside 
 the regiments of Fowlkes and Godwin which he already had with 
 him, he embarked about 800 men from Barbados, and proceeded 
 direct to Martinique, reaching Cul de sac Marin, near the south 
 end of the island, on April 1st. Here there was some delay, 
 waiting for the arrival of Codrington with the troops collected 
 from the Leeward Islands ; but the time seems to have been em- 
 ployed in landing considerable parties to burn and destroy both 
 west and east of the anchorage. On the 9th and 10th of April, 
 either before or after the arrival of General Codrington, but I 
 think it must have .been immediately after, the usual council of 
 war, composed of the land and sea officers was called, and diver- 
 gencies of opinion seem to have at once made themselves apparent. 
 There seem to have been differences of view as to whether the 
 conquest of Martinique was to be attempted, or whether the expe- 
 dition was to confine its operations to a series of landings and 
 ravagings, such as had already been entered on in the neighbour- 
 hood of Cul de sac Marin ; and then the discussion turned on 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 2G1 
 
 whether Fort Koyal, the capital of the island, and the great port, 
 on the southern part of the west shore, or St. Pierre, a place of 
 secondary importance on the northern part of the same shore, was 
 to be first attacked. It was decided that St. Pierre was to be 
 attempted, and by the 20th the troops had been landed there and 
 had committed some ravages. But then came the crucial ques- 
 tion, debated in another council of war, whether the town and fort 
 were to be besieged, or whether the troops were to be re- embarked 
 for some further ravaging operations in other parts. The Admiral 
 and a Colonel Colt were alone for persevering against St. Pierre, 
 but the majority were against them, holding that there was not 
 force enough ; that the troops were not to be depended on ; and 
 that as of the 3,000 men landed, some 800 were either killed, 
 wounded, or missing, within three days, it was hopeless to think 
 of going on.* 
 
 In accordance with the decision, the men were re-embarked, but 
 yery naturally there was no heart for another landing, and it was 
 determined to retire to Dominica to water the fleet and refresh the 
 crews and troops. At Dominica, another council was held, still 
 less inclined for action. A proposal to attack Guadaloupe was 
 rejected, and it was decided to break up the whole expedition. 
 Lediard f gives the following account of the debate. 
 
 The great charge the Crown had been at on this expedition being considered by Sir 
 Francis, he was of opinion that Guadaloupe ought to be immediately attacked, and 
 Oeneral Codrington, as well as Colonel Fowlkes, wei-e of the same mind, provided the 
 squadron and army could remain there six weeks or two months ; for in less than that 
 time it was believed it could not be effected, because the enemy was here as strong, 
 or rather stronger, than at St. Peter's. But Sir Francis informed them that the King 
 had positively ordered that the fleet should not continue in those parts longer than the 
 last of May ; and the forces belonging to Barbados being very urgent to be gone, he 
 havmg refreshed the officers and men, bent his course to New England, and arrived at 
 Boston the 12th of June. 
 
 This is the failure of a territorial attack over a commanded 
 sea.| The land defences of Martinique did not prevent the attack 
 being made, and we cannot say whether or no it might have 
 succeeded had there been no delays, or differences of opinion in 
 the council of war. It is conceivable that had the conquest of the 
 island been the single aim. Fort Eoyal, with its excellent harbour, 
 
 * Burchett is not altogether consequent in his narration. Lediard and Entick follow 
 him not more consequently ; and none of them seem to have referred to a map. I have 
 collated their accounts into a somewhat more consequent form. 
 
 t Vol. ii.,p. 672. 
 
 X '• Daring the whole expedition there was not any account received of a squadron' of 
 ships of war." — Lediard, vol. ii., p. 072. 
 
 13* 
 
262 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 I 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 203 
 
 might have fallen to a vigorous combined attack. The fleet again 
 takes the second place in the attack, all the operations relied on 
 being committed to the land forces. The failure may be said to 
 have arisen from the double cause of too little force and inefficient 
 handling. None of the immediate failure relates to points of 
 naval strategy, or lies in any way on the naval forces employed ; 
 but it may be said that the King's orders, in limiting the time 
 during which command of the sea was to be held, may have 
 prevented a successful attack on Guadaloupe.* 
 
 Sir Francis Wheeler, still carrying his troops with him, was 
 naturally anxious, finding himself in command of the sea at New 
 England, to make some conquest which should cover the Mar- 
 tinique failure. He hoped to attempt the French settlement of 
 Placentia in Newfoundland, which was a place where the attack 
 by troops could be supplemented by that of the ships. The 
 council of war was, however, against him, and the only service 
 effected was the landing of a small force to ravage St. Pierre. 
 
 Sir Francis did not receive official censure on his return to Eng- 
 land in October 1693. He became almost at once Commander-in- 
 Chief in the Mediterranean, but was drowned next year with all 
 but two of his ship's company by the foundering of his flag-ship, 
 the Sussex. The public were not so discriminating as the autho- 
 rities in apportioning the blame for the failure in the West Indies. 
 After his death, Wheeler was called an unfortunate man, suffering 
 from undeserved clamour.f 
 
 I pass now to consider in the order of time, but very briefly, 
 some territorial operations on the West Coast of Africa, in 1692-93. 
 The French at the end of 1692 had but two settlements on the 
 West Coast, of which the head-quarters were the island of St. 
 Louis in the Senegal River, and the island of Goree, just south of 
 Cape Verd. South of these settlements were those of the English 
 Royal African Company in the Gambia, the head-quarters being at 
 James Island. 
 
 " The Royal African Company of England having of late years 
 been molested in their trade in the north parts of Guinea, by the 
 French, did, by virtue of their Majestys' Commission, order their 
 agent-general, John Booker, Esq., at James Island in the river of 
 
 * Campbell, vol. iii., p. 142, lays the chief cause of the failure on the sickness of the 
 troops. He says, the loss by the sword did not exceed 120 men, while during the 
 same period nearly a thousand either absolutely fell victims to disease, or were rendered 
 incapable of service. 
 
 t Campbell, vol. iii., p. 145. 
 
2G4 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Gamboa, to attempt the dispossessing them from those parts; 
 which succeeded acconlingly, as appears by letters from the said 
 agent of the 14th March 1692-93, now received by way of 
 Jamaica ; an abstract of which follows. 
 
 " Having embarked myself, and above a hundred men of this 
 island upon the Company's ships, Anne, Captain Leech, and the 
 America, Captain Brome, with several sloops as an addition to the 
 force they sent me, I arrived at Senegal river, the 30th of Decem- 
 ber 1692, with great difficulty, and the loss of six men. I got over 
 the bar, and whilst I was preparing to attack the fort called Louis 
 de Bourbon, the first day of January, I received a letter from M. 
 Desmolins, the Governor, offering to surrender if he and his men 
 might have civil treatment ; which I readily granted, landed, and 
 
 ISL.VND OF GOKEE. 
 
 took possession of the fort the same day, where I found j&fteen 
 cannon, &c. The said fort is situated in the mouth of the river 
 Senegal, and has been in the possession of the French above fifty 
 years, where I have now settled a factory, and called it by the 
 name of William and Mary Fort. I continued there until the 
 twenty-fifth, ^Yhen I sailed thence, and having succeeded so well, 
 called a council of war at sea the next day, where it was resolved 
 to attack the Island of Goree, the only place remaining in the 
 French possession in Guinea ; where I arrived with the ships 
 the first of February, and continued to alarm the castles until 
 Saturday the fourth, when in the night I landed with a hundred 
 men under the old fort, within two hundred and fifty yards of the 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 2G5 
 
 new castle called St. Michael,^ and commanded by Mr, Felix, 
 situated on a rising ground, and mounted with twenty-eight guns, 
 without any resistance till about break of day, when they fired 
 furiously upon us with great and small shot. 
 
 " About noon I sent them a summons to surrender before our 
 cannon should be landed ; when they immediately desired a 
 capitulation, which being granted, and articles agreed on, they 
 marched out on the eighth, with their arms, bag and baggage, 
 and colours flying, and were carried to the Company's fort at 
 James Island, whence they are to be transported on the Com- 
 pany's shipping, and at the Company's charge, for Europe.'^t 
 
 These attacks are minor, but still very good instances of the 
 success which attends well-handled descents in sufficient force from 
 a commanded sea. The island of Goree is, in little, an exponent 
 of the great principles. *' It produces nothing, and its importance 
 is solely derived from its inaccessible situation, which renders it 
 capable of being converted into an important military position." 
 So speaks the Edinburgh Gazetteer of 1822. J But what are the 
 facts as to its military position ? Originally occupied by the 
 Dutch in 1617, and fortified by the works of St. Michael, it was 
 duly captured in 1663 by Sir Eobert Holms in local command of 
 the sea. It was retaken by De Euiter in the expedition alluded 
 to in my fourth chapter. It was taken again by the French under 
 D'Estrees in 1677. We have now seen it easily taken by the 
 English in 1692-93, and it was soon after retaken from them by 
 the French. They then re- fortified it,§ but it fell again easily to 
 
 * Demolished by the English imdei* Sir Robert Holms, but rebuilt by the French. 
 
 •f London Gazette, November 13th, 1693, quoted in ChurchiWs Voyayes, vol. v., 
 p. 423. The speed of intelligence in those days is well illustrated by the date of the 
 gazette, nine months after the conclusion of the operations, and by way of Jamaica. 
 
 { In the same way Brookes' Gu~eLeer speaks of it as " an almost impregnable mili- 
 tary position." 
 
 § "Some time after (that is after 1G93) the French Company, to prevent any further 
 invasion upon Gooree, caused the upper foi't of St. Michael to be rebuilt, fifteen foot 
 high, and furnished it with thirty-two guns, from eighteen to thirty-six pounders, an 
 equal number of each ; the latter of which reach a mile beyond the great road of 
 Goeree ; whereas an eighteen pounder, fired from aboard a ship in the road, cannot 
 reach it, which nothing under thirty-six pounders will do from thence, as has been 
 experienced by the commander of the island." Barbot, in Churchill's Voyages, vol. v., 
 p. 424. The illustration is reduced from Barbot's own in the same volume, and it 
 represents the condition of the island in 1682. The 64-gun ship which took the island 
 in 1800 would not have had heavier guns than 24-pounders, and the two 44-gun ships 
 would only have carried 18-pounders. I find, however, no mention of any attack, and 
 I suppose the mere presence of Sir Charles Hamilton's three ships was sufiicient to 
 compel surrender. Had an attack been necessary, it would no doubt have been made 
 by landing parties and guns mounted on shore in the usual way. 
 
2G6 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 KepiDel's attack in 1758, and again in 1800 to the attack of Captain 
 Sir Charles Hamilton with one 64 and two 44-giin ships. That 
 is to say this " almost impregnable military position " has been 
 chiefly characterized as being always attacked by, and always 
 falling into the hands of, the Power commanding the adjacent sea. 
 It may no doubt have looked impregnable, as many another 
 frowning fortress has done, and yet it never showed itself to have 
 any military value. 
 
 James Island in the Gambia, from whence we have seen the 
 forces issuing over a commanded sea to the capture of St. Louis 
 and Goree, fell in its turn to the French in 1695 as soon as their 
 command of the sea was re-established. M. de Gennes sailed from 
 Eochelle on June 3rd, 1695, with a squadron of 4 frigates and 
 3 smaller vesssels, furnished with mortars and shells, and fully 
 supplied for a long voyage. He touched at Goree to refresh his 
 men, being on his way to prosecute discoveries and conquests in 
 the south seas. There he learnt that the state of the English 
 garrison at James Island was such from sickness and want that 
 it might be possible to carry the place. He entered the river 
 Gambia on the 22nd July, guided by an English deserter and 
 some negroes. He immediately set about investing the island 
 by water, in order to stop its supplies, while he at the same 
 time converted one of his pinks into a bomb-vessel. On the 23rd 
 the French commander sent an officer to demand the surrender 
 of the place from the English governor. After the polite fashion 
 of those days, the French envoy was hospitably entertained with 
 much drinking of the healths of the hostile sovereigns to the music 
 of salvoes of artillery. At the end of it all, the envoy went back 
 with the Governor's answer that he would defend the fort to the 
 last extremity. 
 
 But the investment was complete enough to intercept supplies, 
 and though a couple of ineffective shell were discharged at the 
 fort, it was unnecessary to pursue the attack further, as there was 
 nothing but capitulation before the garrison, and on the 27th of 
 July it was completed."^" 
 
 This little affair is another example of the axiom that every place 
 depending on the sea for supplies must fall to the Power in com- 
 mand of the sea. And there is no limit to this rule, beyond the 
 obvious one that if the command of the sea changes hands while 
 the investment is in progress, the place is relieved and does not 
 fall. 
 
 • Barbot, in Churchill, vol. v., p. 427. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 267 
 
 We return again to the West Indies for a moment, for an example 
 of cross-raiding with very small naval, and considerable military 
 force. The English had left West Indian waters almost in an 
 indifferent state, so that M. Du Casse, the French Governor of St. 
 Domingo, conceived the idea of making a conquest of Jamaica. 
 He sailed from St. Domingo in June 1693 with 1,500 troops in 
 23 transports, convoyed by 3 men-of-war only, and landed at 
 Port Morant, which was abandoned on his approach. He ravaged 
 and plundered at will for some time, advancing probably towards 
 Kingston, but being met by such forces as people in danger of 
 losing their property unless they fight for it are wont to assemble, 
 the French did not think fit to continue their design, and re- 
 embarked, contented with the plunder they had collected. 
 
 Practically, this was mere cross-raiding with which naval force 
 had little to do, and naval strategy nothing. The landing at Port 
 Morant, rather than in the neighbourhood of Kingston, seems 
 to point towards an original idea of plundering and retiring, 
 rather than of conquering and holding. The occurrence possibly 
 illustrates the truth that if the sea is free, the enemy is also free 
 to land where opposition is least ; and that, though such raids 
 may be checked by the assemblage of land forces subsequent to 
 the enemy's disembarkation, land forces alone cannot be suffi- 
 ciently numerous or ubiquitous to prevent such attempts being 
 initiated. 
 
 Keturning now to Europe, we have to bear in mind that the 
 battle of La Hogue left the British for the time in almost unques- 
 tioned command of the European waters. Instead of having any 
 hopes of disputing with England at sea,- France was only solicitous 
 of securing and concentrating the remains of her broken up fleet. 
 The thoughts of the English were entirely directed towards pre- 
 venting this concentration, and if it might be possible, capturing 
 the ports in which the French war ships lay, with the simple object 
 of destroying them. The Channel and western waters having 
 passed under the English command for the first time, the naval 
 war began to assume its second stage, and to favour attacks upon 
 territory, which contained a main element of success as proceeding 
 from an unthreatened sea base. 
 
 At a council of war called on board the Allied fleet in Torbay on 
 the 5th June 1692, it was decided that part of the fleet should 
 watch to the west of St. Malo, where it was believed that 25 ot 
 the enemy's ships had taken refuge, in order to cut off their retreat 
 to Brest ; while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Spithead to jo^'n 
 
268 NAVAL WAHFAKK. 
 
 and support the land forces understood to be assembling there, for 
 the purpose of a descent on St. Malo. 
 
 Considerable delays occurred in assembling the transports, so 
 that it was not till the 28th July that a council of the sea and land 
 officers could be called. It was then decided that nothing could 
 be done by the ships against St. Malo, or the ships there, until 
 the place had been sufticiently reduced by the land forces. Unfor- 
 tunately the land officers were equally satisfied that nothing could 
 be done by the troops unless they were supported by the fleet. It 
 was then considered whether anything could be done against 
 Brest, or failing that, against Rochefort. But the officers of the 
 fleet had had experience of the helplessness of " the great ships " 
 in a gale of wind, and had formed the opinion already alluded to 
 in Chapter X. as to shifts of wind making either side of the Channel 
 a lee shore in eix hours, to a fleet in the middle of it,* aiid they all 
 decided that it was too late in the season for either of these enter- 
 prises. But they agreed that the fleet might support any attempt 
 of the troops on the coast of Normandy, or thereabouts, which would 
 not occupy more than about a month. In the result no steps were 
 taken, and the greater part of the ships from St. Malo were able 
 to escape to Brest without meeting interruption.f 
 
 We have here a failure even to make an attempt at descent, 
 due perhaps, in a small degree, to divergence of opinion between 
 the land and sea officers, but more because of delay and the 
 lateness of the season, the importance of the latter element 
 hanging on the backward state of the marine architecture of the 
 day. A century later, the expedition would probably have gone on 
 without reference to the season, and a steam expedition would 
 probably not have been delayed. { 
 
 In 1694, the command of the sea being still undisputed in home 
 waters, a proposal to attack Brest took practical form. Lord 
 Berkeley was given the command of a squadron of 22 English 
 ships of and above the fifth-rate, with 19 Dutch line-of-battle 
 ships, and a full supply of bombs, advice-boats, fire-ships and 
 small craft. Transport, either in the war-ships or otherwise, wa& 
 to be provided for about 6,000 troops. 
 
 * Bm-chett, p. 471. 
 
 t Bii-chett, p. 470-476. 
 
 J Vice-Admiral Rooke, who had made a preliminary examination of the approaches 
 to St. Malo, and who would have attempted some of the ships in the harbour if the 
 pilots would have carried his ships in, seemed satisfied of the feasibility of an attack. 
 Biirchett, p. 472, Six or $even thousand men were prepared for landing. Entick, p. 5C3. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEEEITOIIY FROM THE SEA. 2G9 
 
 The main features of the plan were that Paissell, who was to 
 take a great fleet with him to command the Mediterranean Sea, 
 and to assist the Spaniards against the French on the Spanish 
 I soast, should accompany Lord Berkeley's fleet towards Brest, and 
 that the latter should then make fo;.: Camaret Bay, anchor and 
 I [and the troops immediately. That when General Talmash, who 
 '' was in command of the land forces, should have reduced the forts 
 I on the south side of the Goulet, the fleet might push in for the 
 I capture or destruction of Brest itself. 
 
 The two fleets parted on the 6th June, and Berkeley arrived at 
 Camaret Bay on the 8th, when a council of war determined that 
 General Talmash should at once land and attempt to make himself 
 master of the fort at Camaret under cover of the frigates. " Accord- 
 ingly a considerable number of forces were put on shore ; but the 
 French coast being fortified and intrenched almost in every place, 
 
H 
 
 270 NAVAL WAliFAllE. 
 
 our men received so warm a reception that they were soon obliged 
 to return to the boats, and that, too, in no little disorder. 
 
 " In this action we lost about 600* men; and the lieutenant- 
 general himself being wounded in the thigh, died soon after at 
 Plymouth. The Monk, Charles galley, and Shoreham, some of 
 the ships which were sent in to protect the landing, and to batter 
 the French forts, were very much shattered, and in them and the 
 others about a hundred and twelve men were killed and wounded ; 
 a Dutch frigate was sunk, and her captain killed ; besides which, 
 we received many other damages. 
 
 " The whole extent of the Bays of Camaret and Bertheaume 
 (which lie on each side of the entrance into Brest water) was, in a 
 manner, a continued fortification ; for where there was any place 
 to put forces on shore, there had the French batteries and intrench- 
 ments, and they threw bombs at our ships from five or six 
 places. . . . 
 
 " Thus ended this unlucky expedition ; but I cannot leave it 
 without making this observation, that the French would not, in all 
 probability, have been in such a posture to receive our troops had 
 not early advice been given of the debates and resolutions concern- 
 ing this affair, by Frenchmen who were consulted and advised with 
 therein, as hath been before observed."f 
 
 The elements of success in such an attempt as this were the 
 commajid of the sea, without which it could not have been thought 
 of, and that force enough should have been landed out of the area 
 commanded by the forts. The causes of failure are therefore 
 plain enough. The command of the sea was present, but not the 
 other element. The naval and military commanders, indeed, had 
 no idea of finding any important works defending the landing at 
 Camaret Bay until they saw them, and General Talmash, when 
 he landed, was well aware how desperate the venture was. The 
 council of war was against the landing when it was seen how great 
 the risk was ; but Talmash insisted on it as involving the honour 
 of the English nation. He took not over 900 men on shore with 
 him, many of the boats were left hard and fast by the ebb tide, 
 and it seems that the greatest loss was in the endeavour to re- 
 embark. $ 
 
 The cause 'of failure, then, was the improper handling of the 
 troops in landing, whether the force was or was not sufficient to 
 meet unintrenched troops. We have seen the rule of landing out 
 
 * Entick says at least 500, p. 574 f Burchett, p. 499. 
 
 I Entick, p. 574. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEERITORY FROM THE SEA. 'Ill 
 
 of the area covered by the forts almost established in the West 
 Indies, and we see it broken here. If Talmash was actuall}'' pro- 
 vided with force enough to maintain his position on shore, a 
 landing in Douarnenez Bay might have proved as successful as 
 that in Camaret Bay was disastrous. 
 
 We must now follow Admiral Eussell into the Mediterranean, as 
 his operations there throw some light on the particular field of 
 naval strategy which we are examining. 
 
 The French at this time were making way in Catalonia ; they 
 had possessed themselves of Palamos, a sea-port north-east of 
 Barcelona, and the fear was that if the French were left in com- 
 mand of the sea, Barcelona itself would fall when invested by land 
 and water, and bombarded by the French fleet as it had been in 
 1691. Fears also pointed to Minorca as certain to fall into the 
 hands of the French if the command of the sea was not disputed. 
 
 Piussell entered the Mediterranean at the head of some 63 sail of 
 the line, English and Dutch, and arrived at Cartagena on July 
 13th, 1694. He had intelligence of the French naval force, not 
 materially superior to his own, being in the vicinity of Barcelona, 
 and further intelligence soon reached him that the enemy, having 
 notice of his arrival, had abandoned operations on the coa<3t of 
 Spain, and had retired to Toulon and Hyeres. 
 
 As exhibiting the effect which the improvement of marine archi- 
 tecture was producing in placing naval warfare under settled 
 rules, it is proper to remark here that the power of disputing the 
 command of the sea was now well understood to be capable of 
 holding territorial attacks in suspense. But it was equally ap- 
 parent that these attacks would be resumed the moment the threat 
 of the Allied fleet was withdrawn. Discussion turned wholly on 
 the power the Allied fleet might have of wintering in the Mediter- 
 ranean. The question was hotly disputed, for the idea of trusting 
 "great ships" out of our home ports in the winter was a staggering 
 one for the minds of that day."^ The matter was decided from home, 
 however, and the fleet kept its threat in force by wintering at 
 Cadiz.t 
 
 * Burchett, p. 507. Ledkrd, vol. ii., p. 693. Entiek, p. 575. Russell was himself 
 agaiust it, and seems to have thought the winter season altered all the conditions. He 
 was quite ready to face the French Heet in the summer, but at tirst looked for a forti- 
 fied port to spend the winter in. 
 
 t •■ The Spanish Secretary of State informed the admiral, soon after, that they were 
 now under no api^rchcnsions for Catalonia ; but that it was much feared the French 
 would attack the fleet in Cadiz Bay ; but he knew these fears were ill-grounded, . . . 
 to divert the Spanish Court from this melancholy app?:ehension, the Admiral assured 
 
272 JSAVAL WAHFAKh. 
 
 Eussell received considerable reinforcements during the winter, 
 and squadrons of the lighter ships were actually cruising during 
 the winter months. In the spring, land forces to the number of 
 about 4,500 arrived under the command of Brigadier-General 
 Stewart. The same convoy conducted store ships and victuallers, 
 as well as 12 bomb-vessels. The whole fleet then sailed for the 
 neighbourhood of Barcelona, the French fleet not showing itself 
 at all. 
 
 The Spaniards were exceedingly dilatory in assembling either 
 their land or sea forces in preparation for freeing Catalonia. No 
 operations could be entered on for some time, but towards the end 
 of July 1695, the Spanish troops marched upon Palamos, and on 
 the 9th August about 4,000 English and Dutch troops were landed 
 there from the fleet, under the command of General Stewart and 
 Count Nassau. Notwithstanding the failure of the Spanish to 
 provide the troops landed with the necessaries promised, the siege 
 progressed with rapidity and success. The better part of the 
 castle and town were battered down and the remainder set on fire 
 in several places. There seemed nothing to prevent the speedy 
 fall of the place, when one of Eussell's cruisers brought in a 
 couple of the inhabitants of Toulon, who affirmed that the French 
 had 60 men-of-war there, ready to put to sea. 
 
 In Eussell's view, the strategic condition of the sea was wholly 
 altered by this intelligence. It was no longer possible to risk in- 
 terruption by the appearance of the French fleet. The troops 
 were immediately embarked, the attack on Palamos was given 
 over, and the fleet sailed towards Toulon in quest of the enemy. 
 
 This forms the second clear instance we have of the abandon- 
 ment of an attack on territory as the direct consequence of 
 threatened interruption from the sea. Four years had passed 
 since the vials of wrath had been poured on the head of Commodore 
 AVright for anticipating the rule of naval warfare now acted on by 
 Admiral Eussell, but laid down by Lord Torrington. It is by such 
 actions that rules of war are gradually established. It is not that 
 they have ever been absent, but that they have remained like an 
 unknown rock of which the existence was not suspected until 
 some ship ran upon it. We may suppose that it is now marked 
 on the historical chart, and that its position is well known. 
 
 the Secretary, that as he would never have above two or three ships disarmed at a time, 
 the enemy -would be very daring indeed if they attempted to force him in that harbour, 
 unless their numbers did much exceed his." Lediard, vol. ii., p. ^\i5. Burchett, 
 p. 514. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIIIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 273 
 
 I We pass back again to the West Indies, where the French had 
 not as yet attempted to dispute the command of the sea with us, 
 
 I having but three ships of war, besides some 19 privateers, the 
 
 i latter incapable of doing more than they were prepared for, 
 namely, attacking our commerce. We had then three rated ships 
 in the West Indies, so that a comparatively small squadron sent 
 
 I from England would give an ample command for the success of 
 territorial expeditions. 
 Captain Eobert Wilmot was, under these conditions, placed in 
 
 ' command of five rated ships, accompanied by a compact little 
 
 ' army of 1,200 or 1,400 men, with a train of artillery and full 
 supplies of stores and munitions. The intention was to attack 
 Petit Guavas (Petit Goave), a fortified place on the north side and 
 near the base of the long peninsula which runs out due west 
 from the south-west corner of St. Domingo (or Hispaniola, as it 
 was then called). The Spaniards possessing the east end of the 
 island, it was arranged that they should co-operate, and in April 
 
 .1695 Wilmot, with three or four ships, was communicating with 
 the Governor of St. Domingo, while the bulk of his fleet and the 
 transports were on the north side of the island about Samana 
 Bay. 
 
 Bickerings, disputes, and jealousies broke out early and con- 
 tinued late between Wilmot and Colonel Lillingstone, who com- 
 manded the land forces, and the co-operation of the Spanish 
 commanders was not secured without some additional friction.* 
 But in the end it was determined that 1,700 Spaniards and 150 
 English troops should march across from San Domingo to Cape 
 Francis, the easternmost French place of importance on the north 
 coast, and should there meet the fleet and the troops landed from 
 it. The plan was put in force, and, notwithstanding the disagree- 
 ments, succeeded. The settlement fell, and the fort, which does 
 not seem to have been inconsiderable, was abandoned, and blown 
 up by the enemy. Spaniards and English then marched for sixteen 
 days westwards to Port de Paix (Port Paix). Two thousand five 
 hundred mtm had come by land, and men and guns were landed 
 from the ships. The fort was besieged in form, and in form fell. 
 It had mounted no less than 80 guns, and from Port de Paix 
 
 ,and Cape Francis 130 guns and a considerable amount of ammu- 
 nition were carried off. 
 
 Lillingstone, after the publication of Burchett's account of these transactions, 
 ■"'rote a reply accusing Wilmot (who did not live to reach home) of all the crimes thai 
 a commander could well commit 
 
274 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Sickness now breaking out amongst the troops, and divided 
 counsels being still divided, the attack on Petit Guavas was given 
 up. The squadron was separated so as to leave some strength in 
 the West Indies, and Wilmot sailed for England, which, however, 
 he did not live to reach, as I have already observed. 
 
 This expedition was successful as far as it went ; remarkably so, 
 if we take into account the quarrels of the commanders. Apart 
 from these, it had all the elements of success ; command of the 
 sea, sufficient land force, and the support and co-operation of the 
 fleet.* The aims of the expedition were destructive rather than 
 conquering, but as there was an assured command of the sea, the 
 difference in character of these two aims did not arise. A pecu- 
 liarity of the operations lay in the fact that the landing was on 
 friendly territory, with what amounted to a march across the 
 frontier. 
 
 In 1696, the French had despatched a squadron under M. de 
 Pointis, to endeavour to make a capture of the rich Spanish convoy 
 from the West Indies. Admiral Neville, with a squadron, was 
 sent to the West Indies with a superior fleet, and with the 
 special object of thwarting the French design. The French find- 
 ing nothing in the West Indies to dispute with them, used their 
 command of the sea to capture and plunder Cartagena, on the 
 Spanish main.f Failing in bringing de Pointis' squadron to 
 action, but assured of his superiority by the flight of the French,, 
 Neville afterwards sent a detachment to plunder and ravage Petit 
 Guavas, he himself remaining in the neighbourhood as cover. 
 
 In these two successful descents we have, on the one side, an 
 example of action when in supposed command of the sea, and the 
 somewhat narrower margin by which success, or at least full 
 success, may sometimes be achieved. In the English attack on 
 Petit Guavas, we have the command of the sea secured by the 
 body of the fleet, which would contest any attempt to interfere 
 with the detachment. In principle, the attack on Petit Guavas 
 resembles that successful raid upon the Vlie described in my third 
 chapter. 
 
 While these descents upon territory, ending in failure or success,. 
 
 * Lediard uses two opposition accounts for his narrative, lliat of Burchett and that 
 of Colonel Lillingstone ; of the latter he rather makes light I think, because he had 
 no map before him. The soldier's account bears the stamp of truth about it. Wilmot's 
 death is hardly an excuse for putting forward a certainly garbled account. 
 
 t Burchett (p. 556) thinks Neville might have recovered Cartagena and desliMycd. 
 the ships, had it been so determined. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 275 
 
 were being transacted in the West Indies, in America and in the 
 Mediterranean, our command in the home waters, which had led to 
 the attempt upon Brest, led also, in the years 1694, 1695, and 
 1696, to a series of bombardments of French coast towns, and 
 some lighter ravaging attacks, which, though they are not properly 
 classed under the heading I have chosen for this chapter, require 
 a moment's attention as bearing on the proposition that while 
 every territorial attack requires a commanded sea as a general 
 rule, there is little or no limit to be placed on the nature of 
 attacks which can be conducted from a commanded sea upon 
 territory. 
 
 Immediately after the failure at Brest, Dieppe and Havre were 
 heavily bombarded ; and inventors devised ingenious mechanisms 
 for effecting the destruction of shipping, piers, and towns which 
 trusted to the security of their land defences. A machine vessel 
 was blown up at the pierhead of Dieppe, but with little effect. A 
 Mr. Meesters brought forward an elaborate plan for smoking the 
 inhabitants out of Dunkirk, and blowing up the forts by means of 
 special machines. The plan was put in force under the auspices 
 of Sir Cloudesley Shovel in September 1694, but the inventor's 
 expectations were not justified by the result. "'^ 
 
 The year 1695 opened with deliberations over the possibilities of 
 effecting anything material by descents upon, or bombardments of, 
 the French coast towns, no French naval force showing any 
 inclination to dispute our command of the home waters. The 
 thoughts of the councils settled upon Dunkirk and St. Malo. Mr. 
 Meesters' plans against Dunkirk were not yet discredited, notwith- 
 standing his failure, and it was decided that the attack on Dunkirk 
 should be on his lines. As, however, he was not yet fully prepared, 
 it was determined to occupy the time by the bombardment of St. 
 Malo. 
 
 A considerable squadron under Lord Berkeley, with bomb- 
 vessels and frigates, got before the place on the 5th July, and, 
 notwithstanding the fire of many forts, the whole of the shells 
 carried — some 900, including carcases — were poured into the town, 
 which was set on fire in the west part and burnt furiously. 
 
 * Burchett (p. 504) tias a remark on the operations of this year in the Channel 
 which deserves quoting as exhibiting the business nature of war. " Thus ended our 
 attempts on the French at home this year ; and although I will not pretend to make an 
 exact computation of the expense these bombardments put the nation to, yet I do 
 verily believe it was more than efniivalent to the damage the enemy sustained from 
 them." 
 
 • 19 
 
270 AAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Tlie squadron then passed on to Granville, which it is said was 
 destroyed by the bombardment. 
 
 On the 1st of August, Mr. Meesters being ready with his machine 
 vessels and smoke- boats, a combined attack by the frigates and 
 bomb-vessels of the squadron was made, followed by the advance 
 of four of the smoke-boats and intended to have been followed up 
 by the machine, or explosive vessels. But the smoke-boats proved 
 to be a failure, and though some damage was done by the shells 
 fired, the attack was considered to be a fiasco, and led to mutual 
 recriminations between Mr. Meesters and the sea officers. 
 
 Subsequently Calais was thoroughly bombarded for nearly a 
 whole day, 600 shells being thrown into it, and this concluded the 
 year's operations of this character on the French coast. 
 
 The year 1696 opened with a proposal by Sir George Eooke to 
 make another attack upon Brest, but without landing. His pro- 
 posal was : — 
 
 That the body of the fleet should be in Camarct and Bertheaume Bays, and a detach- 
 ment be made to sustain the small frigates and bomb-vessels, while they went in to do 
 what mischief they could. It was his opinion that by thus blocking up the enemy's 
 fleet in their principal port, insulting their coasts, and burning their towns at the same 
 time, it would expose them to the world, make them very uneasy at home, and give 
 reputation to His Majesty's arms ; and this he believed might be done, if speedily 
 undertaken, with the assistance of some small frigates, which were much wanted.* 
 
 This project was not thought feasible ; a council of war sat at 
 Torbay to consider how the fleet could best operate during the 
 summer, and it was put before this council that the French were 
 seemingly disposed to make head again at sea. 
 
 It was agreed that if the French disarmed not, to proceed to the coast of Franco 
 for the space of fourteen or fifteen days, for that thereby, if they had not an ojjpor- 
 tunity of destroying some of their shipping, yet it might very much alarm them, and 
 occasion the weakening of their armies by keeping up their militia and standing forces. 
 
 It was also determined, that upon notice of their sending any squadrons to molest 
 our trade, an equal strength should be detached to oppose them, and that when the 
 French disarmed their ships, it would bo convenient to divide ours, some to bombard 
 their towns, and others on necessary services ; but yet that the whole should be so 
 disposed of as that they might unite upon any emergent occasion.! 
 
 The ultimate decision come to was to proceed to Brest in order 
 to observe the condition of things there, and then to act as might 
 be most desirable. The fleet accordingly looked into Brest in July, 
 and finding that " all the great ships were up the river," with only 
 
 ♦ Burchett, p. 54G. 
 
 t Burchett, p. 546. The language comes with peculiar force from one who wrote 
 before 1720 as Secretary of the Admiralty, and must have had access to all papers. 
 It shows the distinction drawn between the condition when the command of the sea 
 was not disDuted, and that when it mii^ht bo. 
 
ATTACKS OX TKIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 211 
 
 two light squadrons ready for sea, it was determined to carry out 
 some bombarding and ravaging under cover of the main fleet. 
 
 This accordingly lay near Belleisle, while detachments ravaged 
 the He de Groix, Haedik, and Houat, and the bomb-vessels, 
 escorted and covered by a detachment, shelled the towns of Oionne 
 and St. Martin further to the south, throwing into them nearly 
 2,000 shells and carcases. 
 
 If we take a general survey of what has been set forth in this 
 chapter, we may draw a good deal of proof of the statements made 
 in Chapter X. We can see at least a general tendency, both in 
 the home waters and abroad, for both sides to require command 
 of the sea before proceeding to territorial attacks. This is almost 
 equally seen in what is commenced, abandoned, or omitted from 
 consideration. 
 
 Commodore Wright operates against territory successfully so 
 long as his command of the sea in the West Indies is not 
 threatened. The moment it is threatened, he hastily abandons 
 his territorial operations. Eussell follows precisely the same 
 course in the Mediterranean. The English forces in the Channel 
 everywhere operate at will against the French coast, so long as 
 there is no sign of any considerable French fleet being able to 
 put to sea; The French, on their side, abandon their operations 
 against the Mediterranean coast of Spain the moment they know 
 that Eussell may be in a position to interfere with them, and 
 neither in the Mediterranean nor in the Channel is there any 
 attempted territorial attack on their part. 
 
 When the command of the sea in the West Indies is divided, 
 neither Wren on the English side, nor Count de Blanac on the 
 French, feel themselves able for territorial attacks, though the 
 French are in a decided superiority. 
 
 De Pointis' successful attack on Cartagena in the West Indies 
 in 1696 may be regarded as, in some sort, an example to the con- 
 trary ; but not so much perhaps when it is remembered that his 
 particular quarry was the Spanish silver fleet, and that when he 
 attacked Cartagena in furtherance of this aim, he was not aware 
 that Admiral Neville was in pursuit of him, and we have noticed 
 that in contemporary judgment Neville might have made him 
 suffer for his exploit if he had been rather more active. And again, 
 notwithstanding Neville's superiority, he seemed to have taken 
 care only to engage a detachment of his fleet in the destruction 
 of Petit Guavas, just as we have seen Lord Berkeley acting from 
 
 19* 
 
278 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Belleisle upon the French coast under somewhat similar circum- 
 stances. 
 
 There is very Uttle failure in the attack on territory when it is 
 not interrupted by intelligence of approaching naval relief. When 
 there is failure, as at Quebec and Brest, we have almost clearly, 
 insufficient military force and a reliance on the battering co- 
 operation of the fleet ; or, as at Martinique, divided counsels and 
 want of decision and speed. 
 
 If the strength of the land defences is properly estimated, if 
 sufficient troops are employed, landed clear of the fortifications 
 of the enemy, and supplied and supported from the fleet, there 
 appears to be, so far as we have yet come, no reason to doubt the 
 fall of any place attacked, provided relief does not come to it 
 over sea. 
 
 S^^^' 
 
i:7i) 
 
 CIIAPTEE XIII. 
 
 The Conditions tinder which Attacks on Territoky from the 
 Sea succeed or fail — (Continued). 
 
 Outbreak of the War of the Succession, 1702. — Preparations to attack Cadiz. — 
 Questions as to amount and distribution of cnem3''s naval force. — Attack on Cadiz 
 complicated by political considerations. — Cadiz. — Disputes as to landing and su-b- 
 eequeut operations between sea and land ofEcers. — Abandonment of expedition. — 
 Attack on French fleet and treasure-ships in the inner harbour of Vigo. — Causes of 
 success of attack. — Comparison with Farragut's attack on Mobile. — Captain John 
 Leake, in absence of naval defence, raids Newfoundland. — Benbow in West Indies ; a 
 doubtfully commanded sea and no territorial attacks. — Whetstone reinforces Benbow. 
 — Chateaurenault and Du Casse. — Their return to Europe leaves territorial attacks 
 open. — Destruction of raiding force at Petit Goave. — Captain Hovenden Walker to 
 West Indies. — Destruction of town of Basse Terre in Guadaloupe. — Failure to per- 
 severe. — Graydon fails to attack Newfoundland. — Rooke's proceedings in the Mediter- 
 ranean, 1704. — Chases French fleet and falls back to Lagos Bay. — Reinforced by 
 Shovel. — Capture of Gibraltar. — Battle of IMalaga. 
 
 The outbreak of the War of the Succession, declared against 
 France and Spain on May 4th, 170'2, was signaKzed by the pre- 
 paration of a great expedition destined for Cadiz, under the 
 command of Sir George Eooke for the sea forces, and of the Duke 
 of Ormond for the land forces. The fleet consisted of 30 English 
 and 20 Dutch sail of the line, which, together with frigates, 
 transports, store-ships, and other vessels, made up a total of 160 
 ships. The land forces amounted to some 12,000 men, of whom 
 9,600 were English. The expedition sailed from Spithead on 
 June 19th, and, anchoring at St. Helen's, the main part lay there 
 till July 1st.* 
 
 That this expedition was prepared with some knowledge of the 
 distribution of the French naval forces there seems little doubt, 
 but I have not found it easy to piece the information together. 
 
 • An Impartial Account of all the Material Transactions of the Grand Fleet and Land 
 Forces. By an officer that was present in those actions 1703. 
 
280 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Certain things were undoubtedly known, of which the following 
 is a summary : — 
 
 As the relations between this country and France and Spain 
 were growing strained in the summer of 1701, Captain John Leake 
 had been sent to cruise off Brest in August, in order to gain in- 
 telligence. His news was that 8 French ships of war had gone to 
 Cadiz, and that there were at Brest 19 sail of the line with fire- 
 ships and a frigate, all ready to sail, under three flag oflicers. 
 
 On this intelligence Sir George Eooke had been cruising off 
 Ushant in September, and had returned to Spithead on the 20th. He 
 had previously detached Sir John Munden with a strong squadron, 
 to see our West India trade well to sea. Sir George's intelligence 
 was, that on the 3rd of August a small squadron, with store-ships, 
 had sailed from Brest for the West Indies ; also that Chateau- 
 renault, with 10 line-of-battle ships, frigates, and store-ships, had 
 gone to sea from Brest on the 29th August, the day Sir George 
 had finally sailed from Torbay. These ships were understood to 
 be victualled for sis months. There were still 15 sail of the line 
 lying at Brest, and they were stripping to refit against the next 
 spring. It was also said that Count d'Estrees had arrived at 
 Brest from Cadiz in order to take command in Chateaurenault's 
 absence.* 
 
 Further intelligence was brought by Captain Loades, who pro- 
 bably arrived at home from Cadiz in January 1702. He had been 
 several months at Cadiz, assisting the English merchants to bring 
 away their goods as a preparation for the expected war. The 
 Count d'Estrees had been at Cadiz all the summer, with 23 sail, 
 which lay above the Puntales, and towards the latter end of 
 October he had been joined by Chateaurenault from Lisbon, with 
 1-4 more sail ; and there were, besides, a considerable number of 
 fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and store-ships. t 
 
 At Cadiz it appears to have been understood that Count 
 d'Estrees had departed with 7 sail and Spanish troops for Naples 
 on the 1st November ; and that Chateaurenault, with 26 sail had 
 proceeded early in December for the West Indies. After this there 
 ^yere only a few sail left at Cadiz. 
 
 In April 1702, " a nimble frigate called the Lizard, commanded 
 by Captain Eupert Billingsly," was sent to gain intelligence of 
 
 * Burchett, pp. 587-89. 
 
 •f D'Estrees, by means of many advice-boats, kept himself fully informed of every 
 movement of the English fleets, and when Chateaurenault sailed, he knew that Ben- 
 bow had preceded him in September. Burchett, p. 610. 
 
ATTACKS ON TKRRITORY FROM THE SEA. 281 
 
 the French preparations in the Atlantic ports, and he, by means 
 of a story about a ketch carried o£f by a felonious crew, managed 
 to observe a great deal until he got into Camaret Bay and 
 M. Coetlogon, the commander of the forts there, told him '* that 
 if he did not suddenly depart the road, he would fire on him.'" 
 But he found du Casse's squadron — that which Benbow met after- 
 wards in the West Indies — collecting in the Basque Eoads, and 
 apparently gathered that it was to go first to Ferrol, where troops, 
 were assembling, and then to proceed to the West Indies.* 
 
 I suppose it was on Captain Billingsly's intelligence that Sir 
 John Munden, on May 12th, 1702, with 9 sail of the line and ^ 
 frigates, was despatched to Ferrol to bar the entry of the French 
 squadron. He heard on May 16th, being then on the coast of 
 Galicia, that 13 French ships were on their way from Eochefort to 
 Ferrol, and on the 27th he had the mortification to see 14 sail of 
 what he supposed were all war-ships pass him into Ferrol, owing 
 to his inability to get up to them. This having happened, other 
 intelligence led the council of war to suppose that there were 17 
 sail of the line now in Ferrol, which was a force so greatly in 
 excess of his own, that in pursuance of his interpretation of his 
 orders, he fell back into the soundings, and then, on June 25th, he 
 sailed up to Spithead, passing on his way tlie great fleet of Sir 
 George Eooke, which was lying at St. Helen's. f 
 
 Three days before his arrival, Admiral Fairborne (June 22nd) had 
 sailed with a squadron of 30 sail in all, to block up the forcB. 
 supposed to be in Ferrol, and with orders that, if they should have-; 
 sailed, he was to cruise on a rendezvous thirty or forty miles north- 
 west of Finisterre to await the arrival of Sir George Eooke. This 
 latter officer sailed from St. Helen's on July 1st, but was obliged to 
 bear up for Torbay, so that he did not reach Fairborne's rendez- 
 vous until July 30th. Arrived here, Eooke sent the Lime frigate to 
 Ferrol for intelligence, which returned to report Ferrol empty and 
 no signs of Fairborne. Eooke then bore up to the south-west- 
 ward and on the 8th August, near Lisbon, Fairborne joined, 
 having been blown down in that direction by a north-easterly 
 gale.t 
 
 • Burchett, in mistake, puts all this in 1701, and thereby makes the story more 
 difficult to unravel 
 
 t Munden was tried by court-martial for his failure, and though he was fully 
 af^quitted, the Queen, yielding to popular clamour, ordered him to be broke. 
 
 + Entick says (p. 624-) that Fairborne " was reduced to great streights for want of 
 provisions," which even at that date would have been remarkable after only a si^ 
 weeks' cruise. 
 
282 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 We must suppose, on these general grounds, that Sir George 
 Kooke had every reason to beUeve that there was no naval force 
 anywhere in his neighbourhood that was great enough to incon- 
 venience him in any way, yet he seems from first to last to have 
 exercised a certain caution before proceeding to Cadiz ; and quite 
 possibly this caution, arising from shadowy doubts as to possible 
 interruption from the sea, may have been the seat of the dislike 
 to the whole expedition, attributed to him by Bishop Burnet, and 
 of his abstention from giving that full support to the Duke of 
 Ormond after he had landed, which otherwise might have been 
 expected. 
 
 On August 9 th, frigates were sent into Lisbon to gain intelli- 
 gence, and the fleet lay-to, pending their return. A council of 
 war sat on the 11th, and on the 12th the Isabella, j^acht, brought 
 news that there were 4 French men-of-war and 4 galleys at Lisbon. 
 On this Eooke steered for Cadiz, and about 5 o'clock on the 13th 
 the fleet anchored about six miles west of the town of Cadiz. 
 
 It is necessary to remember that this expedition was almost as 
 anuch political as military, and might have been more so. The 
 Allies supporting the House of Austria in its claims on the throne 
 of Spain, against those of the Bourbons, looked to the advantage 
 •of possessing a port in Spain which should be open to them and 
 devoted to the Austrian cause.* It was thought to be quite possible 
 that Cadiz would declare for the Archduke Charles on the appear- 
 ance of the allied fleet. These circumstances bring the case of the 
 expedition somewhat within the category mentioned in Chapter X.f 
 as being a landing on friendly territory, not involving the element 
 of time, and therefore possible to be undertaken even when the 
 command of the sea is disputed. On Sir George Piooke's arrival 
 there was, however, no sign of friendliness on the part of Cadiz, 
 and it became necessary to consider about obtaining the port by 
 force. 
 
 Bishop Burnet represents Sir George Eooke as averse to the 
 whole expedition;! and the Life, already referred to in the note, 
 which may be presumed written with a favourable view of the 
 Admiral's action, appears to bear the Bishop out as far as the 
 
 • See the letter of the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt in The Life and Glorious Actions 
 of the Right Hon. Sir George Rook, Kt. (1707) to the Admiral. 
 
 t P. 219. 
 
 X " Rook spoke so coldly of the design he wont upon, before he sailed, that those who 
 conversed with him were apt to infer that he meant to do the enemy as little harm as 
 -History of His own Times, vol. v., p. 38. Ed. 1823. 
 
Sketch Chart of 
 
 CADIZ HARBOUR 
 
 NAUTICAL M I LES 
 
 Sa.n t't, 
 
 Ferdlndtiofo \*^i 
 
 Leon I s I a ni 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 283 
 
 actual operations against Cadiz were concerned. How far this 
 arose from any personal jealousy of the Duke of Ormond, or pro- 
 fessional jealousy of the sister service, is not so well made out. 
 But the separate councils of war, at one time by the land and 
 another by the sea officers, which were held, as well as the resolu- 
 tions come to by those councils, seem to betray the reverse of that 
 cordial co-operation between the services on which alone the attack 
 on such a place as Cadiz could rely for success. 
 
 As may be seen by reference to the sketch plan, the town of 
 Cadiz lies at the end of a narrow peninsula stretching to the north- 
 westward for about five miles from the main part of the island of 
 Leon. The peninsula runs out into, and partly shelters from 
 westerly and south-westerly winds, the Bay of Cadiz. The eastern 
 shore of the bay is intersected by streams and marshes, and a 
 narrow channel runs to the southward and eastward along the 
 eastern side of the peninsula, forming the inner harbour of Cadiz, 
 and it was guarded near the entrance by the fort of Puntales on 
 the southern or Cadiz side, and by the fort of Matagorda on the 
 northern side. Cadiz itself was guarded by the fort of San Sebas- 
 tian on its outer or western side ; and across the bay to the north- 
 ward was the town of Eota, and to the north-eastward, the fort of 
 Sta. Catalina ; while in the same direction, but farther up the bay, 
 was the town of Puerto Sta. Maria, generally called Port St. Mary's 
 in the English records of the time. 
 
 It may be seen that it is peculiarly a place for the combined attack 
 of naval and military forces, and it cannot be forgotten what 
 short work Howard and Essex made of it, the former surrounding 
 the place with his ships while the latter conducted the operations 
 by land. The actual capture of Cadiz was then made by the 
 landing of Essex at Puntales under cover and support of the Dutch 
 ships ; and in the different accounts of the attack in 1702 no valid 
 reason appears to show that the same system might not have been 
 carried out. 
 
 The first proposal was to land on the sea side of the peninsula, 
 but a joint council of war decided otherwise, and the landing was 
 ultimately effected between Eota and Sta. Catalina, a mile from 
 the latter place, so that its fire did not effect anything against the 
 troops. A little four-gun battery, however, offered a slight opposi- 
 tion to the landing ; but on the approach of the troops the 
 Spaniards deserted it and spiked the guns.^ Piota at once surren- 
 
 • An Impartial Account, ^'c. 
 
284 NAVAL WAUFARE. 
 
 dered, and the army marched to Puerto Sta. Maria, which was 
 found to be deserted by the inhabitants. Here the soldiers fell to 
 plundering, and got completely out of hand; and it was supposed 
 that the political effect of their conduct was more disastrous to the 
 Austrian cause than the progress of the military expedition could 
 possibly be favourable to it. 
 
 Sta. Catalina fell easily to a detachment sent against it ; but 
 there now arose the question of the next step. Manifestly, if Cadiz 
 was to be captured by the troops, they must march round by way of 
 Puerto Pieal, and either cross the Channel near Puntales and 
 Matagorda, taking Matagorda as a necessary preliminary, or else 
 march still further south and advance on Cadiz along the penin- 
 sula ; thus ultimately putting themselves just where they would 
 have been had they landed as first proposed. Sir George Eooke 
 submitted that Matagorda should be captured, and a party of 
 infantry marched thither and broke ground against it. But the 
 roads were not practicable for cavalry and artillery, and Sir George 
 Rooke was asked to transport them by sea from Puerto Sta. Maria. 
 The flag-officers in council separately, decided that if the crossing 
 by sea was made at all, the embarkation should be from the Mole 
 at Piota. But they said the embarkation and crossing was none of 
 their business, and that it was enough for them to look after their 
 ships. However, if it was line, a flag-officer and a captain might 
 be spared to assist and advise on the embarkation.'^ 
 
 Meantime Sir George Booke and his council of flags changed 
 their minds about Matagorda, and said that its capture would not 
 help the navy in operating in the inner harbour above Puntales, 
 where the French ships had withdrawn to be out of harm's way ; 
 and would not assist in the main design of capturing the town of 
 Cadiz. 
 
 Ormond wrote of the possibility of taking Matagorda, and asked 
 for boats to make a bridge across to Puntales. Eooke granted the 
 boats and supplies, but it was resolved to have an independent 
 bombardment of Cadiz by the fleet " the first fair night." Politi- 
 cally, this was objected to by the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt ; and 
 very naturally, as the bombardment of a place in the name of the 
 Austrian Archduke was not calculated to impress the bombarded 
 inhabitants in his favour. The flag council of war, with the kind of 
 grim humour so often mixed with the most serious affairs in the days 
 gone by, replied to the Prince's memorial that they had the highest 
 
 jife of Sh- George Rook, p. 79. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERniTORY FROM THE SEA, 285 
 
 esteem for bis person, but did not find his name in Sir George 
 Eooke's instructions, and therefore could not attend to him. 
 Nevertheless, on the plea of unsuitable weather, the bombardment 
 was indefinitely postponed.* 
 
 Meantime Baron Sparr, who, with a detachment of 2,400 men, 
 had begun the attack on Matagorda, was not making much progress, 
 though reinforced by 800 men. Pie had mounted four guns in 
 battery in low wet ground, so low and so wet that the guns stuck 
 in it as they fired. They were replied to not only by Matagorda, but 
 by the galleys stationed for defence, and by the 2nd of September 
 Sparr had lost sixty-five men in killed and wounded. In fact, the 
 attack on Matagorda was proving to be a failure. 
 
 It is not distinctly stated, but I infer that a good many seamen 
 must have been landed, and that they were doing the rough work 
 of the attack on Matagorda. Seeing the delay, the naval council 
 of war came to certain conclusions : — 
 
 Upon the repeated complaints of several of the captains of the fleet, that the subal- 
 tern officers and ships' companies began to grow very sickly by their constant employ- 
 ment and fatigues in digging, and other slavish services very unusual for seamen, who 
 do think it indispensably our duty in the first place to take care of the fleet. f 
 
 Such was the preamble to a resolution to recall all the seamen 
 on board, but while the order was given, it was intimated to the 
 Duke that if, after watering, the health of the men would suffer 
 it, the boats of the fleet might assist the troops. No doubt, it was 
 said, the fleet was there to assist the troops in reducing Cadiz^ 
 but time was getting on. The troops had landed on the 15th of 
 August, and that was more than a fortnight ago ; it was not 
 improper to ask how long the army was likely to be ? 
 
 On this rather broad hint, the land officers' council resolved that 
 as the taking of Matagorda was so difficult, and would not, even 
 if accomplished, help the fleet to pass up to the inner harbour, it 
 was judged impracticable by the land forces to make an attempt 
 for the reducing of Cadiz, a work of considerable time for a much 
 greater number of troops, and it was proper to re-embark and give 
 up the objects of the expedition. 
 
 And thus, in fact, was this expedition abandoned. That there 
 was no real reason for its abandonment may be said to be plain 
 enough. And if we ask why it was abandoned, we can but be, 
 answered that it was not persevered in. Very possibly the poli- 
 tical hampered and confused the military considerations, and 
 
 Life of Sir Georye Hook, p. 90. 
 Jbid., p. 81 
 
 t Ibid., p. 
 
286 NAVAL W A UFA RE. 
 
 caused in the first Instance a landing in the wrong place, and in 
 the second, checked the possible vigour of the naval attack. The 
 force was ample for the object in view, had it been properly 
 handled, for the whole of the troops estimated to be in Cadiz were 
 but 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse of regular garrison.* 
 
 There was, as we have seen, no immediate question of possible 
 interference with the operations from seaward ; and we at least 
 know, from what followed, that such interference was the very 
 last thought entertained by the only French admiral in a position 
 to put it in practice. But, notwithstanding. Sir George Eooke 
 seems to have laid stress on keeping his fleet intact, and dis- 
 entangled from the land operations. 
 
 On the whole, we are thrown back on the inference that this 
 failure at Cadiz in 1702 was only an illustration of what mis- 
 management and divided counsels can effect in the face of every 
 other prospect of success. 
 
 The attack on the French fleet guarding treasure and cargo 
 ships at Vigo, carried out to such success by the same commanders 
 less than a month after the failure of the Cadiz attempt, was not 
 properly an attack on territory, though the territory had to be 
 mastered before the ships could be attempted. It was essentially 
 a joint attack, which could not have been even considered except 
 as a joint attack. For the navy would have been powerless to 
 penetrate the inner harbour had not the Duke of Ormond landed 
 with 2,000 or 3,000 men,t and carried the batteries which guarded 
 the southern shore of the entrance. 
 
 But the troops could not have landed but by support of the fleet, 
 nor could they, after landing, have destroyed or captured the 
 enemy's ships. 
 
 After its retirement from Cadiz, the fleet lay in Lagos Bay, 
 where councils were held and considerations were entered into as 
 to an attack on some other port of Spain. But all proposals of 
 this kind were negatived, and the determination to return to 
 England adhered to. Before the last ship quitted the bay, however, 
 news reached her that ten days before, 30 French ships of war, 
 convoying 22 Spanish galleons, had entered the port of Vigo. Sir 
 George Eooke was already on his homeward route, but he was 
 followed up, and on the 7th of October received the intelligence. 
 A council of war was at once called, and an attack determined on. 
 
 Vigo Bay is a long tapering inlet, running from the sea to the 
 
 • Annals of Queen Ann, quoted by Lediard, vol. ii., p. 749. 
 t Markham's Life of Robert Fairfax, p. 159 says 7,500 in all 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 287 
 
 north-eastward, and extending for some eight miles until it narrows 
 into the Estrecho de Eande, which is only some 600 yards across, 
 and then, inside this narrow passage, the water broadens into a 
 sort of lake, which is now rather shallow. The town of Vigo — in 
 1702 a mere fishing village — is on the south side of the inlet, and 
 the town of Eedondela occupies the south-east corner of the inner 
 lake just mentioned. 
 
 What may be called the entrance to the Bay of Vigo is about a 
 mile and three-quarters across, and at the time I write of there 
 do not appear to have been any batteries or forts there. The town 
 of Vigo was itself defended by some works, but they were not of 
 any magnitude, and did not affect Sir George Eooke's proceedings 
 in any way. 
 
 Chateaurenault had drawn the whole of his ships and their 
 convoy through the Estrecho de Eande, and forts and batteries had 
 been erected on each side of the strait at its narrowest part ; 
 the works on the south side mounting 38, and that on the nortli 
 17, guns.* 
 
 A boom connected the two forts and obstructed the passage ; 
 and far within the boom the French fleet was anchored in the 
 form of a half moon, intended to protect the galleons.f 
 
 On the 10th October Sir George Eooke's fleet passed up the Bay. 
 It was fired on by the forts at Vigo in passing, but without effect, 
 and it anchored above the town to observe the situation and 
 mature the plan. It was decided in the first place to land suffi- 
 cient force to capture the batteries on the south side, and that 
 when the English flag should be hoisted as a sign of the works 
 having changed hands, 25 of the ships should proceed to break the 
 boom and pass on to the attack of the French. 
 
 About 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th the Duke of 
 Ormond landed, with 2,000 or 3,000 men. 
 
 In a sandy baj'- about two leagues from Vigo, and marched towards the battery and 
 fort on the starboard side going into Redondela, which we attacked, and met with a 
 vigorous opposition ; but our men so boldly pressing forward, made themselves 
 
 • An Impartial Account, Sfc, p. 22. 
 
 t " On the left hand was a battery of about 20 guns, and between that and the fort on 
 the right a boom was placed athwart the harbour, made of masts, cables, and other 
 proper materials, the French ships of war lying almost in the form of a half-moon a 
 considerable distance within this boom, whereas, had they anchored close to it and 
 laid their broadsides to bear upon our ships as they approached, we should in all 
 probability have found the task much more difficult. But they had so great a depen- 
 dence on the strength of the boom, as to think themselves sufficiently secured by that 
 a)id the batteries on both sides of the harbour." — Burchett, p. 626. 
 
 20 
 
288 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 masters of the battery and trenches, and (forced) the enemy to retreat, although they 
 had at lea t 20,000 in and near this place, yet durst not engage us, because they saw 
 the resolution of our forces. We had no sooner took the platform, on which were 38 
 cannon, but the detached ships, which were drawn up in line of battle, began to sail. 
 Admiral Hopson with undaunted courage leading the van, and forced the boum with 
 his ship; at the same time, the Asuociation, Capta'n Backnam, laid his broadside 
 against the battery on tlie other side of the harbour (in which were 17 guns), so that 
 for a considerable time the firing of great and small shot on both sides was so terrible 
 that I want words to relate it ; besides the dismal aspect of many ships on fire, which 
 our enemy put in flames and then left them. Some they sunk and others we took ; a d 
 our grenadiers drawing up against a fort they had of 12 guns, and saluting them with 
 their grenadoes, they surrendered and became prisoners of war; and in it were above 
 200 French and Spaniards, and amongst them several men of note, as the Yice-Admiral 
 of the French fleet, with several captains of their ships, and the Lieutenant-General of 
 the Spanish flota, but all the private men were dismissed in a few days. Admiral 
 Hopson's ship was clapt on board by a French fire-ship, and had been burnt had not 
 the latter fortunately blown up ; yet the former received much damage by it, and lost 
 in the action, being killed and drowned, upwards of 100 men, the other shijDs' loss being 
 inconsiderable. And our loss on shore was 2 officers killed and 4 wounded, and about 
 40 private men killed and as many wounded. Our enemy's loss was not inferior to ours, 
 and amongst theirs the governor of the fort was killed. This glorious victory was 
 obtained in about two hours' time. 
 
 So the same night we marched about three miles farther, where we lay on our arms 
 all night, though very wet, &c., and the ships and galleons on fire saluted us with 
 several shot when burnt down to the lower tier. And when they blew up, 'twas 
 (tho' dismal) inexpressible fine. The next morning we marched to Redondela, 
 from whence the inhabitants were fled ; yet great bodies drew together on the moun- 
 tains, but finding us in so good a posture to receive them, they would not attack us. 
 Also about this place we took many prisoners, &c., but had none taken and killed of 
 ours.* 
 
 Such was the famous attack upon the ships in Vigo Bay. There 
 were inside the boo«i 18 French and 3 Spanish men-of-war, most 
 of them being hne-of-battle ships; and they were intended to 
 protect 13 rich Spanish galleons, carrying from 20 to 30 guus 
 each. The result of the attack was that everything that floated 
 inside the boom was either burnt, sunk, or captured. Six French 
 ships and 5 galleons were taken, 8 French ships were burnt, 4 
 French ships were sunk, 5 galleons were captured, and the re- 
 mainder were either burnt or sunk. It is, perhaps, one of the 
 most remarkable failures of a fortified port to protect a fleet which 
 had sought its shelter, and it seems probable that the French had 
 felt something like a sense of absolute security in their position. 
 From the passage quoted it would appear that the ships had dis- 
 embarked men and stores for the land defence of the entrance, 
 and must therefore have considered the position, so arranged, 
 
 • An Impartial Account, &c., pp. 21-25. There is but one sandy bay between Ti 
 id Redondela, and this was probably the place of landing 
 
ATTACKS ON TERHITOUY FEOM THE SEA, 28'J 
 
 more secure than it would have been had they kept their ships in 
 the outer harbour, in order to meet the enemy broadside to broad- 
 side there, placing only the galleons in the inner lake, where it 
 might be trusted that they would be out of harm's way. Modern 
 science cannot be said to have greatly advanced on the method of 
 land defence adopted by Chateaurenault. But, then, probably 
 modern science could not better the method of attack decided on 
 by Sir George Eooke. 
 
 In some respects Kooke's achievement is paralleled by that of 
 Farragut at Mobile. In this case, too, there was obstruction 
 covered by works guarding a narrow passage into wider water, 
 where the ships lay which were the admiral's objective. But at 
 Mobile the obstructions were sub-marine mines, and at Yigo a 
 boom. Moreover, at Mobile no troops were landed, the passage 
 being "rushed " at speed. We may, perhaps, say that the method 
 pursued at Vigo made assurance doubly sure, and ought generally 
 to succeed if carried out in sufficient force. 
 
 At Yigo, as at Mobile, no question of the command of the sea 
 arose, for the only naval force competent to interfere, was the very 
 force which was the object of attack. 
 
 In this same year (1702), in June, Captain John Leake con- 
 ducted a small raiding expedition to the shores of Newfoundland, 
 which was chiefly directed against shipping, but incidentally, as it 
 were, destroyed fishing stages on the land here and there, and 
 demolished a small fort of 6 guns at Fortune Bay. There was 
 nothing heard of any naval force of the enemy in the neighbour- 
 hood, so that nothing need be noted except the impunity with 
 which ravages can be committed in the absence of opposing naval 
 force. 
 
 Vice-Admiral Benbow had been detached from Sir George 
 Piooke's fleet off Scilly on the 2nd September 1701. His force was 
 10 sail of the line, and his destination the "West Indies. As war 
 was not yet declared, his arrival at Barbados on November 3rd was 
 precautionary merely, and could not immediately lead to any 
 operations. He proceeded to visit and reassure the Leeward 
 Islands in our possession, and then reached Port Ptoj^al, Jamaica, 
 on December 5th. At Port Pioyal he had news of 5 French ships 
 having been seen ofl" the west end of Cuba, and then, on the 
 arrival of the new Governor of Jamaica, Brigadier-General Selwjm, 
 at the end of January 1702, he had advice of the arrival of a 
 French squadron at Martinique, which it was confidently asserted 
 was stronger than his own. 
 
 20* 
 
290 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 In the beginning of March, Benbow heard that Admiral Coet- 
 logon, who commanded the squadron which had been seen off 
 Cuba, had joined Chateaurenault at Martinique, and that the com- 
 bined fleet had put to sea. This alarmed Barbados, inasmuch as 
 there was no naval force sufficient to prevent an attack, had 
 Chateaurenault been determined to make one. Later intelligence, 
 which Benbow showed himself very solicitous to collect, assured 
 him that Chateaurenault was in the Gulf of Logane,* with 30 
 ships of war. On May 8th Benbow, having put to sea for a cruise, 
 met Admiral Whetstone with orders from England. In the middle 
 of May he learnt that on the 17th of April 17 sail had passed the 
 coast of Venezuela, near Trinidad, steering for Cuba. Soon after, 
 he heard that Chateaurenault was at Havanna with 26 ships of 
 war, waiting for the flota from Vera Cruz in Mexico, in order to 
 escort it home, as, we have seen, he ultimately did. 
 
 It would appear that Whetstone must have brought orders to 
 Benbow to begin hostile operations, for his first act after meeting 
 him was to send 3 ships to cruise off Petit Goave, where they 
 made several captures of ships. He must also have thus been 
 advised of the probable arrival of the squadron of du Casse, for 
 he sent Whetstone, with 5 sail of the line and a fire-ship, in hopes 
 of intercepting him off the west end of San Domingo, while he 
 prepared to follow up himself shortly after. 
 
 He accordingly left Port Koyal on July 11th with 8 sail of the 
 line and a fire-ship, and three days later, getting news that du 
 Casse was expected at Leogane, in the Gonave Channel, he beat 
 up for that port. He remained in this neighbourhood until August, 
 capturing ships, but avoiding all territorial attacks. f He then 
 got news that du Casse had gone towards Cartagena, and on the 
 10th August sailed from a bay near Cape Donna Maria, the 
 westernmost point of San Domingo, where he had been watering, 
 towards Cartagena himself. It was on the 19th, in the evening, 
 that Benbow discovered du Casse's squadron, then consisting of 
 5 sail of the line, with a transjDort and small vessels, Benbow's 
 squadron consisting of 6 sail of the line ; and then began that in- 
 decisive action which reflected such disgrace on the British arms, 
 and led to the Admiral's death by the enemy's shot, and to that 
 of two of his captains at the hands of the executioner. 
 
 I have dwelt upon the movements of the hostile squadrons, in 
 
 ♦ Now called Gonave Channel, in the west of San Domingo. 
 
 I " Thereby fatiguing the people, who were apprehensive that he would land, which 
 his circumstances would by no means permit him to do." — Burchett, p. 594. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 291 
 
 order to mark the absence of the idea of territorial attack on 
 either side, the one being wholly intent on commerce protection, 
 and the other on attacking the enemy's war-ships whenever 
 they could be found sufficiently weak to justify such attempts. 
 
 In 1703 Sir Cloudesley Shovel was sent with a fleet into the 
 Mediterranean, and his orders involved descents upon the coasts 
 of France, Spain, Italy, and Sicily. Nothing was done, however, 
 but even had there been, I should not have felt it necessary to 
 dwell upon it, as, in every case, the landings were to have been 
 made in hopes of assistance from a friendly part of the population, 
 and therefore would have come under the form of attack on 
 territory which least involves questions of naval strategy. 
 ' Eeturning to the "West Indies, we have to note that Chateau- 
 renault had gone home with the Spanish flota in August or 
 September 1702, only to fall into the hands of Eooke at Vigo in 
 October. Du Casse also went home with 4 sail, and was met by 
 Vice-Admiral Graydon on the 18th March 1703. Therefore when,, 
 after the death of Benbow, which occurred on November 4th, 
 1702, Bear- Admiral Whetstone found himself in command of per- 
 haps 13 sail of the line, he was quite in command of the West 
 Indian seas, and on du Casse's departure had probably nothing to 
 oppose him. 
 
 The authorities of Petit Goave do not appear to have recog- 
 nised the condition of the sea, for they employed themselves in 
 fitting out a small squadron of privateers, intended to carry over 
 500 men for a raiding descent on some part of Jamaica. Having 
 no information, but merely cruising to check any hostile move- 
 ments and capture the enemy's merchant ships, Whetstone fell 
 upon this squadron and destroyed it.* 
 
 While Whetstone was thus engaged to leeward at and near 
 Jamaica, the force in the West Indies was increased by the arrival 
 at Barbados, in the beginning of January 1703, of Captain Hovenden 
 
 • Captain Berkeley, in his Naval Histori/'f ha.s the following, at p. 583:— "The 
 French had determined to make a descent upon the Island of Jamaica, to burn and 
 plunder. They had got 500 men for the purpose, the place of landing, the conduct of 
 the expedition, even the division of the plunder was adjusted by regular agreement, 
 and these ships were to have carried them. The people of Jamaica, who had often 
 been idly alarmed, knew nothing of their danger. The country would have been a 
 scene of blood and fire, for they could no more have prevented these people landing 
 on the north side, where they intended, than they could have opposed them when 
 landed." Berkeley commanded the Windsor, under Vernon, in 1739-41. He probably 
 understood the nature of naval war well, and of its particular application in that part 
 of the world. He describes the successful counter-raid organized by the merchants of 
 Jamaica in 1703, on the coast of the Spanish Main. 
 
292 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Walker with 5 sail of the line, convoying 10 transports, having on 
 board 4 battalions of troops. He soon after sailed to the Leeward 
 Islands, and arranged with General Codrington for an attack on 
 Guadaloupe. 
 
 The accounts of this attack are very meagre ; it does not appear to 
 have been organized for the conquest and occupation of the island, 
 but only for a raid upon it, and yet there was great disappointment 
 that the conquest was not made. A landing was first effected at 
 the north end of Guadaloupe, where the troops burnt some houses 
 and plantations and then came on board again, the fleet meantime 
 standing off and on. On the 12th March, at daylight. Colonel Byam 
 was landed with his own regiment and 200 of Colonel Whetham's 
 regiment at Les Habitants, where there was a sharp encounter 
 with the French. At 9 the same morning Colonel Whetham was 
 landed north of a town called La Bayliffe, where the enemy had 
 thrown up breast-works and defended themselves with spirit. The 
 works were carried one by one, our troops continually pressing on 
 towards Basse Terre, assisted occasionally by the covering fire of 
 one of the ships. The enemy was gradually forced back until they 
 "took refuge in the castle and fort of Basse Terre, which they held 
 until April 3rd, then blowing them up and retiring to the moun- 
 tains. 
 
 The English now ravaged and plundered right and left, then 
 burnt the town, razed the fortifications, embarked the best of the 
 guns and burst the rest, and finally returned on board. Though 
 Lediard tells the story as if the success had been complete, 
 Berkeley and Entick exclaim against the result, while Burchett 
 makes the re-embarkation the inevitable consequence of "the 
 circumstances our troops were in," and of the French having 
 landed, on another part of the island, about 900 men from Marti- 
 nique as a reinforcement. 
 
 There had been a good deal of trouble from sickness. General 
 •Codrington had first succumbed, and returned to Nevis ; then 
 Colonel Whetham, on whom the command devolved, followed him. 
 Then the command fell to Colonel Willis, " who," says Entick, 
 
 Upon certain information that the French had landed 900 men on the back of the 
 island, called a council of war, in which it was resolved to embark the forces. And it 
 must be acknowledged that this service suiJered not a little from some disputes that 
 happened between the land and sea officers ; which is, generally speaking, the ruin of 
 our West India expeditions.* 
 
 * P. 640. In a note, Entick says : " The Governors of our Colonies have scarce ever 
 been able to agree with the commanders of our squadrons ; and with respect to this very 
 expedition, there were as warm complaints made against the commodore as ever came 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 293 
 
 All, therefore, that we have to note of this expedition is the 
 strangeness of the story that the French were able to throw 900 
 men across from Martinique, while Commodore Walker was in full 
 command of the sea and had ample force to have prevented any 
 such thing. ^Yalker was greatly to blame ; for his chief business 
 ought to have been the insurance of the troops against inter- 
 ruption of this kind. We have seen in the former attack on 
 this very island, how insufficient naval force to prevent the land- 
 ing of reinforcements compelled the abandonment of the whole 
 design ; here, where there was no opposing naval force, a few 
 of the lightest cruisers would have sufficed.* 
 
 When the news of Benbow's death reached England, Vice- 
 Admiral Graydon was appointed to command in his stead. He 
 was to take three sail of the line with him, and his orders as 
 regarded the West Indies were mostly defensive. But as there was 
 no naval force to hinder him, he was, after sending home such ships 
 and troops from the West Indies as required relief, and stationing 
 at Jamaica and elsewhere such ships as might be proper for their 
 defence against raiding attacks and attacks upon shipping, and 
 also, after providing for homeward-bound convoys, to proceed with 
 land and sea forces for operations against Newfoundland. 
 
 He carried out all the defensive part of his orders, but did not 
 see his way to make any attacks upon the enemy's territories in 
 the West Indies, owing probably to the paucity, the unfurnished 
 and sickly state, of the troops stationed there. Then he found him- 
 self with his ships and land forces near Cape Eace on August 2nd. 
 Here the ships fell into a fog which lasted for thirty days, and 
 left them so scattered that it was the 3rd September before they 
 were sufficiently concentrated to think of any land operations. 
 Then a council of war was called to consider the situation. At 
 this council sat the Vice-Admiral, Eear-Admiral Whetstone, and 
 
 from the West Indies." But he represented that the Road of Guadaloupe was exces- 
 sively bad, that he found it impossible to procure pilots, that several of the ships lost 
 their anchors, the ground being foul and the water deep, so that some or other were 
 daily forced out to sea ; and, added to this, that the troops were under excessive 
 difficulties, having no guides to conduct them, and being under the utmost want of 
 necessaries to support them. Besides, the island was not abandoned till the expedition 
 bad cost us j^retty dear, as a])poars by the following account of our loss. There were 
 killed in the first action, 1 major, 2 captains, 6 lieutenants ; and wounded, 2 colonels, 7 
 captains, and 9 lieutenants ; and 3 ensigns died ; 154 soldiers were killed, 211 wounded, 
 72 died, 59 deserted, and 12 were taken prisoners. 
 
 * The Comte de Lapeyrouse Bonfils, in his Histoire de la Marine Franqaise, says 
 (vol ii., p. 28) : " L'arrive deM. Gabaret avec huit cents hommes inspira une nouvelk 
 ardeur aux Fran9ais at pcrta le deoouragement dans les rangs ennemis." 
 
294 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 thirteen captains of the sea forces ; Colonel Eivers, who com- 
 manded the land forces in succession to General Collembine, who 
 had died some time before, six captains, and an Engineer officer. 
 This council concluded that as the ships were mostly in a bad 
 state ; as the whole of the troops they could muster were now 
 under 1,100 men; and as both soldiers and sailors were weak and 
 sickly, while the intelligence from Placentia, the objective of the 
 expedition, represented it in a good state of defence with a 
 superior garrison, it was judged to be impracticable to make any 
 attack so late in the season. The final result was the return, in a 
 more or less disordered condition, of the whole expedition to 
 England. 
 
 Burchett, in wishing that he " could, by summing up the whole, 
 make any tolerable comparison between the services this squadron 
 did the nation and the expense which attended it, and, which is 
 still more valuable, the lives of many good officers, seamen, and 
 soldiers," lays much stress on the time many of the ships had 
 been out, some of them having been in the West Indies since 1698.* 
 The inferences we may draw are somewhat wider. We see on the 
 one hand that a doubtfully commanded sea is still preventive of 
 territorial attacks ; and that even the assured command of the 
 sea does not always admit of such operations. Yv'e note again that 
 as at Guadaloupe sufficient force, well handled, landed from, and 
 supported by, the fleet, should always be successful ; want of per- 
 severance, aggravated by differences of opinion between the land 
 and sea commanders, may easily cause conquests to stop short of 
 completion. 
 
 On the other hand, the case of Placentia may teach the nation 
 that expects to fail in its command of the sea, that even a repu- 
 tation for a defensive state, combined with accidents such as are 
 common to the sea in all ages, may in practice become armour of 
 proof. 
 
 Sir George Eooke had proceeded to Lisbon with a fleet and 
 troops in support of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who accom- 
 panied the force, in February 1704. It was feared that this force 
 might not be large enough to avoid blockade at Lisbon by the 
 French fleet preparing at Brest, and it was demanded by the 
 Admiral that strenuous exertions should be made to bring up his 
 strength not only to avoid blockade, but to prevent the Brest and 
 Toulon fleets from forming a junction, and thereby threatening the 
 
 • Burchett, p. 607. 
 
ATTACKS OX TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 295 
 
 command of the sea -which was necessary to carry cut the intended 
 operations on the Mediterranean coast of Spain.* 
 
 Orders to proceed into the Mediterranean reached Eooke in 
 April, he being informed that there was a probability of the 
 French having designs upon Yiila Franca and Nice, and that he 
 was to take proper measures for frustrating them should the news 
 be true. The flag-officers in council, however, represented that 
 tiieir force was not large enough to perform what might have been 
 expected of it, for that both at Brest and Toulon the French 
 preparations were active.f On the 'loih. of April a despatch from 
 Lord Nottingham of the 10th of April, informed PiOoke of the 
 intention of the French to attack these places by sea ; and it was 
 thereupon determined to proceed to their rehef, but sailing to the 
 northward of the Balearic Islands, and as near the coast of Spain 
 as the winds would permit, towards Barcelona, for intelligence. If 
 there were no intelligence of the supposed attacks, the fleet was not 
 to go beyond Barcelona, and was to execute there the designs for 
 its recovery to the Austrian cause which had been put forward by 
 the Almirante of Castile, he holding that if troops were landed, 
 and a show of bombardment made, the place would declare for 
 Charles m. 
 
 The force which it was intended Sir George Eooke should lead 
 on this service was very considerable; it was to comprise 30 
 English and 18 Dutch line-of-battle ships, with frigates, nre-sliips 
 bomb-vessels, kc, making up a total of 69 sail. 
 
 But this was not considered alone sufficient either for the defen- 
 sive or oflfensive operations upon territory which were to be under- 
 taken. Sir Cloudesley Shovel was placed at the head of 25 sail 
 of the line, and about the middle of May sailed to mask the sup- 
 posed operations of the Brest fleet fitting out under the Count of 
 Toulouse. As it was not quite certain whether the force at Brest 
 might be designed to fall upon Sir Cloudesley's possibly inferior 
 fleet in the Channel, or to proceed to the Mediterranean and form 
 a junction with; the Toulon fleet believed to consist of 25 sail 
 of the Une, Shovel was, if he had certain intelligence that Brest 
 was empty, to fall back to the chops of the Channel, and not to 
 proceed to the Mediterranean, or to detach ships thither imtil he 
 was pretty sure that the French had gone south. 
 
 On his way to Brest on May 15th, Shovel got news not only 
 from home, but from one of his look-out frigates, that Brest was 
 
 * BnrehetT, p- 665. 
 t Ibid., p. 6C9. 
 
296 NAVAL WARFAUE. 
 
 really empty ; he fell bcick to a rendezvous 60 miles W.S.W. of 
 Scilly, and then, leaving a ship there to give notice to stragglers, 
 he proceeded to his second rendezvous, 420 miles W.S.W. of Scilly. 
 This second move was determined by the non-receipt of intelli- 
 gence, and by the fear that the French might intend to operate 
 against our trade. On the 28th of May, as nothing had been seen 
 or heard of the French, it was judged that they must have pro- 
 ceeded either to blockade Eooke — supposed to be still at Lisbon — 
 or to join the Toulon squadron, and so keep the command of the 
 Mediterranean Sea. Shovel thereupon, after making provision 
 for the security of the trade, sailed for Lisbon with the 22 ships 
 of the line to which he had been limited by his orders, to join or 
 to relieve Eooke at Lisbon as the case case might be.* 
 
 Eooke, however, had sailed for the Mediterranean before this, 
 and was off Cape St. Vincent on April 29th. He had then with 
 him 22 English and 14 Dutch sail of the line. The actual force 
 which the French no doubt knew they might have to meet in the 
 Mediterranean, if they proposed to make either territorial attacks 
 without securing the command of the sea, or to make a definite 
 struggle for that command, was no less than 58 sail of the line. 
 Eooke's rendezvous was Altea Bay, north of Alicante ; and off Cape 
 Palos on the 8th of May, some of his ships chased a small French 
 squadron, but without being able to come up with it. 
 
 Meantime, the Count of Toulouse had actually quitted Brest 
 on the 6th of May, with 23 sail of the line, and having touched at 
 Cadiz proceeded on his way towards Toulon. 
 
 The Prince of Hesse pressing Eooke with assurances that Barce- 
 lona would certainly come over to the Austrian cause if an attack 
 by land and sea were threatened, Eooke yielded. On the 19th of 
 May 1,200 English marines and 400 Dutch troops were landed, 
 and the Dutch ships made a show of seriously bombarding the 
 place. But it was soon discovered that the French were too strong 
 for the Austrian party, the men landed were re-embarked, and 
 the fleet stood over toward Hyeres. 
 
 As bearing on the strategy of territorial attack from the sea, 
 we may here note that Eooke does not appear at this time to have 
 supposed that there were more than 15 or 16 ships ready at 
 'L'oulon,t while he had 36. Even had the attack been serious, and 
 
 * See, for interestirg light on these translations, Laughton's Memoirs oj Lord Tor- 
 ring ton. 
 
 \ Burchett, p. 676. According to Troude, the information was probably correct. 
 
 I 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 297 
 
 had he intended to press it, there was nothing in the way of inter- 
 ference from the sea to he apprehended, and nothing to prevent 
 him from preserving a vastly superior force intact to meet it 
 should intervention, contrary to all reasonable expectation, occur. 
 But, in fact, the strategical question was little touched in executing 
 what was a mere demonstration, not expected to last more than 
 a few hours. 
 
 On the 27th of May, at night, the English look-out ships ob- 
 served a great fleet standing for Toulon, and Sir George Kooke, 
 being informed, at once chased to the northward after them, and 
 continued so all night. At daylight it was calm, but Eooke counted 
 40 sail doing all they could to pass into Toulon. He thereupon called 
 a council of war, which decided to continue the chase as long as 
 there might be a hope of cutting the enemy off, and when that 
 failed, to fall back out of the Mediterranean again, as the junction 
 of this fleet — which was that of the Count of .Toulouse which we 
 have just left — with the 15 or 16 supposed to be ready in Toulon, 
 would be too powerful to be safely encountered by Sir George 
 Rooke's present force. 
 
 We may here note, however, that Eooke was really in the lion's 
 mouth, had French intelligence and French enterprise been com- 
 bined in full efficiency. As it was, the junction of the two fleets 
 was not effective until July 22nd, before which date the Toulon 
 ships were not ready to put to sea.* 
 
 Eooke chased till the evening of May 29th, when the French 
 were within 90 miles of Toulon. The fear of an immediate junction 
 of the enemy's forces seems then to have prevailed on the minds of 
 the flag officers, and the fleet bore up for the Straits of Gibraltar, 
 through which they passed on June 14th. I suppose Eooke must 
 have been aware that Shovel was likely to reinforce him, for he 
 only fell back as far as Lagos Bay, where he was joined by 
 Shovel on the 16th of June. 
 
 The strategical situation was now wholly changed. Even with 
 all the ships of the Toulon fleet, the Count of Toulouse would not 
 make up more than some 48 sail,t while Eooke had ten sail 
 more. The flag officers were now of opinion that operations 
 
 * Troude, vol. i., p. 250. He says that the delay was designed, and meant by the 
 Minister of Marine to prevent the Count of Toulouse from reaping credit. 
 
 t The actual force assembled two months later was 50 sail of the line, 24 galleys, 
 7 frigates, and 7 fire-ships (Troude, vol. i., p. 250), when Rooke's, by detachments, 
 had come down to 55. See The Ancient and Modern History of Gibraltar, by 
 J. S. Dodd, 1781, p. 38. 
 
298 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 against Cadiz and Barcelona might be renewed if land forces in 
 sufficient numbers could be obtained, but they were probably 
 supposing at this time that the French possible force did not 
 amount to more than 39 or 40 sail. 
 
 The want of sufficient troops making an attack on Cadiz im- 
 practicable, and the Austrian claimant to the Throne of Spain, as 
 well as the King of Portugal, being anxious that something should 
 be done on the coast of Andalusia, a council of war was called on 
 the 17th of July, the fleet being then twenty miles east of Tetuan, 
 and a determination to make a sudden attack on Gibraltar 
 come to. 
 
 Such an attack as this, where the sea was not assuredly com- 
 manded, required consideration. It does not seem probable that 
 had it necessitated the employment of any large portion of the 
 fleet, it could have been attempted, in view of the possibility of 
 interruption from Toulon. But though the place was naturally 
 and artificially remarkably strong, it was probably known to be 
 very inefficiently garrisoned. It is certain that the intention was 
 to capture it in a rush, and by surprise. 
 
 The fleet being in Tetuan Bay, on July 19th Eear-Admiral 
 Byng received orders to take with him 11 English and 6 Dutch 
 ships of the line, with 3 bomb-vessels, and to be ready to proceed 
 to bombard Gibraltar, previously discharging all the marines of 
 his squadron into the other ships. These, with the rest 'of the 
 marines of the fleet, were to be put under command of the 
 Prince of Hesse, and to land, with 18 rounds of ammunition each 
 man, on what is now the neutral ground. Signals were arranged 
 both for night and day as to anchoring and bombarding, which 
 latter was to follow the advices from the Prince of Hesse. 
 
 The wind did not prove favourable till the 21st, when Eooke 
 made Byng's signal to proceed in execution of his orders. On the 
 22nd, the whole fleet, except a squadron to be mentioned presently, 
 followed Byng and anchored at the head of Gibraltar Bay, and 
 quite apart from the operations. The marines, to the number of 
 about 1,800, were landed with scarcely any opposition, and they 
 took possession of some mills which then existed within gunshot 
 of the north part of the town. The Prince of Hesse sent a 
 summons to the governor of the place to declare for Charles III., 
 but no answer coming back that night, nor early next morning, 
 Byng proceeded to warp his ships into their positions under a 
 desultory fire. Meantime, the governor sent his answer, expressing 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 299 
 
 a determination to defend the place as a loyal soldier of Philip V. 
 When Eooke heard of the answer, he sent 5 additional ships to 
 Byng, which made up his squadron to 22. The whole of this day 
 seems to have been spent in getting the ships into position, but as 
 the marines barred all approach on the land side, the delay was 
 of no material consequence. At night Captain E. Whitaker was 
 sent in with some boats to burn a French ship which lay at the 
 old Mole, while Byng, to harass the enemy, directed the mortar 
 vessels to open fire on the town. 
 
 The next morning, the 23rd, about 5 o'clock, the forts 
 began to fire on the ships, to which they, as ordered by 
 signal, replied by so heavy a return fire that the inhabitants 
 hurried out of the town and up the hill. The smoke became 
 so great that Byng sent orders down the line to cease firing 
 altogether from the light guns forming the upper tiers, and 
 to direct a careful and slow fire from the lower tiers of heavy 
 guns only^'= ; about noon, he stopped the firing altogether, in 
 order that he might see what effect had been produced. 
 Whitaker took these orders, and when on board the Lennox, 
 communicating them to the commander. Captain Jumper, who 
 was nearest the New Mole, both officers concurred in thinking 
 that as the batteries at that point were silenced and many 
 of the guns dismounted, it might be possible to land and 
 capture them. Whitaker returning to Byng with this opinion, 
 the Admiral at once made signal for the boats to assemble, 
 sending to Sir George Eooke to ask that the boats of the rest 
 of the fleet should follow up. 
 
 But before these boats arrived. Captains Hicks and Jumper 
 had dashed in with the boats of Byng's squadron. Sir Cloudesley 
 Shovel had got on board Byng's flag-ship, presumably to see the 
 fight at a nearer view. He noted that a great number of priests 
 and women who had taken sanctuary in the Chapel of Our Lady 
 of Europa, were making a rush back to the town again on seeing 
 the boats approach. He caused a gun to be fired across their path, 
 which frightened them all back into the chapel again. The 
 discharge of this gun was taken as a signal to reopen fire, and 
 under cover of it the seamen landed, and pursuing two different 
 routes, clambered over the works " with great valour and much 
 
 * Byng's orders almost seem to find their eetype in what happened at the bombard- 
 ment of Alexandria in 1882 
 
300 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 more courage than prudence."* Either by accident or design, 
 while one of the parties was mounting to the capture of what was 
 called the Castle, and seems to have been a principal work on the 
 New Mole, it blew up, and 2 lieutenants with 40 men were killed, 
 and 60 wounded by the explosion. f The party were so dis- 
 heartened by this accident that they turned back towards the 
 boats ; but just then "VVhitaker was bringing up a further relay of 
 boats, upon which they all faced about and took the remaining 
 works without opposition. When Byng saw that the footing was 
 made good, he sent further reinforcements, and ordered Whitaker 
 to secure himself in his present position. Summonses were now 
 sent to the town both by Byng and the Prince of Hesse ; and the 
 Governor, moved, it is said, a good deal by the fact that the 
 English and Dutchmen were between the town and all the women 
 of the best families who were in the chapel, agreed to capitulate 
 the next morning. The articles were accordingly signed, and next 
 day, the 25th of July, the place was delivered up, everyone 
 quitting the town except some twenty families. 
 
 Thus fell the great fortress of Gibraltar into our hands, as, in 
 fact, a place naturally in the power of the nation which commands 
 the sea almost entirely surrounding it. It is a place so nearly an 
 island that it cannot be attacked on the land side with much pro- 
 spect of success ; while it cannot be so attacked at all, except in the 
 absence of defending naval force. In a former chapter I have 
 spoken of the attack and capture of Gibraltar chiefly by the ships 
 and the seamen as something unique. The strength of the fortress 
 may be measured by considering that probably 9,000 or 10,000 
 men were directly employed in the attack, while only about 150 
 were engaged in the defence. J The allied loss was near three 
 times as great as this whole garrison, being 3 officers and 57 
 men killed, and 8 officers, and 207 men wounded. 
 
 It is almost obvious why the attack on Gibraltar should be, as 
 I say, unique. Usually, places to be attacked are defended by 
 fortresses, and landings can be effected with a view to subsequent 
 operations against them. But here it was the fortress itself which 
 
 * Memoirs of Tornngton, p. 142 
 
 t Drinkwater's History of Gibraltar, p. 10. Mr. Pocock (see " Journal of the Rev. 
 Thomas Pocock," printed as an appendix to Torrington's Memoirs, p. 123), says the 
 explosion was an accident, one of our own men letting a lighted match fall into the 
 powder. 
 
 X Entick (p. 645), Drinkwater (p. 10). Torrington's Memoirs (p. 146) say eighty 
 men only, and Burchett confirms this. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 301 
 
 had to be attacked, and there was absolutely no other way of 
 doing it. 
 
 Strong as the place may have been, it must have fallen into 
 Eooke's hands however strongly it had been garrisoned, had time 
 allowed, and had there been no prospect of relief from the sea. 
 For the fleet covered and protected the force on the isthmus, and 
 that force blockaded the land approaches, while the detached 
 portion of the fleet under Byng was competent to blockade it on the 
 sea side. Cut off from supplies and reinforcements, there was 
 nothing before any garrison but surrender within some definite 
 time, marked by the original store of provisions and munitions. 
 Such a mode of attack could not be undertaken with prospect of 
 success but by the power holding an assured command of the sea ; 
 and Gibraltar has defied its foes from that day to this, only because 
 it has never been attacked by any power with such command. 
 When it is so attacked its fall is certain. Over and over again it 
 would have fallen to attacks made upon it had it not been relieved 
 from the sea. Over and over again have the attacks been futile, 
 because they had no assured sea base such as Sir George Kooke 
 considered himself to possess in July 1704. 
 
 But probably this base was not quite so secure as Sir George, in 
 full prospect of speedy success, for the moment assumed it to be. 
 That he was fully alive to the general situation is clear from the 
 message the council of war sent to the sovereigns in esse and posse 
 at Lisbon a month earlier, in answer to their expressed wish for 
 operations on the coast of Andalucia. Attacks, it was said, could 
 not be made without troops, and "the Marines being part of the 
 ships' complements could not be spared at that juncture, when 
 the French fleet were hourly expected upon them."* And Sir 
 George took a precaution which we only hear of in the most inci- 
 dental way. He detached Admiral Dilkes with a squadron to 
 cruise off Malaga, no doubt with the intention of covering his 
 operations at Gibraltar from any light interruptions, but more in 
 order that he might have the earliest intelligence of any enemy's 
 approach. t But though he recognized the danger, and prepared 
 to take full precautions against it, there can be no doubt 
 
 • Life of Rook, p. 126. 
 
 t I only find this in Mr. Pocock's Journal, p. 194, -where, on the 24th July, appears 
 the entry, " Admiral Dilks came in hither from cruizing of Malaga." Naval historians 
 so seldom understand where the pith of the narrative lies, that generally the best 
 information comes from such chance statements. 
 
302 NAVAL WABFAEE. 
 
 that he was either consciously or unconsciously running a good 
 deal of risk as the attack proceeded. Probahly, if he had 
 known that while Byng was warping his ships into place, the 
 Count of Toulouse was preparing to quit Toulon in search of him 
 with 50 sail of the line, the whole attack would have been post- 
 poned. As it was, we have seen him weaken his original cover, 
 first by landing his Marines, against what had been his earlier 
 judgment ; then by engaging 5 more of his cover ships in the 
 direct attack, and lastly by detaching his boats. 
 
 On the other hand, besides the knowledge we have of Eooke's 
 cognizance of the danger and of one at least of his measures of 
 precaution, there are two matters of surmise which it may be pro- 
 per to take account of. The Admiral probably now knew from 
 Shovel the exact strength of the fleet which he had chased towards 
 Toulon ; he might still have thought, as he had done before, that 
 the Toulon squadron was not more than 15 or 16 sail strong. We 
 have seen how troubled Byng was by the smoke of his guns; 
 this almost surely betokens either calm or westerly winds. In 
 neither case could the French fleet have made any rapid ap- 
 proach upon him, and he might easily have relied on the watch 
 which was kept by Dilkes. 
 
 Eooke was not long left ignorant of the risks he had run and 
 escaped from. After the capture of Gibraltar, it was considered 
 desirable to keep the fleet in the bay, except such squadrons as it 
 might be necessary to detach for water. And Eooke seems to have 
 thought little of a possible enemy, since he detached 5 Dutch ships 
 for Lisbon and Plymouth, besides making up out of the fleet a 
 garrison of 1,800 men for Gibraltar. Subsequently the whole 
 fleet passed over to Tetuan for water ; and then on August 3, 12 
 ships remaining behind which had not completed their water, the 
 rest stood over to Gibraltar with very light winds. At 6 o'clock 
 on the morning of the 10th one of the scouts came in from the 
 eastward, reporting the enemy in sight. There was considerable 
 discussion as to what was best to be done. There was fear of 
 allowing the 12 ships on the African coast to be cut off, there was 
 also fear of battle with such short complements as the garrisoning 
 of Gibraltar had left on board. Nor were matters mended when 
 the look-out captain, John Heme of the Centurion, reported the 
 French fleet to consist of 66 sail, and to be 30 miles to windward. 
 Rooke's fleet was now between Gibraltar and Malaga, 9 miles from 
 the latter place. It was determined to send in at once to Gibraltar 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA 303 
 
 the fire-ships and small vessels to bring back half the Marines, while 
 the fleet, in line of battle, stood towards the African coast to pick 
 up the 12 absent ships, to whom expresses had been sent ordering 
 them to join. Both arrangements succeeded, and after a few 
 days' manoeuvring in consequence of the French returning to 
 Malaga after seeing the allied fleet, to pick up their galleys, there 
 was fought the indecisive battle of Malaga, which was a conse- 
 quence of the capture of Gibraltar, but would probably have 
 prevented it had it occurred a few days earlier. I mention it, not 
 to go farther with any description of the battle here, but to show 
 how the law of a doubtful command of the sea works, and how 
 necessary it must be to pay attention to it in all cases of territorial 
 ;i,ttackc 
 
 21 
 
S04 NAVAL WAFiFARE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Ihe Conditions under -which Attacks on TEnrjiOBY from tee 
 Sea Succeed or Fail — (continued). 
 
 The protection of Gibraltar from tbo Lisbon base, 1701-5. — Sir John Leake relieves 
 it three times, capturing attacking ships. — The English and Dutch assume command 
 of the Channel and Mediterranean seas, and the French decline to contest it. — The 
 rocoverj', based upon the command of the sea, of Barcelona to the Austrian cause, 
 1705. — Naval views as to the security of that command.— Leake, falling back to 
 Lisbon, leaves Barcelona open to any attack possible -svithin the time necessary for his 
 return. — French invest Barcelona by land and sea. — Leake relieves it, just as he had 
 relieved Gibraltar, bj' reassuming command of surrounding water, 170G. — The Mediter- 
 ranean coast of Spain gradually falls under control of the Power commanding the 
 sea — In theW'^est Indies, St. Christophers and Nevis raided in absence of English naval 
 force, 1705.— Arrival of such force co-incident ■with cessation of territorial attacks. — 
 Increase of English naval force suggests territorial attacks, but commerce suffers. — 
 Increase of French naval force and check to territorial attack again co-incident. — In 
 lairope, Ostendo falls to investment by land and sea ; attack bj' land and sea on 
 Toulon fails, 1707. — Forbin's attempt to invade Scotland checked by naval force. — 
 Minorca falls to Power commanding sea, 1708. — Spanish coast held and supplied from 
 Iho Eea base. — French'making head at sea, hope to carry Sardinia by evasion of allied 
 licet, Sir John Norris drives them back with loss, 1710. — Capture and abandonment of 
 Cctte. — Capture of Port Koyal, Nova Scotia. — Attack on Antigua prevented by 
 appearance of naval force. — Raid on Monserrat interrupted bj' rumour of naval force 
 a])proaching. — Failure of intended attacli on Quebec under Sir Hovenden Walker, through 
 ■wreck, season, and want of supply. — Attacks successful and unsuccessful on Leeward 
 Islands in consequence of distance of naval force at Jamaica. — Duguay-Trouin's 
 capture of Rio Janeiro. — Reflections on these occurrences. 
 
 The arrangement come to for the defence of Gibraltar, after tlie 
 battle of Malaga and in view of the necessary return home of 
 most of the ships, was to land all the Marines except those of two 
 ships that were under-manned, together with CO gunners and 12 
 carpenters which the Prince of Hesse, appointed Governor, had 
 ashed for. Accordingly " 2,000 Marines were landed, and the 
 garrison supplied with a quantity of stores and provisions and 48 
 
ATTACKS ON TEliniTOHY FROM THE SEA. 305 
 
 cannon, in addition to the 100 there before."^ Then all the ships 
 which were found in a condition to remain abroad were placed 
 under the command of Sir John Leake, to form the winter guard 
 of the new conquest. 
 
 As Gibraltar produced nothing that was necessary to the fleet, 
 not even water, Leake, with 12 sail and a fire-ship, parted from 
 Fiooke off Cape St. Vincent in order to make Lisbon his head- 
 quarters, and his action in protecting Gibraltar even from that 
 distant base is not a little striking and instructive. 
 
 The French and Spanish naturally determined to make strenuous 
 efforts for the recovery of Gibraltar, and it seems by no means 
 impossible that they might have succeeded had the efforts been 
 great enough and carried out in the proper direction. Sir John 
 Leake, greatly put to it to procure at Lisbon the necessaries for 
 his ships, heard, on the 1st October, that Gibraltar was invested by 
 land, and later he learnt that a squadron of 19 of the enemy's 
 ships, great and small, had come into the bay, and that the inten- 
 tion evidently was to invest the place by land and sea.f 
 
 The squadron was that of M. de Pointis, with 13 sail of the 
 line,t but so badly provided that he was no sooner arrived than 
 he found it necessary to go to Cadiz for supplies. 
 
 Sir John Leake, while hastening all preparations, received advice 
 from the Prince of Hesse that de Pointis had landed 6 battalions 
 and gone to the westward, leaving only 6 frigates of from 40 to 20 
 guns in the bay, and that the trenches had been opened on October 
 11th. Leake in council, determined to proceed at once to the 
 relief of the Prince wuth his squadron, which now consisted of 14 
 English and 6 Dutch sail of the line. The fleet arrived at Gibraltar 
 without adventure, and apparently found no force there. Leake 
 landed some reinforcements, but upon receipt of intelligence — 
 without any basis of truth that I can discover — of the approach of 
 a superior French force, and being still unsupplied with neces- 
 saries, he re-embarked the men landed except the gunners, car- 
 penters, and marines, and made sail again for Lisbon. 
 
 De Pointis on his side was being urged to re-establish the 
 blockade, but was pressing the danger of his situation at Gibraltar 
 in the presence of " 30 sail " in the Tagus, and recommending that 
 he should remain at Cadiz, where he was not only secure but in a 
 
 * Memoirs of Lord Toi iin//ion, p. 1G4. 
 
 t Entick, p. 649. 
 
 X Troudo, vol, i., p. 2oG. 
 
 21* 
 
806 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 position 10 harass any convoys for Gibraltar, until he was re 
 inforced.* The French Government seems to have had but little 
 conception of the strategy of the situation, and not to have under- 
 stood that Gibraltar could never fall unless Leake were masked or 
 beaten. De Pointis, however, managed to remain safe at or near 
 Cadiz with his main force, while leaving a few frigates and small 
 vessels to watch Gibraltar and check its supply by sea. 
 
 Leake was ready, and got out of the Tagus on the 25th of 
 October, and four days later he appeared in the bay of Gibraltar 
 with such little warning that he captured the whole of the enemy's 
 light squadron, consisting of 3 frigates, a sloop, a fire-ship, a 
 store-ship full of ammunition, and other small vessels. The state- 
 ment is that his arrival was most critical, as the enemy had 
 intended to storm the fortress that very night, having prepared 
 boats from Cadiz to land 3,000 men upon the New Mole.f Sir 
 John now remained at Gibraltar, and landed such men and stores 
 as the fleet could spare. Towards the latter end of November 
 he had intelligence that de Pointis was at sea, and he himself 
 put to sea, keeping sight of Gibraltar in order to be in a position 
 to receive him. On the 17th and 19th of December two convoys, 
 one of 9 and the other of 7 transports, arrived, having on board 
 1,970 men, and no doubt stores for the garrison of Gibraltar. J 
 On the 21st December a Council of War decided that it was quite 
 safe for the allied fleet to go back to Lisbon to refit, as, beside the 
 good condition Gibraltar garrison was now in, it was known that 
 the besiegers were themselves suffering the greatest distress and 
 privation. Leake was therefore back at Lisbon by January 19th, 
 1705. 
 
 Further supplies and reinforcements arrived at Gibraltar during 
 the month of January, and the French Government, disregarding 
 de Pointis' arguments, ordered him back to re-establish the 
 blockade. He sailed during the early days of March 1705, but 
 had hardly reached Gibraltar when his ships were dispersed by a 
 gale ; 8 were driven to sea, and he himself, with 5 sail of the line 
 only, found his way to the anchorage. § News that de Pointis, with 
 
 * Troude, vol. i.,p. 256. 
 
 t The Prince of Hesse wrote that he did not think he could have held out acrainst 
 such an attack. — Hervej', vol. iii., p. 468. 
 
 { The last convoy, off Cape Spartel, nearly ran into the toils of M. de Pointis' fleet of 
 22 sail, which as a ruse had hoisted Entjlish and Dutch colours ; as it was, 1 transport 
 was captured, and 3 morn with 2 war-ships as couvoy, were forced back to Lisbon. 
 
 § Troude, vol. i., u. 25G. 
 
 I 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 307 
 
 14 sail, had arrived at Gibraltar, reached Leake at Lisbon, who 
 sailed thence on the 16th of March at the head of 23 sail — English, 
 Dutch, and Portuguese — having on board an English, a Dutch, 
 and a Portuguese regiment. At half -past 5 on the morning of the 
 20th of March, de Pointis' ships were seen from the fleet to be 
 working out of the bay of Gibraltar. Sir Thomas Dilkes was de- 
 tached to attack them, and the whole were speedily either captured 
 or destroyed. Sir John Leake supposing that the remainder of the 
 French squadron might have made for Malaga, proceeded thither 
 after it, but learnt that the ships, on hearing the firing in Gibraltar 
 Bay, had beat a speedy retreat to Toulon. Marshal de Tesse, who 
 was in command of the besieging land forces, upon this wrote to 
 the French King that it was impossible to continue the siege, and 
 it was raised on the 1st of April 1705, after having lasted five 
 months. 
 
 We may clearly say of this failure of the attacking, and success 
 of the defending, force, that both were centred on the proceedings of 
 Sir John Leake. Just as it was not the force actually engaged 
 which had wrested the great stronghold from the Spanish, but the 
 covering and sustaining force of Sir George Eooke, so it was not 
 the defenders of the works, however gallant and enduring, who held 
 them. It was the unmatched threat of Sir John Leake at Lisbon 
 which would have operated to prevent the waste and disappoint- 
 ment incurred by the French had they only understood its nature, 
 and which, being foolishly dared, passed beyond the threatening 
 stage and rolled over everything in its way. Just as Admiral 
 de Pointis foresaw failure from a breach of the rules of naval war, 
 so we may be sure that Sir George Rooke based his hopes of success 
 when he attacked, in a consciousness that he had force enough, 
 apart from what was immediately engaged, to defy the enemy 
 should he make his appearance from the sea. 
 
 The operations of Sir Cloudesley Shovel and the Earl of Peter- 
 borough on the coast of Spain in 1705, although they were carried 
 on against a territory which was at least in part friendly, are yet 
 in some degree illustrative of the influences that are exercised by 
 the neighbourhood of a possibly opposing fleet. Though the battle 
 of Malaga had been a drawn battle, and might, according to the 
 judgment of contemporaries, have turned against the Allies had it 
 been renewed by the French,* yet it had by no means given confi- 
 dence to our enemies or tended to make them less cautious in 
 
 • Burchett, p. 680. 
 
308 NAVAL WAEFARE, 
 
 attaclving. They had, hideed, left the battle-field m the hands of 
 Sir George Rooke, and by so much acknowledged his superiority at 
 sea. 
 
 The fact was doubtless recognized on both sides ; in stimulating 
 the Allies to farther operations, which pre- supposed a command 
 of the sea, yet not such assured command as would dispense with 
 any precaution ; and in pressing on France the necessity of recover- 
 ing her maritime position. 
 
 On the French side, fleets were fitted out at Brest and Toulon, 
 and a formidable guerre de course under Forbin was initiated at 
 Dunkirk. On the English side, in addition to the great attack- 
 ing and covering force destined for the Mediterranean under the 
 Earl of Peterborough and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, defending forces 
 were placed under Sir George Byng for Brest, and Sir Thomas 
 Dilkes for Dunkirk.* 
 
 By the middle of June 1705, Sir Cloudesley Shovel found himself 
 at Lisbon at the head of a fleet of 58 sail of the line, of which 38 
 were English and 20 were Dutch, besides frigates, fire-ships, 
 bomb- vessels, and the other usual acccompaniments of a great 
 fleet. 
 
 The French Brest fleet was at this time supposed to consist of 
 about 18 sail of the line, and the force, under Sir George Byng, left 
 to watch it amounted to 12 sail of the line. His orders were to 
 cruise off Ushant, and if he found that the enemy had sailed, he 
 was, when assured that they were not bound up Channel, to detach 
 Sir John Jennings with the ships intended for the main fleet. If 
 Sir Cloudesley Shovel had no direct intelligence as to the strength 
 of the Toulon fleet, he would have estimated it by remembering 
 that the full French fleet of the year before had come up to 49 of 
 the line and had been diminished by the loss of De Pointis' 5 sail, 
 though possibly increased by subsequent additions. 
 
 As soon as the fleet assembled at Lisbon, although the land 
 forces were not yet fully collected, a council of war was held to 
 consider the situation, the chief point of which was the possibility 
 of a junction between the Brest and the Toulon fleets.f The first 
 decision come to was to detach 4G or 48 ships to cruise between 
 Cape Spartel and Cadiz, to interpose between the Brest and Toulon 
 fleets and prevent their junction. On the 20th of June, however, 
 this decision was reversed, and " it was agreed not to be advisable 
 
 • Dilkcs, however, came on with the grand fleet to Lisbon. 
 
 t Peterborough and Shovel were in commission jointly as admirals. Burchett, 
 j>. 684, 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 309 
 
 to detach any ships, in regard the fleet was proceeding on action, 
 and that there was a probabihty of the junction of the enemy's 
 ships of the ocean and Mediterranean." '' 
 
 Leaving the Earl of Peterborough to await the completion of 
 his army by the arrival of transports expected from Ireland, and by 
 hoped-for additions from Portugal, Shovel with the main part of 
 the fleet sailed from Lisbon on June 22nd, a measure which must 
 have had for its object the covering and protecting the expedition 
 which was to follow. The intention was to cruise off Cape 
 Spartel as determined by the first council of war, until the Earl of 
 Peterborough should join with his army.f 
 
 Peterborough followed on July 17th; his army amounted to 
 about 12,000 men, and the whole expedition being united at Gib- 
 raltar, sailed thence on the 5th August and anchored in Altea 
 Bay on the 11th. 
 
 A determination was then come to, to endeavour to recover 
 Barcelona to the Austrian cause, it being held for the Bourbons. 
 The fleet was before the place on the 12th of August. On the 13th 
 the troops were landed without opposition, a couple of miles from 
 the town. But as the attack proceeded, the generals feared it might 
 prove beyond the strength of the army. 
 
 On the 5th September the generals, at the Archduke Charles's 
 request, resolved to persevere in the attack, at any rate for a time ; 
 but on the 7th the Earl of Peterborough was for giving the thing 
 up and re-embarking, and the council suj)ported him, alleging 
 " that they had not been assisted cither by the fleet or by the 
 country peojple as they expected ; that the King (Charles) was 
 uncertain in his resolutions — one day for a siege, one day for a 
 march; and that the deputies of Catalonia had told my Lord 
 Peterborough their people could not work where they were exposed 
 to the enemy's fire. "J 
 
 What had occurred in the meantime is well worth our attention. 
 Peterborough was admiral as well as general, and Shovel, with 
 his fleet, was under his orders. The generals, in their council of 
 the 5tli September, had relied upon the landing of a number of 
 seamen and marines from the fleet, which Peterborough, as 
 
 * Buichett, p. 685. 
 
 t Byng had bcfoie this quitted Ushant and joined the main fleet. I have not been 
 aLlo to discover why. 
 
 t The History of the Last War in Spain, from 1702 to 1710. 1726. Page 25. This 
 book, sometimes quoted as An Impartial Inquiry into the Management of the War in 
 Spain, is -written against Lord Peterborough, but it has the advantage of containing 
 the letters that passed between the various authorities. 
 
310 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 admiral, could certainly order. The actual demand made on the 
 fleet was for " 1,500 men to be upon duty, and work in opening 
 the trenches every day, as also to ply the cannon on the battery 
 of 52 guns, besides the 1,100 marines of the complement of the 
 fleet that are already in the camp.""^ 
 
 "When the request reached Sir Cloudesley Shovel, he called a 
 council of war on board his flag-ship, the Britannia, and sent a 
 request to Peterborough to attend it. Peterborough did not come 
 on board then, but he seems to have gone to Shovel immediately 
 after the council of land officers held the day before. Now he 
 sent to the flag-officers' council his opinion that the demand " was 
 more than could be expected, or that, perhaps, he could have agreed 
 to in his private opinion. "f This difference in opinion between 
 the admiral and the general in the same person has been thrown 
 in Peterborough's teeth as double dealing ; but it is at least pos- 
 sible that when he voted with the land council he was not actually 
 aware how completely the Toulon fleet was governing the whole 
 transaction, and that when he consulted Shovel he was convinced 
 of the mistake he had made. That there was abundance of 
 friction between the land and sea officers is plain enough, and the 
 council of flag-officers marked it by a stinging record of the Earl's 
 absence — " The Earl of Peterborough not thinking fit to afford 
 us his company at this great council." 
 
 But the flag-officers, left to themselves in this way, and knowing 
 that if there were a failure it would be charged against the fleet 
 by those who would never understand the strategical conditions, 
 yielded almost the whole demand. They said : — 
 
 We do agree to send out of Her Majesty's ships five and twenty hiindred men, armed, 
 including those belonging to the lieet already ashore, which will reduce the fleet under 
 their middle complement, besid'js the misfortune of the sick men of the fleet. 
 
 And the Dutch flag-officers agree, on behalf of the States-General's fleet, to assist 
 the service at land with six hundred men, armed. 
 
 The fleet not being in a condition to assist with sails to make lodgments, all the Flags 
 do desire the men may have houses or tents to lodge or shelter themselves in. 
 
 Upon any notice we have of the enemy's being at sea, and approaching towards us, 
 we desire both seamen and marines may be in a readiness to embark when sent for. 
 And we further desire that immediate notice may be sent when it is designed the men 
 aud guns should be landed, that the first opportunity of good weather maybe taken for 
 landing the latter. J 
 
 Before any of these men and stores were landed, the army, by 
 
 * Minute of the Council of Yhv^ Officers of August i!7th (o.s. j, at p. 30, History vj 
 the Last War, Sfc 
 t Ibid. , p. 32 
 X J hid., p. 31 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA, 311 
 
 an inspiration of the Prince of Hesse, who knew the localities 
 well, made a successful attack on one of the works, which proved 
 to be the key of the position. Shovel did all that he promised, 
 and more, and between the renewed vigour of the soldiers and sea- 
 men with ithe guns and ammunition of the fleet on shore, and a 
 bombardment from the sea, carried out by the bomb-vessels and 
 a few of the ships themselves, the place was put to such straits 
 that the adherents of Charles rose upon the Governor, and Barce- 
 lona surrendered on the 3rd October 1705. 
 
 The ordinary historians of these occurrences seem none of them 
 aware that it was governed by the circumstances and attitude of 
 the French fleet at Toulon. Even although it is plain from the 
 minute of the council of the 6th September, quoted above, that the 
 flag-officers' minds were full of regard to the Toulon fleet, yet even 
 Sir Cloudesley Shovel, in the accounts he sent home to the Lord 
 High Admiral, does not think it necessary to advert further to the 
 subject. I neither learn what knowledge the flag-officers had of 
 the number and state of the French fleet, nor what precautions 
 were taken to watch it and guard against surprise. That the 
 Allies were in command of the sea is clear ; that the flag-officers 
 at least were aware of the tenure by which they held it is equally 
 clear, from their own language. We cannot doubt but that full 
 precautions were taken in view of all the circumstances of the 
 moment, even as we have seen them in Rooke's case at Gibraltar, 
 though they are not directly alluded to. 
 
 Not impossibly. Shovel had news of Toulon, and was aware that 
 so far from preparing to contest the command of the sea, the 
 French were m desperate fear of being attacked in Toulon itself, 
 and were busily employed in preparing to defend themselves 
 there.* And it was not until too late, that any attempt whatever 
 was made to equip a squadron, and then the key was pitched no 
 higher than 32 sail of the line. 
 
 After the surrender of Barcelona, Peterborough and the army 
 remained with the Archduke Charles in occupation of Catalonia. 
 Sir John Leake was left with a strong squadron in the Mediter- 
 
 * " Le bruit ayaut couru que Fennemi se disposait a attaquer Toulon, il fut ordonne 
 aM. de Vauvi'e, inteudant, d'etablir de nouvellea batteries dans tous les endroits ovi il 
 les jugerait necessairos, de les bien garnir de munitions, de retenir les vaisseau armes 
 dans les darses, et de se concerter avec le commandant du port et celui de terre pour 
 faire une vigoureuse defense. M. le Comte de Toulouse y fut envoy^ pour y commander; 
 le roi lui donna six bataillonb de troupes reglees et deux re'sriments de dragons pour 
 s'opposer aux ennemis en cas de descente." — Hisloire c(e 14 Murine Frangaise, par 
 Eugonu Sue. 1845. Vol. iv., p. 44:1. 
 
812 NAVAL IVAUFAHE. 
 
 ranean, but with no nearer port of supply than Lisbon, while Sir 
 Cloudesley Shovel, with the main body of the fleet, returned to 
 England for the winter. 
 
 How completely all the operations at Barcelona were subordinate 
 to sea command, we may be convinced as we proceed with the 
 history. Leake had to fall back to Lisbon for supplies, and when 
 he was there in the middle of February 170G, he had but 10 
 English and 6 Dutch ships under his command. In March 
 Marshal de Tesse was before Barcelona with a considerable army.* 
 It was furnished and supplied from the sea, and the Count of 
 Toulouse was anchored off the place with 20 sail. 
 
 Leake was reinforced from England on April 3rd by 6 English 
 and 6 Dutch sail of the line, and with this increased force it was 
 deemed possible to relieve Barcelona. By the 18th of April the 
 Admiral was once more in Altea Bay, and there he was joined by 
 heavy reinforcements under Sir George Byng and Commodore 
 Walker. The Allies had now a fleet of 53 sail of the line and G 
 frigates, and pressing messages arriving from the Archduke 
 Charles simultaneously with a fresh southerly breeze, the fleet 
 made sail for Barcelona. 
 
 The place [says de Lapeyrouso Bonfils], reduced to extremity, was on the point of 
 surrendering when the allied fleet of 45 sail arrived before it on tho 7th May. The 
 Count of Toulouse, too weak for battle, fled precipitately ; then Marshal de Tesse' 
 raised the siege in disorder, abandoning his artillery and wounded. The Spanish army, 
 demoralized, broke up, and Catalonia passed once more under the rule of the Archduke. 
 A battle lost could not have been followed bj' more deplorable i-osults.f 
 
 Barcelona is, in fact, only the history of the Gibraltar affair 
 over again, and Sir John Leake was pretty well versed in tho 
 mode of proceeding. Both places were attacked by portions of 
 the fleet only; in both cases, the prospects of success induced the 
 Admirals to go perhaps farther than it was wholly prudent to go 
 in weakening the covering fleet which alone enabled the enter- 
 prise to be undertaken, by the command of the sea which it 
 secured. Both places fell before the joint attack. The enemy, 
 taking advantage of the temporary absence of the covering fleet, 
 attempted to recover each place by a land and sea investment and 
 siege. Sir John Leake in both cases arrived and drove the sea 
 force away, which in both cases necessitated the break up of the 
 land attack. 
 
 * Forty thousand men according to de Lapeyrouse Bonfils (vol. ii., p. 06). 
 t Hist, de la Mar. FraiiQaise, vol. ii., p. 66. Sir John Leake, in his report to the 
 Lord High Acjmiralj says the Count of Toulouse made off the night before he arrived. 
 
 I 
 
ATTACKS ON TEllUITORY FROM THE SEA. »ia 
 
 Sir John Leake was now left in assured command of the Mediter- 
 ranean Sea, and we find him proceeding to work systematically and 
 almost leism-ely, assisted by the Earl of Peterborough and the 
 troops, to carry every place which could be conveniently got at 
 from the sea. The Earl and the troops were first embarked from 
 Catalonia and landed on the shores of Valencia. Then, learning 
 that a show of force would bring about the surrender of Cartagena, 
 he proceeded thither on the 1st June and accepted the declaration 
 of the place in favour of Charles, placing in it a garrison of 
 marines. On the 7th June the fleet went to water at Altea, and 
 dn the 26th it was before Alicante. Here was a strong garrison, 
 disposed to hold out, so that, the fleet not having with it a 
 sufficient land force to undertake the attack, a delay occurred till 
 the 21st and 22nd of July, when the marines left on board, with 
 800 seamen, were landed, and joined a body of Spanish troops. 
 The same night the town was bombarded by some of the ships. 
 On July 24th the marines which had been in garrison at Cartagena 
 arrived, and then these being landed with 40 more seamen from 
 each ship, Alicante was carried by storm. 
 
 On September 9th the island of Iviza surrendered to Sir John, 
 and on the 14th Palma, after a show of resistance, followed the 
 example of Iviza, and brought the whole island of Majorca in 
 its train. 
 
 These conquests being completed, Sir John Leake, pursuant to 
 his orders, withdrew from the Mediterranean with the whole 
 fleet for the winter months. He himself now went home with 
 part of the fleet, but Sir George Byng was detached to Lisbon 
 with 17 sail of the line and some smaller vessels, in order to 
 carry out the service of guarding the coasts and assisting the 
 Earl of Peterborough, as Leake himself had acted in the preceding 
 winters. 
 
 Passing back to the West Indies, and to the year 1705, it does 
 not appear that we had any naval force there in the early part of 
 it. In the months of March and April the French, taking advan- 
 tage of what was either an indifferent or a commanded sea, pro- 
 ceeded with a small squadron under the Count de Chavagnac, and, 
 with forces collected by M. Herville, the Governor of San Domingo, 
 made a raiding attack on St. Christophers. They carried off 
 plunder, it is said, to the amount of i^l50,000 ; but the garrison 
 retreating into the fort remained masters of it, and the French 
 retired to attack Nevis. Here they were even more successful, as 
 they raided the island and also held it to heavy ransom. There 
 
814 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 is no mention of any British naval force in the vicinity, and so the 
 French appear to have bad it, as usual in such cases, all their own 
 way. 
 
 It was not till May 7th that Sir William Whetstone, with a 
 squadron, arrived at Jamaica and thus disputed command of the 
 sea with the French. Coincidently, the character of the war 
 changed. Nothing is heard of territorial attacks, and both sides 
 appeared to devote themselves to the attack and defence of com- 
 merce, as well as to direct attack upon the war-ships. But towards 
 the latter end of July Whetstone was reinforced by a squadron 
 under Captain Kerr, and then the idea was entertained of exhibi- 
 ting such force before Cartagena as might induce the Governor to 
 declare for the Austrian Archduke. A demonstration was accord- 
 ingly made there, but the Govern9r declined to change his 
 allegiance, and there was not force enough to make any attack 
 practicable, even if it had been considered safe to risk the fighting 
 power of the squadron. 
 
 Whetstone left Kerr in command, and himself sailed for England 
 at the end of December ; and Kerr thereupon, instead of directing 
 his energies to commerce attack and defence, began to have ideas 
 of descents upon the coast of Hispaniola, yet more upon the 
 shipping probably to be found in the ports than on the ports them- 
 selves. Everything in this direction miscarried in one way or 
 another, and the merchants were so dissatisfied with the protection 
 afforded to their trade by the Commodore, that they pushed their 
 complaints against him into the House of Commons, where they 
 gained such weight that Kerr was never again employed. 
 
 The whole of 1706 passed in this way. If there was French 
 naval force in the West Indies, it had no command ; and nothing 
 is stated of it beyond the successful attacks on commerce above 
 referred to. 
 
 In Europe there were made two attacks on ports, in the years 
 1706 and 1707, which may be noticed merely to point out how they 
 differed from the class of attacks properly under discussion in 
 these chapters. The one was an attack on Ostende in June 1706, 
 which place being invested by the allied troops on land, and 
 blockaded and bombarded by a British squadron under Sir Stafford 
 Fairborne, surrendered. The other was a similar attack on Toulon 
 in August 1707. The port was invested on land by the forcies of 
 the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene, which were covered and 
 assisted on their march thither by the large fleet under Sir 
 Cloudesley Shovel. The investment by land, however, appears to 
 
ATTACKS ON TEEIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 315 
 
 have been very far from complete, and after a vigorous sally from 
 the garrison, which inflicted great loss on the attacking forces, it 
 was determined to raise the siege, on the ostensible gromid that the 
 strength of the garrison would increase, while there were no hopes 
 of reinforcement for the allied armies. Political and personal 
 reasons were also stated to have had an effect in reducing the 
 operations to failure. 
 
 Though in neither of these cases could the attacks have been 
 contemplated, unless the attacking power were assured of freedom 
 from apprehension as far as the sea was concerned, yet they were 
 not properly attacks from the sea, as the troops marched by land, 
 and drew their supplies also from land. 
 
 In 1706 an allied descent on the north coast of France was in 
 contemplation, in order to assist the Protestants in insurrection ; but 
 a long continuance of foul winds ultimately caused the abandon- 
 ment of the idea. 
 
 In March 1707 Commodore Wager, with 7 sail of the line, 
 sailed for the West Indies, to relieve Commodore Kerr. It was 
 not known what force the French might have in those waters, and 
 the dispositions of the British ships show merely a defensive 
 attitude ; but in December, precise information of the arrival 
 of du Casse, with 10 sail of the line, and other forces to follow, 
 caused Wager to apprehend the possibility of an attack on Jamaica, 
 and drew him thither in concentrated force, which may or may 
 not have caused the abandonment of the design. At any rate, no 
 attack was made. 
 
 In the beginning of 1708, an occurrence took place highly illus- 
 trative of the conditions which are necessary to success in attacks 
 upon territory over sea. I have already observed that the weaker 
 Power may often carry out successful expeditions over sea, for the 
 attack of territory, where the naval part of the undertaking is 
 complete when the troops are landed. At the time when our fleet 
 was engaged in the siege of Toulon, the French were operating in 
 our rear, as it were, by means of small groups of ships acting, as 
 Entick puts it, " by stealth," and in this way Minorca had been 
 relieved by them. Scotland, presumably ready to rise and wel- 
 come any body of French troops landed in support of the Pre- 
 tender, offered just the sort of opportunity for a success of this 
 kind, yet, of course, with the risk of failure if knowledge of the 
 design should reach the English Government soon enough to 
 enable them to detach a small force to frustrate it. 
 
 In order to take advantage of the position, the French pro- 
 
316 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ceeded to fit out an expedition 20 sail strong, under the Count 
 de Forbin, with a numerous body of troops. Certainly a month 
 before it was ready to sail the English Government had intelli- 
 gence of it, and by the 12th March ample force was assembled, 
 Sir George Byng being in the Downs with the main part of it. 
 The winds and weather so favoured the French that they were 
 able to put to sea on the 17th March^ at a time when Byng 
 was driven to the Downs by adverse weather. On the 19th, 
 being back again on the French coast, he learnt the departure of 
 the enemy, but could only guess that their destination was Scot- 
 land. He therefore divided his force, leaving Eear-Admiral Baker 
 with a division in the Downs, while he himself made all sail for 
 Edinburgh. He anchored in the Firth of Forth at night on the 
 23rd, and in the morning saw the object of his pursuit flying to 
 the north-eastward as fast as the wind would carry him. Forbin 
 had anchored before Bjmg arrived, and had been made aware of 
 the pursuit which .was on his heels, as well as of the fact that his 
 plans were known and thoroughly prepared against by the English. 
 He had observed the anchoring of Byng's squadron, only too 
 happy to know that he was himself unobserved, and had imme- 
 diately sent round to the ships to put all their lights out and make 
 off to sea without a moment's delay. Byng chased them, but only 
 managed to capture one ship, the Salishiirij, and Forbin got the 
 rest of his squadron safe back into Dunkirk. 
 
 The incident simply shows how precarious the success of any 
 expedition by sea must be when it depends, not on its strength, but 
 upon the chances that the enemy may not have intelligence, or 
 may, in some way, be unprepared to employ a sufficient naval 
 force in time. Doubtless the thing may be done in cases, but 
 they must bo rare, and the risks of failure are so great as 
 generally to stigmatise such attempts as mere acts of rashness. 
 
 In October 1708 Minorca fell to the attack of an army com- 
 manded by Lieut. -General Stanhope, when supported and supplied 
 by a fleet, under Sir John Leake, in command of the surrounding 
 waters, acting on the knowledge that tlie French fleet was in no 
 condition to interfere. 
 
 Eeturning to the West Lidies, we find the rule of naval war, 
 which may be said to have now become fundamental, in full 
 force. Du Casse was in command of a squadron estimated to be 
 double the strength of that commanded by Commodore Wager, 
 and not only does he abstain from all idea of territorial attack, 
 but he, though certainly one of the most able and energetic officers 
 
ATTACKS ON TERIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 317 
 
 in the French navy, seems to have devoted himself wholly to com- 
 merce defence. His true objective was Wager's squadron, but it 
 is not always that the true objective is seen. In this case. Com- 
 modore Wager used his powers of evasion in a legitimate way, 
 not necessarily hazardous. He intercepted the Spanish galleons 
 in the absence of du Casse's protecting fleet, and made a great 
 prize. 
 
 The only point noteworthy in the naval history of Europe in 
 1709, in connection with the subject of this chapter, is the way in 
 which the towns along the Spanish coast, which, in the collapse 
 of the Austrian cause in Spain, had come to be invested on the 
 land side, were kept alive for a time by resting on the sea base to 
 which stores and provisions arrived from all parts of the Mediter- 
 ranean. The chief services of Sir George Byng and Sir Edward 
 Whittaker may be said to have been, on the one hand, the 
 supply of the Spanish coast, and on the other, the prevention of 
 interference with it by the French over sea. 
 
 In 1710 Sir John Norris became Commander-in-Chief in the 
 Mediterranean, and on his arrival with the spring fleet in March 
 13th at Port ]\Iahon, he learnt that the French had been making 
 such head at sea while the English fleet was, so to speak, in 
 winter quarters, that they had captured the Pemhrole, 64, and the 
 Falcon, 32. To a certain extent, therefore, and for the first time 
 since the battle of Malaga, there was a tendency — it was not more 
 — to a disputed command of the sea.* 
 
 Such as it was, the French, still untaught by all that had gr ne 
 on, considered the territorial attacks might be renewed on their 
 side, if not with impunity, at least with a minimum of risk. 
 When Norris, on the 7th of April, arrived at Barcelona with the 
 squadron under his immediate command, he learnt that the enemy 
 had a project in preparation for an attack on Sardinia, with 20 
 galleys, 5 ships, and other small vessels, carrying with them some 
 3,500 men. Norris immediately set himself to prevent the success 
 oi this expedition, and sailed for that purpose with 10 line-of- 
 battle ships and 2 regiments. He proceeded first to Bastia in 
 
 * That no apprehensions were entertained by the English, may be gathered from the 
 Tcry scattered state of the 23 sail of the line which are stated to have been under Norris's 
 command when he left Port Mahon for Barcelona. Two were on their way to Lisbon 
 to clean, refit, and return ; 2 were convoying corn from Oran to Spain ; 9 were con- 
 voying corn from the Archipelago ; 2 were watching the Straights of Messina ; 1 was 
 watching Sardinia ; 2 were on a mission to Genoa ; and only G were with Sir John 
 Norris. But I think that some Dutch ships at Barcelona are left out of this account. 
 (-See Entick, p. 68G, note.) 
 
318 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Corsica, and then to Terra Nuova on the N.E. coast of Sardinia. 
 Here he found some tartans, which had just landed between 400 
 and 500 troops who had taken the town. But the capture of the 
 tartans, and the landing of some troops under General Brown, 
 compelled the surrender at discretion of the w^hole of the enemy's 
 forces. 
 
 There being no intelligence of any further attempts on the east 
 side of the island, and reports reaching Norris that the Duke of 
 Fursis was conducting the main attack on the west side of the 
 island, he made his way through the Straits of Bonifacio. There, 
 on the 8th of June, he got intelligence of the inevitable action of 
 rule in naval warfare. It was impossible for the French to con- 
 tinue their design, under the threat of the superior sea force of 
 Norris. The Duke of Fursis had retired to Ajaccio, seeking as he 
 supposed and hoped, the shelter of a neutral port."^ Not being so 
 sure of his ground, the Duke himself fled away back to France 
 with his galleys, leaving some of his troops in 8 large transports, 
 with the greater part of his artillery, ammunition, and provisions. 
 Norris fell upon and destroyed them, and thus at once ended all 
 ideas of attack on Sardinia, and added another page to the 
 chapter of naval strategy, which teaches the hazard, at least, of 
 all attempts to attack territory over an uncommanded sea. 
 
 Immediately after this came a further illustration of the dogma 
 that, even over a commanded sea, it is no use attacking territory 
 with insufficient land force ; and that, generally speaking, reliance 
 on effective co-operation from the inhabitants of an invaded 
 country is not very safe. The inhabitants of the Cevennes were 
 then in insurrection against the king of France, and were in arms 
 as far south as to be within 50 miles of the town of Cette. The 
 idea of the Allies was that, if this place could be captured and 
 held, communications might be established with the rebels, and 
 something like a permanent footing established in France itself. 
 To be successful in an undertaking of this character, it is obvious 
 that considerable land force in the first instance, and a full pro- 
 vision for its reinforcement and supply in the second, was abso- 
 lutely necessary. To attempt it, as was done, with only 700 men 
 and no preparation for reinforcement, was at the best but rash. 
 
 Cette is a little town on the French coast, midway between 
 Marseilles and the Spanish frontier. It stands at the foot of a 
 hill which is itself almost an island, being connected with the 
 mainland only by a beach stretching to the N-E. and S.W., and 
 
 * Corsica then belonged to the Rfjjublic ot uo-ioa. 
 
i 
 
ATTACKS ON TERPdTORY FROM THE SEA. 319 
 
 forming the coast line. Within this beach and cutting it ofif from 
 the land for six or seven miles to the southward, and for three or 
 four miles to the northward, is a sheet of water which is several 
 fainoms deep where it immediately surrounds the hill of Cette. 
 Without long-range artillery Cette cannot be attacked but by 
 approach along these causeways or beaches, and it was therefore a 
 place naturally strong, so long as it could be supplied from the 
 sea, which a little harbour facilitated. But just as it was a place 
 easily held on a sea base, because of the difficulty of approach on 
 the land side, it was by so much a bad place from which to open 
 up communications with the Cevennes. 
 
 The fleet got before Cette on the 19th of July, and at once 
 lauded upon the beach the 700 troops and some marines provided, 
 without difficulty or opposition. The first thing next morning 
 they marched upon the town, and, assisted by the fire from some, 
 of the ships, possessed themselves of it. The next day they took 
 possession of the town and bridge of Agde, ten miles to the S.W., 
 which formed the key of the position in that direction, as ap- 
 parently the long causeway could not be reached but by the 
 bridge, or by fording the shallow or south-w-estern part of the lake, 
 to which there was communication from the sea. 
 
 On the 17th Major-General Seissan, who was in command of 
 the troops, received intelligence that the Duke de Koquelaure was 
 advancing from Meze with 400 Dragoons and 2,000 Militia to 
 cross the shallow part of the lake. The General sent 140 men to 
 secure the bridge of Agde, and at the same time a message to the 
 x\dmiral to send boats into the lake. These precautions caused the 
 French to return to Meze, but word was soon brought that on a 
 false alarm the detachment guarding the bridge had abandoned it. 
 Then, toe, it became known that the forces approaching by way of 
 Agde were considerable,''' and there was nothing for it but to fall 
 back on Cette. But this was to leave the place open, and accord- 
 ingly the enemy pressed on so that it was impossible to hold it, 
 and the troops were embarked, with the loss of their rear-guard, 
 and all hopes of combining with the inhabitants of the Cevennes 
 collapsed. 
 
 There being no naval force to hinder it, a sufficient squadron 
 under Captain Martin proceeded to Boston in the summer of 1709, 
 for the purpose of organizing there an attack against Port Royal, 
 now Annapolis, in Nova Scotia. Two thousand land forces were em- 
 
 • Said to bo 2.000 horse, each with a foot soldier behind him. Lediard, vol. ii. , 
 p. >^iTi. 
 
 •>9 
 
n 
 
 320 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 barked in transports, with full supplies and munitions, and the 
 expedition came to an anchor at the entrance of Port Royal har- 
 bour on September 24th. Careful arrangements resulted in the 
 landing of the troops, with guns and all proper appliances. The 
 single mortar vessel belonging to the expedition proceeded to play 
 heavily and continuously on the fort, which was at the same time 
 bombarded from the batteries erected on shore. The result was that 
 on the 1st October the Governor sent to propose terms of capitula- 
 tion, which were accepted, and this part of Nova Scotia passed thus 
 easily into our hands. The historians reasonably credit the naval 
 and military commanders with complete agreement and co-opera- 
 tion, and we may point to it as conveying the simple lesson already 
 several times stated, that a land and sea attack properly con- 
 ducted against a place which is not relieved by sea ought generally 
 to succeed. 
 
 In the West Indies, in 1710, the attack and defence of commerce 
 entirely occupied the minds of the authorities carrying on the war, 
 and in 1711 the presence of du Casse on the French side, and of 
 Commodore Littleton on the other, kept territory as it were neutral, 
 and fixed attention on the English side to the capture, and on the 
 French side to the defence, of the annual fleet of the Spanish 
 treasure ships. 
 
 But in the Leeward Islands the French hoped to take advantage 
 of the fact that the mass of the English force was away far to 
 leeward at Jamaica, and that there were only one or two cruisers 
 to prevent any attacks being made on the British Islands. They 
 proposed to treat the water strategically as an indifferent sea, for- 
 getting that if there was any naval force they must be prepared 
 to meet and beat it before they could hope for success ; and that an 
 indifferent sea did not mean a sea where the naval forces engaged 
 were small, but where there was no naval force whatever, properly 
 so called. The design was against the Island of Antigua, and a 
 force of 2,000 land troops was prepared at Martinique. The naval 
 force to convoy it was insignificant, and for the most j)art extem- 
 porised. The expedition sailed from Martinique on the 10th June, 
 but was scarcely clear of the island when one of the few British 
 cruisers available, the Neivcastle, fell upon it, broke it up and dis- 
 persed it so that the vessels were only too glad to seek the shelter 
 of their own harbours. 
 
 Untaught by this mishap, the French still hoped to do some- 
 thing on a smaller scale ; and after a few days later succeeded in 
 slipping some 1,500 men by night into the Island of Monserrat. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 321 
 
 There, for a moment, they proceeded to plunder, but before the 
 day was over, intelligence of the probable arrival of the Neivcastle 
 caused their hurried re-embarkation, so hurried that they left some 
 of their men behind them. Nor did they then wholly escape, for 
 on their way back to their own island they were met by the British 
 cruisers Diamond and Panther, which made several prizes amongst 
 them. 
 
 These attacks, where the force employed is small, where the dis- 
 tance to be passed over sea is short, and where, if a successful 
 landing is effected, capture of the whole territory may follow, con- 
 stitute perhaps the limits within which there is any chance at all 
 of a successful attack on territory by the inferior naval force. But 
 attacks on territory of any kind are such serious affairs that the 
 best-arranged sometimes fail from various causes, which could not 
 have been foreseen, even when the expedition is conducted over 
 a sea absolutely undefended. 
 
 Such an example we have in the intended attack on Quebec in 
 1711. The forces both land and sea for this expedition, which left 
 St. Helens for America on the 11th April 1711, were on a not in- 
 considerable scale, and consisted of 11 sail of the line, with other 
 vessels under Ptear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker, and 31 trans- 
 ports carrying 5,300 troops under Brigadier-General Hill. It was 
 expected that large reinforcements would be drawn from Boston, 
 whither the fleet proceeded in the first instance, but " the Admiral 
 was far from meeting in New England with that hearty zeal for 
 the service which he expected," * and in the end the expedition did 
 not sail for the St. Lawrence until the 30th July, and then with 
 pilots on board who only professed their ignorance of the navigation 
 before them. 
 
 Sir Hovenden Walker's inquiries as to the conduct of the busi- 
 ness in hand were not encouraging. The navigation of the St. 
 Lawrence was represented to be so dangerous that he held it im- 
 possible to take 80-gun ships up, and felt himself obliged to send 
 two of these home, shifting his flag from one of them into a 70-gu]3 
 ship, the Edgar. He had also intelligence of the probable arrivaJ 
 of a French ship of 60 guns, and another of 80 ; and though sucll 
 a force could not attempt anything as against his own, yet he 
 ordered the two 80-gun ships to cruise for a month at the mouth of 
 the St. Lawrence before they went home, in order that he mighi 
 not be interfered with. 
 
 Walker did not reach Gaspe Bay until August 18th, where he 
 
 • Entick, p. 692. 
 
 22* 
 
822 NAVAL WAHfAtiUj. 
 
 anchored to wait for a fair wind. On the 20th he sailed, but next 
 day fell into a thick fog in the evening, accompanied with strong 
 winds from E. and E.S.E. In this dangerous position, probably 
 in the open water above Anticosti Island, the fleet was brought-to 
 with their heads to the southward. Had they kept so till morning, 
 very possibly the subsequent disaster might have been avoided. 
 But about half-past 10 at night it was assumed that the south 
 shore was seen, and the fleet was ordered to wear and bring-to 
 with their heads to the northward. " What men will do, not 
 knowing what they do," at sea, is not ill- exemplified when we learn 
 that Sir Hovenden Walker, with this great fleet under his charge, 
 in a fog, with pilots he did not trust, and fully impressed with all 
 the dangers of the situation, was going comfortably to bed as soon 
 as the fleet was brought to. It was one of the soldiers — a Captain 
 Goddard — who, with sharper eyes than the sailors, and a mind 
 probably free from foregone conclusions, saved the whole fleet from 
 destruction. As they were wearing, he was certain he saw breakers 
 stretching away to leeward. At first he was not listened to, but 
 becoming more certain and more importunate, " he penetrated to 
 the Admiral's cabin," and made him come on deck — even in his 
 dressing-gown and slippers. Then, indeed, it was seen that the 
 whole fleet was standing on to the north shore, and was even then 
 amongst the breakers. It speaks well for the subsequent energy 
 and seamanship that only 8 transports were lost. They carried 
 1,383 men, of whom only 499 were saved.* 
 
 This disaster not only made delay in an undertaking already 
 long behind its time, but it broke any spirit that may have existed 
 amongst the officers and pilots previously. It was unanimously 
 concluded that the St. Lawrence was barred to the fleet because of 
 its dangers, and the ships were ordered to rendezvous in Spanish 
 River Bay in Cape Breton. There were other considerations which 
 possibly had equal weight. The supplies of the fleet were by this 
 time exceedingly limited. There were only provisions for ten weeks 
 on short allowance, and the bread would not last out even as far as 
 that- There was indeed some apprehension that if the fleet did 
 get up to Quebec, it might find the place deserted and void of sup- 
 plies of any sort, in which case the great expedition must either 
 starve there or quit it with all speed, and with complete failure 
 lacing it. This shortness of supply, combined with the lateness of 
 the season, forbade an attack on Placentia, in Newfoundland, which 
 was intended to have formed a subsequent item in the prograunne 
 
 * Ledianl. vol. ii., p. 854. 
 

 
, ATTACKS ON TEIUUTOIIY FROM THE SEA. 3'23 
 
 had the attack on Quebec succeeded. There was then nothing for 
 it but to return home to meet the disgrace which failure ahnost 
 invariably entailed at the hands of the Government and people of 
 England upon the naval officer who was the agent. Sir Hovenden 
 Walker did not, however, at first meet this disgrace. He com- 
 manded again in the West Indies, until after the peace of Utrecht 
 in 1713, but was afterwards, for reasons not on public record, 
 struck off the list of Admirals.* 
 
 In bringing the War of the Succession to a conclusion, as far as 
 attacks from over the sea are concerned, there appear to be but two 
 incidents which it is desirable to refer to. 
 
 I have spoken, in my tenth chapter, of the effect of the wind 
 in the West Indies preventing a fleet at Jamaica from exer- 
 cising any command over the water surrounding the Eastern 
 Islands. Sir Hovenden Walker was at Antigua on June •24th, 
 1712, and then probably in command of 8 sail. He may not have 
 had intelligence of the fact, but the French then had a considerable 
 naval force in the neighbourhood, so that, when he sailed for 
 Jamaica and arrived there on July 6th, he consequently left behind 
 liim a sea to some extent commanded by the enemy. Nor were the 
 French slow to take advantage of the conditions. M. Cassard, 
 with 8 large men-of-war, and 17 or 18 smaller vessels, and some 
 thousands of troops, made an unsuccessful attack on Antigua, and 
 then raided the island of Monserrat, quitting it, however, with pre- 
 cipitation on hearing of the aijproach of some English war-ships. 
 The few that there were in these waters appear to have concen- 
 trated themselves for the defence of the islands, so that a second 
 attempt proposed against Antigua was given over. Something, 
 however, seems to have been done against Surinam and St. 
 Christophers by the French, but the accounts are meagre and 
 conflicting. 
 
 Duguay-Trouin had conducted a somewhat considerable and 
 successful expedition against Rio Janeiro in 1711, where he was 
 able to land near 3,000 men, all the conditions which we have 
 noted as being conducive to success being present, t 
 
 It may, perhaps, appear not so easy to lay hold of any prin- 
 ciples governing so varied a series of occurrences as I have detaile^I 
 in this chapter. But I think that, properly understood, princ^'pies 
 
 * As a teetotaller and a vegetarian, Walker was probably not a popular 
 Lcfliard. Note in vol. ii., p. 855, 
 t De Lapeyrouse, vol. ii., p. 115 
 
324 NAVAL WARFAUE. 
 
 of the broadest and clearest kind may be drawn out and adopted 
 as lessons. 
 
 In the first place, the rule as to the influence of the superior 
 naval force in checking, preventing, or interrupting attacks on 
 territory by the inferior naval force continues absolutely un- 
 broken. We see Gibraltar three times saved, and Barcelona once 
 saved, by Sir John Leake, when the base of the fleet was as far 
 distant as Lisbon. Sir John Norris catches the French attempt 
 on Sardinia, as it were in mid-air, and stops it altogether, at con- 
 siderable loss to the would-be invaders. It is, perhaps, Worthy of 
 note, too, that the French hoped to effect this act of evasion by 
 means of propulsion independent of wind. The galleys employed 
 were not able to effect their object, but they were able to escape by 
 reason of their greater mobility, while the sailing ships became the 
 spoils of the victorious Enghsh. On a smaller scale, the prin- 
 ciple is illustrated at least once in the West Indies, where the 
 proposed attack on Antigua is frustrated by the appearance of 
 naval force, and where the raiding of Monserrat is checked by the 
 rumour of approaching naval force. The failure of Forbin's 
 attempt on Scotland is possibly a still stronger illustration of the 
 rule, for if we suppose Scotland to have been at any point friendly 
 to the landing of the French troops, the expedition was one not 
 involving either time to complete the naval part of it, or communi- 
 cation over sea afterwards. 
 
 Where the naval force is so superior as to be in assured com- 
 mand of the sea, tbe operations on the Spanish coast, the capture 
 of Cette and of Port Koyal,* the raiding of some of the West 
 India Islands, and the capture of Kio Janeiro by the French, all 
 prove the openness of territory to attack in spite of local 
 defences when the surrounding sea is not defended. 
 
 On the other hand, it is a question of the relations between the 
 attack and the local defence, whether the latter proves superior. 
 Of this we get an illustration in M. Cassard's failure against 
 Antigua, and success against Monserrat, so far as approaching 
 naval force admitted. 
 
 But then the reflection offers itself that, in the West Indies at 
 least, while superior local and fixed defensive force was necessary to 
 repel attacks when made, inferior defensive and movable naval force 
 may have been sufficient to prevent even the contemplation of a 
 territorial attack. This is illustrated by the curious coincidences 
 
 * Annapolis. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 325 
 
 between the cessation of territorial attacks and the apj)earance of 
 hostile squadrons facing each other, even where the difference of 
 force was great. And a further particular reflection occurs when 
 we see the success which attended so many of the attacks from 
 island on island, and the fruitlessness of so many local defences, 
 whether the permanent maintenance by either side, of a small 
 squadron at the Leeward Islands might not have been a cheaper 
 as well as a more effective means of defence. There seems reason 
 to believe that French and English naval forces, in nearly equal 
 strength, always in those waters, might have meant territorial 
 peace throughout the war. 
 
 But it is clear that to read aright the lessons of this series of 
 territorial attacks, whether successful or unsuccessful, we must 
 take largely into account the effect the season had in preventing 
 in those days the maintenance of naval force in a permanent 
 position. Whatever advantages were gained on either side from 
 the absence of opposing naval force in the West Indies were due to 
 season, or to the belief or custom that naval force must be 
 withdrawn from certain localities at certain times. Take away 
 this element of withdrawal, and all idea of territorial attack passes 
 away, not only by the inferior naval power, but even by the 
 superior naval power also, unless the superority is very great 
 indeed. 
 
 Another point to be noticed, as more or less influencing all terri- 
 torial attacks, is the relative distance of the bases from the objective. 
 Taking Barcelona as an example, the French were at an advantage 
 in all operations, either for its attack or defence, because of its 
 nearness to Toulon ; and they were able to strike at it, or to 
 succour it, as the case might be, because the English naval base 
 was as distant as Lisbon. In the W^est Indies, too, we see 
 operations conducted from the base of Martinique against neigh- 
 bouring islands, which are not at all checked by naval force with 
 its base far to leeward at Jamaica. 
 
 But yet all these questions as to the effect of the interference of 
 naval force with territorial attacks seem to be in abeyance, not 
 only in the minds of the historians who relate the facts for us, but 
 even in the contemplation of the chief actors when we meet their 
 ipsissima verba. No doubt there are two ways of accounting for 
 this. It may be said that the thought was equally absent from 
 their minds as from their words, because as a fact this threat of 
 naval interference did not influence the actors. For myself, I 
 cannot so argue. I cannot deny the detailed experience of so 
 
82G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 many cases where the naval force went beyond the thre.at, and 
 was absokitely defensive. Nor can I escape from the conviction 
 that the occasional allusions — mere slips of the pen, they seem to 
 be — to the governing power of the naval threat in territorial 
 attacks and defences, betoken an abiding sense of a cause so 
 obvious to naval commanders that it does not occur to them to 
 state it in form. Historians do not seem to have been well enough 
 informed to notice the omissions and their causes. 
 
 I must observe also, generally, that while on the one side we have 
 seen, both in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, successful 
 attacks on commerce by the inferior fleet evading the superior, and 
 successful reliefs conveyed over sea in spite of the presence of 
 superior naval force, we should check our conclusions upon the 
 facts by remembering that, as yet, history has shown us very 
 little blockade, or attempt to blockade. The superior nav}^ covers 
 each operation by the display of such a force on the spot that the 
 enemy does not dare to appear, but it leaves the enemy free to 
 attack unguarded supplies and convoys. The practice, perhaps 
 even the idea, of barring the enemy in his ports, and so pre- 
 serving a free sea in rear, i? not yet developed. 
 
>'ll 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory rnoii the 
 Sea succeed or fail — {continued). 
 
 Spain in 1718, being in command of the Mediterranean Sea, conr[viers Sicily.— 
 Byng appears, and destroys the Spanish fleet. — Sea round Sicily commanded by the 
 British, Sicily offers to surrender. — Case of Sardinia parallel to that of Sicily. — Spanish 
 attempt on Ross-shire a failure. — Vigo raided by Mighells and LordCobham. — Capture 
 of Porto Bello remai'kable as the direct attack by ships. — Cartagena, in the West 
 Indies, bombarded by Vernon. — Surrender of Chagres to simple bombardment. — 
 Change in strategic condition of West Indian waters in consequence of arrival of 
 Spanish and French fleets. — Misapprehensions of contemporary historians. — Arrival of 
 Ogle and departure of French fleet reverses strategic conditions. — Cartagena attacked. 
 — Incomprehensible failure. — St. Jago de Cuba. — Failure of attack from personal 
 causes. 
 
 Spain in 1718 had crept up considerably in naval po\yer, yet 
 was admittedly incapable of contending against England for the 
 dominion of the sea. Nevertheless, she held fallacious ideas as 
 to the possibility of making and holding conquests which required 
 free sea-communications for their maintenance. She proposed to 
 wrest the island of Sicily from the House of Savoy against the 
 will of the power which would, when it chose, command the 
 Mediterranean Sea, and, of course, to hold it in spite of opposing 
 naval force. 
 
 In July 1718, she herself being in command of the Mediterranean, 
 a Spanish army of 30,000 men, convoyed by a fleet of 22 sail of 
 the line, had no difficulty in possessing itself of almost the whole 
 island, the fortress of Messina being, in fact the sole possession 
 remaining to the House of Savoy. 
 
 But in August the interfering British fleet appeared off Messina, 
 under the command of Sir George Byng, and began the series of 
 operations which could only result in the undoing of all that the 
 Spaniards, in their want of comprehension of the problem, had been 
 
328 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 at such pains to do. The Spanish ifleet, consisting of 17 sail of the 
 line,'^ had quitted Messina for the east coast of Sicily only the 
 day before Byng with 22 sail of the line arrived there. Byng 
 made fair proposals to the Spanish general, the Marquis de Lede, 
 and these being rejected, he scented the prey of the Spanish fleet 
 and made sail after it. War was not yet declared, but the con- 
 quest of Sicily from a British ally was, according to Byng's 
 construction of his orders, in itself such a declaration. The Spanish 
 fleet cannot be said to have made any attempt to really defend 
 itself against a force not only numerically but individually superior, 
 materially and morally. Byng's work at the ensuing battle, 
 called the Battle of Cape Passaro, was a chase and a destruction. 
 Nine sail of the line, 3 frigates, and 3 smaller vessels were taken ; 
 3 sail of the line and 5 smaller vessels were burnt, and only 5 
 sail of the line, 7 frigates, and some galleys and smaller vessels, 
 escaped. The fate of Sicily was sealed by this battle, and the fact 
 that the citadel of Messina surrendered to the Spanish army a 
 month afterwards was of no account. It was like a knight's 
 excursion over to the opponent's side of the board to capture a 
 pawn and be himself cut off. 
 
 War was declared by Great Britain against Spain in December 
 1718, and the weaker naval power immediately set about concoct- 
 ing one of those descents which might possibly not require the 
 command of the sea for its success, evasion of the superior naval 
 force being assumed a possibility. Spain proposed to land troops 
 in Scotland, to raise the country on behalf of the Pretender. 
 Forty transports, with 5,000 troops on board and abundance of the 
 munitions of war, sailed from Cadiz early in 1719 under convoy 
 of 5 men-of-war, bound to the coast of Boss, the whole under the 
 control of the exiled and proscribed James Butler, Duke of Ormond. 
 As usual, the British force was far behind in time, and it was not 
 till April that Sir John Norris put to sea on the defensive. But 
 more than a month before he sailed, winds and weather had 
 practically put an end to the Spanish expedition. On the 28th of 
 February the Spaniards fell in with a gale of wind when they were 
 150 miles west of Finisterre, which broke up and dispersed the 
 whole fleet. Only 5 transports and 3 frigates reached Eoss-shire, 
 from which were landed some 400 men under the Earl Marshal, 
 the Earl of Seaford, and the Marquis of Tullibardine. Major- 
 General Wightman met this force after it had drawn some 1,500 
 
 • Ships of 44 guns an 1 -ipwarda. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM TILE SEA. 321) 
 
 Scotchmen to the Jacobite standard, and defeated it. Whereupon 
 the invaders surrendered, and the Scottish insurgents tied hither 
 and thither. Naval force was also on the spot, and sufficiently 
 numerous to have checked all reinforcement.* 
 
 Byng, having cleared the way for the reduction of Sicily, allowed 
 that matter to stand over for the winter according to the estab- 
 lished course of warfare at that time. He wintered at Port Mahon 
 in Minorca, and in the early spring proceeded to Naples to concert 
 measures for reversing the Spanish conquest, he being in com- 
 mand of the sea, with the Empire behind him for troops, while 
 the Spaniards in Sicily were wholly dependent on the island itself 
 for reinforcement and supply. 
 
 The first attack was made upon Milazzo, on the north coast of 
 Sicily, which was captured, and apparently became the landing- 
 place for the first body of troops destined for the capture of 
 Messina.f The transports were sent back to Naples for a rein- 
 forcement, and Byng seems to have then captured the Faro of 
 Messina, and advanced on the town by land and sea. The town 
 soon surrendered, and then the attack on the citadel began. Some 
 of the Spanish men-of-war had taken refuge under the guns of the 
 citadel, and hoped to shelter themselves till at least the citadel 
 itself should fall. But Sh- George Byng, observing that awkward 
 questions would arise as to the disposal of these ships, caused a 
 special battery to be erected for their destruction, which was duly 
 effected before the citadel fell. This took place on the 7th Octo- 
 ber 1719, and on the 12th November Sir George sent his whole 
 fleet, except the flag-ships, to Trapani, in the extreme west of the 
 island, as convoy for 7,000 foot and 500 horse destined for its 
 attack. This force possessed itself of Trapani, Marsala, and Maz- 
 zara, while other forces landed from other transports took Mola, 
 Tavornina, Cantabiano,t and other ports. The work of the navy 
 was, in short, of the usual character, namely, to prevent inter- 
 ference from the sea ; to convoy, land, and support troops ; and to 
 supply ports after they were captured. Hervey § says that on the 
 capture of Trapani the Marquis de Lede offered to evacuate the 
 island on terms, so that the conquest was then effected. That 
 the terms were rejected, and that the island was not evacuated till 
 
 * Hervey's Naval History, vol. iii., p. 406. 
 
 t Cruisers stationed to watch Palermo intercepted a squadron of 3 ships, ■with 
 troops and supplies for the Spaniards. Two were captured and the third burnt. — 
 Lediard, vol. ii., p. 883. 
 
 * Not identified. 
 
 § Naval Histoii/, vol. iii., p. 410. 
 
330 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 the armistice preceding the peace, does not in any way touch the 
 main position that Spain could not hold even a great territory like 
 Sicily, with a friendly population, against the will of the power 
 commanding the sea. It is at the same time sufficiently manifest 
 that it was only her temporary command of the Mediterranean 
 which enabled her even to consider the attack. Her mistake was 
 in supposing that she could in any way gain by a hold on Sicily 
 destined to be shaken loose the moment the superior navy put in 
 a word. 
 
 Just as she possessed herself of Sicily without difficulty, when 
 there was nothing to interrupt her by sea, so had she possessed 
 herself of Sardinia. Had the war continued, it must have been 
 wrested from her as Sicily was, but no attempts of this kind 
 appear to have been made by the English, owing to their forces 
 being occupied by the attack on Sicily. Spain was forced to 
 abandon both islands as one of the conditions of peace. 
 
 The battle of Cape Passaro in 1718 having shown that there 
 Avas no chance whatever in the command of the sea being con- 
 tested by Spain, and the fate of the expedition to Eoss making it 
 improbable that the Scottish Jacobites could expect any farther 
 support from the Spanish Government, the English Government 
 turned its attention to reprisals upon Spanish territory. These 
 mark the second phase in the naval war, as they could not be 
 safely or properly undertaken until the command of the sea was 
 assured. Lord Cobham was appointed to command a body of 
 4,000 troops, the transports to be convoyed by a force of 5 sail of 
 the line, under Vice-Admiral Mighells. The destination of the 
 expedition was kept secret, but Corunna was the point of attack, 
 and the fleet and transports sailed for that port from St. Helens on 
 September 21st. It is stated that after waiting off the coast of 
 Galicia for three days for the two men-of-war which failed to 
 arrive, the delay was sufficient to change the destination of the 
 force. Vigo was fixed upon, and Lord Cobham landed his troops 
 three miles from the town on September 29th. The town sur- 
 rendered on October 1st, the regular troops retreating into the 
 citadel, which appears to have grown up since Sir George Eooke's 
 attack fifteen years earlier. Batteries were erected on shore and 
 guns landed in increasing numbers, while mortars both on shore 
 and afloat were used against it. The citadel surrendered, on the 
 8th, after nearly half its defenders had been placed hors de corn- 
 hat, and the garrison marched out. Ponte Vedra at the end ol 
 the bay was subsequently taken, and its guns carried oii', but 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 331 
 
 Redondela was found undefended, with its old fort in ruins. The 
 guns being everywhere destroyed or carried off, and the forts 
 l)Iown up, the troops were re-embarked, and the expedition having 
 secured plunder, chiefly in the way of arms and ammunition 
 destined for the service of the Scottish Jacobites, to the amount 
 £'80,000, returned safely to England.'-^ 
 
 The loss to the English was very small, two officers and three or 
 four men only being killed. The whole expedition was qualified 
 for success, being sufficient, well handled, and arriving over a 
 commanded sea. It may be observed that again it was the land 
 forces that made the attack, and that they landed where there 
 were no works to oppose them. We also get a view of the action 
 of the fortification policy of those days . A citadel shelters a 
 body of troops quite unable to hold their own in the open, and 
 causes a delay of eight days by the strength which the work 
 conferred. 
 
 The reflection occurs that the delay was useless, and onl}^ caused 
 additional loss to the Spaniards ; but that it might have been of 
 supreme importance had a relieving force been in a position to 
 arrive before the eight days had expired. As the matter stood, it is 
 impossible to say that Spain was in the smallest degree advantaged 
 by her fortification of Vigo, though if the strength of the fortifica- 
 tion of Corunna had to do with changing the objective to Vigo, we 
 have their value exhibited there. The difficult strategical and 
 economical question appears to hinge on relative cost. Was 
 Spain at this time spending on her fixed coast defences and their 
 garrisons a sum which would have provided a fleet which must be 
 watched before any territorial attacks could be considered by her 
 enemy ? If there had been five or six sail of the line at Corunna, 
 Admiral Mighells must have kept his whole force there to watch 
 them, and the accidents of blockade would have made it necessary 
 to have a like fleet with Lord Cobham's transports. If it had 
 been necessary to double the naval force employed on the ex- 
 pedition, would it have been contemplated at all ? History seems 
 to bring these questions before us as of everlasting practical 
 importance. 
 
 The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of carrying attacks on 
 territory to a successful issue in the face of a naval enemy was 
 further illustrated in this year, 1719, by what took place in 
 the Baltic. Russia had attacked Sweden, and being so far in 
 
 * Lo<liard, vol. ii.. p. 885; Ilorvcv, vol. i';i., p. -112. 
 
332 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 command of the Baltic that the Swedish fleet could^mot make 
 even the appearance of defence, she had landed 15,000 men near 
 Stockholm. Sir John Norris being despatched with a fleet in 
 order to effect a pacification, joined the Swedish fleet^t Carls- 
 crona. The intelligence was enough for the Czar, who immediately 
 withdrew his forces and retired to EeveL* 
 
 Before the outbreak of the Spanish war, which was proclaimed 
 on October 23rd, 1739, preparations for it had, as usual, been 
 made on a considerable scale. Two squadrons witUP designs of 
 territorial attack were ordered to be got ready, thq, one under 
 Captain Anson and the other under Captain Cornwall. The 
 original intention was that Anson's squadron was to proceed 
 round the Cape of Good Hope, while Cornwall's -^s to pass round 
 Cape Horn. Cornwall was then to attack the iHpc side of the 
 Isthmus of Darien, while Admiral Vernon was to attack the 
 eastern side. Afterwards, Anson's and Cornwall's squadrons were 
 to rendezvous at the Philippines for operations there. Ultimately 
 the idea of Captain Cornwall's squadron was laid aside, and Anson 
 took his place, prosecuting his celebrated voyage. This voyage 
 does not concern us here farther than its mere mention as an 
 expedition designed chiefly against territory which was known to 
 be unprotected by any naval force, and so far at the mercy of the 
 attacking expedition. 
 
 Vernon, with 5 sail of the line, sailed from Spithead for the 
 West Indies on July 23rd, 1739. After touching at Antigua, he 
 arrived at Jamaica on September 11th, where, on the 28th, he was 
 joined by a sixth line-of-battle ship, and where a decision was 
 come to to make an attack on Porto Bello. 
 
 At this time Porto Bello was the depot for Panama, from which 
 it is distant some 70 miles, and the other Pacific ports of Spain, 
 and it was here that the great fleets of galleons, the never-failing 
 quarry of tne British seamen, were loaded with their precious 
 cargoes. The bay is about a mile deep, and the entrance is about 
 half a mile wide. At the entranc'e, on the north side of the bay, 
 close by a steep rock, stood a strong castle, mounting 78 guns, and 
 a lower battery mounting 22 guns, placed close to the water. 
 These works were garrisoned by 300 men. On the opposite side 
 of the bay, about a mile farther up and on a height, stood the 
 Castle Gloria, which consisted of two regular bastions, mounting 
 90 guns, with a curtain between them mounting 22 guns, and 
 another battery facing down the harbour, which carried 8 guns. 
 
 * LoJiard, vol. ii., p. 884 ; Hervey, vol. iii. , p. 415. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 333 
 
 These works were manned by a garrison of 400 men. Eather 
 above these defences, on a point running into the bay, was the 
 strong quadrangular redoubt of Fort St. Geronimo, mounting 
 many guns. The cannon of Gloria and St. Geronimo [were in- 
 tended to cover and protect the anchorage. At the bottom of the 
 bay was the town of Porto Bello, which then contained some 500 
 houses. The place was reputed to be immensely strong, and not 
 to be attempted but by an army of 8,000 men, acting with a 
 squadron. Vernon, however, had declared in the House of 
 Commons that he could take it with only six ships of war, and we 
 now find him sailing thither to fulfil his promise with the force he 
 had named. His six ships were manned by 2,495 men, and the 
 Governor of Jamaica had lent him 200 land forces. If Vernon 
 was fully aware of the nature of the defences he was expecting to 
 break down, he must also have known that his undertaking was 
 somewhat desperate.* 
 
 Vernon's plan of attack was chiefly by the ships, but he be- 
 lieved that as the north shore was steep-to, his ships standing in 
 in line of battle, with a fair wind, might pass the Iron Castle at 
 less than a cable's length, and so overpower its guns by the 
 number and rapidity of fire of his own, accompanied by the small 
 arms available at that distance. He gave corresponding orders ; 
 also directed the ships to tow their barges alongside and their long 
 boats astern in standing in, so as to be ready at a moment's 
 notice to throw appointed portions of the ships' companies on 
 shore as storming-parties. 
 
 The squadron did not sight Porto Bello until the evening of the 
 20th November 1739, and it anchored 18 miles off shore for that 
 night. On the morning of the 21st it stood in, as arranged, 
 in line of battle, close under the guns of the Iron Castle, and 
 began the attack. The exceedingly close quarters adopted by the 
 Admiral had all the advantages that he had bargained for ; for 
 after a sharp exchange of fire for about twenty-five minutes, it was 
 seen that the Spaniards were being driven from the lower battery 
 by the musketry of the squadron, which 'rendered it possible to land 
 the storming-parties. In this way the lower battery was quickly 
 mastered, and that success was at once followed by the capitulation 
 of the Iron Castle. Only 5 officers and 35 men actually surren- 
 dered, the remainder of the garrison of 300 having either been 
 killed or wounded, or having fled, before the British entered the 
 
 • Hervey, vol. iv., p. 98 ; Entick, p. 746. 
 
33-1 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 works. The loss in the squadron was inconsiderable, amounting in 
 killed and wounded to only 19 men in all. 
 
 After the capture of the Iron Castle, the ships appear to have 
 anchored, and a distant fire took place between Vernon's flag-ship, 
 the Burford, and Gloria Castle without any great effect. On the 
 morning of the 22nd the Admiral went on board the Hampton 
 Court, the ship of Commodore Brown, who had led in the day 
 before, for the purpose of arranging plans to warp the ships up to 
 the Gloria and St. Geromino fortresses during the ensuing night, 
 but the arrival of Spanish pi'oposals to capitulate rendered these 
 plans unnecessary. Terms of surrender were at once arranged, and 
 before night the British were in full possession of Porto Bello.* 
 
 This operation was so far remarkable as following the example 
 set at Gibraltar, and making the attack by the ships on the forts 
 the primary, instead of as usual the secondary, part of the attack. 
 We have noted that at Gibraltar there was hardly a choice in the 
 matter, and that, contrary to principle, the landing there was in 
 face of the works, because the geographical conditions forbade 
 any other mode of attack. Here, at Porto Bello, the geographical 
 conditions in no way compelled a departure from the established 
 and more certain form of attack, but yet the want of land forces 
 equally compelled Vernon, if he were to make the attack at all, to 
 make it as he did. There being then no choice, we can only note 
 that the extreme boldness, not to say rashness, of the attack was 
 probably justified by some previous belief that the conduct of the 
 garrisons of the Porto Bello fortresses would turn out to be what it 
 actually was ; and that, as at Gibraltar success was hoped for from 
 the numerical weakness of its garrison, so at Porto Bello victory was 
 achieved as a consequence of the just estimation of the moral weak- 
 ness of its defenders. 
 
 Vernon next determined to make an attack on Cartagena, though^ 
 I think, without a definite design of possessing himself of the place 
 as he had done in the case of Porto Bello. Perhaps the determining 
 cause in this new design was the reinforcement which had reached 
 him under convoy of the Greenwich, of fire-ships, bomb- vessels, and 
 store-ships. Almost certainly the possession of the bomb-vessels 
 determined the mode of attack, which was negatively governed by 
 the absence of any effective supply of land forces. 
 
 Cartagena, as may be seen from the sketch chart, is peculiarly 
 situated. The town is open to bombardment from the sea, but the 
 port which gives the town all its importance, can only be ap- 
 
 * Entick, p. 749; Hervey, p. 108; Berkeley, p. tiii'J 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 3B5 
 
 proached through the Boca Chica, a passage so narrow that only 
 one ship can enter or leave it at a time. The possession of Boca 
 Chica was, therefore, almost a necessary preliminary to the posses- 
 sion of the town, unless by bombardment or other direct form of 
 attack the town should be reduced to the surrendering point, in 
 which case the port might be expected to fall with it. 
 
 Vernon arrived within sight of the high land about Sta. Martha, 
 east of Cartagena, on March 1, 1740. He had with him only 5 
 
 — 
 
 SKETCH PLAN •'""'"lfb\<^i '^' '^T' J 
 
 HARBOUR of CAHTAXiEN/i ,^V J 
 
 f\- 
 
 s::i 
 
 C^K5 
 
 A.— Position of Port St. Louis and Redoubts. B.— Fascine Battery, &c 
 C— Fort St. Joseph. D.— Mancinilla. E.— Castillo Grande. 
 
 ships of the line with 7 smaller vessels and the bomb-vessels, his 
 own flag-ship, the Burford, having been left behind at Port Eo^^al 
 to careen after running ashore at Porto Bello. He left one ship to 
 windward, to guard the approaches from the eastward, and himself 
 anchored with his ships in the open water off the town of Carta- 
 gena on the 3rd. On the 6th the bomb-vessels were placed in 
 position under cover of the smaller vessels, and they opened and 
 continued a bombardment until the morning of the 7th. A certain 
 
 23 
 
336 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 amonnt of damage only was clone — " enough," as Vernon wrote, 
 " to awaken Don Bias de Lezo, and to let him know I was not 
 stealmg upon him by surprise." This being accomplished, Vernon, 
 on the 10th weighed, and after closely examining the coast and 
 Boca Chica, with a view to possibly subsequent operations, stood 
 away for Porto Bello to water, and with the intention of operating 
 by way of bombardment upon the fortress of Chagres.^ 
 
 This operation was systematically and deliberately carried oiit 
 by the bomb-vessels, and three of the line-of-battle ships, using 
 only their lower tiers, and firing slowly and carefully, from the 
 '22nd of March 1740 till the 24th, when the fortress hoisted a flag 
 of truce and surrendered. 
 
 The fall of Chagres after an attack by bombardment alone, comes 
 upon us now, we may observe, as in some sort a novelty in naval 
 war. We have had captures of forts by the attack of land forces, 
 without any direct assistance from the ships ; we have had them 
 when the attack by ships has been made subsidiary to that by land 
 forces ; and we have seen the captures made, as at Gibraltar and 
 Porto Bello, where the main attack has been by the ships, and 
 the land attack has completed it. We have also had bombard- 
 ments where no surrender has followed. This fall of Chagres 
 appears to be the first instance of capture following simple bom- 
 bardment, but the course of history shows us that the result 
 was exceptional, and depended on the geographical situation of the 
 place, and the moral fibre of the garrison defending it. 
 
 All this time nothing is heard of any possible opposition by the 
 Spanish at sea, and we therefore observe the results in the cap- 
 ture of Porto Bello and Chagres, and the bombardment of Carta- 
 gena, of the strategic condition of a commanded sea. It can hardly 
 be a mere coincidence that the expectation of the arrival of Spanish 
 naval force, and the cessation of territorial attacks, should again 
 be simultaneous. In the beginning of June 1740, Vernon had a 
 despatch from the British Minister at Lisbon, announcing the 
 departure from Cadiz of a Spanish squadron, said to be destined 
 for the West Indies. Vernon thereupon put to sea from Jamaica 
 and cruised to windward, in the hope of falling in with it ; but 
 getting no intelligence he returned to Port Royal.f 
 
 * Berkeley, p. 674 ; Entick, p. 749 ; Hervey, p. 110. 
 
 t The naive misapprehension of historians in general as to the operating causes in 
 the circumstances of naval war is aptly illustrated by a remark of Hervey (vol. iv. , 
 p. 114). He says, '• The abatement of this commander's (Vernon's) zeal, first appeared 
 in the shortness of this cruise." Hervey had clearly made a mental note of the cessa- 
 
ATTACKS ON TFAUUTORY FROM THE SEA. 337 
 
 Although I do not find any mention of it, it seems more than 
 probable that Vernon at this time had notice of the great likeli- 
 hood that France would presently throw in her lot with Spain, 
 and he may have known that not only was the Spanish squadron 
 from Cadiz to be expected, but that another Spanish fleet,* accom- 
 panied by a French one, had sailed from Ferrol, for a like desti- 
 nation. I think that Vernon must have been aware, in the 
 autumn of 1740, that the balance of power in the West Indies, 
 so to call it, was about to be turned, and that this consideration 
 tied his hands. It seems of all things the most unlikely that so 
 soon after the daring and almost reckless attack upon Porto Bello, 
 the admiral could have changed his nature, and have sunk, as he 
 was accused of doing, into a slothful repose. 
 
 To re-establish command of the sea in the West Indies, Rear- 
 Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle sailed from Portsmouth on the 26th 
 October 1740 at the head of 21 sail of the line,t besides frigates 
 and fire-ships, and with a considerable body of marines and land 
 forces under Lord Cathcart.j As usual, the actual departure of 
 this fleet was much behind the appointed time. Vernon had such 
 intelligence of its intended sailing, that he put to sea from Jamaica 
 with his whole squadron on October 3rd, hoping to fall in with 
 Ogle on the coast of Hispaniola. Instead of this, he only heard 
 on the 12th of its detention by contrary winds at home. On the 
 same day, he learnt that the Spanish Ferrol squadron, under 
 Admiral Torres, had arrived at Porto Rico on September 7th, and 
 had sailed for Cartagena on the 25th of the same month. Soon 
 after this, he learned that the French fleet under the. Marquis 
 d'Antin had arrived at St. Louis in the west of Hispaniola, and 
 that possibly some enterprise against Jamaica was threatened 
 although war was not yet declared. This intelligence necessarily 
 drove the admiral back to his headquarters at Port Royal, where 
 he busied himself with preparations for defence, pending the time 
 when the arrival of Ogle should enable him once more to take the 
 offensive. 
 
 tion of Vernon's activity after such a group of exploits as he had just described. But 
 he did not in the least connect it with the apprehended arrival of a Spanish fleet in 
 West Indian waters. 
 
 * Twelve sail of the line. Entick, p. 751. 
 
 t Entick, p. 752. Hervey (vol. iv., p. 107) says 25, and gives their names, but 
 several of the names do not appear in the list which Entick gives of the total West 
 Inuia fleet united under Vernon. 
 
 X The regiments of Harrison and Wentworth, 6 regiments of marines, and detach- 
 ments. Entick, p. 75 1. 
 
 23* 
 
338 NAVAL WAUFAUE, 
 
 As, taking all together, the different and probably hostile forces 
 were at bay, no steps were taken on either side, and Ogle arrived 
 at what was then the neutral island of Dominica on December 19th, 
 where Lord Cathcart died. Ogle then went on to St. Christo- 
 pher's and sailed thence for Jamaica on December 28th, where ho 
 arrived on January 9th, 1741.* A council of war was presently 
 held to consider the situation, and determine future proceedings. 
 The resolution come to was : " That the whole fleet should proceed 
 to windward, to observe the motions of the squadron under the 
 command of the Marquis d'Antin, which had been for some time 
 at Hispaniola ; and that Captain Dandridge should be sent before 
 in the ll'o//' sloop, to get intelligence." *' The resolution," says the 
 historian Hervey, " taken by the general ofi&cers at this council 
 was very surprising, and their motives for forming it quite inex- 
 plicable. Every circumstance seemed to concur in pointing out an 
 immediate attack upon the Havannah, by the reduction of which 
 Spain would have been humbled into the most abject submission, 
 and as it lay to leeward of Jamaica, the fleet might have reached it 
 in two or three days. Instead of directing their force against that 
 quarter, it was resolved to beat up against the wind to Hispaniola 
 and St. Domingo, to observe the motions of the French squadron. 
 Three weeks elapsed from the arrival of Sir Chaloner Ogle to the 
 sailing of the fleet under Vice-Admiral Vernon ; and when another 
 fortnight had been spent in a fruitless cruise, intelligence 
 was received that the French fleet had sailed for Europe 
 in great distress, being destitute of men and provisions, neither 
 of which could be procured in the West Indies. "t How easily 
 the point of naval operations may be missed, is once more 
 illustrated by this extremely instructive passage. The historian 
 has been following through three volumes and a half the narrative 
 of these incidents which I have brought together into a single 
 group. As he has studied them, they have come into his mind 
 mixed with an immense variet}^ of other incidents, and it has never 
 struck him that law has been governing every step that has been 
 taken. So he does not perceive that Vernon's later conduct, and 
 the resolution of the council of war, are only of a piece with all that 
 had hitherto taken place in concordance with naval success. He 
 has no consciousness that the fall of Porto Bello and Chagres were 
 primarily due to the absence of possibly interfering naval force in 
 
 * On his way six of his ships had a partial action with a small French squadron^ 
 supposin£t them to be enemies. They separated with some loss and mutual apologies, 
 ■f Hervey, vol. iv., p. I'di. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FIlOM THE SEA. 339 
 
 the West Indies, and tliat with the 12 sail of the line of Spaniards 
 at Cartagena, beside the Cadiz squadron of 5, and the 14 French 
 sail of the line at St. Domingo,* Vernon's 29 sail of the line was 
 not a force to overawe each squadron separately and liberate a suffi- 
 cient force to operate against Havannah at the same time. Yet 
 nothing can be more certain than that any territorial attack under- 
 taken by Vernon at this time would have been culpably foolish and 
 rash, and would have deserved the terrible condemnation which 
 must have been pronounced upon it, had France and Spain taken 
 proper advantage of the British mistake.f More than foolish and 
 rash would it have been to run to leeward to Havannah, leaving 
 the French to windward of Jamaica, and offering, as it were, tlie 
 right cheek for a blow which would be accepted on the left cheek 
 subsequently. 
 
 But the receipt of news that the French fleet had quitted the 
 West Indies altered the whole position, and on February 16th a 
 council of war decided to make an attack on Cartagena. 
 
 The force at Vernon's disposal was now 29 sail of the line with 
 22 frigates, fire-ships, and bomb-vessels, and transports carrying, 
 with the men-of-war, a body of about 12,000 troops. The fleet itself 
 was manned by about 15,000 men, and the total number of the 
 ships was about 124, J This was a gigantic armament, and if it 
 had been found possible to destroy Porto Bello with about one-fifth 
 of the ships and about one-twelfth of the men, the doom of Carta- 
 gena must have appeared already sealed when the great fleet turned 
 its course to the southward and steered for the place. On the 
 4th of March the armada dropped its anchors in the open water to 
 the northward of the town of Cartagena, and at once made dis- 
 positions as though a force was about to land on that part of the 
 coast, and so drew the garrison to intrench itself in that direction. 
 
 Cartagena was not unused to hostile demonstrations ending in 
 capture. Sir Francis Drake had sacked it in. 1585, and not long 
 afterwards it had been again sacked and left in ruins by a few 
 privateers. In 1697 it had been captured by the French under de 
 Pointis, who were said to have made a booty of i'9,000,000. It 
 was now considered the principal, the most populous, and the best 
 fortified city in Spanish America, Its garrison numbered 4,000 
 Spaniards, besides negroes and Indians, and now it was further 
 
 * De Lapeyrouse Bonfils, vol. ii., p. 24G, gives the names. There were also Hve 
 frigates. 
 
 t Campbell (Lives of the Admirals, vol. iv.. p. 275. Ed, 1813) is preciselj' under 
 the same error. 
 
 I Entick, p. 754. 
 
340 NAVAL WAEFABE. 
 
 strengthened by the Spanish squadron under Don Bias de Lezo 
 The approach to the town from the sea was naturally protected by 
 shallow water, which extended nearly three miles out, and the want 
 of shelter of any kind from northerly or westerly winds, put a 
 regular attack from that side almost out of the question. 
 
 The real objective in an attack on Cartagena was the port, which, 
 again, was to be got at only by way of the narrow passage of Boca 
 Chica, eight miles to the southward of the town. This entrance 
 was defended on its northern shore, called Tierra Bomba, by a 
 regular square fort called St. Louis with four bastions, strong and 
 well-built, and mounting 82 guns and 3 mortars. The central 
 work was strengthened by several redoubts : St. Philip with 7 
 guns, St. Jago with 15 guns, and a small fort of 4 guns called the 
 Battery de Chamba. On the south side of the entrance was a 
 fascine battery of 15 guns called the Barradera, and in a small bay 
 at the back of that another battery of 4 guns ; and facing the 
 entrance on a small flat island stood Fort St. Joseph, of 21 guns. 
 From this to the north shore a boom and cables were carried, and 
 behind the boom one 70-gun and three 66-gun ships were moored 
 with their broadsides covering the entrance. 
 
 Beyond this passage lay the great lake or harbour of Cartagena, 
 land-locked in all its southern part, and capable of sheltering a 
 vast navy. About midway towards the town it grew narrower, 
 and about three miles south of the town there was a second 
 narrow^ passage formed by two peninsulas, the one to the west being 
 crowned by a fort mounting 59 guns, called Castillo Grande, and 
 the one to the east bearing* a horse-shoe battery of 12 guns, called 
 Mancinilla, There was a shoal between these two points, and 
 ships had been sunk on each side to block the passage against the 
 British. The town of Cartagena itself, spreading over two low 
 sandy islands, w^as surrounded by natural defences of shoal water 
 and swamps, and was artificially strengthened by works mounting 
 no less than BOO guns. West of the city, about a mile from 
 the gate called Himani, and on a hill fifty or sixty feet high, was 
 the Castle of St. Lazar, which was a fort about fifty feet square, 
 with three demi-bastions, having guns mounted, two on each face, 
 one on each flank, and three on each curtain. The fort itself was 
 not so strong, but it was in a commanding position, and covered 
 the approach to the city on that side. There was, however, a 
 height about 400 yards from it, which entirely commanded it.* 
 
 * Entick, p. 754 (note). — The place chosen for the beginning of the attack and the 
 landin;^ was that which de Pointis had successfully used fortv-four years before. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEEIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 311 
 
 Vernon had already, as we have seen, some knowledge of the 
 nature of the work before him. He had also sent in advance of 
 the fleet a line of battle-ship, a frigate, and a sloop, to reconnoitre 
 and sound. From the captains of these ships, and particularJy 
 from Captain Knowles of the Weymouth, who had hitherto acted as 
 engineer to Vernon's operations, he learnt that the most suitable 
 commencement of the attack would be to possess himself of the 
 forts on the north side of Boca Chica, and that there was anchorage 
 almost within musket shot of the redoubts St. Philip and St. Jago 
 without opening the guns of the great fort of St. Louis or Boca 
 Chica. 
 
 The fleet being at this time organized in three divisions. Ogle 
 commanding the van, Vernon the centre, and Commodore Lestock 
 the rear, it was determined in council that Ogle should take his 
 division down to Boca Chica, and should anchor three line-of-battle 
 ships to batter forts St. Philip and St. Jago while two more attacked 
 the smaller work of Chamba. 
 
 On the 9th of March, Sir Chaloner Ogle, having with him 
 General Wentworth, who had succeeded to the command of the 
 troops on the death of Lord Cathcart, proceeded to the southward, 
 and having placed the five ships in their appointed stations, reduced 
 the fire of the batteries so completely, that 500 grenadiers being 
 landed, under Lieut. -Col. Cochrane, they were in possession of the 
 three redoubts by eight o'clock in the morning, and there was 
 nothing to prevent such further disembarkation of troops as might 
 be decided on. 
 
 This success had been achieved with a loss of only six men 
 directly, but indirectly it was heavier. One of the ships, the 
 Shreivshury , had had her cable cut by a shot, and not having 
 a second anchor immediately ready, she drifted opposite the 
 Boca Chica, and was for the whole of the day engaged with nearly 
 all the batteries, thereby suffering great and useless damage, and 
 a loss of sixty men in killed and wounded. 
 
 Towards night on the 9th, the bomb-vessels got into place, and 
 began to play on Fort St. Louis ; and during the next day the two 
 regiments of foot and the six regiments of marines were all landed 
 without opposition, and with and after them were carried great 
 stores of artillery, ammunition, and camp equipage. On the 13th, 
 a mortar-battery which had been erected began to play on Fort 
 St. Louis, and by the 14th all the stores had been landed, as well 
 as twelve 24-pounders from the ships' armaments. 
 
 From the moment the troops landed they seem to have become 
 
342 NAVAL WAIiFARE. 
 
 sickly, and to have either lost heart or energy. Vernon com- 
 plained to Wentworth of the dilatoriness of the military opera- 
 tions, and Wentworth in reply complained of want of support from 
 his officers. The navy seems to have omitted nothing that could 
 convenience the soldiers, and the force landed was certainly super- 
 abundant for the mere duty of reducing the remaining works on 
 the Tierra Bomba side of Boca Chica. The fascine battery on the 
 south side of the passage proving to be a great annoyance to the 
 military camps, Vernon sent a landing-party of seamen which, on 
 the night of the 19th of March stormed it, spiked the guns, and 
 tore up the platforms, sustaining very little loss, and returning 
 to the ships with six wounded prisoners. 
 
 The main object of the army was the erection of a battery, under 
 cover of a wood, to reduce Fort St. Louis to a condition 
 suitable for the troops to attack, and it was hoped that this might 
 be so speedily set in order as to enable the engineers to transfer 
 their skill to the south side of the passage and to capture all the 
 forts on both sides without putting the ships to the hazard of 
 attacking a passage so formidably covered by guns. But the 21st 
 of March arrived without the completion of the battery on the 
 north side alone, though 500 seamen had been lent for that purpose. 
 
 The vice-admiral began to grow seriously uneasy at the delay. 
 The season was drawing on. The anchorage was so exposed and 
 so bad, that the rocks were continually cutting the ships' cables. 
 There was a growing danger of interruption from seaward, as 
 Vernon had intercepted intelligence informing him that de Torres 
 had arrived at Havannah with the Ferrol fleet, and was expecting 
 to be joined by a French fleet under Eochefeuille. It became plain 
 that if the business was to be done at all, the navy would have to 
 take it in hand promptly, and finish it. 
 
 Accordingly, on the 23rd, Commodore Lestock conducted an 
 attack upon the northern forts and the ships supplementing them, 
 with three 80-gun and three 70-gun ships. They were terribly 
 shattered and obliged ultimately to draw off, but other ships took 
 their places, and the seamen landing, carried those of the batteries 
 on the south side which had been in part restored. Meanwhile the 
 land forces had opened fire from their long delayed battery on the 
 22nd, and by the 24th, a practicable breach was effected in the ram- 
 parts of Fort St. Louis. It was arranged to storm it on the evening 
 of the 25th, and by way of diversion, Vernon sent Captain Knowles 
 with a large landing-party to take the fort, as it were, in flank. 
 
 The fortress fell so easily to VVentworth's stormers, that Knowles 
 
ATTACKS ON TElUUTonY L'ROM THE SEA. 313 
 
 pushed on with the boats to Fort St. Joseph, which he took with 
 hardly any loss, the garrison flying precipitately on his approach. 
 It was the same with the ships. Arrangements had been made 
 for scuttling them in the event of a reverse, but such was the 
 hurry and confusion consequent on Knowles' approach, that one 
 of them, the Gallicia, fell into his hands intact, with her captain 
 and 60 men. A complete conquest of the passage was thus made, 
 and nothing barred the way but the boom and the Gallicia, which 
 Knowles speedily removed, and the next day, March '26th, the 
 Admiral and several of the ships not only passed into the harbour, 
 but advanced several miles towards the town. On the 26th, some 
 of the ships directed to do so, had anchored just out of gunshot 
 of Castillo Grande. 
 
 By the 30th the whole fleet was inside, and it must have ap- 
 peared to most of those engaged that a success as splendid as that 
 of Porto Bello was already achieved. But certain points might 
 have been taken into consideration. It is apparent to us now, and 
 after the event, that a much larger force than necessary had been 
 landed on Tierra Bomba ; that force had already suffered a loss of 
 400 by sickness and casualties. It had to be re-embarked before 
 anything farther could be done, and when re-embarked it would 
 carry the seeds of sickness with it. To complete the success, it 
 was probably necessary to push the garrison of Cartagena at once, 
 and before they had time to recover themselves, but the troops 
 were not again ready to land until the morning of the 5th of April, 
 and then not all of them. 
 
 But pending their readiness, the ships had been pushing up and 
 on. The fort on Mancinilla (Manzanilla) being weak, was de- 
 stroyed by the Spaniards themselves on the nearer approach of 
 the squadron ; and on the 30th Sir Chaloner Ogle with some of the 
 ships of his division having anchored close to Castillo Grande, 
 Captain Knowles reconnoitring in the evening, came to the conclu- 
 sion that the enemy was evacuating that fort also. Next morning 
 it was discovered that they had sunk the two remaining line-of- 
 battle ships of the squadron in the channel, and had abandoned 
 the fort, which was immediately taken possession of by the 
 British. There was nothing now between the navy and the town 
 but the sunken ships, and the shallow water beyond them,^ 
 
 Some of the bomb-vessels were now brought up, and on April 
 2nd began to play on the town, and a few of the guns of Castillo 
 
 * No mention is made in my accounts, of Fort Pastelillo, which aijpears in the plan 
 of 1654. 
 
344 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Grande were likewise utilized in that direction. By the evening a 
 passage was made through the sunken wrecks, and three fire-ships 
 passed through it to occupy stations for covering the landing of 
 the troops when it should take place. On the 3rd, the Weijmoitth, 
 Captain Knowles' CO-gun ship, passed through the western 
 channel and came under the fire of the town without material 
 damage to herself, and next night she passed round the shoal to a 
 secure position in the eastern part of the harbour, where were now 
 assembled other covering ships which swept the surrounding 
 country with their guns, and prepared for the landing of the 
 troops from the transports which were beginning to warp in. 
 
 Even now, and notwithstanding the delay, the fall of Cartagena 
 could not but have seemed certain, to both soldiers and sailors. 
 The troops began to land early on the morning of the 5th, at a 
 place about two miles from St. Lazar,* and though the whole of 
 the garrison was drawn out of the town to oppose them, it was 
 broken up into small parties, and Wentworth's advance was little 
 retarded. 
 
 What actually followed seems almost inexplicable. The Admiral, 
 daring to rashness as we have seen him up to this moment, and 
 trying everything before he pronounced that it could not be done, 
 suddenly, and without warrant, came to the conclusion that there 
 was not water to allow his ships to close up to the town and fire 
 on it. As a fact, we now know that there was 7 fathoms water 
 close up to where Fort Pastelillo is now shown on the 1854 plan, 
 that is, within 1,000 yards of the town. He therefore made no 
 advance after landing the troops. 
 
 General Went worth, on his part, had secured the convent sur- 
 mounting the highest point, and knew or ought to have known, 
 for he saw it with his own eyes, that Fort St. Lazar was not very 
 strong, and was commanded from higher ground close to the east- 
 ward of it. Instead of pushing on to what, after his experience, 
 he ought to have supposed was an easy conquest, he not only made 
 no attempt either upon the fort, or upon the heights commanding 
 the fort, but set about making an encampment, and lay for three 
 nights waiting for tents and baggage. 
 
 Between the Admiral, who seemed suddenly to be morally para- 
 lyzed, and the General, who had all the time seemed to think that 
 if he kept his mouth open long enough the cherries would cer- 
 tainly drop into it, there arose mutual recriminations. 
 
 * Very probably near the spot where the house stands which is marked on the sketch- 
 plan, if that be not the identical house which is spoken of in the accounts of the landing 
 
ATTACKS ON TEHIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 845 
 
 The General complained that the fleet lay idle, while his troops were harassed and 
 iiruinishcd b}' hard dut}- and distemper. The Admiral affirmed that his ships could 
 aot lie near enough to batter the town of Cartagena, and upbraided the General with 
 want of activity and resolution to attack the fort of St. Lazar, which commanded the 
 town, and might be taken by scalade. Wentworth, stimulated by these reproaches, 
 resolved to try the experiment. His forcos marched up to the attack, but the guides 
 being slain, they mistook their route and advanced to the strongest part of the fortifi- 
 cation, where they were, moreover, exposed to the fire of the town. Colonel Grant, who 
 commanded the grenadiers, was mortallj'- wounded ; the scaling ladders were found 
 too short ; the officers were perplexed for want of orders and directions, yet the 
 soldiers sustained a sevei-e fight for several hours with surprising firmness, but at 
 length retreated in good order, leaving above 600 men killed or wounded on the spot.* 
 
 This check was one that the troops could not recover ; sickness 
 had ah-eady shown itself amongst them to such an extent that 500 
 men were either dead or incapable, and in view of all the con- 
 ditions, a council of war of the land officers decided that the troops 
 must be re-embarked with all speed. This was done on the 15th, 
 when 3,200, of the 5,000 landed, returned to their ships, and 
 further operations against Cartagena were abandoned. 
 
 Although in this undertaking all the forts accessible by sea 
 which defended the approaches to Cartagena were destroyed, and 
 with them a squadron of five sail of the line, yet the attack was a 
 failure and not a success. But when we come to the question oi 
 why it was a failure, it is not so easily answered. It would seem 
 clear that it was an error to land so great a force as was employed, 
 chiefly in looking on, at the fall of the forts on Tierra Bomba. 
 It seems at the same time strange that part of the force landed on 
 the north side was not landed on the south side, or, at any rate, 
 transferred to the south side when its weakness was discovered. 
 But then the subsequent success in forcing the passage of the Boca 
 Chica, and all the operations up to the moment of the second 
 landing of the troops might be held to have condoned any errors 
 at the beginning. Why it came to pass that after the second 
 landing, and when a vigorous advance in any form, and in almost 
 any direction, would have succeeded, there should have been no 
 vigorous advance in any direction, passes knowledge. The ulti- 
 mate failure of the attack on Cartagena is not explained, and 
 that is all we can say about it. 
 
 But it may be remarked of the forcing of the Boca Chica that it 
 resembled in many respects the attack at Vigo. The difference in 
 principle is that the fleet was unsheltered, and that the landing 
 was in the face of the batteries. Why it should have been so is 
 not explained, though perhaps a single glance at the locality 
 
 * Hervey, vol. iv., p. 148 
 
34G NAVAL WAUFAEE. 
 
 might even now explain it. With the great land force at disposal, 
 it seems strange that it should not have been employed both north 
 and south of the passage simultaneously, and there does not now seem 
 any reason why one party should not have been landed well to the 
 south, and another well to the north of the forts to be taken, and 
 then that the ships should not have co-operated in the usual way. 
 The loss and damage to the ships in engaging the batteries does 
 not seem to have been met by commensurate advantages. We 
 must observe that the hazard to which the ships were put was not 
 deliberate, but was forced on Vernon by the threat of the Spanish 
 force a thousand miles off at Havannah. 
 
 The state of the ships was such, and his instructions so ordered 
 it, that Vernon was obliged to send several of them home ; and 
 then, with a smaller fleet and a body of troops reduced from its 
 original strength of 12,000 to about 3,000 only, it did not seem 
 that there could be any continuance of territorial attacks. Vernon, 
 however, was of a different opinion, and considered that by 
 dividing his fleet he might have sufficient force to watch and 
 guard against the Spanish fleet at Havannah, and also to support 
 a land attack. 
 
 The placed aimed at was St. Jago de Cuba, a town and close 
 harbour on the S.E. coast of the island, and then chiefly cele- 
 brated as the rendezvous of the privateers. Entrance to the port 
 was difficult, not only because of its narrowness, but also because 
 of certain eddy winds, which caught ships at a certain part of the 
 approach and necessitated very special appliances if the ship was 
 to advance. For these reasons, and not so much because of any 
 real strength of the place in the way of fortification and garrison, 
 it was determined to push the usual principle of successful attack 
 to its extreme limit as it were, and to take possession of a neigh- 
 bouring port easy of access and entirely undefended, and to 
 operate upon St. Jago de Cuba overland from that sea base. This 
 port was Walthenam Bay (now Guantanamo), 40 miles to the 
 westward of St. Jago de Cuba, an inlet noted for its convenience, 
 and as a shelter during the hurricane months now approaching. 
 It appears to have been entirely unoccupied by the Spaniards, and 
 not defended in any way, and Vernon sailed into it with his whole 
 force on the 13th July 1741. This consisted of 61 sail in all, and 
 comprised 9 sail of the line and 12 frigates and smaller vessels,* 
 
 * He had sent home 11 sail of the line under Lestock. and had left 9 sail of the 
 line at Port Royal, 6 to protect Kingston, and 3 to follow him when they were 
 ready. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 347 
 
 with transports containing the 3,000 men remaining of the army, 
 and 1,000 negro troops which had been raised in Jamaica. Three 
 days were spent in getting the flotilla up the harbom*, collecting 
 information, and in placing six sail of the line across the entrance 
 to secure it against an}^ attack from the sea ; and in arranging 
 Sir Chaloner Ogle's division and the frigates to block the entrance 
 to St, Jago, and to watch the motions of the Spanish fleet at 
 Havannah."*^ Then on July 20th 1741, a council of war decided 
 to begin the reduction of the Island of Cuba by the proposed attack 
 overland upon St. Jago. 
 
 The landing was quickly and easily effected, and advanced 
 posts were occupied on the road to St. Jago, which had been, on 
 good evidence, considered not only practicable but convenient for 
 the march. 
 
 On the 28 til of July this advanced guard had reached the village 
 of Elleguava with scarcely a sign of opposing forces. Major 
 Dunster, who was conducting the advance, then returned to a 
 station which he had left occupied, and now, on the 2nd August, 
 found to be held by some 500 men under Colonel Cochrane. It is 
 unaccountable that at this juncture, when there seems on the 
 record nothing whatever to have prevented the advance and com- 
 pletion of the design, Colonel Cochrane should have taken his 
 troops back to the main camp under Wentworth, and that on the 
 Dth of August a council of war of the land officers should have 
 decided " that they could not march any body of their troops far- 
 ther into the country without exposing them to certain ruin ; and 
 that they were firmly of opinion that their advancing with the 
 army to St. Jago in their present circumstances was impracticable.^'t 
 As the decision was in the hands of the land officers, the Admiral 
 and the naval officers, whatever they may have thought, and how- 
 ever they may have chafed at this second failure of the troops to 
 complete what had been well begun, could not controvert it. But 
 Vernon was not yet prepared to give up all hopes, and on the 4th 
 September, leaving the troops in camp, he proceeded himself by 
 
 * •' As the security of the army and all the transports depended upon the squ3/-h-«n 
 being in a condition to defend the harbour from any surprise on them, which was to be 
 dreaded, as the Spaniards had so strong a force so near to them at the Havannah, 
 Vice-Admiral Vernon, thei-efore, took the safest and most prudent precautions for 
 their security, by forming the best dispositions with his six capital ships in a line, to 
 defend the entrance to Cumberland Harbour" (so re-named by Vernon), "having 
 dispatched the other part of the squadron to block up the harbour of St. Jago, and 
 to watch the motions of the Spanish Admiral at ihe Havannah.". — Entick, p. 7G1. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 762. 
 
348 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 sea to St. Jago, in order to ascertain if it were possible to force tht 
 entraDce with his ships. He ascertained, however, that it was a 
 matter of warping in one ship at a time, and only with considerable 
 difliculty, under the immediate fire of the batteries. He also found 
 that there was neither anchorage nor landing-place near the mouth 
 of the harbour. Reluctantly he had to admit that approach in this 
 way was hopeless. Nevertheless, he seems to have been so pressing 
 upon General Wentworth to keep the hold they had got on Cuba, 
 that it was not till November that he consented to re-embark the 
 troops, and it was not till the 28th of that month that the expedi- 
 tion quitted the ambitiously new-named Cumberland Bay. 
 
 In looking back, we can see that Vernon, so far from deserving 
 the slurs that were cast upon his name for apparent want of 
 activity and for over-caution, was really exceedingly rash in his 
 operations against Cuba, if he supposed it possible that de Torres, 
 with his fleet from Havanna, was capable of taking the advantage 
 offered to him. For while de Torres presumably had a compact 
 force of 12 sail of the line in one body, Vernon's force was divided 
 into three sections not exceeding 6 sail of the line each. He there- 
 fore — if he ran any risks at all from Spanish movements — ran the 
 greatest risk of being destroyed piecemeal by de Torres falling 
 suddenly on Ogle at sea, defeating him by overwhelming superiority 
 of numbers, and then blocking up Vernon in Cumberland Bay, 
 while the military forces of Cuba gathered round him on the land 
 side, and cut off his communication with the outer world entirely. 
 It seems most probable that the Admiral and his naval surround- 
 ings had by this time come to the conclusion that there was in no 
 case much to be feared from the activity of the Spanish Admiral. 
 On the face of the records I am using, the whole blame of these 
 failures must rest on the shoulders of General Wentworth, though 
 how much of this officer's shortcomings were due to the effect on 
 his temper of Vernon's impetuosity and probably dictatorial man- 
 ner, may be open to argument. Certainly the " conditions " under 
 which these failures took place were more personal than material.* 
 
 * Vernon asked to be i-ecalled on his return to Jamaica, " under his daily prayers for 
 a deliverance fi'om a gentleman whose opinions he had long experienced to be more 
 changeable than the moon, though he had endeavoured, agreeable to his orders, to 
 maintain the most civil correspondence in his power with General Wentworth." 
 Campbell, vol. iv., p. -iOO. 
 
849 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 The Conditions undek which Attacks on Tekritory from the 
 Sea Succeed or Fail — continued. 
 
 Commerce siiffers when territorial attacks are in progress. — The policy carried out in 
 the West Indies, 1742. — The quarrels of joint commanders a fruitful cause of failure. — 
 Kuowles fails in his attacks on La Guaira and Porto Cavallo, 1743. — Successful attack 
 on Louisbourg, 1745. — The causes of success usual. — Second successful attack in the 
 same form on Louisbourg, 1758. — Peyton loses the command of the sea in the East 
 Indies, Madras falls in consequence, 1746. — Attempted revival of cross-raiding at Cape 
 Breton and L'Orient ; failure of both attempts, 1746. — The first capture of Minorca, 
 1756.— The siege and reliefs of Gibraltar, and fall of Minorca, 1780-81 and 1782.— 
 Reflections. 
 
 In considering the nature of the transactions in the West Indies 
 which I described in the last chapter, it is proper to notice that 
 while the navy was occupied in making territorial attacks, com- 
 merce was suffering heavity. The result of the proceedings of 
 1741 was only, after all, to raise complaints in all the commercial 
 centres of the kingdom. Petitions against the system of leaving 
 commerce exposed poured in upon Parliament, and London, 
 Bristol, Exeter, Glasgow, Liverpool, Lancaster, Bideford, South- 
 ampton, and other places remonstrated with the Commons on the 
 small regard which had been paid to the defence of that on which 
 the greatness and prosperity of the country in a large degree 
 rested.* 
 
 But the policy of carrying out attacks upon territory was con- 
 tinued in the West Indies, and W^entworth's forces being augmented 
 in January 1742 by the arrival at Jamaica of 2,000 newly-raised 
 Marines, a project was considered of landing an army at Porto 
 Bello, and marching across the isthmus to the capture and destruc- 
 tion of Panama. The cross- counsels between the Admiral and the 
 
 * Entick, p. 767. 
 
350 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 General remained in full force and delayed the departure of the 
 fleet and troops. A tedious voyage supervened ; the passage, Avhich 
 should have occupied but eight days, covered three weeks, so that 
 the ships did not anchor in Porto Bello harbour until March 
 28th. The preliminary landings to occupy the Custom House and 
 other parts of the town were effected without difiicult}^ the mag- 
 nates of the place making no objection when assured of protection. 
 But on the 31st the Admiral received a memorandum from the 
 land officers, declining to persevere in the enterprise and recom- 
 mending its immediate abandonment. There was, therefore, no 
 choice left, and the whole expedition returned to Jamaica, arriving 
 there in the middle of May. 
 
 By the 23rd of September Vernon had his wish in the arrival of 
 letters recalling him and General Wentworth, but not before he had 
 given some of his mind to the latter in an assurance " that to his 
 inexperience, injudiciousness, and unsteady temper was principally 
 owing His Majesty's affairs having prospered so ill in those 
 parts."* 
 
 It is clear that the failures I have narrated contain lessons for 
 all time, in the conduct of joint naval and military expeditions such 
 as those described. The Home Government read the lesson in one 
 way, by giving Ogle, Vernon's successor, the absolute command of 
 the Marines, and transferring them to the service of the fleet. But 
 without going so far as to say that the Admiral should be given 
 the supreme command, with power to over-ride the decisions of the 
 land officers, it is plain that in this case Wentworth ought never 
 to have been left in command for a moment after such incompati- 
 bilities of temper between the Admiral and the General had been 
 shown as to render it probable that cordiality could not exist in 
 carrying out the service. This remains plain, because there was 
 never the least sign of failure on the part of the navy, which had 
 done everything that was possible, both before and after the arrival 
 of General Wentworth, and because in joint attacks the army must 
 be considered an instrument in the Admiral's hands. Not indeed 
 so as to give the Admiral a power of interference for which his 
 education does not fit him, but as a something which cannot use 
 the fleet, but can be used by the fleet. To put the matter gravely 
 but firmly, it seems plain that had Vernon possessed the power of 
 suspending Wentworth, the mistakes and shortcomings indicated 
 would never have occurred. On the other hand, it seems obvious 
 
 * Entick, p. 773. 
 
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ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 351 
 
 that had Wcntworth possessed the power of superseding Vernon, 
 there was no probability that matters would have been bettered. 
 There is but little chance that any such powers would be conferred 
 on either officer in great undertakings; but it behoves Government, 
 without further inquiry, to remove a General in a joint expedition 
 the moment it is seen that he cannot cordially support the 
 Admiral.* 
 
 In the absence of naval force, the Spaniards, from Fort St. 
 Augustine in Florida, projected and carried out in June 1742 an 
 invasion of the newly-settled colony of Georgia. Thirty-six trans- 
 ports conveyed 4,000 troops, which were landed at St. Simons and 
 marched upon Frederica ; but General Oglethorpe, the governor, 
 made so good a show of defence that the Spaniards hastily returned 
 to their ships and re-embarked. 
 
 In February 1743, Captain Knowles, at Jamaica, was placed in 
 command of 5 sail of the line, 1 frigate, and 3 sloops, with orders 
 to proceed to Antigua, there to pick up 1 40-gun and 1 20-gun ship, 
 and to make an attempt to reduce La Guaira and Porto Cavallo 
 (Puerto Cabello) on the Caraccas coast of South America. Captain 
 Kuowles had not been present at the capture of Porto Bello, but he 
 had arrived there shortly afterwards, and had been specially em- 
 ployed in engineering the destruction of the forts. Afterwards he 
 had been in a sense Vernon's right-hand man in planning the attacks 
 upon Ghagres and Cartagena ; he was also well acquainted with the 
 coast. The selection was not, therefore, a random one, and what 
 afterwards happened cannot properly be set down to the choice of 
 the commander. The only troops he was furnished with, beside his 
 Marines, were 400 men of Dalzell's regiment. 
 
 He arrived within sight of La Guaira on February 18th. There 
 was a considerable swell, which prevented any landing of men, and 
 the ships could not be brought nearer than within a mile of the 
 town. The attack, therefore, was no more than a distant bom- 
 bardment, a form which had succeeded, indeed, at Chagres, but 
 which, in tracing the history of attacks on territory to this point, 
 we have seen no reason to put much faith in. It was said also 
 that the Governor of the Caraccas had been in some way warned' 
 of the intended attacks, and had made considerable preparations 
 for resistance. The fire began at noon and continued till night. 
 The British had succeeded in blowing up one of the enemy's 
 
 • These observations have no reference to those great undertakings like the invasions 
 of the Crimea and Egypt, where any landings or attacks on ports are a means to an end 
 and not an end in themselves. 
 
 24 
 
352 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 magazines certainly, but four of Knowles' line-of-battle ships were 
 so disabled that they had to be sent to Curacoa to repair ; the 
 Suffolk received 140 shot, and 92 men and officers were killed, and 
 308 wounded.''' 
 
 As I have just observed, the causes of this repulse and loss were 
 on the surface. Sir Chaloner Ogle and Captain Knowles ought 
 never to have had any hopes of success in a form of attack which 
 was supported simply by what had happened at Chagres as a very 
 exceptional case. 
 
 Warned by his failure, Knowles proceeded differently in his 
 attack on Porto Cavallo. The place was known to be in a 
 good state of defence, and garrisoned by some 5,500 men of 
 various classes. Knowles procured the reinforcement of some 
 Dutch volunteers, and proposed to make up a landing party in the 
 usual way, covered by the fire of a detachment of his ships. He 
 arrived near the place on April 15th, and anchored in or near 
 Borburata Harbour, then called " The Keys of Barbarat." Com- 
 modore Knowles, in reconnoitring the defences, observed that the 
 entrance to the harbour was blocked by a ship moored there, from 
 which chains extended to either shore. New fascine batteries were 
 erected in suitable places, and the centre of the defence was the 
 Castle of St. Philip, afterwards called Fort Libertador. On Point 
 Brava were two new fascine batteries, one mounting 12 guns and 
 the other 7, and Knowles determined to make these his objective, 
 in hopes that they might be taken in flank, and their guns turned 
 against the castle. Accordingly a landing party of 1,200 men was 
 prepared, and two ships were sent in to engage and, if possible, to 
 silence the two batteries. When night fell, the batteries were 
 pretty well silenced, and the men were landed on the beach to the 
 eastward, and marched along the shore towards Point Brava, the 
 Commodore in his boat proceeding side by side with them. They 
 took one of the batteries completely by surprise, but the alarm 
 being given and some guns fired by the Spaniards, the mixed 
 party which was landed immediately fell mto confusion and panic, 
 fired into each other's ranks, and fled along the beach to the boats 
 in hopeless disorder. This unexpected failure determined the Com- 
 modore to fall back on a general bombardment. It was carried out 
 from about eleven in the forenoon of April 24th till dark, when the 
 ships, having expended nearly all their ammunition and received 
 considerable damage, returned to their anchorage at Borburata 
 
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ATTACKS ON TERRITOnY FROM THE SEA. 353 
 
 Harbour. On the 28th it was conchided that no farther attempts 
 on the place were Hkely to succeed, the squadron was broken up 
 and the ships dispersed to their several stations. 
 
 The causes of the failure at Porto Cavallo are not more difficult 
 to seek than those which governed the repulse from La Guaira. 
 The original attack was in the form which experience had shown 
 to be best calculated for success, and had the party of 1,200 men 
 landed been a homogeneous body of disciplined troops, there might 
 have been every hope of a good result. But composed as it was of 
 seamen, soldiers, and Dutchmen, acting together for the first time, 
 it was not surprising that it should have fallen into confusion and 
 panic in contact with an enemy in the dark. There was, as we 
 have seen, no real reason to expect success from the general bom- 
 bardment that afterwards followed. 
 
 As illustrating the strategical law that nothing but naval forc( 
 will prevent attacks upon territory, for the reasons set out with so 
 much force and clearness by Sir Walter Ealeigh, we have it noted • 
 that the withdrawal of the usual station ships from the British 
 Leeward Islands for these attacks on the Spanish Main, encouraged 
 the Spanish privateers to push beyond their usual function of cap- 
 turing merchant ships, and to land plundering parties on the 
 Island of St. Christopher's. 
 
 War having been declared against France in 1744, and there 
 being no naval force to prevent it, the French garrison of Cape 
 Breton made a successful raid on Nova Scotia, and captured Canso. 
 But the arrival of a single British 40-gun ship seems to have put a 
 termination to any farther designs of this kind by the French. 
 
 In the West Indies both sides remained on the defensive so far 
 as territorial attacks went, the British awaiting reinforcement 
 before anything could be undertaken. 
 
 By the year 1745 plans had been arranged between the American 
 Colonies and the Home Government for retaliation on Cape 
 Breton. The former furnished the troops to the number of 3,850 
 volunteers, with 85 transports, 8 20-gun privateers, and 10 smaller 
 vessels; these assembled at Boston and proceeded to Canso, in 
 Nova Scotia, to await the covering squadron of 4 line-of-battle and 
 other ships under Commodore Warren. 
 
 On the 28th April the whole force arrived in Gabarus Bay, to 
 the south-westward and within four miles of the fortifications oi 
 Louisbourg. The troops were immediately landed, being covered 
 from the attack of a detachment sent to resist the landing by the 
 
 * Entick, p. 787, note. 
 
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 351 NAVAL WAHFAUtJ. 
 
 lire of some of the lighter vessels. The troops now marched 
 directly on Louisbourg, while Warren blocked the entrance to the 
 harbour and cut off all chance of reinforcement and supply, cap- 
 turing on this service many store-ships and one French line-of- 
 l)attle ship, which was loaded with military stores."^ Warren had 
 been joined by three more sail of the line, and was thus an absolute 
 master of the sea. The land forces making successful progress 
 with full supplies coming to them from Gabarus Bay, Warren 
 determined to push in upon the harbour, and for that purpose 
 made arrangements for a sudden storming of the Island battery. 
 The boats were caught in a dense fog on the first attempt, and 
 were obliged to desist after alarming a garrison said to consist of only 
 fourteen men. Before a second attack could be made, the French 
 had so largely reinforced the Island battery that when the operation 
 was attempted the British were beaten off with severe loss. A 
 single night's work, however, sufficed to erect a battery near the 
 
 • Entick gives the following description of Louisbourg at the time : — " The port of 
 Louisbourg, or English harbour, is but a league distant by sea from the Bay of Ga- 
 barus, and one of the best in all America ; being about four leagues in circumference, 
 and having in every part of it seven fathoms water. The anchorage is good,, and ships 
 may run ashore on the sands without danger. The entrance is not above 400 yards 
 broad, between two small isles, and is known twelve leagues off at sea by the Cape of 
 Larembec (? Loran Head), which lies a little to the N.E. In the N.E. part of the 
 harbour was a fine careening wharf for men-of-war to heave down, and very safe from 
 all winds. On the opposite shore were the fishing stages, with room for 2,000 boats, 
 to make their fish ; and on the starboard side of the harbour, going in, was a light- 
 house, on a high rocky point, which might be distinguished on a clear night five 
 leagues off at sea The city was built on a point towards the sea, on the south side 
 of the harbour, and was improved with fortifications that cost upwards of two millions 
 of livres in building. The streets are regular and broad, principally composed of 
 stone houses, with a spacious citadel on the western part of the town, near the 
 ramparts, erected for the security of the land side. . . . The greatest extent of the 
 city is from the citadel to the eastern gate, called the Duke de Penthievre, which is 
 more than half a mile ; and to walk round all the ramparts, mounted with heavy 
 cannon, was at least two miles and a quarter. The road from the town to the country 
 is by the western gate, over a drawbridge, where was a circular battery of 16 guns, 
 24-prs., seated on and commanding the upper part of the harbour. Between this and 
 the eastern gate was the Iron battery, mounting 30 guns. Opposite to this was the 
 Grand battery of 35 42-prs., which commanded both the entry and all the bay; and at 
 the mouth of the harbour was the Island battery, of 34 42-prs. The walls, ramparts, 
 and bastions of the city, had 148 embrasures, though only 64 cannon were mounted; 
 but there were 10 mortars of 13-in. bore', and 6 of 9-in. ; and the garrison consisted 
 of 1,200 regular soldiers, under the command of M. Chambon. But the fortifications 
 on the land side were not entirely finished at the time of the siege, there being no out- 
 works, glacis, or covered way. Besides, though the bastions and curtains were of 
 masonry to the summit, which was 36 feet above the field, yet these, and the quoins 
 and embrasures were cemented with such indifl'crcnt mortar that they were unable t-J 
 rcbiat the fury of a strong and continual battery." P 803, note. 
 
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ATTACKS ON TERIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 855 
 
 liglitliouse, which commanded both the Island battery and the 
 entrance to the harbour, and was of the greatest service to 
 the besiegers. 
 
 Meantime, the failing ammunition and stores of the British were 
 replenished from over sea to Gabarus Bay, and news of further 
 i-einforcements to arrive immediately was received, side by side 
 with intelligence that the French squadron at Brest intended for 
 the relief of the place was masked by a sufficient British naval 
 force. On the other hand, the command of the sea by their enemy 
 was bringing distress to the besieged. Deserters told the English 
 commanders of great shortness of food and ammunition, while 
 four ships carrying relief were captured by Commodore War- 
 ren's ships. His naval force was again reinforced, so that by 
 June 11th he was at the head of 4 60-gun, 1 50-gun, and 5 
 40-gun ships, beside a crowd of smaller vessels. The fire was 
 constant from all the British batteries, and by the 14th prepara- 
 tions for a general assault were nearly completed, when on the 
 15th the governor offered to capitulate, and terms being arranged, 
 the French flag was struck on the 17tli, and the British entered 
 into possession. 
 
 The siege had lasted 47 days, during which time 9,000 shot and 
 GOO shell had been fired into the place, causing a loss to the garri- 
 son of 240 killed, while the loss to the besiegers was only 100. 
 The capture of the place is one of the best examples of successful 
 co-operation between land and sea forces, each confining itself to 
 its normal sphere of action. Its plan was, indeed, of the essence 
 of all the teaching of naval war, and is in some sort paralleled by 
 the more modern instance of Sevastopol, with the substantial 
 difference that the Crimean port received supplies overland which 
 were denied to Louisbourg. It will be observed that Vernon's plan 
 of attack on St. Jago de Cuba was identical with that adopted 
 against Louisbourg, where an undefended port was seized as a 
 base for the land forces to act from, and the fleet operated doubly, 
 as keeping communication open to that base, and closing the sea 
 communications of the place to be attacked. To a certain extent 
 we are also reminded of the operations of the Federals against the 
 Confederate port of Charleston, and of the admitted mistake which 
 was there made of bringing the fleet itself into contact with bat- 
 teries and works, instead of reaching them through land forces 
 supplied from the sea. 
 
 The clear necessity that there should be command of the sea on 
 the side of the attacking party is well demonstrated by the opera- 
 
356 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 tions against Lonisbourg. Had the squadrons destined to relieve 
 the place not been masked by a British force off Brest, the mere 
 foar of its approach would have paralyzed Commodore Warren's 
 arrangements, and the care that was taken to reinforce him showed 
 a consciousness of the fact on the part of the British Government. 
 It is evident that had a superior French naval force arrived, Warren 
 must either have abandoned the troops landed altogether, or else he 
 would himself have been shut up with them in Gabarus Bay, to 
 be besieged in turn by the garrison of Louisbourg. 
 
 This place was given back to the French at the peace of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, but in 1758 it was again attacked by the British under 
 Admiral Boscawen for the sea, and Generals Amherst and Wolfe 
 for the land forces. The method pursued was identical with that 
 of thirteen years before. The assemblage and landing was in 
 Gabarus Bay, and Boscawen acted as Warren had done. The only 
 differences were that the landing was opposed by troops covered 
 by some works, and that there being line-of-battle and other ships 
 in the harbour, the French took some of them to block the 
 entrance, and Boscawen carried two others in a boat attack. 
 
 The landing began on June 2nd, 1758, and the place surren- 
 dered on July 17th, the siege having thus lasted within two days 
 of the term occupied in the former siege. As in 1745, the garrison 
 of 1758 had hoped vainly for relief from the sea, which was, as 
 before, stopped by the British on the coast of France. But things 
 had gone farther this year than in 1745. Boscawen sailed from 
 England with his expedition on the 19th of February. On the 
 11th of March Hawke sailed with 7 sail of the line and 3 frigates, 
 with the direct purpose of destroying in Aix Roads the very reliefs 
 which M. de Drucourt, the Governor of Louisbourg, had hoped 
 might reach him. He drove the 5 sail of the line there on shore 
 and forced them to throw overboard their guns and stores in order 
 to escape him.^ 
 
 It had been intended to attack Louisbourg the year before, but 
 the presence of 18 French sail of the line in those waters effec- 
 tually barred all attempts of the kind. So it may be said that the 
 fall of Louisbourg was brought about by Hawke in 1758, as it had 
 been by Martin in 1745, neither officer quitting Europe, but opera- 
 ting to maintain the British command of the sea at Cape Breton.f 
 
 * Schomberg, vol. i., p. 313. Lapeyrouse, vol. ii., p. 437. Troude, vol. i., p. 369. 
 
 + In May, however, Count Duchaffault got away from Aix Roads, v^ith 5 sail of the 
 line, bound for Louisbourg via Martinique. He heard of the fall of the place there. 
 Boscawen's force was 23 sail of the line, 11 frigates, and 7 smaller vessels. The troops 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. '6tu 
 
 As bearing on the question of the actual value of fortification 
 in naval warfare, it is worthy of remembrance that in 1760 Cap- 
 tain Byron was directed to destroy the Louisbourg fortifications, 
 and that they lay in ruins ever afterwards, although the place 
 never again passed out of our hands. 
 
 The withdrawal by Warren of most of the ships from the 
 Leeward Islands left the sea there indifferent, and the arrival of 
 the Chevalier de Caylus (or Cheylus) with a squadron put the 
 command of the sea into the hands of the French and raised 
 much alarm amongst the English Islands. He made no attempt 
 on any territory however, except on the little island of Anguilla, 
 which the garrison successfully defended. 
 
 Territorial attacks in the West Indies may be said to have been 
 abandoned almost entirely by both sides during the remainder of the 
 war. As will be shown presently, the defence of British possessions 
 on the other side of the Atlantic were really effected in Europe. 
 But it may be mentioned that in 1748 Port Louis (Hispaniola) was 
 added to the scanty list of places which surrendered to simple 
 bombardment by ships. The batteries defending the place mounted 
 78 guns, and Eear-Admiral Knowles brought 8 sail of the line, 
 showing a broadside of 257 guns, within pistol-shot of them, and 
 continued to fire upon them for three hours, after which the place 
 capitulated, the British losing 70 in killed and wounded.* 
 
 Admiral Knowles seems to have held, in spite of his experiences 
 as a captain under Vernon and after, a greater faith in the direct 
 attack of ships than most of his contemporaries. He proposed to 
 attack St. Jago de Cuba directly, by ships forcing the entrance, a 
 method which was not thought practicable by Vernon. Captain 
 Dent, the officer placed in command of the ships intended for this 
 service, observing a boom across the entrance and ships within it 
 placed to oppose, did not think it prudent to make any attack. 
 He was afterwards tried by court-martial for this failure, but was 
 " most honourably acquitted, "f 
 
 About the year 1745 naval rivalries began to spring up in the 
 East Indies, which brought into play the principles of naval war- 
 fare in regard to territorial attacks which had hitherto been ex- 
 emplified most perfectly in the West Indies. The French had not 
 
 were 14,000. Lapeyrouse, vol. ii.. p. 439 Troude, vol. i. . p 352. Schomberg, vol. 
 iv.,p. 255 
 
 * It is generally to be noted that war-ships have always been credited with greater 
 powers against forts when it was possible to close with them. The immense numerical 
 superiority of guns sometimes possible under such condition is here well exemplified 
 
 t Schomberg, vol. i., p. 250. 
 
358 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 as yet maintained an_y squadron in those waters, but in order to 
 counterbalance the British force of four sail of the line and two 
 smaller ships under Commodore Barnet, which had been sent 
 thither, the French Government commissioned Commander de la 
 Bourdonnais, Governor of Mauritius and Bourbon, to make up a 
 squadron out of tlie ships belonging to the French East India Com- 
 pany, and to operate against the English. In May 1746 La 
 Bourdonnais was on the coast of Coromandel with 1 72-gun ship 
 and 8 frigates of from 30 to 38 guns. Barnet had in the meantime 
 died, and the British command descended to Captain Peyton. There 
 was an engagement of a partial character between the two forces 
 on June 25th, but the result was to make the British abandon all 
 idea of further encounters, and to send the squadron to the north- 
 ward, leaving Madras entirely open to attack. 
 
 La Bourdonnais arrived before the place with a considerable 
 body of troops. These were landed south of the town, and pro- 
 ceeded to invest it on the land side, while the French squadron 
 prevented any relief arriving by sea. Madras was in no condition 
 to offer defence to such an attack, and it capitulated in a few days. 
 
 The tactics of this attack were what we have seen usually pre- 
 cedent to success ; the only note proper to make is that La Bour- 
 donnais had become confident of his command of the sea from his 
 experience of the British commander. We may fairly infer that 
 Pej^ton was no strategist of the Torrington school, and was not 
 aware that La Bourdonnais could have done nothing, if the 
 British, doubtful of their superiority in action, had kept in a 
 position of observation, and not attacked at all. Peyton having 
 attacked, and having shown clearly by his conduct that he felt 
 himself unable to make a second attempt, La Bourdonnais was 
 justified in assuming that he had the command of the sea.^'^ 
 Besides this, it must be remembered that Peyton had run away to 
 leeward, and by so much deprived himself of any chance of inter- 
 fering. And again, Madras being an open roadstead, the ships 
 not being specially concerned in the actual attack, were still in a 
 position to meet a hostile fleet without necessarily compelling the 
 land forces to abandon the enterprise. Moreover, it is to be sup- 
 
 * Entick, p. 809, makes out that La Bourdonnais, before attacking Madras, had put 
 Peyton to the test by firing on one of the Company's ships in the roads on August 18th, 
 and then passing south to observe whether Peyton would return to defend the place. 
 Also that he heard how Peyton, on receipt of this news, had disappeared from Pulicat, a 
 little to the northward. It was this, according to Entick, that determined La Bour- 
 donnais to make his attack. De Lapeyrouse (vol. ii., p. 359), however, represents 
 La Bourdonnais as always alarmed by the possible interf«rence of Peyton. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTOllY FROM THE SEA. 359 
 
 posed that even in this ease the troops were not in special danger, 
 being able to retreat on their base at Pondicherry. 
 
 Eear-Adrairal Boscawen had left England at the close of 1747 at 
 the head of an expedition intended to reduce the islands of Mau- 
 ritius and Bourbon, and afterwards to operate for the reduction of 
 Pondicherry. The squadron anchored in Turtle Bay, Mauritius, 
 l)ut the reports were that success was not to be hoped for unless 
 a harbour could be seized, and as the season pressed, Boscawen 
 made sail for India. 
 
 The balance of sea power had been reversed by the arrival early 
 in 1747 of Commodore Griffin with 4 sail of the line and a 
 40-gun ship ; and Boscawen found himself in assured command of 
 the sea, when at the head of 9 sail of the line, 2 frigates, and some 
 smaller vessels, the troops were assembled at Fort St. Davids, and 
 marched overland to the attack, while a detachment of the fleet in- 
 vested the place by sea as usual. The march of 24 miles began 
 on August 8th, and the siege went on till the 6th October, when 
 failure in the attack was admitted, and the troops marched back to 
 Fort St. Davids. 
 
 This was the last operation in the East Indies during this war, 
 and there is nothing to be noted about it but the general fact that 
 though command of the sea is required before such an attack can 
 be contemplated, success does not follow its attainment in unbroken 
 sequence. But in the East Indies, as in the West, we see the 
 same general law prevail. Command of the sea must be fought 
 for if it is not admitted, and territorial attacks must cease while 
 this process goes on. They cannot be undertaken at all while the 
 command is in abeyance ; but after it is settled, the side that holds 
 it inevitably pushes on to the attack of territory, when success is 
 measured by the power and skilfulness of the attack ; the land forces 
 undertaking the active work, while the sea forces support, cover, 
 and supply them. 
 
 Coming now to the proceedings at home, so far as they relate to 
 the subject of this chapter, we have to note the beginnings of that 
 deeper naval policy which proposes to guard our distant possessions 
 and to strengthen our distant fleets, not directly and on the spot, 
 but indirectly, and at home. The sources of all naval power are 
 to be found in each nation in not more than two or three com- 
 modious sea-ports, which a variety of circumstances have set apart 
 for the purposes of war. In England there were the Thames and 
 Medway, Portsmouth and Plymouth ; while France had Brest, 
 Lorient, Rochefort and Aix Roads, and Toulon. Spain had 
 
860 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena. Everything that could command 
 the sea came originally out of these ports, and simultaneously 
 with the growing ability to watch them from the outside grew the 
 conception that command of the sea off the coast of America and 
 in the West and East Indies could be preserved by that process. 
 Eeinforcements and supplies prepared at Brest might be inter- 
 cepted in European waters by the superior naval power, and the 
 distant British squadrons, though not directly strengthened, 
 would be indirectly kept powerful by the enforced weakness of the 
 enemy. 
 
 So we have seen the French force, destined in 1745 to relieve 
 Louisbourg, unable to sail from Brest, Vice-Admiral Martin with a 
 more powerful squadron masking it. In 1747, again, reinforcements 
 and supplies were prepared at Brest to wrest the command of the 
 sea once more from the British in North American and East Indian 
 waters. The British Government sent Anson with 14 sail of the 
 line to intercept them. He met the whole force, amounting, with 
 the transports and store-ships, to 38 sail, on May 3rd, N.W. of 
 Cape Finisterre, and captured all of the men-of-war and many 
 of the other ships. Later in the year, 8 sail of the line, with a 
 convoy, were preparing in Aix Roads for the West Indies. Hawke, 
 with 14 sail of the line, left England in August to intercept them, 
 and he also was successful in meeting them off Cape Finisterre. 
 The French had put to sea on the 6th October ; on the 14th they 
 fell into Hawke' s clutches, who carried 6 of the 8 line-of-battle 
 ships to Spithead with him. 
 
 Notwithstanding the proofs of the general impracticability of 
 cross-raiding when the sea was other than strategically indifferent, 
 which lay behind them in history, the French in 1745, amongst 
 other plans for raising insurrection in favour of the Pretender, 
 formed one of a secret and sudden invasion. The idea was to 
 throw 10,000 troops on shore near Plymouth during a single night, 
 and without any attempt at covering naval force. '* But, after 
 much pains had been taken and vast preparations made, it was 
 discovered that it was impossible to transport such a body of 
 troops into En.dand whilst the English remained masters of the 
 Channel." * 
 
 In 1746, the French had their opportunity, and got out a 
 great expedition for the recapture of Cape Breton, taking ad- 
 vantage of the momentary concentration of British thought on 
 a design for the capture of Quebec. A squadron of 10 sail of 
 
 * Hervey, vol iv. , p 2i)'o 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 361 
 
 the line, with frigates and smaller vessels, and 78 transports 
 3arrving 3,500 troops, left Eochelle on the 22nd June, under com- 
 mand of the Due d'Enville, bound for a rendezvous in the Bay of 
 Chibouctou (Chedabueto), in the N.E. of Nova Scotia. There was 
 no attempt to intercept this expedition in its complete state, though 
 a blockade of St. Male, where the transports were prepared, de- 
 layed their arrival at Brest from the date fixed, 1st March, to the 
 15th April. In consequence of this delay, the squadron, which 
 ought to have been assembled in Aix Roads early in April, did not 
 arrive there till 17th May, and did not sail till 20th June, anchor- 
 ing for a day at Eochelle before finally quitting France. 
 
 It was only indirectly to British effort that the failure of this 
 expedition was due. All went well with it till it sighted the coast 
 of Nova Scotia. Then it was overtaken on 13th September by a 
 southerly gale, accompanied by thick fog. By the 27th September 
 only 7 sail of the line, 2 frigates, a fire-ship, a bomb-ves-sel, and 30 
 transports had succeeded in gaining the rendezvous. Then general 
 sickness broke out in the ships ; the Duke died of apoplexy, and 
 his successor, d'Estourmelles, in a fit of delirium, destroyed him- 
 self, and in the end what was left of the expedition returned in a 
 miserable and exhausted state to Brest." 
 
 Meanwhile, in England, the expedition which had been prepared 
 against Quebec was turned against Lorient. It sailed from Ply- 
 mouth on 14th September, and consisted of 16 sail of the line, with 
 8 frigates, bomb-ketches, store-ships, and 30 transports carrying 6 
 battalions of land troops, with " matrosses and bombardiers," in 
 all 5,800 men. The sea commander was Admiral Lestock, who had 
 been tried and acquitted by court-martial four months earlier for 
 misconduct in Mathews's action ; the general was Sinclair. 
 
 The troops were landed in Quimperle Bay, a few miles from 
 Lorient, on 20th September, and marched next day upon the place. 
 It immediately offered to surrender on terms, but these were re- 
 jected, and a very ineffective and ill-arranged siege began. Lestock 
 had intended to bring some of his ships up to take part in the 
 operations, but subsequently changed his mind. Then followed a 
 long story, comprising councils of war, references to the opinion of 
 the engineers, shortness of ammunition, fatigues, sickness, and 
 indiscriminate blame-throwing, after which Sinclair determined 
 that the capture of the place was impracticable, and the troops 
 were re-embarked without interruption, after being a week on shore. 
 
 • Entick, p. 812; Schomberg, vol. i., p, 231 ; Troude, vol. i., p. 309 ; Lapeyrouae, 
 vol. ii., p. 297. 
 
362 NAVAL JVABFARE, 
 
 Yet they left behind them several guns and mortars and much 
 ammunition and stores.'^ 
 
 It is not at all difficult to draw the lesson from these varied 
 events of 17-16. Most probably they were drawn by the Govern- 
 ment, and the intercepting attacks of Anson and Hawke next year 
 were the consequences. I have said that the British only contri- 
 buted indirectly to the French failure on the other side of the 
 Atlantic. But they did contribute, by the six weeks' delay which 
 the watch upon St. Malo enforced. It is clear that an expedition 
 which had to be collected at St. Malo, Brest, Aix Eoads, and 
 Rochelle, before it was in a state to sail finally, was entirely at the 
 mercy of a superior and alert naval force. There was ample 
 opportunity for falling on it as it collected, as well as when it 
 finally put to sea. Probably the fact that superior force was 
 hovering near might have stopped the sailing altogether, as it had 
 done before. But the English Government was losing sight of the 
 principles of war. It could not properly have thought of the 
 capture of Quebec, if France was at the same time in a position to 
 think of recapturing Louisbourg. If it contemplated an attack on 
 Lorient, it should not have waited, as possibly it did, for the 
 absence of the Brest fleet on the other side of the Atlantic. The 
 sack of Lorient on one side and the loss of Cape Breton on the 
 other was like an exchange of bishops in a game of chess. Bad 
 play, unless there was an object behind it. If England was not 
 strong enough to mask d'Enville's force in Brest, and to cover an 
 attack on Lorient at the same time, she should not have contem- 
 plated the latter. France on her side had no prudence in offering 
 Lorient to sack for the sake of recovering Cape Breton. My 
 historians say that the detention of the Quebec expedition, which 
 became the Lorient expedition, was not explained.! Probably the 
 Government became aware of its original strategical error when too 
 late, and made the attack on Lorient as a sort of reprisal for the loss 
 of Cape Breton, which it thereby discounted. The special tempta- 
 tion, beside the sacking of a place which was the entrepot of East 
 Indian wealth, was the notion of raising the French Protestants 
 of Rochelle to rebellion, an idea which alone gave it any legiti- 
 macy as an operation of war under the conditions. 
 
 Having now reached the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and having 
 traced closely through so many chapters, and with so few omissions, 
 the history of naval warfare so far as it concerns attacks upon 
 
 * Entick, p. 812; Lapeyrouse, vol. ii., p. 308. 
 Ibi'L, p. 811 ; Hervey, vol. iv., p. 302. 
 
ATTACKS ON TElllUTOliY FROM THE SEA. 303 
 
 territory carried out from the sea, I do not think it will be neces- 
 sary to pursue that plan further. It was expedient to continue it 
 for some time, in order to show that the exceptions to rule were 
 few and far between. Kule being now in a sense established, I 
 shall content myself with sketching rapidly some of the more 
 prominent and remarkable illustrations of those parts of it which 
 we have seen in operation, so long as the wind was the motive 
 power of ships, and then proceed shortly to examine what history 
 tells us as to the continuance or otherwise of those rules when 
 steam has hecome the propulsive power, and brought in its train 
 various other new elements. 
 
 We come first to the French attack on and ultimate capture of 
 Minorca, an enterprise set on foot by the French before the 
 declaration of war in 1756. In the spring of the year there were 
 12 sail of the line ready at Toulon, and two or three English at 
 Port Mahon or Gibraltar under Commodore Edgecumbe. By the 
 10th of April the Marquis de la Gallisonniere, at the head of 12 
 sail of the line, 6 frigates, and 150 transports, was anchored in 
 Hyeres Koads, and nearly ready to put to sea. In the transports 
 15,000 troops were embarked under the command of the Due de 
 Eichelieu. In two days the expedition put to sea, and on the 18th 
 the ships anchored before Ciudadela in the Island of Minorca. 
 
 The English Government had been much more alive to the 
 preparations for invasion understood to be in progress by France 
 as a suitable means of declaring war, than they were to the nearer 
 danger. They had plenty of advices. through and from Germany, 
 warning them of what was intended, but it was not till the 6th of 
 x\pril that Admiral Byng left St. Helen's with 10 sail of the line 
 under orders to relieve Minorca if he should find it attacked. Even 
 then the number and the bad condition of the ships showed that 
 Government had no knowledge of the real strength of the French 
 expedition. They got news of its sailing and of its force at the 
 same time, under date April 18th, from Captain Hervey of the 
 Phoenix at Villa Franca. Captain Hervey informed the Govern- 
 ment that General Blakeney, in command at Minorca, had 
 collected about 5,000 troops and labourers inside Fort St. Philip, 
 and was preparing for full resistance, which Captain Hervey 
 thought he would be able to prolong until the arrival of Byng's 
 relieving force. 
 
 Later accounts, of the 21st April, direct from Minorca, soon 
 after reached the Government. The French had landed on the 
 l8tli, and had at once possessed themselves of Ciudadela, from 
 
364 
 
 NAVAL WAUFAliE. 
 
 which the English garrison retired. The main body of the 
 army was preparing to invest Fort St. Philip, while detachments 
 were to advance on the town of Malion, and the Heet was to 
 block up the port by sea. 
 
 PUchelieu met with no difficulties. The whole enterprise had 
 been arranged and was being carried out on the Louisbourg pattern, 
 and, saving relief from the sea, was as certain of success. Mahon 
 was occupied without a shot having been fired. Fort St. Charles, 
 on the north side of the harbour was attacked from seaward by 
 boats and small vessels specially brought from Toulon. But Fort 
 St. Philip was held to rival Gibraltar in strength, its garrison of 
 
 regular troops was said to be from 2,500 to 3,000 men, and there 
 was a general belief in England that it would hold out till Byng 
 arrived, and that all would then be well. No doubt the French 
 were running risks. If Fort St. Philip could hold out till Byng 
 appeared, and if Byng should be even no more than a match for La 
 Gallisonniere, the least they could suffer would be the loss of their 
 whole army. And they had no sufficient reason to believe that their 
 12 sail of the line could by any possibility be more than a match 
 for the 13 sail of the line which they probably now knew that Byng 
 would bring against them. It was a greater risk than was justilied. 
 The proper course would have been to threaten Minorca, and then to 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 365 
 
 beat the fleet sent to relieve it ; after which Minorca would fall as 
 a matter of course, without any risk of losing an army. 
 
 Byng arrived at Gibraltar on May 2nd, heard from Edgecumbe 
 the state of affairs at Minorca, joined to his own 10 sail the 
 Commodore's 3, and sailed from Gibraltar on the 8th of May. 
 
 On the 19th of May the French army had been just a month 
 landed on the island, and La Gallisonniere, seeing Byng's fleet, 
 sent on shore to borrow 450 men from the army to strengthen his 
 crews. The next day the battle, which cost Byng his cruel con- 
 demnation and death, took place. La Gallisonniere had proved 
 more than a match for Byng, just as La Bourdonnais had proved 
 more than a match for Peyton in another quarter of the world ten 
 years before. Byng sailed away for Gibraltar, leaving Minorca to 
 its fate, just as Peyton had sailed away towards Calcutta, leaving 
 Madras to its fate. And on May 30th General Blakeney capitulated, 
 as there was nothing else that he could do. 
 
 The lesson, and the rule of war, here lie on the surface again. 
 The fate of a garrison open to attack from a commanded sea is 
 certain if the attack be made properly and with adequate force. It 
 may be postponed by the employment of that citadel form of for- 
 tification of which I have spoken in former chapters, and the more 
 impregnable the citadel, the longer will be the delay before the 
 place falls. But if the attacking force is sufficient and properly 
 used, the citadel will be fully invested, and the fact that it is 
 surrounded by water on one side does not affect its position. 
 Commodore Edgecumbe had 3 sail of the line under his command ; 
 if he had had 12, the idea of an attack on Minorca could not have 
 been entertained at all. But, on the other hand, the fact that 
 Fort St. Philip was so strong enabled Byng to come in sight of it 
 while the English flag was still flying. Had there been no fortifi- 
 cation, Minorca would have succumbed to a much smaller force 
 long before any relief from England could have reached it. But 
 again, it has to be noted that the French might have ravaged and 
 destroyed everything on the island out of range of the guns of 
 St. Philip, and then have sailed away again long before any relief 
 could have appeared. 
 
 Minorca, like Louisbourg after its first capture, passed back by 
 the treaty of peace into the hands from which it had been wrested 
 in war. Like Louisbourg it was destined to be a second time 
 attacked by the power in command of the sea, to fall a second 
 time, and not again during the war to come back to the hands 
 which only from want of command of the sea had failed to hold it. 
 
3(i6 
 
 NAVAL WAUFAUE. 
 
 In 1780, 1781, and 1782, the pressure on the resources of the 
 United Kingdom in defending herself against France and Spain in 
 alHance with her revolted colonies, while attempting to recover 
 lost ground and to prevent revolt spreading farther, strained them 
 near to breaking point.* 
 
 Her possessions were attacked in the East and West Indies, and 
 in the Mediterranean simultaneously. The Mediterranean Sea at 
 that time was of least importance to her, and she gave up all idea 
 of maintaining her command there, not by choice, but by necessity. 
 Her two possessions in those waters, Gibraltar and Minorca, were 
 in no way necessary to her defence, unless that defence was trans- 
 ferred to the shores of France and Spain. It may now be a 
 question whether the East and West Indies could not have been 
 better defended in Europe than they could possibly be in those 
 distant waters ; and whether prevention would not have been 
 better than cure. But the choice was made the other way, and it 
 left the fortresses of Gibraltar and of St. Philip in Minorca a drag 
 on resources to which they contributed nothing. They were useful 
 only as bases and depots for operations, either active or passive, 
 carried on against the coasts of France and Spain. If there were 
 no such operations, Gibraltar and Minorca were for the time a 
 trouble and a nuisance only. But they were great posts, strongly 
 fortified and garrisoned ; the loss of either of them would not only 
 seriously affect the prestige of the nation, and encourage her 
 
 * The following table exhibits with fair accurucy the distribution of our liiic-of-batilo 
 ships in 1778, 1771). 1780, 1781 and 1782. The stations w«re so continually cschan;;- 
 ing their forces, and ships attending convoys passing and repassing so fre(iucutly, thai 
 no list would be absolutely correct which did not refer to a particular day: — 
 
 
 Home 
 
 West 
 
 North 
 
 Mediter- 
 
 East 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 Wuters. 
 
 ludies. 
 
 America. 
 
 ranean. 
 
 ludies. 
 
 1778 Sumninr 
 
 48 
 
 14 
 
 12 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 77 
 
 ,, Winter 
 
 43 
 
 23 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 ,S0 
 
 177S Summer 
 
 43 
 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 93 
 
 „ Winter 
 
 42 
 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 92 
 
 1780 Summer 
 
 43 
 
 33 
 
 17 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 102 
 
 „ Winter 
 
 35 
 
 50 
 
 14 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 107 
 
 1781 Summer 
 
 39 
 
 44 
 
 19 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 115 
 
 „ Wint.-r 
 
 38 
 
 52 
 
 14 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 119 
 
 1782 Summer 
 
 35 
 
 59 
 
 12 
 
 1 
 
 22 
 
 129 
 
 „ Winter 
 
 29 
 
 49 
 
 2(3 
 
 - 
 
 22 
 
 127 
 
 Notwithstanding these evidently gigantic efforts we were almost everywhere met by 
 equal forces of the enemy, and often had to retire before superior force, while we lost 
 besides our American Colonies, the Islands of Grenada, Tobago, St. Christopher's, 
 Monserrat and Minorca, and surrendered Trincomalee. 
 
ATTACKS 0.\ TEURLTOUY FEOM THE SEA. 367 
 
 enemies, but would to some extent render more difficult any 
 transfer of the seat of war to Mediterranean coasts. Of the two 
 places, Minorca was by far the most important. Gibraltar never 
 had been, and never could be, so good a base to operate from as 
 Minorca. Geographically it was too far from the French coast, 
 while Minorca was placed nearly midway between Toulon and 
 Cadiz. The anchorage at Gibraltar was contracted and detestable. 
 Ships could not water there, and possible wharf space was very 
 confined. It was attackable by land, and might be captured by 
 land forces without the necessity of any covering navy. Minorca, 
 on the other hand, possessed one of the finest harbours in the 
 world. It was impossible to attack it by land forces alone unless 
 the command of the sea were first assured. It was capable of pro- 
 ducing much that was wanted for the refreshment and supply 
 of ships' companies, exhausted and worn by watching enemy's 
 ports. But unquestionably the prestige belonged to the least 
 worthy place — Gibraltar. Minorca had passed into and out of our 
 hands, and it and we were used to it. True, the loss of it had led 
 to the death of a great commander by the hands of the executioner, 
 but then Gibraltar had never yet been successfully attacked. 
 However narrow the issue had been, naval force had always 
 appeared in time to prevent the final catastrophe. The habit of 
 defending Gibraltar had been formed, that of defending Minorca 
 had not been formed. Probably a great deal more money had 
 been spent on the local defences of Gibraltar than on those of 
 Minorca, and quite possibly instinctive reasoning confused value 
 and cost. Lastly Gibraltar could be relieved by a naval force 
 which need not be absent from the English Channel for more than 
 two months and a half.* A fleet relieving Minorca might expect 
 to be absent twenty days longer.f All these things together 
 tended to concentrate attention on Gibraltar as a place that might 
 be saved, and to leave Minorca to the chapter of accidents. 
 
 It was with no willingness that any piece of territory was to be 
 parted with, but there was a dire necessity about it which had to 
 be faced. Grenada in the West Indies had already gone. The 
 newly restored port of Savannah, and province of Georgia, had 
 been almost successfully attacked by forces under cover of the 
 
 * The relieving fleet of 1780 left Portsmouth on 26th December 1779, and sailed 
 from Gibraltar on February 13th 1780. The second relief sailed on March 13th 1781, 
 and returned on May 21st. The third relief sailed on September 11th 1782, and 
 returned November 15th. 
 
 t Byng, sailing from Gibraltar on May 8th, was not off Port Mahon till the 19th. 
 Lord St. Vincent, leaving Gibraltar on May 12th 1799, reached Minorca on May 20th. 
 
 25 
 
368 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 same French fleet which had covered the capture of Grenada, and 
 successfully faced Admiral Byron afterwards. In the East Indies 
 troubles had not yet come, but they were certain. At home a 
 British line-of-battle ship had been captured in sight of Plymouth, 
 and a 40-gun frigate in sight of Scarborough. 
 
 Besides all this, towards the close of the year 1779, Gibraltar, 
 invested by land and sea, was guarded from any relief by a Franco- 
 Spanish fleet of 24 sail of the line to operate from Brest, and 35 
 sail of the line to operate from Cadiz. 
 
 With the coolness and the boldness which then generally 
 characterized the action of the navy, Sir George Rodney was 
 despatched from the Channel in the last days of December at the 
 head of 15 sail of the line, escorting an immense convoy of troop-, 
 ships, store-ships, and victuallers, with directions to throw rein- 
 forcements and supplies into Gibraltar and Minorca, and then to 
 proceed to reinforce the British power in the West Indies with the 
 greater part of his fleet. He had the fortune which favours the 
 brave. Off Cape Finisterre he fell in with a great convoy of 
 the enemy destined for Cadiz, and captured it. An opportune gale 
 of wind had caused the separation of the Cadiz fleet, and left Don 
 Juan de Langara off Cape St. Vincent with only 11 sail of the 
 line. Eodney fell upon them and captured or destroyed all but 
 four of them. The Brest fleet was too sluggish in its operations to 
 thwart the briskness of Eodney, and he took his convoy and his 
 prizes safe into Gibraltar Bay on January 27th. He at once 
 passed his supplies into that fortress, and despatched those for 
 Minorca under convoy of 3 line-of-battle ships.* 
 
 So Gibraltar, invested, and in considerable straits, was again 
 free, and relieved of all immediate danger. Minorca was not as 
 yet seriously threatened, and Eodney proceeded for the West Indies 
 in the middle of February. 
 
 It is not possible to say what might have now happened to 
 Gibraltar, had the whole naval power of the enemy been launched 
 and sustained against it. But no attempt of this kind was yet 
 made. Other concerns, indeed, employed the naval enemy. In 
 April, Don Josef Solano sailed with 12 line-of-battle ships, several 
 frigates, and 83 transports, carrying 11,460 troops for the support 
 of the allied power in the West Indies. The 31 sail of the line 
 which still remained at Cadiz, contented themselves with making 
 
 * Admiral Barcelo, -who was blockading Gibraltar with 4 or 5 ships of the line, some 
 frigates and a number of galleys and gun-boats, retired under the guns of Algeciras on 
 Rodney's approach. 
 
/ 
 
 4s 
 
 \}\7I //pes/rss 
 
 l¥- 
 
 New /f/ue 
 
 / 
 
 SKETCH PLAN 
 . .__ O F 
 
 GIBRALTAR. 
 
 IN 1812. 
 
 Scale of Miles 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 369 
 
 cruises to the northward and westward, with the view of destroying 
 British convoys, or possibly of intercepting relieving forces. On 
 18th July they were joined by 5 more French sail of the line, and 
 on the 9th of August, this great force being at sea, captured, and 
 afterwards carried into Cadiz, no less than 55 ships of British East 
 and West Indiamen. 
 
 But France was feeling that something bolder and more tren- 
 chant than this waiting game was now within her power, and 
 hoped that the assemblage at Cadiz, ostensibly acting against 
 Gibraltar, might be turned against Jamaica, International 
 jealousies brought the project to an end, and on the 3rd of 
 January, 1781, the French squadron, now commanded by 
 d'Estaing, and probably of 19 or 20 sail of the line, was back at 
 Brest. 
 
 The blockade of Gibraltar had been taken up by Don Barcelo 
 again, the moment Eodney disappeared. Cordova was by way of 
 preventing its second relief, with about 30 sail of the line at Cadiz, 
 The only really active operations against the place were con- 
 ducted on the land side by Mendoza, and these were pushed on 
 with great vigour and perseverance. From the direct attack 
 Gibraltar was suffering little; from the sea blockade it was 
 suffering much, and a second relief was arranged. 
 
 On March 13th, 1781, Vice- Admiral Darby sailed from Spit- 
 head with a convoy of 200 sail of victuallers and store-ships, 
 nearly half of which were for the relief of Gibraltar, and of which 
 the escort was no less than 29 sail of the line, with 12 frigates and 
 small vessels. It was practically the whole of the home force, but 
 nothing short of such a display could insure the safety of a 
 fortress, so far impregnable to all but famine."^ 
 
 * "So early as the preceding month (October. 1780), their wary and provident 
 governor found it necessary to make a reduction of a quarter of a pound from each 
 man's daily allowance of bread. Their quantity of meat was likewise reduced to a 
 pound and a half in the week ; and that became, latterly, so bad as to be scarcely 
 eatable. ... Of the most common and indispensable necessaries of life, bad ship 
 biscuit, full of worms, was sold at a shilling a pound ; flour, in not much better con- 
 dition, at the same price; old dried pease at a third more; the worst salt, half dirt, 
 the sweepings of ships' bottoms and store-houses, at eighteenpence ; old Irish salt 
 butter at half-a-crowa ; the worst sort of brown sugar brought the same price ; and 
 English farthing candles were sold at sixpence apiece. 
 
 But fresh provisions bore still more exorbitant prices. Even when the arrival of 
 ■vessels from the Mediterranean opened a market, turkeys sold at £3 12s. apiece ; 
 sucking-pigs at two guineas ; ducks at half a guinea ; and small hens sold at nine 
 Bhillings apiece. A guinea was refused for a calf's pluck, and £1 7s. asked for an 
 ox-head. To heighten every distress, the firing was so nearly exhausted as scarcely to 
 afford a sufficiency for the most indispensable culinary purposes.'" — Annual Registir 
 for 1782, pp. 9<J-100. Beatson, vol. v., p. 337. 
 
 25* 
 
370 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Darby arrived off Gibraltar on April 12th, and the next day he 
 sent in the victuallers and transports, of which he had 97, under 
 the escort of a detachment of 4 sail of the line and some frigates 
 under Sir John Lockhart Eoss ; 13 store-ships and victuallers, 
 under convoy of 2 frigates, were at the same time sent on to 
 Minorca. " From the moment in which Admiral Darby's fleet came 
 in sight of the fortress, the Spaniards opened all their batteries, 
 hoping by their tremendous cannonade and bombardment to pre- 
 vent the store-ships and victuallers from approaching the rock. 
 Perhaps nothing more awfully loud was ever heard before. A 
 hundred and seventy pieces of cannon and eighty mortars dis- 
 gorging at once their horrid contents on such a narrow spot, made 
 the beholders imagine that not the works only but the rock itself, 
 was in danger of destruction. The enemy continued this astonish- 
 ing fire, night and day, for a considerable time, without inter- 
 mission ; and the garrison returned it with the most undaunted 
 and persevering resolution.""^ The chief work of the blockade had 
 been carried on by means of gun-boats, under oars, of which the 
 Spaniards had constructed a considerable number. During the 
 continuance of the convoy in the bay, about 20 of these craft used 
 to issue from Algeciras every morning, taking advantage of the 
 early calm, and displayed the greatest and most successful audacity 
 in attacking the convoy and its covering ships. But by the 19th 
 of April all the store-ships were cleared, and the coal-ships sunk 
 inside the Mole to be weighed when wanted, and the Admiral 
 made sail for England.f 
 
 Meantime the whole military power of Spain was concentrated 
 on the isthmus which connects the rock of Gibraltar with the main- 
 land. 170 guns of the largest calibre, and 80 mortars, protected 
 by stupendous works, poured their fire into the place, hurting 
 the actual works but little, but leaving the town a wreck and 
 uninhabitable. It was computed by the garrison that in the first 
 three weeks of this attack the Spaniards must have expended 
 100,000 lbs. of gunpowder and from 4,000 to 5,000 shot and 
 shell in every twenty-four hours. But after discharging 75,000 
 shot and 25,000 shell at this rate, it was lowered to 600 projec- 
 tiles a day, and so continued for several weeks. J But the loss 
 to the garrison, on account of the protection afforded by case- 
 mates, was small. From April 12th to the end of June only 53 
 
 * Beatson, vol. v., p. 344. 
 
 t Ibid., vol. v., p. 348. 
 
 J Ajinual Refjister, 1762, p. 104. 
 
ATTACKS ON TElirdTOllY FROM THE SEA. 371 
 
 officers and men were kired and 260 wounded. So the siege 
 proceeded with great expenditure on the one side,'^ and, now that 
 provisions abounded, little hurt on the other. 
 
 But now, in despair with Spanish delays, as they appeared to 
 France, the latter proposed a determined attack on Minorca. 
 Spain agreed, and on June 23rd, 18 sail of the line, commanded 
 by de Guichen, arrived at Cadiz from Brest, and were placed by 
 their commander under the orders of Cordova. In a month, a 
 combined fleet of 49 sail passed out of Cadiz, escorting an army of 
 10,000 men. On the 25th July Cordova, agreeably to his orders, 
 detached the transports with the army, under convoy of 2 line-of- 
 battle ships and some frigates, while he himself returned towards 
 the entrance to the English Channel. 
 
 The progress of the army and its escort was so slow that it only 
 got sight of the island on the 18th August. The former landing, 
 it may be remembered, had taken place at Ciudadela ; but it was 
 now held that that was a blunder, as the garrison of the island 
 were not taken by surprise, and had time to collect into the citadel 
 of Fort St. Philip. The plan now was to land only a detachment 
 at Ciudadela and to land the main body in two parts, one three 
 or four miles to the north, and the other three or four miles to 
 the south of Port Mahon.f So far as it was a surprise, the plan 
 failed, for there was plenty of time to draw in most of the outlying 
 garrisons and to secure a certain amount of provisions. But 
 Fort St. Philip was securely invested by land and sea, and the 
 Due de Crillon, who was in command of the Allies, leisurely sat 
 down before it, sending to Barcelona for reinforcements and stores 
 in order to press on the siege. Six thousand additional troops 
 presently arrived from Toulon, and the total force ultimately 
 employed came to 16,000 men, with 109 pieces of battering 
 cannon and 36 large mortars. The opposing garrison was no 
 more than about 2,700, all told. It was about half the strength 
 necessary to man the works. 
 
 The blockade of the harbour was not complete. It was so 
 incomplete that, though the enemy was in possession of all its 
 shores, General Murray, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, 
 was able to send a detachment in boats by night to beat up the 
 Due de Crillon's quarters at Mola. And the British Consul at 
 Leghorn was able to pass several ships into Fort St. Philip with 
 supphes, and even with recruits. 
 
 • The estimated cost of the ammunition expended was £10,000 a day. 
 t The spots are marked by crosses on the sketch plan. 
 
372 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The enemy was so leisurely that he did not open his batteries 
 till November 11th, after which date they kept up a heavy fire, 
 without, however, at first doing much damage to the works. The 
 garrison replied with spirit and success ; but it was evident that 
 an end must come if no relief appeared from the sea. And no 
 relief could come. Minorca, with only half, or less than half, the 
 garrison of Gibraltar, and without its prestige, could not draw the 
 whole of the English home fleet to its succour,'^ and nothing was 
 left but to hold out as long as it was possible. 
 
 Leaving a commanded sea behind him, and the investment and 
 siege of Gibraltar and Fort St. Philip in serene and uninterrupted 
 progress, Cordova consulted as to the feasibility of attacking Darby 
 at anchor in Torbay. He had all the numerical superiority neces- 
 sary, and only the prestige of the English navy prevented its 
 being done. It is impossible to say what the tremendous historical 
 consequences of such an attack might have been had it succeeded ; 
 but it was so near that when de Guichen returned to Paris it was 
 difficult to preserve him from a mob, because he had not enforced 
 the opinion in favour of an attack which he was known to hold. 
 
 The Due de Crillon proceeded with the siege of Fort St. Philip. 
 It was well provisioned with all that could be stored, and though 
 the fire of the enemy was now beginning to tell, in injuring the 
 works, dismounting the guns, and in one case destroying a great 
 magazine of provisions, yet little impression was made on the 
 strength or vioral of the garrison so far. But scurvy began to 
 show itself, and a closer sea blockade stopped the entry of fresh 
 vegetables. The general health of the garrison began to fail, and 
 the end drew nigh. Fever and dysentery set in above the scurvy, 
 and the defenders were becoming hors de combat by the indirect, 
 though not by the direct, efforts of the besiegers. But they held 
 out. They died in the guard-rooms and on their posts as sentries, 
 and by the beginning of February 1782 only 660 men were fit for 
 duty, and of these onl}^ 100 were untainted with disease. 
 
 On February 4th General Murray offered to capitulate, and the 
 decrepit garrison marched out with all the honours of war. 
 
 The fall of Minorca caused the Spanish Government to hope for 
 the best from a simultaneous attack on Gibraltar by land and sea. 
 The nature of the attack is too well known to need recapitulation 
 here. But it must be pointed out that while the land part of it 
 was in ordinary form, the sea part was chiefly carried out by 
 
 * The garrison of Gibi-altar, when Darbj- turned his bacli on it, was 6,133. Beatsoa, 
 vol. v., p. 349,. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 373 
 
 specially prepared engines of war. It is only of antiquarian value 
 to inquire how those engines were constructed. They never were, 
 and never will be, repeated. It is enough to know that when 
 brought face to face with the works on September 13th, 1782, they 
 failed utterly and ignominiously, and that Gibraltar after the 
 attack remained just as strong as it was before. But no stronger. 
 It was impregnable to direct attack — so, apparently, was Fort St. 
 Philip. But it would fall to the indirect attack of famine, as Fort 
 St, Philip did, unless the whole naval power of England were once 
 more put forth to save it. Lord Howe sailed on September 11th 
 at the head of 34 sail of the line, besides frigates and small vessels. 
 He escorted a great fleet of store-ships and victuallers, and carried 
 two regiments in transports for recruiting the garrison. Lord 
 Howe was the usual month in reaching the fortress, and heard on 
 his way that the combined fleet of 40 sail of the line was ready to 
 receive him. With some difticulty, owing to the bad navigation 
 of most of the convoy, and in safety, owing to the sufferings of the 
 Franco-Spanish fleet in a recent gale, and to their want of enter- 
 prise, Lord Howe threw all his supplies into Gibraltar ; but he was 
 during the whole time, as it were, facing the enemy's fleet ; and so 
 pressing was his condition that some of the officers of the garrison 
 on a mission to the fleet were carried into the Atlantic and 
 could not be landed. Eeady to face and to fight the numerically 
 superior force, Howe was not disposed to do it in the confined 
 waters at the eastern entrance to the straits. He passed out of 
 the Mediterranean 34 sail of the line strong ; he was followed by 
 a fleet apparently 44 sail strong, which brought him to a partial 
 engagement, but sheered off when Howe appeared prepared for 
 closer quarters. 
 
 This was the third and last relief of Gibraltar. I have com- 
 bined it and the proceedings relating to its attack and defence, with 
 the second fall of Minorca, led up to again by the first fall of that 
 fortress, because all the operations seem to tell the same tale, and 
 to be inseparable in principle, both the one and the other being 
 those with which these chapters have made us familiar. 
 
 Gibraltar, and Fort St. Philip at Minorca, were but those citadel 
 fortresses which I have described in a previous chapter as being 
 universally employed. But Gibraltar differed from Minorca, and 
 from most sea-faced citadels, inasmuch as owing to the narrowness 
 of its land face and the impregnability of one of its sea faces it was 
 unapproachable except at enormous disadvantages. In no case 
 could it be subject to a full cross fire such as an ordinary fortress 
 
374 NAVAL WAHFAUE. 
 
 regularly invested by land expects to be. The idea of breaching it 
 in a regular way from the land side was almost hopeless. In such 
 a condition its close attack by an overwhelming fire from line-of- 
 battle ships was known to be at least exceedingly hazardous, but 
 the form of attack — which Sir George Eooke had used for its first 
 capture — was not employed. If we ask, Why not? we must no 
 doubt answer, Because of the wholesome fear of stone walls with 
 which most naval authorities were imbued ; but, more, we are safe 
 in saying, Because the Franco- Spanish command of the sea was 
 precarious. The Allies were able to make themselves masters of 
 Minorca, and to drive Gibraltar to excessive straits. But as what 
 was going on in the East and West Indies and North America per- 
 mitted the attacks on these strongholds, so the presence intact of a 
 fleet of 30 or 40 sail of the line in Southern European waters was 
 that which governed affairs in these distant parts of the world. 
 Let but the Franco- Spanish home fleet meet with complete defeat, 
 and the strain which England was suffering would be relaxed. It 
 was the necessities of her home naval affairs which drove her into 
 such naval difficulties abroad, even as it was the pressure of her 
 afiairs abroad that made her home difficulties. For her enemies to 
 throw themselves against the stone walls of Gibraltar might win 
 Gibraltar — possibly. But what would a disabled fleet do against 
 the intact British one, even numerically inferior? But in the 
 cases of both Gibraltar and Minorca, the strength was not in the 
 attack, but in the investment. Supplies were withheld from Fort 
 St. Phili]3, and it fell. They were not withheld from Gibraltar; 
 they were thrown in at the risk of the United Kingdom; and to 
 some extent it may be said that the American Colonies and Gib- 
 raltar were weighed against one another, and the American scale 
 went up. When Darby was passing out of the Channel to relieve 
 Gibraltar, de Grasse was passing out to attack us on the other side 
 of the Atlantic. At the time it was debated, and at the time it 
 was doubted, whether the real rule of war was followed when 
 Darby avoided him.* 
 
 Gibraltar was therefore on all grounds exceptional, and it held 
 out because it was so. Minorca fell under the general rule, and 
 passed into the enemy's hands, who absolutely commanded the 
 surrounding sea. There was nothing peculiar about it, and it was 
 attacked according to rule. As if to emphasize the maxims which 
 were now accepted, the great naval force which was necessary, if 
 
 * See Annual Register, 1782, p. 102. Darby sailed on March 13th, and de Grasse 
 sailed on March 22nd. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIIHITORY FBOM THE SEA. 375 
 
 Minorca was to be attacked at all, never even sighted the island. 
 Now, and after all experience more than ever, was the attack on a 
 port a military and not a naval affair. Now, and more than ever 
 in tlije cases of Gibraltar and Minorca, was it seen how powerless 
 the navy was in direct attack, how all-powerful in defence, and in 
 indirect attack. 
 
 And again we are brought face to face with the two or three 
 prominent points which concerned the objects and uses of fortifica- 
 tions. The citadel form in both cases showed its power of delay, 
 and showed at the same time that it had no other power. A day 
 after the troops landed, Minorca fell without opposition, and all 
 the stores and appliances of the arsenal fell with it. Were philo- 
 sophy permissible in war, the Allies might have captured Fort St. 
 Philip nearly as soon, had it simply been invested out of the 
 range of its guns. Gibraltar did not fall, just because it could not 
 be invested for a long enough time, but also because troops could 
 not be landed out of range of the batteries. Fortification so far 
 has all that the range of its guns give it, but no more ; and when 
 it can be invested and opposed by fortification, it falls whether or 
 no for want of supply. 
 
 Still we seem to see that those who made our history for us 
 looked to their fortifications to serve the purposes of delay only, 
 and not really of defence. 
 
 ---^^^ 
 
37G NAVAL JVARFARE. 
 
 CHAPTER XYII. 
 
 The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the 
 Sea succeed or fail — {continued). 
 
 The -war of American Independence prolific in strategical lessons. — But in the 
 methods of attack there is no difference. — Fewer lessons can be drawn from the events 
 of the French Revolutionarj^ and Napoleonic wars, because the attacks on territory 
 were generally based on the supposed alliance with part of the populations. — Lord 
 Howe and d'Estaing at Sandy Hook. — The relief of Newport. — Junction of Bj-ron and 
 Howe forces d'Estaing to the West Indies. — Barrington's attack on St. Lucia. — 
 D'Estaing's interference and Barrington's defence. — Reflections on the defective strategy 
 on both sides.— Byron's strategical error in quitting his watch on the French fleet.— 
 D'Estaing's capture of Grenada, and Byron's failure to relieve or recover the island. — 
 Rodney's capture of St. Eustatia. — More perfect strategy of de Grasse against Rodney. 
 — Misapprehension as to Hood's position off Fort Royal. — De Grasse's attack on and 
 repulse from St. Lucia. — Success against Tobago. — Rodney paralyzed. — Suflfren and 
 Hughes in the East Indies, and the capture of Trincomalee. — Perfect system of the 
 attack vipon BelleisJe in 17G1. 
 
 The American War of Independence is, perhaps, more than any 
 other prolific in examples of the influence which command of the 
 sea, and the loss and regaining of that command has on the ini- 
 tiation, the success, or the failure of expeditions carried over sea 
 against ports and islands. The naval forces were more evenly 
 balanced than usual on each side, and such a condition would, 
 under ordinary circumstances, have lea to a renewed struggle for 
 the command of the sea similar to that which was carried out 
 between England and Holland in their three great naval wars, or 
 between England and France in their first naval war. 
 
 But both in the East and in the West the countries at war were 
 holding territories contiguous, and accessible the one from the 
 other, either by sea or land, or both. The great stake which was 
 immediately played for was the independence or subjection of the 
 North American Colonies of Great Britain, and she was, in con- 
 sequence, precluded from throwing her whole force against the sea 
 
ATTACKS ON TERBITOIiY FROM THE SEA. 377 
 
 forces of Spain and France. It might have been higher and better 
 pohcy for these countries to have fought directly for the command 
 of the sea in European waters, continuing the ill-organized but 
 gigantic effort of 1779 with greater determination and skill. But 
 the more immediate and natural desire on the part of Spain to 
 recover the great trophy of Gibraltar, and the necessity that lay 
 upon France to succour directly the revolted English Colonies, 
 together with the desire of increasing her holding in India, threw 
 the Allies into a kind of naval war in which the attack and defence 
 of territory became a primary object. The main point was to 
 place at the proper times, in the proper localities, naval forces 
 great enoiigh to succour places which were defending themselves, 
 or to cover attacks on the enemy's positions. 
 
 In the West Indies and North America, the influence of season 
 compelling the withdrawal for a time of nearly all naval force 
 from the southern islands to the Northern Continent, and vice 
 versa, and the doulile duty thrown on the forces on each side, of 
 attacking and defending territories in close proximity, put actual 
 command of the sea more or less hopelessly into the background, 
 until the great victory of Rodney, in April 1782, sent the British 
 scale of force permanently up. But in the distant Bay of Bengal, 
 where reinforcements could only arrive at very long intervals after 
 they had been asked for, the sea forces were about as evenly 
 matched as they had been a century before in the North Sea. And 
 there both sides showed themselves aware that all attacks on 
 territory over a doubtfully commanded sea are, at best, chance- 
 work; five great and drawn battles were fought between Sir 
 Edward Hughes and Suffren simply for the command of the sea, 
 which was never gained by either side.* 
 
 Yet I must dwell for a short space in these waters, over one of 
 the most perfect exercises of naval strategical ability which is left 
 on historical record. The capture of Trincomalee by Suffren was 
 a most admirable illustration of what can be done in the successful 
 attack on territory from the sea, if the time-limit is thoroughly 
 understood and properly calculated ; while, on the other hand, the 
 exceeding narrowness of the limit shown is a warning as to the 
 risks run under such conditions. 
 
 We have seen that the method of attack by expeditions over sea 
 had long been established, and that the idea of capturing ports or 
 islands by naval forces alone was almost entirely out of view. The 
 
 * The same characteristic had been exhibited in the former war in these waters, 
 where Pocock and d'Ache set the example afterwards followed. 
 
378 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 experience of a centur}^ marked by only one or two successes and 
 many failm-es of ships against works, antl almost uniform successes 
 of troops covered and sui^plied by ships when numerically sufficient 
 and properly handled, had quite settled the plans of attack. Only 
 extraneous causes, such as want of troops or disbelief in the 
 enemy's strength, could lead to occasional departures from the 
 established form. Therefore, as the motive powers and the 
 weapons were similar to what had preceded them, we ought not 
 to expect to draw any special lessons from the territorial attacks 
 in the American War, or in the Kevolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
 with France, touching the method of attack. We have, in fact, 
 drawn all those lessons already. But we shall find some useful 
 illustrations as to the indirect influence of naval force, or even to 
 its direct effect in covering, sustaining, or interfering with attacks 
 upon territory. 
 
 There is, however, at least one operation during the War of 
 American Independence to which special attention must be drawn, 
 on account of the very remarkable significance of its lesson. 
 Charleston in South Carolina was twice attacked by expeditions 
 over sea during the American War of Independence. The first of 
 these attacks failed ; the second succeeded. Charleston was again 
 twice attacked in the American Civil War, when the first attack 
 failed, and the second succeeded. Between the two pairs of attacks 
 eighty-seven years had rolled, and the whole face of naval war- 
 fare had changed. Steam power had superseded sail power ; 
 the shell had superseded the shot; iron had to a great extent 
 superseded wood ; and iron armour was adopted as the clothing of 
 ships. Yet, according to the example, the rule of war which 
 governed success and failure in attack had undergone no change. 
 In 1776 and in 1863, ships alone failed to capture the place ; in 
 1780 and in 1864, troops supported by ships in the usual way 
 succeeded. 
 
 Otherwise, the one or two illustrations which I propose to draw 
 from operations on the other side of the Atlantic during the War 
 of American Independence, will have reference less to the form of 
 attack than to the strategical causes which led to projecting such 
 enterprises, and to their ultimate failure or success. We shall, 
 in short, from one or two other examples, gain some confirmation 
 of those views to which the examples of Louisbourg and Minorca 
 had led us. 
 
 The French Eevolutionary War, though marked on its outbreak 
 by many remarkable successful and unsuccessful attacks upon 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTOni" FROM THE SEA. 379 
 
 territory, is somewhat barren of the lessons conveyed by former 
 wars, for the reason that pohtical causes, as much or more than 
 mihtary ones, governed the initiation as well as the issues of nearly 
 all these struggles. And this was the case equally in home waters, 
 in the East and West Indies, at the Cape, and in the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 The state of semi-insurrection in which Ireland found itself 
 determined the efforts of Hoche and Morard de Galles upon Bantry 
 in 1796, the landing of General Humbert in Killala Bay, and the 
 more thoroughly abortive design of Bompart against Lough 
 S willy in 1798. So did the divided condition of the people of 
 France encourage the disastrous descent of the Emigres at Qui- 
 beron Bay in 1795. So did Corsica pass into the hands of the 
 British, and out of them in 1794 and 1796. 
 
 The reduction of the different ports in Ceylon in 1795-96 was 
 undertaken in view of a presumed difference in political opinion 
 amongst the Dutch possessors of the island, and the summonses 
 to surrender assumed a willingness on the part of portions of the 
 garrisons to revolt against the dominant Kepublican faction. At 
 the Cape of Good Hope, when it fell to the British in 1795, there 
 may have been less dependence on political division, and more on 
 the weakness of the Dutch garrison, but still the political cause 
 was there. 
 
 In the West Indies, every island was politically divided against 
 itself, and advantage of this circumstance was taken in 1794 by 
 the expedition under Admiral Sir John Jervis, and General Sir C. 
 Grey, that remarkable instance of union between the commanders 
 of the sea and land forces which made a clean sweep of the French 
 possessions. 
 
 Thus, although all the conditions of military success which we 
 have seen to be necessary were present in the attacks by which 
 French ports were wrested from the hands that held them, some 
 dependence was always placed on the military support which it 
 was supposed might be drawn from the political feeling of a portion 
 of the population. When this feeling turned, or was suppressed 
 by a majority of opponents, the military force which had been 
 supplied was found insufficient, and the places fell back again into 
 the hands of the French Eepublicans. 
 
 The surrender of Toulon by the French Eoyalists to Lord Hood 
 was an exaggerated instance of the principles now set forth. The 
 idea in accepting it was that the political views of the Royalists 
 might dominate, and an insufficient supply of military force to hold 
 
380 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 the place was provided. Had it been otherwise, had we recognized 
 the unchanging rules which governed these cases, and sent out a 
 garrison strong enough to hold the place apart from all depen- 
 dence on politico-military support, resting its supply upon the sea 
 as we had learned to do by Barcelona and other Spanish ports in 
 the "War of the Succession, the whole course of European history 
 might have been changed. As it was, the Eoyalist cause grew 
 weaker and not stronger as had been expected, in the South of 
 Frapce, and Toulon was evacuated by the British as an effect of 
 that miscalculation. 
 
 Corsica comes in as an illustration of the same kind. Military 
 force, resting in a great measure on the belief that political 
 opinion in the island was convertible into the same instrument of 
 war, made its conquest. An undue dependence on political 
 opinion left a fleet in the Mediterranean which was unable to hold 
 its own, and a small garrison in the island face to face with a hos- 
 tile population. The evacuation of the island and of the waters 
 surrounding it was the necessary consequence. . 
 
 Precisely the same sort of thing went on in the West Indies. 
 In the absence of any naval force to hinder it, and with a section 
 of their populations to assist, Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadaloupe, 
 and several ports in St. Domingo, fell easily in 1794 to the snf- 
 Hcient forces brought against them, though Martinique had re- 
 sisted insufficient forces the year before. But the British hold on 
 most of these places began to relax from the moment its grasp 
 had closed on them. Guadaloupe was the first to feel the result of 
 dependence on political opinion. Captured on the 20th April, a 
 very small reinforcement of the Eepublican party thrown in on 
 June 5th, was sufficient, even under the eyes of superior British 
 force, to drive the garrisons out of the island by December 10th. 
 Tiberoon in St. Domingo was recovered by the French in the same 
 way and in the same month of 1794. By June next year, St. 
 Lucia had followed the example set, and the insurrections in St. 
 Vincent, Grenada, and Dominique had well nigh carried those 
 islands. 
 
 For these reasons, and because, except in the case of Corsica, 
 the command of the sea was assured, there will be no need to 
 dwell at length on the examples of territorial attacks found in the 
 annals of the French Eevolutionary and Napoleonic wars. So far 
 as they go, they contradict nothing of all that had gone before in 
 illustration of the rules of naval warfare, and the only new lesson 
 which can be drawn from them is the distrust which ought to 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 381 
 
 govern all ideas of dependence on political, as convertible into 
 military, power. 
 
 But an exception must be made in regard to the great expe- 
 dition of Napoleon into Egypt, already alluded to in a former 
 chapter,^ and this for the reason that the real bearings of the 
 transaction are so often misapprehended at the present day. 
 
 Eeverting, then, to the War of American Independence, I take, 
 as an example of the power of even inferior sea-forces to prevent 
 the success of territorial attacks, the relief of Newport in 1778. 
 
 The story is well told by de Lapeyrouse Bonfils : — 
 
 The Count d'Estaing, aftei- having examined the coast of Virginia, proceeded to tho 
 entrance of the Delaware. Contrary to his expectation, he saw neither Howe nor 
 Clinton. Provoked by this accident, which withdrew from him a glorious opportunity, 
 d'Estaing made sail for Sandy Hook. In spite of foul winds, he appeared on July 
 11th before the port, and at once made preparations for attack. 
 
 Howe was at anchor inside the bar with 9 sail of the line, 
 carrying 534 guns, while d'Estaing had with him 12 sail of the 
 line carrying 856. 
 
 Howe, surprised and ill-placed, found it impossible to offer a satisfactory resistance. 
 The sole obstacle which met d'Estaing was the bar which connected Long Island and 
 Sandy Hook, and which it was necessary for his ships to pass. At high water the 
 operation was practicable ; the Count d'Estaing promised a hundred thousand crowns 
 to the pilot who would act. The coup de main accorded with his character, and he 
 knew that at the opening of a war, such an attack sufBced to draw fortune to the 
 colours. The American pilots, with whom he took too much counsel, either from 
 ignorance on their part, from disaffection, or want of zeal, dissuaded him from the 
 enterprise. They made out that several of his ships drew too much water to pass the 
 bar ; in consequence, d'Kstaing weighed his anchors on July 22nd, and dropped them 
 again some miles on the side of New Jersey. He provisioned and reappeared before 
 Sandy Hook. The tide and wind suited to cross the bar, but although daring, the 
 Cotmt d'Estaing wanted that ready audacity which despises the rules of prudence to 
 follow the dictates of genius. As at first, the pilots diverted him from his object, f 
 One consideration, however, appeared to justify his circumspection. The arrival of 
 Vice- Admiral Byron with a powerful fleet had been reported, and might it not have 
 been feared that he would find himself placed between the latter and Admiral Howe ? 
 However, the Americans, after the ill-success of the plan arranged at Paris, had fixed 
 their attention on Rhode Island. For the accomplishment of this design, from which 
 they anticipated the most important consequences, the concurrence of Count d'Estaing 
 was considered necessary. Washington and Lafayette undertook to negotiate with the 
 French Admiral, and on his favourable reply, Congress appointed Sullivan to conduct 
 the enterprise. 
 
 Cotmt d'Estaing quitted Sandy Hook and stood for Rhode Island, where he ai-rived 
 on 29th July. Sullivan proceeded to encamp near Providence. D'Estaing first 
 anchored at Brenton's Ledge, five miles from Newport, and occupied the three passes 
 
 * Chapter X. 
 
 t M. Chevalier (pp. 112, 113) points out that d'Estaing had the passage sounded 
 by one of his officers, who found only twenty to twenty-two feet of water on the 
 bar. 
 
382 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 into the river. On the 8th August he got under sail, and, in spite of the fire from the 
 enemy's batteries, penetrated as far as Newport, and entered the bay of Connonicut. 
 On this sudden approach the English were seized with panic, and without dreaming of 
 offering resistance, burnt the frigates Juno, Flora, Lark, Orpheus, and Cerberus, two 
 corvettes and several magazines. 
 
 Meanwhile Admiral Howe, favoured by circumstances, from a defensive passed to 
 an offensive attitude. Byron's squadron, on making the coast of America, was dis- 
 persed in a gale of wind. Four of his line-of-battle ships, driven by the gale, made 
 for shelter at Sandy Hook, and reinforced the British squadron there.* 
 
 From this moment, Howe, finding himself in strength, and knowing the importance 
 of Rhode Island, prepared to subvert the projects of the Allies. His spies kept him 
 informed of the position which the French squadron had taken up for the attack on 
 Rhode Island. Well understanding those waters, he knew that, where anchored, the 
 French could only weigh with a northerly wind, which during the month of August 
 seldom prevailed on that coast. Howe consequently weighed, and appeared on 
 August 9th off point Judith. The wind blew from the sea; at the moment when 
 he was most certain of the success of his arrangements, it suddenly changed, and 
 blew from the northward. 
 
 Count d'Estaing on his jjart, observed the enemy, and determined to 23i"oceed to 
 attack him should the wind allow. When the northerly wind sprang up, d'Estaing 
 hastened to weigh, and with a good breeze from the norihward he bore down upon 
 Admiral Howe on the 10th. The latter who, with two ships of the line less than 
 d'Estaing, did not feel himself in a state to accept the battle which his impetuous 
 adversary offered, soon stood away to the southward, in hopes that the wind might come 
 from that quarter, which everything seemed to promise. The two fleets manoeuvred 
 for a day and a half, the one to bring about, and the other to avoid, battle. It was now 
 thellth, towards five o'clock in the evening. A few hours more, and a general action 
 would perhaps decide the fate of America. The wind, which had been freshening 
 since the morning with continual rain, blew hard as the evening wore on, and ended 
 during the night between the 11th and 12th in a terrible gale. Howe, who had his 
 flag in a frigate, the better to dii-ect the movements of his squadron, was sej^arated 
 from it, and his ships found themselves dispersed. 
 
 Count d'Estaing was still more unfortunate. The Languedoc, which carried him, 
 lost her rudder and all her masts. Others of the Fi'ench ships suffered much in their 
 masts and rigging. After the gale, which lasted forty hours, dangers not less great 
 threatened some of the ships of our squadron. The Languedoc, wandering at the will 
 of the waves, was attacked by the Preston. The Marseillais, nearly as much 
 damaged, had a brush with the Renown. It required all their courage to escape the 
 two adversaries, and the wind having fallen light, all the ships joined Count d'Estaing 
 at Newport. 
 
 Under any other circumstances, the route taken by Count d'Estaing would have been 
 proper ; but he had received news of the junction of Byron with Howe. This certainly 
 was more than sufficient to prevent him from committing an act of rashness without 
 excuse. In vain his captains implored him to give up the enterprise. The sole reason 
 which he offered in refusal was the word of honour given to Sullivan that he would 
 return to Newport. D'Estaing forgot that in such a case his promise was only relative, 
 and could not bind him ; but like all his race he was, so to speak, superstitious on the 
 point of honour, and almost put this chivalrous sentiment above the interests of his 
 
 * My author is not quite accurate here. Before the 28th July the Renown, 50, had 
 arrived from the West Indies ; on the 28th the Ruisonahle, G4, joined from Halifax; 
 and on the 30th the Cornwall, 74, and Centurion, 50, of Byron's fleet came in. See- 
 Hervey, vol. v., p. 552 
 
ATTACKS OA' TERRLTORY FROM THE SEA. 3tiS 
 
 country. He exposed eight thousand men and twelve ships uf the lino to satisfy 
 it. However it was, d'Estaing anchored at Rhode Island and saw Sullivan, who in- 
 formed him of the presence at Sandy Hook of the combined fleets of Howe and 
 Byron. Unable longer to co-operate in the reduction of the place, understanding all 
 the danger of his position a few leagues distant from a fleet much superior in numbers to 
 his own, of which most of the ships were defective aloft, Count d'Estaing informed 
 Sullivan of his intention to proceed to Boston to refit. The American general, who had 
 just received reinforcements, was in despair at the news. " Land," he said to the 
 French Admiral ; " you promised. Your departure will hand us over to the English. 
 Land; honour and friendship alike compel you." The Marquis de Lafayette was still 
 more pi-essing ; but the preservation of his squadron was so absolutely bound up with 
 its departure from Rhode Island that Count d'Estaing did not consider it his duty to 
 yield to such solicitations. Besides, the conduct of Sullivan in the matter was not all 
 calculated to retain him. The General, by his proposals as much as by certain equivo- 
 cal acts, was suspected of having intelligence with the enemy. He did not like the 
 French : and when Count d'Estaing made sail for Boston, he did not fear to outrage our 
 national character in passing the word amongst his troops that the French were traitors ; 
 insolence which was repelled with the spirit which it demanded, by the Marquis de 
 Lafayette. 
 
 The arrival of the French squadron at Boston, which took place on August 25th. 
 and its retirement from Rhode Island, sowed disunion between the Allies, and was the 
 pretext for many vehement struggles. England gained new partisans in the insurgent 
 provinces, and the raising of the siege of one of her principal fortresses.* 
 
 In this example, we see again that the neighbourhood of a 
 superioi' fleet is destructive of all idea of territorial attack carried 
 on from the sea, even where, as in the case of Newport, the main 
 attack is from the land, and depending on the land for reinforce- 
 ment and supply. The necessity of d'Estaing's retreat from 
 Newport was made absolute by the junction of Howe and Byron, 
 yet it was a necessity not recognized by either Lafayette or 
 Sullivan, so easily are the fundamental axioms of naval war 
 misunderstood by those who do do not feel their control. 
 
 This, however, was the action of a superior naval force. We 
 have to recollect that Newport had already been relieved by the 
 presence of an inferior naval force. It was Howe's smaller fleet 
 which drew away d'Estaing from Newport in the first instance, 
 and could evidently have done it again and again in the same 
 manner. The French account does not credit Howe with any 
 desire to offer battle to d'Estaing, but the English accounts tell us 
 that he intended to risk a battle if he could have the weather 
 guage, and that even failing it he had drawn his fleet into line of 
 battle, and prepared to attack in the leeward position when the 
 fleets were separated by the gale. Had a battle ensued, Newport 
 would still have been relieved, for d'Estaing, even as victor, must 
 have gone to Boston to refit after such a struggle. 
 
 * Lapeyrouse, vol. iii., p. 45; see a'-so Troudo. vol. ii,, p. 12; Chevalier, p. 3; 
 Hervey, vol, v., p. ^0; Schomherg, vol. i,, p. 447. 
 
 26 
 
884 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 D'Estaing, however, clearly played a bad game, and deserved to 
 suffer the contumely which the Americans poured upon him. 
 Having Howe safe at Sandy Hook in inferior force, he should 
 never have lost his grip of him when there were designs against 
 Newport. An inferior, or at least an equal force, would have 
 probably been sufficient to mask him in his own awkward 
 position behind a bar, and then d'Estaing might have sent the 
 remainder of his ships to co-operate with Sullivan against New- 
 port, certain that, at least ac far as Howe was concerned, there 
 would be no interference from the sea. If, however, d'Estaing 
 had considered that he was not strong enough so to divide his 
 fleet in this way, he should have informed Sullivan of the im- 
 possibility of his co-operating at all except by way of masking the 
 English fleet. But had he divided his fleet, or had he confined 
 himself to masking that of Howe, we have seen how fortune might 
 have befriended him. Very possibly he might have made prizes 
 of every one of the four ships which put into Sandy Hook, and 
 reinforced Howe. 
 
 It was not till October that Byron had collected sufficient force 
 to attempt the blockade of d'Estaing in Boston, but then a storm 
 again dispersed his ships, and enabled d'Estaing to slip out and 
 proceed to the West Indies.* This he did on November 3rd, and 
 on the same day Commodore Hotham sailed from Sandy Hook for 
 the same destination with a squadron of w^ar-ships and 60 sail 
 of transports, carrying 5,000 troops. These were under Major- 
 General Grant, for the defence of the West Indian Islands, or 
 the attack of the enemy's possessions there, should the conditions 
 allow. The two fleets were for some time close together without 
 either being aware of the other's presence, and both met the same 
 gale of wind, which proved more damaging to the French than to 
 the English, dispersing the former, but enabling the latter to 
 arrive at Barbados in safety. 
 
 Kear-Admiral Barrington, who commanded on the Leeward 
 Islands station, was in such weak force that far from being in a 
 position to undertake offensive operations, he had been unable to 
 prevent the fall of Dominique on the 7th of September to the arms 
 of the Marquis de Bouille. 
 
 But when- Hotham joined him it was at once determined to 
 make an attack on St. Lucia. Before such a determination was 
 
 * "Le Comte d'Estaing, r^duit a I'maction par la superiority de t'ennemie, ii'attendait 
 qu'une occasion favorable pour se rendre dans les Antilles. Protitant de re'Ioignement 
 des Anglais, il fit route pour la Martinique." — C/icvuliir, p. 121. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEBIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 885 
 
 come to, we may be sure that the strategical conditions were well 
 considered by the two chiefs. As Hotliam and d'Estaing had 
 sailed from American ports on the same day, it seems certain that 
 Hotham must have informed Barrington that d'Estaing was safely 
 masked by the superior fleet of Byron. Interruption from the sea 
 was, so far, not to be feared, and it might well have been supposed 
 that even did d'Estaing manage to escape, Byron would have been 
 so close upon his heels as to paralyze his motions. 
 
 The sequel presents one of the most remarkable stories in the 
 whole range of territorial attacks from the sea, showing on the 
 one hand the extreme hazard of such attacks unless the command 
 of the sea is fully assured beforehand, and on the other, the 
 possibilities of successful resistance even in the most desperate 
 extremities. 
 
 Barrington's squadron, now consisting of 7 sail of the line, 
 2 frigates, and a sloop, convoying the army in its transports, 
 arrived off the island on December 13th, and on the same day 
 Brigadier-Generals Meadows and Prescot landed in different parts 
 of the Grand Cul-de-sac with a considerable body of troops, while 
 Brigadier-General Sir Henry Calder protected the landing-place to 
 keep open a communication between the fleet and army. There 
 was no opposition to the landing, and the troops marched at once 
 on the fortress of Morne-fortune, the chief land defence of the 
 Bale du Carenage, which they took. 
 
 The gale of wind, from which the French had suffered most, 
 might, however, have been most favourable to them, had skill or 
 fortune allowed it. D'Estaing fell in with and captured three of 
 Hotham's transports, from which he learnt the news of his sailing 
 for the West Indies, and of his force, but not of his exact desti- 
 nation. He wrongly concluded it to be Antigua, and bore away 
 for that island, off which he cruised for some days, and then, 
 disappointed at seeing nothing, he made for Martinique, where he 
 arrived on December 6th, a week prior to Barrington's arrival at 
 St. Lucia. My authorities do not say whether Barrington had 
 early notice of d'Estaing's arrival, but as soon as he became 
 aware of his presence, he placed all his transports at the bottom 
 of the Cul-de-sac and drew his ships up in line across the 
 entrance, covering each flank by the erection of batteries and the 
 mounting of guns. 
 
 The Baie du Carenage on the east coast of the island is entered from the west. 
 The entrance is not more than 200 yards wide. Rocks surround the two points of this 
 entrance, which is still rather narrowed by a shoal which extends from the south point 
 
 2C» 
 
38(i NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 to the W.N.W. The depth of water varies from four to seven and a half fathoms in 
 this passage. Inside the north point, at about 550 yards, is a second point, also sur- 
 rounded by rocks;' Morne-fortune is in the direction of and at a small distance 
 from this point. Its guns protect at once the road, its entrance, and the Cul-de sac, 
 though this is screened from fire on the north side and at the bottom of the bay. . . . 
 
 On the 14th, in the morning, Vice- Admiral d'Estaiug had intelligence of the attack 
 directed against St. Lucia ; he at once embarked 6,000 troops, and in the afternoon 
 got under weigh with 11 sail of the line, a twelfth, the Marseillais joined him next 
 morning. 
 
 On the 15th, in the morning, the squadron arrived off the Bale du Carenage. 
 
 The intention of the Commander-in-Chief was to get alongside (e'longer) the English 
 line from north to south ; to anchor a ship abreast of each one of the enemy, and to 
 authorize the captains to board their adversaries if they judged it prudent. In case 
 of the depth of water being too great to anchor, he hoped to get positions inside the 
 English line. The circumstances of wind, and the position of the enemy might, how- 
 ever, modify the plan of attack. The Sagittaire (50) and the frigate Chimere had 
 orders, in any case, to attack the battery on the south point ; the Provence (64) and the 
 Vaillant (64) were charged to silence the guns on the north point. The wind was 
 light from the eastward. The French squadron passed along the English line, 
 engaging it and receiving the fire of the batteries on shore, but it did not anchor ; it 
 continued under sail, and in the evening renewed the attack of the morning. On the 
 17th d'Estaing anchored in the Creek du Choc, landed the troops and directed them 
 upon Morne-fortune', distant a few miles only from the anchorage. The squadron 
 subsequently (on the 24th) got under sail again to renew the attack on the English 
 division; but the lightness of the wind interfered with the projects of the Commander- 
 in-Chief, and in the evening he returned to the anchoi\age. The expedition by land did 
 not succeed. The troops were embarked on the 30th, and the squadron returned to 
 Martinique. The governor of St. Lucia capitulated on the morning of its departure.* 
 
 This occurrence, so striking in its contrasts, requires some little 
 examination before we can look at it with the view of drawing out 
 its lessons. A century ago these would all have been obscured 
 l)y the pseans to be sounded in praise of the English skill and 
 courage. Now we should be foolish to take that line. We should 
 rather reflect on the greatness and imminence of the risks that 
 were run, and treasure them up in order that in the time to come 
 we at least might know how to avoid them in like cases. 
 
 In the first place, the coincident sailing of Hotham and d'Estaing 
 and their near neighbourhood en route to the West Indies, sugge.sts 
 that good fortune, and not skill, enabled Hotham to get to the 
 West Indies at all. Then Lapeyrouse justly points out that when 
 d'Estaing ascertained the truth from the captured members of 
 Hotham's convoy, he had in his hands the greatest of opportunities 
 had he chosen to use it. 
 
 On the evening of the capture of these three transports, the wind was E.S.E., 
 Antigua bore S.W. In running to the southward for twenty-four hours he had a 
 
 * Troude, vol. ii., p. 17. See also Lapeyrouse, vol. iii., p. 53; Chevalier, p. 125; 
 Schomberg, vol. i., p. 451. The illustration, from a contemporary print in the Royal 
 United Service Institution, gives a capital idoa of the position. 
 
'=5^>;^5^F»;7p^^5^^tS^^iFp^ 
 
 A Fionoli Troops encamped after the attack on tlio "S'iyic. B INIortar P.atteiy. C Sejnr! 
 Byron's Fleet. F Count D'Estaing's Fleet. G Large Division of English 'F?t 
 tln-f>wn across t!ie Rond leaflina to Tlioc I'av wliere the French emharked. 
 
PART OF THE ISLAND 
 
 OF 
 
 S" LUCIE 
 
 
 _ "oil '^y" '^ ^ " Jf , „ #j f-^ - 
 
 ■~^^- 
 
 i^ 
 
 V r 
 
 
 ^^0<> 
 
 'V;-A^/*j3A^-s- 
 
 #M|f' 
 
 
 '^'='-^/<^ 
 
 I Frfnck ritel "^ ^ 
 
 Me Jo/rnno,, of the IS'' * 
 
 (lOi.nlojtheLine} 
 
 ^ ^• 
 
 ^ <r <r 
 
 ^^ French Fket in 
 ^- M« APtlrwon. of tire 15* 
 "^ (n 6sit of thi Li'iie ) 
 
 *.^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 Bjtery. D Tlii-ee-.<;nn Battery to defend the Road leading! to the Vio-ie. E Admiral 
 siij off Port Koyal. H Ships cruising round tlie Island of Martinico. T Traverses 
 
ATTACKS ON TFAirJTOUY FROM THE SEA. 387 
 
 chance of meeting the convoy, or he would have assured himself in missing it, that its 
 destination was not Barbados. Then, being in the latitude of Antigua, he might 
 have run before the wind for that island, and in the morning he would have picked up 
 the convoy before their arrival. Another important consideration should have deter- 
 mined him. Barbados, by its position to windward, dominated the other islands ; it 
 was presumable that the enemy would profit by the favourable wind to proceed to an 
 anchorage there, because from this point it could distribute its forces according to 
 convenience.* 
 
 But then it seems strange that Barrington on his part should 
 have made no attempt, by cruisers, to ascertain whether the coast 
 was clear before he advanced upon St. Lucia. Fort Royal in 
 Martinique was the known head-quarters of the French navy in 
 the West Indies, and it was but 120 miles from Carlisle Bay in 
 Barbados. It was not more than 60 miles from the south point 
 of St. Lucia, and d'Estaing was at Fort Royal a full week before 
 Barrington arrived off St. Lucia. But again d'Estaing lost his 
 chance a second time by not dispatching cruisers towards Bar- 
 bados to ascertain whether that had been, after all, Hotham's 
 destination. Had he done so he might have caught Barrington 
 half seas over, when his total destruction might have been easy. 
 From the moment of leaving Sandy Hook, until the moment of 
 landing at St. Lucia, the English force therefore had been running 
 a series of imminent risks, which even the doctrine of chances left 
 it imprudent to run. 
 
 Quite possibly Barrington's and Hotham's minds were dominated 
 by chagrin at the loss of Dominique, and were full of the example 
 which the French seemed to have set them in that success. But 
 the capture of this island by the Marquis de Bouille had been in 
 the nature of a snap-shot. Its nearness to Martinique had always 
 left it and St. Lucia peculiarly open to sudden coups de main by 
 troops alone, and nothing but the blockade of Fort Royal by sea 
 could prevent such attacks being made. De Bouille had taken the 
 island with 2,000 men, suddenly thrown into it, under the escort 
 of no more than 3 frigates and a corvette. The expedition 
 sailed after sunset on September 6th, the troops landed early next 
 morning, and immediately occupied positions which commanded 
 the capital of the island, and the governor capitulated the same 
 day. Barrington, on learning what had happened, sailed to defend 
 the island, but found the French flag flying everywhere. 
 
 He returned to Barbados [says Chevalier], awaiting with the keenest impatience the 
 reinforcements from America, of which he had been informed. He proposed to attempt 
 some operation, the success of which should diminish the effect which the loss of 
 Dominique would produce in England. Ignorant that the Count d'Estaing had quitted 
 
 * Lapeyrouse, vol, iii, , p $7. 
 
;>88 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 noston, he considerod himself in command of the sea, and, in consequence, free to go 
 wheiever he thought proper. He cast his eyes on St. Lucia, the possession of which 
 would be of peculiar value to the British navy.* 
 
 Where he was in error, then, was in not making more sure of 
 his ground, by the use of cruisers to Fort Royal, before proceeding 
 in his expedition. Where he was fortunate was in selecting so 
 defensible a post as that in which he had moored his squadron. 
 Had he been forced to anchor in an open position, he would at 
 least have courted a terrible disaster. 
 
 Even as it was, we can only note that d'Estaing with a force so 
 greatly superior could and ought to have destroyed Barrington, 
 but he made no determined attack on him. The two cannonades 
 were really distant affairs, without effect on either fleet. Chevalier 
 tells us why, after the abortive attempt of the 24th, the attack was 
 not renewed. D'Estaing, on the 28th, learnt that Admiral Byron 
 was expected at Barbados, and that consequently his command of 
 the sea was threatened. It must also be said, on the side of 
 d'Estaing, that the attack of ships properly disposed under cover 
 of batteries had always been considered extremely hazardous ; and 
 we have, iii the course of these chapters, observed that in such 
 cases it was generally considered necessary to get possession of the 
 batteries in the first instance. D'Estaing did not reach the island 
 until it was practically in the hands of the British, and the attacks 
 he attempted were in the nature of those on an assured British 
 possession. D'Estaing was shortly to prove his case by exhibiting 
 himself in the position of Barrington, while forcing Byron to occupy 
 that of the French Admiral, and to fail very much as he did.f 
 
 D'Estaing's information as to Byron had not been absolutely 
 correct. He did not join Barrington until the 6th January 1779, 
 and then it was at St. Lucia that the junction was formed. On 
 the 11th, d'Estaing's frigates counted 15 British sail of the line 
 at anchor at St. Lucia, which left him in a position of inferiority 
 as to force. On the 19th he was joined by 4 sail of the line from 
 France, under Count de Grasse, but Byron was about the same 
 time joined by 4 sail of the line under Rowley. D'Estaing felt 
 himself constrained to remain on the defensive, and presumably 
 Byron did not consider himself strong enough to make any attack ; 
 and the weeks and months rolled on. 
 
 • P. 125. 
 
 t It is proper to observe that my criticisms on the English success and the French 
 failure at St Lucia agree with those offered by Lapeyrouse and Chevalier. The 
 latter quotes Suffren, who commanded one of d'Estaing's _line-of-battle ships, to the 
 same effect as to the sea attack. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRLTORY FROM THE SEA. 389 
 
 On April 2Gth, Rear-Admiral de Vaudreuil joined d'Estaing with 
 2 sail of the line, and a third had arrived the evening before 
 with a convoy. And then, on June 27th, the arrival of Rear- 
 Admiral Lamotte-Piquet with 5 sail of the line, 3 frigates, and 60 
 transports loaded with troops, put d'Estaing in a position to 
 operate on the offensive. 
 
 I have not yet succeeded in getting a clue to the methods some- 
 times pursued by our admirals in the West Indies when making 
 St. Lucia their head-quarters and ostensibly watching Fort Royal, 
 Martinique. I do not know of anything which should have 
 prevented such a watch upon the port as would either have 
 brought on a general action, or intercepted these constant rein- 
 forcements of the French. It seems difficult to believe that the 
 principle of blockade, which had been so well understood and 
 carried out in European waters by Hawke, should, though its 
 application there was at this time impracticable, have been alto- 
 gether forgotten, yet I have not so far been able to discover any 
 other explanation. D'Estaing was allowed to pass from inferiority 
 to superiority, with the result we are to note, without apparently 
 any attempt to prevent the growth of his force in what we ought 
 really to call now the usual way. 
 
 Early in June a considerable fleet of British merchantmen 
 homeward bound was assembling at St. Christopher's to wait 
 convoy. Byron, with, as far as I have ascertained, the alternative 
 of blockade before him, chose to secure the safety of the convoy 
 against d'Estaing, by himself accompanying it with his whole 
 fleet. He proposed to make, with reference to d'Estaing, we may 
 observe, a similar mistake to that which d'Estaing had made with 
 reference to Lord Howe at Sandy Hook. Having the enemy in 
 view, he should have kept him in view, being assured of the safety 
 of the convoy as long as this was so. If d'Estaing was to be 
 fought, it would be much better to fight him when unimpeded by 
 the care of a convoy. If Byron, in his care of the convoy, were to 
 quit West Indian waters, he left it open to d'Estaing to make any 
 attack which the probable duration of his absence might warrant. 
 
 Byron sailed from St. Lucia for St. Christopher's, to the north, 
 with his whole fleet on June 6th, and d'Estaing, being well in- 
 formed of all the circumstances, began operations by despatching a 
 small force to the south for the capture of St. Vincent. In doing 
 this, d'Estaing was entirely within rule. The Caribbee inhabi- 
 tants of St. Vincent were in revolt against the English garrison, 
 which only numbered 300 men. Tlie chiefs of the Caribbees had 
 
390 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 solicited the help of the French, and there was every reason to 
 suppose that once landed, the French troops could possess them- 
 selves of the island and hold it, without need of maintaining com- 
 munication over sea. So the naval part of the expedition con- 
 sisted only of 3 corvettes and 2 schooners, carrying no more than 
 400 troops, and the whole under the command of Lieutenant de 
 Vaisseau Frolong du Rumain. He sailed from Fort Eoyal on the 
 9th of June, arrived in sight of St. Vincent on the 17th, landed his 
 troops, received the expected help of the Caribhees, and the sur- 
 render of the island next day. 
 
 This was a small matter, but one which could only have taken 
 place in the absence of Byron, and for which his absence was 
 therefore directly responsible. But d'Estaing had larger business 
 before him when the ships and troops already spoken of reached 
 him on the 27th of June, He took the troops on board his fleet, 
 now consisting of 25 sail of the line, and on June 31st made sail 
 for Barbados. He must have been well aware of the risks he was 
 running. He probably knew that Byron had under his command 
 now 22 sail of the line, though they might not be all with his 
 flag. Byron had already been more than three weeks absent to 
 the northward, and it was not easy to say how soon he might re- 
 appear. The French ships, crowded with troops, would have been 
 much hampered in a general action. If they were in sufficient 
 force to conquer the island, the main point was to get them on 
 shore at once, and to be ready to meet Byron at sea in superior 
 strength should he attempt to interfere. 
 
 The direction of the wind was such that d'Estaing found he 
 could not fetch Barbados. The pressure of the above considera- 
 tion was upon his mind, and he stood for Grenada. On the 2nd 
 July he anchored near Beausejour Point, a little distance from 
 George Town, the capital of the island. 
 
 On a height which commanded the town, the English had established an entrenched 
 camp, armed with heavy guns. This position, known under the name of Hospital 
 Hill, was occupied by a detachment of regular troops and militia — about 800 men. 
 The Governor of Grenada, Lord Macartney, supposed it impregnable, and he had placed 
 there everything that was most valuable in the colony. He himself occupied a fort 
 between Hospital Hill and George Town. Count d'Estaing, expecting the arrival of 
 Admiral Byron, wished to recover his liberty of action as soon as possible. He deter- 
 mined to make himself master of the entrenched camp by a coup de main, as he con- 
 sidered it the key of the position.* Immediately after sunset, the expeditionary corps, 
 divided into three columns, commanded by Colonels Arthur and Edward Dillon and de 
 Noailles, were put in motion. In order to divert the enemy's attention, a dcmonstra- 
 
 * It must be borne in mind that d'Estaing was commander-in-chief by land as well 
 as by soa. 
 
ATTACKS ON TEUIUTORY FROM THE SEA. 391 
 
 tion vas iiinde in the evening against an English post facing the sea, in wliich some nf 
 the ships of the squadron took part. Towards eleven o'cloek, our troops silently 
 climbed the steep slopes which led to the summit of the hill. Although the English 
 had accumulated obstacles, such as pallisades and stone walls, nothing was able to 
 check the ardour of our troops. D'Estaing, sword in hand, was amongst the first to 
 leap over the enemy's entrenchments. After a sharp but short struggle, the English 
 laid down their arms. On the 4th, at break of day, Count d'Estaing fired a few shot 
 into the fort where the Governor was placed. Lord Macartney, knowing that all 
 resistance had become vain, sent an officer to treat of capitulation. The proposals 
 which he made to Count d'Estaing being rejected, he surrendered at discretion. One 
 hundred and two guns, sixteen mortars, three flags, provisions, stores, thirty merchant 
 ships, fell into our hands. On the 5th July, the troops which were not required to 
 occupy the town and the forts were re-embarked.* 
 
 Byron returned to St. Christopher's on July 1st, and immediately 
 heard the news of the fall of St. Vincent. He at once decided to 
 make an attempt for its recovery, and sailed with 21 or 22 sail of 
 the line, and 28 transports carrying troops for landing, when he 
 learnt, from a cruiser which had been in search of him, that 
 Grenada was attacked. He pushed on for that island, with the 
 hope of defending it if there was yet time. 
 
 D'Estaing had heard, on the night of the 5th of July, that 
 Byron was approaching, and had given orders to weigh at four 
 o'clock next morning. At break of day the two fleets saw each 
 other. Byron saw the French standing out to sea from St. 
 George's Bay, their force not being then ascertained, but believed 
 to be not greater than his own. Supposing that the French 
 Admiral was anxious to avoid an engagement, he made signal for a 
 general chase, and then, more aware of what was before him, a 
 signal for close action. In the result, and owing in part to the 
 fact of several of d'Estaing's ships which had been under weigh 
 all night finding themselves to leeward, and also to the fact of 
 Byron's discovering that Grenada was gone, the action was only 
 partial. Byron lay-to for the night, and d'Estaing went back to 
 his conquered anchorage in St. George's Bay. Byron had lost 
 Grenada and was in no condition to recover it. He took his 
 damaged fleet back to St. Christopher's. t 
 
 Except that d'Estaing acted with his eyes open to the risk, and 
 was superior in the attack on Grenada, while Barrington acted 
 with his eyes shut, and was inferior in force at St. Lucia, the 
 cases lie nearly on all fours. In the detail that Barrington after 
 possessing himself of the commanding works, chose to meet the 
 enemy at anchor, while d'Estaing chose to meet him under weigh, 
 
 * Chevalier, p. 135. 
 
 t Schomberg, vol. i., p. 470; Troude (whose account is a bad one), vol. ii. , p. tili ; 
 Lapeyrouse, vol. iii., p. 88; Chevalier, p. 12.S. 
 
 27 
 
392 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 there is a difference, but the results and the main points were 
 identical. The game on Barrington's part was a risky and a 
 daring one, but there was no otlfer, with his inferior force, for him 
 to play. D'Estaing was playing the wrong game. It was clear that 
 he might have kept himself superior to Byron, and his proper play 
 was to beat him at sea. As it, chanced, his bad play succeeded, 
 but if Hospital Hill had been able to defend itself only for a day 
 or two, the French might have lost their whole army. Byron and 
 the forts of Grenada together were more than a match for 
 d'Estaing, and the latter could never have embarked his troops 
 had the anchorage in St. George's Bay been available for Byron. 
 But as it was, Grenada was an enemy's country when Byron 
 sighted it, just as Sto Lucia had been an enemy's country when 
 d'Estaing sighted it, and nothing could be done in presence of 
 existing forces. 
 
 The extracts which Chevalier gives from Suffren's letters, written 
 at the time, are of the fullest value when we remember that 
 Suffren's strategy in the East Indies was the greatest condemna- 
 tion of d'Estaing's in the West. Suffren seems to have been clear 
 that gallant as d'Estaing undoubtedly was, he was less a seaman 
 than a soldier, and did not at all understand the elementary 
 principles of naval war. 
 
 As a contrast to this defective strategy in making territorial 
 attacks, it may be' useful to pass at once to an example of more 
 ]3erfect strategy which was carried out by de Grasse in 1781 against 
 Bodney. 
 
 In December 1780, the latter officer had arrived at St. Lucia from 
 New York, and there being no sufficient naval force to oppose him, 
 he arranged and carried out several territorial attacks. The 
 arrival of Sir Samuel Hood from England raised his strength to 
 21 sail of the line, and the intelligence that war had been declared 
 against Holland, gave him the opportunity of making conquest of 
 the important island of St. Eustatia and its dependencies before 
 the Dutch authorities had recovered from their astonishment at 
 being summoned to surrender. But when he proceeded on this 
 service with his main strength, he took care to mask the five 
 French sail of the line and frigates, which were at anchor in the 
 bay of Fort Eoyal, at Martinique. 
 
 Kodney and General Vaughan now proposed to follow up this 
 blow by an attack on Surinam and Cura9ao, but on 11th of Feb- 
 ruary, news came that a French squadron of 8 or 10 sail of the 
 line and frigates had been seen steering for the West Indies. Eear- 
 
ATTACKS ON TErdUTOnY FROM THE SEA. 893 
 
 Admii-al Drake was then with G sail of the Kne carrying out the 
 blockade of Fort Eoyal, already mentioned. Eodney, in view of 
 the strategical conditions that Drake in weak force would be 
 between two fires, but in strong force might be able to strike a 
 blow at the approaching enemy, sent Sir Samuel Hood to take 
 command of the blockade of Fort Eoyal with additional line-of- 
 battle force. Having soon reason to believe that the approaching 
 force was greater than had been represented, he sent further 
 reinforcements to Sir Samuel Hood which raised his fleet to 18 
 sail of the line, while Eodney continued at St. Eustatia with the 
 remaining 3 or 4. 
 
 Eodney, however, was misinformed as to the strength of the 
 approaching fleet. It was 21 sail of the line under Count de 
 Grasse, convoying a merchant fleet of 200 sail, and carrying 6,000 
 land troops with a formidable artillery. The two fleets came into 
 contact close to Fort Eoyal on the 29th of April, and the 5 French 
 sail of the line in Fort Eoyal were able to get out and take part 
 in the ensuing action. De Grasse, with such great superiority 
 ought to have crushed Sir Samuel Hood ; but, as it turned out, 
 there was a partial action only, in which the French were the 
 greatest losers in men, though many ships of Hood's fleet were 
 badly damaged, and Hood was forced to proceed to St. Christopher's 
 to join Eodney and to refit. The junction took place after the 9th 
 of May, and the whole fleet proceeded to refit and supply at 
 Antigua. 
 
 The command of the sea had thus passed entirely out of the 
 hands of Eodney, and if de Grasse had been unbiassed in his views 
 of the consequences, it is plain that he should have followed up 
 Hood to the northward, and made immediate use of his superiority 
 in a determined attempt to crush Eodney altogether. But French 
 commanders seldom understood, or at any rate acted on, the plain 
 principles of strategy. Even when numerically superior, their 
 strategy was that of the inferior force, which tried to gain advan- 
 tages by means chiefly of evasion. 
 
 Eodney concluded that this would be the immediate action of 
 tie Grasse, and he felt all the inconvenience of being to leeward 
 with a partially disabled fleet. He assumed that St. Lucia would 
 be attacked, and sent letters to its Governor and to the senior 
 officer of the ships there, that he was making all haste to come to 
 their relief. 
 
 Eodney's surmise was correct. The military expedition, consist- 
 ing of some 1,200 men under the Marquis de Bouille, sailed from 
 
394 NAVAL WARFARK. 
 
 Fort Royal on the 9th of May, the same day that Hood had re- 
 joined Rodney, and at once landed at several points at St. Lucia. 
 On the 12th de Grasse supported, by appearing in Grosse Ilet 
 Bay. But in the end the troops were embarked and the enterprise 
 abandoned, and three separate reasons have been assigned for a 
 circumstance that certainly wants explanation. It is said, first, 
 that de Bouille found the place too strong for him ; secondly, that 
 he found he could not secure himself in his conquest if he made 
 it, for several weeks ; and thirdly, that the;^whole attack was a mere 
 feint to divert Rodney's attention from the real point which was 
 to be struck at. 
 
 There may be some reason in this last assigned cause, as well as 
 in the two first ; for on the same day that de Bouille sailed for 
 St. Lucia, a force of 1,300 troops, under convoy of 2 line-of-battle 
 ships and some frigates, was despatched direct to Tobago in order 
 to effect its capture before any relief to it could come over sea. 
 
 If the chart of the West Indies be referred to, it will be seen 
 that with Rodney at Antigua, de Grasse at Martinique, still nume- 
 rically superior, and Tobago 200 miles, if not dead to windward, 
 at least slow of approach from the northward, it becomes plain 
 that the blow was well aimed. And then, too, it may be seen that 
 the attack was in a sense covered by de Grasse's position, for he 
 might reasonably expect to know when Rodney should proceed to 
 the southward. After the withdrawal of de Bouille from St. Lucia 
 the troops re-embarked were sent after the first instalment, and 
 de Bouille either then went with them, or followed, while further 
 troops for the attack, said in some of the accounts to reach 3,000 
 men, were pushed on. 
 
 Rodney had news of the attack on St. Lucia immediately after 
 his quitting Antigua, but not, it is said, of its abandonment. That 
 news reached him when he was near Barbados, and it follows that 
 he either believed in the capacity of St. Lucia to repel attack, as 
 it is said,* or else he abandoned it to its fate in his fear of what 
 might happen to Barbados. He had no idea whatever that Tobago 
 would be attacked. But it may be that want of water, and the 
 necessity of landing his sick, as is also alleged, determined him to 
 make for Barbados on his way to St. Lucia, Barbados not being 
 so much out of the way as it appears on the chart, because of the 
 prevailing winds. He made detachments of a line-of-battle ship, 
 a frigate, and several small vessels, to St. Lucia, fearing another 
 attack on it, and thus weakened his own force. 
 
 * Bealsou, vol. v., p. li> . 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 395 
 
 It was on the 23rd of May that Eodney anchored in Carhsle 
 Bay, Barbados, and it was on the 27th that he first heard of the 
 attack on Tobago, and the naval force mentioned was only that 
 which convoyed the first detachment of troops, Rodney detached 
 Drake on the 29th with six sail of the line and a land force, to 
 succour Tobago, but had no sooner done so than he heard that de 
 Grasse's whole fleet had been steering a course for that island. 
 Very soon afterwards letters from Drake informed him that 20 sail 
 of the lifie of the enemy were already at Tobago when he arrived 
 there. This intelligence reached Rodney on June 2nd, and he put 
 to sea with all his force on the 3rd, and was joined by Drake the 
 same day. But de Grasse had already reaped the reward of his 
 strategy. Rodney learnt on the 4th that Tobago had capitulated, 
 and on the 5th his look-outs observed the French, fleet con- 
 sisting of 24 sail of the line and 5 frigates, steering towards 
 Grenada. Rodney had with him but 20 sail of the line, and did 
 not care to risk an action except under more favourable geo- 
 graphical conditions than existed at the time. Tobago no longer 
 flew the English flag, and the operation was over. 
 
 It must again be observed that though de Grasse's strategy on 
 this occasion was good, and so far deserved success, it was not 
 perfect. It was, as I have said, the strategy of the inferior force, 
 and he ran the risk of having his detached force cut off before he 
 could succour it. Not, indeed, that detaching a force was wrong 
 in itself ; it was the proper policy of the inferior naval power, 
 where the risk was worth running for the sake of the reward. The 
 danger was in not keeping closer touch between his own and 
 Rodney's fleet ; had he done so, his detached force would have 
 run but little risk. Rodney, as we have seen, anchored in Car- 
 lisle Bay on May 23rd. De Grasse did not sail from Martinique 
 till the 25th, the French troops only landed at Tobago on the 24th, 
 and de Grasse only reached the island on the 31st, according to 
 de Lapeyrouse, while, according to Beatson, Drake saw them on 
 the 30th. Nautical and civil time may possibly account for the 
 discrepancy, but it is certain that the time element, of which I 
 have so often spoken, was not calculated with sufficient care, and 
 that it was good and ill fortune, more than absolutely sound 
 strategy, which gave Tobago to the French without a hitch, in 
 1781. 
 
 But I think the finest piece of strategy against territory, as it 
 may be practised by the naval commander who is not in assured 
 command of the sea, was that exhibited by Suffren in the East 
 
BOG NAVjiL WARFARE. 
 
 Indies in 1782. This officer had found himself, by actual experi- 
 ment, evenly matched by Sir Edward Hughes. He had had three 
 pitched battles with him, one on February 16th, another on April 
 11th, and a third on July Gth, when each fleet had been of the 
 same numerical strength, 11 sail of the line, but the French loss in 
 killed and wounded had been more than double that of the English. 
 At Cuddalore, after the last of these battles, Sulfren heard of the 
 approach of 2 sail of the line and other ships of war, as well as 
 transports. He proceeded to meet them at Batacaloa, a port 
 about sixty miles to the southward of Trincomalee, having 
 taken on board 600 or 700 troops. Then for the time he was 
 lost to the sight of Hughes, who remained refitting at Madras. 
 On the 21st of August he was joined by the 2 sail of the line with 
 transports and store-ships carrying GOO infantry, and he at once 
 conceived his plan. 
 
 In the south-west monsoon which then blew, it would, as 
 Suffren knew, take a fleet about a fortnight to beat up from Madras 
 to Trincomalee, while half a day was sufficient to run down from 
 Batacaloa to the same place. If, therefore, Hughes got notice of 
 the sailing of Suffren on the day that he sailed from Batacaloa, 
 the French commander would have a fortnight for his operations 
 against Trincomalee. This was one security drawn from the time 
 element. But he now made up 15 sail of the line, while Hughes 
 only made up 12. The risk was not excessive, even if Hughes 
 should appear before Trincomalee surrendered, as the fleet itself 
 was not necessary to support the attack, though some of its men 
 and guns were. The passage was so exceedingly short between 
 .Batacaloa and Trincomalee, that there was no fear of being 
 caught when hampered with troops and transport. Four or five 
 days might have been taken as a reasonable time within which to 
 effect the reduction of Trincomalee, and therefore in any case, 
 Suffren was allowing a good margin. But he took the precaution 
 to ascertain from the report of a cruiser which had watched off' 
 Trincomalee for the purpose, that the coast was clear before ho 
 sailed for his destination on the 24th of August. The fleet passed 
 straight into the harbour on the succeeding day, and anchored 
 within the forts and out of their fire. Broadsides had been ex- 
 changed on passing them, but with little effect. On the night of 
 the 2Cth 2,600 men were landed, and on the 27th and 28th, bat- 
 teries were erected and armed with guns from the ships. Fire 
 was opened on the forts on the 29th, and on the 30th the Governor 
 of Trincomalee offered terms of capitulation, to whicli Suffren, not 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIUUTORY FROM THE SEA. B07 
 
 at all easy in his mind as to the possibilities should Hughes 
 appear before the surrender was complete, lent a ready ear. The 
 French flag was hoisted on the works on the 31st, and Trincomalee 
 had become a French possession. 
 
 A less wise strategist than Suffren might easily have prolonged 
 the siege for the exaction of severer terms ; but SutYren knew that 
 after all the precautions possible to bs taken, there were yet 
 adverse chances in war. 
 
 It had happened that on the 12th of August one of Hughes's 
 frigates, the Coventry, had chased the French frigate Bellona into 
 Batacaloa ; to her astonishment she saw Suffren's squadron, with 
 his transports, lying at anchor. Without a moment's delay she sped 
 away before the south-west monsoon to warn Sir Edward Hughes 
 at Madras of the danger. Hughes put to sea on August 20th, 
 that is, four days before Suffren was ready to quit Batacaloa, and 
 he arrived off Trincomalee during the night of September 2nd. 
 At daylight in the morning he saw that his errand was bootless : 
 that Suffren had outwitted him, and that the French flag had 
 superseded the English on shore. 
 
 Suffren had only just escaped a danger, although with his 
 numerically superior fleet it could never have been a very serious 
 one. But a miss was as good as a mile to the French commander 
 who, with Trincomalee secure behind him, was able to come out 
 and fight his fourth pitched battle with his enemy. The result 
 was, as usual, indecisive ; Hughes returned to Madras, and Suffren 
 to the shelter of his new port, Trincomalee. 
 
 Such was this famous exploit, which, with the rest of his con- 
 duct in the East Indies, has placed Suffren in the highest rank of 
 naval commanders. We must not forget, however, that the 
 strategy employed was only justified in the absence of force 
 enough to carry out the masking of Hughes and the attack on 
 Trincomalee at the same time. Perfect strategy would have 
 required that this should have been done, and as I have now 
 brought these normal examples nearly to a conclusion, I may 
 usefully subjoin an illustration where the method adopted was 
 absolutely faultless. 
 
 The case is the capture of Belleisle in 1761 by Keppel and 
 General Hodson. Keppel sailed from St. Helens with 10 sail of 
 the line, to be joined afterwards by 7 more. With him were a 
 considerable body of frigates and sloops, and 100 sail of transports 
 carrying 10,000 land forces. At the same time, Captain Buckle 
 sailed for Brest with 12 sail of the line and 3 frigates. Brest wag 
 
398 NAVAL WARFARK. 
 
 the only port wlieiice any naval force capable of interfering with 
 Keppel could issue ; so that not only was he prepared by the great 
 rieet of 17 sail that he took to Belleisle, to meet any hostile fleet 
 likely to make an appearance, but his operations were doubly 
 secured inasmuch as all the existing French power was masked 
 at Brest by Buckle. 
 
 The French garrison at Belleisle was 2,(i00 men, so that the 
 forces landed from Keppel's fleet were ample for the subjugation of 
 the island ; and there being no chance of interference from the 
 sea, its surrender in time was certain. On the 8th of April the 
 first detachment was landed clear of all batteries at Port Andeo 
 Bay, but it was repulsed after landing, by a body of the enemy 
 who had entrenched themselves on a hill. A second landing in 
 greater force was effected on the 22nd, near Fort D'Arsie, after its 
 guns had been silenced by some of the ships of war, and the foot- 
 ing on shore was made good. M. de St. Croix, the governor, then 
 retired into his citadel, the town of Palais, which he defended 
 until the 7th of June, when, a practicable breach having been 
 made, he capitulated, and Belleisle became British territory. 
 
 There is absolutely nothing to remark on this operation, except 
 that the method pursued was as certain to produce success as any 
 other which could be conceived. All experience had dictated what 
 should be done, and being done, the result became a certainty 
 
 -— ^=-rj^;J^5^' 
 
399 
 
 CHAPTER XVITI. 
 
 The Conditions under which Attacks on Territory from the 
 Sea succeed or fail — {concluded). 
 
 The pxpedition of Napoleon to Egypt as an instance of incorreot strategy. — The 
 invasion of tho Crimea in a sense analogous. — The capture of Bomarsund conducted in 
 full accord with all the rules of naval warfare. — Long series of bombardments com- 
 mencing with Algiers. — Syrian coast towns and Acre. — Odessa. — Employment of steam 
 and sail on precisely the same duty and in the same way.— Sweaborg, a continuation of 
 the old methods. — Bombardments by the Chilians of Peruvian coast towns. — The 
 Angamos. — Long-range bombardments less novel than they seem : chief change from 
 mortar to gun. — Sfax ; range of bombardment still extended. — Alexandria; ranges 
 governed by geographical conditions. — Former lessons not disturbed. — Charleston, and 
 the four attacks upon it ; two against rule and unsuccessful, two in accordance with rule 
 and successful. — Other attacks on territory by tho Federals. — The French fleet in the 
 Baltic in 1870 ; remarkable prevalence of law. — Nothing to show that the old rules of 
 war have changed. 
 
 Those who have described the incidents which together make up 
 the story of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, have seldom with- 
 drawn themselves far enough from the details of the narrative to 
 observe that, from beginning to end, the results were governed by 
 law. That law, preceding chapters have given us pretty ample 
 means to comprehend, and if we rightly exercise our faculties we 
 shall have no difficulty in pronouncing that Napoleon wrongly set 
 about his work. How far the whole scheme was visionary, and 
 whether, supposing all had succeeded to his wish in Egypt, it 
 would really have been possible ^ trike at India from that 
 position, we need not argue. Our point is that Napoleon in his 
 conduct of the expedition was false to rule, and deserved even 
 worse than the loss of a fleet and an army which attended his 
 misconception. 
 
 No doubt the conditions under which the expedition was pre- 
 pared were tempting. In December 1796 Sir John Jervis had been 
 
400 NAVAL WABFAEE. 
 
 aorced out of the Mediterranean by the junction of the French and 
 Spanish fleets, making up 38 sail of the line against Sir John's 15, 
 and no attempt had been made to re-enter it. In February 1797 
 the Spanish fleet, sailing from Cartagena to Cadiz, had been 27 
 sail of the line strong ; 25 of these felt the weight of Jervis's arm 
 on the celebrated Valentine's day, but his fleet was still only 
 15 sail of the line, reinforcements from England having been dis- 
 counted by an equal number of casualties. But the battle of St. 
 Vincent left the Spanish fleet at Cadiz still 28 sail of the line in 
 May, watched by St. Vincent with only 21. 
 
 The French fleet of 12 sail of the line remained intact at 
 Toulon, and there were from 12 to 15 sail of the line at Brest. 
 
 The Dutch fleet which had encountered Duncan at Camper- 
 down in October 1797 had been 15 sail of the line, was thus 
 reduced to 6 only. 
 
 The opening of the year 1798 therefore found some GO sail of the 
 line of the old stock, disposed in four of the enemy's ports, while 
 general belief in France magnified the possible additions. England 
 was troubled with alarms of invasion either of Ireland, Scotland, 
 or the south coast of England. It was probably this fear which 
 dictated the retention of such a large proportion of the ships at 
 home, and continued the policy of abandoning the Mediterranean 
 to the French at Toulon. The Channel fleet in the early part of 
 the year 1798 was nominally 47 sail of the line, but some 18 of 
 them do not appear to have acted at all in home waters unless 
 they were held in reserve at anchor. In April there were only 17 
 ships of the nominal Channel fleet at sea, 6 under Sir E. Curtis 
 off the coast of Ireland, and 10 under Lord Bridport at Brest, 
 while one was on detached service with Warren off the French 
 coast. At the same time, St. Vincent only had about 23 sail with 
 him to watch Cadiz. 
 
 In the North Sea there was a British fleet of nominally 19 sail ; 
 while the needs of a maritime empire absorbed some 10 sail of the 
 line in convoy duties, 16 in the West Indies and 11 at the Cape of 
 Good Hope and in the East Indies. Nominally, we had 118 sail of 
 the line (including 50-gun ships) in commission in the early part 
 of 1798, but it does not seem that anything like that number were 
 available at a given moment. 
 
 Under such conditions as these, there was really little to lead 
 the French Government to anticipate interference with their pro- 
 ceedings in the Mediterranean, and there was a certain foundation 
 for Napoleon's belief that fear of attack in India woul(J make it 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 401 
 
 necessary for England to detach additional line-ofbattle force 
 thither, thus making Mediterranean operations still more secure 
 from interference by sea. 
 
 The assemblage of the force at Toulon was known to the English 
 Government, yet the pressure on her naval resources was so great 
 that it was not till the 30th of April 1798 that Nelson, with 3 sail 
 of the line, 2 frigates, and a sloop, could be detached into the 
 ^Mediterranean. As there were now 13 sail of the line at Toulon, 
 the dispatch of Nelson's force was really offering it as a sacrifice. 
 But, as is well known. Nelson was prevented from reconnoitring 
 Toulon by a gale which met him and dismasted his flag ship on 
 May 22nd, three days before the French expedition, consisting of 
 18 sail of the line and 59 other war-ships, with 400 transports 
 carrying 36,000 men, sailed from Toulon and Genoa for Egypt. 
 
 Nelson was not able to reach his rendezvous off Toulon till the 
 31st May, and by that time had learnt that the French fleet was 
 at sea. Had the English Government not detached 8 sail of the 
 line to reinforce St. Vincent, it is evident that Nelson must simply 
 have returned to Cadiz. But his hopes of a reinforcement kept 
 him at the Toulon rendezvous, and he was joined there, on June 
 7th, by 11 sail of the line under Troubridge, making his fleet up to 
 14, or rather superior in number to the French. He was then 
 able to proceed in search of them. 
 
 It is not necessary to tell again here the well-known story of the 
 pursuit, and the Battle of the Nile. It is only desirable to mention 
 the one point which has not been as much noticed as it deserves, 
 namel}^ that Nelson, on June 22nd, at daylight, actually saw off 
 Cape Passaro two French frigates, part of Napoleon's force ; and 
 that a line-of-battle ship was also seen by some of the ships. The 
 ships seen were chased by the Leandcr, and if Nelson had not at 
 the moment received information from a merchant ship which led 
 him to recall the Leander, there can be no doubt that he would 
 have met and destroyed the whole expedition at sea."^ 
 
 The ultimate result of this great invasion is well known. The 
 fleet accompanying it was destroyed on the 1st August, and tbo 
 army, after holding Egypt, but being so cut off from France that 
 efforts were vain to supply and reinforce it, finally surrendered in 
 1801. It has sometimes been argued that the results of the 
 Eg3'ptian expedition were worth the sacrifice, but such a view is 
 not generally held, and it seems difficult to believe that it was 
 anything but a gigantic failure. 
 
 * X'fson Dispa'chcs, vol. iii., p- 43 
 
402 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Had the prospects been much better than they were, the conduct 
 of the expedition was contrary to the plain rules of naval war. 
 Before it started, steps should have been taken to prevent inter- 
 ference by sea, by masking or employing St. Vincent's fleet. If 
 he was left in a position to detach a force equal to the French, the 
 risks were altogether too great to have justified the despatch of the 
 expedition. There was really no object in taking the line-of- 
 battle ships to Egypt, and the exceedingly narrow chance by which 
 a battle at sea was missed on 22nd of June exhibits the danger in 
 a striking light. Had the French line-of-battle ships remained at 
 Toulon, it seems unlikely that Napoleon's expedition could have 
 l)een interfered with at all, for Nelson could not have turned his 
 back on them in view of the dangers of their junction with the 
 Spanish fleet at Cadiz. But had Brueys in the first instance 
 pushed for this junction, it remains possible that no attempt would 
 have been made oy England to recover the command of the Medi- 
 terranean, owing to the large force which it would have been 
 necessary to place off Cadiz. The loss of the French fleet at the 
 battle of the Nile was primarily due to false strategy ; and if the 
 French were not strong enough to mask the English fleet, they 
 were courting defeat by employing invasion. 
 
 Thus the expedition to Egypt was " an adventure," carried out, 
 not in the cool deliberation which wins and holds success, but in a 
 burst of Kepublican enthusiasm which would not stop to calculate 
 chances. It failed, either because it was not properly conducted, 
 or because it ought never to have been undertaken. 
 
 There is a slight analogy between the French expedition to 
 Egypt and the Anglo-French expedition to the Crimea. King- 
 lake has stigmatized it as " an adventure " also, and there is no 
 doubt that in disobedience to the strict rules of naval war, risks 
 were run which were entirely unnecessary."^ The chief breach of 
 rule was the omission to mask the Russian ships at Sevastopol by 
 a sufficient force, and thereby leaving the crowded transports open 
 to devastation by a determined onset. There is no doubt but that 
 the risk ^\ as known and felt at the time ; but a general absence of 
 understanding that there always had been, and always would be, 
 rule in these matters, placed the whole of the naval defending 
 force with the transports, rather than in watch upon the only 
 force of the enemy which could interfere with them.f The justifi- 
 cation for breach of rule, was the great disproportion which existed 
 
 * 'J'/ii' Ivi'isinnofthe Crimea, -vol. ii., p. 145. 
 
 t A watch ynxa, however, kept upon Seyastopol by a frigate 
 
ATTACKS ON TFAUUTOHY FROM THE SEA. 403 
 
 between the defending British fleet with the transports, and tlie 
 possible attacking force at Sevastopol ; and rule was yielded to so 
 far as to keep this British fleet entirely clear of troops and ready 
 for action.^ 
 
 Then, in the invasion itself, risks were run which were not 
 necessary, and which even more justified the stigma of "an 
 adventure." We have seen throughout these chapters that, assum- 
 ing a command of the sea, suitable ports can always be captured 
 and held on an enemy' & coast, and that from them any sort of 
 military expeditions can penetrate inland, resting On the absolutely 
 secure base which the sea, being commanded, gives them. The 
 safe course, the course according to rule, when it was determined 
 to invade the Crimea, was to secure a port in the first instance — 
 Kazatch or Balaklava — and then to operate inland from that base. 
 This, which was afterwards found to be the necessity, should have 
 l)een, according to experience, the preliminary. In omitting it, the 
 most desperate and wholly unnecessary risks were run. 
 
 Probably there never was an operation so splendidly conducted 
 as the disembarkation of the British troops on the beach at Old 
 Fort on the 14th of September 1854, yet these were the 
 conditions — 
 
 At 7 A.M., when the operations commenced, the water was smooth as glass; no 
 enemy appeared to oppose the landing. As the ships were taking up position, only one 
 Russian officer, with his mounted orderly, appeared on the beach, and remained beside 
 his horse for a considerable time, apparently occupied with his note-book, as though 
 he were dotting down our proceedings, certainly neither contemplating a descent upon 
 his shores nor a departure from the rules of chivalry in the receipt of a warning shot. 
 Suddenly our design seemed to burst upon his mind, and he beat a very hasty retreat, 
 narrowly escaping capture, for the landing of the French troops further to the east- 
 ward had not been noticed. 
 
 By 6 P.M. , 30,000 infantry and 24 guns, or 4 complete batteries, were landed ; but 
 sunset came upon us with a louring skj' and a threatening swell breaking on the beach, 
 a sure indication of approaching wind, rendering the disembarkation of artillery more 
 and more tedious and difficult. At nightfall the weather was so bad, and sea heavy, 
 
 * "It was upon the English fleet, therefore, that the duty of protecting the whole 
 jumada devolved ; and supposing that the enemy were aware of the helpless state of 
 the French and Turkish vessels laden with troops, and of the enormous convoy of 
 transports which had to be protected, he might be expected to judge that it was 
 incumbent upon him to come out of the harbour and assail the vast flotilla of trans- 
 jjorts ; for under the guns of Sevastopol the Russians had 15 sailing ships of the line, 
 with some frigates and brigs, and also 12 war steamers, though of these the Vladimir 
 was the onlj' powerful vessel. To encounter this force, and to defend from its enter- 
 prises the rest of the armada, the English had 10 sail of the line (including 2 screw- 
 steamers), 2 50-gun frigates, and IS steamers of war heavily armed. . . . None of our 
 ships of war carried troops ou board ; they were, therefore, ready for acliou." — 
 Kiuglake, vol, ii., p. 145. 
 
404 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 that the difficult operation had to be suspended. The troops had landed with thred 
 days' provisions in their haversacks, but without tents or camp equipage of any kind. 
 Thus was that gallant army exposed for two days and nights on a hostile shore, with 
 no water except what fell from the heavens, not half its artillery, no shelter, and in 
 the vicinity of a powerful enemy.* 
 
 It is terrible to think what the result might have been had the 
 whole Russian force, close to at the Alma, marched upon the 
 British by night when tke cover of the ships' fire could not have 
 been available. Looking back, it is plain what the risk was, and 
 how unnecessary it was; it seems hardly possible that had the 
 then authorities possessed any clear knowledge of the principles of 
 naval warfare, a British army would ever have been placed in such 
 jeopardy. 
 
 A month before this " adventure," all the principles which had 
 for a century and a half governed the successful attacks upon ter- 
 ritory were put in force in connection with the capture of Bomar- 
 sund, the Eussian citadel of the Aland Islands in the Baltic. 
 
 We have first the Anglo-French fleets in command of the 
 Baltic Sea, and controlling therefore the waters which surrounded 
 Bomarsund. The forts were four in number. The chief, facing a 
 narrow channel between the islands, was a stone fort, semicircular 
 in shape, mounting upwards of 80 guns in two tiers, on the 
 sea- faces, and said to be equally strong on the land face. A thou- 
 sand yards north of the main fort, and the same distance west of 
 it, were circular forts, each capable of mounting 36 to 40 guns, 
 but of course incapable of concentrating any large proportion of 
 lliem on one spot. There was another circular fort across the 
 channel, and 1,000 yards distant from the main fort, and, lastly, a 
 5-gun battery 1,700 yards S.S.W. of the main fort, which guarded 
 the approach by sea from the southward. - Although it is stated 
 that the main fort was equally strong on the land and sea sides, 
 it seems clear that the older principles of fortification were here 
 departed from, and that there was no main citadel, stored and 
 arranged so that a garrison might hold out for a considerable time, 
 however attacked. The design of the works seemed somewhat 
 Chinese in character, and contemplated attack upon the sea face 
 only. 
 
 From the moment that the Allies determined to attack Bomar- 
 sund, it was decided that the navy was to play its old secondary 
 part, and that 10,000 troops were to be employed against a garri- 
 son of about one-third of this strength. 
 
 * Captain (now Admiral Sir William) Mends, in Journal Jt. U.S.I.f vol. vi., p. 397. 
 

 English Patterj 
 
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 Bombardment of 
 
 BOMARSUND. 
 
 Scale. 
 
 ^English Ships ft French Ships 
 
 Tlli, Si.HUMM »T 10HDO».-« 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 405 
 
 The next point of arrangement was the assumed command of the 
 Bea, and the anxiety on this head is not a little remarkable, seeing 
 the overwhelming superiority which steam had given to the 
 Allies.* 
 
 Thus Sir Charles Napier writes to Sir James Graham, on July 
 10th, 1854, apropos of the intended attack — 
 
 I shall take cai-e to be on my guard against the Russians from Cronstadt. If they 
 come down, so much the better. f 
 
 The naval force told off to support the attack on Bomarsund 
 was but 4 steam line-of-battle ships, with a few steam frigates and 
 smaller vessels ; while Commodore Martin watched the Russian 
 fleet with 9 sail of the line, mostly steam ; and the bulk of the 
 allied fleet was concentrated at Ledsund to support Commodore 
 Martin in the exceedingly remote possibility that an inferior fleet 
 of sailing line-of-battle ships would dare to face, at sea, a superior 
 fleet chiefly moved by steam. Yet the contingency was always 
 present, and provided against. Sir James Graham wrote to Sir 
 Charles Napier that : 
 
 His block ships, screw frigates, some of his steamers, and a portion of the French 
 squadron would be strong enough in invest Bomarsund, as there was no naval force 
 except gun-boats opposed to him ; and that after detaching these, he and the French 
 admiral would have 20 sail of the line at the neck of the Gulf of Finland to keep the 
 Russian fleet sealed i;p.+ 
 
 As for preventing the junction of the Cronstadtand Sweaborg fleets, if they wished 
 it, this, said the Admiral to the First Lord, was utterly impossible, without remaining 
 off there with the whole fleet, and leaving the French admiral and general to them- 
 selves at Bomarsund, which Sir James could never have contemplated. Commodore 
 Martin had 2 steam frigates and three paddle steamers in advance' of him, and he would 
 give timely notice should the Russians break ground. This, continued the Admiral, is 
 the best disposition I could make, and I hope all will go right.g 
 
 Napier thought the n amber of troops to be sent was excessive ; 
 he thought 5,000 quite sufficient, as it was not intended to hold 
 Bomarsund through the winter. He wrote again : — 
 
 The Gulf of Finland was well guarded by Commodore Martin, and he (the Admiral) 
 had taken steps to act, should the Russian fleet attempt to disturb the operations 
 going on. 11 
 
 The reason why the large ships were not brought up to the fortress was the evident 
 one that they might be wanted to meet the Russian fleet, should an attempt he made 
 by the enemy to raise the siege. . . . 
 
 * The English fleet alone consisted of 18 sail of the line, of which 12 wore steam ; 5 
 steam frigates, 14 steam corvettes, and 4 steam sloops. The Russians had not a single 
 steam line-of-battleship and very few — about — steamers of any kind. 
 
 t Ilislorif of the Bailie Ciniijicajn o/' 1S54, edited by G, Cutler L:\vp, p. 2S9. 
 
 X Earp, p. 318. 
 
 § Ibid., p. 321. 
 
 II iW.,p. 327. 
 
•iOC) NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The French admiral thought of taking the greater part of his 
 large ships to Bomarsund, to keep the troops and ships together. 
 
 This arrangement rendered it imperative on Sir Charles to keep his large ships in 
 readiness for any attempt on the part of the Russians. He had been strictly enjoined 
 by Sir James Graham not to leave the Gulf at all, and when Sir James found that the 
 bulk of the fleet was at Ledaund, he expressed his fears lest the Russians might suc- 
 ceed in getting out. * 
 
 On the 5th (August) the Admiral expressed his fears to Admiral Parseval (Deschenes, 
 the French Admiral) that the force at Ledsund was being reduced too low, should the 
 Russian fleet attempt to disturb that of the Allies, f 
 
 These various extracts from a book written in defence and under 
 the inspiration of Sir Charles Napier, are a very ample proof that 
 steam had in no way touched the great principles which govern 
 territorial attacks. We shall see, before we close this chapter, 
 that according to the very latest experience they remain intact. 
 
 There is no need to describe the attack on Bomarsund. We 
 have had the picture of it over and over again in the successes 
 described in the preceding chapters. It happened that the most 
 convenient landing-place for the French was covered by some of 
 the guns of the 5-gun battery, and these were accordingly 
 silenced by an overpowering bombardment from the ships. The 
 English landing was clear of all opposition. Batteries were then 
 erected to play upon the forts. Fire was opened first on the west 
 circular fort on the 13th August, and it surrendered on the 14th 
 to the French battery at 600 yards. The English battery opened 
 on the north circular fort on the 15th at 950 yards, and by the 
 afternoon it was untenable and surrendered. The main fort had 
 been well shelled by the ships on the 15th, and was about to be 
 proceeded against by the shore batteries on the 16th, when it sent 
 out a flag of truce and surrendered, followed soon after by the 
 last circular fort across the water. 
 
 A long series of operations of a particular class — bombardments 
 — is ushered in by that of Algiers. I shall touch upon it, and 
 then make a few observations on the similar attacks which were 
 carried out on Acre, Odessa, Sweaborg, Sfax, the coast towns in 
 Peru, and Alexandria. Of these operations, all, it must be remem- 
 bered, were carried out by naval Powers in command of the sea, 
 thus continuing the old rule ; while only Acre and Sfax are cases 
 where bombardment was other than a destructive and punitive 
 operation. It is again worthy of observation that the bombard- 
 ment of Algiers, Acre, and other Syrian coast towns, Sfax and 
 
 • Earp, p. 332. 
 t Jl'i'/., p. 359. 
 
J^^t^Olrf.,^^ 
 
 % I 
 
 % 
 
 ^^ 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 407 
 
 Alexandria, were conducted against enemie3 admittedly inferior in 
 every respect, whether moral or material. The attack upon 
 Sweaborg again was made, not by regular men-of-war, but by 
 special gun and mortar boats, the latter differing in no essential 
 point from those which the British had all along so ''eely used 
 against the Channel ports of France. 
 
 The sea front of Algiers, extending nearly north and south, 
 possessed a nominally terrific offensive power. A line of connected 
 works three quarters of a mile long, closed the sea face of the town, 
 and for half a mile or so on each side of this, a series of detached 
 batteries fringed the shore, backed by heavier works inland. From 
 a point near the north end of the sea face of the town, a mole in 
 the form of a T extended 400 yards from the shore, and spread 
 to right and left in arms parallel to the beach, and extending 600 
 yards. The southern arm formed the harbour, within which the 
 Algerian fleet of a dozen frigates, corvettes, and brigs was closely 
 packed. 
 
 The sea-face of the mole carried works — in three cases of three 
 tiers — which mounted some 200 guns, a few of exceptionally large 
 calibre, besides mortars ; while the shore line of batteries showed 
 over 250 guns along their fronts. But the whole system of forti- 
 fication had this weakness, that there was deep water close up to 
 the mole, and that ships brought against it at close quarters had 
 little or nothing to contend against except the fire from the mole 
 itself.* 
 
 But still the force set apart for the bombardment was small 
 enough to show that the British Government, and presumably 
 Lord Exmouth and his officers, did not believe that the actual 
 strength of Algiers nearly approached its nominal appearance. 
 It consisted of six sail of the line, two 40-gun, and two 36-gun 
 frigates, five 18 and 10-gun corvettes and sloops, and four bomb- 
 vessels; the ships showing a broadside of 344 guns, besides the 
 mortars. 
 
 This force left Plymouth on the 28th of July, and was ready to 
 leave Gibraltar on the 12th of August, joined by five Dutch frigates 
 and a corvette, showing a broadside of 84 guns. The works had 
 all been closely reconnoitred, and every captain in the fleet had 
 been furnished with a plan of them and his ai^pointed anchorage. 
 On the morning of the 27th of August the whole fleet was in 
 sight of the place, and certain terms of submission were offered to 
 
 * The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth, by Edward Osier (Appendix). James saya 
 there might have been 1,000 guns in all. 
 
 28 
 
408 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 the Dey. This potentate, not seeing fit to respond to the message, 
 the flag-ship of Lord Exmouth, the Queen Charlotte, led in, and 
 anchored with springs on her cable, 50 yards only from the 
 southern head of the mole. The other ships ranged themselves 
 as nearly as possible in their assigned positions north and south 
 of her, and in very close order, so that the strength of the tire was 
 upon the mole itself. The Dutch formed the extreme south of the 
 line, and the bomb-vessels lay 2,000 yards outside. 
 
 The conduct of the Algerines as the ships approached was a 
 proof to Lord Exmouth that the difference between their moral 
 and material force was quite as great as it had been estimated. 
 Not a gun was fired from the land until the Queen Charlotte was 
 seen to be quietly lashing herself to the main-mast of an Algerine 
 brig fast to the shore. At the time, the mole was crowded in front 
 of the works by a gazing crowd of two or three hundred people, 
 to whom Lord Exmouth personally signalled to move out of the 
 way of the broadsides immediately to follow. Not till then were 
 three guns fired at the ships, replied to first by the whole power 
 of the 100-gun three-decker, and then of every other ship as fast 
 as the guns would bear. 
 
 It was towards three o'clock in the afternoon that the action 
 began, and in smoke and confusion was continued until 10 p.m. The 
 Queen Charlotte then cut her cables and put to sea, followed by 
 the remaining ships; and by two o'clock on the morning of the 28th 
 every ship was out, and the bombardment of Algiers was over. 
 
 Besides the regular men-of-war and bomb-vessels engaged, a 
 numerous flotilla of ships' and other boats firing rockets and guns 
 were employed between the ships, and a.t a little after 9 p.m. an 
 explosion vessel, charged with 143 barrels of gunpowder, was run 
 ashore and blown up on the north end of the mole. 
 
 The fire of the Queen Charlotte brought down the whole of the 
 batteries on the south end of the mole in three broadsides, 
 exposing the vessels in the harbour to destruction, and leaving tha 
 works behind the mole open to the storm of shot. The shipping was 
 burnt ; the upper tiers of guns on the mole and many of the town 
 works were silenced, and the town was on fire in several places ; 
 but it does not appear that the ships — even if they had not 
 exhausted all their ammunition, whicti they had — could have 
 remained in position. The amount of ammunition fired away by 
 the ships was tremendous, amounting for the 6 line-of-battle 
 ships and 4 frigates to over 39,000 rounds, while the Dutch are 
 reported to have fired over 10,000 rounds, the total weight of 
 
ATTACKS ON TEIiPJTORY FROM THE SEA. 409 
 
 round shot being estimated at 500 tons.* The loss of life and 
 limb in the ships was heavy, amounting between Dutch and 
 English to 141 killed and 742 wounded. One of the ships, the 
 Impregnable, is stated to have received 233 shots in her hull, and 
 she lost 210 in killed and wounded.f 
 
 The operations against the coast of Syria in 1840, which involved 
 bombardments by ships, of Beyrout, Djebail, and Sidon, and 
 culminated in that of Acre, took place under somewhat exceptional 
 ^circumstances. But the rule of war was not neglected which 
 required the masking of any naval force which could by possibility 
 interfere by sea. Such naval force as Mehemet Ali possessed, was 
 closely watched by a British force off Alexandria during the 
 whole time that hostilities lasted. Again, though bombardment 
 was freely used, the country was not an enemy's country, for the 
 towns bombarded and captured were friendly Turkish possessions, 
 temporarily in the hands of hostile Egyptian garrisons. The object 
 was to drive these garrisons out of Syria, and Turkish troops 
 already possessing more or less hold on the land, co-operated with 
 troops landed from the sea, in the general scheme of operations. 
 What lessons may be drawn from these coast attacks must there- 
 fore be modified by these special considerations as well as by our 
 knowledge that there was considerable difference in all cases 
 between the nominal and the actual strength of the places 
 attacked. 
 
 Beyrout was partially bombarded by the ships, while a large 
 Turkish and British land force lay in the vicinity. It was not a 
 place capable of much resistance, and it was hoped that the 
 Egyptian garrison would withdraw to save effusion of blood. The 
 Governor declining, the forts were again bombarded on September 
 11th, but still without result. But it was afterwards evacuated in 
 consequence of the movements of the Turkish troops in its rear. 
 Djebail was a small fortress, and was bombarded to cover the 
 attack by a storming party landed from the Carysfort, Dido, and 
 Cyclops steamer. The immediate attack failed, but the place was 
 evacuated the same night. 
 
 The capture of Sidon was effected on the 27th September by the 
 fire of an 84-gun ship, the Thunderer, an Austrian frigate, a 
 
 * Nine hundred and sixty-sis 13 and 10 inch shells were thrown in by the bomb- 
 vessels. 
 
 t See Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the Year 1816, by A. Salame; 
 James, vol. vi., p. 569; Life of Admiral Viscount £xmouth, by Edward Osier, 
 p. 294. 
 
 28* 
 
410 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Turldsli corvette, and a sloop, together with four steamers, the 
 Ci/dops, Gorgon, Stromholi, and Hydra, covering the landing of a 
 sufficient body of troops. The business was quickly done, and the 
 garrison of 3,000 men submitted to the force of 1,000 men landed 
 against them, the loss of the attacking party being but 35 in killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 The capture of Acre was on the principle of the capture of Sidon, 
 or, farther back, of the capture of Porto Bello. The behef, which 
 turned out to be well founded, was, that if the ships could be 
 brought sufficiently close to the walls, the fire might be subdued 
 to a point permitting of the landing the British artillery and 
 engineers, together with a division of Turkish infantry, which was 
 held to be sufficient force to overcome an Egyptian garrison said 
 to number 5,000 men. 
 
 The plate, which is copied from that in Yonge's Naval History,^ 
 sufficiently illustrates the nature of the attack. The ships took 
 up their positions in the early part of the 4th November 1840, 
 and fire was opened on the works about two o'clock in the afternoon, 
 and continued till near dark. The garrison at first replied with 
 vigour, but with small effect, owing to the badness of the aim. 
 But in a couple of hours one of the principal powder magazines, 
 which was at the back of the town, exploded with most destructive 
 effect, two whole regiments under arms being cut off. The garrison 
 was paralysed by the accident. The fire slackened, and in half an 
 hour ceased altogether. The Egyptians evacuated the place in 
 the night, which was occupied by the British and Turks next 
 morning. None of the ships were materially damaged ; and the 
 loss in killed and wounded did not exceed 60 men.f 
 
 The attack on Algiers and the operations against the Syrian 
 coast towns exhibit signs of transition in the material of war. 
 Congreve rockets, which we had not before heard of at sea, were 
 used against Algiers ; and on the coast of Syria, steam was doing 
 its part. But it is well to note that here, as later, steam and sail 
 were employed indifferently on the same work. We are so far 
 from observing any change in the method because of steam, and 
 because few heavy shell guns, in the case of the Vesuvius, Gorgon, 
 Stromholi, and Phoenix, had taken the place of many light guns 
 in the frigates and line-of-battle ships, that the sailing ships have 
 the inshore and the steamships the offshore position. Only the 
 
 • The plate of Bomarsund is from the same source. 
 
 t The War in Syria, by Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., vol. i., p. 196 
 Yonge's Naval History, vol. ii., p. 532, 
 
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ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 411 
 
 advantage of more perfect locomotion is taken advantage of when 
 Sir Eobert Stopford, the British Commander-in-Chief, transfers his 
 flag from the Princess Charlotte three-decker to a steamer. 
 
 Hence our chief observation must be that there is not, up to 
 1840, any sign of a change either in the principles of strategy or 
 of tactics in the attack from the sea upon territory. 
 
 We therefore pass to the next prominent attack upon territory 
 from the sea, the bombardment of the forts of Odessa on the 22nd 
 of April 1854. The object of the demonstration, for it was not 
 really more, was punitive, and yet care was taken that it should 
 not be so. Odessa had, a few days earlier, fired on a flag of truce, 
 and 4 British with 3 French steamers were detailed to inflict a 
 certain amount of chastisement, not on the town or its ships, but 
 on the forts defending the town. Government ships, and Govern- 
 ment stores. The ships attacking naturally kept under way, as 
 the force was not nearly sufficient to settle down to the work as at 
 Algiers, and while this limited the damage to the ships — although 
 the Vauban, one of the French steamers was compelled to with- 
 draw — it limited the damage done on shore. Gun-boats with 
 rockets afterwards assisted in the bombardment, but as if to em- 
 phasize how little in real fact steam had altered the processes of 
 naval war, the sailing frigate Arethusa, under the command of 
 Captain W. R. Mends,* took part in the operation side by side 
 with the steamers. 
 
 At last, a little before noon, signs that our cannonade had not been without its effect 
 began to be seen in the flames ■which burst out from the fort at the end of the 
 mole, and from different parts of the works and storehouses which had been most 
 e-sposed. At one o'clock the fort blew up with a terrible explosion ; the rest of the 
 batteries, most of which were now in flames, discontinued their fire ; and Captain 
 Jones brought his squadron closer in to attack the shipping behind the mole. Its 
 destruction was easy and rapid. Many of the vessels were sunk by our guns ; others 
 took fire, and the conflagration lasted throughout the night and the greater part of 
 the next day. The trading vessels under the quarantine mole, and the unarmed part 
 of the town were spared; but the batteries, the Imperial docks and port, the barracks, 
 and the abundant supplies of ammunition and military stores of all kinds accumulated 
 in the Goverment storehouses were utterly destroyed, f 
 
 This was in reality the same sort of thing which towns on the 
 north coast of France had been subjected to over and over again in 
 earlier times. The only real difference was that the shells were fired 
 from guns instead of mortars, and not against private property. 
 
 But the bombardment of Sweaborg on the 9th and 10th of 
 August 1855 was in reality a return, on a much more imposing 
 
 * The present Admiral Sir William Mends, G.C.B. 
 t Yonge, vol. ii., p. 5l)2. 
 
412 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 scale, to the ordinary operations against the French coast towns. 
 Numbers of mortars mounted in specially built sailing mortar- 
 vessels were the engines chiefly relied upon. Gun-boats carrying 
 one or two heavy shell-guns formed the next implements of attack, 
 and only one or two line-of-battle ships, at each extreme of the 
 attack, created a diversion by firing for a short period, at somewhat 
 long range, on some earthworks and gun-boats which formed the 
 flanks of the defence. I have extracted the plan of the opera- 
 tions from Yonge's History of the Navy, but as the object is. not to 
 go into detail of attack, I need only observe that with the excep- 
 tion of the French mortar battery erected on an island, every- 
 thing was kept in motion, and the casualties from the enemy's 
 fire were very few. There was, however, a great failure amongst 
 the mortars, many of them splitting up, rather than bursting, after 
 a short time. The command of the sea, it may be remarked, was 
 entirely secured b}^ the immense fleet which was not occupied in 
 the bombardment, and was ready to act against any possibly in- 
 terfering force. 
 
 The result of the bombardment was one great explosion, 
 with lesser ones, and many fires, which continued long burning. 
 The Eussian reports were that the damage was slight. The tele- 
 graphic account to the Kussian Government at 10.17 p.m. on the 
 10th, was — 
 
 The bombardment to-day has positively done no damage, either to the fortifica- 
 tions or to the batteries or guns. In these two days the conflagration destroyed some 
 buildings in the island of Stura-Ester-Swartoe.* 
 
 No lives were lost on the side of the Allies. The Russian loss 
 was not published. They estimated that the allied fire reached 
 thirty shells per minute, and that 10,000 shells were fired between 
 7 A.M. and 8 p.m. on the 9th of August. 1 have not seen what the 
 actual expenditure of the Allies was, but I think the general im- 
 pression has been that the allied expenditure on the attack was not 
 more than balanced by the results obtained. Yet I suppose it must 
 be considered as the greatest bombardment which was ever under- 
 taken from the sea. Certainly, nothing resulted from it to alter 
 the general judgment which had long been passed on operations of 
 the class. JPerhaps the most novel feature in the bombardment 
 was the great distance at which it was carried on. Reference to 
 the plan shows that no gun or mortar vessel was nearer than 2,000 
 yards to the batteries, and that most of the mortar-boats were over 
 3,000. The method of altering the position of the mortar-boats 
 
 • Annual Register for 1855, p. 131 ; Yonge, vol. ii., passim. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 413 
 
 from time to time, by hawsers laid out ahead and astern, was pos- 
 sibly not new ; and the circling of the gun-boats was but what 
 might have been done in a somewhat varied manner by vessels 
 under sail. All this leaves the chief change in material as the 
 substitution of few and heavy shell guns for many smaller shot 
 guns. 
 
 It is not necessary to do more than notice the fact that our ships 
 in the Black Sea — chiefly sailing line-of-battle ships — engaged the 
 powerful Eussian forts at Sevastopol on the 17th October 1854, as 
 an assistance and diversion to a bombardment from the land side 
 at the same time. It was a fine exhibition of gallantry, but the 
 Eussian works were not those of Algerines or Egyptians ; nor 
 could they be approached nearer than 750 yards on the side chosen 
 by the English flag-ship, so that the results were no more en- 
 couraging than heretofore for that particular method of attack. 
 
 A certain amount of bombarding was done by the Chilians on 
 Peruvian coast towns in 1879-81. The naval forces were small on 
 both sides, but it does seem worthy of note that Peru, as the 
 inferior naval power, did not attempt to make territorial attacks 
 from the sea, though she engaged ships covered by shore 
 batteries."^ 
 
 Nor can the Chilian bombardments by gun and rocket, as at 
 Mollendo and Pisagua, be regarded as regular set attacks upon 
 territory, but rather as casual reprisals upon practically undefended 
 places, where troops had in the first instance fired on Chilian boats 
 sent to destroy wharves and cargo barges, &c. These were minor 
 affairs in ordinary course, which had constantly happened in the 
 days of sail. Yet it ought to be observed that this first method of 
 carrying on the war adopted by the Chilians, which came to some- 
 thing like ignoring the Peruvian navy, was wholly condemned by 
 the Chilian people, and many of those concerned in it lost their 
 commands and reputations. Afterwards, when at Arica, it became 
 a question, on the 4th October 1879, whether the Chilian squadron 
 should bombard the place or go in quest of the Huascar, the 
 latter decision was taken, and the result of it was the capture of 
 that ship on the 8th. 
 
 This gave the Chilians the command of the sea, and they very 
 soon began to make use of it by pushing territorial attacks. The 
 capture of Pisagua on November 2nd was almost in regular form. 
 
 * The War on the Pacific Coast of South America^ 1879-81, by Lieutenant T. B. 
 M. Mason, U.S.A. Office of Naval Intelligence; The War between Peru and Chili, 
 by Clements R. Markham, C.B., F.R.S. 
 
414 iV.ir.4L WARFARE. 
 
 The main body of the troops was landed some distance down the 
 coast to advance on the place by land, while smaller bodies, covered 
 by the ships, were to land at closer quarters, but chiefly by way of 
 feint and diversion. But the Chilians were able to convert the 
 feint into the real attack, and the main body found the work done 
 on its arrival. 
 
 Arica was shelled for a time by way of diversion on February 
 27th, 1880, but the ships drew off, finding that the odds were 
 against them. But the general course of the Chilians was the 
 carriage of troops along the coast, and the landing of them at 
 convenient places for purely military operations. 
 
 What was in some respects a novel feature in naval warfare 
 took place here two days afterwards, and was continued for six 
 days. The Chilians had bought an Irish cattle-ship, the Belle oj 
 Cork, and at Valparaiso they had fitted her with an 8-inch 114 -ton 
 breech-loading Armstrong gun on a revolving carriage. It had a 
 great range, much greater than any of the guns mounted on shore. 
 Immediately on her arrival off Arica, this vessel, which had been 
 re-named the Angamos, opened fire on Arica at from 6,000 to 8,000 
 yards range. She fired 100 shell into the place deliberately, but it 
 does not appear that any great damage was done.''^ 
 
 This operation, which was several times repeated by the same 
 ship at different places, until December 9th, 1880, when the gun, on 
 discharge, suddenly slipped out of its trunnion ring and disappeared 
 overboard, was really less novel than it seemed. We have several 
 times observed that when territorial attacks were designed, the 
 ships were accompanied by bomb-vessels, sometimes two or three, 
 sometimes only one. We have just read how at Algiers the bomb- 
 vessels operated at what was then an extreme range, 2,000 yards. 
 It was of the essence of the bomb-vessel's functions that she should 
 throw shell at ranges which were, by comparison long. We have 
 seen the gun and the mortar united at Sweaborg on precisely the 
 same service, and now we see the Angamos alone performing just 
 the functions which a bomb- vessel would have performed had the 
 mortar been adopted instead of the gun. I suppose it is not im- 
 possible that the howitzer may, for this kind of service, take the 
 place of the gun, in which case the change would be even slighter 
 than the Angamos made it.t 
 
 * Lieutenant Madan. "Incidents of the War between Chili and Peru." — Journal 
 Jt. U.S.I., vol. XXV., p. 700. Lieutenant Mason does not mention the occurrence. See 
 also Markham. 
 
 t Remark is offered by Lieutenant Madan as to the advantage the Angamos had 
 by the superiority of the of range her gun. This was obviously an accident, and 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITOllY FROM THE SEA. 415 
 
 The change seems to be summed up m the extension of the 
 range at which bombardment is conducted. When the French 
 bombarded Sfax on July 5th, 1881, the Chacal opened fire at 5,000 
 metres on the Water Battery, and breached it after an hour's work. 
 The land batteries replied with only 18 discharges. At first their 
 shot fell short, but when they got the range, they reached the ship. 
 On -July the 6th, the Reine-Blanehe and the Alma fired slowly and 
 at long range, throughout the day, upon the town. The Pique 
 and Chacal opened fire in the afternoon upon the batteries at 2,400 
 metres. These only replied with 18 discharges. On the 7th the 
 same sort of fire was resumed, with the same feeble reply, but on 
 the 8th the bombardment was pressed more closely home by the 
 employment of the armed launches of the ships up to ranges of 
 1,000 metres. On the 9th fire was again opened, but only two 
 shots were returned. 
 
 The fleet with the troops for landing arrived on the 14th of July, 
 and, after further bombardment on the 15th and 16th, at ranges 
 of from 2,200 to 6,500 metres, six battalions and a naval brigade 
 landed, and after slight opposition and loss captured the town.* 
 
 Here, again, we seem to be met by the reflection that the 
 differences between an operation of this kind in 1781 and 1881 
 are matters of degree. If the range at which ships attack works 
 for the purpose of silencing them to prepare for landing the troops 
 is increased, the time necessary is correspondingly attenuated. The 
 long range at Sfax was forced on the French ships by reason of 
 the shallowness of the water. Perhaps the ships would have taken 
 no part in the capture of Sfax a century earlier ; but the troops, and 
 the command of the sea— the two requisites — would have been just 
 as clearly demanded in the one case as in the other. 
 
 The bombardment of Alexandria on the 11th July, 1882, had 
 for its object " the destruction of the earthworks and dismantling 
 of the batteries on the sea front of Alexandria." t Hence 
 it was of a destructive and punitive character, such as the 
 various bombardments of French Channel ports, and those of 
 Algiers, Odessa, and Sweaborg. The position of the batteries, 
 
 was always present when, in days gone by, a bomb-vessel opened on a fort with her 
 mortars. 
 
 * "Operations of the French Xavy during the recent War with Tunis, 1880-81." 
 Translated from L'Arme'e Maritime, by Lieut. M. Fisher Wright, U.S. Navy, Office 
 of Naval Intelligence, Washington. 
 
 t Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour's Memorandum, July 10, 1882, given in Report of the 
 British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, by Lieut. -Com. C. F. Goodrich, 
 U.S.N. Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. 
 
ilG NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 and the lie of the rocks and shoals which skirted the shore, 
 governed the positions appointed for the ships. Such close 
 quarters as the Princess Charlotte took up at Algiers were not 
 feasible for the British ironclads. The shortest range from the 
 batteries named for any of them was 1,000 yards, and that was 
 extended to 3,700 yards in other cases. 
 
 To go at all minutely into the results of this bombardment 
 would be foreign to my purpose. The leading features are familiar 
 to most readers. The fire was opened at 7 a.m., and continued 
 until 5.30 P.M., when the ships anchored for the night. The ships 
 — 9 battle ships, and 6 smaller vessels — threw 3,198 projectiles 
 against the place, a general average for the battle- ships' heavy 
 guns of 20'6 rounds per gun, or a rate per gun of one round in 
 Slh minutes. * The loss and damage to the ships was not great. 
 There were 6 killed, and 27 wounded on board. But the detail of the 
 damage done to the forts makes up a long list, and seems formidable ; 
 I must sum it all up in the conclusion of the competent onlooker 
 who is my authority. He says, as the result of his observations : 
 "Vessels are not yet, and never will be, able to fight on even terms 
 with forts." This broad issue, so put, is equivalent to saying that 
 all the modern improvements in ships have been met by equivalent 
 improvements in forts, and unless the capacity for engaging at 
 longer ranges be a change, there is none. Other broad issues 
 arising out of the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria are, 
 that the surrender of a place cannot be achieved without troops 
 to occupy any more now than formerly ; and that the command of 
 the sea remains a necessity before such an operation can be con- 
 templated. A narrower issue advanced a stage at Alexandria was 
 the superiority of fire from an anchored ship, and the preference 
 for slow and deliberate fire when the range was considerable. 
 Nothing was settled as to whether close quarters had lost its old 
 effect in subduing the fire of an ordinary battery. 
 
 Having thus traced out the more modern instances of attack by 
 bombardment from the sea with or without the immediate aid of 
 troops, I return to compare the older and more modern general 
 attacks upon territory, and I take up this thread at Charleston in 
 South Carolina, because, as I have observed, it was twice attacked 
 in two different ways, and with different results, in the last 
 century, and twice with analagous results in this century. 
 
 In the spring of 1776 it was determined to make an attack on 
 Charleston, then in the hands of the revolted Colonists, and early 
 
 • Only 1;731 projectiles of and above 7 in. were fired. 
 
418 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 place was now considered very much stronger than it had been 
 four years earlier, but the size of the force assembled under Vice- 
 Admiral Arbuthnot and General Sir Henry Clinton, was altogether 
 out of comparison with the former one; 7,550 men were now 
 embarked at New York, and the naval force was 6 sail of the line, 
 7 frigates, and a sloop, all of which sailed from New York on 
 December 16th, 1779, having .been detained there for some time 
 by the threat of d'Estaing's fleet, until it was ascertained that on 
 the 1st November part of it had gone to the West Indies, and the 
 rest, with d'Estaing himself, home to France.* The expedition 
 first anchored off Savannah, where Clinton gathered information 
 as to the situation of Charleston, and also ordered a co-operating 
 force to march overland to Charleston to his assistance. 
 
 It seems at once to have been arranged that the fleet should 
 play a very subordinate part in the affair. Clinton landed his 
 army on the 11th and 12th of February at Stono Inlet and John's 
 Island, separated from Charleston by two rivers, the Stono, with 
 the Wappoo Creek, and the Ashley River running between James 
 Island and Charleston itself. Between the 24th and 26th of 
 February the army, except troops left on John's Island and Stono, 
 to cover the communications, was passed over the Stono River to 
 James Island, and advanced towards Charleston. A bridge was 
 erected over Wappoo Creek, and defensive works were set up, while 
 the material for the siege, including guns from the ships, was 
 coKccted. The next step was to send all the line-of-battle ships 
 back to New York, while Arbuthnot shifted his flag into the 
 Roebuck, a 44-gun frigate. 
 
 There was a small Franco-American naval force in Charleston 
 Harbour, consisting of 1 44-gun and 1 32-gun frigates, besides 6 other 
 smaller ones and 2 sloops. This force was for a long time able to 
 seriously delay the passage of the British ships over the bar ; but 
 when Arbuthnot persevered, and his ships were actually in the 
 Channel, but still four or five miles from the entrance of the har- 
 bour, the American Commodore, Whipple, first fell back to support 
 Fort Moultrie, and then further back to the town. He afterwards 
 abandoned all defence by ships. The guns were landed and placed 
 in battery on shore. Ships were sunk between Shute's Folly and 
 the town, and booms and obstructions were prepared. 
 
 * Schomberg and Beatson differ as to their dates, the former saying that Arbuthnot 
 did not leave New York till February 11th, 1780, whei-eas Beatson makes the expedi- 
 tion sight Carolina on February 1st. But the necessity which was felt of waiting for 
 the disappearance of opposing force is worthy of note, and probably Beatson's dates 
 are correct. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERIUTOliY FROM THE SEA. 419 
 
 But still this naval work, both of attack and defence, was mere 
 diversion. The town had been covered by a line of works on the 
 north side, and this was the real point of attack by Clinton. On 
 the 29th March, the army, assisted by the boats of the fleet, which 
 I think must have come up the Stono Eiver and Wappoo Creekj, 
 crossed over and proceeded to make a formal attack on the works. 
 It must be noted that the Cooper Eiver and the land on the east 
 side of the town was open, and that Charleston could therefore 
 draw in supplies and reinforcements. On the 9th of April Clinton 
 was ready to open his batteries, and on that day the British 
 squadron weighed and ran the gauntlet of the forts on Sullivan's 
 Island, anchoring on the north coast of James Island, and as it 
 was hoped, out of the fire from the guns of Charleston. In truth, 
 the ships were well within range, but the fact that several shot passed 
 througli the Roebuck was concealed, and the enemy was deceived 
 into so complete a belief of their shot falling short, that they left 
 the British ships unmolested in a position where the Americans 
 might perhaps have easily destroyed them. Instead, they con- 
 tented themselves with sinking more vessels in Cooper River, and 
 by means of batteries and galleys forbidding approach in that 
 direction. 
 
 Clinton had been reinforced by the troops marching from Savan- 
 nah, and he was subsequently reinforced from New York, while 
 operations in the field in the rear of the siege works, and upon 
 the Cooper Eiver, tended to cut off the Charleston garrison more 
 and more from outside help. The Admiral on his side made un- 
 successful attempts to push small craft up the Cooper Eiver, but 
 the work of the ships was not done by them, but by their men in 
 landing parties. These first took a post and battery at Mount 
 Pleasant, and afterwards Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Sulli- 
 van's Island capitulated. 
 
 Meantime the work of the siege went on in the regular way. 
 The third parallel was completed on the 6th of May, on the 
 8th the General — Lincoln — in command of Charleston was again 
 summoned, and on the 11th he capitulated. 
 
 If we pass now to the American Civil War, we shall see that 
 though the details of the two pairs of attacks were different, the 
 principles were alike, and the same results from their application 
 followed. We have seen that in both the attacks described, the 
 command of the sea was necessary, but that when it was used in 
 the successful attack, it was more to secure a base for the army 
 by means of the navy, than to employ the latter in direct opera- 
 
-120 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 tions. The Federals in 18G3 were fully assured of the command 
 of the sea ; but in the new and remarkable constructions called 
 monitors, with their immense shell guns and their supposed in- 
 vulnerability, they had implements which, perhaps, they were 
 fairly justified in believing would upset and destroy the well- 
 established rules of naval war. However this may be, we find the 
 belief everywhere prevalent that monitors were more than a match 
 for fortifications, and a preliminary trial of the Montauk in January 
 and February 1863 against Fort McAlister on the Ogeechee 
 River, which resulted in the expenditure of two stocks of ammu- 
 nition without material result, only whetted the desire for further 
 proof that old rules still held. On the 3rd of March, three of the 
 new vessels fired on Fort McAlister for eight hours without doing 
 more damage than could be repaired in a night, while some of the 
 vessels were under repair after the bombai;4nient was over, till the 
 end of the month. 
 
 The Federals at this time had all the advantages of ports to 
 serve as bases, which the British had had in the American "War of 
 Independence. They had seized Port Eoyal, between the Con- 
 federate ports of Savannah and Charleston, and had made it their 
 main base, but they also used North Edisto Inlet, an excellent 
 harbour within twenty miles of Charleston bar, and there, at the 
 end of March 1863, the " ironclads," as the monitors were called, 
 began to assemble, and from thence they sailed for Charleston bar 
 on the 5th of April. There were 8 monitors, and the broadside 
 ironclad New Ironsides, bearing the flag of Eear-Admiral Dupont. 
 The early proceedings were precisely as they had been so many 
 years before ; there was the detention at the bar while it was 
 sounded and buoyed, and then the gradual passage over at high 
 water, with the final anchorage inside. 
 
 It is not necessary for my purpose to go into much detail over 
 the attack. We hear the very old story of the whole expedition 
 being in the hands of the pilots, and of their being unwilling to 
 move till noon on the 7th of April. Then the ships weighed and 
 proceeded along the shore of Morris Island led by the Weehawken, 
 which had a most hampering and inconvenient torpedo-catching 
 structure attached to her bows. It was intended that the ships 
 should be in line ahead, and about 100 yards apart, but precise 
 order was found to be difficult to maintain. By the time the head 
 of the line had reached Fort Wagner, Forts Moultrie and Sumter, 
 and all the batteries within range opened fire, and the orders had 
 been not to return it until within easy range of Sumter. But a 
 
ATTACKS OX TEIUUTOBY FROM THE SEA. 421 
 
 line of obstructions was observed between Sumter and Moultrie, 
 which barred the further progress in that direction, just as, by an 
 earlier system, Arbuthnot's progress had been barred up Cooper 
 Eiver eighty-three years before. 
 
 Various difficulties occurred in getting the ships into accurate 
 positions against Sumter. Some ships got within 500 yards of the 
 fort, others no nearer than 1,000. The fire of the monitors was 
 found to be exasperatingly slow. It was difficult for the com- 
 manders, between their narrow outlook from the pilot-houses and 
 the smoke, to see what they were doing. The ships were hampered 
 by the tides and shoal water, and by the space, which was arti- 
 ficially narro.wed by the supposed obstructions. The machinery of 
 the guns failed in unexpected quarters. Bolt-heads and nuts flew 
 about the interior of the turrets and pilot-houses in showers. 
 The mere concussion in the interior, due to blows of the enemy's 
 shot on the outside of the turrets, seem to have temporarily dis- 
 abled the inmates. 
 
 The modern minuteness of publication gives us data which we 
 look for in vain amongst some of the older chronicles, and in a 
 comparison of the guns in action and of the fire on each side, and 
 its results, we can glean a fairly clear knowledge of how this 
 operation stands when statistically viewed. 
 
 There were 9 ships engaged against 6 forts and batteries. The 
 ships carried 32 guns in all, of which 7 were 15-inch, 22 11-inch 
 smooth-bores, and 3 150-pounders rifled. 
 
 Fort Johnstone mounted only a 10-inch mortar; Fort Gunter 
 mounted 44 guns, but the largest were 4 10-inch, and 8 8-inch 
 C(^lumbiads, with 2 9-inch Dahlgrens, all smooth-bores, and 2 
 Brooke's rifled 7-inch guns. There were 7 42-pounder rifled guns, 
 the remainder being 32-pounders. Fort Moultrie bore nothing 
 larger than 8-inch smooth-bore Columbiads, of which there were 
 9, the remainder being 32-pounders, rifled and smooth bores, with 
 2 mortars. Battery Bee, in continuation of Fort Moultrie, carried 
 5 10-inch and 1 8-inch Columbiads. Wagner had only 1 32- 
 pounder rifled gun in action, while Fort Beauregard on Sullivan's 
 Island and that on Cuming's Point mounted 4 guns between them. 
 
 There were thus amongst the ships 32 guns, the smallest of 
 which were as powerful as the largest of the guns in battery ; 
 while of the 67 guns opposed to them, only 2 were up to the power 
 of the 3 smallest guns carried afloat. Thirty-three of the Confe- 
 derate guns did not exceed 42-pounders, and there were 10 10-inch 
 mortars. 
 
422 NAVAL WAItFAUE. 
 
 If the number of the guns was adverse to the ships, the pre 
 sumptive power was the other way. The actual power turned out 
 to be very much m favour of the forts, as while they fired 2,229 
 shot and shell, the ships only fired 139 shot and shell in all. 
 
 All but 24 shot fired from the ships were directed upon Fort 
 Sumter, which was struck 55 times, Moultrie 12 times, and 
 Wagner twice. At least 346 shot or shell struck seven of the 
 ships. The Keokuk received no less than 90 projectiles, the Wee- 
 hawken 53, the Nantucket 51, and the rest smaller numbers. The 
 number of projectiles that struck the New Ironsides is not given, 
 but the Confederates asserted that she was struck 65 times. If 
 this were so, we should have 19 per cent, of the projectiles fired 
 from the forts taking effect, while 50 per cent, of those fired from 
 the ships struck.* 
 
 The Admiral ordered the ships out again at 5 p.m., being then 
 under the intention of renewing the attack nest morning. The 
 Keokuk had withdrawn beforehand, but otherwise it was not sup- 
 posed that the ships had been beaten till they reassembled at their 
 former anchorage inside the bar. Then, as reported by the 
 Admiral — 
 
 No ships had been exposed over forty minutes, and yet in this brief period, as the 
 Department will perceive by the detailed reports of the commanding officers, five of the 
 ironclads were wholly or partially disabled, disabled too (as the obstructions could not be 
 passed) in that which was most essential to our success — I mean in their armament, or 
 power of inflicting injury by their guns. ... I was convinced that persistence in the 
 attack would only result in the loss of the greater part of the ironclad fleet, and in 
 leaving many of them inside the harbour to fall into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 As an earnest of the truth of the estimate, the Keokuk sank at 
 her anchors next morning. f 
 
 As usual, the weight of the failure, which should have fallen on 
 those who ordered an attack which all experience was against, fell 
 upon the Admiral, who did his best. Dupont was superseded by 
 Admiral Dahlgren, and joint operations were arranged between him 
 and General Gillmore, by way of Morris Island, the latter being, 
 already in occupation of Folly Island, with batteries on its north 
 end to cover the advance into Morris Island. Dupont had already 
 laid down the proper functions for the ships : — " Of course, the 
 most that is expected from the action of these vessels is to relieve 
 
 * Probably the difference is owing to the small targets the ships offered in- 
 comparison with the size of Fort Sumter, or to the inherent superiority of converging 
 over diverging fire. 
 
 t 77(6 Navy in the Civil War, the Atlantic Coast, by Roar-Admiral Ammen,. 
 U.S.A., p. 91. et sea. : Journal Royal U. S. Inst., vol. xii., p. 243; vol. xxv., p. 316. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 423 
 
 the troops as much as possible, and is to be considered of no other 
 consequence." 
 
 It can be seen from an inspection of the map that as the troops 
 advanced to the north, their right flank would be covered by the 
 ships, while the enemy's left flank would be exposed, and any 
 works he had, or might have, to check the Federal advance, would 
 be enfiladed by the ironclads. It was, perhaps, hardly possible to 
 devise a more certain method of attack. Sumter would become 
 untenable when Morris Island was held by the Federals, and the 
 batteries on Sullivan's Island being matched by those across the 
 water would be left open to be taken in flank from the sea ; while 
 the obstructions, no longer covered by fire from both sides, might 
 be deliberately removed by the Federal navy. 
 
 The strength of the method of attack was recognized. On the 
 10th July Gillmore opened his batteries against those of the 
 enemy on the southern shore of Morris Island. Early the same 
 morning four of the monitors crossed the bar and took the Morris 
 Island batteries in flank. By eight o'clock the Confederates began 
 to abandon their southern works and to make towards Fort 
 Wagner. The monitors followed up, searching the sand hills, 
 which were capable of concealing troops, as they proceeded. The 
 Federal troops, covered by the ships, pushed on. From 9*30 a.m. 
 to 6 P.M. the ships engaged Wagner at 1,200 yards range while 
 Gillmore advanced to make his assault upon it. Then they 
 withdrew out of fire for the night. In the morning Gillmore 
 informed Dahlgren that he had assaulted Wagner and been 
 repulsed. On the 19th of July the ships got within 300 yards of 
 Wagner, and between their guns and those of Gillmore's batteries, 
 the work was silenced ; but an assault made at night by the troops 
 was again repulsed. 
 
 Active operations were now suspended on Morris Island ; while 
 preparations for renewed attack went on until 17th August, but there 
 was diversion by way of Stono River, very much in the form of 
 Clinton's advance in 1783, in the meantime. The point of attack 
 from the land was now changed to Fort Sumter, upon which all 
 Gillmore's batteries opened on the above named day. The ships 
 engaged Wagner and Cuming's Point batteries at short range, and 
 Sumter at long range ; but the return fire was inconsiderable 
 The land batteries had done such service that the Confederate 
 General in command reported " Sumter in ruins, and all guns 
 N.W. face disabled, beside seven other guns." 
 
 The ships attacked Sumter on the 23rd August at 800 yards, 
 
 29 
 
424 NAVAL WARFARE, 
 
 but only received six shots in reply. On the 25th there was a 
 pause, in order to make an exchange of prisoners, but the state 
 of Fort Sumter was such as to make the Admiral believe he could 
 pass it with impunity if the obstructions did not prevent him. On 
 the Light of the 2nd September, he took the ships up the harbour 
 to within 600 yards of Sumter, and on the night of the 6th the 
 Confederates evacuated Morris Island. On the night of the 8th 
 the Federals made an attempt to storm Sumter by a boat 
 expedition, but were repulsed, with destruction of boats and great 
 loss of life. 
 
 Sumter had long been powerless for offensive purposes, but was 
 still held by the Confederates, and the Federal navy, having 
 established itself within the harbour, restricted its operations to 
 those of blockade. Direct operations in fact ceased with the ruin 
 of Fort Sumter. There was not military force enough to follow 
 the plan of Clinton, and the obstructions, being considered fatal to 
 naval advance, had proved their efficiency by the destruction of the 
 Patapsco on January 15th, 1864. The operations of Sherman in 
 rear of the town, combined with the virtual possession of the 
 port which the Federals held, led to the evacuation of Charleston on 
 February 18th, 1864.- 
 
 The analogies between the four attacks to which Charleston was 
 subject, are, no doubt, not absolutely complete. The first attack 
 was entirely naval, not by choice, but by tbe failure of the troops 
 to take their intended part in it. The third attack was wholly 
 naval by choice, and by a special faith in the monitors which it 
 may be said were far from being regular men-of-war, if they were 
 not specially prepared for the sort of service to which they were 
 put. Admiral Dupont, however, seems to have attributed his 
 failure to the misapprehension of the nature of things, and not to 
 any removable causes, and he was careful to lay down a subordi- 
 nate part for the ships in any future attack. That is to say, that, 
 in spite of the radical changes which had been made in the 
 material, the Federals would have been wise to have taken past 
 experience as their guide. 
 
 The analogies between the two successful attacks are also to be 
 found more in the principle than in tbe details. Had there been 
 military force enough, Gillmore might have proceeded against 
 Charleston just as Clinton did. But, then, owing to the strength 
 of Fort Sumter as well as to the batteries on Sullivan's and 
 
 * The capture of the town of Charleston was never in fact contemplated. The real 
 object, was tbe safe insliere. anchorage for the pui-poses of blockade, which was obtaiiifld. 
 
ATTACKS ON TErdUTORY FROM THE SEA. 425 
 
 Morris Islands, the fleet could not have passed up to within 
 gunshot of Charleston itself, which the transfer of the obstructive 
 barrier so much nearer the entrance of the harbour than it had 
 been in 1780 might alone have prevented. It was necessary that 
 the troops should, in the first instance, operate upon the harbour 
 defences, and, these being subdued, it only wanted sufiicient 
 military force to proceed directly on Charleston. What seems 
 clear is that the navy alone did not consider itself capable of 
 pushing on, even though there was no great barrier of fortifica- 
 tion to oppose. 
 
 The comparisons which may be drawn between the four attacks 
 upon Charleston make them a peculiarly valuable study ; but it 
 must not be held that exceptions to rule are any more absent 
 from the American steam wars than they were in previous sailing 
 wars. The works defending the entrance to Port Eoyal were so 
 situated, and of such a character, that they could be, and were, 
 reduced by 14 war-ships before any men were landed. The main 
 body of the ships passed and repassed Fort Walker at the south 
 side of the entrance, at 500 to 850 yards, and shelled it till it was 
 evacuated ; and then the fort on the north side, Fort Beauregard, 
 which had hardly been attacked at all, was abandoned. There 
 were about 100 guns in the ships and about 23 in the south fort. 
 Works at Hatteras, mounting 25 guns, were also successfully 
 bombarded by ships alone ; 70 guns on a broadside of the ships 
 being opposed to 25 in the works, at a considerable range. But 
 in these cases the troops were there, or the attacks would not have 
 been made, and they occupied and held the forts which had 
 succumbed to the ships' fire. The type of such actions was 
 already given in Porto Bello, and not impossibly their success 
 depended much on the particular character of the works attacked, 
 and the exposure of the men in them. 
 
 There were several remarkable instances of running the gauntlet, 
 both past and between forts, in the American Civil War. These 
 operations were practically new to naval forces, and were mainly 
 the result of geographical conditions. Mobile, New Orleans, Vicks- 
 burg must, unless their lessons are hereafter reversed, teach 
 us that forts have of themselves little power to stop a fleet passing 
 them. 
 
 The attacks on and capture of Fort Fisher, one of the last great 
 operations in which the Federal navy was concerned, must be noted 
 as a further confirmation of the continuity of the rules of naval 
 warfare through all material changes. 
 
 29* 
 
426 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Fort Fisher was the chief guard of the approach to Wilmington 
 by Cape Fear River. It was a powerful w^ork mounting about 75 
 guns, and it was proposed to attack it by sea and land, with a fleet 
 mounting 500 guns and an army disembarked in its rear. 
 
 The army being behind time, the first attack was made by the 
 old expedient of an explosion vessel, which proved the accuracy of 
 the historical record in proving harmless. Then on the 24th 
 December 1864, the tremendous armada bombarded. The fire of 
 the fort was subdued and the ships were little damaged, but when 
 an army of 3,000 men landed next day to co-opei'ate with the ships, 
 its General pronounced the fort intact for defensive purposes. 
 
 The third attack was made on the 13tli and 14th of January by 
 the ships alone, while 8,000 troops were landing and preparing to 
 attack. The final attack was on the 15th, when the troops, sup- 
 ported by the ships' ^fire, pressed on and on, till at ten o'clock at 
 night the Federals were in full possession of the work. There were 
 but 2,300 men in the garrison, and considering the enormous force 
 brought against the place, we must probably infer that most of the 
 naval fire was thrown away. The 8,000 troops, properly sup- 
 ported from the sea by a much smaller naval force, would, 
 according to experience, have succeeded equally well.* 
 
 We have seen in the foregoing chapters that the lessons to be 
 drawn from what was not done in the way of territorial attack 
 are often as valuable as any that can be drawn from examples 
 of what was done ; and perhaps one of the very latest exhi- 
 bitions of this truth, the proceedings of the French fleet in the 
 Baltic in 1870, is as pregnant with lessons as any that had pre- 
 ceded it. The broad features of the situation were that the 
 French fleet was entirely of the most modern character, all the 
 changes in naval material having there displayed their full force, 
 and therefore operating to produce all the changes in the method 
 sf naval warfare which were due to them. Yet it appeared that 
 nothing was due to them. All the methods, influences, and 
 governing causes which made or modified procedure in 1770 are 
 found in full force in 1870, and leave us with the reflection that 
 there is no reason to doubt the teaching of history as to naval 
 warfare, even after it has been in theory revolutionized. 
 
 The intention of the French in sending Bouet-Willaumez to the 
 
 * See Boynton's History of the Naci/ durin;; the Rebellion. Ammen's The Navy in the 
 Civil War. The most concise accounts of the principal naval operations in the Civil 
 War are those of Admiral Hamilton (no\\ Sir Vcsey) and Captain Long. li. U. S. 
 .fdurnal, vol. xxii.,p. 612, and vol. xxv., p. oitj. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITORY FROM THE SEA. 427 
 
 Baltic in command of an ironclad fleet, was, in the first instance, 
 the blockade of the German ports, but it was intended to devote 
 it to the making of territorial attacks, while another squadron 
 watched and masked the only existing German fleet at Wilhelms- 
 haven on the Jade, outside the Baltic Sea. Here we have at 
 once the re-establishment of the old condition that before terri- 
 torial attacks can be made, a possibly interfering fleet must be 
 masked. 
 
 Not only so, but it was as well understood by the French 
 Government in 1870 as ever it had been in former days, that the 
 navy alone was practically powerless to make territorial attacks, 
 and that whether ships were steam " battle-ships " or sailing 
 *' line-of-battle ships " they did not in themselves represent the 
 proper force for conducting territorial attacks. So when Bouet- 
 Willaumez was told that he would be given 14 ironclads to start 
 to the Baltic with, he was told that La Eonciere le Noury would 
 follow him with another squadron made up of gun-boats, floating 
 batteries, and transports, conducting an army of 30,000 men 
 under General Bourbaki. 
 
 Bouet-Willaumez never passed be^'ond the blockading stage in 
 the Baltic, imitating therein the conduct of the larger proportion 
 of British admirals in command for years in the North Sea, the 
 Channel, and the Mediterranean. There was a furious outcry 
 against him in France by a people profoundly ignorant of the 
 conditions, yet his answer was complete. He had no troops, no 
 small vessels ; none of the appliances for territorial attack ; and 
 the masking of the very inferior German fleet was not complete. 
 The conditions which had always prevented territorial attacks 
 prevailed, and they were found to have just the same weight as 
 they always had. The French people had assumed wrongfully 
 that steam and rifled shell-guns had changed all things, but it was 
 found that they had changed nothing ; that was all. 
 
 When Bouet-Willaumez sailed from Cherbourg on the 24th July, 
 he took with him but 6 battle-ships and 1 despatch vessel. With 
 this force he proceeded to do the only thing open to him, namely, 
 to watch the German squadron. But orders soon reached him (on 
 August 2nd) to pass on into the Baltic, which he did. 
 
 He reconnoitred the coast, considering the most suitable points 
 of attack when the land forces and small craft, which he still ex- 
 pected, should reach him. Pie made Kioge Bay his base, and 
 refitted there, receiving a communication from his Government, 
 dated August 7th, which inferred that none of the necessaries for 
 
428 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 territorial attack would reach him, and directly informed him that 
 " it was in a strict blockade of German commercial ports that the 
 chief means of action by the squadron would be found."* 
 
 Subsequently Bouet-Willaumez reconnoitred Kiel again, and other 
 parts of the coast, and then, having received one despatch from his 
 Government which ordered him back to France, and another 
 which bade him stay in the Baltic, he returned to Kioge Bay, 
 and ordered a committee to assemble and report to him as to what 
 might be in the power of the squadron as it stood, to effect by way 
 of territorial attack. 
 
 This Committee was immediately formed. It was composed of Rear- Admiral Dieu- 
 donne, President ; M. Duburquois, Chief of the Staff ; Lacour, Colonel of Artillery ; 
 and two Captains, chosen by lot, Captains Quilio and Serres, commanding the Gui/e»>ie 
 and the Thetis. On the 12th August they met on board the Survei/hinte, and the same 
 evening their report was complete. 
 
 The following are the terms in which they expressed themselves with regard to the 
 most important places on the Prussian littoral, and the military operations which might 
 be undertaken :— 
 
 Alsen. — The depth of water will not permit an approach to this point within at most 
 3,000 metres, a distance at which an engagement would be useless, because of the 
 plunging fire of the forts. Nothing is here possible without a force to land. Besides, 
 it is most probable that submarine mine defence extends along the shore, which it 
 would be indispensable to remove, and which could not be attempted until the squadron 
 was supplied with the necessary materials. 
 
 Duppcl and Kappeln. — Completely out of reach from the ships' guns. Too little 
 water in the bays. We could only get at them with armoured gun-boats. 
 
 Erkernford. — It is easy to destroy the isolated batteries, but they are of no impor- 
 tance, and without the possibility of throwing troops on shore the reduction of the 
 forts would be insignificant. 
 
 Kiel. — It would be necessary to employ the whole force of the squadron. The 
 success of gun-fire uncertain, on account of the height of the forts above the shore, and 
 the losses certain for the assailants, if they were not able to occupy the forts as they 
 were silenced. The forts of Frederiksdort being destroyed, and the squadron being 
 unable to penetrate to the bottom of the bay within gunshot range of Kiel, on account 
 of the obstructions, the torpedoes, and all the means of defence which have there been 
 accumulated, the French ships would soon be forced to retire without even knowing 
 the result of their attack. 
 
 Nenstadt. — An open town and without defence, but with a bay so shallow that the 
 French ships could not even reach with their projectiles the merchant ships which 
 are anchored some distance from the port, properly so called. 
 
 It is the same all along the coast as far as — 
 
 Colberg. — A strong place, besieged in 1807, and attackable (from the sea) at 2,200 
 metres. Before entering upon action there, it will be necessary to make a reconnais- 
 sance, in order to make certain that the housesalong the shore, the Casino in particular, 
 do not mask fortifications which would compel a modification of the plan of attack, 
 
 Danziij. — The fort at the entrance to the bay is within range of our upper-deck 
 guns, but only at a distance of 400 metres. The battery guns could not be used else- 
 where with advantage. 
 
 * The Campaign in the North Sea and the Baltic, by Rene' de Pont Jest. Journal 
 R.U.S. Institution, vol xxxiii., p. 229. 
 
ATTACKS ON TERRITOEY FROM THE SEA. 4ay 
 
 Conclusion. — Colbcvg and Danzig alone can be attacked; but the small effect which 
 •will result from these two attempts will be of a nature to deprive the French squadron 
 of the prestige of its force. In order to operate usefully, special vessels are required, 
 and the prospect of forcing the enemy to assemble his troops on this part of the 
 littoral. But this end is unattainable without a landing force.* 
 
 We thus see that all that was open to this modern steam fleet, 
 whose real function was holding the command of the sea, and not 
 territorial attack, was just what would have been open to a sailing 
 fleet of line-of-battle ships in the same waters one hundred or two 
 hundred years before. The projectiles which might be fired into 
 Colberg or Danzig were larger, and would generally be shells; 
 their range was greater, and the attack might be conducted at a 
 greater distance from the shore, but otherwise all the pros and cons 
 were the same as ever, and still as ever was it necessary that the 
 ships attacking should have command of the sea assured. The 
 proof came immediately. 
 
 There remained, then, Colberg, and Vice-Admiral Bouet prepared to make some 
 serious demonstration against this town, when he received, on the night of the 13th 
 August, a dispatch which informed him that the Prussian fleet had left the Jade, and 
 had passed up the Coast of Jutland to enter the Baltic. The fact might be true for 
 it was possible that Prince Adalbert might have learnt the departure of Admiral 
 Fourichon from Cherbourg, and had left the Jade to seek the shelter of Kiel, which he 
 thought might be attacked. In the face of this contingency, the Commander-in-Chief 
 of the squadron did not hesitate an instant ; he hastily drew his ships together, and 
 proceeded towards the Great Belt, to oppose the passage of the enemy's vessels, and 
 to offer them battle. 
 
 The attack upon Colberg was thus postponed by the threat of an 
 inferior force, just as, so many years before, Newport had been saved 
 by the threat of the inferior force of Howe. It was not, perhaps, 
 that there was a fear of what the inferior force of the enemy might 
 do, or attempt to do, directly. It was just the impossibility that 
 a commander whose operations depended on his supremacy at sea, 
 could allow that supremacy to be even questioned by the appear- 
 ance of the enemy's fleet at sea and unfought. 
 
 The information was subsequently found to be false, and again 
 preparations were made for the attack on Colberg. When within 
 80 miles of the place, a gale of wind decided a rendezvous at 
 Kioge Bay, and there true news reached Bouet-Willaumez that 
 the French squadron had raised the blockade of the Jade. Col- 
 berg was once more saved ; the Admiral felt bound to give the place 
 up, and to make his dispositions to defend the Great Belt. 
 
 Here, therefore, we see that under the latest conditions, as under 
 the earliest, even so simple an operation as the distant and merely 
 
 * Rene de Pont Jest. RU.S. Journul, vol. xxsiii., p. 230. 
 
430 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 punitive or destructive bombardment of a place cannot be under- 
 taken unless possibly interfering naval forces of the enemy are 
 first masked. 
 
 As if to conclude my argument, and make it unanswerable, we 
 have the great defeat of the Italian fleet off the Island of Lissa in 
 1866 by the Austrians, which has been already alluded to. Here 
 all the law that history had been so long elaborating was set at 
 defiance. The Austrian force at Pola — supposed inferior — was 
 unwatched by even a single cruizer. Persano proceeded to bom- 
 bard the forts of Lissa without a notion of what the Austrian 
 movement might be. He had run counter to historial teaching in 
 making bombardment the first and main attack on the island, 
 instead of first landing the troops and making the ships play the 
 subordinate part in co-operating with them. He had fired away 
 most of his ammunition, and was, on the 20th July, in the middle 
 of landing the troops, when the Esploratore, the only ship in the 
 shape of a look-out which he had established, signalled at about 
 eight o'clock in the morning, the enemy in sight. They were so 
 close that in two hours and a half, Tegetthoff had made his cele- 
 brated signal to the ironclads to rush upon and sink the enemy, 
 an enemy which, owing to its mistakes, was totally unready to meet 
 him and suffered the defeat it had courted. 
 
 I think, therefore, that these chapters leave us under the infe- 
 rence that certain conditions — command of the sea, sufficient and 
 well-handled land forces, landings either away from the batteries, 
 or after their fire has been temporarily silenced, proper appliances 
 and small vessels — have always been necessary to secure the suc- 
 cess of territorial attack, and that there is at least nothing in 
 recent times, to show that the rule has in any way changed. 
 
IJl 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 Recent Illustratioxs of the Principles of Naval Warfare. 
 
 The Civil Wak in Chile, 189L — Geographical conditions anomalous. — Superior fleet 
 without ports of supply. — Cross-raiding. — Acquirement of ports and territory in the North 
 by the Congressists. — Destruction of a battle-ship by torpedo-gunboats. — Blockade pre- 
 cluded. — Prospects of invasion by the North on the South. — Invasion carried out. — Success 
 of invaders on land. — Reflections. 
 
 The Korean AVae, 1894-5. — Remarkable illustration of principles already treated. — 
 Anomalous conditions at opening of the war. — Assertion of command of the sea by Japa- 
 nese. — Admission by China. — Consequences to land operations in the Korea. — Parallel with 
 Campaign of Vittoria. — Error of Chinese in method of reinforcing its Korean armj-. — 
 Defeat of the Chinese fleet off the Yalu. — Japanese command of the sea confirmed. — 
 Consequences : 1. Blockade of Chinese ports ; 2. Territorial attacks. 
 
 Since the first edition of this work was published, at least two 
 naval wars have afforded illustrations of the principles of naval war- 
 fare as sketched in the preceding chapters. These are, the war 
 carried on between the two political parties contending for power in 
 Chile in 1891 ; and the war just concluded between Japan and 
 China. -^ 
 
 Greographically, the conditions of the war between the " Balmace- 
 dists " and the " Congressists " in Chile resembled those of the war 
 between Chile and Peru. In both cases they were anomalous, the war 
 being carried on upon a long stretch of coast-line, with access to every 
 point both by land and sea. But the civil war in Chile, extending over 
 some 900 miles of coast from Valparaiso to Arica, was rendered still 
 more anomalous by the doubt which hung over the political com- 
 plexion of every coast town and port along the sea border. 
 
 At the outbreak of the revolt in January, 1891, the existing army 
 declared for Balmaceda, the President, and the existing fleet for the 
 Congressists. The latter thus started with 3 armoured ships and 
 4 cruisers, besides 13 steam transports which were early seized 
 upon and partly armed. The Balmacedists started with 1 armed 
 transport, but she was later reinforced by the arrival from Europe 
 
432 ^'AVAL WARFARE. 
 
 of 2 torpedo-gun-boats of the newest pattern, which played a con- 
 spicuous part in the war. 
 
 The Congressists thus held a command of the sea, but it was not 
 an assured command, and the lack of defined territory prevented 
 them from making a determined atteznpt to suppress the naval force 
 under the control of the Balmacedists. The Congressists were at 
 first on the sea without any territory, and with no assured ports of 
 reinforcement or supply. They withdrew to the northward to secure 
 such necessary elements of force, and gradually succeeded in draw- 
 ing permanently to their side the more northern ports and terri- 
 tories. They did this by demonstrations against the various north- 
 ern ports, when the garrison and people, either by coercion or 
 willingly, declared for their side ; or otherwise — as sometimes hap- 
 pened — when the garrison, reinforced overland, declared against them, 
 and drove the parties landed back to their ships. The Balmacedist 
 policy was to counteract this progress of the Congressists, not only 
 by marches of troops by land, but by exhibitions of their inferior 
 naval forces when the absence of the Congressist fleet permitted it. 
 *' All the Grovernment (Balmacedist) party could hope to do was to 
 harass their adversaries by attacking the unfortified ports. These 
 were always immediately retaken without opposition, the little 
 Government fleet withdrawing out of danger. This system of cross- 
 raiding was carried on to a great extent during the entire war." * 
 
 It is possible to argue that this cross-raiding was apart from the 
 geographical and political conditions just described; and to say that 
 it was due to steam alone, and was a feature differentiating steam 
 wars from sailing wars. I apprehend, however, that the stronger 
 position is to deny the inference, as it has not the corroborative evi- 
 dence of other steam naval wars. 
 
 The Congressist fleet gradually acquired control of territory in the 
 north, which gave it funds, supplies, and a military force ; and it 
 received by reason of its virtual, if incomplete, command of the sea, 
 arms and equipment for it. Once they had an army, the Con- 
 gressists were in an extraordinarily strong position. The Balmace- 
 dists must either surrender territory to them by ev^acuating the 
 northern ports to concentrate in the southern province, which in- 
 cluded Valparaiso and Santiago; or else they must scatter garrisons 
 to the northward to hold the ports, and leave the vital part of their 
 position open to invasion by a superior force. They pursued the 
 latter policy. 
 
 * The Chilean Revolution o/1891. Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, 1893. 
 
RECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 433 
 
 The Balmacedists became, therefore, well aware that their cause 
 might become a lost one unless they could in some way destroy or 
 neutralise the Congressists' fleet. The Congressists on their side 
 were pressed by the knowledge that the Ealmacedist naval power 
 might be so well recruited from Europe as to openly contest the 
 command of the sea with them. They consequently did their best 
 to hasten the military preparations. 
 
 The two Balmacedist torpedo-gun-boats, the Lynch and the 
 Condell, were in a very bad state of repair when they arrived at 
 Valparaiso from Europe, but they were ready in April, and though 
 they were incapable of attacking the Congressist ships in the open, 
 it was thought possible to employ the new weapon, the torpedo, by 
 surprise and in darkness, or semi-darkness, against even the most 
 powerful of the Congressist ships with impunity ; the greatly 
 superior speed of the new vessels giving them means of escape. 
 
 The two torpedo-gun-boats were at Huasco, some 330 miles north 
 of Valparaiso, and 80 miles south of Port Caldera, on the 22nd of 
 April. They were informed by telegram that the Congressist fleet 
 was in Port Caldera ; they determined to attack them, or some of 
 them, just before daybreak on the 23rd, and they put to sea for that 
 purpose. As it happened, only the Blanco Encalada, of 3,500 tons, 
 an armoured ship something like a small Audacious, and the Biobio, 
 an armed transport, were in the bay, lying close over on the southern 
 shore. They were not expecting an attack, and could not be said to 
 be in any proper state of preparation. The torpedo-gun-boats passed 
 the port at sea, then turned round and steamed into the bay close 
 under the northern shore, the Condell leading, and the Lynch fol- 
 lowing close behind. It was moonlight, and there was no sign that 
 they were observed. As soon as the commander of the Condell made 
 out the Blanco, he steamed straight for her, and at an estimated 
 distance of 100 yards, and before the Blanco opened fire, dis- 
 charged her bow torpedo at her. The torpedo missed the Blanco, 
 whereupon the Condell put her helm a-port, and discharged a second 
 torpedo at an estimated distance of 60 yards. Then fire was opened 
 from the Blanco Enccdada, and the Condell fired a third torpedo, 
 and steamed out. She did not put on full speed until she had fired 
 the first torpedo. The captain of the Blanco Encalada afterwards 
 reported that all three torpedoes had been fired at 1,000 yards, and 
 that none of them took effect. 
 
 The Lynch following close, fired her bow torpedo, which missed. 
 She then put her helm a-port, and fired her second torpedo, which 
 took the Congressist ship amidships, blew a hole in her side seven 
 
434. NAVAL WARFARK 
 
 yards long and tliree to four yards broad, causing her to sink so rapidly 
 that she carried down with her about 120 of her crew. 
 
 This was a form of attack upon shipping of whit-h there had been 
 no previous example, except in a modified form in the American Civil 
 ^^"ar. On the report of its occurrence, the naval view was chiefly 
 directed towards considering the unprepared state of the Blanco 
 Encalada. But the attack was really the first direct challenge the 
 position of the battle-ship had received. The first direct and com- 
 plete raising of the question of the effect of the torpedo on the 
 differentiation of naval force. This seems clear from the reflection 
 that no one can say that any state of preparation, except some form 
 of barrier round the ship to stop the advance of the torpedo, as 
 armour stops the advance of shot, would have been available to pre- 
 vent the destruction of the ship. Better look-out, and earlier and 
 better gun-fire, might have prevented the gun-boats from getting 
 within torpedo-range ; but it might not. No one can say. What 
 remains is that an armoured battle-ship was destroyed by vessels of 
 much smaller displacement,* smaller cost, and exposing a smaller 
 number of men, with comparatively small loss or damage to the 
 attacking ships. The issue raised is therefore clear. 
 
 The smallness, numerically, of the naval forces on each side, and 
 the open character of the Bay of Valparaiso, precluded the idea of 
 blockade such as was seen in the American Civil War, But though 
 the three fast ships of the Balmacedists were thus free to make 
 attacks by the methods of surprise and evasion, there was no power 
 on that side to contest the main operations of the Congressist fleet ; 
 and no capacity to threaten an invading force in daylight. When their 
 army was ready, therefore, the Congressists were free to invade with- 
 out fear of interruption at sea, or from the sea during the landing. 
 
 The point of assembly selected for the invading flotilla and army 
 was Port Caldera, and the landing-place proposed was the sheltered 
 beach of Quinteros Bay. A total force of nearly 9,300 men was em- 
 barked in 14 war-ships and transports, and was landed in Quinteros 
 l*)ay during the forenoon and afternoon of the 20th of August, and 
 being entirely unopposed, marched at once to the southward. On 
 the 21st the Congressist army crossed the Eiver Aconcagua, and 
 defeated the Balmacedist army, which contested the passage on the 
 southern bank, the Balmacedists being materially harassed by the 
 fire on their left flank emanating from some of the ships of the 
 Congressist fleet. 
 
 * Bhi.nro Encalada, 3,500 tons; Cotuh'U and Ltinch together, 1,500 tons. 
 
80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
REGENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 435 
 
 The Congi-essist army passed on to Viua del Mar, three or four 
 miles only from Valparaiso, where, on the 23rd of August, the Bal- 
 macedist army was drawn up to receive them. Forts along the 
 shore here not only protected the left flank of the Balmacedist army 
 from the guns of the Congressist fleet, but enabled the Lynch to fire 
 on the Congressist array under their cover. The Congressist General 
 did not think it wise under the circumstances to make his attack 
 here. Cut off partially by the forts from his sea base, he boldly gave 
 it up altogether, and marched round the right flank of the Balma- 
 cedists on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of August, finally taking up a 
 position at Las Cadenhas, eight miles south of Valparaiso. The Bal- 
 macedists, at first unaware of this movement, responded to it by 
 covering Valparaiso at a point two miles south of the city. 
 
 The Congressists attacked on the morning of the 28th, and speedily 
 defeated the Balmacedists, afterwards entering Valparaiso without 
 opposition, and thus closed the civil war. 
 
 The immense power of a fleet in virtual command of the sea has 
 scarcely ever been more clearly demonstrated than in this war, but 
 in the end it was the hazard of a battle on the land, at which the 
 invaders were inferior in number, and to the success of which the 
 fleet in no way contributed, that decided the issue. 
 
 The anomalies of the war were the cross-raiding already referred 
 to, the destruction of the battle-ship by torpedo-gun-boats, and the 
 curious fact that, while the invasion was in progress, the Condell and 
 the Imperial, armed transport, twice passed by the Congressist fleet 
 up to Coquimbo, bringing down from thence reinforcements of troops 
 for the Balmacedists, which, however, were not in time to assist them. 
 
 It may not be denied that there were many circumstances in the 
 war to give a greater colour to the 'common idea of a neutral sea 
 over which war is carried on indifferently by the parties to it, than 
 previous experience since the time of Charles I. had offered. No 
 doubt it is fair to argue that steam, and not the anomalous con- 
 ditions, geographical and political, was the agent at work. Nor, 
 perhaps, can the question be decided by mere argument. But in any 
 case, the necessity of the command of the sea for the purpose of 
 serious territorial attack, and its enormous power for that purpose, 
 were demonstrated with a force that leaves nothing to be desired.^^ 
 
 The contest between Japan and China, which may possibly be 
 known to history as the Korean War, illustrates to a remarkable 
 degree the characteristics of naval warfare, and, in almost the high- 
 est degree, its leading principles as considered in this work. The 
 question of what is meant by the command of the sea, what results 
 
486 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 from its gain and loss, and how it is gained and lost, are presented 
 to us in the Korean War almost as if it were a designed experiment 
 to strengthen our reliance on the teaching of history. The differen- 
 tiation of naval force has had light thrown upon it by the battle off 
 the Kiver Yalu, which some call the battle of Hai-yun-tau. The 
 successful landing of Chinese troops in the Yalu Eiver, with its 
 disastrous naval issue, is a recent commentary on the old rule ; while 
 the rapid captures of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei are startling 
 examples of what modern practice reaches to when it follows the 
 teaching of ancient experience. 
 
 Every aspect of the war is interesting to this country, as Japan 
 is to China in a position similar to that which the British Islands 
 occupy to the European continent ; but here I must confine myself 
 to those circumstances alone which form acted commentaries on 
 what has been said in the first edition of this work. 
 
 The war began anomalously in the mutual transport of troops by 
 the Powers whicli were afterwards to declare war against one another 
 to a piece of neutral territory — the Korea. It opened, according to 
 common precedent, by acts of war previous to the declaration 
 thereof. 
 
 On the 20th of July, a body of Chinese troops, said to be 12,000 
 in number, sailed from Taku under escort of a squadron said to con- 
 sist of 8 men-of-war. INIost of the troops were safely landed at Asan ; 
 and on the 25th, in the early morning, the Tsi Yuen, cruiser, and the 
 Kwang Yi, having apparently completed the duty of landing the 
 troops, were proceeding to sea, when they were met by the greatly 
 superior Japanese force of the Naniiva, Akitsushima, and YoshinOy 
 cruisers. After some manoeuvring, the Japanese opened fire on the 
 Chinese, and in a short time drove the Tsi Yuen off towards Wei-hai- 
 wei; the Kxvang Yi making for the neighbouring coast, where she 
 ran ashore and was afterwards burnt. 
 
 On the same day, but later, the Naniiva stopped the transport 
 Kotvshing, which was carrying a further body of troops for Asan. 
 The Chinese declining to surrender, or to obey orders given by the 
 Japanese commander, the Naniwa fired upon and sank the trans- 
 port, with most of the troops on board her. 
 
 This was a challenge by Japan to China to contest the com- 
 mand of the sea with her. If we were to accept the cross -raiding 
 over a neutral sea along the coast of Chile, which has just been 
 mentioned, as a characteristic of steam warfare in general, and not 
 due to anomalous geographical and political conditions, we might not 
 lay stress on this first encounter and its result. But with our ex- 
 
 i 
 
RECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 437 
 
 perience of what the struggle for the command of the sea has always 
 been, and what it has meant, we must allow the sinking of the Kow- 
 sking, and the defeat of the Chinese war-ships, to be decisive of the 
 character of the war, unless the next act of the Chinese had been to- 
 successfully contest the position at sea taken up by Japan. 
 
 The Japanese officially announced a state of war on July 31st; 
 and war was officially declared in China on August 2nd. 
 
 The general situation of the belligerents in reference to one 
 another was then as follows : — 
 
 Japan had claimed the command of the sea. China had not ac- 
 cepted her challenge. The military possession of the Korea was the 
 immediate objective of both Powers, and both already held parts of 
 the country. China held the north, and had landed several thousand 
 men at Asan. But Japan had interposed by holding the capital. 
 Soul, and its port, Chemulpo, and her force was understood to be 
 numerically superior to that of China in the southern part of 
 Korea, and that the Chinese at Asan were isolated. 
 
 If China should allow Japan to hold the command of the sea; and 
 if the laws of naval warfare were to hold good with steam and all 
 modern appliances, as they had been settled in wars carried on under 
 sail, then the communications of China with the Korea would be 
 restricted to almost a single, long, and difficult road through Man- 
 churia, and across the Yalu as the frontier river ; while every port in 
 Korea, except such as might be actually held by the Chinese, would be 
 open to the Japanese, and the routes of communication between the 
 army in Korea and its ultimate base in Japan would be innumerable, 
 easy, and free. There would be a general parallel between the 
 strategic position of Korea and that of the Crimea in the Kussian 
 War. Supposing that equal forces were forthcoming on either side, 
 it followed as a certainty that in any given time China would be 
 immensely outnumbered in the Korea. 
 
 The results of the failure of China to strike for the command of the 
 sea were inunediately seen. Before the war, with naval forces not so 
 unequal but that the whole on each side might have been brought to 
 a struggle such as characterised the Dutch wars, it was a question 
 whether the theatre of the contest should be on the shores of China or 
 on the shores of Japan. By her failure to contest the command of the 
 sea with all her naval force, China accepted her own shores as the 
 theatre of war, and as early as the 10th August Japanese cruisers 
 were asserting their sense of the position by throwing contemptuous 
 shells, at long and safe range, into Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur. 
 
 The Chinese fleet did not show. Abandoning the naturally easy 
 
us NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 sea-route foi- her troops, China restricted herself to the difficuh and 
 toilsome route through Manchuria. 
 
 Japan, unmolested, poured her troops into Chemulpo on the west 
 coast, and into G-ensan and Fusan on the east coast of Korea. An 
 indecisive attack was made by the Japanese on the Chinese at Asan ; 
 but the Chinese there cut off, and likely to be surrounded, escaped 
 across country to join the main forces in the north. 
 
 The situation was now closely paralleled by that of the Peninsula 
 in the Campaign of Yittoria. It was absolutely necessary for the 
 Chinese, as it had been for the French, to withdraw from all outlying 
 positions and to concentrate near the frontier on the line of their 
 communications, and there accept battle. The Chinese, in fact, took 
 up a defensive position at Ping-yang, and on the 23rd of August 
 they were joined there by their countrymen from Asan. 
 
 The Japanese marched their forces for the attack from Gensan 
 and from the south, and also forwarded them from Chemulpo by sea, 
 which their command of it left them free to do. It became certain 
 that the Chinese, much because of their restricted means of transport, 
 would be greatly outnumbered by the Japanese. China felt the 
 situation keenly, and resolved to relieve it. But as she had failed 
 to understand that, to win in a war such as she was engaged in, the 
 command of the sea was an absolute necessity, and that if it could 
 not be fought for, there was no reasonable course but to sue for 
 terms of peace, so she continued a fatuous policy. 
 
 During the second week of September she collected some 7,000 
 troops, embarked them in transports, and, assembling them at Ta-lien- 
 hwan, appointed her main fleet as their convoy to the mouth of the 
 Yalu Kiver. 
 
 This was a repetition of Napoleon's mistake in his expedition to 
 Egypt, but it was of a more glaring character. Napoleon had no 
 idea of the near vicinity of a British fleet. The Chinese knew that 
 they might fall in with the Japanese fleet at any moment after 
 they got to sea. If the Chinese fleet had not been considered strong 
 enough for an equal contest with the Japanese fleet, how could it 
 possibly not only defend itself, but its transports, from the almost 
 certain Japanese attack ? The object was to reinforce the Chinese 
 army in the north of Korea, and it might have been sound strategy 
 to risk the loss of the 7,000 men, and the transports, by sending them 
 through a water-country held by the enemy, for the sake of that 
 object. But the " fleet in being " was the only weapon in Chinese 
 hands to prevent landings on her territory and the capture of her 
 ports. It was impossible that a reinforcement of 7,000 men to the 
 
RECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 489 
 
 Korean army could balance the possible desti'uction of the " fleet in 
 beino-." If this fleet was considered in any way competent to 
 match the Japanese fleet, it should have been thrown against it at 
 once in a struggle for the command of the sea as a primary object. 
 If it was not competent, it should have been held in reserve, as 
 Torrington proposed to hold the Anglo-Dutch fleet, in the confidence 
 that as long as it was prepared to strike at the Japanese fleet, em- 
 barrassed with the impedimenta of an invading flotilla, the Japanese 
 would have been unable to proceed with any serious territorial attack. 
 
 As it was, there was a futile attempt to gain the command of the 
 sea for an ulterior purpose, and it suffered collapse as all such pre- 
 vious attempts had done. . It is true that the 7,000 men were 
 successfully landed in the Yalu, and that no transports were cap- 
 tured by the Japanese ; but these successes were not in the slightest 
 degree due to any action of the Chinese fleet. The Chinese trans- 
 ports passed to and fro over the Yellow Sea in safety, only because 
 they were not seen by their enemy, and they would have had even a 
 greater chance of so avoiding observation had the Chinese fleet never 
 quitted the shelter of Wei-hai-wei. 
 
 The troops landed were too late to be of any assistance to the 
 army at Ping-yang. They landed on the 16th, and on the day 
 before, the Chinese were attacked by superior forces of the Japanese. 
 The Korean Vittoria was fought, the Chinese were defeated, and 
 retreated, as the French did after Vittoria, on the line of their com- 
 munications. 
 
 On the 17th of September, the Chinese fleet of 10 sail was at 
 anchor some 10 miles to the south and west of the Yalu Eiver, the 
 shallowness of the water forbidding their nearer approach to it. The 
 Japanese fleet, of 12 sail, had been in the neighbourhood of the 
 island of Hai-yun-tau, and were steaming slowly to the north- 
 eastward. The smoke of their ships was seen by the Chinese 
 fleet, which immediately weighed and proceeded to encounter the 
 Japanese. 
 
 The description of the battle which ensued, the tactics employed 
 on either side, and the causes of the victory which the Japanese 
 gained, do not come within the scope of the present work. It is 
 enouah to state on this head, that while no shii) on either side 
 surrendered, and while no ship on the Japanese side was destroyed, 
 5 Chinese ships — half their fleet — were in various ways put an 
 end to. 
 
 The Yivng Wei was set on fire, ran ashore to save herself, and was 
 afterwards destroyed ; the Chih Yuen and Ghao Yung sank ; the 
 
 30 ' 
 
440 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 King Yuen was set on fire and sank ; the Kwang Chia deserted 
 from the fleet, ran ashore on the Kwang-tung Peninsula, and wa? 
 afterwards destroyed by the Japanese. 
 
 But the question of the differentiation of naval force, treated in 
 my fifth chapter, has a certain light thrown upon it, in its modern 
 aspects, by this battle. 
 
 In this respect the battle of the Yalu was like the early battles 
 between the English and the Dutch, where all classes of ships fought 
 indiscriminately. The result of that method of fighting was, as I 
 have shown, to force a selection of ships " fit to lie in a line," and to 
 discard from participation in a general action all ships below a cer- 
 tain standard of size and force. But in this case Chinese ships of 
 7,400 tons carrying 12-inch guns, and heavily armoured, fought side 
 by side with unarmoured ships of 1,300 tons which carried no guns 
 of greater calibre than five inches. On the Japanese side, ships 
 partly armoured, of 4,210 tons, and carrying 12i-inch guns were 
 placed in line with a mere armed gun-vessel. 
 
 The question therefore arises, whether the fact points at all 
 towards destroying the significance of historical teaching in this 
 particular matter, and whether the distinction between the ship 
 " fit to lie in a line " and the ship which is unfit is about to pass 
 away; or whether we must regard this mingling of various classes 
 in battle, which has scarcely shown itself for two centuries, as a 
 mere anomaly due to the smallness of the contending navies, and 
 the special conditions of the moment. 
 
 It is not easy to come to a conclusion, though on the whole I con- 
 sider that the latter conclusion is the more reasonable. 
 
 There was in the battle little or no side by side engage- 
 ment. In the first phase of it, when each fleet fought more or less 
 in a body, there was no broadside to broadside contention, and con- 
 sequently no pitting of a weaker ship against a stronger. Nearly 
 every ship in the Japanese fleet was then firing on a part of the 
 Chinese fleet, and though, as it happened, it was some of the weakest 
 of the Chinese ships that were most exposed, this was not a necessity 
 of the conditions, but was due to the arrangements of the Chinese 
 Admiral. Again, from first to last the battle was fought at con- 
 siderable range, at first from 3,000 to 4,000 yards. The lines of battle 
 opposed at that distance can scarcely be said to present a ship to 
 ship engagement. Probably it is right to say that in such a case 
 every ship in each line would be open to the fire of any ship in the 
 opposite line. 
 
 If the tactics pursued at the battle of the Yalu are hereafter 
 
KECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 441 
 
 to prevail, these two conditions make it of less importance to avoid 
 mixing different classes of ships in what may still be called " the 
 line " than it was in earlier times. But two arguments stand out on 
 the other side in a very prominent way. The two first ships to quit 
 the Chinese fleet in a disabled state were the Chao Yung and the 
 Yung Wei, small ships of 1,350 tons. The two next ships to quit 
 the fleet were the Tsi Yuen and Kivang Chia, the former displacing 
 2,300 tons, and the latter 1,300 tons only. On the Japanese side, 
 the armed transport, the Saikio Mavu, was the first ship to be put 
 out of action. Then it seems clear that the armoured battle-ships 
 of the Chinese, the Chen Ytien and the Ting Yuen, maintained the 
 fight with sturdiness and success from first to last, and retired from 
 the field at the end of the battle with all the honours that came 
 of it. 
 
 These facts, on the other side, lead to the reflection that neither 
 fleet seems to have gained much by putting weak ships into the general 
 action. It is impossible to say that the weak ships on the Japanese 
 side made the victory for them, while the driving off of four of their 
 weaker ships comparatively early in the battle must have brought 
 great discouragement to the Chinese. 
 
 The balance of argument seems to be to confirm the old decision, 
 and to show that if the gun is to remain the determining weapon in 
 naval war, there must still be, for the general action, a selection of 
 ships " fit to lie in a line." 
 
 There is a strong parallel between Admiral Ito's victory off the 
 Yalu and Nelson's at the Nile. Not, of course, in any of the details, 
 but in the general conditions and in the general results. In each case 
 an army had been conveyed across a sea over which the command 
 was not fully assured. In each case, the safety of the army was in 
 no way assured by the presence of the convoying fleet. In both 
 cases it was entirely a matter of fortune that the army was not met 
 at sea in its transports, and destroyed at a blow. In both cases, 
 owing to their being unobserved, the armies were landed without 
 interference of any kind. In both cases, the convoying fleets were 
 defeated and broken up after the landing of the troops. 
 
 As the battle of the Nile restored the command of the Medi- 
 terranean to the British, so the battle of the Yalu confirmed the 
 command of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechili to the Japanese. 
 As results of the battle of the Nile, Acre was occupied, Malta was 
 invested and captured, and Egypt was invaded. As results of the 
 battle of the Yalu, Port Arthur, and Wei-hai-wei enclosing the 
 Chinese fleet, were captured by the Japanese. 
 
 80* 
 
442 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The Japanese had been victors in the Korea, no doubt in a great 
 degree because their battalions were individually superior to those 
 of the Chinese. But it seems certain that if each army had been 
 of equally high class, the superior numbers of the Japanese would 
 have insured victory. This superiority was partly the result of the 
 Japanese command of the sea, which was now, by the sea-fight of the 
 Yalu, absolutely confirmed to them. 
 
 But it was thought at the time by many that the landing of 7,000 
 men in the Yalu Eiver by the Chinese was a proof that command 
 of the sea was incompetent to prevent invasion. It was a singular 
 position to adopt, because, in the first place, there was no invasion, 
 but only a transfer of a small body of troops from one friendly 
 port to another; and, secondly, because such transfers have been 
 admittedly common in former wars. There was absolutely nothing 
 new in the occurrence, and, as fleets cannot be ubiquitous, such 
 things must always be expected between unblockaded ports. If,. 
 without the command of the sea, the Chinese had attempted to 
 land the 7,000 men on a coast occupied by the Japanese, as at 
 Chemulpo or Asan, the rule of naval war would have been violated. 
 But nothing so wild could have been thought of. The detachment 
 of Chinese at Asan, when the war broke out, found themselves abso- 
 lutely useless there, and made their escape from the position. To 
 have landed 7,000 men on the coast the Japanese held would have 
 merely sacrificed them for no object. This consideration did prevent, 
 and generally has prevented, such rashness. To make a success of 
 such a landing the army must have been large, but, if it had been 
 large, it could not have passed unnoticed across the sea, and it would 
 have been attacked and beaten, either at sea, or before the landing 
 had been completed. 
 
 The transport and disembarkation of the Chinese troops to and at 
 the Yalu Eiver does not therefore bear in the slightest degree upon 
 the question of hostile invasion across a sea which is not commanded. 
 
 But when the sea is commanded, the case is reversed. All history 
 had shown that attacks on territory were then open across it. The 
 American Civil War, and, more recently, the Chilian Civil War, had 
 shown how greatly steam had facilitated the operation of invasion, 
 and reduced its uncertainties to a minimum. The Japanese conduct 
 of the war confirmed in the highest degree all the lessons that 
 history had taught. 
 
 Though the Japanese had occasionally braved the Chinese ships in 
 their harbours by a display of force before them, yet the}^ had not 
 established a regular watch upon them till after the battle of the 
 
R/'JCE^^T ILL USTRA TIONS OF NA VAL WA RFA RL\ 4 1:1 
 
 Yalu. But now, as early as October 5th, the Japanese fleet was 
 watching the harbours of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, closing in at 
 nightfall and drawing off at daylight. This was blockade ; and if 
 the first stage of naval warfare is obtaining command of the sea, the 
 second is blockade. 
 
 One of the earliest results of blockade is the disappearance of the 
 merchant flag of the lieaten belligerent. It was reported from 
 Shanghai early in October that " very few vessels are now under the 
 Chinese flag; and so great is the risk now considered, that Chinese 
 merchants at this port are cancelling all their freight contracts." 
 Some of the damaged Japanese ships had gone to Japanese dock- 
 yards for repair, but notwithstanding this, the report from Tientsin, 
 under date October 10th, was that " Chinese officials no longer 
 deny that the Japanese fleet commands the Shantung coast, and in 
 reality holds the Gulf of Pechili." At Shanghai, on the 11th 
 October, it was " considered doubtful whether any more vessels 
 carrying contraband of war would be able to enter Chinese ports." 
 On the 19th of October it was reported from Tientsin that " Japa- 
 nese cruisers were boarding and searching ships, but were letting 
 traders pass." 
 
 All the conditions were thus ready for the third phase of naval 
 war, namely, territorial attack, by the Japanese; and on the 19th of 
 October it was reported from Yokohama that a Japanese army of 
 40,000 men (it was not so large), under Marshal Oyama, had em- 
 barked in transports and left Hiroshima for an unknown destination. 
 
 Meantime the land operations in the north of Korea were being 
 conducted on lines similar to those followed by Wellington in 1813. 
 .With their left wing resting on the sea and receiving assistance from 
 it, just as Wellington's had done, the Japanese advanced to the Yalu. 
 This was the Korean Bidassoa, and it was crossed on October 24th 
 in the face of some opposition. The First Army, as it was called, 
 marched from this point amid toils and difficulties, greater in point 
 of topography and climate than from the opposition of the enemy, 
 round the north shores of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechili 
 towards a line drawn from Mukden to the Port of Niu-chuang. This 
 army, under Marshal Yamagata, was reinforced and supplied from 
 the sea both east and west of the Liau-tung Peninsula, and by 
 land by forces disembarked for another purpose on the Liau-tung 
 Peninsula, yet its progress was so slow that, on the conclusion of the 
 armistice at the end of March, it had not advanced far beyond that 
 line. 
 
 The operations over sea were much more speedy and decisive ; 
 
444 ^''AVAL WARFARE. 
 
 although it ought to be remarked that after troops had been actually 
 landed, their advance to tlie final attack appears to be no more 
 rapid than preceding pages ha\'e shown it to be in the days long 
 past. 
 
 Marshal Oyarna's array, which left Hiroshima on the 19th of 
 October, was said to be 40,000 strong, embarked in 37 transports. 
 It appears that a portion of this force was landed near Taku-shan, 
 on the north shore of the Yellow Sea, as a reinforcement to the First 
 Army. The main part of it, still under Marshal Oyama, was landed 
 under cover of a portion of the fleet,*without difficulty, and marched 
 upon Kin-chau, some 25 miles, as the crow flies, overland to Port 
 Arthur. 
 
 The neck of the isthmas here narrows to about two miles in width 
 l:)y the encroachment of Ta-lien-hwan Bay to the south and of Kin- 
 chau Bay on the north. The army landed is said to have been from 
 20,000 to 22,000 men, and the landing-place seems to have been 
 chosen in order to keep clear of the guns mounted and the sub- 
 marine mines laid down to defend the anchorage of Ta-lien-hwan 
 Bay. The landing-place was therefore selected in accordance with 
 the rules which previous chapters of this work have shown to pre- 
 vail. 
 
 The main body of the Chinese fleet was at Wei-hai-wei, well pro- 
 tected by forts and extensive works. Reports were from time to 
 time circulated of Chinese ships having put to sea, and it is possible 
 that some demonstrations may have been thus made. But there is 
 good reason to suppose that the Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-wei^ there 
 being nothing but a torpedo-boat at Port Arthur, was closely watched 
 by the Japanese and practically blockaded and masked. Wei-hai- 
 wei and Port Arthur being less than 100 miles apart, any main 
 fleet stationed at sea between them, with look-out vessels close in 
 upon each port, would have a comparatively easy task in blocking both 
 harbours. The Japanese appear to have kept the sea in this way, 
 and, constantly showing themselves, made it hopeless for the Chinese 
 to think of interfering with the operation of invasion unless — which 
 was beyond their hopes — they could first defeat the Japanese cover- 
 ing fleet. 
 
 The Japanese invading army was for some days detained in pre- 
 paration before attempting a forward movement. It was not till 
 the 6th of November that the town of Kin-chau was attacked and 
 captured, and Ta-lien-hwan was carried early on the 7th. Respect- 
 
 * Admiral Ito's despatch, November 7tli. 
 

 
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 H 
 
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 P4 
 
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 5 
 
 H 
 
 
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 "^ 
 
 o 
 
 
 Ph 
 
 o-i 
 
REGENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 445 
 
 ing Ta-lien-hwan, the place appears to have been strongly fortified, 
 and on the sea face very strongly fortified. It is said there were 6 
 large forts, mounting 80 guns, which commanded the waters of the 
 bay. There were other works, evidently planned by an engineer of 
 high skill, designed to interfere with an invading army. 
 
 The part the fleet might take in the actual attack was discussed 
 between the land and sea commanders, and though all the teaching 
 of history lent its force to the decision come to that there should be 
 no main attack from the sea, it was arranged, quite in accordance 
 with precedent, that the fleet might create a diversion in favour of 
 the army during the attack, by opening fire upon the sea faces of 
 the works. Admiral Ito accordingly sent a squadron within range 
 of the forts, but without drawing their fire, and, on advancing next 
 morning, found the Japanese flag flying in all the forts. The Chinese 
 had offered but little opposition to the enemy, and the co-operation 
 of the ships was not called for. 
 
 With their rear thus secured against land attack, and their flanks 
 guarded by the fleet on each side of the peninsula, the Japanese 
 army advanced towards Port Arthur. This place was now absolutely 
 invested, and evidently must fall by lapse of time, if not by direct 
 attack. 
 
 The defences of Port Arthur on the land side were arranged on the 
 modern system of a chain of small works, often, if not generally, like 
 those protecting our own dockyards, weaker in rear than in front ; 
 and therefore liable to be turned by any force breaking through the 
 chain. The Japanese slowly pushed on through a difficult country 
 towards Port Arthur, while the bulk of the fleet — said to be 11 
 men-of-war, 8 torpedo-boats, and some transports — remained in 
 close watch on the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei. Now and then the 
 Chinese offered a stout resistance, but generally the difficulties were 
 more topographical than military. But the end was inevitable, and 
 on the evening of the 21st of November, nineteen days after the 
 troops disembarked, Port Arthur was in possession of Marshal 
 Oyama. The main fleet, though present, held aloof altogether, but, 
 in a modern application of the old principle, some torpedo-boats 
 and one or two small vessels shelled tlie country in advance of the 
 troops, and to a certain extent distracted the attention of the sea- 
 faced works. 
 
 The defences of Port Arthur appear to have been — following- 
 modern usage — much stronger on the sea side, from which, accord- 
 ing to experience, attack was least to be expected, than on the land 
 side. Five forts on the west side, and three on the east side, com- 
 
41G NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 inanded the entrance ; there were also two lines of submarine mines 
 ])rotecting it, and these were guarded by considerable numbers of 
 iield-pieces and machine-guns. But the continuous teaching of 
 history had been that comparatively slight defences would prevent 
 the hazard of a sea attack, and Port Arthur fell to the land attack of 
 troops carried over a commanded sea, in what was quite the usual 
 way. It appears that, after leaving a sufficient garrison at Port 
 Arthur, most of Marshal Oyama's army either marched north by 
 land or was carried up by sea and landed at the head of the Liau- 
 tung Gulf, in support of the First Array operating in Manchuria. 
 That army, however, was presently cut off from the sea by the 
 gathering of ice along the shore. 
 
 As early as October 29th it was rej^orted that a third Japanese 
 army of 24,000 men was being assembled at Hiroshima, to be em- 
 barked for some destination, which, like every other proposed move- 
 ment of the Japanese, was kept a profound secret. 0n December 
 loth it was stated to be yet at Hiroshima waiting orders. The 
 watch was still kept up on the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei, and 
 about the 18th of December a sailing store-ship with supplies for the 
 fleet was captured by the Japanese and carried to Ta-lien-hwan. On 
 the 21st it was reported from Shanghai that the Japanese fleet — 
 possibly a part of it — had sailed from Port Arthur, escorting some 
 transports bound to the southward. On the 23rd it was reported 
 from Hiroshima that 25,000 troops would be embarked there in the 
 course of the week. On the 25th it was reported from Tientsin that 
 Japanese cruisers were reconnoitring the coast above Wei-hai-wei. 
 On the 8th of January, 1895, it was reported that several transports 
 with part of the third Japanese army on board had left Hiroshima, 
 «ind it was expected that the embarkation of the whole would be 
 complete by the 11th. 
 
 On the 19th, Japanese ships — said to be three in number — and 
 a landed force of 2,000 men, bombarded the fortified town of Teng- 
 chu, which is on the Shan-tung coast, nearly south of Port Arthur, 
 and 70 miles west of Wei-hai-wei. By nightfall .the guns were 
 silenced, and the town was occupied by the victors. Probably this 
 was not only a diversion, but was intended to cut the western com- 
 munications of Wei-hai-wei, and especially the telegraph between 
 Wei-hai-wei and Pekin, which passes through Teng-chu. 
 
 It was finally announced from Tientsin, on the 20th of January, 
 that a Japanese force had landed at Yung-tcheng Bay to the south 
 of the Shan-tung Promontory, that is to say, about 25 miles by land, 
 as the crow flies, from Wei-hai-wei. Fifty transports were said to 
 
REGENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 447 
 
 have put in an appearance, and the disemlmrkation was begun at 
 once. 
 
 Meantime, a third Japanese landing was effected at Niug-hai, 
 between Chefu and Wei-hai-wei, in this case with a more definite 
 purpose of closing the road to Wei-hai-wei, while the troops landed 
 at Teng-cha were withdrawn. 
 
 There had been some little opposition to the landing in Yung- 
 tcheng Bay, but the few guns placed to protect the shore were easily 
 silenced and captured by an advanced guard of Marines landed for 
 the purpose. A blinding snowstorm had concealed the approacli of 
 the flotilla from the Chinese, but this was followed by bright 
 weather and keen frost, which placed the country in an admh-able 
 state for marching over. 
 
 On the 27th it was announced from Chefu that there weie 20 
 Japanese war-ships and 19 transports in Yung-tcheng Bay, and that 
 the landed army was steadily advancing on ^Vei-hai-wei. Except 
 for the island of Leu-kung-tau, which lies across the bay and divides 
 access to it into two channels, one to the west a mile wide, and the 
 other to the eastward two and a-half miles wide, the anchorage there 
 would be open to the north-east. But the width of the channels, on 
 the one hand, invites attack from the sea on any shipping inside, 
 but, on the other hand, enables war-ships some freedom to defend 
 themselves against a sea attack. A fortified island like Leu-kung- 
 tau is a sort of Sumter over again, difficult to reduce wholly, except 
 by attack from the sea, and capable of holding out for a considerable 
 period against any land force which might have captured the works 
 upon the mainland. The war-ships, again, within the harbour, would 
 not only be capable of defending themselves against an enemy's 
 fleet outside, but might give great support to the island and main- 
 land batteries in resisting land and sea attacks. On the other hand, 
 unless there were a perfect system of booms and mines extending 
 over an arc more than three miles long, the war-ships were peculiarly 
 open to the new method of attack, under cover of night, which the 
 torpedo-boat has developed. Wei-hai-wei, again, was not like Port 
 Arthur, where a landed army, flanked by war-ships, could hold a 
 narrow neck of land, and so keep its rear free. A military force 
 attacking Wei-hai-wei from the land side must spread itself over a 
 wide arc, and leave its rear open at every point to the successful 
 attack of even a small relieving army. It seems entirely a question 
 whether the land defence of a place like Wei-hai-wei would not be 
 better effected by small works and garrisons and a moving army in 
 tlie vicinity, than by having defending works and a large army shut 
 
448 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 up in an inner circle. But though, as the Japanese advanced, it was 
 reported that a garrison of 1 1 ,000 men manned the works of Wei- 
 hai-wei. Marshal Oyama, who had arrived from Port Arthur and 
 taken the command of the Thild Army, doubtless felt pretty secure 
 against the arrival of any relieving force. 
 
 By the 30th of January the Japanese had drawn a cordon round 
 the defences of Wei-hai-wei, and the place was fully invested by 
 land and sea. The prize before the invaders was not only the port 
 itself, but almost the whole Chinese navy which was at anchor 
 there. 
 
 With marvellous speed the Japanese army captured the chain of 
 forts which surrounded the town and harbour. They were stated to 
 be all in the enemy's hands on the evening of the 30th of January, 
 and on the 1st of February it was reported that the Japanese were 
 turning the guns of the captured forts upon the war-ships and on the 
 island forts. But it was, very likely truly, stated that very little 
 fire was directed upon the war-ships, in the hope — a hope which the 
 dogged tenacity of the Chinese seamen frustrated — that they might 
 ultimately fall into Japanese hands intact. 
 
 Following all the war precedents, the Japanese fleet kept well out 
 of range of serious damage from the shore batteries, and only offered 
 a desultory and distant fire upon ships and shore. But the Chinese 
 war-ships, especially the battle- ship Ting Yuen, showed a most 
 gallant front, and actually shelled the Japanese out of one of the 
 captured forts. 
 
 But the weather was telling terribly against the Japanese fleet. 
 There were 26 degrees of frost with a northern gale which made 
 Admiral Ito's position off the port most insecure. He was compelled 
 to withdraw the main part of his fleet to Yimg-tcheng Bay, leaving 
 only a small squadron to watch the Chinese fleet. 
 
 It is worthy of note that we should see the modern admiral, not- 
 withstanding all the material changes which surround him, following 
 .precisely in the steps of Hawke or of Howe when assailed by heavy 
 weather. Doubtless the steam fleet would not be so early compelled 
 io quit its post as the sailing fleet was, and doubtless its return 
 would be more speedy ; but yet it seeks the nearest shelter — in this 
 case 40 miles off — just as the sailing fleet was compielled to do in the 
 days gone by. 
 
 Admiral Ito was back again on the 3rd of February, and the fleet 
 took a more prominent part than hitherto in joining the land works 
 in their fire on the island forts and on the Chinese war-ships. But 
 both of these resisted with a dogged determination, and replied to 
 
t 
 
 I 
 
RECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 441) 
 
 the Japanese fire with a gallantry which had hardly been before dis- 
 played by the Chinese. No material change seems to have been 
 effected by a bombardment which was warmly carried on by both 
 sides until night fell. 
 
 On the 4th the bombardment reopened, and continued ;dl day 
 without any real advance being made by the Japanese. 
 
 Both entrances to the harbour were guarded by a double line of 
 submarine mines, and also by certain obstructions defending the 
 inner waters against torpedo-boat attack. It is to be presumed that 
 the mere belief that such things existed, coupled with the ocular 
 demonstration afforded by the forts, were effective in preventing 
 any close attack by the Japanese fleet ; but from the first. Admiral 
 Ito had proposed to employ the torpedo-boat force of which he was 
 possessed in a night attack upon some of the ships. On the night 
 of the 30th of January, the western forts being then in Japanese 
 hands, the torpedo-boat flotilla was directed to force the western 
 entrance to the harbour. As the boats were creeping silently in, 
 however, they were observed by their friends in the land forts, who, 
 taking them for the enemy, opened fire upon them. This awoke 
 the Chinese to their danger, and they joined indiscriminately in the 
 bombardment. The Japanese torpedo-boats had no option but to 
 retire, which they did. Another attempt was made on the night of 
 the 2nd February, but this time the Chinese were fully on the alert, 
 and the flotilla was withdrawn. 
 
 On the night of the 4th, Admiral Ito sent two divisions of his 15 
 torpedo-boats in, as soon as the moon set, through the eastern en- 
 trance, the third division watching the western entrance. The boats 
 met a variety of obstacles, but ultimately succeeded in getting into 
 the bay and forming a circle round the Chinese ships which were 
 gathered up under the shelter of the island and its forts. One of the 
 boats got within range of the Ting Yuen unobserved, and fired two 
 torpedoes at her, both taking effect, and sending the ship instantly 
 to the bottom. The Chinese at once opened a stirring fire. A shell 
 exploded in the engine-room of one torpedo-boat, which destroyed 
 her and her crew. Three of the boats ran ashore, and two broke 
 their propellers against the obstructions or the rocks. Only one 
 boat escaped entirely untouched, and it was on board her, appa- 
 rently, that the officer in command and his two look-outs were frozen 
 to death at their posts. 
 
 Heavily damaged as the flotilla was, some of the boats renewed 
 the attack on the night of the oth of February, firing torpedoes 
 with apparent effect on three ships, and these boats returned un- 
 
450 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 harmed. The damaged torpedo-boats were towed to Port Arthur for 
 repair. 
 
 On the niglit of the 7th, Admiral Ito, without meeting with any 
 opposition, destroyed the boom which extended 400 yards from the 
 mainland of the eastern entrance. 
 
 The island forts and 13 remaining war-ships were holding out as 
 obstinately as ever on the morning of the 8tb, and the Japanese 
 ships appear to have closed in upon them on that day. Some of the 
 ■Chinese torpedo-boats in attempting to escape — apparently in day- 
 light — were said to have been destroyed by the Japanese. On the 9th 
 the bombardment was renewed, and the Ghinrj Yuen was sunk by 
 projectiles. 
 
 But the ver}' gallant defence of the fleet and the island forts, so 
 honourable to Admiral Ting and to General Chang, who was in com- 
 mand of the island, could not last for ever. It had all along been a 
 question of days, and it soon became a question of hours, when sur- 
 render would be offered. On the afternoon of the 12th, Admiral 
 Ting, having held his own for 14 clear days, offered the surrender 
 of the fleet and island and the remaining forts to Admiral Ito on 
 condition that the lives of all should be spared. A curious sense of 
 pathos surrounds the stipulation. Want of knowledge of, and prac- 
 tice in, western methods of war may be said to have lost the day to 
 a great nation composed of splendid raw material, and given it to a 
 smaller one which added to its capacities the knowledge and practice 
 which the Chinese lacked. When the time for surrender comes, the 
 gallant Chinese commander shows no knowledge of how and why he 
 has lost the day, and is far away back in the times when massacre of 
 prisoners was a mere incident. Some feeling as to the pity of it 
 could scarcely have been absent from the mind of Admiral Ito when 
 he granted the terms as a matter of course. 
 
 Nor can we read without strong sympathy, the further account 
 which tells us how, when Admiral Ito's envoy, bearing his acceptance 
 of Admiral Ting's terms, returned to the Japanese flag-ship next 
 morning, he told how the Chinese Admiral and Greneral, the two 
 men who had done most honour to the Chinese name since the war 
 began, had destroyed themselves. Who shall cast a stone at the 
 memorials of two men who certainly had a sense of greatness in them, 
 if their environment warped it ? 
 
 The surrender was complete on February 13th, and the remainder 
 of the Chinese fleet, including the battle-ship Chen Yuen, fell into 
 the hands of the victors. 
 
 Wei-hai-wei lacked the sole land defence which is competent to 
 
RIJGENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE. 451 
 
 l)rotect such a port : namely, a sufficient moving, or relieving army. 
 Without this, it fell as every place must fall, when properly attacked 
 by an enemy in command of the sea, and using it. 
 
 From first to last the lessons of history were confirmed at Wei- 
 liai-wei. A sheltered and practically unfortified landing-place was 
 chosen, though the subsequent march was made the longer thereby. 
 A close watch in sufficient force was kept upon the only Chinese ships 
 capable of interfering with the invasion. So far as the land defences 
 were concei'ned, it may be said that the fleet took no direct part in 
 their capture. But the island, as it happened, could not be easily 
 assailed except by the fleet, for the Chinese disabled most of the 
 guns of the western forts, which commanded those on Leu-kung-tau 
 Island, before abandoning them, and the eastern forts, though intact 
 and otherwise available, were 5,000 yards from the island, and the 
 batteries on it were probably invisible from the mainland batteries 
 to the east. 
 
 Then the ships which formed the mainstay of the defence were 
 proper objects of attack by ships, even though they were, to such a 
 large extent, covered by the fire of the island forts. But the care 
 which the Japanese commanders took to keep oat of close range with 
 the batteries is a striking repetition of the tactics pursued in the 
 past. 
 
 Doubtless there was no great precedent for the persistent and 
 successive attacks of the ships by torpedo-boats, but it would have 
 been a strange anomaly had the Japanese not used the new force in 
 the new way which it had been specially designed to follow. 
 
 Throughout the whole war it had been found easy for a section of 
 those who consider these matters to pass their lessons by, somewhat 
 contemptuously, with the allegation that the absolute collapse of the 
 Chinese at every point had rendered all the operations null and void 
 as practical examples. Such reasoning might properly be available 
 had there been anything new or surprising in the methods pursued, 
 and in the results of them. But where we read, in the former chap- 
 ters of this work, example after example of the consequences of 
 certain methods of procedure, and how one method produces success, 
 and another failure ; and when we find the Japanese always adopt- 
 ing the methods which led to the one, and eschewing those which 
 led to the other, we can scarcely make more of the Chinese failures, 
 than to say that the Japanese successes were more speedy and less 
 costly than they would have been had a stronger foe been met. 
 
 In any case we must except the Ting Yuen and the Chen Yuen, 
 and perhaps other of the Chinese ships, from the stigma of being 
 
452 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 oonteuiptihle enemies. The ships were at least quite as well fought, 
 from the first to the last, as the general run of those which we met 
 and conquered in our later wars with France. 
 
 I conclude this chapter during the armistice, which it may be 
 lioped will lead to peace. Just before it was agreed on, the Japanese 
 had made an easy capture of the Pescadore Islands, and it was evi- 
 dent that with them it was only a question of the availability of 
 troops what further conquests would be achieved. 
 
 But the general conclusion must be that the Koi'ean War gives us 
 no reason for believing that any of the new inventions have modified 
 the leading principles of Naval Warfare. 
 
453 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Acadia, 257. 
 
 Achates (ship), 28, 236. 
 
 Acre, 222, 406, 409, 410, 441. 
 
 Actium, 228. 
 
 Active (ship), 182, 183. 
 
 Admiral, the Lord High, 82. 
 
 Admiralty, 173, 188, 191. 
 
 Adalbert, Prince, 429. 
 
 Adelentado, 19, 22. 
 
 Africa, West Coast of, 7, 50, 77, 
 
 176, 211, 263. 
 Agele, 319. 
 Agincourt Road, 180. 
 Aiguillon, Duke d', 136, 143. 
 Aix, 164. 
 
 Aix (Isle de), 175. 
 Aix Roads, 179, 180, 356, 359, 360, 
 
 361, 362. 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 92, 356, 
 
 362. 
 Ajaccio, 318. 
 Akitsushima (ship), 436. 
 Aland Islands, 404. 
 Albania, 27. 
 Albany, Duke of, 3. 
 Albemarle {see Monk). 
 Alexandria, 166, 219, 222, 406, 
 
 407, 409, 415, 416. 
 Algecii-as, 370. 
 Algiers, 217, 222, 406-408, 410, 
 
 411, 414-416. 
 Alicante, 111,' 296, 313. 
 Alison, 199. 
 
 Allemand, 180, 186, 190, 195-198, 
 Allemonde, Admiral, 126. 
 Allen, Sir T., 45, 56, 59. 
 Alliance, Spanish, 158. 
 Ahna (ship), 415. 
 Alma River, 404. 
 Almirante, 295. 
 Alsen, 428. 
 
 Altea, 296, 309, 312, 313. 
 Alva, Duke of, 29, 228. 
 
 Ambassadors, Dutch, 34. 
 
 Ambleteuse', 175. 
 
 Ameland, 72. 
 
 America (ship), 264. 
 
 America, 29, 186, 207, 245, 320, 
 
 382, 387. 
 America, North, 150, 160, 211, 
 
 257, 377. 
 America, South, 7. 
 Amherst, General, 356. 
 Amiens, Peace of, 92, 169. 
 Amsterdam, 68, 169. 
 Andalusia, 298, 301. 
 Angamos, 414. 
 Anglo-Dutch fleets, 130. 
 Anglo-Dutch War, 80. 
 Anguilla, 357, 
 Annapolis {see Port Royal). 
 Annunciado (ship), 236, 237, 239. 
 Anson, Captain, 135, 332, 360, 
 
 .362. 
 Antelope (ship), 258. 
 Anticosti Island, 322. 
 Antigua, 187, 188, 191, 208, 249, 
 
 250, 252, 255, 256, 258, 259, 
 
 320, 323, 324, 332, 351, 385, 
 
 386, 393, 394. 
 Antelope, 28. 
 
 Antin, Marquis d', 337, 338. 
 Antwerp, 29. 
 Aquitaine, 28. 
 Arbuthnot, Vice-Admiral, 418, 
 
 421. 
 Archaiologia, The, 236. 
 Ardrossan, 136. 
 Aretlnisa (ship), 411. 
 Arica, 413, 414, 431. 
 Ark (ship), 235, 236, 241. 
 Ark Royal (ship), 8. 
 Arlington, Lord, 60, 62. 
 Armada, the Spanish, 8, 10, 11, 
 
 82, 108, 227, 228, 230, 242, 243. 
 Arminach, 28. 
 
454 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 ^Vi-thur, Colonel, 290. 
 
 Asan, 43G, 437, 442. 
 
 Ash by, Admiral Sir John, 126. 
 
 Ashley River, 418. 
 
 Association (ship), 288. 
 
 Atlantic, 158, 160, 190, 207, 357, 
 
 362, 373, 374, 378. 
 Audacioits (ship), 433. 
 Austerlitz, 199. 
 Austria, 200. 
 Ayscue, Sir George, 34-37, 47, 54, 
 
 66. 
 Ayde, 28. 
 Azoies, or Western Islands, 10-13, 
 
 15-20, 22, 189, 191, 192. 
 
 Balaclava, 403. 
 
 Balearic Isles, 183, 295. 
 
 Balmacedists. 431-435. 
 
 Baltic Sea, 7. 8, 53, 57, 158, 204, 
 
 331, 332, 404, 426-429. 
 Baltimore, 246. 
 
 Bankert, Admiral, 58, 67, 69, 72. 
 Bantry Bay, 108, 157, 165, 168, 
 
 220, 246, 379. 
 Barbados, 34, 61, 78, 183, 184. 
 
 186-188, 191, 249, 250, 252; 
 
 253, 255, 258, 260, 289-291, 
 
 384, 387, 388, 390, 394, 395. 
 Barbary, 27. 
 Barca-longa, 86. 
 Barcelona, 182, 183, 271, 272, 295, 
 
 296, 298, 309, 311, 312, 324, 
 
 325, 371, 380. 
 Barcelo, Don, 369. 
 Bareil, Commodore, 132. 
 Barfleur, 124, 126, 164. 
 Bark of Bullein, 28. 
 Barnet, Commodore, 358. 
 Barradera, 340. 
 Barrin<T;ton, Rear-Admii-al, 384, 
 
 385,^387, 388, 391, 392. 
 Barrow, 234, 238. 
 Bart, Jean, 131. 
 Baskerville, 15. 
 Basque Roads, 135, 136, 281. 
 Basse Terre, 250, 254, 292. 
 Bastia, 317. 
 Batacaloa, 396, 397. 
 Battery Bee, 421. 
 Bayonne, 234. 
 Beachy Head, 109, 119, 122, 259. 
 
 Beachy Head, Battle of, 120-123, 
 
 127. 
 Beatson, 395. 
 Beaufort, Duke of, 53, 58. 
 Beauregard, Fort, 421, 425. 
 Beausejour Point, 390. 
 Belle of Cork (ship), 414. 
 Belleisle, Island of, 130, 144, 277, 
 
 278, 397, 398. 
 Belfast, 117. 
 Bellona (ship), 397. 
 Belts, the, 204. 
 Benbow, Admiral, 281, 289-291, 
 
 293. 
 Bengal, Bay of, 377. 
 Bereen, 50, 51, 60, 68, 74, 76, 
 
 146. 
 Berkeley, Lord, 54, 268, 269, 275, 
 
 277, 292. 
 Berryer, Marshal, 143. 
 Berteaume Bay, 186, 207, 270, 
 
 276. 
 Bettesworth, 188, 190, 191. 
 Beyrout, 409. 
 j Bidassoa, 443. 
 I Bideford (ship), 132. 
 ! Bideford, 349. 
 i Bierne, 28. 
 
 Billingsley, Captain Rupert, 280, 
 ; 281. 
 Biohio (ship), 433. 
 Biscay, Bay of, 137, 158, 192, 232, 
 
 242. 
 Black Sea, 204, 413. 
 Blake, 33-39, 46, 66, 76, 89. 
 Blakeney, General. 363, 365. 
 Blanac, Count de, 259, 277. 
 Blanco Encalada (ship), 433, 434. 
 Blockade, 18, 19, 21, 41, 42, 51, 
 
 53, 55, 60, 62-64, 68, 116, 139, 
 
 145, 157-159, 175, 179, 180, 189, 
 
 190, 195, 196, 201, 427. 
 Boarding, 87. 
 Boca Chica, 335. 336, 340-342, 
 
 345. 
 Bodley, Commodore, 40, 66, 77. 
 Bomarsund, 404-406. 
 Bomb Vessels, 137. 
 Bombardment, 130, 137, 147, 164, 
 
 165, 222, 336, 357, 406-416, 
 
 420-422, 426. 
 Bompart, Admiral, 136, 141-144, 
 
 148. 
 Bompart, Commodore, 164, 220, 379. 
 
INDEX 
 
 455 
 
 Bonadventure, 28. 
 
 Bonasolia, 8. 
 
 Bonifacio, Straits of, 318. 
 
 Bonnet, the, 26. 
 
 Booker, John, 263. 
 
 Borburata Harbour (the Keys of 
 Barbarat), 352. 
 
 Bordeaux, 45, 69. 
 
 Border Ships, 102. 
 
 Boscawen, Admiral, 138-141, 144, 
 148, 356. 
 
 Bosphorus, 204. 
 
 Boston, 257, 261, 319, 321, 353, 
 383, 384, 388. 
 
 Boteler, 259. 
 
 Bouet-Willaumez, Admiral Count, 
 426, 427, 429. 
 
 Bouille, Marquis de, 384, 387, 393, 
 394. 
 
 Boulogne, 3, 4, 58, 131, 157, 163, 
 165, 174-179, 185, 186, 198, 
 200, 201. 
 
 Bourbaki, General, 427, 428. 
 
 Bourbon, Island of, 358, 359. 
 
 Bourbons, 282. 
 
 Boys, Commodore, 136, 146. 
 
 Boysott, Admiral, 29. 
 
 Bowline, 87. 
 
 Bracket, Commodore, 45. 
 
 Brandaries, 57. 
 
 Brandenburg, 53. 
 
 Brava Point, 352. 
 
 Breame, 30. 
 
 Breda, 59. 
 
 Brenton's Ledge, 381. 
 
 Bretagne (ship), 155. 
 
 Brett, Commodore Sir P., 136 
 
 Brest, 3, 4, 14, 53, 59, 110, 111, 113, 
 122-124, 127, 130-133, 136-138, 
 141-148, 150, 153, 156-160, 
 163-165, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 
 177-180, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 
 195-198, 200, 201, 207, 217, 220, 
 246, 247, 267-270, 275, 276, 278, 
 280, 294-296, 308, 355, 356, 359, 
 360, 361, 362, 368, 369, 371, 397, 
 398, 400. 
 
 Bridger, Sir- Thomas, 78. 
 
 Bridport, Lord, 165, 168, 400. 
 
 Brighton, 3, 
 
 Bristol, 349. 
 
 Bristol (ship), 417. 
 
 Britannia (ship), 310. 
 
 British Seas, 31, 42, 133. 
 
 Brittany, 14, 27, 150, 175. 
 
 Brodrick, Captain, 132. 
 
 Brome, Captain, 264. 
 
 Brouncker, Lord, 58. 
 
 Brown, Commodox^e, 334 
 
 Brown, General, 318. 
 
 Brueys, Admiral, 402. 
 
 Bruix, Admiral, 165-167, 171, 176. 
 
 %ron. Captain, 357, 359, 368, 
 381-385, 388-392. 
 
 Buchan Ness, 34. 
 
 Buckle, Captain, 139, 141. 
 
 Bucknam, Captain, 288. 
 
 Bueno, Don Alonso Perez de 
 Guzman el, 230. 
 
 Bull (ship), 28. 
 
 Burchett, 6, 242, 243, 292, 294. 
 
 Burford, 334, 335. 
 
 Burnett, Bishop, 112, 282. 
 
 Burrough, William, 7. 
 
 Butler, James, Duke of Ormond, 
 328. 
 
 Byam, Colonel, 292. 
 
 Byng, Admiral Sir George, after- 
 wards Lord Torrington, 298. 
 302, 308, 312, 313, 316, 317, 
 327-329. 
 
 Byng, Admiral John, 363-365. 
 
 Cabritta Point, 139. 
 
 Cadiz, 10, 15-17, 22, 45, 84, 111, 
 
 11^, 138-143, 148, 150, 151, 158, 
 
 159, 162,165,166, 168, 170, 171, 
 
 173, 176, 179, 182, 184-186, 192. 
 
 196-199, 229-231, 243, 271, 279, 
 
 280, 282-286, 296, 298, 305, 306. 
 
 308, 328, 336, 337, 339, 360, 367, 
 
 368, 369, 371, 400-402. 
 CaflEa, 27. 
 Cagliari, 182. 
 Calais, 3, 4, 30, 130, 131, 179, 237, 
 
 241, 242, 276. 
 Calcutta, 365. 
 Calder, Sir Robert, 190-195, 197, 
 
 198. 
 Calder, Brigadier - General Sir 
 
 Henry, 385. 
 Caldera, Port, 433, 434. 
 Cailemberg, Admu'al, 113. 
 Camaret Bay, 130. 
 Camaret, 186, 207, 269-271, 276, 
 
 281. 
 Cambray, 200. 
 
450 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Camperdown, 162, 163, 169, 170, 
 
 400. 
 Canada, 11. 
 Canaries, 19, 69, 141. 
 Candia, 27 
 Candoit8, 8. 
 Canso, 353. 
 Cantabiano, 329. 
 Cape Breton, Island of, 322, 353, 
 
 356, 360, 362. 
 Cape Coast Castle, 77, 78. 
 Cape Fear River, 426. 
 Capesterre, 254. 
 Caraccas, 351. 
 Cardinals, 146. 
 Carenage, Baie du, 385, 386. 
 Caribbees, 389, 390. 
 Carlisle Bay, 186, 191, 249, 252, 
 
 259, 387, 395. 
 Carlskrona, 332. 
 Carrach, 10, 14. 
 Cartagena (America), 10, 274, 277, 
 
 290, 334-337, 339, 340, 343-345, 
 
 351. 
 Cartagena, 158, 159, 162, 166-168, 
 
 172, 179, 183, 184, 186, 271, 313, 
 
 314, 360, 400. 
 Carter, Admiral, 125, 126. 
 Carvel (ship), 83. 
 Carvils, 29, 30. 
 Carysfort (ship), 409. 
 Casco Bay, 257. 
 Cassard, M., 323, 324. 
 Castile, 295. 
 Castilians, 27. 
 Castillo Grande, 340, 343. 
 Castle, the, 300. 
 
 Catalonia, 271, 272. 309, 311-313. 
 Cathcart, Lord, 337, 338, 341. 
 Catholic League, 11, 14. 
 Caylus (Cheylus), Chevalier de, 
 
 357. 
 Centa, 111, 124, 138. 
 Centaur (ship), 14(». 
 Centurion (ship), 302. 
 Cerherus (ship), 382. 
 Cette, 318, 319, 324. 
 Cevennes, 318, 319. 
 Ceylon, 379. 
 Chacal, 415. 
 
 Chagres, 336, 338, 351, 352. 
 Chama, 78. 
 
 Chamba, Battery de, 340, 341. 
 Cliang, General, 450. 
 
 294, 
 
 -418, 
 
 Channel, the. 6, 12, 14, 15, 17-19, 
 24, 33-36, 38, 39, 59, 64, 66, 109, 
 110, 112, 113, 124, 131-133, 143, 
 151-153, 155, 156, 158, 160, 162. 
 163, 167, 168, 171,173, 176-178, 
 185, 190, 192, 194-196,198-201, 
 207, 217, 221, 229, 232-235, 239, 
 259, 267, 277, 284, 295, 308, 360, 
 387, 368, 371,374,427. 
 
 Channel Islands, 125. 
 
 Chao Tun;/ (ship), 439, 441. 
 
 Chateaurenault, Admiral, 110, 111, 
 113, 246, 280, 287, 289-291. 
 
 Chatham, 60,62, 74, 115. 
 
 Cfiarit// (.ship), 49. 
 
 Charnoch, 86. 
 
 Charles I., 2, 8, 25, 31, 33. 
 
 Charles II., 60, 61. 
 
 Charles III., Archduke, 282, 
 295, 309, 311-313. 
 
 Charles V., 3. 
 
 Charles, Fort, 250, 251, 254. 
 
 Charles (galley), 270. 
 
 Charleston, 225, 355, 378, 416 
 420, 424, 425 
 
 Chavagnac, Count de, 313. 
 
 Chefu, 447. 
 
 Chemulpo, 438, 442. 
 
 Chen Yuen (ship), 441, 450, 451. 
 
 Cherburg, 3, 123, 128, 135, 174, 
 177, 186, 427, 429. 
 
 Chevalier, 388, 392. 
 
 Chibouctou (Chedabucto), Bav of, 
 361. 
 
 Chih Yuen (ship), 439. 
 
 Chile, 431, 436. 
 
 Chimere, 386. 
 
 China, 431. 
 
 Chin;/ Yuen (ship). 450. 
 
 Choc, Creek du, 386. 
 
 Ciudadela, 368, 371. 
 
 Clarendon, 60. 
 
 Clark, 6. 
 
 Clear, Cape, 189, 207. 
 
 Clinton, General, 381, 417-419, 
 423, 424. 
 
 Clyde, Firth of, 136. 
 
 Cobham, Lord, 330, 331 . 
 
 Cochrane, 186, 188. 
 
 Cochrane, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
 347. 
 
 Codrington, General, 249, 252, 253, 
 255, 256, 260, 261, 292. 
 
 Coetlogon, M., 281, 290. 
 
 341, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 457 
 
 Colberg, 428, 429. 
 
 Collembine, Creneral, 294. 
 
 Colliber, 76. 
 
 Collingvvood, 192, 201. 
 
 Colt, Colonel, 261. 
 
 Columna Rostrata, 72. 
 
 Comet (ship), 73. 
 
 Command of the sea, 24, 33, 38, 39, 
 
 43, 46, 53, 65, 73, 78, 106-109, 
 
 123, 129, 134-136, 149, 150, 162, 
 
 170, 185,201-205, 207, 224,435, 
 
 437. 
 Commerce, 2, 25, 80. 
 Commerce, attack and defence of, 
 
 5-7, 26-33, 43, 46, 50, 51, 65, 
 
 76-78, 81, 82, 93, 94. 
 Commerce, Dutch, 32-39, 42-45, 
 
 47, 56, 57, 66-68, 74, 81, 106, 
 
 107, 212, 394. 
 Commerce, English, 17, 32, 34, 36, 
 
 53, 59, 66. 
 Commerce, Prussian, 46. 
 Commerce, Russian, 7. 
 Commerce, Spanish, 11-13, 15, 
 
 18-20, 22, 46. 
 Commissioners of the Navy, 55, 
 
 84. 
 Commons, House of, 314, 333, 
 
 349. 
 Commonwealth, 85, 212. 
 CommoiiwealtJi (ship), 8. 
 Condell (ship), 433, 435. 
 Conflans, Marshal Vice-Admiral 
 . de, 136, 137, 141-145, 148,171, 
 
 227. 
 Congo, 27. 
 
 Congressists, 431-435. 
 Connonicut, Bay of, 382. 
 Conquet, 3, 4, 128, 142. 
 Constantinople, 27. 
 Constant Wanvicl^ (ship), 259. 
 Consul, 161. 
 Convoy, 33, 35, 37-40, 42, 45, 48, 
 
 59, 65, 93, 94, 111, 124, 132, 
 
 155, 191. 
 Cooper River, 419,421. 
 Copenhagen, 169, 222. 
 Coquimbo, 435. 
 
 Cordova, de, 151, 369, 371, 372. 
 Cork, 175, 246. 
 Cormantin, Fort, 78. 
 Cornwall, Captain, 332, 
 Cornwallis, 174, 17.5, 178, 189, 
 
 190, 192, 19.5, 197, 198, 246. 
 
 Coromandel Coast, 358. 
 Corsica, 181, 318, 379, 380. 
 Corunna, 11, 197, 231, 232, 234, 
 
 242, 330, 331. 
 Corvo, 189, 191. 
 Council, Privy, 46, 59, 119. 
 Council of War, 37, 115, 249, 252, 
 
 306. 
 Coventry, Sir William, 71. • 
 Coventry (ship), 145. 
 Cressy, 27. 
 
 Crimea, 204, 217, 402, 403. 
 Crimean War, 106. 
 Croatia, 27. 
 Cromwell, 42. 
 Cronstadt, 405. 
 Cross, Captain Robei't, 242; 
 Cross-ravaging on raiding, 3, 4, 9- 
 
 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 36, 77, 84, 
 
 207-210, 267, 432, 436. 
 Cross -sails, 28. 
 Cruisers, 59, 95, 98, 100, 101, 104- 
 
 106. 
 Crumster, 29. 
 
 Cuba, 16, 289, 290, 347, 348. 
 Cuddalore, 396. 
 Cul de sac Marin, 260. 
 CuUoden (ship), 140. 
 Cumberland, Earl of, 11, 13, 16, 
 
 19, 231, 241. 
 Cumberland Bay, 348. 
 Cuming's Point, 421, 423. 
 Curacoa, 353, 392. 
 Curieux (ship), 188, 190, 191. 
 Curtis, Admiral Sir Roger, 400. 
 Custom House, 350. 
 Cyclops (ship), 409, 410. 
 Cyprus, 27. 
 Czar, the, 332. 
 
 Dacres, Admiral, 186. 
 Dahlgren, Admiral, 422, 423. 
 Dalmatia, 27. 
 Dalzell, Colonel, 351. 
 Dandridge, Captain, 338. 
 Danes, the, 7. 
 Dantzig, 28, 429. 
 Darby, Vice-Admiral, 369, 370, 
 
 372, 374. 
 Darce, Don Antonio, 151. 
 Dardanelles, the, 222, 204. 
 Darien, Isthmu.s of, 332. 
 Daru, Count, 199. o^j^c- 
 
458 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Dauphin V, 28. 
 
 Daws, 235. 
 
 D'Aiguillon, Due, 136, 143. 
 
 D'Arsie, Fort, 398. 
 
 De Bazan, Aloiizo, 12, 13. 
 
 De Belleisle, Marshal, 143. 
 
 De Boufils, Count Lapeyiouse, 312, 
 
 381, 38G, 395. 
 De CiillDn, Due, 371, 372. 
 De Drueourt, M., 356. 
 D'Enville, Due, 361, 362. 
 D'Estaiug, Count, 369, 381-392, 
 
 418. 
 D'Estourmelles, Due, 361. 
 D'Estrees, Count, 67; 69, 72, 265, 
 
 280. 
 De^Forbin, Count, 308, 316, 324. 
 De Frontenac, Count, 257. 
 De Galles, Admiral Morard, 379. 
 De Gata, Cape, 183. 
 De Gennes, M., 266. 
 De Gent, Admiral, 50, 61-63, 67. 
 De Grasse, Count, 374, 388, 392- 
 
 395. 
 De Guichen, Admiral, 371, 372. 
 De Gunn, Sir Bernard, 60. 
 De Haan, Admiral, 71. 
 De la Gallisoiiniere, Mavqui.s, 363- 
 
 365. 
 De Lafayette, Marquis, 381, 383. 
 De Langara, Don Juan, 162, 368. 
 De Lezo, Don Bias, 336, 340. 
 De Liefde, Vice-Admiral, 73. 
 De Morogues, Captain, 136, 148. 
 De Noailles, Colonel, 390. 
 D'OrWlliers, 151, 153-155. 
 De Pointis, Admiral, 274, 277, 
 
 303-308, 339. 
 De Recalde, Don Juan Martinez, 
 
 240. 
 De Roquefeuille, Admiral, 131- 
 
 133 
 De Ruiter, 35-37, 50, 56, 58, 61, 
 
 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 77, 245, 
 
 265. 
 De Saxe, Count, 131. 
 De St. Croix, M., 398. 
 De Torres, Admiral, 337, 342, 348. 
 DeTourville, Count, 110-113, 116, 
 
 118, 122, 124, 127, 129-131, 
 
 247. 
 De Witt, 36, 37, 40-42. 
 De Witt, Cornelius, 62, 114. 
 De Yaldes, Don Pedro, 240. 
 
 Deal, 40, 150. 
 
 Dean, Admiral, 39, 40, 66. 
 
 Decres, 176, 185, 198, 199, 202. 
 
 Defiance (ship), 193. 
 
 Delaware, 381. 
 
 Delaval, Sir. Ralph, 120, 124-1 2G, 
 
 128. 
 Demarara, 177. 
 Demi-eulveiin, 28. 
 Denmark, 53, 158, 169. 
 Dent, Captain, 357. 
 Deschenes, Admiral, 406. 
 Desirada Island, 259. 
 J)esirSe (ship), 164. 
 Desmolins, 264. 
 Deventer, 30. 
 Diamond Rock, 188. 
 Diamond (ship), 321. 
 Dido (ship), 409. 
 Didon (ship), 186. 
 Dieudonne, Rear-Admiral, 428. 
 Dieppe, 3, 53, 58, 130, 275. 
 Dilkes, Admiral, 301, 302, 307, 
 
 308. 
 Dillon, Colonel, 390. 
 Disbrowe, 89. • ' 
 " Discourse of the First Inventiori 
 
 of Ships " (Raleigh's), 26. 
 Djebail, 409. 
 Dogger Bank, 52, 68. 
 Dominica (Domini(jue), 176, 177, 
 187, 191, 208, 261, 338, 380, 384, 
 387. 
 Donna Maria, Cape, 290. 
 Douarnenez, 271. 
 Dover, 39, 40, 121, 125. 
 Dover Castle, 40. 
 Dover, Straits of, 33, 35, 36, 41, 
 
 58, 66, 161, 200, 232, 244. 
 Downs, the, 20, 34-38. 52, 59, 66, 
 75, 124, 132, 133, 136, 174, 175, 
 198, 316. 
 Drake, Sir Francis, 10, 11, 14, 22, 
 83, 228, 232, 235, 237, 238, 240. 
 241, 339, 392, 393, 395. 
 Drabler, the, 26. 
 DreadnouqJit (ship), 28. 
 Du Cassej Admiral, 254, 267. 281, 
 
 290,291, 315-317, 320. 
 Duburquois, M. de, 428. 
 Duckworth, 166, 171, 222. 
 Dudley, Sir Robel•^ Duke of 
 
 Northumberland, 81. 
 Duflf, Capt., 142, 144, 145. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 459 
 
 Dugnay-Troxiin, 323. 
 
 Dal-e (ship), 154. 
 
 Diike William, 161. • 
 
 Dnpont, Rear-Admiral, 420, 422, 
 
 424. 
 Duppel, 428. . - 
 Dumas, 199. 
 Duncan, Admiral, afterwards Lord 
 
 Camperdown, 71, 400. 
 Dungeness, 132, 133. 
 Dunkirk, 7, 36, 39, 54, 58, 130-132, 
 
 136, 164, 174, 179,240, 242-244, 
 
 275, 308, 316. 
 Dunose, 114. 
 Dunster, Major, 347. 
 Duro, 237, 238. 
 
 East India Company, 20. 
 
 East India Company (French), 
 
 358. 
 East India ships, 41, 50, 51, 63, 
 
 68, 72, 78. 
 East Indies, 7, 30, 99, 357, 359, 
 
 360, 366, 368, 371, 379, 392, 395, 
 
 397, 400. 
 Echjar (ship), 140, 321. 
 Edgecumbe, Comm'odore, 363, 365. 
 Edinburgh, 316. 
 Edward of Maiden (ship), 83. 
 Egmond, 41. 
 Egypt, 108, 109, 162, 164, 171, 
 
 175, 181, 182, 219-221, 227, 381, 
 
 399, 401, 402, 441. 
 Elbe, 58. 
 EHzabeth, Queen, 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 
 
 21, 22, 25, 29, 30, 82, 209, 232. 
 EUzaheth-Bonaventure (ship), 8. 
 Elizabeth Jonas (ship), 28. 
 EUiguava, 347. 
 Elmina, 77. 
 Embden, 30. 
 Ems, 50, 72. 
 English Islands, 357. 
 Entick, 6, 255, 292. 
 ; Epirus, 27. 
 
 Esploratore (ship), 430. 
 Esquibo, 177. 
 I Essex, Earl of, 15-19, 22, 84, 283. 
 I Estapona, 138. 
 
 Estreches de Rande, 287. 
 Etaples, 161, 175, 196. 
 Eugene, Prince, 314. 
 Euryalus (ship), 238. 
 
 Evelyn, 55. 
 
 Evertson, 78. 
 
 Evertz, Vke-Admiral, 63, C6. 
 
 Excellent (ship), 238. 
 
 Exeter, 349. 
 
 Exmouth, Lord, 407-, 408. 
 
 Exjieriment (ship), 417. 
 
 Fairbourne, Admiral Sir Stafford, 
 
 281, 314. 
 Fair Islands, 34. 
 Falcon (ship), 28,317. 
 Falmouth, 18. 
 Farmer, Colonel, 255, 256. 
 Faro, 329. 
 Farragut, 289. 
 Fayal, 11. 
 Fear, Cape, 417. 
 Federals, 225. 
 Felix, Mr., 265. 
 Felixtowe, 63. 
 Fenner, 233,- 232, 241. 
 Fenton, 230, 232, 241. 
 Ferrol, 17-19, 22, 151, 152, 158,159, 
 
 165, 168,174, 175,177, 179,185, 
 
 186, 189, 190-192, 194-197, 200, 
 
 201,281,337,342,-360. 
 Finisterre, Cape, 197, 207, 231, 281, 
 
 328, 360, 368. 
 Finland, Gulf of, 405. 
 Fire-ships, 35, 40, 47, 48, 54, 56, 
 
 58, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 73, 86, 88, 
 
 91-93, 111, 113-115, 126. 
 Firme (ship), 193. 
 Fisher, Fort, 425, 426. 
 I Fisheries, Dutch, 33, 42, 46. 
 Fitz-William, Su- W., 3. 
 Flanders, 30, 131. 
 Fleet in being, 122, 438. 
 Flemyng, Thomas, 233. 
 Floi-a (ship), 382. 
 Flores Island, 11,12, 16. 
 Florida, 10, 351. 
 Flushing, 30. 
 Foix, 28. 
 Folly Island, 422. 
 Foresight (ship), 28, 236. 
 Formidable (ship), 146. 
 Forth, Firth of, 316. 
 Fortification, nature and Tise of, 
 
 222-225, 375. 
 Fort Royal, 188, 191,261,387-390, 
 
 392-394. 
 
460 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Fortune Bay, 289. 
 Foula Island, 34. 
 Fourichon, Admiral, 429. 
 Fowlkes, Colonel, 260, 261. 
 Frances, Cape, 273. 
 Frederica, 351. 
 Frederiksdort, 428. 
 Frejus, 167. 
 
 French privateer.s (see Privateers). 
 French Prote.stants (see Protes- 
 tants). 
 Freshwater Bay, 114. 
 Friesland, 30, 48, 72. 
 Frigata, 84. 
 
 Frigate, 86, 95, 98, 104. 
 Frigate Bay, 251. 
 
 Frolusher, 9, 11, 13, 232, 235, 241. 
 Furet (ship), 187. 
 Fursis, Duke of, 318. 
 Fusan, 438. 
 
 Gabarus Bay, 353-356. 
 
 Galerata, 84. 
 
 Galeron, 84. 
 
 Galicia, 281, 330. 
 
 Galigabra, 84. 
 
 Galleas, 84. 
 
 Galleon, 9. 
 
 Galleys, 2, 3, 14, 15, 19. L'G, 27, 
 
 84. 
 Gallicla (ship), 343. 
 Galliot, 48, 52. 
 Galloper (shoal), 54. 
 Gambia, 263. 
 Gamboa, 264, 266. 
 Gauteaume, Admiral, 179, 180, 
 
 185, 186, 188-190, 195, 196,198, 
 
 200. 
 Gaspe Bay, 321. 
 Geary, Admiral, 142. 
 Genoa, 167, 401. 
 Genoese, 8, 27. 
 Gensan, 438. 
 George II., 98. 
 George Town, 390. 
 Georgia, 351, 367. 
 Gibraltar, 111, 138, 150, 162, 165, 
 
 168, 171, 186, 192, 298, 300-307, 
 
 309, 311, 312, 324, 334, 363- 
 
 370, 372-377, 407. 
 Gibraltar, Straits of, 111, 112, 117, 
 
 123, 138, 183, 184,218, 219,222, 
 
 279. 
 
 Gibraltar (ship), 138, 139, 144. 
 
 Gillmore, General, 422-434. 
 
 Glasgow, 349. 
 
 Gloria Ca.stle, 3;;2-334. 
 
 Glorioso, 239. 
 
 Gluckstadt, 58, 66. 
 
 Goddard, Captain, 322. 
 
 Godwin, 260. 
 
 Golden Hind (ship), 233, 238. 
 
 Golden Liion (ship), 28, 72. 
 
 Gonave Channel, 290. 
 
 Good Hope, Cape of, 160, 235, 332, 
 400. 
 
 Goree (in Holbuid), 52. 
 
 Goree Island (Coast of Africa), 77, 
 176, 263-266. 
 
 Gorge.s, Nicholas, 241. 
 j G on/on (ship), 410. 
 ' Gottenberg, 59, 146. 
 
 Goulet, of Brest, 186. 269. 
 ' Gourdon, Admiral, 186. 
 
 Graciosa Island, 11. 
 
 Graham, 8ir James, 405, 406. 
 j Grant, Colonel, 345. 
 
 Grant, Major-General, 384. 
 
 Granville, 130, 276. 
 , Gravelines, 35, 37, 131, 241. 
 
 Gravesend, 63. 
 
 Graves, Sir Thomas, 180. 
 
 Graydon, ^^ce- Admiral, 291, 293. 
 
 Great Belt, 429. 
 
 Great James (ship), see Bo>fal 
 James. 
 
 Great Ship, 51, 84. 
 
 GreenwicJi (ship), 334. 
 
 Grenada, 187, 191, 367, 368, 380, 
 390-392, 395. 
 
 Grenville, Sir Richard, 12. 
 
 Grey, General Sir Charles, 379. 
 
 Griffin, Commodore, 359. 
 
 Grisnez, 196. 
 
 Groix, Isle de, 277. 
 
 Grosse, Ilet Bay, 394. 
 
 Grotius, 2. 
 
 Groyne (see Coiunna and Ferrol). 
 
 Guadaloupe, 14, 176, 189, 191, 252 
 -254, 256, 259, 261, 263, 292, 294, 
 380. 
 
 Guadiana, River, 158. 
 
 Guantanamo, 346. 
 
 Guarnizo, 159. 
 
 Guernsey, 4. 
 ' Gvernseif (ship),. 140. 
 j Guiana, 176. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 461 
 
 Guichan (de), 371, 372. 
 Gun-boats, 106. 
 Gunfleet, 115-119. 
 Gunter Fort, 421. 
 Guyenne (ship), 428. 
 
 Haedik, 130, 277. 
 
 Hai-yim-tau, 436, 439. 
 
 Hamburg ships, 48. 
 
 Hamburg, 53, 58. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir Charles, 267. 
 
 Hamoaze, 112. 
 
 Hampton CouH (ship), 334. 
 
 Handmaid (ship), 28. 
 
 Hanover (Coast of), 158. 
 
 Hanse Towns, 27. 
 
 Haarlem Gazette, 61. 
 
 Harman, Sir John, 78. 
 
 Hardy, Admiral Sir Chas., 151- 
 
 156. 
 Harwich, 48, 49, ol, 60, 64. 66. 
 Hatteras, Cape, 225, 425. 
 Havannah, 159, 188, 290, 338. 
 
 339, 342, 346-348. 
 Havre, 123, 124, 126, 130. 136, 
 
 137, 145, 147, 164. 174, 179, 
 
 240, 275. 
 Hawke, Admiral Lord, 135. 136, 
 
 141,142,144, 145, 148, 227, 356, 
 
 360, 362, 389. 
 Hawkins, John, 7, 9. 11. 14. 230, 
 
 231, 241. 
 Helder, the, 169. 
 Helvoetsluys, 37. 
 Henrv IV. (of France), 11, 14. 
 Hemy VIII., 3, 4, 26. 
 Henry VIII., ships of, 8. 
 Herbert, Admiral, afterwards 
 
 Lord Torriugton, 91, 93. 110, 
 
 112-114, 116-123, 127. 129. 130, 
 
 137, 152, 220, 245-247, 272. 
 Heme, Captain John, 302. 
 Hero (ship), 193. 
 Heros (ship), 146. 
 Herring Fleet, the Dutch, 33. 
 HerviUe, M., 313. 
 Hervey, Captain, 363. 
 Hesse-Dai-mstadt, Prince of, 284, 
 
 296, 298, 300,304, 305, 311. 
 Hicks, Captain, 299. 
 Hill, Brigadier-General, 321. 
 Himani, 340. 
 Hiroshima, 443, 444, 446. 
 
 Hispaniola, 208, 209, 273, 314, 
 
 337, 338,357. 
 Hoche, 108, 157, 379. 
 Hodsdon, Christopher, 7. 
 Hodson, General. 397. 
 Hoe, the, 233. 
 Holland, 149, 158, 169, 220, 243, 
 
 377, 392. 
 Hollesley Bay, 174. 
 Holms, Sir Robert, 50, 56, 57, 67, 
 
 75, 77, 78, 245, 265. 
 Holstoek, Sir Thomas, 7. 
 Home Fleet, 124. 
 
 Hood, Admiral Sir Samuel, after- 
 wards Lord, 379, 392-394. 
 Hope (ship), 8, 28, 242. 
 Hopson, Admiral, 288. 
 Horn, Cape, 235, 332. 
 Hospital Hill, 390, 392. 
 Hoste, Pere, 90. 
 Hotham, Commodore, 384-387. 
 Houat Island, 130, 277. 
 Howard of Effingham, Lord, 8, 15, 
 
 16, 231, 235, 241, 242, 244, 283. 
 Howard, Lord Thomas, 12, 13, 20, 
 
 22, 231, 232. 
 Howard, Sir Edward, 3. 
 Howard, Sir Thomas, 3. 
 Howe, Admiral Lord. 71, 135, 373, 
 
 381-384, 389, 429. 
 Hoys, 29, 30. 
 Huascar (ship), 413. 
 Huasco, 433. 
 Huffues, Admiral Sir Edward, 377, 
 
 396, 397. 
 Husues, Victor, 176. 
 Hull, 257. 
 Humber, the, 174. 
 Humbert, General, 164, 379. 
 Hifdra (ship), 410. 
 Hyeres, 271, 296. 363. 
 
 He de Rhe, 38. 
 Imjjerial (ship), 435. 
 Impreqnable (ship). 409. 
 India,' 164, 359, 377, 399, 400. 
 Indifference, state of the sea, 212. 
 Invasion, 17, 43, 108, 109, 121, 
 
 134, 135, 138. 147, 150, 152. 
 
 153, 156, 157, 163, 168, 169, 
 
 171, 173, 210, 402, 403. 
 Invasion flotilla, 137, 161, 169, 
 
 174. 178, 179,200. 
 
4(32 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Inverness, 34. 
 
 Irelaml, 10,17, I'J, -'0, 22,26,109, 
 
 110, 111), 100, 10-1, 105, 174-178, 
 
 180, 189, 192, 220, 240, 245, 
 
 246, 309, 379, 400. 
 Irish Seas, 110, 117. 
 Iron Castle, 333, 334. 
 Irvine, 137. 
 Isahella (ship), 282. 
 Isle of Wight, 4, o, 16, 54, 67, 113, 
 
 117,120, 125, 132,240. 
 Istrii, 27. 
 Italian Fleet, 420. 
 Italy, 227, 291. 
 Ito, Admiral, 441, 445, 448, 449, 
 
 450. 
 Iviza, 313. 
 
 Jacobites, 110, 123, 124. 
 
 Jacobites, Scottish, 330, 331. 
 
 Jade, the, 427, 428. 
 
 Jamaica, 132, 184, 187, 208-210, 
 216, 252, 258, 264, 267, 289, 291, 
 293-315, 320, 323, 325, 332, 336, 
 227, 338, 339, 347, 349, 350, 351, 
 269. 
 
 Jamaica, Governor of, 333. 
 
 James I., 25, 85, 229. 
 
 James Duke of York, afterwards 
 James II., 47-49, 59, 60, 67, 
 89-91, 109,110, 116, 124, 245. 
 
 James Island, 263, 265, 266, 418, 
 419. 
 
 James's Naval History, 104. 
 
 Japan, 431. 
 
 Jenkinson, 7. 
 
 Jennett (ship), 28. 
 
 Jennings, Sir William, 117. 
 
 Jennings, Sir John, 308. 
 
 Jersey, 4. 
 
 Jersey (ship), 253, 258, 259. 
 
 Jervis, Sir John, afterwards Earl 
 St. Vincent, 162, 165-167, 170, 
 173, 193, 379, 399-402. 
 
 .John's Island, 418. 
 
 Johnstone, Fort, 421, 
 
 Jones, 411. 
 
 Judith, Point, 382. 
 
 Jumper, Captain, 299. 
 
 Jnno (ship), 382. 
 
 Justin, Count, 243, 244. 
 
 Jutland, Coast of, 429, 
 
 Kappelyn, 428. 
 
 Ivazatch, 403. 
 
 Keith, Admiral Lord, 165-168, 171. 
 
 Kent, 38, 190. 
 
 Kentish Knock, 37, 
 
 Keokuk, 422. 
 
 Keppel, 266, 397, 398. 
 
 Kerr, Captain, 314, 315. 
 
 Kiel, 428, 429. 
 
 KillalaBay, 164, 220, 379. 
 
 Kiiligrew, Vice-Admiral, 111-113, 
 
 115-118, 120. 
 Kin-chau, 444. 
 Kinq George (ship), 239, 
 Kinglake, 402. 
 Kingston, 267. 
 King William, 247, 
 King Yuen (ship), 440. 
 Kinsale, 20, 21, 109, 220, 245, 246. 
 Klnsale (ship), 132. 
 Ivioge Bay, 427-429. 
 Knowles, Captain, 341-344, 351, 
 
 352, 357. 
 Korean War, 435-45'2. 
 Kowshing {iihvgi), 430. 
 Kvmng Chia (ship), 440, 441. 
 KvKina Yi (ship), 436. 
 
 La Bayliffe, 292. 
 
 La Bouidonnais, 358. 
 
 Lacour, Colonel, 428. 
 
 Lafayette, Marquis de, 381, 383. 
 
 La Gallisonniere, Marquis de, 
 
 363-365. 
 Lagos Bay, 148, 183, 184, 286 
 
 297. 
 Lagrange, General, 176. 
 La Guaira, 351, 353. 
 La Hague, Cape, 125. 
 La Hogue, 123, J 27-1 30, 259, 260, 
 
 267. 
 La Hogue, Battle of, 125-128. 
 Lamotte - Piquet, Rear - Admiral, 
 
 389. 
 Lancaster, James, 20. 
 Lancaster, 349. 
 Land's End, the, 59, 151. 
 Landguard Fort, 63. 
 Languedoc (ship), 382, 
 Larh (ship), 382. 
 La Ronci^re le Noury, Admiral, 
 
 427. 
 Las Cadenhas, 435. 
 
mDEX. 
 
 463 
 
 Lntouche-Treville, 151, 174-176. 
 Laughton, Profe;>sor, 228, 242, 
 
 243. 
 Lauriston, 198. 
 Lawson, 39, 41, 49. 
 Leauue, the Eoman Catholic, 11, 
 
 14. 
 Leake, Captain, afterwards Admiral 
 
 Sir John, 280, 289, 305-307, 
 
 311-313, 316, 324. 
 Leander (ship), 401. 
 Lede, Marquis de, ^28, 329. 
 Lediard, 6, 261, 292. 
 Ledsimd, 405, 406. 
 Leech, Captain, 264. 
 Leeward Isles, 208, 249, 253, 256, 
 
 258, 260, 289, 292,320,325,353, 
 
 367, 384. 
 Leghorn, 59, 371. 
 Leicester, Earl of, 30. 
 Leicester (ship), 83. 
 Leith, 174. 
 Lennox (ship), 299. 
 Leon Island, 283. 
 Les Habitants, 292. 
 Lestock, Admiral, 94, 341, 342, 
 
 361. 
 Leu-knng-tau, 447, 451. 
 Levant, 8. 
 
 Levant Squadron, 235, 237. 
 Lewson, Sir Richard, 20-22. 
 Liau-tung, 443, 446. 
 Libertador, Fort, 352. 
 Lillingstone, Colonel, 273. 
 Lime (ship), 281. 
 Lincoln, Geneial, 419. 
 Lindsey, Earl of, 88. 
 Line, the, 88-93. 
 Line of battle, establishment of, 91- 
 
 95, 97, 98, 104. 
 Line-of-battle ship, 95-98, 101, 
 
 102, 104, 106. 
 Lisbon, 10, 15-17, 116, 162, 192, 
 
 197, 229-231, 234, 239, 280-282, 
 
 295, 296, 301, 302, 305-309, 312, 
 
 313, 324, 325, 336. 
 Lissa Island, 108, 205, 227, 244, 
 
 430. 
 Littleton, Commodore, 320. 
 Liverpool, 349. 
 
 Lizard, the, 23, 154, 185, 232, 233. 
 Lixard (ship), 380. 
 Lloyd, Sir Godfrey, 60. 
 Loader, Captain, 280. 
 
 Logane, Gulf of,- 290. 
 
 Loire, the, 146. 
 
 London, 8, 62,. 118, 159, .349. 
 
 Long Island, 381, 417. 
 
 Lorient, 175, 185, 359, 361, 362. 
 
 Louisbourg, 353-357, 360, 362, 364, 
 
 365, 378. 
 Louis de Bourbon, Fort., 264. 
 Louis XIV., 119, 124. 
 Low Countries, 20, 229. 
 •Lowestoft, 49, 52, 53. 
 Lower Hope, the, 61, 66, 71. 
 Loyal Lond.oa (ship), 63. 
 Lyncli (ship), 433, 435. 
 Lyons, Gulf of, 167, 180. 
 
 Maas, 40, 48, 68, 72. 
 
 Macartney, Lord, 390, 3-91. 
 
 Madalena Islands, 180, 181. 
 
 Madeira, 184, 249. 
 
 Madras, 358, 365-397. 
 
 Mahon, 364. 
 
 Maidstone, 145. 
 
 Majorca, 313. 
 
 Malaga, 111, 138, 218, 301-304, 
 
 307, 317. 
 Malta, 166, 171,181,441. 
 Manjchuria, 438, 446. 
 Mancinilla, 340, 343. 
 Mann, 162, 170. 
 Marcouf, Isles of, 164. 
 Marie-Galante, 253, 254, 256. 
 Marlborough, Earl of, 49. 
 Marmont, 175. 
 Mars (ship), 191. 
 Marsala, 329. 
 
 Marseillais (ship), 382, 386. 
 Marseilles, 174, 318. 
 Marshall, Earl, 328. . 
 Martin, Commodore, 319, 356, 360, 
 
 405. 
 Martinico, 256. 
 Martinique, 176, 177, 180, 184-188, 
 
 190, 191, 209, 210, 216, 254, 
 
 258-261, 263. 278, 289, 290, 292, 
 
 293, 320, 325, 380, 385, 387, 389, 
 
 392, 394, 295. 
 Mary (ship), 258. 
 Mary, Queen, 4. 
 Mary, Queen of Scots, 6. 
 Marv, Queen (William's Consort), 
 
 110, 119, 120, 122. 
 Mary Rvse (ship), 4, 8, 26, 28, 259. 
 
4(}4 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Matagorda, 283-285. 
 
 Mathew, 360. 
 
 Mathews, Admiral, 94. 
 
 Mauritius, 358, 35'J. 
 
 Mayo, 164. 
 
 Mazon, Admiral, IM-"), 186. 
 
 Mayzara, 329. 
 
 Mazarri Bay, 184, 197. 
 
 McAlister, Fort, 420. 
 
 McCIeverty, Captain, 144. 
 
 Meadows, Brigadier-General, 385. 
 
 Medina Celi, Duke of, 29. 
 
 Me'lina Sidonia, Duke of, 171, 
 230-233, 235, 239, 240, 243, 244. 
 
 Mediterranean, 3, 8, 40, 59, 77, 92, 
 98, 99, 111, 124, 130, 133. 137, 
 155, 158, 160, 162-166, 168, 170, 
 172, 175, 181, 182, 186, 23.5, 263, 
 269, 271, 275, 277, 291, 295-297 
 308, 309, 311, 313,317, 326, 327, 
 330, 366, 367, 373, 379, 380, 
 400-402, 427. 
 
 Medway, 57, 60. 63, 67, 75, 119, 
 359. 
 
 Meesters, Mr., 275, 276. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, 409. 
 
 Mends, Captain W. R., 411. 
 
 Mendoza, 369. 
 
 Merchant Adventurei>, Companj- 
 of, 7. 
 
 Mere Honour (ship), 237. 
 
 Messina, 181, 327-329. 
 
 Metternich, Prince. 200. 
 
 Meuse, the, 33, 169. 
 
 Mevis, 256. 
 
 Mexico, 290. 
 
 Meze, 319. 
 
 Middling ships, 84. 
 
 Miguells, Vice-Admiral, 330, 331. 
 
 Millazzo, 329. 
 
 Milbrooke Men, 26. 
 
 Militia, 110,122. 
 
 Minho, 158. 
 
 Minion (ship), 28. 
 
 Minorca, 135, 166, 167, 171, 182, 
 271, 31.5, 316, 329, 363-368, 370- 
 375, 378. 
 
 Missiessy, Admiral. 177, 180, 188- 
 190, 201, 217. 
 
 Mitchell, Admiral, 169. 
 
 Mobile, 289, 425. 
 
 Modest e (ship), 140. 
 
 Mola, 329, 371. 
 
 Mole, the Old, 299 370. 
 
 Mollendo, 413. 
 
 Mondy, Commodore, 78. 
 
 Monk, General, afterwards Duke 
 
 of Albemarle, 39-41, 54, 56, 59, 
 
 60, 66, 75, 89, 91, 96, 259. 
 Monk (ship), 270. 
 Monserrat, 78, 188, 250, 256, 320, 
 
 323, 324. 
 Mouson, Sir William, 10, 11, 15, 
 
 16, 19, 21-24, 45, 83, 87. 
 Montank, 420. 
 Moray Firth, 33. 
 Morbihan, 136, 138, 141, 142. 
 Morea, the, 181. 
 Morlaix, 3. 
 
 Morne-fortune, 385, 386 
 Morris Island, 417, 420, 422-425. 
 Moultrie, Fort, 417-422. 
 Mount Pleasant, 419. 
 Mount Royal (Montreal), 257. 
 Mount's Bay, 14, 232. 
 Mountjoy, Earl, 21. 
 Mouse-hole, 14. 
 Mozambique, 10. 
 Mukden, 443. 
 
 Munden, Sir John, 280, 281. 
 Murray, General, 371, 372. 
 
 Naiad (ship), 238. 
 
 JVamur (ship), 139. 
 
 Naniwa (ship), 436. 
 
 Nantasket Bay, 257. 
 
 Nantucket, 422. 
 
 Napier, Sir Charles, 405, 406. 
 
 Naples, 166, 181, 182, 329. 
 
 Napoleon, 108, 156, 157, 160-163, 
 171, 173-176,178, 181, 185, 190, 
 196, 198-202, 219, 221, 227, 244, 
 381, 399, 400, 402, 438. 
 
 Napoleonic War, 100, 102, 106. 
 
 Nassau, Prince Maurice of, 30. 
 
 Nassau, Count, 272. 
 
 Naval war, opening of regular, 7, 
 23, 24, 205-207. 
 
 Navigation Act, 42. 
 
 Nelson, 164-166,171, 173, 175, 180- 
 184, 186-188, 190-192, 197, 198, 
 201, 218, 221, 401, 402. 
 
 Netherlands, 228, 229, 242. 
 
 Neustadt, 429. 
 
 New England, 259. 
 
 Newfoundland, 78, 100, 159, 177, 
 263. 289, 293, 322. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 46; 
 
 Newark (ship), 140. 
 
 Newcastle, 28, 30, 38, 5^, 69. 
 
 Neivcastle (ship), 3'20, 321. 
 
 Newhaven, 6. 
 
 NewUn, 14. 
 
 Newport, 381, 383, 384, 429. 
 
 New England, 263, 321. 
 
 Neic Ironsides (ship), 420, 422. 
 
 New Jersey, 381. 
 
 New Netherlands {see New York). 
 
 New Orleans, 425. 
 
 New York, 50, 77, 392, 417, 418. 
 
 Nevis, 78, 250, 292, 313. 
 
 Ne\'ille, Admiral, 274, 277. 
 
 Nice, 158, 295. 
 
 Nieuport, 36, 40, 68, 243, 244. 
 
 Nile, 171, 221. 
 
 Nile, Battle of the, 401, 402, 441. 
 
 Ning-hai, 447. 
 
 Niu-chuang, 443. 
 
 Nombre de Dios, 14, 15. 
 
 Nonjyariel (ship), 236, 237. 
 
 Nore. the, 55, 122. 
 
 Norris, Admiral 8ir John, 132, 133, 
 317, 318, 324, 328, 332. 
 
 North America, 99, 141, 374, 377. 
 
 North Edisto Inlet, 420. 
 
 North Foreland, 54. 56, 64, 71, 75, 
 125. 
 
 North Sea, 48, 51, 71, 76, 108, 131, 
 156, 158, 160, 162, 377, 400, 
 427. 
 
 Normandy, 6, 27, 127, 130, 151, 
 268. 
 
 Northei-n Confederacy, 169, 
 
 Northumberland, Duke of (see 
 Dudley). 
 
 Norway, 50, 146. 
 
 Norwich, 258. 
 
 Nott, Colonel, 253. 
 
 Nottingham, Earl of, 110, 112, 114, 
 115,117-120, 295. 
 
 Nova Scotia, 257, 319, 320, 353, 
 361. 
 
 Nuesfra Senora del Rosario (ship), 
 236, 237, 240. 
 
 Oce«?^ (ship), 140, 177. 
 Odessa, 217, 222, 406, 411, 415. 
 Ogeechee River, 420. 
 Osle. Admiral Sir Chaloner, 337, 
 ^"338, 341, 343, 547, 348. 350, 352. 
 Oglethorpe, General, 351. 
 
 Oldenburg, 158. 
 
 Old Fort, 403. 
 
 Old Road, 250. 
 
 Olonne, 277. 
 
 Opdam, Admiral, 48. 
 
 Orange, Prince of, 29, 109, 169, 
 
 219. 
 Orde, Admiral Sir John, 182. 
 Orkney Isles, 34. 
 Ormonde, Duke of, 279, 282-287. 
 Orpheus (ship), 382. 
 Ortegal, Cape, 196, 197. 
 Ostend, 40, 56, 161, 164, 175, 179, 
 
 217, 314. 
 Our Lady of Europa, Chapel of, 
 
 299. 
 Oyama, Marshal, 443-446, 448. 
 
 Pacific, 7, 14. 
 
 Palais, 398. 
 
 Palamos, 130, 271, 272. 
 
 Palermo, 166, 181, 182, 184. 
 
 Palmas Bay, 182, 183. 
 
 Palma, 313. - 
 
 Palos, Cape, 296. 
 
 Panama, 14, 342, 349. 
 
 Panther (ship), 321. 
 
 Paria, Gulf of, 186. 
 
 Paria Bay, 191. 
 
 Paris, Peace of (1763), 92. 
 
 Paris, 150, 159, 160, 373, 381. 
 
 Parker, Commodore Sir Peter, 
 
 417. 
 Parma, Duke of, 30, 228-230, 233, 
 242, 243. 
 
 Parseval, Admiral, 406. 
 
 Passaro, Cape, 171, 328, 330, 401, 
 
 Passa-volante, 84. 
 
 Pastelillo, Fort, 344. 
 
 Patapoco (ship), 424. 
 
 Payance, 14. 
 
 Pechili, Gulf of, 441, 443. 
 
 Peiho Forts, 222. 
 
 Pekin, 446. 
 
 Pelican (ship), 238. 
 
 Pembroke (ship), 56, 317. 
 
 Penn, Admiral Sir William, 36, 39, 
 41, 47, 55, 60, 89, 91. 
 
 Pensee (ship), 177 
 
 Peppin (ship), 83. 
 
 Pepys, 47, 58-60, 71, 91. 
 
 Persano, 243, 244, 430. 
 
 Persia, 7. 
 
466 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Peru, 406, 413, 431. 
 
 Pesciulol^^>!, 452. 
 
 Peterborough, Earl of, 307-311, 
 
 313. 
 Petit Godav, 290, 291. 
 Petit Guavas, 273, 274, 277. 
 Pett-s, the, 8, 63. 
 Peyton, Captain, 358, 365. 
 Philip II., 10-12, 15, 22, 46, 109, 
 
 228, 229, 232, 239, 243, 244. 
 Ph'dip and Manj (ship), 28. 
 Philippines, 332. 
 Phipps, Sir William, 257. 
 PArtjftc (ship), 182-184. 
 Pluealv (ship), 132, 363, 410. 
 Picardy, 131. 
 Ping-yang, 438, 439. 
 Pique (ship), 415. 
 Pisagua, 413. 
 Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, 
 
 136, 137. 
 Placentia, 263, 294, 322." 
 Plate Fleet, the Spanish, 12. 
 Plymouth, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
 
 39, 112, 119, 120, 132, 142, 151- 
 
 155, 175,230-234, 244, 249,270, 
 
 302, 359, 360, 361, 368,407. 
 Pola, 245, 430. 
 Pondicherry, 359. 
 Ponte Vedra, 331. 
 Pope, the, 119. 
 Popelmire, 26. 
 Porcupine {ii\\\\)), 154. 
 Port Andeo Bay, 398. 
 Port Arthur, 436, 441, 443-447, 
 
 450. 
 Port Bassin, 137. 
 Portland, 3, 23, 39, 240. 
 Port Louis, 357. ' 
 Port Mahon, 168, 317, 329, 363, 
 
 371. 
 Port Morant, 267. 
 Porto Bello, 14, 332-339, 343, 349- 
 
 351, 410, 425. 
 Porto Cavallo (Puerto Cabello), 
 
 351-353. 
 Porto Rico, 14, 19, ISV, 209, 337. 
 Port de Paix, 273. 
 Port Royal (Annapolis), 257, 319, 
 
 320, 324, 425. 
 Port Royal, Jamaica, 289, 290, 
 
 336-337. 
 Port Royal, South Carolina, 225, 
 
 420. 
 
 Portsmouth, 26, 59, 60, 117, 124, 
 
 132, .175, 337, 359. 
 Portugal, King of, 11. 
 Portugal, 11, 22, 41, 58, 116, 139, 
 
 156, 197, 309. 
 Portuguese ships, 11, 
 Portuguese squadron, 237, 242. 
 Prescot, Brigadier-General, 285. 
 Preston (ship), 382. . 
 Pretender, the Young, 131. 
 Prince (ship), 72 . 
 Princess Charlotte (ship), 411, 416. 
 Privateers, 82. 
 Privateers, Dutch, 6, 7, 68. 
 Privateers, English, 6. 
 Privateers, French, 6, 7. 
 Protestants of France, 6. 
 Provence (ship), 386. 
 Providence, 381. 
 Prussia, 46, 47. 
 Puerto Reale, 284. 
 Puerto Sta. Maria, 283, 284 
 Pala, 183. 
 Puntales, 280, 283, 284. 
 
 Quebec, 257, 278, 321-323, 360, 
 
 362. 
 Queen Charlotte (ship), 408. 
 Quiberon Bay, 136, 142, 144, 145, 
 
 148, 379. 
 Quiberon Bay, Battle of, 144. 
 Quilio, Captain, 428. 
 Quimperle Bay, 361. 
 Quinteros Bay, 434. 
 Quiryns, Commodore, 78. 
 
 Race, Cape, 293. 
 
 Ragusans, 8. 
 
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 10, 13, 22, 23, 
 
 26, 29, 31, 45, 353, 
 Rambargo, 84. 
 Ramhead, the, 155. 
 Rates, establishment of. 84-87 
 Red Sea, 163. 
 Redondela, 287-289, 331. 
 Redoutahle (ship), 140. 
 Pef/ar/ona (ship), 235. 
 Eequlus (ship), 185. 
 Reid, Mr., 255, 256. 
 Reine-Blanche (ship), 415. 
 Renown (ship), 382, 383. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 467 
 
 Revel, 332. 
 
 Eevenge (ship), 12, 13, 22, 28, 237. 
 
 Revolutionary War, the, 100, 102. 
 
 Rhine, the, 200. 
 
 Rhode Island, 381, 382. 
 
 Richelieu, Due de, 363, 364. 
 
 Rio Janeiro, 323, 324. 
 
 Rivers, Colonel, 294. 
 
 Robertson, Commodore, 59, 76. 
 
 Rochefeuille, Admiral, 342. 
 
 Rocheforte, 131, 135, 136, 141,142, 
 
 146, 158, 159, 168, 174-179, 185, 
 
 186, 189-192, 194-196, 200, 268, 
 
 281, 359. 
 Rochelle, 53, 266, 3b 1, 362. 
 Rock of Lisbon, the, 16. 
 Rodney, Admiral, afterwards Lord, 
 
 137, 368, 369, 377, 392-395. 
 Roebuclc (ship), 418, 419. 
 Rooke, Admiral, afterwards Sir 
 
 Georae, 126, 218, 276, 279-282, 
 
 284-287, 289, 291, 294-297, 299, 
 
 301, 302, 307, 308, 311, 330, 
 
 374. 
 Roquelaure, Due de, 319. 
 Rosas Bay, 167. 
 Rosily, 176. 
 Ross,' 328, 330. 
 Ross, Sir John Lockhart, 370. 
 Rota, 283. 
 
 Rowley, Commodore, 388. 
 Eoiial Charles (ship), 58, 62, 63, 
 
 73. 
 Royal James (ship), 63, 68. 
 Royal Oak (ship), 63. 
 Royal Prince (ship), 54, 55. 
 Ruhy (ship), 59. 
 Rumain, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, 
 
 390. 
 Rupert, Prince, 47, 54-56, 59, 69, 
 
 72, 75, 96. 
 Russell, Admiral, afterwards Earl 
 
 of Oxford, 124-126, 128, 131, 
 
 269, 271, 272, 277. 
 Russia, 7, 169, 331. 
 Russia, Emperor of, 7. 
 
 Sagittaire (ship), 386. 
 Sailcio Maru (ship), 441. 
 Saker, 28. 
 
 Salisbury (ship), 316, 
 Samana Bay, 273. 
 Sampson, Admiral, 49. 
 
 San Domingo, 10. 
 
 San Felipe (ship), 237, 242. 
 
 San Francisco de Asis (ship), 196. 
 
 San Juan de Sicilia (ship), 237, 
 
 242. 
 San Lorenzo (ship), 236, 237, 241. 
 San Martin (ship), 235, 237. ' 
 San Mateo (ship), 237, 242. 
 San Rafael (ship), 193. 
 Sandwich, Earl of, 47, 50-52, 67, 
 
 68, 75. 
 Sandy Hook, 381-384, 387, 389. 
 Santa Anna (ship), 240. 
 Santa Gatalina (ship), 283, 284. 
 Santa Cruz, Marquis of, 228-230. 
 Santa Justina, 10. 
 Santa Maria de Visari (ship), 236, 
 
 237, 239. 
 Santa Martha, 335. 
 Santiago, 432. 
 Sardinia, 181-184, 317, 318, 324, 
 
 330. 
 Savannah, 225, 367, 418-420. 
 Savary, Commodore, 164. 
 Savoy, Duke of, 314. 
 Savoy, House of, 327. 
 Scarborough, 368. 
 Schelde, the, 34, 40, 42, 48, 69. 
 Schelling Island, 56, 57, 66. 
 Schevelling, the, 72. 
 Schomberg, Captain, 97. 
 Schooneveld, the, 56, 69, 70, 74. 
 Scilly Islands, 18, 151-154, 231, 
 
 232, 247, 289, 296. 
 Scotland, 39, 50, 68, 118, 136, 157, 
 
 163, 174, 178, 242, 315, 316, 
 
 324, 328, 400. 
 Seaford, Earl of, 328. 
 Sea-goins: and sea-keeping ships, 5, 
 
 8, 9, 19, 25-31, 51, 137. 
 Seine, the, 59. 
 
 Seissan, Major-General, 319. 
 Selden, 2. 
 
 Selwyn, Brigadier-General, 289. 
 Senega], 176, 263, 264. 
 Serres, Captain, 428. 
 Sevastapol, 217, 222, 355, 402, 
 
 403, 413. 
 Seymour, Lord Henry, 241, 243, 
 
 244. 
 Sfax, 406, 415. 
 Shanghai, 443, 446. 
 Shannon, the, 189, 247. 
 Shantung, 443, 446. 
 
468 
 
 NAVAL WARFARt'. 
 
 Sheerness, 60, 62, 66, 71. 
 
 Sheffield, Lord, 231.^ 
 
 Sheppy, Island of, 63. 
 
 Sherman, General, 424. 
 
 Shetland Islands, 33-35, 51, 63, 
 66. 
 
 Ships' bottoms, fouling and de- 
 struction of, 12. 
 
 Ships Royal, 84. 
 
 Shorehani (ship), 270. 
 
 Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, 112, 116- 
 118, 120, 126, 275, 291, 295-297, 
 299, 302, 307-312, 314. 
 
 Shrewsburif (ship), 341. 
 
 Shute's Folly. 418. 
 
 Sicily, 166, 181, 291, 327-330. 
 
 Sidon, 409, 410. 
 
 Sinclair, General, 361. 
 
 Siriago, 16. 
 
 Sirius (ship), 193. 
 
 Signet (ship), 82. 
 
 Sloop, the origin of the, 97. 
 
 Sluis, 40. 
 
 Small ships, 84. 
 
 Smith, Admiral Sir .Jeremiah, 56. 
 
 Smith, Sir Sydney, 164. 
 
 Smoke-boats, 130. 
 
 Solano, Don Josef, 368. 
 
 Sole Bay, 48, 52, 67, 69, 70, 76. 
 
 Sole Bay, Battle of, 67-69. 
 
 Sound, the, 42, 204. 
 
 Soundings, the, 59. 155, 246. 
 
 South CaroUna, 379, 416. 
 
 South Foreland, 133. 
 
 Southampton, 349. 
 
 Southampton, Earl of, 60. 
 
 Southwell, Sir Ftobert, 231. 
 
 Sovereignty of the seas, the, 2. 
 
 Spain, 150, 151, 158, 162, 179, 
 196, 227, 230, 231, 234, 271, 279, 
 
 280, 282, 286, 291, 295, 298, 
 307, 317, 327, 328, 330-332, 
 337-339, 359, 366, 370, 371, 
 377. 
 
 Spain, King of, 178, 230, 243. 
 
 Spanish Eiver Bay, 322. 
 
 Sparr, Baron, 285. 
 
 Spartel, Cape, 138, 139, 308, 309. 
 
 Speaker (ship), 8, 9. 
 
 Spithead, 5, 155, 247, 267, 279- 
 
 281, 332, 360, 369. 
 
 Spragge, Vice- Admiral Sir Edward, 
 
 64, 69, 72, 73. 
 Sqxiadron of Observation, 151. 
 
 St. Albait'g (ship), 140. 
 
 St. Augustine, Fort, 351. 
 
 St. Charles, Fort, 364. 
 
 St. Christopher's (St. Kitt's) 
 
 Island, 78, 250, 252, 253, 256, 
 
 313, 323, 338, 353, 389, 391, 
 
 39.3. 
 St. Davids, Fort, 359. 
 St. Domingo, 176, 177, 185, 267, 
 
 273, 290, 313, 338, 339, 380. 
 St. Eustatia (St. Eustace), 78, 250, 
 
 253, 392, 393. 
 <S'^ Georr/e (ship), 73. 
 St. George's Bay, 391, 392, 
 St. George's Channel, 148. 
 St. Geronimo, Fort, 333, 334. 
 St. Helena, Island of, 78, 1 70, 177, 
 
 179. 
 St. Helens, 4, 55, 112-114, 125, 
 
 132, 151, 152, 279, 281, 321, 
 
 330, 363, 379. 
 St. Jago, 185. 
 St. Jago, Fort, 340, 341. 
 St. .Jago de Cuba, 346-348, 355, 
 
 357. 
 St. .John's Eiver Settlement, 257. 
 St. Joseph, Fort, 340, 343. 
 St. Juan de XJlloa, 7. 
 St Lawrence, the, 257, 321, 322. 
 St. Lazar, Castle of, 340, 344, 345, 
 St. Louis, 263, 266. 
 St. Louis, Fort, 340-342. 
 St. Lucia, Island of, 176, 177, 187, 
 
 239, 210, 216, 380, 384-389, 
 
 391-394. 
 St. Malo, 124-126, 128, 130, 135, 
 
 174, 267, 268, 275, 361, 362. 
 St. Martin, 277. 
 St. Mary's, 11. 
 St. Michael, Castle of, 265. 
 St. Pierre, 261, 263. 
 St. Philip, Fort, 340, 341, 363- 
 
 365, 371-375. 
 St. Philip, Castle of, 352. 
 St. Sebastian, Cape, 166, 167. 
 St. Simon's, 351. 
 St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 140, 162, 
 
 170, 184, 187, 188, 191, 192, 
 
 296, 305, 368, 380, 389-361. 
 St. Vincent, Earl (see Jervis). 
 Stanhope, Lieut. -General, 316. 
 Start, the, 36. 
 States-Genei-al, 40, 46. 
 Stewart, Bricrndier-General, 272. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 469 
 
 Stirling, Reai-- Admiral, 190, 191, 
 
 195. 
 Stockholm, 332. 
 Stono Inlet, 418. 
 Stono River, 418, 419, 428. 
 Stopford, Sir Robert, 411. 
 Stromboli, 181. 
 StromboU (ship), 410 
 Strozzi, 228. 
 
 Stura- Ester- Swartoe, 412. 
 Sufolk (ship), 352. 
 Suffi-en, Admiral, 377, 392, 396, 
 
 397. 
 Sullivan, 381-384. 
 Sullivan's Island, 417, 419, 421, 
 
 423, 424. 
 Sumter, Fort, 420-424. 
 Superb (ship), 198. 
 Superbe (ship), 146. 
 Surinam, 78, 176, 177, 184, 201, 
 
 323, 392. 
 Surveillante (ship), 428. 
 Sussex, 4, 123, 190. 
 Sussex (ship), 263. 
 Sivallow (ship), 28. 
 Sweaborg, 217,222, 405-407,411, 
 
 414, 415. 
 Sweden, 41, 146, 169, 337. 
 Sweers, Admiral, 52, 73. 
 Swiftsure (ship), 28. 
 Swilly, Lough, 164, 177, 220, 379. 
 Syi'ia, coast of, 409, 410. 
 
 Ta-lien-hwan, 444, 445, 446. 
 
 Tagus, the, 230, 232, 305, 306. 
 
 Taku, 436. 
 
 Takvi-shan, 444. 
 
 Talmash, General, 269-271. 
 
 Tavornina, 329. 
 
 Tegetthoff, Admiral, 430. 
 
 Teignmouth, 121, 122. 
 
 Teng-chu, 446, 447. 
 
 Terceira, 11, 228. 
 
 Tercentenary Retrospect, 228. 
 
 Terouenne, 3. 
 
 Terra Nuova, 318. 
 
 Tesse, Marshal de, 307, 312. 
 
 Tetuan, 111, 168, 183, 184, 192, 
 
 298, 302. 
 Texel, the, 35, 39-42, 47-49, 51, 
 
 55, 59, 68, 72, 76, 91, 157-159, 
 
 163, 169, 174,175, 177, 178, 185, 
 
 186. 
 
 Thames, the, 34, 36-38, 40, 52, 53, 
 
 55, 59, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 74, 75, 
 
 116, 119, 359. 
 Thames Haven. 61. 
 Thesee (ship), 146. 
 Thetis (ship), 428. 
 Thiers, M., 199. 
 Thornhill, Sir Timothy, 250. 
 Thunderer (ship), 409. 
 Thurot, 136, 146. 
 Tiberoon, 380. 
 Tiddiman, Sir John, 50, 51, 74, 
 
 75. 
 Ting, Admiral, 450. 
 Tientsin, 443, 446. 
 Tierra Bomba, 340, 342, 343, 345. 
 Tifier (ship), 236. 
 Tilbury Hope, 71. 
 Tinq-Yuen (ship), 441, 448, 449, 
 
 451. 
 Tobago, 78, 187, 394, 395. 
 Tone, Theobald Wolfe, 157, 158. 
 Tormant (ship), 145. 
 Torbay, 110, 121, 142-144, 148, 
 
 152-155, 220,237, 240, 667,276, 
 
 280,281, 372. 
 Torquay, 237. 
 Torres Vedras, 116. 
 Torrington {see Herbert k Byng). 
 Toulon, 53, 110, 111, 120, 123, 135, 
 
 136, 138, 139, 141,147, 158-160, 
 
 162, 167, 169, 171, 173, 174, 
 
 176-180, 182-184, 197, 221, 271, 
 
 272, 295-298, 302, 307,308,310, 
 
 311, 314, 315,325, 359, 363-364, 
 
 367, 371, 379, 400-402. 
 Toulouse, Count of, 295-297, 302, 
 
 312. 
 Tournay, 3. 
 Trafalgar, 238. 
 Tramontana, 236. 
 Trapani, 329. 
 Treport, 4. 
 
 Trincomalee, 377, 396, 397. 
 Trinidad, 184, 187, 191. 
 Triumph (ship), 8, 28, 82, 235. 
 
 236. 
 Ti-omp, Admiral Martin, 34-42, 66. 
 Ti'omp, Admiral Cornelius, 69, 70, 
 
 72. 
 Troubridge, Admiral Sir Thomas, 
 
 401. 
 Tsi-Yiien (ship), 436, 441. 
 Tullibardine, Marquis of, 328. 
 
470 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Tureune, Marshal, 61. 
 Turkey fleet, 50. 
 Turtle Bay, 359. 
 Ti/!,er (ship), 28. 
 Tyrone, Earl of, 21. 
 
 Ulm, 201. , 
 
 United Pro\'inces, the, 31, 46. 
 
 Ushant, 148, 15.1, 152, 190, 192, 
 
 195, 197, 207, 247, 280, 308. 
 Ushant, Lizard Line, 308. 
 Utrecht, Peace of, 323. 
 
 Vado Bay, 167. 
 Vaillant (ship). 386, 
 Valencia, 313. 
 
 .Valentine's Day, Battle of, 400. 
 Valparaiso, 414, 431-435. 
 Van der Hulst, Vice-Admiral, 64. 
 Van Galen, Admiral, 77. 
 Van Nes, Rear-Admiral, 63, 64. 
 Vandevelds, the, 8. 
 Vandrieuil, Rear-Admiral, 389. 
 Vauhoii (ship), 410. 
 Vaughan, General, 392. 
 Venetian Republic, 8, 163. 
 Venezuela, 290. 
 Vera Cruz, 290. 
 Verd, Cape, 263. 
 Vernon, Admii-al, 332-339, 341, 
 
 342, 346-348, 360, 351, 366, 
 
 357. 
 Vesuvius (ship), 410. 
 Vicksburg, 425. 
 Victory (ship), 8, 198, 
 Vienna, 200. 
 Vigo, 186, 189, 194-198, 286-289, 
 
 291, 331, 345. 
 Vilaine, the, 146. 
 Villa Franca, 295, 363. 
 Villeneuve, Admiral, 176, 177, 179- 
 
 181, 183-202, 218. 
 Vimereux, 1 75. 
 Villa del Mar, 435. 
 Virginia, 78, 381. 
 Vittoria, 438, 439. 
 Vlie, the, 35, 48, 56, 57, 61, 66, 74, 
 
 75, 274. 
 
 Wager, Commodore, 315-317. 
 Wagner, Fort, 420, 421, 423. 
 
 Walker, Captain Hoveuden, 291, 
 293, 321-323. 
 
 Walker, Fort, 425. 
 
 Walthenam Bay, 346. 
 
 Wappoo Creek ,419. 
 
 War, American Civil, 204, 212, 
 222,226, 378,419, 425. 
 
 War of American Independence, 
 376,378,381. 
 
 War, Austro-Italian, 205. 
 
 War, Chilo-Peruvian, 205, 222. 
 
 War, Crimean, 204, 212. 
 
 War, Franco-German, 204, 212. 
 
 War, Napoleonic, 208, 378, 380. 
 
 War, Revolutionary, 378, 380. 
 
 War of the Succession, 206, 279, 
 323, 380. 
 
 Warren, Commodore, 353-367. 
 
 Warren, Sir John, 164, 220, 400. 
 
 Washington, General, 381. 
 
 Weelmwhen (ship), 420, 422. 
 
 Wei-hai-Wei, 436, 437, 43-0, 441, 
 443-452. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, 116, 119, 443. 
 
 Wells, 257. 
 
 Wentworth, General, 341, 342, 344. 
 347-351. 
 
 West Indies, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 
 77, 78, 98, 99, 147, 156, 160, 
 176, 178-180, 183, 117-190, 192, 
 201, 207-211, 217, 218, 225, 228, 
 245, 247, 250, 254, 258-260, 263, 
 267, 271, 273-275, 277, 280, 281, 
 289, 291, 293, 294, 313-316, 320, 
 323-326, 332, 336-339, 349, 363, 
 357, 360, 366-368, 374, 377, 379, 
 380, 384-387, 389, 392, 394, 418. 
 
 Western Islands {see Azores). 
 
 Weymouth, 120, 237, 240. 
 
 Weymouth (ship), 341, 344. 
 
 Whalley, Lieut. -General, 257. 
 
 Wheeler, Rear-Admiral Sir Fran- 
 cis, 259-261,263. 
 
 Whetstone, Admiral, 290, 291, 
 293. 
 
 White Bear (ship), 8. 
 
 Whetham, Colonel Sir William, 
 292, 314. 
 
 Whipple, Commodore, 418. 
 
 Whittaker, Captain Sir Ed., 299, 
 300, 317. 
 
 Wielings, the, 40, 56. 
 
 Wight, Captain, 40. 
 
 Wightman, Major-General, 3-28. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 471 
 
 VVillielmslmven, 427. 
 
 Willis, Colonel. 292. 
 
 William and Mary, Foi-t, 204. 
 
 William the Conqueror, 157. 
 
 William III., 110, 116. 
 
 Wilmington, 225, 426. 
 
 Wilmot, Captain Robert, 273, 274. 
 
 Windsor Castle (ship), 194. 
 
 Windward Islands, 208. 
 
 Wolfe, General, 356. 
 
 TroZ/'(ship), 338. 
 
 Wren, Commodore, 258-260, 277. 
 
 Wright, Commodore, 249, 252-256, 
 
 272 277. 
 Wyuter, Sir William, 241, 243. 
 
 Yalu, Battle of the, 439-441. 
 Yalu River, 436, 439, 442. 
 Yamagata, Marshal, 443. 
 Yarmouth, 40, 52, 174. 
 Yellow Sea, 439, 441, 443. 
 Yokohama, 443. 
 
 Yonge's Naval Nisfonj, 410, 412. 
 Yoshlno (ship), 436. 
 Yung-tcheng, 446, 447, 448. 
 Yuwj-Wei (ship), 439, 441. 
 
 Zealand, 40, 41, 48, 49, QS 69, 
 243, 
 
 I 
 
SECOND EDITION. 
 
 Royal 8vo. With New Maps and Hates. 21s. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE: 
 
 Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated. 
 
 New Edition, with an Additional Chapter on Recent Illustrations. 
 
 By Vice-Admiral P. H. COLOMB, 
 
 Go/d Medallist Royal United Service Institution, and Lecturer on 
 
 . Naval Strategy and Tactics in the Royal Naval 
 
 College at Greenwich. 
 
 OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 
 
 " The book is almost a pioneer of its class, for, strange to sa)-, the litera- 
 ture of the greatest Naval Power in history has no authoritative treatise 
 on the principles of Naval Warfare. . . . Ought to have an absorbing 
 interest to every Englishman who loves his country and cares for its his- 
 tory." — Times. 
 
 " Such a work ought to find its way into every reference Jibrary, as well 
 as into the hands of all who are preparing for the service." — Standard. 
 
 " Admiral Colomb does good service in breaking what is positively 
 new ground, for no one before him has treated naval history in the 
 unique manner he has done, nor made so scientific an attempt to draw 
 useful and practical lessons therefrom." — United Service Gazette. 
 
 " The volume before us may be described as a work on the philosophy 
 of naval warfare, confined to its purely strategic aspect ; and it has been 
 written because our naval literature is almost a blank in this most 
 important province." — Academy. 
 
 " Admiral Colomb has written a treatise long wanted by na\al officers, 
 and which will be read with interest by all classes of the community." — 
 Broad Arrow. 
 
 " The gallant author, who is a most prolific writer on professional sub- 
 jects, deals with every phase of the question of naval warfare. . . . 
 There are numberless illustrations, plans, diagrams, maps, &c., to assist 
 the reader, and the bulky volume should, upon its merits generally, find 
 many readers." — Hatits Telegraph. 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 CHAPTEK XX. 
 
 The Spanish-American War. * 
 
 Anomalous character of the war. — Naval force on each side. — Causes preventing 
 privateering. — Captures of merchant ships. — Blockade. — Absence of attempts to 
 watch or mask the enemy. — Resulting division of United States force. — Augmenta- 
 tion of American naval force. — Intelligence. — Control of naval movement from 
 Washington. — Status of telegraph cables. — Attacks on territory by naval force alone. 
 — Panic on United States coasts. — Naval attacks on shore batteries. — Dewey's 
 operations at ^Manila. — Attack on war-ships at Cardenas. — Encounters with bat- 
 teries. — Attack on San Juan batteries. — Effect of command of the sea. — Attack on 
 Manzanillo. — Effect of the " fleet in being." — Naval bases. — Invasions : Santiago 
 and Porto Rico. — Differentiation of naval force. 
 
 The Spanish-American war, commencing on April 21, 1898, 
 and ending with the armistice proclaimed on the 12th of August 
 in the same year, partook of the anomalous character which is 
 discoverable in the war of American Independence, and the 
 Chino- Japanese war described in Chapter XIX. In both these 
 wars there was a particular objective to which attention was 
 directed, and which gave a certain colour to what was done, 
 differing from that which has generally controlled and modified 
 the conduct of naval war when nation has been set against 
 nation with only a general struggle for the mastery. France 
 and Spain, in declaring war against Great Britain towards the 
 close of the last century, were determined to injure us by 
 detaching altogether from the Empire the already revolted 
 American Colonies. Most of what was done was subsidiary to 
 that object ; and our enemies succeeded because we had not 
 naval force sufficient to match the naval combination against us. 
 The Franco- Spanish attack on Gibraltar was subsidiary to the 
 main object, inasmuch as it compelled us to divide our naval 
 forces on opposite shores of the Atlantic, and on each shore we 
 
 * This chapter is chiefly based on the Appendix to the Rcpmrt of the Chief of the 
 Bureau of Navigatimi at Washington, 1898. 
 
 31 
 
ii NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 were, on the whole, overmatched by the combined fleets. Our 
 home fleet retired before the Franco-Spanish fleet, off Plymouth, 
 in 1779; De Grasse, off the Chesapeake, in 1781, succeeded in 
 his object, in spite of the presence and limited attack of the fleet 
 under Graves and Hood ; while Howe, in 1782, retired before the 
 combined Franco-Spanish fleet in the Straits of Gibraltar. The 
 sea in this war was unoccupied territory. There was no distinct 
 attempt on either side to assume the command of it. The 
 numerically superior force chose rather to directly achieve the 
 object in view by operating on the other side of the Atlantic, 
 and by threatening Gibraltar, than to obtain it indirectly by 
 closing on the naval forces of Great Britain, by watching and 
 masking them, so as to ensure the fall of the territories threatened 
 by depriving them of succour or sustenance. Our own naval 
 force was distracted between the desire to sustain our military 
 force in America, to preserve Gibraltar, and to guard against 
 the invasion of the British Islands. 
 
 This anomalous character of the war was maintained through- 
 out ; so that it may be considered whether Eodney's victory in 
 1782, had it been achieved before the fall of York-town, might 
 not have put the Allies wholly on the defensive, and destroyed 
 the abnormal character of the contest. The peace naturally 
 followed, because the French had attained the chief object for 
 which they went to war, and because its continuation might — 
 after such a victory — have proved wholly disadvantageous to 
 them. 
 
 It should be observed that the principal objective of the war 
 was distant, and may be treated as equi-distant, from the head- 
 quarters of the several navies engaged. 
 
 In the Chino- Japanese war the objective was the Korea. This 
 was territory not very distant from the headquarters of either 
 navy, but may be considered also as having been equi-distant 
 from each. The Japanese object was to turn the Chinese out of 
 that territory ; and at first they sought their object directly by 
 landing troops on the territory, ignoring, as it were, the existence 
 of the Chinese fleet ; while the Chinese sought to defend their 
 territory directly by landing troops also. On neither side were 
 these landings considered acts of war at first, and the Korea stood 
 for a common territory, while the sea surrounding its shores stood 
 for a common sea. 
 
 There was no war, in fact, until the Japanese claimed a com- 
 mand of the sea by interfering with the conveyance of Chinese 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEEICAN WAB. iii 
 
 troops. Then came war, and the choice of carrying it on in the 
 anomalous way it had begun, or of setting up a struggle for the 
 command of the sea, under the conviction that whichever side 
 obtained it would necessarily do all that was desired to be done 
 afterwards. The anomalous method was chosen. Neither side 
 made any attempt to watch and mask the fleets of the other. 
 The Japanese fleet remained as it were on the defensive, while 
 carrying on the offensive against China by means of a land war 
 in the Korea, and leaving the sea common, in spite of the claim 
 they had so far made good to command it. 
 
 The Chinese took the same line in trusting to the convoy of a 
 defensive force to land troops upon a shore that was not hostile. 
 It was therefore accident, and not intention, that brought the 
 two fleets into battle off the mouth of the Yalu, and in the result 
 placed the command of the sea in the hands of the Japanese. 
 But from this moment the war assumed a normal form. The 
 Japanese original object was gained by the victory of her army 
 at Ping- Yang ; and had that been obtained before the Chinese 
 started their transports and the convoying fleet across the Yellow 
 Sea, a peace might have been concluded without any contest 
 between the navies. But the battle of Ping-Y"ang was fought on 
 the 15th of September, and the battle of Yalu on the 17th, so 
 that the one was without influence on the other. Then, as the 
 Chinese made no overtures, the war fell into normal channels. 
 The Japanese not only claimed, but made good their claim, to 
 the command of the sea. They undertook a general attack on 
 China, and conducted a series of brilliant assaults upon territory, 
 all the features of which were mere repetitions of those described 
 in the later chapters of this book. 
 
 AVhen we look at the war between the United States and Spain 
 we note at once the same primarily anomalous conditions. The 
 object of the United States was to turn the Spaniards out of 
 Cuba, and had Spain been wise, she would have taken Admiral 
 Cervera's sound advice at the outset, and have made a bargain 
 for the surrender of Cuba which would have rid her of a trouble- 
 some and expensive appendage without loss either financially or 
 in honour. In this case the objective was close to the shores of 
 the United States, and she had set up a naval base at Key West 
 which was only one hundred miles from the principal port of 
 Cuba, Havana. Havana was, however, more than forty times as 
 far from Cadiz ; and it was this disparity in distances which, more 
 than anything else, determined the character of the naval war. 
 
iv NAVAL WABFARE. 
 
 This character is differentiated from that of the war of American 
 Independence and the Chino-Japanese "War, inasmuch as Great 
 Britain and China succom^ed their forces in America and in the 
 Korea to a great extent, and to the utmost of their power, whereas 
 Cuba received no support from Spain after w^ar was declared, 
 unless the abortive effort of Cervera's squadron can be considered 
 as such. But as in the earlier war there were parts of the 
 American shores, and many ports, that were friendly to Great 
 Britain, while other parts of the shore and other ports were 
 friendly to the French ; so it was in Korea that ports and shores 
 were in some places friendly to Japan, and others friendly to 
 China ; and it was anticipated that parts of the shore of Cuba, and 
 some of the ports, would be found friendly to the United States, 
 and others friendly to Spain. As it turned out, however, there 
 was no suitable or convenient port in Cuba that was in the hands 
 of the insurgents, and therefore friendly to the United States ; 
 while even parts of the shore that were taken as friendly to the 
 United States, turned out to be otherwise when minor landings 
 in order to offer succour and support to the insurgents were 
 attempted by America. And while there were British troops in 
 America, and Japanese troops in Korea, at the outbreak of those 
 wars, Cuba was to all intents and purposes an enemy's country 
 to the United States in 1898. Supposing, therefore, that the 
 Spanish naval force had been effective enough to have taken 
 advantage of the position, the risks that the United States ran in 
 proposing to ignore, as it were, the action of the Spanish fleet, 
 was much greater than that which was run by France, or by 
 Japan, in the previous wars. On the other hand, a true gauge of 
 Spanish power might have justified the decision come to by the 
 United States, in the principles adopted for carrying on the war. 
 It is perhaps not impossible that a peaceable solution of the 
 international difficulty might have been found, had events not been 
 precipitated by the instantaneous destruction of the United States 
 ship Maine from explosion in the harbour of Havana. In the 
 United States, opinion was universal that the terrible event had 
 been caused by the treacherous firing of a heavy submarine mine 
 placed in contact with the bottom of the ship in order to destroy 
 her and all who were on board her. Perhaps the opinion was as 
 widely spread in the United Kingdom that the explosion was 
 interior and spontaneous. Not impossibly the opposite opinions 
 were excited and controlled by antecedent conditions of mind. 
 The officers of the Maine took the ship into Havana harbour in 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. v 
 
 full expectation that some dastardly attempt to destroy her would 
 be made. The ordinary Englishman found it difhcult to conceive 
 of any intention so wicked ; or if he got over this conception, 
 then he thought its madness and its stupidity would have 
 restrained any body of men from contemplating it. For it was 
 certain that if the Maine was destroyed by a submarine mine of 
 the character supposed, the preparation must have engaged the 
 services of many men, and a special manufacture and arrange- 
 ment, hardly possible without some authorisation. 
 
 But those who wrote in England on the subject, with the 
 evidence of the American inquiry before them, could not see that 
 there was any proof except of the interior explosion of magazines. 
 They recalled the unexplained explosion of the magazine of the 
 Dotterel, and chose in their thought the line of least resistance. 
 The spontaneous explosion of certain highly tempered steel shells 
 on board a British man-of-war subsequently has not tended to 
 convert the English to the American view ; but however the truth 
 may lie, the disaster forced the running, and the United States 
 went to war with Spain, shouting the chosen battle-cry — 
 " Eemember the Maine ! " 
 
 The naval forces of the two countries showed on the face of 
 things a considerable superiority on the side of the United States 
 over Spain. I myself calculated that the American naval forces 
 stood as three to two when compared with those of Spain. The 
 Spanish Admiral, Cervera, calculated before the war, that the 
 Spanish force was less than two-fifths of that of the United 
 States.* But then the United States added greatly to the 
 effective force of her navy by purchasing considerable numbers of 
 yachts and other swift vessels, and by hiring several large and 
 fast steam ships, which, as patrols and scouts, relieved the 
 effective warships for combatant services. + 
 
 * Views of Admiral Cervera regarding the Spanish Navy in the late War, published 
 by the Office of Naval Intelligence at Washington, 1893. He calculated the dis- 
 placement of the United States ships at 116,445 tons, as against 56,G44 tons for the 
 Spanish ships. He took the offensive power of the American guns as represented 
 by 132,397 when that of the Spanish guns was represented by the figure 50,622. 
 
 f Sixty-nine regular ships of war appeared on Brassey's list of the U.S. Navy for 
 1898. Of these, twelve being obsolete, with smooth-bore guns, were not employed 
 apart from harbour defence ; while nine were either building or under repair,, and 
 the Maine being destroyed, made up a list of twenty-two ships of the regular navy 
 that were ineffective. But, according to the returns, beside the forty-seven regular 
 warships employed, ninety-four purchased or hired ships, were used in the war, as 
 well as four of the regularly enrolled and subsidised ships of the mercantile marine. 
 
 Spain, according to the same authority, possessed fifty-five warships in all, in- 
 
vi NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 In connection with these disparities of force a remarkable 
 change, apparently due to the change in propulsive power, made 
 itself manifest. In the war between Great Britain and the 
 United States in 1812, the disparity of force was tremendous. 
 Great Britain having perhaps a thousand ships in commission, 
 while the United States could number no more than half a dozen 
 frigates and six or eight sloops and brigs,* But while in the 
 Spanish-American War, only Cervera's squadron crossed from 
 Spain to operate in the western waters, no ship from the United 
 States crossed the Atlantic to interfere with Spanish commerce, 
 or to threaten Spain in any way. In the war of 1812, while 
 a great force of the dominant navy crossed to America and 
 operated on the United States coasts, cruisers from America 
 crossed to British waters and not only threatened and inter- 
 rupted commerce, but captured warships at the entrance to the 
 Channel. 
 
 Neither the United States nor Spain were signatories to the 
 Declaration of Paris, as regarded privateering. The United 
 States disclaimed all intention of taking advantage of her free- 
 dom in that respect ; and though Spain reserved her liberty of 
 action, she did not send out a single privateer. 
 
 I think these two conditions of the war must be taken together. 
 No doubt neither nation cared to lay itself open to a charge of 
 being behind the age in the manner of conducting civilised war ; 
 but had the pursuit of privateering offered great advantages 
 either to the Government or to adventurers of the United States 
 or of Spain, the reasons against taking it up were not over- 
 whelming. 
 
 The civilised world has never distinctly condemned the action 
 of the Confederates in formally commissioning ships to prey on 
 the commerce of the Federals ; and the difference between the 
 Alabama, for instance, and a privateer, was one only conferred 
 by legal formalities. A privateer is a warship acting under 
 restrictions. She has powers of capturing, but probably less of 
 destroying, for her rights in any prize only appear after an 
 
 eluding the Cristobal Colon purchased from Italy, but only Cervera's squadron of 
 four cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers crossed the Atlantic ; and though there 
 was a considerable number of presumably effective ships, generally of small size, 
 in Cuban and Porto Rican harbours, they scarcely made an appearance, and had 
 little or no effect on the course of the war. The Spanish ships that came into effec- 
 tive contact with the United States ships were all destroyed, to the number of nine 
 ships and two torpedo-boat destroyers. 
 * Roosevelt, War of 1812. 
 
I 
 
 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. vii 
 
 Admiralty Court has pronounced judgment, and if she destroys, 
 there is no fund from which she can recover vahie. 
 
 A belhgerent government has only to commission a privateer, 
 without altering her condition in any other way, to convert her 
 into a warship, with powers of destruction, as well as of capture, 
 at the discretion of the commander. Both the United States and 
 Spain might have evaded the obloquy of sending out privateers — 
 supposing such obloquy existed — by commissioning any ships 
 that adventurers offered. But the doubt is whether any such 
 did offer. Neither the Spanish flag nor the American flag is 
 frequently met with at sea ; and nothing was more marked in 
 regard to the Alabama and her consorts than the coal difficulty. 
 The Sumter, it may be remembered, was ultimately sold in 
 European waters because it became impossible for her to obtain 
 a supply of coal ; and it is well known that the Alabama 
 generally cruised under sail, and confined her attacks almost 
 wholly to Federal sailing ships. 
 
 I cannot persuade myself that this coal question is insuperable, 
 because there are few coasts in the world where there are not 
 unguarded smooth water anchorages, where, if only colliers were 
 at hand, they could be brought alongside the warship, or the 
 privateer, and cleared. But the whole matter requires precon- 
 sideration and organisation, and it is certain that on neither 
 side in the Spanish-American war was there any such thing. 
 Indeed it may be said that in no part of the world has the coal 
 question yet been treated as one necessary to arrange in a per- 
 manent and mobile form as of vital import. But if, in the 
 Spanish-American war, we take the difficulty of the coal question, 
 and the smallness of the result likely to arise from any organised 
 issue of privateers, or of commissioned commerce-destroyers 
 fitted out on the principle of the Alabama, we do not require to 
 set up international proprieties to account for the absence of any 
 such ships on either side. The fact that while in the war of 
 1812, warships and privateers were found efiective on both sides 
 of the Atlantic, and were so used by all parties to the war, while 
 in 1898 neither side made any show in this way, should convince 
 us that the question of coal supply is the most retarding of all 
 the influences that affect modern naval warfare.* 
 
 * It will be remembered that Prussia in 1870 proposed to fit out a volunteer fleet 
 which only the thinnest disguise differentiated from privateers. Prussia was a 
 party to the Declaration of Paris, and the French Government remonstrated on that 
 ground. But though it was made quite clear that the proposed ships were but 
 
viii NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Light is thrown upon these questions by an examination of the 
 official Hst of captures — confessedly incomplete — published by 
 the United States Government. It looks a large and important 
 list, but only appears so from its form, as many captures are 
 mentioned several times over, and the list includes the war ships 
 captured at Cuba and the ships which came into the hands of 
 the United States navy by the fall of ports such as Manzanillo 
 Santiago, Ponce, Arroyo, and others. 
 
 In reality only some five or six Spanish ships of any importance 
 were captured or destroyed, the two larger, the Santo Domingo, 
 of 5,600 tons, and the Alfonso XII., of perhaps 6,000 tons, being 
 destroyed when attempting to run the blockade at Cienfuegos 
 and Havana respectively. Most of the other captures were 
 insignificant sailing vessels and fishing boats. The Spanish navy 
 on its own side made only two or three captures, and these were 
 at the opening of the war.* Practically it may be repeated that 
 on neither side was the commerce great enough, or the merchant 
 ships numerous enough, under the belligerent flags, to tempt 
 merchants to engage in privateering, had it been open to them. 
 
 When a state of war then was declared, the United States, 
 looking to the force and character of the Spanish navy and the 
 distance of its headquarters from Cuba, believing also that Cuban 
 shores were much more friendly than they turned out to be, 
 determined to ignore the Spanish naval forces on the borders of 
 the Atlantic, and to proceed against Cuba in a manner which 
 would have been entirely orthodox had there been no Spanish 
 naval forces left free to interrupt such proceedings. 
 
 There was not naval force enough in America to completely 
 blockade all the Cuban ports, but the blockade of the western 
 ports on the north shore, from Cardenas to the western end of 
 the island, and Cienfuegos on the south side, was at once declared. 
 The western end of the island was the most important to strike 
 at, as, although much of the interior was in the hands of the 
 Insurgents, it contained the capital and the chief port of the 
 island and the bulk of the Spanish garrison ; it was the richest 
 and most advanced part of the country. Havana in the north 
 was so easily supplied from Cienfuegos in the south, that the 
 
 privateers in disguise, Lord Grauville " declared himself unable to make any 
 objection to the intended measure on the ground of its being a violation of the 
 engagement into which Prussia had entered." See Hall's International Laiv, 2nd 
 ed. p. 486. 
 
 * Morris (The American War witJi Spain, p. 152) says Spain made only one prize, 
 a ship taken in the China Seas. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAIL ix 
 
 blockade of the former port was as necessary as that of the 
 latter. 
 
 As the question of modern blockade is one upon which very 
 opposite opinions prevail, and as to which no experiments in 
 peace time worthy of the name have been carried out to ascertain 
 how the matter really lies, some of the opinions of the United 
 States officer engaged in conducting the duty, may be usefully 
 referred to here.* 
 
 Commodore J. A. Howell had been placed in charge of the 
 blockade on the north coast of Cuba. He reported on the 17th 
 July, before which time the blockade of the whole northern 
 shore, including nearly 700 miles of coast, and some thirteen 
 ports, large and small, had been declared. He did not consider 
 the force at his disposal sufficient for the service, and named 
 twenty-six ships of all sorts as required. We need not go into 
 detail over the smaller ports, which were only assigned one ship 
 each, but may confine ourselves to his remarks as to Havana, 
 with Matanzas, forty-five miles to the east, with Mariel, and 
 Bahia Honda, twenty miles, and fifty miles, respectively, to the 
 west. The blockade aimed at was, it must be understood, 
 mercantile principally, and chiefly against inward traffic ; and 
 fourteen ships were demanded for the service, of which only two 
 were required to be heavy ships. The opinion was that Matan- 
 zas could be fully closed by only two ships. Havana required 
 ten ; two heavy ships, " because of the moral effect, to serve as a 
 rallying point for the lighter ships, to run under the batteries, 
 to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the 
 fire of the batteries if desired." Four of the ships should draw 
 not more than ten feet of water, and the remaining four should 
 be " vessels of good speed." 
 
 Great stress was laid on the light draught ships, because "all 
 present efforts seem to be toward running the blockade at this 
 port by creeping along the shore, especially from the westward, 
 and small, light draught vessels are necessary to detect and stop 
 this, while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take 
 up the chase." This necessity for providing smaller vessels to 
 act as the " inshore squadron," is entirely in accordance with the 
 teaching of history, for if the recorded failures of blockade are 
 examined, it is made plain that the failure was rarely on the part 
 of the masking fleet, but always from the want of, or from the 
 mismanagement of, the lighter ships, which were still found 
 necessary by experience of the steam blockade of Havana. 
 
 * See also what Sampson says in Ccnturij Magazine for April, 1899. 
 
X NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 The misapprehensions that prevail in regard to the breaking of 
 blockade by Sir George Tryon's ships in the manoeuvres in 1888 
 are due to neglecting the historical facts. Neither at Bantry Bay 
 nor at Lough S willy were the blockading Admirals able to command 
 an efficient inshore squadron. Off Bantry Bay the inshore look- 
 out work was confided to torpedo-boats chiefly — confessedly the 
 most inefficient vessels for that particular purpose. But here we 
 have the United States Commodore satisfied that with only four 
 vessels fitted to work inshore, and four vessels of speed in the 
 offing, he could undertake to close the very accessible harbour of 
 Havana to entering traffic. I think it must be allowed that the 
 entry of ships into blockaded ports is more difficult to guard 
 against than their exit, because the exit is all from one point, to 
 which all attention can be directed, whereas the entering traffic 
 puts in an appearance from any of perhaps seventeen points of the 
 compass, every one of which must be watched. But when 
 Commodore Howell spoke of being able to blockade Havana with 
 only ten ships of three different classes, he meant not ten ships 
 set apart for that service, but ten ships constantly engaged upon 
 it. He calculated that if his blockading ships coaled and took in 
 fresh water for their boilers at Key West, which was 100 miles 
 distant, he would require about a third more ships than it was 
 intended to keep continually off the port. 
 
 Our own Admirals, reviewing the manoeuvres of 1888, concluded 
 that two-thirds more ships than were actually required to be off 
 the port must be provided in order to allow of that number being 
 maintained. It is true that they spoke only of battleships, but 
 evidently the rule applies to all classes of ships which are supplied 
 and refitted at a distant station. Our Admirals, taking the 
 general case, and evidently being cautious not to underestimate, 
 thought that five ships would be required to maintain three off 
 the enemy's port. Commodore Howell taking a particular case, 
 with full knowledge of the facts, and with the actual responsi- 
 bility of war upon him, only saw the necessity of providing four 
 ships in order to maintain three constantly off the port. 
 
 But the way in which reality in war falls short of expectation is 
 illustrated by some remarks of the Commodore made ten days 
 later, in urging the necessity of remedying the "very unsatisfac- 
 tory condition of affairs now existing." 
 
 " There are now (that is, off Havana) here," he said, " two small 
 revenue cutters, two tugs, one converted yacht, two gun-boats, 
 and this ship (the San Francisco, a cruiser of 4,098 tons). The 
 
THE SPANISH- AMEBIC AN WAR. xi 
 
 powerful batteries compel the ships in the centre to remain at 
 least six miles away in the daytime, while those at the ends must 
 keep at least ten miles away from the Morro " (the fort at the 
 entrance of the harbour). "The arc to be covered includes over 
 seventeen points of the compass. Thus in the present state each 
 ship has far more ground to cover than she should. There should 
 never be less than ten ships here, and twelve would be far better. 
 At one time the blockade here was reduced to only four small 
 ships, and at another, the Mayflower was the largest ship here.* 
 
 " Our best reports give at least four vessels of war inside 
 Havana, among them the Conde de Venadito, one of the Pinzons, 
 and another ship similar to her, and an armed merchantman.! 
 The risk run by reducing the number of ships on the blockade 
 under these circumstances is manifest, as is also the incomplete- 
 ness of the blockade." \ 
 
 As to the real effectiveness of the blockade of Havana under 
 given conditions, the information is imperfect. General Blanco, at 
 Havana, telegraphed on the '24th of June to Cervera at Santiago 
 that in spite of nine blockading ships, " the Santo Domingo 
 and Montevideo left at two o'clock in the morning, and were able 
 to run the blockade with ease." § The number of blockading 
 ships mentioned is only one short of the number asked for by 
 , Commodore Howell ; but his despatches make it clear that unless 
 his ten ships were of the particular character demanded, he would 
 not have considered the blockade efficient. I have no account of 
 the character of the nine ships mentioned by General Blanco, so 
 that I cannot express an opinion adverse to those held by Commo- 
 dore Howell. 
 
 In the previous chapters of .this book the question of blockade — 
 in itself a separate study — has only been touched on incidentally, 
 but it has appeared to me proper to take up the subject here in 
 this way, because a blockade of Havana, founded on a base a 
 hundred miles off at Key West, is probably as typical a case as it 
 is possible to imagine. It was the case of a port with a narrow 
 entrance, well defended by batteries, opening directly on a deep 
 
 * She was one of the extemporised warships— a commander's command. 
 t The Conde de Venadito was a cruiser of 1,130 tons. "The Finzons " probably 
 refers to the class of .570 ton torpedo gmi-boats, of which there were six on the list 
 of the Spanish navy, one being named Martin Alonzo Pinzon, and another Vincente 
 Ganez Finzon. 
 
 I App. to Rep. of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, pp. 256-258. 
 . § H. W. Wilson in the U.S. Mag. for February, 1899. The Santo Domingo was 
 afterwards destroyed in attempting to run the blockade on the South Coast. 
 
xii NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 water and shelterless sea, with no possibility of anchoring, and 
 therefore presenting an extreme set of conditions. The solution 
 offered by Commodore Howell does not impress me with any 
 sense of the extreme difficulties of a steam blockade which so 
 many more recent thinkers have attributed to it. 
 
 The fact that no attempt was made by the United States navy 
 to watch or mask the free Spanish warships in the Atlantic, set 
 up a great alarm on the coast of the United States, and not only 
 caused a large expenditure in local defence by batteries and sub- 
 marine mines, but popular clamour detained much naval force in 
 a defensive attitude at home. It is well worthy of remark that 
 this attitude of the American people has been exactly the 
 opposite of that which has been traditional to the population of 
 our islands for centuries. Macaulay, in part, bases his fierce 
 phihppic against Lord Torrington on the complaint of Sir Thomas 
 Clarges in the House of Commons in November, 1689. The com- 
 plaint was that the fleet was not at sea, and in those days the 
 expression meant out of sight at sea. As long as they did not see 
 it, the public of that day were quite easy in their minds about the 
 fleet ; but they were always impressed with the idea that if they 
 saw the fleet, it was idling, and meantime the enemy with which 
 it should be in touch, might be doing every sort of mischief. At 
 the time the complaint was made, the French were in Ireland, 
 and the air was full of Jacobite plots, and of the arrival of a 
 French military force to aid them. I do not remember a single 
 instance in our history where the public feeling has differed from 
 that of Sir Thomas Clarges, and I do not believe that in our 
 future history it will ever be otherwise, unless the end is close at 
 hand. But in the United States, the feeling was different, and 
 was, oddly enough, attributed to the lack of fixed coast defences 
 which had been bitterly ridiculed by Pepys more than two 
 centuries ago, and found useless when our fleet was withdrawn. 
 
 The result of this feeling was the following division of the 
 United States naval force, at the beginning of the war, and up to 
 the end of April. The total disposable ships at the outbreak of 
 war seem to have been sixty-nine, divided into five squadrons. 
 The North Atlantic squadron was under Commodore, afterwards 
 Eear-Admiral, Sampson, and it consisted of thirty-five ships and 
 vessels, stationed in the vicinity of Cuba, with the headquarters 
 at Key West.* Additions in April brought this squadron 
 
 * Two battleshiiDs, three coast-defence ships, two gun vessels, three gun-boats, one 
 special ship (the Vesuvius), two destroyers, five torpedo-boats, and eight extemporised 
 warships. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xiii 
 
 up to forty-three ships and vessels before the end of the 
 month.* 
 
 The Flying Squadron, under Commodore Schley, had its 
 headquarters at Hampton Eoads, and was destmed to protect the 
 northern coasts of the States. At the opening of the war it 
 consisted of seven ships and vessels,! to which one was added 
 before the end of i^pril,t bringing the force up to eight ships and 
 vessels. 
 
 The Northern Patrol Squadron, under Commodore Howell, 
 was destined to guard the coast and commerce from the Delaware 
 to Bar Harbour. It consisted of five ships and vessels. § Then 
 there were the Pacific and Asiatic squadrons. After war was de- 
 clared, two of the subsidised liners were set apart for the special 
 service of patrolling in the Northern United States waters. 
 
 Thus the conditions adverted to set apart forty-three ships and 
 vessels for the offensive, and fifteen for the purely defensive role 
 in the Atlantic — surely a very large proportion ! 
 
 Just before the outbreak of the war, namely, on the 16th of 
 April, an informant wrote from Madrid describing the amount 
 and state of the Spanish naval forces, and we may perhaps 
 suppose that some such information was that on which the 
 United States Government acted. They were told that the 
 cruisers Cristobal Colon and Maria Teresa, with the extemporised 
 cruiser Ciudad de Cadiz, three destroyers, and three torpedo-boats 
 were at the Cape de Verde Islands |i ; that two more cruisers, the 
 Almirante Oquenda and the Viscaya, were expected to join them 
 from Porto Rico on that day. It was also stated that one battle- 
 ship, four powerful cruisers, one torpedo gun-boat, two destroyers, 
 and four torpedo-boats were ready, or all but ready, in the har- 
 bours of Cadiz and Carthagena. There were — so it was stated 
 — nine trans- Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports being armed and 
 equipped as cruisers, and five in Cuban ports being treated in like 
 manner ; and other ships were mentioned. Altogether, though 
 greatly inferior to the fleet of the United States, it could not have 
 appeared to any one not cognisant of the reality that the United 
 States were to have the simple walk-over that was before them. 
 
 But the one navy was very much alive, and the other was to 
 
 * One gun-boat and seven extemporised vessels. 
 
 f One battleship, four cruisers, one special ship (the Katadin, ram), and one 
 extemporised vessel — the Merriinac, collier. 
 
 I An extemporised vessel. 
 
 § One cruiser and four extemporised vessels. 
 
 II Belonging to the Portuguese, and therefore neutral. 
 
xiv NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 all intents and purposes a dead one before the war opened ; and 
 yet, as no attempt was made by the United States to watch these 
 " fleets in being," it was necessary, as we see, to throw a con- 
 siderable part of the United States navy uselessly on the defensive 
 at the beginning of the war. 
 
 The living character of the United States navy is illustrated by 
 the following facts. Brassey's list gave twenty-eight armoured 
 and thirty-five unarmoured ships as presumably available for 
 employment in the war. Of these, twelve of the armoured and 
 twenty-four of the unarmoured were in employment before the 
 end of April ; and before the close of the war fourteen of the 
 former and thirty-two of the latter were at work. The bulk of 
 the ships not actually put to use was composed of thirteen coast- 
 defence ships, mostly monitors, launched in the early sixties, and 
 consequently only appearing by courtesy on an effective list.* 
 
 And the United States fleet increased every month, chiefly, of 
 course, by way of extemporised vessels, but still increased. Thus 
 in May twenty-two ships were added to the fleet, in June fifteen 
 were added, in July nineteen were added, and even in August 
 there was one addition. It is true that some of these were 
 commissioned colliers and supply-ships, but still the fact remains 
 that between April 21st, when the war began, and August 12th, 
 when it ended, sixty-seven ships were added to the sixty-nine 
 with which America started in the war. 
 
 On the other hand, Admiral Cervera's revelations show that 
 there was hardly a really effective ship amongst the eleven 
 armoured and the thirty-eight unarmoured ships and vessels 
 with which the lists credited Spain. Guns were wanting, 
 ammunition was wanting, torpedoes were wanting. Ships that 
 were supposed to be ready were not ready ; and the time within 
 which others were supposed to be ready became indefinitely 
 extended. Coal was never where it was wanted ; and ships 
 supposed to steam twenty-one knots could only steam thirteen 
 when they were put to it.f The utter failure and collapse of the 
 Spanish navy, both in council, and in material and moral force, 
 withdraws from examination many possible lessons, and throws 
 doubt upon many others, just as was the case in the Chino- 
 Japanese war. China and Spain, being thrown into defensive 
 
 * It is, however, stated by Mr. Morris {The American War with Sjmin, p. 146) that 
 these monitors were fitted out and used foi; harbour defence. 
 f Vieivs of Admiral Cervera. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAB. xv 
 
 wars, failed to make any real defensive efforts, and they leave the 
 proposition open as to whether steam has enormously enhanced 
 the superiority of the superior fleet, or whether the collapse of the 
 inferior navies in both cases was due to inferiorities in the warlike 
 qualities of the races. 
 
 In earlier chapters of this work I have referred incidentally to 
 the amount of intelligence received by authorities in naval wars, 
 and the speed of its conveyance. Generally speaking, both were 
 defective, and a special instance is given at p. '265 in reference to 
 the capture of Goree on the West Coast of Africa. It may be 
 truly said that the amount of intelHgence gained by belligerent 
 Governments as to the movements, or projected movements, of 
 their opponents, is in direct proportion to the facility existing for 
 its carriage. If such a law exists, the result must be that the 
 number of reporters will multiply according to the facilities 
 present for forwarding reports. Reason, on this basis, would have 
 told us to expect that the American and Spanish Governments 
 would, by the presence of telegraph cables and wires, and swift 
 news-carrying steamers, have the fullest and most speedy intelli- 
 gence of everything done, or proposed to be done, by either side. 
 And this was so. The American authorities state that, "during 
 the war, the Board" (that is, the Naval War Board), "and, 
 previous to the formation of the Board, the Department itself, 
 was kept informed of the movements, resources, conditions, and 
 plans of the Spanish naval force by various secret agents. It is 
 now known that the Department was promptly informed of all 
 important movements. At times, however, information was con- 
 flicting, and decisions had often to be made as to what was most 
 probably true." * And besides, all the world knew everything that 
 went on, and much of what was designed, a few hours after its 
 inception, through the untiring energy of the modern newspaper 
 reporter and the enterprising Press. If, in 1693, intelligence of 
 the capture of Goree took nine months to reach London, via 
 Jamaica, the change of condition is startlingly exhibited when 
 we note that news of the sailing of Cervera's squadron from St. 
 Vincent on the 29th of April reached Admiral Sampson, off 
 Havana, via Washington, on the 1st of May. 
 
 It becomes almost certain that the element of surprise, which 
 is exhibited in my earlier chapters as so marked a feature in 
 former naval wars, must be expected to disappear in future naval 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 33. This was not the case in the Chino-Japanese war, wliere 
 the methods of conveying intelligence were usually primitive. Seep. 446 of this work. 
 
xvi NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 wars, excej)t in cases where the belHgerent suffering in conse- 
 quence of it, has deliberately courted it. All the world knew 
 almost from day to day exactly what Cervera was doing at St. 
 Vincent, and it is only reasonable to infer that the United States 
 Government was more speedily and more accm-ately informed 
 than the general public. The movement of a portion of the 
 United States fleet after the sailing of Cervera was known, is 
 scarcely explicable if the American Government was not in 
 possession of information that was not in the hands of the 
 general public. 
 
 But the remarkable feature as to the conveyance and receipt 
 of intelligence, which though unique and peculiar to this war, 
 is likely to be a feature in others, is, that instead of the warships 
 collecting and transmitting intelligence to the Government, which 
 was the ordinary practice in the wars carried on by sailing ships, 
 it was the other way. The authorities at AVashington received 
 the intelligence from independent sources, and communicated it 
 by cable and dispatch vessel to the admirals and captains. The 
 consequent result was that the movements of the squadrons and 
 ships were directly ordered and controlled from the Navy 
 Department at Washington.''' The admirals and captains were 
 instruments in the hands of the American Government, and were 
 moved from point to point, hastened or checked, withheld from 
 action, or forced into action, in the carrying out of a policy as to 
 which they exercised little control, because the facts on which it 
 was based were in the knowledge of Government, and not in 
 their own. 
 
 If we apply the modern conditions in regard to intelligence to 
 our operations off the coast of France at the close of last century 
 and the beginning of this, we shall see that such failures and 
 miscarriages as occurred when Hoche passed out of Brest in 1796, 
 when Napoleon passed out of Toulon in 1798, or the escape of 
 Bruix from Brest in 1799, or when certain junctions between 
 allied fleets were effected which caused us much anxiety and loss, 
 could hardly have occurred under modern conditions.! Press 
 reporters, eager to be the very first — and whose livelihood would 
 depend upon their being the very first — would swarm everywhere. 
 
 * Strong indications that this would be so had been afforded by our own 
 operations in Egypt from 1882 to 1884. See my Memoirs of Sir Cooper Key, 
 pp. 456-470. 
 
 t I am bound to say, however that the escapes of Hoche and of Bruix must be 
 charged either to the neglect, or to the want of enterprise, in Admiral Colpoys and 
 Bridport. The conduct of Colpoys is inexplicable when it is closely investigated. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEBICAN WAR. xvii 
 
 Press vessels of the highest speed would pry into nooks and 
 corners, and would brave dangers in pursuit of news, which the 
 ordinary warships, having other business on hand, would abstain 
 from doing. The information in the hands of our Government 
 would be so full, so complete, and so recent — from hour to hour 
 in fact — that none of the doubts and hesitations which paralysed 
 movement near a century ago would exercise their influence now. 
 Commanders of fleets and squadrons, and even of single ships, 
 would be in such close touch with the Admiralty, that it would 
 not be they, but the Admiralty itself which would have to bear 
 the public censure should false steps be made.* 
 
 But the perfection of the Washington information, and the 
 perfection of the Navy Department's control over its forces in 
 every part of the world, depended on the maintenance of com- 
 munication by cable. No more interesting and instructive 
 question relating to the art of modern naval war than this, was 
 raised by the events of 1898. By many it had been previously 
 surmised that the destruction of cable communication would be 
 the first and most prominent feature at the outset of a modern 
 naval war.! By some this surmise had been deprecated ; and it 
 had been said that the international difficulties and doubts on 
 the one side, the physical difficulties on another, and the facilities 
 existing for the repair of cables on a third, would altogether 
 prevent the cable question from becoming a prominent or a 
 recurring one in future naval warfare.! The general drift of the 
 events of 1898 certainly goes to confirm the accuracy of the 
 latter view. 
 
 In the first place, though this again may be set down to 
 the apathy of Spain, rather than to the inherent difficulty of 
 such operations, or to the possible international questions that 
 might arise thereon, no attempts were made by the Spaniards to 
 injure the United States by cutting the cables landed on her 
 shores. In the second place, though as early as April 6th, the 
 United States Government designed to cut the Cuba cables on 
 the outbreak of war,§ yet when war actually broke out. Secretary 
 
 * Recent investigations have convinced me that members of Queen Jlary's 
 council in 1690 were iii possession of information which they kept to themselves, 
 and that Torrington was deliberately betrayed by them. Against such laches 
 modern publicity would guard. 
 
 f H. W. Wilson and others. 
 
 \ Sir G. S. Clarke and others. 
 
 § Secretary Long to Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic Squadron, April 6, 1898. 
 See Appendix, &c., p. 171. 
 
 32 
 
xviii NAVAL WAliFARE. 
 
 Long forbade the cutting of the Cuba cables ; and it was stated 
 that the Government were "considering the advantage of declaring 
 all cables neutral,"* and permission was not given to cut them 
 until April 30th, when alarm at the sailing of Cervera's squadron 
 from St. Vincent dictated the advisability of cutting it off from 
 telegraphic communication with Cuba.f 
 
 There were three cables connecting Cuba with the outer world. 
 One froln Havana to Key West, and therefore directly under 
 the control of the United States Government, t It was debated 
 before the outbreak of the war whether there might not be a 
 possibility of cutting the Havana end of it and connecting the 
 cable with a ship off Havana, but Commodore Sampson did not 
 think it possible, because " a ship could not anchor off 
 Havana." 
 
 Another cable ran from Santiago § to Jamaica whence cables ran 
 to the Isthmus of Panama, Porto Eico, and St. Domingo, con- 
 necting with the general West Indian system. A third cable 
 belonging to the French ran from Guantanamo to Mole St. 
 Nicholas in Hayti, thus communicating again with the general 
 system of the world. 
 
 Local cables ran from Cienfuegos to Batabano to the west, 
 and Santiago with intermediate stations to the east. 
 
 The Cable-station at Key West was taken possession of by the 
 Government at the outbreak of war, and thereupon the Havana 
 cable became useless to the Spanish Government. But from 
 May 11th to July 16th continued attempts were made to cut the 
 different cables mentioned. It turned out to be considered only 
 feasible to attempt the cutting of cables in shallow water. But 
 sometimes cables could not be discovered; sometimes the defence 
 of the Spaniards protected the cables ; sometimes — as off 
 Cienfuegos — considerable loss was incurred in making the 
 attempt. But the remarkable fact remains that though the 
 different officers employed in this service were under the con- 
 viction that they had cut the cable from Cienfuegos to Santiago, 
 from Santiago to Jamaica, and from Guantanamo to Hayti, they 
 seem to have been in every case mistaken. Some cables were 
 
 * Secretary Long to Commander-in-Chief, April 25th and 27th, 1898. See 
 Appoidix, (fee, p. 176. 
 
 t Secretary Long to Commander-in-Chief, April 30th. See Appendix, &c., p. 365. 
 
 \ News of Spanish movements reached the United States over this cable by the 
 aid of traitors in the office at Havana. Century Magazine for April, 1899, p. 896. 
 
 § I abandon the spelling used in the earlier part of this work. The usage during 
 the war was to spell it " Santiago," and to omit the specifying words. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEBICAN WAR. xix 
 
 cut, but they do not appear to have been such as were in working 
 order, and Cuba was never isolated from first to last.* 
 
 The proof is convincing that the cutting of telegraph cables is 
 in itself not so easy a matter as some had considered it, and that 
 were it easier than it is, proper defences, either naval, by localised 
 gun-vessels ; or military, by light batteries mounting light long- 
 ranged guns, would often, perhaps generally, be found an efticient 
 protection.! 
 
 The international question was to some extent raised by what 
 occurred with regard to the Hong-Kong-Manila cable after 
 Commodore Dewey, by his defeat of the Spanish squadron, had 
 assumed the possession of the bay of Manila. He requested 
 permission of the cable authorities at Manila to allow him to 
 send his messages in the usual way, as one of the Manila public ; 
 but this being forbidden by the Governor of Manila, Dewey cut 
 the cable and took the end on board one of his own ships. It 
 was some time before instruments and operators could be pro- 
 cured to set up communication with Hong Kong in this way, but 
 thereupon the Spanish Government availed itself of a clause in 
 its convention with the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, 
 and closed the Hong Kong office. The result was to cut off 
 Admiral Dewey equally with Manila from communication with 
 the outer world by means of that cable. 
 
 The Eastern Extension Company considered that there was 
 cause of damage against the American Government, and they 
 were supported by the opinion of eminent Counsel. They were 
 advised that while neutral property in belligerent territory (or, of 
 course, waters) must take its chance, yet the rule ought not to be 
 
 * My friend, Admiral Sir Wm. Wharton, the hydrographer to the Navy, informs 
 me that there are commonly at every point near which the ends of cables are landed, 
 a great many old cables lying on the bottom. It is near the shore that most of the 
 injuries to cables occur, and these are usually repaired by cutting off the piece of 
 cable lying between the shore and the fault, connecting the shore and the sea-end 
 with a new cable, leaving the old one lying on the bottom. After the occupation of 
 Guantanamo, the Americans used the cable thence to Hayti for their own purposes. 
 The American War luitli Spain, p. 233. 
 
 t The United States Commander-in-Chief wrote, on July 19th, that " Captain 
 Goodrich from the first has rendered valuable assistance in severing telegraphic 
 communication between Cuba and the outside world. This has been diificult because 
 the Cubans had placed dummy cables, so that it was impossible to learn when a 
 cable was cut. Every cable cut on the south side was cut by Captain Goodrich. 
 The Adria which was sent down here for the special purpose of destroying com- 
 munication, did not succeed in cutting a single cable in more than a month's work." 
 Sir Wm. Wharton's opinion recorded above shows what the real state of the case 
 was (see Appendix, &c., p. 213). 
 
XX NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 applied to international property like telegraph cables, which were 
 parts of a wider system. Counsel thought, too, that cutting a 
 neutral cable on the high seas constituted an undoubted breach of 
 international law, for which the owners could claim compensation. 
 Cables are, by international convention, protected in peace time, 
 but the Convention states that its stipulations " do not in any 
 way restrict the freedom of action of belligerents," a rather 
 ambiguous phrase, when " the rights of belligerents " were 
 exactly what was in doubt.* The Telegraph Company brought 
 their claims before the United States Government, but they were, 
 in the first instance, rejected by the American Law officers. 
 
 Supposing the view of Counsel to be correct, the United States 
 Navy in one case went out of its way — unwittingly, of course — 
 to commit a breach of international law. Failing to cut the 
 French cable from Guantanamo to Mole St, Nicholas within the 
 three-mile limit off the Cuban shore, the officer in charge of the 
 operation proceeded off the Haytian shore, and assumed to 
 succeed in cutting the cable outside the three-mile limit, which 
 was — it is to be supposed — the thing that broke international law.f 
 
 I have dwelt at some length on the modern position of intelli- 
 gence in naval war because it is an entirely new experience, and 
 lies at the very root of " the ruling principles " of naval warfare. 
 
 Students of my previous Chapters from X. to XVIII. cannot 
 have failed to note how rarely attacks of any kind upon territory 
 have been conducted by naval force alone ; how, in fact, such 
 attacks have almost invariably been confined to punitive or 
 destructive bombardments ; and how still more rarely have even 
 these been carried out against towns ; how generally the few attacks 
 
 * I am greatly indebted to Mr. F. E. Hesse, Manager of the Eastern Extension 
 Telegraph Company for the information regarding the Manila cable. 
 
 t Captain Goodrich of the St. Louis, the most successful of the cable-cutters, 
 offered his own interpretation of international law, as concerned therein, in a very 
 remarkable proposed despatch to the Commanding Officer of the cable-repair ship 
 Grappler, which he found at the Danish island of St. Thomas, on Llay 23rd. 
 Captain Goodrich informed the captain of the Grappler that any attempt to repair 
 the cables connecting Cuba with the outer world, which had been cut by the United 
 States Navy, would be regarded by his Government " as an act of hostility." And 
 he was warned that the least violation by him of the injunction pronounced would 
 render his vessel " subject to capture " and to be made " a lawful prize wherever 
 found on the high seas." The Grappler belonged to the West Indian and Panama 
 Telegraph Company, and no doubt was flying English colours. The despatch was 
 submitted to Admiral Sampson for his remarks, but he happily availed himself of 
 the point that it had not been forwarded, and made no remarks on the highly 
 delicate, difficult, and dangerous matter of international law. See Appendix, &c., 
 p. 212. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEIUCAN JVAR. xxi 
 
 of this sort have— from the very earhest times — had for their 
 object the capture or destruction of shipping sheltered by- 
 batteries. 
 
 On the other hand, nothing appears to be capable of persuading 
 the dwellers in coast towns that they may rest easy and unalarmed 
 because of the teaching of experience. This should convince 
 them (1) that the bombardment of towns is rarely naval business ; 
 and (2) that if it were, such proceedings require a preliminary 
 and pretty well assured command of the sea, as well as special 
 preparations. It is not easy to conceive of any more forcible 
 illustrations than those afforded by the war under consideration, 
 of popular fallacies and popular fears on the one hand, and of the 
 continuity of historical experience on the other. 
 
 Although not one single attempt to bombard any Spanish town 
 by the United States fleet was made, except the trial of throwing 
 a few shell into Santiago as an assistance to the troops engaged 
 in its attack ; and just at the very end of the war, in the case of 
 Manzanillo ; yet from the openmg to the close of the war there 
 was hardly a day in which reporters missed announcing in the 
 public press the bombardment, if not the destruction, of some 
 Spanish coast town. Not seldom, too, the towns thus devoted 
 to destruction were really inland cities, practically out of the 
 reach of the guns on board American men-of-war. 
 
 Something like a panic, as I have already observed, arose in all 
 the Atlantic ports of the United States — in the towns, that is — 
 lest the Spanish ships should force themselves into the harbours 
 for the purpose of bombarding the houses. Batteries were every- 
 where thrown up, guns mounted, and submarine mines laid 
 down in such inconvenient profusion that specially organised 
 patrol services had to be raised and maintained in order to 
 prevent the innocent merchant ships from running upon them.* 
 These absurd terrors, engendered in defiance of all experience by 
 a fear of a naval power w^hich never had the least chance of a 
 command of adjacent seas, came to a head at the very time when 
 the American Government, in full command of Cuban waters, 
 was carefully forbidding all such attacks, and issuing orders to 
 the fleet in the strictest accordance with the teaching of history. 
 
 Mr. Secretary Long wrote as follows to the Commander-in- 
 
 * See Appendix, &c., p. 59. In the early part of the Chino-Japanese war, the 
 Japanese acted in a similar manner, impelled by a similar consideration, namely, 
 that the ships of the enemy capable of making such attacks were neither masked 
 nor even watched. As soon as they were, the Japanese removed their harbour 
 defences. 
 
xxii NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, on April 6th, in antici- 
 pation of war : — * 
 
 " The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the 
 fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in 
 Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those 
 harbours. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade 
 and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the 
 destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men- 
 of-war to the fire of the land batteries. 
 
 " There are two reasons for this : 
 
 " First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured strong- 
 hold, or to protect from riot or arson, until after the dry season begins, about the 
 first of October. 
 
 " Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our 
 vessels should not be crippled before the capture of Spain's most formidable vessels." f 
 
 After the declaration of war, namely, on April '26th, t the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy confirmed the previous instructions. Mr. Long 
 wrote : — 
 
 "While the Department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by 
 heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may 
 protect vessels you desire to attack, if you can do so without exposure to heavy 
 guns." 
 
 Subsequently, on the 6th of May, doubts having arisen as to 
 the meaning of the foregoing instructions, Mr. Long wrote — 
 if anything in stricter and closer adherence to the teaching of 
 experience : — 
 
 " The Department is perfectly willing that you should expose your ships to the 
 heaviest guns of land batteries, if, in your opinion, there are Spanish vessels of 
 sufficient military importance protected by these guns to make an attack advisable, 
 your chief aim being for the present the destruction of the enemy's principal vessels." § 
 
 These instructions, it is clear, followed the rule of experience 
 with great accuracy. Attacks on territory by the fleet alone, 
 except by way of set bombardment for merely punitive or 
 destructive purposes, are not now, any more than they were two 
 hundred years ago, the proper objects for a navy alone to carry 
 out. Encounters with batteries may come about by way of 
 reconnaisance — to draw fire and disclose strength — or more 
 seriously and persistently to force a passage, or, as indicated so 
 clearly by Mr. Secretary Long, to capture or destroy ships pro- 
 
 * Appetidix, &c., p. 171. 
 
 t The nearest dock of any size to Havana was at New Orleans, about GOO miles 
 distant. J Appendix, &c., p. 177. § Ibid.., p. 368. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xxiii 
 
 tected by them ; or for some other special reasons, but not with the 
 view of capturing or destroying towns, unless by way of diversion, 
 or assistance to the carrying out of a land attack. 
 
 It is rather remarkable, under the circumstances, that Com- 
 modore Sampson should have replied to Mr. Long's letter of the 
 6th of April, by suggesting that he should do the very thing that 
 Mr. Long had deprecated, and should make a serious and deter- 
 mined attack upon the batteries defending the entrance to 
 Havana. The Commodore must have been carried away by 
 a pardonable desire that the navy should distinguish itself early, 
 and at all hazards ; and he seems to have forgotten for the time, the 
 teaching of history, the most important lesson of which had been 
 afforded by the action of his own countrymen. He pointed out 
 that the Havana batteries were mounting 6-inch, 8-inch, and 
 1'2-inch guns, and he laid particular stress upon the power of the 
 Puritan and Amphitrite, armoured coast-defence turret ships ; 
 and said that " having silenced the western batteries, it would be 
 quite practicable to shell the city, which he would only do after 
 warning given twenty-four hours in advance.* I have much 
 difficulty in understanding how such a proposal could have been 
 made by an American officer, after the unfortunate Admiral 
 Dupont's failure in 1863. f 
 
 Admiral Dupont was ordered to attempt the destruction of the 
 Charleston batteries, including Fort Sumter, with a squadron of 
 monitors and other ironclads proportionately much better fitted 
 to achieve success than were the ships commanded by Commodore 
 Sampson. Yet the result was a dismal failure, marked by the 
 disgrace of the Admiral who was really in no degree blamable. 
 
 Admiral Sampson, too, had later the idea of bombarding the 
 town of San Juan, Porto Rico, in his mind,| and though it did 
 not go farther than his thought, yet showed, as did other things, 
 that the admiral was restless under the acceptance of historical 
 teaching. 
 
 It is of course arguable that such expressions of intention tell 
 against the main proposition which history so well supports. 
 But, in the first place, we do not know what the result of the 
 attack on Havana would have been had it been carried out, all 
 reason pointing to failure, however defective Spanish batteries 
 and Spanish gunnery might have been considered. In the second 
 place, I think that when a proposed operation is not in the end 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 172. f See pp. 420-422 of this work. 
 
 J See Appendix, &c., p. 368. 
 
xxiv NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 carried out — when nothing but the greater weight of the arguments 
 against proceeding than of those in favour, can account for the 
 determination not to proceed — the fact is logically for, and not 
 against, the historical teaching. The positive lessons of war 
 must be drawn from what is done, not from what is contemplated 
 and left undone. 
 
 And then we have it that the serious attacks upon territory, 
 that is, the determined contention between ships and batteries, 
 which were carried out in this war, followed the ancient rules, 
 and the instructions of the Navy Department in accordance there- 
 with. One of these attacks at the opening of the war was per- 
 fectly, even remarkably, successful. The other was a failure. 
 
 I have only just mentioned the operations of the Asiatic 
 Squadron under Commodore Dewey, because they only naturally 
 come before us under the cable question ; in the present section ; 
 and in one other. When the war broke out. Commodore Dewey 
 was in command of a squadron of seven cruisers and gun-boats, 
 one of which was an old corvette, not considered fit for battle, 
 one extemporised vessel, and two colliers. These were assembled 
 at Hong Kong. At the Philippine Islands was a Spanish 
 squadron of ten vessels, of a total force much inferior to that of 
 the United States, one of the ten being under repair, and having 
 landed her guns to arm the batteries covering the dockyard at 
 Cavite, in the bay of Manila.* Feeling his inferiority, the 
 Spanish Admiral, Montojo, determined to await attack, and 
 ranged his ships at anchor in a defensive position, and covered 
 by the batteries at and near Cavite, such as they were. 
 
 The laws of neutrality obliged the United States Squadron to 
 leave Hong Kong, and it took up an anchorage at Mirs Bay. There 
 was never any question as to the duty of the Americans ; and, 
 having left the old corvette in the bay, and distributed her crew 
 amongst the other ships, t the squadron sailed on the 27th of 
 April, bound to seek, and capture or destroy, the Spanish 
 Squadron, expected to be found where they were found. 
 
 The bay of Manila is very easy of access. The entrance is 
 divided into two channels by some islands, the northern channel 
 being two, and the southern five miles wide, with deep water all 
 across each. To the northward and eastward the bay widens 
 into a great deep-water basin, thirty miles from north to south, 
 and twenty-five miles from west to east. In the south-east of the 
 
 * The American War ivitli Spain, p. 158. 
 t Ibid., p. 153. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEIUCAN WAB. xxv 
 
 basin a little peninsula projects which shelters a shallow 
 anchorage, and on w^hich is placed the dockyard, the latter 
 protected on the sea side by some batteries which did not in the 
 end turn out to be of much account. Seven miles from this, in a 
 north-easterly direction, lies the city of Manila, which was at this 
 time supposed to be protected by some batteries facing the sea. 
 The southern entrance was too wide to be protected to any extent 
 either by batteries or submarine mines, and aware of this, Com- 
 modore Dewey had no hesitation in taking his fleet through it in 
 darkness on the night of the 30th of April. In passing, some 
 stray shots were ineffectively fired from shore batteries against 
 the squadron, which drew a slight reply from two or three of the 
 ships, but the whole went slowly on towards Manila. When day 
 broke, the Spanish ships were seen to be anchored in a line from 
 the north end of Cavite, towards the eastern shore, where a 
 flanking battery seems to have been erected. The American 
 ships, steaming slowly backwards and forwards, in a manner 
 similar to that emploj^ed in the reduction of the fortitications 
 of Port Eoyal in 1861,"^' engaged the ships and batteries at 
 4,500 yards' distance. There was no adequate reply. The 
 Spanish ships w^ere most severely handled, and the American 
 ships were scarcely touched. After four runs had been made at 
 this long distance, two runs were made at 2,000 yards, the result 
 of w4iich was that several of the Spanish ships were in flames. 
 Two submarine mines had been exploded harmlessly to the 
 Americans, because too distant to produce an effect. A torpedo- 
 boat, apparently extemporised, gallantly ran out with an idea of 
 attacking the United States ships, and being driven back, more 
 gallantly renewed the attempt, when she met with such treatment 
 that she w^as obliged to save herself by running on the beach, t 
 Some attempts, too, were made by the Spanish Admiral to close 
 with the United States ships, but the intention was not pursued. 
 At the end of two hours, although the American ships had not 
 lost a man, and were scarcely affected by the fire of the enemy, 
 a pause in the action occurred, and the United States Squadron 
 drew out of fire. The main cause was a question of the ammu- 
 nition holding out, but advantage w^as taken of the pause to give 
 the men some rest and refreshment. Then, at a quarter past 
 eleven — that is, after three hours and a quarter pause — the 
 
 * See p. 425 of this work. 
 
 t There is doubt whether one or two boats were so employed. The Admiral says 
 two, his Flag-Captain one. 
 
XX vi NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 squadron renewed the fire. "By this time," says the Commodore, 
 "the flagship and ahnost the entire fleet were in flames, and at 
 12.30 p.m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced 
 and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted." * 
 
 This was the early successful application of historical precedent. 
 The unsuccessful appHcation of it took place at Cardenas, a port 
 eighty miles" east of Havana, on the 11th of May. 
 
 The town of Cardenas lies at the bottom of the bay of that 
 name, which is approached by a narrow and somewhat tortuous 
 entrance, and widens into a shallow basin ten miles across. 
 Beside the wharves at the town were three Spanish gun-boats, 
 and Commander Todd of the Wilmington, a cruiser of 1,400 tons, 
 having under his orders the Hudson, an extemporised war- vessel, t 
 and the Winsloio, torpedo-boat, determined to make an attempt 
 to capture or destroy them. Accordingly the three vessels 
 proceeded into the bay, unimpeded by any sign of batteries or 
 mines. As the Wilmington, from her draught of water, could not 
 approach within 2,000 yards of the town, a position from which 
 the gun-boats could not be distinguished, the torpedo-boat 
 Winsloiv was sent in, apparently, to reconnoitre. She reached 
 within 1,200 yards, when fire was opened on her from the gun- 
 boats, and also, apparently, from batteries which could not be 
 localised because the guns employed smokeless powder. She 
 was quickly disabled, and suffered a great loss in killed and 
 wounded. Her consorts did all they could to support her, and 
 the Hudson closed upon her and towed her out. The repulse, 
 however, was complete. 
 
 There was a successful attack of the same nature, and with the 
 same object, at Manzanillo, on the 30th of June. The attack 
 was made by three small vessels of the United States navy 
 upon several small armed and unarmed ships in the harbour of 
 Manzanillo — which has narrow entrances — protected by batteries. 
 A great deal of destruction was done upon the ships, but the little 
 squadron was obliged to draw off in consequence of injury sus- 
 tained by one of the number. I 
 
 As the war went on there were many slight and distant 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 70. It is no part of my duty in this work to apportion praise or 
 blame ; but it is difficult to withhold a tribute of admiration to Commodore Dewey 
 for the determined and business-like conduct of his squadron. Whatever his infor- 
 mation may have been, he could not have expected so easy a walk-over, and we must 
 not limit our praise after the event. 
 
 t She was spoken of as a revenue cutter. 
 
 \ Appendix, &c., p. 227. The American War ivith Spain, p. 2G8. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEBICAN WAR. xxvii 
 
 exchanges of fire between the ships and batteries on shore, for 
 which no adequate reasons beyond a desire to locate the latter and 
 gain an estimate of their strength ; or even beyond a desire to 
 practise the seamen-gunners, and somewhat relieve blockade 
 monotony, are forthcoming. One of the most remarkable of 
 these encounters, an attack on the batteries defending the entrance 
 to the harbour of San Juan, in Porto Rico, by a squadron under 
 Admiral Sampson, was stated at the time to have been designed, 
 not so much to produce an impression on the enemy as on the 
 voters at home. The reasons officially assigned do not seem 
 adequate. 
 
 Admiral Sampson had been detached to the eastward to San 
 Juan in Porto Bico, in view of the possibility of Cervera's 
 squadron making for that harbour. He reported as follows as to 
 the attack made by a portion of his squadron on the 12th of May : — 
 
 " Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none of the 
 Spanish vessels were in the harbour. I was therefore considerably 
 in doubt whether they had reached San Juan and again departed 
 for some unknown destination, or whether they had not arrived. 
 As their capture was the object of the expedition, and as it was 
 essential that they should not pass to the westward, I determined 
 to attack the batteries defending the port in order to develop 
 their positions and strength, and then without waiting to reduce 
 the city or subject it to a regular bombardment — which would 
 require due notice — turn to the westward." * 
 
 It will be observed that there does not appear here sufficient 
 ground for the expenditure of a considerable amount of ammu- 
 nition, and some risk of damage, at a moment when it was 
 surmised that a Spanish squadron of perhaps seven heavy Spanish 
 ships and four torpedo-boat destroyers might appear at any 
 moment.! However, fire was opened on the Spanish batteries 
 by eight of the United States ships steaming slowly backwards 
 and forwards at four knots speed, and it was kept up from 5.16 
 till 7.45 a.m. Many hundreds of rounds of shell of all calibres 
 were fired away at ranges of from 1,100 to 2,800 yards. Some 
 of the American ships received damage, and there was a small 
 list of killed and wounded. There does not appear to have been 
 much damage done to the forts either. I 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. b68. 
 
 t The Navy Deimrtnient at Washington assumed the possibility that the Pelayo, 
 Alfonso XIII., and Carlos V., might have joined with Cervera's four cruisers. See 
 Appendix, &c., p. 364. 
 
 \ See The American War ivith Spain, p. 185. See also War Notes, No. IV., issued 
 by the Office of Naval Intelligence at Washington, p. 27. 
 
xxviii NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 The effect of the more assured command of the sea which was 
 estabhshed by the destruction of Cervera's squadron is well 
 illustrated by the increased frequency, as well as by the increased 
 persistency of these legitimate encounters of warships with 
 batteries on shore which had their origin in the desire to capture 
 or destroy ships, whether warships or merchant ships, which 
 were defended and protected by the latter. The attacks arose 
 naturally out of the extended blockade which was then set up all 
 round the coasts of Cuba. And the survey of such operations 
 supports the historical experience which places command of the 
 sea as the real preliminary to blockade, and places blockade as 
 preliminary to encounters with land defences. In all cases — leaving 
 the special operations against Santiago, and the conduct of actual 
 invasions, out of question for the time — these were minor events 
 of the war. The naval forces employed were small and isolated, 
 and the batteries — often mounting field-pieces only — were of 
 little power. It was rare for the ships to be severely handled. 
 The attacks were sometimes successful ; not seldom only partially 
 successful ; not infrequently failures. In many cases they were 
 carried out in conjunction with the Cuban insurgents on land, so 
 that anomalous conditions were introduced, placing the attacks 
 under a different category. 
 
 An attack upon the town of Manzanillo, on the south coast of 
 Cuba, by six vessels of the United States navy, on the 12th of 
 August, requires to be noticed separately, as presenting, at the 
 first glance, an endeavour not altogether in keeping with ordinary 
 rule, but proving on investigation to have been quite in accord- 
 ance therewith. Captain C. F. Goodrich, who commanded the 
 little squadron in the Newark, a cruiser of 4,098 tons, drawing 
 18 feet 9 inches of water, thus speaks of the enterprise.* 
 
 " On the afternoon of the 9th the Newark left Guantanamo 
 and was joined shortly after, off the entrance to that port, by the 
 U.S.S. Resolute, carrying the battalion of marines under Colonel 
 Huntington. We proceeded to Santiago de Cuba, where we 
 communicated with the St. Louis, and then continued to the 
 westward. On Wednesday afternoon, the 10th instant, we fell 
 in with the Hist and 8uwanee\ off Cape Cruz. Lieutenant-Com- 
 mander Delehanty, of the Smvanee, having preceded us to this 
 point, communicated with the Hist, and learned from her com- 
 manding ofticer. Lieutenant Young, that the condition of affairs 
 at Manzanillo was such as to warrant the belief that an attack 
 
 * Appendix, &c., 301. f Both extemporised ships. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEBICAN WAR. xxix 
 
 by the force under my command would result in a speedy 
 capitulation of the garrison and city. . . . Lieutenant Young, who 
 had on board a competent pilot, assured me that it was entirely 
 practicable to approach to within about two miles of Manzanillo 
 in a ship drawing as much w^ater as does the Newark. . . . We 
 waited off Cape Cruz that night in order to be joined by the 
 Alvarado and Osceola * and then on the morning of the 11th 
 started for Cuatro Eeales Channel, the following ships accom- 
 panying the Newark: Resolute \ Suwanee, Hist, Osceola, and 
 Alvai'ado. 
 
 "Yesterday morning, the 12th instant, my little flotilla got 
 under weigh at half-past four, and proceeded to the vicinity of 
 Manzanillo. The Resolute, Suwanee, Hist, and Osceola anchored 
 well outside of the northern entrance. I hoisted a flag of truce 
 on the Newark and proceeded to an anchorage about three miles 
 distant from the town, whence I sent the Alvarado, also bearing 
 a flag of truce, to present to the Military Commandant a 
 demand for surrender, a copy of which I have the honour to 
 enclose.! The demand was placed in his hands by Lieutenant 
 Blue at thirty-five minutes past noon. The reply was to the 
 effect that the Spanish Military Code forbade a surrender, except 
 as the sequence of siege or other military operation. 
 
 " The town being fortified, is exempt from the privileges and 
 immunities attached to defenceless places. Nevertheless, as you 
 will perceive from my demand, sufficient time was given to 
 permit non-combatants to leave the city. At three o'clock I 
 signalled to the outlying vessels to take the stations off the town 
 which had been assigned, and at 3.35 hauled down the flag of 
 truce on the Newark and proceeded towards Manzanillo until the 
 shoalness of the water forbade her further approach. At 3.40 
 fire was opened from this ship on the batteries and was main- 
 tained with tolerable steadiness until 4.15 o'clock. The other 
 vessels followed shortly after." 
 
 Captain Goodrich goes on to relate how, from a supposed dis- 
 play of flags of truce, fire was suspended, and reopened at 4.50, 
 when " the Cuban forces at this time appeared to the northward of 
 the town and began discharging volleys, which were returned 
 
 * The Alvarado was a Spanish prize. The Osceola was an extemporised 
 ship. 
 
 t The Resolute was an extemporised ship. 
 
 + The harbour of Manzanillo is formed by two groups of Cays, forming a northern, 
 middle, and southern entrance, the two first having deep water. The harbour is 
 three miles wide. 
 
XXX NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 apparently by Spanish artillery. The Newark threw a number 
 of 6-inch shells in this direction in order to assist the Cubans. 
 The Suioanee, Osceola, Hist, and Alvarado, soon returned to the 
 neighbourhood of the flagship, and we all anchored at about 5.30 
 p.m., for the night. From that time until daylight this morning 
 (the 18th), one 6-inch shell was fired from the Newark at the 
 batteries at irregular intervals, one shot being fired during each 
 half-hour. Daylight revealed a large number of white flags flying 
 over the blockhouses and batteries of Manzanillo, and the 
 approach of a boat from the shore bearing a flag of truce. The 
 captain of the port came off and delivered to me a cipher dispatch 
 from the Secretary of the Navy, reading as follows: "Protocol 
 of Peace signed by the President ; armistice proclaimed." My 
 disappointment was, as may be imagined, very great, for I had 
 every reason to believe that the garrison was entirely ready to 
 surrender."* 
 
 As it stands, this looks like exactly the sort of attack that New 
 York feared and hoped to guard against by fortifications and sub- 
 marine mines. But if we regard the conditions we shall see that 
 not one of them were present in the Empire City. The Americans 
 had the full command of the sea ; the trade of Manzanillo had 
 been suppressed by its blockade, its shipping had been destroyed 
 in the harbour and some sort of attack upon it was the regular 
 sequence of the treble fact. The town was more or less invested 
 on the land side by the insurgent Cubans ; the United States 
 ships carried an invading land force ; it was " a fortified town," 
 and that was the very thing that drew the ships' fire ; yet the fire 
 was directed against " the batteries " and not against the town ; 
 and the attack would never have been made if it had not been 
 previously ascertained that it would capitulate as soon as it had a 
 reasonable excuse. The result is but to confirm all that I have 
 advanced as to the teaching of history in the chapters of this 
 work dealing with such attacks. 
 
 But perhaps this question of the attacks of ships upon towns, 
 and the defence which batteries may offer, is reduced to an anti- 
 climax by what happened at Manila. There were some batteries 
 
 * This was confirmed by a subsequent note from the commander of the Hist. 
 " Late in the afternoon of the 12th, the Spanish Commander appointed a board to 
 determine what was the best to do, and they recommended an immediate surrender 
 after the fight in which we were fired on, and the General signed it. In order to 
 carry it out they withdrew all their forces from the wharf and landing, so as to 
 permit the landing of our forces, and that was the troop we saw marching through 
 the town." — Appendix, &c., p. 303. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAB. xxxi 
 
 erected on the shore in front of, and by way of guarding, the 
 city. These opened fire on Dewey when he opened fire upon 
 the Spanish ships. Dewey rephed to it by sending a boat to say 
 that if the batteries did not cease fire, he would shell the city 
 itself, and they were consequently silenced from that time.* 
 
 Of serious attacks on territory, we have that on Santiago and 
 the invasion of Porto Kico. It must be carefully noted that the 
 object of the first was only the capture or destruction of Cervera's 
 squadron, and it was only made when the command of the sea 
 was secure, because that squadron was in any case masked ; while 
 the invasion of Porto Eico was distinctly the outcome of an 
 established command of the sea. 
 
 Preliminary to the attack on Santiago there was a complete 
 assemblage of the United States fleet off the port, for the 
 purpose of watching and masking the enemy's ships within it. 
 But so far from there being any idea on the part of the United 
 States navy of forcing the entrance to the harbour, which was 
 the role popularly attributed to it, exactly the reverse course, 
 that of blocking, or trying to block, the entrance by the sinking 
 of the Merrimac in the channel, was adopted. This was but 
 following up the idea of the Dutch in 1673,* and some other 
 examples of the same character. It is true that the entrance to 
 Santiago de Cuba was remarkably narrow and tortuous, but the 
 point is that such an entrance must be wide or easy of access — 
 like that to the bay of Manila — or else ships will not attempt to 
 force it. 
 
 Of all the leading principles of naval warfare which this book 
 was written to set out and enforce, none have raised so much 
 controversy, or have been more eagerly disputed than the great 
 principle that Torrington proposed to act upon in the defence of 
 the realm and dynasty, and which he defined as the power of 
 "the fleet in being." No principle received in the war such 
 extraordinary and unexpected confirmation as this did. Never 
 was its extended effect more definitely expressed than by the 
 authorities of the American navy. 
 
 Lord Torrington, in his definition of the principle, went no 
 farther than to assert that while he observed the enemy's fleet 
 with one certainly inferior, but yet not so inferior as to be 
 debarred from offering battle on any advantageous circumstances 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 70. 
 t See p. 68 of this work. 
 
xxxii NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 appearing, it would be paralysed.* In this steam war we have 
 the case of an utterly inferior squadron, which could not dream 
 of facing in fair fight even a detachment of the great American 
 fleet ; and was so far from being " in observation," that its very 
 whereabouts was unknown ; yet breaking up the distribution 
 of the United States navy ; raising blockade ; and absolutely 
 forbidding the transport of troops over sea, even in small 
 bodies. 
 
 Cervera was at St. Vincent with four heavy cruisers and three 
 torpedo-boat destroyers. At ten knots speed, he was then about 
 ten days from San Juan in Porto Rico ; and about sixteen days 
 from Key West — the most probable objective if any real im- 
 pression was to be made — via Martinique. This squadron put 
 to sea, steering west, on the 29th of April. It was known at 
 Washington on the same day ; the news was telegraphed to Key 
 West on the 30th ; and reached Admiral Sampson off Havana on 
 the 1st of May, when he was authorised to cut the cables from the 
 south coast of Cuba.! The Navy Department instantly ordered 
 the subsidised American liners Harvard, St. Louis, and Yale, 
 which had formed part of the special squadron retained for 
 scouting work on the Atlantic coast of America, to sea ; the two 
 former to look out east of the Windward Islands, and the latter 
 at Porto Kico. It was at the same time suggested to Admiral 
 Sampson at Key West that he should take a sufficient force to 
 meet Cervera, east, 960 miles, to San Juan in Porto Eico, where 
 it was anticipated Cervera might arrive by the 8th of May.t 
 Schley was left in Hampton Roads with the so-called Flying 
 Squadron, and the Northern Patrol Squadron was still in course 
 of fitting out in the navy yards. Various ships were on the 
 western coasts of Cuba on blockade duties. 
 
 * I put it in this way to suit the general conclusion reached in controversies 
 which arose after the publication of the first edition of this book. Personally, I 
 went, and still go, further (see p. 122 of this work) ; I was, and am, satisfied that it 
 was chiefly the presence of the beaten but not subdued allied fleet at the Nore that 
 put an end to invasion prospects. That Torrington believed it so ; that de Tourville 
 felt it so; and that de Seignelay's pressure upon de Tourville to follow up and 
 destroy Torrington's fleet, resulted from his knowing it to be so. There is direct 
 reason to believe that had de Tourville been fully successful, the French would have 
 crossed from Ireland, and Humieres' army from Dunkirk. Nottingham reported 
 that transport was provided. Noit. to Will. July 15th, 1690. 
 
 t Appeyidix, &c., pp. 360, 365. Rear- Admiral Sampson in the Ccnturij Magazine 
 for April, 1899. 
 
 \ Twelve knots speed was assumed for Cervera, which surely was, on any grounds, 
 an exaggeration. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEIUCAN WAIL xxxiii 
 
 We, who are not pressed by any sense of responsibility or 
 feeling of anxiety, may be allowed to wonder at the effect of both 
 upon the strategy adopted. The whole point was, of course, to 
 get touch with this dangerous squadron which ought, according 
 to the rules of successful war, to have been under observation all 
 along. There were two things only open to it. To strike some 
 blow at American war vessels or shipping ; or to make for some 
 Spanish West Indian port as a consequence of lack of supplies — 
 especially of coal — and thence to organise some form of attack. 
 But there were not many ports offering the conditions required. 
 There were, in fact, only four : San Juan on the north coast of 
 Porto Eico ; Santiago and Cienfuegos on the south coast, and 
 Havana on the north coast of Cuba. It was, however, per- 
 fectly clear that if the United States took proper steps to insure 
 the earliest intelligence of Cervera's arrival at any one of these 
 ports, it became almost certain, owing to the rapidity of com- 
 munication by telegraph, that into whatever port Cervera entered, 
 he would be blockaded there by a force that it would be necessary 
 to accept battle from, if an attempt was made to escape after 
 refit and supply. It was all but certain that entry into port 
 before striking a blow would at least forbid any blow being 
 struck, if the port entered did not prove to be simply the grave 
 of the squadron. 
 
 The blows possible to be struck required both daring and 
 good fortune to send them home with success. There was, as 
 a possibility, the sudden blockade of New York ; the expectation 
 of a few prizes under the United States flag there ; and the 
 confusion and alarm that the appearance of a hostile squadron 
 off Sandy Hook would surely produce all over the United States. 
 But from such a position there was much danger, if not mere 
 hopelessness, in retreat. It was not at all likely that this 
 objective would have been chosen. 
 
 There were, however, the blockading ships possibly to be found 
 off Havana, and the ships certain to be found at Key West ; and 
 a sudden appearance of the enemy's squadron amongst either of 
 these groups at the critical hour of breaking daylight, might 
 cause such disturbance and uncertainty in combined action as to 
 promise an extraordinary success to a daring and resolute leader. 
 And then there was an immediate retreat to Havana open, as 
 the United States navy began to recover from its surprise. As 
 an inferior, but not unimportant object, something might be 
 done, on the way to Key West or Havana, in the picking up of 
 
 33 
 
xxxiv NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 the stray, outlying cruisers which had to do with the blockade, 
 and might not have been called in. 
 
 To us, in our studies, untouched by the emotions experienced 
 by the leaders of the United States Navy, the strategy to be 
 adopted was obvious. There should have been concentration at 
 Key West and Havana, and two or three of the swiftest ships — 
 not necessarily armed at all — with the largest coal endurance, 
 should have been despatched to lie off each of the four ports, 
 ready to watch for the entry of the squadron into any of them, 
 and then to fly instantly to the nearest telegraph station to inform 
 Key AVest and Washington of the result. The strategy actually 
 adopted by the United States cannot be said to have contributed 
 in any way to the barring of Cervera's success. It was almost an 
 accident that early news of Cervera was transmitted by one of 
 the look-out ships, and it is probable that this news succeeded that 
 which the ordinary reporter was able to convey ; while, owing 
 to no watch being set up on Santiago, Cervera was allowed to 
 lie there for eight days before any masking force put in an 
 appearance.* 
 
 Immediately on the news of Cervera's departure from St. 
 Vincent reached this country, I sketched what I thought was 
 the only programme open to him. I considered his case was 
 quite hopeless, unless he should be able to strike his blow before 
 putting into a West Indian port. I calculated that, starting with 
 a full supply of coal, and taking the destroyers in tow, he might 
 cross the Atlantic at the rate of ten knots, and passing between 
 Martinique and St. Lucia in the hou]:;s of darkness, proceeding 
 south of Jamaica, and through the Yucatan Channel, he might 
 make his first appearance amongst the United States ships at 
 Havana or Key West, at breaking daylight on the 14th or 15th 
 of May, with near 4,000 miles at ten knots, represented by the 
 coal in his bunkers.* 
 
 * From Santiago to Mole St. Nicholas is 140 miles, and to Port Antonio in 
 Jamaica is 112 miles. A telegram announcing' Cervera's entrance might therefore 
 have reached Washington in ten or twelve hours, and in about four days after the 
 arrival, a masking fleet might have been of£ the port. Both these telegraph stations 
 were in constant use afterwards by the ships off Santiago. 
 
 f The assumptions are that it would not take more than 1,000 I.H.P. to drive the 
 Cristobal Colon of 6,840 tons displacement and 1,000 tons of coal, at the rate of ten 
 knots. Allowing the distance from St. Vincent, via Martinique and south of the 
 Pedro Shoal, through the Yucatan Channel to be 4,000 miles — which it does not 
 exceed — and that the Colon consumed 3 lbs. of coal per I.H.P. per hour — 
 which is fair allowance ; then allowing 10 per cent, for the auxiliary engines, the 
 Colon was capable of reaching Key West with 415 tons of coal in her bunkers, and 
 her consorts would have had more in proportion. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMElilCAN WAli. xxxv 
 
 I did not shut out from m.y mind, how, in carrying; out tliis 
 main idea, Cervera might have been assisted by sending in his 
 destroyers to Santiago or Cienfuegos by night for information. 
 Nor did it seem to me improbable that he might have captured 
 American cruisers off Cienfuegos and at intervals round the coast 
 to Havana without in any way disclosing his whereabouts to his 
 enemy.* 
 
 Whether Cervera ever had any ideas of this sort, I do not 
 know. If he had all along determined to make for a West Indian 
 port as a preliminary measure, I gather from his reasonings in 
 regard to other matters, that he knew from the first that he was 
 simply going to destruction, and proceeded to it with that 
 pathetic but idle devotion to an obscure principle of honour, 
 that distinguished the Spaniards generally throughout the war. 
 
 At any rate he only succeeded m crossing the Atlantic at a 
 speed of less than eight knots, and he destroyed almost all hopes 
 of effecting a surprise by showing himself at Martinique on the 
 l'2th of May, and leaving a damaged destroyer at Fort de France. 
 The Harvard look-out ship was then at St. Pierre in Martinique, 
 and she telegraphed the news to Washington the same day, while 
 the reporter gave the news to the world. 
 
 Had Cervera been able to make ten knots speed with the 
 residue of coal calculated, the distribution of the United States 
 fleet was much in favour of his success in the role 1 had supposed 
 he would adopt. For on the 15th of May, Schley was at Charles- 
 ton, and Sampson near Cape Haitien. There were ships off 
 Havana, and others round the coast, from Matanzas to Cien- 
 fuegos. It was the weaker part of the American navy that was 
 left at the only points where Cervera could really strike. 
 
 But Cervera's squadron was useless in every way. It was 
 short of coal ; the foul bottom of the Vizcaya, nine months out 
 of dock, forbade speed ; the Cristobal Colon had not shipped her 
 heavy guns ; the ammunition was short in quantity and of the 
 wrong kinds. The squadron could not have faced a nominally 
 inferior force with any hopes of success. 
 
 The disclosure of Cervera's whereabouts on the 12th of May, 
 sent Schley to Charleston on the way to Key West ; altered 
 
 * It appears, however, from Admiral Sampson's statements, that the treachery of 
 the telegraph ofhcials at Havana would probably have frustrated Cervera's strategy 
 if he had shown himself on the south coast of Cuba in any way. As a fact, the 
 treacherous agents at Havana reported Cervera's arrival at Santiago at once to Key 
 West, but the news was not credited. Century Magazijie for April, 1899, p. 986. 
 
xxxvi NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 positions of look-ont ships, and placed more ships on that duty. 
 But Sampson, off Puerto Plata in San Domingo, on the 14th, 
 was still unaware of the news from Martinique, and was half 
 disposed to credit the rumour that Cervera had gone to Cadiz. 
 On that day, however, the Navy Department knew that Cervera 
 was at Cura9oa seeking coal, and Schley and Sampson were 
 ordered to Key West, the positions of the look-out ships were 
 again changed, the blockaders of Cienfuegos — all except the 
 smallest ships — were ordered to be withdrawn, the northern 
 blockade ships were ordered to be warned, and other ships were 
 ordered to fall back on Key West. All the arrangements and 
 distribution of the American fleets were altered and controlled by 
 the mere fact that four evidently broken - down cruisers were 
 approaching Cuban waters. 
 
 Sampson was detained by the monitors attached to his fleet. 
 He could only make seven knots. On leaving his fleet, he took 
 his flagship and another cruiser, and, making speed, reached 
 Key West on the 18th, and Schley arrived there the same day. 
 
 It was now thought that Cervera would make either for 
 Santiago or Cienfuegos, most probably the latter, in order to 
 be in close communication with Havana, and probably to supply 
 the city with munitions. Schley left Key AVest with a strong 
 squadron * for Cienfuegos, via the Yucutan Channel, on the 19th, 
 and the rest of the fleet were coaled and filled up with all speed. 
 On the same day Sampson got a wire through the traitor at 
 Havana that Cervera had arrived at Santiago, but he scarcely 
 credited it even after repetition of the message. But the Navy 
 Department acted on the information, and ordered look-out ships 
 off the port, and sent directions to Schley at Cienfuegos to 
 proceed at once to Santiago. 
 
 Meanwhile Schley did not close sufficiently with Cienfuegos 
 to make sure that Cervera was not there until May 24th. He 
 was also alarmed at the state of his coal supply, and the want 
 of smooth water in which to distribute the 4,000 tons of coal 
 which his collier, the Merrimac, had on board her. In the same 
 way the look-out ships oft' Santiago failed at first to close near 
 enough to the port to see the mastheads of the Spanish ships 
 that were visible over the land. Schley did not get off Santiago 
 until May 28th, but it was not till the next day that he was able 
 to report, via Mole St. Nicholas, that the Cristobal Colon, the 
 Maria Teresa, and two destroyers were certainly in port. 
 
 * Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and two cruisers ; Iowa to follow when coaled. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xxxvii 
 
 He was still alarmed about his coal supply, and still talked of 
 despatching ships to Key West to replenish. Strong messages 
 were sent to him to maintain his position at all hazards, and 
 a general assemblage of ships off Santiago was directed. 
 
 As early as the 28th of May the coaling difficulty was recog- 
 nised, and the seizure of Guantanamo as a remedy was suggested. 
 As early as the 28th, too, Sampson had despatched the Sterling 
 collier under convoy to Schley, with a definite proposal to sink 
 her and block the entrance to Santiago. But even on the 27th, 
 Secretary Long had announced that if Cervera was at Santiago, 
 10,000 troops must move at once for the capture of that place. 
 Finally Sampson, with a further reinforcement, arrived at 
 Santiago on the 1st of June ; on the 7th, Guantanamo was 
 seized, and the coaling difficulty disappeared. On June 3rd the 
 Merrimac was sunk in the channel, but not — as it turned out — so 
 as to block the entrance ; and a close blockade by the whole force 
 of the United States fleet was set up off the port, preparatory to 
 the descent of a military force, for the capture of the harbour 
 and all that it contained. 
 
 Having reached the point at which the alarm of a " fleet 
 in being " had controlled all the movements for thirty-three days, 
 it is convenient to make some reflections upon this, on all grounds, 
 most important lesson of the war. 
 
 There are some minds which can easily submit to the teaching 
 of experience, and which, having established what may be called 
 a historical curve, can rely upon the co-ordinates to continue 
 its character from age to age, and, in spite of apparently opposing 
 forces, can see that these only cause temporary aberrations, so 
 that the curve is, in the long run, undisturbed. There are other 
 minds which cannot so rely on the philosophy of history, and 
 find no guide in it. 
 
 Thus, while the teaching of this work had clearly been to lead 
 us up to all that I have just described and am about to confirm 
 and strengthen, these antagonistic minds saw nothing in it, and 
 had pronounced against this teaching as unreliable before the 
 outbreak of the Spanish-American war. I select, for examples, 
 one eminent military, and one still more eminent naval authority, 
 who would have been supposed least of all liable to relax his hold 
 on historical precedent. 
 
 General Maurice, in his able work on National Defences * takes 
 throughout a strong position opposing any application of Torring- 
 * Macmillan, 1897. 
 
xxxviii NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 ton's doctrine to the circumstances of the present day, and 
 considers. that he had high support from at least three eminent 
 seamen, the late Sir Geoffrey Hornby, the late Sir George Tryon, 
 and Captain Mahan. He says, at p. 192: "Mr. Thursfield and 
 others have accepted from Admiral Colomb a view of a certain 
 naval event in the reign of William III. which involves principles 
 applicable to our own time, the truth or falsehood of which is of 
 importance as a question of the possibility of invasion, and as at 
 least one of the elements that have to be dealt with in considering 
 whether a land defence is or is not a proper supplement to the 
 naval defence of these islands." Then, going on to speak of 
 Torrington's views, the General says : " He believed, as he 
 expressed it, that a ' fleet in being,' though inferior, would 
 prevent, by the mere fact of its presence, any superior fleet from 
 attempting to cover an invasion." The General then discusses 
 considerations involved, and says: " Now the importance of the 
 question for us lies in this — that if their contention be true, then 
 even if our navy be temporarily inferior in the Channel, it would 
 be impossible for a foreign invasion to take place as long as we 
 had an inferior ' fleet in being ' here. . . . Now it is not too much 
 to say that, against all these theories in a bunch. Captain Mahan, in 
 his noble Life of Nelson — in my judgment one of the very greatest 
 books from every point of view that have appeared in our time — 
 flings himself and Nelson. . . . Never was there such clear, 
 straight, well-defined antagonism — not Mahan's only, it is forced 
 on him by historical veracity, but Nelson's — to every one of these 
 theories of Admiral Colomb's." 
 
 Turning then to the passages in Mahan's Life of Nelson cited, 
 we find as follows.* The author relates how, when it was deter- 
 mined to undertake the capture of Calvi, General Stuart was 
 anxious to proceed at once with the siege, " but asked Nelson 
 whether he thought it proper to take the shipping to that exposed 
 position ; alluding to the French fleet that had left Toulon, and 
 which Hood was then seeking. Nelson's reply is interesting, as 
 reflecting the judgment of a warrior at once prudent and enter- 
 prising, concerning the influence of a hostile ' fleet in being ' 
 upon a contemplated detached operation. ' I certainly thought 
 it right,' he said, ' placing the firmest reliance that we should be 
 perfectly safe under Lord Hood's protection, who would take 
 care that the French fleet at Gourjeau (Golfe Juan) should not 
 molest us.' " 
 
 * The Life of Nelson. By Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., &c., i. 136. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAh. xxxix 
 
 I must observe that Nelson's reply was entirely in accordance 
 with Torrington's view. Nelson clearly implied that he could 
 not have gone on with the siege of Calvi unless he had been sure 
 that Lord Hood's fleet would put the French fleet "out of being" 
 and prevent it from thinking of trying to interfere with the 
 operation. Captain Mahan, however, does not admit this. 'He 
 says : " When a particular opinion has received the extreme 
 expression now given to that concerning the ' fleet in being,' 
 and apparently has undergone equally extreme misconception, 
 it is instructive to recur to the actual effect of such a force upon 
 the practice of a man with whom moral effect was never in excess 
 of the facts of the case, whose imagination produced to him no 
 paralysing contingencies.* Is it probable that, with the great 
 issues of 1690 at stake, Nelson, had he been in Tourville's place, 
 would have deemed the crossing of the Channel by French troops 
 impossible, because of Torrington's 'fleet in being? ' " f 
 
 Now, so far as history had gone when Mahan wrote, it was 
 plain that the existence of any adequate force, free to act and 
 presumably willing to act in defence of an attack upon territory, 
 would paralyse the possibly attacking force and prevent the attack 
 being made. There was absolutely nothing in Nelson's character 
 to lead us to doubt that in his judgment the destruction of 
 Torrington's fleet was the first thing to be done, and that no 
 other operation should be taken in hand until that was completed. 
 
 There is some irony in the fate which made Captain Mahan a 
 party to the strongest affirmation of this view that history has 
 yet afforded, and associated his name with the extremest defini- 
 tion of the doctrine of the "fleet in being" that has ever been 
 committed to paper. I 
 
 I have shown how everything was disarranged by the mere 
 announcement that Cervera was at sea at a point several 
 thousand miles distant. The disarrangement is summed up in 
 the statement that on the 30th of April, when the news reached 
 Key West, there were but nineteen warships there, mostly small 
 
 * It will be easily noted— especially after my relation of what took place in regard 
 to Cervera's fleet— that there was no "fleet in being" in Nelson's view. Had 
 Sampson watched Cervera with a sufficient force off Santiago, there was nothing 
 to have prevented the United States— supposing the overplus of force was sufficient 
 — from proceeding with the invasion of Porto Rico. And so Hood's watching of the 
 French fleet allowed Nelson to proceed with the siege of Calvi. 
 
 t I am bound to say that, plain as Captain Mahan's words are, they can only 
 represent an intellectual and momentary slip when they come from a writer of such 
 eminence. 
 
 + Captain Mahan became a member of the War Board on the 9th of ^lay. 
 
xl NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 craft and coast-defence vessels, and that on the 19th of May the 
 flower of the American navy had assembled there, nmnbering 
 forty-two ships. But it is of course the actual statements of 
 authorities on the effect discovered when " a fleet in being" was 
 found in existence, that mark its real position. 
 
 These began on May 3rd, while yet Cervera was- calculated to 
 be at least 8,000 miles distant. The Secretary to the Navy 
 telegraphed: "No large army movement can take place for a 
 fortnight, and no small one till we know the whereabouts of the 
 four Spanish cruisers and destroyers." * 
 
 On May 5th the Secretary telegraphed to Admiral Sampson : 
 " Do not risk so crippling your vessels against the fortifications 
 as to prevent from soon afterwards successfully fighting the 
 Spanish fleet." t 
 
 On May 13th the Secretary telegraphed: "Orders concerning 
 convoying and landing are suspended until objective Spanish fleet 
 is developed." I 
 
 Admiral Sampson, on the 26th of May, telegraphed to Secretary 
 Long: "I cannot detach armoured vessels to guard army until 
 movement of Spanish Squadron is thoroughly known." § 
 
 Admiral Sampson telegraphed to Secretary Long on the 28th 
 of May: "The importance of absolutely preventing departure 
 of Spanish Squadron of paramount importance, and demands the 
 most prompt and efficient use of every means." ij 
 
 On the 29th of May Secretary Long dispatched the following 
 remarkable message to Commodore Schley, supposed to be off 
 Santiago : " It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the 
 Spanish fleet is in Santiago, and report. Would be discreditable 
 to the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All 
 military and naval movements depend upon that point." 51 
 
 On the same day Schley ascertained that two of the Spanish 
 cruisers and the two destroyers were certainly in Santiago 
 harbour, and those who lightly regard the continuity of history 
 would have supposed that this was enough. But it was not so. 
 The fact that two of the cruisers might not be under observation 
 was still paralysing everything. Secretary Long wired to Schley 
 on the 30th of May: "Where are other two armoured cruisers? 
 When discovered, report promptly." ** 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 366. § Ibid., p. 396. 
 
 t Ibid. II Ibid., p. 398. 
 
 + Ibid., p. 386. II Ibid., p. 399. 
 
 ** J6id.,p. 401. 
 
I 
 
 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xli 
 
 Then, on the 31st of May, he wired to Admh'al Sampson : 
 " Essential to know if all four Spanish armoured cruisers in 
 Santiago. Military expedition must wait this information." * 
 
 Then, so soon as Admiral Sampson had, on June 3rd, made 
 sure that all four cruisers were in port, the military preparations 
 w^ent on; and, trusting to the masking of the "fleet in being," 
 they were carried to completion, and Santiago was captured by 
 the joint action of the army and the fleet, as it might have been 
 captured one hundred and fifty-seven years before. 
 
 If this evidence is not conclusive on one side of the controversy 
 as to the power of a "fleet in being" to paralyse all offensive 
 operations against territory, it can only be alleged that the 
 American navy and the American statesmen were unduly 
 timorous. But it was all along foreseen by such as were ready 
 to accept historical experience as their guide, that, whatever the 
 power of a sailing "fleet in being" might have seemed, the 
 certainty and precision of steam propulsion would be sure to 
 enormously increase it. The United States authorities have 
 only shown that the most extreme advocates of the powers of 
 defence resting in a free steam squadron, under-estimated the 
 reality. 
 
 It must be observed, too, that this most recent experience 
 decides for steam propulsion the proposition enunciated and 
 proved in the first chapter of this work, that naval warfare does 
 not admit of " cross-raiding." The sea must be swept clear of 
 defending ships or squadrons before that further step in naval 
 war, the assault of territory, can be undertaken. 
 
 The importance of bases when attacks on territories are to be 
 made, or when the enemy's ships are to be watched in port, has 
 been continually shown in previous chapters; and it has been 
 generally contended that for these operations temporary bases, 
 which mean no more than smooth-water anchorages that can 
 be seized and held against the enemy, become of much greater 
 consequence — except, of course, in those cases where heavy 
 repairs and docking, which cannot be effected at the temporary 
 base, are concerned — than the permanent bases or headquarters 
 of navies. Of later years the tendency has been to exalt the 
 importance of the permanent bases, and to make little or no 
 efforts, by the provision and organisation of supply ships and 
 repairing or factory ships, to enable the Admiral to use to the 
 fullest extent the temporary base when he has occupied it. Still 
 
 * Appendix, &c., p. 401. 
 
xlii NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 more has the tendency been to increase the number of these 
 permanent bases, each as it is occupied, tending to swell in 
 assumed importance and real expense. 
 
 The teaching of history appears to me to be almost wholly 
 against this tendency. It has always shown that we never can 
 tell beforehand in war what points it will be necessary to occupy 
 as naval bases, and that the making of provision which will tend 
 to force ships to go for supply and repair to certain positions, 
 whether they are placed conveniently or not in regard to opera- 
 tions in hand, is a policy likely to end in some loss and much 
 wasted expenditure. 
 
 The main argument, of course, is that in the earlier historical 
 days the wants of ships were not only simple, but few and far 
 between ; that even the necessity of docking at the permanent 
 base could often be obviated by careening at the temporary base ; 
 and most other necessary repairs to even a good number of ships 
 could be carried out at the temporary base by the skilful riggers 
 and artificers of the fleet. Now it is urged that the complexities 
 of the modern warship have so increased that docking must be 
 far more frequent than it was, and that a dockyard with full 
 appliances alone can deal with ordinary defects in war. The 
 argument is even carried to the extent of declaring that — apart 
 from torpedo injuries — the hull under water is much more liable 
 to damage than was the bottom of a sailing ship. 
 
 Sometimes the argument even seems to assume that supply 
 from ship to ship is not what it was, and that the close harbour, 
 the wharf, and the special lighter, are all necessary adjuncts with 
 which permanent bases must be supplied, and to which — no 
 matter how inconvenient — the warship must come when she is 
 engaged in operations against the enemy. 
 
 I have already remarked that the Chino-Japanese war gave no 
 countenance to these theories, and they seem to be flatly contra- 
 dicted by the experience of the United States in the war under 
 consideration. 
 
 The case of Admiral Dewey's squadron may be dismissed in 
 ver}^ few words. He had no base of any sort nearer than the 
 American coast of the Pacific. But he took his suppHes with 
 him, and in an absolutely mobile state he attacked and destroyed 
 his opponent's fleet. Then he seized, at Cavite, the most con- 
 veniently situated port near him, and he thenceforth used it as 
 his sole basis for war against Manila. He simply did for, and 
 with, modern ships exactly what his model Admirals had done 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xliii 
 
 regularly since the advent of naval war. Suppose he had had a 
 permanent base at Chusan or Quelpart, where would have been 
 his advantage ? Or at what time would he have felt the want of 
 such supports? 
 
 Passing to Cuba, we note, that under the impression that 
 Havana was sure to be the objective of the fleet, the United 
 States had organised a permanent naval base at Key West. If 
 Havana had turned out to be the objective. Key AVest, only one 
 hundred miles distant, would no doubt have sufficed. But even 
 here we must not omit to note that the practice of coaling inside 
 the Cays off Cardenas had obtained, though these were some 
 seventy miles from Havana.* So Key AVest remained the only 
 important base, and was immensely used, until the whole plan 
 disappeared on the entry of Cervera into Santiago. Then the 
 permanent base at Key West may be said to have been super- 
 seded in favour of the temporary base at Guantanamo. That 
 port is only forty miles from Santiago, and the visits of the 
 blockading ships backwards and forwards to Guantanamo were 
 exceedingly frequent. It may almost be said that Key West was 
 ignored except by the monitors and small vessels that were 
 looking after the blockade of Havana ; and to give some idea of 
 the importance of the new temporary base, as compared with that 
 of the old permanent base, it can be stated that on the 3rd of 
 July, the day before Cervera broke out, there could be counted 
 forty-one ships either at Guantanamo, or going to, or having 
 come from it, while there were only twenty-six ships, and those 
 mostly insignificant, in like condition as regards Key West. But 
 it was not only in that way that Key West was thrown out. 
 The ships that required it were sent, not to Key AVest from 
 Guantanamo, but to the northern dockyards at Norfolk and New 
 York. 
 
 The experience would seem a clear addition to all that had 
 gone before, and the lesson ought to give pause to the multi- 
 plication of permanent bases, and also to making any large 
 provision for repairs, or even for docking, where such were 
 already to be found within some moderate distance. There is, 
 so far, nothing to show that docking is more required in war 
 than it was when copper sheathing first became universal. 
 Where there is not copper sheathing, the cry for " clean ships " 
 is just now what it was in the time of Sir George Kooke. But 
 
 * We have seen that Commodore Dowall thought the balance inclined to Key 
 West. 
 
xliv NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 I have no doubt that the constant docking required l)y ships 
 with unsheathed bottoms has had much to say to the prevalent 
 idea that warships in war require constant docking, and that 
 docks must follow them wherever they go. There is little or no 
 sign of this necessity in the Spanish-American war. 
 
 I have already touched on the coaling question in the course 
 of my narration. The lesson given is plain that an organised 
 system of commissioned colliers, is a necessity of modern war. 
 But they must not be too large. The 4,000 tons in the Merrimac 
 somewhat hampered Commodore Schley. He would have been 
 less anxious with two colliers properly fitted in all respects, and 
 not carrying more than 2,000 tons each. 
 
 AVhen we come to organised attacks upon territory or invasions, 
 as illustrated by this war, we find absolutely nothing new, except 
 perhaps the understanding — which indeed was obvious before it 
 — that landings from steamships can be effected at points which 
 could not be used by sailing transports. We have seen how the 
 intention of invading Cuba for the possession of Santiago, and 
 the necessity of seizing Guantanamo as a base were discovered 
 simultaneously. The latter port was occupied after a very slight 
 resistance — but not, be it observed, by the ships alone — on the 
 7th of June ; and it was debated whether the invading army 
 should not be disembarked there, as it had been in Vernon's 
 time. Vernon, it will be remembered, examined the coast near 
 the entrance to Santiago with the view to discovering a landing- 
 place, but there was none suitable.* The deep water close to 
 the shore, which prevented anchorage, was probably considered 
 fatal to disembarkation from sailing ships, but did not at all 
 interfere with that from steamships. This consideration, 
 together with the length and badness of the road from Guan- 
 tanamo, determined the choice of the United States officers, and 
 the landing was effected, chiefly on the fine iron pier at Daiquiri, 
 and on the short stretch of beach at Siboney. 
 
 The army for the landing at Santiago left Tampa on the 14th 
 of June, after one false start and a recall owing to a rumoured 
 approach of warships from Spain. The force consisted of 16,000 
 men of all arms, and it was announced to be fifteen miles from 
 Santiago on the '20th of June, in thirty-four transports under 
 convoy of more than a dozen warships, mostly small craft. The 
 Commander was General Shafter. The Admiral, the General, and 
 the leading insurgent Generals all met on shore at Aserraderos, a 
 
 * See p. 348 of this work. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMElilCAN WAR. xlv 
 
 point eighteen miles west of Santiago, and there the programme 
 was arranged, and the disembarkation at Daiqmri on the 22nd 
 settled. 
 
 Accordingly, the shore in the vicinity was searched by the guns 
 of ships appointed for the purpose, but it was not imtil nine 
 o'clock that the transports were near enough to begin the dis- 
 embarkation. There was a nasty swell, and little of the landing 
 could be effected except at the pier. It took three days to get 
 the bulk of the 16,000 men on shore, but they were even then 
 very short of guns and all necessary material. However, no 
 attempt to interfere was made by the Spaniards, and in due 
 course, but not until July 18th, the city and port surrendered, 
 Cervera's squadron, the real objective of the army, having quitted 
 the latter and been destroyed on the 4th. 
 
 As there was no sort of idea of further interference by Spanish 
 warships, a military force was soon after detailed for the invasion 
 of Porto Rico. It reached Port Guanica on the 25th of July, 
 landed without practical opposition — indeed with some welcome 
 from the inhabitants — to the number of about 35,000 men in the 
 harbours of Guanica and Ponce, on the south-west side of the 
 island, at entire leisure, without hurry or confusion. The 
 advance into the country was equally leisurely, so that it was 
 not till the 12th of August that an attack on the central position 
 of Aibonito was begun. It was at this point that the Spaniards 
 were expected to make some stand, but on that day the procla- 
 mation of the armistice put an end to the operations. 
 
 There were, clearly, no reasons why these two operations should 
 have failed. The Americans must have had the best of infor- 
 mation as to the number and quality of the forces they would have 
 to meet, and as there was nothing to prevent the landing of any 
 amount of force, the employment of inadequate force would have 
 been a simple blunder. But the strategical aspect of the landings 
 was only of the ordinary character. 
 
 The last point to be taken in considering the ruling principles 
 of naval warfare, as last illustrated, is the differentiation of force. 
 Here we at once note that just as the old differentiation be- 
 tween battleships and cruisers seemed weakened in the Chino- 
 Japanese War,* so it appears to be still further weakened in that 
 which we are considering. Neither at Manila, nor off Santiago, 
 was there any sorting of ships for attack and defence ; but every 
 kind of ship, on either side, took just the part that she was able to 
 
 * See page 440 of this work. 
 
xlvi NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 take, and unless we are prepared to say that the greater area of 
 armoured side which was the feature of the Cristobal Colon, was 
 specially effective in preserving her for a longer time than the 
 lesser armoured area of the other cruisers was able to do, we are 
 met by the general condition that no one class of ships appeared 
 to be more vulnerable than any other.* Admitting, as we still 
 must, that the longer range at which fire is effective does in the 
 end tell against any special differentiation of force for battle 
 purposes, such as so clearly obtained after we had had a long 
 experience of war under sail, we must guard ourselves from allow- 
 ing such an argument to sweep all before it. For the cause 
 makes the effect ; and as most nations have thrown over all idea 
 of building ships with a view to widely differentiating their fight- 
 ing force, except in matters to be presently noticed, it follows 
 that belligerents must use the forces they are provided with, and 
 they must use them how and as they can. 
 
 In England, perhaps more than in any other country, the line 
 of demarcation between the fighting battleships and the flying 
 cruiser, which in the programme of 1889 seemed likely to show 
 itself, has been made to disappear. Most thinkers of the present 
 day seem really to allow of no differentiation except that of the 
 armour-belt — the vertical armour at the water-line. We speak of 
 " armoured ships " as if they were necessarily more powerful than 
 "protected ships," and of course that ships which are neither 
 armoured nor protected are hopelessly inferior. There was a 
 widespread impression that these ideas were confirmed by the 
 results of the battle of Yalu, and that the comparative immunity 
 of the Chen Yuen and the Ting Yuen in that fight was caused by 
 their possession of an armoured belt. It appeared to me to be 
 more due to the protection afforded to the fighting crew of the 
 heavily-armoured turrets. 
 
 On one occasion I made a somewhat close investigation of the 
 causes of victory in the sea-fights of the French Kevolutionary 
 and Napoleonic Wars ; and it appeared to be certain that the 
 proportion of killed and wounded determined surrender. I was 
 even able to go so far as to say that unless the enemy suffered a 
 a like loss, the ship — no matter what her nationahty — that 
 reached a loss of 30 per cent, in killed and wounded would 
 haul her colours down. If, however, the loss was at first fairly 
 even on both sides, a much heavier percentage must be expected 
 before there was any surrender. 
 
 * She was only hit seven times. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. xlvii 
 
 The battle of Yalu, inasmuch as there was no surrender, but 
 only total destruction or flight, seemed so far to belie these 
 historical experiences, and pointed towards destruction rather 
 than surrender as the conclusion of the naval battle. In the war 
 we are considering similar results have been displayed ; for though 
 the Cristobal Colon actually hauled her colours down, she ran 
 ashore and destroyed herself at the same time. Otherwise, both 
 in the Korean war and in that under consideration, the destruction 
 was effected by shells producing fire, and not by the penetration 
 of armour. It is highly noteworthy that in the fight off Santiago 
 no heavier projectile than a six-pounder struck any of the armour 
 belts of the Spanish ships.* On the other hand, it appears certain 
 that the Don Antonio de Ulloa was sunk by water-line hits. She 
 was a cruiser of 1,130 tons, and unprotected in any way. It is 
 not known of what size of projectiles she was sunk, but the fact 
 must be taken into account. 
 
 The only question is, how ? Are we to say that because in our 
 experience of the conquest and destruction of one small vessel 
 out of a total number of twenty-two modern ships, one entirely 
 unarmoured, was destroyed by water-line hits, therefore we must 
 incommode a whole navy with water-line belts, or protective 
 water-line deck, not calculated to resist the blows of lighter pro- 
 jectiles that can alone be numerous, but immensely more cumbrous 
 and weighty, in order to withstand the blows of the heavier 
 projectiles that must be few and far between ? If, as we seem to 
 have been too read}^ to suppose, water-line hits were the only ones 
 competent to conquer, there might be a difficulty in answering. 
 But when conquest, in the vast majority of cases, has come 
 about just as it used to in sailing wars, from hits other than 
 those between wind and water, the logic is conclusive. The 
 water-line should not be neglected, but in all cases the armoured 
 protection should only be sufficient to resist such projectiles as, 
 because of their lightness, may be numerous in their strokes ; and 
 the heavier projectiles should be allowed to pass through, because 
 the proportion that will strike near the water-line must be so very 
 small. 
 
 The remarkable table prepared by the German Admiral Pliid- 
 
 * See the diagrams opposite page 573 of the Appendix. Several thinkers had pre- 
 dicted the result, and I myself had written either officially or semi-officially to the 
 Admiralty in view of the coming programme of 1889, urging that it was not necessary 
 to heavily armour the water-line, as it was so unlikely to be struck except by a pro- 
 portion of the numerous, and therefore light, projectiles. 
 
xlviii 
 
 NAVAL WABFARE. 
 
 demanii, as to the results of United States gunnery on the hulls 
 of Cervera's ships at Santiago, forms a remarkable commentary 
 on the above observations * : — 
 
 AMEEICAN GUNS. 
 American Designation. 
 
 
 1-Pr. 
 
 6-Pr. 
 
 4-inch 
 
 5-inch 
 
 8-inch 
 
 12-inch 
 
 13-inch 
 
 Total 
 
 Calibre in Centimetres 
 
 No. of Guns on board .... 
 
 3-7 
 22 
 
 5-7 
 
 84 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 12-7 
 12 
 
 20 
 32 
 
 30 
 6 
 
 33 
 
 8 
 
 170 
 
 Hits. 
 
 Maria Teresa 
 
 Almirante Oqnenda 
 
 yizcaya 
 
 Cristobal Colon . . . . 
 
 Total 
 
 79 
 
 15 
 
 On this table the author remarks : " This is not quite one hit 
 per gun, or, leaving out the 1-pounders, which have only a short 
 range of fire, nine hits to eight guns. 
 
 " The Iowa is the only ship that has 10-centimetre guns, the 
 Brooklyn the only one having 1'2-7-centimetre guns. These data 
 cannot lay claim to absolute accuracy, owing to the extent of 
 the destruction. The calibre of the hits also admit of some 
 margin." 
 
 But even with these qualifications we seem to be assured that 
 the results anticipated by pure reason — or almost pure reason, 
 because the fight between the Huascar and the British Shah and 
 Amethyst showed similar results — are borne out by experiment. 
 We have on the one side a waste of power in the Spanish ships 
 in the twelve inches of armoured belt, or even in the six inches 
 of Harveyed steel carried by the Cristobal Colon; and on the 
 American side a waste of power in the six 12-inch and the eight 
 13-inch guns carried by their ships. These extra heavy guns 
 dominated the displacement and character of the ships that bore 
 them ; and yet, when it came to the arbitrament of battle, they 
 
 * See Comments of Rear-Admiral Plilddemann, German Navy, on the Main 
 Feattires of the War with Spain, published by the Washington Office of Naval 
 Intelligence, December, 1898, p. 7. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN IVAB. xlix 
 
 might just as well have been left on shore for all th(; good they 
 did. * 
 
 Lieutenant John M. Elhcott, U.S.N. , a competent eye-witness 
 of the battle of Manila, sums up the general lessons derivable 
 from a survey of the results of the United States Artillery in 
 these words : — 
 
 "1. The sides of iron and steel-built cruisers do not arrest 
 projectiles enough to explode them.f 
 
 " 2. The incendiary effect of bursting 8-inch shells is great, 
 and far greater than would seem proportionate to that of lower 
 calibres. 
 
 "3, At ranges over 2,500 yards the gun-shields of cruisers are 
 in no sense a protection, but ensure the annihilation of the gun's 
 crew and the disabhng of the gun, if struck by a large projectile. 
 
 "4. Warships of the present day will generally be placed hors 
 de combat by conflagration and the destruction of their personnel 
 before they are sunk by gun-fire." | 
 
 At the battles of Yalu, of Manila, and Santiago, fire was the 
 immediate agent of destruction ; and though it may be admitted 
 that there is evidence of the superior incendiary power of the 
 heavier shell, there is nothing to show that medium, or even 
 small shell have not had, from their number, the major effect in 
 destroying. § In any case we may assume that the rain of pro- 
 jectiles, not necessarily large ones, were effective in cutting the 
 water-pipes and breaking down the fire engines, while at the 
 same time they baffled the efforts of the different fire brigades, 
 and let the fire gain. It was at one time the faith of a portion — 
 perhaps of the greater portion — of the navy that if the water-lines 
 were protected by armour, the guns' crews, and of course the fire 
 parties, might be left wholly exposed. ;, We have for some time 
 been parting with that idea, and the evidence of the Spanish- 
 American war should confirm us in that course. For thouefh 
 Lieutenant Ellicott may be absolutely accurate in his statement, 
 it is incomplete unless it can be shown that the loss of life 
 in a squadron is greater from the cases where heavy projectiles 
 have penetrated armour than from the cases where light pro- 
 jectiles have passed through the unarmoured side. 
 
 * The two 12-inch shells struck the Maria Teresa in an unarmoured part, 
 t I believe this is not true in the case of British fuses. 
 
 X Effect of the Gun-fire of the United States Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay. 
 Published by the Office of Naval Intelligence at Washington, 1899. 
 § No doubt some of the Spanish ships were set on fire by their crews. 
 II See my Memoirs of Sir Cooper Key, p. 371. 
 
 34 
 
1 NAVAL WABFABE. 
 
 The general conclusion seems to be that we ought to protect 
 both water-line and crews by armour, but not one more than the 
 other, and that we should be content to keep out lower medium 
 shell at some medium distance. 
 
 This dictum might apply generally, but it does not touch the 
 question of whether the late war shows it to be right to break 
 down classification and fall back on the methods of non-classifica- 
 tion shown in the fifth chapter of this work to have been adopted 
 before it was seen that naval warfare was governed by rule. It 
 seems certain that in the war before us the Americans were 
 forced to use the ships how they could and where they could. 
 But a general survey will show us that, on the whole, what was 
 required in 1B98 was just what was required in 1798 : namely, a 
 body of powerful ships for fighting purposes, and a body of ships 
 which were much smaller and weaker, for coast and blockade 
 work, for the attack on commerce, or if necessary for its defence. 
 For the former, coal supply showed itself more necessary than 
 speed, because it was found that action in concert, from circum- 
 stances, compelled the bulk of the ships to a lower speed than 
 individuals were capable of. * In the smaller class force must 
 give way to speed and coal supply ; while the larger class may 
 allow speed to give way to force. It is rather remarkable to note 
 what little work was apportioned to the large fast cruisers Colum- 
 bia and Minneapolis, compared to the service which fell to the 
 shares of the small craft, and the almost unarmed subsidised 
 "liners." 
 
 There has been shown, I apprehend, in this war precisely the 
 same wants in the differentiation of force that were felt one 
 hundred years ago — namely, a heavy force and a light force ; and 
 there has not been so far shown a want of force which is neither 
 light nor heavy, which was typified in the 44 and the 50-gun 
 ships of a bygone age, and by the Columbia and Minneapolis, if 
 not of the Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquenda, and Vizcaya of 
 to-day. 
 
 AVith regard to that wholly modern differentiation of force where 
 the gun-ships and the torpedo-ships are in opposition, we have 
 learnt nothing in the course of the war. The United States never 
 used their torpedo vessels, as it was generally expected they 
 might, and as their Government suggested they should, in 
 endeavouring to penetrate into harbours to destroy the enemy's 
 
 * Note Cervera's voyages, and Sampson's passages, between Key West and San 
 Juan. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMEBICAN WAB. 11 
 
 ships sheltering there. The Spaniards never had at any one point 
 torpedo vessels enough to make even a show of attack. The 
 single occasion on which we might have learnt something was 
 when the Furor and the Pluton came out of Santiago at the tail 
 of Cervera's squadron and found themselves in face of the con- 
 verted yacht, the Gloucester. Had they made straight for her 
 and endeavoured to torpedo her they could not have fared worse 
 than they ultimately did, but we might have learnt something 
 of the possibilities of such an approach, for the forces were not 
 so utterly disproportionate as they were in the case of the torpedo- 
 boat at Manila. 
 
 Another modern form of differentiation — a branch of the 
 general modern form which conceives the idea of providing 
 special ships for special services — has probably received its 
 deathblow in the country which most developed it — I mean 
 the building of special coast-defence ships. When it came to 
 the point, the most efficient of the United States coast-defence 
 ships were taken away from their coast-defence duties and thrust 
 into Admiral Sampson's fleet. He seems to have found them 
 fine instruments for hampering his movements, and of small use 
 for those bombarding purposes that were their sole recom- 
 mendation. 
 
 But if, in considering differentiation of force, we are entitled to 
 assume that it is very easy to overdo it in the matter of heavy 
 guns, it seems quite certain that the British Admiralty are pur- 
 suing a logical course in pushing forward — as in the case of the 
 Vickers-Maxim guns — -the highest energy and the most rapid 
 fire. All through the war it was the rapid fire of the longest 
 ranged guns that won the day. 
 
6) 
 
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