%» u CevuvenUÓu' y (Oti/e'/&r/ cyV.^yttctS2-& C/4&1A& ~ TL > LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, PATERNOSTF.K-ROW. 1844. VI 'T HENftY MORSE 3 TEPHENS NOTICE. The Publishers of this work beg to state that it is private property, protected by the late Copy- right Act, the 5 & 6 Victoria, c. 45. They beg also to state that any person having in his pos- session, within the United Kingdom, for sale or hire, one or more copies printed abroad of any English work protected by the Act referred to, is liable to a penalty, which, in cases affecting their interests, they intend to enforce. The Public are farther informed that the Act 5 & 6 Victoria, c. 47. s. 24., prohibits the im- portation of all works printed in foreign countries, of which the copyright is not expired. Even single copies, though for the especial use of the importers and marked with their names, are excluded ; and the Customs officers in the different ports are strictly enjoined to carry this regulation into effect. N.B The above regulations are in force in all British colonies and dependencies, as well as- in the United Kingdom. London : Printed by A. Spottiswoode, New- Street- Square . TO EARL GREY. My dear Lord, I inscribe to you this record of a period, Ml of danger to Europe, and of difficulty in our relations with the Continental Powers, in which you bore a distinguished part. Accept it, in remembrance of the great man whom, on his death, you succeeded in the direction of our Foreign AfFairs. Accept it, also, in the name of our fiffcy years' friendship, increasing on my side in veneration as life and its businesses recede from me. ROBERT ADAIR. Chesterfield Street, Mayfair, lOth April, 1844. 5088; ADVERTISEMENT, It was originally intended by the author of this Memoir that it should not be published during his lifetime ; but the many and increasing errors of the Foreign Press in commenting on the matters of which it treats, induce him to alter his purpose. He lays it before the Public therefore now, in order that, if necessary, recourse may be had for the truth of his statements to the testimony of some eminent men still living, and who were employed in planning and executing the foreign policy of England in 1806. He avails himself likewise of the official permission granted to him by Lord Palmerston, and not with- drawn by Lord Aberdeen, to print such parts of his despatches from the Court of Vienna, where he was employed at that period, as might not be prejudicial to the public service. Prince Metternich's consent, without which their publication would not have been proper, has been notified to him through her Ma- jesty's ambassador at that Court. CONTENTS. Pages Introduction - 1 — 6 Memoir ----- 7—314 Causes of the Commencement and Rupture of the Negociation for Peace in 1806, between England andFrance - -." - 21—82 Transactions, until the Cessation of Diplomatic Intercourse between England and Austria - 83 — 106 Despatches to Mr. Fox, Lord Howick, and Mr. Can- ning, until Lord Pembroke's Arrival at Vienna, July 3. 1807 - - - - 107—256 Despatches continued from Lord Pembroke's De- parture, September, 1807, until February 21. 1808 ----- 257—314 Appendix: Correspondence - - - 315—441 Letter to Count Stadion - - - 443 — 470 Remarks on M. Gentz's Narrative of what passed at the Prussian Head-Quarters in October, 1806, previously to the Battle of Jena - - -471—492 Remarks on M. Gentz's Observations on the Nego- ciations of 1806, for Peace between England and France ----- 493—532 INTRODUCTION, It is observed by Mr. Fox, in his historical work on the reign of James II., that " in reading the history of every country, there are certain periods at which the mind naturally pauses to meditate upon and consider them with reference, not only to their immediate effects, but to their remote consequences." Two such periods will occur to him who reads the history of the revolutionary war with France, and the part taken in it by Great Britain. His first pause will be at the peace of Amiens, in 1802; his secondJ at the general peace and settlement (as it was called) of Europe, in 1815. The period at which it shall be given him to iix his thoughts, and to take into his view the remote consequences of that war, social as well as political, is still at too great a distance to be more than a subject for speculation. At all events, if he pauses now it is all he can do. The " Two Principles " are still opposed to each other in adverse array. The narrative which follows, and the documents by which it is accompanied, relate to the second of the above periods, namely, the war which broke out afresh aft er the peace of Amiens. In rendering them public the Author does not pretend to write a history of that war. It will be enough for his purpose if the materials which he presents shall assist others, better qualified than himself for that task, to establish some truths hitherto little regarded, but the knowledge of which is necessary to place in their proper light the B 2 ... INTRODUCTION. transactions to which he refers, and the character of the statesmen by whom they were directed. It was shortly after the commencement of this second period, that Mr. Fox, after a long exclusion from power, became Foreign Minister. The new war, begun under Mr. Addington's administration, and continued by Mr. Pitt until his death, had been dis- tinguished by events the most disastrous to Europe. Mr. Fox's accession to office was the epoch, not of any new system in our foreign relations, but of an honest experiment to reconcile our old system to the new state of things into which the affairs of the Continent appeared to have settled down. The experiment of peace with France, as a state, partially tried by Mr. Addington, in 1802, by a treaty which never was executed, was now again to be attempted by Mr. Fox, disincumbered indeed from all obstacles of form, but incalculably aggravated in point of difficulty by the increased power and resources of France, and by the recent discomfiture at Austerlitz of a confederacy, the last which it seemed possible to oppose to her. Re- ferences to the negociations at Paris, in 1806, will occupy consequently an important place in the follow- ing work. But in order fully to understand this part of the subject, and in some measure likewise the cause, which, by encouraging Napoleon to ask too much, eventually occasioned the rupture of these negoci- ations, it will be proper to take a short view of Mr. Fox's political situation at the time at which he opened them. On the breaking out of the first war in 1793, Mr. Fox declared his determined opposition to its prin- ciple and its policy. The debates on those topics involved every conceivable subject of English interests, foreign as well as domestic, and were carried on not only with the gravity proportioned to their import- INTRODUCTION. 3 ance, but with all that personal earnestness and party zeal with which an honest conviction of their value had inspired the statesmen who took part in them. Exaggeration, of course, on both sides soon embittered our divisions ; and such was the extent of alarm and horror excited among all ranks of our population, by the doctrines and actions of the French revolutionary chiefs, that every endeavour to find out some rational means of avoiding war was regarded as an approbation of their enormities, and the proposer of such a course as little better than their accomplice. The war, consequently, had not continued long before there began to prevail among a great portion of what may be called the governing classes of this country, an opinion that Mr. Fox had become so enamoured of the French Revolution as to have lost sight of all his old English principles. How this opinion became prevalent it would be long, although not difficult, to explain. It originated, undoubtedly, in the separation which, from the opposite views entertained of that revolution as influencing the destinies of the world, and more especially with regard to the most prudent manner of dealing with it in reference to ourselves, had taken place among the leaders of the Whig party. With the classes above- mentioned the speeches and writings of Mr. Burke were decisive. Every where they had given the tone to the public feeling. When to these considerations are added the really mischievous designs of an extreme popular faction then beginning to form itself, Mr. Pitt's dexterity in connecting and confounding the old reformers with this faction, and in availing him- self of the vantage ground thus given him, so as, in all discussions on our existing institutions, to throw his antagonists on the defensive, it will not be won- dered at that such powerful causes, all operating together and aided by nearly the whole of the daily b 2 4 INTRODUCTION. press, should have produced the effect described, and that through them Mr. Fox should have been exhibited to the world as a dangerous man, who, if ever he ob- tained power, would use it to bring about such changes in our English system as he and his friends might think best calculated to fit and adapt it to that of France. If, with all their absurdity, such notions as these obtained credit at home, they could not fail to be received generally abroad. In France especially, — and such was the necessary consequence of this unwise scheme of detraction — he was believed to be so much on their side in his views of foreign affairs, that hu accession to office was looked forward to as the epoch, not only of a peace favourable to France in its direct stipulations, but of a strict incorporating alliance with her. Such were the circumstances personal to Mr. Fox, under which he came into power, in February, 1806. It was not long afterwards that negociations for peace were set on foot. Here, therefore, in the judgment of those who did not know him, was to be the test of his character as an English statesman. Here would speedily be brought to the proof the consistency of his opposition to the war-system of his predecessors, with his old opinions as a supporter and advocate of the European policy of King William. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, the negociations were to be under his immediate conduct and control. How, and on what principles would he conduct them ? Having condemned the war as unjust, would he incline towards France in the terms of the peace ? Having reprobated the intervention of the Continental powers in the settlement of her internal concerns as a viola- tion of the law of nations, would he take for his guidance the new version of that law asserted and promulgated by France, or would he adhere to the INTRODUCTION. 5 established usages of Europe, and his own early principles of resistance to her power and prepon- derance ? The reader of the following pages, after considering them, will answer these questions for himself. He will form his judgment from the transactions to which they relate; and perhaps in a small degree from the part borne by the Author, small as the then circumstances and condition of Europe necessarily rendered it, in executing Mr. Fox's instructions to him on his appointment as Minister to the Court of Yienna. It is for this purpose that he now offers to the public, with permission from the proper authorities, some extracts from his despatches while at the Court of Yienna. They extend from June 1806 to February 1808, when his mission was brought to an end. They were carried on consequently beyond Mr. Fox's life, and the continuance in office of the administration of which he formed a part. During the whole of this latter period the Author continned in the same course of action with which he began his mission, without receiving from the Ministers who succeeded Lord Grenville's government any instructions in a different sense or spirit. He is entitled therefore to assume that on the main points of English European policy which, under Mr. Fox's directions, he had been pressing on the consideration of the Austrian govern- ment, they saw no reason to alter the line of conduct which had been prescribed to him by their pre- decessors. These letters, it will be observed, relate to a point of history which may be said to stand alone, in some measure, in the picture of Mr. Fox's political life. Since his twenty years' exclusion from power, which began when he was but six and thirty years old, and during the whole of the war with France, this was the only opportunity he had had of proving by his actions b 3 6 INTRODUCTION. when he came into direct contact with the new system, how much better adapted he considered the old one to be for the administration of the foreign interests of such a country as Great Britain. The Author has a further motive for dweiling some- what particularly on the negociation for peace in 1806. On its failure some of Mr. Fox's warm friends so far mistook the character of that transaction, as to have persuaded themselves that it had been rendered in- effectual, not so much from any disinclination on his part to conclude a treaty on the terms offered by Napoleon, as from his ha ving been over-ruled by what, in their total ignorance of facts, they called a war- party in the Cabinet. The same notion was taken up at the time by a great portion of the Continental press, as well as by individuals of no small note, with whom the Author has had the beneht of conversing at various periods of his intercourse with foreign statesmen. It is his wish, and he thinks it his duty, to correct this error as far as he possesses the means ; and he trust s that whoever may be disposed to study this period of English history with the special purpose of under- standing the true character of Mr. Fox's policy, and not to rest satisfied with what he will find about it in the party records, and "basse littérature" of the day, may read with some advantage the documents which are here laid before him. MEMOIR. The state of Europe in 1806 — the new combination of interests which had arisen upon the breaking out afresh of the war between Great Britain and France, by the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens — tJie con- tinued subjection of Prussia and Germany to the ascendancy of France, together with the line of policy which, after the disastrous peace of Presburg, an overwhelming necessity prescribed to Austria, until the great day of their common emancipation, have long become matter of history. They are divested of that obscurity which attends diplomatic transactions while in progress, and may now be understood by any one who will give himself the trouble to examine the public documents within his reach. Not so the efforts made by England and Russia, and, in her own prudent way, by Austria herself, although not then in alliance with either, to save the sinking vessel of European independence. These are but little known; and are besides so lost in the great results of suc- ceeding years, that it will be a task of sorae difficulty to revive their remembrance, and to place them where they deserve to stand in the history of our eventful times. I will endeavour to perform this task. Among the first and wisest of those efforts, was the attempt made by the administration recently formed by Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, to make peace with b 4 8 MEMOIR. France. The measured, and, at the same time, ge- nerous policy of Great Britain in that attempt, had for its basis not merely a settlement between us and France as to our mutual objects and individual in- terests, but the keeping together and preserving, at almost any cost to ourselves, the shattered remnants of Europe, and the elements of her federative system. With these purposes in view, Mr. Fox in February 1806, entered upon his administration of foreign affairs. To effect them by arms was no easy task. All the military strength of Europe that could be relied on in a contest with France had been dispersed by the recent defeat of the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. The finances of both those powers were exhausted. Great Britain was not in a condition to help them, either by subsidies or loans, and — worse than all — the principle of concert and union, so often abused by the several powers for the attainment of separate advantages, was by this time nearly worn out among them, and had lost that sup- port of mutual confidence without which it never can be brought to act for a common cause. The con- nection of Prussia with France, founded on a scheme of partial neutrality incompatible with the existence of the old Germanic empire, more or less intimate, but in some form or other ever subsisting under all the different forms of government which France had given to herself since the peace of Basle, and the gra- dual fusion of the German States on the Rhine into the same system, had effectually broken the great chain of association through which alone the friends of continental independence could hope to erect any thing like a defensive barrier against her power. It is not the purpose of this memoir to dweil on the many circumstances which contributed to produce this disunion. The fact of its existence is all that is now necessary to notice. For the causes, we may MEMOIR. 9 consult the profound writings of Mr. Burke, who in deep bitterness of heart has thus laid them open to the common eye : — " As long as there was any appearance of success," writes Mr. Burke in reasoning upon the failure of the first war against France, M the spirit of aggrandise- ment, and consequently the spirit of mutual jealousy seized on the coalesced powers. Some sought accession of territory at the expense of Trance ; some at the expense of each other; some at the expense of third parties ; and when the vicissitude of disaster took its turn, they found common distress a treacherous bond of faith and friendship. " It would answer no great purpose to enter into the particular errors of the war. The whole has been but one error. It was but nominally a war of alliance. As the combined powers pursued it, there was nothing to hold an alliance together. There could be no tie of honour in a society for pillage."* It will be seen but too often in the transactions which are here commemorated, how this incurable spirit of discord among the chief powers repelled every approach towards a scheme for common action among them, when fresh vicissitudes of disaster show- ing themselves in the worst of all shapes — that of impending foreign conquest — had thoroughly awakened them to a sense of their common danger. Mr. Fox, on entering his office, found it full of des- patches and other documents, verifying to the fullest \ extent this gloomy prospect of continental affairs. ! Something, however, was to be tried. The power of \ Kussia, notwithstanding the disasters at Austerlitz, was still standing erect. Her last alliance with Aus- tria, indeed, as to its specified objects, had been put an end to by the Treaty of Presburg, but for all the * Letters on a Regicide Peace. 10 MEM01R. purposes of a common cause her alliance with England still subsisted. We had an alliance too with the king of the Two Sicilies ; and we were on friendly terms with Austria. Here were Mr. Fox's means, and his only means, for protecting the Continent from the arms of France, if unhappily the failure of the nego- ciation for peace should render the continuance of war inevitable. The nature and extent of these means clearly pointed out the use of them. Powerless for aggression or for the recovery of lost ground, in any defensive scheme of resistance they might be made to go far and to last long. At the same time they excluded no active measures in advance which the fortune of war might give encouragement to. The whole system of the new ministry, therefore, might be comprised in the two words, " voir venir." Building on this rock, and without ostentatiously aiming at successes out of their reach, they patiently waited the sure result of a policy through which, in a few years afterwards, and in spite of all intervening obstacles and disasters, Europe, with resources preserved and with energy restored, was to work out its own way to peace, freedom, and security. The embassy at St. Petersburg was then filled by Lord Granville Leveson, and in his absence its duties were discharged by Mr. Stuart ; men who were then laying the foundation for the high character and rank which they have now reached in their public life. They were succeeded by the Marquis of Douglas. The situation of Sicily, menaced by the immediate neighbourhood of a French army, made it necessary to entrust the commander-in-chief of our forces in that kingdom with diplomatic authority, and General Fox accordingly was accredited as minister to the Court of Palermo. We were on such terms with Sweden as to render it fit that we should stipulate for her interests as an MEMOIR. 1 1 ally, if we did not admit her into the general nego- ciation for peace. Our relations with Prussia at this period were doubtful, and in one respect hostile. The occupation of Hanover was an act of aggression which placed the King of England in a state of war with that power ; and it remained for His Majesty, guided by consi- derations of prudence alone, to determine in the then situation of his Continental interests, how far he would avail himself of his belligerent rights. The Prussian envoy, Baron Jacobi, ho wever, remained still in London, and Mr. Jackson continued in the same ca- pacity at Berlin. Our envoy at Vienna was Sir Arthur Paget, and on I his recal, or rather resignation, I was appointed to I succeed him.* I had no regular instructions from Mr. Fox. There was nothing in his office on which to ground any. Long habits of indulgent regard (it could be nothing else) had led him probably to believe that I should not abuse the confidence ex- pressed in the remarkable words with which, on my* asking for instructions, he dismissed me: — "I have none to give you. Go to Vienna, and send me yours." These words were my guide in many trans- actions which occurred during my residence there, and chiefly so when the occupation of Germany by the French armies deprived me of all means of communi- * Sir Arthur's resignation arose from his high sense of honour and I delicacy. He thought himself bound to offer it, in consequence of the i publication of one of his despatches, in which he had given an account, as it was his duty to do, of the causes which led to the capitulation of Ulm, and the failure of the last campaign. In this narrative, neces- sarily most confidential, it was not possible to avoid mentioning names and proceedings of distinguished persons, in a manner, that if divulged must obviously lessen his efficiency with them in treating of other con- cerns. Mr. Fox himself had no intention of removing Sir Arthur Paget. He had the highest opinion of his ability, and told me, when I took leave of him, that he had found no better despatches in his office than his. — R.A. 1 2 MEMOIR. cating with England ; but they were not sufficiënt to authorise me to act with decision in cases easily to be foreseen, when it would be out of my power to await orders from thence. On my pressing him therefore for some specification of the points he particularly wished me to attend to, he wrote them down as follows: — " To express on all occasions the most perfect good- will to Austria, and to tranquillise her perfectly, with regard to any apprehensions she may entertain of our getting her into a scrape for the purposes of Eussia and Great Britain, or even for that of the general ad- vantage of Europe. She cannot wish to avoid war more than we wish she should. " To suggest to her the possibility of her not being able to avoid it by any concession whatever, and to advise her to make up her mind speedily, to what she will do in such a contingency. " To observe that it is very doubtful whether Eussia will give up the mouths of the Cattaro. If she apprehends an approaching war in the south-west parts of the Ottoman Empire, such a concession from Russia is scarcely to be expected. But even if, in kindness to Austria, she should give up a place which she considers to be of such value, it is still to be feared that Bonaparte will take some other pretence for quarrelling with Austria. On this supposition also, it isnecessary for the Cabinet of Yienna to make up her mind. At all events, let not a danger, which may go to her very existence, come upon her unawares. " If there is war, how is Yienna to be defended? or can it be defended at all? " To admonish them (without however taking any tone of superiority), that they can expect no safety unless the war be begun and managed with the per- fect concurrence of the generals, and especially the MEMOIR. 13 Arch-Duke Charles, and that there ought to be no difference of opinion among the members of the Cabinet. Those who do not concur with the leading power ought to quit. The generals ought all to act under the Arch-Duke, and to be such as he approves. " If there should be any means of preserving peace, we will favour that design by keeping most perfectly secret any good understanding that may exist between us, and confine our intercourse (except when opportunity offers of secret and confidential communication) to that of mutual respect and civility. " If Razamouski be still at Vienna, to cultivate his friendship, and show him every proof of entire confidence." On putting this paper into my hands, Mr. Fox fur- ther told me to observe to Count Stadion, in my first conference with him, that it appeared to our Cabinet that Austria was not sufficiently aware of her danger. My first audience of the Emperor was on the 18th June 1806, for the delivery of my credentials, and my first confidential conference with his minister imme- diately foliowed. In this interview I laid open to him without reserve the whole course of policy intended to be pursued by the new Government. I told him explicitly that the system of forcing or persuading foreign powers, by means of subsidies, to enter into wars against their own conception of their interests, if ever it had been acted upon by England, was now effectually renounced ; but that at the same time, and particularly with reference to the present situation of Austria, if she should feel herself in real danger from fresh exactions and injuries on the part of France, we were not the less determined to assist her in a de- fensive war ; and I did not neglect to repeat to him Mr. Fox's last words to me, " that Austria did not ap- pear sufficiently aware of her danger." After this nothing of importance occurred, until by 14 MEM0IR. accounts received from Paris, it appeared that the negociations for peace which had hitherto * been con- fined to unofncial Communications, were about to be opened regularly between Great Britain and France, and that a Russian plenipotentiary was expected there to take part in them. This was an anxious moment for Austria. Hard as were the terms of the peace which she had just concluded at Presburg, it was her wish as well as her interest to maintain it ; and she could not but be aware that her best hope of doing so and of escaping from fresh exactions under pretext of a renewal of hostilities between France and Russia, lay in the success of a negociation which would render the peace general throughout Europe. On the other hand, she could not be indifferent as to the terms of such a pacification. She would naturally be anxious, first, that in principle the peace might be one in which all the belligerents shpuld concur by a common act, and next — for she could hope for nothing better — that the territorial condition of Europe should remain as it was. Taking no part herself, however, that might enable her to influence the negociations, she watched them with the most intense anxiety ; and when the principle of negociation on the basis of the uti possidetis announced in M. de Talleyrand's first confidential communication to Mr. Fox, was acceded to by England, Austria joined cordially in the common wish and hope that a treaty upon that basis, compre- hending all the belligerents, might speedily be brought to a conclusion. One of the chief advantages which presented itself to Austria of making a peace on this basis was the preservation of Sicily to the king of Naples. 111 in- formed by his correspondent s at the Court of Palermo, that Court itself misled by the most erroneous accounts * From March 5th, the date of Monsieur de Talleyrand's first letter to Mr. Fox, until June löth, the date of Lord Yarmouth's return to Paris. MEMOIR. 15 from its minister at London, whom the British Ca- binet did not think fit to admit into their confidence, Count Stadion had entertained some doubts whether we might not give way on this essential point, and agree to propose to his Sicilian Majesty some com- pensation for that island ; but on my repeated as- surances that there was no intention on our part of listening to any proposal of that nature, I succeeded in removing his suspicions.* This was the situation of affairs when Monsieur d'Oubril, the Russian Plenipotentiary appointed to co-operate with Lord Yarmouth, who had been in- vested with the same character on the part of England, arrived at Yienna on his way to Paris. He stayed there only to communicate his mission to Count Razamoffsky and myself, and on the 23d of June proceeded on his journey. Of the extent of M. d'Oubril' s confidential Commu- nications to Count Razamoffsky I am ignorant, but it is my firm belief that he did not inform the Count either of his intention to sign a separate treaty with France, or even that he had power s to do so. His Communications to me were very scanty; scarcely more than the fact of his mission for the ostensible purpose of an exchange of prisoners, and of his orders to listen to any overtures which might be made for peace. But he did not fail anxiously to inquire of me what were Mr. Fox's *eal opinions on the subject of Hanover, and whether he was determined to make its restoration to His Majesty a sine qud non of any treaty. In a few days after his departure, we received the * There had been some conversation on this point at Paris, which will be amply noticed in other parts of this Memoir. For the way in which the proposal was received by the English government, consult the diplomatic correspondence laid before parliament, on the rupture of the negociations. — Annual Register for 1 806. 16 MEMOIR. astonishing news of his having signed a treaty with France for a separate peace. In this place, as the serious business of my mission is about to commence, and in order to do full justice both to Count Razamoffsky and M. d'Oubril — to the one for not deceiving me, and to the other for not telling me what he might have thought it his duty to conceal from the ambassador of his own Court — I think it right to publish full extracts from my des- patches relative to this subject. Monsieur d'Oubril shall have no reason to complain ; for if on Count Razamoffsky's authority I represented him at the time as acting in opposition to his instructions, and as ex- ceeding his powers, I will now repair that error by reprinting the text of those powers as they were pub- lished ten years afterwards by authority; and the translation of which will be found among the State Papers of 1806, printed in the Annual Register for that year. From the tenor of these it is clear that in signing a separate treaty, M. d'Oubril did not at least exceed his commission.* * These instructions are given under the authority of a work, en- titled, " Les Ephémérides Russes, compilation publiée d St. Petersbourg, avec permission de la censure, et aux frais de la Couronne." They are as folio w : — " Nous Alexandre I. Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c. &c. " Portant constamment notre solicitude a la conservation en Europe du calme et de la tranquillité, et étant mü par un désir sincère de mettre fin a la mésintelligence et de rétablir la bonne harmonie avec la France sur des bases solides, nous avons jugé bon de commettre ce soin a une personne jouissant de notre confiance. A eet efFet nous avons choisi, nommé, et autorisé notre aimé et féal Pierre D'Oubril, notre conseiller d'état, et Chevalier des ordres de Saint Wladimir de la troisième classe, de Sainte Anne de la seconde, et de Saint Jean de Jerusalem, comme nous Ie choississons, nommons, et autorisons par les présentes, a l'effet d'atteindre ce but, d'entrer en pourparlers avec celui et ceux qui y seront sufHsamment autorisés de la part du Gouvernement Francois,, de conclure et signer avec eux un acte ou convention sur des bases propres a afFermir la paix qui sera établie entre la Russie et la France, comme a la pré- parer entre les au tres puissances belligérantes de 1'Europe. " Promettans sur notre parole Impériale d'avoir pour bon et d'ex- MEMOIR. 17 The treaty was signed on the 20th July, by the Russian and French plenipotentiaries, and on the 21st Lord Yarmouth presented his full powers for entering into a negociation on the part of England. It were needless to describe the effect produced at Vienna when these twoevents came to be known there : — enough to say that the surprise and consternation were general. Russia deserting the common cause and England following her example ! — these, and not without reason, were signs of danger serious enough to perplex the councils of Austria in the precarious state of her own relations with France, after the peace of Presburg. And here began my first and only difference with that excellent minister Count Stadion, of whom I never can speak without the highest respect for his honour and frankness, nor without lasting gratitude for his kindness towards myself. Except at Vienna, justice has rarely been done to him other- wise than for his personal qualities ; but in European history he will be remembered as one of those states- men to whose temper and sagacity Austria owes, in no small degree, her restoration to her present state of independence and stability. It happen ed that in a conversation on the course of foreign policy adopted by our new ministry, and particularly with reference to the principle on which they meant to conduct the negociation with France, I had assured him that they never would depart from the old English rule which from the earliest times had governed the system of our Continental alliances, and which had a balance écuter fidèlement tout ce qui aura été arrêté et signé par notre dit Plénipotentiaire, de même de donner notre ratification Impériale dans Ie terme auquel elle aura été promise. " (Signé) Alexandre. " (Contre-signé) Princb Adam Czartorysky." See "Pièces Justificatives/' in the Mémoires d'itn Homme d'Etat. vol. ix. p. 481. C 18 MEMOIR. of power for its object ; and that although we had no prospect for the present of making that balance as even in the scale as might be wished, still we should never make a peace that did not provide a foundation for one, leaving it to time and events to bring it to something like an equipoise. In confirmation of this assurance, I referred him to the cause which had occasioned the suspension of the preliminary corre- spondence from the time of M. de Talleyrand's first overture in March until May. It had been inter- rupted, as he knew, because France had refused to admit Russia into it as our ally, on the old pretension of excluding us from continental connections ; nor had it been resumed until she had given way on that vital point,byacknowledgingin express terms our unlimited right of intervention and guarantee ; and that it was then, and then only, that Mr. Fox, on consultation with Russia, had consented to a form which admitted of discussing, but only of discussing, separately such matters as pertained to our several interests, common as well as individual. With regard to specific con- ditions, I had it not in my power to particularise what they were likely to be ; but on one point, namely, the cession of Sicily to France, I could venture posi- tively to assure him that, so far from consenting to its surrender, it was not intended to be made the subject even of negociation ; that in fact there would be no negociation at all unless France as a preliminary renounced her demand of Sicily, and returned to her first proposal of the uti possidetis ; for it was on the acceptance of that condition alone, that Lord Yar- mouth would produce his powers. After so distinct an assurance, I had no right to be surprised at perceiving some coldness on the part of the minister when he communicated the fact to me, which he did a few days after this conversation, of the presentation of his full powers by Lord Yarmouth MEMOIR. 19 without his having obtained this previous renunciation. At first sight it seemed to be clear, that on this latter point, I had either deceived him, or had been deceived myself ; and in either case my credit with him must necessarily be diminished. But this awkward state of our incipient diplomatic relations was sure to cease on the receipt of my next despatches from Lon- don. In the full certainty therefore of what they would contain on this head, I ventured to assure him that either some great mistake, or some pressing ne- cessity, must have occurred at Paris to have occasioned such a step on the part of our negociator ; and that, after all, France would gain nothing by it but the insignificant advantage of being enabled to perplex the conferences at her pleasure, by the introduction of fresh matter for dispute without the remotest prospect of attaining her end. In all that I had anticipated on this subject the event fully bore me out. It was soon known that to produce his full powers on the instant, or to quit Paris in twenty-four hours, was the alternative offered to Lord Yarmouth, before M. d'Oubril could have well folded up his treaty. Placed in so new and difficult a situation, the French government having actually refused him the short delay necessary to get fresh instructions upon it from his own government, and unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of an absolute rupture, Lord Yarmouth had indeed given way, and by so doing had admitted that he was ready officially to discuss the pretension of France to place Sicily among the objects to be treated for ; but on the other hand it will be no less clear on referring, as we shall shortly do, to the correspondence, that from the beginning to the end the French negociators never advanced a single step towards their object of acquiring Sicily, nor even so far as to obtain an esti- mation of its value from the British plenipotentiary c 2 20 MEMOIR. in considering what might constitute an equivalent for it. It is needless to say that my very first despatches from London were of a nature fully to relieve the British government from all suspicion of a vacillating policy on this important occasion, and to reinstate me consequently in the. confidence of the Austrian minister. But in order to sift this whole matter to the bottom, to clear the way for rightly understanding the steadi- ness and the unity of our policy at this period until Napoleon, failing to separate us from the Continent by his diplomacy, effected it for a time by his arms, it wiil be necessary to go somewhat at length into the history of these Paris negociations ; with respect to which, and to the true causes of their rupture, much mis-statement has been hazarded, and much error has prevailed. 21 CAÜSES OF THE COMMENCEMENT AND RUPTURE OF THE NEGOCIATIONS FOR PEACE IN 1806 BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE. In order thoroughly to understand the circumstances which led to the negociations for peace, in 1806, and the reason of their failure, we must look back to the iïrst war with France, in 1 793. Into the causes of that war, and by what gradations we got into it, it will not be necessary to enter. The facts are as follow : — A long series of vices and errors had existed in the government of France. The country called for a remedy to them. If the first movers in the re- volution looked, for their part, no further than so to limit the monarchy as to obtain through new institu- tions security against the return of the public evils, other leaders with far different views, and other factions formed on far different principles, soon took the direction of it out of their hands, and, instead of reforming the monarchy, subverted it. These new leaders went further. They passed the celebrated de- cree of fraternity, holding out to the people of all other countries who might choose to imitate their example the promise of assistance and support. In doing this they had gone beyond the lawful means of defence which every country is justified in employing against its adversaries, and thus put themselves into a state of hostility towards every community, whether mon- archical or republican, that was living under a settled government. Europe took the alarm. A revolution so made and so sustained could not be matter of indifference to the neighbours of France, especially to England. It could not be so, whether considered as an example in government, or as her c 3 22 MEMOIR. first step towards the conquest of tlie world. The question, therefore, for us, was — how to dealwith it. The most distinguished leaders of the public opinion at that time were Mr. Pitt, Mr. Burke, and Mr. Fox. Now, in this case, and before any act of direct aggres- sion had been committed on either side, there was a choice as to our mode of proceeding. First, we might make war upon France, and force her back on her old monarchy. Secondly, we might keep aloof, and wait for events, observing a wary and mistrustful neutrality towards her. Thirdly, we might leave her alone ; be neutral, but friendly in our neutrality; and above all, throw no obstacles in the way of her internal reforms. Of these three modes of proceeding, Mr. Burke was for the first ; Mr. Fox for the last. The minister took the middle course. He would neither enter into war for the old monarchy, nor, if forced into one, continue it until its restoration ; but he was willing enough to oppose the revolution by arms, if France should give just cause for hostility on other grounds. The comparative prudence of these different courses it were useless now to discuss ; all that is required is to point out clearly the opposition of sentiment which prevailed amongst the great leaders of the state. For the views of Mr. Burke, and his reasoning upon them, we may consult his writings ; and Mr. Fox, in his letter to his constituents of December, 1793, has set forth his own in a manner sufiiciently explicit to be left as they stand for the judgment of after times. The views of Mr. Pitt, together with his acts, must appear before the same tribunal, to be judged by those rules of historical justice to which all men are amen- able whose hands have wielded the destinies of the world. But the diversity of opinion amongst these eminent men led to other differences, which, as materially MEMOIK. 23 affecting the public measures, must not be overlooked in this narrative ; and the less so, as they afford a decisive, although in this instance a painful proof of the soundness of the distinction between a party acting together for national objects and ends, and a mere factious combination to drive a minister from his place. Many friends of Mr. Fox, some of them connected with him by the strongest ties of affection and confi- dence from the earliest days of his life, differed from him as to the nature and character of the impending crisis. They dissented not only from the course he proposed, and the opinions by which he recommended it, but thought both of these dangerous to the country and the government ; and in their minds it was no small aggravation of the danger that he was in- sensible to the view which they took of it themselves, and inaccessible to their remonstrances. Taking the obvious line under such circumstances, they withdrew from all participation with him in political counsels ; for with them this was no case for compromise, nor even one in which private friendship could follow its impulses in the search of motives for mutual agree- ment. It may not be superfluous to add, that if ever there was virtue in politics, it was seen and proved on both sides in the separation which then took place among the Whigs. But that virtue was put to a severe, if not a difiicult trial. The deep agony of Mr. Fox was witnessed by an assembled Parliament ; and if the feeling was not, in its demonstration, reci- procal, allowance must be made for those sterner modes of thinking which made its repression appear a duty. To differences of such a nature there could be but one remedy ; not time, but the extinction of their cause. Such was the state of political sentiment among the leaders when the war broke out. After much c 4 24 MEM0IR. mutual manifestation of ill-feeling, an act of positive aggression was committed on the part of France by the infraction of a treaty to which England was a guaranteeing party. Whether this was the first ag- gression, — whether, on the other hand, the refusal to receive M. de Chauvelin's credentials from the new government did not constitute such an act of hostility as to justify France in considering herself to be placed in a state of war by us, — is a question of public law wholly beside the purpose of the present work. It is enough that this act of aggression, aggravated by the decree of fraternity already mentioned, brought on an immediate rupture. For the military events, varying through every form of success and of defeat, and for the political changes in the conduct of foreign powers which oc- curred from this time until the peace of Amiens, we must consult the public annals. It will not be acting justly, however, towards either of the great parties under whose opposite banners the people of England had ranged themselves, wholly to disconnect the intervening transactions from the opinions and coun- sels adopted by them at the first breaking out of the revolution. The war had not lasted long before ill-success began somewhat to sour many of its popular sup- porters. Under the impatience of disappointment they began to inquire into its object, which seemed to them not sufficiently clear, and to urge that it should be explicitly and intelligibly declared. Mr. Wilberforce, a virtuous and able man, at the head of the two most powerful sects of England in alliance with the church and the state, and partaking himself in all the horror excited by the proceedings of the dominant factions in France, saw the necessity of removing every obstacle in the way of peace which belonged to mere questions of government, and not to MEMOIR. 25 practical security. The restoration of the French monarchy, whether as a cause or an object of war, having been disclaimed by the leaders of every section of opinion except Mr. Burke, he thought it might be practicable not only to open a door for peace, but to reconcile to it all dissentients who in the main agreed in the justice and necessity of the war itself. With this view he moved an amendment to the address to the Crown, on the opening of the session of December, 1794. His proposal (after the usual assurances of support against the enemy) was " to represent to His Majesty that the time was come when it would be advisable and expediënt to endeavour to restore the blessings of peace." Opposed to this amendment as to the exact time, but agreeing in the substance of it, Mr. Pitt, on the 28th of the ensuing month, on Mr. Grey's motion 4 ( that the existence of the then government of France ought not to be considered as precluding at this time a negociation for peace" brought forward a declaration in the shape of an amendment to that motion, " that he was ready to treat for peace with any government, under whatever form, in France which should be ca- pable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity." Thus Mr. Wilberforce carried two vital points in this question of the French war, both as to principle and practice. Mr. Pitt, disavowing all extreme doc- trines, and admitting that a government, although itself emanating from insurrection, and, therefore, likely enough to encourage insurrection in other states, might yet be capable of maintaining such relations, soon cleared his way to a direct negociation with the Republic ; while his high-prineipled sup- porters saw jio inconsistency in consenting to one, so that the question remained open with regard to the 26 MEMOIR. extent and nature of the security to be demanded, and that he himself was to be the judge of it. In these advances towards peace Mr. Fox, of course, heartily concurred. He accepted them not only as wise and just in themselves, but as affirming his original proposition, that neither the peace so much desired by Mr. Wilberforce, nor the security required against a revolutionary government, could be obtained otherwise than through a regular negociation with persons in actual possession of authority in France, no matter how they came by it. Two negociations were, therefore, entered into, the one in 1796, the other in 1797. For much of their >character, making allowance for his particular view of this great subject, we may consult Mr. Burke's two celebrated " Letters on a Eegicide Peace." But the world was not yet ready for peace ; nor is it to be wondered at that these attempts failed, considering the temper which then prevailed on both sides. Matters went on thus until the year 1800, when Mr. Pitt, who had failed also in an endeavour to obtain the consent of the Crown to a measure of home policy favourable to the Eoman Catholics of Ireland, resigned his office. He was succeeded by Mr. Addington, who immediately set on foot a third negociation. More successful than his predecessor, he got as far as a treaty, such as it was, but he never arrived at its execution. Not but that he was him- self willing enough to execute it if France would have sat down quietly with what she had gained ; but her never-ceasing exactions and usurpations in Piedmont, in Switzerland, and every where within her reach, alarmed him for the state in which Europe had been left under its stipulations, and taught him that his treaty was any thing but a security for peace. The conditions of that treaty, concluded at Amiens in 1802, were such as to separate those supporters of MEMOIR. 27 the war who thought them on the whole to be as favourable as could be obtained in the relative situ- ation of the two countries, from those who required from a revolutionary government a greater degree of security than they would have demanded from a restored monarchy. In the Upper House,. Lord Grenville, and in the Commons, Mr. Thomas Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Mr. William Elliot, declared their dissent from them, for reasons which, although ill supported by numbers, soon began to make a serious impression on the public mind, or rather to revive, it may be said, that opinion of insecurity, the sense of which had been suspended by the hopelessness of success, and the heavy pressure of taxation. Against this revulsion of the public sentiment Mr. Addington could not make head, although sup- ported in his measure both by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. This was very much owing to the inherent weakness of his government, which had not nerve enough to stand by their treaty after they had made it. With a real wish for peace, the minister was fairly bullied out of the one he had just concluded, by the charges of timidity and incapacity showering down upon him without mercy from almost every quarter. The consequences were natural enough in such a case. Attacked for his weakness, Mr. Addington seemed to think that the best defence for his ministry would be some demonstration of vigour, which should shame the world out of its accusation ; but his vigour, instead of braving, was displayed in yielding to it. Stung to the quick by the never-ceasing imputations of in- capacity, doubtfully supported by Mr. Pitt, well and honestly by Mr. Fox so far as his treaty required it, but opposed by him and by the chief leading powers of the House of Commons as a minister representing the mere will of the Crown, Mr. Addington retreated from a ground he could no longer hold, and feil back 28 MEMOIR. upon the war-spirit of the country, which seemed to revive under his pacific experiment. Thus after a short feverish interval we relapsed int o our old hostile habits, taking our chance as before for what might happen. But the state of parties by this time had become such as to render a change of ministry inevitable. As a measure indeed, the non-execution of the treaty of Amiens was popular enough, and Mr. Addington recovered all that he had lost by having made it ; but the great interests of England and of the world were not again to be hazarded under his guidance. Ac- cordingly, after some close divisions in the House of Commons, he gave in his resignation in May, 1804, and Mr. Pitt resumed the administration. Into the causes which at this time defeated the project of the formation of a ministry on an extensive basis, and which was to comprise Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and other distinguished men, it is not meant to enter at large. Enough to say, that the necessity of such a ministry was understood and feit by no man more than by Mr. Pitt himself, and he had recommended it accordingly to his sovereign. Un- happily, that monarch's personal prejudices against Mr. Fox disappointed both his and the public wishes, and he found himself compelled to form a govern- ment out of the scanty materials which lay ready to his hand ; for of his former colleagues Lord Grenville declined to come into office with him, and thus to sanction an exclusion for which no wise or constitutional reason could be alleged, while Mr. Fox's old Whig friends, who had separated from him on account of their differences at the beginning of the first war, had in this crisis of public difficulty rejoined him. The new ministry therefore, thus got together by Mr. Pitt, lived and breathed on the credit of his name alone. MEMOIR. 29 That name, however, was great enough to infuse spirit into the new war, and to encourage a fresh effort on the part of some of the Continental powers. Under his auspices explanations were sought; and although they made no progress at Berlin, treaties were entered into with Russia and Austria for no less an object than the entire liberation of Europe, and the reduction of the power of France to bounds which might render it possible to live at peace with her. The result of this confederacy was like that of the former ones. A short and disastrous campaign de- stroyed and dispersed almost all the remaining means of defence for the Continent, and hurried, it is sup- posed, to his grave the celebrated man who had called them once more into the field. Even the will of George the Third bent beneath this mighty loss — a loss carrying with it the overthrow of his own dearest plans of internal government ; and finding for the moment all combination of factions in resistance to the national voice to be impossible, he consented to the formation of a ministry, including Mr. Fox, at the head of which was Lord Grenville. Of this union an honest endeavour to make peace with France was one of the leading measures. The country called for it. Every English statesman of any note feit that the time was come for putting an end to the miseries of a protracted struggle, profitable to no party, and which from the hour that a treaty of peace had been signed at Amiens with the one and indivisible republic left no longer an object to those chivalrous spirits who had drawn their swords for the old monarchy of France. Alive, therefore, to the im- portance of peace, if it could be had on terms of safety to Europe, and strong in the public confidence, Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox from the day of their entering upon office held themselves ready to renew 30 MEMOIR. the experiment which all preceding administrations had hitherto failed to bring to a successful issue. It must not be supposed, however, that peace, desir- able as it was, was the only object of that great union of parties which, with the exception of some names much to be regretted, led to the formation of the new government. A general sense of the public difficulties arising from the renewal of the war, and the neces- sity of meeting them with all the available resources of the country, had produced in the minds of our leading statesmen the effect which they ever will produce among men who deserve that name — the oblivion of all differences which are not of a nature to affect the fundamental principles of their public conduct. The treaty of Amiens, as already noticed, by which republican France was admitted into fra- ternity with the lawful sovereigns of Europe, had divested the new war of that peculiar character, which, in the old one, formed the chief ground of support with one of the parties, and of opposition with the other. The constitution, suspended during that war in many of its important articles, had been restored. The great questions which divide and distract us in the present day were but dimly visible in the distance. No difference, therefore, was likely to arise with re- gard to internal affairs ; and at the epoch at which we are now arrived, there existed no impediment to the fullest and most complete fusion of all party in- terests as a foundation for the construction of a truly national and parliamentary government. The opening, therefore, of a negociation for peace with France was a necessary consequence of the establishment of such a ministry in England ; not, as it has been pretended by uninformed foreign writers and orators, that an entire and fundamental change in our national policy had been brought about by Mr. Pitt's death — it was precisely the reverse ; but MEMOIR. 31 that many practical difficulties in the way of peace, most of them referable to considerations of a personal nature, were removed by that event. Unhappily, however, the question of difficulties had only changed hands ; and while in appearance every thing both as to public opinion in England, and the construction of the new ministry, seemed as favourable to peace as even France herself could desire, — while in the warm professions both of Napoleon and of his minister M. de Talleyrand, and in the really altered tone of our mutual intercourse, every thing seemed to lean towards a pacific termination, — it soon became ap- parent that under all these flattering hopes there lurked an incurable cause of failure, through the prevalence of which they must inevitably be destroyed. That cause was Napoleon himself. Before I proceed to develop this cause, it will be but just to discard from it all imputation of deliberate insincerity on the part of Napoleon. From what has been said in the introductory chapter to this work, it is clear that he might well have fallen into an error with regard to the minister with whom he was about to negociate, from the impression he was then under as to his character and political views. To give him this impression, as we have already seen, the enemies of that statesman, and not a few of his friends, had alike contributed. Having detected, as they thought in their wisdom, an " esoteric doctrine" in his politics*, his enemies had for years been representing him as an ambitious and disappointed man, who not fmding in his own country the place due to his pre- tensions and his powers, had identified himself with the French cause, and who sought for peace, not so much for its own sake, or for any good he might hope for ultimately to the world from the change which * See Lord Dudley's Letters. 32 MEMOIR. had been effected in its social condition, as for the means it would afford of securing and fixing the destinies of a revolution, through the influence of which he was to obtain elevation for himself. On the other hand, many eager friends who, on no better authority than the inspirations of their own zeal, had acquired the habit of considering themselves as speaking his sentiments, helped not a little to coun- tenance that preposterous belief by a boundless admiration of the new theories, and by a vehemence of language in regard to foreign monarchies ill-suited, to say the least of it, to questions of political conduct involving such mighty interests as those we were then contending for. It was too mueh, perhaps, to expect that, in the hurry of his tempestuous career, Napoleon should ever have stopped to weigh in his own mind, on the one hand, Mr. Fox's early admiration of the efforts made by France to give herself free institutions, and on the other, the conduct which it would become his duty as an Englishman to hold whenever in the course of events he might have to treat with a French government on the adverse interests of the two countries. If he had, he would have under- stood him better. He would have seen that, in the first and promising days of the mighty change which had just been effected, Mr. Fox looked to it as an e vent which by the formation of a government responsible to public opinion might operate such a fundamental alteration in the foreign policy of France, as to render her more just and pacific in her dealings with other states, and so far consequently to enable him to relax in some degree from his old system of mistrust and jealousy of her preponderance. But of all men Napoleon surely must have been the last to pretend that France, under any of her new govern- ments, had performed the fair promise of her outset, MEMOIR. 33 or to persuade himself that in 1806 it had been such as to inspire the hope of more moderation in his own. He might have been aware, therefore, that any negociation with himself, of which Mr. Fox should have the conduct, would necessarily follow the old plan and habits of such transactions, and be carried on at arm's length between the parties; and he might have expected in the conferences of 1806 to meet the same man whom M. de Vergennes in those of 1782 deservedly characterised as " un fagot d'épines." But these reflections never appear to have occurred to him. Spoilt by his successes, and yielding possibly to that false way of estimating human actions and motives the habit of which is said to have been among his weaknesses, he gave in to the common error, and persuaded himself that he should get almost any treaty from Mr. Fox which would not be a positively disgraceful one to England. It is but fair to say that Napoleon was not sin- gular in this opinion. The pains taken in parliament, and by a very unscrupulous use of the public press, to fix a jacobin taint on Mr. Fox's public character, had, in many quarters where he was not known, been successful. ïhey had been eminently so in foreign countries. In France, the belief that in all public questions Mr. Fox was on their side, prevailed almost universally. To this fact I can offer personal testi- mony. So far back as the year 1802, after the rati- fication of the treaty of Amiens, I accompanied Mr. Fox on his journey to Paris. I had then an oppor- tunity of conversing with many of the leading men of the day, and amongst almost all of them I found the belief prevalent, that his accession to power, whenever it should happen, would be foliowed by a peace most favourable to France as to terms, and lead to a strict alliance and incorporating union with her, something D 34 MEMOIK. like the old " family compact " with Spain.* It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that when four years afterwards these not ion s were to be brought to the test, Napoleon should enter upon a negociation with Mr. Fox, in the full belief that he should hear nothing from him about the balance of power, and such like " old saws;" nor of any claims founded on what it was the fashion to call the antiquated and exploded system of international confederacies. And here was the foundation of the grand error, which so shortly after their commencement was to prove fatal to the ensuing negociations. It has pleased a French author, who informs us that he was commissioned by Napoleon to write the diplomatic history of France, to teil the world a dif- ferent story. In a very elaborate account of the above negociations, which, on the presumption of its authenticity, I shall be obliged to notice at some length, he tells us, and fairly enough so far, that Napoleon considered them to bear, on the part of Mr. Fox, a character of frankness and sincerity, which gave them in the beginning every prospect of success, but that they assumed a different character on his death ; that, by that event, the ascendancy in the British Cabinet passed into the hands of a party adverse to his pacific intentions, and that the treaty was broken off in consequence of it. In this version of the transaction, Napoleon is foliowed by his his- torian, who adds some remarks of his own on what * That Napoleon had himself given into such fancies, may be pre- sumed from his words to Mr. Fox, on his presentation at the Thuilieries, •when in his loose and rambling way he talked to him of the division of Europe into two sects, and of the great Western family which was to give peace to the world. I did not hear the exact words, although standing near Mr. Fox at the time of their utterance ; but he told me the purport of them on our return from the Thuilieries, adding, with regard to the great Western family — ' ' and himself, I suppose, at the head of it." — R.A. MEMOIR. 35 he calls Lord Lauderdale's uncourteous manner of pressing his demands, and assigns, for the failure of this attempt at peace any and every cause except the true one. It may be well to give this author's statement in his own words : — u Ces divergences," he tells us in referring to some disputed points, which we shall consider hereaft er, — u ces divergences ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles qu'au moment oü la maladie que suivit ia mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direction de la politique Anglaise." * In support of this statement, and to claim likewise for his government equal sincerity of purpose, and a most accommodating generosity in point of terms, the author, M. Bignon, has entered minutely and critically into the details of that negociation, together with the nature of the proposals of each party for a reasonable adjustment; and he points out the fluc- tuations which from time to time they underwent, until the final rupture of it by the departure of Lord Lauderdale from Paris. As these matters are closely connected with my proceedings at Vienna, and with the principles on which I acted in executing Mr. Fox's instructions to me, I shall enter more fuliy than it might otherwise be necessary into this gentleman 's narrative; and I will begin mine by adopting his excellent advice. " Ce n'est point," he says, although for a different purpose, " ce n'est point sur des manifestes, mais sur les pièces seules des négociations, qu'il est aujourd'hui possible de connaitre la vérité." To these documents which M. Bignon equally with myself, I understand, admits to be the official notes and correspondence laid bef ore * Histoire de France depuis Ie 18 Brumaire jusqu'a la paix de Tillsit, vol. v. p. 278. par M. Bignon. D 2 MEMOIR. the English Parliament at the beginning of the session of 1807, I shall adhere. Fortunately they are so full and so clear, as to make it easy to substantiate from them the direct reverse of M. Bignon's conclusions on all the material points on which he reasons ; and to prove, not only that it is not true that the death of Mr. Fox occasioned the rupture of the negociation by its having fallen into other hands, but that long before that event, and even before the mission of Lord Lauderdale, he had attained the moral conviction that peace with Napoleon was at that time hopeless ; and that whether sincere or not in the first offer, it had been rendered hopeless by Napoleon himself. A word or two first with regard to the character of this negociation, as given to it by M. Bignon's narrative. On its gravity and its immense importance to the in- terests of mankind he dwells but little. He represents it rather as a diplomatic fencing match, than as a serious examination of difficulties with a determin- ation on both sides to come, if possible, to an agree- ment. His whole relation is a self-complacent recital of the scientific movements on this chess board, by which Mr. Fox was driven, as he pretends, point by point, from the strong ground he had taken up at the commencement of the discussions, and compelled at length to negociate on the principles and terms pre- scribed to him by his opponents. All this is meant to redound to the honour of the French diplomatist, by whose superior skill it is insinuated that Mr. Fox's firmness was overpowered, the great European set- tlement which he meditated was defeated, and the whole question reduced to one of individual interest, to be settled on a balance of pront and loss between England and France alone. Believe his statement, and it will appear that Mr. Fox was not only com- pelled to renounce his whole system of international union and confederacy, but that he was ready also to MEMOIR. 37 discard the only remaining ally of his country, the king of Sicily, and to join Napoleon in despoiling that sovereign of the little that still remained to him of his dominions. In thus stating his case, M. Bignon does not seem to be aware that he gives up in fact a most essential part of it. For admitting the above statement to be correct, what does it prove ? simply that as to what is called diplomatic dexterity in the contest M. de Talleyrand had the superiority over Mr. Fox. Now this is an advantage which, even if the fact were so, Mr. Fox might easily grant him. He was great enough to be able to spare to an antagonist any credit to be derived from excellence in that branch of the art on which he never valued himself, and of which indeed he knew nothing ; but on the other hand, what becomes of the assertion that his death was the cause of the rupture of the negociation? The object of M. Bignon's work, the proposition he has under- taken to prove with a view of casting the blame of the rupture upon the English ministry, is that Mr. Fox was so well disposed towards Napoleon, as to have been ready to come into his terms if he had lived. If so, what becomes of this superior skill of the French diplomatist in cajoling him ? If he was so willing to yield, where was the triumph in forcing him to do so ? The cleverness is not very appa- rent, by which we are made to consent to what we wish. Victory can only be gained over resistance ; but if Mr. Fox resisted to the last, his warlike suc- cessor was not likely to resist less. If it be true, therefore, as this author pretends, that in the course of this negociation Mr. Fox was gradually beaten from his ground, and forced in his entrenchments, M. Bignon mu'st find out some other cause for its un- successful termination than his death, and for the pre- d 3 38 MEMOER. valence of a more warlike spirit infused, as he affirms, into the discussions by his successor. But in the character thus impressed upon the transaction, M. Bignon, as well as his master, is mis- taken from beginning to end. No warlike spirit either prevailed or existed at this time in the British cabinet. And here lies the great fault of the history- makers of the present times. Standing without-side (as one may say) of the great causes of political action, they never seem to recollect that in all im- portant concerns there are two parties. What is partially communicated to them, or what they contrive to piek up by their own skill and industry, they consider to be the whole of the case. Thus they never arrive at a distinct knowledge of the events which they relate. This happens more particularly when they write about England and English states- men. Foreigners, it is true, are not bound to enter into the disput es and quarrels of our factions, but they ought to understand the difference between what is merely personal in such quarrels, and the higher national objects embraced by them ; and before they undertake to become historians of transactions over which the power of Great Britain has exercised a de- cisive influence, they ought to study the nature of that power and in what it consists. They would then learn that the divisions of our parties constitute one of its main ingredients, and that in an honourable struggle for the great offices of state, the success of one of them over the other never leads to a change in the direction of the public force prejudicial to the acknowledged interests of the state itself. Had M. Bignon taken the trouble to consider this, his acute- ness would have enabled him to perceive that if the negociation of 1806 began under more favourable auspices than any which had preceded it, it was pre- cisely because that war-spirit which he has conjured MEMOIK. 39 up anew on this occasion existed no longer ; and because Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Lord Spencer, were not less anxious than Mr. Fox himself to bring the war to an hononrable end. Like the writers of this class, M. Bignon concludes, from the opposite view taken by the chiefs of our parties of the necessity of the war in 1793, that in any attempt at peace in which those statesmen might hereafter participate, the old difference would ever be ready to break forth according to the accidental prevalence in council of one or other of them on a particular point. This is to show equal ignorance of English politics in general, and of the composi- tion of the new government. We have seen how that government was constructed. Like all Whig administrations, that of Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox was a union of national interests for national pur- poses, giving security to the country through their names and their character for the faithful execution of their public engagement s. It was a government strong enough either to receive from France or to offer to her fair terms of peace, and honest enough to try for it in good earnest. The proposal came from France. The formal origin of the negociation is fairly enough stated by M. Bignon. Yet he might have spared, without injury to the inte- rests entrusted to his defence, his allusion to Mr. Fox's visit to Paris, in 1802. He cannot mean to affirm, and he ought not to have insinuated, that the visit in question, resolved upon by Mr. Fox for the purpose of consulting the despatches of Barillon and D' Avaux for the historical work on which he had for some time been engaged, or that the attentions paid to him by the First Consul, had had the effect of disposing him, four years afterwards, to favour France in the terms of peace. Neither was it necessary to remie upon the motives which might induce Mr. Fox to D 4 40 MEMOIR. enter upon a negociation as soon as he had the power to do so. They were simple and ready to his hand. They were to be found in the whole tenor of his opposition to the war. So anxious had he been from the first to avert that calamitv, that in 1792, in his place in Parliament, he declared himself ready even to become Mr. Pitt's envoy, and to go himself to Paris if that Minister would empower him to treat for a settlement of the existing differences, and of the declared matters of complaint. Holding these strong opinions, and too much of a statesman to stand upon the idle ceremony of who should speak first, Mr. Fox, when he became Minister in 1806, was ready, if necessary, to take the first step himself. Not to have met an advance towards peace, therefore, would have been a childless inconsistency, totally out of keeping with his character. It required no " dis- positions affectueuses " (a word by the way not at all descriptive of his mode of estimating Napoleon) to induce him to make peace; and the u adroites insinu- ations " of M. de Talleyrand (if they were anything more than a friendly demonstration of the pleasure feit by that statesman at the renewal of an old acquaintance under circumstances which " promised apparently to render it useful to the world) might have been reserved for an obstacle more difncult to surmount than reluctance or indifference on the part of Mr. Fox to enter upon a negociation for it. In these dispositions, both of himself and of his colleagues, Mr. Fox received with unfeigned satis- faction M. de Talleyrand' s overture of the 2d of March, expressing a readiness on the part of France to treat for peace on the basis of that of Amiens. To negociate on that basis, however, could not suit Mr. Fox. The peace of Amiens was a transac- tion simply between England and France, in which no continental interests were provided for. It was MEM01R. 41 liable also to the apparent objection of positively ex- cluding England from a participation in those in- terests, inasmuch as in that instrument the renewal of former treaties, according to the old practice of Euro- pean diplomacy, had been omitted. In his reply, therefore, Mr. Fox required the admission of the allies as an indispensable preliminary. To the admission of our allies — of Eussia particu- larly as a negociating party — France objected. For this she had two reasons : iirst, the obtaining from us the practical acknowledgment of our separation from the Continent ; secondly, she was herself carrying on at this time a correspondence at St. Petersburgh for a separate peace. In the sequel it will appear that she availed herself with some dexterity of her manoeuvres at that court to disturb for a moment, although not essentially to interrupt, the harmony between Great Britain and that power. In the mode, however, in which M. de Talleyrand brought forward this objection to joint negociation, and the statement of it by M. Bignon, there is the widest possible difference, a difference the more ne- cessary to be here remarked and understood, as within it we shall discover the iirst thread in the web of chicanery which so early began to show itself in the conduct of the negociation on the part of France. M. Bignon's statement would lead us to believe in a plain peremptory rejection of this principle by his government ab initio. " La France ne voulait pas souffrir," he tells us, " 1'intervention d'une puissance étrangère." This is lofty, but nothing to the purpose. The " intervention d'une puissance étrangère " was never thought of by Mr. Fox, and except for the sake of assuming a tone in his work of which it would be in vain to search for an example, much less for a justifi- cation, in any of the French official documents, it is 42 MEMOIR. singular that he should deliberately persist in con- founding a joint negociation of two parties, each of whom is at war with a third for an object common to the two, with an " intervention étrangère," which from its very terms supposes the interference of a power indifferent to that object. But what says the official French answer to this demand for the admis- sion of our allies ? Is there a word in it rejecting the principle of joint negociation ? Is there one phrase equivalent to the " la France ne voulait pas souffrir ?" Nothing like it. M. de Talleyrand, indeed, who was most anxiously desirous of peace, knew full well that the introduction of any such language must put an end at once to all further discussion. To understand thoroughly this important point, it will be necessary to read, and to read attentively, the official correspondence from the 26th of March to the 20th of April, and particularly the two letters of Mr. Fox and M. de Talleyrand, the first dated March 26th, and the second April lst in answer to it. In the first (that of Mr. Fox) the demand of joint treaty is set forth with a precision and clearness charac- teristic of the man and of the occasion. " England cannot neglect the interests of any of her allies, and she is united to Russia by such close ties that she would not treat, much less conclude anything, but in concert with the Emperor Alexander; but while awaiting the arrival of a Russian plenipotentiary, some of the principal points might be discussed." And he concludes with the benevolent exhortation, justified as he had fully hoped by softened animosities on both sides, and by the many new circumstances in which the two countries then found themselves, " Let us then do all in our power to terminate them (the common misfortunes), and let us endeavour, if possible, to re- concile the respective interests and the glory of the two MEMOIR. 43 countries with the tranquillity of Europe and tlie hap- piness of the human race." M. de Talleyrand's reply to this demand of treating in concert with Russia contains not a syllable in refusal of it. For what are his words ? " The Emperor wants nothing that England possesses. Peace with France is possible, and may be perpetual, provided — " lst. ïhere be no interference in her internal affairs ; and that " 2dly. No attempt is made to restrain her in the regulation of her Custom House duties ; or a 3dly. To cramp her commercial rights ; or " 4thly. To offer any insult to her flag." This is all: not a word in rejection of the principle of joint negociation, according to the proposal con- tained in the letter he is answering, appears in this despatch, from first to last. It consists only of the four articles above stated, to be expanded of course hereafter into the details necessary to give them their effect, as the groundwork on which a peace honour- able and " perpetual " might be made between France and England. Here, therefore, is the whole of what was to be done. Here is all that Mr. Fox was required to consent to do. Here was the alpha and omega of this vast transaction ; a greater than which, or one more pregnant with happiness to mankind, could not come within the compass of a statesman's care. It is true, indeed, that although the above enume- ration contains the whole of the French conditions, it does not contain the whole of the Minister's despat ch. After having stated them as fixed and indispensable articles, M. de Talleyrand goes on propounding a number of plausible generalities (on which he insists with still more importunity in a subsequent despatch) pour battre la campagne as it would appear, and pre- pare us, not for a frank and vigorous rejection of Mr. Fox's principle, but for an objection to its application 44 MEMOIR. under the circumstances ; an objection grounded, as we have already seen, on an evident and perhaps in- tended confusion between participation and me- diation. Such an objection was no answer to Mr. Fox's demand ; on the contrary, M. de Talleyrand took effectual care (and in this consists the whole of his dexterity) to avoid putting it in such a shape as to elicit a reply which must have broken off all further intercourse between them. With the excep- tion of these four points, his despatch consists of observations more or less astute and ingenious, all of them tending no doubt to persuade Mr. Fox to fall in with the writer's views, but not one of them necessary to be agreed to, or requiring even to be discussed, before opening the regular conferences. Of all this M. de Talleyrand was himself so thoroughly aware, that without waiting to see the effect either of his objection or of his arguments, he accompanied his answer at once with a passport for a negociator. The lure of a passport, however, did not take. Mr. Fox replies instantly and satisfactorily to the four conditions of France, but in the terms of his former letter insists again on treating only pro- visionally until Russia could take part in the negoci- ation. On this M. de Talleyrand returns to the charge with another set of arguments, of no greater cogency indeed than his former ones; but for the refinement of some of them amusing enough. It was represented that England totally misunderstood her real position ; that Russia was no ally of hers, nor anything like it. Russia, we were told for our in- formation, was at peace with France at the commence- ment of the war with England. During that war, indeed, she had entered into a coalition with Austria ; but Austria having made her separate peace, Russia became by that act, if not at actual peace with France, yet in such a state of relationship towards MEMom. 45 lier as to preclude her from becoming the ally of England. Sophistry such as this, we may well believe, could not overpower the reason, nor was it much likely to conciliate the confidence, of Mr. Fox. The whole despatch indeed of the French Minister bore a cha- racter of jinasserie utterly repugnant to his own habits of transacting business ; and from this moment he began to augur ill of the result. He replies there- fore in two lines, " Will you negociate conjointly with Kussia ? We answer, yes ; but if you require us to negociate separately, we say, no." Such is the summary of the five important letters which passed between these Ministers during the first two months of their intercourse. From the many other topics of observation and of argument contained in them, the two fundamental points of fact above stated are easy to be selected : first, joint negociation insisted upon by Mr. Fox; secondly, joint negociation argued against but not rejected by M. de Talleyrand. And at this point, with a slight formal variation about to be noticed, the question remained between them from the 20th of April to the 20th of July, that is, until Russia cut the matter short by signing separately for herself, and before our negociation with France was even opened. Let us now return to the progress of the corre- spondence. The despatch of Mr. Fox bringing the question thus to an " ay" or a "no," was delivered on or about the 24th of April ; and by its contents an end was put for five weeks to all intercourse between the two governments. By this time France began to perceive that she had not chosen her ground judiciously in her attempts to decoy us into a sepa- rate treaty. No use had been made of her passport; there it lay, and might continue to lie for what we cared about it. She began then to see that she was 46 MEMOIR. losing her opportunity. Accordingly, after live weeks of reflection, M. de Talleyrand sets himself about seriously to clear away the main obstacle which lay at the bottom of his pertinacious resistance to a joint treaty. First, and most formally he disavows all pretension on the part of France to contest the right of England to form such alliances as she should think fit, or to interfere with her in any of her transactions with the Continent; and next he declares himself ready, first, to negociate in the pre- liminary forms which were adopted during the administration of Lord Rockingham in 1782; or secondly, " to establish as a basis two fundamental principles," taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely, " That the two states should have for their object that the peace be honourable for them- selves and their allies, and at the same time of a nature to secure, as far as in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe" France having thus lowered her tone, and reduced her demand of separate treaty to separate and pro- visional discussion, Mr. Fox acquiesced in the proposal. He had ascertained, during the interval between his last despatch of the 20th of April and this renewed offer of the 2d of June, that Russia had no objection to the proposed mode of negociating, provided nothing were concluded but by common consent. He replies thus, therefore, on the 14th : — " After the open disavowal which you have made of the intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our Continental connections, no doubt can exist upon that essential point ; and it would be more distressing that diffi- culties in form, rather than in substance, should prolong a war which the two governments equally desire to terminate." Still, ho wever, he was not satisfied without adding to his consent to treat the proviso, " That while we mutually acknowledge M1M0IR. 47 our respective rights of intervention and guaranty with regard to the affairs of Europe, we also mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or the lesser states that compose it." This stipulation was not without a motive. He had an eye to that modern invention of carrying on war during peace which had begun under the directory, and to the scheme then on foot, and admirably con- trived for that purpose, of setting up a protectorate of the Rhine against the old German empire. On the principles, and under the explanations therefore, contained in the above letter and proviso, Mr. Fox consented to open the conferences in a regular form : and now let us look back for a moment to M. Bignon's account of the way in which matters had reached this point. " La difficulté," says this writer, " qui arrêtait les négociations au premier pas, ne pouvant être vaincue, il fallait 1'esquiver." He then recites M. de Talleyrand's proposal as above stated, and adds, " eet expediënt sauva tous les amours propres." How this "expediënt" which admits to the utmost extent to which England ever claimed it, the right and the practice of allying herself with what Con- tinental power she pleased — a right for giving effect to which confederacies for wars and joint négociations to end them are but the means — a right also strenuously and invariably resisted by France ever since her attempt to introducé her own version of the law of nations into the European system — how this proceeding can be said to " esquiver la difficulté," is not very intelligible. The difficulty, as it regarded France, was neither avoided nor compromised. It was submitted to. The French government had created it ; and the solution came from themselves. Their object was to get us to make a separate peace, and they teil us so at the first word. Nothing is 48 MEMOIR. easier, they say, than to make a peace that shall last for ever if we will but be reasonable. " Nos interets sont conciliables par cela seul qu'ils sont distincts." * What says England in reply ? She denies flatly this principle. She denies that her interests are, or can be, distinct from those of the Continent, f The French despatch proceeds: "Si, maitres de la raer par votre puissance propre, vous voulez 1'être aussi de la terre par votre puissance combinée, la paix est impossible." In this, therefore, consisted the " diffi- culté" on the lst of April; and how was it gotten over ? By the disclaimer of France on the 2d of June of all pretension to interfere with us in the man- agement of our Continental interests or alliances — interests which she had just told us were distinct from those of the Continent, and alliances which, through the action of a "puissance combinée," were to make us masters of the Continent as we already were of the seas, and which consequently was to ren der u la paix impossible! 17 M. Bignon's way of settling this point is curious. " M. de Talleyrand," he says, " se rappelant la mode suivie pour la paix d'Amiens, témoigne qu'il était pret a admettre deux principes fondamentaux. Le premier était celui qu'avait indiqué M. Fox, une paix honorable pour les deux parties et pour leurs alliés respectifs. Le second, quHl proposait lui-même, était la reconnoissance en faveur de Tune et de 1'autre puissance de tout droit d'intervention et de garantie pour les affaires continentales et pour les affaires maritimes." Thus we see how ingeniously the French negociator contrives to get clear of his own objection by enveloping it in our proposal, and how the narrator of these transactions would fain secure for his chief the merit of having effect ed a compromise by turning * M. de Talleyrand's Despatch of April 1. •f- Mr. Fox's Despatches generally, and of April 20th in particular. MEMOIR. 49 his concession into an offer, and our condition into the sernblance of an equivalent concession on our side. Kidding themselves thus of their own embarrass- ments, they began the business in form. Lord Yar- mouth, detained in France ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, was about to return to England under an agreement between the two governments for a partial exchange of French prisoners of war, against those of his Majesty's subjects, who, residing or travelling in France when the war broke out, had been detained and treated as such. In accordance, therefore, with that rule for conducting the preli- minary discussions, namely, that a British Plenipoten- tiary might stipulate for Russia as well as for England, which on the authority of the documents above recited, it will not be too much to affirm was mutually agreed upon between the parties, M. de Talleyrand took this opportunity of sending by his Lordship a confidential overture to Mr. Fox, pro- posing grounds of agreement on the points that separately concerned the two countries. The substance of this overture, which it took some days to settle, was satisfactory as far as it went. France was ready to resign her pretensions to the restoration of Malta, to obtain from Prussia the restoration of Hanover to the King of England, and to leave the King of Naples in the undisturbed possession of his maritime dominions. With regard to Sicily in par- ticular, M. de Talleyrand's words were too remarkable to be omitted. " Nous ne vous la demandons pas. Si nous la possédions elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés." He was too well aware that Great Britain never would consent to see Sicily united to France, or make a part of the French system, not to place this point out of the reach of cavil or dispute from the very beginning. 50 memoir. All this looked fair and promising, and particularly the temper manifested in the concluding words of the verbal communication to Lord Yarmouth: " Les sen- timens de la France sont entièrement changés. L'aigreur qui caractérisait Ie commencement de cette guerre a cessé, et ce que nous désirons Ie plus c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne." But the prospect was soon to be overclouded. On Lord Yarmouth's return with Mr. Fox's answer to this communication, he found that a material change had taken place in the sentiments and views of the French Government. They had begun to hope, during his absence, that they might induce Russia to make a separate peace ; and consequently that by a dexterous management of the two negociations, they should either bring about a similar one with England — the object of all their aims — or, what would be next best as a result, leave England in a war in which she must de facto be separated from all Continental alliances. The effect of this sudden change was soon made manifest. It has already been stated that Mr. Fox, in consenting by his letter of June 14th to enter int o separate discussion with France, had ascertained that there would be no objection on the part of Russia to such a course. But Napoleon had ascertained some- thing more — he had discovered that the existing Russian Cabinet was disposed not only to make peace with him, but to be satisfied with very moderate con- ditions, and he might form a probable conjecture as to his chance of concluding such a peace separately, from the tenor of the powers and instructions, of neither of which he could be ignorant, which so early as April had been given to the Plenipotentiary who was to negociate it. Napoleon saw his advantage, and instantly struck out a new course for the conduct MEMOIR. 51 of the English negociation. Everything was now reversed. The confidential overtures to Mr. Fox through M. de Talleyrand were to go for nothing. These, it was pretended, were mere civilities between two old acquaintances, binding on neither of them when they should come to real business. Other means were to be brought into action ; and in an evil hour for the world, and for the continuance of those better feelings in which our long interrupted intercourse had been resumed, this great effort for ending the revolutionary war degenerated from that time forward, on the part of France into the old game of shift and j , stratagem, to be carried on with the common resources ' of diplomacy manifested in the least and lowest of its arts. And here began the deviation that led, and led inevitably, as we shall now proceed to demonstrate, to the loss of the treaty of 1806. In the course now resolved upon by the French Cabinet, the first experiment was to be made by raising a question on the possession of Sicily. This certainly was a dexterous manoeuvre. The altered aspect of affairs at Paris, produced by the discovery of amicable : tendencies at St. Petersburg, presented Kussia as the power to be first propitiated ; and as the possession of Sicily by France was a point on which it would be far more easy to satisfy Russia than England, since the long projected plans of that power for a naval estab- lishment in the Mediterranean point ed rather towards Corfu, this first move in the game was judged, and rightly so, to be an admirable contrivance for setting us together by the ears. Accordingly, in his very first interview with M. de Talleyrand after his return, Lord Yarmouth is told by that Minister, with an ease and sangfroid which carried with it almost the appear- ance of levity, that since he was last at Paris a change had come over the mind of the Emperor; that his generals assured him that his brother Joachim could e 2 52 MEMOIR. not possibly do without Sicily, and therefore that he must insist upon its cession to him. It was not enough it seems, for France to set out in this negociation with directly revoking the basis she had herself laid down for conducting it, but this must be done in such a manner as to fix, by our com- plying with his new demands, an indelible stain on the public faith and honour of Great Britain. Her ally, the King of Naples, had been driven from his Continental territory. There was no hope, it is true, of regaining for him what he had lost, but we were now required to assist his enemy to turn him out by force from the little he still possessed. There is no example in the annals of negociation, of a demand so utterly devoid of all sense of shame or decency in the party proposing it. Such an act of plain unblushing insincerity at the very threshold, justified, and under most circumstances would have caused, the breaking off at once of all further attempt at negociation ; and such would have been its effect under any other English Ministry than that of 1806, strong and resolute enough to command their own line of action both abroad and at home. Discouraging therefore as this specimen of bad faith must have appeared to Mr. Fox, he would not suffer himself to despair. The demand of Sicily had been merely thrown out in conversation by M. de Talley- rand; and as no plenipotentiaries had as yet been appointed, it was in fact, as well as in form, unofficial. There was ground even to think that it might be re- tracted should Napoleon's hope of a separate peace with Eussia prove abortive. For these reasons, and to obviate likewise M. de Talleyrand's complaint that Lord Yarmouth had returned to Paris without powers to treat, Mr.- Fox transmitted to his Lordship without delay the necessary credentials. But although not absolutely despairing of peace, it MEMOIR. 53 is no wonder that from this moment, and even in the very act of sending credentials to treat, the hope of it was in the mind of Mr. Fox considerably weakened. It had begun to give way as soon as he saw the course of argument adopted by M. de Talleyrand with a view to engage him in a separate treaty. It was not im- proved by the refusal of France during five weeks to answer the plain question, " Will you negociate con- jointly with Russia, or will you not ?" It was further diminished by the information he had obtained of the manoeuvres going on at St. Petersburg, and by this last step — the retraction by the French Government of their own proposal with regard to Sicily — it was shaken to its foundation. Indeed, in speaking of this negociation, it will scarcely be a solecism to say that it was ended before it began. It was considered to be so, although most reluctantly, by Mr. Fox himself, then in the full possession of his faculties, of all the energy of his mind, and more than ever anxious for the success of the great object of his declining days. To this fact all and every one of his colleagues will bear witness. In the full powers thus issued to Lord Yarmouth there was nothing defective ; but at the same time there was nothing extraordinary. They were drawn up in the usual forms of office, and varied in nothing from the powers conferred on all ministers employed on similar business. Our foreign office is full of them. Powers exactly similar were given to Lord Malmes- bury in 1795 and 1796, and such were those enumer- ated in the joint commission issued shortly afterwards to Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth. But as M. Bignon has made what he believes to be a discovery on this point, it may be well to see what it is worth. This writer, never losing sight of his main purpose, represents the fact of issuing the above powers as the abandonment on the part of England of her original e 3 54 MEM01R. condition of joint negociation, and by necessary infer- ence, as a renunciation of her Continental system. " Il est donc de fait," he says, " que Ie Cabinet de Londres s'est complétement désisté de la résolution d'abord exprimée de ne traiter que conjointement avec la Kussie ; " and again in the résumé of his general argument on this point, he says, " Cette question de forme a été tranchée par la Russie, qui a envoyé un Plénipotentiaire a Paris avec des pouvoirs pour trai- ter séparément. L'Angleterre elle-même a renonce a sa première prétention, et des pouvoirs, pour une paix séparée, ont été pareillement donnés a Lord Yar- mouth. Les pouvoirs mêmes de Lord Lauderdale portaient encore aussi cette autorisation." To be sure they did ; and so are all powers expressed, whether they be to treat for peace or for any other object. M. Bignon's way indeed of presenting the question would at once make an end of it in his favour, if the forms in which one state negociates with another were all. These forms requiring, for the sake of the business itself, that the powers to transact it should be as extensive and as general as words can render them, it is usual so to draw them up, even to a pro- mise to ratify ; although in practice the non-ratifi- cation of preliminaries is never considered to be a con- travention of the law of nations. The reason is plain. A plenipotentiary, to obtain credit with a state on an equality with his master, must be invested with powers to do, and agree to, all that could be done and agreed to by his master himself, even to the alienating the best part of his territories. But the exercise of these vast powers, always under the understood con- trol of non-ratification, is regulated by his instruc- tions. M. Bignon, by the easy device of confounding the two, enables himself in the above passages to represent Russia and England simultaneously, and by common accord, submitting to the demands of MEMOIK. 55 France, in all that she exacted for her pride, and all that she had contended for in principle; thus con- verting, with some dexterity it must be confessed, the general power into a special purpose — the general power to treat into the special purpose of renouncing the object for which they were to treat. But this is mere quibbling. How were these plenipotentiaries to use their powers ? What were their instructions ? Of the Russian instructions we know nothing ; at all events they are out of court in this argument. Those of the English minister are before the public. In his letter to Lord Yarmouth of June 26th, accompanying the transmission of the credentials, Mr. Fox expressly reserves the two fundamental points of joint nego- ciation and of Sicily. His words are as follow : " It was on the faith of the uti possidetis, being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, that his Majesty was induced to authorise your Lord- ship to hold further conference withM. de Talleyrand: " and again, " Your Lordship is further directed to ac- quaint M. de Talleyrand, that if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance in concert with each other;" and to strengthen and make clear this concert the more, he sums up his instructions thus : " The result of what I have stated to your Lordship is this: — that Sicily is a sine qud non, on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place. If according to the hope conceived by your Lordship, this matter should be arranged, you may open your full powers, stating at the same time the determination of this court not to come to any fin al agreement without the consent of Russia." All these facts, and especially Mr. Fox's resolution with regard to Sicily, are of such decisive importance, e 4 56 MEMOIR. not only in determining the character of this whole transaction, but in rendering clear and manifest the true cause of the failure of the negociation, that they cannot be stated too often, or with too much precision and circumstantiality. Again, therefore, I shall tran- scribe the words of Mr. Fox himself ; M. Bignon's shall follow : — " I have no conception," says Mr. Fox, in reply to Lord Yarmouth's first communication to him of the oïFensive demand, " on what grounds he (M. de Tal- leyrand) can recede from what he said so distinctly to your Lordship before upon the subject of Sicily. c Vous 1'avez. Nous ne vous demandons rien/ are words that made the more impression upon me, be- cause those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his Excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on the faith of the uti possidetis being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your Lordship, that his Majesty was induced to authorise your Lordship to hold further conference with M. de Talleyrand. Any tergiversations or cavil, therefore, on that article, would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential party — " With regard to the complaint of the want of full powers, to avoid all pretence for cavil on that account, I am commanded by his Majesty to transmit to you the instrument accompanying this letter. But your Lord- ship should fairly state to M. de Talleyrand, that you are not authorised to make any use of them formally, until M. de Talleyrand shall return to his former ground with regard to Sicily." And now for M. Bignon's narration. He describes the course of proceeding which necessarily arose out of this conduct of his own government on the one part, and Mr. Fox's resolution not to be made the dupe of it on the other, in the following terms : — MEMOIR. 57 " Nous verrons les deux puissances s'écarter 1'une et 1'autre de ces bases, ou bien en vouloir forcer Ie sens selon leurs interets. Le gouvernement Fran- cois s'éloignera sur le fait de la Sicile, mais sans détour, et en proposant des compensations. Cette dé- rogation sera admise puisquïon ouvrira la discussion sur la nature des compensations proposées. L'Angle- terre de son cóté forcera le sens des mots sur deux points. Elle prétendra que la France a reconnu le principe de Vuti possidetis. On se souviendra que cette reconnoissance aurait été tout au plus tacite, car c'est Lord Yarmouth seul qui dit avoir vu 1'équivalent de cette reconnoissance dans les termes ' nous ne vous demandons rien,' de M. de Talleyrand. Il y a ici une distinction a faire. Sous 1'administration de M. Fox cette prétention sera abandonnée, ou du moins on s'en désistera dans la pratique. Plus tard il y aura peu de bonne foi a y revenir, ou du moins a s'y attacher avec obstination. Sicile — uti possidetis — négociation unie ou séparée — voila les trois questions, on pourrait dire les trois mots sur lesquels vont rouler les discus- sions qui dureront plusieurs mois. Ces divergences cependant ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles qu'au moment oü la maladie que suivit la mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direc- tion de la politique Anglaise. Jusque la on avait porté dans la négociation le désir de pouvoir s'en- tendre, et on avait fait quelques pas qui permettaient d'en attendre une heureuse issue." And further on : Après quelques hésitations 1'Angleterre cède, ou du moins admet la discussion sur 1'indemnité ; elle n'est pas satisfaite de celle qui est offerte; elle en voudrait une plus avantageuse. Ainsi le Cabinet de Londres a fléchi sur deux objets importans. D'abord il consent a une paix séparée. En second lieu, il ne repousse plus la cession de la Sicile, mais il 1'admet 58 MEMOIR. sous la condition d'un dédommagement a regier ; ce qui constitue une dérogation formelle au principe de Yuti possidetis" These extensive quotations from M. Bignon's work will render a return to it, except in a very few in- stances, unnecessary. Distorted as are his facts, and false as are the inferences which he draws from them, his statement nevertheless is valuable. It enumerates the points at issue with precision, and in a way to exposé his asseverations with regard to them to direct contradiction. ïwo of these points have already been disposed of ; first, the bold assertion that there was a war party in the English Cabinet, together with the fact more than insinuated that but for them Mr. Fox, if he had lived, would have made peace on the terms offered by Napoleon ; secondly, that on the question of joint negociation with Russia, he ultimately gave way, and consented to make a separate peace, — a fact distinctly disproved by the official documents already quoted. That he never departed from the claim of negociating his treaty on the basis of uti pos- sidetis — that he never consented that France should have Sicily, and that so far from opening conferences* on the nature of the compensation to be proposed, he never would suffer the cession of that island to be talked of, unless France were prepared to offer to its lawful sovereign, not only such a compensation as he might accept for himself, but a continental equivalent such as might afford security to JEurope, — is all that now remains to be proved in order to demolish the whole fabric of sophistry which his work has been so labo- riously endeavouring to erect. And first of the uti possidetis. But before entering into the argument on this head, it may be well to notice some of the doctrines of public law as taught * " On ouvrira la discussion sur la nature des compensations pro- posées." See suprd. MEMOIR. 59 and practised in those days the glories of which M. Bignon has been selected to commemorate. It will be no less curious than instructive to ascertain what the French statesmen then understood by di- plomatic intercourse ; what value they set on au- thorised discussion, on confidential Communications, and in short on all that is transacted between plenipotentiaries when they take their seats at the council table. It will be to take our example in- deed a little out of the order of time, but from the illustration it affords of the spirit which they brought to this negociation, it can no where be more usefully introduced than in this place. One of these doctrines was put forth by General Clarke (the minister named shortly affcer the period which we have reached to treat with Lord Lauderdale) so very plainly, and expounded by him, briefly indeed, but with such a curiosa felicitas of allusion, that it were doing him injustice to present it to the world in any words but his own. Lord Yarmouth, who had conducted the business up to this time, judged it necessary, on the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries after Lord Lauderdale's arrival, to read over the minutes of what had passed in his former conferences with the French ministers, and particularly that part of them which regarded the recognition of the uti possidetis as the basis on which aione Great Britain would consent to treat. To this recapitulation it was replied by General Clarke, that he could give no answer to what had been stated without alluding to conversations which were to be considered only as M des romans politiques." Incredible as these words may seem, the fact of their having been used, and used in earnest, is placed beyond a doubt by the joint despatch of Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated the 9th of August. These are their words : " General Clarke in reply said that he could make no answer to what 60 MEMOIK. Lord Yarmouth stated, without alluding to conversa- tions which he affected to consider as loose, calling them * des romans politiques ; ' at the same time by his silence he clearly admitted what Lord Yarmouth most distinctly stated." That these were no light words thrown out at random, is evident from the whole tenor of what we have already read. And to what do they lead ? To render all serious and consequently all honest in- tercourse between states, impossible. To call such conversations loose and leading to nothing, is non- sense, if not worse. There are none such in diplomacy. The propositions brought forward in conference are parts of the negociation. They are its records ; and whether agreed to, or rejected, or reserved for further discussion, they are of the very essence of the trans- action itself. How are we to believe a plenipoten- tiary who, after many days of grave deliberation on the most important of them all, namely, the basis, so soon as he ïinds a difficulty beginning to press upon him, turns it off with a horse-laugh, as if the pro- posal were nothing more than the bavardage of a couple of gossips ? How are we afterwards to be sure that when all appears settled, and the substance of the conferences is about to be embodied in a treaty, some jocular kind of mental reservation, lurk- ing within and infecting the mass, may not vitiate the whole contract? But this levity is no laughing matter. Mischievous to nations, it is fatal to nego- ciators, both as to their character and usefulness. There is nothing that comprehends higher ideas of trust as well as of dignity than the credentials of an ambassador. In them we see the greatest interests confided to the best qualities — a people and their hopes to the sagacity and honour of their delegate. But according to General Clarke, all this must be reversed. The minister appointed to negociate with MEMOIR. 61 him must read his commission backwards ; and pre- suming that the General, acting on his own avowed principle, will so read his own, mutual disbelief, in the intervals of their mutual mauvaises plaisanteries, must be the rule of their intercourse, in exact propor- tion to the extent and value of the objects committed to their care. But to return to the uti possidetis. This we know to be the practical as it is the obvious basis for an adjustment between contending parties who are equal in force and means, and who mutually become tired of the combat although neither of them be compelled by necessity to quit the field. Like every human rule, however, this has its deviations and exceptions in cases which do not alter its essence. One of the belligerents, for example, finds himself at the opening of a treaty which takes the uti possidetis for its pro- fessed basis, in possession of a territory belonging to his adversary, of no possible use to himself in the economy of his own system, but essential to the very existence of the other. Here an exchange may be admitted without necessarily revoking the basis, and without prejudice to the distinctive character of the treaty by substituting, as a new and different basis, the principle of mutual restitution. Such, with the special reservation of Hanover, was the basis proposed for the treaty of 1806 ; communicated confidentially no doubt to Mr. Fox, as all such weighty matters must be in the first instance when men are disposed to undertake them in earnest. General Clarke, as we have seen, treats its admission by France as a " roman politique." M. Bignon goes farther — he stoutly denies the fact. He says it was all a mistake; that this basis never was thought of by M. de Talleyrand in his Communications to Lord Yarmoutb ; and that there is no authority for stating it to have been so, ex- cept M. de Talleyrand's words to his Lordship on his 62 MEMOIR. taking leave. " On se souviendra," he says, " que cette reconnoissance aurait été tout au plus tacite, car c'est Lord Yarmouth seul qui dit avoir vu Téquivalent de cette reconnoissance dans les termes ' nous ne vous demandons riem' " Now what says Mr. Fox ? In his letter to Lord Yarmouth above cited he expresses himself thus : — " ' Vous Tavez ; nous ne vous de- mandons rien,' are words that made the more impres- sion on me because those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his Excel- lency in one of his letters to me" Here is a direct falsification of an important fact ; for however it may suit this writer's purpose to dispute the construction of the words in question, the fact of their having been used by M. de Talleyrand, not only verbally to Lord Yarmouth, but in writing to Mr. Fox, is dis- tinctly averred by Mr. Fox himself. M. Bignon cavils, however, at the extended sense given to these words. Does he mean to deny this sense because they are but iive in number — " Nous ne vous demandons rien ? " He is a master of his language, and in his vocabulary perhaps may iind some limit to the word " rien ;" but gravely, and in a matter of serious business, such as that in hand, and intrusted to the agency of two such men as Mr. Fox and M. de Talleyrand, to affirm that this sentence, short though it be, did not substantially and fully convey and include, and was not intended to convey and include, the broad principle of an unfettered exercise of power over property — " use as your own what you possess" — can only be protected from severer censure by attributing to it an intention of trifling wholly misplaced in transactions of so much vital importance to the peace and happiness of the world. But this is a case on which not a shadow of am- biguity must be suffered to rest. It is not enough MEMOIR. 63 that the plain unsophisticated mind of Mr. Fox led him to put this construction on M. de Talleyrand's words ; his knowledge of the law of nations, in which no man in Europe was more thoroughly versed than himself, made it impossible that he could have under- stood them in any other. Eules are prescribed by that law, — plain, positive rules, for the interpretation not only of treaties, but of all acts leading to treaties. In cases of doubt as to the construction of words, it lays down their natural meaning as the rule by which to judge of their import. In cases of doubt as to the nature of an offer, it is to be taken from the words of him who offers. If there be obscurity in these, so much the worse for him; " pactionem ob- scuram" it is the rule, " iis nocere in quorum f uit potestate legem apertius conscribere ; " and in cases of doubt as to the extent of an offer, it is to be in- terpreted against the party offering. To every branch of the case before us, these principles of interpretation directly apply. France told us that she wanted no- thing of what we or our allies held in possession. France was the party voluntarily using the words by which that renunciation was expressed. France was the party offering to make peace with us on a basis which she herself proposed. What, therefore, did she mean when she engaged herself so to do ? What did she want when she told us that she wanted nothing ? Was it not her business to teil us ? or was it Mr. Fox's to find it out, and to enter hand over head into a negociation before he could see an inch of his way, for the chance of picking up a basis as he went ? Eeally there is no end to the absurdities in which the neces- sity of sustaining his negative does not involve this author at every step. From the doctrines of General Clarke and M. Bignon, it would follow that confidential Commu- nications, the moment they begin to be acted upon, 64 MEMOIR. lose their obligatory force, precisely because they are confidential. It is painful to observe, as we advance into the evidence on the subject of this negociation, how much appears in the conduct of his agents to justify a suspicion that Napoleon, from the moment of Lord Yarmouth's return, never intended to make peace ; for no statesman like him could be ignorant of the uses of confidence in great affairs. It is in fact their very life and being. It enables the actors in them to reach their point quickly, and when reached to hold it securely. It helps them to escape from the wearisome path of fencing and iinessing, in which a negociator may go on for months together, and after having, with consummate skill as he flatters himself, extorted at length a concession from his antagonist, feel himself as little sure of its definitive adoption as he was from the beginning. Confidence in such cases is amongst the most valuable of human means. To- gether with the ministers, it brings the two countries face to face, as it were, and in the interchange of pro- posals adds the sanction of public truth to the security of private honour. The ground thus prepared, as Mr. Burke observes in one of his letters on a " Re- gicide Peace," the peace is as good as made before the discussions begin. It was by reciprocal confidence, he says, in each other's good faith, and that of the countries they represented, that Sir William Temple and the pensionary De Witt were enabled to carry through successfully, in the short period of three days, the great treaty of Triple Alliance, one of the most important diplomatic transactions on record, and which, under any other circumstances, would have been one of the most drfficult. Precisely of the same character was the opportunity presented in 1806 to the governments of England and France. That of England had come to the resolution of putting an end, if possible, to the war of the Revolution. In this for MEMOIR. 65 the first time since 1792, Parliament and the country were unanimous. The union of our Cabinet for this object was complete. The confidence necessary for effecting it was, on the part of England, personifted, one may say, in Mr. Fox ; and all that was wanted to finish the work, and render it lasting, was a similar disposition on the part of Napoleon, equal steadiness of purpose, and good sense enough to understand the man and the government he had to deal with. But he mistook them both. I now come to the main question as to Sicily, namely, Mr. Fox's readiness, according to M. Bignon, to cede that island to France ; a point which he much labours to establish, and which he represents as having been nearly agreed 'upon before Mr. Fox's death. For what the author alleges on this head, he has not a shadow of authority, whether from the published documents, or from any other source whatsoever, written or oral. No such willingness, he must himself confess, is to be found in Mr. Fox's instructions to Lord Yarmouth, nor in his letters to his Lordship before he present ed his credentials. It is not meant to deny that when, under circumstances to be stated hereafter, Lord Yarmouth had exchanged his powers and opened the negociation in form, some conversations may have taken place among the plenipotentiaries on the comparative importance of Sicily in the hands of France, or of its lawful possessor, as affecting the peace of Europe ; but this was all. As a proposition, the question of its cession never was brought forward from first to last. Not a single conference was held upon it. Not a memorial was presented, not a step taken to bring even under discussion an estimate of its value with a view to fix a compensation for its sur- render. On no ground indeed, except that of a general European interest, nor even on that without the full consent of its owner, could the negociators be F 66 MEMOIR. justified in allowing Sicily to be named. That island was part of the ancient dominions of the common ally of England and Russia, never possessed, never even attacked by France during the whole course of the war. Let this author show, if he can, on what prin- ciple of public law its cession could be bargained for, or on what ground he can maintain his proposition that Mr. Fox by consenting, under the qualification of the King of Sicily' s consent, to enter upon a discussion as to its cession, gave up his original claim of nego- ciating on the basis of uti possidetis. Now as f ar as England was concerned, the uti possidetis had nothing whatever to do with this claim. The principle which governs this mode of negociating relates only to con- quests made during war by one of the belligerents over the other, and cannot apply consequently to the demand of a territory, the possession of which never had been out of its rightful owner. A demand for it, therefore, on the part of France, and a surrender of it on that of England, could be nothing but an act of naked undisguised spoliation, perpetrated against a third party for the convenience of the two others. But such an act, infamous as it would have been on other accounts, would not have constituted a departure on the part of England from the uti possidetis , or from any other recognised method of negociation. Not so on the part of France who made the demand. Her preliminary renunciation of all and every possession belonging to England and her atties, was so ample as to cover this and every other conceivable form or principle on which treaties can be discussed. Nor can France pretend that if England did not deviate from her original principle of negociation, neither did she deviate from hers, inasmuch as if the uti possidetis was not in question for one, it could not be in question for the other. The fallacy of this reasoning is palpable. It was France who asked us to negociate with her. MEMOIR. 67 She asked to do so under the above renunciation, and received value for it in our consent. This it was which constituted her title to be negociated with ; not on this or that specified or defined principle, but to be negociated with at all. France, therefore, when she claimed Sicily, did more than deviate from the uti possidetis. In effect she broke off the treaty ; and when England, at the desire of Russia, agreed to hear what she might have to offer to the King of Sicily, and what reasons she had to allege why we should admit of a deviation from her first proposal to us, it amounted in fact to no more than a permission de novo to set the negociation upon its legs. The event confirms this view of the case. No proposal, acceptable or otherwise, with regard to Sicily, was ever brought forward during Lord Lauderdale's stay at Paris. It is true no doubt, that speaking abstractedly and apart from the immediate point in view, and supposing likewise a general fusion of European interests, such as existed some years later at the Congress of Vienna, there might be imagined a way of disposing of Sicily, and even of giving it to France, under such arrange- ments as might render its cession not only acceptable to its Jawful sovereign, but advantageous to the general security of Europe. An equivalent, prac- tically speaking, for that island, the quiet possession of which by France would at all times depend upon her keeping at peace with us, might assuredly be found in other quarters, where a new and safer line of defence for the Austrian frontier might easily be devised ; such for instance as the setting up a strong and efficiënt sovereignty in the north of Italy, con- nected with Piedmont and the Swiss cantons. A plan of this sort might have had its advocates, even in 1806, among statesmen who looked beyond their day, and who feit the incalculable value of Austria as a preponderating and protecting power in the f 2 68 MEMOIK. European system. Nor could there be any funda- mental objection of principle to bringing under the consideration of English statesmen a question of how far they miglit safely allow France to extend her military posts in the Mediterranean, provided that such an accession to her maritime strength were balanced by the cession on her part of a continental territory adequate to the establishment and con- solidation of such a sovereignty. But nothing like this appears by the conferences to have been under contemplation. Taking these principles for our guide, we will follow M. Bignon through the whole of what he has told us on this subject. Let us begin with Lord Yarmouth's return to Paris on the 1 6th of June, and his first despatch from thence of the 19th, in which he states that a demand had been brought forward for Sicily, and that complaint was made that he had returned without full powers. Mr. Fox replies on the 26th, rejecting the demand, but sending him the full powers with an instruction not to use them unless M. de Talleyrand should return to his first ground with regard to Sicily. At the first conference after this, on a renewal of the demand, Lord Yarmouth informs M. de Talleyrand that he cannot talk with him on that subject. Subsequently however, and during the same day, on that minister' s return from St. Cloud with an offer of the Hanse towns in exchange for Sicily, his Lordship on consideration agrees to forward this new proposal to his Court. It is answered by another refusal, and by an order to Lord Yarmouth to return home if it should be persisted in. As it was so persisted in, his Lordship accordingly on the 9th of July applies for his passport. The French m nister puts him off for a day, and then offers, instead of the Hanse Towns, Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, possessions as much out of MEMOIR. 69 his power as Sicily itself, by way of compensation to the King of Naples. Lord Yarmouth again consents to transmit this proposal to his Court ; and in stating to Mr. Fox his reasons for so doing, he says, " Had not M. d'Oubril been here, I should have insisted on my passports" That the presence of M. d'Oubril at Paris should have induced Lord Yarmouth to depart from the strict letter of his instructions requires some ex- planation. This was the minister appointed by the Emperor of Russia to co-operate with the English plenipotentiary, in the manner pointed out in Mr. Fox's several Communications with M. de Talleyrand, on the so much disputed question between them of joint or separate negociation. How well he co-operated with Lord Yarmouth will appear hereafter. Of one part of his proceedings, I am myself enabled to render some account. I have already mentioned that in his way from St. Petersburg to Paris, he passed through Yienna where he remained three or four days. During the whole of that time, and although lodging together under the same roof, he never came near me, but having once met him by accident at the Count t de Cobenzel's, he informed me that the object of his Ij mission was to negociate an exchange of prisoners, B and to listen to any proposals that might be made to him for peace. He then took occasion to ask me some questions with regard to the value annexed by the British government to the restitution of Hanover. I referred him to Mr. Fox's speech on that subject in the House of Commons. That I may not have occasion to return to this part of the subject, I will add that not being satisfied that his mission to the French capital was solely for the purpose of an exchange of prisoners, or of listening to pacihc pro- fessions, I sent off without delay a special messenger to England to apprise Mr. Fox of the above circum- f 3 70 MEMOIR. stance, which, in the relative situation of the two governments, struck me as cariying an air of too much reserve towards myself, to be perfectly fair. I have since heard that M. d'Oubril had orders to commumcate with me confidentially and fully on the object of his mission. He best knows whether this be true. At all events, his reserve towards me at Yienna may afford a clue to much of his conduct while he was at Paris. There he arrived early in July, with powers, as it has since been ascertained, to make a treaty with or without England. I have been assured on no light authority*, that on leaving the Eussian Court he had orders not to return without some treaty ; a joint treaty, if possible, with us, but if not, a separate one for his own government. Be this as it may, it ap- peared to Lord Yarmouth that to ascertain how far he might depend on M. d'Oubril to act with him in resisting the new demand of France was a matter of sufficiënt weight to justify the suspension of the execution of his orders to quit Paris. Of the extent of M. d'Oubril's assistance he was not long in doubt ; for it soon became evident that, whether specially authorised or not, he was not only ready to give up Sicily to France, but most anxious that England should do the same. As his first object was a joint peace, he seems to have exerted himself fairly enough to remove what he believed to be the chief obstacle to so desirable an event; but his efforts to this end were of a nature to convince Lord Yarmouth that, whether we should consent to the French demaads or not, he was fully resolved on his own part to sign separately for Russia. On considering this fully, Lord Yarmouth's reason for transmitting the second proposal for the exchange * M. Pozzo di Borgo. MEMOIR. 71 of Sicily was admitted by the British government ; and Mr. Fox's despatch in reply to his Lordship on July 1 8th will bring under our view all that remains to be stated, not only as to this matter of Sicily, but as to its influence on his own hopes of success in the work he was labouring to effect. After observing, accordingly, that the demand, in whatever shape brought forward, was a direct breach of the original terms on which Great Britain consented to negociate, Mr. Fox proceeds to examine — not with M. de Tal- leyrand, but with his own representative — the nature and value of the territories specified as a compensation to the King of Naples. He discusses the point with a view of exposing the utter inadequacy of these ter- ritories as a compensation, and the injustice of an act to give effect to which " they must first be wrested from independent and friendly states." He throws out, indeed, that if it were proposed to annex Istria and the Yenetian territories to Dalmatia, it might be possible " to submit such a proposal to the King of Sicily." In the suggestion thus thrown out to his own representative, consists the whole extent of Mr. Fox's relaxation from his peremptory order to his Lordship not even to discuss such a subject. And why did he relax? To comply with the anxious desire of the Russian minister, and for that reason alone — to stop him, if possible, in his headlong course of concession on matters which vitally affected our alliance with his sovereign. " There appears so little probability," he says, " of inducing France to extend her offer that any further discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril expressed his wish that this Court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a negociation now brought to a state which affords so little prospect of success. It is only in compliance with that desire that his Majesty has been pleased to direct you f 4 72 MEMOIR. to continue the conferences with M. de Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practicable shape can be given to the proposal for the exchange of Sicily." And why, it may here be asked, was Mr. Fox so anxious to keep on terms with the Russian plenipo- tentiary ? This gentleman had written just at this / time to Count StrogonoïF, the Russian ambassador at j London, a most ominous despatch to say that there were circumstances and considerations which might in- duce him to sign a separate treaty. To take from him all excuse or even pretence for such an act as arising from any difference bet ween himself and the British Cabinet, Mr. Fox yielded to his proposal for u tem- porizing " on this point with the French govern- ment. We have perceived over and over again the vital importance attached by Mr. Fox to the Russian al- ; liance. " In the present circumstances of Europe," he says to Lord Yarmouth, " the last hope of averting those dangers (dangers that threatened Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Ottoman Porte, Spain, and Portugal) is to be found in the union of the only two powers on whom France has made no impression, — Great Britain and Russia." Any delay, therefore, that could have been interposed to arrest the execu- tion of a measure which must have separated them, — for half a century perhaps, — appeared to Mr. Fox cheaply purchased at the expense of this very limited compliance with the wishes of a plenipotentiary, to whom the power of producing that separation had in an evil hour been entrusted. The existence of that particular influence at St. Petersburg, under which M. d'Oubril's instructions had been drawn up, was not unknown to Mr. Fox: nor had he been inactive in his remonstrances against the wavering policy of that Court. It was easy to MEMOIR. 73 perceive the bait held out by France, in offering to \ erect the last-mentioned territories into a state, ■ which, nominally given to the King of Sicily, must essentially become Russian ; and he did not fail ear- nestly to exhort the Russian Cabinet not to slacken in the great cause of European independence, for the sake of some trifling local advantages on the Turkisn, frontier. But M. d'Oubril at Paris was too quick for: Mr. Fox at St. Petersburg, and in spite of Lord Yar- ! mouth's remonstrances against any separate signature, — separate discussion he had consented tofrom thefirst, — never even communicating to Lord Yarmouth what he was about, nay even in spite of the readiness of the British Cabinet so far to comply with his wishes as " to ascertain whether any practicable shape could be given to the proposal for the exchange of Sicily," M. d'Oubril signed and sealed ! He refused even to wait eight and forty hours, to learn the sentiments of the Russian ambassador at London with regard to the step he was about to take. On the plan adopted by the French Cabinet for the negociation, this no doubt was a great advantage to them ; and as such they folio wed it up. The x DOm ^ was to give a new turn to the demand for Sicily. lts preliminary renunciation had been made, as we have seen, by Mr. Fox the condition of the exchange of powers. In that case there could be no talk of its surrender. lts possession never could become an object to be negociated about, nor its retention counted as an equivalent for something else. But by exchanging the powers first, and, after the pretension to its cession had been put forward and recorded, that possession, like all others, would be thrown into the mass, and brought to account in making up the set- tlement. Thus they would get rid, as they hoped, of their first basis of uti possidetis ; and by substituting for it that of compensations and equivalents, open a 74 MEMOIR. door to every sort of complication and delay that might suit their future convenience. Accordingly, on the very next day after M. d'Oubril's departure for St. Petersburg whither he had hurried off " to lay his head" as he declared, " at the f eet of his master" Lord Yarmouth was told that he must produce his full powers instantly, or quit the country. In vain he asked for the delay of a few hours to consult his government on a case so important and unprece- dented, — a case on which by all the established practice of diplomacy he had a right to apply for fresh in- structions. In vain he appealed to the common rules of fair dealing, — to the distinctive character for frankness and honesty given by themselves to this negociation. The French Cabinet held fast the ground they had won; until at length Lord Yar- mouth, seeing no alternative between compliance and the immediate renewal of hostilities, on the 21st of July exchanged his full powers with the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke. Such is the brief summary of this extraordinary transaction ! Such the boasted victory achieved by the French diplomatists ! a victory indeed, if estimated according to the rules by which cards are shuffled in a way to secure the co-operation of fortune, but if judged by those of true wisdom working for great purposes, a most calamitous defeat. And so in the sequel it proved to be. Neither of the two governments of England and Russia adhered to what had been done in their names. That of Russia refused to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty ; and that of Great Britain, making every allowance for the difficulties of Lord Yarmouth's situation, never would consent to the admission of a new basis for the negociation. M. Bignon, however, comments on this manoeuvre with something of sarcastic exultation — " Ce n'est MEMOIR. 75 pas la faute du gouvernement Francais," he observes, in alluding to the breach of the condition prescribed to Lord Yarmouth for the production of his powers, "si Ie Plénipotentiaire Anglais s'affranchit de cette restriction." Vee victis! he would say — so much the worse for the loser ! But this is dangerous ground. Is M. Bignon aware, in resorting to it, how much more he loses than he gains for his government ? How for the sake of stealing a little credit for cir- cumventing a young negociator under circumstances that would have puzzled many an older one, he sacrifices their whole character for prudence as well as sincerity ? True, that the production of his powers by Lord Yarmouth was not a fault on the part of the French government. Their fault — and it was a great one — consisted in compelling him at the outset of such a negociation as this, — characterised as it had been with so much emphasis by themselves as an exception to all preceding ones by its superior preten- sions to honour and faith, — either to break it off or to disobey his orders. Whether what he did was for the best, is one question ; but they, it is clear, did for the worst by having recourse in their dealings with him to a scheme of trickery that could serve only the purpose of an hour, while it dashed to pieces at a blow the light fabric of incipient good-will, which after so many years of mistrust and hatred had begun to peer above the horizon, reviving and cheering the hopes of a troubled world. What, therefore, did France gain by all these contrivances ? Just nothing ! For with regard to Sicily, their immediate object, they never advanced a step towards its cession ; while by the instantaneous disavowal of M. d'Oubril, they failed in detaching Russia from England as completely as they had failed before in detaching England from Russia. 76 MEMOIR. With the extracts above cited from the documents of the negociation, I might close my examination of M. Bignon's work. Yet I cannot take my leave of this author without thanking him once more for his rule of judging of the truth in diplomatic contro- versies. " C'est sur les pièces seules des négociations qu'il est aujourd'hui possible de connaitre la vérité." Mr. Fox's despatch to Lord Yarmouth of Jury 18th was before him when he wrote his book ; yet in the face of that minister' s declaration, — not (as I have already observed) to M. de Talleyrand, but confi- dentially to his own representative, and while in- structing him how to act, — that the negociation had, by the conduct of the French government, been brought to a state which he considered to be " hope- less," M. Bignon has deliberately affirmed that if Mr. Fox had lived, peace would have been made at this time; and he gives his readers to understand that before Mr. Fox died, thé principle of an ex- change for Sicily had been so well settled, that a recurrence to the subject as a cause of rupture subsequently on the part of England, was a proof of bad faith, in the surviving members of the British Cabinet. " Ces divergences," he says, enumerating the three points of difference, — uti possidetis, joint treaty, and Sicily, — " ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles, qu'au moment oü la maladie que suivit la mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direction de la politique Anglaise." To venture on such a sentence with the above despatch lying before him, and in such manifest defiance of his own rule for judging of political truth, does it not exhibit, to say the least of it, an intrepidity of pur- pose more suited to the inventor than to the narrator of historical transactions ? From the above plain statement of facts, derived from Mr. Fox's confidential as well as official corre- MEMOIR. 77 spondence, it is clea* that so far from there having been any understanding on the subject of an ex- change for Sicily, the question had never even been seriously mooted between the two governments, whether by written or oral discussions, from the first moment of the negociation to the end of it. In de- ference to Russia, Mr. Fox authorises Lord Yarmouth to inquire how far, with the consent of the King, it might be possible to put such a matter in a negociable shape. That was the utmost of their understanding on this point ; and it is needless to say that in such a shape it never was put either during Mr. Fox's life, or at any subsequent period until the final rupture of our intercourse with France on the 6th of October. What more do we want to evince the soundness of Mr. Fox's views in adhering with such tenacity to his refusal on this point ? What but the candid con- fession of M. Bignon himself of the true secret of the demand ? " Kelativement a la Sicile," he .says, " ce serait une étrange méprise de supposer que Ie seul but de 1'em- pereur füt de procurer a son frère, Ie Roi Joseph, la totalité des états du Roi Ferdinand. L'objet véri- table, Ie digne objet de la politique de 1'empereur quand il se voyait contraint d'abandonner Malte au pouvoir de TAngleterre, était de balancer 1'influence et la navigation de cette puissance dans la Méditer- ranée, en y donnant pour point d'appui a 1'influence et a la navigation Francaises Tadmirable établisse- ment de la Sicile, soit qu'il dut laisser cette isle exister comme province dépendante de Naples, soit qu'il nourrit Ie projet d'en faire ceder plus tard la propriété a la France. Telle était certainement la pensee de Napoléon, et c' était par Ie même motif que 1'Angleterre, qui ne s'y trompait pas, avait montré sur ce point une si longue résistance." If these were Napoleon's views, he must have had 78 MEMOIR. them at the very time that he disclaimed them — at the moment that he authorised the declaration to Lord Yarmouth that he asked nothing from England ; and at the moment that M. de Talleyrand assured his Lordship that Sicily in the hands of France would prove rather an embarrassment to the negociation than a help to it ! It is not my purpose to pursue further these re- marks on M. Bignon's account of the negociations of 1806 ; nor to enter into their history after they were put into the hands of Lord Lauderdale as plenipoten- tiary for England. The official documents and the notes that passed between his Lordship and M. Cham- pagny and General Clarke, were published at the time, and are in every body's hands. To those conferences, and to the notes exchanged from the 9th of August until the 6th of October*, nothing can be added in elucidation of the facts of the case. On them the British government relies with confidence to justify the inflexible steadiness of their course. It were a waste of time, therefore, to enter into a particular defence of Lord Lauderdale from the personal attacks upon him in which the author has indulged. For these there is no more foundation than for his insinuated praise of Mr. Fox. Criminal facility in yielding all things to Napoleon is just as untrue when applied to the one, as is a settled determination to betray his trust, and obstruct the conclusion of a treaty, when applied to the other. So little does he know of the public men about whom he writes, that it will be new to him to learn that Lord Lauderdale was selected for this mission by Mr. Fox, because his public life and opinionshad marked him out as^the steady advocate for peace with France under every one of her go- vernments, and because it was universally known * This last to M. de Talleyrand, then at Mayence. MEMOIR. 79 among his colleagues that, short of the surrender of national honour, there was scarcely any sacrifice he would not be ready to make to effect it. Here therefore I should take my leave of M. Bignon were it not for the temptation of making one more extract from his history, the deliberately printing and publishing of which will appear incredible to those who do not know the work, but which to those who do, may afford some relief from the severer re- flections which must have passed across their minds on perusing it. " Dans eet intervalle " (the period between Lord Lauderdale's firstnote of August llth and the 22d), " Lord Yarmouth était retourné en Angleterre. Le Comte de Lauderdale, resté a Paris, semblait ne s'y trouver que pour renouveller sans cesse les demandes de ses passeports, et annoncer a tous momens le terme de sa mission. Les discussions verbales n'avaient pas plus de succes avec lui que les argumentatiohs écrites. Pour mieux lui faire sentir que le Cap de Bonne Es- pérance, Malte, et le Hanovre, formaient une paix assez honorable pour 1'Angleterre, on avait beau lui donner a entendre que, si elle s'y refusait, le sort du Hanovre pourrait dans quarante-huit heures être ftxé autrement d'une maniere irrévocable : le Comte de Lauderdale immuable dans sa position, sans égard pour les insinuations flatteuses ou comminatoires, n'opposait a tout que 1'éternelle demande de Yuti pos- sidetis. " Blessé a la fin d'une conduite aussi étrange le gouvernement Francais laissa éclater son mêcontentement dans une note dont la franchise alliait des formes dé- centes au langage sévère de la vérité. En se plaignant que le Comte de Lauderdale eut fait prendre une direction inattendue a une discussion qui jusqu' alors avait été calme et modérée, et qu'il voulait tracer autour du gouvernement Francais le cercle de Po- 80 MEMOIR. pilius," M. de Talleyrand ajoutait, " Si effectivement la mission du plénipotentiaire Britannique a été de rompre la négociation déja si avancée, s'il a voulu en faisant succéder au langage doux et conciliant qui avait rapproché les deux gouvernemens Ie ton im- périeux du reproche et de la menace, prolonger les calamités qu'il était dans son devoir de faire cesser, Lord Lauderdale a la triste gloire d'être arrivé a son but." And M. Bignon adds for himself in his cha- racter of authorised historian of these transactions : " Comme on reconnoissait Timpossibilité de conclure la paix avec un plénipotentiaire dont toutes les de- mandes étaient des offenses, et toutes les démarches des traits d'hostilité, on lui expédiait enfin les passé- ports qu'il avait demandés avec tant de persévérance." And a little further he adds, " Après la note accu- satrice que M. de Talleyrand venait de remettre a Lord Lauderdale, il semblait que ce plénipotentiaire ne devait pas demeurer a Paris un seul instant de plus." Undoubtedly he ought not, if such a note had been delivered to him. The date of it is the 4th of Septem- ber. Will it be believed that Lord Lauderdale never saw nor heard of it until after his return to England in October, when it was ostentatiously put forth in the Moniteur as one of the official documents ? What is yet more astounding is that the note really sent to Lord Lauderdale on that day was an invitation to renew the conferences ! It appears among our par- liamentary papers in the following words : — " Paris, September 4. 1806. " The Minister for Foreign Affairshas receivedthe orders of His Majesty the Emperor and King to hold a conference this day with his Excellency, Lord Lau- derdale. He has the honour, therefore, to propose to MEMOIE. 81 His Excellency to call at the office for Foreign AfFairs at half past two," &c. The history of all this will be found in Lord Lau- derdale's previous despatch of the 30th of August. The French plenipotentiaries having refused to return to the original basis, and he himself having refused to deliver any projet of treaty until that basis should be re-established, he had applied on the preceding day for his passport. In the interval between that and his last angry conference, all appeared to have changed. MM. de Champagny and Clarke met him with smiles and afFability. On delivering to them his va- ledictory note, he was told that, after all, " they did not know whether, on a more p articuleer explan- ation, they might not arrive at a conclusion co-incident in its effects with the object he had in view" and they went on talking about Hanover, the East Indies, the Dutch Colonies, St. Lucia and Tobago, "in a style," his Lordship adds, " so perfectly different from any- thing I had before heard, that I should not be more surprised if, at our next conference, they should give them up, than I was at the change of tone manifested on this occasion." And he excuses himself to his government for consenting once more to listen to what they might have to offer. It was in the midst of these blandishments that the terrible " note accusatrice," was concocted. The bolt was uplifted, and — where did it fall ? Not on Lord Lauderdale, who was safe in England, but on the pages of the Moniteur ! And does M. Bignon se- riously think that this after-clap tends to the honour and dignity of France ? Or, that it could please Napoleon, who possessed within himself so many sources, and achieved so many acts, of true renown ? Or is it England that he humbles by this exhibition of his Emperor, like the hero of Virgil, clothed in all G 82 MEMOIR. his terrors, and rising in his wrath after having ex- hausted his forbearance — " Inde ubi tot traxisse moras, tot spicula taedet Vellere, et urgetur pugna congressus iniqua, Multa movens animo jam tandem erumpit, et in ter Bellatoris equi ca va tempora conjicit hastam " — when instead of striking his adversary to the ground, he changes his spear for the pen of M. de Talleyrand, and most obligingly requests us to talk with him again about peace ? We did talk with him again, but to little purpose. The conferences went on until the 6th of October. The refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify D'Ou- bril's treaty had again brought England and her allies on the line on which they stood at the period of the first overtures to Mr. Fox. Napoleon was again at his manoeuvres to decoy us into a separate peace. They failed, and Lord Lauderdale left Paris. MEMOIR. 83 CONTINUATION. If the author, in examining the French account of the negociations of 1806, has adopted rather more of a controversial tone than may agree with the rules of strict historical statement, let it be remembered that he has undertaken not a bare narrative, but a vindication of those transactions, and of the states- man who directed them on the part of Great Britain. Impelled by his sense of duty to the memory of that minister, as well as by the demands of truth, -he has set down his remarks in the spirit of one who com- munes with himself, and consequently under that impression of their correctness which renders all re- straint painful that prudence and propriety do not impose. The despatches which follow contain only the recital of events as they successively arose during his mission, and call for no comment beyond such as may be useful to connect them clearly in the reader's mind, to lay open the nature of the difficulties which thwarted every project for mutual defence, and under the guidance of a fixed principle in English policy to carry him through the alternations of hope and disappointment which prevailed among the Continental power s at the time of their several dates. The transactions which they record will appear to divide themselves into three periods : — first, from the time of the author's arrival at Yienna, in June, 1806, until the battle of Jena, and its consequences ; secondly, from the arrival there of M. Pozzo di Bor CORRESPONDENCE. 229 % de ïalleyrand rélativement a la conduite et au sys- tème de 1'Angleterre ; bien convaincu que S. M. Im- périale et Eoyale verra avec un déplaisir également sensible, et les imputations injurieuses contre une puissance amie, et un manque si total d'égard pour son caractère de médiateur. Le Soussigné saisit avec empressement cette oc- casion, &c. (Signé) Kobert Adair. Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning. Vienna, May 9. 1807. SlR, Feeling the necessity at the present moment of keeping up the best understanding possible among all the allied Courts, I sent off last night a confi dential letter to Mr. Drummond at Palermo, communicating to him Bonaparte' s answer to the Austrian proposal of mediation. I also took upon myself to assure him that he might safely promise his Sicilian Majesty that in any Congress which might assemble for the settle- ment of the afFairs of Europe, the interests of his Sicilian Majesty would be an object of primary at- tention to Great Britain. I have been induced to take this step in conse- quence of information respecting the internal state of Sicily, and the factions which prevail at the Court of Palermo ; and I have deemed it the more necessary from the consideration that neither the grounds on which Austria first proposed her mediation, nor M. Tal- leyrand's note of April 19th, had been communicated to the Sicilian minister at this Court. I likewise know that during the late negociations at Paris very false information was transmitted by Prince Castelcicala Q 3 230 CORRESPONDENCE. to his Sicilian Majesty respecting the views and dis- position of Great Britain. Having likewise received despatches addressed to his Majesty 's government from Mr. Foresti at Corfu, in which he states that great preparations appear to be making from the opposite coast of Italy for an attack on the Seven Islands, and that on the other hand a Eussian force of about 6000 men had pro- ceeded to attack the territories of Ali Pacha in Al- bania, but that he himself, owing to the want of instructions, was unable to concert with the Russian minister the necessary measures of defence or attack ; in either of those cases, I have thought it right not to lose a moment in recommending to him to co- operate to the utmost in all the views of Russia. To this end I have transmitted to him an extract from Lord Howick's despatch to me of March 6th, together with a passage from the first instructions I had the honour of receiving from you, dated April 7th, taking upon myself the responsibility of an advice which appears to me to be consonant with his Ma- jesty' s unvaried dispositions throughout the long con- test in which his Majesty has been engaged. As Mr. Foresti's despatches are too voluminous to send^by jbhe^^ost through Germany, I shall take the first opportunity of forwarding them to you by Lord Hutchinson. All that they contain material, except what I have already stated, is that the Russians took possession of Tenedos on the 23d of March,and that the Russian admiral had declared all the Turkish ports in the Archipelago and the Mediterranean to be in a state of blockade. I have the honour to be, &c. C0RRESP0NDENCE. 231 Mr. Adair to Mr. Drummond. Vienna, May 7- 1807. Dear Sir, I lose no time in sending you the copy of a note which has just been communicated to me by Count Stadion, containing Bonaparte's acceptance of the Emperor of Austria's good offices for the restoration of general peace. Neither the note, nor I believe the measure itself of mediation, has been officially communicated to the Commandeur KufFo, but you may safely assure his Sicilian Majesty, as I have myself assured the Com- mandeur, that his interests will form a subject of primary attention to Great Britain in any Congress which may be assembled for the restoration of peace to Europe. Of course this letter is confidential, but I leave it entirely to your discretion to make what use of it you may think prudent for the preservation of the good understanding which so happily subsists between his Majesty and the Sovereign at whose Court you reside. Believe me, &c. Mr. Adair to Mr. ForestL (Referred to in the preceding Dcspatch.) Vienna, May 8. 1807. SlR, Before this letter can reach you I trust that you will have seen M. Pozzo di Borgo, and that he will Q 4 232 CORRESPONDENCE. have informed you of my having safely received all your despatches. A great pressure of business at the present moment prevents my answering so fully as I could wish your letter of April 17th, accompanying your despatches to Lord Howick, Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. ; butyour No. 12. contains at the close of it a passage so ex- tremely material to the furtherance of his Majesty's service, that I cannot permit myself to lose a mo- ment in offering you the best opinion in my power upon it. You mention that your want of instructions pre- vents your communicating with the Eussian plenipo- tentiary on the political affairs of the Seven Islands, or on the means to be taken for their defence, or the projects of attack on Albania ; and that you are like- wise preven ted by the same circumstance from re- ceiving through his channel the information connected with those important subjects. I think it proper, therefore, to inclose you an extract from the last despatch written to me by Lord Ho wiek, and dated on March 6th. The instructions it contains will deserve your attention the more par- ticularly, as they were sent out to me for the express purpose of satisfying some inquiries I thought it my duty to make, in regard to points needless just now to state to you, but on which it was necessary that I should learn the sentiments and dispositions of go- vernment. Since that period his Majesty has been pleased to change his administration, and I have the satisfaction of informing you that my very first despatch from Mr. Secretary Canning, to whom his Majesty has been graciously pleased to deliver the seals of the Foreign Office, announces the same vigorous determination in the new government to support the common cause, and particularly " his Majesty's constant and CORRESPONDENCE. 233 invariable disposition to cultivate and maintain the most cordial union and good understanding with the Emperor of Russia." I cannot hesitate a moment, therefore, in ear- nestly recommending it to you to co-operate to the utmost with the Russian minister in all those measures on which you appear at present to entertain doubts, for want of sufficiënt instructions. I take willingly upon myself the responsibility of this advice, which I shall also mention having given to you in the strongest terms, in my next despatches to government. I have the honour to be, &c. Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning. Vienna, May 9. 1807. Sir, From some information which has lately reached me, I am very much afraid that the Austrian Court is permitting the passage of French troops into Dal- matia in far greater numbers than is consistent either with the spirit of their Convention with France on the subject of Cattaro, or with the repeated assurances of Count Stadion to myself as well as to Count Raza- moffsky. Want of proper information of the fact (which ought to have been sent me from Trieste) has obliged me to defer any remonstrance against a pro- ceeding so contrary to all notions of neutrality. Whenever I obtain that information I shall not fail to act according to the instructions which already have been sent to me with a view to that possible case. I perceive that this is likely to become a very embar- rassing affair to us ; but you may depend upon it that nothing shall make me lose sight of the main object, 234 COERESPONDENCE. which is, and must be, by every effort, and almost at any price, to gain Austria to our side. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, May 13. 1807. SlR, Count Stadion returned on Saturday to Vienna. Immediately on his arrival I had a long conversation with him on the present posture of affairs. It gives me great satisfaction to inform you that Count Stadion was himself so sensible as well of Bo- naparte's unjustifiable expressions concerning Great Britain contained in his answer to the Austrian pro- posal of mediation, as of the gross indecency of ad- dressing them to the Power whose good offices to restore peace he had just accepted, that he had im- mediately and without waiting for my note of the 4th instant, ordered General Vincent to remonstrate in the strongest manner against a conduct and language in every sense so improper. It is another satisfactory circumstance that the insidious invitation to Austria at the close of M. Tal- leyrand's note, to renew her connections with France, has totally failed of its effect. It is considered in no other light by the Austrian Cabinet than that of being intended to sow mistrust and jealousy among the different Powers before opening the negociations. A third consolatory topic is that of the supposed passage of French troops through the Austrian ter- ritories towards Dalmatia. Before adopting the more serious course of presenting an official note to the Austrian government, I requested Count Razamoffsky to ask a confidential explanation upon the subject. CORRESPONDENCE. 235 The fact is most positively denied by Count Stadion, and this with such vehemence and apparent good faith that, even if my information of the demand be correct, I am confident the passage has not been authorised. At all events the steps which have been taken in regard to this affair will, I trust, prevent the j recurrence of an evil which, in the present weak state I of the Seven Islands, would threaten the most fatal consequences. These I am concerned to say are the only points of a favourable nature which I feel myself justified in representing as the result of my conference with Count Stadion. I can perceive no symptom whatever of a disposition in the preponderating part of the Austrian Cabinet to enter into the views, or even to meet the wishes of the allies, further than I have already had the honour of stating in my former despatches. Some correspondence has taken place respecting an armistice; but the views oftheparties are so different, Russia requiring that Bonaparte should retire behind the Rhine, and Bonaparte requiring that Russia should retire behind the Pregel, he himself remaining on the Vistula, that before a middle point can be arrived at, hostilities will most probably have recom- menced. Austria has proposed the Elbe as the line of demarcation. If we could prevail on Austria to insist on this line, and to support the proposition by putting her army in motion, a great advance would indeed be made in our affairs. But of this I see no prospect. I have the honour to be, &c. 236 COKRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, May 16. 1807. SlR, I have the honour of enclosing you the extract of a letter which I have just received from Commodore Campbell, dated May 7. The purport of it is of such consequence that I should have forwarded my de- spatch by a special messenger if I could have found any person of trust to go with it through Germany. Count Stadion is returned to Buda. My second conversation with him was even less satisfactory than my last. He expressed his belief that negociations were carrying on very actively at head-quarters ; and in answer to all I could say favourable with regard to the appointment of Baron Hardenberg, and the dis- missal of Zastrow, he replied that there was nothing to be hoped for from that measure, further than the benefit which might be derived from the individual integrity of Baron Hardenberg. Much he admitted would depend upon the nature of the convention understood to have been signed between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, the communi- cation of which is expected here every day ; but from the general tenor of his conversation, I confess I have no hopes of Austria stepping in the slightest degree at this moment out of her character of mediator. In other respects aïfairs continue nearly the same as when I had last the honour of writing to you. The military preparations go on with unabated vigour. I have the honour to be, &c. CORRESPONDENCE . 237 Inclosure. Commodore Campbell to Mr. Adair. (Extract.) H.M.S. Unité, Trieste, May J. 1807. With regard to the preparations at Venice, they are very active in building gun-boats, large brigs, and praams. They have desisted working on their frigates and line-of-battle ships, and thrown all their strength on the small vessels. They will have a formidable flotilla early in the summer — about forty gun-boats, four or five brigs, two praams, and one heavy frigate. The other two at Chiozza I learn are not sea-worthy. By information I had that the French were sending a quantity of ship-timber from the island of Veglia to Venice, I was induced to run up there, and took from thence some Trabacolos laden with excellent timber for line-of-battle ships and frigates, and 350 pieces off the island, which were on the coast ready to be shipped off. Finding the French had evacuated the island of Lusin, I was induced to enter the harbour to refit my ship ; it is a most excellent one, and could be kept by a few hundred men against a large force, provided we kept command of the sea. The proxi- mity of Pietro di Nembo induced me, as it was a great shelter to the enemy's gun-boats, as also to secure any thing we might send into Lusin, to attempt its reduction. I went there on the 28th with the Weazle, and succeeded in getting possession of the fortress on the 30th without any loss, making the garrison pri- soners. The enemy have not now a soldier on any of the Dalmatian islands. I think I could, with the addition of a few small vessels, make the situation of their army in Dalmatia very unpleasant by cutting off their supplies. 238 CORRESPONDENCE. Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning. Vienna, May 20. 1807. SlB, I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatches of the 28th ultimo, together with their inclosures. In obedience to his Majesty's commands I did not fail immediately to notify to the Austrian minister, that his Majesty had been pleased to nominate the Earl of Pembroke to be his plenipotentiary at the Court of Vienna. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, May 23. 1807. SlR, I had yesterday the honour of receiving your despatch, No. 4. Count Stadion will return this day to Vienna, when I will not fail to communicate to him his Majesty's consent that embassies should be reci- procally established between the two Courts of London and Yienna, if such should be the wish of his Imperial Majesty; and likewise that the Earl of Pembroke would be furnished with credentials as ambassa- dor, to be produced at whatever time the Court of Yienna might be desirous of seeing him assume that character. As I have no doubt that I shall receive some communication from Count Stadion respecting the progress of the Austrian Court in its mediation, I shall most probably re-despatch Lieutenant Drach- brawa in a day or two. I have the honour to be, &c. CORRESPONDENCE. 239 The same to the same. Vienna, May 27. 1807. SlR, , Immediately on Count Stadion' s return to Yienna I communicated to him the purport of your despatch, No. 4., relative to the establishment of embassies be- tween the two Courts of London and Vienna ; and to obviate all possibility of mistake, I made the com- munication in the very words of the despatch. I received for answer from Count Stadion that this question having on former occasions been brought under the Emperor's consideration, who, after mature deliberation, had deemed it more expediënt that the intercourse between the two Courts should continue on the same footing on which it had stood for so many years, his Imperial Majesty, all circumstances considered, was still of the same opinion. This answer was accompanied by professions of the most amicable dispositions on the part of the Austrian government, and by an observation from Count Stadion, that as the intercourse between the two countries during the period of their strictest alliance and concert had been conducted by envoys, it was hoped that the Emperor's declining the proposition of investing the ministers respectively with a higher character, would in no sense tend to diminish the good understanding which subsists between the two Courts, nor be considered by his Majesty as any want of at- tent ion to his royal wishes. I have the honour to be, &c. 240 CORKESPONDENCE. 'V (Private.) The same to the same. Vienna, May 27. 1807- SlB, I intend either despatching a messenger to England in three or four days, or writing to you by the return of Prince Starhemberg's. Things are not going on at all to my satisfaction. The Prussian answer to the proposal of mediation is greatly censured here. It is almost called impertinent. The accession of this Court, therefore, to the Convention of the ||th of April is still at a great distance. Indeed I never en- tertained a hope of their acceding to it simply and at once. An agreement substantially of the same nature between Eussia and Austria was the very thing which M. Pozzo di Borgo and myself were so ineffectually labouring at during the winter, and which we saw at last no chance of bringing about, except through the mediation, and as a result from it. Nothing, however, is as yet finally resolved upon ; nor will anything be determined until Dantzic be either taken or relieved. Yours, with great truth, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, May 29. 1807. Sm, The moment Count Stadion arrived from Buda I had an interview with him for the purpose mentioned \ in my despatch, No. 37., which I forwarded yesterday by the post. On this occasion I endeavoured also to learn what might finally be expected from Austria in the situation to which our affairs are now brought. CORRESPONDENCE. 24 1 It will here be proper for me to inform you that about ten days.ago, Count Finkenstein received the King of Prussia's answer to the Emperor' s offer of mediation, together with a copy of the Convention * entered into on the 26th of April bet ween his Prussian Majesty and the Emperor of Russia. Count Raza- moffsky received also, at the same time, the answer of the Emperor of Russia, accompanied by an instruction to press Austria in the strongest manner to accede to the above Convention. It was in consequence of these despatches that Count Stadion was sent for from Buda by the Russian and Prussian ministers. I lament to inform you that the King of Prussia's answer has given great dissatisfaction to this Court. It is censured both in substance and in form. The Con- vention itself, too, is not more favourably considered. The demands of the allies are deemed too high for it to be expected either that Bonaparte will comply with them, or that the allies themselves will adhere to them. What is proposed with regard to the future con- dition of Germany is called vague and unsatisfactory. In short, I see nothing as the result of these Commu- nications but a more than ordinary degree of shyness on the part of Austria, and an increased unwilling- ness to come forward. What gives me the most uneasiness is, the altered tone of Count Stadion himself. After his first return from Buda (on which occasion I wrote my despatch No. 3.), he said, in the course of our conversation, that he thought peace would be the best thing that could happen. This phrase struck me the more from its being coupled with a sort of explanation of the basis of the mediation which, I will venture positively to assure you, never was in his contemplation at the time * The Convention of Bartenstein. R 242 CORRESPONDENCE. it was proposed. In order to try how far he was disposed to adhere to this basis (viz. the five articles as in my despatch, No. 18.), I remarked that both in spirit and substance the proposed Convention between Russia and Prussia (for it had not then been actually signed) ofFered more favourable terms to Austria than she seemed disposed to ask for herself; and that, so far at least as affording additional aid to her own views, obtaining a secure frontier for her, and en- abling her to recover a great portion of her influence in Germany, such a Convention must be attended with the most beneficial effects to Austria. Count Stadion immediately answered, " You must recollect that the Peace of Presburg is the point from which we must set out in all our negociations." If Austria can be got to act on no higher principle than this, — if she be not thoroughly impressed with the necessity of preserving what remains of the federative system — and if her mediation be not directed to this great end, the pro- spect for Europe is calamitous indeed ! In this point of view it is much to be lamented that the answer of the Prussian Cabinet was not a simple acceptance of the Emperor of Austria' s proposal. Con- sidered with reference to its ostensible object, the al- lies never could have been entrapped through it into a disadvantageous peace, while, as an instrument of bringing Austria forward, the mediation might have been used with the best effect. It seemed not difncult, with good management, to induce Austria, engaged as a mediating Power in the discussion of interest s so dear to her as the state of Italy and the Federation of the Rhine, to exact on these points such concessions from Bonaparte as the violence of his character would never suffer him to listen to. On his refusal to make such concessions, and, above all, to give such securities as might easily be suggested for the maintenance of peace, Austria would have fallen into her true place C0RRESP0NDENCE. 243 in the new struggle, and would have found herself engaged in it naturally, justly, and without any vio- lence to her pacific inclinations. It is to be feared that these hopes are nearly destroyed by the Prussian answer. I will not yet, however, totally despair. No positive refusal to accede to the Convention has yet been given, nor will any be given until the fate of Dantzic shall be decided. In the mean time I shall not fail to do every thing which depends on me to determine this Court either to accede directly to the Convention, or to give some intelligible answer to the various propo- sitions which have been made to it, or to teil me to what extent they mean to support the propositions they have made themselves ; and although, since your communi- cation of his Majesty's pleasure to me respecting the cessation of my powers at this Court, I can no longer speak from authority, I shall not hesitate to urge every motive which may be derived from a confidence that the most vigorous prosecution of the war, and the most determined support of the House of Austria, is the sentiment and the resolution of all ranks and descriptions of his Majesty's subjects, and particularly of those whom he has at any time honoured with his confidence. I have the honour to be, &c. P. S. I shall send a copy of this despatch to Lord Pembroke, in order that his Lordship may make such use of it as his own judgment and the instructions you may send out with him, may suggest. R 2 244 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. {Private.) Vienna, May 29. 1807. SlR, The letter from M. de Yaudreuil which accom- panies my despatches relates to the unfortuiïate Mar- quis de Rivière speedily about to be sent to Cayenne, unless means can be found of helping him to escape from his prison. If you should deern this an object worthy of the generosity, or perhaps the justice (con- sidering by whom he was employed) of the British nation, let me entreat you to send out orders without delay to Lord Pembroke to furnish the means of effecting it. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, June 3. 1807. SlR, Despatches were received two days ago by the Russian and Prussian ministers, ordering them to propose to this Court its immediate accession to the Convention of the — th of April, and to require a cate- gorical answer to the proposition. I reserve myself until such answer shall be given to write more fully to you, and I propose sending off Lieut. Drachbrawa through Germany with my letter. I have received despatches from the Danish minis- ter at Constantinople of April 29. and May 10. The Porte seems very pacincally inclined towards Great Britain, the Grand Admiral's orders being to avoid attacking any of his Majesty's ships. Other pacific symptoms appearing likewise in these despatches, I C0RRESP0NDENCE. 245 have in consequence written to the Danish minister to inform him that Sir Arthur Paget was coming out, and that, as his Majesty would never separate his cause from that of the Emperor of Russia, the Turks had better in the mean time listen to any overture of peace which might be made to them by Russia. I alluded in this to M. Pozzo di Borgo's mission, but did not think proper to mention it to the Danish minister, whom I suspect to be friendly to France. , I have the honour to be, &c. Mr, Adair to M. Hubsch, Danish Minister at Constantinople. Monsieur, Vienne, ce 1 Juin, 1807. J'ai recu hier les dépêches que vous avez eu la complaisance de m'adresser pour Ie gouvernement Britannique. Sa Majesté vient de nommer Ie Chev. Arthur Paget, autrefois son Envoyé Extraordinaire a la Cour de Vienne, a la mission de Constantinople. On peut donc espérer, d'après ce que vous me mandez des dispositions apparentes de la Porte Ottomane, qu'on trouvera moyen de s'entendre. Je dois cepen- dant vous prévenir que jamais sa Majesté ne séparera sa cause de celle de 1'Empereur de Russie ; jamais elle ne fera la paix sans que les conditions qu'y mettra son illustre allié ne seraient acceptées et remplies a la lettre. Que les Turcs se règlent sur eet avis ; qu'ils prennent leur parti au plus vite, et qu'ils ne négligent aucune ouverture pacifique qui pourrait leur être faite de la part de 1'Empereur de Russie. Le tems est précieux pour eux, car je leur suppose assez de bon sens pour être revenus de r 3 246 CORKESPONDENCE. l'espérance de voir une armee Frangaise se réunir a eux sur Ie Dniester, ou même sur Ie Danube. De 1'autre cóté ils mourront de faim dans deux mois d'ici. Agréez je vous prie, Monsieur, &c. Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning. Vienna, June 10. 1807. SlR, The great question is still in deliberation at this Court. The Emperor returned on Monday toVienna, and yesterday Count Kazamoffsky had an audience at which in obedience to his last positive instructions, he pressed his Imperial Majesty in the strongest manner to accede to the Convention of the ^th of April. Count Razamoffsky, as I am informed, represented to his Imperial Majesty that under the present circum- stances Russia could not possibly do more than de- fend her own frontiers, and that she could not even risk a battle, the loss of which must be her own destruction, as well as that of Europe. He also took occasion to state plainly, although not in any manner which could be misconstrued into a menace, that unless Austria would consent to join the allies, they must make the best terms they could for themselves. The Emperor's answer was, as I learned, still very general. The impression on Count Razamoffsky' s mind from this audience, as well as from the conversations he has had with Count Stadion lately, is that Austria will in the end accede to the Convention, but he fears it will be too late to do any material good. By information received from an authentic chan- nel, Bonaparte is preparing for a grand and deci- CORRESPONDENCE. 247 sive attack on the whole of the Eussian army. It is supposed that his plan is to turn their left wing, and by cutting oif their communication with Galieia oblige them to evacuate the whole of Prussian Poland, and retire behind the Niemen. This was his plan last winter, in which he was disappointed by the resist- ance he met with at Pultusk. If he should execute it now, Austria may consider Galieia as lost. The extent of the preparations of Austria, and the activity in the war department, especially in the article of providing subsistence for an army, are con- siderable enough to justify better hopes than I can yet venture to give you. But until I hear that orders are issued for assembling an army, it would be only misleading his Majesty's government to place the prospect of co-operation from this side in a stronger point of view than I have now done. On the subject of the mediation, I have heard nothing more from Count Stadion. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same* Vienna, June 17. 180J. SlR, Since writing my last despatch, I have been in daily and anxious expectation of learning the answer of this Court to the Russian proposals. It is still delayed ; but as the Emperor is again about to leave Vienna, the Russian and Prussian ministers have fixed next week as the period beyond which they cannot delay communicating to their re'spective Courts the success or failure of their efforts. It is intended by the ministers to despatch Count r 4 248 CORRESPONDENCE. Stutterheim (a very intelligent officer, and well dis- posed towards active measures) to the allied armies, in order to verify the statements which the Eussian and Prussian ministers had given in of the number and military disposition of the combined forces. I wrote to Lord Hutchinson on the 7th instant (ordering the messenger to deliver my despatches to Lord Pembroke in case Lord Hntchinson should have left head-quarters), andtook occasion to recommend Connt Stutterheim to his particular attention, as it is from him that his Lordship will be able to obtain the most complete information, not only of the state and dis- position of the Austrian forces, and of their readiness for immediate action, but also of those causes which have so long operated to prevent Austria from enter- ing into the confederacy. The fall of Dantzic, and the expectation of a de- cisive action between the grand armies, have delayed the Austrian answer for so many days. Upon the success of that action, and of the first operations of the British expedition *, a great deal will of course depend. As Count Stutterheim's reports will be much relied upon by the Archduke Charles, the general cause would in my opinion be essentially promoted by showing him the utmost confidence. The diminished state of the French army in the Nejapolitan dominions has encouraged the Prince of Hesse to make a descent at Reggio with about 4000 men. A further force was to follow. He has been joined by a considerable number of the inhabitants. I have no intelligence on which I can depend respect- ing his progress. The French General Gardanne is now at Vienna, on his way to Persia. Bonaparte is indefatigable in * It was not dreamt of at Vienna that this was designed against Copenhagen. — R. A. CORRESPONDENCE. 249 his eiforts to establish the French influence in that part of Asia. I am sorry to inform you that affairs are going on very ill indeed on the side of ïurkey. The Russians have been obliged to evacuate Wallachia, the Turks having crossed the Danube in considerable force. The Russians are thus entirely separated from Czerni Georges ; Austria is greatly alarmed for her frontiers ; and this is another difficulty we have to contend with in our endeavours to obtain her co-operation. I have the honour to be, &c. P. S. Important accounts have just arrived from Constantinople. The Grand Signior is deposed by the Janissaries, and his cousin Mustapha placed on the throne. The heads of several of the chief officers, among others of the Reis EfFendi and the Bostangi Busha, were sent to the Janissaries by Sultan Selim, but nothing short of his deposition would satisfy them. It is said that they have sent for the heads of the Grand Vizier and several others at the army. The same to the same. Vienna, June 20. 1807. SlR, Nothing has occurred here since writing my last despatch. We have received the accounts of the Russian successes on the 5th and 6th instant, on the Passarge, and we are in anxious expectation of the result of the general engagement which it is sup- posed has already taken place. The Danish minister at Constantinople having given me no account of the deposition of the Grand Signior, I am not able to send you any accurate de- 250 CORRESPONDENCE. tails respecting this important revolution. By all concurrent information however, it appears to have been entirely produced by the Grand Signior's per- sisting in his attempt to introducé the European dis- cipline in his armies. It began by an accidental insult offered to a Janissary, which was resented by that formidable body, who assembled instantly in arms, and proceeded, under the authority of the Mufti, to the deposition of the Grand Signior for the four folio wing reasons : — his having no children, — his having addicted himself to Christian vices and adopted Christian manners, — his having increased the taxes, — and his having acted as the lieutenant of a Christian Prince in investing the French ambassador at Constantinople with the order of the Legion of Honour. Before descending from his throne, the Grand Sig- nior, as I un derstand, made some slight resistance, but no one declaring in his favour, his cousin Mustapha was placed upon it, and the deposed Sultan was the first to acknowledge his authority and to do him homage. Accounts difFer as to one important point, namely, whether the war, and particularly the war with Great Britain, has been sufficiently feit at Constantinople to have assisted in producing these events ; but I have the satisfaction of informing you that Count Stadion' s despatches mention positively the sending away of the French engineers. It now remains to be seen whether M. Pozzo di Borgo, of whose mission I apprised his Majesty's government on the 5th of April, will be able to pront by this opportunity to make peace. We expect des- patches from him every day, and I shall forward by a special conveyance through Holland whatever ma- terial intelligence he may transmit. I have the honour to be, &c. C0RRESP0NDENCE. 251 The same to the same. Vienna, June 24. 1807. SlR, I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 9th instant. In my No. 41. I mentioned that the Russian and Prussian ministers had determined to press for an answer within the cour se of the present week to the proposals which have been made to Austria by their respective sovereigns. I am to see Count Stadion this day, when I will again press upon his consideration all those motives for immediate decision which you have so clearly stated, and so forcibly urged in your despatch. Some days however will still elapse before we shall obtain a definitive answer. Couriers are following couriers with accounts of the operations of the adverse armies ; and until the success of one or the other be determined, I am afraid nothing will persuade Austria to stir. When I re-despatch Lieujt. Drachbrawa with the definitive answer of Austria, I will enter more at large into the motives which appear to me chiefly to have produced this deplorable inactivity. At pre- sent, I will only refer you to a former despatch, in which I mentioned my belief that fears for the safety of Galicia operated considerably on the mind of the Archduke Charles. I am now confirmed in this be- lief by its having been made almost a condition of Austrian co-operation that the main body of the com- bined army shall have reached the Bug. I have the honour to be, &c. 252 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. (Separate.) Vienna, June 24. 1 807. SlR, The information contained in the concluding part of your despatch is becorne so material in conse- quence of the recent occurrences at Constantinople, that I shall send it off instantly to M. Pozzo di Borgo. I am just at this moment embarrassed about the means of conveying it to him, as nothing can be trusted to M. Hubsch, at Constantinople. I hope, however, speedily to get over this difficulty. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, June 27. 1807. SlR, I wrote on the 24th to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 9th instant, and likewise to inform you that I expected very shortly to send off Lieutenant Drachbrawa with the deiinitive resolution of this Court. The fatal intelligence is at length arrived from General Yincent of the battle of the 14th, and of the total defeat and dispersion of the Russian army. Although the Russian official accounts have not yet been received, and for that reason some slight hopes may still be entertained that General Vincent's statement from "Warsaw is exaggerated, the degree of truth which appears in the substance of his report, and above all the effect which it has produced at this Court, render the period so extremely critical that CORRESPONDENCE. % 253 I think it my duty to send off Lieutenant Drachbrawa immediately with this despatch. The consternation of the Austrian government is extreme : they begin already to tremble for Galicia, and for the preservation of that peace for which they have made so many sacrifices, and lost so many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. Into what this feeling may subside I cannot pronounce — most probably into a confirmed stupor and inaction, and a complete resignation to events. To this conclusion I am led by the tenor of almost all my late conversations with Count Stadion. I gave you an account of two of them in my despatches, Nos. 33. and 38. Three days ago, I read him yours of the 9th instant. He admitted fully the truth and justice of almost all the reasoning contained in it, but I could make no further progress. He had then received some information which led him to anticipate the calamitous events of the 14th. Whatever hope, therefore, might once have been entertained of the co-operation of Austria through the effect of our representations and other measures, it appears for the present to be completely at an end. In communicating the intelligence to me, Count Stadion said most distinctly that he feared there was nothing now to be done but to make peace. I observed that these fresh successes would lead pro- bably to fresh preten sions on the part of France, and that Bonaparte, to whom no project seemed prepos- terous or impossible, might adopt that of carrying his army into the heart of Russia, and attempt to dictate the law even at St. Petersburg. Count Stadion agreed that this would give us one chance more ; but his belief was rather that Bonaparte would immediately offer peace. But in order to leave no means unattempted, (being thoroughly convinced that if Austria were to 254 CORRESPONDENCE. declare herself even now she would have a better chance of safety than she can hope for three months hence,) I assured Count Stadion tha/t if the delay of Lord Pembroke's arrival kept back any resolution which the Court of Yienna might otherwise be dis- posed to adopt on account of subsidies, I was ready to take upon myself the responsibility of guaranteeing any sum that might be wanted to put their army instantly into motion. To this offer he was silent. I have not stopped here. Some days ago Prince Kadzivill, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, arrived at Yienna, charged to convey personally to his Imperial Majesty the sentiments and views of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia. His private audience was, for some reason or other, delayed until yesterday evening, when it took place at Laxemburg, whither he was summoned by special invitation from the Emperor. As I am in the habit of much confidential intercourse with Prince Eadzivill, he imparted to me this intended interview, and like- wise the topics it was his intention to urge. So favourable an opportunity of conveying truth to the ear of his Imperial Majesty was not to be neglected. I recapitulated to Prince Radzivill, therefore, all the arguments contained in your despatch, and entreated him to lay them before the Emperor, accompanied by every inducement to come forward derived from the fresh dangers which are gathering round the Austrian monarchy. I urged him to represent to his Imperial Majesty that some forward motion — some sign of life on the part of Austria, appeared to be most peculiarly necessary at the present moment, as with- out it, Bonaparte would probably begin first by insisting she should disarm; and I renewed most warmly the offer of pecuniary assistance, provided the army were but once fairly put in motion. If any success should have attended . this effort, CORRESPONDENCE . 255 which I shall know before sealing my despatch, I will add a postscript. You will see by what I have now the honour of communicating to you, that although our prospects are unfavourable to nearly the greatest possible degree, the case is not absolutely desperate. A considerable Russian army may yet exist ; and the mere loss of territory, exhausted as are those districts into which the French have now advanced, is nothing in the scale of ultimate success. Could Austria be convinced of this, and that, con- sidered with a view to military operations, she would gain more in point of position by the forward move- ment of the French armies than she would lose by the disadvantages consequent upon a partial defeat of those who would be her allies, the effects of this terrible calamity might yet possibly be retrieved. Under this supposition, although the speedier her decision the better, delay would not be absolutely fatal. Such being the situation of affairs, Count Stutter- heim left Vienna yesterday on his journey to the Russian head-quarters. The object in view, when he first received orders to proceed thither, was to obtain accurate information of the numbers and condition of the allied forces ; but I have now strong reason to believe that he carries with him the most earnest entreaties from this Court to the Emperor of Russia to make peace if it can be had on any tolerable terms. Such a mission would naturally be concealed from me, but I hope that by what I have already written, both to Lord Hutchinson and Lord Pembroke (and particularly to the former) respecting this officer, they will soon discover whether this be or be not the object of it. I have the honour to be, &c. 256 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, July 4. 1807. SlR, I have the honour to inform you that Lord Pembroke arrived here yesterday, and that his Lord- ship intends seeing Count Stadion this evening or to-morrow. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, July 15. 1807. SlR, The Earl of Pembroke having this day presented his credentials to his Imperial Majesty, I have the honour of informing you that, in obedience to his Majesty 's commands, I have delivered up to his Lordship the ciphers and official correspondence in my possession. I have the honour to be, &c. Eobert Adair. MEM0IR. 257 EROM LORD PEMBROKE S ARRIVAL AT VIENNA, UNT1L THE CESSATION OF DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE BE- TWEEN ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA. Lord Pembroke presented his credentials to the Emperor on July 15th. He brought out with him those of ambassador extraordinary, as well as minister plenipotentiary, but he was received only in the latter capacity. The objections on the part of the Austrian govern- ment to receiving his Lordship in the character of ambassador, are stated in my No. 37., dated the 7th of May ; and as he had brought out no letter of recal for me, I found myself, in consequence of the refusal to admit him in his higher character, placed in an awkward and somewhat difficult situation. To explain this, it must be observed that the credentials of minister plenipotentiary, in which character I had been received at the Austrian Court, are a simple autograph letter, in which the sovereign accrediting requests that confidence may be given to the bearer of it by the sovereign to whom he is accredited, until he shall be recalled, or until a minister of a higher character shall be appointed to succeed him. It seems that in this case the Austrian government, — whether right or wrong, is a question of precedent and practice, — considered that to such an appointment two parties are necessary ; namely, the sovereign who should nominate to it, and he by whom the person nominated was to be received ; and that until such reception and recognition on his part, the appointment was not complete. On applying, therefore, for my passports, and the usual audience of 258 MEMOIR. leave, (after having surrendered tlie correspondence and cyphers to Lord Pembroke,) I was asked for my letter to the Emperor announcing my recal, and on my observing that the character in which I had hitherto acted was extinguished by the appointment of an officer of higher rank, and consequently that no such letter was necessary, the distinction above noticed was opposed to my request — not indeed of my passports, but of my audience, which I was distinctly told by Count Stadion could not be granted me. He added also, that knowing nothing officially of the fact of my being either recalled or superseded, he still should consider me as the regular resident minister, Lord Pembroke having been received only in the character of plenipotentiary, on a special mission. It will be obvious that the situation in which this objection placed me, was neither a pleasant nor an easy one. My own government had put an end to my functions, and ordered me to give up the ciphers and correspondence to Lord Pembroke. That was easily commanded, and cheerfully obeyed ; but, on the other hand, the government to which I was accredited, acting in conformity to the credentials which I had delivered, and having no knowledge of their abrogation, continued to recognize me in my public capacity, and — the case in their judgment not having arisen — refused me consequently the dis- tinction above mentioned, invariably granted on the amicable termination of a diplomatic mission. Out of this embarrassment there was one way of escape indeed, namely, to quit Vienna without taking leave ; but such a step would have been contrary to all usage, except on a rupture of pacific relations, offensive to the Emperor, who had graciously intimated his wish through his minister at London, that I might not be removed from his Court, and unworthy MEMOIR. 259 the station I had occupied as representing the policy of the English government, under the direction of such men as Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Lord Grey. Under these circumstances, I addressed the following letter to Mr. Canning, and took the reso- lution of remaining at Vienna until I should receive his answer; abstaining in the meantime from all political intercourse, whether with the Austrian government, or with the ministers of any of the other Powers. u (Private.) "Vienna, July 10. 1807. "Dear Sir, " I wrote on the 4th inst. to give you notice of Lord Pembroke's arrival at Vienna. His Lordship with that politeness for which he is well known, and with a kindness of manner I shall never forget, delivered to me the duplicate of your despatch No. 3.; but as he has brought me no letters of recal, I find myself placed in a situation of extreme awkwardness in regard to the general business of the mission. It appears that his Lordship's credentials as pleni- potentiary are not considered here as conferring a rank beyond that of minister plenipotentiary, and it is in that character alone that this Court will receive them. They do not, therefore, necessarily revoke mine, and (as I am informed by Count Stadion, after his having read the copy of the letter to be present ed by Lord Pembroke,) I must still be considered as accredited until I present letters of recal, or until this Court shall consent to receive a minister of superior rank. I am also informed by him, that without such letters, I cannot have my audience of leave. Now to quit Vienna without taking leave, would be to the highest degree improper, more especially since my having learned that the Emperor had done me the high s 2 260 MEMOIE. honour of expressing his wishes to Iris Majesty that I should remain at Iris Court. I will thank you, therefore, to relieve me as soon as possible from this embarrassment, the nature of which in all its points of view, no man can more fully understand or more sensibly feel than yourself. " Believe me, &c. " (Signed) Robert Adair." To this letter I received no answer ; but early in September, Lord Pembroke notified to me his in- tention of returning immediately to England, and proposed to me to carry on the business of the mission until his Majesty 's pleasure should be made known respecting the recal which I had solicited. In consequence of this proposal, I resumed my correspondence with Mr. Canning on the 15th of September. During the interval of its cessation, the peace of Tilsit had been concluded between Russia and France. The circumstances under which it had been negociated, and the hard terms on which the peace was extended to Prussia, are too well known to require recapitu- lation or comment. The despatches thus resumed are continued until the 22d of February, 1808, a few days previously to which (as it will appear in its place), on the non- acceptance by his Majesty 's government of a mediation proposed by Austria for what, in the phrase of the day, was called "the maritime peace," Prince Star- hemberg had been recalled from London, and it was intimated to me that our diplomatic relations were at an end. In effect, the utility of an English mission at Yienna, as far as the old Continental system was concerned, ceased when such a peace as that of Tilsit was signed. By that act, the power of MEMOIR. 261 Napoleon was rcndered confessedly predominant, and all that Europe had to do was to submit, and wait for better times. The interests of the world also were now beginning to take another direction, and Constantinople was the point around which they were gathering. But with this new direction, a new element was introduced into our dhïerences with Russia, which required to be watched cautiously in their commence- ment, and touched with the tenderest hand. Her situation was this : — At the moment of her rupture with us, she had a large neet in the Mediterranean ; she had a numerous garrison at Corfu: on the question of Tnrkish politics she had changed sides, holding out her hand to France as the Power most likely to assist the new prospects opened to her by the recent treaty ; and in pursuance of her altered politics, and against all right and public law, she had agreed to surrender to France the military possession of Corfu, and with it practically the protectorate of the republic of the Seven Islands. In any other case we should immediately have set about to do her all possible mischief — in the Mediterranean and every where else — and have begun by seizing her ships, than which nothing was more easy. But the other side of the picture pre- sented larger and wiser views. The Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding his unjust anger against England, was not yet in actual alliance with France ; and although he had yielded to the fascination of Napoleon, much was yet wanting to give steadiness to their incipient connection. It was not the business of England, therefore, to force matters into a state which might consolidate and render it permanent. Wars of resentment never enter into the plans of English statesmen ; and in this case for England to s 3 262 MEMOIK. have put forth her strength merely to punish an act, the ill consequences of which were sure, if left to their own operation, to fall upon those who were parties to it, would have been the summit of political im- prudence. Independently of all other mischiefs, Austria, if not absolutely their victim, must have become deeply and immediately the sufferer by a real alliance between Eussia and France. Considerations of this nature forbade any hostile proceedings against Russia ; the very reverse indeed was the policy that was foliowed. Under the date of the 23d of January, 1808, will be found a despatch opening some views upon this subject, which sub- sequently were acted upon, and not without success. I On the other hand, it could not be permitted that \ Russia should, unopposed, assist France in executing her projects in the Mediterranean ; nor that Corfu and the other islands should be quietly transferred to that Power, if by any efFort of ours it might be possible to prevent it. This matter is the subject of the several letters, subjoined in the Appendix, to Sir Alexander Ball, Lord Collingwood, and General Sir John Stewart. With our altered relations towards Russia, those towards Turkey were now to be attended to. As we had gotten ourselves into a war — our only war, be it remembered, with the Turks since their establish- ment in Europe — entirely for the sake of Russia when she was our ally, there could be no reason for persist- ing in it when she had ceased to be so. Sir Arthur Paget, therefore, had been sent from England with a commission to restore the peace. The progress and failure of his negociation may be traced in the cor- respondence. While it was going on, all preparatory good offices were rendered to the Porte and her subjects. Peace with Russia was almost indispensable to her. Sir Arthur did what he could to promote it ; MEMOIIt. 263 and on my being appointed, some months afterwards, to renew his negociation, I foliowed the same course.* Meanwhile the peace of Tilsit, among other of its eonsequences, had necessarily altered the footing on which the English and Russian legations stood towards each other at Vienna. Count Razamoffsky had been displaced. His successor was Prince Kurakin, on whose entrance upon his functions all intercourse, except that of common civility, ceased between the missions. The very first despatch to Mr. Canning, dated Sep- tember 15th, notifies an act on the part of Russia of a nature not only to justify but to provoke hostilities with her. This was the landing of the garrisons of the Ionian Islands at Yenice, then blockaded by a British squadron under the escort of Admiral Seni- avin's fleet, which had so lately been co-operating with us at the Dardanelles. It will appear from the unsatisfactory conference with Prince Kurakin on this point, how difficult it was to avoid a rupture.f The landing of 5000 Russians on the Continent of Italy, considering the facility of adding to their numbers from the interior of France, was by no means an indifferent matter ; for about this time there appeared strong symptoms on the part of Napoleon — natural enough when assured, if not of the co- operation of Russia, at least of her not opposing it — of setting up a maritime kingdom in the Adriatic. It was with a view to this danger, that the project already alluded to for getting possession of Corfu and the other islands, had been recommended to the consideration of Sir Alexander Ball. At Vienna, matters at first continued much as before this fatal treaty. No immediate demand had been made to occupy Trieste and Fiume, or to close * See a Despatch from M. Pozzo di Borgo. Appendix, f See Letter to Commodore Campbell. Appendix. s 4 264 MEM0IR. the Austrian ports to British vessels. Austria was well aware of the possibility of these and even worse exactions, and assuredly was in no condition to resist them. She waited, therefore, with anxiety for in- telligence from Paris before taking any determination as to her future course ; but I will bear testimony to this truth — that she waited with a firm determin- ation to abide the struggle, should it become un- avoidable unless by the sacrifice of her honour. By the 7th of October, this long expected despatch had arrived. It was not of a nature to increase the fears of Austria as to an immediate attack on her territories or independence. Her situation, how- ever, was one of complete paralysis ; and so much so that she positively refused to take any steps towards bettering it. She was afraid that any attempt to re- establish, even for the purposes of peace, a good understanding with other Powers, would draw down upon her the vengeance of Napoleon; for even the evacuation of Braunau, in execution of the treaty of Presburg, had been delayed by him under pretence that the Austrian army had not been sent into cantonments. Compliance, however, with this demand was to be expected when it should be made. The march of French troops through the Austrian territories into Dalmatia was regular and continued ; and soon after- wards came the Convention of the Isonzo, by which a military road was granted for their passage. On this condition, Braunau was at length surrendered; a condition which, in fact, was an additional article to the treaty of Presburg, and a fresh concession exacted from Austria since its signature. It was easy in this state of things to foresee that my mission was about to close. Towards the end of October, therefore, and on learning that some Russian ships of war had been admitted into Trieste, MEMOIK. 265 I thought it right to come to an explanation with the minister as to the situation in which we were standing. My No. 50., of the 31st of October, contains the result of this conference. I was not surprised afterwards to learn that four days before the date of the above despatch, instruc- tions had been sent to Prince Starhemberg to offer the mediation above alluded to ; and I began imme- diately to make provision for an event that was no longer doubtful. Two objects were essentially proper to be provided for. The first was to make some arrangement for securing to the officers of the disbanded Condean army the payment of the allowances made to them by the British government, and which had hitherto been efFected under the authority of the English minister at Vienna. An arrangement, therefore, for this purpose was entered into with the House of Arnstein and Eskeles ; to carry which into effect, I drew bills on the Treasury of England for 12,000/. sterling, being the amount of two years' allowance for the whole corps. With the consent of such of the officers as I could confer with, the superintendence of these payments was entrusted to the Comte de la Farre, Bishop of Nancy, who resided at Vienna in the supposed character of agent to Louis XVIII. The next object was to establish some method of communicating with England, and to which, for reasons which will be well understood, the Austrian minister could not be a party. It was effected through Count Kazamoffsky, Count Hardenberg (the Hanoverian minister at Vienna), the Commandeur Ruffo (minister from Naples), and M. Pozzo di Borgo. But, beside these concerns, there was a matter to be ascertained of immediate importance to the com- mon welfare, and in which it was necessary that England should see her way. In the possible, if not 266 MEMOIR. projected, dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, what part was Austria to take ? It could not be doubted that in any great scheme of partition she would be offered her share ; and that share, com- prising the fortress and territory of Belgrade, was a tempting acquisition. I brought forward the subject, therefore, in my final interview with the Austrian minister, and received from him the most distinct dis- claimer — together with the expression of his desire that I would communicate it to my government — of any participation in the projects attributed to the new alliance, and the no less positive determination under no circumstances, either to accept any exten- sion of territory at the expense of Turkey, or to countenance such projects in others ; and I well remember the warmth with which he assured me that the public feeling with which the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia by Kussia would be regarded at Vienna, was much the same as that with which the possession of the Isle of Wight by France would be regarded in London. My correspondence with England closed at the end of February, 1808 ; and having, on my way to Trieste, to cross the military road granted to the French by the Convention of the Isonzo, I asked for and obtained an Austrian escort. C0RKESP0NDENCE. 267 DESPATCHES CONTINUED FROM LORD PEMBROKE'S DEPARTURE TO FEBRUARY 21. 1809. Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning. Vienna, September 15. 1807. SlR, I think it necessary to acquaint you without delay that two days ago I received a letter from Commodore Campbell informing me that a Russian force, con- sisting of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 Russian troops on board from Cattaro, had anchored off Pirano on the coast of Istria ; and that the Russian commander had acquainted him that he had orders to land them at Venice. The Russian commander also signified to Commo- dore Campbell his intention of sending on the trans- ports under the escort of a frigate. The Commodore, entertaining doubts how far their being suffered to enter Venice would be consistent with the blockade of that port, represented to the Russian commander that it could not be permitted unless he went with a superior force. It was agreed accordingly, that nothing should be done until he could receive instructions from Prince Kurakin at Vienna. By the Commodore's desire I had yesterday an in- terview with Prince Kurakin on the subject, the result of which I have now the honour of communi- cating to you. Having stated the object of my desiring to see him, 268 CORRESPONDENCE. I mentioned that Commodore Campbell, with a view to avoid even the appearance of a misunderstanding with a Power which had been so long and so closely connected with Great Britain, had proposed a middle course, namely, that the Russian Commander should land his troops at Garda (which is immediately opposite Pirano, and only twelve miles distant from it), from whence they could easily be conveyed by in land navigation, or marched along the high road to Venice. To this proposal I requested Prince Ku- rakin's consent, and likewise that he would imme- diately issue the necessary instructions to the Russian Commander. It was not my good fortune to persuade Prince Kurakin to adopt this suggestion. He alleged his want of powers : and I could only obtain from him a declaration that, upon his honour, the landing of the troops at Venice was with no hostile intention, but merely a measure of convenience and arrangement. An answer so little satisfactory occasioned my writing immediately to Commodore Campbell (who had earnestly solicited my advice how to proceed in a case so new and difficult), recommending to him, if the Russian Commander should persist in sending troops by sea, and under the convoy of a frigate only, to oppose by force their entry into Venice. If he should come with his whole squadron, then to deliver him a strong protest in writing, drawn up as closely as possible to the spirit of his instruc- tions, against so flagrant a violation of the right of blockade. It appears to me- fit that his Majesty's government should, without loss of time, be made acquainted with a transaction which may lead to the most serious dis- cussions between the two countries. More Russian ships are expected every day with troops from Corfu, which important station has been put into the pos- C0RRESP0NDENCE. 269 session of France by virtue of the secret engagements at Tilsit. All these troops, it appears, are destmed for Venice, and by the inclosed letter from Mr. Foresti to Commodore Campbell, you will see that there is some reason to fear that a part of the Russian fleet has been ceded to the enemy. It has not yet been in my power to ascertain this fact, or whether, as it is more probable, Russian ships have been used in transporting the troops which were to take possession of Corfu. Either of these acts would approach very near to positive hostility on the part of Russia, and would require to be seriously resented by us ; but I think it prudent to avoid any steps which may increase the number of our enemies, except such as are dictated by the most imperious necessity. Of this nature, I trust you will consider the advice I have thought it my duty to give to Commodore Campbell. Under the present apparent relations between Russia and France, and considering our many just causes of alarm from what has already transpired of the secret articles of the peace of Tilsit — the meaning conveyed in the limitation to one month of his Majesty's ac- ceptance or rejection of the Russian mediation — the recent surrender of Corfu — the known determination of Bonaparte to attempt every thing to get possession of Sicily — and the too probable apprehension that he will endeavour to force this Court into his measures, I could not help looking upon the as- semblage of a large body of troops in the North of Italy as a measure extremely suspicious (to say the least of it), and as one which his Majesty's govern- ment would by no means suffer to be carried into effect through the abandonment of the blockade of the port of Venice. I have the honour to be, &c. 270 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, September 19. 1807. SlR, My preceding despatch has been delayed by the extreme difficulty of finding a trusty person to take charge of it through Germany. This delay affords me an opportunity of soliciting the attention of his Majesty's Government to the situation of the Republic of the Seven Islands. Of their importance to Great Britain in the present state of the world there can, I apprehend, be no doubt. Since yesterday, I have obtained information which may be depended upon, that a very general disposition prevails among the inhabitants to seek his Majesty's protection. I am pursuing this line of information with diligence and secrecy, and endea- vouring to ascertain what strength will be wanting to drive the French from the forts, and to retain possession of them. In general, I learn that Corfu may be taken by blockade, but that Cephalonia, Zante, and Ithaca may be carried by a coup de main. At Cephalonia there are 300 vessels and 7000 ex- cellent sailors. The harbour of Argostoli is repre- sented to me as safe in all seasons, and able to contain the largest fleet. Not far from it there is a fortress, which, with a little exertion, might be made as strong as Gibraltar. I shall send all my information to Sir Alexander Ball and General Moore. It will be for them to de- termine whether there be any thing sufficiently dis- tinct in it to call for immediate operations without waiting for orders from home. In the meantime it will be of great use for me to know the senti- ments of his Majesty's government with regard to a regular enterprise of this nature (provided nothing CORRESPONDENCE. 271 can be done by a sudden blow), and what engage- ments they will authorise me or any other person to enter into with the leading persons in the republic. One of them is now at Vienna, and will wait here for your answer. His description of the state of public opinion in the Islands is shortly as follows : — they rely on the generosity of England to maintain their constitution as it was settled and guaranteed to them in 1802 ; but rather than have the French, they would be content to become British subjects. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, September 24. 1807. SlR, Information has been received here of the occu- pation of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States by the French. It appears, also, that Bonaparte is speedily expected at Yenice, that he has given orders for fitting up a palace for his reception not far from Udina, and for tracing out a camp to hold 80,000 men, between Udina and the Tagliamento. I cannot perceive, however, any increase of preparation on the part of this country to meet the danger which awaits it. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, September 30. 1807. SlR, Your despatch of the 5th instant, addressed to the Earl of Pembroke, was opened by me, in consequence 272 CORRESPONDENCE. of his Lordship having left Vienna, and I immediately proceeded to execute the instructions contained in it. For this purpose I had an interview with Count Stadion, in which that minister assured me in the most distinct terms, that no propositions had been made either by Russia or by France to Austria, to shut her ports against British vessels, or to assent to the principles of maritime law which Russia appears disposed to re-assert. He assured me, also, that France had not yet made any requisition for the possession of Trieste and Fiume, although he was not ignorant of Bonaparte's views in that quarter, nor uninformed of the public language of his generals, particularly of those who command in Italy. At the same time that he gave me these assurances, he did not flatter him- self that France would long remain quiet, or abstain from bringing forward these, and perhaps still more extensive pretensions. As to their subsisting relations with France, he in- formed me that no variation had taken place in them since the peace of Tilsit. That their reciprocal Com- munications were civil, and apparently even amicable ; dispositions which Austria was endeavouring by all means in her power to cultivate. I then asked him to teil me confidentially, what he thought would be the course which France intended to pursue towards Austria, since leaving her long at rest appeared so little probable. He answered, that in a few days he should have a courier from Count Metternich, from whom he ex- pected more distinct information on this point than he was then enabled to give me, and he promised that he would duly inform me whenever he should know any thing positively himself. With regard to any sudden attack on the side of Italy, the French were not in sufficiënt force there to attempt it, and in ge- neral he thought that the pretensions which France C0RRESP0NDENCE. 273 might feel disposed to urge, would be deferred until Bonaparte's arrival at Yenice. Erom the manner in which he talked on this and other matters, which feil naturally within our con- versation, I am sure that he expects that this demand of the sea-coast of the Adriatic will speedily be made ; and I am also inclined to think it will not be very vigorously resisted. My reasons for thinking so are derived from the evident impossibility of Austria sustaining a war, in which she will have France, Germany, and Italy to contend against, without the hope of succour, possibly even with the dread of hostility, from Russia. Whether other possible demands on the part of France will be rejected by Austria — whether she will risk a war rather than recognise Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, or rather than assent to the meditated changes in Italy and Germany, and to the possible transfer of the Duke of Wurtzburg to Tuscany, is, I firmly believe, more than Count Stadion or any other memoer of the Emperor's Cabinet can teil. All that can be said for the present is, that Austria is not un- prepared for the worst, and that if she is doomed to fall, she will not fall without a gallant resistance. By the arrangements already made, four armies can be assembled at a very short notice, and all accounts agree that the composition of them is superior to any- thing which she has brought into the field for many years. I have the honour to be, &c. 274 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, September 30. 1807. Sm, I have the honour of informing you, that on the 21st instant, the Russian commander conveying the troops from Cattaro to Venice, sailed for that port with his whole force, and that Commodore Campbell has remonstrated strongly against the proceeding. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, October 3. 1807. Sm, I yesterday received despatches for his Majesty's government from Sir Arthur Paget, dated from Te- nedos August 6th, and addressed under a flying seal to Lord Pembroke. As they contained no account of any progress in the negociation with the Turks, and as the packet is too large for conveyance through Germany by the post, I have forwarded it to Lord Granville Leveson. From Commodore Campbell, however, I learn that he had received intelligence from Lord Collingwood's fleet of September 4th, informing him that the nego- ciations were then going on, and that it was supposed they would have a favourable issue. Information has just reached me of a circumstance which, coupled with what you must undoubtedly have heard from St. Petersburg, may not prove un- important in its efFects. In consequence of the death of General Michelson, which took place about the time when the armistice was negociating between the Russian and Fsench armies, the Russian general CORRESPONDENCE, 275 officer next in command to him refused to evacuate Wallachia until the return of a courier who had been sent with despat ches to St. Petersburg to learn the Emperor's pleasure. The answer was received on September 13th, and in consequence of positive orders (as I am assured) the Russian s have now refused to execute this article of the treaty of Tilsit. A French courier passed through this place two days ago for Paris in great haste, with intelligence (it is supposed) to the above effect . You already know that on Au- gust 14th the Emperor Alexander wrote to Bona- parte complaining bitterly of the delay in evacuating the Prussian states, and of the heavy contributions imposed on them. If the politics of the Russian Cabinet could be judged of by any rule of reason, the probability would be that the order for the non- evacuation of Wallachia had been given in conse- quence of the conduct of France towards Prussia; but their own conduct in the Adriatic forbids me to entertain this belief, or to hope that any good will result from this apparent misunders tanding. I just learn that they have sold all their military stores to the enemy, and that the Russian commander who convoyed the garrison from Cattaro to Venice has now sailed for Corfu to assist in establishing the French in that and the other islands. I have the honour to be, &c. TJie same to the same. (Separate.) Vienna, October 3. 1807. SlR, I am sorry to acquaint you that by orders from Lord Collingwood, Commodore Campbell is obliged t 2 276 CORRESPONDENCE. to quit the Adriatic with the squadron under his command. For the present, therefore, no English ship of war will be left in that sea, and the inter- course between the coasts of Italy and Dalmatia and the Seven Islands will be completely re-established. This intelligence disconcerts for the present any plan for an attack on those Islands by a small force ; but I shall nevertheless pursue the object mentioned in my despatch No. 49., and collect all the information I can, in order to facilitate the measure when it shall be judged practicable. It appears that Lord Colling- wood is apprehensive of an attack upon Sicily, but, by what Count Stadion tells me, the French are by no means in sufficiënt force to make the attempt. On September 25th, I sent Mr. Summerer with de- spatches to Sir Alexander Ball, inclosing him a memoir relative to the present state of the Seven Islands which had been drawn up and put into my hands by the person alluded to in my No. 49., and I accom- panied it with a letter, recommending an attack par- ticularly on Cephalonia, if a sufficiënt force could be spared for such an enterprise. Some movements in favour of the English have already taken place at Zante ; but they have been suppressed, and I have recommended most strongly to my correspondent that no manifestation whatever of the public senti- ment should be made until matters are sufficiently prepared for a concert between the inhabitants and a British force. The operations recommended by this gentleman are first to attack Cephalonia and Zante, and then to form the blockade of Corfu, which must in the end belong to the Power which possesses the dominion of the sea. I have the honour to be, &c. CORRESPONDENCE. 277 The same to the same. Vienna, October f. 1807. SlR, Ha ving learned that the courier expected from Paris had arrived, I again waited upon Count Stadion, in order to ascertain more exactly than I had been able to do in my former conference, the nature of those objects which are at present under discussion with France. I am still unable to state them to you with as much precision as I could wish ; but I learn from him in general that no fresh pretensions have been advanced, and that the discussions, on whatever point they may turn, are likely for the present to end amicably, although not satisfactorily. His expression on this point was remarkable. When I repeated the question in my No. 51., namely, what course France appeared likely to pursue towards Austria, he answered that he could not exactly teil, but that " tant bien que mal les affaires s'arrangeront." As he informed me that he expected very soon another courier from Count Metternich, I thought it as well not to question him closely respecting the two points to which this expression of tant bien que mal most probably refers, namely, the restoration of Braunau, and the reduction of the Austrian army. But I gave the conversation a more general turn, in order to reason with him on the policy of coming as soon as possible to a good understanding with Eussia, which you have so forcibly urged in your despatch to Lord Pembroke of August 7th. On this ground I could advance but little ; and when I mentioned to him, according to the tenor of your instruction to his Lordship, that he was at liberty to communicate through Count Meerfeldt to the Russian government the views entertained by his Majestv of the perma- *t 3 278 CORRESPONDENCE . nent and unalterable policy of Europe, he answered by a direct refusal to take any step of that nature at the present moment ; feeling, as he declared, tho- roughly satisfied that its effect would be to widen the breach which exists unfortunately in the European system, to unite Russia still more closely with France, and more especially to exposé Austria to the imme- diate vengeance of Bonaparte. All I could get him to agree to was the fact that the interest of the re- maining states of Europe was still the same, and that no jealousy of Russian aggrandisement ought to stand in the way of a more close connection with her when- ever there appeared a reasonable degree of stability in her councils. From another quarter on which I place much re- liance, I am informed that the matter immediately in agitation between Austria and France is the sur- render of Braunau, and that the Duke of Wurtzburg is charged with the negociations for this purpose at Paris. The answer which was at first given by Bonaparte was, that he would surrender Braunau as soon as the Austrian army should be put on the footing of peace, and the different regiments were retired into cantonments. From Count Stadion' s communication to me, I can scarcely hope that any more favourable answer has been since received. I have also been informed that the number of Russian troops on their frontier nearest to Warsaw has of late been augmented, and this to such a degree as to occasion very strong remonstrances on the part of General Davoust. By accounts of the 1 lth ultimo received from Con- stantinople nothing had been concluded between Sir Arthur Paget and the Turkish ministers. I have the honour to be, &c. COERESPONDENCE . 279 The same to the same. Vienna, October 14. 1807. SlR, Nothing of moment has occurred at this place since I had last the honour of writing to you. There are no accounts from Constantinople which can be depended upon. I am informed, but cannot entirely rely upon my authority for the truth of it, that the Ëussian prisoners in the interior of France are to be marched into Italy, and added to the garrisons of Corfu and Cattaro lately landed at Venice. The whole Russian force in Italy would then amount to about 30,000 men. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, October 17. 1807. Sm, Axthougu I have no certain information, I think it right to acquaint you that a very strong report is current here that the definitive arrangements respect- ing Italy are at length settled as follows : — the Milanese to be incorporated with France — Venice to be the capital of a new maritime kingdom to be called the Kingdom of the Adriatic — and the dominions of the Queen of Etruria to be given to M. Baciochi. I mentioned this report to Count Stadion, partly with a view of discovering whether he had himself any authentic information on the subject of the in- tended changes, but from his answer I am led to be- lieve that he has none. He told me that his reason for doubting the truth of those which I had mentioned t 4 280 CORRESPONDENCE. was, that fresh proposals had been made to Lucien Bonaparte to establish him in Italy, and that it was scarcely probable that if he accepted them, the domi- nions allotted to him would be inferior in extent or value to those given to his other brothers. I think it clear from this answer that Count Stadion is unin- formed of the projected arrangements, if any indeed be yet agreed upon. The establishment however of a naval power in the Adriatic by the enemy is a design so probable in itself, and one in which so great a progress is already made by his possession of Dalmatia, of Corfu, and of the adjacent islands, that no assidnity on the part of those who are intrusted with his Majesty's interests in this part of the world ought to be spared to counteract it. My attention will be unremittingly directed to this object; and I have the satisfaction of acquainting you that by a letter just received from Commodore Campbell, dated Lessina, on the 2d instant, in which he acknowledges the receipt of my despatches to Sir Alexander Ball (mentioned in my separate of the 3d instant), it appears that our cruisers are indefatigable and very successful in preventing the entrance of re- inforcements into Corfu. Commodore Campbell, to whom I sent the above despatches under a flying seal, agrees perfectly in the necessity of our becoming masters of this island ; but he says it will now require a blockade and a siege to take it. The others, he thinks, would easily fall into our hands. I am in great hopes therefore, that Sir Alexander Ball may be able to spare a small force before the French can throw in a sufficiënt body to take complete possession of them. The only thing to be feared is, that they will contrive to get the assist- ance of the Russian admiral for that purpose. Whether it be in his instructions or not, to favour the French so far, is more than I can find out ; but at all events CORRESPONDENCE. 281 I shall again enforce upon Prince Kurakin's attention (which I have the means of doing very efficaciously) the necessity of Russia observing the most exact neu- trality in the Adriatic if she wishes to avoid a rupture with Great Britain. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, October 21. 1807. » SlR, The post from Constantinople of the 3d instant has brought no accounts from Sir Arthur Paget; I have however the best reason for believing that the Turks are mostanxious to make peace withhis Majesty, and that they are only prevented by the menaces of General Sebastiani. I have also reason to believe that some hostile demonstrations against the Turks on the part of France are apprehended by this Court. The demand of a passage for French troops through Croatia, if it has not already been notified, is certainly expected to be made, and I fear will be granted. A courier was despatched yesterday to St. Peters- burg, and I took the opportunity of writing to Lord GranvilleLeveson, in clear, informing him of the above circumstances. M. Pozzo di Borgo is arrived at Vienna after the unsuccessful termination of his mission to the Port e. I have the honour to be, &c. 282 C0RRESP0NDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, October 24. 1807. SlR, I am still without any accounts from Sir Arthur Paget; but according to some private advices received here from Constantinople, of the 3d instant, it does not appear that any progress had been made in the negociations for peace eitherwith his Majesty or with the Emperor of Russia. These advices state that the chief Dragoman of the Porte had been beheaded ; together with the extra- ordinary fact that the negociations for peace between Russia and the Porte had, through the influence of the French ambassador, been transferred to Paris. The beheading of the Dragoman is explained as follows : — the Turks had obtained information of some secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, containing stipulations for the eventual partition of their empire in Europe. The knowledge of their danger having disposed them to conclude peace with his Majesty, Sir Arthur Paget had profited by this disposition to sign an agreement with them by which a mutual good understanding was essentially re-established, although it could not, with safety to the Turks, be openly avowed. The secret of this transaction was betrayed by the Dragoman (Suzzo), in consequence of which he had been beheaded. The march of French troops into Dalmatia by the road of Trieste is becoming serious. Ten days ago about 800 passed, and they will be foliowed by other detachments. Being no longer supported by the Russian mission, any representations I might make to the Austrian government on this subject would be CORRESFONDENCE. 283 fruitless, and perhaps even prejudicial. I am aware however, that in the event of peace with the Turks, or the capture of Corfu by his Majesty's forces, it may become necessary to ascertain distinctly what degree of succour his Majesty's enemies will be per- mitted to derive from the resources and position of the Austrian territory. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, October 28. 1807. SlR, I have no other information to transmit to you by this post except that a further corps of 1,200 French troops were to pass by Trieste into Dalmatia, on the 22d instant. The occupation of Bosnia, and even Belgrade, by their armies seems at no great distance. How Austria can suffer this it is difficult to conceive, but how she can resist it is still more so. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same, Vienna, October 31. 1807.* SlR, Having been informed by Mr. Stanley that two Russian frigates had been suffered to enter the port * Four days before the date of this, viz. on October 27th, Count Stadion had sent instructions to Prince Starhemberg, to offer us the inediation alluded to hereafter in my separate of Nov. 25. R.A. 284 COKRESPONDENCE. of Trieste, I asked immediately for an interview with Co unt Stadion, in order to learn from him whether orders had been issued for the re-admission of the British flag into the ports and harbours of Austria ; and I thought it expediënt likewise to take the oppor- tunity to ascertain whether any fresh engagements had been entered into between the Austrian govern- ment and that of France since my conversations with him on the 30th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, of which I had the honour of transmitting you an ac- count in my despatches, Nos. 51. and 53. It is with the deepest concern that I now commu- nicate to you that from what passed at this last in- terview, I can no longer doubt that arrangements are on the point of being concluded with France, involving not only sacrifices of territory on the part of Austria, but the sacrifice, virtually, of her independence. Having first obtained an acknowledgment from Count Stadion, respecting the re-opening of the Austrian ports to Russia, and likewise that no orders had been issued for the admission of British vessels, I asked him (although in terms the most amicable) in what manner I should represent these facts to his Majesty's government. Count Stadion's answer was, in substance, as fol- lows : — He assured me that Austria had by no means be- come the ally of France, although the preponderance of that Power, and the immediate dangers to which the country was exposed by it, rendered a compliance with almost any demands she might make absolutely necessary for the moment. He told me that the peace of Presburg was made with a view of saving Austria as an independent nation, but that the peace of Tilsit had rendered their situation so much worse, that they must now consider only how they could preserve their existence. To this system he CORRESPONDENCE . 285 said they were reduced by the certainty, that if war were again to break out with France, they should receive no assistance from any quarter ; and he hinted that, on the contrary, there were Powers ready to avail themselves of any fresh embarrassments to which Austria might be put. He added, also, that their internal situation was another motive for sub- mission. Such being the circumstances, Count Stadion in- formed me that he would communicate to me in a few days the extent and nature of the sacrifices which had been exacted by France, and with which they should be under the necessity of complying ; but he told me that it was not then in his power to state them to me more distinctly. Having ascertained that this short delay would afford no additional advantage to the enemy, in any designs he might entertain upon the property of his Majesty's subjects at Trieste and Fiume, I thought it most expediënt to close the conversation, reserving any observations I might have to make upon what Count Stadion had told me to the period he had fixed for his more detailed communication. I did not omit on this occasion to inquire concern- ing the march of so large a body of French towards Bosnia, as appeared, by the accounts I had received, to be passing through the Austrian territories. It is Count Stadion's opinion, that the occupation of that province by the French is a matter concerted with Russia, and he joined me in apprehending that Bel- grade also would soon be in their possession. It cannot, I think, after this be doubted that the sacrifices on the part of Austria, of what nature so- ever they may be, will be limited only by the will of Bonaparte; nor should I be the least surprised, from the peculiar stress laid by Count Stadion upon the word " Independence" at receiving a notification 286 CORRESPONDENCE. that the functions of a British minister at this Court had ceased. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, November 11. 1807. SlR, I have at length received some information which may be depended upon, although it has not been given me by Count Stadion, relative to the engage- ments which have recently been entered into between this Court and Bonaparte. According to this information, a fresh * convention has been concluded, by which a free passage is granted to the French troops through Croatia, with- out any limitation as to number or time. Gradesca, and a portion of territory in its neigh- bourhood, is to be ceded. The exclusion of the British flag from the Austrian ports and harbours is to be continued. In return for which sacrifices, Braunau is to be restored to Austria. ïhere is an affectation of not communicating this convention, or its contents, officially to me until the return of a courier from Paris with the ratification of it. Until then, indeed, Count Stadion would pro- bably find it difficult to assure me that the above concessions comprised the whole of the demands of France. I have the honour to be, &c. * The convention of the Isonzo. CORRESPONDENCE . 287 The same to the same. Vienna, November 11. 1807. SlR, If the sentiments of the Russian Cabinet towards Great Britain may be guessed at with any degree of probability by the conduct of Prince Kurakin towards myself, I have some hopes that they are improving. Since my interview with that minister on September the 14th, on which occasion I was under the necessity of stating very freely my opinion (always guarding it with the qualification of its being my individual opinion) respecting the new system Russia seemed disposed to adopt, I have had no intercourse with him whatsoever. It were useless to trouble you with trifling details on matters merely ceremonial ; I wili, therefore, only inform you that finding my attentions not answered as they ought to have been on his side, I judged it right to observe at least an equal, and a still more marked distance on mine. The result has been, that yesterday he sent M. Pozzo di Borgo (who is rendering us the most essential service) to make all the advances I could desire towards establishing an amicable intercourse between us. I yield to them with the greater readiness, as there is reason to believe that he will soon be prime minister at St. Pe- tersburg, and as it is certain that at this present moment the Emperor Alexander listens to him more than to any other person. Through a channel on which I can confidently rely, I learn that what is called in the cant phrase of the day, " the liberty of the seas," is considered by Russia as the sole obstacle to peace with us. Bo- naparte has persuaded the Emperor Alexander to devote himself to this object. Most powerful reasons have been urged to Prince Kurakin, to convince him 288 CORRESPONDENCE. not only of the impossibility of ever extorting from Great Britain her assent to the system which goes under the name of "the liberty of the seas," but likewise of its total inutility to Russia in any view either of policy or of commerce. These reasons, although not of a nature to be justly appreciated by Prince Kurakin, are, I know, transmitted to St. Petersburg. Another great point is the convincing him that the peace of Tilsit, which he considers as the masterpiece of modern diplomacy, is not likely to be executed by France in any of its essential articles. He already confesses that he cannot comprehend what France is about, but that he hopes for the best. As among the reasons rnentioned by him to Mons. Pozzo for his wishing to be on good terms with me, he has alleged that many things might be explained through us which could not be explained through Prince Romanzow, I have, of course, an additional motive for accepting and returning his civilities. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, November 18. 1807. Sm, By accounts which have reached me both from Trieste and Fiume, and which mention the arrival in those ports of several vessels from Malta and Sicily, it appears that our troops from Alexandria, whose arrival at Messina I rnentioned in my despatch of the 7th instant, sailed from thence on October 26th (without having landed), on a secret expedition. Lord Collingwood was off Syracuse on October 28th, with ten or twelve sail of the line, waiting for the transports, which are stated to be about fifty in COKRESPONDENCE. 289 number. Reports are already circulated oi his having taken Corfu. Although this last intelligence is probably pre- mature, I have thought it highly expediënt to send off without delay to Lord Collingwood the person whom I have already had the honour of describing to you in my despatch, No. 49., and who since that period has been occupied in carrying on such correspondence in Zante and Cephalonia, as may facilitate the expulsion of the enemy from the whole of those islands, and their settlement under his Majesty's protection. It is expediënt that this person should reach Lord Collingwood immediately ; but if he were to proceed openly to the neet, his whole property would in- stantly become the forfeit, and the most successful issue of the enterprise would scarcely afford him an adequate indemnification. What we have concerted, therefore, is as follows: — that he should embark at Fiume and make the best of his way to Zante, and that after having seen and concerted his measures with the leading persons there and at Cephalonia on whom he can depend, he should re-embark and con- trive to get taken by some of Lord Collingwood's cruisers. I shall furnish him with the necessary passports to Lord Collingwood, who will be able to compare his own information with what he may re- ceive from this gentleman. The reduction of the fortress of Corfu will, I am afraid, be the work of some time, although by the vigilance of our cruisers, several detachments of French troops have been intercepted in their way from Otranto. For whatever difficulty his Majesty's forces may experience in obtaining possession of this island, we shall have to thank the Russians, who sold to the French an immense quantity of military stores before they left it. In this, therefore, as in every similar case, and particularly when we look forward u 2 90 COEKESPONDENCE. to the future condition of the world under any pos- sible arrangement with France, to secure the con- fidence and attachment of the inhabitants of the Seven Islands will become highly important. The assistance which this sort of possession would afFord to his Majesty's arms in time of war, especially if a good understanding be cultivated with Ali Pacha, and the commercial advantages to be derived from it in peace, are of a nature too obvious to require demon- stration ; but I learn from my informant that a great party spirit prevails there, that Russia and France have each their several factions, and, in short, that whatever footing we may obtain even by conquest, we can only preserve by the greatest degree of ma- nagement and conciliation. It has been suggested to me that the connection with Great Britain would be best maintained by preserving the Eepublican go- vernment, and assimilating its administration as much as possible to that of Malta. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, November 25. 1807. Sub, I yesterday received a despatch from Lord Gran- ville Leveson Gower containing a copy of the note presented to his Lordship on the 8th instant by Count Romanzow, accompanied with information that he was about to quit St. Petersburg without delay. I despatched a messenger to Lord Collingwood with this intelligence a few hours after it reached me. I have the honour to be, &c. CORRESPONDENCE. 291 The same to the same. Vienna, November 25. 1807. SlR, In consequence of the communication made to me by Lord Granville Leveson Gower, I thought it ne- cessary to see Count Stadion in order to learn from him what were the intentions of this Court with regard to its future relations with Great Britain. On this occasion his Excellency acquainted me for the first time* that a distinct demand had been made by France that Austria should make common cause with her, 'and put an end to all diplomatic relations between our two countries. He informed me that this demand was accompanied by a threat of im- mediate war if not complied with, and that in the present condition of the Austrian monarchy, and the almost hopeless state of Europe, the Emperor had found himself compelled in some degree to yield to ifc, if his mediation to restore peace which he had again offered, were rejected. With expressions of the most lively sorrow (which I have no doubt are sincere), Count Stadion assured me that no concession which his Imperial Majesty had been called upon to make during the whole course of his reign, afFected him more deeply than the measures which had been extorted from him upon this occasion. He excused himself for not having communicated this transaction to me at an earlier period. On my urging him however, by all those considerations of amity and common interest which still subsisted be- tween the two countries, to give me due notice of any determination which might be in view, in order that I might take the necessary measures for protecting * See the preceding Despatch, Oct. 31. u 2 292 CORRESPONDENCE . the persons and property of his Majesty's subjects, he not only promised me the most unreserved confidence in this respect, but expressed his wish to concert with me the means of keeping up a sincere and friendly understanding should Austria after all be obliged to submit to the hard necessity of suspending her os- tensible intercourse with his Majesty's government. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, November 28. 1807. SlR, The accession of Russia to the system and views of France appearing to be likely to extend its effects to the remotest countries, I have thought it my duty to transmit to Lord Minto* an account of the principal transactions which have taken place in Europe since the Peace of Tilsit, and I have inclosed for his Lorcl- ship's information a copy of Count Romanzow's note of the 8th instant to Lord G. L. Gower, and of Lord G. L. Gower' s answer. It has appeared to me the more necessary that his Lordship should be apprised of these events (especially of the change of system in the Russian Cabinet), from my having had frequent occasion to notice within this last year the activity with which the enemy has been carrying on his intrigues with the Court of Persia. I was also assured in the course of last week, and previously to my receiving Lord G. L. Gower's de- spatches, that the intention of attacking the British possessions in India through Persia had been seriously resumed. * Governor-General of India. See Appendix. CORRESPONDENCE . 293 A plan for such an attack was undoubtedly formed during the life of the late Emperor of Russia. I have seen it in the possession of Sir John Coxe Hippesley. Visionary as it may have appeared at that period, it must afford matter for serious consideration now, when the subjugation of the European Continent, and the alliance of France with Russia, have removed the first material obstacles to its success. My despatch was inclosed to Sir Alexander Ball, whom I requested to forward it by the most ex- peditious conveyance to the Governor- General at Calcutta. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, December 5. 1807. Sir, Count Stadion has at length imparted to me the despatch which he wrote to Prince Starhemberg on October 27th, in which the Emperor of Austria renews to his Majesty the offer of his mediation to restore peace. After reading it over by Count Stadion' s permission, I could no longer wonder at his reluctance to com- municate to me the full extent of the submissions which this government thinks itself under the neces- sity of making to the enemy ; submissions of which, although it was impossible for me to know the precise details, I have not been disappointed on learning the result, as my despatch of October 31st will evince. The communication being confidential but not official, I contented myself with stating my opinion with regard to the success to be expected from such u 3 294 C0RRESP0NDENCE. an offer while Great Britain continued to enjoy remnant of her ancient spirit or independence. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, December 12. 1807- SlR, As no courier has yet arrived from Paris, the de- parture of Count Stadion for Buda, where the Em- peror is gone to close the Diet, will prevent my receiving any official communication from him until his return on the 17th. By accounts of November 18th from Corfu, no attack had then been made on that island, nor was Lord Collingwood in those seas ; and I am also sorry to learn that the messenger I despatched from hence on November 24th to his Lordship with an account of the Russian declaration, did not embark at Trieste until the 4th instant, owing to contrary winds. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, December 30. 1807. SlR, I have just received information on which I can depend respecting a transaction in Italy, which, if it produce no immediate good effect on the conduct of the Emperor Alexander, will at least afford him ample proof of Bonaparte' s dispositions, and of the degree of estimation in which he holds his new allies. On his road from Venice to Milan he feil in with a corps of Russians encamped somewhere near Yerona. CORRESPONDENCE. 295 These troops were proceeding towards the Austrian frontier in their way to their own territories. At the sight of them Bonaparte flew into a violent passion, inquired why they staid in Italy, and gave orders that they should be told instantly to continue their march. The Russian commanding officer explained that he was following the route assigned him, and for which provision had been made by the Commissaries appointed to regulate their march. Bonaparte became still more violent upon this answer, insisted on their instant departure, and exclaimed " Qu'on me débar- rasse de ces barbar es-la. " These commands having been signified to the Russian commander, he replied that he was acting under the orders of his Emperor, that he was responsible to no other Power, that he would not stir from his ground before the hour ap- pointed, and that if attacked he should defend himself to the last extremity. This intelligence has, I know, been received by Prince Kurakin. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, January 6. 1808. Sik, I have the honour of informing you that the mar- riage between his Imperial Majesty and the Arch- duchess, Mary Louisa Beatrix of Austria, was cele- brated this day at half past six in the evening. I have the honour to be, &c. u 4 296 CORRESPONDENCE. The same to the same. Vienna, January 9. 1808. SlR, At the Court which was held by their Imperial Majesties immediately after the celebration of their nuptials, some circumstances occurred with which, together with what foliowed them, I think it my duty to acquaint you. A material deviation from the ancient form took place in the admission of the ambassadors to the presence of their Imperial Majesties. Hitherto the nuncio had enjoyed the unquestioned precedence over all other foreign ministers, and the ambassadors have been called in, each in the order of his arrival. On the present occasion, the nuncio and the two ambas- sadors of Eussia and France entered the presence- chamber together. The Emperor, by what I have since learnt, addressed his conversation solely to the ambassador of France. At the supper of their Majesties, it is not usual for ambassadors to appear ; but the ministers of the second order are placed on his Imperial Majesty's right-hand, who from time to time signifies by his grand master his desire to speak with one of them. It is undoubtedly true that no order or etiquette is fixed, with regard to the priority of their admission to this honour ; but I am informed that it has hitherto been the usage, in consideration no less of the respect and veneration due to the person of his Majesty, than to the rank held by the British nation among the Powers of Europe, to call first to the British envoy ; and that if any deviation from this form has at any time taken place, it has only been in favour either of the Saxon envoy, as the oldest member of the corps diplomatique, or the Neapolitan envoy, in consideration of the family connection of the two Courts. CORRESPONDENCE . 297 I was, therefore, surprised and hurt to observe that, after the Saxon and Neapolitan envoys had respec- tively been honoured with the notice of the Emperor, the grand master called successively to his presence the envoys of Bavaria, Wirtemburg, and Prussia. For a moment I was in doubt whether it was fit for me to remain longer at the ceremony; but, con- sidering that a step so marked as that of retiring suddenly from the circle, would have put me under the necessity of exacting a reparation, which, in the present melancholy state of the affairs of Austria, it is impossible for her to make, I preferred a dif- ferent course, and waited patiently until my name was pronounced, which was after the Prussian envoy had retired. The next day, which was the day fixed for the presentation of strangers, I waited upon Count Stadion, and told him that, after what had passed on the preceding evening, it would be impossible for me to attend the circle unless I received some marked reparation for a neglect which I could not help thinking intentional ; and that, with this view, I required that, immediately after the ambassadors, I should be the first envoy spoken tobytheir Majesties, and admitted to present the English gentlemen who attended me. After some discussion between Count Stadion and myself, in the course of which he repeatedly assured me that there was nothing intentional in the circum- stance of which I complained, and that, if I pleased, he would say so in writing, he agreed to grant me the reparation I asked, and that in a manner suf- ficiently distinct to attract the general attention. I then further made a point of his arranging this matter himself with the Emperor ; and on receiving his pro- mise so to do, took my leave. I have the satisfaction of informing you that the 298 CORRESPONDENCE. promise was faithfully kept, and that immediately after the Russian ambassador, and before that of France*, I was spoken to by both their Imperial Majesties, and admitted to present the English gen- tlemen to the Empress. These circumstances, which in any other times would scarcely have called for a detailed communica- tion, may perhaps deserve the attention of his Ma- jesty's government in the present very critical situ- ation of our relations with the Continent, and with Austria in particular. I must not omit reporting to you that her Imperial Majesty expressed, on this occasion, the warmest and the most particular wishes for the long continuance of their Majesties' health and happiness ; and that, in the course of the evening, the Archduchess of Milan, with whom I had the honour of conversing, took every opportunity of testifying to me how deeply she feit, and how gratefully she remembered, the notice with which she was distinguished by their Majesties during her residence in England. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, January 20. 1808. SlR, Although in the present situation of suspense respecting the Austrian offer of mediation, it is not in my power to transmit to you any interesting in- formation immediately relative to this country, I receive from time to time various articles of intelli- * This was an attention on the part of General Andreossy, personal to myself. — R. A. CORRESPONDENCE. 299 gence, which it may not be wholly unimportant to communicate to you. Of this nature is what has just reached me from a quarter on which I can depend, relative to Bonaparte' s interview with his brother Lucien. It appears certain that what is called the kingdom of Etruria, together with the most considerable portion of the ecelesiastical States, including the city of Kome, was destined for Lucien. The folio wing is the substance and sum of his ans wer to Bonaparte's proposals : — 1. That he would accept no kingdom. 2. That he would not attempt anything against his brother, but that he thought it necessary at the same time to declare to him that he totally disapproved all he had done for these last four years. 3. That he would never consent to annul his mar- riage. The ill success of this negociation may partly account for the ill-humour Bonaparte manifested during his whole stay in Italy, and for his sudden return to Paris. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, January 23. 1808. SlR, Conceiving that, in the present state of the inter- course between Great Britain and the Continent, any information, however general, relative to the senti- ments and dispositions of Russia may be useful to his Majesty's government, I think it right to acquaint you that great dissatisfaction continues to prevail at Petersburg in consequence of the non-execution of the treaty of Tilsit by France. 300 CORRESPONDENCE. My sources of information on this subject are at Vienna ; and making due allowance for zeal, they are such as may be depended upon as far as they go. It is known here to the Russian embassy that France, and France only, prevents the conclusion of the Turkish peace, and the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Much of Bonaparte's conduct in Italy has been oïfensive to Russia ; and a considerable impres- sion has been produced by a declaration which he thought proper to make there : — " That no treaty now subsisted between himself and the Emperor Alexander." From Paris we understand that Bonaparte's pre- tended anxiety for peace with his Majesty is caused, not only by the difficulties he finds in reconciling the Emperor Alexander to the non-execution of the treaty of Tilsit, but by the necessity of obviating his Imperial Majesty' s disappointment on findirig that the rash declaration of November 8th has produced no other effect than that of involving the Russian empire in a war which no man believes she can sustain for twelve months. It is hoped from these general symptoms that the time is not distant at which an attempt may be made to dissolve the relations which subsist between these two Powers, and that, at any rate, the gigantic plan of uniting the whole Continent in active operations against Great Britain may be counteracted and finally defeated. In my next despatch I may perhaps be enabled to speak more fully on this point, and to submit to your approbation a measure* founded on the concluding * The clause in my instructions when going on my mission to Constantinople, and which Mr. Canning at my suggestion adopted, authorising me to be the mediator of a peace (if the opportunity should offer) between Turkey and Russia, was grounded on this state of things. — R, A. CORRESPOKDENCE. 301 part of his Majesty's declaration of the 19th of De- cember, which may eventually lead to the re-establish- ment of our amicable relations with Russia. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, January 27. 1808. SlR, The courier from Prince Starhemberg arrived yesterday from London with despatches of the lOth instant, and in the evening I saw Count Stadion, who communicated to me the state of affairs as they then stood between his Majesty's government and that of Austria. He informed me at the same time that he feared that in a very few days he should be under the ne- cessity of presenting a note to me declaring the motives which had led his Imperial Majesty to put an end to the relations subsisting between the two countries. Although fully prepared for this issue to the offer of mediation of October 28th, I must confess that it will be extremely painful to me to receive an inti- mation of this nature, without any instructions as to my conduct in a situation so full of difficulty and re- sponsibility. Notwithstanding what has passed, I am persuaded that it must be the wish of his Majesty's government to consider Austria as a Power to whom every facility should be afforded of resuming at a favourable mo- ment her amicable relations with Great Britain. You must be aware, however, how little can be effected towards this object by my mere personal and unas- 302 CORRESPONDENCE. sisted efforts, and that no plan of future correspond- ence or confidential intereourse, still less any pro- vident arrangement with a view of counteracting the enemy in his designs on Turkey, or of preventing the consolidation of a Continental league against Great Britain, can take place, unless under the sanction of his Majesty's government. I have the honour to be, &c. P. S. I have just heard that the French ambas- sador received four days ago a fresh order to insist* upon the expulsion of the English mission, and I know that he has complained of some pretended intrigues by which his demand has been resisted. Coupling the date of Bonaparte's message to England of the 3d instant with the probable date of Andreossy's iirst orders, you will observe that if his Majesty's go- vernment had listened to his offers, and if Austria had obeyed his commands (both of which were sent off at about the same period), he would have been by this time in a state of amicable discussion, and Austria in a state of positive hostility, with Great Britain. The same to the same. Vienna, January 30. 1808. SlR, Notwithstanding the present discouraging aspect of affairs, I shall not quit Vienna without an en- deavour towards the future re- establishment of our intercourse with this Court, and even for the renewal of those more general relations with other Powers which the present crisis has suspended.* * Letter to Count Stadion, February 22., on leaving Vienna. CORRESPONDENCE. 303 After discussing this subject under all its views with the persons by whose assistance alone any plan of this nature can be efFected, it appears that the first measure in any degree practicable must be to induce the Emperor Alexander to conclude the long depend- ing Turkish peace without the intervention of France. The terms of such a peace would be immaterial com- pared with the importance of taking the negociation for it out of the hands of Bonaparte. It is hoped that this peace may be brought about by prevailing on the Emperor to depart from his pre- tensions to Wallachia and Moldavia, and to be content with some augmentation to the security of his frontier on that side. The expectation of success in this endeavour is derived principally from what has passed at Paris between Count Tolstay and the French government, and from the increasing dissatisfaction which that minister expresses against Bonaparte, in his corre- spondence with his Court. It is also hoped that a peace concluded separately with the Turks may lead to a change of system at Petersburg with regard to any further partitions ; and that the Russian Cabinet, maturely weighing the danger of permitting Bonaparte to establish himself at Constantinople, may be convinced of the necessity (at least for the present) of supporting and upholding the Ottoman empire. On this measure it is hoped that the grounds may be laid for renewing amicable explanations between the Courts of Petersburg and Yienna; the motives to which are so obvious since the recent arrangements in Poland. It is not difficult to see that the re-establishment of anything that bears the resemblance of a good understanding between this country and Russia, must include the return to a certain degree of amicable dis- 304 CORRESPONDENCE. positions on the part of Russia toward us, and that it must at all events materially influence the conduct which Austria may adopt after the departure of the British Legation from Vienna. ïhere can be no doubt that Bonaparte's views lead to the formation and consolidation of a grand Continental confederacy, consisting of all the states under his influence, forced into one common bond of union, to subsist, even after a peace, against Great Britain ; and that to this con- federacy, Austria will be summoned to furnish her contingent both in men and money. I need not ob» serve how useful the friendship of Russia may prove in enabling her to avoid this last of disgraces. A material share in the protection of the Otto- man empire may be borne by Great Britain inde- pendently of any communication or private under- standing with either Russia or Austria. It is with this view that I again take the liberty of calling your attention to the occupation of Corfu and its depend- ent islands, as a point of considerable advantage, whether to prevent the conquest of the Morea by France, or to embarrass, in concert with Ali Pacha, the assemblage or subsistence of any large French army in the neighbourhood of Albania; or to dis- quiet the enemy on the shores of Italy ; or to assert and preserve our naval superiority in the Adriatic, or iinally, for such eventual disposal of them at a peace as the system of policy growing out of the new state of the world may then require. The attainment of these objects, although not suffi- ciënt of itself to recover for any of the Powers of Europe that entire freedom of action of which the peace of Tilsit has deprived them all, is yet consider- able enough to deserve the attention, and to animate the exertions of every man who remains faithful to the ancient cause. It is for this reason that the gentle- CORRESPONDENCE. 305 man * to whom I have offcen had occasion to allude in my correspondence, and who will be principally concerned in giving effect to the measures in contem- plation, will leave Yienna for Petersburg as soon as I receive from Count Stadion the notification of the ter- mination of my mission. I confess that I am anxious for his stay here until the arrival of the next and final courier from Prince Starhemberg, as I will not yet abandon the hope of receiving some instructions from you which may serve as a guide for his conduct as well as my own in this eventful moment. It was my intention to have stated to you more in detail his intended operations, but he is desirous for many reasons that they should be reserved for verbal com- munication. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, February 6. 1808. SlR, I have the honour to inform you that I this day received an official note from Count Stadion, acquaint- ing me that Prince Starhemberg had quitted London on January 20th, after having failed in his endeavours to induce his Majesty's Government to enter into ne- gociations for peace with France ; that all diplomatic intercourse, therefore, between Great Britain and Austria must be considered as broken off, and that he had the Emperor's commands to send me passports for my departure. In consequence of this communication I shall remain no longer at Yienna than will be necessary for me to learn how I can quit the Austrian territories, and * M. Pozzo di Borgo. X 306 CORRESPONDENCE. bring away in safety the cyphers and official corre- spondence entrusted to my care. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, February 7. 1808. Sm, It is very generally believed here, and it has been stated to me on such authority, and even accompanied by such particulars that the fact would appear scarcely doubtful, that a triple alliance between France, Russia, and Austria, is already signed for the partition of the Turkish dominions in Europe. According to this account, Austria is to furnish an auxiliary army of 60,000 men under the immediate command of General Bellegarde, and is to have Bosnia and part of Servia for her share. Some hostile incursions have already taken place on the frontier of the latter province, but on inquiry I find them to have been accidental, and that the Turks were the aggressors. What makes me doubt the fact of the actual signa- ture of the alliance is the great anxiety Bonaparte has all along shown that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, his reiterated and lately re- newed personal assurances to the Turks that not a foot of their territory should be wrested from them, and above all his not being ready himself for any attack on Albania or the Morea. Prince Kurakin also knows nothing of the matter ; and on his asking Count Stadion the other day what he was to under- stand from the rumours in circulation, he received for answer that they were totally devoid of truth. Putting all these considerations together, and adding CORRESPONDENCE. 307 to them the extremely bad terms on which Count Tolstoy has lived with the French government ever since his arrival at Paris, and his repeated complaints to his Court of the impossibility of getting Bonaparte to execute the treaty of Tilsit, it has occurred to the persons with whom I occasionally communicate on these and other matters, that Bonaparte may be pressing Austria forward at this moment with a view to make her the instrument of inducing Russia either to evacuate the territories in her possession, or to consent that Austria shall have Bosnia and Servia ; an alternative the first part of which he expects that Russia will readily accept rather than lose her influ- ence in Servia, or see the House of Austria in posses- sion of Belgrade ; while for his own part, and if he should fail of inducing Russia by these means to withdraw her troops, he has it always in his power to force Austria to grant him an equivalent on the side of Bohemia or Galicia for any augmentation of terri- tory he may permit her to acquire on the Turkish frontier. His promises to the Turkish ministers, however solemn and explicit, cannot it is true weigh for much ; yet it is singular that he should so repeatedly have made them, and within these two months have re- newed them (especially to so weak a Power as ïurkey), if there did not still exist some difficulties in the way of the iinal accomplishment of his projects which are increased by the continuance of a Russian army in a position that may be said to command Constantinople. With regard to the general consequences likely to result to Europe, and to Great Britain in particular, from the partition of the Turkish dominions, and es- pecially from .the possession of Constantinople by France, it were needless to offer you an opinion ; but there is one consequence attached to the attempt, x 2 308 CORRESPONDENCE. as well as to the success of the enterprise, to which I will shortly take the liberty of adverting. There is no doubt that the Turks will defend them- selves to the last man, and that whatever number of troops may be employed in reducing them, they may delay for a long time the conquest of their country. If succoured by a British force (and when the danger is evident and imminent they can scarcely be mad enough to refuse it), they may maintain themselves some months at Constantinople, and at the last sell it dearly to the confederates. Driven to the other side of the Bosphorus, they may become our most useful allies if any thing serious against our Oriental estab- lishments be to be apprehended from the side of Persia. This speculation I am induced to hazard as an additional motive for the occupation of Corfu, and for keeping up a considerable military force in Sicily, Malta, and other parts of the Mediterranean. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, Febmary 7. 1808. SlR, After receiving from Count Stadion the note of which I yesterday gave you an account, I called upon him for the purpose of obtaining explanations with regard to several matters to which, although I am not honoured with your instructions, the duty I owe to his Majesty will not allow me to be insensible. There is a matter most materially interesting to his Majesty's paternal feelings, concerning which I received instructions frcm Lord Howick in the month of De- cember, 1806. I greatly fear that it will not be in my power before my departure to arrange any sure CORRESPONDENCE. 309 plan by which his Majesty may receive information on so interesting a topic ; all that it is at present in my power to say, is, that ***** will remain at Lintz, and that every attention which the circumstances can admit will be paid to his correspondence. With regard to the persons and property of his Majesty's subjects, as the Austrian government does not consider what has passed to be a declaration of war, it is promised to me that they shall not be mo- lested. I have thought it my duty, however, notwith- standing this assurance, to explain to the English at this place how little they could rely upon any security for themselves after Austria had put an end to all in- tercour se with Great Britain. Six weeks ago I gave notice to the merchants at Trieste of this impending event. The arrangements which I am making provisionaüy, and until the signification of his Majesty's pleasure can reach Vienna, with regard to the gallant remains of the Condéan army, will receive from this govern- ment every facility which it may be in their power to afford. In these arrangements I am assisted in such a way as to exceed all praise, by the humane and disinterested zeal of the Bishop of Nancy. If accidents should pre- vent my explaining personally to his Majesty's go- vernment how greatly I am indebted to him for the furtherance of an object which they must have warmly at heart, I beg leave to recommend him to your pro- tection, more especially as the precarious and scanty means of subsistence which he has hitherto enjoyed are speedily about to be diminished, if not wholly suppressed. The great interests of the two countries, separated although they may be for the present, wil3 as far as possible be left in such a state as to feulitate any overtures to an accommodation, and to prepare the x 3 310 CORRESPONDENCE. way for any return on the part of Austria to a just and energetic system of policy. On this subject it is impossible for me to enter into much detail. It will suffice for your present information, tliat the recent marriage of his Imperial Majesty is an event propitious to views of this nature. All that remains for me now to acquaint you with, is that the Austrian government, desirous no doubt of testifying to the last their respect for his Majesty, has shown every attention to the British Legation which the circumstances admit of. Those circum- stances, however, are so new and embarrassing, and I feel so anxious that my public conduct should stand clear in the judgment of my sovereign, that I must trouble you with a statement rather more particular than would be justifiable if my private feelings were alone concerned. On being informed by Count Stadion that no des- patches for me had been given to any of the couriers who had passed from London to Vienna during the late intercourse on the subject of the mediation, and likewise that he knew of no means which his Ma- jesty's government might have provided, for bringing away in safety from a country surrounded. by~the enemy the cyphers and correspondence entrusjed to my care, I asked him how he proposed that I should leave the Austrian dominions, since it was neither consistent with his Majesty's dignity that I should re- main here after the note which he had delivered to me, nor possible for me to quit the country in safety while the enemy were masters of the Adriatic. He answered that the Austrian government would grant me every accommodation in its power, and with this view he offered me an Austrian frigate to convey me to Messina or Malta: but he suggested at the same time the necessity of my having a passport from the French ambassador. In the course of the same CORRESPONDENCE . 311 day I received a message from the Archduke Charles, placing the frigate entirely at my disposal, or offering to equip any other vessel (if their frigate should not be in readiness), and to givemea guardfor mybetter security, but accompanied with the same suggestion as to the passport. Having judged it highly improper to accept this part of his Imperial Highness's offer, and considering how little it was to be hoped that the cruisers from Venice would respect even a flag of truce, if they knew the English Legation to be on board, I trust that you will see the necessity I was under of sending off a letter to Sir Alexander Ball, explaining my situation to him, and requesting the assistance of an English frigate, if one could be spared consistently with the due execution of his Majesty's service. I think it my duty to state these matters to you, in order that if, after all, I should be under the necessity of destroying^ the.. cyphers and correspondence, his Majesty's government may be convinced I had no other choice left me except that of submitting to sail with them under the protection of a French passport. I have the honour to be, &c. The same to the same. Vienna, February 21. 1808. SlR, I have the honour to inclose you copies of Count Stadion' s note to me of the 6th instant and of my answer, as likewise of the note from Count Stadion, which accompanied my passports. I have the honour to be, &c. x 4 312 CORKESPONDENCE. Inclosure A. Count Stadion to Mr. Adair. Le Soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangères, a communiqué a M. Adair dans son tems les démarches dont M. le Prince de Starhemberg a été chargé par S. M. I. E. A. auprès du Cabinet Britannique, afin de 1'engager a donner la main a des négociations de paix sur des principes conformes au voeu des Pu- issances y interessées ; et il ne lui a pas caché des lors les conséquences qui résulteroient du refus de la Cour de Londres de donner suite a ces propositions amicales. Un courier arrivé de Paris venant d'ap- prendre a S. M. que les instances de M. le Prince de Starhemberg non seulement sont restées sans effet, mais que ce ministre a déja quitte Londres le 20. Jan- vier, le Soussigné se voit, quoique avec un véritable regret, dans le cas d'annoncer a M. Adair, que toutes Communications diplomatiques doivent être regardées comme rompues entre 1'Autriche et 1'Angleterre, et que son auguste Maitre lui a donné 1'ordre de dé- livrer a M. Adair, ainsi qu'aux personnes compo- sant sa mission, les passeports nécessaires pour leur départ. Le Soussigné a 1'honneur de renouveller, &c. &c. (Signé) Stadion. Vienne, le 6. Février, 1808. Inclosure B. Mr. Adair to Count Stadion. Le Soussigné a recu la note que S. E. Ie Comte de Stadion, ministre des affaires étrangères, lui a fait Thonneur de lui adresser le 6. de ce mois, et il n'a pu apprendre qu'avec la peine la plus sensible la CORRESPONDENCE . 313 résolution de la Cour de Vienne d'interrompre toute communication diploraatique avec celle de Londres. N'ayant recu de la part de son gouvernement aucun éclaircissement ou instruction quelconque sur les motifs qui auraient déterminé Ie Cabinet Britannique a ne pas se prêter aux ouvertures faites par M. Ie Prince de Starhemberg, Ie Soussigné se borne a exprimer a S. E. Ie Comte de Stadion tous ses regrets du parti que la Cour de Vienne s'est décidée de prendre en mettant fin aux Communications diplomatiques entre deux Puissances appelées par leurs interets mutuels a conserver entre elles l'harmonie la plus inaltér- able ; — parti dont la suite ne peut être que de per- pétuer ce système de désunion qui a déja eau se tant de malheurs a 1'Europe, et qui paroit destiné a les augmenter encore d'une maniere et pour un terme incalculable. Dans ces circonstances si affiigeantes, Ie Soussigné attendra les passeports que son Excellence a bien voulu promettre de lui expédier pour la légation Anglaise. Il saisit cette occasion, &c. &c. &c. (Signé) Robert Ad air. Vienne, ce 10. Février, 1808. Inclosure C. Count Stadion to Mr. Adair. La note que M. Adair a fait 1'honneur d'adresser au Soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangères, en date du 10. de ce mois, ne lui étant parvenue qu'hier, il croit ne devoir pas tarder de lui transmettre ci-joint Ie passeport que M. Adair attend pour se rendre avec la légation Anglaise de Vienne a Trieste. Le Soussigné s'empresse de le prévenir en même tems, que pour le cas oü le batiment Anglois sur lequel 314 C0RRESP0NDENCE. M. Adair compte s'embarquer, tarderoit d'arriver a Trieste, il y trouvera un batiment Autrichien con- venablement disposé pour Ie recevoir a son bord avec les personnes attachées a la raission, de même que leur suite, et que les précautions nécessaires seront prises d'avance pour faire respecter de toute facon Ie dit parlementaire dans son trajet, Ie Soussigné priant M. Adair de vouloir bien agréer Tassurance de sa considération tres distinguée. (Signé) Stadion. Vienne, Ie 20. Février, 1808. APPENDIX. APPENDIX. Mr. Adair to Mr. Fox. {Extract.) Dresden, June 2d, 1806. By Sir Arthur Paget's messenger, Smidt, you will have received the account that in consequence of the definitive refusal of Russia to evacuate Cattaro the ports of Trieste and Fiume are shut against British as well as Russian vessels. Connivance with the conduct of Austria to the utmost limits I know to be necessary in her present situation : but I request your most particular instructions as to the extent to which it can be shown in the possible event of the capture or detention of British vessels, or of the adoption of any measure affecting British property. &c. &c. R. Adaik. Mr. Adair to Sir Sidney Smith. Vienna, Jüne 28th, 1806. Dear Sik, It gives me great satisfaction to think that the situation to which his Majesty has been pleased to appoint me at Vienna may afford me the opportunity of corresponding with you occasionally, and of co-operating with you hereafter in some measures for the public good. Your receipt of this letter will ascertain whether I have chosen a safe and expeditious method of communication, 318 APPENDIX. and your answer to it may possibly suggest some method by which you can hear regularly from me in future. I must apprise you that I have no precise instructions upon the sub- ject ; but from my near knowledge of Mr. Fox, I can at the same time answer for it, that he will approve all my volun- tary exertions for the success of his Majesty's arms and councils. As the Neapolitan courier who is the bearer of this, together with the Commandeur de Kuffo's despatches for his Sicilian Majesty, is going off immediately, I have not time to inform you in any detail of the situation in which I have found our affairs at this Court. I must content myself with communicating to you that having been instructed by Mr. Fox to act with the Russian ambassador in the strictest union and confidence, I am in the habit of receiving from him in return the fullest and mpst candid Communications of all the Emperor Alexander's views for the common benefit. One of these views, I think it important for you to know, although in my opinion it will fail of success. It is that of endeavouring once more to open negociations with France for the restoration of a general peace. M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from St. Petersburg on the affair of Cattaro, has had passports for Paris from M. de Rochefoucault, and is now on his journey thither. In addition to which Lord Yarmouth has returned to Paris, where he arrived on the 17th, to co-operate with him, and see what can be done. With regard to terms, I have reason to believe that we shall make the restoration of Hanover and the evacuation of Dalmatia indispensable conditions of peace. It is with pleasure I inform you that by despatches of the 14th of this month, I learn that the Emperor Alexander adheres to all the principles of negociation laid down in the recent correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Talley- rand ; the chief of which is, that of listening to nothing without mutual communication, and concluding nothing with- out mutual consent. I shall of course be immediately ap- prised of M. d'Oubril's success or failure, and if we can devise any method of safe correspondence, will immediately let you know. I beg of you to command me in anything you may think of advantage for the King's service. Knowing how much APPENDIX. 319 you must occasionally take upon yourself in the command with which you are entrusted, without waiting to consult the government at home, it has appeared a point of duty with me to send you all such information as should reach me, which it is material for you to know. If the negociation should break off, the season for acting will come, and then you will instruct me confidentially with regard to those points which you would wish to press upon Russia, and also with regard to those where you think you can do better alone. Our policy is to keep this unhappy country from being exposed to a renewal of its sufferings. With the King of Prussia we are in a state of war; but the ports in the Baltic are not blockaded. The King of Sweden has rejected the Emperor Alexander's mediation between him and the King of Prussia, to whom he has proposed a personal interview. Believe me, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. Mr, Adair to Sir Sidney Smith. Vienna, July 29th, 1806. My dear Sir, I wrote to you on the 28th of last month. A Sicilian courier carried my letter with the Commandeur Ruffo's des- patches to General Acton. I mentioned to you in that letter the intended negociations between Russia and France for the restoration of a genera! peace, and likewise Lord Yarmouth's being at Paris to co- operate in that object, if a reasonable basis could be agreed upon. I likewise mentioned to you the terms on which I thought it likely we should insist as constituting such basis ; and I added that the Emperor Alexander had given us the most positive assurances of his adherence to the great prin- ciple of negociation laid down in Mr. Fox's correspondence with M. Talleyrand; namely, that of concluding no peace except by mutual consent. It is with great regret I now inform you that by a letter 320 APPENDIX. I have received from Lord Yarmouth of the 21st inst. it appears that a separate peace between Russia and France was signed at Paris on the 20th. The conditions are: — 1. The immediate evacuation of Ger- many. 2. The reciprocal guaranty of the independence of the Ottoman Empire. 3. Swedish Pomerania not to be at- tacked. 4. A secret article, by which Russia engages to obtain the consent of the King of Naples to receive Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica in exchange for Sicily. Thus you see we are once more left alone to carry on the contest, which I trust we shall do to extremity rather than subscribe to suffering France to gain possession of Sicily under any circumstances, still less under those of aiding in the forcible dispossession of its lawful sovereign of the re- mainder of his dominions. This conduct of Russia I can only attribute to the change which has lately taken place in the administration at Peters- burg ; Prince Czartorisky having resigned his office in con- sequence, I understand, of his having advised a more vigorous line of conduct than the Emperor Alexander was disposed to follow. I have entrusted this letter to Mr. Matthews, who is pass- ing through Vienna on his way to Sicily. Mr Matthews is private secretary to General Armfelt, and in the service of his Swedish Majesty. He brought me a confidential letter from Mr. Pierrepoint, dated Stralsund, July 16th. Mr. Fox has been ill, but on the 18th was very much re- covered. Since I began my letter, I have heard that Lord Yarmouth had delivered his full powers at Paris, and had opened the negociations ; at the same time I have received a cypher from England of which I inclose you the copy. I conclude from this that France has given way upon the point of Sicily. Yours ever, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 321 Lord Yarmouth to Mr. Adair. Paris, July 2d, 1806. Deae Sik, I think it right to give you the earliest intelligence of the great changes which the Cabinet of St. Cloud has determined to make in Germany ; by which you will see that the consti- tution of the empire is entirely destroyed. I do not give you these details as official, but as being such as I consider to be very accurate. Article 1. The dissolution of the Germanic Empire. Art. 2. The small immediate states situated in the circles of Bavaria, Bhine, and Westphalia, with the exception of the possessions of the Houses of Salm, Hohenzollern, Nassau Weilbourg, Nassau Usingen, Prince d'Isenbourg, Duc d'Aremberg, Comte de Leyen (who have found means to be peculiarly favoured), are to become dependent upon the greater sovereign states, which are to form a new federation under the protection of France. Art. 3. The arch-chancellor is to be the head of the union ; he is to present a plan for its organisation, and conclude an alliance defensive and offensive with France. Art. 4. The arch-chancellor will receive an augmentation of territory, and reside at Frankfort. And this determination of France is to be notified to the diet on the 15th of this month. I wrote to Mr. Fox yesterday, but was then ignorant of what I now communicate to you; indeed it has not been many hours determined upon. Gen. St. Vincent is so good as to send this letter by a courier he means to despatch to-morrow. I have the honour to be, Dear Sir, With great truth and regard, Your very obedient Servant, Yarmouth. 322 APPENDIX. Mr. Adair to Mr. Fox. (By Sir Arthur Paget.) (Extracts.) Vienna, July 18th, 1806. " I leave all farther explanations respecting the state of the Court, and particularly the footing they are on with Russia, to Sir Arthur, who is perfectly master of this, as well as of every other subject connected with his mission, and who, let people say what they will, is very much liked by the Emperor. Now to other matters : — In my despatch of July 3d, I mentioned to you that the Russian scheme about Dalmatia was likely to be viewed with great jealousy by this Court. If ever you get so far as this point in the negociation with Trance, which I greatly doubt, do you not think that it would be judicious to propose, in the first instance, the re- trocession of Dalmatia to the House of Austria? As a barrier to the Turkish Empire, it would be best perhaps in the hands of Russia ; but it strikes me that the proposal to give it back to Austria would have the best effect, even if it failed, of reconciling Austria to the Russian plan; which after all they could not dislike so much as its being in the power of France. Before I close this letter, which will not be for twenty- four hours, some account will probably be received from Ratis- bon ; and I will add in my postscript whatever it may be worth while to say. At present, although I am afraid that much can- not be done, I see enough of the effect which the formal ab- rogation of the old Empire will produce here, to augur some distant hope of bringing about an understanding between Austria and Prussia. This last Power has certainly not been consulted in the arrangements, and must feel almost an equal interest with Austria in resisting many of their consequences. A real good understanding between Austria and Prussia might pave the way, through Austria's mediation, to a recon- ciliation between England and Prussia, and if matters should be favourable, the joint guaranty of those Powers for Hanover; for I conclude we shall not think of accepting the guaranty APPENDIX. 323 of France for Hanover. These things, and much more, are upon the cards, if you have time and better health. You know by this time that Czartorisky is out. I under- stand that the reason is his having advised firmer counsels than the Emperor is willing to follow. &c. &c. &c. R. A. Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot. Vienna, July 29th, 1806. My dear Sir, I received your letter of the 27th uit. by Mr. Morier, who passed through Vienna on his way to England, on the 21st inst. He arrived here on the 19th. I had already written to you by the post of the 18th, in- closing a letter from Mr Fox's office. You know, I suppose, that on the 22d of June, M. d'Oubril went from hence to Paris in order to open ne- gociations for a general peace ; and that Lord Yarmouth, who in his way from Verdun to England had passed through Paris about the beginning of the same month, and had there received overtures from M. Talleyrand tending to a renewal of the negociations with us, which were broken off in April, returned to that place on the 17th of June with orders to listen to what might be proposed to him, and to act in all things in concert with M. d'Oubril. Lord Yarmouth was not to appear in any diplomatic character unless a reasonable basis of peace could first be agreed upon. It is with great regret that I now inform you that by ad- vices I have this day received from Lord Yarmouth, a sepa- rate peace between Russia and France was signed on the 20th inst. The conditions are — lst, the immediate evacuation of Germany. 2. A joint guaranty of the independence of the Ottoman Empire. 3. Swedish Pomerania not to be attacked. 4. A secret article, by which Russia engages to obtain the y 2 324 APPENDIX. consent of the King of Naples to abandon Sicily, and receive in exchange the Balearic Islands. Great Britain, therefore, is once more left alone to carry on the contest ; and as there seems every reason to hope that Sicily is in a good posture of defence, and the King of Naples determined to hold out, we have to fear no further extension, for the present, of the power of France in the Mediterranean. Mr. Fox has lately been extremely ill, but I am happy to say that all serious alarms are now over; by accounts from England, so low as the 18th inst., he was very much re- covered. I thank you very much for sending me the Constantinople despatches. They are indeed highly interesting. You give, as you always have given, the best advice. Believe me, dear Sir, Most truly yours, (Signed) E. A. P.S. I have heard, but not from Lord Yarmouth directly, that he was to produce full powers to open a negociation on the 21st inst., and since my writing the former part of this letter, I have received the inclosed communication from England. I conclude from it that France has given way about Sicily. E. A. Mr, Adair to Lord Granville Leveson Gower. Vienna, Aug. 16th, 1806. My dear Lord, I think it material to the public service to acquaint you confidentially with the result of some conversations I have had with'Count Stadion, in consequence of instructions I received from London, dated Jury 28th. Those instructions, as far as they relate to Eussia, are stated to me to be a summary of what have been sent to you, in consequence of M. d'Oubril's separate treaty, and as far as they relate to the Court of Vienna, to promise assistance in APPENDIX. 325 case the increasing demands of Bonaparte should force her once again to take up arms for her own defence. It is on this latter point that I have chiefly to write to you at present. I find so much discouragement still to prevail among those on whom the chief reliance for a vigorous conduct would naturally be placed, and so much indifference among the rest, that except in the last necessity, I can see no reason to believe Austria will depart from her pacific system. Count Stadion assures me indeed, that there is a point beyond which they are determined not to yield, and this is, the further cession of territory to France. I have reason to fear however, that upon another point of nearly equal im- portance to themselves, and of more importance to the neigh- bouring Powers, they will not be so resolute ; and this is, the passage of French troops through their territories. I will explain to you why I think so. Upon the signature of the preliminaries by D'Oubril, it appeared to me that he had exceeded his instructions ; that consequently the Emperor Alexander might refuse to ratify the treaty, and that then Bonaparte would seize the pretext afForded him to pour his whole army instantly into Germany. It seemed probable too, that he would insist upon Austria not remaining neuter, but most certain that he would demand a passage for his troops through Bohemia and Moravia. Now this, after what we know of French armies, would be nearly the same thing as the military occupation of those countries, and but another word for forcing Austria to take part with her in the war. These things considered, I lost no time in speaking to Count Stadion, and warning him of' the dilemma in which Austria, notwithstanding all her pacific inclinations, might eventually be placed. It is since this conversation that I have had it communicated to me that Austria did not feel herself in a condition to refuse the passage of troops to the French government. Under these circumstances it may be material for you to consider how far Russia ought to press for a more particular explanation of the intentions of this Court, in the event of the disavowal of D'Oubril, and the consequent renewal of the Continental war. Another point of my instructions relates to the Court of Y 3 326 APPENDIX. Berlin. Great dissatisfaction at the conduct of France in the arrangements concerning Germany appears to subsist in Prussia, and a counter-federation has certainly been proposed by her to Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark. Saxony has proposed to this Court its accession to the confederacy, and has received an answer in substance highly favourable to the project, but declining to act just now ; giving the Elector to understand however that such a time might come, and that then, although they had little to thank Prussia for, they would stand by her to the utmost if she should be attacked. Something surely may be grounded on these dispositions, especially as I have reason to think that we are ready, not only to pardon Prussia, but to assist her if she could be brought to act on any reasonable system. I have stated this also to Count Stadion, but he seems to have no hope of Prussia while Hangwitz is at the head of aifairs. I have nothing further at this moment to trouble you with ; indeed the subject of chief interest, both here and every where else, is the ratification, or not, of D'Oubril's preliminaries. Believe me, &c. &c. E. A. P.S. I hope you have received my letter * by estafette of the llth Jury. It related to the projected change in the Germanic Empire. E. A. Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot. Vienna, August 25th, 1806. Dear Sik, You will have heard without doubt from M. d'Italinsky that the Emperor of Eussia has disavowed M. d'Oubril, and refused to ratify the preliminaries he signed on the 20th of Jury at Paris. It will be additionally satisfactory to you to learn that he has done this entirely from his own sense of * This letter containing a copy of Lord Yarmouth's of July 3d (see supra) was entrusted to a Russian courier, but never reached its des- tination. — R. A. APPENDIX. 327 what was duc to the faith of his engagement with Great Britain, and without waiting for any representation from us. This honourable and decisive conduct will infallibly produce a renewal of the war on a very extended scale. You will have more difficulty than ever to encounter in your very laborious and important situation ; but I trust that you will be efficaciously seconded from home. Every efFort must now be directed to recover Dalmatia from France. I sent home by a courier yesterday a plan of operations against the enemy in that quarter, which had been given me by an officer who knows every part of the country and coast, and who is sanguine of success, if the Montenegrins be properly supported. The success of this enterprise may be greatly accelerated if we can get any assistance from the Porte ; the reverse, if France should succeed in getting her to declare openly against B-ussia. I need not say more to one so well informed and vigilant as yourself. It is not difficult I am afraid to anticipate the immediate effect of the renewal of the war in this part of Europe. The neutrality of Austria cannot long be preserved. The worst part is, that they may go on from concession to concession, until France has drained the country of all its resources. It is difficult however to advise them just at this instant to a contrary conduct: much will depend upon the success, and still more upon the character, when it can be discovered, of a measure now in agitation for uniting the northern states of Germany in a defensive and separate league. This measure is given out to be a counter-federation to that of the Rhine. Prussia has proposed it to Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark, inviting those Powers to put their armies immediately upon the war establishment, and offering to fur- nish herself 200,000 men. All this sounds very fine ; but when I remark to you that Hangwitz is still minister, and the only one the King consults, you will easily account for the doubts which exist as to the ulterior objects of the plan. This matter however must now be brought speedily to the test. Bonaparte is not a man who will suffer it long to be in doubt who are his friends and who are his enemies ; and I think it may reasonably be inferred, that if he allows the confederacy to go on, it is either an instrument of his own forging, or will be rendered one for his use. Y 4 328 APPENDIX. I have not heard lately from Paris ; but as Lord Lauderdale would naturally do nothing until the ratification of D'Oubril's treaty, that event not having taken place, it is most probable that both he, and the remainder of the Russian mission, will leave Paris at the same time. My last advices from London are of the 8th instant. Mr. Fox was then better, and his physicians had great hope of preventing the recurrence of his malady. Believe me, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. Mr. Adair to Mr. Elliott. Vienna, August 25th, 1806. Dear Sir, Having an opportunity of writing to you by a courier despatched by the Commandeur Ruffo to Palermo, I will now state to you more distinctly than I could in my short letter of the 24 th the important event to which I alluded. It is with infinite pleasure that I inform you that the Emperor of Russia has not only refused to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, but that he has utterly disavowed him, alleging that he transgressed both his instructions and his powers in signing it. The Emperor has indeed sent fresh pro- posals to Paris, but they are all so wide of Bonaparte's claims and expectations, that you may consider the renewal of hos- tilities as certain. The Emperor demands the evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by France, that Sicily, at least, shall remain to the King of Naples, and some indemnification agreed upon for the King of Sardinia. Above all, he refuses any peace with- out England. Think of Bonaparte having proposed, and D'Oubril having signed, an article by which the present King of the Two Sicilies was to be utterly set aside, and even the miserable indemnity stipulated for Sicily, viz. Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica, was to be given to his son with the title of King ! Our part of the negociation at Paris has in point of fact APPENDIX. 329 been suspended ever since D'Oubril's signature of the pre- liminaries with Russia. He acted so no-toriously contrary to his instructions, that we had scarcely a doubt of his being disavowed. We did not, however, trust to this, but sent out the strongest remonstrances to St. Petersburg. Lord Lau- derdale of course could do nothing except provisionally until the arrival of the Emperor's answer ; and that answer being what I have stated, I have no doubt that both he and what remains of the Russian mission at Paris will be ordered to leave it directly. The state of affairs however must now experience a ma- terial change all over Europe by this stoutness of the Emperor Alexander. The Continental war will probably be renewed upon a very extended scale. In this event the neutrality of Austria has no chance of being long respected. Bonaparte is tired of the peace of Presburg ; and on a renewal of hos- tilities with Russia, pretences will easily be found to force this unhappy country, either into a war directly, or into fresh sacrifices, and still more painful humiliations to avoid it. Immediately on my hearing of M. d'Oubril's signature, I thought it my duty to warn this Court of the possibility, in the event of his being disavowed, of their being called upon by Bonaparte to declare either for or against him ; that he would insist here upon knowing who were his friends and who were his enemies ; and that he would accept nothing as a proof of friendship which did not leave the whole resources of Austria at his disposal. The case supposed has now hap- pened, and I lament to say that nothing is prepared for resistance. The state of the army and treasury is such, that unless they can contrive to ward ofï the blow a little longer the worst consequences are to be apprehended. On the other hand, a measure is in agitation, of which I dare say you have heard something, the object of which is professedly to form a counterpoise to the Federation of the Rhine. All we know of it is, that Prussia has proposed to the Elector of Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark, to enter into a defensive league, and to put their forces imme- diately upon a war footing, Prussia herself furnishing 200,000 men. Prussia is in fact arming with great celerity. The treaty however goes on but slowly : its character is not yet understood ; indeed, as Count Hangwitz is still the minister 330 APPENDIX. at Berlin, great suspicions are entertained of its ulterior objects. I have hopes of procuring some light into this matter ; but before my information can reach me, it will pro- bably be developed by the course of events. If Bonaparte suffer the league to be formed within the reach of his army, it will clear up in my mind all doubts respecting its nature. If not, and it should go on in defiance of him, I should not even yet despair, notwithstanding all our misfortunes, of the cause of Europe. The Pope's nuncio was with me some days ago. His Holiness has been threatened with the loss of all his dominions unless he consents to join Bonaparte in a perpetual league against England. The nuncio assured me he had refused : on this I did not hesitate ofFering him an asylum any where under our protection. He might serve the common cause efficaciously, if any means could be found of securing his retreat to Sicily. I have been entreated by the nuncio to keep this commjinication secret, but it is fit that you know it, and likewise Sir S. Smith. Having no time to write to Sir Sidney, as the courier is now waiting for this letter, may I take the liberty of re- questing that you will communicate its contents to him ? My last advices from England were of the 8th inst. Mr. Fox was then going on as well as possible, and his physicians had great hopes of preventing the return of his malady. Believe me, dear Sir, &c. &c. &c. E. ÈL Count Starhemberg to Mr Adair» (Extract.) London August, 29th, 1806. My dear Sir, I cannot let my messenger go without thanking you for the two letters you wrote me, which both bear the stamp of that intimate friendship and confidence you promised me, and which I natter myself mutual inclination has created, and the reciprocal interest of our countries must enforce. APPENDIX. 331 My despatches chiefly relate to the agreement entered into between the British ministry and me about the remnant of our subsidies. I seize this opportunity to repeat again and again to Count Stadion how many reasons we have to be completely satisfied with the conduct of the present ministers, whose feelings, mo- deration — nay, even partiality for Austria, leave Mr. Pitt and all his colleagues at any period whatever, far behind them. If something is still able to restore the House of Austria to its former power and glory, it must be looked for in the closest intimacy and union of plans and principles with Great Britain. I entreat you to preach firmness and courage at Vienna, and exhort them to prepare their utmost energy for the great day of vengeance which will certainly present itself sooner or later. It would be quite unnecessary to recommend them to avoid for the present the renewal of hostilities. I am afraid I trespass a great deal on your time, but I was anxious to avail myself of this good opportunity. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) Starhemberg. Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot Vienna, Sept. 1806. My dear Sir, Mr. Mandeville arrived here on the 4th inst. and brought me your letters and despatches for government. Having no messenger in waiting I was obliged to forward them by my valet-de-chambre as far as Hamburg, where I can depend upon Mr. Thornton's taking the greatest care of them. I had a letter from Lord Lauderdale on the llth, dated September lst: he had not then heard of the non-ratification, but expected it. He seemed to think that there was no 332 APPENDIX. chance whatever of getting the French government to listen to any thing reasonable. As the conduct of the Emperor Alexander, especially that part of it in which he refuses to hear of any terms without England, would put him upon stronger ground, there was every reason to expect a speedy and an unsuccessful end of the whole. The only reason which gives a colour to a contrary specu- lation is, that this Northern confederacy wears a more serious appearance than was at first imagined. Prussia is arming in good earnest, and, what is more, has persuaded Saxony to arm too. Nothing can be more warlike than both her language and her posture. But somehow or other, not a man believes in her striking a blow against France. Be that as it may, Bonaparte perceives that it will require a lower tone than he has lately adopted to get rid of the embarrassments this new confederacy may cause him. He has accordingly in some degree adopted that tone towards Austria. It is so changed in this respect, that all immediate apprehension of his demanding a passage for his troops through Bohemia has subsided. Whether he will extend his modera- tion to the Powers with whom he is actually at war, and renew the negociation upon the terms proposed by Russia, remains now to be seen. I will not fail to let you know the moment any thing of a decisive nature occurs. You will soon hear of an attack on Cattaro by the French. They are so pressed in Calabria that they must endeavour to disengage themselves from the Montenegrins and Russians, or they will risk the loss of both their armies in those quarters. Your account of the battle with Regnier on the 4th of July was quite new to me. The difficulty of getting intelli- gence from the South of Italy, especially since the ports of Trieste and Fiume are shut to English vessels, is inconceivable. A story is just now circulated of General Stewart's having defeated Massena in the early part of August. There is a letter in town from Pisa to that effect, but I cannot trust to the writer's accuracy. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. • 333 Mr, Stuart to Mr. Adair. St. Petersburg, Aug. 30th, 1806 (N. S.). Sik, An unusual press of business at the moment which suc- ceeded M. d'Oubril's arrival from Paris prevented my early acknowledgement of yours by estafette. I am this day honoured with your letter, dated 1 8th August, and directed to Lord G. L. Gower. As the ambassador left St. Petersburg five weeks ago, and very material changes in the opinions and foreign politics of the Russian ministers have taken place since that period, I feel it incumbent upon me to communicate to you such details as may render you master of the views of this Court towards that of Vienna in the pre- sent crisis. The administration now in office commenced their career by a determination to cultivate the friendship of Prussia, and at all hazards to prosecute war against France to the south- ward, not only on the shores of the Adriatic, but by advancing a great part of the disposable force in Poland against Turkey without regarding the remonstrances of Austria, a Power which naturally would view with jealousy such an extent of her frontier exposed by the probable conquest of provinces, of which in the course of time she herself might have hoped to obtain possession. Since the refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, these senti- ments appear, however, to have given way to the expectation of organising such a resistance to France in the North of Europe, as may prevent the further progress of the enemy's encroachments in that quarter. Uncertain if the counter-federation planned by the King of Prussia is not a scheme originating at Paris, the request of a guaranty on the part of E-ussia has been hitherto coldly received ; and it has been alleged that the Emperor will wait until events shall develope the sincere intention of the Court of Berlin to oppose France before any proposition from thence (while Hangwitz is in office) will be sanctioned. At the same time they have received strong assurances of support in case of hostility, and it has been hinted that in the present state of affairs I should do well to cease my instances on the 334 • APPENDIX. Hanoverian question until the line to be adopted by Prussia shall be fully decided. It results from these causes that the aid, or at least the perfect neutrality, of Austria will become highly necessary. General Budberg therefore assures me that no measure will be pursued which can in any way commit the Court of Vienna; that whether actively fighting against France, or remaining a tranquil spectator, she is the left wing of the mass opposed to the common enemy, and even in the latter case 100,000 French will be necessary to watch her movements. I do not find the minister apprehensive that France may require a passage through Bohemia and Moravia. He argues that the preservation of the Austrian provinces in Poland are a stronger motive to induce her to withhold her consent, than any which can be urged from hence, for the same purpose. Should the French government actually commence hosti- lities against Austria, when the passage of troops destined to act against Russia shall be refused, M. Budberg asserts that every feeling of interest and honour will induce the Emperor to support the Court of Vienna with the most eifectual as- sistance in his power. The march of troops to Dalmatia, which was formerly with justice the cause of so much complaint, is no longer weighed upon with the asperity which was remarkable in the language of this government, at the time they refused every conciliatory offer on the part of Austria. I beg you will observe that the above reasoning is rather what I have heard from M. Budberg than my own opinion, and is merely the abstract of my despatches to the office for the last six weeks. If you conceive a regular correspondence will contribute to the advantage of the King's service, I hope you will be as- sured that so long as the business of this embassy is conducted by myself, I shall not fail to communicate whatever can be useful, although I have not the honour of your personal ac- quaintance. I am, Sir, With great truth and regard, Your most obedient humble Servant, Charles Stuart. APPENDIX. 335 Baron Hardenberg to Mr. Adair. (Copy.) a Tempelberg, Ie * de Sept. 1806. • J'ai recu la lettre dont vc-us avez bien voulu m'honorer en date du 19 de ce mois, Monsieur, et je me trouverai infini- ment heureux de travailler avec vous a établir la plus parfaite union de principes et de mesures entre nos deux souverains. Persuadé qu'il ne peut exister dans ce moment qu'un seul grand büt pour tous les deux, les autres objets devroient facilement s'arranger. Depuis huit jours Ie Hoi est a Parmée : il ne me reste donc que de rendre compte a S. M. de ce que vous venez de m'écrire, et d'attendre les ordres dont elle daig- nera me munir, d'autant plus que des pour-parlers ont été entamés entre Ie Baron de Jacobi et M. Thornton a Ham- bourg. Le traite de Potsdam conclu sous des circonstances tres différentes entre la Prusse et la Russie, ne pourra guère servir de base aux arrangemens a prendre entre nos deux cours, tant pour les subsides que pour les autres objets, quoique 1'esprit doive sans doute être le même. Mais il faudra toujours s'occuper d'un nouveau projet de traite, adapté a 1'état actuel des choses. En attendant les ouvertures ultérieures que vous me faites espérer, Monsieur, je ne man- querai pas de mon cöté de vous informer des intentions du Hoi mon maitre, aussitót qu'il aura plu a S. M. de me les faire connoitre. Agréez 1'assurance de toute la sensibilité avec laquelle j'ai reeu les témoignages de votre estime et de votre confiance et de la considération la plus distinguée avec laquelle J'ai 1'honneur d'être, &c. &c. &c. ( Signé) H ARDENBERG . * Date effaced, but it must have been about the 24th. — R. A. 336 APPENDIX. Mr. Adair to Baron Hardenberg. (Copy.) Vienne, ce 16 Oct. 1806. Je m'empresse, M. Ie Baron, de répondre a la lettre que vous m'avez fait Fhonneur de m'adresser de Tempelberg, et de vous communiquer 1'heureuse nouvelle que Ie Lord Morpeth, fils ainé du Comte de Carlisle, a été nommé par sa Majesté Britannique pour traiter directement avec Ie Cabinet de Berlin des grands interets qui ont motivé notre correspondance. J'espère tout de cette démarche de mon gouvernement, cependant j'aurois préféré que Ie Lord Morpeth n'eut pas quitte Londres avant 1'arrivée de mon courrier que j'avois expédié Ie 19 Septembre, jour oü j'ai eu Phonneur de vous écrire. Ainsi j'attends toujours la réponse a ma dépêche en date de ce jour-la, dont je ne manquerois pas, Monsieur Ie Baron, de vous rendre compte aussitót que je 1'aurois recu. J'ai Fhonneur d'être, &c. &c. &c. (Signé) E. A. Substance of a Letter f rom Mr. Adair to Mr. Stuart, dated Vienna, Sept. 30. 1806. Importance of establishing a correspondence between the British legations of Petersburg and Vienna, in the present state of our relations with the one, and of my hopes as to the other. That I had received the new cypher. Since the non-ratification (of D'Oubril's treaty), the French plenipotentiaries civil to Lord Lauderdale; and, since the Prussian armaments, Bonaparte smooth to Austria. That Prussia might be got to act, in her present good dis- positions, even with Hangwitz ; but, if Hangwitz continued minister, would they go on against reverses ? My instructions and the conduct of Russia agree exactly APPENDIX. 337 on the three main points of, 1. negociations for peace; 2. understanding with Prussia ; 3. advice to Austria to preserve her neutrality. Inclose a letter to Lord Douglas, requesting him to make nse of all the influence of the British legation to retain Count RazamofFsky at Vienna. Mr. Stuart to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, Oct. 9th, 1806. My dear Sir, I have been honoured with your obliging letter by a Russian messenger, and I am happy to assure you that the communication of its contents to the Russian minister, toge- ther with the assurances received from the Austrian ambas- sador, have been productive of the happiest effects. The jealousy which the progress of affairs in Turkey had already created between the two Imperial Courts has, I natter myself, been very materially done away by repeated repre- sentations of the necessity which renders politic the sacrifice of every other consideration to the more essential object of advancing the moment when war is to commence in the $orth of Germany ; and your letter was an evidence in favour of the language I have constantly held during the last three months. I have the satisfaction to inform you that an army of 64,000 men, under the command of General Beningsen, has orders immediately to march to Silesia to support the Prus- sians and cover Bohemia. This government hopes that a demonstration on the part of Austria, in the latter province, will prevent any hazard from operations of Bonaparte on their left flank. General Meerfeldt has endeavoured to satisfy them on this point, by showing that his Court is fully deter- mined to defend her own frontier by assembling an army so placed as to prevent the Russians being turned, in case such an operation should be threatened on the part of the French. The Court of St. Petersburg requires nothing farther from Austria at the present moment. z 338 APPENDIX. Major Krusemarck is arrived empty-handed, to the great disappointment of this government, who expected many Com- munications by his conveyance. It is generally supposed that this mission is a manoeuvre of M. de Hangwitz, by which that minister hopes so far to conciliate the Emperor as to avert any measure from hence likely to remove him from office. He will, ho wever, be mis- taken, as orders are sent to urge an immediate change in the Prussian councils. I am, and ever will be, With great truth and regard, Your obedient, humble Servant, Ch. Stuart. Mr. A. to Viscount Howick. Vienna, Oct. I7th, 1806. My dear Lord, No post from England having reached me since that of the 19th Sept., it is only from your despatches, brought by Donaldson, that I learn of your appointment to the Foreign Office. I heartily rejoice at it. In the sad scène that public life now exhibits, this, at least, is something to be pleased with. Sir Francis Vincent will put you in possession of all my private letters to our lost friend. I had not a thought con- cealed from him ; nor have I one on public affairs which I do not wish to lay open to you. All I ask is, that you will indulge me, as he did, with the liberty of speaking out. Your own judgment will determine afterwards the value of what I may say. On the present occasion I shall only call your attention to one point, on which you will see, by my secret despatches, I have been a great deal occupied. I mean my correspondence with Count Hardenberg. On being apprised of Lord Morpeth's mission, I thought it right to acquaint the Count with the fact that a regular nego- ciation had been commenced between our two governments, APPENDIX. 339 the result of which would determine whether they could agree upon those matters which had given occasion to our intercourse. My next suggestion to you is the importance of making use of all the influence we may have with the Emperor Alexander, to get Razamoffsky to be re-established as ambas- sador here. I know RazamofFsky's faults ; but they have been greatly exaggerated. He is thoroughly in the common inter- ests ; and such a man will be greatly wantod in the prosecu- tion of the long struggle of which we have the prospect. You will, I hope, approve of my sending off to Lord Morpeth a confidential letter, apprising him generally of the state of things here. It was necessary from what I know will be represented to him of the dispositions of Austria. Count Finkenstein is pressing them much too hard. At some moment of comparative leisure I shall have much to say to you upon the subject of correspondence. I have already established a personal correspondence with Constan- tinople, Petersburg, Stockholm, Hamburg, and Dresden. I am trying to establish one, through the North of Italy, with Sicily ; but this will be attended with expense, as men must risk their lives. If a general war should break out, I have another and a very extensive plan for a correspondence with, and operations in, Switzerland and the Tyrol. This I shall shortly submit to your consideration, apprising you, in the mean time, that I have no dealings with any but approved men, recommended by actions of distinguished and acknow- ledged merit. There is at this hour a great deal going on in Switzerland, which, if the French have one great reverse in Germany, will break out in spite of all attempts to hold it back. Nothing further occurs to me just now, except to inform you that your squadron is arrived off Venice. It was high time ; as the Russian admiral suffered the French, about three weeks ago, to transport 14,000 men by sea from Zara to Ancona, where they were marched to reinforce the army against Calabria. Cattaro is still in the possession of the Russians, who seem z 2 340 APPENDIX. to care about nothing else. It is again strongly given out that the Austrians are preparing to storm it. Believe me, my dear Lord, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. Mr. A. to Lord Morpeth. (Copy.) Vienna, Oct. 15th, 1806. My dear Lord, The messenger Donaldson arrived here the day before yes- terday with despatches from Lord Howick, announcing your mission, and communicating to me a copy of your instructions. I request you to accept my most sincere congratulations on the choice which has been made of you for this important charge. I cannot say how much it gratifies me. You will have learned, among the first confidential over- tures made to you, that the King of Prussia has applied in the strongest terms to the Emperor to join him in his present measures against France ; and that the answer has been that the extreme distress of the Austrian finances, and the abso- lute necessity of gaining time, as well to put them in order, as to raise their army to a proper degree of force, prevented them from departing at present from their neutrality, but that they would send 70,000 men into Bohemia in order to make their neutrality respected. This resolution has been notified to M. de la Rochefoucault as well as to the Prussian minister. I can assure you from the most attentive personal observa- tion that Austria can do no more. It is well that they do so much. You will observe that their troops are to occupy a position which covers the left wing of the Prussian army and protects Silesia; and I have accurate private inform- ation that this corps d'armée of 70,000 is already 90,000, and in a fortnight's time will be upwards of 100,000 men. Besides this there are armies in Styria and Anterior Austria of from 25,000 to 30,000 each ; and every exertion APPENDIX. 341 is silently making to get up to the complete war establish- ment. Independently however of their great pecuniary difficulties, there is one obstacle to their joining cordially with Prussia, which it is of the utmost consequence that you should know, and this is their deep distrust of Count Hangwitz, and their fear of the want of steadiness and perseverance in the King notwithstanding the confidence they place in his honour and in his present good dispositions. This point I find it most difficult to touch. On the one hand, the immediate junction of Austria might afford infinite advantages, and perhaps decide the fate of the war. On the other, it must be considered that this would be the last war in which Austria could ever engage, and that the total ruin of her House and Empire would be involved in its bad success. In- deed when we reflect that Hangwitz has the conduct of it, and full possession of the King's confidence, there is a most fearful responsibility in advising its being undertaken. Under these circumstances the course I have adopted for the present is as follows : — never to urge Austria beyond her strength, but to assure her, as I have done, by the desire of our lost and lamented friend, that whenever she chose to act Great Britain would support her to the utmost. * 7& 9fc ft $£ ^ % I leave it, my dear Lord, entirely to your discretion and judgment to determine upon the use you will make of this in- formation as a motive for inducing Prussia to accede to the just demands of his Majesty. I will only observe that it is the secret of the Austrian government, and that if it were communicated to that of Prussia plainly and directly, which is perhaps the only way in which it could produce any effect, there would always be the risk of its being divulged to France as long as Hangwitz and Lombard are the King's confidential advisers. This brings me to a point on which I am extremely anxious to have your opinion after you shall have had * I have not been able to recover frora the hrouillon of this letter the precise words of the paragraph which follows next ; but the substance of it is a distinct declaration from the Austrian minister to me, that all mis- trust of Prussia would be removed if she would give proper satisfaction to his Majesty on the subject of Hanover. — R. A. z 3 342 APPENDIX. time and opportunity to form one. What is really the truth about Count Hangwitz ? Is he in earnest in his present system of resistance to France? or is there any "dessous des cartes " in his game ? Observe that Talleyrand and Clarke are in Bonaparte's camp, and I am most positively assured that on the first of this month a Prussian officer of distinction passed through Mayence, to find Bonaparte, wherever he might be, with fresh proposals. If the fact should turn out to be so, you will have a right to demand a communication of such proposals. On the other hand, if he (Hangwitz) is really acting fairly, your opinion, I make no .difficulty in saying, will greatly determine me in the line I mean to take when the time comes for ulterior explanations with this Court. Both Austria and Russia wish for the removal of Hangwitz as a preliminary step, but if I hear any thing from you to make me think that they are pushing their objections to him too far, and risking the loss of this, perhaps the last oppor- tunity of forming a solid union against France, I shall of course use my best endeavours to get them to be more reason- able. I have now nothing more to add. Having stated how matters stand here, I shall not in future have to trouble you so much at length. Regular correspondence will be impossible, but occasions may occur by which you may let me hear from you. The success or failure of your mission it will be most material for me to know, likewise if Hangwitz should be playing any tricks with Talleyrand. Dresden at present seems the safest centre of communication. Have the goodness to forward my messenger to England ; and Believe me, &c. &c. &c. R. A. APPENDIX. 343 Mr. A. to Mr. Arbuthnot. Vienna, Oct. 25th, 1806. My DEAR Sir, I send back Mr. Morier's messenger, Colomb ; and it grieves me to the heart to say with the most afïlicting intel- ligence. The Prussian army has been completely defeated, and nearly ruined. The French will most probably be at Berlin by the end of this month. Hostilities began on the 8th. All we can collect here (for we have no detailed official accounts) is, that, after more or less fighting on the four succeeding days, the left of the Prussians under Prince Hohenlohe was turned, that the King of Prussia had resolved upon attacking with the whole army on the 14th, and that on the morning of that day he was not only attacked himself, but attacked in such a manner as to give the enemy the full advantage of surprise. The battle was fought near Naumberg. The result was a most complete, and I fear irreparable, defeat. I cannot give you particulars ; even at this day the full extent of the mischief is not known with sufficiënt accuracy. In general we reckon here the loss of the Prussians on that day alone at 24,000 men, killed and prisoners, and 184 pieces of cannon. The Duke of Brunswick was wounded, and is since dead. Since this dreadful day, disaster appears to have succeeded disaster. Just now an account is come that Marshal Mollen- dorff and the Prince of Orange have been taken prisoners with a corps of 6000 men at Erfurt. The fact is undoubtedly so, although we cannot understand how they came there. The army appears to be completely separated. What remains of the centre and the right wing were by the last accounts at Halberstadt, from whence they will probably fall back on Magdeburg. Of Prince Hohenlohe and the Prussian left wing there is no intelligence. The King is supposed to be either gone or going to Kustrin. The Queen was at Stettin. The Elector of Saxony has made his peace and withdrawn his troops. If the King of Prussia can get any tolerable con- z 4 344 APPENDIX. ditions (of which I confess there appears little chance) it would not surprise me to hear that he had done the same. A Russian army of 64,000 men imder General Beningsen is by this time not far from the borders of Silesia. But the Emperor must send three times that number if he wishes to save Poland. I do not know where Lord Morpeth is, or what he has been able to effect. Lord Lauderdale has quitted Paris. It may be useful for you to learn that the point on which the negociations broke off was our insisting upon the evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania. This Court perseveres in its neutrality ; but Europe is now in such a state that nothing with the least semblance of system, whether for war, for peace, or for neutrality, seems likely for some time to be arranged. Fare you well, my dear Sir ; on which side soever we turn ourselves, this is indeed a life of troubles ! Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. Mr. A. to Mr. Stuart Vienna, Nov. 2d, 1806. My dear Sir, When I wrote to you last I had only time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 9. I will now enter more fully upon one or two points, 'which, in the present dis- astrous moment, seem to be of the utmost importance. The views of Bonaparte on Poland are now evident to demonstration. I have heard from very good authority of his demanding the Elector of Saxony's daughter for his brother Jerome, in whom it is intended to revive the kingdom of Poland, and thus to carry into effect the doublé project of surrounding Austria, and erecting a barrier against Russia on that side of Europe. Austria feels her danger to the greatest degree. She has a most difficult part to act, and, as far as I can see, she is acting it well. Her armaments, notwithstand- ing the deplorable state of her finances, are continuing with APPENDIX. 345 redoubled activity; and I trust that before Bonaparte can totally destroy Prussia (before which time he will hardly call upon Austria to disarm) they will be completed to the full establishment. Even then her danger will be but little diminished, unless Russia, feeling her own in an equal degree, shall come forward with her chief force on that vulnerable side of her empire. I do most fervently hope, therefore, that no temptation of advantages on the side of Turkey will prevail upon the Cabinet of Petersburg to divide its armies, so as to leave Poland in a state of jeopardy. If I might venture to suggest a plan of operations suited to the political views which present themselves at this mo- ment, it would be one on something of the following outline : The great body of the Russian forces could then act on the side of Poland, and perhaps restore our affairs in the East of Europe. On the other hand, such is the internal state of the Turkish provinces, that Russia can have no reason to apprehend offensive operations on that side, especially too as the Turks can derive no succour from France. But let her seriously contemplate the consequences of another Austerlitz in Poland. I own I have scarcely nerves to contemplate the consequences of such a disaster. There is another matter which has fallen under my obser- vation here, and which gives me serious concern. It is the state of the affair concerning Cattaro. This is, perhaps, a very tender subject to touch upon ; all I can say is, that it is one which requires the greatest address in managing, other- wise I foresee a most fatal misunderstanding between the two Courts. The demands of France have been so peremptory that, added to her late successes, and the rupture of Lord Lauderdale's negociation, they have feit themselves here under the necessity of again issuing orders to attack the place. Let me therefore take the liberty of recommending it to you to prepare the Russian ministry for such an event, and to deprecate its producing any renewal of coldness be- tween the two Courts. I really do not see how Austria can act otherwise than she has done in this unlucky business ; and 346 APPENDIX. much as I should regret to see the fortress in the hands of France, far better would it be that it were so than that France should establish herself in Poland through any ill- timed jealousy on such an inferior object. This would be more particularly to be regretted, as, if Cattaro were even surren- dered to the French, it is impossible that they could maintain themselves there while we are masters of the sea, and friends with the Montenegrins. Indeed, it is the opinion of the best officers here, who know every inch of the ground, that every man the French sent to Dalmatia is sure of falling into our hands, if our affairs are but commonly well managed in that quarter. It does not occur to me to add more at this moment ; satis- fied as I am that the imminent perils which threaten this country when Bonaparte shall be in possession of Dresden, Königstein, and all the military positions in Saxony, will, with the aid of your representations, produce their due eifect upon the Russian Cabinet. I will not, however, conclude my letter without recom- mending another point to your management, should Lord Douglas not already be arrived at St. Petersburg. I wish, therefore, as no time ought to be lost in it, that you would open the letter I inclosed for him when I wrote to you on the 30th September ; and that, after considering it, you would # make such use of its contents as you may think prudent, with a view to the success of the matter you will find in it. Separated as I now am from my usual channels of communi- cation with England, this object becomes not only of the greatest importance to me personally, but to the common interests of the allied countries. I must in many instances act entirely from myself, which individually I can venture to do, as I see that the same system governs our councils which prevailed during the life of Mr. Fox ; but although I can act largely on my own view of affairs, I cannot answer that others will co-operate with me who are strangers to me, and ignorant of my long and intimate connection with him. When you read what I have written to Lord Douglas, you will see in a moment the importance of what I allude to. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 347 Mr. Stuart to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, Nov. 26th, 1806. My dear Sir, I have received yours dated the 2d of November, and General Meerfeldt has communicated to me the substance of letters from Count Stadion, directing him to request my interference with this Cabinet, in the hope of efFecting such an arrangement of the affairs of Turkey as may harmonise the interests of the two Courts, and create a good understand- ing at a period when mutual concert is to be desired against the enemy. This task has not been easy; for although on the most intimate footing with Meerfeldt, and honoured with the entire confidence of the Russian minister, irritability on the one side and quick feelings on the other have created obstacles which, in my opinion, should never have existed. However, the ambassador's remonstrances upon the declar- ation respecting Turkey were by these means sufficiently softened to induce the minister to specify in writing that no intentions of aggrandisement influence the conduct of the Court of Petersburg towards the Porte. The state of affairs in Prussia then compelled me to urge the necessity of reducing the means employed by this go- vernment to the South, for the purpose of directing the great mass of their disposable force towards the Yistula. The army in Moldavia has been accordingly diminished to 40,000, and the remainder of Michelson's corps has orders to march to the Prussian frontiers. Every argument tending to show the important aid which may be rendered to our cause by the Court of Vienna, ought to determine the Russians to fix M. Razamoffsky in his pre- sent station, and to delay, or, if possible, to prevent the em- bassy of Prince Kurakin. Baron Budberg frankly told me that he condemned the measure, which is the consequence of a Court intrigue before he came into office, and which it is not in his power to revoke. He will, however, endeavour to parry the mischief by sending to Vienna Count Pozzo di Borgo, the person who will deliver this letter, and who has ample secret in- structions to treat on every subject which can, in the present 348 APPENDIX. moment, interest the two Courts. It is the great object of this government to persuade Austria to arm, and if a favour- able opportunity shall offer to take a part in the war. Cattaro and every minor consideration will be sacrificed to obtain that ■ end. The number of troops to be employed on èither side will, if possible, be determined by a convention. A mutual declaration, it is hoped, will bind both parties not to conclude a separate peace, and to disregard the probable future neu- trality of Prussia. Stadion, Razamoffsky, Meerfeldt, and Budberg are equally intimate with M. Pozzo di Borgo. His selection is therefore likely to conciliate all parties ; it remains only for me to re- quest that you will treat him with confidence, and assist his exertions by all the influence the nature of his employment deserves. His journey will remain a secret to every one except those with whom he is immediately charged to negociate. I am aware that in this transaction we must both act in a great measure without positive instructions from home ; but where the means of communicating with the office are cut off, it must depend upon our judgment to do whatever we may deern most beneficial to the interests of government. On these grounds I therefore suppose you will not hesitate to support an undertaking, upon which the feasibility of the measures suggested in your last letter must in a great degree depend. As your letters from England must pass through Peters- burg or Trieste whenever the present state of the Continent shall be known in London, I deern it expediënt that a frequent communication shall be maintained in future between the two missions. I inclose extracts of my despatches respecting Turkey and a copy of the Russian declaration on that subject, which I have likewise forwarded to Mr. Arbuthnot. I am with great truth and regard, My dear Sir, Your faithful obedient Servant, Charles Stuart. APPENDIX. 349 Mr. A. to Mr. Stuart. Vienna, Dec. 6th, 1806. Dear Sir, The departure of a courier for St. Petersburg gives me an opportunity of writing to you, and of informing you of the present state of affairs at this Court. On the 3d instant I received a letter from Mr. G. Jackson, dated at the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, informing me that his Majesty had rejected the proposed armistice in toto, and had put himself entirely into the hands of the Em- peror of Russia. He added that it was most anxiously hoped by his Majesty that the intervention of Russia through the medium of her minister here, and that my zealous co-operation with both him and Count Finkenstein, would be used in order to engage this Court to come forward. His letter contained further a request from Count Woronzow that I should make the above communication to Count Razamoffsky. At no time since my arrival here have I omitted an oppor- tunity of laying before the Austrian government the immi- nent peril of its situation under the ascendency of France. I have added to these representations assurances of the strongest support, and the most vigorous co-operation on the part of the British government. My discussions with Count Stadion on this, and I may say on all subjects of a common interest, have been minute and confidential, and it has rarely happened to us to differ except on points comparatively trivial. Mat- ters were coming to an understanding from which the most beneficial consequences to Europe might have resulted, when the precipitation of Prussia in rushing into this war before any concerted plan had been settled, before even the first elements of a concert had been formed (for I must observe that Baron Jacobi himself appears to have returned to Eng- land without proper powers), spoiled all our operations. With the best wishes for Prussia, the extent and suddenness of the disasters which befel her arms in the first days of the cam- paign, rendered, as you must acknowledge, the choice of the moment for interference the most difficult of all questions for this Court. It was a question very unpromising with a view to success, if she decided in favour of interference, and deci- sive of her own destiny upon the least failure. 350 APPENDIX. These points premised, I come to the immediate circum- stances of the present moment. Since the 23d of October, negociations for peace as well as for an armistice have been going on between Prussia and France. It is only three days ago that I received the advice which I have already alluded to as contained in Mr. Jackson's letter. During these negociations Count Finkenstein, by orders from his Court, has repeatedly urged Austria to come for- ward. The answer has been in the negative, founded on these three following reasons : — lst, the possibility of a peace between Prussia and France ; 2d, ignorance of the intentions of Russia ; 3d, the distance of the Russian succours. Of these reasons, the first is without further force ; but the two others, and more especially the last, appear, and I must confess justly, to weigh most decisively against any imme- diate effort on the part of Austria. In answer to all I can say, and I have said much on former occasions as well as on the present, it is replied to me, and the same to Razamoffsky, "Teil us what Russia will do. Where are her forces ? What is their effective number ? Where are they stationed?" and, unfortunately, at the mo- ment I am writing, I have no satisfactory information to give them on this important head. By all I can learn, there are of Russian troops at General Beningsen's head-quarters at Pultusk little more than 15,000 men ; at Praga, there are no more than 6,000. At Grodno, indeed, we hear of Buxhow- den with an army of 70,000 ; but, putting all these together and with the remains of the Prussian army, what is it in comparison with the immense force collected, and still col- lecting from all parts of Germany, as well as France, to oppose them ? It is really dreadful to think of this. Depend upon it, my dear Sir, that unless Russia puts forward the whole forces of her empire immediately, and without the loss of an hour, she is gone as an European Power. Next spring she will be attacked by 400,000 men, and when she asks why Austria does not assist her, it will be replied that Austria is surrounded, and cannot. It was the strong and deep sense of these stupendous dan- gers that prompted me to write to you as I did on the 25th of October last. This danger I should think must now be APPENDIX. 351 evident to Kussia herself. For God's sake, let me request you again and again to press these points upon those in his Imperial Majesty's councils who may not yet be thoroughly aware of its extent, or of the celerity with which it is advanc- ing upon them. Indeed, we have but a few moments left in which to make our choice, not merely whether we shall resist or not, but whether we shall enjoy the last consolation to the great and brave, — that of perishing as we have lived, with honour. I am, &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. Mr. A, to Mr. Jackson. Vienna, Dec. 6th, 1806. Dear Sir, I received your letter of the 23d November by the courier, Large, and am greatly obliged to you for it. I am fully re- warded for his detention by the service which the communica- tion he has brought me may enable me to render His Ma- jesty's government. His Prussian Majesty may rely upon my utmost zeal and assiduity in doing every thing for his service, which my duty will allow me. His Majesty will, before this, have received a proof of it in my having requested Mr. Wynne to convey to him some very important Communications. I did not, of course, know of your being at head-quarters. Nothing effectual is to be done her e unless Russia will come forward with her whole force. I have frequently urged Russia to do this, to set all considerations of Turkish politics aside for the present, and bear down with all her powers to the Polish frontier. I have written by a special courier to Mr. Stuart again to-day, in the strongest terms to this effect. Count Razamoffsky has done the same, and I have reason to think that Count Meerfeldt's orders are to press this point equally. Have the goodness to answer my letter as soon as possible, 352 APPENDIX. that I may know how to direct to you, and whether it reaches you in safety. I am, dear Sir, &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. The same to the same. Vienna, Dec. 12th, 1806. Dear Sir, I have again to return you my thanks for your attention in writing to me. I received very safely your letter of Novem- ber 27th. It gives me great pleasure to hear of Sir Harford Jones' safe arrival so f ar on his journey. I have not yet received the letter you mention his having written to me from Pul- tusk. By the time you will receive this letter, it is most likely that Mr. Wynne will have arrived. I send you some letters for him which have been received here since his departure. I have now to request your attention to the inclosed paper, and after communicating it to Mr. Wynne, if he should still be at head-quarters, to cause it to be laid before his Prussian Majesty in such a manner as to obtain an early consideration, and a speedy answer to its contents. You will observe, and of this you will likewise assure his Prussian Majesty, that this paper is strictly confidential, and that until his pleasure shall be made known to me, I shall open myself to no person whatever, not even to his own minister, respecting its con- tents. A most anxious desire alone to clear away all possible difficulties in the way of procuring him effectual and imme- diate assistance, lias guided me in the step I am now taking, and in proposing such an object for his deliberation. I will only observe that if this matter should appear to be of a nature to require that, in return, any confidential communi- cation be made to me, there can be no harm in sending it through Count Finkenstein. I am, &c. &c (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 353 P. S. You may give a copy of the inclosed, and likewise the original if it should be wished ; otherwise it would be better perhaps only to show it. The proposal is entirely my own, and wholly without the participation of Austria. K. A. Lord Hutchinson to Mr, A. {Copy.) Konigsberg, Jan. lst, 1807. My dear Sir, The bearer of this despatch is Mr. Walpole, with whom I believe you are already acquainted; he will give you the best account of every thing which has passed in this quarter. Should there be any occasion, I have little doubt that you could prevail upon him to return to me ; indeed, he has already pro- mised so to do. I opened your last despatches of the 14th of December to Lord Howick, and have written to his Lord- ship on the subject of the note confidential which was in- closed in your letter.* In the present temper, it would by no means be prudent to deliver it; they have thegreatest doubts and suspicions of the Austrian government: I am by no means certain that an absolute promise on the part of that government to come forward with their whole force would induce this Court to put the Silesian fortresses into the hands of their old enemy: some days ago, I mentioned to Count Zastrow that I had reason to believe the Austrians were in- clined to offer their mediation for a general peace. I supposed that the Count might have received the proposition with great satisfaction ; quite the contrary : he said that no good could be expected from Austria, that he was certain that they did not mean to give any effectual assistance to the Prussian monarchy: that he, for his own part, would not wish to ac- cept of their mediation; that the King of Prussia had connected his interests with Russia and England, on whom he could rely, and with those two Powers he was determined to stand or lail. I have not yet been enabled to * See Inclosure, p. 160. A A 354 APPENDIX. sign a treaty of peace with Prussia. They have sent me a project in which they take care to mix the question of subsidies with the afFairs of Hanover. They have made very large demands for the future. They have required that the treaty of the Hague in '94 should be taken as the basis; this demand is entirely inadmissible, as by that treaty we pro- mised to give at different payments to the amount of three millions, of which twelve hundred thousand pounds were actually paid, though the Prussians did nothing. By the second secret article they ask the immediate pay- mentoffive hundred thousand pounds: there are a variety of reasons against complying even with this demand ; it was refused after much discussion to Jacobi in England, and I do not believe they are in immediate want of money assistance. A great sum of money was brought from Berlin, I believe to the amount of between two and three millions sterling. ******* Thus circumstanced, it would be highly imprudent to hazard a proposition which would be revolting in the greatest degree to the pride of this Court, and would awaken all their old jealousies against Austria. It is extremely unfortunate that the Russians at this critical moment should have no ambassa- dor or any man of consideration to represent them here ; his co-operation with me would be invaluable ; they have nobody here but a chargé des affaires, certainly a very worthy and a very sensible man, but entirely without weight or power, as he can never act from himself, but always waits for instruc- tions from his Court, who are frequently very remiss in fur- nishing him with any, and the generals of the army do not think it worth their while to correspond with him at all. I should deceive you excessively were I not to state to you plainly and directly that I have a very bad opinion of the state and posture of affairs here. The pretended victories of the Russians are great exaggerations, and were probably no- thing but affairs of advanced and rear guards, the Russians retiring, and the French following them. The King of Prussia has written a strong letter to request the Russian generals would re-occupy their former positions; otherwise all this line must fall into the hands of the enemy, who will make themselves masters of great magazines of stores and provisions which they have had the imprudence to place here. APPENDIX. 355 Count Zastrow told me yesterday that the Russians were in full retreat towards the Neimen, and their ovvn frontiers, and that the King would be obliged to retire from this place in a few days. A few hours afterwards General Rüchel told me it was no such thing, and that affairs went on tolerably well ; I do not, ho wever, believe him. To judge from all appear- ances, as far as I am able to estimate the consequences of the military events which have lately happened, I do not think that the Russians are willing, or have strength sufficiënt to re-occupy their former positions. If that be the case, Kö- nigsberg, Dantzic, and all the country between these two places, and those with the magazines they contain must fall into the hands of the French. The greatest misunderstanding prevails among the Russian generals ; it is not known exactly who has the command. The Russian chargé des affaires and Count Zastrow both suppose that Marshal Kaminsky has abandoned the command of the army and returned to Petersburg ; certain it is that he has never sent any report to the King. I wrote both to him and to Count Woronzow on the day of my arrival here, but have received no answer from either of them. The Marshal refused to allow Colonel Sontag, a British officer, to remain with his army without an express permission from the Emperor of Russia; he was, therefore, obliged to join the Prussian corps. Mr. Walpole will give you the best accounts of what has passed here. I have the honour to be, Dear Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant, (Signed) Hutchinson. P.S. Colonel Sontag is this instant arrived from General Lestocq's army ; he does not bring any intelligence of import- ance. We probably shall be obliged to leave this in a few days. AA 2 306 APPENDIX. Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson. * Vienna, Jan. 14th, 1807. My Lord, Your Lordship's arrival at the King of Prussia's head- quarters, having been notified to me by Count Finkenstein, and it being essential to the public service that you should be informed of what is transacting both here and in the South of Europe, I take the liberty of requesting your Lordship to point out to me a safe and ready channel of communication with you. I shall continue in the meantime addressing my letters to your Lordship, by such opportunities as may offer themselves. The first matter that I have to communicate to your Lordship, is that in consequence of a representation made to me by Count Finkenstein, at the earnest request of the Count de Gotzen, of the deplorable state of his Prussian Majesty's afFairs in Silesia, and of the imminent danger to which their fortresses there are exposed, by the impossibility of keeping an army together, unless instant pecuniary succours be sent to him ; I have, after maturely weighing the nature and urgency of the service, taken upon myself the responsibility of advancing 20,000 ducats, under an agreement signed by him in the name of his Prussian Majesty, that this sum shall be deducted from the first subsidies which it may be his Majesty's pleasure to grant to Prussia. I trust that your Lordship will approve the application of this money. Count Finkenstein earnestly pressed me for 260,000 dollars, but as I have reason to believe that 20,000 ducats will be enough to meet the most pressing danger, namely, a dissolution of the Silesian army, until such time as your Lordship's sentiments can be known, I have judged it expediënt to limit the advance to the sum above mentioned. There are likewise other possible contingencies, for which I must reserve the credit I possess at Vienna. With regard to what will most chiefly interest your Lord- ship in my correspondence, namely, the hopes of Austrian co-operation, I will state at once that it depends upon the success of the allies. The best effects have certainly been * Written previously to the receipt of the previous letter. — R. A. APPENDIX. 357 produced here by the result of the actions of the 25th and 26th of December. Hitherto I have seen but little chance of Austria coming forward at all, but the language is greatly altered within these few days. I am assured that if the allies can maintain themselves without experiencing any further disaster until the spring, Austria will join us. The Russian Minister and myself, who are alone informed of these dispositions, are entreated earnestly to discourage at our respective Courts all propositions tending to peace. This is going far beyond what I could have expected a fortnight ago, at which time I had to send an account to government of the failure of the Emperor Alexander's efForts to engage this Court in a common alliance. I will not, however, be too sanguine even now. Should Bonaparte fall back upon the Oder without its being in the power of the Russians to follow him, I am afraid this government has not energy enough to take the only step which would enable them to follow him, namely, that of marching into Silesia and Saxony. The importance of this step, together with the danger of letting the French get possession of the Silesian fortresses has been demonstrated again and again to the Archduke Charles, but it seems impossible to make the government understand it. Your Lordship will, therefore, perceive of what infinite use any Communications with which you may honour me, must become in the view of determining Austria to declare herself. 1 allude of course chiefly to such Communications as tend to exhibit in a favourable point of view the resources of Prussia, and the stability of her councils. Any advances towards peace in that quarter may be attended with the worst effects. I am not sure whether Major Krusemarck's last mission to St. Petersburg is yet known to the ministers here. Certainly I shall not be the first to teil them of it, and the same reason which determines me not to teil them of his journey, makes me likewise request of your Lordship to send me the earliest information of his return, and of the continued resolution of our allies, of which I will not permit myself to doubt, to prosecute the war to the utmost. As it is possible that your Lordship may find much difficulty in obtaining any intelligence from the interior of Germany by a nearer way than Vienna, I will send you from time to A A 3 358 APPENDIX. time such reports of what is passing as I receive through confidential channels. Generally speaking, great discontent and a disposition to have recourse to arms prevail in Ger- many. In Hesse a formidable insurrection has actually broken out, but as I do not know accurately the extent of it, I will not risk misleading your Lordship by statements which may prove exaggerated. Your Lordship may depend upon hearing from me whenever this Court shall agree to join in the common cause. If that event should take place, I mean to suggest the propriety of despatching an intelligent Austrian officer to your Lordship, to concert the necessary measures with you in person. If you should happen to know any one in the service with whom you would more lik e to confer than another, I have no doubt but that he would be named at your desire. I have now nothing further to trouble you with, except to mention that it would be of essential benefit to the public service, if Mr. Arbuthnot, our ambassador at Constantinople, could receive early intelligence of events in Poland. It is with the greatest difficulty that the Turks can be prevented from declaring in favour of France, and General Sebastiani's account of Bonaparte's successes, especially in Poland, have almost turned their heads. I do my best to keep Mr. Arbuth- not well informed, but as the French are between the Russians and Vienna, my accounts cannot reach Constantinople so soon as General Andréossy's. I need scarcely suggest to your Lordship the utility likewise of sending me such intelligence as may be made use of for the common benefit here or in Sicily. I have constant Commu- nications with Capt. Campbell, who is off Trieste, and who has a sloop in the Adriatic always ready for my despatches. I have the honour to be, With great truth and regard, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 359 Mr. Stuart to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, Jan. 19th, 1807 My dear Sir, I have been favoured with yours by M. Pozzo's messenger; and before I proceed to relate what passed after the arrival of the Communications sent by that opportunity, I must state a circumstance which has materially influenced the sentiments of this Court towards Austria. Positive instructions from Count Stadion had induced General Meerfeldt to bring forward a peremptory representa- tion respecting the non-execution of the orders said to have been sent from hence for the evacuation of Cattaro. This de- mand being unsupported by the reports which it was natural to expect from Count Razamoffsky, the Court of Petersburg was not prepared to receive with indulgence an unfavourable answer to the proposition transmitted through Colonel Pozzo di Borgo. Count Razamoffsky remained likewise silent as to the probable future dispositions of the Austrian government, and the language conveyed in your former letters held out hopes so contradictory to the assertions of General Meerfeldt, that I must freely confess I had in some degree given into the same mistake. The evasion of every question on which this Court thought an explanation from that of Vienna indispensable, the refusal of Count Stadion to declare that future aggressions on the neutrality of that Power, which appeared to be meditated by France would be resisted, the general cold reception of the overtures from hence, the silence of the ambassador here, and the reserve maintained towards Razamoffsky, not only damped the expectations of the Russian ministers, but created a sus- picion that an inclination to join the enemies of the alliance might possibly exist, and thinking, as you do, from my knowledge of the persons in power at Vienna, such a change to be improbable, I assure you my assertions that the panic created by the late numerous successes of the French was the principal cause from whence the answers lately received are to be traced, were extremely necessary, though perhaps not always entirely credited. A A 4 360 APPENDIX. General Budberg in particular has frequently expressed uneasiness concerning the line of conduct which the Austrian government may think proper to adopt ; and has observed, though with much temper, that however their determination may be fatal to their own existence, or contrary to the interests of Russia, reproaches from hence will only irritate or increase the evil, but that no endeavour will be omitted to conciliate and to reclaim a Court suffering from the erroneous line of policy she has chosen ; although at the same time it cannot be expected under such circumstances that much consideration for their interests should bias the proceedings of Russia, whether on the side of Turkey or elsewhere. The insinuation on your part, that it was possible the Court of Yienna might propose her intervention, to bring about a peace bet ween the belligerent Powers was not folio wed by any proposition from General Meerfeldt or his government. The arrival, however, of M. Krusemarck, with a similar overture on the part of the Prussian Court, enabled me shortly after to ascertain the real sentiments of the Russian government upon that important subject, and though I am assured that terms incompatible with her own honour or derogatory to the con- nection with England will not be listened to at St. Peters- burg, yet the answer which they experienced when M. Pozzo di Borgo's propositions were submitted to the Austrian ministers, induced his Imperial Majesty not wholly to reject the offer. The public outcry against Austria is loud and unrestrained : the personal irritation of every one in the employment of that Court must, under such circumstances, be very great ; but whatever may be the report s on this subject which reach Yienna, I am willing to believe that, provided M. Pozzo, Count RazamofFsky, and yourself go hand in hand, no other feelings but good-will towards Russia, as the active enemy of France, will prevail on the spot. The views of the Em- peror respecting Turkey have been satisfactorily explained in writing : the objects of the war against France, and the force employed to attain those objects are now wellknown; nothing further therefore remains but to hush up the clamour created respecting Cattaro. Why the Court of Vienna should press this subject so ur- gently, and why this government hesitate to give it up, are APPENDIX. 06 1 not easily explained, but at all events the fewer irritating de- mands brought forward, and the less writing on the subject the better : I have said this to the ambassador, and although he admits the principle, I do not think he entirely acts con- formably to his opinion, and I lament it ; for these questions being either set aside or satisfactorily answered, there exists no reason why Austria should be suspected of unfavourable intentions towards the allies, because she has refused to take an active part in their support. I hope, ho wever, every negociation on this subject will be exclusively arranged at Vienna, matters being there in the best hands, and I anxiously wish to hear from you, as the principal task of an English agent here must now depend upon the details which you transmit. I beg to be remembered to Pozzo; and as the Marquis of Douglas is expected daily, I close my correspondence with many thanks for the interesting Communications I have re- ceived. Prince Kurakin has the gout, which I hope will continue long enough to prevent his departure for some months. I remain, with the greatest truth, My dear Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant, Charles Stuart. P.S. May I beg you to forward the inclosed letter to its destination. Lord Hutchinson to Mr, A. Memel, Jan. 26th, 1807. My dear Sir, I received your despatch of the 14th of January, the day before yesterday. I think that under the circumstances of the case, you did perfectly right to advance the 20,000 ducats to Count Finkenstein. My powers of granting subsidies are limited indeed ; I shall mention the sum which I am at liberty 362 APPENDIX. to give in cypher, and I was even told not to make use of these limited powers unless the occasion was urgent. I came here with full powers accredited to a king, whom I expected to find at the head of his army. In this expect- ation I am disappointed, and nothing remains for me to do, but to perform the duty of a negociator without any com- munication with my own government, and without being able to know what are their opinions on the present exist- ing circumstances of affairs; however, I should be un- worthy their coniidence were I unwilling to take upon myself every degree of responsibility, when I see that the public service absolutely requires it. I therefore have thought it right to promise Count Zastrow that I would advance 500,000 dollars for the payment of the Silesian army ; and I promised to write to you to furnish Count Finkenstein with money to the amount of that sum, in different payments as he may require. You will understand me that it is entirely my act, and not yours ; that I am responsible to the English govern- ment, and not you ; it is impossible that I could think of suffering fortresses to be surrendered, and an army to be disbanded for such a paltry consideration as seventy or eighty thousand pounds, particularly as this government has agreed to sign the treaty which relates to Hanoverian affairs, and to give up all pretensions to the future possession of that Electorate. There is also an article relating to the guaranty of Russia, by which Prussia pledges herself to ask for that guaranty. I fear it will be unavailing, as Russia is unwilling to consent ; however, I can do no more, nor can I require any thing further on the part of this government. 1 am extremely happy that they have agreed to sign, otherwise I should have furnished with difficulty the sum of money which I now authorise you to pay. Though I suppose you are already informed of the result of Krusemarck's mission directly from Petersburg, I still think it right to acquaint you that a negociation for peace is on the tapis, that Krusemarck brought the consent of the Emperor of Russia, and that Zastrow has written a letter to Talleyrand, inclosing one from General Budberg to himself, which states that Russia had no objec- APPENDIX. 363 tion to' enter into a joint negociation with Prussia and England, and names Lublin in Gallicia, where the intended Congress is to meet. I thought it right to mention to Zastrow, that I had that moment received a despatch from Petersburg, dated the 1 9th of January, which stated that the Emperor of Russia never would have agreed to the proposed negociation had he not been influenced by the absolute refusal of Austria to enter into the war. I added that as I knew from you that the disposition of the latter Court was changed, and that Austria might be induced to co-operate with the allies, I did hope that the negociation which had been entered into from mistaking the views of that Power, might not be persevered in. In answer, he read me the despatch of Count Finkenstein, which is at least as strong as yours, and states as forcibly the determination of Austria to come forward in the spring. In short, every thing is con- tained in it which I find in yours, except the declaration which you and the Russian ambassador received, expressing a wish that neither England nor Russia should enter into any negociation. When I told it to Zastrow, whom I believe to be a very direct and honest man, it did not make any impression on his mind. I know him so well, that I am sure he was not acting, but that he really feit that it was, and is the intention of Austria to do nothing ; and to be candid with you, I have the same apprehension. I cannot be persuaded that the situation of Bonaparte and his army is so desperate as is represented ; I do not at all say that he may not be baffled in his designs against Poland, provided the Russian army is conducted with any ability. The seasons and the nature of the country may throw obstacles insurmountable in his way, and set limits to his ambition. As a military man, I am very much inclined to believe that France will never succeed against Russia in a contest on Russian ground, always with a proviso that the Russian generals are not blunderers, and have sense enough to avoid great general actions. At the same time that I make this acknowledgment in favour of Russia, I am convinced that in countries abounding in pro- visions with great chaussées and towns, the French have a real superiority over them. The intelligence I get here is so bad, that nothing can 364 APPENDIX. be relied on : they never have been able to give me an exact statement of the position of the French army, nor do they appear at all to have penetrated into the military views of Bonaparte, or into the probable plan of the campaign. I dare say there are many sick in his army, but there is nothing which ought to lead me to imagine that there is not an equal proportion in that of the Russians. They appear to have moved a great deal more than the French : they have been constantly advancing and retreating, and moving from right to left ; when, on the contrary, I do not under- stand that the French, with the exception of Ney's corps, have been much in motion. The French hospitals are better taken care of than those of any other nation, with the excep- tion of England. The Russians, I have always understood, are miserable in the extreme. I have entered into this part of the subject in order to let you into an opinion, or rather a conjecture of my own, which may not be at all founded, that it is not at all impossible that Bonaparte does not mean to persevere in his designs against Poland, and might be glad of an excuse to abandon them. In the present position of the French army, nothing would be so easy for him as to make an attack on the Austrian hereditary states, and by that means extricate himself out of the difficulties, or rather the embarrassments of his present situation. He might draw prodigious resources from Gallicia, and march an army through Silesia into Bohemia ; these are all military reasons which ought, and will induce Austria to be cautious, and not to act till the army of Bonaparte is thoroughly committed in the Polish war. The Archduke Charles is certainly a great officer, and they have many men of merit in their army ; let nobody persuade you that there does not exist more military talent in the Austrian than in any other service in Europe, with the exception of the French ; their soldiers are excellent, at least as good, perhaps better than those of any other nation. I wish most anxiously that they would act ; I should have the greatest hope and reliance on them, but I am sure that the observations which I have just stated to you cannot have escaped their generals, and that they are perfectly alive to the dangers of their position. I think it right to communicate to you, but in the utmost APPENDIX. 365 confidence, that when I told the Russian chargé des affaires that I meant to send my brother and Sir Robert Wilson to the Russian army, he objected in the strongest manner. When I asked him for an explanation, he said that he must teil me in confidence that the greatest disorder had prevailed in that army, which had been represented to the Emperor by General Tolstoy, and that he knew it would be very dis- agreeable to General Beningsen and the chiefs of the Russian army, that English officers should see them in their present state. I told him that it was a duty which I owed to my own country, and that as probably we were to pay them, we must see them ; that we came to act as soldiers, and not as spies ; that the character of British officers was well known all over the Continent ; that there were no men more anxious to acquire reputation than they were ; that we came for the purpose of risking our lives with our allies ; and if the gentle- men whom I sent were not received with the respect and attention which they so justly merited, I should make the strongest complaints to my government, who would undoubt- edly remonstrate, and insist that their officers should be countenanced and respected in the allied army. I was obliged to use this language, because Marshal Kaminsky would not allow Colonel Sontag to remain at the Russian head-quarters ; he was obliged to go to General Lestocq who commands the Prussian corps. I am sure that the King and government here are highly pleased with the determination which I have taken ; it was absolutely necessary, as I shall now be enabled to know something of the real condition of that army : as yet I have been in a state of most perfect ignorance. I shall direct those gentlemen, if they find it necessary for the public service, to communicate immediately with you, as that will save a great deal of time, which may be of impcrtance in case any very extraordinary event should take place. I take the liberty of a friend, and write to you in the utmost confidence, without any disguise. I beg you will do the same, and that the freest Communications may pass between us. I hear nothing from Germany but through y our medium. I should therefore be very anxious to hear everything which is passing there. Zastrow tells me that 36() APPENDIX. the intended negociations will not paralyse the military operations. I should doubt it; but perhaps the season has done it most effectually already. Lord Douglas arrived at Petersburg the 23d. I have the honour to be, My dear Sir, With much regard, Your most obedient humble Servant, (Signed) Hutchinson. Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson. (Copy.) Vienna, Feb. 3d, 807. My dear Lord, This letter will be presented to you by Lieutenant Sche- pelar, an ofïicer of great merit in the Austrian service, who has been recommended to me so strongly, and from so many quarters, that I make no scruple of complying with his re- quest for a letter to you. Of his talents, and of the degree of service to be obtained from them, you will be the best judge. Of his zeal his journey will be a proof, as he under- takes it entirely from his own feelings, and with his own means. I have now to thank you for your letter of the 30th Dec. by Mr. Walpole.* He did not arrive here until Thursday the 29th of January. He is quite disposed to return to you, and as soon as I have anything of importance to communicate I will undoubtedly send him. I am happy to think you were already arrived at Konigs- berg time enough to act as you did, respecting my despatch and the inclosure. My proposal was certainly not imagined in concert with the Austrian government, nor was it even known to them, but there is no saying how far this would have been believed by that of Prussia. My hopes, I confess, were grounded upon the existence of * The present Lord Orford. — R. A. APPENDIX. 367 more liberal dispositions on the part of Prussia, dispositions of which I cannot even yet entirely renounce the hope with- out supposing the Count de Gotzen to have acted not only without authority, but intentionally, with a view of deceiving both Austria and myself. The fact is, that in the course of my correspondence with the Count de Gotzen, I have re- ceived from him direct authority to offer the occupation of Silesia to Austria. I am sorry to say that as yet Austria has discovered no disposition to listen to the proposal. I perceive by the tenor of your letter that I have ventured a very hazardous step in advancing the 20,000 ducats, but I still hope you will not condemn it under the circumstances, especially when you hear that it has been of infinite service to the King's affairs in Silesia. The Turks have declared war against Russia, but they have suffered M. dTtalinsky to leave Constantinople quietly. Mr. Arbuthnot is yet there. I expect his despatches every hour, and will contrive some means of forwarding them to England when they reach me. Believe me, &c. &c (Signed) R. A. P. S. I will send Mr. Walpole to you as soon as I receive some despatches which I am daily expecting from St. Peters- burg. Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A. (Copy.) Memel, Feb. 8th, 1807. My dear Adair, I avail myself of this opportunity by an English messenger to inform you of what is passing here. Things have taken an unexpected, and certainly an unfavourable turn. On the 3d of February Bonaparte put himself at the head of his 368 APPENDIX. whole army, and marched to attack the Russians near Al- lenstein : about 3 o'clock on that day there was some can- nonading, and an affair, in which only a few battalions and squadrons were engaged on eacli side, took place, in which the Russians claim the advantage; however, General Ben- ino-sen, finding that the French were endeavouring to turn his leftj he retired to Guttstad, from thence to Landsberg, and he has now taken a position between Allenberg and Welau, which threatens to take in flank any corps of the French that may move on to Konigsberg. I know it is not General Beningsen's intention to risk a general action if he can avoid it, but if he remains where he is I think one must take place. Bonaparte will endeavour in the first instance to turn his left flank, and if the Russians are beaten, their retreat is a miserable one indeed. The armies of Essen and Beningsen are entirely separated ; the consequences of these unfortunate events have been that some cannon, baggage, and magazines have been lost, particularly that of Seeburg, which was lately formed by the King of Prussia at a great expence by the particular desire of Beningsen. It was supposed here that Beningsen would have made a most obstinate stand at Allenstein; he wrote to that effect to Count Zastrow, and said that as he had taken an aide-de-camp of Bernadotte's with the whole of the disposition on the night before the intended action, he was then sure " de son fait," but with all thïs anticipated certainty of success he retired as soon as he was attacked. I rather hope that he will not make a stand in his present position. I always remonstrated strongly against the Russian army's making the movement which they did to cover Konigsberg. I was persuaded of the danger of placing the whole force in such a trouée, where, if any misfortune happened, half their army would be obliged to lay down their arms. They are now convinced themselves of the imprudence of these movements. If they should re- ceive no other punishment for them but the loss of military reputation, it will be fortunate indeed both for the Russians themselves, and the common cause. I have received your despat ch of the 23d of January, and will forward the inclosure to Lord Howick by the first op- portunity. I send you inclosed a letter from her Majesty the Queen APPENDIX. 369 of Prussia to her sister, which you will have the goodness to forward to Ratisbon. I have the honour to be, my dear Adair, Your most obedient humble Servant, (Signed) Hutchinson. Le Comte de Gotzen to Mr. A. (Copy.) Glatz, ce 7 Février 1807. Monsieur, Je De puis me refuser la satisfaction de vous témoigner ma grande reconnoissance de ce que vous avez bien voulu nous pro- curer la somme de 20,000 ducats * sans laquelle nous n'aurions pas été en état ni de pourvoir pour le moment au besoin des troupes réglées, et de 1'approvisionnement des forteresses encore dans notre pouvoir, qui sont d'une importance si évidente pour le succes des opérations des armées alliées, ni a la levée de troupes en forme de corps francs destinées a des diversions absolument nécessaires' pour notre existence. Retranchés par 1'ennemi a un petit coin de la Silesie, le rest e absolument dé vaste par ses troupes de brigans, nous ne manquons pas d'hommes, qui nous accourent en masse, mais bien d'armes et d'habillement que nous ne nous pouvons procurer qu'a grands frais, et 1'épée a la main. Le manquement de canons disponibles contre un ennemi qui ne fait point de patrouille sans une batterie nous reduit a des surprises, sans pourtant oser trop nous exposer, pour ne pas intimider notre troupe qui commence a devenir tres brave. Mais quel dommage pour la suite des opérations si ces forte- resses si formidables, bien garnies de troupes et de canons, qui ne manquaient pas a 1'ennemi mais bien a nous, tomberaient encore dans son pouvoir par manque de nécessaires, comme aussi cette cavallerie de deux mille chevaux, et ce corps de Chasseurs de mille hommes que nous avons leve depuis peu, qui s'augmenteront tous les jours, et que 1'on pourroit facilement augmenter a 1'incroyable, s'il ne falloit pas tant menager 1'ar- * See Despatch of Jan. 23. 1807, with the two Inclosures, p. 176. B B 370 APPENDIX. gent que nous ne pouvons plus tirer de la partie envahie par 1'ennemi ? Et pourtant ce n'est que par la que nous sommes probablement en état de sauver Ie Comté de Glatz, qui par les montagnes qui 1'entourent doit être notre dernier asile, si 1'ennemi dans sa retraite inondoit ces contrées, ce qui est tres vraisemblable. Vous sentirez, Monsieur, par ce petit tableau de 1'état dans lequel nous nous trouvons, combien je vous dois être obligé, et combien il est nécessaire qu'il ne nous manque pas d'argent. Je désire que 1'occasion se présente bientót oü je vous pourrois témoigner en personne 1'estime avec laquelle J'ai 1'honneur d'être, &c. &c. &c. (Signé) Le Comte de Gotzen. Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A. (Copy.) Memel, Feb. 27th, 1807. My dear Adair, Your despatch of the 3d of February by Lieut.' Schepelar arrived here on the 17th. That officer appears to be a man of merit. I will do every thing in my power to serve him. I doubt, however, whether my exertions can be useful to him or not. Apropos, on the subject of couriers, you ought to take some measures that those passing between you and me should not be stopped on the Austrian territories ; the delay may be of the worst possible consequences : it is so easy to distin- guish an Englishman, particularly an English gentleman, from any other man, that I wonder they do it ; if no other means can be devised, you must send me two or three blank Austrian passports, which I will fill up as occasions may re- quire. By some mistake in the Foreign Office I am only in possession of cypher *, so that what you have written at the conclusion of your letter is to me unintelligible ; have the goodness therefore in future to use that cypher. Ha ving discovered that this government had made an offer to Austria to put the remaining Silesian fortresses into their hands, I took the opportunity of saying that you had long since, in your zeal for the service of Prussia, suggested that idea to me, but APPENDIX. 371 that I, from delicacy to them, had not thought it expediënt at the moment to lay your communication before them. I then repeated to them again how much they were obliged to you for all your conduct on the subject of the troops and for- tresses in Silesia. It is a very extraordinary thing that, not- withstanding all our united efforts to preserve so valuable a part of the Prussian dominions, I never was told that any such offer had been made to Austria, and I only discovered it by accident. Zastrow tells me that the offer was not only re- jected, but they would not listen to it even for a moment. It appears to me to be clear that if Austria does not declare now, she never can think of doing it after the remaining Silesian fortresses shall have fallen into the hands of the enemy. I send you an account of the battle of Preuss Eylau, written by my brother, who was present. The Russians certainly re- pulsed the French in every attack ; they say they were victorious. The loss of men on both sides has been immense. There are 800woundedRussianofficersinKonigsberg, and from 8,000 to 10,000 privates ; what has happened is a proof that though the Russians may repidse the French, they cannot gain a victory, or at least profit by one. Jealousies, faction, and in- subordination prevail in their army beyond all imagination. Beningsen has requested leave from the Emperor to resign. There is now every appearance that the French are going to retire behind the Vistula ; whether it is from want of provisions or because Bonaparte means to give up his designs on Poland, it is difficult to ascertain. I am apprehensive that he means to leave this part of the world, and to concentrate himself be- hind the Oder. The Silesian fortresses once in his hands, I think the army of Russia alone, with the now feeble assistance of Prussia, will probably never be strong enough to force the enemy to abandon it ; with Mecklenburg and Pomerania on one flank, and Silesia on the other, with Saxony in their rear, they may subsist for ever. Everything, therefore, now de- pends on Austria ; if ever she means to engage with France again, certainly now is the time to recover her glory and pos- sessions. The Turkish war is certainly a most unfortunate event, and the policy of Russia on this occasion is undoubtedly a reasonable cause of jealousy to the Court at which you reside. B B 2 372 APPENDIX. General Bertrand, an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, brought to the King a letter from the French Emperor on the 15th. The letter was only in the usual style of compliment, but Bertrand made a verbal declaration, both to Zastrow and the King, that his master was willing to enter into a separate ne- gociation with Prussia, and to restore his Majesty to his do- minions. The offer I believe was only in general terms ; it has been rejected. I saw the letter of the King of Prussia to the Emperor of Russia, in which he leaves the decision en- tirely to him in this negociation. There never has been any question as to England ; indeed, we are not even in alliance with Prussia : I signed a treaty of peace, but nothing more. I have now only to repeat to you again that every thing de- pends upon Austria. It is unfortunate that they have no minister here : probably it would not be advisable that they should send one ; it might give cause of suspicion, but you may therefore, in my name, assure the Austrian government, and particularly the Archduke Charles, that I never will de- ceive them as to the situation of military affairs in this country and the probable designs of this Court. If you should find any disposition in the Austrian government to act, and they should desire further information on the state of things here, I will send my brother to you to Vienna, who is at present with the Kussian army ; though not an officer, he is a man of great military talents and experience, has constantly served with me, and is as capable of giving military opinions or making military arrangements as I am. If you should wish him to come, only take care that no time should be lost, and that he should not be stopped on the frontiers. Let me know whether you can make out my cypher. I am, my dear Adair, Yours sincerely, (Signed) Hutchinson. ****** ****** APPENDIX. 373 Inclosure referred to in the preceding letter. Mr, Hutchinson to Lord Hutchinson. Konigsberg, Monday Feb. 9th, 1807. My dear John, The different marches of the Russian army from Morungen, which we left on the 3d instant, to Preuss Eylau, where we arrived on the 7th, having taken the direction of Jankova, Wolsdorf, Frauensdorf, and Landsberg, you are already acquainted with. The first movement to Jankova, in the neighbourhood of Allenstein, which the enemy had approached, you cannot but have censured, the more so as General Ben- ingsen had declared that it was his object to avoid a genera! action; at the same moment placing himself in a situation where it was evident he must fight should the enemy wish it, or dispirit and weary his troops by night marches, and through a sea of sand, in order to avoid as long as possible the evil moment which was to decide the fate and interests of all the Powers of Europe. On the 4th the enemy failed in his attempt to dislodge us from tvvo different parts of our very extended position at Jankova ; but on the evening of that day he pushed forward a corps, and made rather an obstinate reconnoissance. The defence of the rear-guard of the Russian army during the f our folio w ing days, against a much superior force, was vigorous and able. On the evening of the 6th at Landsberg, the enemy having driven in the rear-guard, showed himself for the first time in force on the opposite hills to our camp, when night prevented his attempt- ing any thing. On the following evening at Preuss Eylau, he took possession of that village which lay at the front of our position in a valley separating us from a range of sand hills, over which he had to pass in approaching from Lands- berg. We had taken up our position on the morning of the 7th, and had originally occupied this village, and two others in the same valley, towards our right ; but all of which were on the approach of evening abandoned by our troops, owing to some mistake. The enemy, Avho had advanced a corps along the range of hills in our front, immediately pushed for B B 3 374 APPENDIX. these villages, particularly that of Preuss Eylau, from which he was at length driven with considerable loss on both sides, but of which he again took possession during the night, this village having been a second time abandoned by the Rus- sians, though not attacked, I believe, owing to the general who commanded there being wounded, and who had retired behind the camp to head-quarters to be dressed, having, how- ever, left another general to fill his place. The position of the Russians from right to left extended about one English mile, and from front to rear nearly as much ; to the right the country was open for a considerable way, but on the left at some little distance, there were woods and ravines. The front was strong, in consequence of the valley I have mentioned ; and from the nature of the hills opposite, from which the enemy had to descend, he could not approach with an ex- tended front ; besides, in his ascent from the valley to the Russian position, he had to encounter a very formidable range of batteries, consisting on the whole along the front line of nearly one hundred pieces. The whole of the Russian and Prussian artillery amounted (as they inform us) to seven hundred pieces ! Several guns were placed during the night at that point of our position which overlooked the town of Preuss Eylau, and at daybreak yesterday morning this battery was opened against the town; after a little time a strong column of infantry issued from the town, and advanced nearly to the battery, from which they were driven with consider- able loss, when they feil back on a strong corps of troops, posted at some distance opposite in one of the ravines which ran nearly parallel to our front, therefore not commanded by it, and consequently could not be enfiladed by our cannon. At the same time the enemy appeared in several lines on the opposite hills further back than this first corps, extending along our front, and particularly annoyed us from the vil- lages by their tirailleurs ; they had brought up also on different points some guns, which, however, had little effect, whilst our batteries were making a tremendous noise to little purpose. After some time the enemy annoyed us much by the fire from several heavy pieces of ordnance, which he had most judiciously, and with great quickness, placed on the commanding points of the opposite hills : and at length avail- ing himself of the smoke and a snow storm, he attempted to APPENDIX. 375 reach our first line with two strong columns of infantry, which were literally cut to pieces by the Russian cavalry, notwithstanding the ocean of snow through which they had to wade, and that down hill. The enemy again had recourse to his batteries, from which we sufFered much, when at last his cavalry had the boldness to advance, and did actually reach our lines, where it sufFered much, and from whence it was, in a short time, driven by our cavalry, whose conduct then, during the whole of the day, and in all the affairs of rear guards, has been most heroic. The sharp-shooting and discharges from the batteries still continued to do us some mischief; but by the hour of twelve, that is, about five hours and a half from the commencement of the action, the advantages were all on the side of the Russians, who had certainly lost many men by the intrepidity, perhaps inconsiderate rashness of their cavalry, in charging through ground where they were exposed to great disadvantage, but where, notwithstanding, they were always successful, and gloriously so. Still I say, notwith- standing their losses from this and other attacks from batteries, &c, all the advantages were to the Russians, and hitherto the enemy had completely failed : he had, I supposed, very early experienced how impossible it was to attack us with success in front ; on our right, the country was open for a consider- able distance, so that we could have been apprised immediately of any advance from that quarter. Not so the left, where, as I informed you, there were sand hills and wood. There had been repeated requests made to the Russian chiefs to be most active in watching the enemy's movements in this direc- tion, and I was assured that every necessary precaution had been observed ; the distance from the extreme left to where the serious attacks in front were made did not admit of personal observation. At about one o'clock, however, not- withstanding our success, some of the Russian corps of infantry feil back from the left, where at the moment they were not attacked, as also some corps of cavalry, though covered with glory. At this instant the enemy (who had been, I doubt not, for several hours getting his troops through the different defiles and woods on our left) appeared in the rear of the left, where he had already succeeded in bringing up, with certainly vast difficulty, some pieces of artillery, B B 4 376 APPENDIX. which he placed on the summit of the ridges, and from whence he succeeded by his fire to convert the heroes of the morning into the very cowards of the evening ! for neither cavalry nor infantry, which I said was without cause falling back, could now, when attacked in the rear of the left of its camp, be prevailed upon to advance to the point of the left which w$s thus threatened, or in part to re-occupy his former position in front, which the enemy from the opposite hills soon perceived to be deserted, and in consequence again attacked, but fortunately without success, from the exertion of the troops, which were brought up from other quarters. In thismost extraordinary revolution — in this most unlooked for and cruelly mortifying reverse of fortune, where troops which should found necessary to request of General Lestocq, who was sup- posed and reported to General Beningsen to be actually in the rear of his camp, to advance towards the front to impose by the appearance of his infantry upon the enemy. But Lestocq was at this critical moment three British miles from us, and did not arrive before three o'clock : by this time the enemy had taken up a strong and formidable position on our left flank, in the rear of it ; and when a panic once seizes troops your experience informs you how sadly distressing is the situation of the general commanding. The enemy could at first, without much loss, have been compelled to abandon his new position ; but by the time Lestocq arrived he had made it a very strong one. It extended bevond the extre- mity of our left flank, occupying two small woods, which were about equal distances from his centre; the whole of this space was filled with tirailleurs, artillery, and other corps in line. The enemy did not, however, advance; he only cleared that part of our position, particularly the rear of it, by his guns, having placed himself in a most formidable and menacing position, in accomplishing which I cannotbut think he displayed great military proficiency, by which he deprived us almost entirely of the hitherto commanding advantage of our situation in front, and which he could not have accomplished but by the best organized troops. He never ceased occupying our attention in the front with his light corps, having alsopushed some troops towards the right of our front who threatened us APPENDIX. 377 occasionally. Lestocq came into our camp by our right, with I suppose about thirteen thousand men; they say much more, but I don't give entire credit to camp accounts : how- ever, he immediately directed himself by our rear to the left, and advanced in two lines upon the right of the new position of the enemy, while the Russians advanced against him at the other extremity, and also towards his centre. The enemy appeared inclined to advance through our camp from left to right, but there was no light for this, and the thing termi- nated in an affair of sharp-shooting from and against the woods, as also in a mutual exchange of great guns, by which some valuable lives were lost. I should mention that, during all this time, the front of the line was engaged, as I have before stated. The day closed, leaving the enemy in his new 'position, though certainly threatened with a very formi- dable attack, and most likely to be driven from it in the morning, at the same time in a position very menacing to us. At night the enemy opened a battery upon us rather on our right, which we were informed was done by the corps of Bernadotte. The artillery ammunition had been sufFered to be most unnecessarily and uselessly expended. The Russian chiefs were early cautioned not to permit this. The army had not been well fed for some days ; I cannot say, however, that provisions were wanting to the whole of the army, though many of the men had been a long time without food. They hadfought well for some days, during which they had sustained great fatigue and privations of every kind, and during the greater part of this day they had displayed the most un- daunted courage, and had in every instance foiled the enemy in his attacks, and gained the superiority over him, except in manoeuvring, in which I think he showed most signal talent. I allude to his new position, which he conceived as a great general, and executed with the greatest precision and ability. We were still in possession of the field of battle, yet notwith- standing it was resolved to fall back, which we did during the night, leaving Lestocq, who had taken up a position as I have stated, to cover the retreat. The Russians are at about nine miles from hence and ten from where they fought. I don't hear that Lestocq has been attacked, or that the French advance in any direction. Lestocq's affair of last night was very trilling, though they say (Wilson of the number !) that 378 APPENDIX. he had his horse shot — mais supposons cela! Though the French may not have lost in the long fight of yesterday a great number of men, still their loss must have been consider- able, and the dismay of the troops great indeed, for un- doubtedly the Russians have not the smallest dread of them, and that they know. The Russian army, on the other hand, are for the moment nearly disorganized — at least in a most astonishing state of confusion ! Not unlike that which one sees occasionally in a Turkish army ; still I believe and doubt not that a sufficiënt number can be collected, to enable the superior officers, who are really a very fine set of fellows, and possessed of the most indignant feeling against the French power, to make another very formidable resistance to M. Bonaparte, should he wish to persevere. He certainly ought to feel greatly mortified by the frequent and decisive repulses he experienced yesterday, and the resistance which a very supe- rior number of his troops met for several days from a very small rear-guard of the Russians. As I said before, I still am of opinion that the real Russian gentleman, and soldier from his native strength and undaunted disposition, when well led on by this said gentleman, who appears naturally proud and brave, are capable with a little assistance in the way of military heads, &c, of opposing effectually the further progress of Napoleon in these parts at least. The loss on both sides yesterday must have been very considerable, though not as much as it should have been, considering the number of hours we were engaged, from half past six till half past five. I don't take any account of a few bloody night scènes which foliowed. I fear the wounded are sadly off; what we witnessed in that way was dreadfully affecting indeed. Our (Wilson and mine) obligations to Beningsen and his offi- cers are great. A very good horse of his, which I rode yesterday, was badly wounded in two places. I don't think I can oifer to pay for it ; but should the black mare be in good condition, and that you have no objection, I think I may at least present her Ladyship to him as a return for his horse, which, I fear, will never be perfectly well. All the villages we passed through have been ruined, as might have been expected. The action of yesterday destroyed several. Kind regards to all the party. APPENDIX. 379 Monday night, £ past 5. I have been most tedious, and I fear, dull and tiresome, from a wish to put you in possession of our position and the nature of our attack. I believe the Russian strength, from what I saw yesterday, to exceed what I stated it before. I have come into Konigsberg for the night, but shall return to camp in the morning. I think in a few days we shall see you. General Fox to Mr. A. Messina, Mar. 6th, 1807. Dear Sik, I AM to thank you for your letter of the 17th January, which has given us all here the greatest satisfaction, and I trust and hope the effects of the considerable check the French have met with will give a general turn to their affairs, and that the Powers on the Continent will not lose this opportunity of re-establishing their independence. I have only to say how thankful I shall be for any communication you are so good as to make to me, as we are always a long time hearing from England, and the Continental Gazettes that we are likely to receive here, you must well know, cannot be in the least depended upon, being entirely under the direction of the French. According to a secret letter from England, I have sent 5,000 men under the command of General Fraser to occupy Alex- andria in Egypt. They sailed this day under the convoy of the Tigre. I hope you received my letter of the 21st January. I have the honour to be, With great truth and regard, Your most faithful and obedient Servant, J. R. C. Fox. 380 APPENDIX. Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A. (Copy.) Memel, April lst, 1807. My dear Adair, ' I have waited a long time for some intelligence worthy of communication to give you. I have at length received despatches from England, but as the messenger, unluckily for me, was both a gentleman and an officer * * ****** he passed six weeks on his journey, and amused himself for a fortnight at Copenhagen. I see by the English papers that another messenger left London on the 7th of March. I can entertain but little doubt that he has been taken, as there is a privateer known to be out from Stettin, and merchant ships, which left Yarmouth roads on the 27th, arrived here several days ago. I requested them to send out my despatches by a cutter, but, alas ! those who are at a distance always imagine themselves to be better informed than those on the spot. My last accounts from England were only of the 20th of February ; the treaty which I signed on the 28th of January had not then been received ; so there is nothing new or interesting. The Emperor arrivés here to-morrow; he is accompanied by Novosilzow and Budberg : I cannot teil you whether Lord Douglas comes or not ; as I have not heard that he does, I should rather suppose the contrary. The first division of the Russian guards arrive on the Memel to-morrow ; as soon as the whole line have joined General Beningsen, he purposes to make an attack on the French position. Bonaparte has still his head-quarters at Osterode, where they say he has constructed a magnificent house for himself. The Emperor does not mean to take the command of the army, though he probably will go to the neighbourhood of it, and continue some time there : the King of Prussia will accompany him, and I shall folio w his Majesty ; so that you may depend on having from me the earliest information of military events. I think it right to acquaint you that I have proposed to the govern- ment of England, that a large body, or rather an army of British and Swedish troops should assemble in Pomerania, act on the left bank of the Oder, besiege Stettin, which is a very bad place with a small garrison, and perhaps Custrin, APPENDIX. 381 and by that means open the communication with Berlin, the Elbe, and the rest of Germany. I think we can send thirty thousand men, including the German Legion, but at least twenty-five thousand. The Swedes can give ten thousand men at least, and if pressed and paid, fifteen thousand ; so that the whole might compose an army of forty thousand men, placed in a situation where they might render the most essential services, and with a most excellent retreat in case of misfortune behind the river Peene and Stralsund, which is, as you know, a most excellent place in summer. I have read Count Gotzen's paper over and over again ; I have neither power, authority, nor inclination to enter into such schemes. Entre nous, there appears to me to be in England a very laudable design of sparing the public purse : I enter into it most heartily ; I am glad I have done so. They have got it into their heads here, founded on accounts from Troppau and Cracow, that the Austrians are at length determined to take a part in the war, and to act with the allies. I do not give any countenance to this idea ; it would be neither right nor honest to act in that manner, till I have assurances from you that something is likely to be done in your quarter. I satisfy myself with saying that they may be better informed than you are, as to the intentions of the Austrian government ; but I am without any authority from you to assure them that it is in the contemplation of the Court of Viennato give that assistance, which, in the present crisis, would undoubtedly be decisive. Till so desirable an event happens, it is better to rely on our own strength, which is very great, and not to follow false illusions, which must lead to misconceived plans of military operations, and end in ul- timate disappointment. I send you a private letter which I opened by mistake, but which I closed again immediately; it came alone, and was put into my hands by an ignorant master of a vessel, so that of course I conceived it was for myself. Nothing new from the army. The Cossack war still continues, and they have taken a number of prisoners from the enemy. I have for- warded all your letters and papers to Garlike. Believe me ever, My dear Adair, Yours most sincerely, (Signed) Hutchinson. 382 APPENDIX. Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A. (Copy) Memel, April 5th, 1807. My dear Sik, I ayail myself of the opportunity of Mr. Baker, to write you a few lines. The Emperor remained here only two or three days, and then went, accompanied by the King of Prussia, to visit the Russian guards at Georgenburg, where they will remain two or three days, and then I rather think they will both proceed to the army. What is to be done there is the doubt : whether we are to enter into a negociation for peace or continue the war, I defy any man alive to predict. I take it for granted that you have got from England a copy of the instructions sent to Lord Douglas on the 6th of March ; you see that we consent to enter into a negoci- ation, a joint one, with Prussia and Russia, but we are de- termined to make no sacrifices to purchase a peace for Prussia. There has been nothing doing of any consequence with the army for a great while ; Bonaparte is still in his old position, nor does he appear willing to quit it. General Beningsen talks of attacking the French when his reinforce- ments arrive ; I believe it is only talk. The position of the French is a strong one, in a country full of lakes, marshes, and defiles, where they would have every advantage. The f rost is now entirely breaking up : the country will be one sea of water ; the roads almost impassable for cannon, and diffi- cult for cavalry. I see amongst the Russians a great hesi- tation whether they shall attack or not. If Bonaparte oifered any basis which could be accepted, I am sure they would negociate ; there can be no doubt that it is in their contemplation so to do, as Baron Budberg is to be here in six or eight days. NovosilzofF came with the Em- peror. Strogonow got here yesterday, and I am told Czar- toriski is expected. Nothing can be more uncertain than the posture of our affairs ; every thing depends upon events, and particularly upon the favourable intelligence which you may send us from your quarter. I had nearly forgotten to mention to you that Baron Hardenberg is, or is likely to be, minister for foreign affairs. This was chiefly brought about by the efforts APPENDIX. 383 of the Emperor, but I gave my assistance, as I was ordered by my instructions so to do. This change has rather a warlike appearance, but you may depend on it things are just as I stated them to be, and that if the French are reasonable, they may possibly negociate. Prussia will urge Russia, and there are many reasons which ought to have the tendency to make Russia herself wish for negociation. I think I shall not stay many days longer here, but go to the head-quarters, where there must be discussions on several important questions. You shall hear from me as soon as I am in possession of any thing worthy of communication, which I dare say will be soon, as things cannot remain long in their present state. I should not imagine there was any serious danger for Dantzic. Believe me ever, My dear Sir, Yours most truly, (Signed) Hutchinson. Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson. (Copy.) Vienna, April 6th, 1807. My dear Lord, I should have informed you bef ore this, if I hadfound an opportunity, of my having advanced a further sum of 240,000 dollars to the Count de Gotzen, on his Prussian Majesty's account just previous to his departure from Vienna, This makes in all 500,000 dollars, which, according to the rate of exchange at Vienna, amounts to 87,719/., 5s., 9d. ; for which I drew bills on the Treasury at three different periods. ****** ***#** Since writing to you last, we have had but bad accounts from Constantinople. I have nothing direct from Arbuthnot ; but it appears that on March 4th, until which period the negociations continued, Duckworth repassed the Dardanelles without having effected any thing. We have now therefore 384 APPENDIX. a Turkish war to carry on, which, if not speedily finished, may produce fatal conseguences to the common cause. I have great satisfaction in adding, however, that orders have just been received here from Petersburg by M. Pozzo, to proceed instantly to Constantinople 'to make peace. The perfect integrity of the Turkish Empire is the basis on which he is to negociate. You will know by this time that Bonaparte has acceded to the offer of Austria, to mediate for a general peace. I should be astonished at his having done so, considering that the pretensions of Austria are nothing less than a thorough revision and re-settlement of the affairs both of Germany and Italy, were it not evident that he calculates upon the advantage of at least a month's delay before Austria can declare against him, and that in the mean time he hopes to strike some important blow against the Russian army, which, I fear, the reinforcements he has received will but too surely enable him to accomplish. I send you, by Walpole, the official copy of the Emperor of Austria's invitation to his Majesty to accept his good offices for the restoration of peace ; and, having scarcely a moment to write, I refer you to him for other matters of a confidential nature, of which I have made him master. Believe me, my dear Lord, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. Mr. A. to the Marquis of Douglas. Vienna, April 3d, 1807. My Lokd, It is with infinite concern that I have now to inform your Lordship, that his Majesty's neet repassed the Dardanelles on the 4th of March, without having attempted any thing against the city of Constantinople. As I am for the present utterly unacquainted with the motives which occasioned this determination on the part either of Mr. Arbuthnot, or of the admiral commanding the squadron, I can only simply state the fact, together with APPENDIX. 385 the effects which have attended it both at Constantinople and at Vienna. At Constantinople all British property has been seized, and all British subjects declared prisoners of war : General Sebastiani is completely master of the Turkish Empire. At Vienna all the original alarms upon the subject of a Turkish war protracted to an indefinite time, have been renewed, and the approaches to a good understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg have been retarded. I cannot find words sufficiently strong to express to your Lordship the mischief which all this has occasioned to the general system of our foreign relations. It happens most unfortunately, likewise, that much about the time of the ar- rival of this intelligence, representations were received from the Count de Meerfeldt, tending to impress this Court with an opinion that the British government had adopted a totally new system with regard to those relations. I think it right to state that these representations of Count de Meerfeldt were grounded upon a conference with your Lordship soon after your arrival at St. Petersburg, in which you are sup- posed to have declared that Great Britain had now very little to do with foreign affairs, and that her plan of policy would henceforward be regulated more according to the principle of separation from the Continent than of union with it. When this was told me by Count Stadion, to whom it had been represented by Count Meerfeldt, I could not help answering that this statement differed so widely from the whole tenor of the instructions I had received both from Mr. Fox and from Lord Ilowick, that I could not but con- clude Count Meerfeldt had misunderstood you. Not only were his Majesty's intentions to support the King of Prussia to the utmost distinctly communicated to me by government, but I have been authorised from the very first to promise the most liberal assistance to Austria herself in case of necessity. His Majesty's ministers have also been regularly apprised of the support I have given to the negociation for a general concert now carrying on by M. Pozzo di Borgo, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that my conduct has hitherto met with their approbation. C C 386 APPENDIX. If your Lordship will take the trouble of reading my cor- respondence with Mr. Stuart, you will see what have been the principles and the views on which that conduct has been regulated ; you will find them to have been strictly conform- able to the principles and views of Mr. Fox, and consequently to those which I have no doubt your Lordship under similar circumstances would have yourself adopted. I dweil particularly upon this topic, thinking it of the deepest importance to the cause in which we are so closely united with the^Court of St. Petersburg, that no misapprehen- sion whatever should subsist with regard to the fundamental principles of policy which actuate his Majesty's present ad- visers in regard to foreign affairs, and in order that the earliest opportunity should be afforded to Count Meerfeldt of cor- recting the intelligence he has transmitted to his Court upon this subject. It has this day been officially communicated to me that Bonaparte had accepted the Emperor of Austria's mediation for a general peace. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. E. A. The Marquis of Douglas to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, April llth, 1807. My good Sir, I DO not know whether I was more hurt or surprised by the receipt of your letter of the 3d of April; feeling, how- ever, that the opinion Count Stadion has imbibed may place you in a very awkward situation, and impede the progress of public business, I have resolved upon sending off a person immediately, with a view of correcting an error, that, from whatever mistake it may have arisen, ought to be corrected with the utmost promptitude. I had no sooner received your letter than I repaired to General Meerfeldt; and as we are upon the most friendly terms, I thought I could not do better than show him that part of it wherein you state that, in consequence of an official communi- APPENDIX. 387 cation froni him, grounded upon a conference with me, Count Stadion had expressed himself as being impressed with an opinion that the British government was disposed to adopt a new system with regard to her foreign relations; that England had little to do with foreign affairs, and that her plan of policy would henceforward be regulated more according to the principle of separation from the Continent, than of union with it. Nothing can be more contrary to the system of Great Britain, nothing more adverse to the disposition of government, nothing more in contradiction to the policy evidently manifesting itself through all Europe, and nothing more diametrically opposite to every feeling and opinion of my own. General Meerfeldt, not feeling that his despatches had given any ground to Count Stadion for similar conclusions, appeared not a little surprised at the contents of your letter, and in re- ply to satisfy me showed me the two despatches that he sup- posed were alluded to, and wherein he has reported some con- versations we have had together upon general subjects. I find there some hypothetical remarks and conditional inferences of mine, but I can discover nothing, according to my opinion, that leads even to a suspicion that Great Britain has altered, or intended to alter, the system of policy she has so long and so strenuously espoused; and I am persuaded Count Meerfeldt will be ready to do me the justice to acknowledge that, far from appearing to alienate the British government from Continental concerns, I have more than once expressed her extreme anxiety upon the subject, and reasoned the point of co-operation with the General, insinuating that if the satis- fying peculiar views, or the acquiring lost territory, would in- duce Austria to take a decided step, it was more than pro- bable that England would lend her assistance in support of these pretensions. It is unnecessary that I should say any thing more upon this business. It is altogether erroneous. General Meerfeldt is to write by this courier to Count Stadion, to correct a misunderstanding, that I hope has not yet been able to do any mischief, and I send this éclaircissement to you, wishing you to read it to the minister at Vienna, assuring him how much he is mistaken as to the views of the English government, their conduct, and mine; moreover, I havecom- municated to Lord Howick this strange misconception, at the CC 2 388 APPENDIX. same time adding that I am persuaded no evil consequences can ensue, having immediately myself contradicted it in the most unequivocal terms, and assured the Austrian govern- ment through your means that Great Britain feit the same unabated interest towards the Continent that has characterised her whole proceedings. Having said thus mueh, I trust I may expect to hear shortly that Count Stadion's erroneous conception of British policy is done away i I should be glad were I to hear likewise that Austria was so firmly persuaded of the loyal and honour- able proceedings of Great Britain and Russia, that she was resolved to make common cause with them, and assist in re- storing to Europe some relative equilibrium, without which no pacification can be either satisfactory, secure, or permanent. I should have rejoiced to have heard the mediation of Austria announced in another style. With such a document there ought to be an accompanying clause to serve as guaranty of her intentions and her consequence. This subject naturally leads me to the co-operation of Austria, at this moment so desirable; and I cannot refrain from observing that it appears to me that could personal ani- mosities be laid aside, and personal views be fully understood, an union might be brought about. The jealousy and pride of Austria will never permit her to avow her views or admit her mortification to Russia; she nevertheless must be awake to these sentiments, and perhaps would be candid enough to con- fess them to you, in which case I would convey them to this Court, on my part using every delicacy towards feelings that must be wounded. Would Austria suggest a general view of future and con- ditional arrangements in Germany? It is evident that the present system of things has not only destroyed the relative situation of individuai possession, but Empire itself has assumed a novel character with these various changes of limitation. I have expressed to the government here, in consequence of a letter from Lord Howick, a wish that RazamofFsky should use every argument in his power to persuade Austria that his Imperial Majesty has no views of aggrandisement upon the frontiers of Turkey ; this has been suggested with a hope of destroying that jealousy which you must discover at Vienna .APPENDIX. 389 upon many occasions. Be so good as to find out if the Russian ambassador has exerted himself upon this subject; for although I despair of seeing Austria in the field of battle, yet it is a satisfaction to remove every plausible pretext that is brought forward to justify their inactivity at this critical moment. If you should not have heard from home upon the subject of a congress, should one ever be in agitation, perhaps it may be satisfactory to you to know that Lord Howick has desired me to object to Lublin, as a place too distant from the seat of the British government. Copenhagen would be preferred, or even Hamburg. I send you this information, as, should it first fall to your lot (as it is most probable) to hear that such a thing is in agitation, you will be enabled to state with cer- tainty the wishes of Great Britain upon the occasion. You will have heard of the discussions with Count Bern- storff upon the subject of Husum. He wished to exclude the English from that port; however, M. Garlike has per- suaded, or rather alarmed the Danes into an acquiescence. There is a probability of some agreement with Sweden, by which an additional force will be on foot to distract the at- tention of Bonaparte; and it is not impossible that some British cavalry may appear upon the Continent. This pro- bably is not new to you. I send you herewith a letter I have received from England for Mr. Arbuthnot. As you will probably have an opportu- nity of conveying it to him sooner than I shall, I have resolved upon forwarding it to Vienna. The courier that brings this letter is a man of Mr. Arbuth- not's (who was forwarded here with despatches and whom I was requested by him to take care of). As he wishes to get away from here, and as he will be nearer his master at Yienna than at St. Petersburg, I have made use of him as my mes- senger, and must request in Mr. Arbuthnot's name that you will take him under your protection. I am, with the greatest truth, My good Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, DOUGLAS AND CLYDESDALE. cc 3 390 APPENDIX. Mr. A. to the Marquis of Douglas. Vienna, April 8th, 1807. My Lord, I received several packets and your Lordship's three private letters, by the last Russian courier: I am greatly obliged to you for them, and likewise for your expressions of personal civility towards myself. I beg your Lordship in return will command my services here in all things. Herewith I inclose the extract of a despatch I have just received from England of the 7th of March. May I request that you would have the goodness to communicate it to Baron Budberg ; and I should also think it would not be amiss to read it to Count Meerfeldt. The despatch is in answer to one from me, in which I expressed a wish that some distinct mani- festation of the opinion of his Majesty's government should be sent out to me respecting the entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia and Wallachia; I desired this, in order to make use of the authority of the British Cabinet at this Court, for the purpose of allaying those jealousies on the part of Austria, which at one time wore a very formidable aspect. As I have reason to think that this despatch, which contains so explicit a declaration of the sentiments of govern- ment respecting Turkish affairs, may prove of the utmost con- sequence to the success of the negociation which Colonel Pozzo di Borgo is instructed to open with the Ottoman Porte for the restoration of peace, it is my intention to furnish him with a copy of this part of it, together with the strongest recommendation to Mr. Arbuthnot to concert with M. Pozzo the best means of assisting the generous views of the Emperor of Russia. Your Lordship's ideas respecting the importance of bring- ing about a thorough good understanding between the Courts at which we respectively reside, are most correct. Every thing, both now and hereafter, depends upon it — the present safety of the world, and the existence of anything like a feder- ative system for the future. In this point of view I have never ceased presenting the question to the Austrian govern- ment since my arrival here, and I have taken upon myself in APPENDIX. 391 more instances than one to give a wide interpretation to my instructions. The jealousy concerning Turkey is now, I trust, completely at an end, and matters are fast verging to a point at which we shall either force Bonaparte to a general peace, or have the assistance of Austria in a general war. There still exists here a doubt, however, concerning the views of our government in regard to its Continental relations, which I find some difficulty in combating. In returning a second time to explanations with Count Stadion upon this point, I find that the Count de Meerfeldt has represented your Lordship's conversation with him (which I dwelt so much upon in my last letter) in a point of view still more likely to discourage the formation of a general alliance than I had at first thought ; for he not only represents England as generally wishing to avoid the renewal of her connections with the Continent, but so indifferent to its fate as not to be willing at a peace to surrender any of her acquisitions, or to make any sacrifices, in order to obtain better terms for the Powers that may be at war with France. I am confident that your Lordship can never have said this, without such qualifications as the circumstances of Europe naturally suggest; but these, or any qualifications whatever of a declaration so discouraging, it appears that Count Meerfeldt has entirely omitted to state. Believe me, my Lord, With the greatest esteem and regard, Your most obedient Servant, (Signed) R. A, The Marquis of Douglas to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, May 14th, 1807. My good Sir, I cannot allow an instant to escape me in acknowledging your letter of the 8th of April. It has revived with additional pain the subject upon which I last addressed you ; because it appears to convey an idea that the opinions erroneously attributed to me by the Austrian ambassador here, continue to have some weight at the Court of Vienna. That you may be fully aware of every thing I have done in consequence of C C 4 392 APPENDIX. this misunderstanding, I herewith inclose an abstract from my despatch to Lord Howick upon the subject ; and although it is little different from what I wrote to you upon a former occasion, it may yet possibly act upon Count Stadion's mind as a corroborating proof of the opinions of his Britannic Majesty, and his Britannic Majesty's ambassador. With respect to what are the views of England, and what her policy upon the Continent of Europe, Count Stadion, if he doubts her words, will hardly question her actions. Let him examine the line of conduct she is pursuing, and ask himself if it is possible to suppose under such circumstances she can feel indifferent, or can intend to relax from those principles of co-operation, which, whilst they establish her glory and equity, are tending to maintain the honour and independence of Europe. But I will not enter into discussions of this nature. General Meerfeldt has been totally in an error, and I again aver that every instruction I have received from England, and every inference I have been able to draw from those instructions received, so far from appearing to carry with them the appearance of alienation, most decidedly bear the character of union and co-operation. I must add one word more : his Britannic Majesty, so far from not being willing to make sacrifices, I have always declared (although the observation is hypothetical), would be disposed at a peace to make every sacrifice in favour of his friends and allies, that was consistent with the dignity of his crown and the interests of his people. General Meerfeldt, with whom I am personally upon terms of intimate friendship, I am persuaded could never have intended to have given an erroneous intepretation of any conversation we have had together. Of the character and leaning of his political opinions it is not for me to say any thing. If his prepossessions (as you say) are considered at Vienna to be very strong, of a particular tendency, and that tendency inimical to any con- nection between Russia and Austria, I am to suppose that the policy of that Court prefers at this moment an ambassador with such prepossessions. Should such sentiments be congenial to the feelings of Austria, they are neither analogous to those of his Britannic Majesty, nor to the protestations of his representative here. Of this General Meerfeldt can bear witness, for I have frequently attacked him upon the subject APPENDIX. 393 of Austria's inactivity, and encouraged a different system, maintaining the impolicy of the one they had of late adopted. Nay, I have gone further by suggesting that if Austria wished to be indemnified for what she had lost, she might look with greater confidence and security to that indemnifica- tion through the medium of the coalesced Powers than through any other channel ; if she only desires the permanent tran- quillity of Europe, the surest means of obtaining it would be by establishing a relative equipoise upon the Continent. I do not know why I have added so much to what I wrote to you upon a former occasion. I hope it was not necessary, and yet I am aware that too much cannot be done to correct an error that, if persisted in, would prejudice all the operations of the allied Powers. The extract of the despatch you have inclosed shall be com- municated to this government and to the Austrian ambas- sador without delay. His Imperial Majesty will, I am per- suaded, find the sentiments contained in the same similar to those honourable ones that animate his conduct, and therefore will be satisfied ; and Austria, whether active or passive, at this present crisis ought to be made fully aware of these loyal proceedings on the part of Russia, that neither suspicion nor surmise may yield a pretext for inactivity. I am glad to find that you feel in full force the great ad- vantages to be derived from a more cordial understanding between the two Imperial Courts. I fear that we have to combat against personal as well as public impressions; but Great Britain, by softening unpleasant recollections, and miti- gating all recrimination, may do much. To do more, she must communicate that conviction she feels and manifests herself of the essential benefits naturally resulting from a friendly and confidential intercourse. What are the feelings in Austria I cannot teil ; but I really do not see any thing like rancour on the banks of the Neva. Your reports from the Mediterranean are a subject of con- cern : I feel quite grieved that there should be so considerable a depot of military force in a part of the world where there is so little use made of them. What the expedition you allude to anticipates I cannot teil ; but some accounts that lately arrived from Sicily I am sorry to say do not forebode any thing there very favourable for the future. 394 APPENDIX. As you are now probably better informed at Vienna of all that is going on upon the Continent than we are at St. Petersburg, I shall not attempt to send you any news. You will probably have heard of the check that the Swedes have met with : this is a subject of particular grief to me, as I repose the greatest possible confidence both in the Sovereign and the soldiers of that country. It appears that they ex- tended their line too far for the small number of troops they had to defend it. The loss is ho wever not very great, although 500 or 600 men is an object of importance to a Power limited as to finance and population. I have only received a few lines from Mr. Canning since his appointment to the situation of Secretary of State. He has desired that I should notify to this Court that the change in the administration would make no change in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty, but that the same line of friendship, candour, and policy, would be maintained in full vigour. I am happy to have an opportunity of assuring you of those sentiments of regard with which I am, My good Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant, DOUGLAS AND CLYDESDALE. P. S. Before I seal this letter, I should inform you that I have just learnt that Lord G. L. Gower will shortly be here to conduct public business instead of Yours, D. AND C. Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson. (Copy.) Vienna, April 13th, 1807. My dear Lord, I received yesterday your letter of the lst instant. I am extremely sorry to hear of the delay in the messenger's arrival from England, as I have reason to believe that he accom- panies a young gentleman who was sent out to me in the capacity of private secretary, and by whom I expected letters of all sorts from England. Mr. Thornton wrote to me on APPENDIX. 395 the 23d ultimo to teil me that this gentleman had landed from one of the packets at Husum, and that by the advice of the agent, Hart, he had proceeded to Flensburg in order to embark there for Konigsberg or Memel. I have heard nothing about him since. I thank you sincerely for your communication respecting the military measures recommended by you to government. They are exactly what would most suit this Court, if ever it should embark in the alliance. But I am afraid that moment, although certain to come at last (barring treachery and gross blunders), is not so near as his Prussian Majesty suffers himself to believe. I suspect some bad views in encouraging expectations of an opposite nature, which, I must say, Austria has never given either to Count Finken- stein or to any person in his Prussian Majesty 's service. Count Finkenstein has this very day assured me that he has given no cause for such sanguine hopes. Whence then can they come? Are there in the Prussian councils still such determined advocates for the system which has destroyed the monarchy, as to seek to raise the hopes of his Majesty to the highest pitch in order to take advantage of the moment of disappointment ? And do these advocates await the Emperor Alexander's arrival to gain him to their side by artfully urging the necessity of forcing the Cabinet of Vienna to an immediate declaration, and, consequently, to separation if it should be much longer delayed? I am afraid, my dear Lord, that there is much of the old leaven still existing, and that you will find occasion before long for the exertion of all your powers, both of mind and character. Thank God, however, that Count Hardenberg is near his Majesty's person, and that he appears to possess the confidence, or at least the good opinion of his master. I am made very happy too by your information that Baron Budberg accompanies the Em- peror Alexander. He is a strictly honest man, and you will suit each other admirably. As to M. de Novosilzoff, if he be the same who was in England, he is very strongly inclined to the pacific party. The Cabinet here wait with much anx- iety for the result of the meeting at Memel, and will I think be very much guided by the complexion of the first de- spatches from thence after it takes place. If the pacific party appears to have obtained any ascendency, the whole faction 396 APPENDIX. of separatists here will immediately go to work to destroy even the small approaches that have been made towards a better system. If, on the contrary, you all remain stout and resolute, I have no doubt that we shall arrive through the mediation at that most desirable of all results — joint peace or joint war. It is here that I expect the Austrian declaration ; but not one moment before, unless circumstances foreign to this view of the subject should force it on. I learn for instance that some message is gone from Bonaparte to the senate, calling for next year's conscription, and telling his faithful people that he can manage the Kussians and Prussians very well, but that " on s'arme autour de moi," or some such expression. These preliminary indications may lead to a quicker result than would follow from a negociation entered into and broken off. They may lead to the demand of explanations as to what is going on in Hungary, where I understand that a proposal has been made to the Hungarian nation to render the insur- rection -permanent and disposable. A passage may also be demanded through the Austrian territories for an army into Dalmatia. This is sure of being refused, and war of course must follow ; but, except in the above cases, and the conse- quences resulting from them, I see nothing to make me depart from my opinion, namely, that Austria will not be led into active measures except through the failure of her mediation. Now as this is all we are likely to get from Austria, do you not agree with me that it will be much better to take it, and avoid any appearance of forcing her hand ? I am sure Baron Budberg thinks so, because I have seen a great part of his correspondence with M. Pozzo di Borgo on this subject, all of which has been most temperate and judicious. But I should not be surprised if the Emperor were accompanied by persons of a more eager character who may conceive a little brusquerie towards Austria would bring us nearer to our point. Let me recommend such counsellors to your particular vigilance. Be assured they know nothing of the Cabinet of Yienna, nor of the means of convincing; the Archduke Charles, whose influence on the great question of war or peace is decisive. I have not the APPENDIX. 397 least doubt that on comparing notes with Baron Budberg, you will find him of the same opinion. I am extremely glad to find that you are to accompany nis Majesty to the army or its neighbourhood. You shall hear regularly from me on all matters that occur at this place. My instructions from England are of the same nature as yours with regard to subsidies, and a due tenderness of the public purse. I feel it possible, however, that I may be under the necessity of risking much, and pushing responsi- bility to its utmost verge. It is not that I am embarrassed by any promises, for I have always abstained from making any, and latterly would not suffer the word subsidy to be named previous to an actual commencement of hostilities, but if hostilities do actually commence, and combined operations be thought of and proposed, I cannot let them fail for want of sufficiënt assurances of support. This, of course, must always be decided by the circumstances of the moment, which very often prescribe of themselves the readiest way out of the difficulties they appear to create. I am truly sorry to inform you of the death of the Empress at 7 o'clock yesterday morning. She was taken ill in conse- quence of a premature delivery, and died after a short illness. The Emperor is most deeply afflicted by her loss. He re- turned from Buda the day preceding her decease, and at- tended her with the most affecting solicitude during the whole of the night. He introduced all his children to her bedside, to take their leave, with the utmost composure and fortitude. After the last sad moment he gave way to the sensations natural on so severe a loss ; but I am happy to say that he has recovered sufficiënt possession of himself to return to the Diet at Buda, where he is to go to-morrow. I under- stand that matters are going on there much better than was at first expected. Believe me, my dear Lord, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. 398 APPENDIX. Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A. Bartenstein, May 6th, 1807. My dear Adair, The bearer of this letter is Prince Radzivill, who is married to the Princess Louisa of Prussia ; he is a particular friend of mine, and I have a great regard for him. He is a very agreeable, sensible man, and perfectly in the confidence both of the Russian and Prussian governments, so you may open yourself to him in the fullest manner. I am at present with the army, so that it would be impossible at the present for me to resign my situation, which I consider as entirely a military one ; but should any serious negociation for peace be entered into, or when the campaign is drawing to a conclusion, I shall think myself entirely at liberty, and desire leave to retire. As for anything which has passed or is likely to pass in England, I have no information, as I have few correspond- ent s ; those few never write to me but on subjects of private business : but there appears to have been a division amongst the ministers themselves. The Russians, who have no idea of religious persecution, cannot believe that such a cause could have created such a ferment at such a moment. Believe me to be, My dear Adair, With great regard truly yours, (Signed) Hutchinson. The same to the same. (Copy.} Bartenstein, May 19th, 1807. My dear Adair, I hope you have received the letter which I sent to you by Prince Radzivill about a fortnight ago. I have been with the army for about three weeks: we have been very inactive; and such is our want of provisions that we are likely to remain so for a long time. Dantzic is, I fear, likely to be soon taken. On the 15th of this month an attempt was made to throw a body of troops into the place, and to APPENDIX. 399 open the communication with the sea. The Russians on one side, the Prussians on the other, were repulsed with the loss of about 2000 men, killed and wounded. Both attacks were made on the right bank of the Vistula along the [ which is a long narrow neck of land between the Vistula and the sea. This letter will be presented to you by Major Baron Tuyll of the Russian service, formerly in ours ; he is an officer of great merit, and a man of considerable reading and understanding. Believe me to be, My dear Adair, With great regard truly and sincerely yours, (Signed) Hutchinson. Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson. Vienna, May 19th, 1807. My dear Lord, I have nothing at this moment to say more than you will find in my two short letters of the 5th and 16th instant. I do not like the Prussian answer to the Austrian media- tion. It ought to have been a simple acceptance of the pro- posal. The good of the proposal was that it might prove a means of uniting the three powers in some common object. I fear now that no such object will be found, as we are not ripe here for what you propose, namely, an accession to your Convention of the 26th of April. The consequence may be that Austria retirera son épingle du jeu, and will leave us to carry on the war or settle the peace by ourselves. That if the Continental peace be settled without the con- currence of Austria as a party to it, she will be eventually the sacrifice, no man in his senses can doubt. But I have told them all this till I am hoarse, and till they are deaf. I am now, ho wever, reduced to silence myself from another cause. Before this can reach you it is most probable that Lord Pembroke will be at Vienna. I most sincerely hope he may be more successful than I have been in conciliating * MS. here illegible. 400 APPENDIX. this Court to the views of the present ministers. Ever since the change, I have repeated the most positive assurances of sup- port, and endeavoured to persuade them that the political events in England had nothing in common with our Conti- nental system. I have not been successful. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) K. A. P.S. I inclose you three packets. There are two from the Bishop of Nancy of great importance, as he tells me. The same to Mr. Canning. ( Copy — Private?) Vienna, May 29th, 1807. Dear Sir, I wrote a few lines to you the other day to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28th. I have now only to add that you may rely on me, until Lord Pembroke's arrival at Vienna, for a continuance of the same endeavours to promote his Majesty's serviöe* which you have been so good as to notice and to approve. On public affairs my despatch will teil you every thing I know. There is one subject, however, which I have thought it most prudent to reserve for private communication. I inclose what I have to say upon it in a separate paper. I am, dear Sir, (Signed) K. A. Inclosure referred to. The letter to Monsieur de Yaudreuil, which accompanies my despatches, relates to the unfortunate Marquis de Bivière, speedily about to be sent to Cayenne, or perhaps put to death, unless means can be found of helping him to escape from his prison. If you should deern this an object worthy the ge- nerosity, or perhaps the justice of the British government, let me entreat you to send out orders without delay to Lord Pembroke to furnish the means of eöecting it. — K. A. APPENDIX. 401 The same to M. Pozzó di Borgo. Vienna, June 29th, 1807. Dear Sir, The importance of the moment in which you will most probably have to open your negociations at Constantinople, makes me judge it expediënt to forward to you without loss of time an extract from a despatch, dated the 9th of this month, which I have just received from England, You will remember the despatch I wrote home as soon as you received at Vienna the Emperor's orders to proceed on your present mission. You will recollect how strongly I recommended it to the English ministers, in order to give additional weight to your efforts, to send you out such re- commendations to Mr. Arbuthnot as would ensure his co- operating with you ; and also that in my private letter to Lord Howick I used these strong expressions among others : " M. Pozzo di Borgo is now thoroughly master of all the views of his own Court, as well as of ours, and likewise of those of the Court of Vienna — a most material point among his means of negociation at the place to which he is going." That despatch was sent to England the 5th of April, and must have been received there by the 20th of the same month. As events have turned out, it is greatly to be lamented that the new ministers (into whose hands it came officially) did not send me out the necessary authority for you to act upon, without losing a moment's time ; as you might then have been able, as soon as you heard of the revolution at Constantinople, and of the amicable dispositions of the Porte towards Great Britain, to offer peace in our name upon the same terms as you were authorised by your instructions to propose for Russia. The instant I heard of the taking of Alexandria by our troops, I renewed my applications to Government in a despatch dated the 29th of April, and written expressly for the purpose of obtaining full powers for you * to assure the Turks they might have it again, together with all the conquests we might make upon them, as the price of peace with Russia. I hope * Mr. Arbuthnot had left Constantinople. D D 02 APPENDIX. and believe that Sir Arthur Paget's voyage has been accele- rated in consequence of what I wrote, but it is still to be regretted that he did not set sail before the beginning of June. I am, &c. &c. (Signed) ' E. A. M. Pozzo di Borgo to Mr, A. a bord du vaisseau Amiral Ie Tverdoy pres Tenedos, , 21 Juillet lftft H, le 6Aoüt 1807 ' Monsieur, La lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait 1'honneur de m'écrire en date du 29 Juin avec 1'extrait de la dépêche de S. E. Mr. Canning, secrétaire d'état au département des affaires étran- gères, aurait beaucoup contribué a accélérer la conclusion des affaires ici, si les événemens militaires arrivés dans Ie Nord, n'avaient tout-a-fait changé et les dispositions des Turcs et, je crois, Ie plan même de la pacification qui devait être traitée par moi. Je n'ai encore recu aucun ordre de ma Cour, ni aucun renseignement sur les déterminations qui ont été prises en con- sequence de ces événemens ; mais les Communications même imparfaites, que j'ai pü me menager a Constantinople, ne me laissent aucun doute que la nature de ma mission doit avoir entièrement changé. J'attends avec anxiété de savoir a quoi m'en tenir. Le zèle avec lequel votre Excellence s'est employé pour Ie succes des ordres et des intentions de ma Cour, et 1'effet qu'il avait produit sur le Cabinet Britannique, sont si remar- quables que j'ai cru. de mon devoir de soumettre a sa Majesté Impériale la dépêche de votre Excellence, et je ne doute que cette démarche, de la part de votre Excellence, n'ajoute a la considération que 1'on a déja a ma Cour des principes qui la distinguent. M. le Chevalier Paget est arrivé ici le — Juillet. Il s'est annoncé au Divan en sa qualité de plénipotentiaire. Sans les malheurs arrivés en Pologne, son intervention aurait beaucoup contribué au succes de la négociation. APPENDIX. 403 J'ai Phonneur d'être avec la consideration la plus dis- tinguée, Monsieur, De votre Excellence Tres humble et tres obéissant Serviteur, POZZO Dl BORGO. Commodore Campbell to Mr. A. H. M. S. Unité, Sept. 5th, 1807. SlR, I have great satisfaction in congratulating your Excellency on%your re-appointment at the Court of Vienna. Your Excellency will perceive by the accompanying letter the unpleasant situation I am placed in with respect to the Russian troops landing at Venice. I trust you will be able to arrange with their minister a mode of debarkation that will be satisfactory to all parties, as however necessary or proper it might be to prevent their being landed at Venice, with the force I have resistance would be vain ; there are three more line-of- battle ships and four frigates coming from Cattaro with troops, and are daily expected. There was a strong report of several Russian ships being given up to the French : Mr. Foresti mentions it in a letter I had from him ; but I can scarce suppose a thing of the kind can happen, although one is hourly seeing the most extra- ordinary occurrences : should such a thing take place, I shall immediately be obliged to quit these seas. A report has just reached me that one of our frigates has taken General Bertham's staff and military chest on their way to Corfu, also a transport with clothing, and drove several others on shore. A frigate will be going to Malta in a few days with Lord Pembroke ; should you have any thing to send that way, I shall be careful to have it forwarded. I have the honour to be, With great respect, Your Excellency's very humble Servant, Patrick Campbell, d d 2 404 APPENDIX. Mr. Foresti to Commodore Campbell. Corfu, Aug. 12th, 1807. Dear Sie, As it is of great importance to his Majesty's interest that you should be informed with the utmost despatch of the new political arrangements, which are now under execution in virtue of the peace just concluded between Russia and France, the articles of which I have reason to believe may not reach you so directly by way of Trieste, I have thought it expediënt to freight and despatch a vessel from this port, in order to acquaint you with the actual state of affairs in the Adriatic and in these Islands. For this purpose I cannot do better than refer you to the inclosed copy of my despatch to General Fox and Lord Collingwood, to whom they were yesterday forwarded. The Bocche di Cattaro is already evacuated by the Russians, and occupied by the enemy. There is every reason to believe that the Russian ships there and at Curzola have been ceded to the enemy, in addition to the greater part of the Russian squadron now in the Mediterranean. The French troops destined to occupy Corfu are expected here hourly, and perhaps in Russian ships. The ceded Russian ships, it is said, are to proceed to Chioggia, where the Russian crews will be debarked in order to return to Russia overland. Such reports as these would be wholly undeserving of notice, were not the probability of their reality amply sup- ported by the realisation of events almost incredible. The Russian garrison here is in the deepest consternation, and can scarcely conceal its indignation at the peremptory terms prescribed to them for evacuating these Islands, which amount almost to a surrender at discretion. Every arrangement has been made for the reception of the new protectors; and should they not be arrested on their passage to their new possession, which after their arrival will, it is said, be declared as French Departments, any sub- sequent attempt for dislodging them will be almost imprac- ticable. The inhabitants who will know by experience what French protection is, anticipate with terror and disgust the change that awaits them. APPENDIX. 405 The appearance of the slightest effectual support might rouse thera to the most successful resistance, nor can it be supposed that the Russian government would see without exultation every foreign impediment to retard the execution of the harsh stipulations it has agreed to respecting Corfu. To prevent the enemy obtaining the quiet uncontrolled posses- sion of this island so important to their views at this moment, is of the utmost consequence to his Majesty's government. To prevent this operation might produce a diversion not less favourable to his Majesty's interest, than the possession of Cattaro produced to the common cause. Whatever may be the present relations between his Majesty and the French government, the possession of the islands by the latter would greatly enhance their pretensions and claims. And in the event of the war being protracted, the situation of his Majesty's ships on the Adriatic station in the winter season, particularly without a port in the Adriatic or Ionian seas, would be often rendered most critical. I must refer you to the inclosed letter for further arguments in support of the absolute expediency of pre venting, by the promptest and most vigorous measures, and with whatever means can be collected, the occupation of Corfu by the enemy. For this purpose I have to recommend to you to detach im- mediately a frigate, or any disposable part of the force under your command, to cruize in the channel of Corfu. I am now awaiting the answer from the Senate to my demand respecting the new system they seem to have adopted. The violence of the French party so long coerced here re- appears again in all its force. Nor is it to be expected they will show any kind of regard for those who are publicly known as their enemies. But every personal sacrifice will be light to me, if it be the means of promoting the interests of his Majesty in this island, at this most momentous crisis. The rapidity of the enemy's movements for accomplishing the design of occupying Corfu cannot be exceeded, and to frustrate it nothing but an equal celerity on the opposite party can avail. No longer wishing to delay the measures that you may be enabled to take for the public service on this occasion, I hasten to conclude with assuring you, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) Spiridion Foresti. D D 3 406 APPENDIX. Commodore Campbell to Mr. A. H. M. S. Unité, Sept. 5th, 1807 Sik, I yesteeday feil in with a squadron of Russian men-of- war, of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 troops on board from Cattaro ; they are now anchored in Pirano Bay, on the coast of Istria. The Commodore, who I waited on this morning, informed me he is ordered to land them at Venice : as that port is in a state of blockade, I do not know hovv far it is consistent their entering it, as I cannot permit them, otherwise than their going with a force superior to mine, as I find the Com- modore only means to send a frigate to escort the transports there, but he waits from my representation for instructions from Yienna, and this letter goes by the courier he sends. I have pointed out to him, that by landing them at Grado, which is immediately opposite Pirano and about twelve miles distant, they could be sent in Trabacolos by the inland navi- gation, or they might be marched opposite to Yenice, the main road passing within a few miles of Grado, which would prevent any unpleasant circumstances happening. As it is quite a novel case, may I request your Excellency would have the goodness to favour me with your opinion on the subject, as I imagine it would not be the wish of his Majesty's ministers to give any offence to the Russians at this moment. I have the honour to be With great respect, Your Excellency's most humble Servant, Pateick Campbell. Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. A. (Secret and confidentiaL) St. Petersburg, Sept. 14th, 1807. Sik, You have already been informed that the mediation of this Court had only been conditionally accepted by his Majesty's APPENDIX. 407 government. I was instructed to demand, as a preliminary to our acceptance of it, the communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tillsit. I have received a direct refusal, but accompanied by a sort of assurance that the secret articles contain no stipulation hostile to England : I am disposed to give so far credit to this assurance as to believe that the Emperor is not bound by any article to shut the Russian ports against British ships; but at the same time I have reason to think, though the Emperor may not be bound by any engagement to adopt measures of decided hostility, that he has promised to connive at and favour the establish- ment of a maritime league against Great Britain. I have heard, and from pretty good authority, that the Islands composing the Septinsular Republic are to be delivered to France, and that the Russian ships of war are to convey the French troops to Cattaro and Corfu : it appears to me to be of importance that this intelligence should be conveyed as speedily as possible to the commander of his Majesty's naval force in the Adriatic, and from Vienna you will probably find no difficulty in forwarding to him this information. Count RomanzofF is appointed minister for foreign affairs : his feelings are certainly not Anglican. * * ****** I am with great truth, &c. &c. (Signed) Granville Leveson Gower. Le Comte Nicolas de Romanzow to Lord L. Gower (inclosed to Mr. A.). Sept. ** 1807- Le Soussigné a eu 1'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de 1'Empereur la note et la copie de la capitulation de Copen- hague que lui a fait parvenir S. E. le Lord G. L. Gower. S. M. I . a vu avec une peine infinie tous les malheurs qui viennent d'accabler un monarque auquel elle est attachée, et par les liens du sang et par ceux d'une longue amitié. Lorsque le ministère Britannique a concu le dessein de ravir au Danemarc toute sa flotte, lorsque pour eet effet il a envoyé dans la Baltique des troupes nombreuses et une D 1) 4 408 APPENDIX. flotte considérable, il 1'a fait sans en prévenir S. M. I. Ce silence, cette extreme réserve peut servir de preuve que Ie Cabinet de St. James jugeoit lui-même que ce qu'il entre- prenoit étoit directement contraire aux interets de la Russie. Tout ce qui vient de s'exécuter 1'est en effet, et 1'Empereur se doit a lui-même comme aux interets de son empire de ne s'y pas montrer insensible. S. M. se regarde comme garant de la süreté et de la tran- quillité de la mer Baltique ; a quelle époque la tranquillité et la süreté de cette mer a-t-elle été troublée comme elle vient de 1'être aujourd'hui ? Le Soussigné, après avoir instruit M. 1'ambassadeur de S. M. B. des sentiments de 1'Empereur son maitre, prie S. E. &c. &c. (Signé) Le Compte Nicolas de Romanzow. Mr. A. to Lord Granville Leveson Gower. Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1807. Mi Lord, I received some days ago a letter from Commodore Campbell, who commands a squadron of frigates in the Adriatic, by which he informs me that a Russian force of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 troops on board, from Cattaro, had anchored off Pirano, on the coast of Istria; and that the Russian commander had acquainted him that his orders were to land them at Venice. The Russian commander also signified to Commodore Campbell his intention of sending on the transports under the escort of a frigate. The Commodore, entertaining cloubts how far their being suffered to enter Yenice would be consistent with the block- ade of that port, represented to the Russian commander that it could not be permitted unless he went with a superior force. It was agreed, accordingly, that nothing should be done until he could receive instructions from Prince Kurakin at Vienna. By the Commodore's desire, I had yesterday an interview APPENDIX. 409 with Prince Kurakin on the subject, the result of which I think it highly necessary to communicate to your Lordship. Having stated the object of my calling upon him, I men- tioned that, in order to avoid the appearance of any misunder- standing with a Power so long and so cordially connected with us, a middle course had been proposed by the Commo- dore, viz. that of landing the troops at Garda, which is immediately opposite to Pirano, and only at twelve miles distance from it, and thence either to get them conveyed by inland navigation, or marched by the high road to Venice. To this proposal I requested Prince Kurakin's assent, and also that he would issue the necessary instructions to the Russian commander. It was not my good fortune to succeed in persuading Prince Kurakin to adopt this suggestion. I could only obtain from him a declaration upon his honour, that the land- ing of the troops at Venice was with no hostile intention, but merely a measure of convenience and arrangement. An answer so little satisfactory occasioned my writing im- mediately to Commodore Campbell (who had solicited my advice how to proceed in a case so new and so difficult) a despatch, of which the following is an extract : — " All I can recommend you to do is this: — If the Russian commander should persist in sending these troops by sea, and under the escort of a frigate only, to resist it by force. If he should come with his whole squadron, then to deliver him a strong protest in writing, drawn up as closely as pos- sible to the spirit of your instructions, against a proceeding so contrary to every principle of neutrality, and so directly prejudicial to the interest of his Majesty, and of his ally the King of Naples." It appears to me to be necessary that your Lordship should without loss of time be made acquainted with a transaction which may lead to very serious discussions between the two countries. More Russian ships are expected every day with the troops from Corfu, which important sta- tion has, in virtue of the secret engagements at Tillsit, been put into the possession of France. All these troops, it appears, are destined for Venice. I am absolutely without instructions for my guidance on an occasion so novel and so unexpected; but under the present apparent relations between 410 APPENDIX. Russia and France, and considering the many just causes of alarm from what has already transpired of the secret articles of their peace, the term of one monthassignedfor our acceptance or rejection of their mediation, the recent surrender of Corfu and the known determination of Bonaparte to attempt every- thing to get possession of Sicily, I cannot help looking upon the assemblage of a large Russian force in the north of Italy as a measure extremely suspicious, to say the least of it; and one which the British government would on no account allow to be carried into effect through the abandonment of the blockade of the port of Venice. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. The same to the same. Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1807. My Lokd, I inclose you the copy of a letter which Lord Pembroke received a few days ago from M. Foresti, giving an account of the surrender of Corfu to the French. I am afraid they are already in full possession. This effect of the treaty, more perhaps than any other part of it, proves the existence of a general plan of partition between Russia and France, of which the Ottoman Empire will be the first victim in point of order. The rest will follow in their turn. In my conversation with Prince Kurakin on the business contained in my public letter to you, I endeavoured to dis- cover, as much as possible, what was at the bottom of this fatal treaty ; and I am much afraid, by what feil from him, that all your prognostics (as they were communicated to me by Lord Pembroke) are on the point of being verified. His conversation, it is true, is so desultory, that I may be wrong in drawing any distinct conclusion from his silence and embarrassment on points where I pressed him ; but, unhappily, the conduct of his m aster corroborates every suspicion his own language is calculated to inspire. I cannot attempt to give a regular report of this strange conference, as he carried me about from south to north and from west to east at almost APPENDIX. 411 every question I put to him. In short, it was the clumsiest attempt to battre la campagne I ever witnessed. Three points, however, I should judge to be certain, from his way of receiving and noticing what I said to him : — When he gave me his word of honour that the troops were not to be landed at Venice with any hostile intention, he ob- jected to me the injustice of entertaining suspicions against an old friend and ally; and asked what harm Russian troops could do to us in the north of Italy ? He asked also whether the Emperor Alexander had not even given new proofs of his friendly disposition towards us by the offer of his mediation to bring about a peace? I answered to this latter question that what he affirmed res- pecting the mediation, was perfectly true; but that the Em- peror had given us only a month to consider of it. I then asked him in my turn, what Russia meant to do after the expiration of that term ? Was it not true that she meant to force us to make peace? At this he was visibly embarrassed, and made me no answer. I pressed this point still further. In reply to what he had objected concerning our suspicions of an old and faithful ally, I said (taking it for granted by his silence that Russia did actually entertain the designs I have mentioned) that I would accept the pledge of his word of honour for the absence of all present hostile intention in landing Russian troops at Venice ; but that if the mediation should come to nothing, their presence there would be very convenient for whatever operations the allied Courts of France and Russia might think necessary to give effect to their engagements. I then said that I would not conceal from him my opinion that no Continental Power would be free from the influence of those engagements ; and I begged him to recollect that we had not abandoned the King of Naples, and that Bonaparte was determined to get Sicily if he could. He was quite silent to all this except what regarded an at- tack on Sicily by Russian troops ; and to this he replied that the Emperor would never attempt anything against King Ferdinand. He then began talking of the conduct of Great Britain in the Baltic, and twenty other matters totally foreign to the object of our interview. Among other things which escaped him, was a kind of renewal of the principle respecting 412 APPENDIX. blockaded ports contended for by the neutrals. He would have had me to understand that as Commodore Campbell's force before Venice was inferior to that of the Russian com- mander, the entry of the latter with his neet could not be considered as disturbing the blockade. I contented myself with saying that we had not yet received this law into our naval code. From what I have here detailed, I should collect (if I had been conversing with a man at all informed of the views of his Court) three things as certain: — lst, that if we don't make peace, Russia will declare against us ; — 2d, that attempts will be made to force Austria to join the Continental confede- racy; — and 3d, that the troops lancled at Venice will either be employed in rendering disposable a larger French force for the reduction of Sicily, or in some hostile manner against Austria. * I intend either despatching another courier to you, or pro- fiting by one Count Stadion will probably send off to Count Meerfeldt as soon as we know the issue of this business. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. P.S. Lord Pembroke, Mr. A'Court, &c, left Vienna on the 14th, to proceed to England by Trieste. The same to the same. Vienna, Sept. 30th, 1807 My dear Lord, I received, on the 24th inst., your despatch and inclosures of the 14th, and am extremely obliged to you for the informa- tion you have sent me. By what I wrote to you on the 15th, and by Mr. Foresti's letter, you will have seen that the cession of Corfu to France was already known to me; but I confess that I could not have believed that Russia would have pushed her hostile in- clinations against us so far as to lend her ships and her flag to put our enemy in possession, during the war, of a military post of such importance. I am still incredulous respecting the cession of a part of the Russian navy to France ; but APPENDIX. 413 whether it be so or not, we must exert ourselves to send a fleet into the Adriatic, and obtain the superiority there at any price. Soon after I had despatched my messenger to you with the account of my conversation with Prince Kurakin, I received some information respecting the internal state of the Seven Islands, which gives me hopes that with a little exertion we may render ourselves masters of them. I have accordingly transmitted my information to Commodore Campbell and Sir Alexander Ball, and have desired the latter to forward a copy of it to General Moore, or whoever commands in Sicily. I have of course written home to government ; but time is too precious to wait their answer, if our commanders in the Mediterranean can spare a force sufficiënt to make the attack. The difficulty of communication will delay this enterprise, and indeed may possibly prevent its taking place ; other- wise, its success is certainly on the cards. If Sir Arthur Paget, for instance, could make peace with the Turks, which he has orders to do without Russia, the troops from Alexan- dria would be more than sufficiënt to reduce all the Islands before the French could fortify themselves in them and settle their government. They cannot attack us for some time in Sicily ; perhaps not this whole winter, if we could get pos- session of Cephalonia, and the vessels there and at Zante. With the aid of a Turkish peace, too, we could raise a consi- derable number of Albanians, and employ them to great ad- vantage against the enemy in the South of Italy. The state of afFairs in this quarter just now is as follows : the Russian commander who convoys the troops from Cat- taro to Venice, has sailed for that port with his whole fleet ; consequently Commodore Campbell has quitted his station. I trust he will protest in the strongest terms against this pro- ceeding. With regard to Corfu, about 1200 French under General Miolis are arrived there. A second division from Otranto appears to have been prevented from landing by two of our frigates which blockade the harbour ; consequently, the rest of the Russian garrison, which was to have been relieved by the French, are obliged to remain where they are. But if the Russian squadron employed in conveying the troops from Cattaro to Venice should return from executing that service 414 APPENDIX. before we can establish our superiority in the Adriatic, I am afraid the frigates will be obliged to quit their station too. With regard to general politics, I shall in a few days be able to say something more distinct than I can at present. Braunau is not restored, nor likely to be ; but otherwise the Communications between Austria and France since the peace of Tillsit have been, and continue to be civil, and even ami- cable. No cession of the sea-coast of the Adriatic has yet been exacted, nor any requisition been made to Austria to assent to the principles of maritime law attempted to be revived at the present moment. Count Stadion, however, gives me no assurance that these demands will not be made some time hence ; indeed by his manner I am sure he ex- pects them. What they will do in consequence of such demands is more than they know themselves. I am afraid you can give me no hopes that Russia will support them in a refusal to comply with these or any other conditions. I shall be most happy in communicating regularly to you everything of importance which may occur during my resi- dence here, and I shall of course be very anxious to hear from you, as according to the dispositions which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg may manifest, I should be disposed to be more or less tractable on the subject of their proceedings in the Adriatic. I am, my dear Lord, &c. &c. &c (Signed) R. A. P.S. I have this moment received a letter from Lord Pembroke, dated the 2d, on board the Melpomene off Trieste. He incloses me one for you, but desires me not to send it, except by a messenger or other safe conveyance. APPENDIX. 415 The same to Sir Alexander Ball. Vienna, Sept. 25th, 1807. SlR, The Mand of Corfu, having in consequence of the Peace of Tillsit been ceded to the French, who appear to have already been put in possession of it by Russia, and the import- ance to Great Britain of wresting it from their hands being manifest, I conclude you would wish to receive every inform- ation concerning the internal situation of that island, and of its dependencies, which might facilitate an enterprise for such a purpose. It is with this view that I take the liberty of writing to you upon the present occasion, and of transmitting to you the inclosed memoir, which at my request has been drawn up, and intrusted to me by a person on whose accuracy, intelli- gence, and good faith I can depend. The name of this gentleman I am not yet at liberty to reveal, as he would suffer too much from the unsuccessful issue of any enterprise for the liberation of his country, to justify his being exposed to the least risk of discovery. I have already despatched a messenger to England in order to learn the sentiment s of his Majesty's government with regard to the expediency of a regular expedition for the re- duction of these islands. In the mean time it may perhaps be possible to get possession of some of them by a coup de main before the French government can be settled. It would be most useful if we could carry and keep Cephalonia, where there is no fortress at present able to make any resistance. At Cephalonia my informant assures me there are at this moment between 300 and 400 vessels, and 5,000 or 6,000 excellent seamen, all disposed to serve us with zeal and fidelity against France. Could we prevent the enemy from availing himself of this resource, the service would be worth almost any efFort. It will be for your pru- dence to determine whether you can spare the necessary force for it, or whether all things considered, it be advisable to undertake it. As far as my opinion on this last point may be of any value, I do not hesitate under the present mysterious rela- 416 APPENDIX. tions between Prussia and France, to declare decidedly in the affimiative. Should any other method strike you by which such an enterprise might be rendered successful, or should you wish any further information from hence, or to set on foot any secret correspondence within the islands, you will always find me most happy to contribute every assistance in my power. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. P.S. If the Earl of Pembroke should be still at Malta when this letter arrivés there, it would be expediënt to lay it before his Lordship, and take his opinion upon the matter ofit. N R. A. The same to the same. {Private.) Same date. SiR, Mr. Summerers, who will have the honour of delivering to you my accompanying despatch, was his Majesty's Resident at Bucharest, which place he has been compelled to quit in con- sequence of the war in Wallachia and Moldavia. His object is to join Sir Arthur Paget, under whose authority his situa- tion places him, and for this purpose I take the liberty of recommending him to your protection. After having read and considered the despatch of which he is the bearer, together with the memoir it contains, may I request of you to forward the latter to General Moore, or whoever commands in Sicily, and to add to it such observa- tions as you may think the project deserves ? I am, Sir, &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 417 Commodore Campbell to Mr. A. H. M. S. Unité, Lussin, Oct. 2d, 1807. SiR, I last night received your Excellency's despatches for Sir Alexander Ball by Mr. Summerers, who shall be forwarded to Malta by a transport that sails in a few days. I perfectly concur with your Excellency in the importance these islands would be of to Great Britain, particularly Corfu, as it is the key to the Adriatic ; and if once in our possession, while we had the superiority at sea, it would be easily kept. The other islands would at present be easily wrested from the enemy ; Corfu would require a blockade and siege. By a Russian man-of-war brig that arrived at Trieste from Corfu two days before I sailed, the Captain informed me the French had not above two thousand men on the island, but they were in daily expectation of reinforcements. They will find it now a difficult matter to get any over, as we have several cruisers thereabouts. I am fearful Sir Alexander Ball, however much inclined he may be, will not have it in his power to make any attempt until he receives instructions from home, and by that time the enemy will have well established himself. As there are now cruisers to be constantly kept off there, it will greatly facilitate any attempt that may be made on it. I sail with the transport in a few days, and will cruise off there for near three months. I have the honour to be, With great respect, Your Excellency's very humble Servant, P. Campbell. e E 418 APPENDIX. Mr. A. to Count Starhemberg. Vienna, Oct. lOth, 1807. My dear Sir, I cannot suffer an opportunity which I know to be safe, and which I have reason to fear will be the last I shall possess for a long time, to pass by without troubling you with a few lines, and communicating to you my views on the present sino-ular posture of affairs, as far as I can form any that are distinct. And first, as to your situation with regard to France. It is supposed here, but on what the hope is founded I know not, that Austria will be left quiet some time longer ; that the business of the North of Europe, and that the disposition to concede to the utmost, will avert the impend- ing calamity, and that the winter may yet be passed at Vienna. As there is no use in my expressing a contrary opinion, espe- cially having no power to prevent the evil, my duties are now reduced to the task of watching the course of events, and of being ready with the feeble succour I can afford when- ever the opportunity for offering it shall arrive. The errors of the last winter have been so great, and the defection of Russia from the common cause so destructive of all prospect of union, that (I grieve to say it) you have now no other course to pursue except that of submission. With regard to the Court of St. Petersburg and its wretched politics, no man can be more thoroughly disgusted with them than I am. I cannot help, however, being still of opinion that your Court ought to show less aversion towards Russia than appears to me (and with some justice) to be feit. Russia, to say the truth, has far less to answer for towards you than she has towards us. She was bound to you by no alliance, you having yourselves over and over again refused coming to an explanation with her last winter. Nay more, Russia gave you fair notice through M. Pozzo di Borgo, that she and Prussia by themselves, reduced as Prussia was by the first events of the campaign, could do nothing for the general cause of Europe, and would not continue the war unless you gave your assistance. On the other hand, you ought to consider that not only the aggrandizement of France since last autumn, but that the peculiar relation in APPENDIX. 419 which you are made to stand towards Russia by those articles of the peace * which concern Poland, almost obliges you to choose between her friendship and her enmity. There never, in short, was a situation in which two Powers, supposing them even to have been separated by centuries of hostility, ought to come to an understanding with each other more quickly and more unreservedly than your Court and that of St. Petersburg ought to do, notwithstanding the many motives for jealousy and mistrust which subsist between you both. This situation of your affairs with regard to Poland was, I confess, one of the grounds on which I speculated for a chance of gathering together the fragments of Europe, and of once more (at what period events alone could determine) attempting to give them a consistency, and to mould them into some resemblance to that system under which Europe enjoyed so many years of prosperity. In aid of this chance I was sanguine enough to hope that two other events might come, on each of which I will now take the liberty of offering you my opinion. The first was our peace with the Turks. I was in hopes that Sir A. Paget might before this have been able to make that sort of arrangement with them which the change of circum- stances between his quitting England and his arrival at Constantinople rendered it expediënt for him to attempt. I have no doubt, indeed I may say that I know, that Sir Arthur Paget's instructions were the most judicious that could be devised ; but the immense difference of being sent to negociate in concert with Russia, and of finding himself on his arrival obliged (in a manner) to negociate against her, was such as no instructions could meet, and became a case in which a minister must make instructions for himself. I have no hesitation in saying that my conduct, as far as at this distance I can judge, would have been as follows : know- ing the extreme jealousy which Russia feels with respect to a British establishment in Egypt, I should have insisted tht she should evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia, befor e I con- sented that the British troops should evacuate Alexandria ; and this I should do for your sake, and to take away one of * Of Tillsit. E E 2 420 APPENDIX. the causes which contributed last year to prevent your unit- ing with Russia. Another chance of recovering our lost ground appeared to arise so naturally out of the circumstances which preceded the peace of Tillsit, and the good will testified by the Em- peror Alexander towards Austria in all the Communications made by Baron Budberg last winter, that I confess I did entertain hopes that it would have been seized by your Court and turned to some advantage. Previously to the treaty of Tillsit, as you know, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia had in substance accepted your mediation for the restoration of a general peace. This acceptance was grounded, first, on a necessity which appeared to be recog- nised even by France herself, of including England in any peace which it was intended to render permanent; and secondly, on a truth equally admitted by France, namely, that Austria since the federation of the Rhine and the other ar- rangements made by the peace of Presburg, required some further security for her frontiers on the side of Germany and Italy than she now possessed. After the treaty of Tillsit Russia, by the consent of France, ofFered her mediation to Great Britain, and her guaranty for the preservation of the maritime peace to be concluded under her auspices. Observe that I am no advocate for this mediation ; but being ofFered and not rejected by us *, what could be more obviously your policy than to endeavour to engage Russia to extend her guaranty to the Continental peace, and to consolidate the trea- ties of Presburg and Tillsit (bad as they both are) with that which she hoped might be concluded between us and France through her intervention ? If Bonaparte had consented to any proposal from Russia to this effect, I will not say you would have been safe, but as safe as you can be under any treaty made with him. If he had rejected it, then at least he must have completely developed his views to the Emperor Alexander, and given us a foundation to work upon, and to build some reasonable project upon hereafter. It is only through these means, I confess, that I can see the most distant chance of getting round to our old habits, and detaching Russia from her present monstrous association; * See Lord G. Leveson's letter next following, November 8th. APPENDIX. 421 for I cannot suffer myself to entertain a moment's hope that either the ill-humour of Russia at the continuance of French troops in the Prussian territories will be carried further than remonstrance, or that her own non-evacuation of Wallachia will be more seriously resented by Bonaparte. If any thing, I should apprehend still further schemes of partition between them both. Were it possible, indeed, to draw any conclusion from the conduct of Russia in the Adriatic, I should say that she appears determined not only to favour France to the utmost, but to provoke Great Britain to some act of hostility. The manner of the Russian admiral's putting the French in possession of Cattaro and the Seven Islands is to the highest degree offensive. I do what I can to prevent open quarrel- ing, but there are some things to which it is impossible to submit. With regard to what is intended to be done in Germany or Italy, you will hear more from others than you can expect from me. Whatever is settled, you must acquiesce for the present. &c. &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. The same to Lord G. L. Gower. Vienna, Oct. 20th, 1807. My dear Lord, I have nothing particular to send to you by this opportu- nity, but only to recommend the accompanying packet to your care, which contains vouchers for the payment of pen- sions. We have various reports of Sir A. Paget's success at Constantinople, but none on which I can depend. I am, how- ever, pretty sure that he is actually at Constantinople, which is a great point. We should have had peace long ago with the Turks had not Sebastiani declared to them that his Master would consider such a step as a declaration of war against himself ; and the menace I fear be carried into effect if Sir Arthur's negociation succeeds. I have great reason to believe that a demand will speedily E E 3 422 APPENDIX. be made here for the passage of a French army through Croatia. This Court, abandoned as she is by Russia, cannot refuse it, and then let Russia look to herself ! She will find the French very different neighbours from the Turks. M. Pozzo di Borgo is returned. I regret that I cannot have the same intercourse with him which was so serviceable to the common cause in better days, as it might be the means of preventing much mischief between us and Russia in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. Lord Collingwood is return- ing to those seas, and certainly will not permit quietly the establishment of the French in the Seven Islands by the assist- ance of a Russian naval force. Having already said all I could to Prince Kurakin upon this subject in my last con- versation (of which I gave you an account in my despatch of the 15th September), and having no intercourse with him except that of mere civility, I must leave events to take their course if any of our cruisers should fall in with Russian vessels convoying French troops. I am ever, my dear Lord, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. The same to the same. Vienna, Oct. 28th, 1807. My dear Lord, I have nothing very particular to say by this post, except that the passage of French troops through the Austrian terri- tories towards Dalmatia is becoming very serious. They are marching in corps from 800 to 1200 men. Is Russia so infa- tuated with her new system as not to see to what this leads ? How will she like the French in Bosnia, and possibly at Belgrade ? and can she expect that Austria, in the present situation of Europe, can stir a step to prevent these evils ? In this quarter I am sorry to add that appearances are most discouraging. The distance between the Austrian and the Russian Cabinets seems to increase every day. APPENDIX. 423 My poor friend Pozzo is ready to break his heart at all this. I contrive to see him sometimes, but with great circumspection and secrecy. Believe me, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. A. St. Petersburg, Nov. 8th, 1807. My dear Sir, I have been daily deferring the return of your messenger for the last three weeks, from the expectation of having some- thing more decisive to communicate to you of the intentions of this Court. I have this morning received a note from Count Romanzow, of which I inclose a copy. I will not allow myself to make any comment upon its contents, unless it be to observe that the question of the mediation of Russia is completely misrepresented. We did not reject the media- tion of this Court ; we required only previous to our accept- ance of it the communication of the secret articles, which was distinctly refused. The paragraph respecting Denmark contains a curious construction of an assurance I was charged to give to this Court of the readiness of the English govern- ment to come to an understanding with Russia upon the question of the restoration of peace with the Court of Copen- hagen, and the re-establishment of the tranquillity of the North of Europe. There is no doubt that this note is the consequence of an imperative demand brought by Talleyrand from Paris, requir- ing the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tillsit. I inclose copies of the notes which passed between Count Romanzow and myself, to which allusion is made in that which I received this morning ; and also a paper containing materials I have picked up here, which it may perhaps be useful for you to possess. I shall leave Petersburg in the course of a few days, and E E 4 424 APPENDIX. am extremely sorry that circumstances have rendered our correspondence of so little duration. I am, my dear Sir, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) Granville Leveson Gower. Inclosure in Lord G. L. Gower' s letter to Mr. Adair of Nov. 8. 1807. Count Romanzow to Lord G, L. Gower. St. Petersburg, ce f XT ° ctobre - 1807. D ' 8 Novembre. L'Empereur, qui dans Ie cours de la guerre qu'il vient d'achever, avait a se plaindre de la conduite de 1'Angleterre a son égard, subordonnait ses justes ressentimens a la pensee consolante que la paix qu'il venait de conclure devait amener la paix générale. Il s'était constitué médiateur. Il avait ensuite offert sa médiation en prévenant sa Majesté Britannique que son désir était de lui procurer une paix honorable. L'Angleterre rejeta ses offices. Il semblait qu'il entrait dans ses vues de ne pas laisser éteindre les feux de la guerre, mais de la rallumer dans Ie Nord par un evenement subit et nouveau. Les flottes de sa Majesté Britannique, ses armées vinrent commettre sur Ie Dannemarc un acte dont 1'histoire n'offre aucun exemple. L'Empereur, qui du scu de 1'Angleterre était un des garans de la tranquillité de la Baltique qui est une mer fermée, 1'Empereur qui n'avoit été prévenu de rien, ne dissimula pas son ressentiment, et dans une seconde note remise au Lord Gower prévint 1'Angleterre qu'il ne se proposoit pas de rester tranquille spectateur de ce qui venait d'arriver a un roi son parent et son ami. L'Empereur ne prévit pas, il Ie confesse, qu'après cette déclaration 1'Angleterre lui ferait 1'offre de se charger de faire entendre au Dannemarc qu'il était de son intérêt de supporter ce qui venait de lui arriver, et de rendre la Russie garante que la Grande Bretagne pouvait en toute süreté posséder ce qu'elle venait de ravir. APPENDIX. 425 Le Prince Royal de Dannemarc n'avoit pas ratifié la con- vention de Copenhague; aux secondes propositions qui viennent de lui être faites il a encore exposé a sa Majesté Impériale, combien il était irrité par ce nouveau procédé du ministère Brittanique a son égard. L'Empereur, touche de la confiance que le Prince Royal placait en son amitié, ayant considéré ses propres griefs contre 1'Angleterre, ayant mürement examiné les engagemens qu'il avait avec les Puissances du Nord, engagemens pris par 1'Im- pératrice Catherine, et feu sa Majesté 1'Empereur, tous deux de glorieuse mémoire, s'est décidé a les remplir. Aussi sa Majesté charge-t-elle le Soussigné de déclarer a son Excellence le Lord Gower, ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique, que 1'Empereur rompt toute communication avec 1'Angleterre. Sa Majesté Impériale rappelle toute la mission qu'elle y avait, et ne veut pas conserver prés d'elle celle de «a Majesté Brittanique. Il n'y aura dorenavant entre les deux pays aucun rapport. L'Empereur déclare qu'il annulle et pour toujours tout acte conclu précédemment entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie, et nommément la convention fait en 1801 le r= du mois de Juin. Il proclame de nouveau les principes de la neutralité armee, ce monument de la sagesse de 1'Impératrice Catherine, et s'engage a ne jamais déroger de ce système. Il demande a 1'Angleterre de satisfaire complétement ses sujets sur toutes les justes réclamations de vaisseaux et de marchandises, saisies ou retenues contre la teneur expresse des traites conclus sous son propre règne. L'Empereur prévient que rien ne sera rétabli entre la Russie et 1'Angleterre que celle-ci n'ait satisfait le Danne- marc. L'Empereur s'attend a ce que sa Majesté Brittanique, au lieu de permettre a ses ministres, comme elle vient de le faire, de répandre de nouveaux germes de la guerre, n'écoutant que sa propre sensibilité, se prêtera a conclure la paix avec sa Majesté 1'Empereur des Francais, ce qui étendrait, pour ainsi dire, a toute la terre les bienfaits inappréciable de la paix. Lorsque 1'Empereur sera satisfait sur tous les points qui precedent, et nommément sur celui de la paix entre la France et 1'Angleterre, sans laquelle aucune partie de 1'Europe ne peut pas se promettre une véritable tranquillité, sa Majesté 426 APPENDIX. Impériale reprendra alors volontiers avec la Grande Bretagne les relations d'amitié que dans 1'état de juste mécontentement oü 1'Empereur devait être, il a peut être conservé trop long- temps. Le Soussigné s'étant acquitté des ordres de FEmpereur son maitre, prie son Excellence M. 1' Ambassadeur, de faire parvenir sans délai a, la connoissance du Roi, son souverain, le contenu de cette note. (Signé) Le Comte Nicolas de Eomanzow. Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Count Romanzow. (Copie.) Nov. 9th, 1807. Le Soussigné, ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique, a 1'hon- neur d'accuser la réception de la note que S. E. le Comte de Romanzow lui a adressé en date de hier. Il ne tardera pas a la transmettre a sa Cour, mais les inculpations qui y sont contenues contre le gouvernement Britannique imposent au Soussigné le devoir de prier S. E. de vouloir bien porter sans délai a la connoissance de S. M. I. quelques observations qui puissent mettre dans leur jour véritable les démarches réci- proques des deux Puissances. Quoique la célérité indispensable a 1'exécution des projets de précautions adoptés vis-a-vis le Dannemarc ne permettoit pas des Communications antérieures, la note du Soussigné en date du 2 de Septembre, bien loin de cacher les raisons qui avoient motivées cette expédition, les divulgoit avec franchise, et 1'explication en fut réitérée et accompagnée de détails plus que satisfaisans a Foccasion de la première conférence du Soussigné avec le ministère du jour. Les articles secrets du traite de Tillsit sont d'ailleurs incon- nus a la Cour de Londres, et le Soussigné a vainement reclame la communication des arrangemens dont Faccomplissement développe chaque jour des objets peu conformes a Fesprit des anciennes alliances, et absolument préjudiciables aux interets dont le maintien fut jadis une partie essentielle du système Russe. Est-ce donc a la Russie de se plaindre du secret, lorsque cette Cour refuse nettement la seule explication APPENDIX. 427 qu'auroit pu rassurer celle de Londres sur les intentions et les projets médités a son égard ? Ce silence, cette extreme réserve peut servir de preuve que Ie Cabinet de ^Petersbourg jugea lui-même que ses arrangemens secrets étoient directe- ment contraires aux interets de la Grande Bretagne. Quant a la tranquillité de la Baltique, FAngJeterre n'a jamais reconnu des droits exclusifs, et qu'elles que fussent les prétentions de la Russie au titre de garant de la süreté de cette mer, son silence lors de la clöture des ports au Pavillon Britannique de Lubeck jusqu'a Memel paroissoit en être 1'abandon ouvert. Le Soussigné saisit cette occasion, &c. &c. &c. (Signé) G. L. Gower. Mr. Garlike to Mr. A. Memel, Nov. 14th, 1807. My DEAR Sir, Admiral Gambier did send two cutters to Liebau to keep up a communication with England, but he gave orders at the same time that they should not remain longer than the first east wind beyond the lOth of November. I had just time to charge one of them with despatches, and found by the answer from Liebau that they meant to keep company, so that I fear they are both gone. They have shown great unwillingness to remain, although I have little doubt if Russia did not shut her ports that it would be practicable to ply between Liebau and Ystadt at least till Christmas, if not during the whole winter. It was impossible to inform you of it in time, for I understand from this government that the letters, via a road of security, are three weeks on their way to Vienna. You know that this country has 112,000,000 of livres to pay to France. It is proposed to pay one half in five years, and to mortgage certain crown lands as a security (France had required the sale of crown lands near Berlin to be a la disposition des généraux Francais) and the other half in a given time by "obligations royales." For the security of this paper France requires five fortresses, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, Graudenz, Colberg, and that Prussia shall maintain 428 APPENDIX. in each of them 8,000 French soldiers, or, rather, pay France for their maintenance on a calculation given in for that pur- pose, amounting to 11,000,000 thalers, that is to say, 11,000,000 thalers for 40,000 men, while Prussia formerly maintained 250,000 men for 17,000,000. Then you must add about 4,000,000 to pay off the contribution, and 2,000,000 for other demands; that is to say, 17,000,000 of a revenue amounting in the whole to about 20,000,000. Prince William is gone to Paris to endeavour to soften the French government ; while the agreement, or nego- ciation to agree, was already so far advanced as to induce this government to believe that a definitive answer will arrive here about the 19th instant. Which way the di- lemma will turn it is impossible to foresee, for if Prussia agrees to do what is evidently not within her means the favourable condition of that agreement will be to keep the French in the country. The alternative is evident. I have written to Count Goltz against the cession of the fortresses on English grounds. This government wish me in the gentlest, friendliest, most managed terms possible to go away. It may be as well every way to accept an intimation before it grows to an order, but I must be sure it comes from the king ; I mean to say I can justify my departure in no other way. The king's name must appear; as many civilities may folio w as may be thought proper : I sometimes think the notion of its neces- sity is suspended, but so much has already been said upon it, that I shall not wonder if the first time I see Count Goltz something more passes on the subject ; I say the first time, for while I write, a mercantile estafette brings word from St. Petersburg, that an embargo has been laid on all vessels whatever in the Kussian ports ; but that ninety-six hours will be allowed to them to get away if they will ; or, at the farthest, till the 14th instant, that is to say, this day. I do not understand the news, but enough of it is intelligible to justify the belief that an unfriendly step has been taken against England at St. Petersburg. Count Goltz has been informed from Yienna that France had desired Austria to shut her ports also, and to induce you to retire. The Franchise frigate came off this place the other day to look for Lord Pembroke and take him home. APPENDIX. 429 If you have occasion to send this way inclose it to Mr. Griffin, who will always find means of furthering the letters to London. I have the honour to be, My dear Sir, Most faithfully, Your obedient Servant, W. Garlike. Sir Alexander Ball to Mr. A. Malta, Nov. 17th, 1807. Sir, I hope soon to hear that his Majesty's ministers intend to pursue vigorous measures in the Mediterranean, to counteract the enemy's operations, and to open new channels for our commerce, which they may effect, if we act with energy and wisdom. Lord Pembroke arrived here in his Majesty's ship Mel- pomene, the 2d of last month, and proceeded immediately to Gibraltar, and Sir A. Paget called here the 2d uit. in his way to England, having failed in his mission. I have the honour to be, With great respect and esteem, Sir, Your most faithful and obedient, Alex. M. Ball. The same to the same. Malta, Nov. 17th, 1807. Sir, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Mr. Summerers arrived the 15th inst. and delivered to me your despatch containing a project, which I communicated to Major-General Sir Charles Green, the senior officer in the Mediterranean, commanding the troops in this garrison. You will hear before this reaches you that Lieut. -General 430 APPENDIX. Sir John Moore sailed from Sicily last October with a large British force on a secret expedition, which must for the present impede our attempt to put into execution your project. I have this day received intelligence that his Majesty's ship Unité has been chased off Corfu by three large French frigates, which are supposed to have put into that port. As I have been directed (in addition to my civil employment here) to hoist my flag and carry on the duty of port admiral, I have (in the absence of Lord Collingwood, the commander- in-chief,) ordered a very efficiënt squadron under the command of Captain Mowbray, of his Majesty's ship Active, to proceed up the Adriatic to counteract the enemy's operations. I have directed Captain Mowbray to correspond with you by every safe conveyance. I have the honour to be With great respect and esteem, Sir, Your Excellency's most faithful And very obedient, Alex. M. Ball. Mr. A. to Lord Collingwood. {Copy.) Vienna, Nov. 23d, 1807. My Lord, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship the bearer of this letter. He is the gentleman from whom I received the information respecting the state and condition of the Seven Islands, which I transmitted to Sir Alexander Ball in a despatch of the 25th of September, of which Mr. Summerers was the bearer. I trust that your Lordship will find his information to correspond with what you will have yourself received from those inhabitants of the Seven Islands who are attached to the British cause, and who wish to co-operate with your Lordship for the deliverance of their country from the op- pression with which it is threatened by the French. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. APPENDIX. 431 ïnclosure in the above. Proclamation of Gëbrge Moncenigo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Eussia, to the Inhahitants of the Republic of the Seven Islands. L'Établissement d'un gouvernement provisoire, soutenu par les invincibles troupes de S. M. 1'Empereur de toutes les Russies, a pour objet de vous mettre en état de mériter de plus en plus Ie bienfait de cette libre et durable constitution a laquelle vous êtes appellés. Ainsi au nom de mon auguste Souverain je vous exhorte a vous soumettre, &c. &c. Je me propose de soutenir avec fermeté, et tout 1'appui de la force, l'installation du gouvernement, afinqu'une adminis- tration suprème, juste, mais sévère, active et forte — telle que vous n'en avez point joui encore — vous fasse sentir les précieux avantages d'une existence civile. Vous devez, habitans des Sept Isles, recueillir par 1'effet de ses mesures paternelles et prévoyantes, les premiers fruits des soins affectueux que prend de vous mon auguste Souverain. Que celui, qui pourroit ne pas y répondre par la conduite la plus pacifique, sache qu'il sera considéré comme ennemi. Que dans toute 1'étendue de la République Septinsulaire, dans les plus ténébreuses retraites de toutes les parties de 1'Isle, je saurai par des moyens dont je me suis assuré, voir pénétrer, entendre. Je vous invite donc a m'obéir. Retournez a vos demeures, appliquez vous a vos occupations domestiques, et, quant a la chose publique, laissez en absolu- ment toute pensee a ceux-la seuls qui y sont autorisés ! C'est ainsi que vous vous préparerez a devenir les enfans légitimes d'un état libre ! 432 APPENDIX. The same to the same. w Same date. My Lord, Were it in my power to send your Lordship any further information from this place, than that which will be commu- nicated to you by ****** it would give me inexpres- sible satisfaction. All I have now to say (and of this your Lordship may possibly be apprised already) is, that by the secret articles of the peace of Tillsit, it is agreed that both the Morea and Candia shall be possessed by France in the eventual partition of the Ottoman dominions. I have the satisfaction, however, to observe that this new and monstrous connection between Russia and France begins already to wear the appearance of mutual distrust. How can it be otherwise when not one single article of the treaty of Tillsit has been executed by the latter Power ? The Prussian territories are occupied as they were during the war. Up- wards of 40,000 French troops, besides a Polish army, still remain at Warsaw, and in the neighbourhood of the Vistula ; an equal number occupy Silesia, and there is a large division of their army at Berlin, and in its neighbour- hood. All these districts, as your Lordship may well imagine, exhibit scènes of plunder and oppression without end. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, under such circum- stances, Russia should now refuse to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, which were to constitute her share of the Turkish spoils whenever France should proceed to put herself in pos- session of the Morea. But whatever may be the motives of Russia, your Lordship may depend upon the fact, that not only she has not evacuated these pro vinces, but that the interior administration of them is organised on a footing of permanent possession. Of these tardy proceedings France complains, and calls upon Russia first to execute the treaty by which her armies, as well as those of the Turks, were to retire to their respective frontiers, until the definitive treaty of peace. I scarcely need acquaint your Lordship, that Sebastiani has transferred the negociations for the Turkish peace to Paris, in order (no doubt) to give time for the occu- pation of the Seven Islandö by France, and the assembling an army in Dalmatia, so that both parties may start fair in the APPENDIX. 433 race of spoliation. This plan, as your Lordship will instantly perceive, woidd be materially counteracted, and perhaps totally destroyed, should Corfu and its dependent islands be wrested from France, and placed under his Majesty's pro- tection, of which event, among its many and incalculable advantages, one of the most immediate must be, that France, disappointed in the execution of what is to her advantage in the secret a rticles of the treaty, will insist with more firmness upon the execution of its ostensible stipulations, and that by a peremptory demand to that effect, she may break at once the bonds of this unnatural confederacy. It has just come to my knowledge, that the Turkish mi- nister who passed through Vienna last winter in his way to the head-quarters of Bonaparte, and who has repassed a few days ago on his return home,lnformed the Turkish chargé d'affaires at this place that he had obtained thorough inform- ation at Paris of the treachery of France towards Turkey in the late treaty of Tillsit, and that he was hastening to Con- stantinople to lay the whole before the Divan. To what I have here the honour of stating to your Lordship, I have nothing to add, except that the ports of Trieste and Fiume continue shut to the British flag, and that in con- sequence of a new convention with France, they will probably continue so during the war. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. The same to Sir Alexander Ball. Vienna, Nov. 27th, 1807. SlR, In the extraordinary situation of affairs produced by the avowed alliance of Russia with France, it has appeared to me expediënt that Lord Minto, governor-general of Bengal, should be informed as speedily as possible of an event likely to affect in so material a degree the British interests in India. I take the liberty, therefore, of inclosing to your Excel- lency a despatch for his Lordship, which I request you to forward to him, if possible, overland by Alexandria. I send this dispatch to your Excellency under a flying F F 434 APPENDIX. seal (requesting you to close it up when you shall have perused and taken a copy of any part of its contents which you may think useful), in order to your understanding exactly, which you will do by a perusal of Lord Granville Leveson Gower's correspondence, the state of the question between Great Britain and Russia. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) R. A. P.S. I despatched a messenger to Trieste on the 24th instant with orders to hire a vessel there and endeavour to fall in with Lord Collingwood, to whom I wrote an account on that day of Lord Granville Leveson Gower's having been ordered to quit St. Petersburg. E. A. The same to Lord Minto. Vienna, ETov. 26th, 1807. My Lord, It is with the utmost concern that I inform your Lordship that on the 8th instant, Lord Granville Leveson Gower, his Majesty's ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, re- ceived the Emperor of Russia's orders to quit St. Petersburg with the whole of the British Embassy. The motives which are alleged by the Emperor 's new advisers for thus breaking off all connection with Great Britain, and making common cause with France to exclude us from the Continent of Europe, your Lordship will find partly detailed in the inclosed note to Lord Granville Leveson Gower signed by Count Romanzow. Por your Lordship's information I subjoin Lord Granville Leveson's answer to it. At so great a distance from the scène of transactions whose effects and influence are now approaching even the countries committed to your Lordship's administration, you will naturally be anxious to learn through what variety of events, and through what succession of calamity the natural and, as it appeared at the time of your Lordship's departure from England, the fixed policy of Russia, has undergone so entire and so fatal a revolution. APPENDIX. 435 Your Lordship will observe in the beginning of Count Romanzow's note that he alludes to some grounds of complaint against the British government. What may be the nature of those grounds is totally unknown to me. During the whole of the confidential intercourse which subsisted between the Russian ambassador at Vienna and myself, and which never varied for one moment while that post was filled by Count RazamofFsky, I heard no syllable of complaint, nor perceived the slightest symptom of dissatisfaction. On the lOth or llth of the month of June indeed, the Earl of Pembroke, who had been sent from England on a special mission to this Court, and who arrived at Memel in company with Lord G. L. Gower (reappointed to the Russian embassy on the recal of the Marquis of Douglas), had an interview with the Emperor Alexander who had come to visit his army. His Imperial Majesty expressed undoubt- edly much dissatisfaction at that time, and with considerable vehemence of manner, with respect to a supposed want of activity on the part of England in producing a diversion in the North of Germany ; but his Imperial Majesty likewise assured Lord Pembroke in terms equally energetic, that he had no thoughts of entering into negociation with France, much less of accepting such terms of peace as the treaty of Tillsit has unfortunately revealed to Europe. Eight days after these assurances, confirmed by every as- severation which could add weight to the promise of a sove- reign, without the occurrence of any new event except the trifling disadvantage of the battle of Friedland where the Russians scarcely lost 8000 men, an armistice was solicited by the Russian general. Then foliowed the interview at Tillsit between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte, the unseemly familiarities of their prolonged intercourse, and those fatal conferences which under pretended views of uni- versal peace, have banished even the name of peace from Europe, and will carry the war, probably, from the Yistula to the Ganges. Of the treaty of Tillsit your Lordship has no doubt a copy, but it is in the secret articles of the treaty that the essential part of it is contained, and of these little transpires, except through their execution. It was by the occupation of F F 2 436 APPENDIX» Corfu alone that we knew of its cession, together with its dependent islands, to France. Three of the most important stipulations, however, of these articles may be collected from circumstances already known. 1. By the ostensible treaty, the Emperor Alexander en- gaged to offer his mediation to bring about a peace bet ween Great Britain and France. By the secret article, one month was agreed upon as the period for our acceptance of this offer, after which if we rejected it, Russia was to make common cause with France to force us to make peace. 2. Another secret article relates to what in the cant phrase of the day is called the " liberty of the seas," which was to be the basis of smj peace to be concluded between Great Britain and France under the auspices of this me- diation. 3. The third is the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire. I am ignorant whether any proposals of co-operat- ing, and sharing in the spoil, have been made to the Court of Vienna, but I am confident that to this moment none have been accepted. Russia and France are agreed, however, as far as this, that Russia shall have Wallachia and Moldavia, and France the Morea and the island of Candia. It is through the Morea that Bonaparte looks forward to Con- stantinople. A mediation offered to England under the existence of secret articles of such a tenor, was sure to be ineffectual, and indeed could scarcely have been sincere on the part of the Court which proposed it. It was at all events necessary before entering into negociation under circumstances so am- biguous in their appearance, to require an explicit commu- nication of the further engagements subsisting between the mediator and the enemy. This was flatly refused by the Russian ministry to Lord G. Leveson. The attack on Copenhagen, and the surrender of the Danish fleet, foliowed soon after this refusal of Russia to com- municate the secret articles. Of this expedition, and of the circumstances attending it, as I have no knowledge except from the newspapers, I can relate nothing but the fact. I am equally without any documents from Lord Granville Leveson respecting the discussions which passed between APPENDIX. 437 his Lordship and the Russian, ministers upon this event. Your Lordship, therefore, unless better informed, will col- lect the matter of these discussions, as I am obliged to do, from the correspondence inclosed. I think it but fair, however, to observe that Russia has no great right to com- plain of the attack on Copenhagen by us, to whom her secret engagements with our enemy gave the indisputable right, and might perhaps have justified the policy, of attacking St. Petersburg, or any other part of her own dominions. It is also to be collected from this correspondence that Russia had promised her assistance to Denmark on the Prince Royal's refusal to ratify the convention of Copen- hagen. Things appear to have remained in this situation at St. Petersburg until the arrival (as Lord Granville informs me) of M. de Talleyrand, a nephew of the minister, from Paris. This gentleman is supposed to have brought with him a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles. In consequence of this summons Count Romanzow's note appears to have been delivered to our ambassador, who informs me in his private letter that he was to quit Petersburg in a few days. By the style of the note, and the topics of accusation and reproach addressed in it to Great Britain, it was evidently written at Paris. Russia and France, therefore, must, I fear, be now con- sidered as leagued for the destruction and slavery of the world. That an alliance so monstrous, and so opposite to all the old notions of policy entertained by the founders of the Russian Empire, should last, would be incredible in any other times ; but in the state to which Europe is now reduced I see little to shorten its duration, and nothing, certainly, to resist its effects. One of these effects (and which has made me think it my duty to send off this despatch to your Lordship) is the re- newal of the vast project, remote I trust in its execution, but dear and ever present to our enemy, of attacking the British possessions in India through Persia. That such a project has long existed in the mind of Bonaparte there can be no doubt. I saw the details of it myself before I left England (and I make no doubt your Lordship has seen them) in k the F F 3 438 APPENDIX. possession of Sir John Hippesley. Information, general indeed in its nature, but which I think may nevertheless be trusted, has reached me that the plan is again in contemplation. I received this intelligence before the breach between Great • Britain and Russia, — an event alarmingly calculated to accelerate the attempt, and to facilitate its execution. For, visionary as the project seemed even last year, circumstances have so favoured Bonaparte, that even prudence seems now on the side of enterprise with him, and what is regarded as impossible on on e day becomes only improbable on the morrow. At the date of this letter, some of the great obstacles to an \ attack on India have disappeared : others are much diminished. ƒ The Turkish empire in Europe seems approaching to its fall. France has been gaining ground rapidly in Persia, where her I negociations have been pushed during these last two years ] with extraordinary activity ; and all she now wants to be in a condition to execute the most gigantic schemes, is to con- solidate her connections with Russia. Having stated these matters, which are of a more immedi- ate import, for your Lordship's consideration, I will conclude with a few words on the present state of Europe. Of this renowned monarchy * I can say nothing consola- tory to your Lordship who has seen it in some of its best days. I foliowed last year, to the best of my power, the traces you had left behind you, and endeavoured to animate it to those exertions by which alone it could again become illustrious, or continue to be safe. It was my good fortune at that period to co-operate with one whose zeal and abilities no man can appreciate more justly than your Lordship, I mean M. Pozzo di Borgo. I have found in him everything that is valuable in man, — ardourand prudence in great affairs, sincerity and affection in the intercourse of private life. If, before leaving England, your Lordship took the trouble to read the despatches from Yienna, you would have seen how earnestly M. Pozzo di Borgo and myself laboured to bring Austria to a just sense of her situation, and to convince her that as she could have no hope but in resistance, so she never would have such an opportunity of resisting with effect. That opportunity she lost, and she is now bitterly suffering » * Austria. APPENDIX. 439 for her indecision. Not only is she obliged to submit to the humiliating condition of allowing French troops to pass freely through her territory, but she is obliged to resign her inde- pendence in the most essential article of sovereignty, namely, the free intercourse with foreign and friendly Powers. She has been compelled, under a threat of immediate war, to ex- clude the British flag from her ports, and I am in daily expec- tation of receiving a notice that my diplomatic character is at an end. Every other part of Europe presents an aspect to the full as gloomy and discouraging. Germany and Italy are abso- lutely provinces of France. Prussia, notwithstanding the peace of Tillsit, is still occupied by French troops, and likely, for some time, to remain so. In Spain, the Prince of the Asturias has been arrested. The Prince Regent of Portugal, perpetually fluctuating between opposite resolutions, and once half in earnest to emigrate with the Court to the Brazils, seems at the moment of execution to have relapsed into the natural indolence of his character and to have resigned him- self totally to the mercy of Bonaparte. In the hopes of secur- ing some part of his former existence, he was induced on the 20th of October to shut his ports against the British flag : he has been rewarded for it by seeing his capital occupied ten days afterwards by the French, and by being told that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign ! Of all the states of once independent Europe, therefore, Sweden may be considered as the only one which has pre- served her dignity and her faith. How long the generous monarch who reigns there may be able to hold out, especially if Russia should determine upon forcing him to abandon the cause, is more than I can say. Russia and Denmark together, or rather Russia and France acting through Denmark (for we have abandoned the island of Sealand), must prove too strong for him in the end. You will see, my Lord, by this statement, which the short- ness of the time to the departure of my messenger will prevent my rendering so full as I could wish, that on the Continent of Europe nothing is beyond the reach of this man's power. You will, therefore, be pleased to hear that Louis XVIII. and the Ducd'Angoulême left Mittau in September last, and that after passing through Sweden and receiving there the treat- F F 4 440 APPENDIX. ment due to his royalty and his misfortunes, he embarked for England at Gottenburg on the 20th of last month. At Mittau, certainly, he could no longer be safe. I will now conclude, my Lord, with sincerely hoping that this letter may reach you in India; and that you may find its contents not wholly unworthy of your attention. I have the honour to be, &c. &c (Signed) R. A. Mr. A. to Sir Alexander Ball. Vienna, Dec. 22d, 1807. SlR, AlthoüGH I have not yet received any official intimation that my mission at this Court is at an end, my last conversa- tion with Count Stadion gives me every reason to believe that he will soon be under the necessity of sending me a declaration to that effect in writing. It will depend of course upon the terms and the manner of such a declaration, and a variety of other circumstances connected with it, whether I quit Yienna forthwith on receiving it, or whether I may think his Majesty's service will be best promoted by delaying, under some pretence or other, my departure. From present appearances I confess that it is most likely that the option of remaining at Yienna beyond a period reasonably necessary for my private arrangements, will not be left me, and that on every account I shall best consult the good of his Majesty's service by quitting Yienna with the whole of the mission, immediately on receiving the notification I allude to. Under such circumstances, and being wholly without instructions or any other guide to direct my conduct, my present determina- tion is to come straight to Malta with my cyphers and the official correspondence ; but as I cannot consistently with my duty exposé them to the risk of a conveyance by an Austrian or American vessel, I feel the greatest embarrass- ment with regard to the means of executing this intention. If no British ship of war should be in these seas, I am afraid I must be under the necessity of destroying them all ; on the other hand, I have no authority to require the services of any APPENDIX. 44 1 of his Majesty's vessels, nor do I know to whom I ought to apply to solicit as a personal favour the convenience of a con- veyance to Malta or Sicily. If it were in Commodore Campbell's power, indeed, I have every reason which a fre- quent and confidential correspondence with him can give me to believe that he would assist me ; but then the nature of the service he is employed upon, added to my ignorance of the station assigned to him, leaves me in uncertainty with regard to the effect of any application I may make in that quarter. I am equally ignorant where Lord Colling- wood is at this moment, otherwise I should take the liberty of applying directly to his Lordship for his assistance. It is under these considerations that I am induced to address this letter to your Excellency, with a view of making known my situation, and in hopes that your Excellency may be able to suggest some measure by which I may bring away in safety the cypher, and other matters committed to my custody. I am, &c. &c. (Signed) E. A. 443 When the following paper was drawn up, the French Kevolution had assumed a decided character of foreign conquest and aggrandisement. In the minds of many, the hope of peace and liberty to mankind, which had accompanied the first great changes, had long been extinguished ; while even the more sanguine feit themselves obliged to gird up their loins against Na- poleon, wielding, as he did, the prodigious energies of the revolutionary system, and refusing to make peace with us, even on the most moderate conditions. The writer, therefore, can accuse himself of no incon- sistency if, notwithstanding his dislike to the original war with France, which he had proved by his votes in Parliament and by various publications, and his sincere good wishes for the success of her endeavour in 1791 to establish a free constitution, he now gave his feeble, but honest help to resist her aggression to the death. This was a case which, in his mind, ad- mitted of no middle course : in fact, the Government which sent him to Vienna were so convinced of the necessity of a prolonged resistance, that, as may be seen by Lord Henry Petty's budget, they made it the foundation of their whole financial administr ation . As to his opinions in regard to the probable con- dition of the world under the final establishment of such a domin ation, with Napoleon at its head, the 444 author thinks it right to declare that he alone is re- sponsible for giving expression to them. The paper was drawn up without communication with any of his friends in England or elsewhere, and solely at the request of the distinguished Minister to whom it is addressed. The occasion of writing it was as follows : — Austria, after the peace of Tillsit, soon found herself under the necessity of breaking off her intercourse with England. Now, there was at Vienna, and had existed for a long while, a strong feeling of impatience under the sacrifices and calamities which the country had endured by war ever since 1792. It was thought by not a few, and those by no means inconsiderable persons, that now that they had obtained a peace, such as it was, their best chance for keeping it, espe- cially since the cession of the Netherlands, would be through a permanent alliance with France. Fear of Eussia, also, was another motive for favouring such a connection. This party, of cour se, on the inter- ruption of our diplomatic relations was very little desirous of renewing them in their former intimacy. Count Stadion saw the true policy of his country in a different light. Fully aware of the mischief likely to result from ill-advised projects growing out of the recent treaty, he nevertheless preferred friendship with Eussia to falling in with the French system. Neither would he lose sight of a cordial and perfect reconciliation with England, although he thought himself compelled to give way to the ascendency of events, and recal his embassy from London. It was the object of this memorial, therefore, to 445 counteract the impression — more or less common to all — under which our intercourse was about to close, by presenting a view of the condition in which Austria would find herself under the workings of an efFective alliance between Russia and Franee; to show that the consolidation of so fatal an union might yet be kept off, and that there was yet room for a confi- dential understanding with Russia, leading hereafter, perhaps, to better things, bottomed on their common interests in Poland. Reasoning on these topics, it was necessary to point to the nature of a war so entirely maritime as Na- poleon had prepared for Europe by his pretensions to share with us our " ships, colonies, and commerce," — benefits which we could not give him even if we were willing, and which he could only acquire through peace, and by pacific courses ; as also to show that, to render his subjugation of the Continent of any use towards effecting his purpose, he must erect all its several states, including Austria herself, into a regular permanent confederacy, in a constant state of action, against England. In treating this delicate subject, especially that part which points to the establishment of an Archduke in Galicia, the author could not venture to give advice. Even to suggest matter for reflection seemed to him an unwarrantable act of presumption, and only to be justified by the flattering manner in which it was asked of him. TO HIS EXCELLENCY COUNT STADION, &C. &C. Vienna, February 22. 1808. At this moment, my dear Sir, when I am preparing to take leave of you perhaps for many years, I cannot suffer our intercourse to close without expressing to you my gratitude for the many marks of attention and regard with which I have been honoured during my residence at Yienna. Accept, therefore, for your- self as well as for your country, my warmest and truest thanks. Believe me, that next to England I love and cherish Austria ; that I quit you, not with regret merely, but with sorrow; and that in this fearful hour of our destinies, my most fervent prayers are ofFered up for your sovereign and his illustrious House, and for the prosperity and preservation of his dominions. To yourself individually I have to acknowledge an unvaried succession of acts of personal kindness. Above all, I feel obliged to you for the tone of frank- ness and confidence you established bet ween us from the first, in our conversations upon business. If my mission to this Court under the auspices of Mr. Fox has produced any good, or shall leave behind it the seeds of any remedy to the present evils, I can attri- bute its success only to this cause. We may owe to it in a great degree, as I am willing to hope, that in this difficult crisis for our respective governments we separate without hostility ; that our rupture goes not beyond the suspension of diplomatic Communications ; that in happier days these may be resumed where they break off; and that the solid interests of the two 448 LETTER TO empires, so far as they have been treated at Vienna, are left secure and undisturbed. Flattered by this sort of intercourse, I used myself always to blend the sentiments of private esteem with the performance of those duties on which I had to communicate with you ; and even now, forgetting almost the shortness of my mission and how little I am authorised by or- dinary forms, I pres urne upon a reciprocity of feeling on your part, to lay before you, with the freedom of a friend, the reflections which oppress my mind on the alarming posture in which I leave your affairs. It is not that I have the presumption to suppose that I can offer you any new ideas, or present in any new point of view the old topics on which we have so frequently conversed. The dreadful history of the rise and progress of the French power offers but one barren uniformity of thought or action to those who are within its reach. Nothing seems left to them now but to suffer and submit. The reason is plain — the new system has completely subdued the old. That state called Peace, to which France has reduced the Continent, bears nothing upon the face of it which indicates, as in the termination of other wars, some fluctuation of fortune during the struggle, or some apprehension of its future renewal. Aft er seventeen years of war, France has established her dominion whole, and without compromise, over the rest of the European Continent. During that period, she as- sumed, successively, every shape which she found best suited to the destruction of the enemy immediately opposed to her. When a people was to be inflamed to take up arms against their government, she was the Goddess of Liberty. Where empire was to be gained and Consolidated, she became a flaming sword for the extirpation of those who resisted, and for en- slaving those who obeyed. At this point she stops. This is the last character she has to play. COUNT STADION. 449 I can offer you, therefore, nothing new on a subject which seems to have exhausted all fertility of thought and all faculty of combination. General ideas, indeed, and speculations formed more or less according to our several characters and tempers, we cannot banish. These belong to our habits, and to the constant state of fear in which we live ; and will force themselves upon the imagination, how fatigued soever it may be with calculating the chances and adding together in laborious despair all the little items of political safety that yet remain to us. I am myself, for instance, much inclined to think that this mischief may find its end in the principles in which it originated ; and that the present system of unfeeling oppression, which offers to the sufferers no resource in the sym- pathy of their government, may generate a spirit of lawful resistance, as fatal to the new authorities as the spirit of revolution proved to the old. But the cure, if it wait this remedy, will be long and painful. Tired out with conjecture, and dissatisfied with speculating upon these latent possibilities for our deli- verance, we come round at length to the place from whence we set out, — to the old principles on which the states of Europe grew up to civilisation and inde- pendence. All on this side is equally barren. The balance of power is lost to the very name. Every possibility of reviving the principle of association among independent states for their mutual safety, seems to be destroyed by the peace of Tillsit. Hopes would yet remain for Europe, if the Austrian Empire singly could recover its strength. That, like the rest, is for the present a dream ! Nothing is left for you now but to secure, as well as you are able, your present existence, together with some degree of free- dom in your relations with the neighbouring Powers. Here lies the source of all the anxious thoughts I Q G 45Ö LETTER TO carry with me to England. This is the subject on which they are employed without intermission ; in re volving your various dangers, and in exploring the whole circle of possible contingencies to find a remedy for them. My reflections, such as they are, I now submit to your judgment, with no other confidence in their value than what may be due to the motives in which they originate. These dangers are so complicated, and all tend so visibly to one and the same point, namely, the utter destruction and dissolution of your empire, that it is difncult to separate them from each other, or to class them under distinct heads. I set totally aside any direct danger to you from England. Those to which you are exposed from us are purely collateral, and belong rather to the prolongation of our war with France than to any activity we might give to our hostilities — should we unfortunately be involved in hostilities — against you. Here, however, the pro- bable duration of the maritime war becomes to you a point of primary importance. I will shortly call your attention, therefore, to the character and nature of that war, in order that you may have this part of the question before you in its clearest light. Never was the character of any war more clear and definite, than the war now carry ing on bet ween Great Britain and France. All possibility of misrepresenting, or at least all difficulty in comprehending, its objects, are once and for ever cleared away. We are not at war to change the government of France, nor to set up a balance to her power, nor to send her back to her own frontiers, nor even to obtain a frontier for any other state. If there be any Continental interest im- , plicated in the contest, it is an interest so little feit by those in whose favour it is asserted, that they are themselves in arms against us for its destruction. The war is now brought to a simple question of in- COUNT STADION. 451 dependent existence for the British nation. A war of more pure, unmixed self-defence never yet was sustained by one nation against another since the be- ginning of the world. It is so clearly so, that France cannot even find a name for her cause. The ruler of the French professes, as usual, his extreme desire for peace ; but so little does he know, or so little does he wish that we should know, what he wants from us, that he cannot even name the conditions on which he requires that we should make it. It is almost an affront to ask them of him. Talk of a basis — the direst act of offensive war can scarcely raise his in- dignation to a higher pitch. Ask him what he means by the u liberty of the seas " — instead of vouchsafing to inform us, we are referred to Lord Lauderdale's negociation in 1806, to whom neither this foolish phrase, nor any one question belonging to the neutral code was ever mentioned, or in the remotest degree alluded to, during the whole period of his stay at Paris. Pressed a little closer on this point, he im- putes to us the absurd intention of making other nations sign and seal some strange instrument, the idea of which never yet entered into the head of man ; and then proudly asks whether we mean to proclaim eternal war ? Whether our arms are yet in possession of Petersburg, Paris, Madrid, and Yienna ? Scarcely lias he thundered this in our ears than, becoming all at once reasonable, he declares that England may keep her maritime code ; that is (according to him), her maritime superiority — that is, her maritime tyranny (the word is his own) — and that there is nothing to prevent peace in the counter- declarations of the English and Russian governments on this point. Amidst the obscurity and confusion of these opposite pretensions, all he will allow us to unclerstand of his demands, all he suffers to appear of his high will is, that he is much in want of something we have got. G G 2 452 LETTER TO This is plain. Now if the something we have got had ever been his, or if he was in a condition to take it from us by force, or if he had an equivalent to offer for its surrender, or any inducement to hold out for our consent to allow him to participate with us, the point might admit of some discussion. But what is it that he wants ? Participation in naval advantages, in colonial establishments, in commercial profits. None of these ever were his, nor can they be his ex- cept through peace, and even then they cannot be his except through an assiduous cultivation of the arts of peace ; for he can scarcely expect that we should sur- render him a neet by an express article, or that we should give him up the half of Jamaica, or assign him a tributary per centage on our custom-house re- ceipts. Now if these be things he cannot take from us — if he have nothing to offer us in return for them, and if he will not even ask us civilly to be admitted to a share of their benefits, I wish to know how he is to get them from men who possess one grain of the sense or spirit of the country over which they preside ? So much for the character of this war as innuencing its duration. With regard to other points, and particularly such as relate to its nature, this, above all other wars in which Great Britain has ever been engaged, possesses the distinctive character of naval. Other wars, whether sustained by her singly, or in concert with allies, had always a mixed interest : this interest was partly naval, partly territorial. If she had to contend single-handed against France, as in the American war, the territorial interest was neutralised, but not abandoned. The Continental balance never benig- disturbed, she was sure, at a peace, to find it again where she had left it. On the other hand, her wars of alliances embraced naval securities and improve- ments together with the continental balance. COUNT STADION. 453 Under the system of the day, all this complication and interchange of political interests has disappeared: the ruler of France has determined to exclude Great Britain totally from her relations with the European Continent. The means he possesses to accomplish ;his object are great : so are our means of resisting him. In this terrible conflict, now beginning, you see the undisputed superiority of the land striving to reduce the undisputed superiority of the sea. This can only be effected by the conquest of Eng- land. I think he will fail both in his means and in his end. The permanent exclusion of Great Britain from the Continent of Europe must suppose that great calamities, calamities not inferior to those which attend the reduction of mankind from civilisation* to barbarism, had visited the nations of which it is composed. In the present division of human society, the separation of the interests of the land from those of the sea is one of those wild projects engendered bet ween the extravagance of hate and the im poten ce of despair, of which the inventors will soon be taught the folly ; and that it is not in them to subdue the elements of nature as they have subverted the prin- ciples of public order. They will learn that man is associated to man by his wants ; that his wants are in proportion to his civilisation ; that his wants cannot be supplied, and, consequently, that his civi- lisation cannot be continued, except under the free intercourse of state with state, and that, of this intercourse, Great Britain commands all the prin- cipal channels. If the ruler of France shall persist in the fruitless attempt to impose the law of conquest upon a nation, her equal in fame and arms, he will learn that the sure effect of this prolonged contest upon the Continental stat es will be to turn back the current of their prosperity to its scarcely perceptible y 454 LETTER TO sources, and to annihilate the industry which made it flow. He will find how grossly he has been mistaken in his opinion of the value of the Continent to Great Britain under the form in which it is likely for a time to settle. It was as belonging to the same family, as making part of the same commonwealth ; it was from the similitude and sympathy which prevailed more or less among the European govern- ments, all deriving their existence from the same feudal origin, and not on the vulgar principle of finding a market for her goods, that England has always feit an interest in the welfare of the surround- ing states. Their value will be wholly lost to us as soon as they lose the body of their laws and insti- tutions, and the real independence of their respective sovereignties. In proportion, therefore, as they fall under .the dependance of one all-absorbing empire, England, whose great interest was a balance among the separate states, must feel a diminished interest in their prosperity. With a diminished interest in their prosperity, she ceases altogether to have an interest in their peace, which was chiefly useful to her as it constituted the true security of a balance. Those who would exclude Great Britain from the Continent under the pretence that her interference is calculated to promote wars, will soon find that they are occa- sioning the very evils against which their short- sighted policy would guard. They would depri ve her of all common feeling by which to counteract the temptation of an immediate advantage. Observe the dilemma to which these exclusionists are reduced by their own argument. If continental wars are useful to England, they give us an interest in ex- citing them ; if they do not, the accusation is a mere calumny. In a war of the nature I have above endeavoured COUNT STADION. 455 to describe, whatever may be its final issue, this at least is certain, that each of the parties concerned in it possesses the means of inflicting the most lasting calamities on the human species. In proportion as France, as a means of reducing Great Britain to a state of vassalage, shall sücceed in separating her from the rest of Europe, in that proportion must Great Britain, for her own absolute preservation, and not to be so reduced, separate Europe from its means of maritime communication, and thus strike a palsy into the limbs of the confederacy by which she is about to be assailed. She must do this at the risk of reducing the Continent by degrees to the barbarism of the tenth century ; but she must do it There is no help for it — no choice but this ; or the certain aban- donment of our country to France. But it is not so much in the mode of carrying on this war, as in the impossibility (almost) of putting an end to it, that its duration must prove calamitous to Europe. A war on the principles above declared, and for the purpose above announced, is scarcely within the reach of peace ; the objects to be recipro- cally abandoned by the belligerent Powers for the sake of peace being totally unsuited to the condition and state of existence of the adverse parties. No ter- ritorial concessions made to Great Britain can balance the maritime advantages to be acquired by France. Even if such concessions could be desirable for us, where is the protecting Continental Power to guaranty their security ? On the other hand, what are the naval advantages we could grant to France in her present formidable condition which would be short of an act of suicide ? Peace, on these principles, would be nothing but the voluntary, uncompensated, gift to her of a navy. You see from the nature of this struggle that there can be no hope of its end so long as France shall g g 4 456 LETTER TO persist in declaring that our refusal to sign her carte Manche is a declaration on onr parts of eternal war. Here, then, begins your chief danger. Bonaparte, in separating England from every sort of Continental interest, has affected to make the tranquillity of the Continent depend absolutely on the maritime peace. This is the pretext for his continued infractions of treaty, and for his invasion of neutral and unoffend- ing states. Prussia is to be retained by French troops, and robbed of her last ducat, in spite of his most sacred engagements, until England signs the maritime peace. The Ottoman empire is parcelled out because Constantinople is the way to the Ganges, and because the loss of India may force England to a maritime peace. All the exchanges of territory which he forces upon other Powers, he refers to the principle of increasing the energy of those means by which the maritime peace is to be obtained. You will be the first to feel the effects of this system, as yours is the only country where France can look for the means of keeping off for some years longer from her own subjects the pressure caused by her insa- tiable thirst of dominion. You possess almost the only virgin territory of Europe which has yet escaped his grasp, and depend upon it, that while a ducat is to be found in other countries, the armed people of France will not fail to exact it rather than contribute themselves to a war where they have not the shadow of an interest. Your wish certainly is to remain as you are, preserving things as near as you can to your last agreement. But the convention of the Isonzo would be precious indeed if it contained the fixed line of demarcation bet ween you and France. This war is proclaimed — and who shall deny it ? — for neutral rights : neutrals, therefore, must pay the charge of it. It is time, we are told, for France to breathe a little, after having for seventeen years COUNT STADION. 457 fought and bied in this just and sacred eau se ! Shall Austria pretend to remain inactive in the struggle, now become a war of resources ? If so, she must expect that other Powers, whose meritorious efforts are exerted in destroying the maritime tyranny of Great Britain, will not remain indifferent to the advantages she proposes to herself by this system, or patiënt sufferers under their own losses. If we take Corfu and the Seven Islands, you must cede your littorale to France. If Russia, as the reward of her efforts against us, or by way of compensation for the annihilation of her commerce and credit, until she can realise in her coffers the fab]ed treasures of Hin- dostan, requires some douceur in hand, more than Moldavia and Wallachia, which is her already allotted share, she can look to it only in Poland ; and you will hardly doubt that any further unsettlement in that quarter must be paid ultimately by Galicia. This is the danger to which you will, in all proba- bility, be exposed by a situation, such as I have described it, of imperfect peace with France. But let us now suppose that the necessities of your situ- ation force you into a temporary union with her. This case may happen before long. Having once gained his great point of establishing what he calls a continental cause, his next natural object will be a combination of measures to render that cause pre- valent. As a foundation for these measures, the continental Powers will be told that all the calamities he compels them to endure, from the interruption of maritime communication, arise from the obstinacy of England ; and, as a necessary consequence, that if England will not yield to his promulgated will, she must be made to yield to your joint efforts. When, therefore, the grand confederacy is once Consolidated, when the common object is declared, when the manifesto against England is signed by the French, 458 LETTER TO Spanish, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian plenipo- tentiaries, and by the representatives of the vassal kings of Germany, Holland, and Italy, you will be called upon in your turn to furnish your contingent to the grand continental army, which is to carry fire and sword to our devoted shores, and dictate the maritime peace in London. You must pay your quota of subsidy. Your proportion of men and money will be assessed by a French commissioner, and calculated in savage derision, on the subsidies re- ceived by you from England in the days of our common fellowship. You start at this. Teil me how you can avoid it ? Are you strong enough to resist the demand ? Is Bonaparte too kind to make it ? Can you do more than hesitate — than temporise — than represent; and, amidst the stern menaces of ven- geance and robbery, obtest earth and heaven against nis injustice ? These are the measures to which you must become actively a party. Let us now look to those of which you will be the passive agents. I say nothing of Germany and Italy. Leave it also to us to crush her rising naval dominion in the Adriatic. I look only to what France is doing in Poland *, and to what she is meditating in Turkey : these dangers grow upon you with the growth of the year ; every day narrows the circle which France has drawn around your empire, and by a fatality which the world has never before witnessed, you are destined not only to be the spec- tators of this work, but the iirst instruments of its execution, and the forgers yourselves of the chains you are doomed to wear. But even supposing Bona- parte were to leave you quiet for the present, and to require from you nothing but manifestoes and decla- * A treaty was then negociating, and soon after signed, with the Elector of Saxony, for the keeping up an army of 60,000 men in Poland, of which 1 5,000 to be French. COUNT STADION. 459 rations against England, and your perfect neutrality during his Turkish expedition ; admitting that it be his system to end with you, and not to begin with you, there remains still that fatal alliance of Tillsit, that union between France and Russia, which while it subsists^ no intervening state can be certain of an hour's repose. It is not for me to point out to one so well informed as you are, the extent and variety of evils of all kinds which the consolidation of this alli- ance must inevitably produce. There is not a measure it accomplishes which will not be necessarily destruc- tive to you ; not a step it advances which is not over your prostrate bodies. This alliance will not be less fatal to your existence, whether it devote your empire to immediate partition, or whether it confer upon you the poisoned gift of a share in the spoils of Turkey *, and of a frontier which brings you into immediate contact with the most litigious of all dominations. I may err, but I confess that the union of these two Powers appears to me more dangerous to you under its present form, than even if France had annexed \\j Russia as a conquest to her own territories. It were a mere waste of words to say more on this part of the subject. I have before considered the chance of your failure, should you be forced to make common cause with France, in a war essentially of re- sources. But what if you succeed? you are still worse off than if you fail. I leave out of the question what you will have to suffer generally from the humiliation of Great Britain, and from your being at the mercy of France by the sort of peace forced upon us by the suc- cess of these measures. Do you think these measures will stop at a peace ? Do you hope to be then left at liberty, or that you will be freed from the obligations of supporting France by similar efforts whenever the * Proposed the ensning year to Austria by Bonaparte. 460 LETTER TO chief of its government shall think proper to renew the quarrel with us ? Would not such a peace confirm Russia in his alliance? Would it not for ever unite, and bind up the destinies of Europe with the fortunes, the grandeur, the solidity, the high triumphant and uncontrolled ascendency of France and l}er revolu- tion ? Could you stand this long ? Could you remain a state ? Could you even govern your interior ? Could you in vest your capital? Could you transfer your estates? Could you marry your children? Could you, in short, act, or live, or breathe, except by the Code Napoleon f In such a state do you hope for safety ? In such a peace do you hope for rest f or that your in- dependent dominion, your internal authority, your commerce, or even that literature and the fine arts among you could long survive this forcedand perverted state from which all social comfort will have disap- peared, and in which the sole business of human life will be to supply the wants, and administer to the passions of a ruthless and unhearing despotism ? To all these dangers, and to many more less imme- diately in sight, but not less certain and imminent, I leave you exposed, without seeing, I must confess, any means of averting them, whether by force, by compromise, or even by submission. I leave you employed on the sole consideration of the comparative remoteness or proximity of your destruction. But even in this situation it is not permitted us to neglect the examination of every possible means of escape. Under the operation of the monstrous principles which for so many years have been employed in unsettling the world, and which are now moulding it into all sorts of fantastic shapes, you are so placed that you must have recourse to your very danger for your pro- tection. Your choice does not lie between good and evil, but between evil and evil. But still it is much if you may choose. COUNT STADION. 461 In examining with painful solicitude these different questions of danger, precaution, and defence, and turning round this dark body on every side in order to discover some crack or chasm through which a ray of light may penetrate, I cannot help resting with most anxiety on the situation in which the peace of Tillsit has placed you with relation to Eussia. This situation is, no doubt, highly critical and dangerous, but comparing it with all others, it has this in its favour, that the danger is less pressing, less im- minent, and even less positive according to rational calculation. The principal bad effects of the treaty of Tillsit to you individually, will arise, as I have before remarked, from the eventual consolidation of the alliance between Russia and France. Something, therefore, will always be gained while you can keep this consolidation at a distance. But the interest of your position with regard to Russia does not stop here. If it be on this side that you can retard your fall, it is on this side that you must work out your deliverance. I knowwell the unpopularity at Vienna (and in many points of view I acknowledge its justice) of anything that bears the semblance of a Russian connection ; but remember that you have no variety in your choice ; remember that all hateful and all shameful as is this Russian connection with France, it is the weakest side of the line of circumvallation which is drawn around you. After what Russia has done against England, it is not from me undoubtedly that she can expect defence or exculpation ; but in the services she may render to you, I am ready to forget her levity towards us. Be assured that I speak the language of all the men of any lead in the councils of my country, when I declare that if your present rupture with us could produce a real defensive concert between you and Russia, founded on the necessity of preserving to you your German dominions, of guaranteeing the tranquil- v 462 LETTER TO lity of Poland, and of preserving the integrity of tl ie Ottoman Empire, all her wrongs towards us would be forgiven and forgotten for ever. In effect the really offensive part of the conduct of Russia even towards us, is her having leagued with France against the rest of the Continent. England is of all Powers the least affected by her capricious freaks. Remark also that the nature of her complaints against us speaks rather in her favour than otherwise. The alleged cause of rupture was not that we persisted too pertin a- ciously in the plan of deli vering Germany from the French arms, but that we did not assist her with suf- ficiënt energy. This is the complaint. Whether seriously urged by Russia, or fairly urged against Great Britain, are questions wholly foreign to the present discussion. But it is with your affairs, and not with ours, as connected with this powerful neighbour, that my business lies at present. England has the elements for her resource, and throws a wilderness of waters between her and every possible danger with which she may be threatened by a foreign enemy. Your case is different. Russia is a neighbour against whom you have no defence but that of your armies; and by her engagements with France, if once they settle into system, she becomes an enemy from whom you can expect no mercy. Indifferent to you she can never be ; and the choice between her enmity and her friendship, is, I am afraid, all that is left you now. The question, therefore, seems to be, whether in the subversion of the old system, there yet remain any points of contact or of common interest, by which you may approach Russia. If any such points remain, the next inquiry will be whether you can trust Russia enough to have any dealings with her. Both these questions seem to meet their solution in the necessity of the case. You cannot well avoid entering into COUNT STADION. 463 some relations with Russia, if she is to extend her frontier to the Danube ; and the situation of Poland seems to require that they should be those of amity and good understanding. I admit, it is true, that you cannot just now make any treaty with Russia which shall contain the most distant overture towards a future union with her for the recovery of what you both have lost in territory or in influence on this side of the Vistula. You can make none to disturb the new settlement of the House of Saxony in Poland. You must not look for the present further than your own Galicia. But Russia cannot wish to see this province dismembered from your empire ; much less that it should be èrected into a French principality, and become the nucleus of a future confederation of the Vistula. Russia must see this danger in the moment of her returning reason, and must acknowledge no less the necessity of uniting with you for mutual security in that quarter. Is it for your respective interests that Poland should again become a nation ? Is there in the laws, and institutions, and habits, by which your own share of Poland is governed, sufficiënt stuff out of which a nation might be composed ? Would you, or would you not, be better enabled to avail yourselves of the martial spirit of its population by sending an arch- duke to hold his Court at Cracow, with the state and title suited to a people thus re-embodied? Would Russia join you in any future projected settlement of the Polish state ? or if not, would she object to any settlement you might find it convenient for your- selves ? These are important considerations, and wellworth weighing. Unfortunately they contain nothing extravagant. Adversity has so familiarised men's minds with change, that speculations, which in other times would have passed for wild and chime- rical fancies, present themselves now as rational re- sults from what is passing every day before our eyes. 464 LETTER TO I am aware of the many objections which may be urged, and which, in fact, subsist against any pro- posal of engagement of what nature soever, with such a Cabinet as that of St. Petersburg, composed as it now is. I feel — no man more — the justice of all that can be said against the advisers of the peace of Tillsit. Suffer me, however, to point out to you an evident distinction between the grounds of accusation which Austria and Great Britain have respectively to enforce against the Russian ministers. On our side we have to complain of positive and unjust hostility. You have to complain of the levity with which a sovereign, pointed out as it were by the hand of Providence to be the great stay and support of any alliance for the protection of Europe, was, in one dis- graceful day, changed from its defender into its de- stroyer, and into the instrument and accomplice of some of the worst acts of Bonaparte. But let us be just. Austria of all Powers has the least right to complain that Russia made her peace at Tillsit. Austria during the preceding winter (for reasons of which I will not inquire into the soundness) had been a tranquil spectator of the most bloody and the most eventful campaign ever known in modern hi story. She was warned in the month of December of the certain and inevitable consequences of her indecision. The event has answered the prediction, but has not exceeded it. But notwithstanding this marked dif- ference between the two cases, and notwithstanding the many reasons there are to wish for union upon its true and proper principles, I should be the last per- son to recommend that with a puerile oblivion of the past, and a rash confidence in the future, you should throw open at once your arms to Russia. Such an act would be the consummation of imprudence. The proposition I hazard is strictly limit ed to what it professes. It goes to nothing further than the in- COUNT STADION. 465 ternal situation of Poland under the new settlement ; an object scarcely visible as yet above the political horizon, interfering with no declared object of French ambition, and at such a distance from English in- terests that you may even render your separation from us subservient to the arrangements necessary to give it effect. Nor do I suppose, as a motive for its adoption, any thing far short of a positive ne- cessity. Your will I must reckon for nothing. You have no freedom, except in the choice between an understanding of this nature with Russia, and a direct connection with France. * Here, in my opinion, lies the great question. In the long storms which are preparing for the world, you will find it difficult to stand alone ; and if you once entangle yourselves with France, you are gone past remedy or redemption. From that Stygian shore there is no return : — " Fata obstant, tristique palus inamabilis unda Alligat." When you have made one step with her in this vale of death it will be useless to look back — it will be impossible to stop — you must go on to the journey's end. You must participate with her in the plunder of other states. You must exchange your own ter- ritories at her will. You must folio w and assist her in that which she prizes above conquest, in that which is the real motive of all these exchanges of dominion, the disorganisation of the social state, and the blotting out from the memory of mankind all the old relations by which they were once governed. Even this would avail you but little as a safeguard against Russia, or any neighbouring state. What ■ signify to France the petty disputes among the Kings * Napoleon's marriage with the Archduchess took place in the next year. H H 466 LETTER TO she still suffers to wear their crowns? Why should she prevent Kussia from vexing you by her intrigues in Servia and Hungary? You are not her allies. France can have no allies, constituted as her empire now is, except such as are essentially French ; and Austria, to deserve her effectual protection, must pay the same hard price for it which has brought Spain and Holland to the condition of tributary provinces. What, then, is the result of this speculation ? If I can strike out no new and distinct course ; if this be no time to talk of union with Kussia ; if all the con- siderations I have ventured in this long letter to lay before you, lead to nothing more than to the adoption of measures of general caution, and to act for the best as circumstances arise, the r conclusion is too little precise and positive to be worth the pains taken to arrive at it. This would, perhaps, be true if there were not some hopes that a case may soon arise when the reflections I have presented to you may find their application. In Eussia there are still many men who see and feel as statesmen ; many more who, without pretending to the qualifications belonging to that order, love their country with true hearts, and de- precate the certain and countless mischiefs which threaten it from a perseverance in the system of French fraternity. Before many months are elapsed, the pressure of these mischiefs will be seriously feit. It will be asked why Russia is at war with England ? This question cannot long be kept out of the palace of the Emperor himself ; to whose ears it must come at last, and who must and will be told that to have peace with England (I mean anything which deserves the name of a peace between two such Powers) he must resumé the station and the character which belong to him in the distribution of the sovereignties of the world. Of such a peace you are the natural mediators — not the formal mediators — that cannot COUNT STADION. 467 be while France is so near you ; but the mediators in substance ; the power to whom in f act Russia would owe the peace ; the state for whose sake England would bury all her anger in eternal oblivion. It is with a view to this possible turn of affairs that I have troubled you so much at length. You will ask what part I assign to Great Britain under such circumstances. When, and in what form, it may be prudent for you that Great Britain should appear by the side of her old allies, must be de- termined by the prudence of those who may be at the head of your councils and of hers at the moment. It is enough that you be assured that our accession to any new system of continental union will be quite in- dependent of the changes which may happen in our internal administration. Pursuing, in the mean time, with firmness and with frankness the principles of her unalterable policy, Great Britain cannot fail of essentially serving your cause and that of Europe, even while she is defending herself against your united arms. Every mischief she succeeds in preventing is so much saved for the common stock. Every year she continues to keep down the marine of her enemy will reckon for ten in the account of your salvation, by the distance to which she throws the final establishment of the French empire, one, uni- versal, and indivisible ! In the mean time, the sort of war we may have to carry on is not likely to em- bitter our quarrel. There is scarcely an enterprise we can undertake to which you may not fairly wish success. We want no concert, no private under- standing with you to confirm you in these senti- ments. Concert and a good understanding will produce themselves. We shall find them as we go on. You will understand us in our actions. You will read the whole secret of the British state in our deportment towards the real enemy; in the station hh 2 468 LETTER TO COUNT STADION. we confer upon ourselves, and in the proud elevation of our mind above our difficulties. You will know that while we oppose France, the mainspring of our country is sound and whole. As to peace with us, for you it is the affair of an hour. You declare it by the very act of your separation from France. From that happy hour all things will fall back into their original order, and begin for you a new era of life and happiness. Here I close my subject. Much more remains to be said, but we have enough for the day. Time presses, and I must bid you farewell. Receive there- fore, my dear Sir, once more the assurances of my durable esteem, of the high consideration with which I am impressed for your abilities and your virtues, and of my true good wishes for your success and happiness. (Signed) Robert Adair. The papers which follow were written in consequence of the appearance of a work, entitled " Mémoires et Lettres inédits du Chevalier de Gentz ; " printed at Stutgard in the year 1841. Two of these memoirs, especially the latter, concern too nearly the author's account of the same transactions not to require some notice on his part. hh 3 471 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ's NARRATIVE OE WHAT PASSED AT THE PRUSSIAN HEAD-QUARTERS IN OCTOBER, 1806/ PREVIOUSLY TO THE BATTLE OF JENA. It will be observed by the reader of the despatches which form theground-work of the preceding historical memoir, that a fuller exposition of the condition of Prussia, and particularly of the system of its govern- ment under the administration of Count Haugwitz, is necessary for a full knowledge of the state of Europe at the time they were written ; and of the reason why no general confederacy could then be formed against Napoleon. He may collect, indeed, the nature of the obstacles to such a confederacy by the measures sug- gested for their removal ; but it will require a more extended detail of facts, with many of which the writer was then unacquainted, to establish in his mind the conviction of its utter impossibility. Evi- dence decisive of this fact has been produced recently to the world in a posthumous publication of memoirs by the well-known Chevalier Gentz. It was printed at Stutgard, in 1841. This gentleman had been invited to the Prussian head-quarters to write proclamations and manifestoes. He arrived at Erfurt on the 3d of October, a few days before the great battle, and during his stay there drew up a narrative in the form of a journal, of his daily conversations with Messrs. Haugwitz, Luc- chesini, and Lombard — the three great directors of the Prussian councils. His narrative, therefore, becomes an important historical document. M. Gentz was a man steadily attached to the old governments, an acute observer of public transactions, and a writer, as we all know, h h 4 472 REMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS of very considerable eloquence and ability. His Jour- nal was drawn up with a regard to truth which seems evident, under the clearest conviction of his judgment, and in the full bitterness also of his despair for the public cause. To that cause he certainly was devoted ; and although I shall have to remark not very favour- ably on some passages in another paper contained in this posthumous collection, consisting of eomments and criticisms on the negociations for peace in 1806, between England and France, of which he could know nothing, I will not refuse my testimony to his patriotism and his zeal, of which he gave me many proofs in his letters while I was at Vienna. The document is further valuable as exhibiting, by actual experiment of its working, the faults of the system adopted by the Prussian government in the early days of the French Revolution ; that is to say, by persisting in their French connection after the nature and the reason of their original alliance with that Power, and consequently of all that was German in its objects, had become fundamentally altered : I speak of the time when on the failure of the Duke of B runs- wiek' s expedition in 1792, Prussia separated herself from Austria, and concluded shortly afterwards the peace of Basle. From the web of that treaty she never could extricate herself. In fact, the breaking up of the German union began with that act, and prepared the way consequently for the dissolution of the empire. It brought Prussia into a vicious system of relation towards the smaller states, whose union, grounded originally on resistance to the too great pretensions and preponderance of Austria, was never- theless German in purpose, and German in its means. At the head of this national league, Prussia had long taken her place, and she had no right to desert it, or to ehange its character into that of an armed protector- ship, grounded on a neutrality too necessary to France MEMOIES OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 473 to be fair towards Austria and its other members. By so doing Prussia became substantially the ally of France from 1795 forwards. The practical evils of this state of things, and the point which they had reached, are brought out into full day in the conferences here recorded by M. Gentz. They disclose a series of the most disreputable trans- actions : but upon these it will be needless to enter further than as they affect the question of re-uniting in 1806 the Powers of Europe against France. To this point they are conclusive; and on many other matters of deep interest they open a mine of gold to the historian. What we are first led to remark on reading these papers is the singular temerity of Prussia in making war, which, as to the time of beginning it, was purely a voluntary act on her part, not only without the knowledge of Austria, but when by no moral possi- bility she could obtain the co-operation of that Power ; and when in the false calculations of her diplomacy, and, as it would seem, in the hope of making her arrangements without him, she had kept back part of her secret from her best friend, the Emperor of Russia. But the great folly of all was the enterino- upon a war against England and France at the same time : — against the King of England, to retain pos- session of his hereditary dominions, of which at the instigation of Napoleon she had deprived him ; and against Napoleon, who, for his own convenience, now wanted to get them back for their right owner. By what mischievous ingenuity she contrived to get herself into this predicament, puzzled at the time all the old politicians of Europe. It is brought to light in the present publication, which exhibits a picture full of instruction of the consequences of that scheming policy to which Prussia had in a manner delivered 474 KEMAKKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS herself up from her first deviation into French revo- lutionary connection. Her case shortly was this : — Tired of the long and oppressive domination of her ally, towards the end of 1805, when Mr. Pitt on his return to power again endeavoured to bring together something of a con- federacy again st Napoleon, Prussia, although rejecting the specific proposals carried out by Lord Harrowby, saw nevertheless that the time was fast approaching when she would have not only to redeem her mistakes, but to defend the independence of her monarchy. Just cause for action had been afForded to her by the violation of her territory in October, when Bernadotte marched his army through Anspach to the rear of the Austrians. The Emperor Alexander, who ar- rived at Berlin soon after that event, encouraged of eourse the King in his views of emancipation, offered him all his forces, and succeeded in drawing him into a measure, from which there could be no retreat ; namely, a convention for restoring the affairs of Europe to the footing on which they had been placed by the treaty of Luneville. A treaty to this effect was signed at Potsdam on the 3d of November ; and Count Haugwitz was despatched to Vienna with orders to communicate it to Napoleon, to offer the King's mediation with the other Powers in the event of his accepting its conditions, and to denounce im- mediate hostilities if he should reject them. Haugwitz arrived there some days before the battle of Austerlitz. Why he delayed entering immediately on his business has never yet been satisfactorily explained. It is stated in the " Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat," with what truth I know not, that " Ie négociateur Prussien antécédemment au grand evenement militaire, dont il attendait Tissue, ne voulut ou n'osa point communiquer au Quartier General Francais Ie principal objet de son importante mission:" and yet he had his audience of MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 475 Napoleon on the 28th of November ! Be this as it may, Napoleon finding him still at Yienna after the battle, addressed him one day thus: — " Eh bien, vous savez que les jours se suivent, et ne se ressemblent pas. J'ai voulu vous faire la guerre; aujouroVhui je vous offre Ie Ilanovre."* The choice was Hanover, therefore, or war. Haugwitz chose Hanover, and a treaty for its occupation was drawn up on the instant. The king, his master, than whom a more virtuous monarch or man never lived, and who never dreamt of such a transaction, indignant at the whole proceeding, but circumvented in every way, and inclosed in the net of long standing and inextricable difficulties in which his servants had involved him, added nevertheless conditions to his compulsory ratification of this treaty ; stipulating for delay in its execution until a general peace, and for the consent of the King of England to it. These in the spring of 1806 were taken to Paris by Haugwitz. Rage and scorn awaited that minister on their reception. The modifications were rejected : a new treaty was framed, compelling Prussia to occupy the electorate forthwith, and to put herself instantly into a state of hostility with England by excluding the king's flag from his own ports. About this period negociations for peace with England and Russia were opened by Napoleon, and at the very first step towards a treaty, the retrocession \ of Hanover was ofFered by him unconditionally to the King of England. Thus stood the matter between Prussia and France. It was this act it seems which determined the cabinet of Berlin to go to war. So much at least is now established by the testimony of the Marquis of Lucchesini, then their ambassador * See Narrative, p. 275. 476 KEMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS at Paris. Let us see the account which he gives ofit. " Cette première conversation," says M. Gentz, " fut entièrement consacrée a 1'histoire de ce qui s'était passé a Paris pour amener la rupture avec la Prusse. * * # Il (Lucchesini) savait, a ne pas pouvoir en douter, que des la première ouverture des négociations avec 1'Angleterre, la restitution du pays de Hanovre avait été formellement proposée au gouvernement Anglais. On ne voulut pas Ie croire a Berlin ; cette démarche faite a la même époque ou M. Laforêt avait ordre de presser Ie Cabinet de Berlin a completer et a renforcer les mesures par lesquelles il s'était approprié ce pays, parut d'une perfidie si noire, que ceux mêmes qui connaissaient Ie gouvernement Francais avaient de la peine a y ajouter foi." * * * " Napoléon se flattait a cette époque que de concert avec V Empereur de Russie, il engagerait Ie Roi de Prusse sans difficulté a sortir du pays de Hanovre ; on ne pensait pas même a la restitution de ses provinces cédées ; quelque dédommagement chétif, quelque Bernbourg, Coethen, &c. (disait Ie Marquis) voila tout ce qu'on avait imaginé pour lui ; et chaque jour développa davantage Ie projet de Ie sacrifier ab- solument, et de préparer la chute de la monarchie." " Ce fut la la substance des avis qu'il avait donnés depuis quelques mois a sa Cour, mais principalement de deux rapports qu'il fit Ie 22. et Ie 29. de Juillet, et lesquels joints aux propositions faites a 1'Electeur de Hesse, et aux démarches hostiles contre Ie Prince d'Orange, déterminèrent Ie roi a la guerre." Determined thus upon war with France, not for Hanover only, but for the preservation of the mo- narchy, any but the infatuated men who then direct ed the councils of Prussia would have begun by dimin- ishing the number of their enemies, and by calling their friends to their assistance. They did neither. MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIEE GENTZ. 477 And, first, as to Great Britain. With us the door was always open for reconciliation. The King, in his message of April 21st to the House of Commons, on the seizure of his territories, and the closing of the northern ports against his flag, declares that " he will look with anxious expectation to that moment when a more digniiied and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia shall remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a Power with whom his Majesty has no other cause of difference." Assuredly that moment was now arrived; and Prussia had it once more in her power to occupy the post offered to her through Lord Harrowby's ne- gociation of the preceding year. Yet it was not until the 18th of September, and at the very time at which Krusemarck was sent to Petersburg to claim the Eussian succours, that any overture whatever was made to Great Britain ; and even then what was its nature ? A desire was expressed through Mr. Thorn- ton, our resident minister at Hamburgh, that we 1 should send a plenipotentiary to open negociations for a reconciliation ; but not one word was said to authorise a belief that there was any disposition to remove the cause — the only cause — of difference de- clared by his Majesty's message. The English go- vernment, nevertheless, complied instantly with the request, and named Lord Morpeth. He was ap- pointed the lst of October; on the 6th he was at Hamburgh, and at Weimar (the head-quarters of the Prussian army) on the 12th, two days before the great battle. Will it be believed ? Yes, any thing may be be- lieved, when it is remembered that the same ministers who had thus brought their country to the brink of destruction were still in office — Lord Morpeth could not get an audience ! Haugwitz avoided seeing him ; and after the battle, but before the result of it was I \ 478 KEMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS known at head-quarters, his Lordship having asked Lucchesini whether Prussia was ready to enter into a negociation, received for answer, " that it would depend on the result of the battle which had just been fought." M. Gentz's narrative is silent on this point. On the llth, he tells us, the head-quarters had been removed to Weimar ; and as he had signified his intention of returning to Dresden, Haugwitz invited him to remain with them some days longer. " Restez avec nous encore quelques jours; nous serons a Weimar en même tems, tranquilles et instruits ; et nous touchons, comme vous voyez, aux grands événemens." Gentz, however, wisely resolved to set off on the next day. On the 12th, accordingly, he paid his valedictory visits, and dined with Haugwitz. There he again meets Lucchesini, who promises him that " si quelque chose d'essentiel se faisait jusqu'au lendemain matin il au- rait soin de m'en faire avertir a 1'endroit oü je passerais la nuit, pour que je partisse en possession des nou- velles les plus fraiches. Ni Lord Morpeth, ni aucune personne de la Russie n'était arrivé jusqu'a mon dé- part ; " — and afterwards — a Je suis parti de Weimar a cinq heures." There is no reason to suppose that M. Gentz was aware at this time that Lord Morpeth was actually in the town of Weimar. Yet such is the fact ; and Lucchesini' s neglecting to communicate to him this important circumstance, as he had promised to do, at the place where he was to pass the night, is another proof of the dishonest after-thought which lurked under every one of their proceedings about Hanover. So much for the conduct of the Prussian Govern- ment as regards England at this perilous crisis. Let us now see how they acted towards Russia. They had an alliance with Russia which entitled them to call for assistance in a war with France. War MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 479 had been determined upon immediately (as we have seen) after Lucchesini's despatch of the 29th of July, received the 7th of August ; and yet it was not until the 18th of September that General Krusemarck was despatched to Petersburg to claim the Russian succours. But in the interval what was going on in the Prus- sian councils ? This is a matter highly necessary to ascertain, with a view to the main object of our inquiry, viz. the possibility of effectuating a general alliance in 1806. It appears by M. Gentz's account of his first con- versation with Haugwitz, that on the very day on which it was determined to go to war, namely, on the 7th of August, that determination was communicated to the Emperor Alexander, in a confidential letter by the King, and that by the end of August the Em- peror's answer was received. This answer, accord- ing to Haugwitz, " ne laissait rien a désirer." Now it is of importance to truth that we should know the precise meaning of these words. M. Gentz's narrative furnishes no explanation of them. Lom- bard' s statement is as folio ws : " En réponse au premier avis que Ie Roi lui avait donné de ses in- tentions, 1'Empereur lui avait écrit une lettre qui serait un monument éternel de sa grandeur d'ame; il avait déclaré dans cette lettre qu'il ne s'agissait entre lui et M Prusse ni de négociations ni de stipu- lations ; qu'il ne lui demandait pas même ce qu'il comptait faire en cas de succes; qu'il se remettrait absolument a lui : que la seule chose qui 1'intéressait était de voir les Francais bien et düment battus ; que pour eet effet il offrait au Roi la totalité de ses forces, et de 1'argent * même, s'il en avait besoin," &c. &c. But there is no promise here of immediate succour. * It could not be for want of English subsidies, therefore, that Russia was driven into a French alliance the next year. 480 REMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS No Kussian troops were put in motion until the end of November, and General Krusemarck, who was sent to ask for them, did not set out on his mission (as we have seen) until the 18th of September. Why this delay in sending him ? It now appears that a hope was entertained, that notwithstanding Lucchesini's departure from Paris, his successor, Knobelsdorf might obtain some explanations which would change the whole face of affairs, and render the demand of succours from Russia unnecessary. And this presents another point of view in which the exact knowledge of the communication in question becomes highly desirable. As Hanover was the cause of the impending war, the expected explana- tions or proposals from France could only regard that territory. Now the King of Prussia in his letter to the Emperor, either stated the cause of his recourse to hostilities, or he did not. If he did, and if he received an answer which, according to Haug- witz, " ne laissait rien a désirer" it must have been an approbation of, and concurrence in, that cause, — not very consistent, certainly, with good faith towards his ally, the King of England. If his Majesty did not state that cause, he was unwisely concealing a purpose which, when the discovery should be made that it was supported by Russia, must have broken up the alliance between that Power and Great Britain. Such a supposition, therefore, is inadmissible from the common sense of the thing itself ; since it argued very little knowledge of the Emperor Alexander not to be sure that whatever communication favourable to the retention of Hanover might come from France in the interval, it would be in the same degree offensive to his Imperial Majesty; inasmuch as it must not only force him, as already observed, to break with England, but divest him of the high character and station in which he stood towards MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 481 Germany, and render him, instead of a protector, an accomplice in her spoliation. On the other hand, and under the supposition of an unfavourable answer from Napoleon, it will be difficult to believe that his Imperial Majesty would have been sparing of his exhortations to his ally; that he would not have reprobated the principle of a war for such a purpose even against France ; that he would not have shown him the necessity of standing well with Europe, of being rectus in curid on all points of justice as well as prudence before he drew the sword ; or that, with the knowledge that nothing could be done against France without a confederacy, nor any confederacy be effec- tual without England, he would not have advised the removal of every cause which rendered confederacy impossible, especially one which had already dis- gusted Austria, and confirmed the statesmen at Vienna in the belief that the cession of a village or two would disperse the impending storm, and send all the Prussian troops into cantonments.* Yet against this interpretation of the correspond- ence, we have the following words of Haugwitz, supposing M. Gentz to have correctly reported them : — " L'Empereur de Eussie fut d'abord Ie seul dé- positaire de notre projet; Ie Roi lui écrivit Ie jour même que 1'ordre fut donné " — (to put two-thirds of his army on a war footing) ; " en lui exposant toute sa situation, il lui faisoit voir la totalitê de ses plans. 11 If M. Gentz had been con versant with the business of diplomacy as much as he was with the art of drawing up proclamations and state documents, he would have required tosee these papers, — the King's letter and the answer to it. As the matter now stands, namely that the answer was one " qui ne * Baron Thugut's words to me very shortly before the battle. — R.A. I I 482 REMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS laissait rien a désirer," there is a shadow of ambi- guity on this point of Hanover to be dispelled only by our confidence in the high character of both the one and the other Sovereign. The truth may very well be this. On the 20th of Jury, and consequently before Lucchesini's final despatch, M. d'Oubril, the Russian plenipotentiary at Paris, sent thither, as I have already given my reasons for believing, with orders not to return without a treaty, had signed one with the French ministers ; and of this document the Russian minis- ters, who had given him all their confidence, were in daily expectation. Connected with this event was the possibility likewise of a treaty with England, and consequently of the retrocession of Hanover to his Majesty. In such a case, it never could enter into the contemplation of the Emperor that Prussia would hold out against all Europe by retaining it. There was the less necessity, therefore, in a personal correspondence between the two monarchs, for more particular explanations on this head. But it is with councils and ministers that we must examine these matters, and not with their masters. What advice did Lombard and Haugwitz give to their Sovereign on the receipt of the Emperor' s letter ? Evidently not to give up Hanover without some equi- valent Again, we must lament that the letter was not produced to M. Gentz. According to Lucchesini, " Napoléon se nattait que de concert avec 1'Empereur de Russie, il engagerait Ie Roi de Prusse sans diffi- culté a sortir du pays de Hanovre." No ground is assigned for Napoleon's confidence on this point. There was reason certainly to believe in the eificacy of the joint representations of Russia and France, aft er peace should have been concluded between those great Powers, added to the severe pressure of an English blockade : but general belief will scarcely MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 483 be admitted as a safe ground of action with such a man as Napoleon, and, coupled with other words from the above text, namely, a que si TEmpereur de Russie désirait s'étendre en Pologne, on y consenterait sans difficulté," the passage above cited makes one anxious to discover — that which the production of the papers alluded to would enable us to do — what effect, or whether any effect, the offer of extending his dominions in Poland had produced on the Em- peror's mind, considered with reference to the evacu- ation of Hanover. This is the true point; and without the production of the whole of his Imperia! Majesty's answer, the communication, " qui ne laissait / rien a désirer," might be taken to mean, as in the mind of Haugwitz and Lucchesini it did mean, that some opening was leffc in it for the retention of Hanover, or that some possible compromise was ' hinted at on which England had never been con- sulted. Thus much is certain. Whatever good advice the King may have received from the Emperor of Russia, that of his ministers was the reverse of it. If, as is probable, the Emperor privately remon- strated against the retention of Hanover, it was certainly without effect. During the whole progress of her disasters, Prussia held on to her prey with something like the convulsive grasp of death, and it was not until Lord Hutchinson's arrival at Memel that she relaxed her hold. The ministers were ever looking out for equivalents, and it is in this fatal word that we shall speedily see developed the extent of the false principles by which they were governed. But before coming to this point, it may be asked, why such obstinacy on our part about Hanover? Why insist upon an object of such trifling interest to England when the safety of Europe was at stake ? It is answered, because the safety of Europe was at stake ; because that safety depended on a clear, un- ii 2 484 REMAKES ON TWO POSTHUMOUS compromising, systematic resistance to those prin- ciples under the practical operation of which Hanover had been seized by Prussia, and Sicily had been demanded by France. Mnch clamour was raised against Mr. Fox when, in his sound view and pros- pective calculation of the public interests in all their hearings, he compared Hanover with Hampshire. The objectors were but sorry statesmen. Placing Hanover as low as we may please in the scale of territorial importance, although that is by no means inconsiderable in its relation to other and higher interests, its value at that moment was of the first order : it involved the national honour in a question where honour was all. This policy of Mr. Fox, foliowed up as it was by his colleagues and successor, and making part of the system of their foreign administration, sets in its true light of party cavil the hundred times repeated and refuted accusation against them of having abandoned the Continent. Never was there a charge so utterly devoid of truth. M. Gentz, with all his dislike of an administration in which Mr. Fox bore so great a part, repudiates it with indignation. Hear what he says in his instructive conference with Lombard, whom he de- scribes asbeing " encore plus ministre que Haugwitz." After informing M. Gentz that the King was per- fectly satisfied with the good disposition of the Court of Vienna, Lombard goes on, " Je ne sais pas si nous devons également bien espérer de celle de la Cour de Londres. Je ne suis pas sans inquiétude a eet égard." To this Gentz replies naturally that the appointment of a plenipotentiary to negociate with them on their application for one, ought to quiet his alarms. Lombard, however, persists. He is afraid " que T Angleterre leur ferait de bien dures conditions" and then goes on " quoiqu'il en soit, les ministres Anglais se rendraient bien responsables s'ils pouvaient MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 485 sacrifier a un point oVhonneur outrê, ou a un ressenti- ment particulier, la plus belle occasion qu'ils aient encore eue pour co-opérer a l'affranchisement de 1'Eu- rope. Ils feraient un mauvais calcul dans tous les cas ; vainqueur ou vaincu Ie Roi de Prusse trouverait toujours Ie moyen de leur faire regretter un jour une indifférence cruelle, ou une opiniatreté déplacée." Gentz's indignation at this effrontery — for that is the word for it — can hold out no longer. " Ce langage," he says, " que je ne pouvais attribuer qu'a des préventions invétérées contre 1'Angleterre, ou au trouble d'une mauvaise conscience se roidissant de loin contre des obstacles dont elle ne se sentait que trop responsable, me parut tout-a-fait extraordinaire." And he censures it without mercy. " Je lui dis que je trouvais ces plaintes, non seulement prématurées, mais encore arbitraires et injustes ; que selon moi Ie gouvernement Anglais avait fait preuve d'une mag- nanimité peu commune en se prêtant sur-le-champ a des négociations avec une Puissance qui 1'avait si cruellement offensé ; que Ie soupcon d'un ressentiment particulier ne pouvait pas même atteindre les hommes publics de 1'Angleterre; que celui d'une indifférence cruelle sur Ie sort du Continent serait exclu par leur intérêt évident, s'il ne 1'était pas par la libéralité de leurs principes ; et que, quant a ce qu'il craignait de leur opiniatreté, je ne voyais pas même sur quoi pouvait porter cettecrainte," &c. &c. " J'ai ajouté, que loin d'être surpris de Taccueil froid qu'il disait avoir été fait a Londres a leurs premières propositions, je ne revenais pas de mon étonnement de ce que VAn- gleterre y était entree si tot." Disdaining to narrow the question to one of mere persons, the English government took the high ground that became their station and their names. Whether Hanover should be governed by a King of England ii 3 486 REMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS or a King of Prussia, was a question to be sure that could stand in no comparison with the interests of European independence ; but of those interests good faith and honour were with them the first. Here also, independently of general justice, was the special good faith of England pledged to the sovereigns of the House of Brunswick, and which no ministry, least of all a Whig ministry, could abandon ; and here was the fate of the world about to be committed, in a last appeal to arms, to this very honour and good faith, and to a combined defence, if such a benefit could be brought about, in which one false principle, one hesitating friend, would be sure to bring ruin upon all. Of its effect in this sense, the Prussian advisers took no note; and Haugwitz, it is fair to own, does not stand single in his shame. Many dis- tinguished persons at Berlin, although disapproving the original seizure, and hostile themselves to a French alliance, still were disposed to regard it as a thing done, as " un fait accompli 1 '' (in modern diplo- matic parlance), and were disposed consequently to resist any proposal for its retrocession. Even the celebrated M. Stein was of this number.* If, how- ever, they yielded to considerations of what they denominated national convenience on this point, and even thought that the question of good faith might be slurred over by finding out and proposing some- thing in the shape of indemnity to the King of England, never could it enter into their heads or hearts to countenance the nefarious project with the * ' c Que des personnes de poids et des personnes mêmes qui avaient hautement désapprouvé la maniere dont on avait acquis ce pays, m'avaient dit que la chose une fait faite, on ne pouvait plus rétourner sur ses pas, et que cette possession e'tait d'une ne'cessité indispensable pour la Prusse. (Voila ce que par exemple M. de Stein, opposé autant que possible au principe de la première occupation, m'avait déclaré sans de' tour au mois de Juillet a Dresde.") See Narrative, p. 322. MEMOIRS OF CHEVALIER GENTZ. 487 account of which M. Gentz closes the catalogue of his discoveries. Hear the relation of his last conversation with Lucchesini, in which the agony of despair, and it is hoped of remorse, seems to have eviscerated from that minister the last of his portentous revelations : — " Ce soir," the lOth of October, " j'ai eu la dernière conversation suivie avec M. Lucchesini." * * * " Pour épuiser la question sous tous les rapports, je Tai abordée encore sous celui des avantages par- ticuliers que la Prusse pouvait se promettre de cette guerre." Then, after much fencing on one side, and much pertinacity on the other — M. Gentz not choosing to be satisfied without a full confession of all their schemes, " d'autant moins," he says, " que 1'occasion me parut favorable pour m'instruire de leurs véri- tables intentions," — " II s'est expliqué," he continues, " avec franchise. Il m'a dit que tout dépendait de la tournure qu'on donnerait aux négociations avec 1'Angleterre ; que si cette Puissance insistait sur la restitution, et s'il ne se présentait aucun moyen pour Py faire rénoncer, plutót que de garder Ie pays de Hanovre malgré elle, on Ie rendrait sauf a chercher quelque bon équivalent dans les résultats oVune guerre heureuse ; mais que pour peu qu'il seroit possible de convaincre TAngleterre de 1'insuffisance des raisons par lesquelles elle pourrait s'opiniatrer sur ce pays, ce serait a elle que Ton proposerait des équivalens, jusqu'a, concurrence même de la Hollande si elle voulait contribuer a la conquérir. Maintenant, a-t-il ajouté, vous connaissez Ie dernier de nos secrets" It is sad to reflect how rarely, when a course of dishonest measures has once been entered upon, the virtues of a sovereign can avail against the vices of a ministry. Here was an act of pillage, — and that of the very worst character, — meditated against the two Houses of Hanover and Orange; against the ii 4 488 REMARKS ON TWO POSTHUMOUS latter, too, when, by Lucchesini's account, to redress the wrongs of that House was one of the motives of the rupture with France. Observe the circum- stances, too, under which this project was to be executed. It was to take effect " dans les résultats d'une guerre heureuse." The common depredator pleads want as his excuse for robbing his neighbour ; here robbery was to folio w gain and success. And under such auspices, forsooth, the English government was to set on foot a new confederacy for the preservation of the liberties of Europe ! We come now to the speculations of those ministers on the co-operation of Austria ; and on this subject, with an exception soon to be noticed, nothing passes that is not highly creditable to M. Gentz, as well for the soundness of his general views, as for his dis- couraging w r hat would appear from his statement to have been meditated by both Prussia and Kussia, to draw, or rather to force, the Court of Yienna into their measures. With some extracts on this point we shall finish our remarks. His conversation upon it with Count Haugwitz was on the 6th of October. " Il avait re9u un dépêche du Comte Finkenstein. L'Empereur ayant été absent de Vienne lorsque les dernières Communications de la Prusse y étaient arrivées, Ie Comte Finkenstein n'avait pas encore recu une réponse positive. Le Comte Haugwitz me paria de nouveau du projet de la mission militaire. Je me trouvais dans un singulier embarras toutes les fois qu'il entamait ce sujet. Car d'un cóté je fré- missais a 1'idée de voir la Prusse embarquée toute seule dans cette vaste et terrible entreprise ; j'en cal- culais les suites possibles pour elle et pour les autres Puissances ; j'étais sür que sans 1'appui de 1'Autriche elle ne pouvait pas la conduire a bon port. D'un autre cóté, loin d'avoir le droit de proposer ou de pröner des mesures par lesquelles la Cour de Vienne MEMOIRS OE CHEVALIER GENTZ. 489 pouvait être alarmée ou compromise, présumant déja par plusieurs indices que 1'Empereur ne jugerait pas convenable de prendre part a la guerre, j'avais plutót Ie devoir de détourner autant que possible tout ce qui pouvait Ie contrarier ou Ie gêner dans sa résolution. Heureusement (je veux dire pour moi, puisque ce fut bien autre chose pour la Prusse) Ie Comte Haugwitz, des la première conversation, s'était montré si fort satisfait des dispositions qu'il supposait a 1'Autriche, et si complètement tranquille et résigné sur les déterminations futures de cette Puissance, que je n'avais qu'a prendre Ie ton auquel il m'invitait lui- même; et rien ne m'annoncant de sa part qu'il regardait comme particulièrement pressant eet envoi d'un officier négociateur, j'étais autorisé a en penser de même, quelle que fut ma vraie opinion a eet égard." It was a serious fault on the part of M. Gentz, who in many parts of his narrative gives us to understand that he was admitted to these conversations in the character of an adviser, to have concurred in the re- liance thus exhibited by the Prussian minister on the reports favourable to co-operation which he had re- ceived from Count Finkenstein. He might have doubted whether that envoy, however deservedly en- titled to esteem, was, under the existing relations of the two Cabinets towards each other, sufficiently in the confidence of Count Stadion, to justify that pru- dent man in communicating to him so much of his intentions as to render the Cabinet of Berlin " com- plètement tranquille et résigné sur les déterminations futures de cette Puissance." M. Gentz's discretion on this occasion would have shown itself, one would think, in meeting rather than in avoiding an oppor- tunity to express the doubt, which, as he tells us him- self, he entertained of the soundness of Count Haug- witz's conclusions. But at all events he adds his 490 REMAKES ON TWO POSTHUMOUS testimony to that of every man of sense, not only to the practical inefficiency of all confederacies without Austria, but to the inevitable mischief which would result to Europe, as well as to Prussia herself, from her rushing single-handed into this war. Yery different was the good sense he showed when Haugwitz imparted to him the intentions of the Emperor Alexander. Very different his appeal to past misunderstandings and errors which had re- duced Europe to its actual condition of helplessness. " Il me paria ensuite de la Russie. Il dit que je pouvais être bien persuadé que jamais 1'Empereur n'avait été plus prononcé pour la guerre ; qu'il y met- tait plus d'ardeur encore que la Prusse ; que sans se borner aux négociations amicales il tiendrait un lan~ gage tres ênergique a ses voisins * * * et qu'il déclarerait sans beaucoup de détours qvtil ne souffrirait aucune neutralité." Gentz exclaims justly against the mischievous folly of such an intention. " Je lui dis que je voyais se réproduire un système qui déja dans une occasion précédente avait entrainé les plus grands malheurs ; que j'osais lui rappeler 1'année dernière ; quej'avais toujours été persuadé que Ie projet de forcer la Prusse a la guerre était une des causes principales du triste résultat de la campagne de 1805; que je frémissais en pensant que Ton püt s'aviser de renouveller ce pro- jet contre 1'Autriche ; qu'il en résulterait certainement les mêmes désastres ; que s'il existait un moyen de jeter 1'Autriche malgré elle entre les bras de laFrance, il se trouverait dans une entreprise pareille ; que je ne concevais pas comment un homme aussi éclairé que lui pouvait parier avec satisfaction de ce projet ; qu'il me paroissait plutot, que si un Prince aussi juste et aussi magnanime que 1'Empereur de Russie avait pü Ie former réellement, il faudrait tout faire pour lui en montrer les dangers, puisque rien ne serait plus MEMOIRS OF CIIEVALIER GENTZ. 491 propre a détruire jusqu'a la possibilité (Tune union entre les grandes Puissances, sans laquelle cependant je n'hésiterois pas a Ie dire, je regardois une guerre heureuse contre Bonaparte comme la plus désespérée des chimères." Such was the infatuation of the Prussian Minister that he heard these opinions with astonishment ; but he made haste to disavow all share in advising Russia to this course, and to quiet M. Gentz's alarms by ex- pressing his conviction that the Emperor would ex- ecute his intention, " avec toute la modération pos- sible!" Any thing so desperately imprudent as the inten- tion on the part of Russia of forcing Austria at this juncture to declare for or against France, I must be slow to believe, and I notice it only for the purpose of declaring that no symptom of such a measure was visible at Vienna. ïhere was an angry correspondence indeed concerning Cattaro about this time, but nothing more; and so far from a threat of hostility from Russia on this point, the threat, if any, was the other way, Austria being resolved to execute honour- ably the treaty she had concluded at Presburg. Russia, to be sure, in sending the best part of her army to attack the Turks in Moldavia, instead of to defend the Prussian monarchy on the Oder, was guilty of the greatest fault both in war and politics that had been committed during the whole course of her hostilities against France ; but of anything so wild as the pro- ject here imputed to her by Count Haugwitz, I am convinced that she was quite innocent. After what we have now read, can we wonder at General Kalkreuth's prediction uttered in his first interview with M. Gentz on the 3d of October, the day before that gentleman's arrival at head-quarters ? " Voyant que j'étois suffisamment instruit sur beaucoup de points intéressans, il se livra avec plus 492 REMARKS ON TWO MEMOIRS OF CHEV. GENTZ. de franchise, et a la fin entrainé par la mienne, il s'ouvrit a moi sans réserve. Il me dit que personne n'avoit plus désiré que lui une guerre avec la France ; que personne n'en avoit plus reconnu la nécessité; mais qu'aujourd'hui personne ne seroit plus enchanté qu'il se trouvat un moyen honorable pour en prévenir Texplosion ; que de la maniere dont les choses étoient préparées, cette guerre ne pouvoit pas réussir, et que sans un bonheur presque fabuleux, elle con- duiroit aux plus tristes résultats." But enough from this memoir for the purpose for which I have noticed it. In another sense, the whole deserves to be read and studied by every man who wishes to make himself master of the history of the eventful times to which it refers. M. GENTZ ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 493 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ's OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEGOCI- ATIONS OF 1806, FOR PEACE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE. M. Gentz's animadversions on the Paris negociations of 1806, are expressly pointed against the marnier in which they were conducted by Mr. Fox. They were written to prove that he was no statesman. To have foliowed the professor's precepts, or to have acted as it seems he would have advised, was certainly not the way to become one. The work may be read without injury to Mr. Fox's fame. Our observations upon it will therefore be few. The author is evidently misinformed concerning the most important part of that transaction ; namely, the honest intention, not of Mr. Fox alone, but of the whole government in whose name he acted, to make peace on safe and honourable terms, if such could be agreed upon between the parties. When M. Gentz composed his remarks, the ideas which prevailed very generally at the time of our former negociations with the French republic, par- ticularly those of 1794 and 1795, appear to have been still fresh in his mind. It was the belief of many that on those occasions Mr. Pitt gave way — not reluctantly perhaps — to a strong pressure from without, headed by Mr. Wilberforce and the popular supporters of that gentleman ; but that he had himself very little hope of success in the experiment, and that he had agreed to make it, in order to produce a general conviction of its impracticability, as well from the exorbitant demands of the enemy as from the nature of the government with whom he consented to treat. This misgiving of the minister was taken by many persons on both sides of the question for a want of 494 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ's OBSERVATIONS sincerity. It was the source of hope and of fear to them both; with the difference that the fear was openly expressed in accusatory speeches by the opposition, and the hope was silently nourished in the breasts of those, who believed in their conscience that no peace was possible with a governmentborn of the Eevolution. To this class M. Gentz was proud to belong, and he proclaims it in every on e of his writings. Consis- tently with those opinions, therefore, and with the set of hopes and fears associated with them, he must have rejoiced in the two failures of Lord Malmesbury. He must have reprobated the peace of Amiens, and rejoiced in its non-execution ; and (combined with other reasons not worth our while to examine) he must have looked with perfect abhorrence to a nego- ciation with Napoleon, conducted by Mr. Fox. All this is in order. Strong in these opinions, he sets himself to examine the documents relating to that negociation which were laid before parliament at their close ; helping himself in his condemnation of Mr. Fox and the government, by adopting occasionally the reasoning of the French negociators, and that of the speakers of the then Op- position in the two Houses. To the whole of his remarks therefore, on what he considers the faults in this transaction, there lies this fundamental objection of purpose ; for it was really a negociation for peace. M. Gentz of course saw this purpose with no favourable eye. In many respects also he seems to consider it in the same light with M. Bignon, namely, a contest of diplomatic cleverness ; and in his conception of what is meant by skill in such affairs, he states some points which he thinks ought to have been pressed, the mode and the time of pressing them, and the proper language to be used in the discussions with the French plenipotentiaries. He tells us, in short, what he would have done himself, ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 495 had the conduct of the business been confided to him. It would have been more to the purpose, especially as his erudition rendered him fully competent to the task, had he laid down the principles of public law and state policy on which the negociation ought to have been conducted, with a view of demonstrating a deviation from them on the part of Mr. Fox. Not having done this, his remarks can reach a no higher character than that of criticism. Many of them indeed are ingenious and true ; and for the sake of their truth, we may forgive their preten sions to novelty. With these, however, we have nothing to do, except to observe that in the way in which he would have enforced them, we never could have ad vaneed one step towards peace. The true, and indeed the only object for inquiry therefore in this case — all general considerations with regard to the cause, origin, and various fortunes of the war, having been long previously disposed of — will be simply, whether the proposals of France were fit to be listened to ? Whether they were adequate to the just claims of the country? M. Gentz ac- knowledges their sufficiency, and there this matter may rest. But if our demands were just and reasonable, and not below what the country had a right to require, the next question will be, first, whether we could have obtained them by treaty? and secondly, failing in such an endeavour, whether our negociation could have ended more satisfactorily than it did to prove that no peace was at that time possible with Napo- leon ? On all these pointsthe English government of 1806 have no reason to be dissatisfied with the public opinion either of their country or of Europe, or even of M. Gentz himself in his essential admissions. All that remains to be considered, therefore, is the 496 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S OBSERVATIONS question whether in setting on foot, or in conducting this negociation, there was, or was not, any imprudent concession, not to say criminal leaning towards France, on the part of Mr. Fox ? And as it seems to be M. Gentz's chief object in drawing up his notes to maintain the affirmative of this proposition, we shall examine shortly how he tries to make it out. He begins with a letter from Mr. Fox to M. Talley- rand, written a few days after he was in office, to inform that minister that a proposal had been made to him to assassinate Napoleon. The act of writing this letter, according to M. Gentz, was in every sense to be condemned. First, it betrayed an undue partiality towards Napoleon; secondly, it recognised the legitimacy of his go- vernment ; and thirdly, it was taking the first step in the negociation which ensued, and thereby hu- miliating the country. In examining these grounds of accusation, we are obliged to enter upon a question which the publication before us raises again from the unhonoured grave to which the common feelings of mankind seemed to have consigned it for ever. That question is, whether, England being at war with Napoleon, it was lawful for an English minister to connive at his assassination ? The reader of M. Gentz's work is invited, there- fore, carefully to consider this article of his attack on Mr. Fox, and then to determine for himself, whether his mode of stating and arguing the subject be open or not to the observations which follow. In the first place, the right and the duty of putting tyrants to death is not here contemplated by him as an abstract question. He has argued it as one on the practical merits of which a very important part of Mr.Fox's conduct on this occasion, indeed the whole of it in one sense, is to be judged. He states his prin- ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 497 ciple also without exception or limit as to its applica- tion, other than that the man to be killed must be an usurper in the opinion of the man who intends to Tcill him, " La question," he says, a si c'est un crime de tuer un homme tel que Bonaparte tient exclusivement a celle de la légitimité de son pouvoir. Celui qui Ie croit un souverain légitime fait bien de prononcer pour Taffirmative ; mais celui qui ne voit en lui qu'un usurpateur doit en juger autrement. Si Bonaparte étoit aux yeux de M. Fox un usurpateur et un tyran, il seroit Ie plus inconsequent des hommes, s'il n'ap- prouverait pas Ie projet de Ie punir. Son horreur pour Ie projet n'est fondée que sur ce que, pour lui, Bonaparte est un souverain légitime." And then he goes on to argue that the individual who proposed the matter to Mr. Fox being of opinion that he was not a legitimate sovereign, and having himself probably suffered from his tyranny, he had a right to put him to death; and, further, that having such right, there was no harm in his proposing the ex- ercise of it to Mr. Fox, but much harm on the part of Mr. Fox in dismissing him from his presence dis- courteously, in sending him out of the kingdom, and acquainting Talleyrand with what he had done. This is pretty well for a professor of public law and ethics. Let us hope they were not his deliberate opinions — that in asserting thein he was but playing off a little casuistry to suit the purpose of his memoir. For he must have known, as well as other men, that there is no mysterious boundary bet ween right and wrong ; that our notions on extreme cases are never so general as not to be reducible to som e rule of moral definition. But to define is to limit ; and what is to limit individual opinion ? There is no excuse for him, therefore, for giving the semblance of a sanction to principles so full of mischief. If, as he says in another place, " chaque genre d'attaque " on K K 498 KEMARKS ON M. GENTZ's OBSERVATIONS an usurper be " juste et permis " — permis, we may ask, by whom ? and to whom ? By every body, he must answer, and to every body. And where is the usurper who would not hail an admission offering to his " dark suspicions and tyrannous mistrust" a wider scope of action than can be found even in the code of the old man of the mountain — who would not thank him for giving the excuse of self-defence to his seizing and executing every body in whose opinion he was not a legitimate sovcreign ? — since, under this dictum, every such person must of necessity wish and approve all means to procure his death. Following up the singular opinion that Mr. Fox, from the nature of his principles, must have been a fooi not to wish that usurpers of all sorts ought to be put to death, he proceeds to argue that by necessary consequence, the act of rejecting the assassin's pro- posal, and sending him out of the country, was itself a declaration in favour of the legitimacy of Bonaparte. He is too wise, indeed, to argue this point, so we may leave it to its own intuitive worth. Others may therefore be permitted to judge from their own im- pressions on a view of the known facts. To such it will be rather more clear, that when Mr. Fox first heard the proposal, not a thought of legitimacy or legitimates, of tyrants or patriots, ever crossed his thoughts ; that his whole mind was fixed on the pro- posal ; that the intention was to murder a man, and that he deemed it his duty to warn that man of his danger. But to pursue this thread of sophistry any further were a task equally useless and ungrateful. It is enough to place the author's words under the reader' s eye, leaving him to judge of their import. He will then, if an Englishman, and a friend to the present establishment, and notwithstanding his just horror of the French Revolution, have to decide whether, under this justincation of the principle of ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 499 killing such kings as the killer may believe to be ille- gitimate, it was not perfectly lawful in Louis XIV. (supposing the historical fact to be well authenticated) to connive at the murder of King William ; nay more, whether it was not murder in King William's advisers to execute the persons convicted in his courts of justice of attempts to assassinate him. One more observation, and we have done. When he censures Mr. Fox for expressing his regret that he had sufFered the assassin to escape, M. Gentz, in taking the man's part, affirms that he was not re- sponsible to Mr. Fox for his opinions. Certainly not for his opinions ; but he was responsible for his proposal. When the in tention, therefore, was dis- closed to him, Mr. Fox, had he taken no steps to prevent its execution, would have had a guilty know- ledge of what he believed to be a crime, and conse- quently have been a participator in it. He may be pardoned, therefore, for not trusting for his peace of mind to M. Gentz's absolution. The professor, however, I lament to say, does not stand alone in his judgment of this transaction. To the shame of our age, I have myself heard Mr. Fox called " un imbécille," for his conduct in it. " Pour- quoi ne pas laisser faire ?" it has been asked me by politicians of that sect, although happily by no person who has since arrived to eminence in public employments. Such, thank God! was not the way of thinking of the gentlemen of England ; no, nor of France. Among them, great as were their sufFerings from Napoleon, I never heard of an apologist for his murder ; of any who would have accepted M. Gentz' s defence of the criminal, and have joined consequently in his inculpation of Mr. Fox for pre venting the deed. What would Chateaubriand and Polignac say ? how would La Ferronaye have looked, if it were told them in the trashy metaphysics of this school, that their kk 2 500 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S OBSERVATIONS loyalty and misfortunes made them of necessity parties to such principles as the folio wing ? — " Il a Ie droit de ne voir en lui (Napoléon) qu'un ennemi déclaré, perpétuel, et implacable, contre lequel, place au dessus de toutes les loix et de toutes les punitions ordinaires, chaque genre d' attaque est juste, légitime, et permis." It would not be easy to figure the con- tempt and scorn of their noble hearts, on finding themselves incorporated into such a partnership. M. Gentz has disco vered, however, that there was a deep secret in this business ; that the letter to Talleyrand, giving him notice of danger to the life of Napoleon, " n'a été évidemment écrite que pour amener une correspondance pacifique." He even goes so far as to affirm in another place that it was the first step, the actual commencement of the negociation. On the question of who made the first overture, it is needless to multiply words. Were it even as he states, there was nothing disgraceful either in the thing or in the manner of doing it. The English government, as it has already been said, was suf- ficiently strong, and the resources of the country sufficiently at their command, either to offer or to accept negociation; and the fact is simply, that it arose out of the general state of affairs both in France and in England. This, however, is not enough to repel M. Gentz's insinuations directed personally against Mr. Fox for undue favour towards Napoleon. We ask, therefore, where does he find the connection between the letter in question and an overture towards peace ? His proposition must be as follows: — Mr. Fox's partiality produced the warning sent to Napoleon to beware of an assassin. This produced from Napoleon the expression of a wish for peace : ergo, the warning was the first step in the negociation for it. The logic of this is not very clear. It is something like the demonstration familiar to ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 50 L our early years, of the birth of prosperity out of war. War begets poverty, which begets peace, and " peace causeth riches to fLow ; ergo, war is a cause of prosperity." If M. Gentz was serious in imputing such consequences to this act, he ought to have shown why Napoleon' s answer to Mr. Fox's letter could not be one merely of civil thanks, why it could not stop at the simple acknowledgment of an honour- able proceeding on his part, but that it necessarily required a notice of the state of hostility bet ween the two countries, and a declaration either of regret that we were at war, or of a disposition to treat for putting an end to it. M. Gentz has not a word to justify such an interpretation of the bearing of Mr. Fox's letter ; he takes care, on the contrary, to avoid any manifestation of opinion upon it, except — such is the perverseness of party hatred — a sense of his own difficulty to comprehend, or of his reluctance to admit, the possibility of a noble action on the part of Mr. Fox. But this letter, says M. Gentz, was the first step in the negociation. The notion is original, and all his own. No man of sense, except himself, ever took it for such, or doubted that the first advance came from Napoleon. No school-boy reading his Plutarch ever drearat that when the Roman consul wrote to Pyrrhus, apprising him that his physician had ofFered to poison him for a reward, he was in fact becoming a suppliant to hini for peace ; none who, if a similar event should show him a Fabricius of his own acting in the same way, would not blush that " his father had become his foe " for it ; none who does not see that the real overture was made by Pyrrhus himself, when, in emulation of his adversary's magnanimity, he sent back his Roman captives without ransom. So will youth judge — and they are the best to judgc — this generous strife of a distant age ! But in those kk 3 502 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S OBSERVATIONS days men's virtues were their habits ; now, they are exceptions. M. Gentz and those of his class may be excused, therefore, for considering this proceeding as a mere contrivance of Mr. Fox, a " tour de métier," as they would call it, all in the day's work of a heartless and calculating diplomacy. And there let it rest with them. Let us hear the gentleman, however, to the last: — " Cette lettre," he says, " sera un texte inépuisable pour ceux qui, dans les tems futurs, voudront étudier ou peindre Ie caractère de M. Fox. Kapprochée de plusieurs autres circonstances malheureusement trop connues, de ses opinions sur la Révolution de France, de ses liaisons intimes et suspectes avec les plus cruels ennemis de Theureuse constitution de son pays, de son admiration pour Bonaparte, de la visite qu'il lui a faite en 1802, de ses rapports et correspondances continuelies (continuées même pendant son ministère) avec Talleyrand et d'autres de cette trempe, — elle fera naitre les plus sérieuses réflexions sur la conduite de eet homme célèbre, qui a été 1'idole d'un grand nombre de ses contemporains, mais que la postérité saura mettre a sa place." This is mere libel. What does this writer know of the acts which he here imputes to Mr. Fox ? what of his opinions ? Quite at his ease about the facts, M. Gentz takes them at once from Mr. Fox's enemies; posterity, more likely, will take them from himself and his public conduct. That age will not fail to ask, where are to be found in any of Mr. Fox's speeches, or writings, or actions, opinions at variance with those on which the English constitution was built, and on which it must rest ? Where too, we ask, in this day, did he ever discover even a leaning towards any of the wild theories of France? Which of their constitutions did he ever hold up to the imitation of England ? He never read ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 503 one of them in his life ! Indeed, all paper constitu- tions were equally the subject of his mistrust and dislike. Often have I heard him declare to eager partisans who still continued to value his advice, that if Solon and Lycurgus, and all the renowned legis- lators of antiquity were assembled together to make a constitution for the smallest state, they would not be able to effect their purpose. These were the known, settled opinions of Mr. Fox. Many thought him too vehement, even culpably so, in defending the French revolution : his opposition to the war also was as unpopular as his adversaries could wish ; but his opinions were English. At the iirst outbreak in France, he had none which were not held by nine- tenths of his countrymen, even by Mr. Windham ; in after days he retained none that were not retained (and where shall we look for higher sanction ?) by Èomilly and Horner*; but hating the Jacobin mis- * With the truest respect for Mr. Horner, I must offer some remarks, in a sense differing from his, on the following passage of his Journal for 1804: — " An error of inferior appearance, but of fatal influence upon the Opposition party, was the countenance given to the Jacobin party in England by Mr. Fox. He was misled in this by some people about him, and by the persuasion, no doubt, that that powerful party might easily be restrained from excess, and in the mean time give effectual aid to the prevalence of popular sentiments. Mr. Fox was led in this business by such an unworthy agent as Dennis O'Brien, who must have been, as Mackintosh remarked to me, the original of Burke's picture of the go-between in the e Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs.' " The justice of this censure of countenancing English Jacobins, will depend very much on the sense we give to the word " countenance." Mr. Horner, when he entered upon public life, found such an opinion (the cause and origin of which have been noticed in the introductory part of this memoir) very prevalent against Mr. Fox ; and as Mr. F. did not give himself much trouble to remove it, no wonder that such should continue to have been the impression on his mind. This, how- ever, makes no difference as to the fact, quite new in the history of countenancing mischievous factions, namely, that Mr. Fox had neither intercourse nor even acquaintance with any of their leaders. In this, as in all similar cases, men will judge from mixed considerations. Some will condemn the tendency of certain opinions : others will see danger in the K K 4 504 REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S OBSERVATIONS chief as much as they did, he thought with them that war was not the way to cure, or even to conquer it. As to intercourse or correspondence with the enemies of our institutions, he had none; unless, indeed, a literary discussion on a Greek partiele with Mr. Gilbert Wakefield shall be made to pass for such. The very reverse of this imputation is the truth. That faction who, in their clamour for extreme changes, were ready to risk, if they were not desirous to destroy, the ancient constitution of their country as it exists in the balance of its powers, were his bit- terest enemies. They hated him to the full as much as he was hated by the Court for his endeavours to maintain that balance by rendering the House of Commons an efficiënt control over the servants of the Crown. This, in truth, was Mr. Fox's political er eed — in two words, parliamentary government. For this he joined with Lord North ; for this in 1784 he stood up for the Commons against the prerogative. assertion of even the best principles at particular times, and under cir- cumstances of great peril and alarm ; but many, and those not the least re- flecting nor the least honest part of the community, in answer to a charge against the leader of a party, essentially popular and consisting wholly of volun teers, for tolerating extreme courses in others, will oppose the dis- countenance of them by the uniform tenor of his own life. These also. may think the habit a bad one which confers character by exceptions and not by rules — that it tends to destroy all generous consistency in public men. Happily for Mr. Fox's fame it was not exposed to this trial by the conduct of the admirable man whose words we are now considering. Cato never could have become the colleague of Catiline, and Mr. Horner was to the last the political friend of Mr. Fox. As to Dennis O'Brien, and his supposed credit with Mr. F., Mr. Horner was totally mistaken. This was a busy electioneering agent, full of zeal, and very wrong-headed, who had rendered some services to Mr. Fox which were not unrewarded ; but he never was admitted to his councils. He was indeed, as I also learned from Dr. Lawrence, the go-between of the " Appeal to the Old Whigs ;" but if Mr. Horner had attended to Burke's delineation of that character, he would have recol- lected that the salient point in it is the man's erecting himselfinto a negociator, carrying his own ideas to the opposite party, and passing them off for those of his pretended principal. This was precisely the case with Mr. Dennis O'Brien. ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806. 505 For this he sacrificed his power and popularity — his power for twenty-two years, his popularity for ever. As for his admiration of Bonaparte, he had none but for his abilities ; his visit to Paris was not to Mm. * He had no intercourse of any kind, nor any corre- spondence beyond the business of his office, with Tal- * Mr. Foxs visit to Paris in 1802. When I first undertook to comment on the work of M. Bignon, though I had still fresh in my memory every circumstance of Mr. Fox's visit to Paris, I determined to secure the best testimony then living, that would enable me to repel the many falsehoods which had heen spread about in England and every where else, on the subject of his private interviews with Napoleon. No day passed during that visit without my spending many hours in his company, yet I never knew nor heard of one such interview. The First Consul and Mr. Fox met three times and no more in that period, and never once were alone. Unwilling, however, to trust to my own recollection, in the year 1 829 I wrote to his widow, Mrs. Fox, to whom it was the delight of his life to communicate every thought or act in it, with a view of confirming or correcting my impressions. The following was her answer, accompanied by extracts both from his own journal and General Fitzpatrick's. " St. Anne's Hill, August 29. 1829. " My dear Mr. Adair, " The above (see the end of this letter) is an extract from General Fitzpatrick's papers, which I think a more detailed account than any I can give you. Mr. Fox saw Napoleon but three times, and certainly never in private. But as it may be more satisfactory to you to have his own statement, 1 copy the only mention he made of Bonaparte in his journal. " ' Sept. 2. Presented to the first Consul. Bonaparte very civil to me — dined there, near 200 people — very magnificent — long talk — Bony talked almost all — was presented to Madame — liked her very much. — 22d. Went to the exhibition of new manufactures — saw Bo- naparte — (He took no notice of Mr. Fox). — 23d. Went to Court. — October 10. Wife presented. Madame Bonaparte very civil — we were offered a calèche to go about the park, which we were sorry we did not accept.' " I perfectly recollect it was in the conversation where the English newspapers were mentioned, that Wyndham was spoken of, and that appears to me the only time in which there was any conversation — at the exhibition he certainly took no notice. I am truly glad you got in time to your sister, &c. &c. • " Ever, my dear Adair, " Yours, &c. " (Signed) Elizabeth Fox." 506 REMABKS ON M. GENTZ's OBSERVATIONS leyrand or any other persons " de cette trempe." The whole of this passage, where it is not an invidious perversion of the truth, is a direct breach of it. But it is valuable in one sense ; it gives the key to the work. " Mettre M. Fox a sa place" therefore, will not be given to Professor Gentz. He seems to be sensible of this himself, and so calls upon posterity to do it. That, however, is a tribunal which his appeal may never reach. The process in the mean time is going on without him. There is no quarter of the globe in Extract referred to in Mrs. Fox's Letter. " Mr. Fox's first Interview with the First Consul, copiedfrom General FitzpatricJts Papers. " ' Sept. 2. 1802. The First Consul was very polite to all the Englishmen presented, but most especially so to Mr. Fox. The Consul addressed him in a speech evidently prepared, which he was some time in delivering, and apparently anxious not to forget any part of it. The speech was highly complimentary to him on his distinguished talents, which was all I could very exactly hear ; he then talked to him in a more familiar strain. He returned a second time and renewed the con- versation. As we were leaving the palace, General Duroc brought an invitation to Mr. Fox to dine there, a departure in compliment to him from the usual rule, which is to invite foreigners only on the court day subsequent to their presentation. He seemed desirous of marking to every person presented that he had some knowledge of them. To me he said, li Bk* 7 t 1AN 1 V 1989 LD 21A-50m-8,'61 (Cl795sl0)476B General Library University of California Berkeley U.C. BERKELEY URRARIES 1 C0Dbl0M3Mb W. zx fófftt Au THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY