F 1926 P93h A A 5 8 2 1 7 lifornia onal ity fi 3 V rur.iiiiiuPDr/k ff # u .^UIBRAJtYQ^ ^0JITV3JO v ce Z3 1 j ujim »ui WAU 1UQ1I J ' ' /\VI ■ U V ^IOS-ANGEL&a .vvVIIRPARYiO/ Ml -tUF-l'NIVt-" iK-M & I 3^ Cc "%3 waning .avaan ce .^E-UNIVERS//, 5- ^ <3 c£ y the Envoy of General Hyppolite. mentioned before; u the Secretary of State said that was a question to await the event? (1) "Await the event" — suehis the invariable response of Mr. Bayard. And if he declined to receive M. Elie, whatever pretext the latter may have employed in seeking to "brain an interview. President Cleveland's Secretary of State was simply acting in accordance with his fixed policy in Havtian affairs, which was : ••Make it up between yourselves : I. America, will wait.*' Why. then, so mnch talk about a secret treaty, the promise of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, an agreement on the part of Hyppolite, the original lost and a copy remain- ing, and. finally, about bad faith I All this is pure phantasmagoria. The entire structure so audaciously built up by a group of mercenary or misguided publicists tails to the ground the instant we take the trouble to look into the original sources and consult the official documents. Putting things in their very worst aspect, admitting the Elie mission and its pretended commission of powers, could the American G-overnment sincerely suppose General Hyppolite to be bound to any obliga- tion towards it. through its possession of a mere copy of these pretended powers, which have no authentic- character, and which General Hyppolite would have the right to repudiate, even if it were a true copy of the powers given to M. Elie, since nobody in the United States possessed the original paper, with which nobody. — 24 — in consequence, could guarantee the conformity ? Not a man in the United States — not a diplomat or a publicist, however little versed in international ques- tions and the law of nations, would venture to support such a supposition. Thus, the famous document which has given rise to so many recriminations, upon which so many attacks and insults have been based, is not genuine. Instead of being certified as true, it has been denounced as false by M. Firmin, without protest on the part of Messrs. Douglass and Grherardi. It is not even plausible — as the Auguste mission demonstrates. Finally, if it were genuine, it is insignificant, as the Elie mission would have miscarried, and since a non-certified copy, without original, is worthless in international law. From what ov»t side this question may be pressed, then, the alleged bad faith of General Hyppolite absolutely fails to appear. § 2. — The Intervention of the United States. But, say the American journals, it was on account of those promises that the United States lent their support. This idea, too, is erroneous. In order clearly to understand the situation, it will suffice to read attentively : 1, Mr. Haustedt's letter to Mr. Bayard ; 2, the memorial addressed to the Govern- ment of the United States by the central revolutionary committee of the North of Hayti ; and, 3, the letter of M. Auguste to Mr. Bayard — three official documents which will be found further on amongst the appended papers, and which are extracted from the book upon " Recent Occurrences in Hayti," (official documents communicated to Congress). 'J,b Now, the authors of these three documents, in setting forth the history of the situation, recommend to the United States to treat the partisans of Hyppolite as belligerents, and upon the same footing as the partisans of Legitime. Here is a succinct resume of the documents. The tyrannical conduct of President Salomon, which had caused a first uprising as early as 1883, having provoked a new insurrection of the departments of the North, headed by General Thelemaque, the 5th of August, 1888, with the co-operation of the departments of the South under the leadership of General Boisrond- Canal, President Salomon decided to abandon the executive power and quit the country. A first provisory government was then formed, comprising, among other members, the generals Boisrond-Canal, Thelemaque and Legitime, with the mission of convoking eighty-four constituent-electors to elect the president and revise the constitution. The elections were duly held. When it was found that the majority of the electors had declared in favor of Thelemaque, representing chiefly the three depart- ments of the North, his competitor, General Legitime, representing the departments of the South, resolved to seize the power by a coup d'Etat. On the night of September 28-29, 1888, General Thelemaque, then residing at Port-au-Prince, mistrust- ing nothing, and almost without body-guard, was attacked by the troops of Legitime. This attack, made without the slightest pretext, was so sudden that no defence could be organized. At the very outset of the affray, Thelemaque was killed by the discharge of a mitrailleuse, which poured a rain of bullets into his house. As soon as quiet was restored at Port-au-Prince, Legitime, calling together those of the constituent electors of whose partisanship he felt sure, and who 26 numbered only about thirty, had the executive power conferred upon himself, without the least color of right or authority. The first provisory government had retired ; but the indignation caused by the assassination of General Thelemaque led to a new uprising throughout the greater part of the country. Of the five departments into which Hayti is divided, (North, Northwest, Arti- bonite, West, and South,) three departments, the North, Northwest, and Artibonite, together with the arrondis- sement of Jacmel (West), took part against Legitime, resolving at any price to resist the usurpation and to do their utmost to assure the legal election of a president. Meanwhile, a provisory governmental committee was appointed, which chose as its president General Hyppolite. The resistance was rapidly organized in the depart- ments of the North. Unfortunately, the usurping government of Legitime profiting by its presence at Port-au-Prince, the capital of Hayti, where all the pu- blic functions are concentrated, and where the diploma- tic corps reside, succeeded in giving itself the appear- ance, in the eyes of some foreign ministers, of a quasi- regular government. Hence certain difficulties for the belligerents of the North, who did not have access to the representatives of the foreign powers. Furthermore, utilizing to his ends the two gunboats of Port-au-Prince, Legitime, without giving the official notification due, declared a blockade of the northern ports of Hayti. It was an irregular, not to say grotes- que, blockade, there -being no available naval forces whatever to render it effective. But, under this pretext, the two Haytian gunboats from Port-au-Prince set out in pursuit of the merchant- vessels that sought to enter the northern ports of Hayti, and seized several, notably some American ones, which they took to Port-au-Prince. In fact, it may be said that, in defiance of the common — 27 — law of nations, the Haytian gunboats coursed the seas in the interest of Legitime. It was under these circumstances that, in the month of December, 1888, Mr. Haustedt's letter was sent to Secretary Bayard, accompanying the Memorial of the revolutionary committee of the North of Hay ti ; to that time also belongs the official Auguste mission, as well as the pretended officious one of Elie. These facts established, we can better comprehend and seizs the real import of what is called the interven- tion of the United States. While recognizing the right of the Northern party as belligerents, and treating them upon the same footing as the partisans of the usurper Legitime, the American navy had of course the right to cruise in the sea of the Antilles and about the Haytian coasts to protect and assure the liberty of American commerce. This it did. Nor could it be blamed for delivering from the hands of Legitime's partisans the American vessels unjustly and illegally captured by them. But is this a reason, because under these circumstances it looked after the interests of American commerce — is this a reason why it should claim to have earnestly intervened in favor of General Hyppolite ! So much for the demands addressed to the Govern- ment of the United States by the partisans of General Hyppolite. But if, furthermore, we consult the compila- tion of official documents upon the events of Hayti, it will be seen that as early as the 29th of October preced- ing, the State Department at Washington had been informed by a long dispatch from Mr. Thompson, then United States minister to Hayti, of the political situa- tion in that republic, of the illegality of the alleged election of Legitime, of the irregularity from the inter- national standpoint of the soi-disant blockade of the Northern maritime ports, and above all of the capture of the American steamer Haytian Republic by the — 28 — Haytian war vessel Dessalines — a capture which at the time caused great excitement in the American commer- cial world, and directly brought about, dating from that very day, the 29th of October, the decision to send the United States warship Boston into Haytian waters, to compel respect for the American flag, and to protect the commercial interests menaced by the cruisers and gunboats of Legitime. It is, then, in reality, to this affair of the Haytian Republic, and to the reiterated demands of Minister Thompson and the American consul Goutier, at Cape Hayti, that the so-called intervention of the United States must be credited, which, through the unconcilia- tory course of Legitime's gunboats towards the Amer- ican ships, turned to the benefit of the Hyppolite party, and eventually enabled them to put an end to the government of the usurper. The preceding, as well as that which is to follow, on the subject of the actual affair of the Mole Saint Nico- las, abundantly demonstrates that the intervention of the United States in Haytian affairs was far from having the specially Hyppolitophile character so gratuitously lent to it by many American journals. § 3. — The True Stoey of the Mole. The real history of the steps taken by the Federal Government to obtain the cession of the port of the Mole Saint-Nicolas from the Haytian Government begins with the inauguration of the Harrison-Blaine-Tracy administration, and no earlier. Not but that, for a long time past, the United States had cast an envious eye upon this point, which is as the key to the passage between the Gulf of Mexico and the sea of the Antilles. The archives of the State and — 29 — the Navy departments at Washington are full of docu- ments on the subject. Volumes of hundreds of pages would hardly suffice if it were desired to publish all that has been written about the Mole Saint-Nicolas, the Samana Bay, the Island of St. Thomas, etc. — in short, about all the stations coveted by the American Govern- ment with a view to establishing its supremacy in the Antilles, and securing prime control of the projected Central American Canal. Already, twelve years ago, the United States had acquired extensive sites, destined for the establishment of naval stations, at two important points upon the Isthmus of Panama: one in the bay of Chiriqui, on the Atlantic coast, the other in the gulf of Dulce, on the Pacific — two points commanding, between them, the passage of the Isthmus. When the American Govern- ment secured possession, it was realized that here were not only two of the most spacious ports in the world, at the very gateways of the interoceanic canal, but also inexhaustible mines of coal, awaiting only the miner's pick. Have the United States, to secure a naval station in the Antilles so long sought for in vain, fallen back upon the need, in their pan-American relations, of a place where they can harbor their fleet and take in coal, as well in view of certain eventualities, have they then forgotten that double acquisition ? which, never- theless, gave rise to talk enough at the time. At all events, a naval station in the heart of the Antilles has been for nearly half a century the object of the maritime policy of the United States. As far back as Polk's Presidency, with what end in view has never been clearly defined, but which from that epoch aroused the susceptibilities of the Haytians, the late Admiral Porter, then a lieutenant in the Federal navy, was sent by the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. George Ban- croft, upon a special and secret mission to Hayti. He — 30 — traversed the entire island, and upon his return made a detailed and very favorable report upon the various resources of the country. Ten years later, under the Presidency of Pierce, G-eorge B. McClellan, afterwards major-general of the United States army, accompanied by other engineers, was in his turn sent by the War Department to survey the peninsula and bay of Sania- na, at the northeastern point of Hayti. Captain McClellan selected a site suitable for a coaling station ; but in the course of the negociations which ensued between the Republic of St. Domingo and the United States on the subject of the cession of this site, the State Department at Washington was made aware that the representatives of England, France aud Spain were hostile to the project, and the matter was dropped. At the same time, in the official report which he rendered to Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, upon his mission to Samana, Captain McClellan insert- ed this significant passage: " It is to be observed that the Haytian ports of the island possess more good harbors than Dominica; that of the Mole of Saint-Nicolas is, from its position, the most interesting to us, commanding the windward pas- sage even more completely than that of Samana, the Mona passage. It is so well known that I will merely mention that it is a good harbor for large vessels, and was, under the French, strongly fortified." The negociations for the cession of the bay of Samana were resumed in 18(>(> by Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, and again in 1868, when Baez, the President of the Dominican Republic, proposed to President Grant the annexation of Saint Domingo to the United States. The scandals associated with these latter negociations are still fresh in the memory of the public. If the negociations relative to Samana came to naught, the eyes of Washington remained none the less fixed upon the two little independent Republics of the An- — 31 — • tilles , and the first care of Mr. Blaine upon assuming- charge of the State Department in 1889, was to take advantage of the internal strife of the Haytians to bring up again the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. As we have said before, it is not with Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State under President Cleveland, but with Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Harrison, that the veritable story of the efforts of the American government for the cession of the Mole begins. If we are rightly informed — and we do not believe we shall be disputed upon this point at Washington — it was as early as the month of March, 1889, that is* to say, only a few days after Mr. Harrison's occupation of the White House, that Mr. Preston, the agent of Greneral Legitime, was sounded by Mr. Blaine upon the subject of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. Whether rightly or wrongly, it was affirmed that General Legitime, in order to secure the favor of Prance, had offered to Count de Sesmaisons, the French Minis- ter at Port-au-Prince, to cede the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the French Republic. We do not desire to enter here into the discussion of that affair since M. de Sesmaisons was publicly disavowed by his government and recalled. But certain it is that Mr. Blaine, seeing the Haytian Republic divided into two factions; knowing, on the one hand, that the North, or partisans of Hyppolite, could not be treated with upon the question of the Mole, after what Mr. Auguste, the special envoy of Greneral Hyppolite and the revolutionists of the North, had said and written three months previous to Mr. Bayard: " WE, to whom the Mole Saint-Nicolas belongs, could not either PROMISE it or SELL IT," and knowing, on the other hand, that the combinations of Greneral Legitime and M. de Sesmaisons had miscarried, certain it is, we repeat, that while outwardly affecting to maintain equal balance between the two Haytian parties, Mr. Blaine held a certain number of interviews with the — 32 — agent of General Legitime during the month of March, April and May, 1889; that, after these interviews, a project of treaty was elaborated ; that, in the negocia- tions which took place upon this subject, the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas was, if not completely settled, at least taken up and frequently discussed ; that, an understanding having apparently been reached between Mr. Blaine and Mr. Preston, the agent of General Legi- time, Mr. Preston, who had been momentarily in the shade, saw fit to mark his re-entrance into the good graces of the Federal Government by giving a ban- quet to his colleagues of the diplomatic corps and to the Secretary of State, having at his side Miss Blaine, whom he overwhelmed with courtesies and attentions ; that at this time Mr. Preston telegraphed and wrote to General Legitime the tidings of what he regarded as a brilliant triumph for his cause ; that Mr. Preston obtained from Mr. Blaine the accrediting of an official representative of the United States Government 1 1 i that of General Legitime ; that this minister was to be Mr. Douglass, who was to depart without delay for Port-au-Prince, with the mission of recognizing General Legitime and of endeavoring to make General Hyppo- lite listen to reason ; and that, finally, all these fine pro- jects collapsed like a house of cards in consequence of the unexpected victories of Hyppolite's troops over those of Legitime, so that when Mr. Douglass arrived at Port- au-Prince he was surprised to find General Hyppolite, to whom he was to administer a remonstrance, installed in the national executive palace, while General Legi- time, to whom he had been accredited, had taken his departure for the friendly shores of France, so hospit- able to Hayti's political refugees. Such was the manner of the introduction of the Mole Saint-Nicolas affair into Mr. Blaine's Americo-Haytian policy, and such the manner in which the Government 33 at "Washington came to assure the triumph of Hyppolite over Legitime. So much has been said, indeed, about the efficacious intervention of the United States in favor of Hyppolite, that we may be permitted to return yet again to this point, and by way of parenthesis, recite briefly the facts which brought about the flight of Legitime and the triumph of Hyppolite. After having decreed, as related above, the blockade of the Northern ports, General Legitime had directed against the North two armies, commanded by the gene- rals Anselme Prophete, Minister of War, and 0. Pi- quant, Minister of the Interior. For several months following, glowing reports of the alleged successes of these armies were published in the bi-weekly Moniteur of Port-au-Prince, such as the capture of the Grande- Saline of Mirebalais, of Saint-Michel, etc., reports which could deceive only foreigners. In fact, those who were acquainted with the country knew that not even the town of St. Marc, distant only two days' march from Port-au-Prince, had been disturbed ; that the blockade was a farce; that the bombardment of the towns of the so-called "insurgents" had not been followed up by debarkation ; and that an advance of the Southern troops upon the northeastern frontier signified absolutely nothing from a military point of view. Again, the capital fact which ought to have made the result of the war easy to foresee from the first, was that the men of the North went into the field themselves for a cause which was to them national and sacred, to avenge the murder of General Thelemaque, and their own honor so cruelly outraged on the night of Septem- ber 28th; while the Southerners, without any such — 34 — cohesion, merely championed the canse of one man. This was why, despite the periodical dispatches from Port-au-Prince, which naturally were all bulletins of victory, the situation soon became untenable for Legitime. At the verv moment when, on the faith of the Moni- teur of Port-au-Prince, which announced the annihila- tion of the Northern army as near at hand, Mr. Blaine at Washington pursued a policy of diplomatic flirtation with Mr. Preston, agent of General Legitime, at this precise moment the Northern generals Jean Jumeau and Alexis Nord energetically assumed the offensive, routed the Southern General Anselme Prophete from the posi- tion he had chosen at Trou, and finally, after having cut off his communications with his colleague Piquant, who was operating in the Northwest, brought back the demoralized troops of these two generals of Legitime prisoners to Port-au-Prince. So the soldiers of Hyppo- lite returned triumphant at the end of May, 1889, to the Haytian capital, whence they had fled as fugitives the day after the murder of their chief Thelemaque. Let us now return to the Mole. Mr. Blaine, disconcerted by the success of Hyppolite and his legal election to the Presidency of the Republic of Hayti — which election took place a few weeks later — was careful during the earlier days of General Hyppolite's administration not to revive the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. Now, would it not be supposed that if in reality there had ever been— we will not say a signed covenant between the government of General Hyppolite and that of the United States, but even some serious over- tures in regard to this affair, some written or verbal promise — would it not be supposed that precisely this time, just after the victory of Hyppolite, would be the — 35 — most propitious moment for the Cabinet at Washington to demand, to promptly exact, the fulfillment of the promise made % Are we to believe that so shrewd a statesman as Mr. Blaine would have neglected such an occasion for the realization of a project so long cher- ished if he had been in possession of any pretext what- ever that might have authorized him to claim the Mole Saint-Nicolas? There is not a person in the United States having any acquaintance with the habits of thought and the political methods of the present Secre- tary of State, to whom his passive silence at such a moment is not equivalent to a formal avowal or the most convincing proof that there has never been, either directly or indirectly, the slightest agreement or the shadow of a promise on the part of General Hyppolite in regard to the Mole Saint-Nicolas. Mr. Blaine, then, keeps his own counsel ; cordial re- lations ensue between Hayti and the United States; Frederick Douglass is welcomed with every demonstra- tion of cordial sympathy; his reception, according to the correspondence published in an American paper, is the most splendid and enthusiastic ever tendered to a diplomat in Hayti. And this no less on account of his belonging to the colored race, than because he repre- sents the great American republicanism. All seems to be turning out for the best. But Mr. Blaine, whose hopes have vanished with the fall of Legitime and the departure of Mr. Preston, agent of the former chief of the Southern faction, does not lose sight of the matter of the Mole. There was question, just at that time, of a very im- portant concession to be accorded by the Government of Hayti to the firm of Clyde & Co., of New York, in relation to a weekly line of steamers to be established between Hayti and New York. The Clyde house had rendered valuable services to the Northern party during the struggle against Legitime, and nothing which they — 36 — might ask was likely to be refused. It was settled, therefore, that they should have the monopoly of a weekly line between Hayti and New York, with the pri- vilege of establishing a corresponding steam service between the various ports of Hayti and the main line to New York; and that it should receive, moreover, from the Haytian treasury, an annual subsidy of thirty or forty thousand dollars during a period of five years. In the meantime it was learned that the Clyde house had entered into relations with the State Department at Washington ; and some time afterward the Haytians were not a little surprised to receive a new scheme of concession, in which, besides the advantages previously stipulated, it was specified that they should accord to the ( Jlyde house the right of having coaling stations, notably one at the Mole Saint-Nicolas. On this head, it was furthermore provided that the cession of the bay of the Mole Saint-Nicolas should be accorded for a long lease of ninety-nine years, under the express condition that no war- vessel should be permitted to enter there, with the exception of America 1/ ships. It was not difficult, in view of such a form of contract, to devine the portent of the scheme. Mr. Blaine, who is a wily diplomat, had evidently hoped that, thanks to the friendly relations existing between the Eyppolite government and the Clyde house, thanks to the remembrance of the services rendered by the latter to the Northern army, he might be able to recom- mence in the Antilles the tortuous policy he had pursued in 1881, apropos of a certain affair in Peruvian guano, during the short period of his passing in the State Department before the death of President Grarfield. Unfortunately for Mr. Blaine, it was readily surmised in the counsels of President Hypolite that if Messrs. Clyde and Co. had all at once awakened to the pictures- que, and above all to the stragetic value of the Mole — 37 — Saint Nicolas, this sudden appreciation was undoubtedly due to suggestions emanating from the State Depart- ment, which must have offered to take the Mole and bay as sub-lessees. Naturally, this new scheme of concession failed to receive the legislative sanction j and Mr. Blaine, who had perhaps hoped to spirit away the cession of the Mole in the same manner that he had juggled with Peruvian guano, had his trouble for his pains and his outlay of variegated maritime policy. It had become evident at Washington that the Hyp- polite government would never consent to alienate, under any pretext whatever, nor under any possible guise, the minutest part of Haytian territory. Still, Mr. Blaine, mortified at the outcome of the Clyde concession business, dissimulated his chagrin. Abandoning sinuous, underhand ways, and proceeding upon the idea that his road to power must be not only by a policy of vast unrealized projects and unprofitable international discussions, but above all by a showing of substantial results, he determined to attack the head and front of the question, and to make an official demand upon the Government of Hayti for the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with the purpose of establishing there a coaling station for the vessels of the United States navy. Presumably he did not deceive himself as to the probable outcome of such a measure ; still, it might be possible that Hayti would permit herself to be intimi- dated, and at all hazards, the demand might be risked. He risked it. It is well enough understood what is meant by the euphemism, ground for a coaling station. Not, we may be sure, to have purely and simply a coal dock, which in time of war might perchance prove as serviceable to the enemy as to the owners, but a regular bona fide naval sta- tion, where, under cover of guns, the ships might come, not merely for provisioning, but also for all necessary repairs, and in case of need to seek refuge from the — 38 — pursuit of a foe. This nieaus an arsenal, with all its dependencies, batteries, a permanent garrison, etc. Such is, indeed, the definition which, on the 18th of June last, the New York Tribune, Mr. Blaine's chosen organ, gave to the term " coaling depot." Now, when such a station is demanded of a small country, a choice between two things is left : either it must accord the privilege demanded to one sole power, thus virtually placing the small country under the protectorate of that power, or else it must accord it to all those whose interest it may be to have naval stations in those parts — in which case the small country no longer owns itself, it becomes the international public place of the great colonial and military powers, it has no longer anj r proper existence. The disguised protectorate of Hayti — that is what, under the mask of a " coaling station," was in reality asked of General Hyppolite's government. It was in the course of the year 1890 that the Hon. Mr. Douglass, United States Minister to Hayti, asked on the part of his Government for the Mole Saint-Nico- las, for the purpose of installing a " coaling station " there. A succession of interviews followed ; and the State Department at Washington, growing impatient at seeing that nothing definite came of them, decided to send Admiral Grherardi, commander of the West Indian squadron, to take part in the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole. From the first days of February, 1891, the American fleet of the Antilles, comprising the flagships Philadel- phia, the Petrel, the Kearsaye, and the Enterprise, assembled in the bay of Port-au-Prince. Such a naval demonstration greatly surprised the population of the city, aud the excitement became intense throughout — 39 — Hayti when it was learned that Admiral Gherardi had been appointed as special commissioner of the United States to conduct the negotiations tending towards the acquisition by the latter country of the Mole Saint-Ni- colas. It looked to the Haytian public as though this imposing display of naval force had no other object than to exercise a moral pressure upon the members of the Government, while at the same time intimidating the population. After the preliminary exchange of letters, to which we shall revert further on, it was agreed that the nego- tiations should be resumed upon Admiral Gherardi's communicating to the G-overnment of Hayti : 1st, the details or conditions of the tenancy desired by the United States ; 2d, the copy of the full powers con- ferred upon Admiral Grherardi by the Government at Washington. These powers were not transmitted to Port-au-Prince until the 18th of April. By that time there were two American squadron in the bay of the Haytian capital. Four days later, the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States were definitively broken off. The grand naval demonstra- tion gotten up by Messrs. Blaine and Tracy had failed to produce the desired effect. § 4. — The Haytian Government's Refusal. It has been claimed, and is still claimed, that throughout this affair General Hyppolite's government has given proof of had faith and ingratitude : enough has been said here already, we trust, to clear it of this double reproach. It has been further accused, in its refusal, of insolence and ill-will. The refusal of the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas demonstrates on the part of the Haytian Government, — 40 — neither " insolence " to the Government of the United States nor " ill-will " towards the American people. Far from that, whoever will review attentively and impartially the conduct of the Haytian Grovernment, cannot fail to recognize that if it did not cut short the affair at the outset, it was on account of the great defer- ence felt towards the Grovernment and people of the United States, whose good will the present executive ruler of Hayti has ever, in a patriotic spirit, been desirous of assuring to this country. The setback of the Clyde concession sufficiently indicated the principle which rendered it impossible that anything should come of an official proposition relative to the cession of the Mole. Such official propo- sition being made notwithstanding, through the medium of Mr. Douglass, United States Minister to Hayti, the Hyppolite Government did not deem it proper at once and imperatively to renounce the consid- eration of this question. On the contrary, numerous interviews were held, in the course of which the propos- ed arrangement was carefully examined, while at the same time the representative of the great American republic was made to understand the imposibility of Hayti's ceding or letting out the Mole Saint-Nicolas under conditions calculated to place the Haytian Grovern- ment under the latent protectorate of the United States. It was in consequence of the delays necessitated by the examination of this affair that Mr. Blaine found the time opportune to change his tactics, and to send Rear- Admiral Gherardi to Port-au-Prince with all the naval pomp and circumstance at the command of a maritime power. Let us recall here the principle laid down in the beginning, viz., that in this question of the Mole Saint- Nicolas there are opposed to one another two sovereign nations, very unequal in importance, it is true, but — 4L — mutually independent, and one of which is in possession of an object that the other wishes to acquire. Now, in what fashion does the nation which has to ask, the United States, set to work to obtain from the little Eepublic of Hayti the coveted object — the Mole Saint-Nicolas? After long consultation between the Hyppolite Government and Mr. Douglass, Bear-Ad- miral Gherardi presents himself in his turn with his flagship Philadelphia, flanked by the most formidable vessels of the American navy, including the Kearsage and the Enterprise. Will it be asserted that this demon- stration was made simply with the idea of imparting greater solemnity to the official demand of the American Government, and that Mr. Blaine, in going to such an excess of politeness, was actuated by the motives of the young suitor who presents himself in full dress to ask from punctilious parents the hand of his fiancee ? "Why, then, for nearly a year previous, had this mission been left altogether in charge of Mr. Douglass ? No ! in pro- ceeding thus, Mr. Blaine was little concerned about questions of form and politeness. He acted in this affair in the same manner as certain colonial powers of Europe when they wish, in remote countries, to impress primitive people, and impose upon them a protectorate which they could very well do without. Is documentary evidence required ? Let us take the trouble to read the first letter written by Admiral Gherardi to the Haytian Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the very beginning, we find this astonishing passage, which is perhaps unprecedented in the history of diplo- matic demands, addressed by one government to an- other : a Sib,— I have been appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti to nego- tiate for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with a view to establish- ing there a coaling station and dock for the use of the ships of the United States Navy. It is the desire and object of the President of the United States to acquire such a station in the Antilles. The special — 42 — advantages united in the Mole Saint-Nicolas indicate incontestable that it is the manifest destiny of that port to become a naval depot for the use of the ivar vessels of the United States." And further on : " The acceptance of this demand would result in making of the United States a powerful friend and ally, upon whose aid and good offices Hayti might always rely.''' Was ever demand more haughty and imperious 1 Could promise of protectorate be more plainly charac- terized ? One would fancy one's self back in the days when the Prussian monarch wanted the Sans-Souci mill. " We must have your mill. What do you want for it ? " If it be the manifest destiny of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to become a naval station for the convenience of United States war vessels, there is an excellent subject for dis- sertation at the service of the Annapolis naval cadets, a fine theme to put in Latin verse. Meanwhile, the Republic of Hayti being in possession thinks that the manifest destiny of the Mole Saint-Nicolas is to remain Haytian property — a Haytian port and a. Haytian for- tress. Is this, then, an impertinent assumption on her part? To well understand the intrinsic value of this property of the Republic of Hayti, let us hear what a United States Minister to that country had to say some few years since in his report to the Department of State on the subjeci of the Mole Saiut-Nicolas, considered as a strategic point and natural fortification : "It is so out of the way of the ordinary works of nature that words cannot do it justice ''The mole proper is more than three miles long, is almost of uniform height, and at a distance looks like some vast Roman wall. It is mainly composed of limestone. Before you get to it. as you enter from the west, Cape Saint-Nicolas on your right, is the first ohject that commands your attention. It is magnificently bold and volcanic looking, and clouds always hide the summit, so that you cannot well judge of its height. The harbor may be said to begin where the mole and the cape are at opposite points. The outer harbor is — 43 — almost too deep for anchorage in some places, but protected enough from storms for that purpose, and would hold all the fleets in the world. It is as healthy a place as Newport. The inner harbor is so remote from the end of the mole that it is perfectly landlocked by it. Aside from this, the mainland which forms this little pocket, projects far into the water, leaving a deep and narrow channel, bat wide enough for the passage of vessels. After you get in you can hardly persuade yourself that you are not in a little country lake surrounded by bold shores. Ships can anchor everywhere in this basin accord- ing to their size. The outer harbor itself, with a battery on the end of the mole and batteries on the terraces of the cape, would be per- fectly unassailable ; besides, no ship could anchor outside the mole or outside the isthmus, for the purpose of landing troops as it is a wild coast and the waters are without soundings. Aside from all this, both the mole and the isthmus are unsurmountable, the mole being about eighty feet high, and the other on the ocean side from forty to fifty feet high. The back country a few miles from the village is said to be exceedingly fertile and the whole neighborhood salubrious." So, it is this masterpiece of natural fortifications, the principal strategic point of the Island of Hayti, that the American Government asks, in a fashion so imperious and unexampled, of the Haytian Government, in order that it may establish there a new Gibraltar of the An- tilles, commanding the approach of the interoceanic canal. The people of Hayti desire to keep their Mole Saint-Nicolas. They know that this stronghold, once in the hands of an outside power, whether of the United States or of any other maritime nation, they would be no longer masters in their own home. Yet,' to this letter written in so pompous a tone by Admiral Ghe- rardi, what is the reply of M. Firmin, the Haytian Min- ister of Foreign Affairs 1 Let us see for ourselves of what insolence he has been guilty. After acknowledg- ing the receipt of the Admiral's letter, and summarizing the basis of the demand, he adds this singular so-called impertinence : . ..." I HAVE HASTENED TO SUBMIT YOUE LETTEE to the Council of Secretaries of State, presided over by his Excellency the President of Hayti. After hearing the — 44 — reading of it, the Council of Secretaries of State (without having decided either favorably or unfavor- ably upon your demand) have recommended that i ask, WITH ALL COURTESY, AND SUBJECT TO DUE DELIBERATION, THAT YOU WILL HAVE THE EXTREME KINDNESS TO COMMUNI- CATE TO THEM : '" 1st, the details or conditions of the desired lease : "' 2nd, a copy of the full powers conferred upon you by his Excellency the President of the United States, and of which the original shall be presented at the time of the signing (if such signing take place) of the terms of the lease which conslitutes the subject of your demand.* '" What could be more correct, more in accordance with diplomatic usage, than this reply? and what willful blindness, what aberration of mind, must have been required to find in these lines the slightest trace of insolence or ill-will town ids I ho American Government and the people of the United States .' But, the reader may say, it is not in this first letter of M. Firmin's, but in his final response to Admiral ( rherardi that the reprehensible attitude is taken which has brought down upon the Haytians the maledictions of the American newspapers. Very well ! let us continue our documentary examina- tion. Admiral Gherardi asked of the Government at Washington his full powers, which did not arrive at Port-au-Prince until the 18th of April, and were not communicated to the Haytian Government until the 21st of April, 1891. It was at this date that the American plenipotentiaries made known to M. Firmin the details and conditions of the proposed letting of the Mole Saint- Nicolas to the United States. Here, then, is an oppor- tunity to ascertain exactly what Mr. Blaine wants — to find, indeed, the key to his policy in the Antilles. * See complete text of letter in Appended Papers and Justificative Documents. — 45 — Tims, it is stipulated in these conditions that the leas- ing of the Mole td the United States necessarily implies the non-leasing of any other coaling station to any other nation on the globe. The passage relative to this exclu- sion is formulated as follows, in the instructions re- mitted to Messrs. Douglass and Gherardi by the Gro- vernment at Washington : " For the purpose of preserving and strengthening the relations (between the two countries) the President desires that so long as the United States may be the holder of the Mole Saint-Nicolas— in case it is leased — the Hay- tian Government shall not lease any harbor or other portion of its territory, nor otherwise dispose of it, nor grant any special privilege or right of usage to any other power, state or governmenV It is in terms analogous to these, mutatis mutandis, that the European colonial powers impose their protec- torate upon the half-civilized races of Asia and Africa. Notably in recent times, it is in terms almost identical with these that France has established her protectorate over Tunis and Annam. In the present instance, there is no further ambiguity; and Mr. Blaine, whose hand is easily to be recognized in the editing of these instructions, no longer even tries to conceal his play. What is asked of the Republic of Hayti is, that she abdicate her independence ; that she place herself unreservedly under the exclusive protec- torate of the United States ; that she become, in short, a maritime province of Uncle Sam, with the comman- dant of the Mole Saint-Nicolas as proconsul. The Government of Hayti, despite the presence of the two American fleets in the bay of Port-au-Prince, could not see its way to signing the proposed covenant, which would have meant nothing less than the emasculation of the little Black Republic of the Antilles, and its con- version into a veritable eunuch government in the service of the United States. — 46 — But observe, notwithstanding the irreproachable form, the dignity and firmness in language of M. Fir- min's response. After faithfully summarizing the divers phases of the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole, he continues : " The President of Hayti and my colleagues, assem- bled in Council of State, have ordered that I answer you as follows : "After having carefully considered the conditions- under which the United States Government desires to obtain the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas for the pur- pose of establishing there a naval station, there might perhaps be no objection to the offer did not your instruc- tions contain this clause : " For the purpose of preserving and strengthening the relations (bettveeu the tiro countries), the President desires that, so long as the United States may be the holder of the Mole Saint-Nicolas — in case it is leased — the Hay lion Government shall not lease any harbor or oilier portion of its territory, nor other/rise disjiose of it, nor grant any special privilege, or right of usage to any other power, state or government." " The acceptance of your demand with such a clause would be in the eyes of the Government of Hayti an outrage to^he national sovereignty of the Republic and a flagrant violation of the first article of our constitution; for, in renouncing the right to dispose of its territory, it would be tacitly consenting to its alienation. The Govern- ment Jin !' the former rulers against the independ- ence of their colonies. Again, the opening of the diplomatic relations of the United States with Eayti was in consequence of the re- cent abolition of slavery in North America. This grand act having been brought about only through a gigantic struggle, in which thousands of American citizens had laid down their lives for the liberty of the negroes, the blacks of Eayti, by a natural sentiment <>\' race solidarity, felt as much gratitude as tin' emanci- pated Americans toward the men who had waged the war to maintain the Union and Liberate the slav< Tims everything concurred to assure ;<> American diplomacy a preponderant influence from its very outset in the capital of Eayti. Besides, in the choice of ii- iirst representative at Port-au-Prince, the Hon. .Mr. Peck, the Governmenl at Washington was fortunate. The republican simplicity, the dignity of manners of the American ministerwon him from the firsl the confidence and esteem of all right thinking persons. Mr. Peck's untimely death Lef1 Haytian society in sincere morning. Let it lie said al once that, since the death of its firsl minister to Bayti, the American Government had never found an agent worthy to replace that upright man until it had the happy thought of sending to Port-au- Prince the Hon. Frederick Douglass, the man in all the United States best qualified to command the esteem and sympathy of the Haytians, and notwithstanding whatever may have been said or published upon this subject, the man most capable of obtaining from these latter all that conld be in honor demanded of them — 53 — compatibly with then- dignity and their interests, in favor of the United States. From the facts just recalled, the reader will com- prehend that it had become apparent to Mr. Peck's colleagues that the United States legation would occupy the most important position in Hayti. They could not resign themselves to such a state of affairs without a struggle. At this epoch, Hayti was governed by Presi- dent Geffrard, whose wife was the daughter of an Eng- lishman; consequently, the British agent had found means to captivate the President, with all his family. He had the entree of the executive palace, took part in the discussion of current affairs, offered advice, had his say upon all subjects and doubtless believed himself a factor of immense influence ; while President Geffrard, on his part, made ample use of this good will to have his government represented outside under the most fa- vorable aspect, and to counteract such interested reports as might be sent out against him by the other legations. Even during the Secession war in the United States, President Geffrard had taken a dangerous course against Spain, with the object of compelling that power to quit the eastern part of the Isle of Hayti (San Domingo), of which it had been enabled to take possession through this same American civil war. The Haytian Govern- ment, unable or not daring to act openly against Spain, had entered into relations with the Dominican leaders, to whom it promised its aid in driving the foreigner from their country. A Haytian general, Valentini Alcantara, of Dominican origin, had passed the frontier with Hay- tian soldiers disguised as Dominican patriots, and rallied the Dominicans in the name of independence. The Haytian Government continued its assistance to the Dominican patriots until the definit triumph of their cause, furnishing them with all possible means for sustaining the war — arms, munitions, provisions, and money. 54 — This Haytian intervention could not long remain con- cealed from the Spaniards. The latter, on their part, sent Admiral Rubalcara with a fleet to demand from President Geffrard an explanation of his conduct. The Spanish admiral addressed an ultimatum to the Haytian Government, holding it responsible for the uprising of the east, and demanding in reparation the salute of the Spanish flag and a heavy indemnity in coin. Geffrard engaged the good offices of his friends of the diploma- tic corps to obtain the only thing possible at the mo- ment, viz., a reduction of the indemnity, and the return by the Spanish flagship of the Haytian salute, gun for gun. The Haytians then saluted the Spanish flag and paid an indemnity to Eubalcara to save Port-au-Prince from bombardment. But they had obtained their end : the Dominicans were once more in possession of their inde- pendence. So, from this early epoch, and before they had entered into regular diplomatic relations with the United States, the Haytians applied against the Spaniards and in favor of their compatriots of San Domingo, the Monroe Doc- trine. The foregoing sufficiently indicates, we think, that despite the foreign intrigues of which Port-au-Prince was the arena, the republic of Hayti conserved none the less, for herself and for her Dominican congener, that cult of liberty and independence which during nearly a century past has cost her so many sacrifices and so much bloodshed, now for conquest, now for the preser- vation of her autonomy and her existence as a sovereign and democratic republic. Under this same Geffrard administration, some other facts transpired which are worthy of the particular attention of the American public. Geffrard, as everyone knows, was the head of the revolution which overthrew the empire of Soulouque DO and re-established the republic in Bayti. B triots, at the beginning, believed in the sincerity of his republicanism. Young and intelligenl men, of whom the imperial regime had enlisted scarcely any, rallied from all parts of the new republic, to the enthusiastic support of the public liberties which had jusl 1 n re- conquered. Newspapers sprung up, conducted with i less ability than republican ardor. The elections of 1862 sent to the Chamber of Representatives a whole galaxy of young orators, men of education and elo- quence, enthusiastic republicans; the representatives of the two towns of Jacmel in the West and ( Jape Bayti in the North particularly distinguishing themselves among this talented group. Those from the Cape soon became the head and centre of the entire deputation from the North. The deputations from all the communes of Jacmel, being equally homogeneous, formed themseb into a decisive majority, upon which the government found itself obliged to count. General Geffrard, who had gotten himself elected on the strength of his repu- blican principles, did not, it now appeared, carry thi so far as to be willing to submit to the will of the ma- jority of the people's representatives. He decided upon the dissolution of the Chamber. This was the firsl time that the Executive had ever taken such a measure in Hayti. Still, the President was exercising a right then constitutional, and no voice was raised againsl it. It is even permissible to believe that had Presidenl < leffrard acted loyally to the end, in this matter, lie might aave consolidated for long years to come the existing regime. But events demonstrated that he had dissolved the Chamber, not as a means of appealing to the country for a new and sincere election, but simply to secure for himself, at any cost, an assembly that should be docile, servile. While the citizens everywhere, and aotebly in the North, prepared to re-elect the same deputies, the Government audaciously put the national forces in — 56 — movement, so that all the polling-places were sur- rounded by soldiers who gave access only to the parti- sans of the President. The result of this liberticidal campaign in Hayti was, what it would have been in any other civilized coun- try — revolt. It broke out at Cape Hayti, through the ardent speech of M. Delorme, the popular tribune whose re-election the Government had arbitrarily interdicted. Salnave was the military chief of this insurrection. The Government re-awakened, on this occasion; the old- time local rivalries which had been the cause of civil warfare between the North and the West — first between Toussaint Louverture and Rigaud, then between Chris- tophe and Petion. By this procedure, President Geffrard contrived to array all the military forces, all the national guards, all men qualified to bear arms, in the West and the South, against the district of the Cape. This town defended the cause of liberty, and, let it be frankly said, the cause of civilization. The representatives of France and England, not- withstanding, openly took part against her. The United States remained neutral. The revolutionists of the Cape opposed to the Governmental forces of Geffrard an invincible resistance, making of Salnave, their chief, a legendary hero, whom the enthusiasm of the Haytian youth was destined soon to carry into power. Two young officers, whose names it is proper to re- call here, notably covered themselves with glory in this struggle of 1865 : Seide Thelemaque, who defended at Saint-Michel the approach to the Cape by the plain of Limonade; and Florville Hyppolite, who, at Bel- Air, repulsed almost daily, during six long months, the con- tinual assaults of the Governmental forces, hurled against him from the intrenched camp of the- Haut-du- Cap. The town was not only besieged by land, but thor- 0/ (Highly blockaded by sea. It was in danger of being constrained, sooner or later, to capitulate through fa- mine. Some means of escape from this situation had to be found, and promptly. At this crisis was achieved one of those exploits of war which suffice to glorify a cause, be it even an unjust one, and to immortalize the men who accomplish them, as well as their c6untry and their race. A negro of Cape Hayti, Captaine Alonce, commander of a coasting schooner, the Elisa, concealed in the hold of his little boat a small detachment of resolute men, and ran out in front of the Voldrogue, a screw steamer fitted out for war by the Geffrard government, and which was cruising off the Cape. Alonce allowed him- self to be overtaken by the war-vessel, and then, watch- ing a favorable moment, threw out a rope which en- tangled itself in the screw of the Voldrogue and stopped her. Attaching grappling-irons, he sprang aboard the the steamer, followed by his men. Dumfounded at this unheard-of audacity, the crew of the Voldrogue were unable to make any defence, and the Elisa returned in triumph to the Cape with her prize, which became the nucleus of a navy for the revolutionists. Ere long the Voldrogue, refitted for combat, set out from the Cape, manned by Alonce and his intrepid crew, after new laurels. A Government transport- steamer hove in sighs. The Voldrogue hastened to overhaul her. An English man-of-war, the Bull-dog, chanced at the time to be coming out from the port of Cagnette, where her commander had been in conference with President Geffrard, and proceeded to the rescue of the transport. This latter thereupon put herself under the protection of the British flag, and the commander of the Bull-dog gave Alonce to understand that he would open fire upon the Voldrogue if she captured the trans- port. The Voldrogue returned to the Cape for instruc- tions relative to this act of hostility on the part of the — 58 — Englishman. The latter followed, and came into the port at the same time. There, without warning, under pretext of a controversy upon that eternal question of the right of sanctuary of consulates, the source of so many ills for defenceless nations, he opened fire upon the place. An American man-of-war lay there at an- chor. Her commander, indignant, could do nothing against this cruel abuse of superior force. Though fretting under the restraint, his instructions were simply to protect his own countrymen, whom nobody was menacing, and who all sympathized with the defenders of the valliant little town which they inhabited. The Voldrogue, on her part, did not hesitate an instant to attack the Bull-dog : but she was soon demolished by the heavy guns of the English ship, and went down gloriously, with her colors flying. The American sail- ors promptly lowered their boats, saved as many as they could of the brave Haytiaus, and welcomed them on board their vessel. From that time — October, 1865 — dates a particular sympathy between the inhabitants of Cape Hayti and all the liberal citizens of the North and the Americans. The manifestation of this sympathy is evident in all the succeeding occurrences upon the unhappy soil of Hayli. The Bull-dog's fate was no better than that of the Voldrogue. Considering herself in the presence of ad- versaries whom she could afford to despise, this ship drew up within gunshot of the shore. Sal nave came in person to encounter her with all the forces he could spare from the defence of the city ramparts. A terrific fire was rained upon the decks and rigging of the English vessel. Her position becoming decidedly uncomfort- able, the Bull-dog began manoeuvring to get further away from the shore, when she ran upon a shoal, from which she could not pull off without assistance. Her commander, whose opinion of the prowess of " those — 59 — miserable Haytian niggers " had by this time undergone modification, saw the imminent danger of his vessel being boarded and seized by a swarm of the " woolly- heads." He therefore blew her up, and took refuge with his crew in the camp of his ally, President Gefrrard. A little later, the English minister at Port-au-Prince, Sir Spencer St. John, after a visit to Cagnette, departed to Jamaica, and came back with two large English frig- ates, the Galatea and the Lily, which entered the port of Cape Hayti, took up a position out of the reach of harm from that city destitute of artillery worthy of the name, and, without explanation, without ultimatum, without any warning whatever, opened fire upon the fortifications and demolished them one by one. From the Galatea, the English diplomat watched at a distance the retreat of the revolutionnists, and sig- nalled their movements to President Geffrard, whose troops marched in, with their guns on their arms, to take possession of the points successively abandoned. This act of trahison on the part of the Government was destined to bring about, sixteen months later, the fall of President Greffrard. English cannon had been employed to destroy liberty and humiliate the cause of civilization in the " Black Eepublic." One of Geffrard's foremost generals found occasion to characterize this action of his chief by a sarcasm as withering as it was fine. General Petion Faubert had been wounded and had gone to Port-au-Prince for care. Returning to the army the day after this pitiful conquest of the cape by Geffrard, " General," said the President to him, " you have only arrived for the dessert." " I am glad of it, Mr. President," retorted Faubert ; " for I don't like English cooking." On the side of the defeated, a young man, indignant and despairing over what he considered a national shame, and not caring to survive it, sought death in the fray. After the English shot had levelled the last — 60 — stones of the fort he commanded, after the last of his soldiers had been killed at his side, alone he charged a cannon and fired once more upon the enemies of his country. He was picked up beside his gun ; his shoulder shattered by a biscaien ball. This young man, the com- mandant of the Bel- Air Fort, was Florville Hyppolite, to-day President of Hayti — the same man who, because of his long standing friendship for the United States, has been looked upon by short-sighted diplomats as a politician without moral sense, devoid of patriotism and capable of compromising the honor or the independence of his country. But let us return to the special subject in hand; that is to say, the hostile attitude of the American press towards Hayti, an attitude which appears to us abso- lutely unjustifiable, and at every point contrary to the policy which, according to our view, the United States should adopt towards the little Republic of the Antilles. § 2. — An Impartial Account of the Outbreak of the 28th of May last. — The Attacks of the American Press. — The Policy of Hyffolite's Government. Following the excitement created in Hayti by the incident of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, everybody knew at Port-au-Prince that efforts were making to take advan- tage of the situation to foment new troubles in the Hayti an Republic. After a first attempted conspiracy against General Hyppolite, accompanied by threats and the commencement of a conflagration, the government laid hands upon the principal disturbers and decreed a state of siege in the city of Port-au-Prince. Determined to show patience and moderation in his dealings with the affair, President Hyppolite contented himself with CI — locking the conspirators in prison, and no execution was ordered by the commissions of inquiry. At all times in his public audiences on Sundays, the President had not hesitated to declare that his consciousness of the responsabilities of the existing situation would compel an exemplary severity on his part in case of actual troubles. Despite the tolerant though firm attitude of General Hyppolite, the conspirators seemed to be only awaiting a favorable opportunity to release the prisoners, sur- prise the President, and finally to provoke a revolution which could only have the most disastrous results for the capital and the entire Eepublic. It was the Thursday of May 28, the day of the Fete- Dieu, which is celebrated throughout Hayti with mili- tary and religious pomp, that the ringleaders of the plot chose for putting their design into execution. About nine o'clock in the morning, while President Hyppolite, with the authorities and the troops, were attending the ceremonies at the cathedral, bands of armed men led by a " General," Sully-Gruerrier, in con- nivance with others, ostensibly peaceable, made a descent upon the gate of the prison, killing some of the soldiers of the guard and setting at liberty all the prisoners without distinction. These latter, joining the ranks of the rebels, proceeded to attack the arsenal and the national palace, no doubt counting upon the co- operation of other adherents, with the atrocious project of assassinating the chief Executive of the State and his principal collaborators and giving up the city to an orgie of fire and blood. At the sound of the first shots, the military authori- ties, surprised but not disconcerted, exerted themselves to put down the insurrection. All the armed force was directed against the points which had been attacked. In a short time, after a lively fusillade, the rebels, pur- sued through the streets in all directions by a destruc- — 62 — tive fire, took flight and disappeared, some in the consulates or in the houses of foreign residents, others in the woods — not without leaving behind a number of killed. President Hyppolite, quitting the cathedral, hastened to mount his horse and gallop here, there, everywhere about the scenes of the disturbance, giving orders him- self in the midst of the showers of bullets. The repres- sion was as energetic as the aggression had been audacious and criminal. The struggle, happily, was not of long duration, but the consequences were grave. It was now — and we have the fact from an eye-wit- ness — that one of the leaders of the conspiracy, General X , who had prudently remained at home to await the issue of the three projected assaults — the first upon the prison, the other two upon the arsenal and the national palace — perceiving that matters were turning out badly for bis accomplices, hastened to General Hyppolite, excused his tardiness on the plea of having been obliged to make a long detour to evade the mob who were searching for him, and, finally, in the fear of being denounced and compromised, turned State's evi- dence and gave the names of a number of Haytians whom he designated as the originators of the plot to assassinate the President and the principal members of his government. In the necessary ardor of the repressive measures adopted, and following this denunciation, some fifty persons were either killed or executed. * * Among these latter was M. Ernest Rigaud, who, already under the sus- picion of the government, had been arrested by the soldiers at his door for utterances mere or less parliamentary direct ast President Hyppolite as ho passed by. This affair has had so much notoriety in France that it scarcely requires further discussion here. In any case, the matter lias been settled; the French and Haytian Governments having come to a satisfactory understanding based upon an indemnity accorded by the latter to the family of Rigaud. (See official record of the session of the French Chamber of July 4, 1891, and M. Jules Auguste's pamphlet, "Some Facts as to Recent Occurences in Ilayti.") 63 As to General Sully-Guerrier and his lieutenant, who had at first, on the 28th of May, succeeded in getting away, they were caught two days later, and shot. Other citizens, better known, such as the brothers Cauvin, whose participation in such disorders was sincerely regretted, were also arrested, but afterwards pardoned. Such is the impartial story of the occurrences which preceded, accompanied and followed the outbreak of May 28. Now, in consequence of the exaggerated and deliber- ately mendacious reports sent from Port-au-Prince by correspondents and agents interested in misleading American public opinion, the press of New York and other principal cities of the United States has begun a regular warfare against the Haytian Government and the " Black Republic." Epithets of the most odious, the most outrageous, have been fastened upon the name of President Hyppo- lite. Nero, Caligula, Tiberius, were saints, or rather, a petty and well-disposed kind of tyrants, compared to him. As for the Haytian population, all the " tawny monsters of central Africa," all the " voracious and unclean beasts " of the whole creation, are but as bleat- ing lambs beside that tribe of " savage cannibals " and " bloodthirsty slaughterers " who disgrace humanity and blacken the Pearl of the Antilles. Taking into consideration the history of the king- doms, empires and republics of the Caucasian race, for several thousand years past, this reproach seems cer- tainly a little out of place. Useless to insist upon the massacres and abomina- tions which authentic annals lay to the account of the Asiatic monarchies, the Greek, Latin and Carthaginian republics before the Christian era; useless to recall the horrors and infamies which marked the decadence of the empires of Greece and Rome — the feudalism of the Middle Ages— the incessant revolutions, sometimes even — 64 — " semi-annual," out of which blossomed the minor Ita- lian republics, and others, for centuries — the wars of religion, of politics, of mere mercenary greed, which have ensanguined and still menace all Europe, Asia and America, now nearly two thousand years since the light of Christ came into the world — why cite all these ? Is it amongst the peoples of the black race that such things are taking place, have taken place, and will perhaps take place again in the future ? To those who upbraid the latest new-comers into civilization with being as yet somewhat unfamiliar with ih.' methods of modern politics, the reply would be but too easy. At the very moment when, in the United States, Pre- sident Hyppolite was being denounced as a " sanguinary despot," a death-deserving fiend, and the Haytian people covered with vile abuse and ridicule, what was the actual condition of things in Hayti, in that republic of " savages and cutthroats," only three or four days after the outbreak of May 28? We may find out by reading this decree, published the 2nd of June last, in the Moniteur Officiel of Port-au-Prince : Department of State and the Interior. PROCLAMATION. " W/iereas, order has been restored in the capital, and the Government, relying upon the loyalty of the army and the co-operation of the majority of the citizens, is master of the situation ; and, " Whereas, it is desirable that the summary execu- tions, authorized by the legitimate defence at the mo- ment of peril, lie discontinued ; " The Secretary of State, of the Interior and of the Public Police, with the approval of his Excellency the President of Hayti, decrees as follows : "Article I. — It is strictly prohibited to all public au- thorities and all functionaries to order or to perform — 65 — any execution of culprits of the attempt of May 28 last who may be arrested. " Article II. — Any functionary or authority infring- ing upon this order will be dealt with by legal justice. " Given at the Department of State, of the Interior, and of the Public Police, this 2nd day of June, 1891, in the year 88 of the Independence. "Nemours, Pierre Louis, aine." This is how, in the " Black Republic," the governors of the so-called inferior race conduct themselves, a few years subsequent to the massacres of December, 1851, of May, 1871, and numerous other fratricidal incidents committed by the governments and the peoples of the race called superior. Let us leave all these reproaches of cruelty, of mad- ness, and of infamy, prompted by passion or interest on the one hand, by ignorance or overweening presumption on the other ; let us acknowledge that the President of Hayti, in acting as he did on the 28th of May last, took the part of a chief of State, adopting unhesitatingly the measures demanded by the public security and the su- perior right of governmental police ; let us no longer insist that the black race, after less than a single century of emancipation is inferior to the white race which has been in power so many cycles ; and let us try to arrive at a sensible solution of the vexed " Haytian question." CONCLUSION. . § 1. — The Just Policy of the United States TOWARDS ilAYTI. Commercial relations, it is scarcely necessary to say, afford in the modern law of nations the best barometer, the truest indication, of the relations of policy which should subsist between two countries. Let us see what are the commercial relations between the United States arid Hayti. According to the official statement of the condition of the Bepublic of Hayti, in the year 1891, just published by the Haytian Government, the amount of Hayti's importa- tions is made up as follows : From the United States .. gourdes* 6,454,600.9] " France 917,994.23 " Germany 1,930,713.40 " England 662,190.53 " others countries 95,580.29 Amongst the importations from the United States figures the sum of 852,177.97 gourdes in American gold. Her exportations are divided as follows : For the United States gourdes 2,289,292.15 " France " 8,437,500.00 " Germany 1 " Belgium ! Qr1Q(lQ , m " England f - " -gourdes 3,518,986.91 " other countries . J After this statement, the report adds : "A notable fact is the growing importance of the commerce between Hayti and the United States. This " Tin- value of the gourde in $1. — G8 — explains the numerous complaints made by the New York newspapers against the measures in force in Hayti with regard to the sailing vessels which transport the greater part of the provisions brought from the United States. " The American legation has made friendly overtures to the State Secretary of Foreign Relations to inquire if the government could not ameliorate the position of these sailing vessels by placing them under something like the same regime as the steamers. The principal cause of the complaints uttered is, according to the Hon. Mr. Douglass, the refusal to dispatch any sailing vessel the whole of whose importation duties are not yet paid in accordance with the definitive memoranda, while steamers are in no wise retarded by the non-pay- ment of the duties upon their cargoes. " From an investigation instituted in the offices of the Ministry of Commerce, it does not appear that any ex- ist ing law imposes obligation to delay sailing vessels until their importation duties shall have been acquitted. " This measure has perhaps no other foundation than a decree of April 30, 1869, which decree appeared neither in the Moniteur Officiel nor the Bulletin des Lois of the Republic, so that the authority from which it emanates is unknown. In any case, the date of April 30,1869, belongs to a troublous period of the Republic, during which it was impossible to promulgate a decree in con- stitutional form ; hence this decree is purely an act of circumstance. " In the opinion of the Grovernment, the obliga- tion imposed upon traders to pay their importation duties, whether in definite entirety or upon approxi- mate memoranda, is amply sufficient to protect the I i seal interests. If the National Assembly offers no objection, the Ministry of Finances and of Commerce will henceforth apply simply the law of December 10, 1861, which only requires for the expedition of sailing — G9 — vessels the payment of tonnage, and such others duties as affect the body and frame of vessels." * The importance of the commercial relations between the United States and Hayti, and the friendly dispo- sition evinced by the Haytian Government towards importation traffic by sailing-vessels, indicate suffi- ciently, and better than all possible arguments, what ought to be the policy of the United States towards the diminutive Republic of the Antilles. It ought to be, not a policy of provocation nor of menace, but a policy of cordial understanding and mutual good terms. We believe that American public opinion, better informed as to the true situation and the real intentions of Hayti, would be quite of this same mind. When it is added, furthermore, that the three depart- ments of Hayti which sustained the cause of Hyppolite against Legitime are precisely those in which American influence, in consequence of the events already recalled here, has been preponderant ever since the United States entered upon diplomatic relations with Hayti, it will readily appear how far astray the American press has gone in instituting against President Hyppolite and the Haytian people this campaign of insult and provoca- tion, of abuse and menace, which for more than three months past has wounded and disheartened so many patriotic citizens of Hayti. Not only the well-known spirit of justice and loyalty of the American people, but also the immediate interests of so many commercial houses of the United States demand an attitude quite different from that latterly adopted towards the Black Republic. ^ 2. — Solution of the Haytian Question. — Independ- ence and Neutrality of Hayti and the Repub- lic of San Domingo. In the session of the French Chamber of Deputies, at the time of the interpellation upon Haytian affairs, the * General Statement of the Condition of Hayti (year 1851), pp. 2~), 26. — 70 — 4th of July last, M. Kibot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed himself as follows upon the naval demonstra- tion of the United States relative to the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas : " It was said at the time that the French Govern- ment had designs upon Hayti, that it had been inter- meddling in the internal government of that country. It was furthermore said that Admiral de Cuverville had used violent language against the Haytians. All this was nothing but pretext and falsehood. We have never had any such intentions: we have always respected the independence of that little people, and we '-an <>nly wish that all nations might show the same respect." (( ries of" Very oil ! Very <><1 ! " In these words of the French minister is t<> be found, as we think, the germ of the solution of tie- Haytian question. ' Too long have the capitals of Hayti and San Domingo harbored the intrigues of the representatives of certain foreign powers; too long have the 1» Saint-Nico] and Samana, commanding to the wesl and to tie of v Hayti, the two main passages of the highway of the An- tilles, been the object of envy on the part of the world's great maritime and commereial nation- ; to,. Ion--, finally, has the development of the two -mall sister Republics been retarded and comprised by the intestine revolu- tions and disturbances ceaselessly stirred up by foreign merchants or by bankers eager to gorge themselves with Haytian gold, and to fish profitably in troubled waters. The approaching achievement of aninter- anic canal through Central America redoubles the activity of these machinations within and round about the Isle of Hayti. It is time to put a stop to an equivocal and uncertain condition of things which disquiets all good citizens of Hayti and San Domingo. The two little sister republics are feeble, but they are proud of their independence, and desire to preserve it. — 71 — Let the two great Republics of Europe and America, let France and the United States comprehend that the time has come to do for Hayti and San Domingo what Europe did long ago for Belgium, Switzerland and Luxem- bourg. Let them take the initiative in the move- ment WHICH SHALL END IN THE OFFICLVL AND DEFINITIVE CONSECRATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE ABSOLUTE AND ENTIPtE NEUTRALITY OF THE ISLAND OF HAYTI. There is the solution. Then, freed from all the intrigues which have cost her the better part of her riches and her blood, assured henceforth of the future, Hayti will indeed see the era of revolutions close. Her children, enabled to devote themselves in security to the development of her agriculture, her industries and her commerce, and find- ing new careers open before them, will renounce the political practices which too often have turned brothers into enemies ; and, marching proud, free and indepen- dent in the path of progress, Hayti will become morally what already she is physically — the Jewel of Nature, the " Pearl of the Antilles." APPENDED PIECES AXD JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS. APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS. PART I. Events in Hayti at the Fall of Salomon. — The Struggle between Legitime and Hyppolite. — Reasons why the North (or partisans of Hyppolite) should be treated as Belli- gerants. — The Interview between Mr. Bayard and Mr. Auguste. — American Intervention demanded by Mr. Thomp- son, United States Minister at Port-au-Prince. These Documents are Extracts from the Bine Book, entitled " Recent Occurrences in Hayti," published by the United States Government, and communicated to the Houses of Congress in 1889. APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS. No. 149. Mr. Haustedt to Mr. Bayard. (Received December 3, 1888.) Your Excellency, — In remitting to your excellency the meraoire addressed to the United States Government by the Comite Revolu- tionnaire Central du Nord d'Hai'ti, I beg to add by the present a brief statement of the actual political position of that country and of the facts as set forth in the said meruoire, with the object of obtaining thereby a prompt and clear understanding by you of the facts and consideration of the request presented. It is a matter of history that President Salomon, after having governed the Republic of Hayti for several years, commenced to abuse his power and to subdue any free election or opinion to his own personal will by force and suppression. An opposition to this resulted in the open revolution at Miragoane in 1883, which, after six months' fierce and brave resistance, was subdued by the overpower- ing forces of President Salomon. He, after the revolution being thus ended, caused himself to be re-elected President for a second term of seven years, and continued more than ever his oppressive personal government, disregarding the rights and freedom allowed to the people according to the consti- tution. The general feeling of suppression over the whole Republic resulted in the uprising of the Northern departments under the leadership of General Thelemaque on the 5th of August last, with the agreement and help of Port-au-Prince, and the Southern departments conducted by General and ex- President Boisrond-Canal. President Salomon decided to submit to the claims of the people and retired, leaving the country. Thereupon a provisional govern- ment was formed, including as members Generals Canal, Thelemaque and Legitime, and some others, with the object of ordering and conducting general elections throughout the country for choosing the necessary number of electors or constituents, whose duty it should be to elect the President of the Republic and revise the constitution. The lawful number of electors is eighty-four. While these elec- tions were held in due and peaceful order,General Thelemaque resided in Port-au-Prince in a house not far from the palace. A few of his — 7S — follower or troops from the North were stationed near by, but most at a far distance, or outside the town. When it became known that a large majority of electors chosen favored General Thelemaque for the presidency, an attack was made on his house by the troops of General Legitime, aided by the guns of the fort and a Haytian man- of war in the harbor. This was done without the slightest pretext or warning, and so sudden and surprising was it that Genera] Thele- maque had no time to organise for defense, but was killed in the com- mencement of the attack by shot of several mitrailleuses, which poured a rain of bullets into his house. When quiet was restored in Port-au-Prince, General Legitime or- dered the twenty-seven or about thirty constituents present at Port- au-Prince, and disposed in his favor, to proclaim themselves the government, and to grant him the executive power. This was with- out even the color of authority or right. The Northern and Northwestern departments, as well as Jacmel, at once protested against this usurpation of power, and declared the killing of General Thelemaque as a premeditated murder: also de- claring themselves ready to use their utmost force in order to pro- vide for a lawful election of a President, and to resist the usurped rule of General Legitime. This uprising and protest were of the whole people of the depart- ments, not a faction, and meeting in convention, the electors, who composed the majority of those chosen at Cape Haytien, created a provisional governmental committee, who have named General Flor- vil Hyppolite their President. The authority of the provisional government so formed is undis- puted and indisputable in the three departments, the North, tin- Northwest and the Artibonite. Its army is regnla/lj enrolled and officered, and even now marching on Legitime at Port-au-Prince. It governs by far the larger and more populous portion of the Republic, andgoverns it constitutionally, while the rule of Legitime in the South is only upheld by the bayonets of his mercenaries. By the accident of their being in the harbor of Port-au-Prince, Legitime was able to secure control of the gunboats, which are all that there is of the Haytian navy, and with these he has assumed to proclaim a pretended blockade against the Northern ports, which is of no force, and would be farcical were it not for the occasional in- terruption of commerce. The two gunboats sail backward and forward from Port-au-Prince, and when at time they meet a trailing vessel they seize it and take it to Port-au-Prince. There is no block- ade in the true sense of the word, and your Excellency's Government is doubtless in possession of the facts concerning this and the detri- ment caused to American commerce by the sporadic seizures which have taken place. — 79 — The state of affairs existing in Port-au-Prince alone demonstrates the facts that the provincial committee of the North is the only stable government in the Republic, and that government asks that the United States observe a neutral attitude at this juncture, and permit the exportation from their ports of arms and ammunition, as such is permited to any other lawful authority. General Legitime meanwhile uses bis power in Port-au-Prince and the Haytian men-of-war, wbich, being in the harbor, had readily fallen into bis hands, in declaring a blockade on all towns or ports hostile to him, thus damaging regular commerce, extensive Ameri- can interests, and navigation. Believe me, Mr. Secretary, your most bumble servant, T. Hattstedt. T. F. Bayard, Secretary of States. Memorial addressed to the governments of foreign powers on the state of the Republic of Hayti and of the forces, both moral and material, of which the contesting parties dispose, to serve to establish the rights of the departments of the North, the North- west, and of the Artibonite, with the arrondissement of Jacmel (forming more than three-fifths of the Republic actually at war with the usurping government of Port au Prince) to the neutrality of foreign powers. The Republic of Hayti, all of whose misfortunes arise from the internal straggles to which its citizens so often give themselves up, pushed by ambition, or roused to action by tyranny, injustice, or indignation, is on the point of being plunged into one of the most disastrous of civil wars. The patriots are alarmed. Wise men curse the blindness into with cer- tain men of Port-au-Prince have fallen, who forgetting all civic spirit, despising all rules and rights and all the political proprieties, have not shrunk before the responsibility of putting the country to tire and blood- shed to appease their thirst for domination and the material gains which they hope to obtain from an illegal power. This conduct of the usurpers of Port-au-Prince, which shames the na- tion, and which would attract the disdain of foreign powers, if the civi- lized world had not the teachings of history to enlighten its judgments, has created in the whole country a situation so perilous as to require all the energv, the wisdom, and the foresight of all the Haytian people to avert grievous consequences. These people, without scrupule, being able to profit by their position in the capital to present themselves before foreign powers as possessors of a power legally established, it becomes the duty of the three departments of the North, the Northwest, and Artibonite, united with the arrondissement of Jacmel in the province of the West, to enlighten foreign governments upon the true state of things, to the end that they shall not be misled. — 80 — HISTORICAL. Before raising the questions of international public rights which are of nature to justify the action of the three departments and of the arrondia- sementof Jacniel to the governments of foreign States, it is proper to make a rapid sketch of the events which have brought about the actual state of affairs in the Republic of Ilayti. The couutry groaned for nine years beneath the most odious, del. asing tyranny. General Salomon having seized tin- power in a moment when discord, party strife had turned the heads of even the wisest, had esta- blished a despotic go vernment of which civilized people cannol form an idea. There was no guarantee for individual liberty. The press was silenced. The inviolability of deputies and senators was a vain word- The law disappeared before the will of a tyrant all the more capricious aud versatile, in that he applied literally all there is most horrible in the maximes of Machiavelli. An unprecedented si m was practiced in the whole Republic with abominable cynicism. Noone could express the most iunocent criticism upon the administration <>t' the political aspecl id the Government without being exposed to annoying scrutiny, while the pub- lic revenues, squandered with onheard-of prodigality, left the treasury at the mercy of the poorly-paid functionaries. It was desolation and ruin. The chambers, composed in the greater part of the creatures of the tyrant, accepted all, agreed to all, instead of calling the ministers to account. The legislators lavished on them an eternal incense of praise, after having decorated General Salomon with the title of " Father of the Counti An insurrection, which cost as much gold as blood to the country, conquered in 1883. Tired of struggle and of deception, the people Bub. mitted and a new septenary was accorded to the despot in l v ~ ,; How- ever, General Salomon hardly entered on his n> \\ Presidential term, when the whole country recommenced that moral opposition which does not betray its presence by material sign, but can be scented by despots in the very air. The city of Port-au-Prince, where the chief of the State resides, rightly or wrongly, considered the centre of this hidden conspiracy. To punish this the hired assassins of Salomon, outside consl ituted authority, imagined nothing better than to tire the most populous quarters of the capital. The situation was mournfully sinister. The < rOvernment threat- ened with terrible punishments the incendiaries who should be caught in the act, but did nothing to carry out their threats. The tradesmen and citizens of Port an Prince were in despair. At this time, one of the best known citizens of this city (Cape I lay to General Boisrond Canal, ex-President of the Republic, sounded the dispo- sition of General Seide Thelemaque, imploring the aid of the Department of the North to deliver the country from the yoke of Salomon. Brave and chivalrous General Seide Thelemaque, then governor of the city of the Cape, did not hesitate between military discipline and his duty citizen. On the 5th of August last, the flag of the revolution was raised in Cape Haytien, and live days after, General Boisrond Canal, keeping the promise he had made to General Seide Thelemaque, made a mo\ ement — 81 — which obliged General Salomon, in the absence of his minister of war, who had inarched against the North with his whole military force, to to quit the national palace, to abandon a power which he had too long abused. • The government of General Salomon fallen, the population of Port-au- Prince, in a spirit of regrettable egotism and exclusion, pretended to owe nothing to the revolution of the 5th of August. General Legitime, who, obeying in a servile manner the despotic will of the ex-President, had accepted unqualified ostracism, was recalled from Kingston. Up to this time nothing positively reprehensible had occurred, for Port- au-Prince had surely the right to present aud to support a candidate for Presidency. However, the rest of the country does not think that the opinion of the capital should make the law, and the candidacy of General Seide Thelemaque was popularly supported by the larger part of the Repu- blic, in acknowledgment of the services which he had rendered to the country in overthrowing the yoke of tyranny. A constituent assembly, composed de eighty-four members, was then elected, according to the decree of August 25, 1888, with power to frame a new constitution, and to name a President of the Republic. At the end of the elections, it was clear that General Seide Thelemaque would be chosen President, because the majority of the constituent assembly was in his favor. This result enraged the partisans of General Legitime, but how could they rid themselves of him ? During the night of the 28th or 29th of last September, General Seide Thelemaque, who was unsuspiciously returning from a journey to his house guarded by a few regiments of the volunteers of Cape Haytien, was suddenly assaulted by a storm of projectiles sent from the nationa palace, from the national fort, and from the Haytian war vessels anchored in the bay of Port-au-Prince. Surprised by this sudden attack, he had hardly time to visit a guard placed near his house, and in striving to animate the spirit of his frightened soldiers, he was struck by the bullets which poured from three mitrailleuses scarce a hundred yards from him in the national palace, and died four hours later in horrible agonies. All had been arranged so that the divisions of Artibouite and the North, which were stationed in the capital waiting the orders of General Thele- maque, could not come to his aid, the chiefs having been bought over by the usurper of Port-au-Prince. It is thus that one of the most dreadful political murders ever men- tioned in history was committed upon the honorable and deeply regretted General Seide Thelemaque, who, brave among the bravest, has fallen a victim to his confidence in General Legitime and his followers. It were well to throw a veil over the horrors of such an act, but human conscience and justice protest against silence, demanding universal execration against the criminals who, in this nineteenth century, have planned and executed such a deed. When this terrible news had reached all the different parts of the Re- public, a feeling of rage and indignation took possession of all ranks, and ran like wild-fire through the masses. It was not only effervescent pas- sion but a sense of justice outraged by the most shameful deed. It was in- — 82 — iured moral justice with redressed itself with the severity of revenged pow- er Protestations were made on all sides. The three Department* of the North, the Northwest, and Artihonite would not recognize as an authority a Government which had accepted the assassination of oue oi its members as an accomplished fact, while sheltering the authors and accomplices with an amnesty both hateful and immoral. The Government, injured by the withdrawal of many of its members, feeling the false position in which it was placed bv the simultaneous and united uprising oi three departments out of five which compose the Republic, was forced to with- draw and lay aside its power. This withdrawal had replaced the different parts of the Haytian terri- tory in a state of revolution and anarchy. A new government could only he formed by universal adhesion of the citizens, or by a majoi ity ; it was especially the business of the constitutional assembly. But instead of waiting for the majority, which hesitated to assemble in Port-au-Prince after the odious act of September 28, thirty-three constituents in the capital, instead of the eighty-four elected, usurped the title of constituent assembly, claiming the right to give the executive power to Genera] L6gitime, without even troubling themselves as to the nature or limits of "this power. Such a delegation of power is wholly without consti- tutional authority. The minority of the constituents present in Port au- Prince had no right to act in the name of the Republic in the absence of the majority, whose right they have s,, audaciously ignored. The act which the thirty-three constituents have drawn up on the 16th instant, under the name of decree, can he considered only as usurpation ,.| consti- tutional power. Thus the three Departments oft! e North, Northwest, and Artibouite, jointly with the arrondissemenl ofJacmel, in the province of the West, protest, swearing to defend, even by arms, their rights so un- justly trampled under foot by the usurpers of Tort au Prince. I. — The right of resistance to usurpai A constituted nation is the reunion of all citizens with the tacit engfl I ment to live together, to defend themselves, ami to share the Bame destiny while maintaining the existence of the country at any cost or saci Outside of the historic right which accords to a dynasty the exclusive privilege of governing the nation, the chief of the State must be, above all, elected by the people whose will is legally expressed by the vot< of the majority. The principle of his power arises from the confidence of his co-citizens, who make of him the first among his equals, eh-\ ating him to a dignity all the more eminent since he represents the country before foreign states. "All government," says Laboulaye, " is only a political establishment, a tacit contract among people who are equal, an establishment mad. to bring happiness to the community and not for the benefit of a single man or a few privileged ones.'' These are truths whose mora! strength is con- siderable ; any departure therefrom would overthrow eternal justice and social equality Avhich form the fundamental basis of all government. So that any citizen or any minority who should, through open force or by stratagem, take possession of the supreme power without the consent. — 83 — legally expressed, of the majority, commits usurpation. The state of oppression, which succeeds to the brutal act of usurpation, is necessarily precarious, for violence or bad faith can establish nothing respectable. The usurper, while violating the right of the nation whose sovereignty he confiscates, places himself voluntarily and manifestly in a state of war with all the citizens whose assistance has not been given to facilitate his criminal enterprise. The aggressive comes from him, and the people who resist usurpation does nothing else than place itself in a state of legitimate defense. This resistance is all the more authorized that the usurper by the inherent vice of his power is compelled to employ force that he may be obeyed and must necessarily place in peril the liberty, honor and the life of all those who have not accepted his pretensions. In vain were it to seek pretext to justify the deed of usurpation. Cruel as are the difficulties of the situation, it is not permitted to a minority of the people to arrogate to themselves the right to override the majority of the nation under the pretext that the public safety and the national defence demand such action, as was said by the minority in giving the executive power to General Legitime. " Without doubt," says Benjamin Constant, "there are, for political societies, times of danger which human prudence can hardly foresee. But it is not by violence, by suppressing justice, that these dangers are avoided. It is, on the contrary, by adhering more scrupulously than ever to established laws, to tutelary forms and protective guarantees.'' It is thus without any excuse that General Legitime and his accomplices have overriden the rights of their most respectable co-citizens. But far from retracing their steps before the protestations of the three departments, they threaten them and treat them as rebels. " The natural," says Puffen- dorf, "orders, without contradiction, that the aggressor should offer satis- faction to the offended person, who, on his part, is forced to accord to the aggressor the pardon which he asks, and to smother all resentment against him when he shows a true repentance of his fault. If then the aggressor, after having refused just satisfaction which has been asked, defends him- self against the injured party who attacks him, he heaps offense upon offense." It may be that in resisting the usurpation the three departments of Ar- tibonite, Northwest, and North, as well as the important district of Jacmel, see themselves at the same time forced to maintain a civil war with all the horrors which it entails ; but between a peace at once disgraceful and destructive of all liberty and public order and a legitimate war, they cannot hesitate. " Miseram pacevi vel hello bene mutari," says Tacitus, and all the writers on the rights of the people, from Vattel to Calvo, have recognized the necessity in which a people at times will find themselves of undertaking civil war in order to avoid evils which an usurping tyranny menaces. II. — Of the equality of rights between the protestors of the three departments and the usurpers of Port-au-Prince. With a daring which would be simply ridiculous if it were not of a nature to drag such calamities into the heart of the Haytian country, the usurpers — 84 — of Port-au-Prince, profiting by their position in the capital, which is the centre of all the public service and the residence of the diplomatic corps, affect to treat as rebels the protesting departments and the arrondissement of Jacmel. To hear them would lead one to believe that the supreme au- thority belonged to them, while those who protest are in a state of rebellion. ' But' the slightest knowledge of the rights of the people will suffice to distinguish the case of rebellion from the actual position of the three departments of the North, Northwest, and Artibonite. "Those are called rebels," says Vattel, "who take arms unjustly against the leader of the society, either on the pretense of stripping him of supreme authority or because they propose to resist his orders iu some particular affair or to impose conditions upon him. But when a party is formed 111 the state which will no more obey the sovereign, and finds itself sufficiently strong to oppose him, or in a Kepublic, when a nation divides itself into two opposing factions and both come to arms [such is our case], this is a civil war." There is to-day a civil war in Hayti, but there is no distinctive quality between the contesting parties which can make one to be considered as enjoying legal and superior prerogatives over the other. As has been shown at length in the historical part of this memorial the Government of General Salomon has been overthrown. The provisional government, which is, by its nature represented only a transitory order of things, retired before the manifestation of the national will. The po delegated to General Legitime, having no constitutional basis, is a precarious and illegal power, which has no superior authority to the revolutionary powers. There is no reason why more attention should be paid to the pretended Government of Port-au-Prince than to its adversaries. But. then, how is it possible to tell the respective force of the contesting parties and the appar- ent right which each could have to represent the national will ? In a territorial point of view no effort is needed to demonstrate that the force is on the side of the three departments of the North, since the pi sions of the usurpers of Port-au-Prince do not extend further than the departments of the South and West, out of which must be taken the important district of Jacmel. No reliable census having been taken in the country, the number of the population cannot be definitely ascertained, so that no exact count can be made of the number of voices which are supposed to have consented to the usurpation of General Legitime in opposition to the protest in.,' departments; nevertheless a statistical representation fully as important can show to the foreign Governments the incontestable superiority of the protesting party. It is that of commerce, importation, and exportation, which denotes not only the relative importance of the contesting party in an economical point of view, but also their productive activity and the commercial and interna- tional relations, which are its necessary consequences. Let us take at haphazard a synoptical table of imports and exports by the Kepublic of Hayti during the second quarter of the budget I 886-'87, which is inserted in the Moniteur (official journal) of the 19th of November, On the sum total of 1,464,515.26 francs, representing the value of imported — S5 — goods, the commercial cities of the protesting counties figure for 684,116.47 francs. To judge of the importance of the last figure it must be known that the capital imports alone for the value of 539,640 francs ; all the rest of the parts subjected at this moment to the authority of General Legitime is represented only by 320,760 francs— that is to say, for less than half of the imported merchandise of the protesting party. This large figure for Port-au-Prince explains itself, inasmuch as a large quantity of the merchandise imported into Port-au-Prince is destined to be shipped from thence to the cities of Gona'ives, St. Marc, and Port-de-Paix, via cabotage. This assertion can be verified by examining the figures. On the sum total of 3,374,514.55 francs, representing the value of the exported products, the commercial cities which are found in the three protesting departments and the district of Jacmel, that is to say, Cape Hay- tien, Jacmel, Gona'ives, St. Marc and Port-de-Paix figure for 2,039,990.32 francs, nearly two-thirds of the exportation of all the Republic. It must be remarked that these exported products are in true proportion to the territorial extent r.ccupied by the protestators. The exports are of distinctive character to express the laborious and productive activity, the true economical force, of the cities and countries from which come the prod- ucts ; besides which, the fact that Port-au-Prince figures for such a large importation, with an exportation relatively small, has a great significance. It is that the capital, all things being equal, consumes more than it pro- duces. This indication is perhaps the explanation of the real state of the countiv, where provinces are seen to resist against the spirit of centralization which dominates in such a high degree amongst the agitators of Port-au-Prince. The Government of foreign powers, represented by learned men of an experience and an impartiality which is equal to the eminent positions which they occupy, will not hesitate to admit that the true superiority as well as the majority belongs to the protesting party. This fact, which is incontestable in a material point of view, since it is abundantly established by the extent of the territory and the commercial importance of the three departments, is also legally and politically proved by the majority of the elected constituents, which are on the side of the protestators, leaving the usurpers of Port-au-Prince with a minority whose audacity will never give them right. At all events, if the foreign Governments, acting with a well-understood and proper reserve, cannot decide the question of superiority of facts or rights between the usurpers of Port-au-Prince and the protestators of the three departments, they will keep a perfect equality between the contesting parties, neither of which should be considered as more authorized to re- present the country in the eyes of foreigners than the other. III. On the blockade pretended to be established by the usurpers of Port-au- Prince before the different ports or territories occupied by the protestators of the three departments. It is true that, in international law, an acting government has the right to establish a blockade as a coercive measure against its adversaries. While — 86 — abstaining from recognizing the usurpers of Port-au-Prince who are led by General Legitime as depositaries of the lawful authority of the Republic of Hayti, the Governments of foreign powers could not prevent them from establishing a blockade if they possessed the material means. The protestators do not dispute this point, but it is on their side generally admitted that when a marine blockade exists, and in order to have it respected by neutral powers, it must fulfill certain conditions, outside of which it loses its obligatory character. The first of these conditions is the notification of the blockade to the authority against whom the blockade is made and to neutral Governments whose subjects must not be surprised by the exercise of a constraint espe- cially harmful to their greatest interests. The usurpers of Port-au-Prince, profiting by the possession of two Hay- tian war vessels which were in the bay of the capital and which remain in their possession, have simply sent these two cruisers, one time before Gona'ives, another before St. Marc or Cape Haytien, the Mole St. -Nicholas, or Port de Pais. These vessels cruise at a large distance from the coast, turn away all merchant vessels which make sail toward one of these ports, and constrain them to pass elsewhere. This special notification, which is not made according to the rules, since no official notice was given in advance, cannot be sufficient. This kind of blockade, without diplomatic notification, is termed by publicists and English statesmen, a "blockade of fact,'' but it is admitted only in 01 where it is established " by the commanders of vessels before places so far away from their country that it would be impossible to give a diplomatic notification." (P. Fauchille, in the Marine Blockade.) However, the com manders of the Haytian cruisers are not only in close proximity to Port-au- Prince, but communicate daily with that city, which is the seat of the pretended government of the usurper-, [s not such a fact, contrary to all the rules of the rights of the people, of a nature to cause the romousi ranoes of a foreign Government, whose duty it is to maintain the liberty of the seas ? But this is not all : Another indispensable condition to give to a blockade an obligatory character toward the neutral powers is effective force. This point of international right has been definitively decided by the < of Paris in its celebrated declaration of April 16, 1856. Without entering into the controversies raised by many publicists and statesmen in regard to the fourth paragraph of this declaration, it is indis- putably properly interpreted in this sense, that " a legitimate blockade,'' as Mr. Mason, of the United States, says, " demands the actual presence of a sufficient force at the entrance of the port, and stationed sufficiently near to prevent all communication." (Diplomatic Archs, 1861, pp. 1 10, 441.) The blockade by cruisers such as the two Haytian war vessels, coming before the different ports of the protesting cities without formal notice seek to establish, cannot, then, be considered an effective blockade. "In fact," says P. Fauchille, " to be effective, access to the enemy who holds the shore should be really interdicted ; should be rendered impossible by the blockading forces or by a cruising blockade. Blockading the coast is not forbidden, b\it the stopping of vessels at long distances from the block- aded port by cruisers." — 87 — Is not the existence of such a blockade of a nature to bring more harm to the interests of the neutral powers than to those of the protestators ? Even if the right of war admits that a blockade should be established without stopping to consider the harm which is done to a third party, must the liberty of commerce, on which depends the development and the prosperity of nations, suffer such an attack because of this illegal blockade, which can neither weaken the resistance of protestators nor their organized forces ? This is absolutely contrary to the principles of the rights of the people. It is for the foreign governments whose civilizing mission it is to impose everywhere respect for justice, to concur in putting an end to these pro- ceedings, the continuance of which will prove the ruin of the commerce of Hayti. It is the duty of the protestators to struggle to obtain redress. IV. — The protestators should be admitted as belligerents in their relations ivith foreign governments. From all that has been said it is easily understood that since the despotic government of General Salomon has been overthrown by the revolution, and the pro visionary government has retired ; each large territorial and admi- nistrative division of the Republic of Hayti has resumed its independent existence, awaiting the time when the constituents which represent actually all the different factions of the Eepublic, should come together legally, that is to say, with the majority constitutionally necessary to frame a constitution and name the chief of State. This is a result compelled by the events which, having destroyed all rights heretofore created by the common will of the nation, leaves each part of the country to its natural right. The discords which exist between the protestators of the three districts united with the Province of Jacniel and the usurpers of Port-au- Prince, show then a clearly defined political situation. It is a civil war where each party has equally just claim to the rights of belligerents. " Civil wars, properly so called,'' writes Calvo, "give to each party en- gaged the character and rights of belligerents, not only as regards their enemy, but also as regards a third country which desires to remain neutral.' " The idea of belligerence," says Bluntschli, "and as a natural conse- quence the application of the law of nations as opposed to penal law, can be extended to an integral part of a state actually organized as a military force, which observes the laws of war in conducting hostilities, and in o-ood faith strives to defend the welfare of the State." The opinion of these two authors, whose authority is so great, is shared by the most eminent publicists. The principles which they proclaim have been recognized and applied by the principal powers of the civilized world, among other instances, during the war of Sunderbund, in Switzerland, in 1849, and during the civil war of the United States of America, 1861-1865. The protestants of the three departments of the North are, then, author- ized by all the usages of international law to claim from the governments of foreign countries recognition as belligerents, with the privilege of enjoying all the benefits which a perfect neutrality will afford. In making this claim the protestants expect, above all, from the impartiality of foreign governments that they accord no assistance nor advantage to the usurpers — 88 — of Port-au-Prince which may be refused to themselves for any reason. The duties of neutrality would be violated if the usurpers of Port-au-Prince could freely furnish themselves with arms, munitions of war, and war ves- sels, which could only be obtained in foreign ports, while the same privilege should be interdicted to the protestants of the three departments ; but nothing authorizes the supposition that foreign governments will incline to protect usurpers of the capital to the prejudice of their adversaries. "Neutrals," says Bluntschli, " may show sympathies for one of the bel- ligerents. Neutrality is not synonymous with indifference.'' There is an indisputable law, whose origin is in the moral nature of man- kind, which forbids him to be indifferent between right and wrong. In all armed strife there always exists between the belligerents one party whose cause is more just than that of the other, and neutral parties should naturally sympathize with the cause whose justice they recognize. In this point of view the protestants do not doubt that the opinion of foreign governments will be in their favor. The cause which they uphold is that of political morality, atrociously violated by the assassination of General Seide Thelemaque ; that of consti- tutional right, boldly disregarded by a minority of constituents arrogating to themselves the right to assign the executive power to a citizen whose candidature is rejected by the majority of the members who rightfully form the constituent assembly. It is, in fact, the cause of the liberty of the neople, whereof the usurpation of the 16th of October last is an insolent denial. All leads to the hope that foreign governments, far from favoriug the usurpers of Port-au-Prince, will hold an even balance between the bellig- erents, if they do not feel the necessity — the moral stimulant — to make the right triumphant by aiding the cause — legal, just and holy — which is maintained as well with moderation as resolution by the protests of the three departments. " Foreign nations which are bound by no treaty can, without doubt," writes Wattel, " rest their judgment for their own conduct on the merits of the cause, and may assist the party who will appear to them to have right on its side, in case it implores or accepts their assistance. They may do this, I say, as it is free to them to espouse the quarrel of a nation at war against another, if they find it just. " The protestants would be perfectly authorized to claim of foreign govern- ments their intervention on behalf of eternal right and justice ; but without precipitate recourse to this step, which might perhaps be critised as anti- patriotic, they repose confidently in the wisdom and reason of these govern- ments, that they may obtain a hearing of the just claims which are the subject of the present memorial. CONCLUSION. In summing up the facts contained in the historical statement and the discussion of the principles of international right which proceed from therm the three departments of the North, Northwest, and Artibonite, jointly with — 89 — the arrondissenient of Jacmel, of the department of the west, believe to have demonstrated in a clear manner to any impartial body : 1. That the state in which the Republic of Hayti finds itself is the con- sequence of the usurpation of power by General Legitime, assisted by a minority of thirty-one constituents out of eighty-four elected. 2. That the right to resist this usurpation cannot be contested. 3. That in every point of view, territorial, economical, and political, they have a superior right to represent the national will, having the ma- jority on their side. 4. That they must, in fact, be admitted as belligerents in their relations with neutral powers, who are called on to render towards them all the duties of an ecpial neutrality. Done at Cape Haytien, October 20, 1888, in the eighty-fifth year of Independence. Hyppolite, The President of the Committee St. M. Dupuy. J. Le Cokps Fille. Anderson Dtjvtvter. F. Guillematte. A. Grimard. A. Menard. A. Firmin. D. Gentil. Stewart. M. C. Daniel. No. 189. Memorandum of Conversation. Department of State, Washington, December 21, 1888. Dr. Auguste Nemours called to see the Secretary of State this mornirjg. He said that he came as the' representative of the party of the North of Hayti, now under the leadership of General Hyppolite. He narrated the course of events in Hayti since the revolutionary move- ments of last spring and summer, which culminated in the expulsion of President Salomon, and asserted that Hyppolite bad larger follow- ing in the country than Legitime and justly represented the will of the Haytian people and the objects of the revolution which overthrew Salomon. He did not, however, ask for the recognition of Hyppolite as de jure president. His tenure did not profess to be more than provisional, awaiting a fair chance for the real wishes of the Haytian people to be made known by constitutional methods, which, under Legitime's arbitrary and usurpatory control was, he alleged, to be at present impossible. All that Hyppolite desired was impartial treatment. — 90 — The Secretary of State said in reply that the titular government of Hayti under President Salomon, having been overthrown by revolu- tion and followed by a division of the revolutionists themselves into two hostile factions, each exercising local control in a part of the Haytian territory, the Government of the United States could not be called upon hastily to conclude or even to give an opinion as to tbe dejure character of the claim of either faction to represent the will of the people or the Government of Hayti. The state of things in Hayti, unfortunately, was not novel, and experience had shown that the only thing to do was to await the progress of events, and defer any formal recognition until it could be given to an established government, evidently representing the will of the Haytian people. That General Legitime had sent through Mr. Preston a letter to the President of the United States, wherein he announced his election as "chief of the executive power," but that this letter had net been laid before the President because it was deemed premature to do so. The Secretary hoped this state of things would soon end and asked whether no attempt had been or could be made amicably to compose the strife. Dr. Auguste said that Hyppolite's party had offered to abide by the result of a free election of electoral delegates (constituents), the delegates to meet in any city of Hayti except Port-au-Prince, and choose a President according to prescribed constitutional methods. General Legitime had refused this and precipitated the state of war now existing in Hayti. The Secretary said : Then your party really desires the free choice of a President by all the people, and not the triumph of Hyppolite as against Legitime, or of he North against the South. Dr. Auguste said that they did. In the course of the conversation, Dr. Auguste intimated that his party, if successful, could offer to negotiate special advantages for the commerce of the United States with Hayti. The Secretary said that was a question to await the event, and that, for his part, he be- lieved that the people of Hayti, irrespective of party and any regular government representing the popular will, could not but be alive to the importance of fostering full and intimate commerce with the United States. Dr. August then withdrew. — 91 — No. 190. (Translation.) Mr. Auguste to Mr. Bayard. New York, December 21, 18S8. I have the honor to give you in this letter the explanations you were pleased to ask of ine this morning touching Haytian affairs. Two parties are at this time confronting each other and in conflict. One, having at its head General Legitime, claims the supreme power, which it has seized, and alleges that a regular Government has been formed at Port-au-Prince, on the 16th of October, by several depu- ties, who have given to General Legitime the title of Chief of the Executive Power. The other, which I have the honor to represent alleges that this assemblage of a few deputies in the capital of the Republic does not constitute a sovereign national assembly ; that a minority of twenty-seven or thirty- three deputies present when this decision was reached has neither the right nor the authority to act ; that the proceeding is contrary to the spirit aud the letter of the laws and the several constitutions of Hayti ; that it constitutes an invasion of the fundamental principle of the national sovereignty ; and we and the constituent delegates of the three de- partments of the North have protested against this usurpation of power and called upon the citizens of the other parts of the country to join us in restoriug to the people their rights which are so auda- ciously violated. We ourselves are not striving for power, but to pluck it from the hands of those who so unjustly hold possession of it ; we are not striving, as General Legitime and his Mends are, to impose a chief of the state upon the Republic of Hayti, but to permit the constituent delegates elected by the people to choose, without fear of being mo- lested in the performance of their mission, the President whom it is their duty to elect. We have accepted that the election be held in any city of the Re- public of Hayti, provided it be not in the city of Port-au-Prince. We accept also that the city chosen be one of those submitted to the power of General Legitime. The party in power at Port-au-Prince refuses to accept these conditions, and prefers to plunge the country into a long and ruinous civil war. Upon General Legitime, therefore, rests the i esponsability of present events, the blood which is shed, and all the evils which threaten us. Thirty-nine delegates have met at Gonaives, a city of the North, out of the eighty-one which had been elected to form the constituent assembly. Four of their colleagues were on their way to join them when they were seized on board of the American steamer Haytian — 92 — Republic. These four delegates would have given us a majority of seven votes, which would have annulled all the decisions reached by the pretended assembly of Port-au-Prince ; it was necessary, there- fore, to seize them, and this, Mr. Secretary of State, is the sole and true motive of capture of the Haytian Republic and the reason why men without authority and as devoid of right as of patriotism have not shrunk from bringing upon their couutry international complica- tions of which no one can foresee the gravity. General Legitime having caused himself to be named Chief of the Executive Power, we can not be called " revolutionists," so that we declare, in our soul and conscience, before God and men, that it is he who is in insurrection against the law and against the clearly ex- pressed will of the people. We have, therefore, formed a provisional government, of which General Hyppolite is the President. What is it that makes a government and gives it the right to proclaim itself as such except the maintenance of order at the same time that the amplest guaranties are given to individual liberty'/ Your consuls have doubtless informed you, Mr. Secretary of State, upon this point, and told you that never, at any time, has better order prevailed in the Republic of Hayti, or more respect been professed for the liberty of every man. The present political situation differs from all that have preceded it in that it is the whole people who protest the monstrous illegality committed at Port-au-Prince. It is not a faction or a party that is in revolt against another faction or another party — men of all conditions and all professions, and of every station, submit to the most onerous and painful sacrifices in order to prevent a faction which has fraud- ulently gained possession of power from reaping an inheritance which belongs not to thera, ami for the purpose of constraining every one to bow before the will of the people. We regret to state that General Legitime finds his staunchest supporter in the Count de Sesmaisons, the French minister. The limits of discretion within which I must keep constrain me to believe that he has exceeded the instructions of his Government, for, in the course of an interpellation which took place yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies touching the affairs of Hayti, the minister of foreign affairs of France declared that he had riot recognized the government of General Legitime, and that he proposed to observe a strict neutrality between the two parties to the contest, and show favor to neither of them. You were pleased to make me a similar declaration after my inter- view with the honorable Assistant Secretary, and I must thank you for it as a proof of the equity wherewith you are resolved to regard our dissensions. If General Legitime has asked of the Government of the United — 93 — States his recognition as chief of the executive power of the Republic of Hayti, which recognition your Department has refused to accord to him, I only come to ask of you, in the name of my Government, our recognition as belligerents ; that is to say, that you do not treat General Legitime more favorably than you treat President Hyppolite — that you do not forbid the latter to do that which you permit the former to undertake — and that you do not authorize against us any measure that might become an advantage for our adversaries. You have had the goodness to answer me, with a benevolence to which you will permit me to render homage, that such is the decision which you have reached and which has received the sanction of his Excel- lency the President of the Republic, and that I could carry with me from "Washington the assurance that the most absolute impartiality between the two parties will continue to be the rule of conduct of your Department. These declarations, Mr. Secretary of State, are of a nature to sa- tisfy my Government, which will be gratified to learn that you have not given the sanction of your recognition to the coup (VEtat of Port- au-Prince. After having laid before you our political situation and defined the responsibility of the present crisis, permit me, Mr. Secretary of State, to dwell upon a point which I think worthy of your attention. I would speak of the commercial relations of Hayti with the United States. It is said, and repeated with too much earnestness not to have in this regard some fouudation of truth, that General Legitime has promised to the Count de Sesmaisons the Mole St. Nicholas, which has been so much coveted. We, to whom the Mole St. Nicholas belongs, could not either pro- mise it or sell it, but we can propose to a friendly Government stipu- lations of another character, which would give to it more decided advantages. A treaty of commerce and friendship already unites us to the American Republic. We would be happy to draw the ties closer and render more intimate the relations of the two countries. We buy from the United States a large number of manufactures for which the commerce of England is a formidable competitor. To secure to the American commerce the markets of Hayti and deprive the English of it a diminution of the customs duties upon these goods will suffice, and immediately the importation of American manu- factured products will increase to considerable proportions. My Government, in return for the advantages which would be given to it, would be prepared to treat with you on this basis. It is con- vinced that good will result therefrom for the two countries, and that the sympathy which the Government of the United States has ever shown towards us, and of which you have been pleased to give me — 94 — the assurance in the name of his Excellency, President Cleveland, can not but increase at the same time that the relations of every nature between the two countries are developed. I have the honor to send you the letter of the provisional president of the Republic, accrediting me to you in the capacity of envoy extraordinary. Being about to depart for Europe, and the interests at issue re- quiring the presence of a special agent to represent my Government, I have the honor to inform you that I have appointed as general agent of ray Government Mr. Haustedt, to whom I have given powers to this effect. Be pleased to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my profound respect. Dr. Nemours Auguste. The Secretary of State. No. G9. Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bayard. Legation of the United States, Port-au-Prince, Hayti, October 29, 1888. (Received Nov. 7.) Sin,— Late Sunday afternoon, the 21st instant, I received a note from Mr. J. D. Metzger, agentofthe Diamond Mail Line of steamers, informing me that the steamer Hat/tutu Republic had been seized by the Haytian war vessel Dessalines, and brought into this harbor, and that my presence at the port office was absolutely necessary. I im- mediately went down to the city and observed at the port office a great quantity of men and considerable confusion. In the Office I found Mr. Smith, first officer of the Haytian Republic, whom they seemed to regard as a prisoner. After questioning him I thought it advisable to go on board, but was informed by the captain of the port lhat no one could visit the ship without a permit from the acting min- ister of foreign affairs. It was then growing dark ; and noticing the excitement of the common people around there, I determined to call upon General Legitime and request him to allow the first officer to return on board as a measure for his personal safety. I found Gen- eral Legitime with his counselors, made my request, which was granted, and then I refused to have anything whatever to say about the affair that evening. The next morning, Monday, I received a dispatch from Mr. Piquant, acting minister of foreign affairs, copy inclosed herein. In reply to such I sent the enclosed reply. — 95 — General Anselme Prophete, in charge of the portolio of war and navy, called upon me the same morning and appeared to be anxious to arrange the matter; " any friendly arrangement," said he. I could give him no satisfaction, not yet having visited the ship. About noon went on board, examined the ship's papers, and the following is Captain Compton's narrative of the affair, as taken directly from his statement : " Left Jacmel October 19 and arrived at St. Marc, on the 20th, at 5.30 p. m. ; when entering the harbor we sighted a steamer to the northwest, 7 miles distance, but were unable to make her out ; took pilot on board and came to anchor ; pilot informed us that the steamer outside was a Haytian gunboat trying to blockade the harbor. " Saw the American consul, and he informed me that he had re- ceived letters from the American minister at Port-au-Prince, in which there was no mention of any blockade at St. Marc. " Left St. Marc at daylight, October 21, with the American flag flying, and when out clear of the buoy we were stopped by the gunboat, and the commander ordered me on board. I refused to leave my ship and sent my first officer on board with my passenger list and declaration of the steamer's destination. " The commander kept my first officer a prisoner on board and sent a boat-load of armed men to take charge. I let two men on board but refused to allow the others to board. The commander ordered me to proceed to Port-au-Prince, which we did under protest. "We arrived at Port-au-Prince at 2.30 p. m. and came to anchor in the outer harbor ; at 6.30 the commander of the port sent a verbal message to us to take my ship to the inside harbor, which I refused to do, not having seen the American minister. " The commander of the gunboat came on board and wished me to go on shore, but I refused to go, unless by force, until I had seen the American minister ; he then took my first officer on shore and returned at 9 p. in. with my first officer and a detachment of soldiers, who have taken charge of my ship. '< I now protest and deny the right of the Haytian gunboat to detain my ship from proceeding on her voyage, as I knew nothing of any blockade at Haytian ports, and I consider it an insult to the American flag, and will so represent it to the United States through the American minister." The notification of the blockade was made the 16th instant, and from that time I had no means of communication with our agent in the North. There being ten passengers on board and four of them constituents going to join the others in the North, the authorities here wished to have them brought to the shore, but I protested against such action, — 96 — declaring that their persons were guaranteed by the flag covering the vessel, even more so as passengers, than the crew of such vessel. Had they been brought to shore at that time, undoubtedly their lives would have beeu forfeited. General Prophete, returning in the afternoon, had an entirely different attitude than in the morning, and nothing could be done. The following day the three counsellors present at the capital called upon we with an idea of arranging the matter. I was conciliant and asked but three things. 1. That the passengers be permitted to continue their voyage to a port not under blockade. 2. That the United States flag receive a salute of twenty-one guns for the insults received. 3. That an indemnity, the amount to be settled between the au- thorities and myself, be granted the ship at a certain rate each day of detention. The gentlemen appeared to have a certain belief in their culpabi- lity, and anxiety to avert any trouble between the United States and Hayti ; but later they sent to me the charge of finance and commerce, who wished to argue about the first and second .stipulations made by me; wished the four constituents landed to remain under my prol tion, etc.; could not comprehend the insult to our ila.u r : feared it would look like humiliating themselves to salute. I made no argument with him, but remained firm in my convic- tions. To show exactly the situation of to-day it must be explained that Hayti is divided into five departments, the North, the Northwest, the Artibonite, the West, and the South. Now, the three first-named departments are entirely against Legitime, and demand that he retire as candidate and protest against his election as " chef du Ponvoir Executif" by the minority of the constituents of the country. Of the West, Port-au-Prince appears to be Legitime's stronghold, yet they are at this moment conspiring against him, which is taking rapid progress; at Jacmel, also in the West, they have declared against him and have taken up arms to that effect, the two constituents of Jacmel, the one of Bainet being on board of the Kaytian Republic, In the South the principal city, Aux Caves, is said to !„• simply wail for the word. Hence it can be easily seen that almost the entire country is against Legitime, and even had he the departments of the West and South solid in his favor, the majority of the departments would be against him. This country is now in a state of anarchy. They had lately a defective provisional government, which was in charge of affairs when -97- the few constituents elected General Legitime as " Chef du Pouvoir Executif." There were of the eighty-four constituents eighty-four elected to represent to all parts of Hay ti, to form a new constitution and elect a President. Now, the North, Northwest, and Artibonite alone have forty-three constituents, and by the blank votes cast, it appears now that there were but twenty seven of the thirty-three present that voted for Legitime. Hence a small minority is attempt- ing to represent the whole people. Since the seizure of the steamer Haytian Republic, in a printed sheet published by a unknown committee it has greatly commented upon us Americans and tried to show us up in a very bad light. Hence our citizens have become alarmed, and owing to the condition of affairs, are anxious to see at least one of our war vessels. I am afraid for the lives of those Haytians under our protection in the steamer, to say nothing of our own lives; and, as above remarked, the desperate position in which those in this city are placed is such that any extravagance, if they find themselves cornered, may be feared. I send to-day, by way of Kingston, Jamaica, the following cable- gram in care of the United States consul, advising him to send such dispatch in cipher, if possible : State Department, Washington D. C. : American steamer and schooner seized by Haytian war vessels ; ila°- insulted ; life and property in danger. War vessel necessary immediately. Thompson. I received word from Captain Compton on the 25th instant that he was ordered to bring his ship, which was in the outer harbor, into the inner harbor within an hour, or the authorities themselves would bring her in. On account of the outer harbor being the more healthy place, I addressed a note to the charg6 of foreign affairs (inclosure 3), but not ever, has its reception been acknowledged, and the same evening they sent aboard and took out certain portions of the ship's machinery, which is deposited at the port office. Saturday the ship was hauled into the inner harbor. The blockade established is not effective. Consequently in law it is null, because there were three cities blockaded— Cap Haytien, Gona'ives and St. Marc and but two vessels to make such blockade, and I take into consideration that on the 19th instant I received a dispatch from the charge of foreign affairs stating that, notwithstand- ing the notification of the blockade given the foreign representatives at this city on the 16th instant, on the 17th instant the steamer — 98 — Haytian Republic made a voyage from Gonaives to St. Marc. In my reply I said succinctly that certainly I could not enter into the ques- tion of the blockade beiug efficient, since he said in his dispatch that the steamer Haytian Republic continued her regular trips from Go- naives to St. Marc. On Monday, the 22d instant, both of the Haytian war vessels were in this harbor. What vessels, then, were making the blockade? Saturday, the 27th instant, the German steamer, direct from Cape Haytien, arrived at Port-au-Prince. No vessel stopped her on her way. Hence there is no serious blockade. Sunday, the 28th instant, the Mole St. Nicholas, Port de l'aix. and Jacmel, by a decree, were put under blockade. We have in the harbor the French war vessel Bisson. The Haytian war vessel Toussaint L'Ouverture brought in here Sunday evening, the 21st instant, the American schooner William Jones. The William Jones was bound for Gonaives, bavin- left Boston October 3. When off Gona'ives she was spoken by the Hay- tian war vessel Toussaint L'Ouverture and told to proceed to Port-au- Prince, as Gonaives was under blockade. The Captain immediately shaped his course for this port, but later the vessel was taken in tow, soldiers put on board while at sea. and at this writing are in charge of the vessel, which has a perishable cai In the name of all our citizens, I pray you to insist upon the Sec tary of the Navy sending us a vessel of war. I have, etc., John E. W . Thompson. Mr. Piquant to Mr. Thompson. [Translation.] Department of State of Foreign Relations, Section N<>. Port-au-Pj:in< ■■■:, October 22, 1888. Mr. Minister,— I have the honor to inform you that the steamer Haytian Republic, having been captured for bavin- forced the block- ade before St. Marc, a tribunal has been formed so that the affair bo submitted to its appreciation. I hasten to give you notice in the meantime that it be permitted me to submit to you the verdict of that tribunal in the circumstance." Please accept, etc. The counselor of the interior, charged per interim with the depart- ment of state of foreign relation, 0. Piquant. — 99 — M . Thompson to Mr. Piquant. Legation of the United States. Port-au-Prince (Hatti), October 22, 1888. Sir,— I ain in receipt of your dispatch of this date informing me that the steamer Hatjtiun Republic " having been captured for having forced the blockade before Saint-Marc, a tribunal has beeu formed so that the affair be submitted to its appreciation." The object of such an act and the validity thereof I ignore completely, reserving all rights in the premises to the protection of such vessel and all on board. Saluting you, etc., John E. W. Thompson. Mr. Thompson to Mr. Piquant. Legation of the United States, Port-au-Prince, Hatti, October 25, 1888. Sir,- I have just received notice from Captain Compton, of the steamer Haytian Republic, that he is ordered to bring his ship into the inner harbor. I pray you, sir, to have that order remanded until I can have the honor of waiting upon you, which I will do at any hour you name. In the meantime I am willing to give my parole that such ship will not attempt to leave this harbor until the autho- rities of Port-au-Prince consent that she shall leave. Accept, etc., John E. W. Thompson. APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS. AFFAIR OF THE MOLE ST.-NICOLAS, PART II. CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE AMERICAN COM- MISSIONERS and M. Firmin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hayti. These Documents are translated (with the exception of the pretended copy of the pretended powers of Mr. Elie, taken from American newspapers) from the French as they appeared in the Haytian Moniteur, of May 6, 1891, and in L'Ordre, of Port-au-Prince, of May 30, 1891. \ APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS. THE SO-CALLED INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO MR. ELIE. [Copy.] Liberty. Equality. Fraternity. Republic of Hayti. ) Cap Haytien, Dec. 28, 1888. $ In the 85th year of Independence. Hyppolite, Provisional President of the Republic, to all present and to come, greeting : Animated by the desire of preserving the bonds of friendship that exist between the people of the Departments of the North, of the Ar- tibonite, and of the Northwest in the Republic of Hayti, and the great people of the United States of America and of obtaining the active protection of the Government of Washington for the three De- partments above named in return for the economic, commercial, and maritime advantages that we expect to grant it, we have, after hav- ing consulted with our ministers and councillors, resolved to send a special representative at once to the White House for the purpose of there making propositions in which shall be stipulated such mea- sures as may be necessary for the accomplishment of our wishes. For this purpose we have selected, appointed, and authorized our distinguished and loyal fellow-citizen, Charles Frederick Elie (mer- chant), as our representative, chosen, appointed, and authorized by these presents to enter into negotiations with such person, or per- sons, as may be authorized by the United States, to conclude and to sign with him the proposed treaty, promising on the honor of our Re- public to ratify and faithfully execute all which shall be signed by our plenipotentiary and to give it our presidential sanction in the terms in which the promises shall be made by him. In proof of which we have signed this full power in all loyalty and free will. Hyppolite. By the Provisional President, The Councillor charged with the Department of Foreign Affairs, A. FlRMIN. — 104 — RESUME. On the one part, propose to the G-overnment to give us its active protection : 1. By stationing in our ports one or more vessels of war so as to hinder a foreign power from disregarding our right by favoring the usurpers in Port-au-Prince and also to prevent any violation of inter- national law to our detriment. 2. By permiting us to buy in the United States such vessels, arms, ammunitions of war as we may need for our defence. 3. By giving instructions to the commanders of the war vessels to declare, should the necessity arise, their intention not to permit the rights of nations to be disregarded to our disfavor. On the other part : 1. Freedom of shipping from tonnage dues. 2. A deduction of 20 per cent, from the import duties on textile fabrics. 3. The right of a naval station to be granted to the Navy with freedom of entry and exit, the privilege of establishing coaling sta- tions and depots without any expense or formality, conforming, how- ever, to the local police laws. In the course of the negociations should the American Government demand any privileges or advantages not mentioned in the present instructions but which you might regard as acceptable, you can consent to them subject to the subsequent ratification of tbe Pro- visional Government. [The above is the apocryphal copy of the powers of Mr. Elie, published in several American newspapers.] Port-au-Prince (Hayti), February 2, 1891. To the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Port-au-Prince (Hayti). Sir, — I have been appointed by the 'President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti to negotiate for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with a view to establishing there a coaling station and dock for the use of the ships of the United States Navy. It is the desire and object of the President of the United States to acquire such a station in the Antilles. The special advantages united in the Mole Saint-Nicolas indicate incontestably that it is the manifest destiny of that port to become a naval depot for the use of the war vessels of the United States. The cordial relations existing between the two countries, the close and ever-strengthening ties of commerce, and similarity of the insti- — 105 — tutions and interests of the two republics, would seem to render such a demand as reasonable as natural. The acceptance of this demand would result in making of the United States a powerful Mend and ally, upon whose aid and good offices Hayti might always rely. The past history and the well-known policy of the United States are sufficient guarantees that there is no design on the part of that nation to endanger the autonomy or the sovereign rights of the Kepublic of Hayti. This is clearly demonstrated in the instructions which I have received from the President, which declare that: " Aware of the provisions of the Haytian Constitution which interdict the alienation of the least portion of the territory or of the effects of this Republic, and respecting the full right of this people to maintain these provisions, the President desires only to secure a lease of the Mol e Saint-Nicolas, the effects of which lease will be of great advan- tage to the security and prosperity of the Haytian Republic, while at the same time affording to the United States all the accommodation sought by its navy in this part of the Antilles." The privilege here asked has been long since accorded by the Gov- ernment of the Sandwich Islands, without loss of prestige, and to the great advantage of the people of those islands. It was, in fact, accorded to the United States by the Government of Hayti during our late civil war, when a land coaling-station was established and maintained at Cape Hayti. For some years past, the Dominican Re- public has evinced a disposition to concede to the United States a land coaling-depot within the limits of its territory. I have the honor to ask that the Haytian Government express its willingness to concede such a station, the details of the lease to be settled between the special commissioner of the United States on the one part, and some dignitary of State appointed by his Excellency the President of Hayti on the other part. Very respectfully, Bancroft Gherardi, Special Commissioner of the United States to Hayti. State Department of Foreign Relations, Port-au-Prince, February 10, 1891. Sir,— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your impor- tant letter of the 2nd inst., announcing that you have been appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti, to enter into negotiations for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with the object of establishing there a land — 10G — coaling-station or depot for the use of the vessels of the United States navy. After having the kindness to set forth the reasons militating in fa- vor of the demand which His Excellency the President of the United States has charged you to present to the Government of Hayti. you conclude with the request that the latter Government express its willingness to accord the station desired, the details of the lease to be settled between the special commissioner of the United States on the oue part, and commissioners appointed by His Excellency the President of Hayti on the other part. I have hastened to submit your letter to the Council of Secretaries of State, presided over by his Excellency the President of Hayti. After hearing the reading of it the Council of Secretaries of State (without having decided either favorably or unfavorably upon your demand) have recommended that I ask, with all courtesy, and sub- ject to due deliberation, that you will have the extreme kindness to communicate to them : 1st. The details or conditions of the desired lease . 2nd. A copy of the full powers conferred upon you by his Excellency the President of the United States, and of which the original shall be presented at the time of the signing (if such signing take place) of the terms of the lease which constitutes the subject of your demand. I had foreseen the first of these recommendations, and hail the honor to ask of you, in our interview of Monday. February "_'. certain explanations which I felt called upon to lay before the Council of Secretaries of State, without being quite sure of their exactitude. His Excellency the President of Hayti and my colleagues, in council assembled, judiciously reminded me that, since it ia a question of the Government of Hayti expressing its willingness to accord tin- above-mentioned station, it is important to know first the conditions to be stipulated, in order that decision may be rendered according these conditions officially proposed. As regard the second recommendation, it is an essential formality ; for the Government of Hayti being asked to bind itself by the ex- pression of its will directly transmitted, it is indispensable that the special Commissioner of the United States communicate his full powers, which are of a uature equally binding upon the American Government. In thus deferring to the wish of the Council of Secretaries of State. I venture to hope that you will recognize its justice ; and 1 seize the occasion to renew, sir, the assurances of my very high consideration. A. FlRMIX, State Secretary of Foreign Relations. Rear-Admiral Gherardi, Special Commissioner of the United States to Hayti, Port-au-Prince. — 107 — U. S. Flagship Philadelphia. Port-au-Prince, Hayti, February 12, 1891. To the Hon. State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Port-au-Prince, Hayti. Sir,— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, in which you ask me : 1. To furnish to his Excellency the President of Hayti and his Council the details and conditions of the desired lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. 2. To procure for the Council a copy of my credentials, the originals to be presented at the moment of obtaining the desired lease. Conformably to your second request, I have tbe honor of inclosing to you herewith a copy of my credentials, and of making known my readiness to present the original instrument before receiving the desired lease. These articles clearly show that in this matter it does not enter into the views of the United States to obtain anything whatsoever that cannot be accorded consistently with the Constitution and laws of Hayti. If any further assurances are necessary, they can be explicitly set down in the terms of the lease. A tract of ground sufficient for the establishment of a land coaling- depot can be comprised within one square mile, as indicated upon the subjoined map. Now, as this square mile includes the interior basin of the port of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, it is evident that the amount of land desired is of little importance. It is well understood that, as in all previous contracts of this nature entered into between the United States and foreign powers, the local police laws are to remain in full force upon the leased territory. There is nothing novel in the action of the United States in asking this lease, and it establishes no precedent. Provisioning stations have been accorded to the United States at various times, by France, Brazil, Spain, Peru, Mexico, Hawai, Portugal, Italy, Japan, and other nations. Nothing is asked of Hayti to-day which has .not been already accorded by these powers. Nowhere were these privileges more freely granted than at Port-Mahon, where the Spanish Government consented to extraordinary concessions. Certainly there is no gov- ernment more jealous of its prerogatives than the Spanish Govern- ment ; yet no misunderstanding has ensued between the two nations. In no case have these stations been a source of inconvenience or trouble to the nation granting the lease. — 108 — Where they have been abandoned, it has been because the United States Government wished to change their situation or to discontinue them. ., , , . These facts are undoubtedly known to the President and to h.s Council ; but I have cited them in order to explain what the United States desires in the present instance. I am, Sir, very respectfully, Bancroft Gherardi, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Special Commissioner of the United States to Hayti. Port-AU-Prin»k. April 21, 1S91. Sir,— Referring to our interview with you this morning, in the course of which we had occasion to notify you of a document signed by the President of the United States, investing us with plenary powers to confer with all persons invested with similar authority by Hayti, in order to establish a convention between the two Govern- ments, we have the honor to enclose an official copy of the said document. Accept, Sir, etc., etc. [Signed] Fred. Dougla — Bancroft Gherabdi. Hon. A. Firmin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affa ENCLOSURE. To all those whom these presents may come, greeting. I invest by these presents Frederick Dougla ident Minister and Consul -General of the United States of America in Hayti. and "Bancroft Gherardi, Rear Admiral in the United Slates Navy, with full power to confer with such persons as may be authorized on the part of Hayti; and to conclude, subject to the opinion and sanction of the Senate of the United States, a convention to insure to the United States the use of the Mole St.-Nicolas as a naval station. In verification of which I have ordered that the seal of the United States be hereunto affixed. Given under our hand and seal, in the City of Washington, 9th — 109 — March, of the year 1891, and of the Independence of the United States, the one hundred and fifth. [Signed] Benjamin Harrison, President. James G. Blaine, Secretary of State. The above document is certified as a true copy of the original. [Signed] Fred. Douglass. Bancroft Gherardi. Port-au-Prince, April 22, 1891. Messrs. Plenipotentiaries : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 21st inst., in which you enclosed an official copy of a document signed by his Excellency the President of the United States, investing you with full powers to confer with such persons as may be invested with the same powers by the Government of Hayti for the purpose of negotiating a convention between the two Governments. Upon examining the document and referring to the interview which I had the honor to hold with you the same day that I received the dis- patch, I infer that the full power has reference to the request made on February 7 last by Admiral Gherardi, as Special Commissioner of the United States, that the Government of Hayti should signify its willingness to lease the Mole St. -Nicolas to the United States for use as a coaling station by vessels of the United States. In fact, this Department, by its letter of February 10th last, stated to Admiral Gherardi that the Government of Hayti, preliminary to a final settlement, wished to have the conditions of the desired lease, and also a copy of the full power which had been issued by the Pres- ident of the United States, the original of which should be at hand to be presented when the lease was consummated. In his letter of February 12 the Admiral furnished me with all the desired details by giving me a certified copy of his instructions from the State Depart- ment in Washington, and after an interview, it was settled that he should write tu his Government for the full power. It is this docu- ment which you have received and sent, so that this Government is called upon to reply to you formally. As I had the honor to inform you in our interview yesterday, as soon as I learned the arrival of another squadron of the American navy, and that full power had been given you, I sent a detailed dispatch to the President of Hayti, and the Council of the Secretaries — 110 — «f «tnte then absent in the Department of the South. The President of State then ab ent i ^ ^ rep]y ^ followg . a ^S con U sidered the conditions upon which the United StattfSveSntwishestoobtain the lease oftheMoleSaint-N^laa fo use as a coaling station there would appear to be no object.on whatever ^granting the concession were it not that your instructions ^V Lowing clause: 'For the purpose of V™*™^ strengthening the relations (between the two countries), the Pres- ident desired that so long as the United States may be holdei of the Mole Saint-Nicolas-in case it is leased-tbe Haytian GovernmeBt shall not lease any harbor or other portion of its territory, nor other- wise dispose of it, nor grant any special privilege or right oi usage to any other Power, State or Government.' « The acceptation of such a clause would be, in the opinion ol the Haytian Government, an outrage on the national sovereignty,.! tin- Republic and a violation of the first article of the Constitution ; for the renunciation of the right of disposing of its territory would be tacitly consenting to its alienation. " Admiral Gherardi, in his letter of February L2, has mentioned France, Brazil, Spain, Peru, Mexico, Hawaii. Portugal, Italy, Japan, and other countries which have at one time or another granted r«-al- ing stations for the use of the United States Navy. The Haytian Government is no less well disposed than these various nations to- wards the American Union, but it finds itself restricted by its b nal public law which cannot be violated without rendering void any contract made under like conditions. These considerations an important that you will, no doubt, be the first to recognize the im- possibility of the Haytian Government consenting t<. lease the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States on the terms desired by the latter. But, in addition to the constitutional difficulty, there must he ti into account political considerations of the highest importance to the Haytian Government. "The arrival in this port of two American squadrons, composed of the most powerful vessels of the United States Navy, has made a most unfortunate impression on the whole country, which is disturbed and alarmed. Even supposing that the national Constitution offered no obstacle to the granting of the request presented by you in the name of the President of the United States, the Haytian Government could not under existing circumstances enter freely into negotiations for the leasing of the Mole Saint Nicolas without seeming to yield to foreign pressure and to compromise, ipso facto, its existence as an independent nation ; and all the more so because several American newspapers, for some inexplicable reason, are carrying on an un- truthful propaganda, endeavoring to cause it to be believed that engagements have been signed between the Presidents of 1 1 ay ti and \ — Ill — the United States for the cession of this same harbor of the Mole Saint Nicolas, which his Excellency President Harrison wishes to have as a naval station for the use of the American Navy. "Profoundly confiding inyour sense of loyalty and justice, I venture to hope you will understand thoroughly that the refusal of a lease to the United States of the Mole Saint-Nicolas for a naval station is not an act of mistrust or ill-will on the part of the Government of Hayti. It is the result of a two-fold obstacle before which our lively sympathy for and our sincere attachment to the most glorious and most generous Republic of the New, and, perhaps, of the modern World, has been forced to yield." I beg that you will accept, etc. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [Signed] A. Firmin. Hon. Frederick Douglass, United States Minister. Bancroft Gherardi, Rear- Admiral, United States Navy. Port- ah- Prince, Hatti, April 21, 1891. Hon. A. Firmin, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs. S IR? — We have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, in reply to the application of the President of the United States presented by us to the Government of Hayti for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas as a coaling-station for the use of the naval forces of the United States. We regret that the Government of Hayti finds itself under the necessity of refusing the friendly request of the President ; the more so, as we have reason to fear that this refusal may not be received by the Government of the United States as testifying to the amicable sentiments which should exist between the two republics and govern their relations. While obliged to express our disappointment at the ground taken by the Government of Hayti, permit us to present to you, Monsieur le Ministre, the expression of our highest esteem and consideration. [Signed] Frederick Douglass. Bancroft Gherardi. 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