MORAL PHILOSOPHY /Ifc. D. / A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY BY REV. CHARLES COPPENS, S.J., \\ Author of "A Brief Text-Book of Logic and Mental Philosophy,' 1 ' 1 "A Prac- tical Introduction to English Rhetoric" and " The Art of Oratorical Composition." 'The rule and measure of human acts is reason." ST. THOMAS. YORK . SCHWAKTZ, KIKWIN & FAUSS, 43 BARCLAY STREET. .*" Copyright, 1895, by CATHOUC SCHOOL BOOK COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. f * PREFACE. THIS " Brief Text-Book of Moral Philosophy " is a com- panion volume to the author's " Brief Text-Book of Logic and Mental Philosophy," lately published and already exten- sively used in Academies and other educational institutions. The author's aim is to present to students and readers to such, especially, as are unfamiliar with the Latin language a brief yet clear outline of the system of Ethics taught in Catholic Colleges, Seminaries and Universities. This system is based on the philosophy of Aristotle. Questions of Ethics, which in former times were left to the close scientific treatment of specialists, are at the present day freely discussed among all classes of society in newspapers and popular magazines, in the workshop and in the parlor. Extravagant notions of individual and social rights are circulated, while the rash speculations of so-called scientists are sapping in many minds the very foundations of morality. Never before has there been a more urgent call on the part of the people for the lucid exposition and the correct appli- cation of sound moral principles. In this sad confusion of thought, no small utility will be found in a clear, simple, systematic explanation of the ethical doctrines taught by the greatest minds of the past ages, and lately most highly recommended by our Supreme Pontiff, the illustrious Leo. XIII. Such an exposition the author has endeavored to present in this little volume. THE AUTHOR. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY, OMAHA, NEB. March 12, 1895. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTION, 7 BOOK I DIRECTION OF HUMAN ACTS. CHAPTER I. The End to which Human Acts are to be Directed : . . . .11 Article I. Ends in General, . . . .11 " II. The Last End of Man, ... 13 " III. The Attainment of the Last End. . 20 CHAPTER II. The Morality of Human Acts : . . 27 Article I. The Essence of Morality, ... 27 " II. The Determinants of Morality, . . 33 " III. Accountability for Moral Acts, . . 36 " IV. Circumstances that Lessen Account- ability, 39 " V. The Passions, 42 " VI. Virtues and Vices 45 CHAPTER III. Law, the Rule of Human Acts: . . 49 Article I. The Moral Law, .... 49 " II. Conscience, ..... 57 " III. Sanction of the Moral Law. . . 63 BOOK II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. CHAPTER I. Eights and Duties in General. . . 69 CHAPTER II. Our Duties to God : .... 74 Article I. Adoration, . . . . -75 " II. Faith in God, 77 " III. Love of God 84 CHAPTER III. Our Duties to Ourselves. 86 6 Contents. PAGE CHAPTER IV. Our Duties to Other Men : . .89 Article I. Duty of Love to Others, ... 89 " II. Duties Regarding the Minds and Wills of Others, . . . . -91 " III. Duties Regarding the Lives of Others, 95 " IV. Duties Regarding Honor. ... 99 CHAPTER V. Eights of Ownership : . . .102 Article I. Validity of Titles to Ownership, . 102 " II. Violations of Ownership, . . . 109 " III. Various Modes of Acquiring Property, no " IV. Transfer of Property by Contract, . 112 " V. Wages of Laborers. . . . .114 BOOK III. SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. CHAPTER I. Society in General . . . .119 CHAPTER II. Domestic Society : 123 Article I. Nature and Purpose of Domestic So- ciety, 123 " II. Unity and Indissolubility of Matri- mony, 125 " III. Parental Authority Education. . 130 CHAPTER III. Civil Society: 139 Article I. Nature and Origin of Civil Society: . 139 i. The End of Civil Government, 139 2. The Units that Compose Civil Society, . . . .141 3. Civil Authority, . . .141 $ 4. Means Employed by Civil Au- thority 145 Article II. The Functions of Civil Government : 146 i. Legislation, . . . 147 $ 2. The Judiciary, . . . 149 3. The Executive. . . 153 CHAPTER IV. International Law. . . . .155 INTRODUCTION. 1. Moral Philosophy is the science of the moral order, or of the right and wrong of human acts. It is called Ethics from the Greek word f/Or/, which, like the Latin word mores, signifies morals. Since its object is not merely speculative knowledge, but the true direction of human acts, Ethics is also styled Practical Philosophy. 2. Ethics, we say, directs human acts. However, not all the acts of a man are called human acts, but only such as are under the control of his free will. Whatever he does neces- sarily /'. e., whatever he cannot help doing results from the physical laws of nature, and, as such, is willed and directed by the Author of nature. For instance, a man may fall like a stone, or grow like a plant, or perceive a sound like a brute animal, without any power on his part to prevent himself from falling or growing or hearing, if the required conditions are present. These are acts of the man, but they are not acts of what is distinctively human namely, his intellect and his will. The term human act is restricted in Philosophy to those acts which a man does knowingly and willingly which he has the power either to do or not to do. 3. To be qualified for the direction of human acts, Phi- losophy must derive its conclusions by reasoning from first principles; it must take into account the nature of man, and the natures of all the causes that influence human action. 8 Introduction. Much of this we have considered in Metaphysics, or Mental Philosophy. Ethics is thus founded on Metaphysics : Moral Philosophy assumes as its principles the conclusions estab- lished in Mental Philosophy. 4. To explain the object of Moral Philosophy, which we have declared to be the true direction of human acts, we shall treat in Book I. of the direction of human acts in general; in Book II., of the special duties and rights of men viewed as individuals; and, in Book III., of the rights and duties of men viewed as members of society. BOOK THE DIRECTION OF HUMAN ACTS IN GENERAL. 5. In order to treat of the true direction of human acts, we shall examine in Chapter I. the end or term to which such acts are to be directed; in Chapter II., the morality of human acts; and, in Chapter III., the rule by which they are to be directed to their end. CHAPTER I. THE END TO WHICH HUMAN ACTS ARE TO BE DIRECTED. In the present chapter we shall consider : i . Ends in gen- eral. 2. Our last end. 3. The attainment of our last end. ARTICLE I. ENDS IN GENERAL. 6. We mean here by end the purpose for which a thing exists ; the end of an act is the purpose for which that act is done. For instance, some may read a certain book for pleasure ; others for instruction, others again to practise obe- dience : the act is the same, the ends are various. 7. Every human act is done for an end. For a human act is an act of the will, and the will cannot act unless the intellect proposes to it something to which it may tend, i. e., something good. The will is only another name for the rational appetite that is, the power of tending to a good which the intellect proposes to it. The good intended is the end of the act. Hence, every act is done for an end. You may object that you have no special intention, e. g., in read- ing ; that you read merely to kill time, to be busied with some- thing, etc.; nevertheless, you act for an end or purpose, the end in this case being to kill time or to find occupation. 8. We do not say that the end intended is always a true good, but only that it is always good after a manner ; that it is 12 Direction of Human Acts in General. at least an apparent good, and aimed at because apprehended as good. It may be conceived as good in itself, worth tend- ing to for its own sake, or as a means conducive to some other good. No man, however, intends evil for the sake of evil, but only because he sees something good and desirable in what he wills or in its result. A man may do evil to another for the sake of revenge, and thus do what is morally bad ; he may do evil to himself he may even kill himself ; yet he can- not do so except for a purpose which he apprehends as good in some respect for example, to be freed from trouble. No will can possibly act without aiming at something that has been apprehended as in some way desirable. 9. We must distinguish the nearest or proximate end, the farther or remote end, and the last or ultimate end, beyond which the agent does not look and in which his desire rests. Thus a student may exert himself in order to win a prize, because, by gaining the prize, he will please his parents, and by striving to please his parents he will please God. In this act of the student the prize is the nearest end, his parents a farther end, and God the last end. Perhaps he does not think of God, but aims at pleasing his parents so as to receive a promised sum of money, with which finally he intends to buy some sweetmeats for the gratification of his palate. In this act he makes the enjoyment he derives from the gratification of his palate the last end. 10. In the example just given, the sweetmeats constitute the objective end ; the enjoyment of them is the student's sub- jective end. The objective or material end is the object aimed at ; the subjective or formal end is the attainment of that object. 1 1 . We must also distinguish the end of the work from the end of the workman. A watchmaker, e. g., constructs watches The End to which Human Acts etc. 13 in order to earn a living. The end of the work, the watch, is to mark the time; the end of the workman is to earn a living. 12. An end is said to be (a) actually intended, if at the time of the act it is thought of and aimed at; (b) virtually intended, if the act is influenced by a former intention to at- tain an end, though that end is not thought of at the time of the act; (c) habitually intended, if a former intention has not been retracted, yet does not for the time being affect the act ; (d) interpretatively intended, if the act was not really intended, but would have been so intended, if the case in hand had been foreseen. Let us take an example. A boy is sent by his father to assist a distressed family. He sets out with the actiial intention of fulfilling this commission. While walking along, he is occupied with other thoughts and is un- mindful of his message, yet he directs his steps aright in vir- tue of his former intention that is, with a virtual intention. He may delay for hours at a friend's house, totally uninflu- enced by the purpose for which he started out ; nevertheless, as that purpose has not been given up, it remains as a habit ; it is habitual. At last he reaches the distressed family, and finds them in such want that he feels confident that his father, if he knew the circumstances, would wish him to give a larger alms than the sum appointed. Accordingly he gives this larger alms, acting on his father's intention as he interprets it. This is the father's interpretative intention i. e., what he would have actually intended if he had known the facts. ARTICLE II. THE LAST END. 13. The last end, as stated above (No. 9), is that object in which the agent's desire rests. If in his act the agent ex- cludes all reference to any further end, the end is positively 14 Direction of Human Acts in General. last ; if such exclusion is not made, the end is negatively last. By the absolutely last end we mean that object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to it, and that in it all desires shall rest. 14. The first principle of Moral Philosophy is this: Thesis L God is the absolutely last end of all things. Proof. Such an end we have defined to be an object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to it, and that in it all desires shall rest. Now God alone can be that object. For all things except God are contingent or un- necessary, /. e., they have not in themselves the principle of their own existence (Ment. Phil. No. 104), but they exist only because and in so far as God gives them being (Ment. Phil. No. 220), and preserves them by His will and power (No. 263). Hence God possesses entire and perfect dominion over all things, and in the creature there is nothing that is not de- pendent on God. He has therefore the right to make all things tend to Himself and to rest in Him as in their last end. Moreover, He is bound to do so by His own perfections. For, since He is infinitely wise (Ment. Phil. No. 253), He must direct all things to an end worthy of Himself. Now, God alone is worthy of God. Consequently, God must require that all things tend ultimately towards Himself, and that in Himself all desires shall rest. Therefore God is the last end of all things. 1 5. But how do all things tend ultimately to God ? We affirm that they must tend towards Him with their whole being ; because God has made their whole being, the essence and the attributes of each, and all their powers. Now what- soever He makes, He must direct ultimately to Himself as being the only end worthy of His action. Therefore all things must tend towards God with their whole being. The End to which Human Acts etc. 15 1 6. The direction which God gives to things is not a mo- mentary extrinsic impulse, such, e. g., as a musket-ball gets from the exploding powder ; nor simply a continued extrinsic management, such as the leading of a horse by the bridle ; but it is an impulse intrinsic to every creature, which is not distinct in reality from its very essence or nature and its pe- culiar tendencies. Hence, every action that the creature performs in accordance with its nature is towards that end for which it was created, namely, towards God Himself. 1 7. Of course, we do not say that every being tends imme- diately towards God. This can be said of intelligent beings only; yet all other beings tend mediately towards Him. There is a broad truth in the saying, " Order is Heaven's first law." God's direction, which cannot fail to be wise, is ever appropriate to the nature of the thing directed. Hence, everything is so constituted as to tend towards that which is suited to its nature and is for its good ; plants perform just those actions which are good for them, and this their own nature makes them do. By so acting they elaborate from the inert clod food for the animal kingdom. Animals perceive by their senses what is good for them, and are led by their appetites to appropriate that good. Man, finally, whom all material things subserve, tends by the faculties peculiar to himself, his intellect and will, to the knowledge and love of God, and is fitted and prompted by his rational nature to direct the material creation to the glory and service of his sovereign Lord. 1 8. As the inert clod supports vegetable life, as the vege- table is for the animal, and as the brute animal, together with all inferior things, is for man ; so in man himself the lower powers are to subserve the higher powers, which are his intellect and will. Though each faculty has its own specific tendency to 1 6 Direction of Human Acts in General. its own specific good, still man is not a bundle of independent faculties ; but he is a person, essentially one, fitted by nature to employ his faculties for the attainment of what is good for him in his specific nature as man. If, therefore, as it often happens, an inferior faculty craves what hinders rather than promotes the proper action of a higher faculty, reason then requires that such a craving be suppressed, in accordance with this principle of order : the lower faculties are to be con- trolled by the higher. The good craved in this case is not a real good for the person, but rather a real evil (Ment. Phil. No. 44). The intellect and will, when perfectly controlling the inferior faculties, are in a fit condition to follow up their own specific tendencies toward their proper objects, which are truth and all good worthy of man. 19. Good worthy of man is called becoming, fit or proper. In its strict meaning it is moral good that good, namely, which is conformable to reason regulating free acts; in a wider meaning, it includes natural or physical good that is, whatever perfects the nature of man, as health, knowledge, etc. Good viewed as conducive to the attainment of another good is styled useful ; viewed as capable of giving satisfac- tion or pleasure to an appetite it is named pleasurable. The useful and pleasurable, when they are embraced by the will according to the right order of things and in a manner worthy of man, share in the nobility of moral good. Thus the pleasure which a dutiful son finds in making his parents com- fortable and happy is morally good; and all the just and indifferent means used to promote this end are in the right order of human acts, and are therefore morally good. 20. Since God is the last end of all things (No. 14), He is, therefore, the last end of our highest powers, the intellect and will. But there is this difference between the tendencies of The End to which Human Acts etc. 17 our higher powers and the tendencies of other things : that, while the latter tend to God only mediately, our intellect and will tend to Him immediately, and do not find rest until they repose in Him as in their last end. When a brute animal has eaten and drunk what its appetite craves, it rests in the satis- faction of its animal desires, and longs for nothing beyond this. But our understanding and will can find rest in nothing short of the knowledge and love of God. 2 1 . Thesis II. By our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end. Explanation. Of course, we do not say that it is wrong for man to love created things; but right order requires that we should make all these so many stepping-stones, as it were, to the higher plane of the knowledge and love of God. In this proposition, then, we maintain that the last end of man's intellect and will, that, namely, for which these faculties were given to him, is to know and to love God. We can prove this proposition in two ways : first, by considering the matter in the light of God's nature; and, secondly, by considering it from the standpoint of man's nature. However, we shall confine ourselves at present to the first consideration, which demonstrates that God is the objective end of man's highest powers; the second aspect we shall present further on in connection with man's subjective end (No. 32). Proof. God is the absolute ultimate end (Thesis I.), the Supreme Good to which man is bound to tend. This tend- ency must be through faculties or activities by which he can apprehend the Supreme Good. He cannot do so by any organic faculty, because God is a pure spirit, and, conse- quently, not the object of organic perception. It must, there- fore, be through his immaterial faculties, the spiritual activities of his soul, his intellect and will. Man's intellect, by its 1 8 Direction of Human Acts in General. nature, is able to know God, and his will is able to love what the intellect knows and proposes as worthy of love. There- fore, by our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end. 22. Thesis III. God created all things for His own ex- trinsic glory. Explanation. Honor is the recognition of worth; when expressed in words, it is called praise. Glory is the praise of exalted merit, and in its full acceptance implies love as well as knowledge, together with the manifestation of the same by many persons as a tribute of homage that is due to the person glorified. The knowledge and love which God possesses with regard to Himself is His intrinsic glory ; the homage of praise and love that creation renders to God is His extrinsic glory. Proof i. We have seen that God is the absolute ultimate end of all things ; or, in other words, that all things must tend to Him as to their last end. Since this tendency is some- thing willed by God, it is something good. Yet no good can be added to God intrinsically, because He is Himself the Infinite Good : it can, therefore, be added to God only extrin- sically. God has no need of any extrinsic good ; yet, if He creates at all, He must necessarily require that creatures shall proclaim Him as their Creator, and thus render Him the glory which is His due. Hence, the end God had in creating all things was His own extrinsic glory. Proof 2. Man in particular, we know from thesis II., is bound to tend to the Supreme Good, his last end, by his in- tellect and will that is, by knowing and loving God ; but in these very acts of man consists the extrinsic glory of God. Therefore, man in particular was created for the extrinsic glory of God. The End to which Human Acts etc. 19 Objections. 1. Irrational creatures cannot praise and love God. Answer. They cannot love God, it is true ; nor can they praise Him directly : nevertheless, they praise Him indirectly, by displaying God's power, good- ness, wisdom, beauty, etc., to the intelligent crea- tion, thereby serving to inspire and increase the praise and love of God on the part of man. 2. God cannot fail of His purpose, but He fails to receive the praise and love of the wicked. Therefore, He did not create them for that end. Answer. Though the wicked refuse God the homage of their love and voluntary praise in this life, they still serve to proclaim His praise. For in the next life they glorify His justice by their punishment, and even in the present life they make manifest His mercy and longanimity. 3. It would be unworthy of God to promote His glory by the misery of His creatures. Answer. To create man for misery would be unworthy of God, yes ; we are maintaining that God, on the contrary, created all men for happiness, but on the condition that they shall render Him due service. When the wicked voluntarily turn away from their destined bliss by refusing to do their duty, they must necessarily incur a just punishment. The solution of this and similar difficulties will be better understood after we have treated of the sanction of the natural law (No. 107 et seq.). 24. As we remarked above (No. 10), the object aimed at or intended is the objective or material end, and the attainment or enjoyment of the object is the subjective or formal end. So 2O Direction of Human Acts in General. far we have proved that God is the objective end of all things, and particularly so of His rational creatures ; we have ex- plained, also, the manner in which all things tend to God by fulfilling the purpose which He had in view when creating them. We shall next consider the subjective end of man, L e.y his attainment of his objective end. ARTICLE III. THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR LAST END. 25. A man can labor for very different objects now for honor, now for wealth, again for the pleasure of eating or drinking, or for the performance of duty, etc. Yet there is one thing common to all his objects, or ends, or purposes namely, a desire of well-being, of happiness. All men desire happiness, but they often differ widely concerning the object in which they expect to find their happiness. " Oh, happiness, our being's end and aim ! Good, pleasure, ease, content, whate'er thy name." 26. Not only do all men desire happiness, but they also desire perfect happiness or beatitude. Beatitude may be defined as that state in which man is made perfect by the possession of all good things. It implies endless duration and the full satisfaction of all desires. Is such a state attain- able by every man ? 27. Thesis IV. Every man can attain perfect happiness. Proof. If a certain good is found in all men, it must be part of man's nature, and hence it proceeds from the Author of nature. Now, there exists in us all, as we know by our consciousness, a desire of perfect happiness; and this desire is good, for by it we are impelled to perfect ourselves. There- fore, this desire proceeds from the Author of nature. But The End to which Human Acts etc. 21 God could not have implanted such a desire in our nature unless he gave us the means to satisfy it ; because to allure us by a desire and a hope which He had destined to disappoint- ment would be opposed to God's infinite goodness and truth- fulness. Consequently, God has given us the means whereby every one of us can attain perfect happiness. 28. But here a difficulty presents itself. We often experi- ence contradictory desires; a man, e. g., may love peace, yet when provoked by an insult he feels inclined to break the peace. It is evident that perfect happiness cannot exist where desires are in conflict. How, then, can the conflict be made to cease ? Clearly, not until the lower cravings of our complex nature cease to war against reason. But as this never comes to pass fully in this life, the logical inference is that beatitude is not attainable in this life. Yet we have proved it to be attainable ; it follows, therefore, that we can gain perfect happiness in a future life. 29. At this point another question arises : Is man to be made supremely happy by being deprived of half his nature ? Shall the soul be beatified alone, and the body moulder into dust ? You may reply, there will be a resurrection by which all things will be made right. In that event, full gratification will be given to man's desires, among which there will never more be strife; for the faculties of his lower nature will be in perfect subjection to the spirit. This is the answer of Father Costa- Rossetti, SJ. and others, who main- tain that in a purely natural order of things the soul cannot attain beatitude without the body. In the state of separation, they say, the soul would feel a longing to be reunited to the body, which nature intended for it, and with which it formed one person. Nothing prevents us, they continue, from sup- posing that a future resurrection belongs to the order of 22 Direction of Human Acts in General. nature, in this sense : that, as God gave us a natural desire for perfect happiness, He thereby pledged Himself to procure the realization of that desire for those who obey the laws of nature. 30. Most philosophers, however, consider the resurrection as entirely supernatural, and in no sense due to our nature, and they maintain that the soul can be perfectly happy with- out the body. To prove this point, they reason thus : The lower powers of man exist to subserve his higher powers in this life. When the soul possesses in the next life the full knowledge and love of God, it no longer needs the body or the lower faculties, and consequently it will have no desire for reunion with its inferior companion. The authorities and arguments for both opinions are suffi- ciently weighty to warrant the student freedom to accept either. Whichever opinion be adopted, every objection against the attainment of beatitude can be satisfactorily answered. 31. Thesis V. No created object can make man perfectly happy. Proof. Man is distinctively man chiefly by his intellect and will; hence no object can make him perfectly happy, unless it fully satisfies his intellect and will This, however, no created object can do. Such objects are riches, honors, pleasures, human science and virtue. But as none of these, nor all of them together, can satisfy man's intellect and will, it is clear that no created object can make man perfectly happy. i. Not riches, which are only a means of providing other good things. At their best they cannot last beyond the present life, and they do not perfect the intellect and will. The End to which Human Acts etc. 23 2. Not honor. For honor, whether viewed as the esteem which others have of us or as the outward manifesta- tion of this esteem, cannot perfect our intellect and will. It generally has uncertain existence when it is obtained, and it cannot be obtained by all. Besides, honors are often bestowed upon the undeserving and denied to those who are most worthy of them. 3. Not sensual pleasures, which certainly cannot perfect our higher faculties. On the contrary, the pursuit of sensuality degrades man to the level of the brute ; and surely it is absurd to say that man's perfect happiness consists in self-degradation. 4. Not the human sciences. Since human nature is essen- tially the same in all men, the perfect happiness of the human species must be the same in kind for every individual, and hence within the reach of all. But science is not within the reach of all, because many persons have not sufficient ability to acquire it. Being, moreover, something finite, science can neither satisfy the intellect, which is always reaching out for unlim- ited knowledge, nor the heart, which is capable of loving and, therefore, desiring the Infinite. 5. Not virtue, which consists in a habitual tendency to perfection. Virtue is consequently not the ultimate object of desire, but only a means to attain that object (No. 72 et seq.). 6. Not all these united. For they are all confined to the present life, and they cannot satisfy the desires of a being that longs for everlasting happiness. 32. Thesis VI. God is the only object that can make man perfectly happy. Proof i . Every man can attain perfect happiness (Thesis 24 Direction of Human Acts in General. IV.); therefore an object must be attainable that can make every man perfectly happy. But no created object can do this (Thesis V.). Therefore the Creator is the only object that can make man perfectly happy. Proof 2. Man's perfect happiness supposes perfect satis- faction for his highest powers i. ] The State is utterly incompetent, especially in a population of mixed creeds, to teach dogmatic religion ; and yet without dogmatic religious teaching, morality is apt to be little more than a name. Domestic Society. 135 217. Objections. r. The State must control whatever bears on the public good ; but such is the education of children. Answer. This principle, if followed out, would make us a nation of slaves ; for it would destroy every per- sonal right. Almost every act bears immediately or remotely on the public good ; thus the State could regulate all details of food, clothing, and lodging, the choice of trade or profession, the selection of husband or wife; these matters, inasmuch as they affect the well-being of the citizens, are related to the common good. Accordingly, we reply to the objection : The State must control whatever bears on the public good provided it does not go beyond its own province and usurp inalienable private rights, for the protection of which the State has been instituted. 2. The State is bound to secure what is so necessary for the public good as education. Answer. The State has no right to meddle in private matters that are well enough provided for. Its duty in such cases is to come forward and lend further assistance when private efforts are inadequate to avoid a great public evil or to procure a great public good. Now, educa- tion especially that which is called elementary edu- cation can be well enough imparted by parents and those whom they choose as aids in this work. The State may laudably encourage and assist private efforts : to be a patron of education is an honor ; to usurp its functions is injustice. 3. But the State needs intelligent voters. Answer. The man in our times who cannot read and write is surely at a disadvantage ; nevertheless, it is possible 136 Social Rights and Duties. for one to be very intelligent without book-learning. The State needs honest, conscientious voters; to ob- tain these, it must encourage sound religious instruc- tion, but it need not control any form of educa- tion. 4. But the State should defend the rights of children ; hence, it has a right to pass compulsory school laws. Answer, i. The duty of defending children's rights could, at best, only entitle the State to compel parents to educate their children. 2. The education to which children have a strict right, is that which will fit them to attain their happiness in this world and the next. Now, this does not require a certain fixed amount of book-learning. Therefore, if parents choose to teach their child a trade, the latter has no further right to education that the State may defend. 218. The duties of children toward their parents are those of love, gratitude, honor, and obedience. Flowing directly Jrom the mutual relations of parents and children, the first three of these duties remain always in full vigor. In regard to the duty of obedience, three periods of life are to be distinguished : 1. During the years of imperfect judgment, while the child constantly needs support and wise direction, he must allow himself to be trained by his parents with perfect docility. Hence, at this period, he owes them obedience in all things that are not opposed to the law of God. He must submit to his parents' correction and chastisement, in the infliction of which love ought to rule, accompanied by prudence, moderation, and firmness. 2. When the judgment is matured, yet the son or Domestic Society. 137 daughter remains under the parental roof, the parents are to be obeyed in all things pertaining to the man- agement of the home and the general good of the family. They must continue to watch over the morals of their children, to warn and reprove them whenever necessary, and even to enforce compliance with the laws of good behavior. They ought to assist their children to make a wise and prudent choice of a state of life, though they have no right to prescribe or dictate the state of life to be chosen, or the partner to be selected in marriage; nor can parents object to the adoption of a holier career in the religious or eccle- siastical state, unless they be in pressing need of their children's support. Man's first and highest allegiance is due not to his parents, but to God, and he has a perfect right to obey the Divine call to a holier manner of life. " He that loveth father or mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me." (Matt, x., 37.) Hence, it is apparent, also, that parents cannot right- fully prevent their children from embracing the true Faith. 3. When the grown-up son or daughter withdraws from the parental home, the duty of obedience ceases, but not the duties of love and reverence for parents, and of respect for their wisdom and advice. More- over, all must assist their parents in case of need, and ever be to them a source of honor and consolation. 219. A complete family usually includes servants, who differ from other wage-earners by being permanently em- ployed in domestic occupations. As such, they become inmates of the house, and, in a certain sense, members of the family. From this fact special rights and duties arise in 138 Social Rights and Duties. their regard with respect to the other members of the house- hold ; e.g., they may be entrusted with delegated authority over the children of their employers. It is their duty to have the good of the family sincerely at heart : and, on the other hand, they are entitled not only to their salary, but also to special love and care, particularly in times of illness. Every one is bound by the natural law to see to the moral and physical welfare of those belonging to his own household. 220. We know from history that at the dawn of Chris- tianity nearly half the human race was in a state of slavery. In the mildest meaning of the term, a slave is a human being bound for life to work for his master without other remu- neration than his support, possessing no rights except those that are inalienable. Inalienable rights are such as are in- timately connected with the attainment of our last end. They are the rights to life, limbs, health, surroundings favor- able to morality, and in general all those aids to eternal hap- piness of which a man cannot justly deprive himself, since by so doing he would infringe God's rights to his service. Slavery thus limited may, perhaps, in certain special circum- stances, contain no violation of strict right, and, therefore, no injustice ; yet, it ever has been an evil, usually far greater than squalid poverty ; and it has occasioned countless abuses of the most deplorable kind. Hence, the Church has always labored and with unfailing success to mitigate and finally to suppress it. To the general satisfaction, slavery has disappeared from all Christian lands. There is no reason, therefore, for treating the subject further. CHAPTER III. CIVIL SOCIETY. 221. Civil society may be defined as a union of many such persons as are their own masters, sui juris, joined together for the purpose of protecting their rights and securing their temporal happiness. In the present chapter we shall con- sider the nature and the origin of civil society, and the exercise of civil functions. ARTICLE 1. THE NATURE AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 222. The nature of civil society can be best understood from a detailed examination into its constituent notes, namely: i. Its end or purpose, 2. The units composing it, 3. The authority governing it, 4. The means employed to obtain its end. i . The End of Civil Society. 223. i. We have seen in a preceding chapter (No. 199) that society, or association of some kind, is natural to man, and, consequently, that it is an institution of God. The society first in the order of nature is the family, or domestic society, and next in order comes civil society, or the State. The necessity of civil society is obvious : when many families live in proximity, they are forced to have intercourse of some sort with one another. In the course of time it will come to pass, as each family has chiefly its own interests at 139 140 Social Rights and Duties. heart, that many of these families will not be moderate in their aspirations, their claims, and their efforts at aggran- dizement. Hence, unless they be united for the purpose of securing public peace and the protection of personal rights, they will be frequently at variance, and even in deadly strife with one another. 224. The preservation of peace among its members is the primary end of civil society. United by a common bond, men can render great assistance to one another in securing, with comparative ease, the comfort and happiness of all; and opportunities for the development and exercise of the human faculties are thus afforded which would be impossible without such an association. The complex end of civil so- ciety is clearly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which reads thus : "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, estab- lish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the com- mon defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 225. Civil society, we repeat, is natural to man, and, consequently, owes its institution to the Creator. It is natu- ral, because it is the outcome of man's natural tendencies and is necessary for the development and application of his high- est powers. Without civil society, men could not lead lives worthy of their rational nature and their ultimate destiny. The theory of Hobbes and of Rousseau, that man is natu- rally a savage, perpetually at war with his fellow-men, and that society is an afterthought, something artificial super- added to his nature, is as opposed to historical facts as it is degrading to the human race. Civil Society. 141 2. The units of which civil society is composed. 226. When certain families have entered into association for mutual aid and protection, the domestic relations in each family are manifestly not altered thereby : the family con- tinues to be a natural society ; each family is a moral person, the father acting for all the members. Hence the units com- posing civil society are not individual men, women, and children, but the families, or the heads of families. The wives and children are indeed members of the State, though not directly ; they are members of the families that make up the State, and they are represented in the State by the heads of the families to which they severally belong. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the common good that the State should deal directly with them, ignoring the natural organiza- tion of the domestic society. Unmarried men, who are prop- erly qualified by age and civil condition, /. e., who have at- tained their majority and are their own masters, sui juris, share with heads of families in the enjoyment of civil rights. 3. Civil Authority. 227. That the common good may be attained, the mem- bers of which civil society is made up often stand in need of direction, and sometimes of compulsion. The power thus to direct and compel is called civil authority ; it is, as it were, the soul or animating principle of the body politic. What rights should belong to this authority must be inferred from its purpose, which is the attainment of the end of civil society. Civil authority, therefore, is to possess all those rights which are necessary to direct, and even compel, the citizens to tend towards the end of the State, /.