UC-NRLF 
 
 SB 72 M7S 
 
 REPORT ON 
 
 MOBILIZATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ORGANIZED MILITIA 
 
 AND 
 
 NATIONAL GUARD 
 
 OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 1916 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1916 
 
REPORT ON 
 
 MOBILIZATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ORGANIZED MILITIA 
 
 AND 
 
 NATIONAL GUARD 
 
 OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 1916 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1916 
 
WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 MILITIA BUREAU, 
 
 Washing ton,- D. C., December 19, 1916. 
 Issued by the Militia Bureau by authority of the Secretary of War. 
 
 WM. A. MANX, 
 Brigadier General, General Staff, 
 
 Chief, Militia Bureau. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 In the following pages the recent mobilization is discussed under 
 the headings which appear in the table of contents. 
 
 Many letters, telegrams, memoranda, opinions of the judge advo- 
 cate general, etc., are quoted which set forth the policy of the War 
 Department on the subjects dealt with. In themselves they supply 
 answers to many important questions relating to the National Guard. 
 
 To publish the report of a single inspector or mustering officer or 
 even those of several would fail to give an accurate picture of con- 
 ditions found at mobilization camps for the reason that conditions 
 vary greatly, the preparedness in some States being far in advance 
 of others. 
 
 Then, too, the same condition of affairs will not impress two ob- 
 servers in exactly the same light. The method pursued therefore 
 has been to scrutinize carefully all reports, extracting therefrom 
 matter falling under such various headings as " Recruiting-," " Physi- 
 cal examinations," etc., in order that by noting the reports on these 
 subjects as observed in the National Guard of States from Maine 
 to Arizona, a fair general view may be presented to the reader. The 
 reports of a few observers might give a view too much biased, but 
 the considerable number whose reports are quoted and whose rank 
 ranges from that of major general to first lieutenant, all of whom 
 have had more or less experience in ma,king inspection of troops, can 
 hardly fail to present a fairly truthful estimate of conditions existing 
 in the National Guard. 
 
 Extracts have been made from the reports of inspector-instructors 
 on their work during the muster in of the State forces, to which 
 especial attention is invited. In all there were TO officers who sub- 
 mitted reports, 10 each from the Cavalry and Artillery, 7 from the 
 Medical Corps, and the remainder from the Infantry. A large num- 
 ber of officers employed representing all the mobile arms and Medical 
 Corps of the Army tends to eliminate bias and prejudice, and the 
 whole presents to the reader a composite view of this element of 
 national defense which is believed to be fair and just. 
 
 Between July 14 and August 15 a general inspection of all 
 National Guard camps on the border was made by the assistant chief 
 of staff, Maj. Gen. T. H. Bliss, consolidation of whose reports is 
 here presented. Later a systematic inspection was made by the 
 Inspector General's Department on lines suggested by the Chief of 
 the Militia Bureau. The main features of the reports of these in- 
 spections have been condensed for presentation here. The views of 
 several of the department commanders are also given. 
 
 Finally the above is followed by matter on this subject collected 
 from miscellaneous sources. 
 
 3 
 
 349130 
 
4 INTRODUCTOBY. 
 
 The call of June 1&> 1916, .followed so close upon the passage of 
 the act of June 3, 1916, that there had not been enough time for the 
 thorough consideration by the War Department of the new law in 
 all of its bearings. The operation and effects of the new law in 
 respect to mobilization and muster in were still less well known to 
 mustering officers and State officials. Some mistakes were made but 
 as a rule where quick decisions had to be made by mustering officers 
 correct judgment was displayed. 
 
 The second call was made to include both the National Guard and 
 the Organized Militia, since the latter had not in all cases been con- 
 verted into the former and as it was held that the old law had not 
 been superseded or impaired by the new law in respect to the obli- 
 gations contracted under the old to perform Federal service under a 
 call of the President. Under this ruling members of the Organized 
 Militia were held to service under the call regardless of whether or 
 not they had taken the new oath. A few mustering officers and State 
 officials made the mistake of assuming that a member of the Organ- 
 ized Militia might release himself from service under the call by re- 
 fraining from taking the new oath. 
 
 Some confusion was caused by efforts made to change State mobili- 
 zation points after the call was made. Experience also shows that 
 a number of mobilization points were not well suited to the purpose. 
 The small number of distributing points for quartermaster supplies 
 caused congestion and delay in the delivering of quartermaster sup- 
 plies at mobilization points, but the greatest handicap was the lack 
 of reserve supplies from which to equip the militia. Sufficient funds 
 had never been appropriated to completely equip the militia and ac- 
 cumulate a reserve necessary for mobilization. 1 The Ordnance De- 
 partment, however, had on hand sufficient arms and equipment to 
 meet the demand except in the matter of machine guns. 
 
 The demand for additional troops on the border being urgent, de- 
 partment commanders were directed to expedite the muster in, and 
 to send organizations to the border as soon as they could be made 
 ready. This injunction, along with the desire of the National Guard 
 officers and men to make a good showing caused some undue haste. 
 The necessary physical examinations after muster in were slighted 
 in some organizations, and it is reported that the first units to arrive 
 on the border were incompletely equipped and almost destitute of 
 proper records. The muster-in process was unduly prolonged in 
 other States owing to the difficulty of obtaining recruits necessary 
 to fill up organizations to the required minimum strength. The list- 
 ing of property and its transfer from State to Federal service and the 
 preparation of the necessary rolls and records pertaining to muster 
 in were difficult problems for all concerned. The difficulties were in- 
 creased through the inability of the War Department to supply the 
 necessary blank forms when required. 
 
 The duties and work incident to muster in and the distractions at 
 and near mobilization camps were unfavorable to good instruction, 
 and little was accomplished except in the matter of recruit instruc- 
 tion. Upon arrival at the border, instruction was undertaken in a 
 serious and systematic way under the direction of district com- 
 
 1 See remarks of Quartermaster General, U. S. A., under heading of " Shipment of re- 
 serve supplies to mobilization points." 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 5 
 
 manders. Regular officers were detached from their own commands 
 as instructors and drill schedules were adopted calling for instruc- 
 tion periods of from four to six hours daily. Some advance was 
 made, but the lack of proper individual training and the limitations 
 of the National Guard officers were serious obstacles to progress. 
 
 The transportation of the National Guard to the border by rail 
 was accomplished expeditiously and without serious accident, incon- 
 venience, or privation to those transported. Up to date 156,414 have 
 been transported to the border and 47,707 have been returned for 
 muster out. Reported instances of lack of food and water on troop 
 trains have, when confirmed, been found to be due to the inexperi- 
 ence of National Guard officers in taking care of their own men. A 
 few cases were reported of depredations committed by members of 
 the National Guard at stopping places along the route. 
 
 Inspections of National Guard organizations in the Federal service 
 were begun early in the mobilization period for the purpose of ob- 
 taining exact data as to the composition and state of training of 
 these units. All the reports have not been received, but data has 
 been obtained from this source which may be considered as important 
 evidence concerning the merits of the National Guard system. 
 
 The mobilization of the National Guard and its dispatch to the 
 border was a great accomplishment, involving a multitude of details 
 and the cooperation of numerous officers, agents, and officials, who 
 gave to the task their best efforts. Whatever mistakes were made 
 were those of judgment and not of purpose. Undoubtedly the imme- 
 diate purpose of the call was attained. It may not be too much to say 
 that the knowledge and experience gained from the mobilization are 
 incidental advantages worth the cost. 
 
 The mobilization was the outcome of a national emergency de- 
 manding extra military service beyond that which could be furnished 
 by the Regular Army. The call for the National Guard occurred 
 just in time to put in operation the provisions of the new law under 
 which the National Guard is to be paid in time of peace by the Fed- 
 eral Government, and is to be relied upon for Federal service when- 
 ever that service may be required. Under the law the National Guard 
 had precedence. The Regular Army on the Mexican border could 
 be reenforced in no other way. 
 
 The physical examination at the muster in to Federal service 
 eliminated the physically unfit. The muster also disclosed that a 
 very considerable number of men failed to respond to the call. The 
 unfit, and the unwilling who failed to appear, were numerous 
 enough to seriously deplete the strength on the rolls at the date of 
 call, but more than enough new recruits were found to take the 
 places thus made vacant. This accession of men unwilling to join 
 the National Guard in time of peace and impelled to enlist through 
 the prospect of a war has given to the National Guard in the Federal 
 service a good deal of the character of a volunteer force. 
 
 Reluctance to serve when confronted with the realities of military 
 life was quickly shown in the large number of resignations of offi- 
 cers and applications for discharge by enlisted men. The desire for 
 release from the service became so extensive that a general rule of 
 denial of such requests had to be adopted by the War Department in 
 spite of the hardships on individuals which it was known such a 
 
6 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 course entailed. The fact that many individuals desired to be re- 
 leased on account of the losses of position and pecuniary sacrifices 
 which their military service imposed upon them is less a criticism 
 of the individual than it is of the voluntary plan of military service. 
 While faithful service by the National Guard has been the rule, 
 there is much evidence to snow that the duty on the border was con- 
 sidered irksome, and that many believed that they had not been 
 fairly treated. The outspoken ones have assumed to judge and to 
 declare that the emergency requiring their presence on the border 
 was past and that it was an injustice to retain them longer in service, 
 forgetting that the duty of a soldier is to perform the task that is set 
 before him, whatever it may be, and that military ends are frequently 
 attained more by the demonstration than by. the actual exercise of 
 military force. 
 
 W. A. MANN, 
 Brigadier General, General Staff, 
 
 Chief, Militia Bureau. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Introductory 3 
 
 Text of calls of the President of May 9 and June 18 9 
 
 Progress of mobilization 12 
 
 Recruiting for the National Guard; before and after mobilization. . 12 
 
 Mobilizations points; changes in mobilization points after the President's call, 
 
 etc 21 
 
 Shipment of reserve supplies to mobilization points 25 
 
 The effect on the personnel of oath required by new defense act; legal effect of 
 
 refusal or neglect to take oath prescribed in new defense act 30 
 
 Effect of mobilization on inspectors of small-arms practice, Organized Militia. . 33 
 Discharges from service after mobilization by governors or State officials, and 
 
 failures to respond to call 34 
 
 Discharge from service after mobilization on account of dependent relatives 40 
 
 Release from service of students of educational institutions 43 
 
 Discharge from service of Government employees and employees of firms 
 
 engaged in fabrication or supply of munitions 44 
 
 Discharge from Federal service effects a complete separation from the National 
 
 Guard, State as well as Federal service 45 
 
 Resignations of officers 46 
 
 Status and disposition of National Guard reservists created by national defense 
 
 act; decisions of Judge Advocate General 47 
 
 Advantages of divisional organization ^ 48 
 
 Traveling facilities supplied troops en route to border; reply to complaints 52 
 
 Physical examinations 53 
 
 Appointment of officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army to 
 
 commissions in the National Guard 58 
 
 Report of inspection by the assistant chief of staff 59 
 
 Animals and means of transportation for the National Guard 64 
 
 Smallpox vaccination and typhoid prophylaxis 70 
 
 Reports of inspectors general 71 
 
 Deductions from statistical data secured by inspectors general 94 
 
 Engineers 97 
 
 Signal troops 99 
 
 Sanitary troops 99 
 
 Camp sanitation and health of the National Guard 102 
 
 Notes of inspector-instructors on work of National Guard officers during mobili- 
 zation 103 
 
 Evidences of inefficiency 104 
 
 Laxity in physical examinations 106 
 
 Lack of training and unfitness for active service 114 
 
 Necessity for additional officers and noncommissioned officers at mobiliza- 
 tion points 
 
 Lack of knowledge of forms, books, returns, etc 
 
 Objections to sightseers and noncombatants 119 
 
 Value of correspondence schools 119 
 
 Excessive amount of paper work 
 
 More time needed for mobilization 122 
 
 Commendation 123 
 
 Reports of department commanders, etc 125 
 
 Table of all organizations called out and strength of same 143 
 
 Instruction of the National Guard : - 145 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 List of property short 147 
 
 Muster out 148 
 
 National Guard at war strength 149 
 
 What constitutes "first-line troops " 150 
 
 Report on National Guard along the border 151 
 
 Statistics 153 
 
 Extracts from' act of June 3, 1916 156 
 
 7 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA AND 
 NATIONAL GUARD IN 1916. 
 
 The average reader will perhaps better understand this subject if 
 divested of some of its legal and technical terms, and if we go back 
 and refer briefly to the constitutional authority and to certain of the 
 laws relating to this subject. 
 
 The principal constitutional provisions are as follows : 
 
 A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
 right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. (Art. II, 
 amendments. ) 
 
 The Congress shall have power * * * 
 
 To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, 
 suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. 
 
 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for 
 governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United 
 States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and 
 the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
 Congress. (Art. I, sec. 8.) 
 
 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
 United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the 
 actual service of the United States. (Art. II, sec. 2.) 
 
 Pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress in 1792 en- 
 acted the first militia law, which was until 1903 the only law relating 
 to the militia. It was to all intents and purposes, however, in many 
 of its provisions a dead letter. 
 
 In 1903 an act was passed by Congress " to promote the efficiency 
 of the militia, and for other purposes," popularly known as the Dick 
 bill. This, while falling short of being an ideal law on this subject, 
 was a long and very decided step toward placing this important 
 factor of our national defense on a proper footing. By this act the 
 militia was divided into two classes : 
 
 The Organized Militia to be known as the National Guard of the State, Terri- 
 tory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given 
 them by the laws of the respective States or Territories ; the remainder to be 
 known as the Reserve Militia. 
 
 The subject of national defense and " preparedness " having in 
 1915 and 1916 become the main issue of the day, Congress by act 
 approved June 3, 1916, provided, in what is known as the national 
 defense act, for a complete reorganization not only of the Regular 
 Army but of the Organized Militia as well. 
 
 By the terms of this act the militia consists of all able-bodied male 
 citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who 
 have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the 
 United States, who shall be more than 18 years of age and, except 
 as provided in the act, not more than 45 years of age, this militia 
 being divided into three classes the National Guard, the Naval 
 Militia, and the Unorganized Militia. 
 
10 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The National Guard by the terms of this act consists of the regu- 
 larly enlisted militia between the ages of 18 and 45 years, organized, 
 armed, and equipped as provided in the act, and of commissioned 
 officers between the ages of 21 and 64 years. No officer or enlisted 
 man of the National Guard of the several States can, however, be 
 recognized as a member of the National Guard until he shall have 
 taken the Federal oath provided in the national defense act. Until 
 this Federal oath was taken these State forces were known as the 
 Organized Militia. 
 
 The national defense act is referred to so frequently in the follow- 
 ing pages of this report, and its exact wording is at times so neces- 
 sary to a correct understanding of the subject under discussion, that 
 so much of this law as refers to the militia will be found appended 
 to this report. 
 
 There were two calls issued for this mobilization, viz. first, that 
 known as the first call and contained in telegram sent to the gover- 
 nors of the States of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico May 9. 1916, 
 as follows: 
 
 Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of the 
 United States from Mexico and the necessity for the proper protection of that 
 frontier, the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested in him 
 by the Constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia necessary for 
 that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed by the President to call into 
 the service of the United States, through you the Organized Militia of the 
 State of [State designated], which the President directs shall be concentrated 
 at the places designated by the commanding general, southern department, 
 now at El Paso, Tex., and which he has been directed to communicate to you. 
 Upon arrival of the Organized Militia at the designated places of rendezvous 
 they will be mustered into the service of the United States by officers of the 
 Regular Army designated for that purpose. Acknowledge. 
 
 NEWTON D. BAKER, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Second, that known as the second call, and contained in telegram of 
 June 18, addressed to the governors of all States except Texas, 
 Arizona. New Mexico, and Nevada, and in form as follows: 
 
 Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of 
 the United States from Mexico and the necessity for the proper protection of 
 that frontier, the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested 
 in him by the Constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia and 
 National Guard necessary for that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed 
 by. the President to call into the service of the United States forthwith, 
 through you, the folowing units of the Organized Militia and National Guard 
 of the State of [State designated], which the President directs shall be as- 
 sembled at the State mobilization point [location named] for muster into the 
 service of the United States [units designated]. 
 
 Organizations to be accepted into Federal service should have the minimum 
 peace strength now prescribed for Organized Militia, the maximum strength 
 at which organizations will be accepted and to which they should be raised 
 as soon as possible is prescribed in section 2, Tables of Organization, United 
 States Army. In case any regiment, battalion, or squadron now recognized as 
 such contains an insufficient number of organizations to enable it to conform 
 at muster to Regular Army Organization Tables the organizations necessary 
 to complete such units may be moved to mobilization camp and there inspected 
 under orders of the department commander to determine fitness for recogni- 
 tion as Organized Militia by the War Department. Circular 19, Division of 
 Militia Affairs, 1914, prescribes the organizations desired from each State as 
 part of the local tactical division, and only these organizations will be accepted 
 into service. It is requested that all officers of the Adjutant General's Depart- 
 ment, Quartermaster Corps, and Medical Corps, duly recognized as pertain- 
 ing to State headquarters under table 1, Tables of Organization, Organized 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 11 
 
 Militia, and not elsewhere required for duty in State administration, be ordered 
 to camp for duty as camp staff officers. Such number of these staff officers as 
 the department commander may determine may be mustered into the service 
 of the United States for the purpose of proper camp administration, and will 
 be mustered out when their services are no longer required. Where recognized 
 brigades or divisions are called into service from a State and the staff officers 
 pertaining to these units under Tables of Organization, United States Army, 
 will be mustered into service, and also the authorized inspectors of small-arms 
 practice pertaining thereto. Except for these two purposes of mobilization- 
 camp service and of the prescribed staff service with tactical units, officers of 
 State headquarters under table 1, above mentioned, will not be mustered into 
 service at this time. If tactical divisions are later organized, the requisite 
 additional number of staff officers w r ith rank as prescribed for divison staff 
 will, as far as practicable, be called into service from those States which have 
 furnished troops to such divisions. Acknowledge. 
 
 NEWTON D. BAKER, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 In making these calls the units were selected with reference to the 
 making up of complete divisions after arrival at the border concentra- 
 tion camps. Therefore not all the State troops were designated; 
 those left behind were mostly Infantry. The call included practically 
 all the serviceable Cavalry, Field Artillery, and auxiliary troops, 
 these being the branches in which the State troops are relatively 
 weak. 
 
 As the States were called upon to furnish so many units regi- 
 ments, for instance it naturally fell to the governors to select the 
 particular units which were to respond to the call. 
 
 In some cases the most efficient units were thus called out, but in 
 others those named were, as shown by the records of the Militia 
 Bureau, the least efficient. 
 
 The excitement at the moment was high, and the desire to get to 
 the front was general, and w<here, due to local or political considera- 
 tions, any but the most efficient units were called out, the result was 
 disappointing, not only as a discouragement to those of the better 
 organizations not mobilized, but the Federal Government thus failed 
 to get the best the State was able to produce. This is mentioned as 
 simply one of the many disadvantages inherent in a system of dual 
 control, the Federal Government being the loser. 
 
 Pursuant to the provisions of the United States Mustering Regula- 
 tions of 1914, mustering districts were established by the War De- 
 partment each consisting of a State within which the place of 
 mobilization previously designated by the War Department the 
 militia were sent to be examined, organized, and mustered into the 
 service of the United States. 
 
 For each geographical department a chief mustering officer and the 
 necessary assistant mustering officers, together with such officers of 
 the medical and other staff departments as were required, were de- 
 tailed by the department commander who has by paragraph 454, 
 Army Regulations, charge of all matters pertaining to the mobiliza- 
 tion of the Organized Militia in his territorial department and has 
 as a member of the department staff an officer in charge of militia 
 affairs, and by the regulation above quoted all officers on militia or 
 college duty in a State affected by the call automatically come under 
 the orders of the department commander, and were available there- 
 fore for detail as mustering officers. 
 
12 
 
 California 2, 090 
 
 Connecticut 1, 764 
 
 Illinois 4, 608 
 
 Kansas 1, 151 
 
 Maine 1, 043 
 
 Massachusetts 5, 636 
 
 Missouri 1, 641 
 
 PROGRESS OF MOBILIZATION. 
 
 The first militia organization of the call of June 18 to reach the 
 border was the First Illinois Infantry, which left Springfield 10.15 
 p. m. June 28 to 12.20 a. m. June 29, arriving at San Antonio 5.30 
 p. m. June 30 to 12.15 a. m. July 1. 
 
 At midnight July 4 troops from the following-named States had 
 reached their border stations: 
 
 New Jersey 1, 552 
 
 New York 3, 388 
 
 Oregon 1, 415 
 
 Pennsylvania 1, 613 
 
 Utah 148 
 
 Vermont 906 
 
 Washington 205 
 
 The longest distance was traveled by Connecticut troops, 2,916 
 miles. The shortest distance was traveled by Louisiana troops, 608 
 miles. 
 
 When we remember that the air-line distance from Paris to Berlin 
 is only about 650 miles, we are afforded a means of comparison be- 
 tween distances connected with our recent concentration and those 
 which obtain abroad. 
 
 RECRUITING FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD; BEFORE AND AFTER 
 
 MOBILIZATION. 
 
 In August, 1915, recommendation came from the adjutant gen- 
 eral of one of the States recommending that the War Department 
 " prescribe and require a certain method of recruiting in time of war 
 to be adopted by the militia while they are still a State force, and 
 further to outline and put into effect a plan to be folloAved when the 
 militia becomes a United States force." 
 
 Much of this problem, so far as it relates to time of war, was subse- 
 quently solved in the law embodied in section 79 of the act of Con- 
 gress approved June 3, 1916, which, under certain conditions, directs 
 that a draft be made on the unorganized militia for the purpose of 
 keeping reserve battalions at the proper strength with the ultimate 
 purpose of transferring men from these battalions to organizations 
 in the field that the latter may be maintained at war strength. 
 
 This provision, however, is inoperative except in time of war dur- 
 ing all other conditions it is still a problem to be dealt with. 
 
 A memorandum on " Recruiting for the Organized Militia *' was 
 (Aug. 25, 1915) prepared for the Chief of Staff by the Chief of the 
 War College Division and referred to the Chief, Division of Militia 
 Affairs, for comment. This comment by the Chief, Militia Bureau, 
 was given in a letter (Sept. 4, 1915) to the Chief of Staff and covers 
 the views held in the Militia Bureau so completely that it is here 
 given in full : 
 
 1. The memorandum on the above subject prepared by the Chief of the War 
 College Division, under date of August 25, 1915, having been referred to me 
 for comment, I beg to submit the following : 
 
 2. The War Department now sets up certain standards in matters of organiza- 
 tion, armament, and discipline, and requires the Organized Militia to conform to 
 these standards in order to be entitled to certain funds appropriated by the 
 Federal Government. The War Department sets up other standards, to which it 
 advises the States to conform, without exacting any penalty for noncompliance. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 13 
 
 3. The adjutant general of Massachusetts writes that his State law provides 
 for a State recruiting system that he considers unsatisfactory. He says that, 
 notwithstanding this State law, he can put into effect any recruiting system 
 required by the War Department. It is believed he has reference to a provision 
 of Massachusetts law providing for general conformity to Federal standards. 
 
 4. Aside from this Massachusetts case, it is desirable that the Organized 
 Militia be instructed now in the recruiting system they will have to adopt when 
 called into the United States service. It is desirable that the system used in 
 State service be as much like this Federal system as possible. If the War De- 
 partment publishes now an order explaining the recruiting system to be put 
 into effect when the Organized Militia is in the United States service, it is be- 
 lieved that the States will voluntarily adopt such system, as far as practicable, 
 for use for State purposes. 
 
 5. It is the understanding of this office : 
 
 (a) That the Organized Militia is in the United States service from .the time 
 of its appearance at the place of company rendezvous. (See Opinion, Judge 
 Advocate General, June 18, 1915.) 
 
 (&) That while the Organized Militia is in the United States service, recruit- 
 ing is conducted not by the State but by the War Department. 
 
 (c) That existing orders providing for the recruitment of the Regular Army 
 do not fully provide for conditions that may arise in the recruitment of the 
 Organized Militia in the United States service. 
 
 6. As illustrating the character of recruiting problems to be solved, the fol- 
 lowing situations are presented : 
 
 (a) With the appearance of each unit at its company rendezvous, recruiting 
 to war strength will presumably begin. Federal blank forms will be needed. 
 How will these be supplied and how will the recruiting officers be instructed in 
 their use? 
 
 (&) In view of the large number of recruits to be secured, it will probably 
 be necessary for each company of a regiment to do its own recruiting. A. R. 
 840 provides for recruiting by regiment or post only. 
 
 (c) If a unit not fully recruited is ordered to its mobilization camp, will it 
 leave a detachment behind to get additional recruits? Who will compose such 
 detachment? How will the recruiting officer learn his duties? The memorandum 
 of the War College Division suggests that these matters be provided for in the 
 order or proclamation calling the militia forth. Would it not be better to give 
 these instructions now? 
 
 (d) The act of April 25, 1914, provides for recruit rendezvous and depots. 
 Who compose the personnel of these establishments? What methods do they 
 apply in regard to recruiting, training recruits, disbursing public funds, etc.? 
 How do they learn their duties? 
 
 7. It is again recommended that an order be issued covering, as far as pos- 
 sible, the details of the recruiting system to be put into effect when vol- 
 unteers are raised, or the Organized Militia called into the United States service. 
 Confusion must result if the issue of these instructions is delayed until the 
 emergency occurs. 
 
 8. It is believed that the blank forms incidental to recruiting and muster in 
 should be issued to the States and the cost charged against their allotments. 
 And it is thought that mobilization exercises should be frequently held as a 
 part of routine armory training. 
 
 A. L. MILLS, 
 Brigadier General, General Staff. 
 
 It was decided in January, 1916, that the United States may pro- 
 ceed to recruit Organized Militia in the service of the United States 
 without reference to the wishes of the individual States concerned. 
 
 In consequence of the above it was decided that paragraph 36 of 
 the Mustering Eegulations should hereafter read as follows : 
 
 Where a State fails to supply recruits necessary to maintain its militia organi- 
 zations in the service of the United States at the prescribed strength, recruits 
 may be enlisted or reenlisted in the manner provided for enlistment and re- 
 enlstment in Section 2 of the Volunteer Army act of April 25, 1914. 
 
 The object desired, of course, was to get recruits promptly and with 
 as little effort and expense as possible, and to assist the States in 
 
14 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 this matter the Chief of Staff approved, on April 1, 1916, of the rec- 
 ommendation of the Chief of Division of Militia Affairs, that 
 there be printed and issued to the militia a circular to include in one 
 pamphlet all available information on recruiting and on the physical 
 examination of recruits. This was issued in the shape of Circular 
 No. 5, Division of Militia Affairs, April 6, 1916. 
 
 The next step taken was on May 26, 1916, when the Secretary of 
 War approved of a plan for Federal recruiting in case of the Texas 
 National Guard then in Federal service, instead of same being con- 
 ducted by State authorities. 
 
 About a month later (June 23) the following letter was addressed 
 by the Chief, Militia Bureau, to the adjutants general of the several 
 States and of the District cf Columbia : 
 
 The Secretary of War desires Unit the following loiter of May 20, 1916, to 
 the governor of Texas, which is self-explanatory as to its purpose, be brought to 
 the attention of the governor, to the end that prompt and practical measures 
 for recruiting can be at once initiated and maintained with the cooperation and 
 assistance of the State authorities : 
 
 "Among the problems confronting us in connection with the induction into 
 United States service of the Organised Militia recently called forth is that of 
 their proper recruitment and maintenance at authorized strength while in the 
 service of the United States. 
 
 "Your excellency appreciates, I am sure, the legal questions and difficulties 
 which arise under such circumstances. It is practically impossible under the 
 existing system and the existing law to draw clear-cut lines of demarcation 
 which will define in every case the responsibility of the State as contrasted to 
 the responsibility of the Federal Government. The efficient administration of 
 troops requires, it seems to me, that such questions lie approached and settled 
 in a spirit of cooperation between the State and National Government, with the 
 sole idea of securing efficiency by practical and prompt action. 
 
 " Gen. Funston, commanding the Southern Department, has telegraphed to 
 the War Department requesting instructions as to his proper procedure in order 
 to raise the Organized Militia in the service of the United States to the desired 
 strength. Appreciating the fact that your administrative officers are busily 
 occupied and that State agencies for recruiting would no doubt need to be 
 organized anew, and with the further desire to avoid unnecessary expense. I 
 have directed that the Federal recruiting agencies be utilized for recruiting for 
 the Organized Militia in the service of the United States and that the necessary 
 instructions be issued at once to that effect, in order that the proper strength 
 may be promptly reached. 
 
 " In this connection it is hoped that the State authorities may see fit to lend 
 any assistance to the recruiting parties which may facilitate their efforts. 
 
 " Trusting that we shall secure from this action the results we both desire, I 
 remain, my dear governor, 
 
 " Very truly, yours. NEWTON D. BAKER, 
 
 "Secretary of War." 
 
 A. L. MILLS, 
 Brigadier General, General Staff. 
 
 Telegraphic instructions on .July 4 were issued as follows to the 
 commanding generals of the Central and Southern Departments : 
 
 Reference to telegram to you that recruiting for militia in United States 
 service will be conducted by Federal agencies in cooperation with State au- 
 thorities, it is intended, first, that recruiting shall be done by officers in Federal 
 service, either Regulars or National Guardsmen in the service of the United 
 States; second, that recruits accepted shall take new oath, and no further act 
 is required to make them members of organizations for which enlisted ;' third. 
 that recruits shall then be sent by recruiting officers to" designated camps of 
 instruction, which, in some cases, will be convenient Army posts, with the view 
 of saving transportation and utilizing available administrative machinery. The 
 provisions of section 79, national-defense act, and the methods to be pursued 
 when joint resolution 242, authorizing a draft, becomes effective have been 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 15 
 
 under consideration for some time by the Judge Advocate General and you will 
 be promptly advised when final conclusion is reached as to the methods to be 
 pursued. Pending this information you may utilize the services of such officers 
 and men of the National Guard already mustered into the service of the United 
 States and still within the limits of your department for recruiting purposes as 
 may seem desirable. Civilian physicians may be engaged to make the prescribed 
 physical examinations when necessary, as indicated in paragraph 20, Mustering 
 Regulations, Organized Militia. 
 
 MCCAIN. 
 
 The attention of the Militia Bureau having been called by the 
 adjutant general of Georgia to the fact that in his State there was 
 already a carefully prepared plan of State recruitment, the Chief, 
 Militia Bureau, 011 July o recommended that " plans already made by 
 any State for recruiting for organizations before their actual muster 
 into the United States service should not be disturbed, subject to the 
 single provision that officers and enlisted men, Organized Militia, 
 of such recruiting parties, must, under the law, present themselves 
 for' muster and can not for that reason be absent at home station 
 on recruiting duty when the time appointed for such muster arrives." 
 
 The next step taken was on July 11, when a telegram was sent to 
 the adjutants general of all States except Arizona, Nevada, New 
 Mexico, and Texas, as follows: 
 
 To provide proper recruiting agencies for the National Guard now in tne 
 service of the United States, adjutants general of States will submit by tele- 
 graph names of well-qualified National Guard officers at rate of three for each 
 regiment and one for each separate battalion or other separate unit now in 
 service of the United States with a view to their muster into United States 
 service as recruiting officers. Officers so named will not be above the grades of 
 major, they should be willing to serve, and should be active members of the 
 National Guard exclusive of those already mustered into the service of the 
 United States as part of State's contingent under President's call. 
 
 Question having arisen as to whether the services of postmasters 
 might as provided in section 27 of the act of June 3, 1916, be utilized 
 in procuring the enlistment of recruits, this was answered in the 
 negative, us the law reads: "Recruits for the Army.'' 
 
 Several of the inspector instructors have pointed out the fact that 
 recruiting was most brisk \\hen companies were at their home towns 
 and excitement was high. 
 
 After the duties of recruiting for the National Guard were taken 
 over by the Federal service, the number of enlistments, as shown by 
 the enlistment papers sent to The Adjutant General's Office, was: 
 
 In June prior to the second call 75 
 
 From June 18 to July 1 2, 109 
 
 During the month of July 4,877 
 
 During the month of August 3, 793 
 
 During the month of September 1,330 
 
 During the month of October 2,923 
 
 Total 15,107 
 
 To go back and cite a few of the local conditions existing earlier 
 in the year: 
 
 In February last it was realized by those connected with the Na- 
 tional Guard of New York that a call on the National Guard was 
 probable, and strenuous efforts were made, particularly in the two 
 Buffalo regiments, to recruit to the proper strength. A committee in 
 charge of the work was maintained by the 'recruiting office for more 
 than a month in one of the principal office buildings in Buffalo. 
 
16 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Manufacturers, business men, professional men, and all newspapers 
 supported the movement to the fullest extent, lending financial aid 
 and much free advertising to the movement, which was terminated 
 by a mass meeting attended by between 4,000 and 5,000 people. 
 
 The results of the campaign were, however, not as satisfactory as 
 was hoped for ; the Seventy-fourth Regiment was increased from 649 
 on February 7 to 678 on March 31, and the Sixty-fifth Infantry in 
 the same period increased its strength from 469 to 720. Recruiting 
 dodgers were widely distributed by the recruiting committee, but 
 these were met by antipreparedness dodgers widely distributed by 
 the leaders of labor unions and Socialists of Buffalo, in order to 
 combat the efforts of the National Guard in their recruiting cam- 
 paign. The opposition of the labor unions and Socialists is undoubt- 
 edly one of the principal causes of the small strength of the Buffalo 
 regiments. 
 
 Somewhat later similar efforts were made in Greater New York, 
 and .for the week ending May 13, 443 recruits were secured ; for that 
 ending May 20, 511 ; and for that ending May 26, 538, making an 
 aggregate of 1,492, or an increment of about 15 per cent to the en- 
 listed strength. 
 
 Another instance of the strenuous though unsuccessful efforts to 
 secure recruits is shown by the condition of affairs in Massachusetts, 
 where there were on July 28 no less than 20 recruiting parties, each 
 consisting of an officer., a sergeant, a corporal, and a private, mustered 
 in and sent out to stations at various points in the State. 
 
 On August 26, however, the senior assistant mustering officer in 
 Massachusetts reported that they had enlisted only 130 men. He 
 reported at the same time that of 1,000 or 1,100 members of the Or- 
 ganized Militia who declined to take the new Federal oath, only 278 
 had reported for muster in and 100 of those had submitted applica- 
 tions for discharge on account of dependent relatives. 
 
 A report from Capt. - , Signal Corps, National Guard of 
 
 , who was ordered in September from the Southern Depart- 
 ment to , for the purpose of recruiting men necessary to ex- 
 pand his company into a signal battalion, illustrates the difficulties 
 encountered in securing recruits. The following is an extract from 
 his report: 
 
 I arrived in - . I found a condition very unfavorable to recruiting. 
 Men who were anxious to rush to the border with troops on June 19, the 
 day the National Guard was called, now considered the uncertainty of the 
 situation and refused to join. On that date I had several hundred experienced 
 electricians and telegraphers tentatively organized into signal companies, and 
 with prospective officers and noncommissioned officers assigned. For nearly 
 two months scores of these men met each week and drilled. They believed 
 we were going into Mexico and they wanted to see service. September 26 
 the situation was entirely changed. Public sentiment, in fact, seemed to be 
 unfavorable to the military service and especially as to doing duty under 
 present conditions on the Mexican border. The newspapers of - , either 
 purposely or unwittingly, seemed to seek every opportunity to fire the prejudice 
 of the people and especially the tradesmen to whom we were forced to appeal 
 for the character of men needed in the Signal Corps. The threatened strike 
 of the railway trainmen, which had just been settled, hurt our cause. Nearly 
 10,000 National Guardsmen had been called from the border when that strike 
 was imminent. Another strike at that time was also pending. Then, too, 
 on the very day I arrived in , the - Infantry, with its home station 
 at , was mustered out and the newspapers carried great scare-head 
 columns declaring that the authorities had refused to transport these men 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 17 
 
 from the mobilization point to their homes. For days disgruntled officers 
 and sore-headed men went ahout the streets and to public places heroically 
 lying ahout the terrible hardships they tried to make people believe they 
 had bravely endured. Letters and interviews of this character were published 
 in the papers. 
 
 However, after all this effort, the authority for expansion of the 
 Signal Corps Company into a battalion was, by reason of 
 
 the return of - - troops from the border, revoked and the men 
 recruited were ordered discharged. 
 
 These unsatisfactory efforts at recruiting received, when the call 
 was made June 18, a further setback by the failures to respond to 
 the call and by the failures to pass the physical examination after 
 muster-in, which is discussed at length elsewhere in this report. 
 
 The requirement (as well as necessity) of increasing to war 
 strength all organizations called into the service of the United 
 States made a still further and very urgent demand for recruits, 
 which the Militia Bureau attempted to meet by reserve battalions 
 under section 79 of the act of June 3, 1916, but the Judge Advocate 
 General decided that such units could be formed only in time of war. 
 
 The following, pertaining to the general subject of recruiting for 
 the National Guard, are extracts from reports of inspector-instruc- 
 tors. The brief extracts make somewhat disconnected reading, but 
 they are interesting and valuable as throwing side lights on this gen- 
 eral subject from many trained observers engaged in mustering duty 
 in widely separated sections of the country. 
 
 These extracts convey also an idea of the difficulties which the 
 mustering officers have experienced and the perplexing problems; 
 presented for their solution while working to the limit of human 
 endurance in transforming State into Federal troops. 
 
 The troops in this State have received no encouragement from the local 
 newspapers. Their articles have been such as to practically stop recruiting. 
 
 It is believed that some men who are now absent without leave have de- 
 serted as a result of the articles that these papers wrote when these two 
 battalions were not moved to the border as soon as mustered in. 
 
 It is also believed that desertions will be numerous unless they are sent 
 to the border at an early date. (Extract from report of First Lieut. U. M. 
 Diller, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of - , July 17, 1916.) 
 
 The State newspapers are telling the people that the trouble with Mexico 
 is over, that the regiment will never see active service and may not leave its 
 present camp. No recruits are presenting themselves. (Extract from report 
 
 of First Lieut. James YV. Everington, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of , 
 
 July 22, 1916.) 
 
 HARRY RICE, SOCIALIST. Harry Rice, a socialist street-corner orator, engaged 
 in distributing a printed circular (copy inclosed), handed a circular to Second 
 Lieut. R. M. Robinson, battalion quartermaster and commissary, First Infantry, 
 on duty near the St. Paul armory as recruiting officer; Lieut. Robinson promptly 
 arrested Rice and turned him over to the St. Paul police; attorneys for the city, 
 State, and United States are looking up the laws with a view to the man v s 
 punishment. Later it was learned that he was being prosecuted for obstructing 
 and interfering with a National Guard officer in the discharge of his duty. 
 (Extract from report of Lieut. Col. Arthur Johnson, Inf., inspector-instructor 
 N. G. of - , June 21, 1916.) 
 
 [Copy of printed circular.] 
 
 YOUNG MEN : The lowest aim in your life is to become a soldier. The good 
 soldier never tries to distinguish right from wrong. He never thinks; never 
 reasons ; he only obeys. If he is ordered to fire on his fellow citizens, on his 
 friends, on his neighbors, on his relatives, he obeys without hesitation. If he is- 
 
 7203116 2 
 
18 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 ordered to fire down a crowded street when the poor are clamoring for bread, 
 he obeys, and sees the gray hairs of age stained with red and the life tide gush- 
 ing from the breasts of women, feeling neither remorse nor sympathy. If he 
 is ordered off as a firing squad to execute a hero or benefactor, he fires without 
 hesitation, though he knows the bullets will pierce the noblest heart that ever 
 beat in human breast. 
 
 A good soldier is a blind, heartless, soulless, murderous machine. He is not 
 a man. He is not a brute, for brutes only kill in self-defense. All that is human 
 in him, all that is divine in him, all that constitutes the man has been sworn 
 away when he took the enlistment roll. His mind, his conscience, aye, his very 
 soul, are in the keeping of his officer. 
 
 No man can fall lower than a soldier it is a depth beneath which we can not 
 go. Keep the boys out of the Army. It is hell. 
 
 Down with the Army and the Navy. We don't need killing institutions. We 
 need life-giving institutions. 
 
 By JACK LONDON. 
 
 The governor of the State was without the State on the date of the order for 
 mobilization, but returned on June 20, 1916, and took charge of the recruiting 
 for the regiment. This was conducted in a very haphazard manner. Officers, 
 whose services could have been used at their home stations, were ordered into 
 
 and then ordered back to their home stations; other officers were sent 
 
 out to other towns; in many cases officers ordered to return to within 
 24 hours after their arrival at the town ordered to. Civilians were given letters 
 of appointment as " recruiting officers " for the National Guard of - . 
 These men apparently proceeded to send in any male who desired a trip to 
 the mobilization point. (Extract from report of Lieut. Garber, inspector- 
 instructor on N. G. of .) 
 
 So far as I can learn officers and men are very pessimistic as to being able 
 to secure recruits for their regiments. Practically no recruits are being received 
 here at present. (Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. Mcllroy, Inf., 
 inspector-instructor, N. G. of , August 12, 1916.) 
 
 Seventeen officers, largely physical rejects, were mustered for recruiting duty 
 in this State, but were soon mustered out, having accomplished nothing. The 
 names of other officers and men now on duty with regiments here have been 
 forwarded to Central Department for recruiting duty. (Extract from report 
 of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor on N. G. of .) 
 
 Great numbers of the men were obviously physically and mentally unfit and 
 should never have been brought young, anemic, flat-chested boys, 18 to 20 
 years of age, and weighing from 95 to 105 pounds. (Extract from report of 
 Capt. Grissinger, M. C. on N. G. of .) 
 
 A great deal of comment was caused during the mobilization by the presenta- 
 tion for muster in with the consent of the State authorities of 36 men con- 
 tingently paroled from the Greendale Reformatory. These men were not 
 accepted for service and their status for discharge raised questions very 
 difficult for solution. They were enlisted under the Organized Militia oath and 
 brought to Fort Thomas. There, with the other men of the company, they took 
 the so-called " new oath," when it was found the mustering officer would not 
 accept them, new muster-in rolls, with their names omitted, were made by the 
 company commander and the papers with the new oath and contract of enlist- 
 ment to which they had subscribed destroyed. Their status, therefore, was 
 difficult to define. The matter got into the press, and was an all-around un- 
 fortunate incident. (Extract from report of Capt. Gibson, inspector-instructor 
 on N. G. of- , Sept. 24.) 
 
 As indicated in my previous report, all attention has been devoted to getting 
 men to fill the regiment. At least two outsiders have been commissioned as a 
 reward for bringing in men. Two vacancies in the grade of captain now r exist, 
 and it is possible that similar or even less proper considerations will enter into 
 the appointment of officers to fill these places. Such action would have a bad 
 effect on the personnel. Such has occurred already, and it is unfortunate. My 
 relations with the State authorities are such that I have felt free to advise 
 strongly against it. 
 
 Muster in of - - troops does not progress in a satisfactory way, the 
 State authorities having largely discontinued efforts at recruiting since comple- 
 tion of regiment. The sanitary detachment lacks a few men and the band 
 lacks about 20. (Extract from report of First Lieut. B. F. Ristine, Inf., 
 inspector instructor, N. G. of - , July 26, 1916.) 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 19 
 
 Since about June 1 all energies have been devoted to getting men. Officers 
 have been taken away from the regiment, regardless of all other considerations 
 and interests, and have been sent to scour the State for men, even going over into 
 Texas. When muster in of companies was started it was necessary to transfer 
 men from the other companies to the company to be mustered, and this has 
 been continued and repeated until the situation has become such that no com- 
 pany can be said to pertain strictly to any given locality. This it is con- 
 templated to correct by wholesale transfers after completion of the regimental 
 organization. It means that in no company, even now, is there the feeling that 
 the personnel is fixed, and that in each company there are many outsiders in 
 whom no considerable interest need be taken. In some cases it has been neces- 
 sary to reduce noncommissioned officers for the purpose of transfer, and this 
 has not tended toward good feeling. (Extract from report of Lieut. Ristine, 
 inspector instructor, N. G. , July 5). 
 
 Since last week's report the recruiting officers for war have been ordered in 
 and State recruiting offices opened up by retired officers and others, who are to 
 secure men and forward them to this camp at State expense for enlistment here. 
 During the week the losses have equaled the gains, as they have been eliminat- 
 ing the men who should never have been enlisted. They are also discharging men 
 who have dependent families. (Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, in- 
 spector instructor, N. G. of , July 1.) 
 
 The adjutant general, in conversation with me this day, stated that there 
 would be less trouble in getting the required number of men if these troops 
 could be concentrated at Fort Benjamin Harrison and later sent to the border, 
 but that if kept indefinitely in their home towns the same recruiting troubles 
 of the past would be repeated and interest probably quickly lost. He also 
 stated that recent instructions regarding the acceptance of these troops at the 
 armory at their home station would also cause embarrassment, since all armory 
 rentals had been withdrawn, now that the organized troops had left the State, 
 and this feature introduced difficulties that could be largely avoided if the 
 troops could be concentrated. Aside from these questions, it would seem impor- 
 tant from a standpoint of training (particularly of new units) if they could 
 be concentrated for that purpose alone. (Extract from report of Capt. Clar- 
 ence Deems, jr., 6th F. A., inspector instructor, N. G. of - , July 31, 1916. ) 
 
 As the troops were ordered to Texas on the 26th of June, there was not time 
 for any instruction to speak of, and many men were taken only because they 
 were uniformed. As soon as the troops left recruiting began to lessen, and as 
 the strength of the companies leaving here was 65 taken and about 35 remain- 
 ing, I doubt if ever the companies will be recruited to war strength. The 
 recruits left here in camp will be sent to their companies when uniformed, 
 equipped, and have sufficient training. (Extract from report of First Lieut. 
 J. R. McGinness, Inf., inspector instructor, N. G. of , July 5, 1916. ) 
 
 The losses of the Third Infantry on account of disqualification and other 
 causes are so great and enlistments are so slow that I would recommend that 
 as soon as all the men who are to be discharged are discharged the regimental 
 commander transfer to one battalion sufficient officers and men from the other 
 two to bring that battalion up to authorized strength (peace) and then send it 
 to the border ; the remaining battalions to be filled up in the same way as rap- 
 idly as possible. This, I believe, will stimulate recruiting. (Extract from 
 
 report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Inf., inspector instructor. N. G. of , July 9, 
 
 1916.) 
 
 After the departure of the organizations and recruits for the border, orders 
 were received to muster in parties of officers and enlisted men for recruiting 
 duty for the National Guard. For this purpose, seven recruiting parties were 
 mustered in for Connecticut. Each recruiting party consisted of one officer, 
 two noncommissioned officers, and one private. By the time the recruiting 
 parties had reached their stations and were ready to enlist the recruits, the 
 enthusiasm of the call for troops was dead and the recruiting parties had very 
 slight success in recruiting the troops. I questioned a number of officers de- 
 tailed in this duty as to the reason of their failure to secure recruits, and they 
 were of the opinion that the large number of physically rejected men was 
 responsible for the condition. (Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, 
 inspector-instructor, on N. G. of : , Sept. 19.) 
 
 In response to the President's call of June 19, 1916, the Second Infantry, 
 National Guard - , assembled at the company rendezvous on that date. 
 The strength of the regiment was 48 officers and 912 enlisted men. Recruit- 
 ing was commenced at once. On June 22 the strength was 49 officers and 
 
20 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 1,217 enlisted men. On that date those who were armed and equipped were 
 brought to the mobilization camp at - , leaving one officer, one sergeant, 
 and one corporal at each company rendezvous to care for the recruits and 
 continue recruiting. If there had been blankets enough to care for the 
 recruits it would have been better to have brought them to the mobilization 
 camp at this time. On June 27, all recruits and recruiting parties were 
 called in. The regimental strength was 50 officers and 1,343 enlisted men. 
 Several recruiting stations had been opened by the State authorities, but these 
 were called in in compliance with a telegram from the Eastern Department 
 which stated that future recruiting would be conducted from that head- 
 quarters. This was a mistake, as at that time excitement throughout the State 
 was high and many recruits could have been obtained. The new recruiting 
 stations were not opened until the latter part of July. By that time the 
 excitement had died down and numerous letters to relatives and friends 
 from individuals in the Second Regiment, which by that time was at Laredo, 
 Tex., had had their effect in causing very few applicants for enlistment. 
 Results would have been better if the State authorities had continued their 
 recruiting campaign. 
 
 Due to the cooperation of the Maine Central and Bangor and Aroostook 
 Railroads with the State authorities, the mobilization was accomplished 
 promptly and with very little confusion. (Extract from report of Capt. Niles, 
 inspector-instructor, on N. G. of - ,- Sept. 12.) 
 
 After the departure of the organizations and recruits for the border, orders 
 were received to muster in parties of officers and enlisted men for recruiting 
 duty for the National Guard. For this purpose seven recruiting parties were 
 mustered in for - . Each recruiting party consisted of one officer, two 
 noncommissioned officers, and one private. By the time the recruiting parties 
 had reached their stations and were ready to enlist the recruits, the enthusiasm 
 of the call for troops was dead and the recruiting parties had very slight suc- 
 cess in recruiting the troops. I questioned a number of officers detailed in this 
 duty as to the reason of their failure to secure recruits, and they were of 
 the" opinion that the large number of physically rejected men was responsible 
 for the condition. (Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector 
 instructor, on N. G. of - , Sept. 19. ) 
 
 The following resum of my observations on the mobilization of the Or- 
 ganized Militia, State of - , is submitted : 
 
 Before the call of June 18, many of the companies had fallen below the 
 minimum strength, and the efforts of the company commanders after the call 
 to recruit up to war strength resulted in bringing large numbers of unfit 
 men to the mobilization camp. I do not believe this would have been so to 
 the same extent had there been a popular response to the call, but it is my 
 observation that in this State at least there was very little general desire on 
 the part of able-bodied young men to join the colors. 
 
 I do not believe the system of recruiting for the National Guard is on the 
 proper basis. It would be immensely cheaper and far more satisfactory to 
 have 50 men in a company brought to the mobilization camp, 97 per 
 cent of whom would be accepted, than to bring 75 men and have to 
 return 25 of them as physically unfit, with the attendant costs of rations, 
 pay, and transportation, 'and the administrative difficulties of discharging 
 them. 
 
 Officers of the Medical Corps could be placed on duty to make the rounds 
 of all company stations, and no recruits should be finally accepted until 
 passed by these officers. The views held by Army surgeons as to the stand- 
 ard required of recruits and those held by most civilian doctors are so wide 
 apart as to bear little resemblance. 
 
 If the States are unable to meet the Army physical standards, it is demon- 
 strated that as a military system the National Guard is a failure. 
 
 Discharging large numbers of men seems to have a depressing effect on 
 enlistments and is bad in that effect also. Under the present system it takes 
 too long to clothe and equip men who sire recruited after the call, who are 
 not clothed and equipped at the company rendezvous and who wander about 
 the mobilization camp in the most unkempt fashion, waiting for the inven- 
 tory of State property to be made and the physically unfit to be designated. 
 This inventory of property is an extremely tedious process. At least one 
 property officer to each regiment instead of one to a brigade should be pro- 
 vided. My recommendation where time is the chief consideration would be to 
 hold no inventory at all but have the National Guard property officers submit 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 21 
 
 requisitions for their probable requirements and fill them at once. The 
 report of the preceding annual Federal inspection with any filled requisitions 
 added thereto being taken as the basis of settlement with the State after the 
 troops were mustered out. (Extract from report of Capt. Gibson, inspector 
 instructor, on N. G. of - , Sept. 24.) 
 
 Great difficulty in obtaining recruits, though State has been scoured by re- 
 cruiting parties. 
 
 Company I, from - , though not recognized by War Department, was 
 ordered to camp at State expense. Three officers and 13 men were found 
 physically - , and the remainder would not enlist in other organizations, 
 so all men were sent home, at an expense of $1,500 to the State. (Extract from 
 report of Capt. Bates, inspector-instructor on N. G. of - , July 15.) 
 
 MOBILIZATION POINTS. 
 
 CHANGES IN MOBILIZATION POINTS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S CALL. 
 
 As far back as June, 1910, and to an extent for several years pre- 
 viously, the question of the selection of mobilization points had 
 received consideration at the War Department. 
 
 It was contemplated that such selection be made after consulta- 
 tion with the State authorities, and an effort was made to arrive at 
 a definite decision as to the location of such points. Such a step was 
 deemed an essential to any mobilization plan which might be de- 
 vised. 
 
 Points regarded as suitable were tentatively selected and the 
 views of State authorities invited. Blank forms were sent to them 
 on which quite complete information was collected on such sub- 
 jects as railroads, side tracks, water supply, sewerage system, store- 
 houses, target ranges, etc. 
 
 On this basis such places were selected and provisionally listed at 
 the War Department as State mobilization camps and letters written 
 (Sept. 11, 1911) to the commanding generals of the several di- 
 visions directing that they cause an inspection to be made of such 
 of the camps named as were located within the limits of their com- 
 mands, and after full consultation with the State authorities to de- 
 termine whether or not the camps were suitable for mobilization pur- 
 poses. 
 
 It was further directed that the necessary indicated data concern- 
 ing each such camp be obtained and kept up to date by yearly inspec- 
 tion and revision. This data included a contoured map of the camp 
 ground on a scale of 6 inches to the mile. 
 
 In order that such shelters for troops as might be constructed 
 should be uniform in design, blue-print plans, estimates, etc., for 
 shelters of troops at mobilization camps were made. Copies of these 
 were sent to each State. 
 
 Although, as will be seen above, efforts were made several years 
 ago to have mobilization camps in each State selected and pre- 
 pared, this was not always done in a completely satisfactory manner. 
 
 The policy of the War Department on several points in this con- 
 nection is indicated in an indorsement (2125390) of April 4, 1914, to 
 the commanding general, Eastern Departnient : 
 
 1. It is essential that each State have a mobilization camp selected and pre- 
 pared in time of peace, so as to prevent delay in mobilizing in time of war. A 
 mobilization camp may or may not be suitable for a maneuver site, and at- 
 tempt should not be made to combine the two, when such combination will 
 result in poor facilities for mobilization or increased expense for making the 
 
22 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 site suitable for maneuvers. As a rule it is safe to treat the two subjects 
 independently. 
 
 2. The purchase of maneuver sites and concentration camps for the Organ- 
 ized Militia is not recommended, but it is believed that each State should ac- 
 quire a permanent mobilization camp. All such camps should be so prepared in 
 peace time that troops can be made comfortable upon their arrival. Provi- 
 sions for adequate water supply and sanitary arrangements should be made in 
 peace time, and the systems actually installed and kept in repairs. Where a 
 State owns its mobilization camp, it will naturally take more interest and pride 
 in the preparation and maintenance of the camp, with the result that, in addi- 
 tion to the necessities already mentioned, other facilities, such as storehouses, 
 railroad sidings, etc., will probably be provided. 
 
 3. Sites for mobilization camps that are only temporary will always be sub- 
 ject to change and probably never in condition to receive troops. A change in 
 the location of a State mobilization camp means a change in all plans of the 
 War Department with reference to supplying and equipping the troops. 
 
 4. State authorities should be encouraged in every way possible to provide 
 permanent mobilization camps and should be impressed with the fact that they 
 alone will be responsible for any discomforts, suffering, or criticism that may 
 result from lack of adequate preparation in peace time for such camps. 
 
 Department commanders were also directed to keep the War De- 
 partment informed by telegraph of any changes in mobilization sites, 
 which changes should not be made without good reason, as such 
 changes create confusion in supply departments where mobilization 
 supplies are packed and marked for shipment to mobilization points 
 already selected. These changes promised to create so much confu- 
 sion that on June 20, 1916, the following telegram was sent to the 
 several department commanders: 
 
 Secretary War directs no change will be made by War Department from State 
 mobilization points designated in Circular 19, Division Militia Affairs, 1914, 
 except on your telegraphic request. 
 
 Supplies are already prepared for shipment at once to the several State 
 mobilization points listed in circular, and if any mobilization points are 
 changed by you without previous reference to War Department, confusion must 
 result. 
 
 Paragraph 455 (b) Army Regulations reads as follows: 
 
 Whenever an order or proclamation is issued, calling the Organized Militia 
 or any part thereof into the service of the United States, the War Department 
 will inform each governor concerned or the commanding general of the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia Militia of the maximum strength to which organizations will 
 be recruited, and the Federal supply departments concerned will ship at once 
 to the senior mustering officers at the proper State mobilization camps, without 
 requisition, sufficient arms, equipment, and clothing to enable the organizations 
 so called forth to be fully armed and equipped at the war strength ordered. 
 
 Just previous to the call of June 18 the mobilization camp sites 
 for the several States were as follows : 
 
 Mobilization camp sites for the Organized Militia. 
 
 Alabama, Montgomery. 
 
 Arizona, Whipple Barracks (hasty 
 mobilization, Tucson). 
 
 Arkansas, Fort Logan H. Roots. 
 
 California, State camp grounds, out- 
 skirts of Sacramento. 
 
 Colorado, rifle range, near Golden. 
 
 Connecticut, Niantic. 
 
 Delaware, Newcastle (State rifle 
 range). 
 
 District of Columbia, Fort Myer, Va. 
 
 Florida, State camp, Duval County. 
 
 Georgia, Macon, Ga. 
 
 Hawaii, Honolulu. 
 
 Idaho, Gem State fair grounds (just 
 
 outside Boise). 
 Illinois, Springfield. 
 Indiana, Fort Benjamin Harrison. 
 Iowa, Des Moines. 
 Kansas, Fort Riley, Kans. 
 Kentucky, Fort Thomas. 
 Louisiana, Camp Stafford, Alexandria. 
 Maine, Augusta. 
 Maryland, Halethrop, Md. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 23 
 
 Massachusetts, South Framingham. 
 Michigan, Grayling (Hanson Military 
 
 Reservation) Fort Wayne (in winter). 
 Minnesota, Fort Snelling, Minn. 
 Mississippi, Jackson. 
 Missouri, Nevada. 
 
 Montana, Fort William >H. Harrison. 
 Nebraska, Lincoln. 
 Nevada, Carson City. 
 New Hampshire, Concord. 
 New Jersey, Sea Girt. 
 New Mexico, Las Vegas (3 miles out). 
 New York, New Dorp (Stateri Island). 
 North Carolina, Camp Glenn, Morehead 
 
 City (2i miles). 
 North Dakota, Fort Lincoln. 
 Ohio, Columbus, Ohio. 
 Oklahoma, Chandler. 
 
 Oregon, Clackamas. 
 
 Pennsylvania, Mount Gretna. 
 
 Rhode Island, Quonset Point (railroad 
 station, Davisville). 
 
 South Carolina, Lexington County, 
 near Columbia. 
 
 South Dakota, Huron (Redfield, sum- 
 mer). 
 
 Tennessee, Nashville. 
 
 Texas, Camp Mabry, Austin. 
 
 Utah, Fort Douglas, Utah. 
 
 Vermont, Colchester, Vt. 
 
 Virginia, Richmond. 
 
 Washington, American Lake. 
 
 West Virginia, Terra Alta. 
 
 Wisconsin, Camp Douglas, Wis. 
 
 Wyoming, Cheyenne. 
 
 During the progress of mobilization the following changes in sites 
 were made: 
 
 State. 
 
 Original location of mobilization 
 site. 
 
 Changed to. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 Niantic 
 
 
 Tenth Field Artillery mobil- 
 
 Kentucky 
 
 Fort Thomas 
 
 Earlington 
 
 ized at East Haven. 
 Subsequently changed back 
 
 Maryland . . 
 
 Halethorpe 
 
 Laurel 
 
 to Fort Thomas. These 
 changes caused a delay of 
 about 5 days in mobil- 
 izing the Kentucky Na- 
 tional Guard. 
 
 New York 
 
 New Dorp Staten Island 
 
 
 
 Oklahoma 
 
 Chandler (considered unsatisfac- 
 
 Fort Sill 
 
 
 West Virginia. . . 
 
 tory by commanding general, 
 Southern Department, who 
 suggests McAlester. Approved 
 by Secretary of War May 9). 
 Terra Alta 
 
 Charleston 
 
 
 Nebraska 
 
 Lincoln 
 
 Fort Crook 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 Similar changes were also made in Arizona, New Mexico, and 
 Texas to facilitate supply and instruction. 
 
 It is needless to say that such changes, especially when made at so 
 critical a time, are annoying in the extreme to those at the War 
 Department and in the Federal supply departments who are strain- 
 ing every effort to secure a prompt and orderly mobilization and are 
 endeavoring to get the necessary supplies to mobilization points to 
 equip troops at war strength. 
 
 An apt illustration of the absolute necessity for having all prepara- 
 tions as to mobilization point made beforehand, and making no change 
 after the call, is shown by the change which occurred during mobili- 
 zation in West Virginia, where the mobilization site had been defi- 
 nitely fixed at Terra Alta and all calculations based on a mobilization 
 at that point; but it appears that the grounds were subsequently 
 occupied by the State as a tuberculosis sanitarium. 
 
 No report appears to have reached the War Department as to 
 either the unsuitability or unavailability of the site at Terra Alta, 
 and in the meantime the mobilization started at Charleston, while the 
 Chamber of Commerce of Parkersburg made a strenuous telegraphic 
 plea to the Secretary of War, urging that city as the most accessible 
 
24 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 point for this purpose. The commanding general, Eastern Depart- 
 ment, was asked how this change came to be made, and telegraphed 
 back that 
 
 this was clone prior to the final decision of the Secretary of War concerning 
 mobilization point; an effort was made to stop the cars as soon as the Secre- 
 tary's orders were received. 
 
 In the meanwhile it appears that most, if not all, of the troops 
 had arrived at Charleston, although the supplies had properly been 
 sent to Terra Alta. The governor wired the Secretary of War 
 June 28 : 
 
 * * * The transfer of the troops now mobilized and ready for service from 
 Charleston to Terra Alta is regarded by us as impractical and unnecessary 
 and is a step for which we must of necessity refuse to accept the responsibility ; 
 if, however, it is decided to make this change, we will be pleased to turn over 
 these troops to the United States Government at Charleston. 
 
 Matters stood thus at a " deadlock," when on July 5 The Adjutant 
 General of the Army telegraphed the commanding general, Eastern 
 Department, as follows: 
 
 Mobilization point for West Virginia fixed at Charleston. Direct all supplies 
 now at Terra Alta to be shipped immediately to Charleston. 
 
 Disregarding entirely the merits of the question at issue, it should 
 be patent to the most casual observer that this case well illustrates the 
 dangers which beset any such system of dual control as now exists. 
 
 PREPARATION OF MOBILIZATION CAMP SITES. 
 
 As stated above, blue-print plans, estimates, etc., for shelters of 
 troops at mobilization camps had several years ago been supplied 
 State authorities so that ui the event of mobilization such plans, etc., 
 might be at hand and time thereby saved. In Ohio, however, it ap- 
 pears that the furnishing of these plans was erroneously construed to 
 authorize expenditure of money, and before the Federal authorities 
 were aware of it an indebtedness of $202,000 w T as incurred in the 
 preparation of the mobilization camp at Camp Willis, Columbus, 
 Ohio, for occupancy by troops in the construction of latrines, shower 
 baths, mess shacks, storehouses, roads, in the introduction of gas, and 
 in the installation of water and sewer systems. 
 
 The department inspector of the Central Department, who visited 
 the camp, expressed his surprise and indignation at what he believed 
 to be money wasted in expending it for the purposes above named, 
 and generally in preparing a permanent camping ground upon a 
 site which in his judgment was in no way fitted for a mobilization 
 camp and which ought to be given up. 
 
 No dishonesty w r as developed, but it seems unfortunate that so 
 much money should have been spent without authority and before 
 even formal leases had been made for the occupancy of the land. 
 
 The inspector recommended removal of the camp to Camp Perry, 
 Ohio, as soon as it was practicable to do so. Camp Willis was va- 
 cated September 9. 
 
 To cover this, as well as any similar expenditure which might have 
 been made in other States, Congress was asked to make an appropria- 
 tion. As finally acted upon money for this purpose was merged with 
 the appropriation for water and sewers at military posts, $4,000,000 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 25 
 
 being appropriated in the Army appropriation bill for the year 1917, 
 approved August 29, 1916, for both purposes. 
 
 Col. D. A. Frederick, chief mustering officer, Central Department, 
 in reporting on muster in of National Guard, Central Department, 
 says: 
 
 The variations (in expenses connected with mobilization sites) in various 
 States in this department have been astounding. In the case of Ohio, the per 
 capita cost of mobilization was about one hundred times the per capita cost in 
 the State of Nebraska, and the only reason that can be assigned for this dif- 
 ference is lack of due care and economy on the part of the State authorities. 
 If the State has no State-owned mobilization point the camp should be located 
 on a United States military reservation in the State or one nearest to same 
 having the necessary space. 
 
 SHIPMENT OF RESERVE SUPPLIES TO MOBILIZATION POINTS. 
 
 The storage of all reserve supplies of the National Guard in a 
 few depots proved to be a failure on which the chief of the Militia 
 Bureau in a letter of July 25, said : 
 
 1. With reference to the part of this report concerning supplies and equip- 
 ment where it is stated that " The mobilization thus far has demonstrated 
 beyond question, to all who have been charged with the responsibility of for- 
 warding supplies and preparing troops to be moved to the front, the unde- 
 sirability and shortsightedness of storing the reserve supplies for the bulk of 
 the militia of this department in one depot. Never again should it be possible 
 to permit so unsound an arrangement to be made." It is stated that this office 
 has consistently held that the greater the decentralization in storing supplies 
 necessary for the equipment of troops on mobilization, the greater the rapidity 
 and ease of issue. 
 
 In a communication of January 27, 1914, this office stated, " The nearer we 
 can place mobilization supplies to the troops to be supplied, the better, and 
 the points to be considered in authorizing such decentralization of supplies 
 are their security, preservation, and absolute control by the Federal Govern- 
 ment until issued at the outbreak of war." 
 
 Again, on May 6, 1915, it was stated by this officer, " The general plan for 
 the establishment of depots with reserve supplies within the areas in which 
 troops will be mobilized in the event of war * * * is, in the opinion of 
 this office, an excellent one." 
 
 2. I see no reason to change my views as herein expressed, and recommend 
 the early establishment of the six field supply depots of reserve supplies 
 already planned, and recommend further that the question be submitted for 
 consideration by the General Staff of the further establishment of a field supply 
 depot in each of the 12 tactical divisional districts outlined in Circular No. 
 19, Division of Militia Affairs, 1914. 
 
 The establishment of a divisional field supply depot would not only assist 
 greatly in having on hand the necessary supplies on mobilization, but would 
 also greatly assist in the development of the system of ordinary supply and 
 ordinary payment of National Guard troops. 
 
 3. When proper storage facilities in the form of State storehouses and State 
 armories are available, these might possibly be utilized for the storage of reserve 
 supplies until such time as the complete scheme of field supply depots could 
 be put into operation. 
 
 Letter from the chief, War College Division, to the chief, Militia 
 Bureau, August 14, 1916 : 
 
 In connection with report of special inspector on mobilization camp at Sea 
 Girt, N. J., the Quartermaster General in the fifth indorsement, August 2, 1916, 
 on said report, states in part as follows : 
 
 " With special reference to the recommendation of the inspector as set forth 
 in Paragraph I, page 3, this office under date of July 17, 1916, stated that the 
 suggestion to keep on hand in armories or elsewhere sufficient equipment for 
 men necessary to bring the units from peace strength is worthy of careful 
 
26 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 consideration, and that if this is not deemed advisable several supply points for 
 each of the larger departments should be considered. Depots of this character 
 should not, however, be under the control of department commanders." 
 
 Memorandum from the Chief of the Militia Bureau, for the Chief 
 of the War College Division, September 6, 1916 (Subject: Mobiliza- 
 tion site to be chosen for each division of the National Guard) : 
 
 The question of supply depots for the storage of supplies and equipment 
 necessary upon mobilization of the National Guard for war rests upon different 
 considerations. Recent experiences indicate that supplies and equipment of 
 every kind should be kept at the designated depots, and that the number of 
 such depots should be greatly increased, but there is nothing to show that the 
 number should be multiplied to the extent of having one for each State. The 
 divisional plan of organization suggests a supply depot for each divisional dis- 
 trict, which would give 12 supply depots in all. Each depot should be estab- 
 lished at a point suitable to the prompt and economical supply of the State or 
 group of States which it is to serve. By such an arrangement no depot would 
 have to supply more than six States, and probably in every case supplies and 
 equipment would reach the mobilization camps before the troops for which 
 they were intended would be ready to receive them. For better security and 
 control supply depots for the National Guard might well be established at 
 United States military posts, arsenals, or depots. A board of officers is now 
 considering the question of the location of mobilization supply depots. 
 
 Steps are being taken to remedy this matter by the convening of a 
 board of officers by the following War Department order : 
 
 Paragraph 32, Special Orders 177, War Dept, July 31, 1916 : A board of 
 officers to consist of Col. William H. Arthur, M. C., Col. Edwin B. Babbitt, O. D. f 
 Lieut. Col. Richmond McA. Schofield, Q. M. C., Maj. William P. Jackson, I. G., 
 and Capt. John L. De Witt, Q. M. C., is appointed to meet in this city at the 
 call of the senior member of the board to submit a new plan for the supply 
 of National Guard and Volunteers when mustered into the service of the 
 United States and mobilized. The board will exclude from consideration the 
 principle of concentration of supplies for several States in a single depot. The 
 junior member of the board will act as recorder. 
 
 This matter is now in progress of adjustment, and instead of three 
 general depots for reserve supplies for the militia the board now 
 considering this matter will recommend 11 such depots, situated at 
 favorable points in the country. 
 
 The following are extracts from reports of inspector instructors 
 and others bearing on this subject, which point out the defects of the 
 present system. 
 
 As throwing additional light on this subject it may be said that 
 the shortage in equipment in Ohio was such as to call for an investi- 
 gation by an inspector, who reported that he was unable to fix re- 
 sponsibility upon any individual or individuals and that the main 
 reason for shortages was the inability of depots to supply all the 
 articles of equipment C, and the confusion and delay was caused 
 by the method of forwarding invoices, by shipment of property for 
 Ohio National Guard in cars destined for other places, and by mis- 
 understandings between the senior mustering officer and the camp 
 quartermaster as to property on hand in the camp. 
 
 Another point to be noted is the desirability of placing war strength equip- 
 ment in the hands of organizations to be on hand at all times rather than effect 
 this issue at the time of muster in. (Extract from report of Lieut. Olmstead, 
 inspector-instructor, on N. G. of N. Y., Aug. 22.) 
 
 The greatest sources of delay in the work of preparing troops for service have 
 been the items of equipment and physical examination. The troops came 
 equipped for a strength of 81 enlisted per company. The remainder of equip- 
 ment was obtained from Rock Island and St. Louis. This delay could have been 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 27 
 
 avoided if the equipment for difference between war and peace strength had 
 been stored at Camp Douglas. I believe that the property stored would have 
 received excellent care from the quartermaster here. Troops here are examined 
 after muster in, and upward of 400 per day are now being examined. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. L. T. Richardson, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of Wis., 
 July 2, 1916.) 
 
 States should be required to keep on hand at all times blankets, bed sacks, 
 and mess kits sufficient for all organizations at war strength. There should be 
 two blankets for each man. The Montana regiment had about 200 above mini- 
 mum strength. As a result nearly this number had no blankets or bed sacks or 
 mess kits. (Extract from report of First Lieut. A. A. Hofmann, Inf., inspector- 
 instructor, N. G. of Mont., Aug. 16, 1916.) 
 
 Many supplies were unreasonably slow in arriving, though the bills of lading 
 and invoices showed that they had been shipped promptly. As I knew nothing 
 of what was to arrive, it was impossible for me to trace the shipments or to in 
 any manner expedite the arrival. The result was that several shipments arrived 
 after the departure of the troops, and certain of the property had to be shipped 
 to them, and other parts returned to the depots from which received. It is 
 thought that the receiving officer should be informed at once when a shipment 
 is made to him and of what it consists, as frequently it was necessary to plan 
 about the distribution. A case in point was that a shipment of arms took 10 
 days to come from Springfield Armory to Davisville, although shipped by special 
 express. (Extract from report of Capt. T. A. Roberts on N. G. of R. I., Sept. 18.) 
 
 Articles of clothing and equipment were slow in arriving. Many recruits were 
 unable to obtain any article of clothing for a great many days and were forced 
 to go around in ragged and dirty undershirts. It was the usual thing for 200 to 
 250 men to report each morning at sick call to get treated for severe sunburns of 
 shoulders and arms. Although Field Hospital Corps No. 2 and Ambulance Corps 
 No. 2 had been accepted as organizations by the Federal Government early in 
 July, they had not at the time of my departure, on August 1, received their full 
 equipment. (Extract from report of Maj. J. F. Hall, Medical Corps, on N. G. 
 of Mass.) 
 
 The Ordnance Department supplies not only arrived without requisition but 
 as soon as the troops did, and their requisitions have been completely and 
 promptly filled. The highest praise is due them for this efficient service. The 
 troops of this command would have been able to leave on July 5 had the Quar- 
 termaster Department furnished the supplies which they were expected to fur- 
 nish without requisition. Apparently they had no idea of what was required, 
 nor have they yet, and steps had to be taken to submit requisitions, and even 
 these telegraphic requisitions have not been filled for the vital items mentioned 
 above. The first shipment of socks was of an inferior grade and unfit for use, 
 and so recommended by the Inspector General's Department, an officer of which, 
 Maj. Brady, was here. More than half the drawers shipped here were size 
 32 inches in the waist or under ; that is to say, they were boys' sizes. These 
 have been ordered shipped back to the supply depot at St. Louis, though it was 
 necessary to use some of the socks. (Extract from report of Capt. Hughes, 
 inspector instructor on N. G. of Tenn., July 16.) 
 
 Equipment consisting of quartermaster and ordnance stores commenced to 
 arrive by express on the 26th, and as soon as possible the troops were furnished 
 with their supplies. 
 
 The hardships, confusion, and expense of mobilization in the future will be 
 greatly reduced if the complete equipment for the National Guard is stored 
 within the State, preferably in the storehouses at or near the mobilization 
 points. The necessary blank forms for mustering the National Guard into the 
 Federal service should be with the organization, and in large measure the forms 
 may be filled out ready for use. I am of the opinion that the colonel of the 
 regiment or the senior officer of units other than the regiment should muster in 
 their own units into the Federal service. Later, when opportunity is afforded, 
 the organizations should be thoroughly inspected by officers of the Inspector 
 General's Department, and errors found can then be corrected. Another essen- 
 tial point to be determined upon as a preparation for the mobilization of an 
 efficient National Guard is a frequent physical inspection, so that the examina- 
 tion, if one is to be made at muster in, will be of men all of whom are practi- 
 cally physically fit for the duties of a soldier. At least once each year the 
 entire personnel of the National Guard should be inspected by a medical officer 
 of the Army whose powers should be such that any found physically deficient 
 are at once eliminated from the guard. (Extract from report by Maj. Shuttle- 
 worth, inspector instructor on N. G. of Conn., Sept. 19.) 
 
28 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The mobilization camps of the several States should be relocated in some 
 cases. The Federal stores held by the State should be stored at or near the 
 mobilization camp, and its location determined after its site had been approved 
 by the Federal Government. Apparently, in the past mobilization camps were 
 selected because an area of cheap land for use as camp sites was available. 
 More attention must be given to accessibility and the provision of proper rail- 
 way facilities and buildings or administration and the storage of supplies. 
 (Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector instructor on N G of 
 Conn., Sept. 19.) 
 
 I would suggest that instead of storing the so-called war supplies in one 
 storehouse, such as the quartermaster depot at Philadelphia for several States. 
 that each State provide a storehouse at the point selected for the mobilization 
 camp, and the necessary supplies be stored there. If necessary, the senior 
 United States Army inspector instructor, assisted by one or more sergeant 
 instructors, could take charge of this property, be accountable and responsible 
 for it, and when mobilization takes place the property could be placed in the 
 hands of the organizations for which it is intended in a very short time. If it 
 be impossible to obtain such a storehouse at the point selected for a mobilization 
 camp, it would seem that the State in nearly every case would be willing to set 
 aside a part of the building now used as a storehouse for the supply officer of 
 the State in which this property could be kept apart from any State property 
 and to which only the Federal accountable officer could have access. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. V. La S. Rockwell, Cavalry inspector instructor, N. G. of 
 Md., Sept. 7, 1916.) 
 
 Equipment. There was a considerable shortage in cots and blankets. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Company I, Second Infantry, is without arms and equipment. * * * 
 Company D, Second Infantry, has no haversacks nor canteens, and Company M, 
 Second Infantry, has no haversacks. * * * Many rifles show evidence of 
 neglect, particularly in Companies C, D, F, G, and L, First Infantry, and 
 Companies G and L, Second Infantry. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Less than half of the officers are provided with field glasses. None of the 
 companies are provided with Engineer property, and they only have one flag 
 kit of the Signal property. The hospital stores of the sanitary detachments are 
 in bad shape. 
 
 Clothiny. Most of the men had nothing but the clothing they had on. 
 About 75 per cent of the men wore civilian shoes, and about 25 per cent fo the 
 Gevernment shoes were unserviceable. None of the organizations are provided 
 with extra clothing for the surplus kits. (Extract from report of Maj. Simons, 
 inspector general on N. G. of .) 
 
 Equipment. * * * The hospital stores of the sanitary detachment of the 
 Infantry regiment are in bad shape, but the instruments are good. None of the 
 companies or troops are provided with Engineer property, and they have only 
 one flag kit of Signal property. None of the organizations are provided with 
 identification tags. Only about one-half of the officers are provided with field 
 glasses. (Extract from report of Maj. Simons, Inspector General, on National 
 Guard of , July 13.) 
 
 Clothing. Many of the men had nothing but the clothing they wore. The 
 shoes are practically all unserviceable. The officers stated that none of the 
 Government shoes were on their papers, as they had all been dropped, and that 
 many of the men had purchased Government shoes themselves. None of the 
 organizations are supplied with the extra clothing for the surplus kits. There 
 were a few cotton O. D. breeches in the command, but these had been purchased 
 by the men. (Extract from report of Maj. Simons, Inspector General, on Na- 
 tional Guard of , July 13. ) 
 
 The enlisted men did not have the articles required to be packed in the sur- 
 plus kit bags ; therefore they were badly in need of underclothes and socks when 
 they left. It is recommended that the reserve equipment to completely uniform 
 and equip each organization to war strength be turned over to the State and 
 that they be required to store it at a place accessible to the mobilization camp, 
 and that they be required to keep this equipment intact and properly cared 
 for. (Extract from report of Capt. Niles, inspector-instructor, on National 
 Guard of Maine, Sept. 12.) 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 29 
 
 Letter of Lieut. P. Remington, Inf., inspector-instructor, Fort Benjamin Har- 
 rison, Ind., July 14, 1916, reports lack of tables, typewriters, pens, ink, pyram- 
 idal tents, inarch kits, first-aid packets, shoes, underwear, and wool socks. 
 
 Letter of Col. G. H. Morgan, Cavalry, senior mustering officer, Mobilization 
 Camp, Des Moines, Iowa, July 15, 1916, reports a shortage of equipment in 
 tentage, breeches (cotton O. D.), campaign hats, shirts, underclothes, bed sacks, 
 stationery, and quartermaster blank forms. 
 
 Letter of Lieut. Col. A. Johnson, senior mustering officer, dated Fort Snelling, 
 Minn., June 26, 1916, reports the commands have no equipment for those above 
 minimum strength. These numbered 823 men on June 26, 1916. 
 
 Letter of Maj. H. J. Hunt, Inf., inspector-instructor, Camp Glenn, N. C., July 
 9, 1916. Maj. Hunt believes that a reasonable and assorted supply of stationery 
 should be furnished mustering officers with the forms sent from the War De- 
 partment. 
 
 Letter of Capt. R. L. Hamilton, retired, Lincoln, Nebr., July 15, 1916. Capt. 
 Hamilton states that the only defect in clothing shipped the Nebraska Guard on 
 mobilization was in the shoes furnished, which were not of a suitable and sat- 
 isfactory type ; 900 pairs were accepted and issued ; the remainder of those 
 shipped were returned to the parties from whom obtained, consequently the 
 command moved with such shoes as they could secure at their own expense, 
 locally. Since departure of troops, the necessary shoes were received and 
 shipped to Mercedes, Tex. 
 
 Letter of Capt. A. Greig, jr., C. A. C., Raleigh, N. C., July 19, 1916. Capt. 
 Greig states many National Guard officers expressed the belief that a proper 
 reserve supply of uniforms should be on hand at home stations for use in sud- 
 den orders for mobilization. 
 
 Letter of Capt. W. N. Hughes, jr., Inf., inspector-instructor, Nashville, Tenn., 
 July 16, 1916. Capt. Hughes reports that when the organizations in the Ten- 
 nessee Guard suddenly swelled 50 per cent above peace strength the quartermas- 
 ter supplies were totally inadequate to house and equip them. Blankets, bed 
 sacks, pyramidal tents, and clothing were noticably short ; also ponchos. The 
 Quartermaster Department was unable to meet the demand, and to date, though 
 repeated telegraphic requisitions have been made and telegraphic orders have 
 been issued by the department commander to rush supplies here by express, 
 there is still a large shortage in pyramidal tents and ponchos. 
 
 Capt. Hughes reports the troops could not leave on July 5 because the Quar- 
 termaster Department had not sent the supplies they were supposed to send 
 without requisition. He reports the first shipment of socks of an inferior 
 grade and unfit for use, and that more than half the drawers were 32-inch 
 waist, or under, and were sent back to the St. Louis depot. 
 
 Letter of Capt. L. T. Richardson, Inf., inspector-instructor, Camp Douglas. 
 Wis., July 2, 1916. Capt. Richardson found one of the greatest sources of delay 
 was in the items of equipment. He believes that the difference between war 
 and peace strength equipment should be stored at Camp Douglas, Wis., the 
 mobilization camp. 
 
 In regard to the subject of reserve supplies for the militia re- 
 ferred to in the introductory remarks, the Quartermaster General 
 remarks as follows : 
 
 1. With reference to the tenth paragraph under the head of " Introductory," 
 it should be stated that the conclusions sis therein set forth are based on facts. 
 The reserve stock of supplies which had been accumulated at Field Supply 
 Depot No. 1, Philadelphia, Pa., were intended for use in equipping men neces- 
 sary to bring the militia from peace to war strength. The total appropriations 
 for reserve stock for Clothing and Equipage made by Congress amounted to 
 $4,121,533.61, and supplies to this extent were either in Field Supply Depot No. 
 1 or in depots as a working stock. In addition to this reserve, there had been 
 accumulated as a result of economies inaugurated from time to time, supplies 
 to the value of approximately $6,000.000. The accumulation of the reserve did 
 not contemplate additional equipment for the National Guard called in the 
 service, as paragraph 455 (a), Army Regulations, requires that 
 
 " Governors of States and Territories and the commanding general of the 
 District of Columbia Militia are required at all times to keep on hand, either 
 at the various company armories or in suitable storehouses, a sufficient supply 
 
30 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 of arms, uniforms, and equipment to completely equip for the field the minimum 
 number of men prescribed by the President for each organization, so that on 
 being called into the service, any organization will be completely equipped 
 from the stores on hand in the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia 
 without calling on the War Department for assistance." 
 
 2. Under orders from the War Department, the militia had, due to limited 
 appropriations, previously drawn only such articles as one hat, one coat, one 
 pair of breeches, one pair leggins, one overcoat, one blanket and tentage, leav- 
 ing them short one blanket and such articles as shoes, underwear, sweaters, 
 stockings, cots, mosquito bars, etc. Therefore, instead of being able to utilize 
 what reserve, supplies had been accumulated for the purpose of equipping new 
 men, it became necessary to use these articles in completing the equipment of 
 the militia called into service, which early exhausted the available stock. 
 
 3. With reference to extracts and comments under " Shipment of reserve 
 supplies to mobilization points," and particularly in regard to statements of 
 shortage, this condition is due in the main to the following reasons : 
 
 1. Most of the men of the National Guard called into the service were not 
 completely equipped as required by regulations. 
 
 2. The department commanders designated the order in which shipments 
 should be made to the various States. This resulted in those States near the 
 bottom of the list receiving their supplies after some delay. 
 
 3. Many States received supplies in excess of their actual needs, due to the 
 fact that the organizations remained practically at the minimum strength, 
 which prevented other States from getting all the supplies needed. This is 
 borne out by statements of the commanding general, Central Department, under 
 the heading " Supplies," and by the further fact that the records of this office 
 show large quantities of supplies turned in by mobilization camps to depots. 
 
 4. Due to rejections for physical and other reasons the ranks of many or- 
 ganizations were greatly depleted, necessitating the complete equipment of 
 new men enlisted to replace them. 
 
 5. Confusion, especially on the part of the camp quartermasters or of the 
 officers in charge of mobilization points, is evidenced by an extract from the 
 report of First Lieut. James G. Mcllroy, which will be found elsewhere under 
 " Comments of inspectors-instructors, etc." (See Evidences of inefficiency, 
 p. 104.) 
 
 6. With reference to criticisms in consequence of the supply of ununiform 
 or inferior articles, this was a result of an effort to meet the unexpected 
 demands due to incomplete equipment of the men called into the service. All 
 ununiform or articles differing from standard and specification requirements 
 were purchased and issued as a temporary expedient and were replaced as 
 rapidly as the regulation article could be obtained. 
 
 EFFECT ON THE PERSONNEL OF OATH REQUIRED BY NATIONAL- 
 DEFENSE ACT AND LEGAL EFFECT OF REFUSAL OR NEGLECT 
 TO TAKE FEDERAL OATH PRESCRIBED IN THIS ACT. 
 
 When the State troops were ordered out on the second call (June 
 18), a misunderstanding arose in some quarters as to the obligation 
 under which men were held under the oath which they had taken, and 
 also whether or not they were compelled to take the oath prescribed 
 in section 73 of the national-defense act. 
 
 This was not unnatural, for the national-defense act did not be- 
 come a law until June 3, and as there elapsed but 15 days before the 
 second call was made, the new law had hardly been distributed, much 
 less studied and digested, by those affected by it. 
 
 A test case having arisen in Massachusetts during the mobilization 
 of the National Guard in that State, it was referred to the Judge 
 Advocate General, whose views and the policy adopted by the War 
 Department are clearly set forth in the following letter of the Sec- 
 retary of War : 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 31 
 
 LETTER OF AUGUST 8, 1916. FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO HON. RICHARD 
 OLNEY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 Hon. RICHARD OLNEY, 
 
 House of Representatives. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: I have your letter of August 4, as to the taking of the so- 
 called muster oath by members of the militia, and beg to inform you that 
 the rulings of the War Department on this subject have been as follows : 
 
 (a) It seems to be well established that a member of the Organized Militia 
 can not exempt himself from service under the President's call of June 18, 1916, 
 by refraining from taking the oath prescribed in sections 70 or 73 of the de- 
 fense act of June 3, 1916. Under the militia law of 1903, as amended, a sol- 
 dier of the Organized Militia who fails to take the oath prescribed under the 
 new defense act can nevertheless legally be held to service for the remaining 
 period of his enlistment term under his original oath and contract. Under the 
 same law an officer must present himself for service until released by the same 
 authority which summoned him into the service of the United States. 
 
 (&) The obligation to appear for muster into Federal service was imposed 
 on the date of the issue of the President's call. A discharge issued subsequent 
 thereto to a member of the National Guard or Organized Militia by any lesser 
 authority than that of the Federal Government, even if made in ignorance of 
 the President's call, would necessarily have no validity. An individual of the 
 Organized Militia can not therefore through his own volition release himself 
 from service under the President's call, nor can the State, w r hich is a lesser 
 authority than that which issued the call, or any subordinate officer of the 
 State, undertake to excuse from service on any grounds individuals of the 
 Organized Militia included in the President's call. 
 
 (c) It seems, therefore, that the action taken in Massachusetts, which has 
 resulted in the release from Federal service of certain members of the Organ- 
 ized Militia, is illegal. 
 
 Taking up the question of a man in the Organized Militia under the amended 
 Dick law, conforming to the new law and assuming the status of a member of 
 the National Guard, such conforming is entirely in his own hands, and there is 
 no compulsion. 
 
 The call was made to include those who had not conformed, and thus re- 
 mained Organized Militia, and those who had conformed, and thus had become 
 National Guard. 
 
 If a man had conformed and taken the new oath and made the new contract, 
 he obligated himself for six years' service, less the time already served in his 
 present enlistment, and no further oath or contract was necessary on entering 
 Federal service. 
 
 If he had not conformed and retained his status as a member of the Organ- 
 ized Militia, he remained obligated to serve the remainder of his original en- 
 listment, and should have presented himself under the call. Thereupon the 
 procedure would have been for him to take the muster-in oath, but if he did 
 not, he subjected himself to court-martial, as he also did if he neglected to re- 
 spond to the President's call. 
 
 As to the technical point presented by your correspondent, of his presenting 
 himself and being ordered by the mustering officer to return home, requiring a 
 new call by the President, it is not thought that a new call is necessary. 
 
 The mustering officer reported that men began to muster in under the Dick 
 bill as Organized Militia on July 20. 1 
 
 In view of the fact that this call was necessarily made so shortly after the 
 passage of the national-defense act, and before all of its provisions could have 
 been possible of fulfillment, there has been more or less confusion, but it is 
 hoped that with patience and persistent endeavor the results of this confusion 
 will be minimized. 
 
 It is not the desire of the War Department to bring about wholesale courts- 
 martial under the circumstances, but it is plain that a call by the President 
 should be enforced, or chaos will result. 
 Sincerely, yours, 
 
 NEWTON D. BAKER, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 1 Correct date, June 20. 
 
32 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The number of enlisted men of the National Guard who have been 
 inspected is 128,517; of this number 21,884 have not taken the new 
 oath. This is according >to latest information in the Militia Bureau. 
 November 23, 1916. 
 
 One troop of Cavalry from - - refused almost to a man to take the new 
 oath, and this delayed the muster in of that organization until the deficiency 
 was made up on the 19th of July, when it was mustered with a strength of 16 
 officers and 280 enlisted men ; also 6 enlisted men who refused to take the oath. 
 These latter were sent south with the squadron. 
 
 Recommendations: As all the delays occasioned here were caused by the 
 necessity for taking the oath to the United States, and as that condition can 
 
 no more be found, it is sufficient to mention the fact. Good lawyers in 
 
 consider that the oath required for the Organized Militia is quite as efficient 
 as that now required on the muster-in roll or by the national defense bill. 
 However, the new oath was taken advantage of by a certain class, and although 
 patiently explained to them in some cases an explanation was not wanted. 
 As I understood at first that it was a condition precedent to muster in those 
 men who refused to take it in one case an entire company ; they were merely 
 ignored. When your orders were received to muster them under the Dick law 
 the adjutant general of the State was asked to return them. He has made 
 arrangements to do so, but has hardly had time to get any results so far. None 
 are therefore reported. A few men of the Cavalry were in camp when the order 
 was received and they have been sent to the border with the troops 6 in all. 
 
 ( Extract from report of Col. George H. Morgan, Cav., S. M. O., N. G. of , 
 
 July 30, 1916.) 
 
 July 20 the first muster in under the Dick bill of a member of the Organized 
 Militia who refused to take the new Federal oath occurred. Others are ex- 
 pected to follow. (Extract from report of Lieut. Col. B. "B. Buck, Inf., in- 
 spector-instructor, N. G. of - , July 26, 1916.) 
 
 A great deal of discussion arose over the obligations of the new oath for 
 enlistments in the National Guard and the muster-in oath. Many telegrams 
 were received from prominent men in New Orleans advising the members of 
 the batteries not to take the oath. (Extract from report of Capt. C. S. Blakely, 
 Fifth F. A., inspector-instructor, N. G. of - , June 25, 1916. ) 
 
 Another question has arisen as to what oath they shall take when sworn 
 into the service. Men of many organizations, in conformity with instructions 
 from your office, took the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law before 
 leaving their home stations; an oath has been furnished me by the chief mus- 
 tering officer which I have been directed to use, and a third oath is printed 
 upon the muster rolls which the men sign. The question which oath is proper 
 has been referred to The Adjutant General of the Army by the chief mustering 
 officer, but no instructions have been received as yet by me. It hardly seems 
 probable that these men are to be sworn in under all three oaths. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor in N. G. of - , July 1.) 
 
 The California troops were presented as Organized Militia and mustered in 
 as such. They were not translated into National Guard troops under the 
 defense act. (Report of Capt. H. A. Hanigan, Inf., U. S. A., inspector-in- 
 structor. ) 
 
 To the best of my knowledge this regiment has been accepted without being 
 recognized as a part of the National Guard. The State is organizing two troops 
 of Cavalry, which will have an opportunity to come into the Federal service in 
 the same way, i. e., by taking the new oath and appearing at a mobilization 
 camp, unless existing orders are revoked. (Extract from report Lieut. Ever- 
 ington, inspector-instructor in N. G. of , Aug. 2.) 
 
 The new oath of enlistment has been taken by about 85 per cent of the com- 
 mand, and it is believed that others will be coerced or shamed into signing up 
 to-day. (Extract from report Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor in N. G. 
 of - , July 1.) 
 
 The muster-in oath was administered only to those members of the Organ- 
 ized Militia who did not desire to take the new dual oath and thereby become 
 members of the National Guard. In a few instances enlisted men refused to 
 take the muster-in oath Organized Militia. In these cases the company com- 
 mander was advised to place the men in arrest and to prefer charges against 
 them, it not having been considered by me that the mere presenting themselves 
 at the mobilization camp was a complete compliance with the Organized Militia 
 law. (Extract from report of Capt. V. La S. Rockwell, Cav., inspector-instruc- 
 tor, N. G., of , Sept. 7, 1916.) 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 33 
 
 EFFECT OF MOBILIZATION ON INSPECTORS OF SMALL-ARMS 
 PRACTICE, ORGANIZED MILITIA. 
 
 The act of January 21, 1903 (Dick bill), provided in section 3, that 
 in peace and war in the Organized Militia there should be an in- 
 spector of small-arms practice, for a division with the rank of lieu- 
 tenant colonel, for a brigade one with the rank of major, for a regi- 
 ment of Cavalry or Infantry one assistant inspector of small-arms 
 practice with the rank of captain, and for each separate or un- 
 assigned battalion of Infantry or engineers, or squadron of Cavalry, 
 one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of first 
 lieutenant. 
 
 When the Organized Militia was called out, these officers very 
 properly responded to the call. So long as the officers and men of 
 their organizations had not taken the Federal oath they had a legal 
 status. In the hurry and confusion of mustering troops into the 
 service of the United States, however, and due to the fact the pro- 
 visions of the new law were not generally understood at the time of the 
 recent call into Federal service of the National Guard, a number of 
 inspectors of small-arms practice w^ere erroneously mustered into the 
 service of the United States as the fact appears to have been over- 
 looked that while the Dick bill provided for inspectors and assistant 
 inspectors of small-arms practice, the national-defense act did not. 
 
 So long as entire organizations were mustered in as Organized 
 Militia, i. e.. without taking the Federal oath of section 73, national- 
 defense act, these officers were properly a part of the troops called 
 into service, but when all or any portion of these organizations took 
 the Federal oath, thus becoming National Guard, these officers had 
 in fact no legal status. 
 
 The action of the War Department in these cases was that indicated 
 in the following telegram sent to all department commanders : 
 
 JULY 27, 1916. 
 
 It has been held by the War Department that inspector of small-arms prac- 
 tice is no part of the organization of the National Guard as authorized by 
 national-defense act, and that the effect of the qualification of the organizations 
 under the act was to eliminate such an officer from the organization the office 
 being abolished. It is also held that an inspector of smell-arms practice who. 
 without authority of law, has been mustered into the service of the United. 
 States as such with an organization which has been converted into an 
 organization of the National Guard can not be regarded even for the pur- 
 pose of appointment, as a member of the National Guard, and that he can 
 not be appointed an officer of the National Guard unless he is within one 
 or the other of the classes specified by section 74, national-defense act, or 
 unless he enlists in the National Guard and so by becoming a member thereof, 
 becomes eligible for appointment. Secretary of War therefore directs that in 
 justice to the officers concerned all inspectors of small -arms practice who 
 without legal authority have already been mustered into the Federal service be 
 honorably discharged therefrom on or before July 31st instant. 
 
 MCCAIN. 
 
 It might be added, as stated in a letter of the Secretary of War of 
 August 11, that - 
 
 The War Department does not look with favor toward the restoration of the 
 office of inspector of small-arms practice. The office of inspector of small-arms 
 practice has no tactical function when the National Guard is called into Federal 
 
 7203116 3 
 
34 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 service, and at other times the duties which have been performed by the in- 
 cumbents of the office properly pertain to regimental officers. The observation 
 of the War Department indicates that generally the existence of the office has 
 in the. past relieved regimental officers from a sense of responsibility for the 
 instruction of their organizations in this most important work, and sometimes 
 lias resulted in conflict and interference. With the pay allowance provided by 
 the national defense act company and regimental officers .should be required to 
 devote the necessary time and attention to the instruction of their organizations. 
 If a special supervisor of target practice is desired in particular cases, there 
 seems to be no reason why the duty can not be performed by staff and other 
 officers of the regiments. 
 
 The War Department appreciates the unfortunate position of those inspectors 
 of small-arms practice who were mustered into the Federal service before the 
 provisions of the national defense act on this subject were generally understood. 
 
 It is believed, however, that the proper remedy to be applied to these cases is 
 to provide for their appointment to other offices in which vacancies may exist. 
 Such appointments are, of course, in the hands of the governors of the States. 
 It is believed that as officers of the former Organized Militia inspectors of small- 
 arms practice were, under the provisions of section 73 of the national defense 
 act, eligible to be placed on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard, 
 and that they should now be held to be in that status, from which, under the 
 provisions of section 74, they may be appointed to any vacancy now existent in 
 the active National Guard. The view of the War Department is that, while the 
 office of inspector of small-arms practice was in effect abolished by the national 
 defense act, it was not the intention of the act to legislate the incumbents out 
 of office in the National Guard, nor to limit the period of adjustment as a mo- 
 ment of time. 
 
 It is thought, moreover, that line officers in general should qualify 
 as instructors in rifle practice rather than to have instructors limited 
 to the small number heretofore available as inspectors of small-arms 
 practice. In several cases officers had been mustered into United 
 States service as brigade ordnance officers. There being no authority 
 of law for this, the same action was taken as observed in the cases 
 of inspectors of small-arms practice. 
 
 DISCHARGES FROM SERVICE AFTER MOBILIZATION BY GOV- 
 ERNORS OR STATE OFFICIALS AND FAILURES TO RESPOND TO 
 CALL. 
 
 During the mobilization of the National Guard in Nebraska the 
 senior assistant mustering officer reported that it had come to his 
 attention that many discharges of National Guardsmen had been 
 made in some organizations subsequent to the call of the President 
 and prior to the preparation of rolls for muster in. These discharges 
 had been of two general characters. First, " By order of the gov- 
 ernor," the most of which being against the wishes and recommenda- 
 tions of the commanders of the organizations, and upon personal ap- 
 peals made to the governor by relatives and friends of the discharged. 
 The governor ceased ordering such discharges following a letter on 
 this subject from the senior assistant mustering officer to the adjutant 
 general of the State. Second, summary and more or less informal 
 discharges at home stations had been made by company and other 
 commanders of men who were considered undesirable and worthless. 
 In Omaha the company commanders also eliminated all men whom 
 they were satisfied were physically disqualified for service, with the 
 result that in the four Omaha companies there were only 21 men re- 
 jected upon physical examination. This matter was referred to the 
 Judge Advocate General of the Army for his opinion, the action in 
 
ETC. 35 
 
 the case being as indicated in the following letter to the Commanding 
 General, Central Department : 
 
 JULY 28, 1916. 
 
 From : The Adjutant General of the Army. 
 
 To: The Commanding General, Central Department, Chicago, 111. 
 Subject : Discharge of certain members of Nebraska National Guard subsequent 
 to June 18, 1916. 
 
 1. With reference to the question raised by the mustering officer at Lincoln, 
 Nebr., with regard to the authority of the governor of Nebraska to order the dis- 
 charge of men of the Organized Militia of that State subsequent to the receipt 
 of the call of the President, June 18, 1916, and also with respect to the authority 
 for certain discharges issued by certain militia commanders, the following opin- 
 ion and recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, approved 
 by the. Secretary of War, is quoted for your information : 
 
 2. " It is stated that these discharges were issued prior to the preparation of 
 the rolls for muster in. and it is understood that when the discharges wer^ 
 issued the men had not qualified as members of the National Guard. But 
 whether they had so qualified or not, I think it is clear that subsequent to the 
 receipt by the governor of the call of June 18, 1916, the discharges were unau- 
 thorized. Upon the issue of the call into the Federal service, if they had not so 
 qualified, they became bound to appear for muster in, and the Federal authority 
 alone could relieve them from this obligation. However, as the discharges by 
 order of the governor were issued under a misapprehension by him of his 
 powers, I concur in the recommendation of the commanding general, Central 
 Department, that the discharges be approved and no further action respecting 
 them taken. 
 
 " With respect to the discharges issued by company and other commanders, it 
 appears that these were of men who were considered undesirable, worthless, or 
 physically disqualified for service, and in my opinion these discharges should 
 also be approved and no further action be taken respecting them. 
 
 G. W. READ, 'Adjutant General. 
 
 A somewhat similar case arose in , where 24 men took the 
 
 national-defense oath, but before they were mustered into the United 
 States service they were discharged by the State authorities. 
 
 The discharges were allowed to stand as being for the convenience 
 of the Government under circumstances as stated, but the State 
 authorities were informed that the action which had been taken by 
 them was without the authority of law. 
 
 In one of the States a comparison of the muster-in rolls with lists 
 of membership of organizations, as they existed on June 18, dis- 
 closed the fact that 1,375 names which appear on these lists do not 
 appear on muster-in rolls. In other words, 1,375 members of the 
 National Guard or Organized Militia of this State failed to answer 
 the call of the President. The Federal Government did not then 
 release, nor has it since released, these men from their obligation to 
 serve when called by the President. Two thousand one hundred and 
 forty-two new men were enlisted by the State authorities of this 
 State between the time of the call and the muster in. Considerable 
 difficulty was experienced by some organizations to obtain the re- 
 quired minimum number of enlisted men. One company, which had 
 been organized, inspected for recognition, and accepted by the Militia 
 Bureau less than a month prior to the call of the President brought 
 only about 15 men to the mobilization camp. To rehabilitate this 
 company the officers and the enlisted men of a prospective machine- 
 gun company then being in process of organization were taken over 
 by the first-mentioned company. This prospective machine-gun com- 
 pany had, however, not been inspected for recognition or accepted by 
 the Militia Bureau. It is not known how the officers of the first- 
 
36 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 mentioned company, whose date of commission was May 16. were 
 disposed of. 
 
 The State and National Guard authorities of this State, desiring 
 to make a good record for promptness in the transition from the 
 status of Organized Militia to that of National Guard, had taken 
 steps to have the members of its Organized Militia take the new oath 
 prescribed in the new national-defense act as soon as possible after 
 the approval of this act. 
 
 The men who were on the rolls of organizations June 18 and who 
 did not report for muster in either had or had not taken the new 
 oath. All had taken the old oath and were in service on June 3, 
 1916, under that oath. That they all, whether bound by the new oath 
 or the old, were included in the call of the President of June 18 is 
 admitted. 
 
 It was found that all of the enlisted men, members of organiza- 
 tions on June 18, who reported at the mobilization camp with their 
 companies had not taken the new oath, and some difficulty was en- 
 countered by some organization commanders to persuade some of 
 these men to take the new oath. Some others who came to the mo- 
 bilization camp as members of organizations refused to take and did 
 not take the new oath, and some refused to sign the muster-in rolls. 
 When such cases of refusal presented themselves organization com- 
 manders applied to the adjutant general of the State, who was in 
 camp at the time, or to the commanding general of the guard for 
 advice. But it appeared that no definite line of action in such cases 
 had been decided upon, and organization commanders were finally 
 instructed to let the men go. The State has not, as far as known, 
 taken any action in these cases nor in those of the 1,375 men who 
 failed to answer the call of the President and who never appeared 
 at the mobilization camp. 
 
 When the mustering officer became urgent in his request that the 
 State authorities take action in these cases and hold these men to 
 service either under the provisions of the new national defense act 
 or under those of the Dick bill, a copy of <" '* Executive order was, on 
 July 19. furnished him, which order w^s dated June 10, and which 
 directed, first, that all enlisted men refusing to take the oath pre- 
 scribed in the new national-defense act will be immediately dis- 
 charged, and, second, that all enlisted men who had not taken the 
 new oath on or before June 15 will be discharged and their names 
 dropped from the rolls on such date. 
 
 That this order was not in existence in any visible form and not 
 known to the organization commanders prior to the departure of the 
 last organizations from the mobilization camp for the border can 
 admit of no doubt, for men who had not taken the oath by June 15 
 had not been discharged, as required by the terms of the order, but 
 had been brought to the mobilization camp, where some did and 
 others did not take the oath. Also organization commanders, in the 
 cases of the men who refused to take the new oath, did not know 
 just w 7 hat to do, and the adjutant general seemed to be unable to 
 advise them what steps to take. 
 
 Based on this order, which made its appearance after the middle 
 of July, but which is dated June 10, the National Guard authorities 
 of this State claim that there was no Organized Militia in the State 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 37 
 
 on date of call of the President of June 18, and that all the men 
 were either in the National Guard under the new law or out of 
 service. And this notwithstanding the fact that the organizations 
 of this State were inspected at the mobilization camp by the muster- 
 ing officer for recognition by the Militia Bureau as " National 
 Guard " and were so recognized by that bureau upon receipt of re- 
 port of such inspection and were subsequently mustered in the Fed- 
 eral service. 
 
 It is held that the action of the State and National Guard authori- 
 iks in thus releasing from service men who had failed to take the 
 new oath was illegal, and that the State failed in its duty when it 
 did not adopt efficient measures to bring every absent member of 
 the organizations included in the call of the President to the mobiliza- 
 tion camp or to proceed otherwise against them. 
 
 The following is a report of an officer on duty in the same State : 
 
 1. In compliance with your letter this date the following is submitted: 
 
 2. A personal check made by me of muster-in rolls, physical examination 
 forms, and list of members of - National Guard furnished by the adjutant 
 general of the State from files of enlistment contracts at , disclosed the 
 
 following number of officers and men in the National Guard of on June 
 
 19, 1916, who failed to report at the call of the President, 1,375, or about 30 
 per cent. This does not include an entire organization from , mention 
 of which will be made later. Number of men enlisted after the call and before 
 muster in, 2,142, or about 39 per cent. Discharged for physical disability prior 
 to departure for the border 702, or about 13 per cent. 
 
 ;>. I mustered in only two regiments, the - - and - - Infantry. In 
 the first there were three instances of men refusing to take the Federal oath 
 after arrival in camp. In the fourth only 15 men of the - - company 
 reported at camp for muster in. * * * They were assigned to another 
 organization of the same regiment * * * and a new organization from 
 - formed to take their place. In at least tw r o instances, Companies - 
 and , muster in was delayed 24 hours until the captains could get the 
 minimum necessary to sign the muster rolls. What methods the company 
 officers used to obtain the requisite number of men (65) I am unable to state, 
 but a letter from the captain of Company to a National Guard recruiting 
 officer advises that it would be useless to attempt to obtain recruits at - 
 (home station of Company ) until the present feeling against the captain 
 and his organization dies down. Affidavits have been submitted through this 
 office that officers of Company , - - Infantry, resorted to threats 
 
 and the use of liquor in order to obtain the required number of enlisted men. 
 
 4. The order issued by the State authorities dated June 10 was not in ex- 
 istence at time of muster in of these organizations or these men who were 
 presumably discharged would never have been brought to camp. No one in 
 <-amp knew of its existence not even the adjutant general whose signature 
 authenticates it as evidenced by his asking as to what to do with these men 
 who refused to take the oath. 
 
 EXECUTIVE ORDER. 
 
 1. Under the provisions of the act approved June 3, 1916. officers and enlisted 
 men failing to immediately take the oath therein prescribed are not recognized 
 as members of the National Guard. Enlisted men refusing to take such oath 
 will be immediately discharged. 
 
 2. All enlisted men who do not take their required oath on or before June 
 15, 1916. will be discharged and their names dropped from the roll on such 
 date. 
 
 Governor. 
 By the governor: 
 
 Tlie Adjutant General. 
 
38 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 FAILURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TO RESPOND TO 
 
 THE CALL OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 The Militia of - - responded to the call, not in its entirety, 
 as there were numerous cases where sickness, absence from the 
 State, important other obligations prevented the appearance of indi- 
 viduals just how many can never be accurately determined, but the 
 great majority responded. 
 
 The chief trouble in - - arose from the fact that the State 
 authorities and a large majority of the officers of the organiza- 
 tions desired to present themselves in the new status of National 
 Guards at a time when the provisions of the national defense act 
 were but little known to the enlisted men, being chiefly understood 
 as a six-year enlistment, Avhich was to take the place of the periods 
 of one, two, or three years provided by the State law up to that 
 time. This new requirement an obligation to serve six years was 
 not received with any degree of enthusiasm by the enlisted personnel 
 of the Organized Militia. Many stated they were ready to carry 
 out their existing contracts, but were not willing to extend their 
 obligations to a period of six years less the time served in current 
 enlistment. This state of affairs threatened a deadlock in some 
 organizations between the officers, who desired to enter the United 
 States service as National Guards, and the men when the troops 
 reached the mobilization camp. All kinds of runners were afloat 
 as to the requirements of the new law. A very few officers of the 
 National Guard had authoritative copies of the law. Abbreviated 
 reports of the law as printed in the daily papers had to be relied 
 upon largely. These were varied and uncertain. Discussions were 
 numerous in the camp. It was reported to the senior mustering 
 officer several times that the men of certain organizations were 
 positively not going to take the new oath. But finally a majority 
 of all organizations subscribed to the new oath. It became certain 
 that the Organized Militia of - - would be transformed into 
 
 National Guards as defined in the new law. There were, how- 
 ever, several hundreds of enlisted men who steadily declined to take 
 the new oath. At this time peremptory orders to send organizations 
 to the border at minimum strength if necessary were received. The 
 organized militiamen who refused to take the new oath were vari- 
 ously told by their company and regimental officers to go to their 
 homes and there await orders or to return to their armories, deposit 
 their uniforms there, and do as they liked about it ; that they were 
 no longer members of the organization which was now transformed 
 into National Guard, or that as they refused to take the new oath 
 they were automatically released from further obligation in the 
 matter, or to go to their homes and their discharges would be sent 
 to them. Officers had been informed by the senior assistant muster- 
 ing officer that he hacl nothing to do with the choice made by or- 
 ganizations or individual members in the matter of taking the new 
 oath ; that if they took the oath and were transformed into National 
 Guards they would be mustered in as such, otherwise they would 
 be mustered in as Organized Militia. 
 
 At this time it had not developed, so far as the senior assistant 
 mustering officer was concerned, that an organization which had been 
 transformed as National Guard and so mustered in, could also have 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 39 
 
 as members those individuals who had refused to take the new oath. 
 This fact developed and the principle was announced in telegram, 
 headquarters, Eastern Department, July 19, 1916, relating to the 
 muster in of a noncommissioned officer of the Organized Militia, be- 
 longing to - . This instituted in - - the situation of organi- 
 zations being composed of members of the National Guard and of 
 the Organized Militia also. 
 
 After the muster in of 'the organizations of the State as National 
 Guards, it was then seriously questioned by legal authorities in the 
 State that any obligation to serve the United States in any military 
 capacity rested on members of the Organized Militia who had failed 
 or declined to take the new Federal oath, it being held by many that 
 the national defense act operated to abrogate the Dick bill. So cer- 
 tain about this were the State military authorities that they began 
 preparations to discharge all such remaining members. About 60 
 such discharges were prepared at the statehouse, but were not deliv- 
 ered because a letter dated headquarters, Eastern Department, July 
 11. 1916, quoting telegram from the War Department, dated July 7, 
 was received by the adjutant general of - . in which he was 
 informed, " Members of the Organized Militia of - - called for 
 by the President on June 18, 1916, who refuse to qualify as mem- 
 bers of the National Guard under the provisions of the national 
 defense act should be mustered for service under section 7 of the 
 Dick bill." When this letter was received at the statehouse the dis- 
 charges were destroyed or withheld and a general order was issued 
 by the State incorporating for information of the members of the 
 Organized Militia the department commander's letter. This affected 
 about 1.000 organized militiamen. In response to this order 278 
 members of the Organized Militia presented themselves for muster in 
 under their existing contracts of enlistment in accordance with the 
 provisions of the Dick bill. About 100 of these, upon muster in, im- 
 mediately applied for their discharge on account of dependent rela- 
 tives, a majority of the applicants receiving their discharge. 
 
 It was at this time, August 4, that an application, through a writ of 
 habeas corpus, was made by - , Squadron Cavalry, - 
 Organized Militia, for his discharge from the military custody of 
 the United States. The case was heard before - , resulting in 
 the issuance of the writ and the order of the court for the release of 
 Private - . The case was appealed to the United States Circuit 
 Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The case was heard in the 
 October term. 1916, and the order of the district court was vacated, 
 with directions " that the petitioner be returned to the military cus- 
 tody from which he was taken." The issue raised in the petition for 
 writ of habeas corpus was as to the authority of the President over 
 , as the latter had never taken the Federal oath. It was claimed 
 by petitioner that the Organized Militia ceased to exist on June 3, 
 when the national defense act was approved, and that the President, 
 therefore, had no authority to call petitioner into the Federal service. 
 There were four 'other writs issued in four other cases identical with 
 that of - , which, by agreement, were to be disposed of in 
 accordance with the decision in the - - case. At the present date 
 it has not developed whether petitioner will appeal the case, 30 days 
 being allowed for such action. 
 
40 
 
 DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE AFTER MOBILIZATION ON ACCOUNT 
 OF DEPENDENT RELATIVES. 
 
 Immediately following both the first and second calls a great num- 
 ber of applications for the discharge of men on account of dependent 
 relatives were received. This gave the War Department no little 
 embarrassment at the very time that it was making every effort to 
 get men mustered in and forAvarded to the border. 
 
 It was known when these men enlisted in the Organized Militia 
 that they Avere subject to just such calls as Avere made on May 9 and 
 June 18, and manifestly they never should haA'e been allowed to enter 
 the service. Their being on the rolls at that time proved a serious 
 embarrassment both to the State and National Governments, which 
 should have been foreseen by those who originally enlisted them. 
 
 The question whether General Order No. 31, War Department, 
 1914, relating to the discharge of enlisted men in the Regular Army 
 on account of dependent relates was applicable to militia after 
 muster into the Federal service was brought to the attention of the 
 War Department through inquiry made by the commanding general, 
 Southern Department, May 20 on behalf of 14 enlisted men of Com- 
 pany I, Fourth Texas Infantry. 
 
 The view taken at this time, and so announced, was that the order 
 in question was applicable only to the Regular Army, and was not 
 applicable to the National Guard owing to its temporary character. 
 
 Section 29 of the act of June 3, 1916, contains a provision "that 
 when by reason of death or disability of a member of the family of 
 an enlisted man, occurring after his enlistment, members of his family 
 become dependent upon him for support, he may, in the discretion 
 of the Secretary of War, be discharged from the service of the United 
 States or be furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve, upon due proof 
 being made of such condition/' This, hoAvever, applies only to the 
 Regular Army. 
 
 To meet a similar need in the National Guard the following orders 
 were published, the provisions of which are even more liberal than 
 those in section 29 above quoted : 
 
 BULLETIN \ WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 No. 20. / Washington, July IS, 1916. 
 
 The following rules are prescribed for observance in the cases of enlisted 
 men of the National Guard or the Organized Militia who are called into the 
 service of the United States and who have dependent relatives : 
 
 (a) Department commanders may issue discharges to enlisted men. except 
 noncommissioned officers, of the National Guard or Organized Militia called into 
 the service of the United States who are serving within their respective de- 
 partments, provided applications for discharge are made to them in due form, 
 through military channels, setting forth that the applicant has one or more 
 relatives who are dependent upon him for support, each application to be accom- 
 panied by adequate written evidence of real dependency. Applications from 
 noncommissioned officers for discharge under the conditions referred to herein 
 will be forwarded to the War Department for action. 
 
 (I)) When it comes to the knowledge of a commanding officer, through au- 
 thentic sources, that a soldier of his command has one or more dependent rela- 
 tives, the soldier concerned will be informed of his right to make application 
 for discharge on that account, and the discharge will be issued upon application 
 if warranted by the circumstances. Should the soldier express a desire to 
 remain in the service and at the same time decline to allot any portion of his 
 pay to his family or dependents, the case will be reported to the War Depart- 
 ment for final action. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 41 
 
 (c) When an application for discharge has been finally approved, the proper 
 recruiting agencies will be at once informed, so that the vacancy caused may be 
 filled as promptly as possible. Recruiting and mustering officers will be enjoined 
 to avoid the acceptance of recruits having relatives dependent upon them for 
 support. Department commanders will report to the War Department at the 
 close of each month the number of soldiers discharged by them under these 
 instructions during the month for which the report is made. 
 [2426477, A. G. O.] 
 
 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR I 
 
 H. L. SCOTT, 
 Major General, Chief of Staff. 
 
 OFFICIAL : 
 
 H. P. McGAix, 
 
 The Adjutant General. 
 
 These instructions were in force only until September 25, when 
 rescinded by Bulletin No. 36, War Department, the occasion of this 
 being that Congress had made other provisions for the dependent 
 relatives of national guardsmen, as indicated in General Orders, 
 No. 42, as follows : 
 
 GENERAL ORDERS,! WAE DEPARTMENT, 
 
 No. 42. / Washington, September 1, 1916. 
 
 The following extract from an act of Congress approved August 29, 1916, 
 and instructions relative thereto are published for the information and guid- 
 ance of all concerned : 
 
 1. "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal 
 year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes." 
 
 ******* 
 
 " That the sum of $2,000,000 is hereby appropriated out of any money in 
 the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended under the direction 
 of the Secretary of War, and under such rules and regulations as he may pre- 
 scribe, for the support of, at a cost of not more than $50 per month, or so 
 much of said amount as the Secretary of War may deem necessary, and not 
 more than such enlisted man has been contributing monthly to the support 
 of his family at the time of his being called or drafted into the service of the 
 United States or during his enlistment period in the Regular Army at the time 
 of such call or draft of the Organized Militia or National Guard, the family 
 of each enlisted man of the Organized Militia or National Guard called or 
 drafted into the service of the United States until his discharge from such 
 service, and the family of each enlisted man of the Regular Army until his 
 discharge from active service therein or until the discharge of the Organized 
 Militia or National Guard from such service if such enlisted man is at that 
 time in active service in the Regular Army, which family during the term of 
 service of such enlisted man has no other income, except the pay of such 
 enlisted man, adequate for the support of said family : Provided, That the 
 action of the Secretary of War in all cases provided for in this paragraph shall 
 be final, and no right to prosecute a suit in the Court of Claims or in any 
 other court of the United States against the Government of the United States 
 shall accrue to such enlisted man, or to any member of the family of any such 
 enlisted man, by virtue of the passage of this act : And provided further, That 
 this paragraph shall not apply to any such enlisted man who shall marry after 
 the fifteenth day of July, nineteen hundred and sixteen ; and the word ' family ' 
 shall include only wife, children, and dependent mothers." 
 
 2. Construing this provision, the Comptroller of the Treasury, on August 30, 
 1916, held that: 
 
 (a) Only the families of those men of the Militia or National Guard who 
 were brought into the service of the United States under the call of the Presi- 
 dent are entitled to the benefits of the act. The family of a man enlisting in 
 the Militia or National Guard of Texas, New Mexico, or Arizona after May 9, 
 and that of a man enlisting in the Militia or National Guard of the other States 
 after June 18, 1916, are not entitled to the benefits of the act. The amount 
 paid to the family of an enlisted man of the Militia or National Guard may 
 be paid to the family of such soldier until his discharge from the service. 
 
42 MOBILIZATION OF THE OEGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 (&) The amount which may be paid to the family of an enlisted man in the 
 Regular Army is the amount the soldier was contributing to the support of 
 his family on June 18, 1916, the time of the President's general call. The 
 family of a man enlisting or reenlisting in the Regular Army after June 18, 
 1916, is not entitled to the benefits of the act. 
 
 (c) The benefits of the act do not extend to the families of enlisted men of 
 the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry or the Philippine Scouts. 
 
 (d) Since members of the Regular Army Reserve had not been called to the 
 colors and were not in active service at the time of the call of the President 
 of June 18, 1916, which brought the Militia or National Guard as a body into 
 the actual service of the United States, the families of members of the Regular 
 Army Reserve are not entitled to the benefits of the act. 
 
 (e) The law is not retroactive, and its benefits, therefore, do not begin until 
 the date of its approval, August 29, 1916. 
 
 3. Immediately upon receipt of this order the provisions thereof will be read 
 by company and other commanding officers to all enlisted men of their com- 
 mands and the men advised that they are privileged to make application for 
 the support of their families. Men who claim to have dependent families in 
 contemplation of the law will thereupon be furnished by their commanding offi- 
 cers with the form prescribed for making application for support of families. 
 These forms will be furnished to all department commanders for distribution to 
 all posts and stations within the territorial limits of their commands, whether 
 under their administrative control or not. 
 
 Distribution should not be made to organzations of the Porto Rico Regiment 
 of Infantry or the Philippine Scouts. 
 
 4. The application form, when executed by the man and certified to by his 
 organization commander, will be forwarded directly to the Depot Quartermaster, 
 Washington, D. C. To avoid delays incident to the return of these forms for 
 correction, the organization commanders will see that the forms are properly 
 prepared by the men. 
 
 5. The attention of all concerned is called to the fact that the word " family " 
 as used in the law includes only wife, children, and dependent mothers. 
 
 6. When the application is forwarded to the Depot Quartermaster, entry to 
 that effect will be made on the soldier's descriptive list, and, in the event of 
 the soldier's death, discharge, muster-out, furlough to the reserve, or desertion, 
 such fact will be immediately reported by the soldier's immediate commanding 
 officer to the Depot Quartermaster, Washington, D. C., or in the Philippine and 
 Hawaiian Department to the adjutants of those departments. In the Philip- 
 pine and Hawaiian Departments, except in case of deaths which are otherwise 
 reported, the department commanders will send by cable notification to The 
 Adjutant General of the Army, who will at once notify the Quartermaster 
 General. 
 
 [2455574 A. G. O.] 
 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 H. L. SCOTT, 
 
 Major General, Chief of Staff. 
 OFFICIAL : 
 
 H. P. MCCAIN, 
 
 The Adjutant General. 
 
 Up to November 30 there had been $983,108.11 disbursed of the 
 $2,000,000 appropriated by this act, of which $923,495.15 was on 
 account of the National Guard and $59,612.96 on account of the 
 Regular Army. 
 
 The status of enlisted men discharged from the Federal service on 
 account of dependent relatives may at present be regarded as being 
 held in abeyance per decision of September 6, 1916, on such cases by 
 the Secretary of War, as follows: 
 
 Discharge as discussed in the foregoing papers should be held to release a 
 man from service to the United States under the present call of the President, 
 but should return him to the National Guard until such time as, under general 
 regulations, the National Guard is reorganized and undesirable classes of en- 
 listed men excluded therefrom. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 43 
 
 RELEASE FROM SERVICE OF STUDENTS OF EDUCATIONAL 
 
 INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 When the State troops were called out on June 18 there were a 
 number of National Guard organizations wholly composed of under- 
 graduates of colleges, and in other cases there were organizations 
 composed in part of such students. 
 
 Naturally, these men sought relief from military service, and to 
 meet this demand the Chief of the Militia Bureau on August 2 ad- 
 dressed the following letter to the adjutants general of all States 
 having field artillery and to all inspectors of field artillery : 
 
 I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that the following policy 
 is adopted with reference to the National Guard organizations composed of 
 undergraduates of colleges, and the same policy will be applied to all individuals 
 who are members of other organizations of the National Guard and who can 
 show bona fide intention of entering or returning to colleges or schools at the 
 commencement of the fall term in 1916 : 
 
 1. The organizations which are composed of students of colleges or schools 
 and which have been mustered into the service of the United States will remain 
 in that service for the time being. Those organizations which have not been 
 sent to the Mexican border prior to August 1, 1916, will not be sent there unless 
 some unforeseen need arises for their services. 
 
 2. Should the National Guard be retained in the service of the United States 
 until September 1. 1916. all organizations composed of students of colleges or 
 schools will be returned to their home stations on September 1, 1916, and will 
 be mustered out of the service of the United States as soon thereafter as prac- 
 ticable, unless the military situation at that time shall be such as to render 
 their retention in the service necessary. All individuals of other organizations 
 of the National Guard mustered into the service of the United States who can 
 show a bona fide intention of entering or returning to colleges or schools at the 
 beginning of the fall term in 1916 will be discharged as soon as practicable after 
 September 1, 1916. unless the military situation at that time shall be such as to 
 render their retention in the service necessary. 
 
 3. Immediately after mustering out the organizations composed of students 
 of colleges or schools, Federal recognition will be withdrawn from such organi- 
 zations as a part of the National Guard. 
 
 4. Should any college or school whose students composed the membership of 
 an organization from which Federal recognition is withdrawn under the pro- 
 visions of paragraph 3 desire to maintain a division of the Reserve Officers' 
 Training Corps, the authorities thereof will make application as soon as prac- 
 ticable for such division to be authorized under the regulations to be prescribed 
 under the provisions of the national-defense act. 
 
 Subsequently, it was found impracticable to completely carry out 
 this policy, for reasons set forth in the following letter from the 
 Secretary of War of September 9 : 
 
 When the militia were first called out the call reached several purely student 
 organizations which had been formed in various colleges in the country and 
 associated with the State militia merely because there was no legislative pro- 
 vision for officers' reserve corps, and no other easier way for providing arms 
 and training for college students who would thus be made available for mem- 
 bership in an officers' reserve. I therefore directed that on the 1st of Septem- 
 ber these student groups who could not properly be regarded as State militia 
 in a narrow sense, because for the most part their members were not residents 
 of the State in which they were attending college be released from the service, 
 and at the same time directed that, if practicable, individual students in other 
 militia organizations should be so released. A canvass of the situation devel- 
 oped a good many thousand such students in the regiments on the border, and I 
 became satisfied that any general release of high-school and college students 
 would produce profound disorganization in the regiments which are doing bor- 
 der service. I was therefore obliged to suspend the original order applying to 
 individual members, and so far have not seen my way clear to afford them 
 relief. I earnestly hope this border service will not have to be indefinitely 
 
44 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 extended, and that the interference with the work of the high-school and college 
 boys, as well as the interference with the professional and business activities 
 of the other militia soldiers, can be minimized as far as possible. 
 
 Student organizations mustered out of tlie service of the United States. 
 
 Designation. 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Designation. 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Colorado: 
 
 70 
 
 Indiana Continued. 
 Company I, First Infantry 
 
 57 
 
 
 69 
 
 Band Second Infantry 
 
 26 
 
 Troop D Cavalry 
 
 70 
 
 Minnesota: 
 
 
 Battery A Field Artillery 
 
 145 
 
 Battery F, First Field Artillery 
 
 177 
 
 Connecticut: 
 Headquarters and Batteries, A, B, 
 C D Tenth Field Artillery 
 
 513 
 
 Vermont: 
 Headquarters Company, Supply 
 Company, Machine-gun Company, 
 
 
 Illinois: 
 
 
 and Company C, First Infantry. . . 
 
 1124 
 
 
 
 Total . ... 
 
 1 1, 523 
 
 Battery B , Field Artillery 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' i Not including Company C, for which no report has been received. 
 
 DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND 
 EMPLOYEES OF FIRMS ENGAGED IN FABRICATION OR SUPPLY 
 OF MUNITIONS. 
 
 The question indicated in the heading above arose immediately 
 after the second call through inquiry made by the Secretary of the 
 Navy requesting the release from military service of certain em- 
 ployees of the Washington Navy Yard who had associated them- 
 selves with the Organized Militia. It was represented that the 
 absence of these men from the guard would seriously cripple the 
 Navy. 
 
 The Chief of Ordnance also on behalf of a firm engaged in the 
 manufacture of munitions of war, suggested the relief from military 
 service of persons occupying positions of importance to the success- 
 ful operation of private establishments which might be needed to 
 serve the Government in the execution of the same purposes for 
 which the troops were called, and whose withdrawal from their posi- 
 tions might interfere with such execution to a greater extent than 
 their services with troops would forward it. 
 
 These matters having been duly considered, the following general 
 order (G. O. No. 33, War DepC July 29, 1916) was published to 
 cover all such cases : 
 
 II. Members of organizations of the National Guard that have been mustered 
 into the service of the United States, who are officers or employees of Govern- 
 ment departments, the loss of whose services would seriously hamper any of 
 the bureaus of those departments ; members who are Government contractors ; 
 and members who are employed by such contractors in the capacities of super- 
 intendents, foremen, inspectors, or in any other special skilled capacity, the 
 loss of whose services would seriously hamper the contractors in the fulfillment 
 of contracts with the War and Navy Departments for characteristically or dis- 
 tinctively war material, may be discharged from the service in the manner here- 
 inafter indicated. Such discharges will be ordered by department commanders 
 upon receipt by them of proper certification by the proper heads of departments 
 or of independent bureaus, and in the case of Government contractors or em- 
 ployees thereof, upon receipt of a proper certificate of an officer of the contract- 
 ing firm whose responsibility has been certified to by the chief of the supply 
 bureau of the War or Navy Departments under whom contracts are being 
 filled. Action toward the obtaining of any discharge under the conditions above 
 stated should be initiated by the heads of the Government departments or incle- 
 
MOBILIZATI6X OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 45 
 
 pendent bureaus concerned or by the heads of contracting firms supplying war 
 material, but no member of the National Guard will be discharged from the 
 service under the provisions of this order without his consent. 
 
 The substance of the foregoing has been brought to the attention of the 
 proper officers of the various Government departments and independent bureaus 
 located in Washington, D. C. 
 [2416320, A. G. O.] 
 
 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 H. L. SCOTT, 
 Major General, Chief of Staff. 
 
 Although, as will be seen, the War Department made prompt pro- 
 vision for the discharge of such men of the National Guard as might, 
 from the nature of their usual occupations, better (so far as Gov- 
 ernment interests are concerned) be so employed than performing 
 military dut}^ the actual number of such discharges of all classes of 
 Government employees was less than 150. There were about 115 
 employees of the Navy discharged under this order. 
 
 The Chief of Ordnance, United States Army, reported September 
 12 that inquiry had been made of the various arsenals and inspection 
 forces and that no contractors engaged in the manufacture of char- 
 acteristic and distinctive war material are hampered in the delivery 
 of material to the Ordnance Department by the calling out of the 
 National Guard. 
 
 DISCHARGE FROM FEDERAL SERVICE EFFECTS A COMPLETE 
 SEPARATION FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD, STATE AS WELL 
 AS FEDERAL SERVICE. 
 
 Question having arisen as to the nature of discharges to be given 
 those members of the National Guard who responded to the call of 
 the President but who on the subsequent physical examination re- 
 quired by section 115, national defense act, were rejected for ac- 
 ceptance into Federal service owing to physical defects, the matter 
 was referred for opinion to the Judge Advocate General, who gave 
 opinion as follows : 
 
 1. The views of this office are desired on the request of the adjutant general 
 of the State of Georgia for information with respect to the discharge of mem- 
 bers of the National Guard of that State who have been called into the Federal 
 service and who have been rejected owing to physical defects. He says that 
 he is informed that "all members of the National Guard of this State who 
 responded to the call of the Secretary of War who have been rejected for 
 acceptance in the Federal service owing to physical defect will be discharged 
 from the service by the War Department," and requests that he be advised 
 " if the discharge referred to is a complete release from the National Guard, 
 or only so far as the Federal Government is concerned." 
 
 2. The statutes of the United States define the composition of the militia 
 to consist " of all able-bodied male citizens," etc., and of the National Guard, 
 the only authorized organization of militia, as consisting of the regularly 
 enlisted militia and the commissioned officers between the ages specified for 
 each, respectively. The statute further prescribes the qualifications for en- 
 listment and appointment therein, and provides that the National Guard " when 
 called as such into the service of the United States shall * * * be subject 
 to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, so far as such laws 
 and regulations are applicable to officers and enlisted men whose permanent 
 retention in the military service, either on the active or retired list, is not con- 
 templated by existing law." (Sec. 101, national defense act, June 3, 1916.) 
 
 The national defense act (sec. 72), respecting the discharge of enlisted men 
 from the National Guard, provides: 
 
 "An enlisted man discharged from service in the National Guard shall re- 
 ceive a discharge in writing in such form and with such classification as is or 
 
46 
 
 shall be prescribed for the Regular Army, and in time of pence discharges may 
 be given prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment under such regulations 
 as the President m/ny prescribe" 
 
 It is further provided in section 115 of the same act that " every officer and 
 enlisted man of the National Guard who shall be called into the service of the 
 United States as such shall be examined as to his physical fitness under such 
 regulations as the President may prescribe without further commission or 
 enlistment." 
 
 I understand that the Organized Militia of the State of Georgia have qualified 
 by taking the oath prescribed in the national defense act, so that their status 
 can be properly regarded as members of the National Guard provided for in 
 said act called as such into the service of the United States. I think it is clear 
 from the national defense act that the National Guard occupies a dual status 
 that is, as a National force and also as State force and further that no officer 
 or enlisted man can remain a member of the National Guard unless he is physi- 
 cally qualified for Federal service. It is clear that Congress has undertaken 
 in the national defense act to prescribe the qualifications for enlistment or com- 
 mission in the National Guard and has asserted on behalf of the United States 
 the authority to prescribe the conditions under which enlistments and dis- 
 charges in and from the National Guard shall be made. Section 72 of that act 
 restricts the discharges in time of peace so that no discharges may be given in 
 time of peace " prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment " except " under 
 such regulations as the President may prescribe.'" Section 115 of the same act 
 provides for a medical examination to determine the physical condition of the 
 officers or enlisted men when called into the service of the United States, and 
 I think it is clear that an officer or enlisted man, upon being examined as re- 
 quired by that section and found physically defective, must be discharged not 
 only from the operation of the call into the Federal service, but also from the 
 National Guard. In the case of an enlisted man the discharge, when ordered, 
 should be effected by a discharge in writing, signed by the proper National 
 Guard commander under the provisions of section 72 of the national defense act, 
 and should be so worded as to show that it is a discharge not only from the 
 operation of the Federal call but also from the National Guard. With respect 
 to a commissioned officer, I think the discharge should be ordered by the Presi- 
 dent and should purport to be a discharge from the National Guard. 
 
 The above opinion was approved by the Secretary of War. 
 RESIGNATIONS OF OFFICERS. 
 
 During the latter part of August a large number of resignations on 
 the part of National Guard officers were received at the War Depart- 
 ment, the policy of which was announced in the following telegram to 
 the commanding general. Southern Department, September 4, 1916: 
 
 Secretary War is returning several tenders of resignations last received from 
 your headquarters with his action thereon. This action will indicate to you the 
 general policy be intends to follow. Tenders of resignations for ordinary busi- 
 ness or family reasons will be disapproved. This will be especially true of 
 medical officers who can not be permitted to leave their commands, which are 
 in an unusual degree dependent upon sufficient medical attention for their effi- 
 ciency. Discharges of enlisted men are no longer permitted for business or 
 family reasons because of provisions Congress has made for support of relatives. 
 It is not proper to permit officers to leave their commands for reasons which are 
 not accepted in case of enlisted men. Some cases of resignation are noted where 
 it is evident that disciplinary action and not resignation is proper. In numerous 
 cases it is noted officers tender resignations because they are not sufficiently 
 instructed to perform their duties. Such cases should be met by special instruc- 
 tion and not by resignation. 
 
 MCCAIN. 
 
 In the case of First Lieut. - , - Infantry, - 
 
 National Guard, whose discharge had been recommended by an effi- 
 ciency board convened under the provisions of section 77. act ap- 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 47 
 
 proved June 3, 1916, and in whom was " found a lack of general fitness 
 and capacity," the Secretary of War decided as follows: 
 
 In this case of resignation of First Lieut. , tendered be- 
 cause he does not consider himself adapted to perform the duties of his posi- 
 tion in a manner creditable to himself or the service, his colonel states that 
 " there is nothing against his character," and that the resignation was tendered 
 as the result of a suggestion from him. There are great numbers of National 
 Guard officers (of good habits and character as this officer appears to be) who 
 can not thoroughly well perform the duties of their position. The Federal Gov- 
 ernment is giving them an opportunity at very great expense to itself to qualify 
 themselves in this respect. The department commander will instruct his com- 
 manding officers to see that he -is trained to the highest degree possible and that 
 when relieved from duty on the border a special report is made in his case 
 for future guidance of the proper authorities. 
 
 The tender of resignation is disapproved. 
 
 The Adjutant General reports that up to and including November 
 28, 1916, the resignation of 482 National Guard officers had been 
 accepted. 
 
 STATUS AND DISPOSITION OF NATIONAL GUARD RESERVISTS 
 CREATED BY THE NATIONAL-DEFENSE ACT. 
 
 At the date of mobilization, following as it did close upon the date 
 of the passage of the act of June 3. 1916, sections 69, 70, and 78 of 
 said act had not begun to operate to create a National Guard Reserve. 
 At least there was no record in the War Department to show that 
 any individuals had become reservists as contemplated by the law. 
 Soon after the mobilization instances were reported of members of 
 the National Guard whose active service of three years had been 
 completed, and who, under the terms of the law, would pass to the 
 National Guard Reserve. The question having been presented as to 
 the liability to service under the President's call of members of the 
 National Guard who would pass to the reserve while in the Federal 
 service the Chief of the Militia Bureau took the ground that such 
 individuals might be held and continued in active service at the dis- 
 cretion of the President, since as individuals they had already been 
 included in the call. The matter having been referred to the Judge 
 Advocate General of the Army for an opinion a contrary view was 
 taken, and such contrary view having been approved by the Secre- 
 tary of War instructions in accordance therewith were communi- 
 cated to the commanding general, Southern Department, in a tele- 
 gram from The Adjutant General of the Army, dated August 14, 
 1916, as follows : 
 
 According to opinion rendered by Judge Advocate General, dated July '2(3, 
 1916, approved by Secretary of War, National Guardsmen who have completed 
 their three years' term active service can not under call June 18, 1916, be held 
 for active service beyond active-enlistment period unless they so elect. Con- 
 tinuation in active service into period of reserve service should be as provided 
 for in section 69, national-defense act. Reenlistment can take place only after 
 completion full-term enlistment, including reserve period. National Guards- 
 men who have completed their terms active service and who do not desire ro 
 remain in. active service should be transferred to National Guard reserve of 
 State to which they belong and sent to their homes under proper orders, accord- 
 ing to practice followed with reservists of Regular Army. Men who are in 
 service without having taken oath are not National Guardsmen but Organized 
 Militia. Such men should be given final discharge upon completion of enlist- 
 ment term, there being no provision for reserve period of service under Dick- 
 law. Such may be reenlisted for a six-year torni as National Guardsmen if 
 they so desire. MCCAIN-. 
 
48 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 It was also decided that there is no provision in the national-de- 
 fense act by which members of the National Guard reserve could be 
 required by the President or by the governor of a State to engage in 
 field or coast-defense training with the active National Guard. 
 
 ADVANTAGES OF DIVISIONAL ORGANIZATION. 
 
 The first step since the enactment of the militia law of 1903, look- 
 ing to the organization of the militia into higher tactical units, was 
 taken in 1910 in the organization of the so-called " First Field Army." 
 set forth in General Orders, No. 35, War Department, series 1910. 
 The field army contemplated by this order embraced the militia 
 organizations of New York and the New T England States and the 
 Regular Army regiments stationed in those States. It was to com- 
 prise three divisions of three brigades each. The units of the Regu- 
 lar Army were to be distributed among the divisions and brigades. 
 
 It became apparent, however, that this organization did not have 
 the necessary qualities of permanency, as it comprised elements of 
 different degrees of training and readiness for service. An organiza- 
 tion of this character was sure to be disrupted upon the occurrence 
 of the first emergency requiring the immediate services of the regular 
 troops, and it was probable that a considerable time must elapse be- 
 fore the less thorough^ trained elements would be capable of en- 
 gaging in the same character of operations as the better trained. 
 For this reason, the project of combining militia organizations with 
 regular troops for the formation of higher tactical units, was aban- 
 doned, and the plan to develop the Organized Militia into a complete 
 and independently organized force, was adopted. This plan was 
 formulated in 1912 as a result of detailed study of the question by the 
 General Staff and the Division of Militia Affairs, and after consulta- 
 tion with the State authorities. The plan contemplated the formation 
 of 12 tactical divisions corresponding to 12 groups of contiguous 
 States. These divisions and groups as subsequently amended were as 
 follows : 
 
 Fifth Division, the New England States. 
 
 Sixth Division, New York. 
 
 Seventh Division, Pennsylvania. 
 
 Eighth Division, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, District of 
 Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia. 
 
 Ninth Division, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia. 
 
 Tenth Division, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky. 
 
 Eleventh Division, Michigan, Ohio. 
 
 Twelfth Division, Illinois, Indiana. 
 
 Thirteenth Division, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
 Dakota, Iowa. 
 
 Fourteenth Division, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, 
 Wyoming. 
 
 Fifteenth Division, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Okla- 
 homa, Louisiana. 
 
 Sixteenth Division, California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, 
 Utah, Idaho, Nevada. 
 
 At the time of the adoption of the plan the Organized Militia in 
 the United States, comprised the following units: 1,584 companies of 
 infantry, 64 batteries of field artillery, 80 troops of cavalry, 22 com- 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 49 
 
 panies of engineers, 22 companies of signal troops, 15 ambulance 
 companies, 23 field hospitals. 
 
 For the 12 tactical divisions there were required: 1,296 companies 
 of infantry, 144 batteries of field artillery, 144 troops of cavalry, 36 
 companies of engineers, 24 companies of signal troops, 48 field hos- 
 pitals, 48 ambulance companies. 
 
 There was thus a shortage of the following units: 64 troops of 
 cavalry, 80 batteries of field artillery, 14 companies of engineers, 2 
 companies of signal troops, 25 field hospitals, 33 ambulance com- 
 panies, and an excess of 288 companies of infantry. 
 
 The divisional .plan was further developed by the publication of 
 Circular No. 19, D. M. A., 1914, in which the quotas of auxiliary 
 troops required to complete the tactical divisions were assigned to 
 the several States in accordance with their population. 
 
 During the period from May 9 to October 31, 1916, there were in 
 the Federal service the following units of the several arms and 
 branches (exclusive of headquarters, supply, and machine-gun com- 
 panies of infantry, and cavalry regiments) : 1,324 companies of in- 
 fantry, 107 batteries of field artillery, 123 troops of cavalry, 26 com- 
 panies of engineers, 24 companies of signal troops, 26 ambulance 
 companies, and 39 field hospitals, leaving a shortage of 37 batteries 
 of field artillery, 21 troops of cavalry, 10 companies of engineers, 22 
 ambulance companies, and 9 field hospitals. 
 
 There has thus been a gain of the following units since the adoption 
 of the divisional plan of 1912 : 43 batteries of field artillery, 43 troops 
 of cavalry, 4 companies of engineers, 2 companies of signal troops, 
 11 ambulance companies, and 16 field hospitals. 
 
 The above statements are based on the Tables of Organization, 
 1914, in force on the date of the call (June 18, 1916). It is under- 
 stood that these tables are now- under revision and that the result 
 will be to considerably increase the shortage in respect to field ar- 
 tillery and engineers. 
 
 The above statement sets forth the shortages in respect to tactical 
 units of the several arms and branches of service. In respect to com- 
 position of the National Guard in Federal service, i. e., the propor- 
 tion existing between the numerical strength of the several arms and 
 branches, the results differ considerably from a comparison of the 
 number of tactical units. According to Table 2, Tables of Organiza- 
 tion, 1914, the proportion at which the several elements enter the 
 composition of a tactical division is as follows : 
 
 
 Numerical 
 strength. 
 
 Percent, 
 
 Infantry . . . . 
 
 17 244 
 
 77 43 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 l' 308 
 
 5 87 
 
 Field Artillery 
 
 2 391 
 
 10 74 
 
 Engineers 
 
 514 
 
 2 31 
 
 Signal Troops 
 
 176 
 
 79 
 
 Sanitary Troops 
 
 638 
 
 i 2 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 22,271 
 
 100.00 
 
 i Exclusive of regimental detachments. 
 
 The strength of all units of the various arms and branches of the 
 National Guard in service of the United States to September 30, 
 
 72031 
 
50 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 1916, and the percentage of each arm and branch of the total strength 
 were as follows: 
 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Per cent. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 119 134 
 
 77 24 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 10 522 
 
 6 82 
 
 Field Artillery - 
 
 16 210 
 
 10 52 
 
 Engineers 
 
 2 299 
 
 1 48 
 
 Signal Corps 
 
 1 894 
 
 1 22 
 
 Sanitary Troops 
 
 4 191 
 
 2 72 
 
 
 
 
 
 154, 230 
 
 100.00 
 
 From the last two tables, it will be seen that while there exists a 
 considerable shortage in the number of units of auxiliary arms re- 
 quired to complete the divisional organization, the proportions in 
 point of actual strength are practically complete. This apparent 
 discrepancy is due to the relative low strength at which Infantry 
 units have been maintained. 
 
 It would, therefore, appear that in the future development of the 
 divisional plan, an increase in the strength of Infantry units should 
 go hand in hand with the raising of the new units of auxiliary arms 
 required to complete the divisional organization. 
 
 The above statements refer only to the extent to which the di- 
 visional plan evolved in 1912 has approached realization and do not 
 consider Infantry units in excess of divisional requirements and not 
 called into Federal service nor the field-army troops which are totally 
 unorganized. The following Infantry units were not called into Fed- 
 eral service: Thirteen regiments, 3 separate battalions, 10 separate 
 companies, or nearly the equivalent of ^15 regiments. 
 
 These regiments were considered surplus under the divisional plan 
 and were therefore not called into service. By their conversion into 
 units of the proper arm, the greater part of the existing deficiencies 
 in field-army troops would be made up. 
 
 
 ACTUAL ORGANIZATION IN FEDERAL SERVICE. 
 
 While at the date of the call of the President the divisional plan 
 was still incomplete, enough progress had been made to admit of 
 expressing the quotas of troops required from the several States in 
 terms of organized units instead of in bare terms of numerical 
 strength. 
 
 Due to the immediate necessity for the presence of troops on the 
 Mexican border, regiments were at first ordered to border stations 
 as rapidly as they could be prepared for service. As troops were 
 ordered to stations where their presence was most required in the 
 order of their arrival in the Southern Department, regiments from 
 the same division were often located at widely separated points. 
 Many regiments were, moreover, held at their mobilization sites until 
 other regiments were returned from the border for muster out. The 
 result was that the divisional plan never materialized, and it was 
 necessary to regroup the units serving on the border into provisional 
 divisions and brigades which did not in any way correspond to the 
 original scheme. Under instructions from the War Department, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 51 
 
 dated August 4, 1916, the commanding general, Southern Depart- 
 ment, provided for an organization of the National Guard in Federal 
 service into 10 provisional divisions and 6 separate brigades. At 
 this time many of the units included in the provisional organization 
 were located at the mobilization centers of the several States, and 
 when they were ordered to the border, others were returned to the 
 place of muster in, so that even the provisional organization never 
 became a concrete fact. 
 
 VALUE OF THE DIVISIONAL PLAN. 
 
 As very few of the regiments in Federal service have, as judged 
 by reports received to date, attained a sufficient degree of proficiency 
 to enable them to participate with profit in the training of the higher 
 units, the failure of the divisional plan to materialize can not be con- 
 sidered to have resulted in any great actual loss. Efficient partici- 
 pation in maneuvers and operations of the higher units implies that 
 the lower units have been brought to a state of proficiency by the 
 thorough and progressive training of each of the component organ- 
 izations. It can not be expected with the short periods of training 
 required of the National Guard that company, battalion, and regi- 
 mental units will ever attain this degree of proficiency in time of 
 peace or for some months after their mobilization for service. The 
 divisional plan, even if fully carried into effect in time of peace, can- 
 not therefore be expected to result in the constitution of divisions 
 available for immediate service. 
 
 The plan has, however, certain distinct advantages that should not 
 be lost from view. It establishes a standard toward the realization 
 of which all efforts can be concentrated and without which such 
 development of the National Guard as may take place would be 
 entirely haphazard and unregulated. The result of such a develop- 
 ment would be a product which would be unsuited for field opera- 
 tions and which would have to be entirely remodeled upon the occur- 
 rence of an emergency calling for the mobilization of the National 
 Guard. The countless details which are represented or implied in 
 the plan would have to be worked out under very difficult circum- 
 stances. It may indeed be doubted whether any well-digested plan 
 for higher organization could be devised if the drafting of the or- 
 ganizational scheme were deferred until the occurrence of the emer- 
 gency. If the plan is completely realized it will enable future calls 
 to be framed in terms of the higher units, and the process of mobiliza- 
 tion can be decentralized by charging commanders or chiefs of staff 
 of the divisions with the supervision of the details of the mobilization 
 of each division. In this connection it is believed that had the 
 recent call included all the units required for the 12 divisions, as 
 would doubtless have been done had the emergency been more serious, 
 the result would have been the organization of the greater part of 
 the units required to complete the divisional organization. On such 
 occasions the local pride of the States acts as a stimulus toward rais- 
 ing the assigned quotas. 
 
 Not the least of the advantages of the divisional plan lies in the 
 power which it gives to limit the appointments of the numerous can- 
 didates for the positions of general officers which are always urged 
 on occasion of the formation of our war armies. With exact knowl- 
 
52 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 edge as to the higher units to be formed, general officers can be 
 selected to command definite tactical units instead of the units being 
 raised to create positions for particular persons. The divisional plan 
 is the concrete expression of the spirit of teamwork. As such it rep- 
 resents the general interest as opposed to the interest of individuals 
 and should receive the active support of all who are interested in 
 the general welfare. Its value as the expression of a definite policy 
 became apparent during the recent mobilization, for it made possible 
 continuous and progressive action, while without it there could have 
 been only halting, vacillation, and conflict. . 
 
 TRANSPORTATION OF NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS TO THE MEXI- 
 CAN BORDER AND REPLY TO COMPLAINTS. 
 
 During the transfer of troops from their mobilization camps to 
 concentration camps on the border articles appeared in the public 
 press in which it was alleged that troops were " being transported in 
 cars lacking sufficient sleeping space " ; that the cars used have been 
 or are being used to transport troops without light; that they had 
 " been sidetracked and delayed en route to accommodate private busi- 
 ness " ; that troops en route had been obliged to seek food of citizens, 
 and that the supply of drinking water had been insufficient. It was 
 intimated that the cars used for transportation of National Guard 
 troops had not been inspected so as to protect the safety and health 
 of troops assigned to them, and that furthermore these troops had 
 not been equipped with arms and accouterments required by Army 
 regulations for actual service in time of war. 
 
 These reports coming to the notice of Congress resulted in House 
 Resolution No. 292 of July 5, 1916 : 
 
 RESOLUTION. 
 
 Resolved, That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to trans- 
 mit to the House of Representatives full information as to the following mat- 
 ters : 
 
 First. Whether the troops of the National Guard mustered into the service 
 of the United States and on their way to Mexico have been, or are being, trans- 
 ported in cars lacking sufficient sleeping space. 
 
 Second. Whether such cars have been, or are being, used to transport said 
 troops without light. 
 
 Third. Whether said cars have been sidetracked and delayed en route to 
 accommodate private business. 
 
 Fourth. Whether the troops en route have been subsisted by the Government 
 in accordance with the United States Army Regulations or have been obliged 
 to seek food of citizens, and whether the supply of drinking water in the cars 
 has been sufficient. 
 
 Fifth. Whether cars used for the transportation of National Guard troops 
 mustered into the United States service were inspected to protect the health 
 and safety of the troops assigned to them, and by whom. 
 
 Sixth. Whether, being mustered into the service of the United States, the 
 troops of the National Guard are equipped with arms and accouterments re- 
 quired by Army Regulations for actual service in time of war. 
 
 These matters were immediately made the subject of investigation 
 by the War Department. The reply of the Secretary of War of 
 July 21, 1916, published as Document 1311, House of Representatives, 
 together with the reports called for, cover the ground completely. 
 
 The reply of the Secretary of War is as follows: 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 53 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT. 
 Wasliinpton, July 21, 1916. 
 The SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 SIR: In reply to House resolution 292. I have the honor to transmit to you 
 the following information : 
 
 First Troops of the National Guard mustered into the service of the United 
 States and on their way to the Mexican border have been, in some instances, 
 transported in day coaches. This was done only in cases where, due to the 
 urgency of the situation on the border and the large number of troops being 
 moved* at one time, it was not practicable to delay. When day coaches were 
 used three men were assigned to each four sittings, in accordance with the rule 
 invoked in like cases in transporting organizations of the Regular Army. In 
 some cases the railroad company, without extra charge, allowed each two men 
 to occupy four sittings. Wherever it could be done, arrangements were made to 
 transfer' troops from day coaches to tourist sleepers while en route. 
 
 Second. No cars without lights were used to transport troops. 
 
 Third. Trains were not sidetracked or delayed beyond what should be 
 reasonably expected, due to the great- number of special trains employed, most 
 of them manned, no doubt, by extra train crews. 
 
 Fourth. Regular Army rations more than sufficient for the journey were fur- 
 nished to all troops either upon leaving their mobilization camps or, in accord- 
 ance with a prearranged plan, while en route. Where the necessary ranges 
 and boilers were not placed on trains, the troops were furnished in advance 
 of the movement with money for the purchase of hot coffee at the same rate as 
 troops of the Regular Army are allowed under similar conditions. No reason 
 existed for troops seeking food from civilians. Drinking water arrangements 
 were ample. 
 
 Fifth. All cars used were inspected with a view to remedying any defects or 
 deficiencies which would imperil the health or safety of the troops assigned to 
 them. The inspections were made, as a rule, by the quartermaster, accom- 
 panied in some cases by the train commander, the train quartermaster, the 
 mustering officer, or the surgeon. 
 
 Sixth. As rapidly as possible, all National Guard troops mustered into the 
 service of the United States are being equipped with arms and accouterments 
 identical with those furnished the Regular Army. The delays have been due 
 to lack of reserve supplies kept on hand for the purpose. 
 
 The telegraphic reports rendered by the commanding generals of the Eastern, 
 Western, and Central Departments in reply to the inquiries above referred to, 
 are herewith. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 NEWTON D. BAKER, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The gist of the reports concerning the supply of tourist sleepers 
 is found in the fact that to accommodate all the troops moved with 
 Pullman tourist sleepers would have required approximately 3,000 
 such cars. The Pullman Co. owns only about 750 tourist sleepers 
 and supplied 623 of these for the movement. The only reason that 
 more were not supplied was that to have done so they would have had 
 to be taken from the regular passenger service. Conditions were 
 such as admitted of no delay, and, as the bulk of the entire National 
 Guard had to be moved at once, a great proportion of them had to 
 be transported in day coaches. 
 
 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 Section 7 of the Dick bill provided: "That every officer and en- 
 listed man of the Militia who shall be called into the service of the 
 United States shall be mustered for service without further enlist- 
 ment, and without further medical examination previous to such 
 muster, except for those States which have not adopted the standard 
 
54 MOBILIZATION OP THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army " (see 
 par. 19, Mustering Regulations). This not being inconsistent with 
 the act of June 3, 1916, is still in force, but is subject to the modifica- 
 tion of section 115 of the act of June 3, 1916, which provides that 
 every officer and enlisted man of the National Guard who shall be 
 called into the service of the United States as such shall be examined 
 as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the President may 
 prescribe without further commission or enlistment (see also par. 
 19, Mustering Regulations). 
 
 At the time of the call of May 9, Texas and Arizona had, and New 
 Mexico had not adopted the standard of examination for the Regular 
 Army, while on June 18, the Regular Army physical standard had 
 been adopted by all the States whose troops were called out, except 
 Delaware, Kansas, and North Carolina. The normal procedure 
 therefore was to accept into the United States service all National 
 (guardsmen from States which had adopted the Regular Army 
 standard and subsequently to make the required physical examina- 
 tion, discharging men disqualified by the usual means of surgeon's 
 certificate of disability. In those few States where the Regular 
 Army standard had not been adopted, the physical examination 
 necessarily had to precede any muster into the United States service, 
 and only the names of those found physically qualified appeared on 
 the muster-in roll. 
 
 Previous experience demonstrated the advisability, and muster- 
 ing regulations contemplated having an adequate number of regular 
 medical officers at mobilization camps for the purpose of exercising 
 the functions of the Medical Department. At the time of the call of 
 June 18, the majority of the medical officers of the regular service were 
 in Mexico or on the border, so that only one medical officer was avail- 
 able for duty at each of the several mobilization camps. Even this 
 number was secured after considerable delay and strain on the regu- 
 lar service. The inadequacy of but one experienced medical officer 
 at a mobilization camp having from 4,000 to 18,000 troops, is ob- 
 vious, when the responsible duties devolving upon them are taken 
 into consideration. It is reasonable and safe to assume that the in- 
 terests of the Government were not properly safeguarded where 
 State troops were sent to the border within 10 days after mobiliza- 
 tion. It is true that one or more reserve medical officers were sent 
 to several of the mobilization camps to assist the regular medical 
 officers; but the majority of them were without experience and 
 training. 
 
 Sufficient copies of circular No. 8, W. D., D. M. A., dated May 
 10, 1916, were sent to the adjutant general of each State one month 
 prior to the call, with instructions that each medical officer be fur- 
 nished with a copy. This circular defined the duties of medical 
 officers, called attention to the necessity of careful physical examina- 
 tion, prevention of camp diseases, importance of and instructions 
 for the administration of typhoid and smallpox prophylaxis. At- 
 tention was called to organization and equipment. It contained 
 also extracts from mustering regulations and much other valuable 
 information for the guidance of medical and other officers in case 
 the Organized Militia was called into the Federal service. This cir- 
 cular appears to have accomplished the purpose intended, since re- 
 
Defective dentition 249 
 
 Defective hearing 96 
 
 Overweight and obesity _ 65 
 
 Nervous diseases 19 
 
 Hemorrhoids 43 
 
 Heart and lungs 724 
 
 Illiteracy 49 
 
 Skin diseases 26 
 
 Alcoholism and drug habits 12 
 
 Unclassified.. 189 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 55 
 
 ports show that, with few exceptions, the medical officers carefully 
 followed the instructions contained therein. 
 
 Complete data is not as yet available showing the number of re- 
 jections on account of physical disqualifications by States. From 
 the data available there were 23,721 rejections out of a total of 128,- 
 517 examined, making an average of 18.45 per cent rejected on ac- 
 count of physical defects. This did not include those who were, 
 eliminated by the State authorities prior to muster in. the number of 
 whom is not known. 
 
 CAUSES FOR REJECTION. 
 
 Causes for rejection on account of physical disqualification can not 
 be given for each State, as the data is not as yet available. Incom- 
 plete data from five States in different sections of the country repre- 
 senting 35,824 persons examined, shows 5,526 rejections on account of 
 physical disqualification and for the following causes : 
 
 Venereal diseases : 287 
 
 Poor physique, under height and 
 
 weight 1, 731 
 
 Defective vision and disease of 
 
 eyes 741 
 
 Deformity of feet and flat feet __ 414 
 
 Amputations and deformities 195 
 
 Goiter 57 
 
 Defective mentality 40 
 
 Diseases of nose and throat 24 
 
 Veins, arteries, and varicosities_ 80 
 
 Hydrocele and varicocele 89 
 
 Hernia 396 
 
 It is evident that a large number of the defects noted above should 
 have been detected even by a layman. The conclusions to be drawn 
 are that a large number of these cases were not examined physically 
 or that inexcusable laxity was shown on the part of the medical ex- 
 aminers. The States from which this data was compiled claim to 
 have adopted the standard of physical examinations prescribed for 
 the regular service. It would seem then that the medical depart- 
 ments of the Organized Militia in these States were responsible. 
 They are no doubt partly to blame; however, the extent of their 
 culpability pertains only to those .actually examined by them. They 
 can not justly be held responsible for those defectives who were en- 
 listed without a physical examination, those who were examined by 
 civilian physicians, nor those who were enlisted against the recom- 
 mendation of the medical officers. It is believed that inexperienced 
 and untrained medical officers of the National Guard, at the time 
 of the call, did not have a clear conception of the physical require- 
 ments for military service, which is also believed to be an important 
 factor in accounting for the large number of the personnel of the 
 Organized Militia being found physically disqualified upon muster 
 into the Federal Service. 
 
 The matter of physical examinations is one of the most difficult of 
 all the problems connected with the muster in of the National Guard 
 and the records of the Pension Office have furnished ample evidence 
 of the absolute necessity of rigid examinations in this connection. 
 This will be at once apparent when it is realized that in 1898, out of 
 
 Total _ 5,526 
 
56 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 an enrollment of 211,161 men, no less than 108,258 subsequently ap- 
 plied for pensions. 
 
 Only 30,000 of these were granted, from which it is fair to assume 
 that over 78,000 had, to say the least, exaggerated ideas of their 
 claims on the Government on account of physical disabilities in- 
 curred while in active service. 
 
 It is reported that the 30,000 applicants whose claims were found 
 to be valid have already cost the Government some $42.000,000. 
 
 The procedure to prevent fraud, therefore, is to make a careful 
 physical examination of every officer and man stripped, upon his en- 
 try into the Federal service, making note of every physical defect 
 which, though not disqualifying for military service, might in after 
 years be presented to support a claim for a pension. 
 
 A similar examination is made upon muster out of Federal service, 
 particular attention being paid to any physical defect which the per- 
 son examined claims was incurred w r hile in the military servce. 
 
 If these examinations are carefully made and full notes made of 
 the result, they afford an almost certain check against subsequent 
 fraudulent claims for pensions. 
 
 The excessive amount of work imposed upon those connected w y ith 
 the physical examinations upon mobilization is graphically told by 
 Maj. Wadhams, Medical Corps, in his report on the "physical inspec- 
 tions of the New York troops, from which report the following 
 extract is made : 
 
 It will be noted that the rejection rate is very low. This is due to several 
 causes, but the three most important will be mentioned : 
 
 (a) The adoption by the State some time ago of the War Department stand- 
 ard and a fairly rigid adherence thereto, which resulted in excluding from the 
 National Guard many who formerly would have been accepted. 
 
 ( b ) The great haste in which examinations were made rendered it impossible 
 to detect all disqualifying defects. 
 
 (c) Immediately upon the publication of the President's call for the National 
 Guard practically every organization in the State began to eliminate either by 
 discharge or by transfer to the depot battalion those men known to be unlit. 
 
 There are many lessons for the medical officer to be drawn from this ex- 
 perience. Some of them are too obvious to need mention here, while a few 
 are noted, as follows : 
 
 (a) The need of a sufficient number of trained officers and enlisted men of 
 the medical department of the Army available as soon as the National Guard 
 is called into the Federal service is perhaps the most important. Experience 
 in the past has shown that within a few years after such a muster in, about 50 
 per cent of the men so mustered will apply for pension. The great majority 
 of such claims will be fraudulent. The only protection of the Federal Govern- 
 ment lies in having a complete and accurate record of the physical condition of 
 every man accepted. Civilian physicians and inexperienced National Guard 
 officers, if depended upon to do this work, will, without doubt, become proficient 
 in time but at a tremendous ultimate cost to the Government. 
 
 (&) In view of the experience outlined above, it seems imperative that the 
 place designated in each State as a mobilization camp should be prepared in 
 advance for the mobilization of the State troops. The muster in can be con- 
 ducted in armories, in this State at least, and probably would be in wintertime. 
 It is necessary therefore to prepare in advance for both contingencies. The 
 physical examination is a War Department requirement and it would seem that 
 the details for making this examination and the materials and equipment re- 
 quired should be provided for by the War Department. In the recent muster in 
 in this State the physical examinations were going on in many widely sepa- 
 rated places at the same time. To do the work under such conditions a much 
 larger number of medical officers is necessary and should be provided. Even 
 in Greater New York the time spent in getting from one armory to another was 
 a serious handicap. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OEGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 57 
 
 (c) The plan followed provided for the muster in of organizations without 
 physical examination. The additional work this procedure entails is very great. 
 As each man mustered in, subsequent to that time, in the Federal service, it 
 becomes necessary to discharge those men rejected physically in the manner 
 required by the War Department. This necessitates the preparation of certifi- 
 cates of disability, final statements, and a discharge certificate all papers wtih 
 which the National Guard officer is entirely unfamiliar. In some organizations 
 in this State the muster in, the physical examination, and the departure all 
 took place on the same date. It was therefore obviously impossible to comply 
 with War Department orders. It seems to me inevitable that there will be a 
 great deal of trouble in the future in clearing up the status of many of these 
 men whose service to the United States was of a few hours' duration. Of all 
 the organizations mustered in in this State, it was possible to follow the pre- 
 scribed procedure in but one. The exception occurred in the Third Field 
 Artillery, which was not mustered in until August 4, and had not yet gone to 
 tlu- border. In fin- casi> of this regiment there was . sufficient time, blank cer- 
 tificates of disability had been received, and the regimental commander being 
 an officer of the Army, was familiar with the preparation of the required papers. 
 
 (d) In my opinion it would make far better results if, an officer of the Army 
 of suitable rank were detailed to command the mobilization camp. At Camp 
 Whitman there was a brigadier general, National Guard of New York, in com- 
 mand of the State troops, who was not mustered into the United States service. 
 The senior assistant mustering officer was a captain of the Army. As each 
 regiment of the National Guard was mustered in the senior colonel, being the 
 senior officer in the Federal service, was, presumably, in command of all troops 
 in the Federal service. As each regiment left camp as soon as possible after 
 muster in, the commanding officer changed almost from day to day. As surgeon 
 of the camp there were frequent questions regarding sanitary measures to be 
 enforced which arose, and it was at times a difficult matter to find who was in 
 command. Camp administration became a difficult matter and the putting into 
 effect sanitary measures was often very much delayed. 
 
 . (e) One medical officer of the Army acting as medical examiner, camp sur- 
 geon, and in charge of the camp hospital was hopelessly overburdened. As 
 medical examiner I worked during the hours of daylight to the point of com- 
 plete physical exhaustion, and in that condition had to take up at night the 
 many problems connected with sanitating a large camp and the administration 
 of a camp hospital. There should have been an officer for each position, and 
 the examiner should have had a permanent organization for his part of the 
 work. A working force detailed from the organizations in camp would no 
 sooner become partially familiar with its duties than the departure of a regi- 
 ment would require a new detail of inexperienced men. This has been re- 
 ferred to in paragraph 10 above. 
 
 New York is one of the two States having a complete divisional 
 organization, and it is well known that its troops are among the fore- 
 most in preparedness; yet our system seems to have been so faulty 
 that in order to get these troops started for the border on June 27 
 on a call issued June 18, that the work of the medical examiners was 
 kept up for two nights and a day without intermission. 
 
 It may pertinently be asked, why these strenuous efforts, and why 
 such rigid physical examinations, but Maj. Wadhams points out that 
 u experience in the past has shown that within a few years after such 
 muster in about 50 per cent of the men so mustered will apply for 
 a pension. The great majority of such claims will be fraudulent." 
 These statements are startling ones, but they are borne out by the 
 records. 
 
 We note that he comments on these extreme efforts to safeguard 
 the interests of the Government by referring to the exhausting char- 
 acter of the work, and " during the long hours of duty it was observed 
 that officers, as time passed, lost the power or ability to observe 
 closely, and physical defects which should have been detected were 
 overlooked." Certainly any system which with the extreme efforts 
 
58 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 put forth still gives faulty and unsatisfactory results should be dis- 
 carded for more rational methods. 
 
 To make a careful physical examination of every man of the 
 National Guard called into the Federal service requires considerable 
 time and a large number of experienced medical officers. It is be- 
 lieved that in future if every officer of the National Guard was ex- 
 amined physically each year and every enlisted man carefully exam- 
 ined physically as soon as practicable after enlistment or reenlistment 
 in the National Guard by a qualified medical officer of the Regular 
 Army, not more than 1 per cent (barring venereal diseases and acute 
 maladies) would be found physically disqualified when called into 
 the Federal service, and there would be no necessity for so thorough a 
 physical examination on muster into Federal service, and the work 
 would be greatly expedited. 
 
 APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS 
 OF THE REGULAR ARMY TO COMMISSIONS IN THE NATIONAL 
 GUARD. 
 
 OFFICERS. 
 
 The general policy adopted by the War Department as to appoint- 
 ment of officers to commissions in the National Guard is as follows : 
 
 1. That Regular Army officers may be selected for detail as com- 
 manders of divisions or brigades. 
 
 2. That only one Regular Army officer -,vill be detailed with each 
 regiment of the National Guard, and this detail must be in the grade 
 of colonel or lieutenant-colonel. 
 
 3. That Regular Army officers to be detailed as chiefs of staff of 
 divisions will be taken only from the grade of colonel or lieutenant 
 colonel. 
 
 Assistant chiefs of staff may be detailed from the grades of major 
 and captain. 
 
 Individual applications under this policy will be submitted to the 
 Chief of Staff for decision as to the individual before the detail is 
 made. (Decision, Secretary of War, June 30, 1916 (2426227).) 
 
 Pursuant to the above policy, there had been up to September 14, 
 43 officers (1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 25 captains, and 15 lieu- 
 tenants) of the Regular Army authorized to accept commissions in 
 the National Guard under section 100 of the national-defense act. 
 These were appointed as follows: 3 in the grade of brigadier general, 
 11 in the grade of colonel, 24 in the grade of lieutenant colonel, and 
 5 in the grade of major. 
 
 NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS. 
 
 The legality of commissioning retired enlisted men of the Regular 
 Army in active service in the National Guard has been referred to 
 the Judge Advocate General of the Army, who on June 8, 1916, 
 rendered opinion as follows: 
 
 I am of opinion that a retired enlisted man may not legally be accepted for 
 active service, except as provided in section 11 of the act of April 25, 1914, 1 so 
 long as he retains the status of a retired enlisted man. 
 
 1 Voluntary Army Act. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 59 
 
 As to enlisted men of the National Guard, the several department 
 commanders were telegraphed by The Adjutant General of the Army 
 on August 3, granting them authority to discharge enlisted men of 
 the National Guard to enable them to accept commissions in the 
 National Guard when they are eligible for such commissions. 
 
 A considerable number of enlisted men of the Regular Army, both 
 sergeant-instructors and noncommissioned officers of the line, were 
 discharged to accept commissions in the National Guard. The pro- 
 vision of the national-defense act which permits such appointments 
 is the last clause of section 74, which reads: "such other civilians as 
 may be especially qualified for duty therein." 
 
 There is no provision for noncommissioned officers of the Regular 
 Army being furloughed to enable them to accept National Guard 
 commissions. 
 
 This is an unfortunate oversight in the law, for when the National 
 Guard is mobilized it would not only be of great assistance to the 
 State troops to have, while in active service, the temporary services 
 of old and experienced noncommissioned officers of the Regular 
 Army. Such service is broadening to the noncommissioned officers; 
 the advantages of such service are therefore reciprocal. Under pres- 
 ent laws, however, a noncommissioned officer of the Regular Army 
 to accept service as an officer of the National Guard must be dis- 
 charged, and if he is in service with the National Guard longer than 
 three months he forfeits the advantages incident to long service in 
 the Regular Establishment. 
 
 REPORT OF INSPECTION BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff, was sent by 
 the Secretary of War to ascertain the conditions existing in the 
 National Guard who are now camped on the border. His instruc- 
 tions were as follows: 
 
 Subject: Inspection trip of commands along the Mexican border. 
 
 1. The Secretary of War directs that you proceed from this city to Fort Sam 
 Houston, Tex., and from that place begin and complete a thorough inspection of 
 all stations and commands of the Regular Army and of the National Guard 
 and Organized Militia along the Mexican border. 
 
 2. In making this inspection you will be guided by the verbal instructions of 
 the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. You will make as frequent re- 
 ports as possible, by wire when necessary, with recommendation of action which 
 in your judgment should be taken by the War Department. You will confer 
 with the commanding general of the Southern Department, keep him informed 
 of the results of your observations, and transmit to him whatever views and 
 instructions as to the general situation are communicated to you by the Secre- 
 tary of War and the Chief of Staff for that purpose. 
 
 3. The commanding general, Southern Department, has been instructed ta 
 furnish you whatever assistance is necessary to enable you to carry out the 
 foregoing order. 
 
 H. L. SCOTT, 
 
 Major General, Chief of Staff. 
 Approved. 
 BAKER. 
 
 The inspections were made between July 14 and August 15. He 
 inspected the troops in the Brownsville district, as follows: 
 
 Brownsville : First Illinois Cavalry and First and Second Virginia 
 Infantry. 
 
60 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Mission : Second, Fourteenth, and Sixty-ninth New York Infantry 
 and one ambulance company (New York) ; Seventh, Twelfth, and 
 Seventy -first New York Infantry ; four squadrons of Cavalry. 
 
 McAllen: First and Second Regiments Field Artillery, First Bat- 
 talion Signal Corps, First Field Hospital, Third Ambulance Com- 
 pany, First Battalion of Engineers, all from New York. 
 
 Pharr : Twenty- third and Seventy- fourth New York Infantry and 
 one ambulance company. 
 
 Llano Grande: First, Second, and Third Indiana Infantry; one- 
 Virginia field artillery; one signal company; two ambulance com- 
 panies; and one field hospital; the Minnesota Brigade, consisting of 
 the First, Second, and Third Infantry; the First and Second Ne- 
 braska Infantry; and one field hospital (Nebraska). 
 
 Mercedes : Six companies Third Texas Infantry. 
 
 Donna : Four companies Second Texas Infantry. 
 
 Harlingen : Five companies Second Texas Infantry. 
 
 Troops at other points were inspected, as follows : 
 
 Laredo: The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Missouri Infantry 
 and auxiliary troops from Missouri. 
 
 Eagle Pass: Maryland troops: First, Fourth, and Fifth Infantry, 
 one troop of Cavalry, one ambulance company, and one field hospital. 
 Kansas troops : First and "Second Infantry, one battery Field Artil- 
 lery; First Regiment Vermont Infantry. 
 
 San Antonio: Illinois troops: First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sev- 
 enth, and Eighth Infantry; First and Second Field Hospital Com- 
 panies ; First Field Artillery ; Company A, Signal Corps ; Company 
 A, Engineers. Wisconsin National Guard : First, Second, and Third 
 Infantry ; Battery A, Field Artillery ; Troop A, Cavalry ; First and 
 Second Field Hospitals. 
 
 El Paso district : Pennsylvania Division. Michigan troops : Thirty- 
 first and Thirty-second Infantry. Massachusetts troops: Fifth, 
 Eighth, and Ninth Infantry, First Field Artillery. 
 
 Columbus : First New Mexico and Second Massachusetts Infantry. 
 
 Douglas : First, Fourth, and Fifth New Jersey and auxiliary troops 
 from that State, and Second Montana Infantry. 
 
 Warren : Company A, Signal Corps, and First Field Hospital from 
 the District of Columbia. 
 
 Naco: Headquarters and one battalion First Arizona and First 
 Separate Battalion District of Columbia (colored) Infantry. 
 
 Nogales: California troops: Second, Fifth, and Seventh Infantry 
 and auxiliary troops. Connecticut troops: First and Second Infan- 
 try and auxiliary troops. Idaho troops: First Infantry. Utah 
 troops: Two squadrons Cavalry, one battery Field Artillery, one 
 field hospital. 
 
 Gen. Bliss's reports, in a condensed form, of inspections of troops 
 from Brownsville to Nogales, inclusive, is as follows : 
 
 Tentage. Sufficient and excellent, with minor exceptions, as where one of 
 the Indiana regiments was still in shelter tents, but large tentage had been 
 shipped by express and was daily expected. 
 
 Cloth-inft and shoes. All troops were found suitably equipped with O. D. 
 cotton uniforms except three Missouri regiments at Laredo and a few indi- 
 viduals elsewhere who were still wearing woolen clothing, but with prospects 
 of an early supply of the cotton uniforms. 
 
 Generally men were found to be well equipped with shoes, the most notable 
 exception being in the Third Missouri and Fourteenth New York Infantry, where 
 about 100 or more men were reported as being without serviceable shoes 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 61 
 
 There was a shortage of hats in the First, Second, and Third Indiana Regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Condition of camp site.-* In Brownsville district camp sites are suitable as 
 a rule, but on account of the flat nature of the country not easily drained. 
 This was notably the case in the camp of the First Illinois Cavalry at Browns- 
 ville, and the Third Texas Infantry at Harlingen. The soil here is gumbo. At 
 Laredo and Eagle Pass the camp sites are excellent, well drained, and in good 
 sanitary condition. At San Antonio they are excellent, except as to character 
 of soil, which is gumbo and does not absorb water. At El Paso troops are 
 encamped in three localities, the Pennsylvania division being in one body and 
 near their drill grounds and target range. The Massachusetts brigade and 
 two Michigan regiments are encamped in the southeastern section of El Paso 
 to prevent illegal use of the international boundary. The auxiliary troops from 
 Massachusetts and Rhode Island are camped on high and somewhat rocky ground 
 in the northeastern section of El Paso. At Columbus and Douglas the sites 
 are on flat plains drained with deep ditches; those at Warren and Naco are 
 hilly and satisfactory. At Nogales the site of camps of the California Infantry 
 is on low ground and liable to overflow in heavy rains, in consequence of which 
 a change to a more suitable site farther from town is under consideration. The 
 location of camp sites at Nogales and elsewhere was governed in a measure by 
 facilities for piping water to the camps. 
 
 Condition of sinks and bathhouses. Sinks, with few exceptions, were re- 
 ported to be in excellent condition, being vaults with covered seats and disin- 
 fected by being burned out daily with straw and oil. In the excepted cases 
 the troops had shown neither the ingenuity nor carefulness in making most of 
 the facilities available as had been done in other commands. Steps were taken 
 to remedy this defect. Twenty-four seats per battalion is reported as the 
 number provided, though as low as 12 seats per battalion was found and no- 
 complaint of overcrowding. At Llano Grande straddle trenches \vere in gen- 
 eral use, but well cared for and sanitary. 
 
 The number of shower baths found varied from 12 to 30 per regiment ; even 
 with the smaller number there was no complaint of overcrowding. There were 
 no shower baths at McAllen or Llano Grande, the water system at these places 
 at time of inspection just being installed. 
 
 Cleanliness of men and camp. The hard work in the hot sun makes clothing 
 wet, and the dust and lack of washing facilities makes it difficult to keep cloth- 
 ing clean. Prospects for a remedy in the future in this respect are, however, 
 good. 
 
 Cooks. In nearly all companies and other units it was reported that they 
 had at least 1 cook of from 2 to 16 years' experience in cooking, either in res- 
 taurants, construction camps, hotels, or elsewhere. On the whole there was 
 very general satisfaction with the cooking. 
 
 Occasionally cooks were found who had had no previous experience, a defect 
 which effort was made to remedy at Eagle Pass and other camps by the detail 
 of cooks from regular organizations to give instruction, and at San Antonio 
 by detailing four men from each regiment under instruction as bakers in the 
 School of Bakers and Cooks at Fort Sam Houston. 
 
 In some of the camps there had been complaint for a short time after troops 
 arrived of lack of variety of food. This defect was of short duration and soon 
 remedied. 
 
 Kitchens. These are the weak points in most camps, and their condition was 
 found to vary all the way from excellent in the First Kansas to poor in the 
 - and - - and - - Squadron - - Cavalry. As a 
 
 rule the Pennsylvania division brought mess tents with them, which proved a 
 great help. The poor average condition found is natural, owing to troops 
 having arrived only a short time before the inspection and the change of con- 
 ditions under which the personnel were obliged to work. At the time of the 
 inspection of most camps authority had just been received to provide screened 
 kitchens and mess shelters, making a great step forward in the fly problem. 
 The importance of proper kitchen sanitation was strongly impressed upon all 
 organization commanders. 
 
 Picket lines. These were reported as not well drained and no cover for 
 animals anywhere, except for the animals of one ambulance company of New 
 York and a battalion of Field Artillery of Indiana, w r hich had provided shelter 
 at their own expense. The loss of a few animals dying from heat would involve 
 more expense than a simple shelter for the picket line. 
 
 An estimate for shelters was approved by the Department Commander, and 
 its approval by the War Department is strongly urged by the Assistant Chief 
 o.* Staff. 
 
62 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Cots. In the Brownsville district men were without cots, except in two 
 Virginia regiments and in the cases of individual men who had purchased cots 
 at their own expense. At other points most of the troops inspected were sup- 
 plied with cots. Practically all of the remainder were sleeping on bed sacks 
 stuffed with hay or straw. 
 
 Conduct and appearance of men. All camps were orderly and men seemed 
 contented and cheerful, except among some of the New Jersey troops at Douglas, 
 thought to be due to diarrhea and consequent depression and discomfort. 
 
 The physique of the officers was reported to be generally better than that 
 of the men. The poor physical development of the men was particularly notice- 
 able in regiments from large cities. 
 
 Considerable training will be necessary before these men will be physically 
 fit for hard field service. 
 
 Preparedness for field service. All organizations were reported as equipped 
 for field service, except as to horses and mules ; but in no other way than in 
 material is this the case. The men, many of whom were only recruits, appeared 
 almost entirely ignorant of the duties of a soldier, and were poor even in the 
 simple evolutions of company drill. Their equipment can be completed long 
 before their instruction can be. Practically all organizations except the Wis- 
 consin troops are supplied with the old-model personal equipment, and recom- 
 mendation has been made that all be supplied as soon as possible with the 
 model 1910 equipment to increase the comfort of men on the march. 
 
 Instruction. Instruction has been going on continually since arrival in 
 camp, but owing to the necessity for obtaining equipment the instruction has 
 been interfered with. Practice marches of short length are given practically 
 each day. The total amount of instruction varies from 1 to 6 hours per day. 
 
 Officers' schools have been started in a large proportion of the regiments, and 
 occasionally an officer or enlisted man is found who can speak Spanish. 
 
 Guard duty and instruction is confined to regimental guards about camps, 
 the duty being generally performed by company with tours varying in intervals 
 from 15 to 40 days. 
 
 Owing to the great proportion of recruits much of the instruction at the 
 time of the inspection was confined to the School of the Soldier and School 
 of the Squad. 
 
 Transportation. The Indiana brigade had only nine wagons to each regiment, 
 but practically all other organizations had received their full allowance of 
 wagons and harness, and some of the organizations had received animals. Some 
 also are reported as having automobiles and a few have motor trucks. Animals 
 are being purchased, and the deficiency in this respect is being removed as fast 
 as possible. 
 
 Roads. The roads to all camps are passable, at Laredo and San Antonio 
 excellent ; to other camps they are good. This remark applies to dry weather. 
 Where necessary to construct roads within the camps, the work was going on at 
 a fair rate. A new road to the camp of the Pennsylvania Division at El Paso 
 will soon be absolutely necessary. 
 
 Water. In the Brownsville district camps are supplied from the local water 
 supply of the towns near which they are located, all of which in turn receive 
 their supply from the Rio Grande River, the water being excellent. 
 
 The water supply is reported as ample in quantity, except at Llano Grande, 
 where the water system was just being installed, and at Columbus and the 
 camps of the California regiments at Nogales. 
 
 As to purity, it is satisfactory at Eagle Pass, San Antonio, El Paso, Douglas, 
 Warren, Naco, and, with slight exceptions, at Nogales. 
 
 At Laredo it is reported " at present unsatisfactory," but a sanitary in- 
 spector (Lieut. Col. Munson, M. C.) has pointed out how it could be made 
 satisfactory. 
 
 Diseases. The number of contagious and infectious diseases have been 
 almost negligible. A few cases of lice and some venereal cases the latter 
 being generally brought from mobilization camps or home stations are 
 reported. 
 
 Practically all the men have been inoculated for typhoid and, with the ex- 
 ception of one New York regiment, vaccinated for smallpox. 
 
 The percentage of sick in the - - and - - Infantry and 
 
 - Squadron - - Cavalry ranged at time of inspection from" 5 per 
 
 cent to 10 per cent, the majority of cases being diarrhea. Immediate remedial 
 action was taken up with district and department commanders and attention 
 called to the conjunction of insanitary camp conditions, poorly constructed 
 sinks, and a high sick rate. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 63 
 
 Diseases among animals. No diseases have appeared among the animals in 
 the camps, except in a few cases due to lack of shelter. These animals pur- 
 chased have been quarantined for about three weeks before being issued. 
 
 Sanitary condition of the camp. This is reported as excellent in the Browns- 
 ville district at Laredo, Eagle Pass, San Antonio, and El Paso, except that it is 
 feared that the camp of the Pennsylvania Division may be flooded in the rainy 
 season. At Nogales it is reported as very good, but that some of the incinera- 
 tors were faultily constructed. 
 
 Health of the men. Generally the health of the men since their arrival in 
 camp has been excellent. The few cases of sickness have been from heat, slight 
 intestinal derangements, due doubtless to change of diet and water, and lack of 
 experience on the part of the men in judicious eating and drinking. 
 
 The sick, where not cared for in regimental infirmaries and field hospitals, 
 are sent to the nearest hospital usually one at a military post. A new base 
 hospital has just been established at Brownsville and one is under construction 
 at Nogales. 
 
 Ration. The food, with the exception hereinafter noted, was invariably re- 
 ported as excellent in quality and abundant in quantity. The facilities for 
 caring for the food in camp are not very good, and in some organizations but 
 little ingenuity was shown in making the most of the facilities available. 
 
 At McAllen and Mission there was for a couple of days a shortage of bread 
 and. due to lack of transportation, a shortage of ice. 
 
 Complaints and suggestions. The officers of each regiment were asked for sug- 
 gestions, and these were generally limited to requests that screening for 
 kitchens and lumber for mess tables be furnished, while a few desired canvas 
 shelter for mess tables. At El Paso troops were almost totally without blank 
 forms for their everyday administration. In the Brownsville district there 
 were some requests for improving the ration and a general desire for more 
 clothing and underwear. Early compliance with these requests will be made. 
 
 Machine-gun companies. The machine-gun companies were found to be only 
 in part organized and equipped, the progress made being substantially as indi- 
 cated below: 
 
 Brownsville district : Only 5 of the 22 organizations inspected had guns. 
 
 Eagle Pass : Two Maryland and one Kansas regiment supplied with neither 
 guns nor equipment : the other three regiments had guns and equipment but no 
 animals. All were being instructed by the personnel from the Regular organiza- 
 tions. 
 
 Laredo : All regiments except Third Missouri equipped with guns, some com- 
 panies just being organized ; very little instruction as yet has been given. 
 
 San Antonio : The two Illinois brigades are reported backward in this respect, 
 being entirely without animals, and some lack even the guns. Some companies 
 just being organized, and instruction not yet begun. In the Wisconsin brigade 
 all companies are organized and have their guns but no animals. 
 
 El Paso : All the Massachusetts regiments except one and the Michigan regi- 
 ment equipped with Benet-Mercier guns; one Massachusetts regiment has the 
 Colt gun. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Division has neither guns nor equipment, and. generally 
 speaking, companies not yet organized. 
 
 Columbus, Douglas, Warren, and Naco : No organizations except Second Mas- 
 sachusetts supplied with guns. This regiment has 20 side-carriage motorcycles, 
 on which are to be carried men. guns, and supplies. 
 
 Nogales : All the infantry regiments here, except the Idaho and Second Cali- 
 fornia Regiments, have guns and are being assisted in the instruction of their 
 personnel by the machine gun company of the Twelfth United States In- 
 fantry. 
 
 Naturally, until the arrival of guns and equipment no progress can be made 
 in training these units. 
 
 General conditions. A general good spirit prevailing among the officers and 
 men of various commands is noticeable. 
 
 At Laredo there is a congestion of troops at the present camp site, and 
 steps are being taken to remedy this. The telegram sent to Washington by 
 citizens of Laredo complaining about insanitary conditions in camp related 
 chiefly to matters of indecency rather than insanitation, due to latrines and 
 shower baths not being properly screened. This matter has been remedied. 
 
 A few cases of dissatisfaction that existed arose from the .military con- 
 siderations which required organizations to be hurried to the border from their 
 mobilization camps without supplying them there according to the original 
 
64 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 plans of the War Department. These deficiencies are being made good with 
 all possible dispatch. 
 
 At El Paso a sulxlonot is to ho established for the Pennsylvania division at 
 their camp, supplies for this depot being shipped to it by rail, thus lessening 
 the work of motor and wagon transportation. 
 
 As additional troops arrive at this point their organization into divisions, 
 each with its own supply depot, is recommended. 
 
 Some disappointment has been observed at failure of troops to be used in 
 active operations immediately on their arrival at the border. 
 
 Local commanders have been handicapped in a number of instances by the 
 lack of a suitable staff, and have been obliged to pick up such officers for this 
 duty as happened to be available within their commands. These improvised 
 staffs have done well, but the necessity for tactical organization and accom- 
 panying staffs has been strongly emphasized by this concentration. 
 
 At Nogales the physical examination of regiments not so examined previous 
 to departure from mobilization camps had at the time of inspection just been 
 completed, resulting in the rejection of about 1,000 men. or approximately 
 10 per cent of the personnel at that point. 
 
 On the whole the general conditions, except as already mentioned, are satis- 
 factory. 
 
 The sick rates are generally very low, men well fed and cared for, and 
 serving and being trained under the very best conditions as to health and 
 comfort that are consistent with the requirements of soldier life. The in- 
 evitable discomforts arid inconveniences of camp life are accepted by the men 
 in a true soldierly spirit. They are contented with these conditions, and 
 will doubtless remain so unless some misguided and misinformed people in- 
 terfere and, basing their opinions on the comforts and arrangements of civil 
 life, lead soldiers to feel that their lot is unnecessarily hard and should be 
 ameliorated. 
 
 ANIMALS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THE NATIONAL 
 
 GUARD. 
 
 At the time of the call the only animals in the hands of the State 
 troops that had been purchased from Federal funds were 558 horses 
 issued to the Field Artillery. Congress had made appropriations 
 for the pay of mechanics and helpers to care for horses, and for 
 forage and other supplies for 32 horses for each battery, and for 
 4 horses for each regimental and battalion headquarters of the Feld 
 Artillery, and the allotments to the States under the act of Congress 
 approved May 27, 1908, and under section 1661, Revised Statutes, 
 were made available for the purchase of these horses. Many of the 
 States were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the oppor- 
 tunity to obtain horses in this way, and in consequence only 399 
 horses had been purchased from Federal funds and 159 condemned 
 Regular Army horses had been issued. 
 
 States had been required to expend a part of their Federal allot- 
 ments for the purchase of field wagons, and where the allotments 
 were not sufficient for this purpose wagons were supplied from 
 unallotted funds. As a result of these efforts 3.882 of the 3,969 field 
 wagons required were available at the time of the mobilization. 
 
 When the militia organizations of the various States were called 
 into the Federal Service on June 18, 1916, the War Department took 
 immediate steps to secure the number of animals needed to equip 
 the troops by directing all remount stations and the purchasing 
 officers throughout the country to advertise for them as extensively 
 as possible. 
 
 Meanwhile such animals as were on hand at the auxiliary remount 
 depots, and also those that were being delivered under contracts for 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 65 
 
 reserve purposes of the Regular Army, were utilized in equipping the 
 National Guard and were afterwards replaced from animals con- 
 tracted for on June 27. Bids were opened on June 26 and wired to 
 the War Department, and contracts were awarded on June 27 to 
 26 of the lowest bidders for 42,408 horses and 18,440 mules. The 
 necessary number of inspection boards were sent to the points of 
 delivery to inspect and ship the animals to the auxiliary remount 
 depots established at El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., where 
 they were held until entirely free from shipping fever, which is 
 prevalent among animals required to undergo a railway journey. 
 This quarantine"interval covered a period of at least two weeks. If 
 animals were issued to troops before they fully recovered from this 
 ailment, they would infect the well animals with the organization. 
 From the date that contracts were awarded for animals (June 27) 
 to October 28, 1916, the following horses and mules were on hand,, 
 received at, and issued from the auxiliary remount depots and other 
 points on the Mexican border: 
 
 Period. 
 
 Received. 
 
 Issued. 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Mules. 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Mules. 
 
 Auxiliary Remoimt Depot, El Paso, Tex.: 
 On hand Tul v 1 , 1916 
 
 769 
 351 
 1.092 
 2'. 703 
 2,822 
 2.239 
 1,712 
 1,399 
 1, 408 
 1,212 
 613 
 238 
 617 
 402. 
 59 
 20 
 120 
 38 
 
 583 
 23 
 235 
 702 
 1,853 
 1,037 
 1,809 
 448 
 535 
 504 
 222 
 341 
 68 
 160 
 8 
 400 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 Week ending Julv 8 1916 
 
 68 
 365 
 429 
 1,160 
 2,857 
 792 
 1,986 
 1,291 
 1,226 
 572 
 1,167 
 1,131 
 96 
 137 
 85 
 630 
 464 
 
 
 Week ending Julv 15 1916 
 
 151 
 331 
 829 
 1,240 
 702 
 857 
 850 
 559 
 130 
 689 
 1,043 
 255 
 55 
 123 
 29 
 222 
 
 Week endin^ Julv 22, 1916 
 
 Week ending July 29 1916 
 
 Week ending Vug 5 1916 
 
 Week ending \ng 12 1916 .... 
 
 Week ending Vug 19 1916 
 
 Week ending Vug. 26, 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept 2 1916 . 
 
 Week ending Sept 9 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept. 16, 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept 23 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept 30 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct 7, 1916 . 
 
 Week ending Oct 14 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct. 21, 1916 . . . 
 
 Week ending Oct 28 1916 
 
 Total 
 
 17,814 
 
 , 459 
 ,652 
 ,161 
 ,093 
 ,831 
 ,588 
 1,814 
 563 
 1, 568 
 1,764 
 486 
 648 
 578 
 532 
 869 
 503 
 290 
 10 
 
 8,981 
 
 290 
 1,620 
 2,055 
 2,137 
 1,415 
 1,421 
 1,191 
 620 
 59 
 4 
 302 
 565 
 40 
 96 
 261 
 309 
 321 
 126 
 
 14, 456 
 
 8,065 
 
 Auxi'iarv Remount Depot, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.: 
 On hand July 1, 1916 
 
 
 
 \Veek endin^ July 8 1916 
 
 878 
 479 
 1,997 
 1,069 
 1,693 
 766 
 969 
 665 
 2,441 
 459 
 291 
 30 
 234 
 426 
 611 
 160 
 326 
 
 235 
 
 176 
 1,036 
 1,831 
 1,433 
 910 
 895 
 1,100 
 280 
 248 
 246 
 134 
 24 
 605 
 326 
 151 
 950 
 
 Week ending Inly 15 1916 
 
 Week ending Julv 22, 1916 
 
 Week ending July 29 1916 
 
 Week ending A ug. 5, 1916 
 
 Weekending Vug. 12, 1916 . . ... 
 
 Week ending Vug 19 1916 
 
 Week ending -Vug 26 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept. 2, 1916 
 
 "NYepk ending Sept 9 1916 
 
 Week endin<* Sept 16 1916 
 
 Week ending Sept. 23, 1916 
 
 V,'eek ending Sent 30 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct. 7, 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct. 14, 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct 21 1916 
 
 Week ending Oct. 28, 1916 
 
 Total 
 
 19, 409 
 
 12, 832 
 
 13, 494 
 
 10, 580 
 
 Shipped to various posts on the border ( Brownsville, Harlingen, 
 Eagle Pass, Laredo, McAllen, Calexico) and issued to troops 
 when re' eased from quarantine 
 
 2,787 
 
 633 
 
 2,787 
 
 633 
 
 Grand total 
 
 40,010 
 
 22, 446 
 
 30, 737 
 
 19,278 
 
 
 7203116 5 
 
66 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Of the animals received at the auxiliary remount depots 1,964 
 horses and 2,711 mules were turned in by National Guard organiza- 
 tions that have been mustered out of the Federal service. 
 
 Of the animals issued from the auxiliary remount depots 8,449 
 horses and 2,160 mules were supplied to organizations of the Regu- 
 lar Army. 
 
 Were it not for the fact that foreign buyers had purchased and 
 exported thousands of animals from the United States during the 
 past two years double the number of horses and mules shown above 
 would have been delivered during the same period. 
 
 In distributing animals to troops each organization was given a 
 partial supply before attempting to issue the complete allowance to 
 any one organization. This enabled each unit to get along until ad- 
 ditional animals become available for issue. The prudence of this 
 method of distributing animals is apparent. 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing data that the War Department 
 lost no time in obtaining the animals required to equip the militia 
 troops, and after taking into consideration all the conditions that 
 enter into the task of equipping a large body of troops with their 
 quota of animals, the matter was handled as expeditiously as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 The department commander of the Eastern Department was au- 
 thorized to purchase the following animals for the National Guard 
 in his department : 1,861 cavalry horses, 2,685 artillery horses, 1,308 
 draft mules, and 268 pack mules. 
 
 Such animals as were purchased in the Eastern Department neces- 
 sarily had to be purchased hurriedly. The haste in which this was 
 done and the resulting consequences are clearly shown in the fol- 
 lowing letter: 
 
 HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, 
 Governors Island, Nrir York City, August 9, 1916. 
 From : Department ( "oinmaiuler. 
 To: The Adjutnnt General of the Army. 
 
 Subject: Branding, hoof marking, etc., of animals furnished National Guard, 
 New Jersey. 
 
 1. When the troops of the National Guard of the State of New Jersey left 
 for duty on the Mexican border some of the animals taken with them were not 
 branded, some were not hoof marked, descriptive cards had not been made for 
 some, and no receipts and invoices were made out covering the animals assigned 
 to each organization, though it is understood that memorandum receipts were 
 obtained to cover all animals. 
 
 2. In order that the contractors from whom these animals were purchased 
 may be paid, and in order that the property officer of the State of New Jersey 
 who received these animals from the board which inspected them for purchase 
 may prepare "his property returns, it is recommended that the commanding 
 Officer at Douglas. Ariz., where it is understood that all of the troops of the 
 .National Guard of the State of New Jersey are stationed, be directed to detail 
 one or more officers of the Regular Army to inspect all of the animals brought 
 with these troops and. see that the following action is taken in regard to them, 
 to wit: 
 
 (a) That all are branded " U. S." 
 
 (b) That all are hoof marked. 
 
 (r) That descriptive cards are made for all of them. 
 
 (d) That invoices and receipts are made by each respective officer for the 
 animals turned over to him at the mobilization camp at Sea Girt, N. J. 
 
 (c) That the invoices are signed by this officer for Lieut. Col. David S. Hill, 
 National Guard. New Jersey. 
 
 (/) That the receipts made out in favor of Lieut. Col. Hill are signed by 
 the officer who had the animals turned over to him at the mobilization camp. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MIL1TJA, ETC. 
 
 67 
 
 ((/) That these receipts are all forwarded to the department quartermaster, 
 Eastern Department, who will see that they are turned over to Lieut. Col. Hill 
 and that any memorandum receipts which he holds are canceled and returned 
 to the persons who signed them. 
 
 (70 That boards of survey are made to cover the loss of any animals be- 
 tween the time that they left the mobilization camp at Sea Girt. N. J., and 
 the time of this inspection, which boards of survey should be utilized by the 
 officers signing these receipts to cover their losses since receiving the animals. 
 
 (/) A certified list be furnished by these officers showing the number of 
 privately owned animals which were inspected and taken over, giving a value 
 for each of the same. 
 
 (j) A certified list be furnished by these officers showing the number of 
 State owned animals which weire inspected and taken over, giving a value for 
 each of ihe same. 
 
 (/) A certified list be furnished by these officers showing the number of 
 organization owned animals which were inspected and taken over, giving a 
 value for each of the same. 
 
 (0 Wherever it is practicable to do so the name of the contractor and the 
 number of animals furnished by him should be furnished. 
 
 3. It is requested that action be taken in this matter as soon as possible 
 and the papers forwarded to the department quartermaster, Eastern Depart- 
 ment, in order that .the matter may be cleared up. 
 
 4. In this connection you are informed that Capt S. H. Barlow, National 
 Guard of New Jersey, has been sent to Douglas, Ariz., by the State of New 
 Jersey, to represent it and its disbursing and property officer in adjusting 
 this matter. 
 
 LEONARD WOOD. 
 
 The following is a statement showing by months the number of 
 animals issued to the National Guard from the auxiliary remount 
 depots at El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the number re- 
 maining on hand at those depots: 
 
 Month. 
 
 Issued to National Guard from re- 
 mount depots. 
 
 On hand at remount depots El 
 Paso and Fort Sam Houston, last 
 day of month. 
 
 Horses. Mules. 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Mules. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. Draft. 
 
 I 
 
 Pack. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Draft. 
 
 Pack. 
 
 June 18 to June 30 
 
 181 
 3,367 
 6,159 
 2.943 
 791 
 
 100 6 
 1,803 3,9SO 
 4,038 6,065 
 860 . 2,313 
 2,046 2,046 
 
 7 
 781 
 1,227 
 327 
 366 
 
 1,266 
 6,120 
 7,137 
 6,416 
 6,241 
 
 960 
 3,527 
 3, 179 
 3.693 
 2,666 
 
 578 
 5,3.53 
 4,233 
 3,130 
 2,217 
 
 295 
 
 489 
 535 
 644 
 464 
 
 July 1 to 31 
 
 August 1 to 31 
 
 September 1 to 30 
 October 1 to 28 
 
 
 On July 11, 1916, the commanding general of the Eastern Depart- 
 ment reported that the Second Maine Infantry had left for the border 
 practically without animals and stated that unless the Government is 
 prepared to promptly furnish animals to organizations arriving on 
 the border it is recommended that the War Department fix a mini- 
 mum number of animals for organizations to take with them in order 
 that they may have some degree of mobility on arrival on the border, 
 and not be entirely helpless. 
 
 The Quartermaster General reported in this connection on July 28 
 that a sufficient number of horses and mules were being shipped to 
 El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, auxiliary remount depots, to 
 promptly equip organizations arriving on the border with the neces- 
 sary animals to enable them to get along until they can be equipped 
 with the full field allowance of animals, and therefore he considered 
 
68 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 it not necessary to purchase animals for troops at mobilization camps 
 in addition to those which the department authorities, Eastern De- 
 partment, were authorized to buy under War Department instruc- 
 tions. He states that the full allowance of horses and mules has 
 already been contracted for to equip all militia organizations called 
 into the service of the United States, and that animals are being 
 shipped at the rate of 6,000 per week to remount depots mentioned 
 above, and that there were at El Paso on July 19, 2,635 Cavalry 
 horses, 1,144 Artillery horses, 586 draft mules, 219 pack mules, and 
 at Fort Sam Houston July 22, 1,417 Cavalry horses, 860 Artillery 
 horses, 4,115 draft mules, and 292 pack mules. 
 
 The commanding general, Southern Department, indorsed this 
 paper August 12, stating that the supply of animals for all organi- 
 zations is being rapidly furnished. To indicate the amount and 
 character of the work being done, the example is cited of issues from 
 Fort Sam Houston July 22 of 859 animals. Endeavor is being made 
 to give a partial supply to all organizations before attempting to 
 issue completely to any one. The wisdom of issuing green animals to 
 organizations to bring to the border with them immediately is seri- 
 ously doubted. About 150 deaths have been reported in the New 
 York division, and a board of mounted officers has reported as 
 follows : 
 
 The board on mortality among public animals at McAllen considers that mor- 
 tality is not abnormal in view of conditions of mobilization. Losses mostly 
 occurred amongst horses purchased for the emergency of which nearly all were 
 sick when received by organizations, and many sick when entrained. 
 
 This matter having again been referred to the commanding gen- 
 eral, Eastern Department, he states that comments of the McAllen 
 board on the action taken at his headquarters in the matter of pur- 
 chase of horses for the New York troops are unwarranted, as a board 
 of thoroughly competent Eegular officers, assisted by veterinarians, 
 inspected and purchased these horses, and that similar boards pur- 
 chased for Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jer- 
 sey. No horses were sick when they embarked. He states : 
 
 I deemed it highly inadvisable to send mounted organizations to the border 
 without horses. It was assumed that under conditions which necessitated the 
 mobilization, mounted troops would be required to act as such on arrival at the 
 scene of probable military activity, and therefore all mounted organizations 
 should have gone fully equipped with animals. The animals purchased were as 
 a rule seasoned animals. A large portion of those for the New York troops 
 were those which had been hired for their summer training period. The 
 mounted troops from New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
 Rhode Island were given horses enough to mount a portion of the Cavalry 
 organizations, and the Artillery was supplied with horses enough to at least pull 
 the guns into position. These were the only horses they had on arrival at the 
 border and in most instances the only horses they had for a long time after- 
 wards. 
 
 He states that a policy which results in men 75 per cent of whom 
 are untrained being supplied at the theater of operations with green 
 horses, untrained and untried, is in his opinion an unsound and dan- 
 gerous one. If we had had to meet conditions of actual military 
 operations on arrival the results would have been disastrous. In 
 case it is ever necessary to send the militia to the border again, or to 
 call it into the service under conditions which render active operations 
 probable, as was the case in this instance, every organization should 
 leave with its full complement of seasoned animals. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 69 
 
 On October 2, 1916, the Secretary of War, upon recommendation 
 of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, authorized the issue by the Quar- 
 termaster Corps of such of the surplus horses as the law allowed 
 and were needed for training purposes by organizations of National 
 Guard upon being mustered out of the service of the United States. 
 Immediately upon receipt of this authority by the Chief of the 
 Militia Bureau telegrams were directed to the adjutants general of 
 all States that had organizations of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and 
 signal troops, informing them of the action of the War Department 
 and requesting that they report by wire if horses were desired issued 
 to such organizations of the National Guard of the State, and re- 
 questing the designation of the troop, battery or company for which 
 it was desired horses be issued, and requesting information as to the 
 number of horses, not exceeding 32 per troop, battery, or company, 
 and 4 for regimental, battalion, or squadron headquarters, that could 
 be cared for and provided proper stabling facilities by the State. 
 
 Upon receipt of this information at the Militia Bureau it was at 
 once tabulated and The Adjutant General of the Army furnished 
 lists thereof, with request that the commanding general, Southern 
 Department, be furnished with the information contained in the lists 
 and that he be directed that when the organizations referred to were 
 returned from the border for muster out of the service of the United 
 States the number of horses desired by the State for each organiza- 
 tion be returned with those organizations, and further, that in view 
 of the fact that several organizations of Cavalry, Field Artillery, 
 and Signal Corps had already been returned from the border for 
 muster out, that the horses desired for such organizations be shipped 
 to the State concerned with the first mounted troops of the National 
 Guard of that particular State that should be next returned from the 
 border for muster out. 
 
 The action of the Secretary of War contained in the above-men- 
 tioned instructions, dated October 2, 1916, provided means whereby 
 a large number of the animals left surplus in the hands of the 
 Quartermaster Corps on the muster out of mounted troops could be 
 disposed of to advantage and further enabled these National Guard 
 organizations to be furnished with animals essential for their proper 
 training at their home stations and without charge against National 
 Guard appropriations. The number of animals authorized issued 
 under the authority referred to have been 3,409 for Cavalry, 2,345 
 for Field Artillery, and 619 for Signal Corps. 
 
 The number of horses authorized issued to mounted organizations 
 of the National Guard by the act of August 29, 1916, which amended 
 section 90, act of June 3, 1916, is not exceeding 32 to any one battery, 
 troop, or company, or 4 to a battalion or regimental headquarters 
 of Cavalry, Field Artillery, Signal Corps, Engineer company, Ambu- 
 lance company, and other mounted units of the National Guard. 
 
 Owing to the fact that the original estimates of the Militia Bureau 
 for funds for the purpose of purchasing horses for the National 
 Guard, issue of forage, and payment of competent help for the care 
 of these animals, authorized by sections 89 and 90 of the act of June 
 3, 1916, were so materially reduced by Congress as the result of the 
 call of the National Guard into the service of the United States, 
 the Militia Bureau found it necessary to recommend the issue of 
 horses only to Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Signal Corps units of 
 
70 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 the National Guard, deeming it more advisable to make the first 
 issue of animals to those organizations wholly mounted and to which 
 the issue of animals was more essential for training purposes than 
 to any other partly mounted organizations. It is the expectation, 
 however, of the Militia Bureau to authorize the issue of horses to 
 sanitary and engineer organizations in a limited number for train- 
 ing purposes as soon as Congress makes further appropriations for 
 this purpose. Deficiency estimates have been submitted to the Secre- 
 tary of War asking for funds to provide for the National Guard for 
 the last six months of the fiscal year 1917. 
 
 SMALLPOX AND TYPHOID PROPHYLAXIS. 
 
 Circular No. 8, War Department, Division of Militia Affairs, dated 
 May 10, 1916, issued to all States for distribution to all medical 
 officers of the Organized Militia, appears to have been very bene- 
 ficial in securing the desired results in the matter of prompt pro- 
 tection of the personnel of the Organized Militia against smallpox 
 and typhoid fever. Paragraph 7 of this circular called attention 
 to the importance of these preventive measures and the method of 
 supplying the necessary apparatus and vaccine for mobilization 
 camps. 
 
 The Medical Department of the United States Army deserves 
 great credit for the prompt delivery of the vaccine, and the necessary 
 apparatus for administering it, to the mobilization camps. All the 
 antityphoid serum was prepared in the laboratory of the Army 
 Medical School and represented an immense amount of labor. Cir- 
 cular No. 8 also contains full instructions pretaining to the adminis- 
 tration of the antityphoid serum. 
 
 As a result of this timely circular of instructions to the medical 
 officers of the Organized Militia and the prompt and adequate sup- 
 ply of the vaccine by the medical department, practically all the 
 personnel of the Organized Militia were vaccinated against smallpox 
 and received their first dose of antityphoid prophylaxis within from 
 one to three days after their arrival at the mobilization camp, and 
 with few exceptions all had their second dose of antityphoid before 
 their departure for the border, while those who were permitted to 
 remain in mobilization camp 20 days received their last dose within 
 the time limit prescribed in the instructions issued. Those organiza- 
 tions which were ordered to the border before June 28 were given 
 their remaining two doses after their arrival on the border, as were 
 all other organizations whose antityphoid prophylaxis was not com- 
 pleted at the mobilization camps. 
 
 The administration of these preventive measures against smallpox 
 and typhoid fever was done by the medical officers of the Organized 
 Militia, as there were, not sufficient medical officers of the Regular 
 Army available for this purpose. As proof that these valuable pro- 
 tective measures were properly administered there have been no cases 
 of smallpox on the border and only few cases of typhoid fever. 
 While in mobilization camps two or three cases of smallpox were 
 reported, which occurred before vaccination. Only a few cases of 
 typhoid fever were reported, the origin of which is reputed to have 
 been due to infection before coming to camp. As compared with 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 71 
 
 conditions in the mobilization camps of 1898, this is a remarkable 
 showing of the triumph of science over disease. 
 
 INSPECTIONS OF NATIONAL GUARD. 
 
 In the inquiry as to the condition of the National Guard, its effi- 
 ciency and readiness to take its place in the first line of defense, there 
 were really three inspections made. 
 
 First. When the National Guard was mustered in, at which time 
 it was reported on by about 40 inspector instructors and mustering 
 officers, 7 medical officers, .as well as several special inspectors. 
 
 Second. Shortly after the arrival of the bulk of the National Guard 
 on the border a general inspection was made (July 14 to August 15) 
 by Maj. Gen. T. H. Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff, an abstract of 
 whose series of reports appears elsewhere in this publication. 
 
 Third. Subsequently thorough and detailed inspections were made 
 by officers of the Inspector General's Department, with the assistance 
 of a few special inspectors. It was the intention to inspect every 
 organization, but some few were mustered out before this could be 
 done. These inspections originated in the following manner : 
 
 On July 12 the Chief of the Militia Bureau prepared a memo- 
 randum for The Adjutant General of the Army on the subject of 
 the inspection of the Organized Militia and National Guard in the 
 service of the United States, suggesting in considerable detail the 
 character of the proposed inspection, covering such subjects as the 
 present degree of readiness and fitness for field service, and to deter- 
 mine the length of time considered necessary to make the organiza- 
 tions efficient units at war strength in campaign, etc. This memo- 
 randum was submitted to the Inspector General of the Army, who 
 stated that there seemed to be some prospect also of tactical divisions 
 being organized, and such inspections could be made by division 
 inspectors with probably some assistance. He stated, moreover, that 
 he thought it a very wise plan to begin the inspections at once, with- 
 out further delay, and considered " the objects of these inspections," 
 as outlined by the Chief of the Militia Bureau, as appropriate. 
 
 Acting on the above, a regular form of report of special field in- 
 spection (Form 20, I. G. D.) was prepared and the Special Field 
 Inspections were commenced about July 27. The Lst report re- 
 ceived was dated October 19. 
 
 These inspections were made by 22 officers mostly of field rank 
 all of extended experience and nearly all from the regular personnel 
 of the Inspector General's Department. Nine of these officers had 
 served mainly in the Infantry, seven mainly in the Cavalry, and six 
 mainly in the Artillery. 
 
 They were made by the following named officers : 
 
 Infantry. Li. Col. Charles E. Tayman; Lt. Col. Eli A. Helmick, 
 I. G.; Lt. Col. Paul A. Wolf; Maj. Hamilton A. Smith, I. G.; Maj. 
 William P. Jackson, I. G. ; Maj. Douglas Settle; Maj. William H. 
 Simons, I. G. ; Capt. Cromwell Stacey ; Capt. Robert H. Wescott. 
 
 Cavalry. Col. George K. Hunter, I. G. ; Col. George H. Morgan ; 
 Col. John B. McDonald, I. G.; Col. Thomas Q. Donaldson, I. G.; 
 Col. Jesse Mel. Carter; Lt. Col. John S. Winn, I. G.; Lt. Col. Frank 
 M. Cald.well, I. G. 
 
 Coast Artillery. Maj. James F. Brady; Maj. Jacob C. Johnson, 
 I. G. 
 
72 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Field Artillery. Col. John L. Chamberlain, I. G. ; Maj. John E. 
 Stephens, I. G. ; Maj. Fox Conner, I. G. ; Capt. William Bryden. 
 
 No arrangement could easily be made which was better calculated 
 than this to eliminate bias and prejudice. 
 
 Most of the inspections were made at border camps, others at the 
 State mobilization camps. 
 
 The statistical data collected by these inspectors have been of great 
 value to the Militia Bureau and this subject is treated in a subsequent 
 chapter. 
 
 To determine the military value of these troops, inspectors were 
 called on for c; General remarks which may serve in appraising the 
 real value of the citizen soldier on a hasty call into the Federal 
 service and the amount of time necessary for his after development." 
 Especial attention is invited to these general remarks, which are 
 abstracted here. 
 
 The replies to the questions: No. 1, present degree of readiness 
 and fitness for service of the organization and, No. 5, length of time 
 considered necessary to make the organization efficient at war 
 strength in campaign, counting from date of the President's call, are 
 also especially pertinent to our inquiry. The reports under these 
 headings have been much condensed, so as to present to the reader, 
 within the scope of a few pages, a fairly accurate picture of the 
 efficiency of these troops from two to four months after the call of 
 June 18. 
 
 GENERAL REMARKS MADE BY INSPECTORS WHICH MAY SERVE IN APPRAISING 
 THE REAL VALUE OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER ON A HASTY CALL INTO THE 
 FEDERAL SERVICE, AND THE AMOUNT OF TIME NECESSARY FOR HIS FUTURE 
 DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 The essence of the general remarks of Lieut. Cols. Helmick and 
 P. A. Wolf, under this head in reports of about 31 different inspec- 
 tions 25 of Infantry and 6 of Cavalry is, in effect, as follows : 
 
 The real value of the citizen soldier is directly dependent upon the degree of 
 training he has had and upon the completeness of his equipment. From a con- 
 sideration of the data collected as to the amount of previous instruction given 
 the National Guardsmen, the state of their equipment, and the amount of target 
 practice which they have had, the prospects do not seem promising. * * * 
 The quality of instruction received since being mustered into Federal service is 
 defective and satisfactory results in training have not been reached. 
 
 It seems that governors of States have not kept their organizations fully 
 equipped. Then, too, the fact that the organization is under State control in 
 time of peace, with a system of administration and records different from that 
 of the Federal Government, adds to the difficulty and length of time necessary 
 to attain efficiency when called into the service of the United States. While 
 the provisions of the act approved June 3, 1916, call for higher requirements for 
 the National Guard than formerly, it seems hopeless to expect that any satis- 
 factory degree of efficiency can be reached by National Guard troops in a rea- 
 sonable length of time unless the commissioned personnel contains a sufficient 
 number of trained officers of the Regular Army to act as instructors for the 
 mass of untrained men comprising the regiment. 
 
 GENERAL REMARKS. 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 Maj. H. A. Smith, in his inspection of the - - Infantry, says: 
 
 History shows an absence of economy and efficiency following a hasty raising 
 of soldiers. These men are not trained soldiers and would encounter in a hasty 
 campaign all the difficulties to be encountered by any body of men undertaking 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 73 
 
 an intricate business based on constantly changing conditions, and would show 
 the same absence of results ; and in the case of soldiers the stake is human lives, 
 property, national ideals, and honor. 
 
 In his inspection of the - - Infantry, he says : 
 
 It is thought this organization would soon find itself short teamsters, cooks, 
 mechanics, horseshoers, and other men of useful soldier's trades. Some men 
 holding such offices are paid extra from other than Government sources. 
 
 Maj. Smith reports in another regimental inspection : 
 
 The regiment seems loosely held together. Effective leadership is lacking. 
 
 In another he says : 
 
 The officers are trained only in a small degree. Their ideas of discipline are 
 crude and unformed. The equipment was very incomplete on muster in, and is 
 still not complete. The militia has no dependable method of recruiting. 
 
 Maj. H. A. Smith, I. G., in his inspection of the - - Infantry, 
 says : 
 
 The strength of the command was increased by 37.3 per cent of green men, and 
 20 per cent of the increased strength have been discharged on account of physical 
 disability. Almost 50 per cent of present strength were without previous field 
 or camp experience, and the regiment is still short nearly 500 men. New men 
 had to be vaccinated and to receive typhoid prophylaxis. The officers had had 
 no experience with Federal records, reports, returns, or methods of supply, and 
 no serious military training of any kind. The existence of the organization de- 
 pended on the popularity of officers and will shortly revert to the same basis. 
 The degree of control of officers and their efficiency as leaders and instructors' 
 can under such circumstances but be most limited. 
 
 Of the - Infantry he says: 
 
 This regiment was called out in May, 1916, but shows a less degree of readi- 
 ness than others with less service. The colonel, on being directed to prepare 
 his regiment for inspection, directed the lieutenant colonel to do it,. and on being 
 informed that a regimental drill was desired remained in his tent and directed 
 the lieutenant colonel to take the drill. It is thought that all National Guard 
 troops have military spirit, else they would not be in the service. Their lack 
 of efficiency is due to want of training. Thirty days' intensive training under 
 competent officers with the least efficient regiment that the undersigned has 
 inspected would make it equal in readiness to tha most efficient. 
 
 Of the - Infantry he says : 
 
 Forty-two per cent in green men were added to the number in service on call. 
 Forty-nine and three-tenths per cent had had no previous field or camp training, 
 and the regiment is now below strength about 440 men. The opinion exists 
 in the National Guard that it is not more incumbent upon them than upon all 
 others to defend the country. They are in for a limited time only, and having 
 no serious military training, the limit of officers and noncommissioned officers in 
 disciplinary control, leadership, and as instructors must soon be reached. 
 
 Maj. Smith, in inspecting the - - Infantry, says: 
 
 It is thought that all National Guard troops have military spirit, else they 
 would not be in the service. Their lack of efficiency is due to want of training. 
 Thirty days' intensive training under competent officers with the least efficient 
 regiment would make it equal in readiness to the most efficient the undersigned 
 has inspected. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the - - Infantry, October 4, 
 says: 
 
 Nearly all of the regiment seem to have joined after the call. This is prob- 
 ably due to the fact that Federal recognition had been withdrawn from about 
 half of this regiment prior to the call, and that after the call the organizations 
 were inspected and recognition restored. Sixty-four per cent of the men have 
 not attended a previous encampment, the regiment is short of men, and not now 
 fit for active field service. 
 
74 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 In his inspection of the - - Infantry, October 3, he says : 
 
 Over 77 per cent of the men joined after the call, and about 62 per cent of these 
 had no prior service. Both officers and men apparently have little conception 
 of what real discipline is, and are slow and inattentive to their duties. The 
 regiment is not now fit for active service. 
 
 In his inspection of the - - Infantry (less Companies A, B, and 
 C) . October 6 and 7, Maj. Simons says : 
 
 Over 88 per cent of the men joined after the call and over 37 per cent of these 
 had no former service. Sixty-five per cent had not attended a previous encamp- 
 mont. The regiment is not now fit for active service in campaign. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in reporting on an inspection of the mobilization 
 
 camp of the - - National Guard at Fort , June 30 to July 
 
 3, said: 
 
 As the command reported at camp they were, in my opinion, in no way pre- 
 pared for active service. There is a very large percentage of entirely new men, 
 and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they acted at' inspection, 
 do not appear to have had much training. The spirit of * the officers and men 
 is particularly good, and they all seemed very anxious to learn. Any sugges- 
 tions as to camp sanitation, instructions, or paper work is eagerly sought and, 
 as far as possible, is taken advantage of. The troops are now, I believe, very 
 well equipped, but have had very little proper training. 
 
 RECOMMENDATIONS : That in any mobilization camp a regular officer of high 
 rank be assigned as camp commander, with authority to enforce proper camp 
 sanitation and regulate the system of supply, and that as many detached officers 
 of the regular service as can be spared be detailed as instructors, with authority 
 to supervise and direct the instruction in administration and training of the 
 National Guard. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the - - Infantry, reports as 
 foil OATS : 
 
 The general spirit of the men is very good, and the 1 officers inform me that 
 most of the men desire to remain in service and are not clamoring to go home. 
 The material of the regiment is very good, and with proper training they would 
 make very good troops. Regiment lacking in training and proper discipline 
 and not now fit to take the field in active operations. 
 
 Again, in two other regimental inspections, he says: 
 
 The instruction of the older men has not been thorough. It is nol now fit to 
 take the field in active operations. 
 
 In another inspection, he says: 
 
 The regiment has been commanded for about two weeks by an officer of tho 
 Regular Army and shows it, but this officer's time has been so much taken up by 
 routine papers, getting the regiment equipped, etc., that he has not had the time 
 to devote to instruction that he should have. 
 
 In two other inspections, he says : 
 
 The time of the officers since arrival in this camp has been largely taken ur> 
 with muster-in rolls and preparation of requisitions to complete equipment. 
 The regiment is not now fit to take the field in active operations. 
 
 At another inspection, he says: 
 
 Since the other two regiments of Infantry from this State have been ordered 
 home the spirit of this regiment seems broken, and they take very little interest 
 in their work. They seem always thinking of going home. 
 
 Again he says: 
 
 This is a colored battalion, and the officers and men seem very anxious to 
 learn. The major seems to have good control of his officers and men. The 
 battalion needs training and proper discipline and instruction to make it effi- 
 cient. A good deal of time is wasted in learning Army papers and methods, 
 which might be taught with good results at the home station. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 75 
 
 Again : 
 
 The spirit of the regiment appears to bo very good, but it needs a considerable 
 amount of training; it is not now fit for active service. 
 
 In another inspection, he says : 
 
 The men are of exceptionally good material for soldiers, and with training 
 will make a very good regiment. The spirit of the regiment is very good and 
 they seem to take an interest in their work. The regiment is not now fit for 
 active service in campaign. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, I. G., in his inspection of the - - Infantry, 
 states : 
 
 For more than 50 per cent of the men this is a first experience in camp. 
 They have had practically no field training further than living in a permanent 
 camp. It seems hopeless to expect that National Guard regiments can be 
 depended upon for immediate readiness under a hasty call, and there are so 
 many unknown quantities in the equation whether clothing, arms, and equip- 
 ments were immediately available, the time required for necessary recruiting, 
 the ability of the officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors, the number 
 of trained officers available to supervise training that it is impossible to more 
 than guess at the time required to make them ready. 
 
 In inspecting the - - Infantry, he says : 
 
 It seems to me unreasonable to expect the National Guard to be made ready for 
 active field service under a hasty call, either in training or equipment. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, in his report of inspection, September 21, of the 
 - Infantry, says : 
 
 At date of inspection this regiment had a total enlisted strength of 928, of 
 which 888 were present in camp ; of these, 443 enlisted under the call without 
 prior service and 217 others had less than 3 months' service ; so that 660 more 
 than 74 per cent were wholly without training or had only a few hours of 
 drill, less than they would get in two days under an intensive system with 
 competent instructors. Of those armed with the rifle, 382 had not fired before 
 the call. All of this regiment have had some rifle practice since muster in. The 
 regiment has had no real field experience, and the training has been almost 
 entirely elementary, and that is far from complete. Even in close-order drill 
 the companies do not average fair. 
 
 Under the head of drill and instruction in close-order drill of this 
 regiment he reports 5 companies fair, 7 poor. In extended order, 
 he reports 1 company good, 6 fair, 3 poor, and 2 bad. In bayonet 
 exercise, he reports 1 company good, 2 fair, 9 poor. In marching 
 ability and march discipline, bad. Of an enlisted strength present 
 of 841 on a 10-mile march there were 101 stragglers. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, in the inspection of the - - Infantry, says : 
 
 Physical inspection prior to muster in seems to have been very lax, as 236 
 were found disqualified upon muster in. Pour hundred and ninety-four men had 
 not fired prior to the call, and these men have fired only 10 rounds each since the 
 call. Four hundred and ninety of the men are in camp for the first time. The 
 time since muster in has been necessarily devoted to getting equipped, getting 
 settled in camp, and to preliminary instruction. Men and officers are earnest 
 and energetic, and the regiment has made commendable progress along these 
 lines, but has had practically no real field training, and its preliminary training 
 is far from complete. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, in his inspection of the - Infantry, Septem- 
 ber 23, says : 
 
 This regiment is stronger than the average, having 1,243 enlisted men present 
 in camp ; 609 are without prior service, 203 had less than three months' service, 
 therefore about 65 per cent had received before enlistment less instruction than 
 they would get in two days' intensive training under competent instructors. 
 
76 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Of those armed with the rifle, 428 had not fired at date of call and 661 were with- 
 out previous field service. One battalion has had a little border guard duty in 
 the Big Bend district. The training of the regiment has been almost elementary 
 and is not by any means complete. Commendable progress has been made, and 
 the regiment is above the average in training. 
 
 In the inspection of the he says : 
 
 This regiment is more nearly equipped and at its present strength more 
 nearly ready than any yet inspected by me. Its training has been almost 
 entirely elementary, and, aside from living in tents, it has had little field train- 
 ing. The regiment was not ready for field service at the call, and is not ready 
 now, but it has made good progress in training arid is getting itself equipped. 
 I believe within six months of date of call it would be in condition to render 
 fairly efficient service. 
 
 11 iy emcieni service. 
 
 In the inspection of another regiment he states : 
 
 TTnvMlCkT* i~"h n n li^^innr n-nrlrkr* /^OI-TTOC< i r-k n T^/\TI-V-* *- vi/\i-4- sn 
 
 Further than living under canvas, in a permanent camp, the regiment has 
 had little or no training in field service. There are so many unknown quan- 
 tities that it is impossible to more than guess at the time required to make the 
 regiment efficient in campaign at war strength. 
 
 In the inspection of another regiment he states : 
 
 The training has necessarily been almost entirely elementary. The field 
 experience of the regiment has consisted almost entirely in living in tents in a 
 permanent camp. Considering the extremely large percentage of wholly un- 
 trained men, the regiment has made commendable progress, but its training is 
 far from complete, and it is not ready for field service. 
 
 In the inspection of another regiment he says : 
 
 Aside from being under canvas in a permanent camp it has had little or no 
 field training. The regiment was not ready for field service at the call ; it is 
 not ready now, and the question as to when it would be ready at war strength 
 is one that involves so many uncertainties that no one could pretend to more 
 than guess at the minimum time required assuming the most favorable 
 conditions. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, in the inspection of the Infantry, says : 
 
 This regiment has had a little experience in border patrol, but its field ex- 
 perience has consisted largely in living under canvas in a permanent camp. 
 In numbers, training, and equipment it is considerably above the average of 
 regiments so far inspected by me. Its training, however, has been largely ele- 
 mentary, and it still has much to learn to make it really effective in campaign. 
 The officers are earnest and have apparently taken advantage of their oppor- 
 tunities for professional study, but through lack of experience they are deficient 
 in knowledge of practical tactics and of the care of their command in actual 
 field service. 
 
 In the inspection of the - Infantry he says : 
 
 The training has been almost entirely elementary and is incomplete. The 
 regiment is larger than the average, and the enlisted personnel is above the 
 average physically. Officers and men deficient in training and experience 
 necessary for proper care of themselves, men, and animals in actual field 
 service. 
 
 In the inspection of the - Infantry he says : 
 
 * * * its field training has consisted largely in living under canvas in a 
 permanent camp in El Paso. This regiment is the largest yet inspected, and its 
 per cent of recruits is below the average. Its training, however, has been 
 almost elementary, and it has much to learn before it could be considered 
 really effective in campaign. 
 
 Maj. Douglas Settle, in his inspections of the - - Infantry, 
 Infantry, and - - Infantry, says, in effect, as follows: 
 
 The value of a soldier depends upon his physical condition, the completeness 
 of his equipment, and the nature and extent of the training he has received 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 77 
 
 to fit him for the duties of war. When a nation depends principally upon its 
 citizens for soldiers, compulsory service is most desirable, if not necessary, 
 and should be accompanied by universal military training. Even without 
 compulsory service, it is not thought there will be, in the beginning at least, 
 serious difficulty experienced in case of war in securing the requisite numbers 
 of men physically fit, or in properly equipping them, but it must be borne in 
 mind that only a very small per cent of them will have had any military train- 
 ing or experience. In the Regiment, whose physical, mental, and moral 
 
 state is excellent, 44 per cent (58 per cent in the - - Regiment) are men 
 who were enlisted under the call without prior service, while the instruction 
 received by the remainder was so limited as hardly to qualify a nucleus of 
 competent instructors, especially in the important grade of noncommissioned 
 officer. It is manifest that no military organization can absorb at one time 
 such a large per cent of untrained men and be in a state of readiness for imme- 
 diate service. Besides the mistake of not maintaining organizations at war 
 strength in time of peace there are two other defects in the National Guard 
 system for which a remedy should be sought, viz, the dual allegiance to State 
 and Nation and the election of officers by the men they command. A system 
 of thorough instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers should be 
 advised in such way -the time required after the call for the development of 
 National Guard organizations into effective military units can be materially de- 
 creased. In its present state of instruction and incomplete personnel, it is 
 my opinion that National Guard organizations after being called into the Fed- 
 eral service will require from six to nine months to prepare them for offensive 
 action against a first-class foe, and that purely volunteer organizations will 
 similarly need one year. Against an inferior enemy the requisite development 
 could probably be had in one-half the time stated above. 
 
 Col. Morgan, in his report of inspection of the - - Infantry, 
 says: 
 
 With one Regular officer to the battalion it would take three months to make 
 these men into good soldiers. 
 
 Col. Morgan reports: 
 
 The - Infantry could be made efficient in six months if an efficient 
 
 Regular officer were attached to each company. 
 
 On another regiment, Col. Morgan says: 
 
 The organization shows the effect of its camp work and life. The men look 
 hardy and healthy and are beginning to march and look like soldiers. * * * 
 Some of the officers have not made good, and should the regiment remain at the 
 border for a determined time, they should be replaced. 
 
 Col. Morgan, in his inspection of the - - Infantry, says: 
 
 It is the best National Guard regiment at Eagle Pass in equipment and 
 general efficiency. The colonel is a Regular, a good executive, and the regi- 
 ment shows it. Regiment will be fit for the field in about two months. 
 
 Of another regiment, he says: 
 
 Three months would make them very good troops. 
 
 In his inspection of the - - Infantry, he says : 
 
 Probably 50 per cent were new men at muster in, and it will take probably 
 six months to make the regiment a reliable military force with the assistance 
 of proper instructors. 
 
 Col. Morgan, in reporting on the inspection of two regiments 
 of - - Infantry, says : 
 
 With the large number of new men the result of instruction and training 
 after two months has been good. Six months more similar training will make 
 the regiment a reliable force in war. 
 
 Col. McDonald, in inspecting the - - Infantry, says : 
 
 There is no basis on which to rest an estimate of the time necessary to de- 
 velop the citizen soldier or National Guardsman as exemplified by these organi- 
 
78 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Zfltions into nn efficient soldier of the first line. With an average of over 50 
 per cent of the enlisted men utterly untrained at the time of muster in and the 
 remainder, together with their officers, men of little experience in field work, I 
 should estimate the time at three months from date of inspection, August 15, to 
 convert them into a fairly good border patrol. To fit them for the duties of 
 well-trained, modern soldiers would take longer. 
 
 Col. Hunter, I. G., in his reports of inspections of First and Second 
 Battalions, - - Infantry, says it will require a year's training to 
 make them efficient. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Caldwell, in inspecting the - - Infantry, says: 
 
 It has been commanded by Col. McLaughlin, a Regular captain, United 
 States Infantry, for about two years. This advantage in training is apparent. 
 The training and instruction of the regiment was carried on under adverse 
 conditions, as it was hurriedly mustered in and shipped to the border. Officers 
 and men intelligent, zealous, and anxious to learn. Results under these condi- 
 tions very creditable. 
 
 Maj. Jackson reports at one of his inspections: 
 
 The commanding officer impresses me as being efficient. Administration very 
 satisfactory. Discipline enforced. Course of training very satisfactory. In 
 six months intensive training along present lines will make the organization 
 efficient. What it needs is the services of well-trained Army officers as in- 
 structors. The real value of this organization as a fighting unit on first entry 
 into the service would have been small, though field and staff and many of the 
 company officers appear to have devoted considerable time to the study of their 
 duties. Practical work will bring good results in six months. Better results 
 would be obtained if the regiment was sent away from its home station, so as 
 to get rid of the distraction of families. 
 
 Col. Donaldson, in inspecting the - - Infantry, says : 
 
 This is the best-prepared regiment for field service in the brigade, but all 
 officers and enlisted men will require much more field training before pre- 
 pared to enter active field service. The commanding officer is a very capable 
 officer, and will likely bring the regiment up to an efficient state within a very 
 few mouths. 
 
 In inspecting the - - Infantry, he says : 
 
 This regiment was by no means prepared when the call for troops was sent 
 out, and is not much better now. Officers are evidently appointed from personal 
 and not professional qualifications. * * * The men have improved greatly 
 in the past two months and have gained from 5 to 15 pounds in weight. 
 
 In his inspection of the - Infantry, Col. Donaldson says : 
 
 Many men were rejected on the nmster in of this regiment for physical de- 
 fects. A large percentage of them were underweight. Practically every enlisted 
 man has gained from 5 to 15 pounds during the tour of duty here. The officers 
 generally are not familiar with the necessary duties pertaining to active service. 
 Apparently all the officers were selected for the positions they hold for personal 
 and not professional qualifications. Had this regiment been called upon for 
 immediate active field service, the majority of the organizations would not have 
 been prepared. 
 
 In his inspection of the - - Infantry, he says : 
 
 Officers and men still lack the hard physical condition necessary for profi- 
 cient field service, but they are gradually acq\iiring it. The most urgent need 
 is trained officers and noncommissioned officers. 
 
 Of the - Infantry he says : 
 
 The appearance of officers and men, their physical condition, and the observ- 
 ance of military duties have greatly improved. There has also been an im- 
 provement in training, but the great need is trained officers and noncommis- 
 sioned officers. About 0-7 per cent of the men of this regiment had no military 
 service prior to the call. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 79 
 
 He says the same in his inspection of the - - Infantry. 
 Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the - - Infantry, September 1 to 6, 
 says: 
 
 Under the present system of physical examinations the physique of the 
 members of the organizations, as a whole, is not what is to be desired. Twenty- 
 eight per cent of the enlisted personnel of this regiment was found physically 
 disqualified on muster-in. These were replaced in general by untrained men. 
 
 Under the previous system of instruction of enlisted men, 30 to 40 per cent 
 of the enlisted men have had not more than 96 hours instruction. The re- 
 mainder have had none or practically none. Instruction given in this camp is 
 not included in these figures. -The officers are often poor instructors. This is 
 the cause for one of the greatest delays in getting the men up to an efficient de- 
 gree of training. Fortunately in this regiment quite a number of the officers saw 
 service in 1898, and some have been to Plattsburg and to the southern training 
 camp, and I agree with the regimental commander that after two months' train- 
 ing in this camp, this regiment is in better condition for field service to-day 
 than most of the organizations were in 1898 after a summer's training. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the - - Infantry, says: 
 
 For efficiency in campaign under the present system, where a large percentage 
 of the personnel are troops without any training, from four to six months' in- 
 struction should be given in camp in the fundamentals of military work, 
 followed by a similar period in target practice, field-firing problems, and 
 maneuvers. 
 
 In his inspection of the - , - , and - - Regiments of 
 - Infantry, at Fort - , - , August 24 to 29, the in- 
 spector, Maj. J. C. Johnson, I. G., remarked that under the present 
 system of making physical examinations of applicants for enlist- 
 ment in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little 
 value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for 
 this the very large number of officers and men found physically 
 disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in 
 one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all 
 but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses 
 had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes 
 the system which permits this as being faulty. 
 
 Another criticism made is the totally inadequate number of instruc- 
 tors, which in general is limited to one instructor for each branch of 
 the service in one or more States, which is entirely inadequate for 
 efficiency. At this call the instructors were in general taken off in- 
 struction work and made assistant mustering officers, at a time when 
 instruction could best be given, viz, when troops were mobilized and 
 could give their whole time to instruction and training. Proper in- 
 struction of even one regiment is not a one-man job if these troops 
 are to be trained and ready for service at any time for a hasty call. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the - - Infantry, September 1 to 6, 
 says: 
 
 This regiment lost about one-fourth of its members (24* per cent) upon physi- 
 cal examination, and about three-fourths of the regiment has not attended a 
 previous encampment and have not fired. In two of the lettered companies 
 none of the enlisted men have fired. These figures show that this is practically 
 a " recruit " regiment. This is offset to a certain extent by having about a hun- 
 dred ni'Mi in it who have served in the Regular Army, and nearly all of these 
 men have been made noncommissioned officers. The State authorities have 
 made no provision for the payment of fees to examining surgeons, and as 
 civilian surgeons were not willing to make the necessary examinations free of 
 charge, many of the applicants were enlisted after being examined physically, 
 as far as possible, by the company officers. This was done in some cases after 
 the call was made. 
 
80 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The regimental commander reports that most of the officers took the course 
 at the officers' school under the direction of Gapt. W. N. Hughes, instructor. 
 After two months of work in this camp the command has acquired a good 
 knowledge of camp sanitation and of close-order drill. The enlisted personnel 
 is of excellent quality, with an average age of probably between 20 and 21 years. 
 Possibly 20 per cent are 19 or under, and are not yet to their full physical 
 capacity. The regimental commander is of the opinion that there is ample mate- 
 rial in the enlisted personnel who, with a few months' training, would be able 
 to replace the entire commissioned personnel. In my opinion there are enlisted 
 men in this organization who would make better commissioned officers than 
 gome of those who at present hold commissions. I concur in the opinion of the 
 regimental commander as to the value of the citizen soldier that, in general, 
 he is a man of keen intelligence, of good spirit, who has not yet attained his 
 maximum physical development, but who, with six months' intensive training, 
 would give a good account of himself. 
 
 Maj. Brady, C. A. C., A. I. G., in reporting on the inspection of the 
 
 three regiments of Infantry at , August 18 to 29, states 
 
 that he is unable to arrive at any valuable conclusions which 
 may -serve in appraising the real value of the citizen soldiery 
 on a hasty call into Federal service and the time necessary for his 
 after development, as these factors depend so largely upon the 
 efficiency and general coordination of the various staff and supply 
 departments, but states that he believes it would require a minimum 
 of from four to six months of intensive training. 
 
 Maj. Brady, in his inspection of the - - Infantry, makes the 
 same general remarks as above, adding that the colonel is efficiently 
 commanding and instructing his regiment, which, however, has had 
 very little training in marching and field exercises. 
 
 Maj. Brady, in reporting on the - Infantry, is favorably im- 
 pressed with both the colonel and lieutenant colonel in matters of dis- 
 cipline and instruction, and states that the regiment is making satis- 
 factory progress. It lacks considerable equipment, and it is esti- 
 mated that it will require at least six months from date of call to 
 make the regiment a satisfactory field unit. 
 
 The six - - Infantry Regiments were inspected by Capt. Crom- 
 well Stacey between August 6 and 13 at , . 
 
 In his general remarks he says of the - - and - that they 
 
 have been in camp over a month and the majority of the men do not 
 know the School of the Soldier. They have no progressive system of 
 instruction. A large proportion of the officers of these regiments 
 turned out for drill before the inspector without belts or side arms. 
 
 Companies in both regiments were unnecessarily slow in forming 
 for drill. Performance of guard duty poor. 
 
 Enlisted men pay very little attention to officers of their own regi- 
 ment and none to officers of other regiments. 
 
 In the - - the inspector says : Many officers do not know where 
 they belong at drill or what their duties are. In attacks no range 
 given, no target indicated. Officers attempting to control their or- 
 ganizations in extended order by shouting out orders, and in close 
 order they use signals. It is pitiful to watch their incompetency. 
 The regiment would be of no value on the border. To be made effi- 
 cient in any reasonable time it must be placed under a regular officer. 
 The colonel stated that he did not think it possible to have good disci- 
 pline in his regiment, as there were so many men in it who were his 
 equals socially. 
 
81 
 
 In the - Infantry the inspector observed men in ranks at drill 
 smoking cigarettes without protest from their officers. The officers 
 and sergeants seem to have no control over their men and appear to be 
 afraid of hurting their feelings. The regiment has apparently gone as 
 far as it can under its own officers. Everywhere there is lack of coordi- 
 nation, system, and control. At drill officers sit in the shade ;ind talk 
 while the men are being drilled by sergeants who do not know the 
 drill themselves. Apparently there is no supervision on the part of 
 the brigade commander, the colonel, or even the majors. The excused 
 list from drill is excessive,, both officers and men. 
 
 It is a relief to turn from this unpromising picture to the report on 
 the other four Infantry regiments from the same State. These four 
 regiments are well commanded. The inspector reports the - 
 and - ready for border duty. The - - and - - could be 
 made ready for border duty in a few months, and that time even 
 could be considerably shortened if they had a Regular Army officer 
 for instructor and with intensive training. They have evidently 
 much still to learn, but the progress being made is satisfactory. 
 
 Capt. Wescott, in inspecting the - Infantry, says : 
 
 It is not working on any systematic schedule of instruction. It has several 
 officers that have soldierly qualities and who are men of more than ordinary 
 intelligence, but the military knowledge of most of the officers is too limited 
 to permit the carrying out of a varied and progressive schedule of instruction. 
 
 Again, Capt. Wescott says of a National Guard brigade com- 
 mander, his adjutant, and aid-de-camp: 
 
 They are intelligent men who have been successful in civil life and their 
 actual military experience limited to the National Guard. * * * Their 
 value in the Federal service is problematical. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Tayman, in inspecting the - Infantry, says : 
 
 This regiment was mustered into the service in May, and since June has been 
 constantly in the field, with small detachments, patrolling the river, guarding 
 outlying ranches, acting as escort to trains, and the like. It has had the ad- 
 vantage in most cases of being under an officer of the Regular Army, as district, 
 subdistrict, or camp commander. Is fairly efficient in the field, though lacking 
 the refinements of close-order drill and the supervision of the field officers. 
 The regiment is in 19 different stations, 15 of which were visited. The spirit 
 displayed is excellent throughout. The field officers of the regiment are em- 
 ployed by the district commander in making frequent inspections of companies 
 and detachments. 
 
 Col. Carter, in his inspection of the Infantry, says: 
 
 This regiment has recently returned from field service at small stations on 
 the boundary. Two companies, which returned late the night before, were 
 not present at field inspection ; one company is detailed and is doing duty as 
 a motor-truck company (No. 67). 
 
 The officers are well instructed in the mechanism of drill and the theory of 
 combat, but, apparently owing to lack of practical training, make poor appli- 
 cation of their knowledge in combat exercises. 
 
 More than 50 per cent of the enlisted personnel mustered in had had no 
 prior service and are lacking in elementary training. 
 
 The average intelligence of the enlisted men is high and they learn rapidly. 
 The care of public property, especially of animals and transportation, is unusually 
 good in this regiment. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 Col. Morgan, in reporting on inspection of the - - Cavalry, 
 September 16, says : 
 
 This regiment has been handicapped with all the drawbacks incident to the 
 organization of a Cavalry regiment in this country. 
 
 7203116 6 
 
82 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The horses when received were more or less suffering from the usual car 
 fever, and some are just beginning instruction. But one regular officer is 
 detailed with the regiment, and its camp is so isolated that the men have little 
 opportunity of learning from observation the small items of their new business 
 from other mustered organizations. 
 
 A regular schedule of drill has been adhered to with good results. But one 
 horse has been lost from disease. The animals look very well kept, but many 
 are still weak and unable to be properly drilled. 
 
 During preliminary training I consider it a mistake to isolate this regiment 
 from the good Regular Cavalry regiments in the vicinity. 
 
 Col. Morgan, in inspecting Troop , - - Cavalry, September 7, 
 states : 
 
 The troop has no sanitary personnel and lacks attention from that direction. 
 Its horses have but lately recovered generally from the shipping or other fever, 
 and the men and horses need drill by an expert. 
 
 Its camp is isolated and not in a very good location ; its sanitary condition is 
 not as it should be. The men are not furnished with cots and the tents are 
 not neat. 
 
 The horses are small and now in poor condition in most cases. 
 
 The troop should be camped near another cavalry organization for instruc- 
 tion. This I understand will be done at once. 
 
 In his inspection of the First Squadron, - Cavalry, Septem- 
 ber 15, he says : 
 
 This squadron is a part of a provisional regiment composed of units from 
 three States, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. It is com- 
 manded by a regular officer, Lieut. Col. James J. Hornbrook, Seventeenth 
 Cavalry. 
 
 They were supplied with horses upon organization and later, about six weeks, 
 and have been nursing the horses and drilling them when able. Lost 25 from 
 sickness. 
 
 The drills have evidently been conducted in a conservative manner and with 
 system. It will take probably six months to make an efficient regiment of the 
 command. 
 
 In his inspection of the First Squadron of - - Cavalry at Fort 
 , Tex., September 15, Col. Morgan remarked that this organ- 
 ization had had their horses only a short time, and when received 
 they were sick with car fever 25 died. An immense amount of 
 work had been done but as much more would be necessary to make 
 that command a military asset. The principal cause of delay was 
 the poor condition of horses, and he reported that it would require 
 six months to fit the squadron for the field. Remarks of the same 
 tenor were made by this inspector upon the inspection of Troop A, 
 Cavalry, at the same place and date. 
 
 Maj. Conner, in his inspection of Troop , Cavalry, July 
 
 28 and 29, says: 
 
 This troop has an experienced and capable ex-regular for its captain. The 
 troop personnel is exceptional in intelligence and other qualities. It has a high 
 esprit and is in earnest. Yet the troop is not ready for service. This unreadi- 
 ness is due to lack of horses and equipment of all kinds and to lack of adequate 
 training. 
 
 As indicated above the troop is making satisfactory progress in its training, 
 but its real value " on a hasty call into the Federal service " is nil in so far as 
 immediate service in the field is concerned. 
 
 The amount of time required for after development of the citizen soldier is 
 dependent upon the time needed to secure equipment, etc., and largely on the 
 'experience and ability of his officers and noncommissioned officers. For this 
 organization it is believed that four months would suffice, provided horses and 
 all equipment could be provided within 10 days of its muster into the Federal 
 service. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 83 
 
 Col. Hunter, I. G., in his inspection of the First Squadron, - 
 Cavalry, says that it will require probably about a year of intensive 
 training to make this organization efficient. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Winn, in his inspection of Troop , - - Cavalry, 
 August 21 and 22, says : 
 
 The value and efficiency of any soldiery depend upon the amount and charac- 
 ter of its training and the condition and completeness of its equipment. In all 
 National Guard organizations military training is, and necessarily must be, 
 subordinated to the professions and trades upon which the personnel depends 
 for livelihood and, except for a 'few days in camp during the summer, the train- 
 ing consists generally of an hour or so of instruction, not oftener than once a 
 week, after a full day devoted to other pursuits. As the profession of arms 
 is only a side issue, the extent and thoroughness of the instruction is necessarily 
 not of a high order. From the latest data available (1914) it appears that during 
 the year this organization had 45 drills, mounted, and 20 drills, dismounted, 
 with average attendance of 52 and 51, respectively. From the data furnished, 
 it appears that only 49 enlisted men had as much as a year of such training 
 as they receive, and that 26 were enlisted after the call without any previous 
 training. Of the 94 enlisted men present at inspection, 57 had not fired the 
 rifle prior to the call and 45 had not attended a previous encampment or period 
 of field service. The organization prior to the call had 56 horses and all the 
 men on the rolls at that time had some instructions in riding and in the care 
 of animals. Only six of these horses mounts for the troop officers were 
 brought into the Federal service. All the mounts for the enlisted personnel 
 were furnished after the arrival at Fort Sam Houston. The horses were all 
 green, generally not of high class ; many of them have been sick and some are 
 still sick with shipping fever or influenza ; none have been in service more than 
 six weeks ; none have been shod behind and the organization has only one horse- 
 shoer. The organization since the call had had no assistance in the way of in- 
 ;>truction by a Regular officer or noncommissioned officer. The time of the 
 organization has necessarily been largely devoted to the training of the horses 
 and very creditable progress has been made. The organization will require a 
 considerable period of training before it is ready for any real service, and should' 
 have the assistance of a Regular officer or experienced noncommissioned officer. 
 In my opinion no National Guard organization can be depended upon for 
 immediate service upon a hasty call into the Federal service, and this is par- 
 ticularly true of mounted organizations. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Caldwell, in inspecting Troop , - - Cavalry, 
 August 15 to 17, inclusive, states: 
 
 This troop has been in existence a little more than two years. At date of 
 call it w T as composed of 2 officers and 50 men. It possessed no mounts. Since 
 that date it has been filled up with a captain, 47 men, and 105 horses. The 
 officers are men of superior intelligence, are enthusiastic, and willing to work, 
 but are inexperienced. 
 
 Enlisted men are intelligent, adaptable, and eager to learn in fact high- 
 grade material for soldiers. About 50 per cent knew some of the rudiments 
 of a cavalryman's duties ; the balance were absolutely ignorant of them. 
 
 By August 6, 105 horses, none more than partially broken to the saddle, 
 were furnished. They were, of course, unshod and all had to be shod by con- 
 tract, the troop horseshoer being sick. These horses will not average better 
 than " fair." They have been under training less than two weeks. Eight un- 
 broken mules were also received. 
 
 Arms and equipment were on hand for only 65 men and had to be taken in 
 and issued out daily for drills and guard duty. Yet, due to the intelligence, 
 adaptability, and enthusiasm of the men, the horses, with few exceptions, are 
 gentle and can be ridden in ranks. 
 
 I first saw the troop on the road making a practice march to Imperial Beach, 
 about 15 miles from the camp. No one knew I was in the vicinity. The troop 
 was marching in column of twos, each platoon well closed up, and it presented 
 a very creditable appearance. 
 
 It is very evident that the training the officers, noncommissioned officers, and 
 some of the men have received before the call is a great asset toward making 
 an efficient organization for war service. This is especially true as regards 
 
84 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 sanitation, care of arms and equipments, care of animals, and discipline in 
 camp and on the march. 
 
 Taking into account the conditions which have existed and do at present 
 exist in this organization, it is practically impossible to make an estimate 
 which will be of any value in determining the length of time necessary for the 
 after development of the citizen soldier. With instruction and training under 
 experienced officers, this troop could be made an efficient organization in three 
 months from date of inspection. 
 
 Col. Donaldson says of the First Squadron Cavalry, 
 
 August 22, that it was originally an infantry battalion and as such 
 would in two or three months render fair service in the field, but as 
 a cavalry organization its value now is nil, no officer or man having 
 had any cavalry experience. No horses on hand and no instructor 
 from the Regular Army. Men and officers generally are above the 
 average in intelligence and will learn their duties quickly when 
 properly instructed, but are making no progress now as far as cavalry 
 work is concerned. 
 
 He says of the Second Squadron and one attached troop - 
 Cavalry : 
 
 They have had little mounted instruction, as there are no animals on hand 
 except a few private mounts. 
 
 Capt. Donaldson says of Troops and , National Guard of 
 , that they have had very little mounted instruction, due to 
 lack of horses, they having had only 16 horses every alternate day. 
 The men appear to be above average intelligence and in excellent 
 physical condition. With proper instruction they would develop 
 into efficient cavalrymen. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, on September 6, reports that Troop , - - Cav- 
 alry, has no mounts, which disposes of the question of its efficiency as 
 a Cavalry organization. 
 
 Col. Chamberlain makes the same report September 7. regarding 
 Troop , - - Cavalry. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the First Squadron, - 
 Cavalry, says : 
 
 About 83 per cent of the men have no prior service. About 50 per cent have 
 not attended a previous encampment or period of field service. Since the two 
 Infantry regiments from - - have been ordered home, the main idea of 
 this squadron seems to be to get home also. There is very little interest in 
 the work, and the squadron is not fit for active field service. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in inspecting the First Squadron, - - Cavalry, 
 August 25 says : 
 
 The squadron is not supplied with horses, so that it is not possible to have 
 any mounted exercises or to test the troops in marching. The squadron is not 
 now fit to take the field in active operations. 
 
 In his inspection of the First and Second Squadrons, - - Cav- 
 alry, August 21, he says: 
 
 Two troops are still without horses ; none of the horses are trained, and few 
 of them are shod ; so that it was not possible to have any mounted exercises 
 or to test the troops in marching. Six of the troops were originally in the 
 Infantry, and two were recruited on the call. These two troops are equal to 
 or better than the others. Due to recruiting above the minimum strength on 
 the call, the organizations were not supplied with sufficient arms, equipment 
 and clothing to equip the increased strength. One of the squadrons is com- 
 manded by an officer of the Regular Army (captain, Twentieth Infantry), and 
 the organizations show the effect of his experience and knowledge. This is 
 the second organization w r hich I have inspected which had a Regular officer in 
 a position of authority, and the value of Regular officers in such positions is 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 85 
 
 very marked. These squadrons are not now fit to take the field in active 
 operations. 
 
 In inspecting Troop , - - Cavalry August 25 he says: 
 
 Over 63 per cent of the men have net attended a previous encampment or 
 period of field service. The troop needs disciplinary drills to steady it down. 
 The troop is now performing patrol guard duty and orderly service, so that 
 the men do not get the instruction they require. The troop is not fit for field 
 service. 
 
 He states in his inspection of Troop , Cavalry, August 26 : 
 
 The troop needs disciplinary drills to steady it down. It is not now fit for 
 field service. 
 
 Maj. Simons, in his general remarks on the inspection of Troop , 
 - Cavalry, says : 
 
 This troop was organized after the call, and 72 per cent of the men had no 
 prior service. Most of the men are cattlemen, and understand horses and can 
 ride. The troop has only had its horses a short time, but they seem to be mak- 
 ing good progress with them. Both men and horses require a great amount of 
 training to put them in condition for field service. The men are willing and 
 the spirit of the troop seems to be good. 
 
 Maj. Settle, in his inspection of Troop , - - Cavalry, says: 
 
 The value of a soldier depends primarily upon his physical condition, the 
 completeness of his equipment, and the character and extent of his training. 
 
 The average amount of drill and instruction imparted to this troop prior to 
 the Federal call consisted of two drills of one and one-half hours' duration a 
 week. The troop prior to the call had 16 horses, and the instruction not only 
 covered the prescribed mounted and dismounted drill but also the care and 
 training of animals. Upon muster-in to the Federal service it was called upon 
 to absorb 38 per cent of men without prior service or training and 60 per cent 
 who had not participated in target firing. To reduce the time required for 
 after development it is manifest that these organizations should be maintained 
 at war strength in time of peace. 
 
 Cavalry can not be mobilized and developed into a state of readiness for field 
 service in as short a period as Infantry because of the time required to train 
 its mounts. The animals when received were below the prescribed standard for 
 Cavalry mounts and were green and unbroken. At the date of this inspection 
 the horses, considering the short while they had been on hand and their inferior 
 quality, were remarkably well trained and conditioned. 
 
 The time required for the development of any units into an effective fighting 
 machine is largely dependent upon the personnel, especially that of the officers 
 and noncommissioned officers, and its prior training. In these respects this 
 organization has been more fortunate than the average National Guard organi- 
 zation, and, coming from a horse country, is in a fair state of readiness for field 
 service against inferior troops. For its thorough development, however, it 
 should have at least two mouths more training and instruction to make it an 
 effective troop in the field. 
 
 In his inspection of Troop , - - Cavalry, at - , Tex., 
 September 22, Maj. Settle says: 
 
 Cavalry can not be mobilized and developed into a state of readiness for field 
 service in as short a period as Infantry because of the time required to train 
 its mounts. The animals for that troop had been received about seven weeks 
 previously, were below the prescribed standard, and were green and unbroken. 
 He estimated that at least two months' more training would be necessary to 
 make the troop effective for field service. 
 
 In his inspection of the - , - - Cavalry, at Camp 
 
 , - , - , August 8 to 14, the inspector, Capt. Stacey, 
 remarked as follows : 
 
 The officers of this squadron are generally capable, as far as education and 
 intelligence is concerned, but professionally they are below the average of Hegu- 
 
86 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 lar Cavalry sergeants. They don't kiiow anything about handling the saber, are 
 ignorant of combat principles, are careless in camp sanitation, and I believe 
 that the squadron has gone just as far as it can without outside help from a 
 Regular officer. I do not believe that simply attaching a Regular officer to the 
 squadron would accomplish much, as they do not realize how little they know. 
 They don't appear to be willing to learn from the Regular service. They drill 
 close order dismounted very well, and seem to have devoted their entire atten- 
 tion to this, the least important duty of a cavalryman. They do not seem to 
 have a correct appreciation of what Cavalry is for. They have wasted valuable 
 time on close order that might have been devoted to sketching, patrolling, recon- 
 noissance, signaling, and extended-order exercises, all of which could have been 
 learned without horses. If they are ever to become efficient, they will have to 
 be attached to a Regular regiment or placed under the command of a Regular 
 officer. If given horses and left to themselves, they will not be reasonably effi- 
 cient in a year. 
 
 Capt. Wescott, in his inspection of Troop , - - Cavalry, 
 August 11 to 15, says : 
 
 The organization has no horses excepting one private mount. When the 
 horses are assigned it will be safe to say that both horses and men will be 
 green and untrained. In my opinion, the organization could have little or no 
 value as cavalry in less than a year. 
 
 In inspecting Troop , - Cavalry. August 11 to 15, he says: 
 
 The organization has only eight horses. Most of the men of the troop are 
 green and untrained in horsemanship. The horses to be assigned will probably 
 be green also. In my opinion they would have little value as cavalry in any 
 kind of service in less than a year. 
 
 Col. McDonald, inspecting Troop , - - Cavalry, August 18, 
 states : 
 
 This organization furnishes no basis on which to rest such an estimate. It 
 was mustered in on June 28, 1916, and not furnished with horses that could 
 be used until August 21, and then only for slow work at a walk on account of 
 recent shipping fever. 
 
 It had added to it 35 recruits. The men. though generally able to ride, are 
 not horse trainers nor skilled horsemen. 
 
 It is a mere guess as to how long it will take to train these men and horses 
 at the same time ; much depends on the quality of both, which can not be 
 judged at a glance. The citizen soldier is not given a fair chance to show his 
 ability to round out as a trained soldier under such circumstances, when he is 
 handicapped by every drawback abhorred by regular officers in their training 
 of regular commands. The law should require National Guard organizations to 
 be always kept at the minimum number required for war service, so that on 
 the call they could be shipped at once to the point required even before muster 
 in, if needed for immediate use, and mustered in afterwards. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Tayman, in his report of inspection of the First Squad- 
 ron, - Cavalry, says : 
 
 The adaptability is shown by the fact that after a few months' service under 
 an officer of experience, they have become fair soldiers. The spirit displayed 
 in the performance of the duty now engaged upon is excellent. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 Maj. Stephens, in inspecting the First Battalion, - - Field 
 Artillery, says : 
 
 They have been under the instruction of the officers of the - Battalion, 
 - Field Artillery, and have progressed rapidly. If they continue to be 
 instructed by these regular officers, I believe they would be ready to take the 
 field in about three months. The time necessary for the future development of 
 the citizen soldier is dependent on so many variables that each case is likely 
 to be different. If left to their own devices. I think it would take very much 
 longer to develop them than when they arc associated with and looked after. 
 by Regular Field Artillery officers, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 87 
 
 in inspecting the First Battalion, - - Artillery, he says: 
 
 Practically all men are absolutely unfamiliar with animals. Green horses 
 furnished. Will require six months to make them efficient. Battalion com- 
 mander knows less about field artillery than some of the other officers and 
 hence is absolutely useless as an instructor of others. Unless this batt.-.lion has 
 the assistance of a Regular Field Artillery officer as instructor, it is doubtful 
 if it will become efficient in a year's time. The estimate of time necessary to- 
 make them efficient is made on the supposition that a Regular officer would be 
 with them. 
 
 Of the - - and - - Regiments, - Field Artillery, he 
 
 says : 
 
 This is one of the brigade commanded by Gen. McNair (Regular), who treats 
 his brigade as a big regiment, and they are indeed fortunate to have a Field 
 Artillery officer of ability and experience to command them. With his instruc- 
 tion, assisted by Capt. Booker, they are making very good progress, and at 
 least twice as much progress as \yould be possible without their supervision. 
 
 He speaks of six months as the least amount of time required to 
 make them efficient. 
 
 Maj. Stephens, in his report of inspection of Battery , - , 
 Field Artillery, says: 
 
 This battery is commanded by probably the best battery commander in the 
 militia field artillery. He served in the Philippines in 1898 as a second lieu- 
 tenant in one of the Utah batteries and has been continuously in the militia 
 since, most of the time as battery commander. He has been able to hold his 
 organization together well and keep a large number of trained men in it, con- 
 sequently when his battery was called out it was in much better condition than 
 the average organization. A battery such as this one could be put in good 
 shape for field service in about four .months provided it was mobilized in a 
 suitable locality for instruction and target practice, and had its aniamls and 
 equipment furnished promptly, and could be supervised by a regular Field 
 Artillery officer of experience and judgment. 
 
 Maj. Stephens, in inspecting Battery , - , Field Artillery, 
 says: 
 
 This battery is further along in its development than any that I have yet 
 seen, but it has had about two months' longer service than the others. It is 
 ready for target practice now, and in about one month's time ought to be ready 
 for field service in campaign. It has had the advantage of having two officers 
 who served enlistments in regular Field Artillery and has also had the assist- 
 ance of Regular officers as instructors; also its horses were received more 
 promptly than in the case of the other batteries that I have seen. Results of 
 the four months' work of this battery since being called into service lead to the 
 belief that about six months is the time necessary for the after development of 
 the citizen soldier on a hasty call into the Federal service, provided he has the 
 assistance of experienced officers from the Regular service. 
 
 Maj. Stephens, I. G., in inspecting the First Battalion, Field Ar- 
 tillery of - , September 5, says : 
 
 Practically all men are absolutely unfamiliar with all phases of the mounted 
 work, and consequently there are no instructors within the organization for 
 that part of the work. Without assistance from the Regular Artillery they 
 would be a long time getting on to the details of this very important part of 
 the Field Artillery soldier's duties. If the horses had been furnished this or- 
 ganization promptly and they had a competent Regular Field Artillery officer 
 placed in charge of the instruction with about four noncommissioned officers 
 from Regular Artillery as assistants, it is believed this organization would be 
 ready for service in about six months. This assumes that the mobilization 
 camp is suitable ground for Field Artillery to work over. 
 
 In inspecting the - - Field Artillery August 30 and 31, he says : 
 
 In my opinion the citizen soldier, while' of excellent material, is in nowise 
 fitted for field service, for his officers and noncommissioned officers have n >t 
 the training or knowledge necessary to enable them to instruct their men. 
 
88 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Six months under competent instructors would be needed for an organization's 
 after development, and this only provided field-maneuver ground is furnished 
 the organization. 
 
 This regiment has an advantage over many in having a colonel retired Field 
 Artillery officer ; lieutenant colonel, a Regular Field Artillery officer ; adjutant, 
 an ex-Field Artillery officer ; 'and one battery is commanded by an ex-Cavalry 
 officer. No Regular officer has been assigned to them as instructor. They have 
 progressed very well and are now having target practice, which Maj. H. L. 
 Newbold has been detailed to supervise. 
 
 In inspecting Battery , - , Field Artillery, September 27, 
 he says: 
 
 On account of having a great many men with considerable service in this 
 battery and the opportunities afforded them at home to work at the mounted 
 part of the work, this battery will probably need a shorter time for its after- 
 development than most others. This battery is ready to go into the field now 
 and have its target practice, to which should be devoted about one month for 
 best results. At the end of that time it should be ready for service in campaign. 
 
 Maj. Stephens reports in his inspection of the First Battalion, 
 Field Artillery : 
 
 The task of training green men and green horses on a hasty call into the Fed- 
 eral service is 110 doubt a big one, and it is not believed that such a task can be 
 done in any reasonably short time unless competent instructors from the regular 
 artillery service can be furnished. There is no doubt that a battalion such as 
 this has a nucleus of officers and men partially trained on a hasty call into the 
 Federal service, which makes the task of development into an efficient organiza- 
 tion much simpler and easier than taking the entire force from untrained men. 
 The amount of time necessary for the after-development is dependent on the 
 amount of instruction that can be given by regular officers detailed as in- 
 structors with the organization. With ene competent regular Field Artillery 
 officer, as instructor for this battalion, it is believed that it could be made fairly 
 efficient for field service in about six months after the call. The commanding 
 officer of this battalion. Maj. Tyndall, is a very able and energetic officer of the 
 National Guard, and has taken every advantage of his opportunities to become 
 proficient in Field Artillery. 
 
 The same remarks apply to Maj. Stephens's inspection of the 
 
 Field Artillery of - - (less one battalion) , and in his report of 
 that inspection, he adds : 
 
 The regimental commander, Col. George E. Leach, is one of the most enthusi- 
 astic artillery officers in the National Guard, and is as well qualified to command 
 a Field Artillery regiment as any officer not a regular officer that I know of. 
 
 Maj. Stephens, in his inspection of Battery - - Field Artillery, 
 September 25, says : 
 
 I consider this the best National Guard battery I have inspected. The cap- 
 tain is a real soldier and he has fine control over his men. He has been in the 
 service now since about May 9, and has probably had most of his horses since 
 the latter part of June, or about three months. They have all had to pass 
 through the epidemic of influenza and are now generally in very good shape, 
 both as to condition and training, and ready for almost any kind of service, but 
 this organization contained more men used to riding and the handling of ani- 
 mals than are usually found in a militia battery, consequently they are probably 
 further along in their mounted work than the average battery would be. In 
 about two more months, provided an opportunity was given this battery to work 
 over a suitable terrain and have target practice, I should consider this battery 
 ready for any kind of service. 
 
 In inspecting the - - Field Artillery, September 26, he says : 
 
 The fact that this organization was only supplied with a few condemned 
 horses for each battery before muster in necessitated their being supplied with 
 remounts after arrival in Camp Stewart. The horses supplied in many cases 
 were sick, and it was necessary to put them in quarantine for 10 days before 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 89 
 
 training could be started. Gentling the horses and breaking them to harness 
 and draft requires time. I should estimate three months requirement after 
 horses received before organization could be made mobile. And then there 
 would be required considerable time to familiarize officers and men with the 
 real work of reconnoissance and occupation of position so as to thoroughly 
 train each battery to work as a machine throughout. Then more drill instruc- 
 tion to train them to perform their proper function in battalions and in the 
 regiment. It is difficult to see how the complete development of the regiment 
 could be accomplished under six months even under most favorable conditions 
 as to prompt supply of all equipment, suitable terrain to work over, and the 
 assistance of competent regular officers as instructors, and then it is thought 
 many of the higher officers would be in need of further training in actual 
 campaign. 
 
 He reports, in his inspection, September 28, of the - - Field 
 Artillery : 
 
 A great many of the men and officers have had considerable prior service. 
 They haye also had some horses on hand in the batteries, so the men have had 
 some opportunity to be trained for the mounted part of the work. This makes 
 the time necessary for their after-development much shorter. I should judge 
 that this regiment ought to be ready for service in about five months after call, 
 provided horses are supplied promptly and suitable terrain for training and 
 target practice is furnished. 
 
 Capt. Bryden, in his inspection of Battery - , Field Artillery, 
 reports : 
 
 This organization is an average National Guard battery ; the enlisted men 
 are of average intelligence and appear ready and willing to obey instructions and 
 to learn. The same may be said of the officers. Both officers and noncom- 
 missioned officers lack force and that confidence in themselves which comes from 
 a thorough knowledge of their duties. 
 
 There is an easy-going unpunctu.il atmosphere about the battery ; formations 
 are not on time ; the service of the guns is slow ; and " stables " is a period 
 devoted as much to conversation as to grooming. 
 
 The battery has just completed three and a half months' duty in the Federal 
 service and is now about to be mustered out. The battery commander states 
 that at no time during this tour of Federal service, not even at service practice 
 at which 135 rounds of shell and shrapnel were expended, had an officer of 
 the Regular Army been assigned to the battery as instructor, and the work of 
 the organization at this inspection showed plainly the need of such instruction. 
 In its present state of training the value of this battery as a tactical unit is 
 small. 
 
 The personnel, including both officers and men, is good, and it is bejieved 
 that with a live, energetic Field Artillery officer of the Regular Army as in 
 structor, with a full complement of animals, a reasonable allowance of service 
 ammunition for practice, and opportunity for at least 10 hours of instruction 
 per day, this organization could be made into an efficient light battery in eight 
 months time. 
 
 Col. Hunter, I. G., in his report of inspection of Batteries - 
 and - , - - Field Artillery, says that they have profited by 
 having a regular officer to direct their work and that they ought to 
 be in first-class shape in six months more work. 
 
 Capt. "Westcott, in his inspection of Batteries - - and , 
 
 Field Artillery, says: 
 
 These batteries have only five horses each. Very few of the men have had 
 any training in horsemanship. When horses are assigned, they will un- 
 doubtedly be untrained. Although the commanders of these batteries are intel- 
 ligent men, their batteries could not be of any real value to the Government 
 against a modern enemy in less than a year from date of call. The best 
 artillery officer in the United States Army or in any other army could not 
 properly train these batteries in less than one year. 
 
90 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Maj. Fox Conner, in inspecting Batteries - - and 
 
 - Field Artillery, says: 
 
 These batteries have not made the progress which they should have made. 
 This is due to great change in personnel, to lack of serviceable horses, and 
 proximity of - , the place of inspection, to the homes of the men. They 
 have no well-considered program of intensive training and its enforcement. 
 Only from three to five privates, now in gnn squads, have participated in 
 artillery target practice. The real value of these organizations on a hasty 
 call into the Federal service is nil. The amount of time for the development 
 of these organizations is not less than six months, and then only in case they 
 are supplied with an adequate number of competent instructors. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the - Field Artillery, says: 
 
 The personnel of this regiment is very intelligent, and they take a great 
 interest in their work. The present organization would probably not be self- 
 supporting in the field, due to the lack of men having varied occupations, such as 
 cooks, horseshoers, saddlers, and mechanics. Other organizations require more 
 training than this one, but, once trained, they come nearer having trained men 
 for all positions. 
 
 In my opinion, which is based upon my observations in camps of seven dif- 
 ferent State troops, the citizen soldier at the present state of training will be 
 of little real value on a hasty call into the Federal service, unless there i.> 
 a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these 
 troops, not only in times of 'peace at their armories but also in their camps of 
 mobilization. In most camps I have found that the Regular Army instructors 
 had been taken off their regular duty and had been made mustering officers. 
 The instruction and training of the troops in such camps were practically at 
 a standstill. The officers were attempting drills to some extent, but they were 
 groping in the dark. Here it is different. The colonel, lieutenant colonel, 
 majors, regimental and battalion staff officers, and one battery commander are 
 officers or noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army, and the work accom- 
 plished here is in marked contrast to that accomplished in other camps. 
 Instruction is progressive and methodical and, above all, thorough. The 
 accuracy of aiming and laying the pieces at artillery drill and the snappiness 
 of the drills rival the work accomplished by Regular Army organizations. The 
 days are so full, from early morning until late at night, for both officers and 
 enlisted men that it seems as though they could not possibly accomplish more 
 with increased effort, if such increase were possible. They are worked to the 
 limit, but, I think, for a limited time at least, not to excess. After the day's 
 work is over a final assembly of all commissioned officers is held and all mis- 
 takes, defects, and irregularities are taken up and discussed, with a view of 
 their prevention in the future. Some of these remarks do not appear at first 
 thought to come under the caption " Remarks which may serve in appraising 
 the real value of the citizen soldier," etc., but I have made them here to show 
 that the citizen soldier is of little value on a hasty call unless they are provided 
 with competent instructors, and I am becoming more and more convinced that 
 the number of instructors which we must use from the Regular Army must 
 be far greater than that which we have used in the past. The instruction of 
 a regiment is not a one-man job ; it is too great a task for efficiency. And if 
 we expect efficiency from the National Guard organizations, I believe that one 
 Regular Army officer detailed as instructor with each company or battery is 
 not an extravagance. In the regular service we do not think of bringing and 
 keeping a company up to the proper standard of efficiency with one officer, 
 even when he has the advantage of trained noncommissioned officers as assist- 
 ants. Much less can we expect to take untrained troops and bring them up to 
 and keep them at a proper state of efficiency, so that they will be ready for 
 service on a hasty call, with less than one commissioned officer and possibly 
 one sergeant instructor to a company or battery. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, in inspecting Battery - - Field Artillery, says: 
 
 The value of the course of instruction received at Plattsimrg by about one- 
 third of the men of this company is very noticeable. They have had good 
 groundwork, they have an idea of discipline, dismounted drill, small-arms prac- 
 tice, sanitation, courtesy, guard duty, and care of equipment, which are im- 
 portant assets in this camp. 
 
ETC. 91 
 
 The personnel of this battery is very intelligent, and they take a great 
 interest in their work ; but the present organization would probably not be self- 
 supporting, due to the lack of interest by this class of men in cooking, horse- 
 shoeing, repairing harness, camp sanitation, and work of similar nature. Other 
 organizations require more training than this one, but when once trained they 
 come nearer having trained men for all positions. 
 
 The instruction of this organization is under the general direction of Col. 
 R. M. Danford, Tenth Field Artillery, National Guard of Connecticut (first lieu- 
 tenant, Fifth Field Artillery, United States. Army), and under the immediate 
 supervision of Second Lieut. C. A. Selleck, First Field Artillery, United States 
 Army. All instruction has been progressive. The instruction of the drivers and 
 cannoneers in camp has been very thorough, which is shown by snappy drills and 
 the accuracy with which the pieces are aimed and laid and other desired results 
 accomplished. The company is now just taking up road work and field exer- 
 cises. Reveille is at 5.15 a. m. ; the last school of instruction for the officers 
 ends about 10.15 p. m. The days are so full, from early morning until late at 
 night, for both officers and enlisted men that it seems as though they could not 
 possibly accomplish more with increased effort if such increase were possible. 
 They are worked to the limit, but, I think, not to excess. 
 
 The work accomplished by this organization and by other organizations in 
 this camp stands out in- marked contrast to that accomplished by troops in 
 other camps which I have inspected, where they received no instruction from 
 Regular Army officers, their inspector instructors having been taken off of 
 instruction work and detailed as mustering officers. 
 
 Maj. Johnson, in his report of inspection of Battery - , Field 
 Artillery, says : 
 
 This organization appears to be interested in its work and anxious to learn.. 
 The battery was organized about three months ago, and will require much in- 
 struction and training before it will be of use for field service. Two of the officers 
 have had prior service and have participated in firing. Most of the noncommis- 
 sioned officers are new at this work and lack experience. 
 
 The instruction of this organization is progressing satisfactorily. The results 
 accomplished stand out in marked contrast with those accomplished in other 
 mobilization camps which I have inspected where the inspector-instructor had 
 been taken off of instruction work and required to devote his entire time and 
 attention to the duties of muster and supply. In my opinion, which is based 
 upon my observations in camps of seven different State troops, the citizen sol- 
 dier will be of little real value on a hasty call into the Federal service unless 
 there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with 
 these troops, not only in time of peace at their armories but also in their camps 
 of mobilization. 
 
 The instruction of this organization has been under the general direction 
 of Col. R. M. Danford, Tenth Field Artillery, National Guard of Connecticut 
 (first lieutenant, Fifth Field Artillery, U. S. Army), and under the immediate 
 supervision of Second Lieut. C. A. Selleck, First Field Artillery, United States 
 Army. All instruction has been progressive and they are now just taking up 
 road work and field exercises. I consider that the results accomplished are very 
 satisfactory and show that the instructors have put in long hours and have 
 spared no pains in the thoroughness of their work. 
 
 Col. McDonald, in inspecting Battery - , Field Artillery, says : 
 
 There is no basis on which to rest an estimate in the case of this battery. The- 
 same difficulties that beset the Cavalry and Infantry are present here. Inflation 
 by 100 per cent of recruits, no horses, no chance for target practice or combined 
 maneuvers. 
 
 One man's guess is as good as another's a.s to the rate of development under 
 these conditions. 
 
 The officers are capable men and they have excellent raw material on which 
 to work for enlisted personnel. With proper assistance from an experienced 
 instructor good results should be obtained at field firing and marching maneuvers, 
 in four months from date of receipt of horses, August 10, 1916. 
 
 Capt. Stacey, in inspecting the First Battalion, - Field Artil- 
 lery. August 4; to 14 at - , , says: 
 
 The battalion commander, Maj. H. M. Bush, is, in my opinion, a very efficient 
 officer and is entirely capable of developing this organization into a very efficient 
 
92 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 unit if given time. The officers of this battalion are generally good, with the 
 
 exception of Capt. , whom I do not consider competent. His battery does 
 
 not measure up to the standard of the other two batteries in anything. His bat- 
 tery kitchen was positively filthy; I scraped filth from the kitchen table with my 
 knife. His battery drill, mounted and dismounted, was poor. This battalion has 
 92 horses that are owned by the State. Twenty-three were inspected and passed 
 by First Lieut. Hunsaker, United States Cavalry, for peace training under the 
 law of June 3, 1916, but have not yet been officially taken over by the Federal 
 Government. The remainder of the horses are totally unfit for Cavalry or Artil- 
 lery work. The battery drill mounted of this battalion at a walk and' slow trot 
 is fair. They can not drill at a gallop. It was not attempted. It will take this 
 battalion four months to become proficient in battery and battalion drill 
 mounted after they receive their horses. This time might be reduced some by 
 intensive training under the direction of a Regular officer, not necessarily in com- 
 mand. This organization has had a progressive system of training since their 
 arrival in this camp and the results show it. It is capable of being developed 
 into a very efficient organization. It is not fit for any service yet. 
 
 Maj. Brady, in inspecting Battery - , Field Artillery, says: 
 
 Officers are educated and willing, but inexperienced. Great need of Regular 
 officers for outline work. Due to lack of experienced officers, those in the bat- 
 tery are unable to outline a progressive system of instruction. 
 
 Maj. Brady, in his inspection August 27 of Battery - , Field 
 Artillery, of , reports that this battery has no horses. 
 
 Col. Donaldson, in inspecting the First Battalion, Field 
 
 Artillery, says: 
 
 Men are fairly proficient in standing gun drill and officers generally can give 
 proper commands for firing. On account of small number of horses available, 
 mounted drill has not progressed as fast as it should. The personnel appears 
 to be excellent. 
 
 In inspecting the First Battalion, - - Field Artillery, Col. 
 Donaldson says: 
 
 Horses are necessary. Officers are anxious to progress, but organizations 
 suffer from fact that there is no Regular officer to outline work arid to offer 
 criticisms. 
 
 Col. Chamberlain reports September 8 of Battery - - Field 
 Artillery, of , that it has no draft animals and only 30 mounts, 
 these latter being well cared for. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 In reply to the question " Present degree of readiness and fitness 
 for field service of the organization," the answer in 89 per cent of 
 the reports was either "fair," "poor," "unfitted," "not ready," 
 " wholly unprepared," or some reply the equivalent of this. 
 
 There were 102 reports of inspections in the Infantry, and in 46 
 of these inspections the report of the inspector was generally as fol- 
 lows, or the opinion expressed was so near this that it may be so taken 
 without material error: 
 
 Under most favorable conditions, assuming that recruits niul equipment for 
 war strength were made available on call, the regiment might be made efficient 
 for field service against an inferior enemy in six months ; against trained troops, 
 it will require two years. 
 
 In some cases this was coupled with the condition that this progress 
 could only be made by having a Regular Army officer on duty with 
 the regiment. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 9& 
 
 In 14 of the earlier reports submitted, in which the inspector had 
 made the above remarks, the department commander (Gen. Fimston) 
 expressed the opinion that such was far from a correct estimate of 
 the present w r orth. 
 
 He considered that with two months' additional training it could 
 be pitted against an inferior enemy, and with six months' additional 
 training it wou-ld have become as efficient as was possible without 
 being in contact with an armed enemy. Later he reconsidered this 
 action and wrote The Adjutant General of the Army, as follows: 
 
 1. In forwarding reports of -department inspectors on the following organiza- 
 tions I have disagreed with the renun'ks of the inspector as to length of time 
 which would be required for those organizations to prepare themselves for active 
 field service. My remark was based largely on the belief that after a period 
 of approximately six months' additional training those organizations would 
 begin to grow stale and would no longer improve and nothing but actual field 
 service against an enemy would improve them from that time on. 
 
 2. In view of the fact that no militia organization can become better than 
 its officers, and the further fact that the officers have no facilities for improving 
 themselves beyond a limited stage, I am inclined to believe that the time set 
 by the department inspectors for these organizations to become proficient is 
 not far from correct. 
 
 3. I therefore request that the Inspector General's Office attach a copy of this 
 letter to the inspection reports of the following organizations : 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 4. In the reports of remaining organizations that go forward I shall concur 
 \frith the department inspector in this matter, and do not want to do any injus- 
 tice to those organizations as compared with those mentioned above on which 
 I have made a different report. 
 
 In 37 other reports the opinion expressed was essentially as 
 follows : 
 
 If the organization was at war strength at the time of the call and was fully 
 equipped so that they could devote their -entire time to instruction, and had at 
 least one experienced officer of the Regular Army to each battalion, it is be- 
 lieved that the regiment could be made efficient for campaign in about six 
 months. 
 
 This covers this point in about 83 per cent of the Infantry inspec- 
 tions (mostly regimental) ; the others vary considerably. In about 
 six reports the opinion was expressed that the troops could be made 
 ready in about three months. 
 
 These were the most favorable in the remaining 11 per cent the 
 reports indicated that a longer period would be required. 
 
 In 10 reports the inspector says : 
 
 Under their present officers it is doubtful if it will ever become efficient. 
 
 This seems to coincide with Gen. Funston's idea, expressed above, 
 that " no militia organization can become better than its officers, and 
 the further fact that the officers have no facilities for improving 
 themselves beyond a limited stage." 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 
 
 There w-ere in the Cavalry 33 inspections 3 of regiments, 11 of 
 squadrons, and 19 of separate troops. 
 
 In two of the troops the inspector stated that two or three months 
 would be required to make them fit for field service, while one 
 squadron (Texas) was reported as being already in the field. All 
 the remaining Cavalry was reported as being either " unfitted," " not 
 ready," or " not fit for field service," etc. 
 
"94 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 In the inspection of the following organizations it was reported 
 that there were either no animals or only a few on hand at time of 
 inspection: Second Squadron, Georgia, inspected September 1-8; 
 Troops A and B, North Carolina, inspected August 24-29; Troop B, 
 Tennessee, inspected September 1-6; Troop A, New Hampshire, in- 
 spected September 7; First Squadron, Virginia Cavalry, inspected 
 August 16-22; First Squadron, Ohio Cavalry, inspected August 
 8-14; Troops A and B, Michigan, inspected August 11-15. These 
 troops and squadrons of Cavalry were called out June 18. 
 
 Horses are to. Cavalry what ships are to the Navy without ani- 
 mals such troops are helpless, or at best are very poor Infantry. 
 
 (Due to extra expense of transportation and risk of loss of animals 
 from shipping fever, the Secretary of War under date* of June 29, 
 1916, had ordered that, with but few exceptions, militia troops 
 should receive their animals on arrival at the border.) 
 
 One-third of the reports indicated that it would require from six 
 to nine months to make the organizations fit for service against an 
 inferior enemy, and approximately from two to three years against 
 trained troops. In six other reports four to six months was consid- 
 ered the time needed to make them ready for active service. 
 
 The Texas squadron was reported as already doing effective work 
 at time of inspection in patrolling the border, but the inspector 
 thought that it would require six months to make the squadron effi- 
 cient for campaign service. 
 
 In no report did it appear that the organization inspected could 
 be made ready in less than about four months. 
 
 FIELD ARTILLERY. 
 
 In the Field Artillery there were 30 inspections 6 of regiments, 
 8 of battalions, and 16 of separate batteries. 
 
 In 17 the organizations were reported as unfit for field service. 
 
 Six organizations, it was reported, would require only from one to 
 three months to be ready ; the remainder would require a longer time. 
 
 The following at time of inspection, between August 24 and Sep- 
 tember 8, were without horses or practically so: First Battalion. 
 Georgia Field Artillery; Batteries A and B, Alabama Field Artil- 
 lery ; and Battery A, New Hampshire Field Artillery. 
 
 In reply to the question "Length of time considered necessary to 
 make the organization efficient at war strength in campaign, count- 
 ing from date of the President's call," the inspectors reported usually 
 six months, but the time varied generally from two to three months 
 to one year. 
 
 DEDUCTIONS FROM STATISTICAL DATA SECURED BY INSPECTOR GENERAL. 
 
 The statistical data collected by inspectors general at the inspec- 
 tions referred to in the previous chapter include organizations hav- 
 ing an aggregate enlisted strength of 128,517, these being contained 
 in 98 regiments and 5 battalions of Infantry ; 3 regiments, 13 squad- 
 rons, and 20 troops of Cavalry ; 6 regiments, 9 battalions, and 15 
 batteries of Field Artillery; 3 battalions and 10 companies of Engi- 
 neers ; 4 battalions and 16 companies of Signal Corps ; 24 ambulance 
 companies: and 36 field hospitals. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 95 
 
 STATISTICAL DATA. 
 
 Effective strength present 1 __ 119, 874 
 
 Noneffective strength present 3, 219 
 
 Number carried on rolls not present 5, 424 
 
 Number present who have a marksmanship rating of first class or 
 
 better, secured before the call 19, 202 
 
 Number present who have fired and secured a rating of less than first 
 
 class before the call 14, 802 
 
 Number present who have not fired before the call 56, 813 
 
 Number with less than 3 months' service 20, 964 
 
 Number with 3 or more months' and less than 1 year's service 21, 610 
 
 Number with 1 or more years' and less than 3 years' service 34, 976 
 
 Number with 3 or more years' service 19, 601 
 
 Number of men on rolls at call who did not respond 7, 258 
 
 Number of men enlisted under the call with prior service 13, 440 
 
 Number of men enlisted under the call without prior service 60, 299 
 
 Number serving as Organized Militia who have not taken the oath re- 
 quired by the act of June 3, 1916 21, 884 
 
 Number that have subscribed to oath under the act of June 3, 1916 107, 706 
 
 Enlisted men transferred to organizations from other organizations 
 
 after receipt of call 7, 435 
 
 Number found physically disqualified on muster in 23,721 
 
 Number of enlisted men apparently under 18 years of age 678 
 
 Number who have not attended a previous encampment or period of 
 
 field service 71, 505 
 
 Number at date of inspection who were present in arrest or confine- 
 ment 1,533 
 
 Number at date of inspection who were present sick in hospital 1, 816 
 
 Number at date of inspection who were present sick in quarters 1, 887 
 
 Number of married men 16, 009 
 
 Number of arrests 7, 984 
 
 Number of confinements 6, 687 
 
 Number of enlisted men so arrested or confined 7, 849 
 
 Number of trials by general court-martial 48 
 
 Number of convictions by general court-martial 28 
 
 Number of trials by special court-martial 122 
 
 Number of convictions by special court-martial 99 
 
 Number of summary court trials 6, 503 
 
 Number of convictions by summary court-martial 6, 084 
 
 Number of deserters : 1, 116 
 
 From a careful study and analysis of the above figures the fol- 
 lowing deductions are made: 
 
 1. The extent to which the National Guard and the Organized 
 Militia responded to the call and passed into the Federal service 
 may be arrived at in an indirect way through a consideration of the 
 number of men on the rolls of the organizations at the date of call 
 in connection with the number of men reported as having been 
 transferred to or enlisted in the organizations included in the call 
 after the call was issued. 
 
 Seven thousand four hundred and thirty-five men were thus trans- 
 ferred from other organizations, 60,299 men without former service, 
 and 13,440 men with former service were enlisted after the call. 
 
 The aggregate of these three classes is 81,174 enlisted men, or 63 
 per cent of the total number reported upon 128,517, the remaining 
 47,343, or 37 per cent representing the National Guard or Organized 
 Militia element on the rolls of the organizations in question at the 
 date of call. 
 
 2. The records of the Militia Bureau show that at the date of the 
 call approximately 95,000 enlisted men were on the rolls of the organ- 
 izations now under consideration. Fortv-seven thousand six him- 
 
96 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 dred and fifty-seven therefore represents the number of members of 
 the Organized Militia whose names disappeared from the rolls dur- 
 ing the transition from State service to the Federal service. This 
 disappearance is explained in part as follows: 23,721 enlisted men 
 were found physically disqualified and discharged, and 7,258 en- 
 listed men failed to respond to the call. These two classes combined 
 account for 30,979 enlisted men. Deducting this number from the 
 number stated as having disappeared from the rolls during the 
 transition period there still remain 16,678 enlisted men to be ac- 
 counted for a number nearly equal to the strength of an Infantry 
 division. The absence of these men may be accounted for in several 
 ways. The numbers reported as having failed to respond to the call 
 or as having been discharged for physical disability on muster in 
 may have been understated. It is known that many discharges from 
 the National Guard were issued by governors of States or State offi- 
 cials in the interval between the date of the call and the actual date 
 of muster in, but the number so discharged can not now be ascer- 
 tained with any certainty. Undoubtedly some members of the Na- 
 tional Guard or Organized Militia on the rolls at the date of call 
 were discharged by the Federal authorities after muster in and 
 before the date of inspection on account of dependency or for some 
 other reason. The reasons for such separations from service, and 
 whether the discharges issued by State officials were valid or not. 
 need not be dwelt upon, as these matters are of little concern now 
 compared to the importance of the evidence which the figures afford 
 as to the dependability of the National Guard in a national emer- 
 gency requiring its employment as a Federal force. 
 
 3. The number of men enlisted under the call without prior service 
 gives an idea of the state of training of the commands inspected ; but 
 a more correct conception will be gained if to this number there be 
 added the number of men with less than three months Organized 
 Militia service at the date of call. The sum of these two is 81,263 
 enlisted men, which is 63 per cent of the total number, the other 37 
 
 Eer cent representing a partially trained Organized Militia element, 
 ome value must attach to the partial training obtained in the Na- 
 tional Guard, but the disposition is to overrate its value. 
 
 4. The state of training in marksmanship for troops armed with 
 the rifle is shown by the numbers giving classifications above or below 
 a rating of first class, and the number which are reported as never 
 having fired. Of a total of 90,817 included in the report only 21 
 per cent are rated as first class or better, first class being a standard 
 which is barely tolerable. Sixteen per cent can be rated as indiffer- 
 ent shots and 63 per cent are stated as being entirely untrained. 
 Combining the two latter classes, the untrained and partially trained 
 element will be represented by 79 per cent and the trained element by 
 21 per cent. It is thus seen that as far as the inspection has pro- 
 ceeded, including as it does organizations having a total strength of 
 128,517 enlisted men, 63 per cent of this strength is a raw untrained 
 element and 37 per cent represents the partially trained Organized 
 Militia or National Guard element, the untrained element predomi- 
 nating in the ratio indicated by the two percentages stated. Prob- 
 ably these percentages may be taken as establishing rules which 
 might be safely applied to the entire National Guard in Federal 
 service, about 150,000 men. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 97 
 
 5. The sick record of the National Guard in Federal service, 2.8 
 per cent as shown by the inspection reports, is the most favorable 
 showing made by these troops. 
 
 6. The great loss in effective strength at a critical time amounting 
 to about 50 per cent of the original strength, although compensated 
 for in part by the transfer and enlistment of men credited with 
 militia service, seems enough to condemn the system created by the 
 old militia law T as an effective means of making the Organized 
 Militia into an effective force. 
 
 7. The operation of the law of June 3, 1916, with the far more 
 rigid exactions and requirements, which, under its terms the Federal 
 Government may now impose, might be expected in time to produce 
 a great improvement. But the very exactions and requirements 
 which are necessary for the attainment of efficiency will undoubtedly 
 tend to produce a distaste for service in the National Guard among 
 the classes of young men who have hitherto joined it for social rea- 
 sons, or for the sake of the recreation which the service afforded 
 them. Already evidence of pronounced reluctance to serve is seen 
 in the report that 21,884 members of the Organized Militia now in 
 Federal service have failed to take the oath called for under the new 
 defense act, these men being held to service under the Dick law. 
 
 8. Many complaints have been made that members of the Organ- 
 ized Militia have been induced to take the new oath through decep- 
 tion or coercion. Further evidence of reluctance to serve in the Na- 
 tional Guard is afforded by the large number of applications for dis- 
 charge from the Federal service, the considerable number of resig- 
 nations of officers, about 480, and the great difficulty in obtaining 
 recruits for the National Guard in the Federal service. An active re- 
 cruiting campaign carried on all over the United States during a 
 period of four months from July 1, to October 31 produced about 
 15,000 recruits a number insufficient to fill vacancies caused by dis- 
 charge and causualties occurring during the same period. 
 
 9. It is- reported from various sources that those men who have 
 served on the border have not given any the more cheerful service 
 from the belief that the National Guard system with voluntary serv- 
 ice operates unequally and unfairly, a few bearing the burdens and 
 the many, with obligations just as great, being exempt. It can not 
 be expected that such men upon their return to civil life wall become 
 earnest advocates of such a system. 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 
 The call of the President of June 18, 1916, included the following 
 engineer troops, viz : Two battalions of 4 companies each from New 
 York, 2 companies from Pennsylvania, 1 battalion of 4 companies 
 (mustered in as a battalion of 3 companies and 1 separate company) 
 from Ohio, 1 company each from Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, and Okla- 
 homa, and 2 companies from Colorado a total of 20 companies. 
 Company A, Engineers of Hawaii, was not included in the call. 
 
 Company C, Engineers of Pennsylvania, was formed by the trans- 
 fer of Company F, Fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, after the call. 
 Subsequent to the call there were organized and called into the serv- 
 ice of the United States one company each from Virginia,. South 
 7203116 7 
 
98 
 
 Carolina, and California, and two companies each from North Caro- 
 lina and Texas. This makes a total of eight companies organized 
 after the call but subsequently included in it. 
 
 Reports of special field inspections are not at hand for Companies 
 A, D, and F, New York Engineers; Companies A and B, North 
 Carolina Engineers; Company B, Texas Engineers; and Company 
 A, California Engineers. Company A, Hawaii Engineers, was not 
 called into Federal service. Companies A and B, Colorado Engi- 
 neers, were mobilized at the State camps but were mustered out 
 without border service. Company A, Colorado Engineers, had great 
 difficulty in recruiting to minimum strength, not being mustered in 
 until August 5, 1916; it should be noted that this was a student or- 
 ganization. The average strength per engineer company at muster 
 into the United States service was about 100. Of this strength, with 
 the exception of Companies B and E, New York; Company B, Penn- 
 sylvania; and Company A, Iowa, the number mustered in without 
 prior service was from 50 to 80 per cent; the companies organized 
 after the call were of necessity composed almost exclusively of men 
 without prior service. 
 
 The deficiencies in equipment were mostly in the mobilization 
 stores, i. e., the difference between that required for the peace 
 strength and that for the strength to which the organizations were 
 recruited for the emergency. In some instances the deficiencies were 
 in articles which were habitually kept in State arsenals for issue at 
 mobilization, such as identification tags, first-aid packets, socks, 
 shoes, underclothing, cooking utensils, housewives. The inadvisabil- 
 ity of awaiting for the time of stress to distribute equipment for or- 
 ganizations was made manifest. Not only should all equipment for 
 the organizations at peace strength be on hand at the home armories, 
 but for the full strength to which the organizations will be recruited. 
 
 As to personnel, the opinion of almost every inspector was that the 
 greatest handicap was a lack of trained officers and especially the 
 lack of officers with engineering training. This defect is one which 
 was not possible of remedy until the passage of the act of June 3, 
 1916, whereby engineering qualifications can be insisted upon for 
 officers appointed or promoted after date of the act. For some time 
 yet this disadvantage will exist. There is another phase to the ques- 
 tion as to the qualifications of the commissioned personnel of en- 
 gineer organizations : To be a success a National Guard organization 
 must have the support of the home community, and in branches of 
 the service which are technical, such as engineer, medical, and signal 
 troops, the support of the local profession must be secured to demand 
 respect. Engineering societies exist in almost every community 
 cities principally in which engineer troops can be maintained. It 
 is essential that the officers be men of standing in the engineering pro- 
 fession. New York has insisted, in its reorganization of the engineer 
 troops, that only men of engineering experience be commissioned; 
 results justify the wisdom of the policy. 
 
 It is believed, therefore, that the greatest step toward securing a 
 reliable engineering National Guard force is to require as early as 
 is practicable a conformance to this principle; in other words, get the 
 engineering profession in each large city behind its local organization. 
 The satisfactory showing made by Company B, Pennsylvania En- 
 
99 
 
 gineers, at this mobilization demonstrates the value of such support 
 for it was organized from members of the Engineer's Club of Phila- 
 delphia and has had the recognition and support of that society. 
 
 None of the organizations was reported as fit for field service. 
 One of the greatest defects noticed was the lack of training in 
 mounted work ; this is accounted for by lack of funds for supplying 
 the necessary facilities for training in peace time. Generally speak- 
 ing, the enlisted personnel was good material for engineering re- 
 quirements. 
 
 On the question as to length of time necessary for training in order 
 to be prepared for service against a trained enemy, opinions of in- 
 spectors vary, but, generally speaking, it was supposed that from 
 three months to one year under a Regular Army officer of experience 
 would be required. 
 
 SIGNAL TROOPS. 
 
 1. An examination of the field-inspection reports of 24 field com- 
 panies of the National Guard, which were inspected two months or 
 more after they were mustered into the service of the United States, 
 discloses the fact that not one of these organizations was considered 
 ready and fit for field service at the dates of inspection. The average 
 length of time considered necessary to make the companies efficient 
 at war strength in campaign was five additional months of training 
 under Regular Army officers as instructors. 
 
 2. Some of the weak points in judging the efficiency of these com- 
 panies were common to nearly all companies and were, briefly : 
 
 (a) As mounted organizations their training was defective in har- 
 nessing, saddling, bridling, bitting, the care and use of animals. 
 
 (b) As technical organizations created only for rapid and certain 
 communication within a division, coordination in training was over- 
 looked which involves primarily almost perfect interior economy, 
 administration, and management of wagons and animals, in order 
 that every effort may be concentrated on the technique of communi- 
 cation by all the methods provided by wire, radio, flag, helio, etc. 
 Failure in the initial steps of training means certain failure in the 
 final test of efficiency. 
 
 (c) As an organization requiring almost perfect teamwork, dis- 
 cipline was lacking which insures even fair teamwork. 
 
 3. The best feature shown was a personnel composed of a large 
 number of men trained in civilian occupations as telegraph and radio 
 operators and as linemen and electricians, and, with a few exceptions, 
 a commendable zeal on the part of the organization to learn all that 
 could be taught them. 
 
 SANITARY TROOPS. 
 
 1. STRENGTH. At the time of the call, June 18, 1916, the Medical 
 Department consisted of 174 detachments, 31 field hospitals, and 22 
 ambulance companies. Since the call 8 field hospitals and 4 ambu- 
 lance companies have been organized, recognized by the War De- 
 partment, and mustered into the Federal service. In addition, the 
 sanitary troops required for those line organizations having none on 
 date of call have been organized. All detachments and units were 
 increased in strength, the majority being brought up to war strength, 
 so that there were approximately 850 officers and 7,500 enlisted men 
 
100 
 
 mustered into the Federal service. In addition to the above, 80 dental 
 surgeons and 25 veterinarians were authorized mustered into the 
 Federal service. 
 
 2. SPECIAL FIELD INSPECTION REPORT. The folloAving data were ob- 
 tained from the reports of a special field inspection made by the 
 inspector general's department on 60 of the 65 field hospitals and 
 ambulance companies of the National Guard from six weeks to three 
 months after their muster into the Federal service : 
 
 (a) Personnel. 
 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Effective strength present 
 
 281 
 
 3.556 
 
 Noneffectives present 
 
 3 
 
 52 
 
 Number carried on rolls not present 
 
 24 
 
 144 
 
 
 
 
 (b) March ability and march discipline. Two organizations were 
 reported as " very good," 13 as " good," 21 as " fair," 5 as " poor," 
 and 9 organizations were not reported upon under this head. 
 
 (c) Transportation and care of animals. Twenty-four organiza- 
 tions were reported as having the required number of animals, 31 
 were reported as having no animals, and in 5 organizations no re- 
 marks were made under this head. The horses of 22 organizations 
 were reported as being well cared for, of 6 the care of horses was 
 expressed as being " fair " to " poor," and of the remainder no re- 
 port was made under this head. The horses were reported as not 
 being shod in 3 organizations. 
 
 (d) Proficiency of officers as to discipline and as instructors. 
 Under this head the officers of 7 organizations were reported as " very 
 good," of 20 as " good," of 27 as " fair," of 2 as " poor," of 1 as 
 " bad," of 2 as " inefficient," and of 1 no report was made under this 
 head. 
 
 (e) Proficiency of noncommissioned officers as to discipline and as 
 instructors. Under this head the noncommissioned officers of 1 or- 
 ganization were reported as " very good," of 14 as " good," of 25 as 
 " fair," of 11 as " poor," of 1 as " bad," and as " not efficient " in 1, 
 organization. Seven organizations were not reported upon under 
 this head. 
 
 (/) Instruction. The instruction of 1 organization was reported 
 as " excellent," 1 as " very good," 8 as " good," 19 as " fair," and 
 11 as " poor." Twenty organizations were not reported upon under 
 this head. 
 
 (g) Equipment. Forty-seven organizations were reported as com- 
 pletely equipped except for some minor articles. Some of these had 
 not received the required animals. Two were reported as having 
 personal equipment only, and 11 were reported as lacking essential ar- 
 ticles of the Quartermaster Department. Much of the equipment was 
 of the old model. Some was obsolete and some was unserviceable. 
 
 (h) Care of the sick. The sick of all organizations were reported 
 as being properly cared for. 
 
 (i) Records. The records of 9 organizations were reported as 
 being " very good " and " good," of 19 as being " fair," of 26 as being 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC> 101 
 
 "poor," and of 1 as being "bad." Five organizations were not 
 reported upon under this head. 
 
 (j) Present degree of fitness of organizations for field service. 
 All organizations were reported as being unfit for immediate active 
 field service. 
 
 (k) Length of time needed to make organizations fit for active 
 field service. This varied for the several organizations from one 
 month to nine months. Two organizations were reported as requir- 
 ing only one month's training to make them proficient for active 
 field service. The records of this bureau show that both of these 
 organizations were new ones, organized after the call. Neither had 
 had any field service, nor had they been issued horses. It is safe and 
 reasonable, under these circumstances, to assume that neither of 
 these organizations would be found efficient for active field service 
 in the time stated by the inspector. The average length of time 
 needed to train and instruct 51 of these organizations to assure pro- 
 ficiency in the field in active campaign w^as reported as six months. 
 On 5 organizations no statement was made under this head. 
 
 3. Prior to mobilization all armory and field inspection reports 
 show that the greatest weakness of the sanitary troops, especially 
 the units, were the inefficiency of the noncommissioned officers, inex- 
 perience and lack of knowledge in handling transportation, and little 
 or no knowledge of rendering returns and preparing the records 
 required by the Medical Department. 
 
 The mobilization, as indicated by the above special inspection, has 
 demonstrated the accuracy of these reports, and the results are as it 
 was anticipated they would be. It is believed that if adequate medi- 
 cal officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army had 
 been assigned to the Organized Militia as inspectors and sergeant- 
 instructors, and more opportunities had been given sanitary units 
 for field training, much of the inefficiency as shown by the mobiliza- 
 tion would have been obviated. Unless adequate officers and ser- 
 geants of the Medical Department, United States Army, are detailed 
 Jor duty with the National Guard, and more facilities given the 
 sanitary units in handling their transportation, no improvement can 
 be expected in the efficiency of the sanitary troops of the National 
 Guard. 
 
 4. The value of any soldier, as such, depends upon his physical 
 condition, the completeness of his equipment, and the nature and 
 extent of the training he has received, to fit him for the duties of 
 war. There should be no difficulty experienced in case of war in 
 securing the requisite number of men who are physically fit, or in 
 completely arming and equipping them, but it must be borne in mind 
 that only a very small per cent of those secured will have had any 
 prior military service. This is well shown in the personnel of the 
 sanitary units reported upon above. The reports show that, includ- 
 ing those with less than three months' service, more than 33 per cent 
 of the personnel of the sanitary units mustered into the Federal 
 service had had no previous military training or experience, and 
 the instruction and training received by the remainder was very 
 limited and insufficient to properly qualify them as competent in- 
 structors. These reports also show that over 63 per cent of the 
 personnel of the sanitary units called into the Federal service had 
 
102 N MOBILISATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 never attended a previous encampment or period of field service. 
 Auxiliary organizations, such as field hospital and ambulance com- 
 panies, have a large field from which to draw men whose civil pur- 
 suits have more or less fitted them for the duties required of them in 
 war, and the time requisite for development of such organizations is 
 shorter than is the case with combatant units. It is believed that 
 with competent officers and noncommissioned officers, completely 
 equipped sanitary units can be made proficient with from four to 
 six months of intensive training and instruction. 
 
 CAMP SANITATION AND HEALTH OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
 
 TROOPS IN CAMP. 
 
 1. The majority of the medical officers of the National Guard are 
 proficient in the subject of theoretical hygiene and camp sanitation, 
 and a large number of the older officers have had practical experience 
 along this line, so that they could be depended upon for making 
 proper recommendation for the maintenance of efficient sanitation. 
 While numerous sanitary defects were reported as existing in all 
 organizations in all the reports of the general sanitary inspections 
 of the Regular Medical Corps, it was noted that in the majority ol 
 cases it was the fault of the organization commander in failing to 
 carry out the recommendations of the sanitary officer. The rigid 
 system of sanitary inspection adopted by the Medical Department for 
 all troops on the border has produced excellent results. 
 
 2. The sick report of an organization or a body- of troops in camp 
 is a good criterion by which to judge camp sanitation. The sick re- 
 port for the National Guard troops on the border, obtained from the 
 Surgeon General's Office, shows that between July 22 and November 
 4, 1916, the average strength was 104,334; average sick rate per 1,000, 
 21.5, making an average per cent of 2.15, a remarkably IOAV sick rate, 
 much lower than it is for the same number of persons in civil life. 
 During this period there have been 72 deaths, no cases of smallpox, 
 26 cases of typhoid fever, and 326 reported cases of paratyphoid. 
 No deaths from typhoid fever. This is a record, it is believed, without 
 precedent under similar conditions. Compare the above sick record 
 with that of the second division of the Seventh Army Corps camped 
 at Jacksonville, Fla., between June and October, 1898, consisting 
 for the most part of volunteer troops, and it will show a remarkable 
 achievement in the prevention of typhoid fever. There were en- 
 camped there from June to October 10,759 volunteer troops. During 
 this period there were 4,422 cases of certain and probable cases of 
 typhoid fever, with 281 deaths, 248 of which were from typhoid 
 fever. Other comparisons equally remarkable could be shown, but it 
 is believed that the above is sufficient to demonstrate the progress of 
 the Medical Department in the matter of application of the science 
 of medicine to sanitation and prevention of disease. 
 
 3. The remarkable contrast in the sick rate and mortality rates 
 exhibited by the Spanish War camps of 1898 and those of the Na- 
 tional Guard mobilization camps of the border in 1916 is directly 
 attributable to the following factors : 
 
 (a) Great advances made in the knowledge of the cause and methods 
 of transmission of infectious diseases and in the knowledge of pre- 
 ventive medicine, personal hygiene, and camp sanitation. 
 
ETC. 103 
 
 (6) The development and practical application by Army Medical 
 Corps of vaccination against typhoid fever, a measure which has 
 practically abolished the most destructive of all camp diseases from 
 the armies of the United States. 
 
 (c) Improved methods and greater care in the handling of camp 
 sites, and in the protection of food and water supplies, and in the, 
 disposal of wastes. 
 
 (d) Higher standard of physical requirements for volunteer and 
 National Guard, approximating those for the Regular service. 
 
 4. The relatively large number of reported cases of paratyphoid 
 occurred in the troops camped at Me Allen, Tex., and among troops 
 whose home stations were in New York City, and will in all proba- 
 bility be found due to paratyphoid carriers existing in one or more 
 of these regiments. The laboratory finding, no doubt, in these cases 
 will show that a large number of them were not paratypoid fever. 
 This is a disease that can be prevented in the same manner as typhoid 
 fever, and no doubt the paratyphoid prophylaxis now being adminis- 
 tered to the troops on the border will soon stamp it out. The fact 
 that this comparatively rare disease was not prevalent among the 
 Regular troops on the border prior to the arrival of the State troops 
 made it appear unnecessary to administer prophylactic serum for 
 paratyphoid to the National Guard at mobilization camp. 
 
 NOTES OF INSPECTOR-INSTRUCTORS ON WORK OF NATIONAL 
 GUARD OFFICERS DURING MOBILIZATION. 
 
 So large a proportion of inspector-instructors, inspector generals, 
 special inspectors, sanitary inspectors, and mustering officers, and 
 others who have in one way or another been connected with this 
 mobilization of the National Guard and have criticized the military 
 efficiency of organizations with which they have been associated, that 
 it is but just to say that this report would not be complete without 
 some reference to these defects, which perhaps can best be done by 
 quoting extracts from the reports received. 
 
 It may be asked, Why refer to these disagreeable features? The 
 National Guard was duly turned out and sent to the Mexican border 
 and criticisms as to how it was done are now past history. 
 
 All this is true, but in general terms it may be stated, without fear 
 of contradiction, that the chief reason why this country is not fur- 
 ther-advanced in " preparedness " is that it has failed to profit by past 
 errors, blunders, and general deficiencies. 
 
 To publish a report on the mobilization of the National Guard and 
 devote no space to this would be accepted as a tacit admission that 
 there was nothing on this subject to report. 
 
 The publication of the criticisms in the last mobilization will serve, 
 therefore, as a warning what to avoid in the next one. 
 
 Unless we profit by the lessons of the past we make no progress. 
 It must not be inferred that there were no words of commendation in 
 the mass of reports received ; on the contrary, there were many such, 
 and these are referred to elsewhere in this report. A chain is as strong 
 as its weakest link, and it would seem that we might profitably note 
 where the weak links were in our recent mobilization that they may 
 be made stronger in our preparation for the next one. 
 
104 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 EVIDENCES OF INEFFICIENCY. 
 
 Every day I have seen the most pitiful exhibitions of helplessness at the camp 
 headquarters. Only two days ago the quartermaster discovered 5,513 new 
 Army wool blankets which he did not know he had ; the regiments have been 
 clamoring for them and the quartermaster depots have been sending civilian 
 blankets of various types here after purchasing in open markets. (Extract 
 from the report of First Lieut. James G. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, National 
 Guard of - , Aug. 17, 1916. ) 
 
 It took the regiment 15 hours to entrain on the 31st after much of its heavy 
 impedimenta had been loaded on the 29th and 30th ; as an exhibition of incom- 
 petency it was entirely successful. The spectacle of field and other officers 
 and all grades of enlisted men sweating in one chaotic, headless attempt to load 
 everything at once was edifying. It compared favorably with the way in 
 which everything had been done since the regiment mobilized. (Extract from 
 
 report of Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor, National Guard of 
 
 Aug. 2.) 
 
 To a Regular officer interested in seeing an efficient national force, the situ- 
 ation here has ceased to be amusing to think that the Federal Government 
 must pay such enormous sums of money for so much inefficiency ! There is a 
 provisional division in this camp, but not one trained officer in its personnel. 
 What can any one expect in results? It is my honest opinion that a volunteer 
 regiment composed of field officers from the Regular Army and all other officers 
 and men absolute recruits would be worth much more to the Federal Govern- 
 ment after one month of training than any regiment here will be if kept in this 
 camp under present conditions for one year. (Extract from report of Lieut. 
 Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , Aug. 8.) 
 
 An examination of the last efficiency report cards submitted will confirm my 
 opinion that it will be nothing short of murder to send these troops into any 
 sort of active service under some of the officers now on its roster. Many of 
 the officers, including three field officers, have only the remotest ideas of their 
 duties, and have absolutely no conception of even the elements of military 
 tactics. (Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor, Na- 
 tional Guard of - , June 24.) 
 
 I was detailed to muster the - Infantry. They arrived in camp during 
 the day of the 24tbr; most of the regiment was in by noon. The last battalion 
 in procured their tents and pitched them ; the other battalions waited for some 
 one to bring their tents to them. Most of the companies had their canvas up 
 for that night. The majority of the officers spent their time renewing old 
 acquaintances and let the men shift for themselves. The State did not have 
 sufficient canvas for their troops and tentage had to be procured from the 
 
 quartermaster, Fort . No effort was made to dig rears before dark 
 
 on the first day of arrival, and then straddle trenches were constructed for 
 the night. No lanterns were used to mark the location of the trenches so the 
 men defecated at will and where they liked. The next day the commanding 
 officer's attention was again called to this condition and along toward evening 
 several of the companies had dug rears. Friends and relative from all over 
 the State were in camp and officers and men were busy entertaining them and 
 it was very difficult to get any military work done. (Extract from report of 
 First Lieut. Philip Remington, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard 
 of , July 14, 1916.) 
 
 I have had an opportunity to observe property throughout camp. In gen- 
 eral, rifles and bayonets are in an awful condition, some completely covered 
 with rust inside and out. (Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector- 
 instructor, National Guard of , July 7.) 
 
 Another point in which the officers of the guard proved exceptionally weak 
 was in the preparation of muster rolls and other papers. In some cases this 
 was due to lack of care and attention on their part. (Extract from report 
 Lieut. Garber, inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 12. ) 
 
 Officers and men ignorant of administration paper work and papers will be 
 in bad shape. (Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Infantry, inspector- 
 instructor, National Guard of , July 5, 1916.) 
 
 The weakest point in this State seems to be the matter of paper work. 
 Officers are unfamiliar with the forms to be used and seem unable to accomplish 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 105 
 
 forms properly when given to them. My duties have been so many and so 
 varied that I have heen unable to devote the time that I should like to have 
 given to this matter of paper work. There seems to be a great need for more 
 instructor-sergeants, who would be able to take this matter in hand and thus 
 render a valuable service. (Extract from report of First Lieut. L. R. James, 
 Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 22, 1916.) 
 
 Discipline improving, but it is hard to make officers read instructions on 
 blank forms and comply with same. They have not yet learned to obey orders 
 promptly. (Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Infantry, inspector-in- 
 structor, National Guard of - , July 11, 1916.) 
 
 Service in - - has completely broken down; the adjutant general has 
 done nothing since mobilization and has been steadily absent from this camp 
 for some three weeks ; his retention of the office of State property and disburs- 
 ing officer has seriously hampered service in that he has not rendered checks 
 for services and property promptly ; it is most probable that his appointment 
 
 was illegal as being over age limit. When I first came to he was to 
 
 have arrived at 64 in March, 1915 ; the time has now been postponed till March, 
 1917. (Extract from report of Capt. , jr., Infantry, inspector-instructor, 
 National Guard of - , Aug. 3, 1916.) 
 
 Lack of familiarity with and a study of the regular forms and of methods of 
 procedure immediately became apparent and there was much delay and confu- 
 sion and needless repetition. Officers and men worked night and day and were 
 worn out on what should have been a simple affair. (Extract from report of 
 Capt. Emery T. Smith, Field Artillery, inspector-instructor, National Guard of 
 , July 6, 1916.) 
 
 It is presumed that in spite of anything on record officers who are known 
 to be absolutely incompetent will be mustered in ; still I wish to add the follow- 
 ing to my reports now on file in your office. For over a year I have endeavored 
 
 to induce the State authorities to eliminate , Medical Corps, on the 
 
 grounds of incompetence and unfitness, and the adjutant general has admitted 
 
 that all I have said is correct, but it is politically inexpedient. After Capt. 
 
 , Medical Corps, United States Army, had inspected the regimental 
 
 infirmary last winter and seen the inside of Dr. 's office in his home town 
 
 he told me that it would be no less than murder to send men into active service 
 with such a man as a surgeon. (Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, 
 inspector-instructor in National Guard, July 1.) 
 
 Of the papers returned to me, three officers have been found physically dis- 
 qualified: Maj. , Infantry; Maj. - , Infantry; First Lieut. , 
 
 Infantry. Majs. - and - - are both pensioners. This fact was never 
 suspected by me. A few weeks ago another field officer, who probably hoped to 
 profit by the removal of one of these officers, gave me the first hint as to the 
 
 situation. As soon as I returned to City (June 19) I wired to know if 
 
 this was true, and soon received a telegram affirming it. Maj. has taken 
 
 his rejection as a matter of fact, and is making no protest. Maj. , on the 
 other hand, is making a vigorous fight to have his physical defects waived. As 
 he is the most competent field officer of the regiment professionally, I asked the 
 surgeon if the defects in his case were such as could be waived without detri- 
 ment to the service. He replied in the negative. The surgeon reported him 
 " obese ; weak heart ; sounds believed to be fatty." I have been urged by Maj. 
 - and several officers of his battalion to recommend that defects in his 
 case be waived, but have refused to do so. (Extract from report of First Lieut. 
 
 W. G. Murchison, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , July 
 
 9, 1916.) 
 
 An incident of the week was the ordering in to this camp at State expense 
 Company I, of - . This company is not recognized by the War Depart- 
 ment. Its strength was 3 officers and 65 men, very few of whom had regularly 
 enlisted in the guard. The intention of the adjutant general was to have this 
 company substituted for one of the other short companies, but on physical 
 examination the 3 officers and 13 enlisted men were found disqualified. It was 
 then desired to have the enlisted personnel enlist for the other companies, but 
 
 this they refused to do, and the whole organization was sent back to . 
 
 The expense to the State for this was about $1,500. (Extract from report of 
 
 Capt. W. T Bates, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , 
 
 July 15, 1916.) 
 
106 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The incompetency of National Guard officers in general causes the greatest 
 delay in mobilization. Their inability or neglect to do their individual share 
 of the work, even after being informed or shown, requires some one else to do it 
 or see that it is done. Consequently a few competent ones do all the work. 
 For political reasons incompetents are not eliminated. (Extract from report 
 of Capt. J. Malcolm Graham, Infantry, mustering officer, National Guard of 
 , Sept. 11, 1916.) 
 
 The - - troops, less Company . Engineers, left here the 19th instant 
 for designated border stations. They were very well clothed and equipped for 
 the field, but their lack of training is something deplorable. With the possible 
 exception of the two officers commissioned from sergeants of the regular 
 service, there is not one of them fitted for the position he holds. Some of them 
 are capable enough men and with proper instruction will make good officers, 
 but it will be a long hard pull for them, because the senior officers are just as 
 inefficient, or more so, than the juniors. My experience here has more fully 
 convinced me than ever before that National Guard organizations should never 
 have an officer above the grade of lieutenant colonel. He would fill every need 
 during times of peace, and then when the troops were called into the field for 
 active service an officer of known efficiency should be selected from the regular 
 service and assigned to the regiment by the President as colonel. There would 
 then be a foundation from which to build. This would probably result in a 
 speedy elimination of the most incompetent and insure the reorganization of the 
 personnel at the earliest practicable moment. It would also make certain that 
 the discipline and instruction of the regiment would be conducted along proper 
 lines from the very beginning, and would not be a case of " the blind leading 
 the blind." The above may appear a rather severe arraignment of the troops 
 with whom I have been on duty for the past year, but I believe it is justified by 
 the facts. Officers in whom I had confidence proved themselves incapable when 
 put to the test. Not that some of them lack native ability, but because of the 
 fact that most of their time has been taken up with making a living in civil life, 
 and, as one officer expressed it, the military part of it has been a sort of diver- 
 sion for many of them. (Extract from report of First Lieut. W. G. Murchison, 
 Infantry, inspector-instructor National Guard of - - July 24, 1916.) 
 
 When the reports of physical examinations were submitted by the surgeon 
 they were found to be incomplete and absolutely wrong in many cases. For 
 instance, a company commander did not hesitate to scratch off the name of some 
 man who had failed to appear and substitute that of some other man for whom 
 he (company commander) had no report of physical examination. (Extract 
 from report of Lieut. A. A. Hoffman, Infantry, inspector-instructor, on mobiliza- 
 tion of Militia, Aug. 16, 1916.) 
 
 I still find a great many companies with their small arms completely covered 
 with rust, inside and out. They look as though they had just spent a week at 
 the bottom of a creek. In some regiments no attempt is made to clean them. 
 (Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, on National Guard 
 of July 23.) 
 
 The fault lay with the company commanders, who had no control over their 
 men. This straggling rendered it extremely difficult to keep accurate records, 
 but in spite of it I think we have succeeded in doing so. To illustrate, one com- 
 pany of 114 men was ordered to report at a certain hour the following day for 
 physical examination. When they reported there were 40 men missing. On 
 inquiring it was stated they had probably jumped on a freight train and gone 
 
 back to for several days, but that they would return, as they had 
 
 done the same thing several times before, always without permission. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. J. W. Grissinger, Medical Corps, United States Army, 
 National Guard of July 28, 1916.) 
 
 LAXITY IN PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 The large number of rejections for physical causes have been freely com- 
 mented upon by medical officers, inspector-instructors, inspectors general, and 
 others. They throw so much light on this important subject that extracts from 
 these reports are here reproduced : 
 
 The entire time for the last two weeks has been given up to the physical 
 examination of the troops of the - National Guard at Camp 
 
 It is painfully apparent that the civilian doctors used in the previous ex- 
 amination of the men of the National Guard are not familiar with 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 10 T 
 
 the requirements for Army standard of physical fitness. Also that the men 
 they have examined have not been seen by them with their clothing off. For 
 example, men have been sent to me who weigh 91 pounds, and are 5 feet 1 
 inch in height. Others with double inguinal hernia. 
 
 Unless some other rule is laid down this method of examination will be car- 
 ried out again in obtaining recruits for the organization at their home stations, 
 with the second rejection of a large number. 
 
 The medical officers of the Organized Militia are not well drilled in the 
 examination of recruits. 
 
 It is thought that if the company commander could be given a course in the 
 examination of recruits, as is done with officers of the Regular Army when 
 detailed for recruiting duty, and be a part of his efficiency record, that he will 
 at least have the clothing removed, weigh and take the height, and in time 
 know the apparent causes for rejection. If the senior regimental medical officer 
 or the inspector-instructor visited his home to\vn they could pass on any cases 
 in doubt. Have the medical officer ordered to make one or two trips a year to 
 the home station of each company of his regiment to look over the men taken 
 by the organization commanding officer as recruiting officer. (Extract from 
 report of Maj. E. L. Ruffner, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, National 
 Guard of , July 16, 1916.) 
 
 Nothing but praise can be given the Ohio National Guard for the spirit in 
 which after the first regiment saw so many men rejected the rest of them have 
 accepted the inevitable in rejections when their turn came. The first regiment 
 tried to take the case of two officers rejected over our heads, but being sustained 
 by the department commander no further attempt was made by anyone. Many 
 cases of officers and men who were rejected for hernia have had this operated 
 upon and will be ready for service soon. One colonel of Infantry is now con- 
 valescing from this operation. (Extract from report of Maj. E. L. Ruffner, 
 Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 23, 1916.) 
 
 That physical inspection of National Guard officers and men upon entry into 
 the service, and of officers upon promotion, be no longer intrusted to National 
 Guard surgeons, but be taken over by the Medical Corps of the Regular Army 
 in the most direct manner possible. Such inspection should be a condition of 
 pay. Smallpox and typhoid inoculations should follow each physical inspection 
 and ba compulsory. (Extract from report of Col. Morton, special inspector, on 
 National Guard of , July 5. ) 
 
 Physical disability. I consider it a just criticism of both Federal and State 
 authorities that avoidable delays occurred ; that men taken in wholesale were, 
 by reason of physical disability that should have been largely predetermined, 
 were only gotten rid of by retail measures. They were a menace and a nui- 
 sance. (Extract from report of Col. Delamere Skerrett, special inspector, on 
 National Guard of , July 16.) 
 
 The physical requirements in the State are the same as those in the Federal 
 service. The examinations by the State surgeons do not appear to have been at 
 all thorough. The regiments have a large number of immature boys. I asked 
 a great many of them how old they were, and all but two claimed to be over 18. 
 Only one company had been examined by the Federal surgeon when I left the 
 camp. Out of 76 men examined, 21 were found disqualified, but authority was 
 requested to waive the defect in 4 of these cases. From the general appearance 
 of the command, I am of the opinion that about this percentage of the men 
 who are not up to the physical requirements will be found in the other organi- 
 zations. 
 
 The surgeon estimated that about 20 per cent of the men would be rejected 
 physically. There are quite a number of Indians in the Infantry regiment, and 
 they are generally very good physical specimens. (Extract from report of Maj. 
 W. H. Simons, I. G., on N. G. of - , July 13.) 
 
 No organization is provided with the march kit of cooking utensils. 
 
 Physical condition. The physical requirements in the State are the same as 
 those in the Federal service. The examinations by the State surgeons do not 
 appear to have been at all thorough. The regiments have a large number of 
 immature boys. I asked a great many of them how old they were, and all but 
 two claimed to be, over 18. Only one company had been examined by the Fed- 
 eral surgeon when I left the camp. Out of 76 men examined, 21 were found 
 disqualified, but authority was requested to waive the defect in four of these 
 
108 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 -cases. From the general appearance of the command, I am of the opinion that 
 about this percentage of the men who are not up to the physical requirements 
 will be found in the other organizations. (Maj. W. H. Simons's report on 
 inspection of National Guard of - .) 
 
 Pursuant to instructions contained in letter dated Militia Bureau. Wash- 
 ington, D. C., June 30, 1916, I report on the Mustering Regulations as follows: 
 
 The regulations for mustering the Organized Militia into the service of the 
 United States are clear and can be understood by all concerned, and no change 
 is recommended except in one particular, namely : The law prescribes that the 
 militia in such States and Territories as shall have adopted for enlistment 
 and reenlistment the standard of medical examination prescribed for the 
 Regular Army shall be duly mustered into the service of the United States 
 without prior physical examination. (Par. 2, p. 12.) 
 
 However, a physical examination of the whole organization is subsequently 
 held as per (d), paragraph 2, and experience has shown that in this examina- 
 tion from 3 to 20 per cent are found physically deficient. 
 
 As it is desired that the maximum strength shall go forward to the concen- 
 tration point and as only the maximum can be mustered in, it is not possible 
 to determine in advance what the strength will be after the physical examina- 
 tion required per subhead (d), paragraph 2. Much delay is thus caused in 
 discharging the physically unfit and filling up the organization again by re- 
 cruiting. 
 
 It would facilitate the work greatly and be far more satisfactory to all 
 concerned if, where physical examination is to be held at all, it be held before 
 muster in and not after. 
 
 The law should be changed accordingly, except where the new militia law 
 makes the present method unnecessary. By holding examination first, the 
 troop or company commanders would know beforehand their effective strength 
 and could fill up to the maximum in advance and not be left in doubt till 
 time to entrain, and often with insufficient time for recruiting. (Report of 
 Maj. M. M. McNamee, Cavalry, Inspector-Instructor, National Guard, 
 July 8, 1916.) 
 
 The personnel as a whole is good, but several men were brought by organi- 
 zation commanders who are absolutely unfit for military service, one instance 
 of this being in the case of a man with double inguinal hernia and another 
 who was unable to count the fingers of a hand held up before him at a dis- 
 tance of 2 feet. This is due to the fact that although provided by legis- 
 lative enactment in 1910 that the standard of physical examination for enlist- 
 ment and reenlistment in the Organized Militia should be the same as that for 
 the Regular Army, there has been nonobservance rather than observance of 
 this statute from the beginning. In order to be certain that the statute has 
 been complied with, I have required all organizations to submit to me physical 
 examination blanks properly made out and signed by the doctors who made 
 the examination of the organization before leaving their home stations (this 
 examination was made by order of the State authorities). When I discovered 
 on examination of the blank that the man w r as evidently and unquestionably 
 unfit for military service, I recommended to the organization commander that 
 his name be not entered on the muster rolls for I would not muster into the 
 service any man whom I knew beyond question to be absolutely unfit for 
 service. This because I believe that the spirit of the mustering regulations 
 means not only that a State should have adopted such a standard by law, but 
 that the law should have been complied \vith; that it would be abetting a 
 fraud upon the Government to muster into the service of the United States 
 any man when I knew positively he would be rejected at the examination held 
 after muster in merely because a company commander, for reasons best known 
 to himself, had brought this man to camp as a member of the organization. 
 All company commanders have acknowledged the justice of this and I do not 
 believe that when the examination is made after muster in there will be many, 
 if any, men found unfit for service at the physical examination to be held 
 then. (Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector- 
 instructor, National Guard, June 26, 1916.) 
 
 The second sentence of paragraph 28, Mustering Regulations, provides that 
 the mustering officer before accepting organizations presented for muster will 
 satisfy himself that all the officers and men thereof are fit for military service, 
 while under reiterated instructions from .chief mustering officer of the depart- 
 ment I must disregard this requirement and muster all who are presented into 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 109 
 
 the service regardless of the fact that some of them are practically blind, some 
 almost totally deaf, some suffering with acute gonorrhoea, and the like. It is 
 needless to say that this is rather confusing. (Extract from report of Capt. 
 
 Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard, July 1. 
 
 1916.) 
 
 It needs but a casual glance at the list of men who were rejected at the 
 physical examination following the muster in to convince that while there was 
 a law prescribing the standard of physical examination for this State it has 
 never been observed. Every organization is losing heavily and most of the men 
 who are rejected are rejected for some grave physical defect. (Extract from 
 
 report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National 
 
 Guard, July 12, 1916. ) 
 
 Capt. Sloan recommends that all men brought to mobilization camp with 
 serious and apparent physical defects be transported and subsisted at the 
 expense of the responsible officer. He noted many cases of men brought to- 
 and kept at the - - camp for a considerable period suffering from such 
 serious physical disability that they could nbt perform any military duty, and 
 these men cost the Government thousands of dollars in pay, transportation, and 
 subsistence. (Letter 'of Capt. A. B. Sloan, Infantry, United States Army, 
 Fort , Aug. 9, 1916.) 
 
 The examination of companies each day more and more fully demonstrates 
 how farcical the standard of physical examination as established in this 
 State must have been. From one-third to one-half of the men brought here 
 and mustered in are being discharged for physical disability as a result' of 
 the examination made by the Regular Army surgeon. (Extract from report 
 
 of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, , National Guard, 
 
 July 20, 1916.) 
 
 If the character of the physical examination required for enlistment in the 
 National Guard of other States even though the law prescribed that it must 
 be the same as that required for enlistment in the Regular service has been, 
 the same as that in : , then in practice it has been farcical and the Gov- 
 ernment has spent thousands* of dollars in bringing men who are absolutely 
 unfit for military service to the mobilization camps and in sending them home 
 because of the failure to pass a physical examination by the examining; 
 surgeon at the camp. Men were brought to this camp, as members of or- 
 ganizations, who were suffering from diseases and who had physical defects 
 which absolutely unfitted them for any kind of military service. Among 
 these men were numbered some with double hernia, some with trachoma, 
 many with pterygium, marked mitral insufficiency, acute gonorrhea, and an 
 examination by the surgeon of many organizations seemed more like a free 
 clinic than the testing out of physical fitness of men to do duty as soldiers in 
 the service of the United States. The only remedy for this is, I believe, to 
 have every man who is brought to a mobilization camp as a member of any 
 organization, examined by the camp surgeon (who should be an officer of 
 the Medical Corps of the Army) as soon as possible after his arrival thereat; 
 and if he is found physically disqualified that he be refused muster-in. If 
 this be done in the future and the officer responsible for bringing him be 
 required to pay for the transportation and subsistence of the man from the 
 company rendezvous to the mobilization camp and return, this practice would 
 be stopped and the Government would be saved many thousands of dollars. 
 (Extract from report Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of 
 , Aug. 9.) 
 
 Approximately 700 men out of the 3,000 or more examined physically were 
 found physically unfit for service. This included 3 officers. (Extract from 
 
 report of Capt. Hughes, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of -, 
 
 July 16.) 
 
 A large per cent of the officers who have been rejected are using all the 
 political influence they possess to have their disabilities waived, regardless 
 of what the disability may be. (Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector- 
 instructor, on National Guard of .) 
 
 The national defense act, which allows pay for the company officers, should 
 make it possible for all recruits to be examined physically by a doctor, for 
 which he should receive pay, and should evolve a system by which company 
 officers are held strictly responsible for accepting recruits who had not been 
 
110 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 examined or who had failed to pass the doctor's examination. (Extract from 
 
 report of Capt. Hughes, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of 
 
 July 16.) 
 
 The mustering in of the - - militia has progressed very slowly, there 
 being constant trouble from the causes mentioned in my report of the 28th 
 ultimo. I would again call attention to these, namely, the need for physical 
 standards for the militia and the need for supervision over the legality of 
 enlistments, both of these under such amount of Federal supervision as "will 
 accomplish the results. 
 
 The State troops arrived here on May 12. Physical examinations were taken 
 up without delay, and when it became apparent that there was to be a large 
 percentage of rejections all efforts of the State authorities were directed to 
 getting defects waived at first almost regardless of nature or degree of defect. 
 Paragraph 457, Army Regulations, relating to the "length and character of 
 service," was invoked, and it was two weeks before an understanding could be 
 reached which would make clear what was and what was not a sufficient cause 
 for rejection. (Extract from report of First Lieut. B. F. Ristine, Infantry, 
 inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 5, 1916.) 
 
 The undersigned reports and desires to emphasize strongly the need for hold- 
 ing the States strictly to the standards of physical requirements ; also the need 
 for Federal supervision of the legality and regularity of enlistments. From the 
 experience here in - - it seems impossible to exaggerate the importance 
 of these points. 
 
 Rejections on account of physical disqualifications have been about 33 per 
 cent. Roughly, there have been 1,000 officers and men accepted and 500 re- 
 jected. An estimate of the cost to the Government per man of the latter (com- 
 piled without data) may be made conservatively at $40, and we find an abso- 
 lute waste of $20,000 on one regiment of Infantry and a battery of Field 
 Artillery. (Extract from report of First Lieut. B. F. Ristine, Infantry, in- 
 spector-instructor, National Guard of , June 28, 1916.) 
 
 In six cases officers have been rejected physically, this number including the 
 regimental adjutant and two company commanders. One of the latter and the 
 adjutant have since been accepted on the authority of the department com- 
 mander. Rejection of officers results very badly both to the individual and the 
 organization. Under the new law no officer should be carried without exami- 
 nation by surgeons of the Regular Army. (Extract from report of Lieut. 
 Ristine, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - , July 5. ) 
 
 Fifty-six officers and 1,427 enlisted men were mobilized. Of these, 5 officers 
 and 405 enlisted men were physically rejected by the examining surgeon, and 
 minor defects were waived in the cases of several officers. The State had 
 adopted the Regular Army standard for the examination of recruits in so far 
 as the enlistment blank, orders, and instructions were concerned, but the actual 
 examinations must have been very lax in many cases. It is recommended that 
 a physical examination by a medical officer of the Regular Army of all recruits 
 enlisted since the last examination be held each year and that Federal recogni- 
 tion be withheld from any man who fails to pass the examination. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. Niles, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - , 
 Sept 12.) 
 
 Out of a total of 1,181 enlisted men mustered in in the Infantry regiment, 
 387 have already been discharged as physically disqualified. The physical 
 defects of a few have been waived, and some requests to have defects waived 
 have not been heard from. In round numbers, over 400 men were found physi- 
 cally unfit for service. Seven officers have been discharged because of being 
 physically disqualified, another will be as soon as he returns to camp, the 
 physical defects of two have been waived, and I am waiting to hear from the 
 request for waiver in case of another. This out of 50 mustered in. The two 
 troops of Cavalry lost 50 men, the field hospital 4, the regimental infirmary 5, 
 and Company A, Engineers, 25. A grand total of 471. (Extract from report 
 of First Lieut. W. G. Murchison, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard 
 of - , July 17, 1916.) 
 
 It was inevitable that much pressure was brought to bear upon the medical 
 officers who conducted the examination, and as a result many recruits were en- 
 listed who should have been rejected for physical disabilities; every effort 
 was made by organization commanders to take to the mobilization camp their 
 
ETC. Ill 
 
 companies recruited to the maximum, and as a result the organizations arrived 
 at the mobilization camp with a large number of recruits who were without 
 training and in some cases without equipment. Upon the departure of the 
 organizations from their home stations, a recruiting officer and party was left 
 in each armory to continue the work of recruiting, and such recruits as were 
 then enlisted were sent to the mobilization camp without equipment. These 
 recruiting officers were generally inexperienced and the medical examination 
 was conducted by physicians generally ignorant of the requirements of the 
 physical examinations. There was a noticeable deterioration in the quality 
 of the men sent forward after the arrival of the organizations, in one marked 
 case, out of a detachment of 12 recruits sent forward 10 were physically 
 rejected at the mobilization camp. In many other cases men were enlisted 
 and sent forward who should' have been rejected by a line officer without the 
 assistance of a medical officer or a physician; these cases being for such glar- 
 ing physical disabilities as hernia, flat feet, loss of opposing molar teeth, defec- 
 tive eyesight, etc. 
 
 If the evil of a peace strength organization is to be continued a better method 
 of recruiting from peace to war strength must be determined. Two of the 
 regimental surgeons with a carefully selected personnel of from 12 to 20 men 
 would be a great improvement over the method used during the last mobiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 The hardships, confusion, and expense of mobilization in the future will 
 be greatly reduced if the complete equipment for the National Guard is stored 
 within the State, preferably in the storehouses at or near the mobilization 
 points. The necessary blank forms for mustering the National Guard into 
 Federal service should be with the organization, and in large measure the forms 
 may be filled out ready for use. I am of the opinion that the Colonel of the 
 regiment or the senior officer of units other than the regiment, should muster 
 in their own units into the Federal service; later when opportunity is afforded 
 the organizations should be thoroughly inspected by officers of the Inspector 
 General's Department and errors found can then be corrected. Another essen- 
 tial point to be determined upon as a preparation for the mobilization of an 
 efficient National Guard is a frequent physical inspection so that the examina- 
 tion, if one is to be made at muster-in, will be of men all of whom are practi- 
 cally physically fit for the duties of a soldier. At least once each year the entire 
 personnel of the National Guard should be inspected by a medical officer of the 
 Army whose powers should be such that any found physically deficient are at 
 once eliminated from the guard. 
 
 On account of the small fee allowed for the examinations, doctors usually 
 made the examinations in a very perfunctory manner. Practically the entire 
 command had been examined during the month prior to this. However, out 
 of a strength of 53 officers and 1,143 enlisted men, 2 officers and 216 enlisted 
 men were rejected (1 officer submitted to an operation for hernia immedi- 
 ately upon rejection and was later accepted without having been discharged). 
 
 Frequently the form was merely signed. Only rarely was it completely filled 
 out. (Extract from report of Maj. Edw. A. Shuttleworth, Infantry, inspector- 
 instructor National Guard of - , September 19, 1916.) 
 
 The best record among militia medical officers was made by Capt. Charles 
 F. Jump, Medical Corps, who had examined Company A with a strength of 
 68. Only one of these was rejected after muster-in. 
 
 The poorest record was made by Capt. , commanding Company - , 
 who is a practicing physician, and who examined the men in his company. 
 Out of a strength of 85, 22 were rejected after muster in nearly 26 per cent. 
 
 The poorest record among the civilian doctors was made by a Dr. 
 
 who was then on duty at - . Company - - is stationed in - 
 city. Dr. - - examined this company and out of 132 accepted by him, 
 34 were rejected. Even syphilitics were accepted, so the Army surgeon in- 
 formed me. If reported his case to the department commander, as I had 
 been told that he had been ordered before an examining board to take an exami- 
 nation for entry into the Regular Service. (Extract from report of Lieut. 
 Hoffman, inspector-instructor, on - National Guard, Aug. 16.) 
 
 - is supposed to have adopted the Regular Army standard of physical 
 examination. An interesting fact in connection herewith is that in the 
 Infantry 22 per cent of enlisted men were discharged for physical disability 
 when examined under direction of Federal medical officer. (Extract from 
 
112 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 report of First Lieut. James G. Mcllroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National 
 Guard of , July 7, 1916.) 
 
 Eleven per cent of the officers mustered in were rejected by medical examin- 
 ers. However, many were reinstated. As soon as an officer was rejected, it 
 meant that all the influence he could command would be brought to bear to see- 
 that he was reinstated. Twenty-five per cent of the enlisted men were rejected 
 by the medical examiners. (Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. 
 Mcllroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 23, 1916. ) 
 
 While this State has adopted the Regular Army form for physical exami- 
 nations, 50 per cent of the enlisted force had not been examined on June 19, 
 1916; this made it necessary to have the examinations made prior to organiza- 
 tions leaving home stations and the surgeons were not available for proper 
 duty. (Extract from report of Capt. W. B. Wallace, Infantry inspector-in 
 structor, National Guard of , June 25, 1916.) 
 
 About May 20, 1916, a rigid system of physical examination, corresponding 
 to that for the Regular Army, was instituted and all members of the guard 
 were required to take it. This resulted in the elimination of at least 15 per 
 cent of the men examined. The guard was being practically reorganized to 
 comply with the provisions of the Army reorganization bill signed by the Presi- 
 dent on June 3, 1916, and the order for mobilization came before this was com- 
 pleted. (Extract from report of First Lieut. Max. B. Garber, Infantry inspec- 
 tor-instructor, National Guard of , July 12, 1916. ) 
 
 Maj. Hunt reports * * * did not have the physical standard of the Reg- 
 ular Army and that at least 30 per cent were rejected physically. (Letter of 
 Maj. H. J. Hunt, Infantry inspector-instructor, , July 9, 1916.) 
 
 Letter of H. G. Disbrow to Adjutant General, United States Army, 
 suggests saving in time and money to examine men at armories for physical 
 defects before sending them to mobilization camps. 
 
 On Saturday, June 24, 1916, I called a conference of several of the leading 
 medical officers of the National Guard of with the medical examiner 
 and myself. We all knew of our own knowledge that while this State had 
 officially adopted on paper the medical standard of the United States Army, 
 that the detail and requirements of that standard had not been carried out. 
 To protect the interests of the Government, I thereupon decided, and so ordered, 
 that the muster-in of this division would proceed along the lines of the regula- 
 tions for States which had not adopted the medical standard. (Extract from 
 report of Capt. J. B. Kemper, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of 
 , July 11, 1916.) 
 
 It was inevitable that much pressure was brought to bear upon the medical 
 officers who conducted the examination, and as a result many recruits were en- 
 listed who should have been rejected for physical disabilities; every effort was 
 made by organization commanders to take to the mobilization camp their com- 
 panies recruited to the maximum, and as a result the organizations arrived at 
 the mobilization camp with a large number of recruits who were without train- 
 ing and in some cases without equipment. Upon the departure of the organiza- 
 tions from their home stations, a recruiting officer and party was. left in each 
 armory to continue the work of recruiting, and such recruits as were then 
 enlisted were sent to the mobilization camp without equipment. These re- 
 cruiting officers were generally inexperienced, and the medical examination was 
 conducted by physicians generally ignorant of the requirements of the physical 
 examinations. There was a noticeable deterioration in the quality of the men 
 sent forward after the arrival of the organizations ; in one marked case, out of 
 a detachment of 12 recruits sent forward 10 were physically rejected at the 
 mobilization camp. In many other cases men were enlisted and sent forward 
 who should have been rejected by a line officer without the Assistance of a 
 medical officer or a physician, these cases being for such glaring physical dis- 
 abilities as hernia, flat feet, loss of opposing molar teeth, defective eyesight, etc. 
 
 If the evil of a peace-strength organization is to be continued a better method 
 of recruiting from peace to war strength must be determined. Two of the regi- 
 mental surgeons with a carefully selected personnel of from 12 to 20 men would 
 be a great improvement over the method used during the last mobilization. 
 (Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector-instructor on National 
 Guard of .) 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. . 113 
 
 The most marked defect disclosed to date is the fact that although this State 
 has adopted the standard for physical examination required for the Regular 
 Army, this standard has by no means been rigidly adhered to. In the Eighth 
 Regiment alone, of the seven companies so far reported, an average of 41 officers 
 and men have been rejected for physical disability in each company. It is 
 thought that this average is somewhat high and will be reduced in other regi- 
 ments. (Extract from report of Capt. H. H. Tebbetts, inspector-instructor, on 
 National Guard of , July 7.) 
 
 The medical examinations before enlistment in the National Guard, both of 
 officers and men, should be more carefully made, and I recommend that all offi- 
 cers of the National Guard be examined physically once each year, as is now the 
 case in the Regular Army. This examination should, if possible, be made by 
 Regular Army officers of the Medical Corps. (Extract from report of Capt. 
 Raymond Sheldon, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - July 6.> 
 
 It is recommended that the National Guard, when it is again in normal con- 
 dition, shall have frequent medical inspections by regular medical officers, par- 
 ticularly that National Guard officers be examined physically during their first 
 year of service as such and at intervals thereafter of not more than five year*/ 
 and that questions of waiver of physical defects found be considered at that time 
 and not at the time of mobilization. The absence of these regulations has 
 brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives 
 in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out 
 at the physical examination connected with muster in. This has resulted also 
 in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most 
 needed them. (Extract from report of Lieut. Col. E. M. Lewis, senior mustering 
 officer, , July 6.) 
 
 Things are shaping up here slowly, but on the whole satisfactorily. Ten of 
 the troops have been mustered and the medical examination of about six has 
 been completed. The latter examination has demonstrated how useless it is to 
 expect to get reliable work from the civilian physicians, and it would be a keen 
 delight to me to find there was some way to prevent some of them from getting 
 any pay for examining some of the men they accepted and reported as normal 
 in every respect. The principal troubles have been of a nature that would not 
 appear to the casual examiner, such as myself on recognition, but which must 
 have been known to the doctors if they made any sort of an examination. 
 
 Some of the troops have lost a great many men from flat feet, poor chests ; 
 there were quite a few cases of gonorrhea, and even a number of cases of 
 syphilis in all stages ; it seems an outrage that they should be paid for such 
 work, and they should be published as being unreliable men. The troops who 
 lost the most are reduced to a little below the minimum, but I do not believe 
 there will be any trouble in recruiting, as the regiment still appears to be very 
 popular. (Extract from letter from an inspector-instructor on National Guard 
 of .) 
 
 It does not seem advisable to defer the physical examination until after 
 muster in is completed as contemplated in paragraph 24D. Experience with 
 - troops has demonstrated that even in a State that has adopted the 
 standard of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army, there will 
 be a great number of men found defective. In that State, those found de- 
 fective were 10.47 per cent. It is believed that the physical examination 
 should come first no matter whether the State has adopted the regular standard 
 or not. The physical examination will always be the controlling factor. The 
 examination and transfer of property can easily be accomplished in half the 
 time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not 
 necessarily be taken over by the mustering officer for the Federal Government 
 until the result of the physical examination reveals the fact that the organiza- 
 tion has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls 
 should always follow the physical examination and only the names of those 
 who pass the examination should be entered on the rolls. 
 
 In the - - camp some 14,000 men were examined. The physical ex- 
 amination lasted about 11 days. Some 50 or 60 surgeons were occupied under 
 Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted 
 with the same care as would have been done in the Regular Army. During the 
 first two days the examination continued night and day, the surgeons working 
 in eight-hour shifts. Later it was found better to work in the daylight only 
 and only two shifts of eight hours were occupied. 
 
 7203116 8 
 
114 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 While the physical examination was being conducted Capt. Leisenring and 
 myself inspected and took over the property of the division. We commenced 
 on June 25 and ended on the afternoon of July 5. Capt. Castleman had entire 
 rharge of the muster rolls and of the muster in. He completed his work on 
 Sunday morning July 10 and the last regiment left for the border that after- 
 noon, the entire division having been mustered in and entrained for the border 
 in two weeks. (Extracts from report of Capt. D. H. Biddle, inspector-in- 
 structor, July 20, 1916.) 
 
 LACK OF TRAINING AND UNFITNESS FOR ACTIVE SERVICE. 
 
 The amount of work being performed by some of the organizations was not 
 what it should be. This matter was taken up with the camp commander, and 
 I believe that same will be remedied immediately. It is recommended that 
 instructions be issued to all camp commanders to the effect that, weather per- 
 mitting, a minimum of eight hours per day, Sundays and holidays excepted, 
 strenuous work for officers and men is expected. 
 
 Officers and men generally are not well set up. Slouchiness and lack of snap 
 was in evidence. To remedy this defect it is recommended that all camp com- 
 manders be directed that at least 40 minutes physical drill under the Koehler 
 system shall constitute a part of the daily training. This in addition to a 
 short period of exercises after reveille. For this drill an officer should be 
 selected who is peculiarly fitted for same, otherwise desired results will not be 
 accomplished. 
 
 No instructions in signaling, aiming and pointing, or gallery practice. In- 
 struction in first aid not satisfactory. (Extract from report of Col. J. L. 
 Chamberlain, inspector general, department inspector, on conditions at mobiliza- 
 tion camp, Fort - , August 19, 1916. 
 
 Col. S. W. Miller, Tenth Infantry, special inspector, reports, July 15, in his 
 report of inspection of mobilization camp of the National Guard of - . 
 
 " The various units of the , division will require several months of 
 
 field training to prepare them for service under war conditions. 
 
 INEFFICIENCY OF COMMAND FOE ACTIVE SEE VICE.' 
 
 "As the command reported at camp they were, in my opinion, in no way pre- 
 pared for active service. There is a very large percentage of entirely new 
 men, and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they acted at 
 inspection, do not appear to have had much training. ' The spirit of the officers 
 and men is particularly good, and they all seemed very anxious to learn. Any 
 suggestions as to camp sanitation, instructions, or paper work is eagerly 
 sought, and as far as possible is taken advantage of. The troops are now, I 
 believe, very well equipped, but have had very little proper training." 
 
 None of the organizations of the National Guard are ready for active 
 service, and none will be until they have had a considerable period of careful 
 training under competent instructors. 
 
 As may be inferred from the above, the state of discipline among the officers 
 leaves much to be desired. It is believed to be better among the enlisted men, 
 but it must exist among the officers if progress of any kind is to be made. 
 (Extract from report of Maj. Simons, inspector general, on National Guard 
 of , July 13.) 
 
 The regiment arrived at the mobilization camp without the articles required 
 in the surplus kit bags, and the men suffered from the lack of underclothing, 
 as there was none on hand to issue to them. (Extract from report of Lieut. 
 Ristine, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 20.) 
 
 There was a lack of intelligence of National Guard officers as to how to dis- 
 pose of clothing under paragraph 460, Army Regulations, section 5, which sug- 
 gests a handbook of property accountability. Our present system of property 
 accountability is scattered in such a variety of places that National Guard 
 officers have neither the time nor knowledge to grasp it. (Extract from re- 
 port of Lieut. Farnum, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - , 
 July 18.) 
 
 The command is, in my opinion, in no way prepared for active service. There 
 is a very large percentage of entirely new men, many of them immature boys, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 115 
 
 and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they conducted themselves 
 at inspection, do not appear to have had much training. The spirit of the 
 officers and men is very good, and they seemed anxious to learn. (Extract from 
 report of Maj. Simons, inspector general on National Guard of .) 
 
 None of the organizations of the - - National Guard are ready for 
 
 active service, and none will be until they have had a considerable period of 
 
 careful training under competent instructors. (Extract from report of First 
 
 Lieut. James W. Everington, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of 
 
 , July 1, 1916.) 
 
 While every request of mine is promptly acted upon and there has not been 
 the slightest friction, it is evident that the State authorities considered this 
 as a State camp, and that any attempt on my part to speed up the muster in 
 will not be of much avail. They have just awakened to a realization of the 
 imfitness of this regiment for field service and feel that they owe it to the 
 " boys " to keep them here until they have learned at least the rudiments of 
 the game and can take better care of themselves. The work of reorganization, 
 which is still in progress, could have been finished within a few hours at any 
 time, but they are afraid that once the regiment is mustered in it will be 
 immediately sent to the border. 
 
 If "an emergency arises that demands that untrained troops be interposed 
 between the Mexicans and unarmed Americans, they are ready to respond at 
 once, but it is believed that nothing else short of an order to be ready for muster 
 in within a specified time, or not at all, will materially hasten the muster in. 
 If no such orders are given, they will probably be ready to be mustered in in 
 about two weeks. (Extract from report of Capt. W. T. Bates, inspector- 
 instruction, National Guard of , July 3, 1916.) 
 
 The troops are practically untrained, and a recent telegram from the depart- 
 ment commander informs me that Gen. Funston recommends that they be held 
 here for the purpose of training. 
 
 Another fact that has been demonstrated beyond question is that State 
 troops coming to mobilization camp are almost always poorly equipped. They 
 lack uniforms, underwear, shoes, and, in fact, must be fitted out to a very 
 large extent from the property which is only available after their muster into 
 service. (Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor, on National 
 Guard of , July 20.) 
 
 The large number of physical rejections and the corresponding number of 
 recruits caused the regiment, as a whole, to be poorly instructed and trained. 
 Many of the noncommissioned officers had been rejected physically, and the re- 
 mainder were not efficient noncommissioned officers. The regiment should 
 have been kept at the mobilization camp, under an intensive training schedule, 
 for at least a month before it would have been even fairly efficient in field 
 service. (Extract from report of Capt. E. W. Niles, inspector-instructor, on 
 National Guard of - , Sept. 12.) 
 
 The necessity for hardening the men by marching them has been brought to 
 the attention of the regimental commander repeatedly, beginning with the first 
 day in camp; to date the command has taken one march 3 miles long. A 
 12-mile march with full equipment could not be made by the command to-day, 
 after practically a month of service. The little training they have received 
 has not been systematically or scientifically conducted. (Extract from report 
 of Lieut. James W. Everington, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , 
 July 22.) 
 
 NECESSITY FOR ADDITIONAL OFFICERS AND NONCOMMIS- 
 SIONED OFFICERS AT MOBILIZATION POINTS. 
 
 I believe, as a result of my experience in this camp, that a field officer of 
 the Regular Army should be ordered to each mobilization camp as its com- 
 manding officer and that he should be given the necessary administrative, staff 
 for the camp, these last to also be from Regular establishments. It seems 
 almost needless to say that it is not to be expected that the average National 
 Guard officer, no matter how willing he may be, is able to handle the admin- 
 istrative problems which naturally arise in a mobilization camp, for as a rule 
 he has had little or no experience in such things. To place them in such a 
 position means added expense and slow work. To expect the mustering officers, 
 
116 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 in addition to their other duties, difficult at best, to be issuing quartermasters, 
 commissaries, ordinance officers, and the like, does not subserve the best interest 
 of the Government. This is especially true where they must either do all of the 
 work themselves, even to the making out of memorandum receipts, invoices, 
 and other necessary papers, or else have the major part of it done wrong. 
 
 As a result of my inspection of four mobilization camps, I am of the opinion 
 that there should be two mustering officers of the Regular Army on duty at 
 each of these camps, at least during the most active period of the mobilization. 
 (Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, inspector-instructor, - 
 National Guard, Aug. 9, 1916.) 
 
 Unless an officer has unusual physical vigor and capacity for work, the mental 
 and physical strain, together with loss of sleep, is certain to impair his effi- 
 ciency and delay the mobilization. (Extract from report of Col. T. Q. Donald- 
 son, inspector general, on National Guard of - .) 
 
 In a large mobilization camp of this kind everything could be expedited very 
 much if the chief of staff and quartermaster were Regular officers of ex- 
 perience. (Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, on 
 National Guard of , July 23.) 
 
 I believe that in all camps of this character, if permitted by law, the camp 
 commander, camp quartermaster, and camp adjutant should be Regular officers 
 detailed by the department commander, a-s much friction and lost motion would 
 in this way. I believe, be avoided. My experience in a mobilization camp in 
 1898 and 1899 convinces me of this. 
 
 Lack of knowledge of clerical work, and in some cases of education, on 
 the part of some of the officers is adding to the difficulty attending the pre- 
 liminary work of muster in, and the lack of sufficient armory instruction in the 
 past will unquestionably delay the period when these troops can be stated to be 
 "reasonably ready for field service.'' (Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, 
 inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , June 26.) 
 
 A post quartermaster sergeant and an experienced regimental or battalion 
 sergeant major should be detailed for duty with the senior assistant mustering 
 officer at the very beginning of operations. The order designating the senior 
 assistant mustering officer should include the details of these men. The reasons 
 for this are obvious. (Extract from report of Col. Buck, inspector-instructor, 
 on National Guard of - , June 28.) 
 
 It is thought that in every case, upon mobilization, an officer of the Regular 
 establishment should be attached to each regiment for the purpose of in- 
 struction along administrative lines. (Extract from report of Capt. James M. 
 Love, jr., inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , Aug. 1, 1916.) 
 
 I recommend that in any mobilization camp a Regular officer of high rank be 
 assigned as camp commander, with authority to enforce proper camp sanitation 
 and regulate the system of supply, and that as many detached officers of the 
 Regular service as can be spared be detailed as instructors, with authority to 
 supervise and direct the instruction in administration and training of the 
 National Guard. (Extract from report of Maj. Simons, inspector general, on 
 National Guard of .) 
 
 I believe no one is in a better position to see the utter hopelessness of the 
 dual system of control than the mustering officer, the terrific needless expense 
 to the" Federal Government, through destruction and loss of clothing, equip- 
 ment, and arms, and payment of large numbers of men who are discharged for 
 physical disability, the vast amount of work and time required to organize a 
 mob of this kind. Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, 
 on National Guard of , July 23.) 
 
 The great trouble here has been the lack of a strong central head to give 
 orders and see that they are carried out. There seem to be at least four 
 separate and distinct chiefs here the senior assistant mustering officer, the 
 National Guard commander of the camp, the chief quartermaster, and the ad- 
 jutant general of . The lowest ranking one of the four appears to be the 
 camp commander. (Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, 
 on National Guard of , July 23.) 
 
 The greatest friction which arose in camp was due to the fact that the officers 
 were not sufficiently trained in the paper work required for the Regular Army, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 117 
 
 and the execution of this work, which runs so smoothly in the Regular Army, 
 was a constant puzzle to the Militia officers and absorbed almost the major 
 portion of the mustering officer's time in giving instruction in this matter. It 
 is believed that hereafter the Militia Bureau should insist more rigidly on the 
 use of all forms prescribed by the Regular Army for the National Guard not in 
 the service of the United States. (Extract from report of Capt. Hughes, in- 
 spector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 16.) 
 
 I further believe that every regiment should have an inspector-instructor 
 constantly on duty with it, and while so serving he should be commissioned as 
 the de facto lieutenant colonel, and have complete supervision and authority 
 over records and recruiting. This will give him the necessary authority to keep 
 the records in shape, while in no way making him responsible for the procure- 
 ment of recruits. (Extract from report of Lieut. Kemper, inspector-instructor, 
 on National Guard of , July 11.) 
 
 Mobilization, course of instruction for officers on. The mobilization of the 
 troops on the call of the President demonstrated that there should have been a 
 course of instruction given to the officers covering the duties of officers at time 
 of mobilization. It also demonstrated that where an important order, such as 
 General Order 39, War Department, June 29, 1915, is issued that a course of 
 study for all officers should be prescribed covering such an order. (Extract 
 
 from report of Capt. H. A. Hanigan, infantry, inspector-instructor, , Aug. 
 
 3, 1916.) 
 
 In this connection it may be stated that there was published to the Organized 
 Militia of California a pamphlet in the shape of a general order (No. 14 of 
 May 18, 1916) embodying "Rules and Regulations for the Mobilization of the 
 Organized Militia and Volunteers when called into the service of the United 
 States by the President." This little pamphlet of 55 pages, indexed, gives 
 a most excellent outline of the duties of all connected with the mobilization of 
 State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed 
 form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others 
 connected with the National Guard. 
 
 There was a shortage of competent clerks to prepare the important records, 
 and being badly rushed, as we were, mistakes were bound to occur. With me 
 there was one sergeant, Medical Department, and two privates, Medical De- 
 partment of the Army, the services of whom were required to attend to the 
 routine hospital records. Repeated requests were made of the eastern depart- 
 ment for additional help, but without avail. All of the sanitary troops belong- 
 ing to the organizations of the Massachusetts Militia called into the Federal 
 service went to the border with the first shipment, so none were available to 
 do the work for those troops left behind and the recruits, which numbered, all 
 told, about 2,500. I was able, through Adjt. Gen. Cole, to get the sanitary troops 
 belonging to the Sixth Massachusetts Infantry to assist me in my clerical work, 
 but these were all untrained men and in many instances none too well educated. 
 They were employed under State pay until authority could be obtained and 
 other delays overcome to muster them into the Federal service. Although the 
 mustering regulations allowed the mustering officer to employ the necessary 
 <-lerks, my request for one was disapproved at department headquarters. 
 
 The work of carrying out the physical examinations and completing the rec- 
 ords at the Framingham mobilization camp were made possible through the un- 
 tiring efforts of the medical officers of the Massachusetts Militia, who were left 
 behind after the first shipment of troops for the border. Without this assist- 
 ance the work could not have been done. (Extract from report of Maj. Hall, 
 Medical Corps, inspector-instructor of National Guard of - .) 
 
 Great difficulty was experienced by me in keeping up the office work, as I 
 had no assistant, nor were any of the officers of the militia competent to attend 
 to the routine and thus save the mustering officer much time and labor involved 
 in the attending to details. I recommend that in any future mobilization a com- 
 petent adjutant or sergeant major be detailed to each camp to assist the muster- 
 ing officer. Authority to hire a civilian clerk does not solve the difficulty, as 
 such a clerk is ignorant of military procedure. Competent quartermaster ser- 
 geants and ordnance sergeants should also be detailed at once, as the property 
 responsibility is great and time is a great element, and time can always be 
 saved by having the services of these experienced men. (Extract from report 
 of Capt. Roberts on National Guard of , Sept. 18. ) 
 
118 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 I believe an ideal force to muster in a division would be approximately as 
 follows : 
 
 One senior mustering officer as executive officer, one lieutenant as adjutant, 
 two officers to inspect and take over property, one officer to have charge of the 
 muster rolls and muster in, one surgeon, preferably a major. (Extract from 
 
 report of Capt. Biddle, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , 
 
 July 20.) 
 
 At every mobilization camp a Regular officer with experience in the work 
 should be detailed as camp quartermaster, and the National Guard quartermas- 
 ters, if any are mustered in, should be assigned as assistants, without regard to 
 rank. 
 
 A Regular officer of appropriate rank should be assigned as camp commander, 
 with authority to issue orders in the name of the department commander cover- 
 ing all details as to camp administration, and to supervise recruiting in the 
 State. It is thought that the whole time and attention of officers belonging to 
 units of the camp should be devoted to instruction and organization. 
 
 An officer of the Medical Corps, United States Army, should be on duty at 
 each mobilization camp as camp surgeon and sanitary inspector. He should 
 supervise all matters pertaining to sanitary troops as an inspector-instructor. 
 (Extract from report of Capt. G. M. Holley, Infantry, inspector-instructor, Na- 
 tional Guard of , Aug. 17, 1916. ) 
 
 Letter of Col. B. B. Buck, Infantry, mustering officer from Framingham, 
 Mass., June 28, 1916, recommends that all troops be held at armories until 
 the mustering officer and his assistants are established at mobilization camp. 
 He believes it a great mistake to rush troops from their home stations until the 
 mobilization camp is thoroughly prepared. 
 
 Col. Buck recommends that a post quartermaster sergeant and an experienced 
 regimental or battalion sergeant major be detailed at the outset to help the mus- 
 tering officer. 
 
 Capt. Kemper reports the absence of experienced clerks and stenographers 
 for his office and that of the proper officer at a time when they were greatly 
 needed. (Letter of Capt. J. B. Kemper, Infantry, senior mustering officer, 
 Mount Gretna, Pa., July 11, 1916.) 
 
 All the sergeant instructors on duty in Pennsylvania, save two, were put on 
 duties under the property officer with which they were not familiar. (Letter 
 of Capt. J. B. Kemper, Infantry, senior mustering officer, Mount Gretna, Pa., 
 July 1, 1916.) 
 
 LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF FORMS, BOOKS, RETURNS, ETC. 
 
 Report inspector-instructor, Idaho, July 22, 1916, paragraph 5, states that of- 
 ficers of the National Guard of - were exceptionally weak in the prepa- 
 ration of muster rolls and other papers. In some cases it was due to lack of 
 care and attention on their part. 
 
 Lieut. Garber recommends that a brief and thorough explanation of the 
 relation of the United States and the States, their powers and duties with 
 respect to the National Guard, be placed in the hands of National Guard officials, 
 as they know little regarding military law, regulations, terms, and usage. 
 
 Lieut. Garber recommends a three-months' school for quartermasters, and 
 that instruction in the preparation of muster rolls and other company papers be 
 a part of instruction for officers. (Letter of Lieut. M. B. Garber, inspector- 
 instructor, Idaho.) 
 
 Report inspector-instructor from - , July 6, 1916: Capt. Smith noted 
 much delay, confusion, and needless repetition because of lack of knowledge of 
 regular forms and methods of procedure, causing officers and men to wear them- 
 selves out over simple matters. 
 
 The more apparent shortcomings at the mobilization camp were lack of 
 familiarity with Army regulations, Army orders, methods of procuring supplies, 
 making out ration returns. (Letter of Capt. E. T. Smith, Field Artillery, in- 
 spector-instructor. ) 
 
 Capt. Hobbs reports that officers and men are ignorant of administrative paper 
 work, and papers will be in bad shape. Same officer reports in letter, July 11, 
 1916, paragraph 7, it is hard to make officers read instructions on blank forms 
 and comply with same. (Letter of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, inspector-instructor.) 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 119 
 
 Letter of Lieut. P. Remington, Infantry, inspector-instructor - , July 
 14, 1916, paragraph 15, reports that Form No. 2 was distributed to the 
 Third Infantry, National Guard of - , at 2 p. m. one day with instruc- 
 tions to make them out immediately, but at 6 p. m. only two or three companies 
 had started work on the forms. It was necessary to assemble all the officers 
 and give them direct orders before they would start to work. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO SIGHT-SEERS AND NONCOMBATANTS. 
 
 As soon as the Second Infantry arrived at the camp it seemed as though 
 every relative of every officer and enlisted man was present in the camp. There 
 was a general feeling that war was certain and that these troops were going 
 into actual service. The scenes at times were pathetic; mothers and wives 
 were everywhere in evidence and constantly showing their concern. I was 
 harassed from morning until night by mothers and wives seeking the release 
 of their sons and husbands from Militia duty. (Extract from report of Capt. 
 H. A. Hanigan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , 
 Aug. 4, 1916. ) 
 
 Mustering officers receive instructions to attend to duties which in their va- 
 riety and quantity would all but swamp a well-regulated, long-established bri- 
 gade headquarters, with trained personnel and office room, facilities, and 
 materials at hand. If his duties are to be properly discharged, he must be given 
 a little time at least to prepare for their proper performance. The especial 
 significance of this lies in the fact that everybody whom he calls to his assist- 
 ance is put to work on matters which are new to him and which are governed 
 by new instructions hourly received. Windstorms blowing the papers away, 
 anxious mothers demanding the release of their sons of tender age, newspaper 
 reporters using every known resource to secure the basis upon which to write 
 stories, orderlies sent to find people they do not know, lights which burn low 
 and finally fail altogether, telephones choked with messages official and unoffi- 
 cial, sight-seeing crowds, etc., come with the rush of an avalanche, until a little 
 time to organize and prepare for business intervenes to exhaust the curious pub- 
 lic and return them to their homes. (Extract from report of Col. Buck, 
 inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - , June 28, 1916.) 
 
 I do not think the above troops are at all fit for field service, by lack of 
 training. However, I consider it wise that they were sent to the border as soon 
 as they were, for with the floods of visitors in camp every day and other dis- 
 tractions, it would be out of the question to train and harden them where they 
 were. (Extract from report of Col. C. G. Morton, special inspector, on Na- 
 tional Guard of - , July 5, 1916.) 
 
 Training. Discipline and training are far from satisfactory. 
 
 Discipline. I carefully observed the enlisted men in camp and on the street, 
 and I failed to see a single case of drunkenness or disorder, and their good be- 
 havior was a subject of favorable comment generally on the part of civilians. 
 I am of the opinion, however, that the colonel will never be able to put his 
 regiment in good shape until he gets it away from its home surroundings, and 
 I recommend that it be sent to a training camp as soon as practicable. (Ex- 
 tract from report of Col. Donaldson, inspector general, on National Guard of 
 
 On Sunday, July 2, the camp was crowded with visitors, variously estimated 
 at from 25,000 to 50,000. All the surrounding areas were polluted with excreta, 
 as there was no provision in this respect for such crowds. (Extract from re- 
 port of Maj. Truby, Medical Corps, on sanitary conditions in camp of National 
 Guard - .) 
 
 VALUE OF CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS. 
 
 This camp has amply proven the value of the correspondence schools. 
 has a very poor medical personnel, and of all the southern States 
 
 none has been more unsatisfactory than this in the correspondence schools. 
 Despite this I am amazed to find that these officers have a degree of proficiency 
 that I never imagined possible. The sanitary work of regimental surgeons 
 is very good, while my assistant as sanitary inspector has so profited by my 
 training in camp three years ago that I find he can be trusted to do all of 
 this work alone. The camp hospital is providing satisfactorily for the sick. 
 
120 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 This is fortunate, as the medical skill of many of the regimental surgeons is 
 not entirely satisfactory. The forms and papers required seem to be fairly 
 well understood by all surgeons, particularly those who attended camp at 
 Tobyhanna, Pa., last year. I have had no chance as yet to look into the train- 
 ing of the Hospital Corps men. They are inostly new men, but are of excellent 
 quality. (Extract from report of Lieut. Col. Page. Medical Corps, inspector- 
 instructor, on National Guard of - , July 9.) 
 
 In preparing the first copy of the muster-in roll of the various companies 
 of the Third Infantry. Wisconsin National Guard, I assembled the clerks and 
 first sergeants and formed a class of them. I gave them full instructions cov- 
 ering each step in the preparation of the rolls and answered questions and 
 had corrections made on the spot. Excellent progress was made in this way. 
 Bad weather made it necessary to allow the clerks to work in their tents 
 for the preparation of the other two copies of the roll. Much better progress 
 would have been made undoubtedly had it been possible to keep the class 
 together for the preparation of all three rolls, and in future I would certainly 
 advise any mustering officer whenever possible to assemble all of the clerks 
 of organizations to be mustered in and to have them do all their work in his 
 presence. They will thus be free from all interruptions from company com- 
 manders and can be kept from many errors. (Extract from report of Capt. 
 R. H. Wescott, Infantry, inspector-instructor. National Guard of , July 4, 
 1916. ) 
 
 Letter of Capt H. A. Hanigan, Infantry, inspector-Instructor, - , Aug. 3, 
 1916. Capt. Hanigan believes that National Guard officers should have a 
 course of instruction covering the duties of officers at the time of mobilization. 
 Capt. Hanigan found difficulty in getting requisitions for the property needed 
 from organization commanders. 
 
 As a result of my observations here I would recommend that : 
 (a) That the relation of the United States and the States, their powers and 
 duties with respect to the National Guard, be more fully defined. The average 
 State official knows little regarding military law. regulations, terms, and 
 usages, and will devote but little time to this study. A brief and thorough ex- 
 planation will remove many difficulties. 
 
 (I)) That a three months' school for regimental quartermasters be estab- 
 lished and all quartermasters be required to attend. 
 
 (c) That instruction in the preparation of muster rolls and other company 
 papers be included in the course of instruction for officers. 
 
 (d) That officers be thoroughly instructed and impressed with the idea that 
 enlistment in the Guard means something, and that their rolls should be free 
 from dead wood. 
 
 (e) That the strength of Guard companies shall not exceed 100 enlisted 
 men. (Extract from report of Lieut. Garber, inspector-instructor, on National 
 Guard of . ) 
 
 Were I free of my duties as mustering officer there are many things I could 
 do to help the situation one plan I had was to establish a bureau of informa- 
 tion in the center of the camp, with one or more young guard officers with me 
 another to start and superintend schools for field officers, company officers, and 
 noncommissioned officers in camp. Yet one man can do so little compared to 
 what is needed that it seems sometimes scarcely worth while to make an 
 e ff or t. (Extract from report of Lieut. Mcllroy, inspector-instructor, on Na- 
 tional Guard of , Aug. 8.) 
 
 The absence of experienced clerks and stenographers for my office and that of 
 the property officer greatly hampered and annoyed us while under terrific 
 strain. 
 
 I believe that in the future operation of the defense act of June 3. 1916, 
 rigid supervision should be exercised to see that all organizations should be 
 compelled to use and keep posted, completely and to date, similar forms and 
 records to those used in the Army, and all others should be prohibited. This 
 should be a necessary qualification for recognition. This will obviate the 
 necessity of making out Forms 2, 10, and 11 in mobilization camps. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. Kemper, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of 
 , July 11.) 
 
 So far as preparation for the United States service is concerned I consider 
 the mobilization a lesson worth 10 summer camps for all concerned. Should 
 
ETC. 121 
 
 a second mobilization take place within the next few years it would be ac- 
 complished with one-half the trouble. Hereafter I think the correspondence 
 schools held by inspector-instructors should have a thorough course in mobiliza- 
 tion. (Extract from report of Capt. Gibson, inspector-instructor, on National 
 Guard of - .) 
 
 When the first organizations returned to their State mobilization 
 camps for muster out, incomplete and inaccurate records, for which 
 inefficient regimental and company . commanders were responsible, 
 caused serious delays, in order to obviate which in troops whose 
 muster-out was to follow, the following telegraphic instructions were 
 sent to the commanding general. Southern Department, on October 
 14, 1916: 
 
 No. 4354. Commanding general. Eastern Department, reports inspections 
 National Guard organizations returning to Eastern Department for muster out 
 show that in most instances pay rolls and other official records organizations 
 are in poor condition, being incomplete and inaccurate, and that these con- 
 ditions have greatly delayed muster out these organizations, as it has been 
 necessary to make out new papers, in some cases as far back as original muster-in 
 papers. Department commander reports principal causes delay in mustering 
 out organizations returned to Eastern Department as follows : No descriptive 
 lists of men kept. No settlements between company commanders and 'supply 
 officers. Bad condition of records. Ignorance on part of officers and men of 
 requirements as to records, settlements, etc. t 
 
 In most cases muster-out officers had to begin on records from time of original 
 entry of men into Federal service. Department commander requests you be 
 advised of these conditions, with view to having special attention paid by all 
 National Guard organizations in your department to bringing their paper work 
 up to date, as there is no sufficient reason for almost complete failure to cor- 
 rect and bring up to date necessary organization records. 
 
 Department commander adds it has been necessary to detail large number 
 officers to aid in muster out regiments, and practically all of it is work that 
 reasonably competent company and regimental officers should be able to do 
 without assistance Federal officers. It is suggested that you cause all records 
 National Guard organizations now in your department to be immediately in- 
 spected, and, where incorrect, corrected and brought up to date in every par- 
 ticular, and have pay and muster rolls of organizations correctly prepared in 
 your department under supervision officers Regular Army detailed for that 
 purpose, leaving blank day of muster out, in order that these pay rolls may be 
 expeditiously completed upon arrival troops at mobilization camps or home 
 rendezvous and organizations promptly and properly mustered out of Federal 
 service. 
 
 MCCAIN. 
 
 EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF PAPER WORK. 
 
 The present system of transfer of property from the State to the Federal 
 Government is cumbersome, requires an enormous amount of paper work, and is 
 certainly unbusinesslike. It is done under pressure of haste and there is of 
 necessity a great deal of confusion ; clothing must be inventoried while worn by 
 the men, and with all the care possible it is not possible to get all the property 
 brought to camp. This is unjust to the organization commander, who is still 
 accountable to the State for any that may have escaped inventory. 
 
 I found that the Federal forms and returns required to be used and made 
 after muster in were not understood. 
 
 The muster rolls, pay rolls, descriptive lists, company returns, etc., and the 
 manner of making them out properly was all new and had to be learned from the 
 first, requiring a great deal of the time of all officers that should have been spent 
 in other ways. 
 
 These records should all be kept in peace time. Reports and returns of all 
 kinds should be made to the militia bureau as now required by Regular troops 
 to the War Department. 
 
 If left to the State military department, the inspection and correction of the 
 returns will not be carefully made. States are notoriously lax in accounting 
 for the personnel. (Extract from report of Capt. Frank L. Wells, Infantry, 
 senior mustering officer, National Guard of - , Sept. 5, 1916.) 
 

 122 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The mustering officer should have detailed with him a competent clerk as chief 
 clerk who is conversant with the Army methods of business and paper work. 
 It was found impossible to get a civilian clerk at this camp who had the neces- 
 sary requirements for a chief clerk the men who could fill the position being^ 
 employed and not willing to give up their positions for temporary employment. 
 (Extract from report of Capt. J. C. Waterman, Infantry, senior mustering officer, 
 National Guard of - , Sept. 5, 1916. ) 
 
 The one thing, in my opinion, that is vastly more detrimental to rapidity and 
 efficiency in mobilization than everything else put together is the avalanche of 
 papers and forms to be made out incident to muster in, these requirements being 
 suddenly launched upon officers and men unaccustomed thereto and unfamiliar 
 with the particularity insisted upon. (Extract from report of Capt. A. M. Shipp, 
 Infantry, National Guard of - , Sept. 6, 1916. ) 
 
 As I have been on duty from 19 to 21 hours a day since arrival at this camp 
 (excepting the last day or so), it has been impracticable to render the first 
 weekly report desired by the department. (Extract from report of Capt. Ray- 
 mond Sheldon, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of - , July 6, 
 
 1916.) 
 
 Three months' bitter experience with National Guard officers in the prepara- 
 tion of Medical Department records and returns have convinced all of the regu- 
 lar medical officers in this district of the futility of expecting even approximate 
 correctness. 
 
 This office has become a huge clearing house for the correction of papers and 
 records, and only by making out the required forms for the militia medical 
 officers to sign can the demands of the War Department be" satisfied. Gross 
 stupidity on the one hand and utter indifference on the other are the factors in- 
 volved, and yet one can not but feel sympathy for these officers suddenly con- 
 fronted with an overwhelming mass of unfamiliar papers. 
 
 Both the militia and reserve officers complain loudly of the clerical work of 
 our department, and many have informed me of their intention to separate them- 
 selves from the service solely on account of the regulations governing prepara- 
 tion of papers which they claim they can not master. 
 
 The worst of it is, many state their intention to advise other medical men 
 not to enter our service until a simplified set of forms is adopted. 
 
 We have done our best at conferences and in individual conversations to im- 
 press upon these reactionary officers the necessity for correctness in papers 
 and the ease of mastery, if one will only intelligently study the manual, but I 
 fear our efforts are futile. The sick and wounded report is the great stumbling 
 block, and the cards of some organizations are enough to give one blind 
 staggers. 
 
 Despite the preparation of a set of model cards for each organization, no 
 improvement is apparent, and we have abandoned hope of teaching these men 
 anything. Some have the affrontery to state their knowledge of our papers is 
 equal to or superior to ours, and to prove their contention produce evidence 
 that so-and-so taught them to do this way or that. 
 
 This naturally brings up the question, what have the inspector-instructors 
 assigned the militia for some years been doing? You may lead a horse to water 
 but you can not make him drink, and I fear we can never make these militia- 
 men realize the responsibility attached to their commissioners, unless we adopt a 
 simpler form of records which require but little study. (Extract from a per- 
 sonal letter, Oct. 4, 1916, from an officer of the Medical Corps who is an 
 inspector-instructor. ) 
 
 Any system which in time of peace permits militia officers to attain posi- 
 tions of rank which involve functions of command which in time of war they 
 are imperfectly fitted to perform is a system so harmful to the Nation's defense, 
 so universally criticized by students of military history, as to require no further 
 criticism. Yet the present mobilization witnesses its application on a scale 
 never before reached in the history of our country. (Extract from report of 
 First Lieut. B. E. Grey, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of 
 , Sept 7, 1916.) 
 
 MORE TIME NEEDED FOR MOBILIZATION. 
 
 Additional time should be allowed for the training of troops before leaving 
 their State. Of the many recommendations of the inspectors-instructors 
 which I have seen on this subject, none has stated less than three months as 
 
ETC. 123' 
 
 the necessary period. This time is required for administrative, as well as 
 for tactical training. Company officers should learn how to handle questions 
 relating to rations, clothing, etc. ; staff officers should learn their various duties ; 
 and all should learn something about discipline, so that the machinery of 
 the command may be in smooth working order when called upon to meet 
 unusual situations. (Extract from report of Capt. Ralph McCoy on National 
 Guard of . ) 
 
 All reports of inspectors-instructors indicate that a minimum of three months 
 should intervene between the call for the National Guard and the sending of 
 them to the front. 
 
 It Is a great mistake to rush troops from their home stations (armories) 
 to mobilization camp before the mobilization camp is ready to receive them, 
 as the difficulties in the way of establishing and organizing a working force in 
 the office of the mustering officer are so great that the essentials are apt to 
 be overlooked in attending to the multitude of minor though insistent duties 
 which spring up every 30 seconds during the day. Extract from report of Col. 
 Buck, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of - , June 28. ) 
 
 With the idea of perhaps preventing similar errors in future it is believed 
 that mounted organizations of the militia should not be sent from place of 
 company rendezvous to concentration point without first being placed in a 
 mobilization camp for a reasonable time. This was forcibly brought to my 
 attention by the difference in the condition of troops leaving from Van Court- 
 land Park and those leaving from Camp Whitman. In the first instance there 
 was no mobilization, horses were purchased hurriedly, equipment was lacking 
 for recruits, and the paper work connected with the muster in was necessarily 
 hurried too much. In the other instance a w r ell-organized camp, with plenty 
 of equipment and supplies, made the orderly muster in, equipment, and en- 
 training of troops possible. It is realized that rush orders were received for 
 the troops hurried out of New York City, but the advantage gained in time by 
 not permitting them to effect mobilization was largely offset, I believe, by the 
 advantages and quicker efficiency to be gained by less haste at the beginning. 
 (Extract from report of First Lieut. Dawson Olmstead, Field Artillery, in- 
 spector-instructor, on National Guard of - , Aug. 22, 1916.) 
 
 Everyone was working under great pressure time appeared to be a factor 
 and, in my opinion, this great rush defeated one of the objects of a mobiliza- 
 tion camp, the proper equipping of the troops for the duty for which intended. 
 (Extract from report of Capt. W. H. Wilson, inspector-instructor, on National 
 Guard of - , Sept. 5.) 
 
 COMMENDATION. 
 
 Where there is so much to be criticized it is a pleasure to note what 
 inspectors have to say in a different vein that of commendation. 
 
 During the encampment the discipline was excellent. The absence of drunk- 
 enness w^as remarkable; both officers and men appeared to be earnest and will- 
 ing to do all that was required of them. (Extract from report of Capt. Hani- 
 gan, inspector-instructor, on mobilization of National Guard of California.) 
 
 Maj. Phalen, Medical Corps, United States Army, inspector- 
 instructor, commends Lieut. Col. Jacob Frank, chief surgeon, Illinois 
 National Guard, and states that the fact that the Illinois troops were 
 protected from smallpox and typhoid before leaving camp was 
 largely due to his energy and administrative ability. 
 
 I have a pleasant report to make to you, and you can verify it later. We are 
 told that we have the best camp in this district, 60 miles long, and we were told 
 this by Gens. Bliss, Plninmer, and Lewis.-- (Extract from report of Capt. 
 Deems, inspector-instructor, on Indiana Battalion of Field Artillery.) 
 
 I wish to record that all possible assistance was given me by the State 
 authorities. * * * A motor car and driver was placed at my disposal at 
 any hour, day or night. * * The senior medical officer of the State, Col. 
 
 Harlow Brooks, a man of the highest professional accomplishments, assisted 
 me in every way in maintaining a sanitary camp and in the care of the sick. It 
 required only a suggestion from me to secure the purchase of a new motor am- 
 bulance for the transfer of the seriously sick and operative cases to the nearest 
 
124 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 civil hospital, 25 miles away. * * * The State board of health sent a rep- 
 re-entative to the camp and established a temporary laboratory, where all nec- 
 essary bacteriological work and water analysis were made. * * * This 
 spirit of cooperation and cheerful desire to assist in every possible manner fur- 
 nishes in retrospect the most encouraging recollection in what was otherwise a 
 most trying experience. (Extract from report of Maj. Wadhams, Medical 
 Corps, on physical examinations in New York National Guard.) 
 
 Capt. Hanigan commends the performance of duty by Lieut. Col. 
 D. A. Smith, Quartermaster Corps, National Guard of California. 
 He states that Lieut. Col. C. A. Dukes, Medical Corps, and Capt. E. 
 S. Loizeaux, Medical Corps, California National Guard, per- 
 formed their duties faithfully and well. He also commends First 
 Lieut. R. K. Barry, Medical Corps, National Guard of California. 
 
 Letter of Capt. R. L. Hamilton, retired, Lincoln, Nebr., July 15, 
 1916, commends the service of the adjutant general of Nebraska, 
 Gen. P. L. Hall; his assistant, A. D. Falconer; the chief surgeon, 
 Maj. C, W. Walden. 
 
 Both Lieut. Col. David S. Hill, Quartermaster Corps, and Lieut. Col. William 
 G. Schauffler, surgeon general, were untiring in their cooperation with the mus- 
 tering officers. 
 
 The personnel of both these departments of the National Guard had been care- 
 fully trained by their chiefs and rendered very efficient service. (Extract from 
 report of Col. Styer, inspector-instructor, on mobilization of National Guard of 
 , Oct. 38.1 
 
 All matters connected with the encampment and mobilization, Wisconsin 
 National Quard, have been ably managed by the adjutant general of the State, 
 who is entitled to full measure of credit for the excellent conditions noted in 
 this report. (Indorsement of department commander, July 22, on report of 
 Col. George K. Hunter, Inspector General, on inspection of National Guard of 
 Wisconsin. ) 
 
 Capt. Hughes states that the Ordnance Department supplies arrived not only 
 without requisition but as soon as the troops did, and requisitions on this depart- 
 ment have been completely and promptly filled. The highest praise is due them 
 for this efficient service. (Letter of Capt. W. N. Hughes, jr., Infantry, inspector- 
 instructor, Nashville, Tenn., July 16, 1916.) 
 
 Commendatory mention should be made of Lieut. Col. Benton Long, of the 
 governor's staff, who reported in camp, without pay or status, and volunteered 
 as an assistant to the property officer and worked night and day without re- 
 gard to hours. His services as well as those of Maj. George H. Smith, Quarter- 
 master Corps, who also volunteered to assist the property officer, were invalu- 
 able. (Extract from report of Capt. Kemper. inspector-instructor, National 
 Guard of Pennsylvania, July 11.) 
 
 I feel that it is due the officers and men of the National Guard of Rhode 
 Island that I comment on the excellent discipline that was maintained during 
 the whole camp. As far as I know, there were but two cases during the camp 
 that called for even troop discipline, and no summary court was even appointed. 
 In view of the fact that much liberty was given to the troops, this record seems 
 to me to be most commendable. (Report of Capt. T. A. Roberts, Cavalry, in- 
 spector-instructor, on mobilization of Organized Militia of Rhode Island, Sept. 
 18, 1916.) 
 
 The spirit manifested by the enlisted men was good. In very few cases did 
 they seek to avoid service by seeking their discharge on any excuse. (Extract 
 from report of Capt. Hamilton,- inspector-instructor, on National Guard of 
 Nebraska, July 15.) 
 
 The Organized Militia of Iowa I believe tried faithfully to do its share in 
 the tentative divisional organization. It mustered out an extra regiment of 
 Infantry and started its proportion of Cavalry, etc. By this it has actually 
 promoted out of the service some of the most able men in the guards who took 
 rank in the division, thus losing rank in the brigade. As they are enthusiasts 
 for the service, it is probable that they will be found in it again ; but it is recom- 
 mended that if the divisions are formed for drill in the higher requirements of 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 125 
 
 an Army that these men be recognized. I especially recommend Maj. David S. 
 Fair-child, chief surgeon, and Maj. Elliot E. Lambert, Quartermaster Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 We were at first many times out of forms, due partly to the extreme careless- 
 ness of the militia clerks. The State adjutant general gave me great assistance 
 in every way, even to the printing of forms required. He is an able man and 
 willing to assume necessary responsibility. 
 
 The assistant mustering officers were of great assistance and worked" unceas- 
 ingly to accomplish the work properly in the shortest space of time. They gen- 
 erally retained pleasant relations with the several officers with whom they had 
 contact. (Extract from report of Col. George H. Morgan, Cavalry, senior mus- 
 tering officer, National Guard of Iowa, July 16, 1916.) 
 
 REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS. 
 
 Extract from report of the commanding general, Eastern Depart- 
 ment, on the mobilization of the militia in the Eastern Department, 
 June 19 to July 17, 1916 : 
 
 * * * Of the men mobilized not more than 25 per cent can be considered 
 as reasonably well-instructed soldiers (64 per cent of the militia have had one 
 year or more of service ; 36 per cent less than one year ) . A considerable num- 
 ber of the long-service men have had to drop out, some because, of age, some 
 because of business or family reasons, and many because of physical unfitness. 
 Only a small proportion of the recruits have had previous military training. 
 Very few are prepared for immediate field service, and 'practically all were 
 without sufficient experience in fieldwork to take care of themselves under 
 campaign conditions. 
 
 The number of really effective organizations is very small. There is a fine 
 spirit of willingness among officers and men in most organizations, but un- 
 fortunately this can not take the place of organization and training, nor can it 
 replace the lack of trained noncommissioned officers and officers in sufficient 
 numbers. 
 
 The percentage of rejections varied greatly, but, generally speaking, has been 
 heavy and has indicated the physical standards required by the Government 
 had not been insisted upon. The percentage of rejections runs from over 50 per 
 cent in some organizations to perhaps as low as 2 per cent in others, but in gen- 
 eral the number of rejections has been excessive. Many organizations have lost 
 so many men that their mobilization has been more or less indefinitely post- 
 poned. A very large percentage of loss has characterized many of the recruit 
 detachments brought in, indicating the need of much more careful examination. 
 
 SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. 
 
 The officer in charge of the Philadelphia depot and his assistant have done all 
 that men could do to overcome the handicap of a faulty system, and whatever 
 delay there has been in the distribution of supplies is, so far as I can learn, in 
 no way chargeable to them. 
 
 I am informed that there was some delay in furnishing the depot with a copy 
 of the call. 
 
 The mobilization thus far has demonstrated beyond question, to all who have 
 been charged with the responsibility of forwarding supplies and preparing 
 troops to be moved to the front, the undesirability and short-sightedness of 
 storing the reserve supplies for the bulk of the militia of this department in 
 one depot. Never again should it be possible to permit so unsound an arrange- 
 ment to be made. It has been pointed out repeatedly that it would be a physical 
 impossibility to ship the supplies from one depot and get them out with any 
 degree of promptness or with such equality of distribution as to time as would 
 make a prompt and orderly mobilization possible. Hereafter, if the system is 
 to be continued, every militia regiment and separate organization which has a 
 fireproof armory and reasonably secure storage rooms should have with it the 
 additional supplies necessary to bring it to full war strength. The supplies 
 and equipment for those which have not such facilities should be stored in the 
 nearest arsenal, depot, or post, so that a prompt distribution of equipment may 
 be made possible. Under the present system at least three times more time was 
 used in getting supplies to the organizations than would have betMi required 
 had a system been in force which was based upon an appreciation of the value 
 of time as an element in mobilization. 
 
126 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 Nearly all organizations have had to be furnished with a certain amount of 
 transportation in the way of draft animals, and all mounted organizations 
 have had to be furnished with mounts. Generally speaking, the organizations 
 were without animals. Here and there, an organization was found with a 
 few animals. The result of this method of providing animals is that green 
 and unbroken animals, soft and without preparation for work, have been hur- 
 riedly bought and turned over to organizations made up of green men, without 
 any knowledge of caring for animals in the field or elsewhere, a procedure and 
 a condition which in combination insure a high degree of inefficiency and a 
 great loss of animals. All organizations should have in future some of the 
 transportation elements. For the infantry and some of the auxiliary troops 
 these elements may be maintained in the form of light motor trucks, with a 
 limited number of animals. For the mounted arms, a nucleus of suitable 
 mounts should be maintained, and an option should be secured on a sufficient 
 number of suitable animals to bring the command promptly to war strength. 
 The mounted arms should also have at all times a certain amount of motor 
 transport, for moving supplies, etc. We can not afford to hold a full equip- 
 ment of animals through the long intervals of peace, but we can and should 
 make some arrangement for promptly securing through an option suitable 
 animals. These animals should be used during the summer encampments, and 
 their fitness tried out. Of course, this all means a considerable outlay of 
 money, but if we are to have any degree of military efficiency for our mounted 
 troops, this or a similar system must be adopted. The present system of 
 mobilization and supply of animals would have meant disaster, so far as the 
 mounted arms are concerned, had we had actual contact with an enemy. 
 
 RESERVES OF MEN FOR THE MOBILIZATION. 
 
 These must be provided. The present regiments, troops, batteries, and other 
 units which are going to the front, with few exceptions, are not effective organi- 
 zations of fairly well-trained soldiers ; they are men in uniform, largely un- 
 trained, wearing an equipment and carrying arms with which they are little 
 familiar. They are unprepared to meet trained troops and are lacking in that 
 solid foundation of training and experience in practical work and exercise, 
 which are imperative in the making of good troops. The press and people of the 
 country note the trains going to the front filled with men in uniform, and are 
 unaware of the fact that they are not a trained, effective fighting force. Months 
 of hard work will be required before these troops will be fit to take the field 
 against an enemy. 
 
 V.'lien the regiments are brought to full war strength the forces on the border 
 will be made up largely of untrained men, probably to the extent of 75 or 80 
 per cent. There is beginning to be an inadequacy of supplies, even at this early 
 stage of the mobilization. 
 
 These conditions and others pointed out are those which have been foreseen by 
 all who have been familiar with conditions existing in the Organized Militia. 
 It is not the fault of officers or men, but the natural result of an unsound sys- 
 tem. Fortunately, the military situation which confronts the country is one in 
 which the element of danger from an attacking force is relatively small, and the 
 element of time one which we can to a large extent control. 
 
 The delays in shipment are in no way chargeable to the railroads, as 'they 
 have proceeded as rapidly as possible. The men and officers of the militia 
 have been willing and in most instances enthusiastic. The blame for existing 
 conditions does not rest upon them. They have done what they could to over- 
 come the defects of a system which has always rendered a high degree of effi- 
 ciency unattainable. 
 
 It will be at least six weeks or two months after the organizations have 
 reached the border before they will have reached full war strength and be 
 completely equipped, and it is safe to say that it will be fully three months after 
 muster in before they are as a whole able to render reasonably effective service 
 in campaign against our present possible enemy. It would be much longer if 
 they were required to meet first-class troops. 
 
 Taking the militia of the department as a whole it can be stated that the 
 best of the militia has gone to the front, while the remaining regiments will 
 require a good deal of time for preparation. Recruiting is going to be slow 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 127 
 
 and difficult, and from the present outlook it will be very hard to fill the regi- 
 ments up to full strength. This is due very largely to the change of condi- 
 tions on the border and the increasing improbability of immediate active service. 
 
 I believe that no further organizations should go forward until thoroughly 
 prepared and equipped, including the full complements of animals for draft 
 and riding. If it has been decided to provide the animals on the border, then 
 the organizations should be sent to the border as soon as possible in order that 
 they may take over their animals and begin to receive instruction in their use 
 and care. 
 
 The mobilization to date indicates that the militia system as conducted is 
 wholly inadequate and can not 'be depended upon to produce promptly an effec- 
 tive military force. To rely upon it in time of real war would be to insure 
 disaster. When it is remembered that we have already spent four weeks of 
 intense effort in assembling 54,000 troops, out of a call for 131,000, on the border, 
 and that these troops are as yet unprovided with transport or mounts, and, 
 further, that fully 75 per cent of them are without needed instruction ; that our 
 cavalry is largely without training as such, and that much of our artillery has 
 had little or no training, the imperative necessity for a radical change of sys- 
 tem is apparent. 
 
 MUSTERING OFFICERS. 
 
 Mustering officers have rendered excellent service. The plan of turning over 
 the inspector-instructors to the department commander for use as mustering 
 officers has been thoroughly satisfactory. The officer in charge of militia 
 affairs has through these officers been able to conduct very efficiently the many 
 and complex details arising at mobilization camps. 
 
 MOBILIZATION CAMPS. 
 
 The mobilization camps on the whole have been satisfactory ; some of them 
 were not well chosen, but this was a matter which only experience could dem- 
 onstrate. The mobilization camps for recruits for organizations at the front 
 have been and are being transferred to military posts, where the recruits can be 
 received, equipped, and given some training before being sent to the front. 
 This will result in a saving in money and in personnel and will, I believe, in- 
 crease efficiency, as it would be difficult to maintain working organizations at 
 the State mobilization camps without mustering into the United States service 
 a larger number of officers than will be necessary for the proposed system. 
 
 RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 There has been considerable difficulty in securing tourist sleepers, and a 
 large portion of the troops have had to make a considerable part of the move 
 in day coaches. While this has been uncomfortable, there has been no serious 
 hardship. Generally speaking, the railroad companies have promptly responded 
 to calls for transportation. Care has been taken to have cars provided with 
 light and water, and all trains, so far as known, have been carefully inspected. 
 
 TRAVEL RATIONS IN CAMP. 
 
 Rations in camp have been reported generally as satisfactory. 
 
 TRAVEL RATIONS EN ROUTE. 
 
 Almost without exception sections have been provided with kitchen cars or 
 improvised cooking cars, so that men exercising ordinary intelligence and in- 
 itiative could prepare coffee and the necessary food. There have been a con- 
 siderable number of instances of alleged shortage of food, but thus far indica- 
 tions are that the shortage, whenever it existed, was due to inexperience or 
 carelessness. The travel ration is sufficient, and ample has been provided for 
 the journey. 
 
 The handling of the ration by the militia, both at mobilization camps and en 
 route, indicated the need of developing trained field cooks in militia organiza- 
 tions. 
 
128 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 PURCHASE OF ANIMALS. 
 
 Boards were organized under the emergency orders to hurry troops to the 
 front, and large numbers of animals were purchased for troops of New Jersey, 
 New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, and small numbers of 
 animals sufficient to furnish troops with the necessary wagon transportation 
 for use about camp were purchased for several other States. This was neces- 
 sary because organizations were practically without animals. At present the 
 bulk of the militia in camp is asking for draft animals, and all the mounted 
 organizations are requesting that mounts be furnished them before going to 
 the frontier. 
 
 The general price for animals has been satisfactory, and it has been com- 
 paratively easy to secure good animals from agencies which have been collect- 
 ing for foreign Governments. 
 
 SHORTAGE OF QUARTERMASTER'S SUPPLIES. 
 
 The shortage of quartermaster's supplies in a considerable number of lines 
 developed during the second week, and purchases of certain articles had to be 
 made in the open market. 
 
 THE CLERICAL FORCE. 
 
 The clerical force of the department has rendered signally efficient service, 
 working from 16 to 18 hours a day in many instances. 
 
 BLANK FORMS. 
 
 There has been considerable difficulty in securing certain classes of blank 
 forms. This has been remedied. 
 
 * * ***** 
 
 A full report will be submitted on completion of the mobilization. The pres- 
 ent report is intended simply to outline briefly the general situation and to 
 indicate that much must not be expected of these troops until they have had* 
 several months' training. 
 
 LEONARD WOOD, 
 Major General United States Army. 
 
 [Indorsements.] 
 
 1. The following supplementary report to the one forwarded July 17, 1916, is 
 submitted : 
 
 2. Briefly reviewing the situation presented, attention is particularly invited 
 to the following salient points: 
 
 (a) Thirty per cent of the number of enlisted men in the State service at the 
 date of the'call of the President, June 18, 1916, were discharged because of 
 physical disability. Such a proportion of ineffectives is amazing when it is 
 considered that Delaware and North Carolina are the only States in this de- 
 partment that have not adopted the standards of the Regular Army physical 
 examination prior to entry into the service. The lax methods, in this connec- 
 tion that must have been employed are w 7 ell demonstrated in the cases of Geor- 
 gia and Kentucky, both of which States average for each organization pre- 
 sented 50 per cent physical rejections and the unnecessary monetary loss inci- 
 dent thereto in the way of " pay, clothing, and keep " of such men. they being 
 entitled to such from the date they responded to the call of the President, will 
 be a considerable item. As the mobilization has proceeded, the paramount idea 
 seems to have been on the part of the States to simply supply men regardless 
 of their physical qualifications or disqualifications. In many instances a strong 
 effort has been made to bring about the mustering into the service of physically 
 unfit men and to prevent the mustering out of the service of those who are 
 physically unfitted for active duty. 
 
 (6) Of the total number responding to the call of June 18, on July 31 there 
 remained in mobilization camps in this department practically 34 per cent. 
 Departures have been delayed primarily because of lack of equipment, and, 
 secondarily, the inability of organizations to recruit to the authorized minimum 
 peace strength. This feature, as well as the number of recruits received for 
 organizations that have been forwarded to the Southern Department, which is 
 7.5 per cent of the number required to recruit such organizations to war 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 129 
 
 strength, is believed to be a result of increasing improbability of immediate 
 active service, but regardless of the cause, the facts as stated remain. 
 
 (c) With reference to shortages, especially in the Ordnance and Quarter- 
 master Departments, this developed early in the mobilization and has indi- 
 cated a condition of serious shortage in these departments. The Adjutant 
 General on June 27 telegraphed these headquarters as follows : 
 
 " With reference to your request for authority to communicate directly with 
 depots in matter of ordnance material, Chief of Ordnance reports mobilization 
 of militia has practically exhausted small reserve supply in hands of his de- 
 partment, and that it is essential that limited amount of stores remaining on 
 hand should be held subject to order of War Department to meet most urgent 
 needs." 
 
 This statement is significant and indicates very clearly what would have 
 happened had we occasion to meet an enemy who was prepared or meet a force 
 of any strength. This matter will be handled more in detail in the final report. 
 Serious shortages also developed in the Quartermaster Department in the very 
 early stages of the mobilization, and indicated the department was almost 
 wholly unready to meet the demands of war even under conditions of minor 
 gravity, in the military sense, which characterized our possible clash with 
 Mexico. 
 
 (d) The system of furnishing horses through collecting them in the Middle 
 W T est and sending them to the frontier to be assigned to untrained mounted 
 organizations on arrival has been a pronounced failure and should never be 
 resorted to again. Mounted organizations have been held for months without 
 horses awaiting shipment to the border. On arrival it will require additional 
 months to train the men for the mounted service, and an equally long time to 
 train the mounts. These organizations should have had their horses assigned 
 to them in camp and their training conducted there. To assemble the men andl 
 animals of mounted organizations in the theater of w r ar and in the immediate* 
 presence of a presumptive enemy, in my opinion, is a most unwise and hazard- 
 ous procedure. 
 
 3. The evidence as gathered for the period as covered by this report serves 
 only to emphasize the correctness of the statements made in the previous report, 
 and has fully justified the recommendations made in preceding years to the 
 effect that reserves of men and animals must be provided in time of peace. 
 Arms and equipment sufficient to arm and equip regiments at war strength 
 must be kept in the armories or in depots under Government control as near as 
 possible to the troops concerned. The present system of concentrating supplies 
 has 'been an absolute failure, has caused much delay and a great and unneces- 
 sary outlay of money incident to shipping by express, etc. This department has 
 been stripped of medical officers, cooks, bakers, and technical troops in a desper- 
 ate effort to take care of and render more efficient this largely untrained, largely 
 unequipped force of militia. This mobilization has demonstrated a condition 
 \vhich should never be allowed to occur again, and has shown conclusively 
 that we could not have possibly met even a small well-prepared force with any 
 hope of success. It is not the men and officers in the militia who are at fault, 
 but rather the system. If this demonstration of the entire unreliability and 
 workability of our present militia system proves to be sufficient to bring about 
 the adoption of a sound, rational system, the lesson will be well worth what 
 it cost. 
 
 LEONARD WOOD, 
 Major General, United States Army. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, 
 
 Chicago, III., October 19, 1016. 
 From : Department commander. 
 To : The Adjutant General of the Army. 
 Subject: Report concerning recent National Guard mobilization. 
 
 In compliance with letter from The Adjutant General of the Army, dated 
 September 18, 1916, the following report on the National Guard mobilization in 
 the Central Department is submitted : 
 
 (a) The degree of promptness with which these troops have assembled, andl 
 where they have been slow, the reasons for such tardiness. 
 
 72031- 
 
130 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 1. The assembly of the troops at their respective State mobilization camps 
 was practically, and in some cases entirely, completed as follows : 
 
 By June 23, Missouri, Wisconsin. 
 
 By June 24, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas. 
 
 By June 25, Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota. 
 
 By June 26, Wyoming. 
 
 By June 28, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota. 
 
 By July 2, Ohio. 
 
 2. The desirability, or in some cases the necessity, of recruiting certain or- 
 ganizations to minimum strength was the main reason for the delay in the 
 assembling of such troops as reached their mobilization camps on June 25, 26, 
 and 28. The delay in the case of Ohio was primarily due to the fact that the 
 site selected for mobilization camp was absolutely unsuitable and secondarily, to 
 the fact that the State authorities considered it necessary to construct a semi- 
 permanent camp with shelters, sewer systems, etc., all of which resulted in 
 unusual expense for work of no permanent value, and much of which was 
 entirely unnecessary. Every effort was made by department headquarters to 
 expedite the assembling of the Ohio troops, but it was impossible to get the 
 State authorities to hasten assembly. It was 10 days after the call before the 
 first Ohio regiment arrived at camp. Before this time two Illinois regiments had 
 already left for the border, and the troops in several other States of this depart- 
 were practically ready to leave, having been mustered and physically examined 
 and their property checked. 
 
 3. In all interests, especially those of economy, National Guard troops should 
 be mustered in at their respective armories, thus saving the transportation of 
 rejected officers and men to the mobilization camps and return, the great loss of 
 time to the individuals concerned, unusual delay in replacing them, and their 
 pay during that period. 
 
 (6) The degree of preparedness evinced upon assembly, covering organization, 
 supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State. 
 
 1. Orfjfinhiitiou as (tffccthu? preparedness.- In no State was the National 
 Guard prepared to take the field at once. In most cases this unpreparedness 
 was mainly due to the faulty system under which the National Guard is organ- 
 ized, supplied, and controlled. In others, the State authorities were partially 
 responsible. 
 
 T ne _ r _ j due to lack of proper organization, could not be sent to 
 
 the border until July 9, and even then it was without a machine-gun company. 
 A machine-gun company was later organized, but it was not complete and did 
 not join its regiment until the latter returned from the border in September. 
 The - regiment had practically to be reorganized after arrival at 
 
 its mobilization camp, thereby greatly delaying its preparation for the field. 
 
 In many States notably in Colorado, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wyo- 
 ming the various units of State organizations were not up to minimum 
 strength, or were so close to minimum strength that the discharge of the physi- 
 cally disqualified brought them in many cases far below the minimum. This 
 lack of strength was in many cases a cause of delay in assembling, and of still 
 greater delay before the troops, after arrival at camp, could be considered even 
 reasonably ready for the field. The Wyoming battalions were still below mini- 
 mum strength on July 31, when .they were sent to the border. In Colorado it 
 was so difficult to get recruits that many units, months after their assembly, 
 were still little more than skeleton organizations. 
 
 Proper supervision, inspection, and instruction of National Guard companies, 
 batteries, and troops, coupled with proper and efficient command thereof, should 
 suggest that each such unit should have, first and foremost among its enlisted 
 strength, competent cooks and bakers who can properly prepare the rations, and 
 in mounted units equally important requisites are competent blacksmiths and 
 farriers, with the necessary farriers' and blacksmiths' tools, etc., on hand to 
 shoe and care for the animals. 
 
 2. Supplies and equipment as affecting preparedness. The lack of animals 
 in mounted organizations and of draft animals in all was not the fault of the 
 various States. Similarly the lack in many regiments of machine guns and per- 
 taining equipment does not lie within the responsibility of the States. The 
 completeness and condition of equipment in the various States, and even in 
 the various organizations' of a single State, varied from excellent to very poor. 
 The arms, generally speaking, were in good condition. The clothing on hand 
 for peace strength of the organization was in most cases serviceable, though 
 naturally more or less worn. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 131 
 
 The Wisconsin troops as a whole were, upon date of call, better equipped for 
 immediate field service than were the troops of any other State. The contrast 
 between the Wisconsin troops and those of some of \he other States, with refer- 
 ence to completeness of equipment, was in many cases very marked. 
 
 There was a general shortage of engineer and signal equipment. Some of 
 this shortage already existed before the troops were called out in Federal serv- 
 ice, and hence was probably the fault of the State authorities. How much of 
 the total shortage is the fault of the State authorities and how much is the 
 fault of the Federal authorities it is impossible to state. It proved very diffi- 
 cult, however, and in some cases impossible to get requisitions for such prop- 
 erty filled after the troops had. been mustered into the Federal service. Suffi- 
 cient supplies were not on hand in the Federal depots to meet the demand. 
 
 Except in the matter of machine guns and equipment and ammunition, the 
 troops were in most cases well supplied with ordnance equipment for ordinary 
 peace strength, and there was comparatively little difficulty or delay in supply- 
 ing the balance of the equipment necessary to equip troops to war strength. In 
 some cns?s two or more different types of equipment were supplied to a single 
 organization, and some troops were equipped partly with revolvers and partly 
 with automatic pistols. 
 
 Many National Guard organizations were deficient in shoes and blankets, as 
 well as in many less important articles of uniform and equipage. The State 
 authorities, however, can only in part be blamed for these deficiencies, as the 
 Federal authorities did not have sufficient on hand to supply the needs of the 
 National Guard when it was called into that service. Khaki clothing was also 
 conspicuous by its absence. In most organizations, at date of call, soldiers were 
 not provided witli more than an average of 1 blanket, 1 woolen uniform, 1 
 O. D. shirt, 1 pair of shoes, and 1 suit of underwear. 
 
 No militia organization appeared at mobilization camp completely armed, 
 clothed, equipped, and ready to take the field. The lack of equipment ran all 
 the way from a shortage of a few minor articles to a serious shortage of essen- 
 tials, such as rifles, ordnance equipment, clothing, etc. 
 
 (c) The degree of progress made in training by the troops thus mobilized, 
 "ders given or measures taken for the instruction of National Guard troops 
 
 their mobilization camps after muster into the service of the United States : 
 
 1. The degree of progress made by the organizations in this department 
 varied between wide limits. Some regiments, after several weeks in the mobili- 
 zation camps, were still practically ignorant of the most ordinary duties of 
 the soldier. In others the progress made was most gratifying. On account 
 of this wide variation in training, no fixed schedule of training was ordered 
 from these headquarters, it being considered that the senior Regular Army 
 line officer on the ground, acting as instructor as well as mustering officer, was 
 the best judge of what was needed in the particular case. During the early 
 days of the mobilization, any attempt at progressive training would have been 
 worse than useless, as the energies of all were fully occupied in attending to 
 the physical needs of the troops and pushing the arrangements to expedite 
 departure for the border. The troops remaining in mobilization camps after 
 the first rush of troops to the border had passed were given regular drill and 
 instruction the amount and kind varying in the different camps. 
 
 2. The Wisconsin troops end some of the Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, 
 and Kansas organizations were probably the best trained at the tame of muster 
 in. The South Dakota Regiment, Colorado troops, and the two Wyoming bat- 
 talions were probably in the poorest shape as regards both organization and 
 training. 
 
 (d) Criticisms and comments on regulations and methods, with suggestions 
 and recommendations which will enable the department to inaugurate such 
 changes as will insure greater smoothness and expedition in future mobiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 The chief lesson taught by the mobilization of the National Guard in 1916 
 is the utter impossibility of maintaining an efficient military machine under 
 the dual control of the State and National governments. It has also brought 
 home to us very forcibly the futility of prescribing rules and regulations to be 
 followed by the National Guard when the Federal Government has no power 
 to enforce these rules and regulations. The entire mobilization emphasizes the 
 absolute necessity of some form of universal training and service and of having 
 the military forces of the country under sole Federal control at all times. Vol- 
 untary service is undemocratic, unreliable, and expensive, while divided con- 
 trol means divided responsibility and consequent inefficiency. 
 
132 MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The National Guard as now organized and controlled is not as a whole a 
 dependable or efficient force, can never be made so, and is excessively expensive. 
 A like amount of money expended on the Regular Army would increase it in 
 numbers sufficient to meet all emergencies and form an effective first line ready 
 for immediate call and dispatch anywhere. 
 
 This recent mobilization constrains the opinion that there should be no Na- 
 tional Guard unit above the regiment which will eliminate all National Guard 
 line general officers, very few, if any, of whom are competent to properly exer- 
 cise the functions of even brigade command, and if the adjutants general of 
 the several States could be appointed and selected on some system of exami- 
 nation of them their records and service and not be appointed for political 
 reasons, great improvement would come in the administration of their offices, 
 in competent advice to their respective governors and efficient control of the 
 State forces. 
 
 Criticisms and comments on the mobilization and suggestions for future 
 changes are given below under the headings " Personnel," " Recruiting," " Mo- 
 bilization points," " Supply," " Instruction," and "Administration." 
 
 1. PERSONNEL. 
 
 All States in the Central Department have, theoretically, adopted the physical 
 standard prescribed for the Regular Army. Practically no effort has been made 
 in any State to enforce or properly apply this standard in enlisting men for the 
 National Guard. The percentages of rejection upon physical examination held 
 after muster into the United States service are as follows: Colorado, 10 per 
 cent; Illinois, 11 per cent; Indiana, 21 per cent; Iowa, 8 per cent; Kansas, 16 
 per cent ; Michigan, 15 per cent ; Minnesota, 13 per cent ; Missouri, 12 per cent ; 
 Nebraska, 15 per cent; North Dakota, 12 per cent; Ohio, 26 per cent; South 
 Dakota, 11 per cent; Wisconsin, 17 per cent; Wyoming, 25 per cent. In a num- 
 ber of individual companies the percentage of rejections ran from 30 to 35 per 
 cent and higher. One Indiana battery, recently recognized by the Federal 
 Government and accepted into service under the President's call, came to 
 mobilization camp with 137 enlisted men, of whom 52 were rejected upoa 
 physical examination held the day following muster in. 
 
 Under the law no unit can be accepted into the Federal service under a 
 certain fixed minimum strength prescribed by the President. At the same time 
 the law prescribes that any unit having the required minimum must, if called 
 out, be mustered into the Federal service prior to the physical examination that 
 is made under the supervision of the regular mustering officer. Companies of 
 the National Guard averaging about 40 men at the time of the President's call 
 on June 18 were recruited to minimum strength by going into the highways 
 and byways and enlisting any men obtainable. The officers concerned ap- 
 preciated the fact that many of the men who were enlisted under these cir- 
 cumstances would undoubtedly be rejected upon the physical examination which 
 would follow the muster in, but under the provisions of the law they had to 
 attain a certain minimum strength, and in order to do so were practically 
 forced to enlist any applicants whose physical defects were not strikingly ap- 
 parent to the most casual observer. One regiment (Eighth Ohio Infantry) had 
 approximately 500 men, who were so enlisted, rejected upon physical examina- 
 tion held after muster in. 
 
 No advantage whatever was derived either by Federal or State Government 
 from having organizations report at mobilization camps with a fictitious 
 strength caused by the influx of such hastily enlisted and physically unfit 
 recruits. Under the law, however, it was necessary that all such men (even 
 though absolutely and evidently unfit for service), having once been enlisted by 
 State authorities, should at Federal expense be transported to the mobilization 
 camp, fed, cared for, and paid for a period of time varying from a few days 
 to several weeks, examined physically, which took time and required the services 
 of a large number of medical officers, only to be then discharged and returned 
 to their homes. This expensive procedure was necessarily followed out in the 
 case of over 9,000 National Guardsmen in this department alone. The money 
 necessarily paid out for them by the Federal Government was absolutely 
 wasted, 
 
 I recommend that the officers and enlisted men of the National Guard be 
 examined physically at least once a year by medical officers of the United 
 States Army, and that men found physically unfit be discharged at once. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 133 
 
 Some modification should be made in the physical requirements for admis- 
 sion of National Guard officers and men when the organizations are transferred 
 to Federal service. It is unreasonable to require the same physical standard 
 of a field officer of 20 years' service as is required for a young recruit. Many 
 excellent officers can not pass the required eye tost without their glasses, but 
 can see perfectly with glasses. Regulations should lie prepared showing the 
 deviation from 'the standard permitted under certain circumstances. The 
 requirements should also be modified for officers and men of mature years and 
 
 Whether or not the physical requirements governing acceptance of officers 
 and enlisted men are modified as above suggested, it is highly desirable that 
 department commanders be given authority to waive minor defects in weight, 
 height eyesight, etc. The fact that elm-ing the early part of the past mobiliza- 
 tion all such' applications for waiver had to go to the War Department resulted 
 in the loss of many desirable officers and men and in considerable delay and 
 dissatisfaction all around. 
 
 If the National Guard is- in any sense of the word to be what its name im- 
 plies, steps must be taken to obviate discharging, after the guard is called out, 
 a large proportion of the enlisted men on account of their dependent families 
 or for other reasons. Members of the guard who, in time of peace, become 
 residents of another State, should be at once discharged. The company rolls 
 should contain the names of only such men as are actually doing service with 
 the guard when called out in time of national emergency. The appointment of 
 officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to 
 command is a vital fault still existing in many States. 
 
 The fact that as a rule fully one-third of the members of the various organi- 
 zations were, upon muster in, untrained recruits or men of but a few months' 
 service made it impossible to regard any unit as properly trained. The influx 
 of raw recruits at any time cuts down very greatly the efficiency even of 
 well-trained regular organizations. In the case of National Guard organiza- 
 tions it is especially necessary that in time of emergency such influx be not 
 permitted, and they should not be accepted into Federal service unless up to 
 minimum strength at time of call. 
 
 2. RECRUITING. 
 
 Whatever the duty assigned to the National Guard, and whether or not it 
 be mustered into the* Federal service, it continues to remain essentially a State 
 force. In this it differs from other Federal troops. 
 
 In filling vacancies this essential difference must.be considered if the best 
 results are to be obtained. 
 
 To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting 
 officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available 
 to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. 
 The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. 
 
 With the State troops regiments in large cities and companies in smaller 
 communities are essentially local ; the personnel of any such organization 
 belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense 
 interest in them; the men of the organization retain interest in the town; and 
 to maintain proper strength the recruits, due to local pride, are most easily 
 obtained locally. 
 
 To recruit for such organizations the best results are most likely to be 
 obtained by men well acquainted in the various neighborhoods whence come 
 the organizations ; they know the population and -by what feeling it is animated. 
 Methods successful in one State may not succeed in another. Of these and 
 other conditions the State authorities are best informed and they can best 
 take advantage of them. 
 
 Recruiting for the National Guard should be conducted by the State author- 
 ities, they to secure applicants for enlistment through solicitation by National 
 Guard retired or reserve officers, county and other officials, or by such other 
 methods as may be deemed expedient and to send all accepted applicants to 
 a previously selected and centrally located State recruit depot. At this depot 
 the Federal authority begins and the applicants will before enlistment be 
 physically examined by a medical officer of the Regular Army. The State to 
 bear expense of securing and sending all applicants to the depot and of 
 rejected applicants back to their homes, and then the State to be reimbursed 
 
134 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 by the Federal Government for each recruit enlisted in a sum of money equal 
 to the average cost of a recruit for the Regular Army delivered and enlisted 
 at the regular United States Army recruiting depots. 
 
 After enlistment the Federal Government to have full charge of instruction, 
 equipage, etc., the recruits being forwarded for this purpose to the mobiliza- 
 tion camp designated for troops of that State. All recruits will there be fully 
 equipped and given all necessary training before being assigned to units or 
 forwarded to the front for assignment. Individual preferences should, of 
 course, be considered so far as possible, as it would tend to make recruiting 
 easier if recruits were assigned to home organizations. 
 
 By the above plan the forces best calculated to appeal to the people would 
 be used to stimulate recruiting, and it would cost the Federal Government only 
 for accepted recruits. The State loses nothing provided reasonable care is 
 exercised in securing suitable applicants, and the Federal Government is fully 
 protected. 
 
 3. MOBILIZATION POINTS. 
 
 The mobilization camps in many States of this department were not at all 
 suited to the purpose. The site at Columbus, Ohio, was unsuitable and most 
 of the money spent in preparation of this camp was wasted. The camp was 
 abandoned as soon as the troops left. 
 
 The Infantry of the Illinois National Guard were mobilized at the State 
 Fair Grounds at Springfield. This site proved convenient enough under the 
 circumstances, but w r as unsuited for more than temporary use. 
 
 The mobilization point for the Nebraska troops was the State Fair Grounds 
 at Lincoln, a site entirely unsuited for the purpose, having no room for drill 
 ground and being situated on low ground, subject to overflow. 
 
 The South Dakota mobilization camp, near Redfield, is inconvenient of access 
 and unsuited for camp purposes. The South Dakota regiment and the Nebraska 
 troops might much better have been mobilized together at Fort Crook. Simi- 
 larly the North Dakota regiment should have been mobilized at Fort Snelling 
 with the Minnesota troops. This would have simplified supply and been less 
 expensive than to have a separate camp, as was required by the War Depart- 
 ment orders. 
 
 The Wyoming National Guard should have been mobilized at Fort D. A. 
 Russell instead of just outside the reservation. Similarily the Colorado troops 
 should have been mobilized at Fort Logan rather than at their rifle range at 
 Golden, where the water supply was uncertain in quantity. 
 
 Except in the comparatively rare cases where suitable tracts of land are 
 owned by States and set aside for the training and mobilization of the National 
 Guard, existing Army posts and United States reservations within the State 
 should have been utilized wherever practicable. This would greatly have ex- 
 pedited the mobilization of 1916. 
 
 Sites for future mobilization should be selected with the utmost care by a 
 board of specially qualified officers. Accessibility, good railroad connections, a 
 reasonable amount of drill ground and a target range permitting practice up to 
 600 yards are absolutely essential. The fact that the mobilization camp would 
 be the logical place for the assembling and training of newly formed regiments 
 and of unassigned recruits should also be considered and, if practicable, the 
 ground available should include areas of varied terrain suitable for field train- 
 ing of recruits and small units. 
 
 Upon the selected site should be built the necessary office buildings and 
 suitable storehouses for ordnance, quartermaster, and other stores. These 
 buildings should be permanent. 
 
 4. SUPPLIES. 
 
 Under present regulations the equipment, needed to cover the difference be- 
 tween peace and war footing is supposedly shipped automatically to the various 
 National Guard organizations at their designated mobilization camps. Prac- 
 t-cally, however, this does not work. The stores should be available at the 
 armory or mobilization camp at all times. 
 
 Complete supplies for the entire National Guard of a State (less the equip- 
 ment and clothing actually in the hands of the men or at their armories) 
 should be kept throughout the year in the proper storehouses at the respective 
 mobilization camps. Each of these camps should be in charge of a regular 
 officer, whose duty it would be to see that the prescribed amount of supplies 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 135 
 
 is kept on hand at all times. The storehouses at mobilization camps would in 
 effect be subdepots or distributing points of the existing quartermaster, en- 
 gineer, signal, and ordnance depots. All National Guard requisitions for equip- 
 ment and camp equipage should be filled from these subdepots and the stores 
 issued replaced promptly by shipment from one of the main central depots. 
 This would result in the supplies on hand being constantly " turned over," 
 thereby preventing deterioration. The quantity of supplies kept on hand 
 should be based on actual needs of the troops with reasonable provision made 
 lor equipment of recruits. 
 
 A complete supply of blank forms needed upon muster in and for the routine 
 administration and supply of the entire State National Guard after its muster 
 into the Federal service should be kept on hand at all times in the various 
 armories or mobilization camps. 
 
 In the recent mobilization ordnance and quartermaster supplies were, so long 
 as they lasted, shipped direct from the various War Department depots to States 
 with view to cover anticipated increase from peace to war strength. Many 
 States received supplies far in excess of their needs, due to the fact that the 
 troops remained practically at minimum strength, while other States were- badly 
 nandieapped by a failure to receive sufficient supplies to equip troops actually 
 in camp. Supplies received at any camp in excess of needs had to be repacked 
 and shipped back to the depots before they could be redistributed and reshipped 
 to States in need of them. 
 
 Most of the National Guard organizations were fairly well provided with 
 harness and wagons, but practically none had horses or mules. They were 
 immobile units so far as field service was concerned. In many cases suitable 
 horses were obtained locally. Under more elastic regulations governing the 
 purchase of animals, suitable horses could in many cases have been secured 
 at or near home stations and mobilization camps and the regiments could 
 have gone to the border completely equipped with transportation. It is of the 
 highest importance that regulations governing the purchase of animals be so 
 modified as to make it not only possible but eminently practicable to purchase 
 horses locally in open market. 
 
 The issuing of 32 horses to each National Guard battery or troop is a step in 
 the right direction. In addition, the commanding officer of each mounted 
 National Guard organization should be required to have and to keep up to date 
 at all times a list of suitable horses available locally and sufficient in number 
 to completely fill requirements of the, organization. These horses should be in- 
 spected annually by regular officers and an option taken on each at an agreed 
 price, the owner agreeing to bring him, upon demand, to mobilization camp or 
 other designated point and turn him over to proper authorities at the price 
 agreed. 
 
 Machine guns were lacking for a number of regiments in this department. 
 This lack was in part supplied before regiments left for the border, but in most 
 cases machine guns and equipment were not received before leaving this depart- 
 ment. Every infantry and cavalry regiment should at all times have its full 
 quantity of machine guns, and the men who are to operate the guns should be 
 thoroughly acquainted with the same and should know how to make the usual 
 and necessary repairs. 
 
 In case of future mobilizations taking place before complete supplies are on 
 hand for all National Guard troops, more latitude should be allowed the senior 
 mustering officer, or camp quartermaster, who should be authorized to purchase 
 locally articles needed by the troops and which can not be supplied by the Army 
 depots. Nonuniform articles might just as well be purchased locally as be 
 purchased at distant points and then shipped to mobilization camp, as was done 
 in many instances in the mobilization of 1916. 
 
 The supply of uniform clothing on hand in the depots was entirely insufficient 
 to meet the demands. The depot quartermasters did their best to supply defi- 
 ciencies by making open-market purchases, but in some cases articles purchased 
 were unsuitable. Nebraska troops, for instance, were furnished light-weight 
 and light-colored cotton blankets purchased by the St. Louis depot in open 
 market when heavy \voolen blankets, similar to regulation, could have been pur- 
 chased in Nebraska at a reasonable price and furnished promptly to troops. 
 Ohio troops had at this time more blankets than were needed and later returned 
 a large quantity to St. Louis. 
 
 In some cases troops were delayed at their mobilization camp by the latt 
 arrival of hats, shoes, or underclothes. In some cases authority was obtained 
 to make local purchases, but in others the troops had to await shipment of 
 
136 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 same from far distant points. On July 14 the senior mustering officer at Fort 
 Spelling, Minn., reported having received for one organization on the previous 
 day " hats from Philadelphia, shoes from San Francisco, and woolen breeches 
 from St. Louis." 
 
 In the early days of the mobilization large quantities of clothing and equi- 
 page were shipped by express from the various Federal depots to the several 
 mobilization camps. This method of shipment was expensive, as the depots were 
 usually at great distances from mobilization camps. 
 
 5. INSTRUCTION. 
 
 The position of inspector-instructor should be abolished. There should be two 
 classes of officers on regular duty with the National Guard ; one, instructors, 
 and the other, inspectors. 
 
 An instructor should be assigned from the Regular Army to each regiment, 
 or other independent unit of the National Guard. When suitable mobilization 
 camps are selected and the administrative staff of such camps, composed of 
 regular officers, assisted by staff officers and noncommissioned officers of the 
 National Guard, there would be no necessity for taking instructors away from 
 their regiments in order to perform staff duties at mooilization camps just at 
 the time when their services are most needed with their organizations. The 
 instructor should accompany the organization wherever it goes, and might be 
 given suitable rank therein when the organization is called into Federal service. 
 
 Inspectors of the National Guard should be carefully selected from officers 
 on the active list of the.Regular Army. They should be assigned to department 
 headquarters, and their sole duty should be to inspect the National Guard 
 organizations within the department and the instructors thereof. 
 
 Only by having these two classes instructors and inspectors will it be 
 possible to make anything like an efficient machine out of the various and vary- 
 ing units of the National Guard. 
 
 5. ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 If practicable a regular officer of suitable rank should be assigned to the 
 command of each mobilization camp, thereby insuring uniformity in training 
 and avoiding the frequent changes in commanding officers. 
 
 Staff and supply officers and noncommissioned officer of the National Guard 
 should be assembled at least annually at mobilization camps, where instructions 
 should be given and practice actually had in the making out of muster-in 
 records, property returns, etc., thereby keeping all up to date on matters relat- 
 ing to equipment, supply, administration, etc. The expense attending this 
 annual assembly of officers would amount to little as compared with the tre- 
 mendous expense and delay that would otherwise result in time of emergency, 
 due to lack of familiarity with the essentials of administration and supply. 
 
 Considerable delay was caused at various times and in various States during 
 the recent mobilization by reason of inability to obtain the necessary blanks 
 for use of troops and mustering officers. It is considered essential that com- 
 plete supply of all needed blanks be kept on hand at all times, preferably dis- 
 tributed to permanent mobilization camps, as previously recommended. Proper 
 supply of blank forms should be sent to department headquarters, and there 
 kept in readiness for mailing to the various camps. 
 
 The ordinary channels of communication from the War Department to those 
 under control of department commanders must invariably be observed, or else 
 confusion and working at. cross-purposes inevitably result. During the past 
 mobilization orders were occasionally sent by the War Department directly to 
 mustering officers or others, even relieving them from duty and ordering them 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The Militia Bureau in Washington was, in like manner, sending directly to 
 mobilization camps instructions, etc., about which these headquarters were 
 either not at all informed or informed indirectly and with much delay. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 There is but one conclusion to be drawn from what goes before, and that is 
 that the National Guard as now dually organized and administered is not 
 efficient or dependable, can not be made so in any reasonable time, and it should 
 therefore remain solely as a State force, under State control and for State 
 purposes, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 137 
 
 The Regular Army should be increased sufficiently to meet all emergencies 
 and requirements and be kept up to maximum strength by enlistments that will 
 be available should a proper system of universal compulsory training :md service 
 be required of all citizens of suitable age under proper laws to be enacted by 
 Congress. 
 
 T. H. BARRY, 
 Major General, Commanding. 
 
 The following are extracts from report of November 1 of Col. 
 Frederick, the chief mustering officer of the Central Department : 
 
 The mobilization points for National Guard in this department were desig- 
 nated by the War Department; in many cases they were unsuitable for more 
 than temporary use. Apparently, in the designation of these mobilization 
 points, the factors of an area large enough for drill and instruction, as well as 
 for camping, accessibility,, transportation, good roads, sanitation, and water 
 supply, were overlooked in whole or in part. Except in the cases of Missouri, 
 Wisconsin, and possibly Michigan, existing Army posts and United States reser- 
 vations should have been utilized. The North Dakota troops should have been 
 mobilized at Fort Snelling, Minn. ; South Dakota and Nebraska at Fort Crook, 
 Nebr., etc. A list of the mobilization points in this department, with dates of 
 arrival of the units of the National Guard thereat and the date of completion 
 of muster in of the organizations, is hereto attached and marked " B-l " and 
 " B-2." 
 
 The muster in of the National Guard of this department was greatly handi- 
 capped by the shortage of necessary blank forms and delay in the receipt of 
 additional blank forms requested by telegraph. Telegrams showing the num- 
 bers and amounts of forms required were sent your office on June 20, June 21, 
 and June 24. Some of the forms asked for did not arrive at these headquarters 
 until July 20. This office appreciates the fact that, due to the urgency of the 
 situation and the large number of troops ordered mustered in, the delay in re- 
 ceipt of forms was unavoidable, but for future mobilization there should be kept 
 on hand at all times at department headquarters or at designated mobilization 
 points the maximum number of blank forms that can be used. 
 
 This office was required to render numerous decisions upon points where the 
 mustering regulations were not clear or where telegrams or instructions were 
 capable of two or more interpretations. Many of these questions should prop- 
 erly have been decided in Washington, as they involved matters of policy or the 
 interpretation of general instructions ; but in view of the urgent orders received 
 to expedite muster in in every possible manner, there was no time for reference 
 to your office. Out of several hundred decisions made in this office there is but 
 one which has not later been confirmed by you or by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
 eral. The one exception was that this office decided that the President alone 
 had authority to commission National Guardsmen already in Federal service. 
 
 The results of the physical examination of the National Guardsmen called 
 into service on June 18 is shown by States herewith and marked " D-l to 14," 
 inclusive. The remarkable variation in the number of rejections in different 
 units, running from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 34 per cent, shows 
 that there is no uniform physical standard in the National Guard. This is a 
 matter that should receive immediate and serious consideration, and the Na- 
 tional Guard should be rigidly held to the same standard as is prescribed for 
 the Regular Army. 
 
 The National Guard should have a system of annual physical inspection by 
 regular medical officers, so that the large percentage of rejections could be done 
 away with upon muster in to Federal service and the efficiency and strength of 
 prsonnel be kept up approximately to that required iri orders. All members of 
 the National Guard should be kept up to date on smallpox and typhoid prophy- 
 laxis, so that the administration of these vaccinations be not required upon 
 mobilization for Federal service, and the resulting delay and confusion at mo- 
 bilization camp be done away with. The physical standard of the National 
 Guard is not the same as in the Regular Army. The standard should be the 
 same, and some steps, either by annual examination or by a system of penaliz- 
 ing the State, should be placed in effect to keep out of the National Guard 
 officers and men who are not fitted for field service. The high percentage of 
 rejections, which in one organization Company A, Signal Corps, Nebraska 
 reached 34 per cent, shows a lamentable lack of appreciation of the physical 
 requirements of a soldier. 
 
138 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 The system of responsibility and accountability for Government property in 
 the hands of the National Guard should be the same as that in vogue in the 
 Regular Army. The present system of transferring all property in the hands of 
 the State to the United States upon the mobilization of the National Guard is 
 cumbersome and useless. It results in confusion and an undue amount of work 
 at the mobilization camps, as well as in more or less delay in dispatching troops 
 to concentration camps. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT, 
 Fort Sam Houston, Tex., November //, 19 J 6. 
 From: Commanding general, .Southern Department. 
 To : The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
 Subject : Report concerning recent National Guard mobilization. 
 
 1. Replying to letter (2461974) from your office, dated September 18, 1916, I 
 report as follows concerning the mobilization of the National Guard of States 
 within this territorial department : 
 
 (a) Promptness of assembly. Assembly is deemed to have been completed by 
 muster in. 
 
 State. 
 
 Called. 
 
 Muster 
 began. 
 
 Muster 
 com- 
 pleted. 
 
 Degree of 
 promptness. 
 
 Arizona 
 
 May 9 
 
 May 21 
 
 June 13 
 
 V r 1 w 
 
 New Mexico 
 
 do 
 
 Juno 8 
 
 July 13 l 
 
 Do 
 
 Texas 
 
 do 
 
 May 16 
 
 May 19 
 
 Good 
 
 Arkansas 
 
 June 18 
 
 July 6 
 
 lulv Q 
 
 
 Louisiana 
 
 do 
 
 June 25 
 
 July 8 
 
 Do 
 
 Oklahoma 
 
 . do 
 
 June 28 
 
 July 4 
 
 Do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Except sanitary detachment. 
 
 Reasons for slowness : 
 
 Arizona : Mobilization point changed after the call (to facilitate supply and 
 instruction). Principal delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition 
 from some organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await 
 reinstatement. Majority of the companies arrived at mobilization point under 
 minimum strength. 
 
 New Mexico: Mobilization point changed after the call (to facilitate supply 
 and instruction). When personnel was examined at mobilization point the 
 rejections for physical unfitness threw out 35 to 50 per cent of each company. 
 These had to be replaced by recruitment to minimum strength of 65 men before 
 muster in. 
 
 Texas : Promptness of movement was commendable. Mobilization point was 
 changed after the call (to facilitate supply and instruction). 
 
 Arkansas : Principal delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition from 
 13 organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await rein- 
 statement. The 2 regiments finally came to the border with about 60 per cent 
 of minimum strength. 
 
 Louisiana : Delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition from some 
 organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await rein- 
 statement. 
 
 Oklahoma: Principal difficulties arose from shifting of mobilization point. 
 Chandler dropped as unsanitary ; units ordered to Oklahoma City ; later to Fort 
 Sill, Okla. 
 
 (b) Degree of preparedness evinced upon assembly, covering organization, 
 supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State. 
 Detailed information was wired to the War Department immediately upon com- 
 pletion of muster in for each regiment, separate battalion, or other separate unit. 
 
 This is not repeated now, for the reason that it is understood that a report is 
 desired which will be unincumbered by such details and which will present the 
 subject in general terms. 
 
 Organization: Generally the State troops which arrived at the mobilization 
 points were organized like corresponding units of the Regular Army, except 
 that there was an absence of provisional organizations; that is to say, they 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 139 
 
 were organized in conformity with the Federal statutes that were in force prior 
 to the approval of the national-defense act. 
 
 The personnel of the New Mexico regiment was weak and the organization was 
 unstable. It almost went to pieces when the physical standards were applied. 
 There was urgent need for the services of this regiment. As finally mustered 
 in, its enlisted membership included at least 40 per cent of men who would 
 not have been acceptable for the Regular Army. The main efforts of the 
 organizers had been directed to obtaining 65 men for each company, and the 
 dragnet had brought in many that were manifestly unfit. The result was an 
 organization of the required strength on paper, but with the weakness of a mere 
 paper organization. 
 
 In a lesser degree this padding process was evident in the composition of the 
 Arizona regiment, and the elimination of the physically unfit made serious 
 inroads on their paper strength. In the four other States physical defects were 
 not so general nor so flagrant, but the organization was weakened by the large 
 number of men who were subsequently to be discharged on account of dependent 
 relatives, etc. 
 
 Supplies and equipment were generally on hand in quantities sufficient for 
 the minimum peace strength and as prescribed by Circular 10, Division Militia 
 Affairs, 1915. This circular does not require organizations to keep on hand 
 all of the articles prescribed for equipment C. Many organizations arrived in 
 this department without sufficient tentage, cots, mosquito bars, and other articles 
 of the equipment C class, which are not included in the circular referred to above. 
 Very few organizations reached this department equipped for service in a hot 
 climate. Nearly all arrived in the department with olive drab winter clothing. 
 As concentration took place in the hot season, this worked considerable hard- 
 ship on the troops and necessitated the issue of supplies and equipment which 
 should have been furnished at the mobilization point instead of at the concen- 
 tration point. There was a serious lack of blank forms of all kinds, which 
 resulted in delays in the preparation of records and reports and in the instruc- 
 tion of the National Guard in the use of these forms. 
 
 (c) Degree of progress in training troops thus mobilized and measures taken 
 for their instruction at mobilization camps. Three States of this department 
 were mobilized at permanent camps or stations of Regular Army organizations 
 and were instructed by the officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army on 
 duty at these camps and stations. The other three States were mobilized at 
 State mobilization camps or ungarrisoned military posts where troops were not 
 available for instructional purposes. At these latter points special details of 
 Regular officers were made to assist in the instruction of the National Guard. 
 In either case the instruction of the National Guard was necessarily slow and 
 incomplete, as the organization of new units and their equipment, the recruitment 
 and enlistment of the number of men necessary to bring the National Guard 
 organizations up to the required strength, and the inspection, transfer, and issue 
 of equipment took most of the time that the organizations were held in mobili- 
 zation camps. 
 
 Under the conditions mentioned above the degree of progress was as good as 
 could be expected. 
 
 (d) Comments on the mustering regulations. These were found generally 
 workable. They have been modified and improved as a result of the solution 
 of difficulties arising in their application. There was not at first a sufficient 
 distribution of the pamphlet, and many organizations are still without a copy. 
 
 The main fault which still remains, and which demands radical treatment, is 
 the process of muster in, which is too complicated and takes too much time and 
 labor. The mere fact that there are so many regulations condemns it. The 
 process must be simplified so as to be applicable in a real emergency. The troops 
 when called out should be ready for muster in. An emergency being real, the 
 troops offered by the State should be accepted at once and sworn into Federal 
 service. It would seem that this desirable condition can be brought about by an 
 insistence in peace times on the physical requirements and by the abolishment of 
 the present complicated property accountability and transfer. Federal inspec- 
 tion in peace times should include a physical examination. With the new provi- 
 sions of the national-defense act as to pay and property responsibility, it would 
 seem that a peace accountability could be devised which would avoid any inspec- 
 tions, inventories, and transfers of property on mobilization. 
 
 It has been suggested that there should be on hand at all times and kept 
 up to date in each company office a separate muster-in roll for each member. 
 The record of each officer and man should be entered on a standard mobiliza- 
 
140 
 
 tion form similar to a descriptive list. Space should be provided for the use 
 of the medical examiner of the Regular Army. The national-defense oath 
 should be found somewhere on this roll. These ready-to-use muster-in rolls 
 should be in triplicate (one original and two carbons), and the three held 
 together in a perforated sheet. Checking of these muster-in rolls and of the 
 descriptive lists should be a duty of the organization commander and of the 
 Federal inspector. The latter should also examine and check the enlistment 
 papers on file in the company office. 
 
 The basis for mobilization of the National Guard should be the practical divi- 
 sions into which the State troops are organized. A mobilization point for 
 each tactical division should be selected to \vhich each organization thereof 
 should be sent from its rendezvous point. The intermediate step of State 
 mobilization, which has to be followed by divisional mobilization, would thereby 
 be avoided. This became apparent in this department when the National 
 Guard was sent to the border by States instead of by divisions. This procedure 
 resulted in a disruption of the divisional organization, which could not be 
 avoided, as the National Guard organizations had to be utilized in accord- 
 ance with the situation existing at the time of their arrival in this department. 
 Whereas if these organizations had been mobilized as divisions before they 
 were sent to the border they could have been utilized with such an organization 
 in mind. 
 
 Numerous other recommendations have been submitted with reference to 
 the mustering system. Some of those which were brought to my attention 
 were embraced in a report dated June 30, 1916, rendered by Maj. Orrin R. 
 Wolfe, chief mustering officer, Southern Department. A copy of that report 
 was furnished the Militia Bureau. 
 
 FKEDERICK FUNSTON, 
 Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, 
 
 Kan Francisco, October 28, 1916. 
 From : The department commander. 
 
 To: The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
 Subject : Report concerning recent National Guard mobilization. 
 
 1. Referring to No. 2461974, A. G. O., September 18, 1916, the following report 
 is submitted on recent mobilization in this department : 
 
 Question, (a} The degree of promptness with which these troops have as- 
 sembled, and where they have been slow the reasons for such tardiness? 
 
 Answer, (a) The War Department, by letter of May 11, 1916, notified these 
 headquarters of a probable call for the militia of this department. The neces- 
 sary blank forms for muster in were at the same time furnished. Upon receipt 
 of notification a mustering officer was selected for each State and a chief 
 mustering officer for department headquarters. These officers were furnished 
 copies of mustering regulations and were directed to study them so as to 
 familiarize themselves with their duties. Upon receipt of the Presidents' call r 
 on the night of * June 18, 1916, mustering officers and officers in charge of supply 
 departments were at once notified. The necessary blank forms were mailed 
 to mustering officers at mobilization camps. Federal supply departments 
 shipped at once without requisition to State mobilization points sufficient 
 arms, clothing, and equipment for supplying completely the increase of Na- 
 tional Guard organizations from peace to war strength. Mustering officers, 
 medical officers, and representatives of the supply depots were ordered to. 
 mobilization points to arrange for and establish camps. Governors of States 
 promptly ordered organization commanders to assemble their commands at 
 their company rendezvous and commence recruiting to war strength. The 
 State headquarters officers were assembled, and such officers of the Medical, 
 Ordnance, and Quartermaster Corps as necessary and authorized by the Presi- 
 dent's call were examined and mustered into the service of the United States 
 for duty as camp staff officers. The various duties devolving upon the gov- 
 ernors of States and others in connection with recruiting, transportation, and 
 subsistence, during the mobilization, were promptly, harmoniously, and suc- 
 cessfully carried out. 
 
 The following organizations were included in the President's call : 
 
141 
 
 California : One brigade of three regiments of infantry, one squadron of 
 cavalry, one battalion of field artillery, one company of signal corps, one 
 ambulance company, one field hospital. 
 
 Idaho : One regiment of infantry. 
 
 Montana : One regiment of infantry. 
 
 Oregon: One regiment of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one battery of field 
 artillery. 
 
 Utah : One squadron and two separate troops of cavalry, one battery of field 
 artillery. 
 
 Washington: One regiment of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one company 
 of signal corps. 
 
 Organizations were required to recruit to the minimum prescribed by the 
 President's call before leaving company rendezvous. The necessary equipment, 
 funds, quartermaster,- ordnance, and medical stores, furnished by Federal 
 supply departments, were so promptly delivered that in many instances they 
 reached State mobilization .^amps before the troops began to arrive. 
 
 In no case could it be said that troops of this department were slow in assem- 
 bling. The dates of departure of organizations for the Mexican border will 
 indicate the degree of promptness with which troops of the different States of 
 this department assembled, transferred property, and were mustered into the 
 Federal service. As above stated the call was received on the night of June 
 18 and was made known to all concerned on June 19. Organizations entrained 
 and left for the border fully equipped for field service as follows : 
 
 Utah : One battery of Field Artillery left June 27 ; six troops of Cavalry mus- 
 tered in June 29 and left July 3. 
 
 Oregon : One battery of Field Artillery left June 27 ; Third Battalion Infan- 
 try left June 27 ; Second Battalion, June 28 ; headquarters and First Battalion, 
 June 29, 1916 ; one troop of Cavalry left June 28. 
 
 Washington: One regiment of Infantry left June 26; signal company and 
 sanitary troops left June 30. 
 
 California : One squadron of Cavalry left June 29 ; Second Infantry and one 
 battalion of Field Artillery, July 1; Fifth and Seventh Infantry, July 3; 
 brigade headquarters, signal company, ambulance company, and field hospital 
 left July 4, 1916. 
 
 Montana : One regiment of Infantry mustered in June 29 and left for border 
 July 2, 1916. 
 
 Idaho : One regiment of Infantry in camp June 26, mustered in July 3 and 
 left July 7, 1916. 
 
 Washouts on the railroad caused several days' delay for companies of Mon- 
 tana troops, but all organizations were at the mobilization camps seven days 
 after date of call. 
 
 Question. (&) The degree of preparedness evinced upon assembly, covering 
 organizations, supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility 
 of the State. 
 
 Answer. (b) All troops brought to camp their equipment to include minimum 
 strength. Such shortages as existed in equipment were at once supplied by 
 the States from State arsennls. Some confusion existed due to the fact that 
 several officers in some organizations had been found physically disqualified 
 for service and their places had to be filled by others with little or no military 
 experience or knowledge of the duties required of them. 
 
 Several companies had been declared deficient by the Militia Bureau as a 
 result of 1916 Federal inspections and had to be reorganized. 
 
 The transformation from peace or below peace strength to war strength 
 created confusion. 
 
 The supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the 
 State, were generally ample and indicated a proper degree of preparedness. 
 
 Question, (c) The degree of progress made in training by the troops thus 
 mobilized. Orders given or measures taken for instruction of National Guard 
 troops at their mobilization camp after muster into the service of the United 
 States. 
 
 Answer, (c) Training orders were published by most States, but no attempt 
 was made to carry them out. The organizations were held at State camps for 
 a short time only, during which the members of the commands were physically 
 examined, inoculated for typhoid and smallpox and were called upon to perform 
 various other duties in connection with the establishment of camp so that but 
 little progress was made in training. The State of California published a very 
 
142 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 complete order for the mobilization of United States Militia, which included a 
 schedule of instruction. 
 
 Question, (d) Criticisms and comments on regulations and methods with 
 suggestions and recommendations winch will enable tlie department to inaugu- 
 rate such changes as will insure greater smoothness and expedition in future 
 mobilization. 
 
 Answer, (d) The United States Mustering Regulations appear to 
 have answered the purpose for which it was intended until the passage 
 of the national-defense act. The changes in laws, methods of pro- 
 cedure, and the adoption of new blank forms have rendered the pres- 
 ent mustering regulations practically useless and have been the source 
 of much confusion, delay, and extra paper work on the part of those 
 connected with the work of mobilization. The mustering regulations 
 should be revised to conform to the new law, modifications in forms, 
 and other changes which the War Department has, through expe- 
 rience, found necessary to make by telegraphic orders. 
 
 Physical examination. It should be specifically stated in the mus- 
 tering regulations what the physical examination for muster in shall 
 consist of and what blank forms are to be used. Questions regard- 
 ing finger prints, outline finger cards, typhoid inoculations, vacci- 
 nation, kinds of forms to be used, etc., have been the source of much 
 telegraphic correspondence. 
 
 2 1 ransportation.' The travel pay or transportation to be furnished 
 upon muster out should be clearly stated in regulations. The va- 
 rious interpretations placed upon War Department telegraphic 
 orders on these subjects have given rise to much unnecessary corre- 
 spondence. 
 
 Companies should be recruited to war strength before leaving com- 
 pany rendezvous. 
 
 Several new units were organized after the departure of troops 
 included in the first call. 
 
 2. The entire work of mobilization was promptly and successfully 
 accomplished. 
 
 WM. L. SIBERT, 
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
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MOBILIZATION OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 145 
 
 INSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. 
 
 1. The instruction of the National Guard may be divided into two 
 periods; first, that received at the mobilization camps, and, second, 
 that received at the border. 
 
 2. The periods of time during which organizations were at mobili- 
 zation camps varied from a few days to several months. For those 
 organizations at the mobilization camps, two weeks or less, the 
 amount of instruction received was negligible, due to several reasons, 
 among which may be mentioned that the time of officers of the 
 Regular Army, who were their instructors normally, was wholly 
 occupied in mustering duties involving the supervision of paper work 
 and the inspection and transfer of property. Had additional Regular 
 Army officers been detailed to mustering duty leaving the inspector- 
 instructors to continue their duty with the National Guard in their 
 capacity of instructors, not much better results would have been 
 attained, for the reason that the time of the National Guard officers 
 was almost wholly absorbed in preparing the necessary muster-in 
 papers, in equipping /and handling the large influx of recruits for 
 which they had no prior records. A little was learned, no doubt, in 
 the nature of messing, interior economy, camp sanitation, personal 
 hygiene, and perhaps individual instruction not beyond the school 
 of the squad and company. 
 
 3. For those organizations at the mobilization camps more than 
 two weeks, the instruction in general was still unsatisfactory, due 
 primarily to the lack of Regular Army officers to act as instructors; 
 to the unsuitability of the ground in the vicinity for tactical instruc- 
 tion, the organizations being confined to the roads; the lack of suit- 
 able target ranges ; and in the case of mounted troops, to the lack of 
 animals for mounted instruction. 
 
 4. The organizations arriving on the border were in different stages 
 of instruction, though the difference was not very great due to the 
 large number of recruits without prior service in all organizations. 
 It was therefore necessary to devote a large amount of time to the 
 elementary recruit instruction. The standardization of the subjects 
 and methods for the necessary instruction in the different arms was. 
 not available for ready reference with regard to troops in the status 
 of approximately one-fourth partially trained troops, three-fourths; 
 recruits, and many of the officers only partially trained. Even with 
 an exact and approved method of training, the results will always 
 depend upon the individual experience, energy, and ability of the 
 instructors. 
 
 5. These organizations were not sent to the border in their partially 
 trained condition for the purpose of instruction. They were sent 
 for duty there in a grave emergency, because they were the only troops 
 available, even though not yet ready and fit for active field service. 
 The instruction that could be given at that time was incidental to 
 service. However, it was soon realized that additional instruction 
 should be undertaken, and a number of Regular Army officers were 
 assigned to the organizations as instructors. At least one to each 
 battalion or squadron was needed, but that number could not be 
 spared from the regular organizations. Instruction and responsi- 
 bility for discipline and efficiency go hand in hand. Neither these 
 
 7203116 10 
 
146 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 instructors nor the few Regular Army officers commissioned in the 
 National Guard, the latter in general from a lack- of sufficient rank, 
 were in a position of authority to carry into full effect their plans of 
 instruction. 
 
 6. In general the instruction on the border can not be said to have 
 been satisfactory, for the reasons already given and due, in addi- 
 tion, to the lack of suitable target ranges for small arms and service 
 practice; and the limited amount of ammunition available for such 
 practice; to the excessive heat, which in the summer months reduced 
 the hours available for instruction; to the divided duties of service 
 and instruction; to the friction and time due to inexperience spent 
 in paper work; interior economy and property responsibility. The 
 greatest fault was the lack of systematic instruction, which, covering 
 8 or 10 hours a day, should commence first with the individual and 
 progress, upon proficiency, by successive steps to the squad, platoon, 
 company, battalion, regiment, brigade, and division. In many cases 
 this was undertaken, yet the progress made was too fast was not 
 based on proficiency. Precision, uniformity, and thoroughness were 
 lacking in the successive stages, and the final result could not be other 
 than unsatisfactory. In general at the end of five months' service, 
 with few exceptions, the organizations as a whole were reported as 
 still not ready and fit for active field service against a well-trained 
 enemy. 
 
 Field Artillery. None of the States having Field Artillery, with 
 the possible exceptions of Colorado and Kansas, have mobilization 
 camps that afford adequate facilities for the training of Feld Artil- 
 lery in field exercises and target practice. When the mobilization was 
 ordered many of the batteries had difficulty in recruiting to the peace 
 strength, and as a result they were not in a condition to be sent to the 
 Southern Department before the shipment of troops was discon- 
 tinued. In the meantime horses for all batteries were purchased and 
 concentrated in the Southern Department, with a view to issuing 
 the animals when the batteries arrived. As a result of these condi- 
 tions 25 of the batteries embraced in the original call were left in 
 State camps without their quota of horses and without other facili- 
 ties for field training. More than half of the inspector-instructors 
 and eight of the sergeant- instructors of Field Artillery received State 
 commissions, and the majority of them joined the troops in the 
 Southern Department. The remaining inspector-instructors and 
 sergeant-instructors were not sufficient to supply all of the State 
 camps. As a partial remedy for this situation eight batteries were 
 sent to Tobyhanna, Pa., and supplied with sufficient horses for train- 
 ing. Four of them were composed of students and graduates of Yale 
 University. Under the able administration of Col. Robert M. Dan- 
 ford, Tenth Militia Field Artillery ( first lieutenant, Fifth United 
 States Field Artillery) these batteries made remarkable progress. 
 The students and the men at the camp who were not students applied 
 themselves with a willingness that was highly creditable, and their 
 zeal did not cease when they learned that they would not go to the 
 Mexican border, and that the entire summer would be spent in the 
 routine of a training camp. In the technical service of the guns and 
 in the mounted duties they were developed in accordance with the 
 best practices of the Regular regiments. A conspicuous feature of 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 147 
 
 the training at this camp was the course in physical exercises con- 
 ducted by First Lieut. O. A. Dickinson, Twenty-fifth Infantry. 
 While Lieut. Dickinson's success was due in a measure to his superior 
 qualifications as an instructor his work demonstrated the value of 
 this training for the National Guard. It is believed that it should 
 form an important part of armory training, and with skilled instruc- 
 tors it would be of great benefit to the men and would serve as an at- 
 tractive feature of the drills. This camp was not only a demonstra- 
 tion of what can be accomplished in preparing our young men for 
 the service of the country but it was a tribute to the patriotism and 
 the democracy of the great university whose sons came forth at their 
 country's call. They took upon themselves the burden of practical 
 preparedness, and by so doing they qualified themselves by experi- 
 ence to perform their part in arriving at a rational solution of a 
 problem that is vital to the ^elfare of the nation. 
 
 Horses were sent to the First Battalion, Colorado Field Artillery, 
 and the training of these batteries progressed satisfactorily. At 
 the remaining camps there were no horses except such as were hired 
 by the States or were on hand at the time of the mobilization. The 
 Alabama and the Georgia batteries were entirely without horses. On 
 August 29, 1916, the Chief of the Militia Bureau invited attention 
 to the conditions, with reference to artillery, and requested that all 
 batteries in the State camps, with the exception of those composed 
 of students of colleges and schools, be sent to the Southern Depart- 
 ment and supplied with horses as promptly as possible. This action 
 was taken September 27, 1916. In view of the great loss of time that 
 resulted from leaving batteries in State camps, in the future all 
 Field Artillery units should be mobilized at the established Field 
 Artillery training camps, and horses should be furnished them at 
 these camps as promptly as practicable after the call is made. In- 
 spector-instructors and sergeant-instructors can then be utilized as 
 far as their numbers permit for all batteries, and the training can 
 proceed in accordance with the methods provided by the War De- 
 partment for the annual camps of instruction. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 LIST OF PROPERTY FOUND SHORT AT MOBILIZATION. 
 
 The remarks of the inspectors general that the governors of States 
 have not kept their organizations fully equipped the Dick law 
 required States, from funds allotted to them, to keep their forces 
 " sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for active duty in the 
 field," a requirement set forth in detail in Circular No. 10, Division 
 of Militia Affairs, 1915. 
 
 A list of all the various articles short is published in table 17, 
 accompanying the Keport on the National Guard for 1916, the main 
 items of which are as follows: 
 
 First-aid packets 2,992 
 
 Litters with slings 181 
 
 Bridles, Cavalry 274 
 
 Bridles, watering 631 
 
 Canteens 1, 278 
 
 Canteen straps 3, 702 
 
 Cartridge belts, caliber .30 212 
 
 Cartridge-belt suspenders 216 
 
 Currycombs 207 
 
 First-aid pouches 1,289 
 
 Knives 157 
 
 Lariats 237 
 
148 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Magazine pockets, web, double- 338 
 
 Pistols 351 
 
 Pistol belts 1, 152 
 
 Pistol holsters ____* 128 
 
 Sabers 168 
 
 Saber scabbards 158 
 
 Saddles, Cavalry 179 
 
 Saddlebags 173 
 
 Saddle blankets 225 
 
 Spurs, pairs 247 
 
 Spur straps, pairs 245 
 
 Surcingles 272 
 
 Bolos 917 
 
 Bolo scabbards 1,416 
 
 Shovel carriers 402 
 
 Shovels, intrenching 373 
 
 Wire cutters 1,590 
 
 Wire-cutter carriers 2, 060 
 
 Blankets, woolen 234 
 
 Breeches, olive-drab, woolen 182 
 
 Overcoats, olive-drab 3, 255 
 
 Ponchos 497 
 
 Shirts, olive-drab 479 
 
 Slickers 585 
 
 Tents, shelter halves 289 
 
 Waist belts 19, 562 
 
 Bugles with slings 268 
 
 March kits 524 
 
 Surplus kit bags 1.952 
 
 Tents, pyramidal, large 1, 163 
 
 Tents, pyramidal, small 237 
 
 Whistles and chains 1,018 
 
 Kit flags, 2-foot, Infantry 126 
 
 Kit flags, 2-foot, semaphore 817 
 
 Watch compasses 1, 366 
 
 MUSTEK OUT. 
 
 inspector- instructor, on 
 
 Extracts from report of Capt. - 
 the muster out of the - - Infantry : 
 
 All of the property was in a poor condition. A large percentage of it was 
 unserviceable. All of the property showed neglect and an absolute lack of care. 
 The small arms were in a specially poor condition. Nearly all of the rifles 
 were very rusty and dirty. All of the rifle stocks were scratched and battered. 
 An effort \vas made, through the commanding officer, to have the rifles cleaned, 
 but there was no apparent results. 
 
 In spite^of over four months' Federal service, the accountable officers, with one 
 exception, knew r very little about how to keep property records or render 
 returns. No returns for property had been made. 
 
 I found the officers, with a very few exceptions, to be inefficient, indifferent, 
 and practically worthless as officers. They had very little control over the 
 enlisted men. Most of them had to be prompted several times before they 
 would prepare any of the required forms. The companies drilled better in close 
 and extended order, but aside from this the regiment as a whole w T as apparently 
 no more efficient than when it left . Discipline was much more lax than 
 it was in June. 
 
 Gapt. - , Infantry inspector-instructor, on duty with the 
 - reports from Camp - - certain riotous and disgraceful 
 proceedings which occurred upon the muster out of that regiment. 
 He states that written instructions were sent the colonel concerning 
 police of camp and disposition of Government and State property, 
 etc., and when the time had arrived that these orders should 
 have been executed Capt. - - got the colonel to accompany 
 
 him in an inspection of the camp. They found that practically noth- 
 ing had been done, as ordered; that men were gambling in plain 
 view of the colonel and many were drunk. He ordered the colonel to 
 have the camp cleaned up at once, and stated that he would make 
 another inspection in an hour or so. 
 
 The colonel had " officers' call " sounded, with a view to having this 
 done. This was about dark, and although orders had been given that 
 all automatic pistols and ammunition be called in, hundreds of rifle 
 and pistol shots were fired by officers or men, or both, and the night 
 was made hideous with yells and cries. One shot took effect, killing 
 Cook - - of Company - . 
 
 Capt. - 
 seemed to 
 
 says that neither the colonel nor lieutenant colonel 
 have any control over their men. Col. - - stated 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 149 
 
 personally that he had discovered and sent out of camp two wagoii- 
 loads of liquor in the morning, but that much had since been intro- 
 duced. He said that if his men got much liquor no one would be 
 able to handle them. The disorder becoming greater, Capt. - 
 ordered Col. - - to assemble his regiment at once and get it 
 out of camp, so as to prevent more serious trouble and possible clash 
 between the white and colored troops, to say nothing of trouble 
 between the townspeople and colored troops. 
 
 He says the conduct was the most disgraceful and unsoldierly he 
 had ever known, and there was absolutely no discipline after dark, 
 and there was nothing to do but get the regiment out of camp and on 
 its trains. Much of the trouble was due to the fact that the men had 
 just received two months' pay. 
 
 In forwarding the report the department commander said that it 
 was apparent that the officers had no control over the men. 
 
 THE NATIONAL GUARD AT WAR STRENGTH. 
 
 It is to be regretted that the system of voluntary enlistments mili- 
 tates against keeping the National Guard at war strength. 
 
 One of the leading causes of inefficiency is the maintaining of 
 organizations normally at peace strength and increasing them to 
 " war strength " when required for service. The guardsman at best 
 can be but imperfectly trained, and to fill organizations with raw 
 recruits when called for active service is a serious handicap. 
 
 If the guard could be kept at war strength it would mean a saving 
 of expense, for the pay of the officers, upkeep of armories, etc., are 
 the same whether the strength be minimum or maximum, and it is to 
 the interest of the Federal Government to give military training even 
 though that training be elementary in character to the greatest 
 number. 
 
 With the National Guard kept at maximum strength the problem 
 of storage of reserve supplies is in a measure solved automatically, 
 in such event there being no recruiting to war strength it is no longer 
 necessary to keep reserve supplies to outfit the number of men added 
 to organizations during mobilization. A considerable reserve must 
 of course be kept on hand, but not the vast quantities needed where 
 only about the minimum strength is kept enrolled. * 
 
 Lastly, but most important of all, if war strength were the rule, 
 organizations would presumably go from the mobilization to the 
 concentration points with ranks filled with men all of whom will 
 have had some degree of training; a marked contrast with the mo- 
 bilization just completed where organizations were only at minimum 
 strength at the outset, and this minimum immediately depleted by 
 
 (a) Men found physically unfit. 
 
 (b) Men who immediately sought discharge on account of de- 
 pendent relatives. 
 
 (c) Men discharged by State authorities after the call. 
 
 (d) Men who refused to take the Federal oath and were permitted 
 by the mustering officers to return to their homes. 
 
 (e) Men who failed to respond to the call. 
 
 When all the above deductions were made there was in a great 
 proportion of the organizations really only a skeleton of trained men 
 
150 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 left, and the vacancies were necessarily filled by the enlistment of 
 raw recruits. 
 
 Such makeshifts in the way of preparation will surely mean dis- 
 aster in an encounter with an enterprising enemy who has only a 
 fair degree of preparedness. Ours has been not even fair; it has 
 unquestionably been poor. 
 
 WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE. FOR THE UNITED STATES. FIRST-LINE TROOPS. 
 
 The reports from inspector-instructors, medical officers, special 
 inspectors, and inspector generals amply support the contention that 
 we have no National Guard troops really fit for the first line of de- 
 fense. This naturally brings us to the question as to what should be 
 the qualifications for first-line troops. 
 
 A few illustrations in our own service may throw some light on 
 this important subject. On February 24, 1912, the Twenty-second 
 United States Infantry received an order about noon to leave Fort 
 Sam Houston, Tex., for border duty. It left about noon the next 
 day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since. 
 
 On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received tele- 
 graphic orders at 11.30 a. m. to proceed from its station, Fort Hua- 
 chuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty, and left post equipped for 
 field service four hours later for Douglas, and from there was sent on 
 down the line to form part of one of the columns of the punitive expe- 
 dition. It marched about 240 miles in the first eight days, making 108 
 miles in the two days following the crossing of the line. It is still in 
 Mexico on a shelter-tent basis, without cots; has been in several 
 engagements, and in fit condition to continue indefinitely. 
 
 The Eleventh Cavalry left Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., in May, 1914, 
 by rail for coal-strike duty in Colorado on about 24 hours' notice, 
 and was absent for eight months. On March 12, 1916, it entrained 
 at the same post on 24 hours' notice to proceed by rail to Columbus, 
 N. Mex., to form a part of the punitive expedition in Mexico. It has 
 made an excellent record for marching and fighting and is still in 
 shelter tents " somewhere in Mexico." 
 
 The point to be emphasized in these cases, and in innumerable 
 similar ones which could be mentioned, is that the troops have left 
 their stations on short notice with trained men, fully armed and 
 equipped, prepared to immediately encounter an enemy and to re- 
 main in the field for an indefinite period of time. 
 
 This is the degree of preparedness which from experience in this 
 country has been found to be absolutely essential to meet public 
 demands nothing less will suffice. 
 
 Indeed, with increased facilities for transportation and for the 
 transmission of information, the tendency is toward a more complete 
 preparedness; this to a degree that can be expected only from the 
 professional soldier. 
 
 The National Guard may perhaps be likened to the volunteer fire 
 departments so popular years ago in our large towns. They were 
 composed of the elite of the young men of the town, whose generous 
 public spirit in so giving their services in extinguishing fires can not 
 be too strongly commended. When a fire broke out, whether by day 
 or night, the members of the department, no matter in what engaged, 
 
MOBILIZATION" OF THE OKGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 151 
 
 dropped their occupations and rushed to the scene of action often 
 at considerable personal inconvenience and loss. 
 
 But even with this sacrifice the desired end was frequently not 
 attained, for even with the most strenuous efforts, before the fire 
 brigade could assemble and get to work the conflagration would have 
 reached a point beyond control. 
 
 Clearly this means of fire protection, particularly as towns grew in 
 size, was unsatisfactory and it became apparent that the saving in 
 insurance rates alone would amply justify the employment of paid 
 fire departments, having constantly on hand day or night a crew of 
 men trained in the use of the latest appliances for extinguishing fires 
 and exercised in methods of getting to the scene of fire with the least 
 possible delay. 
 
 The paid fire department, then, corresponds to -the troops required 
 for the first line of defense, and we have no more right to expect from 
 citizen soldiers the degree of preparedness absolutely needed for first- 
 line troops than to expect that volunteer fire departments with a per- 
 sonnel composed of young men daily engaged in business pursuits 
 will afford adequate fire protection under existing conditions in our 
 great cities. 
 
 The patriotism and self-sacrifice of the National Guardsman no one 
 would think of disputing; all honor to them, for they form a valua- 
 ble asset in our scheme of national defense; but the role which they 
 are to play is not in the " first line," although many of the leaders in 
 their extreme advocacy of the merits of the National Guard, and with 
 rather crude ideas as to what should constitute first-line troops, would 
 put them in this category, a place for which the recent mobilization 
 shows these troops to be unqualified, and for which, from the very 
 nature of the case, they never can be fitted. The sooner this idea is 
 abandoned the better it will be for all concerned. 
 
 The following is from an officer of wide experience, who has had 
 exceptional opportunities for observing conditions and " feeling the 
 pulse," as it were, of the National Guard along the border : 
 
 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD ALONG THE BORDER. 
 
 [By .] 
 
 At the present time practically all officers and enlisted men of the various 
 National Guard units along the border are primarily interested in when they 
 are to be sent home. Though little discontent is openly expressed, there is a 
 considerable amount of it. This discontent is apparently due : 
 
 1. To a belief that they have not been properly supplied. 
 
 2. That, at least in the beginning, they were not properly cared for. 
 
 3. To a lack of proper training. 
 
 4. To a lack of understanding as to the proper functions of Federal officers 
 and supply department. 
 
 5. To a realization that the present system unequally distributes the burden 
 of military service. 
 
 6. A belief on the part of many that the troops are not really needed along 
 the border. 
 
 No. 1 is due (a) to the ignorance of many of the National Guard officers as 
 to what to get, how to get it, and frequently how to use it after gotten; (b) 
 failure of the Quartermaster Department and Ordnance Department to properly 
 equip all individuals and units with the latest style equipment in the proper 
 models and sizes. 
 
 No. 2 is due (a) to the unnecessary inconveniences caused by the ignorance 
 of militia officers of the proper methods of taking care of their men; (b) the 
 belief prevalent amongst the majority of Americans that they are entitled to 
 every comfort and that any deprivation is a hardship. They do not understand 
 
152 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 what field service really is and consequently are prone to believe that the living 
 methods and exertions demanded by such service is unnecessary. 
 
 No. 3 is due (a) to a lack of proper home training such that the performance 
 of duty comes above personal interest or enjoyment. Hence in too many cases 
 the proper pitching and protection of camp and care of animals prior to atten- 
 tion to the personal comforts of the men is looked upon as a hardship; (b) an 
 unwillingness to engage in the careful and necessarily tiresome training of the 
 individual man and horse, coupled with a desire to be immediately used and 
 treated as fully trained troops. When this desire and the lack of time, under 
 existing conditions, causes such use these troops, not being prepared to undergo 
 either the physical or mental efforts required, suffer where trained troops 
 would not. Also due to this lack of fundamental training a large amount of 
 otherwise absolutely avoidable friction and trouble arises, which inevitably 
 tends to increase the physical and mental strain, already excessive, (c) The 
 privates, being largely ignorant of their duty, a disproportionate amount of 
 work is required from the noncommissioned officers. The same ignorance on 
 the part of the noncommissioned officers causes a disproportionate amount of 
 work to fall on the shoulders of the company officers. The ignorance of the com- 
 pany officers operates in the same manner with respect to their superiors, and 
 so on up, causing a great amount of effort to produce a meager result, with 
 inevitable consequent disgust amongst all grades. With few exceptions men 
 and officers are anxious and willing to learn. Too often their superiors are 
 unable to teach them, and this ignorance is readily found out, causing a loss of 
 respect and discontent. 
 
 No. 4: On the whole the militia expect everything to be shown them and 
 everything to be done for them. The Federal officers and departments natu- 
 rally expect that the militia officers should reasonably well understand the 
 steps necessary to supply and train their respective units. In too many cases 
 this has caused inconvenience and worse to the militia. Many militia organiza- 
 tions were unable to enlist competent cooks or horseshoers, with the result that 
 they have lived poorly, while their animals have gone unshod. In many cases 
 they are inclined to blame this on the Federal authorities instead of realizing 
 that the blame lies with the voluntary system of enlistment. 
 
 No. 5: Had immediate action of some kind been necessary, the resultant 
 excitement and constant movement in most cases would have compensated the 
 many men who are making real sacrifices. Also they would not have had so 
 much time to think about their personal troubles. As it is, they have plenty 
 of time to think of the family and business troubles constantly being told 
 them in letters from home. Many firms are not living up to their promises 
 with respect to the payment of salaries and to holding open of positions. 
 Promotions are being made which men on the border know they would have 
 gotten had they been at home. Many are continually receiving letters from 
 their wives urging them to come back and saying that it is their duty to do so. 
 All this serves to emphasize the fact that a few of the men of the country are 
 making a real sacrifice, while the great majority are not. The practically com- 
 plete failure of recruiting shows the great majority to be unwilling, and con- 
 sequently increases the disgust of those now in the service. 
 
 No. 6: The great majority do not understand the necessity which caused 
 them to be brought to the border, consequently they are inclined to believe that 
 it was a political move and that they are making sacrifices for nothing. 
 
 All this causes the great majority of the men and officers to want to go 
 home. The home-going of some units has increased this desire. 
 
 It is generally considered that it will be very difficult to hold the majority 
 of the men on their return to their home stations, and equally difficult to re- 
 cruit men to take their places. Some of those now in service will move out of 
 the State; others live in towns where there are no militia organizations; 
 others belong to the floating population of mechanics and farm laborers. 
 Many will refuse to take the new oath. Also it is considered that public 
 opinion will be against any attempt to compel those men who do not want to do 
 so to report should the Guard again be called out. Many of the officers who 
 will stay willingly until their organizations are mustered out will then resign. 
 
 With very few exceptions those officers who were the most ardent sup- 
 porters of the militia provisions of the present national defense act believe 
 that it will be impossible to raise the numbers required by this act. Most of 
 them think that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep units now in 
 existence above the prescribed minimum. 
 
 There is a great variety of opinions as to what steps will have to be taken 
 to produce a proper force. There is a practical unanimity of opinion that the 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 153 
 
 present system does not work. The indications are that one of the immediate 
 results will be the authorization of the raising of several more or all of the 
 increments of the Regular Army now provided for by law. This primarily for 
 the reason that the National Guard does not wish further service such as it has 
 just had, and that volunteers can not be called for until the National Guard 
 has been called out. 
 
 X umber of National (Jmird troops transported front State mobilization camps, 
 to border stations and the number returned from border stations to mobiliza- 
 tion camps for muster out of the Federal service, as shown by report of the 
 Quartermaster General of the Army, to Nov. 14, 1916, inclusive. 
 
 State or district. 
 
 Number of 
 men sent 
 to 
 border. 
 
 Number of 
 men re- 
 turned from 
 border. 
 
 State or district. 
 
 Number of 
 men sent 
 to 
 border. 
 
 Number of 
 men re- 
 turned from 
 border. 
 
 \labama 
 
 3 627 
 
 
 Nebraska . 
 
 1 910 
 
 
 Arizona 
 
 915 
 
 
 New Hampshire 
 
 1*329 
 
 
 Arkansas 
 
 1 195 
 
 
 New Jersey 
 
 4 348 
 
 3 978 
 
 California 
 
 4 600 
 
 3 046 
 
 New Mexico 
 
 953 
 
 
 Colorado 
 
 1 133 
 
 
 New York 
 
 18 761 
 
 7 305 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 3 305 
 
 2 578 
 
 North Carolina 
 
 3 208 
 
 
 Delaware 
 
 872 
 
 
 North Dakota 
 
 1 035 
 
 
 District of Columbia 
 
 2 067 
 
 551 
 
 Ohio 
 
 7*456 
 
 
 Florida 
 
 1 208 
 
 
 Oklahoma 
 
 1 337 
 
 
 Georgia 
 
 3 892 
 
 
 Oregon 
 
 1 613 
 
 1.146 
 
 Idaho .... 
 
 1 145 
 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 15 098 
 
 3 375 
 
 Illinois 
 
 9 216 
 
 5 428 
 
 Rhode Island 
 
 655 
 
 643 
 
 Indiana 
 
 3 ? 640 
 
 *237 
 
 South Carolina 
 
 2.376 
 
 
 Iowa 
 
 4 653 
 
 
 South Dakota 
 
 1 016 
 
 
 Kansas 
 
 2 288 
 
 1 788 
 
 Tennessee 
 
 2 580 
 
 
 Kentucky 
 
 2*395 
 
 
 Texas 
 
 3 762 
 
 
 Louisiana 
 
 1 619 
 
 1 128 
 
 Utah 
 
 779 
 
 296 
 
 Maine 
 
 1 043 
 
 964 
 
 Vermont 
 
 906 
 
 893 
 
 
 3*189 
 
 1 880 
 
 
 3 031 
 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 8 314 
 
 7 595 
 
 Washington 
 
 2*078 
 
 1 626 
 
 Michigan 
 
 4*363 
 
 
 West Virginia 
 
 1 182 
 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 4*379 
 
 176 
 
 Wisconsin 
 
 4 288 
 
 254 
 
 Mississippi 
 
 1 292 
 
 
 Wyoming 
 
 491 
 
 
 
 4* 802 
 
 1 904 
 
 
 
 
 Montana 
 
 1*070 
 
 *916 
 
 
 156 414 
 
 47, 707 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table showing, by States, the aggregate strength of National Guard mustered 
 into the Federal service, the war strength of the organizations called into serv- 
 ice, number furnished, number short of war strength, and per cent of war 
 strength furnished. 
 
 State. 
 
 War 
 
 strength. 
 
 Number 
 of men 
 furnished. 
 
 Number 
 short of war 
 strength. 
 
 Per cent of 
 war 
 strength 
 furnished. 
 
 1 Washington . 
 
 2,100 
 
 2,078 
 
 22 
 
 98.9 
 
 2 Rhode Island 
 
 672 
 
 655 
 
 17 
 
 97.4 
 
 3. Massachusetts . 
 
 9,762 
 
 8,314 
 
 1,448 
 
 85.1 
 
 4 Delaware 
 
 1,158 
 
 872 
 
 286 
 
 75.3 
 
 5. Oregon 
 
 2,194 
 
 1,613 
 
 581 
 
 73.5 
 
 6 Utah 
 
 1,081 
 
 779 
 
 302 
 
 72.0 
 
 7 Connecticut 
 
 5 467 
 
 3,891 
 
 1,576 
 
 71.1 
 
 8. Wisconsin 
 
 6,204 
 
 4,288 
 
 1,916 
 
 69.1 
 
 9 Mississippi 
 
 1,915 
 
 1,292 
 
 623 
 
 67.4 
 
 10 District of Columbia 
 
 3 104 
 
 2,067 
 
 1,037 
 
 66.5 
 
 11. Iowa . 
 
 7,043 
 
 4,653 
 
 2,390 
 
 66.0 
 
 12 California 
 
 7,125 
 
 4,600 
 
 2,525 
 
 64.5 
 
 13. Michigan 
 
 6,801 
 
 4,363 
 
 2,438 
 
 64.1 
 
 14. Illinois 
 
 14, 395 
 
 9,216 
 
 5,179 
 
 64.0 
 
 15 Minnesota 
 
 6,941 
 
 4,379 
 
 2,562 
 
 63.0 
 
 
 6 932 
 
 4, 348 
 
 2,584 
 
 62.7 
 
 17. West Virginia 
 
 1,915 
 
 1,182 
 
 733 
 
 61.7 
 
 18 New York 
 
 30, 499 
 
 18, 761 
 
 11, 738 
 
 61.5 
 
 19 Louisiana 
 
 2,641 
 
 1,619 
 
 1,022 
 
 61.3 
 
 20 Florida 
 
 1,988 
 
 1,208 
 
 780 
 
 60.7 
 
 21 Tennessee 
 
 4,296 
 
 2,580 
 
 1,716 
 
 60.0 
 
 22 Alabama 
 
 7,646 
 
 4,573 
 
 3,073 
 
 59.8 
 
 23 Idaho . . 
 
 1,915 
 
 1.145 
 
 770 
 
 59.7 
 
 24 Virginia 
 
 5,298 
 
 3,031 
 
 2,267 
 
 57.2 
 
 25 South Carolina 
 
 4,177 
 
 2,376 
 
 1,801 
 
 56.8 
 
 26. Colorado . . . 
 
 2,621 
 
 1, 487 
 
 1,134 
 
 56.7 
 
154 
 
 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Table showing, by States, the aggregate strength of National Guard mustered 
 into the Federal service, etc. Continued. 
 
 State. 
 
 War 
 
 strength. 
 
 Number 
 of men 
 furnished. 
 
 Number 
 short of war 
 strength. 
 
 Per cent of 
 war 
 strength 
 furnished. 
 
 27. New Hampshire 
 
 2,349 
 
 1,329 
 
 1,020 
 
 56.5 
 
 28 Georgia 
 
 6 891 
 
 3 892 
 
 2 999 
 
 56.4 
 
 29. Missouri 
 
 8,556 
 
 4,802 
 
 3,754 
 
 56.1 
 
 30 Texas 
 
 6 756 
 
 3 762 
 
 2 994 
 
 55 6 
 
 31. Kansas . . . . 
 
 4,191 
 
 2,288 
 
 1,903 
 
 54.5 
 
 32. Oklahoma 
 
 2,449 
 
 1 337 
 
 1 112 
 
 54.5 
 
 33. Maine 
 
 1,915 
 
 1,043 
 
 872 
 
 54.4 
 
 34 Ohio 
 
 13 722 
 
 7 456 
 
 6 266 
 
 54.3 
 
 35. North Dakota. . 
 
 1,915 
 
 1,035 
 
 880 
 
 54.0 
 
 36. Maryland 
 
 6,185 
 
 3 329 
 
 2,856 
 
 53.8 
 
 37. South Dakota . . 
 
 1,915 
 
 1,016 
 
 899 
 
 53.0 
 
 38. Montana 
 
 2,018 
 
 1 070 
 
 948 
 
 53.0 
 
 39. Pennsylvania 
 
 28, 550 
 
 15, 098 
 
 13,452 
 
 52.9 
 
 40. Indiana 
 
 6,871 
 
 3,640 
 
 3,231 
 
 52.8 
 
 41. North Carolina ... . 
 
 6,454 
 
 3,208 
 
 3,246 
 
 49.7 
 
 42. Vermont 
 
 2 331 
 
 1,130 
 
 1,201 
 
 48.4 
 
 43. Nebraska 
 
 3,985 
 
 1,910 
 
 2,075 
 
 47.9 
 
 44. Arizona 
 
 1,915 
 
 915 
 
 1,000 
 
 47.7 
 
 45. New Mexico 
 
 2,091 
 
 953 
 
 1,138 
 
 45.5 
 
 46. Wyoming . 
 
 1,158 
 
 491 
 
 667 
 
 42.4 
 
 47. Kentucky 
 
 5,988 
 
 2,395 
 
 3,593 
 
 39.9 
 
 48. Arkansas 
 
 3,830 
 
 1,195 
 
 2,635 
 
 31.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 267, 925 
 
 158, 664 
 
 108,361 
 
 59.2 
 
 Strength of National Guard organizations not called into service of the United 
 
 States. 
 
 State. 
 
 Organization. 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Florida 
 
 INFANTRY REGIMENTS. 
 
 Fir st Infantry . . 
 
 748 
 
 Illinois 
 
 Fifth Infantry 
 
 606 
 
 
 Sixth Infantry 
 
 420 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Sixth Infantry 
 
 84& 
 
 New Jersey 
 
 Second Infantry . 
 
 731 
 
 
 Third Infantry 
 
 656 
 
 New York 
 
 First Infantry 
 
 767 
 
 
 Tenth Infantry 
 
 784 
 
 
 Forty-seventh Infantry 
 
 602 
 
 Ohio 
 
 First Infantry 
 
 667 
 
 
 Seventh Infantry 
 
 624 
 
 Virginia 
 
 Fourth Infantry . - 
 
 698 
 
 West Virginia 
 
 First Infantry " . 
 
 68~0 
 
 
 
 
 Georgia . . 
 
 BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY. 
 
 Third Separate Battalion 
 
 8,831 
 209 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 First Battalion (First Corps Cadets) 
 
 258 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Ninth Separate Battalion 
 
 238 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 SEPARATE INFANTRY COMPANIES. 
 
 705 
 
 58 
 
 Iowa 
 
 do 
 
 60 
 
 
 do 
 
 56 
 
 Mississippi 
 
 do 
 
 67 
 
 
 
 59 
 
 Do 
 
 .....do 
 do 
 
 55 
 65 
 
 Wisconsin 
 
 
 59 
 
 Wyoming 
 
 .do 
 
 69 
 
 
 
 548 
 10,084 
 
 
 COAST ARTILLERY. 
 
 654 
 
 
 13 companies 
 
 823 
 
 District of Columbia 
 
 
 75 
 
 Georgia . . 
 
 4 companies... 
 
 206 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 155 
 
 Strength of National Guard organizations not called into service of the United 
 
 States Continued. 
 
 State. 
 
 Organization. 
 
 Strength. 
 
 Maine 
 
 COAST AETILLERY continued. 
 13 companies . 
 
 624 
 75 
 
 889 
 187 
 2,111 
 370 
 565 
 1,098 
 415 
 
 Maryland 
 
 1 company 
 
 Massachusetts .. . . 
 
 12 companies 
 
 New Hampshire 
 
 3 companies 
 
 New York 
 
 34 companies 
 
 North Carolina . 
 
 6 companies ... 
 
 Oregon 
 
 8 companies 
 
 Rhode Island ... 
 
 17 companies 
 
 South Carolina 
 
 5 companies. ... 
 
 Total 
 
 
 15 companies , 
 
 8,092 
 18,176 
 
 Aggregate 
 
 
 
 
 By November 1, 1916, 16,856 men of the National Guard and Organized 
 Militia in the Federal service were discharged for the following causes: 
 
 For physical disability 10, 182 
 
 On account of dependent relatives, etc 6, 323 
 
 For fradulent enlistment 84 
 
 For return to Government positions 191 
 
 Dishonorably 46 
 
 To enter United States Military Academy 2 
 
 Sentence of civil court and illegal enlistment (1 each) 2 
 
 Paragraph 75, Mustering Regulations, and by order of Secretary of War_ 2 
 
 Unsuited to service and other causes 24 
 
 Total 16, 856 
 
 New organizations recognized by the War Department between June IS, 1916 
 (date of call), and Dec. 1, 1916, and mustered into the Federal service. 
 
 State. 
 
 Organization. 
 
 Date recog- 
 nized. 
 
 Alabama 
 
 First Cavalry ... 
 
 Sept. 21, 1916 
 July 10.1916 
 Do. 
 July 27,1916 
 June 27,1916 
 June 28,1916 
 July 25,1916 
 Aug. 22,1916 
 July 10.1916 
 Oct. 12,1916 
 July 7, 1916 
 July 10,1916 
 July 17,1916 
 July 4, 1916 
 July 17,1916 
 July 31,1916 
 June 26,1916 
 June 28,1916 
 
 June 29,1916 
 Do. 
 July 4. 1916 
 Sept. 16,1916 
 Aug. 23,1916 
 Sept. 11,1916 
 Sept. 15,1916 
 Aug. 9, 1916 
 Aug. 21,1916 
 Aug. 10,1916 
 
 July 12,1916 
 July 21,1916 
 Aug. 10,1916 
 Aug. 23,1916 
 Julv 21,1916 
 Aug. 31,1916 
 July 8, 1916 
 June 21,1916 
 
 July 25,1916 
 July 8,1916 
 
 California 
 
 Ambulance Company No 1 
 
 Field Hospital No. 1 
 
 Company A, Engineers. . 
 
 Colorado... 
 
 Troop A .First Squadron Cavalry 
 
 Florida 
 
 Battery C, First Battalion Field Artillery... 
 
 Field Hospital No. 1.. 
 
 Indiana . 
 
 Batterv D , Field Artillery 
 
 Kansas 
 
 Ambulance Company No. 2 
 
 Field Hospital No. 2 
 
 Troop A, Cavalry . . . 
 
 Louisiana 
 
 Field Hospital No. 1 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Ambulance Company No. 2 
 
 Montana . 
 
 Field Hospital ^so 2 
 
 Troop A Cavalry 
 
 New HaiTipshire 
 
 Field Hospital No. 1 ... 
 
 New Jersey . . , 
 
 BattervC, Field Artillery 
 
 New York 
 
 Third* Field Artillery (formerly Sixty-fifth In- 
 fantry). 
 First Field Bakerv Company 
 
 North Carolina 
 
 Division Supplv Train 
 
 First Aero Company . 
 
 Field Hospital No 4 
 
 Companv A Engineers 
 
 Oklahoma 
 
 Company B, Engineers 
 
 Ambulance Company No. 1 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Second Field Artillery (formerly Second Infantry). 
 Third Field Artillery (formerly Ninth Infantry)... 
 Company C. Engineers (formerly Company F, 
 Fourth Infantry). 
 Company A. Engineers 
 
 South Carolina 
 
 Tennessee 
 
 First Field Hospital . ... 
 
 Troop C Cavalry 
 
 Texas 
 
 Troop D, Cavalry 
 
 Company A, Engineers 
 
 Utah... 
 
 Company B Engineers 
 
 Field Hospital No. 1 
 
 Virginia 
 
 First Squadron, Cavalry (formerly Richmond 
 Light Infantry Blues Battalion). 
 Company A Engineers 
 
 Wisconsin . . . 
 
 Troop B, Cavalrv .. . . 
 
 
 
156 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 Number of National Guardsmen mustered out of the Federal service to Dec 
 
 1, 1916. 
 
 California 3, 024 
 
 Colorado 354 
 
 Connecticut 3, 163 
 
 District of Columbia 619 
 
 Illinois 5, 445 
 
 Indiana 231 
 
 Kansas 1, 704 
 
 Louisiana 1, 201 
 
 Maine 963 
 
 Maryland 1, 992 
 
 Massachusetts 7, 556 
 
 Minnesota 177 
 
 Missouri l, 922 
 
 Montana 901 
 
 New Jersey 3, 951 
 
 New York 7, 621 
 
 Oregon 1, 152 
 
 Pennsylvania 3, 471 
 
 Rhode Island 641 
 
 Utah 283 
 
 Vermont 967 
 
 Washington 1, 534 
 
 Wisconsin __ 254 
 
 Total 49,126 
 
 Aggregate strength of National Guard troops in the service of the United States. 
 
 June 30, 1916 82, 927 82, 927 
 
 July 31, 1916 : 
 
 On border duty 110,957 
 
 In State mobilization camps 40, 139 
 
 151, 096 
 
 Aug. 31, 1916 : 
 
 On border duty 111,954 
 
 In State mobilization camps 26, 643 
 
 138, 597 
 Sept. 30, 1916 : 
 
 On border duty , 108, 018 
 
 In State mobilization camps 35, 684 
 
 . 143,702 
 Oct. 31, 1916: 
 
 On border duty 102,527 . 
 
 At home stations for muster out 19, 711 
 
 122, 238 
 Nov. 30, 1916: 
 
 On border duty 96, 447 
 
 At home stations for muster out 4, 181 
 
 100, 628 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT. 
 
 The following are sections (57 to 119, inclusive) of the act of June 
 3, 1916, which relate to militia and are here appended for convenience 
 of reference : 
 
 SEC. 57. COMPOSITION OF THE MILITIA. The militia of the United States shall 
 consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able- 
 bodied males who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens 
 of the United States, who shall be more than eighteen years of age and, except 
 as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years of age, and said militia 
 shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and 
 the Unorganized Militia. 
 
 SEC. 58. COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. The National Guard shall 
 consist of the regularly enlisted militia between the ages of eighteen and forty- 
 five years organized, armed, and equipped as hereinafter provided, and of com- 
 missioned officers between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four years. 
 
 SEC. 59. EXEMPTIONS FROM MILITIA DUTY. The Vice President of the United 
 States; the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United 
 States and of the several States and Territories ; persons in the military or 
 naval service of the United States ; customhouse clerks ; persons employed by 
 the United States in the transmission of the mail ; artificers and workmen em- 
 ployed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States ; pilots ; 
 mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within 
 the United States, shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to age, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 157 
 
 and all persons who because of religious belief shall claim exemption from mili- 
 tary service, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such person shall be 
 established %nder such regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall be 
 exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity ; but no person so ex- 
 empted shall be exempt from militia service in any capacity that the President 
 shall declare to be noncombatant. 
 
 SEC. 60. ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD UNITS. Except as otherwise spe- 
 cifically provided herein, the organization of the National Guard, including the 
 composition of all units thereof, shall be the same as that which is or may here- 
 after be prescribed for the Regular Army, subject in time of peace to such 
 general exceptions as may be authorized by the Secretary of War. And the 
 President may prescribe the particular unit or units, as to branch or arm of 
 service, to be maintained in each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia 
 in order to secure a force which, when combined, shall form complete higher 
 tactical units. 
 
 SEC. 61. MAINTENANCE OF OTHER TROOPS BY THE STATES. No State shall main- 
 tain troops in time of peace other than as authorized in accordance with the 
 organization prescribed under this act : Provided, That nothing contained in this 
 act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Territories in the 
 use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of peace: 
 Provided further, That nothing contained in this act shall prevent the organiza- 
 tion and maintenance of State police or constabulary. 
 
 SEC. 62. NUMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. The number of enlisted men of 
 the National Guard to be organized under this act within one year from its 
 passage shall be for each State in the proportion of two hundred such men for 
 each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State and a number to 
 be determined by the President for each Territory and the District of Columbia, 
 and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of not less than 
 fifty per centum until a total peace strength of not less than eight hundred 
 enlisted men for each Senator and Representative in Congress shall have been 
 reached : Provided, That in States which have but one Representative in Con- 
 gress such increase shall be at the discretion of the President: Provided fur- 
 ther, That this shall not be construed to prevent any State, Territory, or the 
 District of Columbia from organizing the full number of troops required under 
 this section in less time than is specified in this section, or from maintaining 
 existing organizations if they shall conform to such rules and regulations re- 
 garding organization, strength, and armament as the President may prescribe: 
 And provided further, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any 
 State with but one Representative in Congress from organizing one or more 
 regiments of troops, with such auxiliary troops as the President may prescribe, 
 such organizations and members of such organizations to receive all the benefits 
 accruing under this act under the conditions set forth herein : Provided further, 
 That the word Territory as used in this act and in all laws relating to the land 
 militia and National Guard shall include and apply to Hawaii, Alaska, Porto 
 Rico, and the Canal Zone, and the militia of the Canal Zone shall be organized 
 under such rules and regulations, not in conflict with the provisions of this act, 
 as the President may prescribe. 
 
 SEC. 63. Any corps of Artillery, Cavalry, or Infantry existing in any of the 
 States on the passage of the act of May eighth, seventeen hundred and ninety- 
 two, which by the laws, customs, or usages of said States has been in continuous 
 existence since the passage of said act, under its provisions and under the pro- 
 visions of section two hundred and thirty-two and sections sixteen hundred and 
 twenty-five to sixteen hundred and sixty, both inclusive, of title sixteen of the 
 Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and the act of January 
 twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, relating to the militia, shall be allowed 
 to retain its ancient privileges, subject, nevertheless, to all duties required by law 
 of militia : Proridcd, That said organizations may be a part of the National 
 Guard and entitled to all the privileges of this act, and shall conform in all 
 respects to the organization, discipline, and training of the National Guard in 
 time of war : Provided further, That for purposes of training and when on active 
 duty in the service of the United States they may be assigned to higher units, 
 as the President may direct, and shall be subject to the orders of officers under 
 whom they shall be serving. 
 
 SEC. 64. ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD TO BRIGADES AND DIVISIONS. For the 
 purpose of maintaining appropriate organization and to assist in instruction 
 and training, the President may assign the National Guard of the several States 
 and Territories and the District of Columbia to divisions, brigades, and other 
 
158 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 tactical units, and may detail officers either from the National Guard or the 
 Regular Army to command such units : Provided, That where complete units are 
 organized within a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia the commanding 
 officers thereof shall not be displaced under the provisions of this section. 
 
 SEC. 65. CHIEFS OF STAFF OF NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS. The President may 
 detail one officer of the Regular Army as chief of staff and one officer of the 
 Regular Army or the National Guard as assistant to the chief of staff of any 
 division of the National Guard in the service of the United States as a National 
 Guard organization : Provided, That in order to insure the prompt mobilization 
 of the National Guard in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in 
 time of peace, detail an officer of the Regular Army to perform the duties of 
 <;hief of staff for each fully organized tactical division of the National Guard. 
 
 SEC. 66. ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF STATES, AND so FORTH. The adjutants gen- 
 eral of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia and the officers of 
 the National Guard shall make such returns and reports to the Secretary of 
 War, or to such officers as he may designate, at such times and in such form as 
 the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe : Provided, That the ad- 
 jutants general of the Territories and of the District of Columbia shall be ap- 
 pointed by the President with such rank and qualifications as he may prescribe, 
 and each adjutant general for a Territory shall be a citizen of the Territory for 
 which he is appointed. 
 
 SEC. 67. APPROPRIATION, APPORTIONMENT, AND DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS FOR THE 
 NATIONAL GUARD. A sum of money shall hereafter be appropriated annually, to 
 be paid out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the 
 support of the National Guard, including the expense of providing arms, ord- 
 nance stores, quartermaster stores, and camp equipage, and all other military 
 supplies for issue to the National Guard, and such other expenses pertaining to 
 said guard as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law. 
 
 The appropriation provided for in this section shall be apportioned among 
 the several States and Territories under just and equitable procedure to be pre- 
 scribed by the Secretary of War and in direct ratio to the number of enlisted 
 men in active service in the National Guard existing in such States and Ter- 
 ritories at the date of apportionment of said appropriation, and to the District 
 of Columbia, under such regulations as the President may prescribe : Provided, 
 That the sum so apportioned among the several States, Territories, and the 
 District of Columbia shall be available under such rules as may be prescribed 
 by the Secretary of War for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by 
 officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army when traveling on duty in con- 
 nection with the National Guard; for the transportation of supplies furnished 
 to the National Guard for the permanent equipment thereof ; for office rent and 
 necessary office expenses of officers of the Regular Army on duty with the 
 National Guard ; for the expenses of the Militia Bureau, including clerical serv- 
 ices, now authorized for the Division of Militia Affairs; for expenses of en- 
 listed men of the Regular Army on duty with the National Guard, including 
 quarters, fuel, light, medicines, and medical attendance ; and such expenses shall 
 constitute a charge against the whole sum annually appropriated for the sup- 
 port of the National Guard and shall be paid therefrom and not from the allot- 
 ment duly apportioned to any particular State, Territory, or the District of 
 Columbia ; for the promotion of rifle practice, including the acquisition, con- 
 struction, maintenance, and equipment of shooting galleries and suitable target 
 ranges; for the hiring of horses and draft animals for the use of mounted 
 troops, batteries, and wagons ; for forage for the same ; and for such other inci- 
 dental expenses in connection with lawfully authorized encampments, maneu- 
 vers, and field instruction as the Secretary of War may deem necessary; and 
 for such other expenses pertaining to the National Guard as are now or may 
 hereafter be authorized by law. 
 
 The governor of each State and Territory and the commanding general of the 
 National Guard of the, District of Columbia shall appoint, designate, or detail, 
 subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, an officer of the National 
 Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia who shall be regarded as 
 property and disbursing officer for the United States. He shall receipt and 
 account for all funds and property belonging to the United States in possession 
 of the National Guard of his State, Territory, or District and shall make such 
 returns and reports concerning the same as may be required by the Secretary 
 of War. The Secretary of War is authorized, on the requisition of the governor 
 of a State or Territory or the commanding general of the National Guard of the 
 District of Columbia, to pay to the property and disbursing officer thereof so 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 159 
 
 much of its allotment out of the annual appropriation for the support of the 
 National Guard as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of War, be necessary 
 for the purposes enumerated therein. He shall render, through the War De- 
 partment, such accounts of Federal funds intrusted to him for disbursement as 
 may be required by the Treasury Department. Before entering upon the per- 
 formance of his duties as property and disbursing officer he shall be required 
 to give good and sufficient bond to the United States, the amount thereof to be 
 determined by the Secretary of War, for the faithful performance of his duties 
 and for the safe-keeping and proper disposition of the Federal property and 
 funds intrusted to his care. He shall, after having qualified as property and 
 disbursing officer, receive pay for his services at a rate to be fixed by the Sec- 
 retary of War, and such compensation shall be a charge against the whole sum 
 annually appropriated for the support of the National Guard: Provided, That 
 when traveling in the performance of his official duties under orders issued by 
 the proper authorities he shall be reimbursed for his actual necessary traveling 
 expenses, the sum to be made a charge against the allotment of the State, Ter- 
 ritory, or District of Columbia: Provided further, That the Secretary of War 
 shall cause an inspection of the accounts and records of the property and dis- 
 bursing officer to be made by an inspector general of the Army at least once 
 each year : And provided further, That the Secretary of War is empowered to 
 make all rules and regulations necessary to carry into effect the provisions of 
 this section. 
 
 SEC. 68. LOCATION OF UNITS. The States and Territories shall have the right 
 to determine and fix the location of the units and headquarters of the National 
 Guard within their respective borders: Provided, That no organization of the 
 National Guard, members of which shall be entitled to and shall have received 
 compensation under the provisions of this act, shall be disbanded without the 
 consent of the President, nor, without such consent, shall the commissioned 
 or enlisted strength of any such organization be reduced below the minimum 
 that shall be prescribed therefor by the President. 
 
 SEC. 69. ENLISTMENTS IN THE NATIONAL GUAED. Hereafter the period of 
 enlistment in the National Guard shall be for six years, the first three years 
 of which shall be in an active organization and the remaining three years in 
 the National Guard Reserve, hereinafter provided for, and the qualifications for 
 enlistment shall be the same as those prescribed for admission to the Regular 
 Army : Provided, That in the National Guard the privilege of continuing in active 
 service during the whole of an enlistment period and of reenlisting in said 
 service shall not be denied by reason of anything contained in this act. 
 
 SEC. 70. FEDEKAL ENLISTMENT CONTRACT. Enlisted men in the National Guard 
 of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia now serving 
 under enlistment contracts which contain an obligation to defend the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States and to obey the orders of the President of the United 
 States shall be recognized as members of the National Guard under the provi- 
 sions of this act for the unexpired portion of their present enlistment contracts. 
 When any such enlistment contract does not contain such obligation, the enlisted 
 man shall not be recognized as a member of the National Guard until he shall 
 have signed an enlistment contract and taken and subscribed to the following 
 oath of enlistment, upon signing which credit shall be given for the period 
 already served under the old enlistment contract : " I do hereby acknowledge 
 
 to have voluntarily enlisted this day of , 19 , as a soldier in the 
 
 National Guard of the United States and of the State of - , for the period of 
 three years in service and three years in the reserve, under the conditions 
 prescribed by law, unless sooner discharged by proper authority. And I do 
 solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States 
 
 of America and to the State of , and that I will serve them honestly and 
 
 faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever, and that I will obey the orders 
 of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of - , 
 and of the officers appointed over me according to law and the rules and articles 
 of war." 
 
 SEC. 71. Hereafter all men enlisting for service in the National Guard shall 
 sign an enlistment contract and take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in the 
 preceding section of this act. 
 
 SEC. 72. DlSCHAEGE OF ENLISTED MEN FEOM THE NATIONAL GlTAED. An en- 
 
 listed man discharged from service in the National Guard shall receive a dis- 
 charge in writing in such form and with such classification as is or shall be 
 prescribed for the Regular Army, and in time of peace discharges may be given 
 
160 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment under such regulations as the 
 President may prescribe. 
 
 SEC. 73. FEDEEAL OATH FOK NATIONAL GUAKD OFFICERS. Commissioned officers 
 of the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of 
 Columbia now serving under commissions regularly issued shall continue in 
 office, as officers of the National Guard, without the issuance of new commis- 
 sions : Provided, That said officers have taken, or shall take and subscribe to the 
 following oath of office : " I, - , do solemnly swear "that I will support and 
 defend the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State 
 of - , against all enemies, foreign and domestic ; that I will bear true faith 
 and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the 
 United States and of the governor of the State of ; that I make this 
 obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and 
 
 that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office .of in the 
 
 National Guard of the United States and of the State of - - upon which 
 I am about to enter, so help me God." 
 
 SEC. 74. QUALIFICATIONS FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS. Persons hereafter 
 commissioned as officers of the National Guard shall not be recognized as such 
 under any of the provisions of this act unless they shall have been selected from 
 the following classes and shall have taken and subscribed to the oath of office 
 prescribed in the preceding section of this act: Officers or enlisted men of the 
 National Guard ; officers on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard ; 
 officers, active or retired, and former officers of the United States Army, Navy, 
 and Marine Corps; graduates of the United States Military and Naval Acad- 
 emies and graduates of schools, colleges, and universities where military science 
 is taught under the supervision of an officer of the Regular Army, and, for the 
 technical branches and staff corps or departments, such other civilians as may be 
 especially qualified for duty therein. 
 
 SEC. 75. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any person hereafter 
 appointed an officer of the National Guard unless he first shall have successfully 
 passed such tests as to his physical, moral, and professional fitness as the 
 President shall prescribe. The examination to determine such qualifications for 
 commission shall be conducted by a board of three commissioned officers ap- 
 pointed by the Secretary of War from the Regular Army or the National Guard, 
 or both. 
 
 SEC. 76. FILLING OF VACANCIES WHEN DRAFTED INTO FEDERAL SERVICE. All va- 
 cancies occurring in any grade of commissioned officers in any organization in the 
 military service of the United States and composed of persons drafted from the 
 National Guard under the provision of this act shall be filled by the President, 
 as far as practicable, by the appointment of persons similarly taken from said 
 guard, and in the manner prescribed by law for filling similar vacancies occurring 
 in the volunteer forces. 
 
 SEC. 77. ELIMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF OFFICERS. At any time the moral 
 character, capacity, and general fitness for the service of any National Guard 
 officer may be determined by an efficiency board of three commissioned officers, 
 senior in rank to the officer whose fitness for service shall be under investigation, 
 and if the findings of such board be unfavorable to such officer and be approved 
 by the official authorized to appoint such an officer, he shall be discharged. Com- 
 missions of officers of the National Guard may be vacated upon resignation, 
 absence without leave for three months, upon the recommendation of an efficiency 
 board, or pursuant to sentence of a court-martial. Officers of said guard ren- 
 dered surplus by the disbandment of their organizations shall be placed in the 
 National Guard Reserve. Officers may, upon their own application, be placed in 
 the said reserve. 
 
 SEC. 78. THE NATIONAL GUARD RESERVE. Subject to such rules and regula- 
 tions as the President may prescribe, a National Guard Reserve shall be or- 
 ganized in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, and shall con- 
 sist of such organizations, officers, and enlisted men as the President may pre- 
 scribe, or members thereof may be assigned as reserves to an active organiza- 
 tion of the National Guard : Provided, That members of said reserve, when en- 
 gaged in field or coast-defense training with the active National Guard, shall 
 receive the same Federal pay and allowances as enlisted men of like grade on 
 the active list of said guard when likewise engaged : Provided further, That, 
 except as otherwise specifically provided in this act, no commissioned or enlisted 
 reservist shall receive any pay or allowances out of any appropriation made by 
 Congress for National Guard purposes. 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 161 
 
 SEC. 79. RESERVE BATTALIONS FOR RECRUIT TRAINING. When members of the 
 National Guard and the enlisted reserve thereof of any State, Territory, or the 
 District of Columbia shall have been brought into the service of the United 
 States in time of war, there shall be immediately organized, either from such 
 enlisted reserve, or from the unorganized militia, in such State, Territory, or 
 District, one reserve battalion for each regiment of Infantry or Cavalry, or each 
 nine batteries of Field Artillery, or each twelve companies of Coast Artillery, 
 brought into the service of the United States, and such reserve battalion shall 
 constitute the fourth battalion of any such regiment or twelve companies of 
 Coast Artillery. Reserve .battalions shall consist of four companies of such 
 strength as may be prescribed by the President of the United States. When the 
 members of three or more regiments of the National Guard of any State, 
 Territory, or District shall have been brought into the service of the United 
 States, the reserve battalions of such regiments may be organized into pro- 
 visional regiments and higher units. If for any reason there shall not be enough 
 voluntary enlistments to keep the reserve battalions at the prescribed strength, 
 a sufficient number of the unorganized militia shall be drafted into the service 
 of the United States to maintain each of such battalions at the proper strength. 
 As vacancies occur from death or other causes in any organization in the service 
 of the United States and composed of men taken from the National Guard, men 
 shall be transferred from the reserve battalions to the organizations in the field 
 so that such organizations may be maintained at war strength. Officers for the 
 reserve battalions provided for herein shall be drafted from the National Guard 
 Reserve or Coast Artillery companies of the National Guard or the Officers' Re- 
 serve Corps, such officers to be taken, if practicable, from the States, respec- 
 tively, in which the battalions shall be organized. Officers and noncommis- 
 sioned officers returned to their home stations because of their inability to per- 
 form active field service may be assigned to reserve battalions for duty, and all 
 soldiers invalided home shall be assigned to and carried on the rolls of reserve 
 battalions until returned to duty or until discharged. 
 
 SEC. 80. LEAVES OF ABSENCE FOR CERTAIN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. All officers 
 and employees of the United States and of the District of Columbia who shall 
 be members of the National Guard shall be entitled to leave of absence from 
 their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating on all days 
 during which they shall be engaged in field or coast-defense training ordered 
 or authorized under the provisions of this act. 
 
 SEC. 81. MILITIA BUREAU OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT. The National Militia 
 Board created by section eleven of the act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen 
 hundred and eight, amending section twenty of the act of January twenty-first, 
 nineteen hundred and three, shall, from the date of the approval of this act, be 
 abolished. The Militia Division now existing in the War Department shall 
 hereafter be known as the Militia Bureau of said department, shall, like other 
 bureaus of said department, be under the immediate supervision of the Secre- 
 tary of War, and shall not form a part of any other bureau, office, or other 
 organization, but the Chief of the Militia Bureau shall be ex officio a member 
 of the General Staff Corps : Provided, That the President may, in his discre- 
 tion, assign to duty in the Militia Bureau as assistants to the chief thereof not 
 to exceed one colonel and one lieutenant colonel of the National Guard for 
 terms of four years, and any such officer while so assigned shall, subject to 
 such regulations as the President may prescribe, receive out of the whole fund 
 appropriated for the support of the militia the pay and allowances of a Regular 
 Army officer having the same rank and length of service as said National Guard 
 officer whose prior service in the Organized Militia shall be counted in ascer- 
 taining his rights under this proviso. 
 
 SEC. 82. ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, AND UNIFORM OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. The 
 National Guard of the United States shall, as far as practicable, be uniformed, 
 armed, and equipped with the same type of uniforms, arms, and equipments 
 as are or shall be provided for the Regular Army. 
 
 SEC. 83. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to procure, under such 
 regulations as the President may prescribe, by purchase or manufacture, 
 within the limits of available appropriations made by Congress, and to issue 
 from time to time to the National Guard, upon requisition of the governors 
 of the several States and Territories or the commanding general of the National 
 Guard of the District of Columbia, such number of United States service arms, 
 with all accessories, field-artillery materiel, engineer, coast artillery, signal, 
 and sanitary materiel, accouterments, field uniforms, clothing, equipage, pub- 
 
 7203116 11 
 
162 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 lications, and military stores of all kinds, including public animals, as are 
 necessary to arm, uniform, and equip for field service the National Guard in 
 the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia : Provided, That as 
 a condition precedent to the issue of any property as provided for by this 
 act, the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia desiring such issue shall 
 make adequate provision, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War, for the 
 protection and care of such property : Provided further. That whenever it 
 shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War that the National 
 Guard of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia is properly organized, 
 armed, and equipped for field service, funds allotted to that State, Territory, 
 or District for the support of its National Guard may be used for the purchase 
 from the War Department of any article issued by any of the supply depart- 
 ments of the Army. 
 
 SEC. 84. Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, whenever a 
 new type of equipment, small arm, or field gun shall have been issued to the 
 National Guard of the several States. Territories, and the District of Columbia, 
 such equipment, small arms, and field guns, including Jill accessories, shall be 
 furnished without charging the cost or value thereof or any expense connected 
 therewith against the appropriations provided for the support of the National 
 Guard. 
 
 SEC. 85. Each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall, on the 
 receipt of new property issued to replace obsolete or condemned prior issues, 
 turn in to the War Department or otherwise dispose of, in accordance with the 
 directions of the Secretary of War, all property so replaced or condemned, and 
 shall not receive any money credit therefor. 
 
 SEC. 86. Any State. Territory, or the District of Columbia may, with the 
 approval of the Secretary of War. purchase for cash from the War Department 
 for the use of the National Guard, including the officers thereof, any stores, sup- 
 plies, material of war, and military publications furnished to the Army, in addi- 
 tion to those issued under the provisions of this act, at the price at which they 
 shall be listed to the Army, with cost of transportation added. The funds re- 
 ceived from such sale shall be credited to the appropriation to which they shall 
 belong, shall not be covered into the Treasury, and shall be available until 
 expended to replace therewith the supplies sold to the States in the manner 
 herein authorized : Provided, That stores, supplies, and materiel of war so pur- 
 chased by a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, in time of actual 
 or threatened war, be requisitioned by the United States for use in the military 
 service thereof, and when so requisitioned by the United States and delivered 
 credit for the ultimate return of such property in kind shall be allowed to such 
 State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. 
 
 SEC. 87. DISPOSITION AND KEPI.ACKMENT OF DAMAGED PROPKKTY, AND so FORTH. 
 All military property issued to the National Guard as herein provided shall 
 remain the property of the United States. Whenever any such property issued 
 to the National Guard in any State or Territory or the District of Columbia 
 shall have been lost, damaged, or destroyed, or becoming unserviceable or unsuit- 
 able by use in service or from any other cause, it shall be examined by a dis- 
 interested surveying officer of the Regular Army or the National Guard, detailed 
 by the Secretary of War, and the report of such surveying officer shall be for- 
 warded to the Secretary of War, or to such officer as he shall designate to receive 
 such reports ; and if it shall appear to the Secretary of War from the record of 
 survey that the property was lost, damaged, or destroyed through unavoidable 
 causes, he is hereby authorized to relieve the State or Territory or the District of 
 Columbia from further accountability therefor. If it shall appear that the loss, 
 damage, or destruction of property was due to carelessness or neglect, or that 
 its loss, damage, or destruction could have been avoided by the exercise of 
 reasonable care the money value of such property shall be charged to the 
 accountable State, Territory, or District of Columbia, to be paid from State, 
 Territory, or District funds, or any funds other than Federal. If the articles 
 so surveyed are found to be unserviceable or unsuitable, the Secretary of War 
 shall direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made of them ; and 
 if sold, the proceeds of such sale, as well as stoppages against officers and en- 
 listed men, and the net proceeds of collections made from any person or from 
 any State, Territory, or District to reimburse the Government for the loss, 
 damage, or destruction of any property, shall be deposited in the Treasury of 
 the United States as a credit to said State. Territory, or the District of Co- 
 lumbia, accountable for said property, and as a part of and in addition to that 
 portion of its allotment set aside for the purchase of similar supplies, stores, or 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 163 
 
 material of war : Provided further, That if any State, Territory, or the District 
 of Columbia shall neglect or refuse to pay, or to cause to be paid, the money 
 equivalent of any loss, damage, or destruction of property charged against such 
 State, Territory, or the District of Columbia by the Secretary of War after 
 survey by a disinterested officer appointed as hereinbefore provided, the Secre- 
 tary of War is hereby authorized to debar such State, Territory, or the District 
 of Columbia from further participation in any and all appropriations for the 
 National Guard until such payment shall have been made. 
 
 SEC. 88. The net proceeds of the sale of condemned stores issued to the 
 National Guard and not charged to State allotments shall be covered into the 
 Treasury of the United States, as shall also stoppages against officers and en- 
 listed men, and the net proceeds of collections made from any person to reim- 
 burse the Government for the loss, damage, or destruction of said property not 
 charged against the State allotment issued for the use of the National Guard. 
 
 SEC. 89. HORSES FOR CAVALRY AND FIELD ARTILLERY OF NATIONAL GUARD. 
 Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard 
 shall be available for the purchase, under such regulations as the Secretary of 
 War may prescribe, of horses conforming to the Regular Army standards for 
 the use of Field Artillery and Cavalry of the National Guard, said horses to 
 remain the property of the United States and to be used solely for military 
 purposes. 
 
 Horses so purchased may be issued not to exceed thirty-two to any one 
 battery or troop, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may pre- 
 scribe; and the Secretary of War is further authorized to issue, in lieu of 
 purchase, for the use of such organizations, condemned Army horses which are 
 no longer fit for service, but which may be suitable for the purposes of instruc- 
 tion, such horses to be sold as now provided by law when said purposes shall 
 have been served. 
 
 SEC. 90. Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the Na- . 
 tional Guard shall be available for the purchase and issue of forage, bedding, 
 shoeing, and veterinary services, and supplies for the Government horses issued 
 to any battery or troop, and for the compensation of competent help for the 
 care of the material, animals, and equipment thereof, under such regulations 
 as the Secretary of War may prescribe: Provided, That the men to be compen- 
 sated, not to exceed five for each battery or troop, shall be duly enlisted therein 
 and shall be detailed by the battery or troop commander, under such regula- 
 tions as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and shall be paid by the United 
 States disbursing officer in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia. 
 
 SEC. 91. DISCIPLINE TO CONFORM TO THAT OF REGULAR ARMY. The discipline 
 (which includes training) of the National Guard shall conform to the system 
 which is now or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular Army, and the 
 training shall be carried out by the several States, Territories, and the District 
 of Columbia so as to conform to the provisions of this act. 
 
 SEC. 92. TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. Each company, troop, battery, 
 and detachment in the National Guard shall assemble for drill and instruction, 
 including indoor target practice, not less than forty-eight times each year, and 
 shall, in addition thereto, participate in encampments, maneuvers, or other exer- 
 cises, including outdoor target practice, at least fifteen days in training each 
 year, including target practice, unless such company, troop, battery, or detach- 
 ment shall have been excused from participation in any part thereof by the 
 Secretary of War: Pro rifled, That credit for an assembly for drill or for indoor 
 target practice shall not be given unless the number of officers and enlisted 
 men present for duty at such assembly shall equal or exceed a minimum to be 
 prescribed by the President, nor unless the period of actual military duty and. 
 instruction participated in by each officer and enlisted man at each such assem- 
 bly at which he sha.ll be credited as having been present shall be of at least one 
 and one-half hours' duration and the character of training such as may be pre- 
 scribed by the 'Secretary of War. 
 
 SEC. 93. INSPECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. The Secretary of War shall 
 cause an inspection to be made at least once each year by inspectors general 
 JUKI, if necessary, by other officers of the Regular Army detailed by him for 
 that purpose, to determine whether the amount and condition of the property 
 in the hands of the National Guard is satisfactory; whether the National 
 Guard is organized as hereinbefore prescribed ; whether the officers and enlisted 
 men possess the physical and other qualifications prescribed ; whether the .or- 
 ganization and the officers and enlisted men thereof are sufficiently armed, 
 uniformed, equipped, and being trained and instructed for active duty in the 
 
164 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 field or coast defense ; and whether the records are being kept in accordance 
 with the requirements of this act. The reports of such inspections shall serve 
 as the basis for deciding as to the issue to and retention by the National Guard 
 of the military property provided for by this act and for determining what 
 organizations and individuals shall be considered as constituting parts of the 
 National Guard within the meaning of this act. 
 
 SEC. 94. ENCAMPMENTS AND MANEUVEKS. Under such regulations as the 
 President may prescribe, the Secretary of War is authorized to provide for the 
 participation of the whole or any part of the National Guard in encampments, 
 maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or 
 coast-defense instruction, either independently or in conjunction with any part 
 of the Regular Army, and there may be set aside from the funds appropriated 
 for that purpose and allotted to any State, Territory, or the District of Co- 
 lumbia, such portion of said funds as may be necessary for the payment, sub- 
 sistence, transportation, and other proper expenses of such portion of the Na- 
 tional Guard of such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia as shall par- 
 ticipate in such encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor 
 target practice, for field and coast-defense instruction ; and the officers and 
 enlisted men of such National Guard while so engaged shall be entitled to the 
 same pay, subsistence, and transportation as officers and enlisted men of cor- 
 responding grades of the Regular Army are or hereafter may be entitled by law. 
 SEC. 95. When any part of the National Guard participates in encampments, 
 maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or 
 coast-defense instruction at a United States military post, or reservation, or 
 elsewhere, if in conjunction with troops of the United States, the command of 
 such military post or reservation and of the officers and troops of the United 
 States on duty there or elsewhere shall remain with the commander of the 
 United States troops without regard to the rank of the commanding or other 
 officer of the National Guard temporarily engaged in the encampments, ma- 
 neuvers, or other exercises. 
 
 SEC. 96. USE OF REGULAR ARMY PERSONNEL. The Secretary of War may de- 
 tail one or more officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army to attend any 
 encampment, maneuver, or other exercise for field or coast-defense instruction 
 of the National Guard, who shall give such instruction and information to the 
 officers and men assembled for such encampment, maneuver, or other exercise 
 as may be directed by the Secretary of War or requested by the governor or by 
 the commanding officer of the National Guard there on duty. 
 
 SEC. 97. Under such regulations as the President may prescribe the Secretary 
 of War may provide camps for the instruction of officers and enlisted men of 
 the National Guard. Such camps shall be conducted by officers of the Regular 
 Army detailed by the Secretary of War for that purpose, and may be located 
 either within or without the State, Territory, or District of Columbia to which 
 the members of the National Guard designated to attend said camps shall 
 belong. Officers and enlisted men attending such camps shall be entitled to pay 
 and transportation, and enlisted men to subsistence in addition, at the same 
 rates as for encampments or maneuvers for field or coast-defense instruction. 
 
 SEC. 98. When any portion of the National Guard shall participate in encamp- 
 ments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field 
 or coast-defense instruction, under the provisions of this act, it may, after being 
 duly mustered, be paid at any time after such muster for the period from the 
 date of leaving the home rendezvous to date of return thereto as determined in 
 advance, both dates inclusive; and such payment, if otherwise correct, shall 
 pass to the credit of the disbursing officer making the same. 
 
 SEC. 99. NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND MEN AT SERVICE SCHOOLS, AND so 
 'FORTH. Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Secretary 
 of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Terri- 
 tory or the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Co- 
 lumbia, authorize a limited number of selected officers or enlisted men of the 
 National Guard to attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military 
 service school of the United States, except the United States Military Academy ; 
 or to be attached to an organization of the same arm, corps, or department to 
 which such officer or enlisted man shall belong, for routine practical instruction 
 at or near an Army post during a period of field training or other outdoor exer- 
 cises ; and such officer or enlisted man shall receive, out of any National Guard 
 allotment of funds available for the purpose, the same travel allowances and 
 quarters, or commutation of quarters, and the same pay, allowances, and sub- 
 sistence to which an officer or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 165 
 
 entitled for attending such school, college, or practical course of instruction 
 under orders from proper military authority, while in actual attendance at such 
 school, college, or practical course of instruction: Provided, That in no case 
 shall the pay and allowances authorized by this section exceed those of a 
 captain. 
 
 SEC. 100. DETAIL OF OFFICEKS OF REGULAR ARMY TO DUTY WITH THE NATIONAL 
 GUARD. The Secretary of War shall detail officers of the active list of the 
 Army to duty with the National Guard in each State, Territory, or District of 
 Columbia, and officers so detailed may accept commissions in the National 
 Guard, with the permission of the President and terminable in his discretion, 
 without vacating their commissions in the Regular Army or being prejudiced in 
 their relative or lineal standing therein. The Secretary of War may, upon like 
 application, detail one or more enlisted men of the Regular Army with each 
 State, Territory, or District of Columbia for duty in connection with the 
 National Guard. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent 
 the detail of retired officers as now provided by law. 
 
 SEC. 101. NATIONAL GUARD, WHEN SUBJECT TO LAWS GOVERNING REGULAR 
 ARMY. The National Guard when called as such into the service of the United 
 States shall, from the time they are required by the terms of the call to respond 
 thereto, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, so 
 far as such laws and regulations are applicable to officers and enlisted men 
 whose permanent retention in the military service, either on the active list or 
 on the retired list, is not contemplated by existing law. 
 
 SEC. 102. SYSTEM OF COURTS-MARTIAL FOR NATIONAL GUARD. Except in organi- 
 zations in the service of the United States, courts-martial in the National Guard 
 shall be of three kinds, namely, general courts-martial, special courts-martial, 
 and summary courts-martial. They shall be constituted like and have cogni- 
 zance of the same subjects, and possess like powers except as to punishments as 
 similar courts provided for by the laws and regulations governing the Army 
 of the United States, and the proceedings of courts-martial of the National 
 Guard shall follow the forms and modes of procedure prescribed for said 
 similar courts. 
 
 SEC. 103. General courts-martial of the National Guard not in the service of 
 the United States may be convened by orders of the President, or of the gov- 
 ernors of the respective States and Territories, or by the commanding general 
 of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, and such courts shall have 
 the power to impose fines not exceeding $200; to sentence to forfeiture of pay 
 and allowances; to a reprimand; to dismissal or dishonorable discharge from 
 the service ; to reduction of noncommissioned officers to the ranks ; or any two 
 or more of such punishments may be combined in the sentences imposed by 
 such courts. 
 
 SEC. 104. In the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, the 
 commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, brigade, 
 regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command may appoint special 
 courts-martial for his command ; but such special courts-martial may in any 
 case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. 
 Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military 
 law, except a commissioned officer, for any crime or offense made punishable by 
 the military laws of the United States, and such special courts-martial shall 
 have the same powers of punishment as do general courts-martial, except that 
 fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed $100. 
 
 SEC. 105. In the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, the 
 commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, or other place, regiment or corps, 
 detached battalion, company, or other detachment of the National Guard may 
 appoint for such place or command a summary court to consist of one officer, 
 who shall have power to administer oaths and to try the enlisted men of such 
 place or command for breaches of discipline and violations of laws governing 
 such organizations ; and said court, when satisfied of the guilt of such soldier, 
 may impose fines not exceeding $25 for any single offense; may sentence non- 
 commissioned officer to reduction to the ranks ; may sentence to forfeiture of 
 pay and allowances. The proceedings of such court shall be informal, and the 
 minutes thereof shall be the same as prescribed for summary courts of the Army 
 of the United States. 
 
 SEC. 106. All courts-martial of the National Guard, not in the service of the 
 United States, including summary courts, shall have power to sentence to con- 
 finement in lieu of fines authorized to be imposed: Provided, That such sen- 
 tences of confinement shall not exceed one day for each dollar of fine authorized. 
 
166 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 SEC. 107. No sentence of dismissal from the service or dishonorable discharge, 
 imposed by a National Guard court-martial, not in the service of the United 
 States, shall be executed until approved by the governor of the State or 
 Territory concerned, or by the commanding general of the National Guard of the 
 District of Columbia. 
 
 SEC. 108. In the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, 
 presidents of courts-martial and summary court oilicers shall have power to 
 issue warrants to arrest accused persons and to bring them before the court for 
 trial whenever such persons shall have disobeyed an order in writing from the 
 convening authority to appear before such court, a copy of the charge or 
 charges having been delivered to the' accused with such order, and to issue 
 subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecnm and to enforce by attachment attendance 
 of witnesses and the production of books and papers, and to sentence for a 
 refusal to be sworn or to answer as provided in actions before civil courts. 
 
 All processes and sentences of said courts shall be executed by such civil 
 officers as may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories, 
 and in any State where no provision shall hfive been made for such action, and 
 in the Territories and the District of Columbia, such processes and sentences 
 shall be executed by a United States marshal or his duly appointed deputy, and 
 it shall be the duty of any United States marshal to execute all such processes 
 and sentences and make return thereof to the officer issuing or imposing the 
 same. 
 
 SEC. 109. PAY FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS. Certain commissioned officers 
 on the active list belonging to organizations of the National Guard of each State, 
 Territory, and the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of 
 the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard shall receive 
 compensation for their services, except during periods of service for which 
 they may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding 
 grades of the Regular Army, as follows, not to include longevity pay : A captain 
 $500 per year and the same pay shall be paid to every officer of higher rank 
 than that* of captain, a first lieutenant $240 per yenr, and a second lieutennnt 
 $200 per year. Regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War shall 
 determine'the amount and character of service that must be rendered by officers 
 to entitle them to the whole or specific parts of the maximum pay hereinbefore 
 authorized: Provided, That all staff officers, aids-de-camp, and chaplains shall 
 receive not to exceed one-half of the pay of a captain, except that regimental 
 adjutants, and majors and captains in command of machine-gun companies, 
 ambulance companies, field hospital companies, or sanitary troops shall receive 
 the pay hereinbefore authorized for a captain. 
 
 SEC. 110. PAY FOR NATIONAL GUARD ENLISTED MEN. Each enlisted man on the 
 active list belonging to an organization of the National Guard of a State, Terri- 
 tory, or the District of Columbia, participating in the apportionment of the 
 annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard, shall receive com- 
 pensation for his services, except during periods of service for which he may 
 become lawfully entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding 
 grade in the Regular Army, at a rate equal to twenty-five per centum of the 
 initial pay now provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the 
 Regular Army : Provided, That such enlisted man shall receive the compensation 
 herein provided if he shall have attended not less than forty-eight regular drills 
 during any one year, and a proportionate amount for attendance upon a lesser 
 number of such drills, not less than twenty-four ; and no such enlisted man shall 
 receive any part of said compensation except as authorized by this proviso and 
 the three 'provisos next following : Provided further, That the compensation 
 provided herein shall be computed for semiannual periods, beginning the first 
 day of January and the first day of July of each year, in proportion to the 
 number of drills attended ; and no compensation shall be paid to any enlisted 
 man for the first semiannual period of any year unless he shall have attended 
 during said period at least twenty-four drills, but any lesser number of drills 
 attended during said period shall be reckoned with the drills attended during 
 the second semiannual period in computing the compensation, if any, due him for 
 that year : Provided further, That when any man enters into an enlistment other 
 than an immediate reenlistment he shall be entitled to proportional compensation 
 for that year if during the remainder of the year he shall attend a number 
 of drills whose ratio to twenty-four is not less than the ratio of the part of the 
 year so served to the whole year ; and when any man's enlistment shall expire 
 the compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled shall be determined in 
 
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 167 
 
 like manner : Provided further, That periods of any actual military duty equiva- 
 lent to the drills herein prescribed (except those periods of service for which 
 members of the National Guard may become lawfully entitled to the same pay 
 as officers and enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army) 
 may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secre- 
 tary of War. 
 
 All amounts appropriated for the purpose of this and the last preceding sec- 
 tion shall be disbursed and accounted for by the officers and agents of the 
 Quartermaster Corps of the Army, and all disbursements under the foregoing 
 provisions of this section shall be made as soon as practicable after the thirty- 
 first day of December and the thirtieth day of June of each year upon pay 
 rolls prepared and authenticated in the manner to be prescribed by the Secre- 
 tary of War : Provided, That stoppages may be made against the compensation 
 payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public 
 property lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such officer or enlisted man. 
 
 Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, no money appropriated under 
 the provisions of this or the last preceding section shall be paid to any person 
 not on the active list, nor to any person over sixty-four years of age, nor to any 
 person who shall fail to qualify as to fitness for military service under such 
 regulations as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, nor to any State, Territory, 
 or District, or officer or enlisted man in the National Guard thereof, unless and 
 until such State, Territory, or District provides by law that staff officers, in- 
 cluding officers of the Pay, Inspection, Subsistence, and Medical Departments, 
 hereafter appointed shall have had previous military experience and shall hold 
 their positions until they shall have reached the age of sixty-four years, unless 
 retired prior to that time by reason of resignation, disability, or for cause to 
 be determined by a court-martial legally convened for that purpose, and that 
 vacancies among said officers shall be filled by appointment from the officers of 
 the militia of such State, Territory, or District: Provided further, That the 
 preceding proviso shall not apply to any State, Territory, or District until sixty 
 days next after the adjournment of the next session of its legislature held 
 after the approval of this act. 
 
 SEC. 111. NATIONAL GUARD WHEN DRAFTED INTO FEDERAL SERVICE. When 
 Congress shall have authorized the use of the armed land forces of the United 
 States, for any purpose requiring the use of troops in excess of those of the 
 Regular Army, the President may, under such regulations, including such 
 physical examination, as he may prescribe, draft into the military service of 
 the United States, to serve therein for the period of the war unless sooner dis- 
 charged, any or all members of the National Guard and of the National Guard 
 Reserve. All persons so drafted shall, from the date of their draft, stand dis- 
 charged from the militia, and shall from said date be subject to such laws and 
 regulations for the government of the Army of the United States as may be ap- 
 plicable to members of the Volunteer Army, and shall be embodied in organiza- 
 tions corresponding as far as practicable to those of the Regular Army or shall 
 be otherwise assigned as the President may direct. The commissioned officers 
 of said organizations shall be appointed from among the members thereof, 
 officers with rank not above that of colonel to be appointed by the President 
 alone, and all other officers to be appointed by the President by and with the 
 advice and consent of the Senate. Officers and enlisted men in the service of 
 the United States under the terms of this section shall have the same pay and 
 allowances as officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army of the same grades 
 and the same prior service. 
 
 SEC. 112. RIGHTS TO PENSIONS. When any officer or enlisted man of the 
 National Guard drafted into the service of the United States in time of war 
 is disabled by reason of wounds or disability received or incurred while in the 
 active service of the United States in time of war, he shall be entitled to all 
 the benefits of the pension laws existing at the time of his service, and in case 
 such officer or enlisted man dies in the active service of the United States in 
 time of war or in returning to his place of residence after being mustered out 
 of such service, or at any other time in consequence of wounds or disabilities 
 received in such active service, his widow and children, if any, shall be en- 
 titled to all the benefits of such pension laws. 
 
 SEC. 113. ENCOURAGEMENT OF RIFLE PRACTICE. The Secretary of War shall 
 annually submit to Congress recommendations and estimates for the estab- 
 lishment and maintenance of indoor and outdoor rifle ranges, under such a 
 comprehensive plan as will ultimately result in providing adequate facilities for 
 
168 MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 
 
 rifle practice in all sections of the country. And that all ranges so established, 
 and all ranges which may have already been constructed in whole or in part, 
 with funds provided by Congress shall be open for use by those in any branch 
 of the military or naval service of the United States and by all able-bodied 
 males capable of bearing arms, under reasonable regulations to be prescribed 
 by the controlling authorities and approved by the Secretary of War. That 
 the President may detail capable officers and noncommissioned officers of the 
 Regular Army and National Guard to duty at such ranges as instructors for 
 the purpose of training the citizenry in the use of the military arm. Where 
 rifle ranges shall have been so established and instructors assigned to duty 
 thereat, the Secretary of War shall be authorized to provide for the issue of a 
 reasonable number of standard military rifles and such quantities of ammunition 
 as may be available for use in conducting such rifle practice. 
 
 SEC. 114. TEMPORARY VACANCIES IN REGULAR ARMY DUE TO DETAILS TO THE 
 NATIONAL GUARD. In time of war the temporary vacancies created in any grade 
 not above that of colonel among the commissioned personnel of any arm, staff 
 corps, or department of the Regular Army, through appointments of officers 
 thereof to higher rank in organizations composed of members taken from the 
 National Guard, shall be filled by temporary promotions according to seniority 
 in rank from officers holding commissions in the next lower grade in said 
 arm, staff corps, or department, and all vacancies created in any grade by 
 such temporary promotions shall be in like manner filled from, and thus cre- 
 ate temporary vacancies in, the next lower grade, and the vacancies that shall 
 remain thereafter in said arm, staff corps, or department, and that can 
 not be filled by temporary promotions, as prescribed in this section, may be 
 filled by the temporary appointment of officers of such number and grade or 
 grades as shall maintain said arm, corps, or department at the full commis- 
 sioned strength authorized by law: Provided, That in the staff corps and de- 
 partments subject to the provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of 
 the act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, and acts amendatory 
 thereof, temporary vacancies that can not be filled by temporary promotions as 
 hereinbefore prescribed shall be filled by temporary details in the manner pre- 
 scribed in said sections twenty-six and twenty-seven and acts amedatory 
 thereof, and the resulting temporary vacancies in the branches of the Army 
 from which the details shall be so made shall be filled as hereinbefore in this 
 section prescribed : Provided further, That officers temporarily promoted or 
 appointed under the terms of this section shall be promoted or appointed by the 
 President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms that 
 shall not extend beyond the war or the passing of the emergency for which 
 additional forces were brought into the military service of the United States, 
 and at the termination of the war or the passing of the emergency said officers 
 shall be discharged from the positions held by them under their temporary 
 commissions or appointments, and officers detailed as herein authorized shall 
 be relieved from their temporary details: And provided further That officers 
 temporarily promoted under the provisions of this section shall not vacate 
 their permanent commissions nor be prejudiced in their relative or lineal stand- 
 ing in the Regular Army. 
 
 SEC. 115. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. Every officer and enlisted man of the 
 National Guard, who shall be called into the service of the United States as 
 such, shall be examined as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the 
 President may prescribe, without further commission or enlistment: Provided, 
 That immediately preceding the muster out of an officer or enlisted man called 
 into the active service of the United States he shall be physically examined 
 under rules prescribed by the President of the United States, and the record 
 thereof shall be filed and kept in the War Department. 
 
 SEC. 116. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACT. Whenever any State shall, 
 within a limit of time to be fixed by the President, have failed or refused to 
 comply with or enforce any requirement of this act, or any regulation promul- 
 gated "thereunder and in aid thereof by the President or the Secretary of War, 
 the National Guard of such State shall be debarred, wholly or in part, as the 
 President may direct, from receiving from the United States any pecuniary 
 or other aid/benefit, or privilege authorized or provided by this act or any 
 other law. 
 
 SEC. 117. APPLICABLE. TO LAND FORCES ONLY. The provisions of this act in 
 respect to the militia shall be applicable only to militia organized as a land force 
 and not to the Naval Militia, which shall consist of such part of the militia as 
 
169 
 
 may be prescribed by the President for each State, Territory, or District: 
 Provided, That each State, Territory, or District maintaining a Naval Militia, 
 as herein prescribed, may be credited to the extent of the number thereof in 
 the quota that would otherwise be required by section sixty-two of this act. 
 
 SEC. 118. NECESSARY RULES AND REGULATIONS. The President shall make all 
 necessary rules and regulations and issue such orders as may be necessary for 
 the thorough organization, discipline, and government of the militia provided for 
 in this act. 
 
 SEC. 119. ANNUAL ESTIMATES REQUIRED. The Secretary of War shall cause 
 to be estimated annually the amount necessary for carrying out the provisions 
 of so much of this act as relates to the militia, and no money shall be expended 
 under said provisions except as shall from time to time be appropriated for 
 carrying them out. 
 
 o 
 
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