MILITARY BOOKS.

lublis^ci) b2

^tttjoritg.

Ii'itUed under the Superintendence of Utr Majesty's Stationery Office,

AND SOLD BY

W Olowbs ife Sons, Limited, 13, Charing Cross ; Harrison & Son8,59, Pall Mall ;
\V H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place; W. Mitchell, 39, Chariug Cross;
Longmans & Co., Paternoster Kow; Tkubner & Co., 57 & 59, Ludgate Hill;
SxANfOKD, Cbaring Cross; and Kegan Pavl,Trknch & Co., 1, Paternoster Sq. ;

Also by

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

—JO blin.
T

Received

Accessions No. "^^ ^^^ Slielf No.

<y'h-

)N-

Pay
oth.

ingr

lyal

•int.^

BT:

« u^. ^, ji.u.^v ^.M., — w j.vj^j.uaLXY V/fj OJ-WXIiXi 11 n.f-/* w.-1-m t«;ni-i'; Jiegnla.-

tions for. War Office, 20th March, 1879. Price 4». {Out of imnt.)

Vol. S.-ENGINEEB. DEPARTMENT, ROYAL : RegTilations for,

with Apcendix War Office, 1st December, 1882. Price 3s.
Vol. 6.— MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF TEE ARMY : Regula-
tions for. War Office, 1885. Price 2s. 6f/.
Vol. 7.— DRESS RE&UIiATIONS FOR OFFICERS OF THE

ARMY. Horse Guards, War Office, 17th May, 1883. Price 2s.
Vol. 8 — MILITIA: Regulations for. 1883. Price 2s.
Vol. 9.— VOLUNTEER FORCE : Regrulations for. 1884. Price
Is. 6d. (Out of nrint.)

Vol. 10.— YEOMANRY CAVALRY: Regulations for the. War

Office, 1885. 8vo.,110pp. Frico Is. 6d
VoL 11.— CLOTHING AND NECESSARIES: Regulations for
the Supply of, to the Regular Forces. War Office, 1881. Price 3s. 6rf.

Do. do. Alterations and Additions. 1881.

Price 2d.
Vol. 12.— VETERINARY DEPARTMENT, HER MAJESTY'S
AlvMY. Regulations for. 1882. Price Is. od.
ENCAMPMENTS: Regulations and Instructions for. Horse Gu»rd.«,

1883. Price 6rf.
STORES. SUPPLY OF TO AN ARMY IN THE FIELD BY THE
ORDNANCE STORE DEPARTMENT. Regulations for, and for the
Orgauization of Ser^'ices iu connection therowiih. (Issued vnih Army
{;ii-cular, November, 1881.) Price, stitched, 9£^. ; cloth. Is. 9(i
THE GENERAL ORDERS, by His Royal Highness thb Field Marshal
Co.mmandino-in-Chief, are published Monthly.
Index to Do., 1874 to 1884. Price Id
THE ARMY CIRCULARS are published Monthly.
Index to Do., 1867 to 1884. Price 4d

(1000 4|8C— H&S 4315)

.TARY Department,

University of California,

MILITARY BOOKS, published by Authority— continued^.

OOVIBBS FOB ABM7 CIBOUI.ABS AND QENEBAL OBDEB'S.

Prir« 9d. each.
OAVALKY:—

SWOBD, CABBINE, PISTOIi, AND LANOE EXEBCISE ;

Instructions for: together with FIELD GUN DKILL. For the Use

of the Cavah-y. Adjutftnt-Goneral's Office, Horse Guards, June, 1871.

Pocket size. Price l,i. (^Out of print.)

INSTBUCTION AND MOVEMENTS OF : BegTilations for. 1885.

liiuo., .')00 pp., 5!) plates. Price 2s. 6rf.
KIT PLATE. 1884. Price V/. •
BECGNNOITBINO- AN Ei^iJMY; Instructions in the Duties of

Marclies, Outpcsts, &c. For the Use of Auxiliary Cavalrj*. 1875. Price

\s. 6d. (Out of prittt.")

OABBINE, SNIDEB : Manual and Firing' Exercises for. Ilorso

Guards, 1882. Price Id.
TBANSPOBT, BEGIMENTAL : Manual for. 1878. Price 3d.
ABTILLEBY:—

BOYAIi BEQIMENT OP : Standing Orders of. 1876. Price 35.

(Out oJpniU.)
EXEBCISES, Siege and Ourrison : Manual of. 1879. Corrected to

1S,S2. 8vo. Price 6».
EXEBCISES: Siege and Garrison, Manual of. 1879. Pocket

Edition. Vol. 1, Parts I.-IV., corrected to June 24, 1882. Price Is. 9d.

Vol. 2, Parts V.-X., corrected to June 12, 1883. Price Is. 9cf.
EXEBCISES, Field: Manual of. 1881. Price 35. ; interleaved, 4«.

(Out oj print.)
FIELD. Tactics of. (Tn the pi-ess. )

FIELD SEBVICE : Handbook for. Compiled under the Super-
intendence of the R.A. Institution. Vol. 1. Field Artillery. (1884.)

8vo. 322 pp. Illustrated. Koan tuck. Price 5*.
SIEQE. Engaged in Active Operations. Instructions for the Service

of ; together with details of Stores to be supplied in connection therewith.

(1880.) Price 4». 6d.
CABBINE, SNIDEB: Manual and Firing Exercises for. 1879.

(Revised November, 1881.) 1883. Price 2d.
KIT PLATES. Nos. 1 to 10. Price 2c?. each, viz. :—

1. Kit of N.C.O. or Gunner E.H.A. Laid out for Inspection.

2. A Driver's Kit. Horse or Field Artillery.

3. Field Kit of Field Artillery. Laid out for Inspection. Dismounted

Men.

4. Garrison Artillery. Inspection of Field Kit.

5. Inspection of Kit of Dismounted Men. Field Artillery.

6. Kit of Garrison Artillery. Valise Equipment. Laid out for In-

spection.

7. Method of placing R.H.A. Kit and Accoutrements in Barrack Eoom.

8. Kit, &c., in Barrack Room. Mounted Men of Field Artillery.

9. „ „ Dismoimted „ „
10. Valise Equipment. Garrison Artillery.

TBUMPET AND BUGLE SOUNDS for all Branches of the Army
"With Instructions for the Training of Trumpeters and Buglers. Horse
Guards, War Office, 1st October, 1883. Price 25.
ENGINEEBING :—

EN0INEEB DEPABTMENT, BOYAL : Begulations for. With
Appendix. War Office, 1st December, 1882 (Army Regulations, Vol. 5.)
Price 3.*.
FIELD, ELEMENTABY : Manual of. 1883. Price l5. 6d.
MILITABY : Instruction in. Compiled at the School of Military
Engineering, Chatham.
Vol. L (Part IV— Field Defences. Third Edition. 1884. 8vo. 115 pp.

62 plates. W rapper. Price 2s.
VoL I. (Part 1).— Errata. 1883. Price 3rf.

Vol. I. (Part 2).— Attack of Fortresse . Third Edition. Price 25. 6d.

Vol. I. (Part 3).— Military Bridges. Third Edition. 1877. Pr.ico 3s.

Vol. L (Part 4).— Military Mining. Third Edition. 1883. Price 1*. Uc/.

Vol. I. (Part 5).— Miscellaneous. Thii'd Edition. 1885. Price 3s. Gd.

FOBTIFICATION AND MILITABY ENGINEEBINO- : Text

Bcok of, for use at the R.M. Academy, Woolwich. Part I. , 1884. 8vo.

200 pp. 45 plat«s. Cloth. Price 65. Part II., 1880. Price 7«. 6d.

RY Department,

•■^iTY OF California,

MILITARY BOOKS, published by Authority —co\Ain\iedi.
ENGINEERING— conf.

AIDE MESIOIBE, for the Use of Officers of Boyal Enigrineers.
Compiled by Colorol A. 0. Cooke, C.B., R.E., with Contributions and
Assistance from other Officers.

Vol. I. FormnlsB, Tables, Military Statistics, and Memoranda for the

Field. 1878. Price 12«. 6rf.
Vol. II. Permanent Euginccriiif?. 1884. Price 12.». 6./.
SAPPERS' MANUAL. For the Use of Engineer Volunteer Corps.
By Major W. A. Fuanicland, ll.E. Profusely Illustrated. Dcniy 16mo.,
leather, with clasp. Price 2s.
INFANTRY:—

FIELD EXERCISE AND EVOLUTIONS OF. As re\ised by Her
Majesty's command, 1884. Price l.r.
Do. * do. PART I. RECRUIT OR SQUAD DRILL.

1883. Price 2d.
KIT PLATE. 1884. Price Id

Do. Highland. 1884. Price Id

MOUNTED. Regrulations for. (1884.) Price \s.
SWORD AND CARBINE SWORD-BAYONET EXERCISES.

December 1st, 1880. Eeprinted. September, 1884. Price ^^d.
TRANSPORT, REGIMENTAL, Manual for. 1877. Price 3d.
VALISE EG CriPMENT. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FITTING. New
Edition. 1878. Price Id
MILITIA : Regrulations for. 1883. (Army Eeg., Vol. 8.)

LIEUTENANTS OF. Regoilations under which Commissions in
the Army may be obtained by. War Office, October, 1884. Issued
with Army Circulars, 1st November, 1884. 8vo., 11pp., stitched. Price Id
(VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT) ACT, 1875. With au Introduction
and Notes, by Charles M. Clode, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-
Law, and Solicitor to the War Depai'tment. Price Is. 6d.
VOLUNTEER FORCE:—

In Reg-imental Camps, or when encamped with the Eegular Fovces.
•Orders and instructions for. Eepriuted 1885. Price Id
GUNNERY :~

TABLE. By A. G. Greenhill, Professor of Mathematics to the Advanced

Class of lioyal Artillery Officers. 1883. Price 6d
Text Book of. By Captain G. Mackinlay, E.A. 1883. Price 5s.
GUNS : Handbooks for, viz. :—
80-PR. R.M.Lc Converted, of 5 tons, on Sliding Carriage (Land

Service). 1883. Price li-.

„ of 58 and 71 cwts. L.S. (1880). Price Is.

,, of 58 cwt., on Moncrieff Carriages

(Land Service). (1883). Price Is. 6d

of 35 cwt. (1880). Price Is.

40-PR. R.B.L. GUNS (side closing) on 6 ft. Parapet Carriage

(Land Service). 8vo. 25pp. 5 plates. W rapper. Price Is. 6d
32-PR. S.B. B.L. (For Flank Defence. Mounted on Garrison
SUding Carriage and Traversing Platform. (Land Service).
8vo. 12pp. Wrapper. (1885.) Price 6d
25-PR. R.M.L. of 18 cwt. (1880). Price Is.

e4-PR.

64-PR.

40-PR.

16-PR.
13-PR.

9-PB.

7-PR.

12-5-inch
12-5-inch

12-inch

10-inch
10-inch

9-iuch

of 12 cwt. (Land Service). (1883). Price Is.
of 8 cwt. (Land Service). (1884). Price Is. 6d.
of 6 cwt. (Land Service). (1883). Price 9d
Steel, of 200 lbs. (1878). Price Is. 6d
„ „ on Colonial Carriage (1882). Price

Is. 6d
of 38 tons, on Sliding Carriage (Land Service),

1883. Price Is. Gd
of 38 tons, Marks I. and II. Casemate, Dwarf,
and Small Port Mountings. (Lard Service).
lH8o. 8vo. pp. Wrapper. Price 5s.
of 35 tons, Mark I., Mounted on Sliding Car-
riage and Platform (Land Service). 1884. Price 3s.
of 18 tona (187G). {Out nf priiU.)

,, Sliding Carriage (Land Service). 1883.

Price Is.
of 12 tons. (1876). Price 6d

M-^'

r 1- i

■^

<
m

•rH
(A

CQ
M

2 O

. H

^ pq

PRECIS OF MODERN TACTICS.

COMPILED FROM THE WORKS OF RECENT CONTINENTAL WRITERS
AT THE TOrOGRAPniCAL AND STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE WAR OFFICE.

ROBERT HOME,

MAJOR ROYAL ENGINEERS, COLONEL, ASSISTANT QTJARTER-MASTER-GENERAL.

'Ifvoe take the lest of the French system, and apply it to the best of our own, tve shall
infallibly beat the French whenever tve meet them." — Prince Frederick Charles.

Printed under the Superintendence of Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

AND SOLD BY

W CLOWES & SONS, Limited, 13, Charing Cross ; HAEKISON & SONS,
59 Pall Mall; W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, Waterloo Place; W. MITCHELL.
Charing Cross; LONGMANS & CO., Paternoster Row; TRUBNER & CO., 57 and
59, Ludgate Hill ; STANFORD, Charing Cross ; and KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH,
& CO., 1, Paternoster Square j

Also by

GRIFFIN & CO., The Hard, Port.sea;

A. & C. BLACK, Edinbcrgh ;

ALEX. THOM & CO., Abbey Street, and E. PONSONBY, Grafton Street, Dublin.

1882.

Price Eight Shillings and Sixpence.

[Wt. 25095 1000—3 1 86 H & S 4345]

3 ^/ ^/S'

NOTE.

The aim of tlie compiler of this book h;is boeu to collate the opiuiora
of others, aiiJ to avoid as much as possible putting forward his own
where original views have been expressed, he alone is responsible for
them.

Insteail of paraplu'asing the sentences of writei-s of acknowledged
worth, he has given their own words, and the marginal notes will assist
the reailer to refer to the original, or its translation, for the context,
when fuller information is desired.

The compiler hopes this plan may be found convenient, as enabling
the reader to gauge the value of the authorities, for on the subject of
Tactics there is much divei-sity of opinion, and the works thereon vary
considerably in merit, there being scarcely any theory, however prepos-
terous, which may not be supported by a French or German quotation
on the subject. Wherever continental writers are oj^posed, on points of
importance, both sides of the question are given.

A list of the works which have been chiefly used in this compilation
is appended.

R. Home, Major,

Royal Engineers.

Topographical aivd Statistical Deparhnhit,
War Office,

Aicffust loth, 1873.

NOTE.

Some apology is due for the great delay that has arisen in preparing a
:;?cond and improved edition of this book. At the same time I must thank
many friends for their kind aid and assistance. Owing to press of work, a
Second Edition has not been prepared, but at the request of Officers, the old
Edition of 1873 is now reprinted.

R. HOME, Major, R.E.,

Colonel, A. Q.M.G.

Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards,
11 or Office,

August loth, 1878.

LIST OF THE WRITEES WHOSE BOOKS HAVE BEEN MORE OR
LESS CONSULTED AND USED IN THE PREPARATION OF
THIS COMPILATION.

Jomiiii. " Trait6 des Grandes Op6rations Militaires." Paris: Tanera, 185L

y' .Toinini. "Tlie Art of War." Translated from the French by Captains
Mendell and Craighill, United States Engineers. Philadelphia.
Lippincott.

V Jomlai. " Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Revolution."'
Bruxelles : Petit, 1840.

( 'harks de Savoye. " Reglement sur le Service des Armees en Campagne."
Paris : Dumaine, 1873.

Vial, Capitaine, cFetat Major. "Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaires." Paris,
Dumaine, 1801.

■ Jfcnih'i/, Colonel, C.B. "The Operations of War explained and illustrated."
Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1869.

Warteiaherg, Duke of. "The System of Attack of the Prussian Infantry*-
1870-tl." Translated by Captain Robinson, Rifle Brigade
Mitchel and Cc, London, 1871.

Jhijcaud, yfarechal de Fra^ice. " Apergu sur (^uelques Details de la Guerre."
Paris, 1832.

" The Prussian Campaign of 1866." A Tactical Retrospect (Captain May) :
translated by Colonel Ouvry, C.B. Mitchel.

" The Prussian TnfantryP (Captain May.) Translated by Colonel Ouvry,
C.B. Mitchel.

^" Tactical Deductions from the War o/ 1870-71," by A. v. Boguslauski. Trans-
hited by Colonel Graham. London : King & Co., 1872.

J)e Ilardegg. " Science de I'etat Major en General." Traduit par Dekevwer :
Paris, 1856.

Dufour. " Cours de Tactique." Paris, 1840.

De (Jiustiniani. " Essai sur la Tactique de Trois Armes." Paris, 1844.

Napoleon. " Memoires pour Service a I'Histoire de France." Sous Napoleon :
Paris, 1842.

Fallot et Legrange. " Colonels du Genie Beige ; Cours d'Art Militaire."
Brussels, 1857.

De Clausewitz. •' De la Guerre." Traduit par Neuens : Paris, 1849.*

Rocquancourt. " Capitaine d'etat Major ; Cours Elementaire d'Art et d'His-
toire Militaires." Paris, 1834.

Wellington. " Selections from the General Orders." Gurwood. London:
Parker, Furnival, & Co., Whitehall. 1867.

* An English translation of this valuable book has been published by Colonel
Graham. Triibner & Co., 57, Ludgate Hill.

Vauchelle. " Cours d'Administration Militaire." Paris : Duniaine, 1854.

Dc (j'crlache. " Sous Intendant Militaire Beige ; Administration des Arniues
en Campagne." Bi'ussels, 1852.

" Control Regulations." War Office. 1870.

Le Bourcj,Chef cVEscadron. " Essai snr I'Organisation de I'Artillerie et sou
emj^Ioi dans la Guerre de Campagne."

Thiehault. " Manuel General du Service des etats Majors." Paris, 1813.

^y^ Frederic!;. "Secret Instructions for his Officers." Translated \>y Major
Foster.

, ^ ^ Frederick. " Secret Sti-ategical Instructions of Frederick the Second to his
Inspectors-General." Translated by Colonel Hamilton Smith.
Coventry, 1811.

' Napier. " History of the Peninsular War." London : Boone, 1832.

^ Thiers. " Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire." Paris : Paulin, 1849.

"^ Alison. " History of Europe from 1774 to 1852." London, 1849 and 1850.

G rivet. " Etudes sur la Tactique." Paris: Dumaine, 1865.

'1-. Stofcl. "Military Reports." Translated by Captain Home, P.E., Topo-
graphical and Statisticid Dei^artmeut, War Office, London,

1872.

^ Wolseley. " The Soldiei-'s Pocket Book for Field Service." Macmillau, 1871.

^ Kinglahe. " Invasion of the Crimea." 1863.

Burgoync. " Militaiy Opinions." Field-Marshal Sir J. Burgoyne, G.C.B.,
edited by Colonel the Hon. G. Wrottesley, E.E. London, 1859.

^ " The Army of the North German Confederation." Translated by Colonel
Newdegate. King & Co., London.

■J-' ' Verdy du Vernois. "Studies in Leading Ti'oops." Translated by Hildvard.
King & Co.

' " La Fwtification Tmprovisee." Par A. Brialmont, Colonel d'Etat Major.
Paris : Dumaine, 1872.*

■ ^^Franco-German War, 1870-71 ; official account." Translated by Captain
Clarke, E.A., Topographical and Statistical Department, War
Office.

.' Vinoy. "Campagne 1870-71; Siege de Paris ; Operations de 13° Corps."
Paris : Plon, 1872.

Prince de Ligne. " Ouvres Military." Vienna, 1806.

Decker. " Tactique des Trois Amies." Traduit jiar Brack . Bruxelles, 1835.

Von Miller. "Lerons sur la Tactique des Trois Armes." Traduit de
rAllemand, by Huybrecht. Bruxelles, 1846.

" The Frontal Attach of InfaMtry." Translated by Colonel Newdegate.
London, 1873.t

" The Elementary Tactics of the Prussian Infantry!' Translated by Cajitain
Baring, E.A., Topographical and Statistical Dejiartment, War
Office, 1872.

" The British Line in the Attack : I'ast and Future." Colonel Gawler.
London, 1872.

Jackson. " Course of Military Surveying."

* Has been translated by Lieutenant Eni)3soii, E.A. King & Co.
t This little book is wortliv of the closest study, and from its portability might
Weil be in ereiy officer's possession.

Chesnci/. "Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland." Smith, Elder,
and Co., London, 1873.

Borbstacd. " The Franco-German War." Translated by Major Dwyer.

^^ Regulations for the Trainimj of Troops for Service in the Field, and for the
Conduct of U rand Manceiivres." Translated by Captain JBai-ing
R.A., \Sll.

De Brack. "Outposts of Light Cavalry." 4th Edition, 1869.

Von MoUkc. " Observations on the Influence that Arms of Precision have on
Modern Tactics." Translated by Lieutenant Crawford, E.A.
Mitchell, 187 L

Todlehen. " The Siege of Sebastopol."

Hoheidhoe. " On the Eniploynient of Field Artillery." Translated by Captain
Clarke, R.A., i87i.

Tellenbach. " The Art of Operating under the Fire of an Enemy." Trans-
lated by Captain Robinson, Rifle Brigade. Mitchel, 1872.
Bonie, Colonel.* " La Cavalerie, Fran§ai^e, 1870." Paris : Amyot, 1871.

" Campaign of 1866 in Germani/J^ Official Account. Translated by Hozier
and Wright, Topogi-aphioal and Statistical Department, Wai-
Office, 1872.

" Conference Militaires Beiges.^' Brussels, 1872. La Guerre des Bois.

De Looze. " Notions Soiumaires de Tactique des Ti'ois Amies."

Viollet le Due. "Memoiresur la Defense de Paris," Paris. Morel, 1871.

Frossard. " Rapports sur les Operations des 2ud Corps, de F Armoe du Rhiu
dans la Campagne, 1870." Dumaine, 1870. Paris.

Von Mirus. " Cavalry Field Duty." Translated by Russel. King and Co
1872.

KScherf.f " A Study of New Infantry Tactics." Berlin, 1873.

De Cessac. " Guide Particulier de I'Officier en Campagne." Bruxelles, 1837.

De Folard. " Nouvelles decouvertes sur la Guerre."

fiaxe. " Mes Reveries."

De la Roche Aipnon. " Introduction de I'Ai-tde la Guerre." Paris. Dumaine,
1857.

Thiers. " La Defense de Belfort." Paris, 1871.

" The Wellington Prize Essay." Lieutenant Maurice, R. A. Blackwood, 1872.

."Essays u-ritten for the WellinQtnn Prize." Crawford, Wolseley,' PRussel,
■ Hildyard, Waller, King, 1872.

" Three Months icith the Army of Metz," by an Officer of Engineers, 1871.

Chesney. " Waterloo Lectures."

" Experimeivtal Tactics of Infantry." Colonel Newdegate, 1872. •

" Military Memorial of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia." Translated br
Chai'les Harcourt Graham, M.A.

" The Minor Tactics of Field Artillery," by H. W. Hime, R. A,

Pelet. " Memoires sur la Guerre de 1809, en Allemagne." Paris, 1824-6.

Fisch. " Etudes sur la Tactique." Brussels. Muquault, 1872.

* Has been translated by Lieutenant C. F. Thomson, 7lh Hussars.

t A translation of this very valuable and important book has been prcijared by
Colonel Graham, and is published by Kiiif^ & Co. It is perhaps a clearer ciiwiient
of modern Prussian views than any other work.

VIU

Lectures given by Colonel Hamley, C.B., when Professor of Military History

at the Stuff College.
Lectures given by Colonel Chesney, E.E., at various places.
Edinburgh Review.
(.Quarterly Review.
Articles in Magiizines.
Journal of the United Service Institution,
Proceeilings of the Royal Artillery Institute.
Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers.
Lectures given at the School of Military Engineering.
Articles in Military and other Newspapers.
Many valuable hints and much assistance from Major-General Walker, C,

Military Attache at Berlin ; and many other officers.

LIST OF PLATES.

PAGE

Sketch of Dessaix's advanee at Marengo Frontixpiece.

I. Formations introduced by Frederick the Great and McsnQ Duraud 36

II. Battle of Prague 38

III. Battle of Leuthen 39

IIIa. Skeleton map of the battle of Leuthen .. .. .. .. 39

lY. Battle of Kolin 40

IVa. Skeleton map of the battle of Kolin. . 40

V. Battle of Koi^sbach 42

Ya. Skeleton map of the battle of Rossbach . . . . . . . . 42

YI. Battles of Lonato and Castiglione .. .. .. .. .. 45

\'1I. French formations .. .. ,. .. .. .. .. 46

A' III. Battle of AusterUtz 48

IX. French formations .. .. >. .. .i .. .. 48

X. Battle of Auerstadt 50

XI. Battle of Busaco c 58

XII. Battle of the Alma 62

XIIa. Details of battle of the Alma ,. ,. .. .. .. 62

XIII. Illustration of a flank attack . . .. .. .. .. .. 70

XIY.^

XY.

XYI.

XYII. I

XYUI.J

XIX. March of a German Division .. •« .. •• .. 166

XIXa. March of an English Division . . • • . . • • . • 168

XX. Defence of a wood .. .. •• t. .. .. •• 208

XXI. Defence of a village .. .. .. .. .. t. .. 217

XXII. Defence of Le Bourget 219

XXIII. Post on the heights of Eaincy 221

XXIY. The heights of St. Cucufa and Celle St. Cloud 220

XX Y. Xormal formation of an Itahan Brigade . . . . . . • • 229

Map of the environs of Metz, at the end.

-Illustrations of an infantry attack t« .. .. •• .. 96

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PREFACE.

r.vGi:.

Ni'cessit J of general militurv information for olllcers . . .. .. .. 1

Tlicory not an absolute guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Advantages of theory .. .. .. .. .• .. .. .. 2

OHAPTEE I.

Organizatiox .. .. .. .. .. .. 3

Division of armies into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades,
divisions, &c. —

May, Vial . . . . 4

Companies — Boguslauski, May, Scherff . . . . . . . . . . 5

Battalions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 6

Brigades — De Hardegg . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 7

Strength and composition of a German Division . . . . . . . . 8

„ „ French „ .. .. .. 8

„ „ British „ 9

Decker, De Preval, Giustineani, De Hardegg.

Necessity for clear definitions — Jomini . . . . . . . . . , 10

Le Bouvg, Decker, De Ternay, Dc la Pierre, De Preral, De la Roche-

Aymou . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IC*

Strength and composition of a German Army Corps . . . . . . 12

° „ French „ 13

British „ 13

Generals, Staff, AKD Departments 14

Napoleon, Jomini, Folard, Rocquancourt 14-15

Plans should be known— Machiavelli, Bngcand 15

Staff, Duties of .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 16

Wellington, Yauclielle, Grimoard, Hardegg, Jomini, "Army of North

German Confederation ". . .. .. .. .. .. .. 17-18

Verdy du Ycrnois, Napoleon .. .. •• .. .. .. 19-20

Staff should not interfere 20

Correspondence to go through staff — Jomini .. .. ,. .. 21

Control Department, Duties -1

Extract from Control Regulations, Vauchelle, Grimoard, De Gerlache,

De Lavarenne, De Cessac, Saxe , . .. •• .. .. .. 21-2G

Artillery, Duties — Jomini .. .. .. .. .. •• •• -7

Yon Miller, Napoleon, Le Bourg 27

"Army of North German Confederation," May 28

Engineers, Duties .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• -^

Thiebault, May, "Army of North German Confederation," Napoleon,

" Organisation of Peninsular Army " .. .4 • 28-33

Xll

CHAPTER II.

TAGE.

l'i;n;F Sketch OF THE IIisTOKY OF Tactics .. .. .. .. .. 33

Tactics liave developed, not changed ., .. .. .. .. 33

Gustaviis Adolpliiifi, Clieiunitz . . . . . . . . . . . . 3i-35

Frederick — Formations .. .. .. .. .. ., .. 35

Prague — Joniini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Leuthen — elomini, Napoleon .. .. .. .. .. .. 38— JO

Kolin — Jomini, Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-42

.Rossbach — Joniini, Nai)oleon .. .. .. .. .. ,. 42-43

Peculiarity of Fredrick's Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. 43

Mesiiil Durand's jjroposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Revolutionary Armies .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45

[talian t'ampaign, 1700 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45

Lonato, Castiglioue, Eivoli ., .. .. .. ., .. .. 45

Taglianicnto, Marengo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45-16

Austcrlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Jena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Auerstadt . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 49

Eylau, Hardships, Army exposed to — Napoleon . . . . . . . . 53

Essling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Wagram .. 53

Regimental Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Si

Formation of Macdonald's Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Alterations in French Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Invasion of Russia . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 57

Alteration of Prussian Tactics, " King of Prussia's Order, 1813 " . . 57

Busaco — Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 58

Albuera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 59

Waterloo — Jomini's conversation with Wellington . . . . . . 59-GO

Origin of Prussian Company . . . . . . , . . . . . Gl

The Alma 61

„ Moltke's remarks on . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

CHAPTER III.

IxFAXTBT Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 64

Motives which sway men — Napier . . . , . . . . . . 64

Discipline — Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 61r-65

Panics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Education — Stoffel . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . ()5

Training and Discipline — Napoleon . . . • ' . . . . . . 65

Good arms— Stoffel 66

Manceuvring under fire impossible . . . . . . . . . . 67

Kinglake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Action of small bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Breaking up of battles into detached fights — Scherff . . . . . . 68

Flank attacks — Boguslauski, Clausewitz ,. . . . . . . . . 69-70

Problem to be solved at present day . . . - . . . . . . 70

Relatively xpeakiiij, attack has gained more than defence — Scherff,

Boguslauski . . . , . . . . .... . . . . 71

Breech-loaders enable a greater fire to be given now than formerly . . 74

Danger of the indiscriminate use of the word " loose ". . .. .. 74-75

Attack on St. Privat — Duke of Wurtemberg .. .. ,. .. 75

floral causes at work — General Walker .. .. .. .. .. 76

•' King of Prussia's Order, 21st August, 1870" ». 77

Attack, individual, not loose — ScheriJ . . . . . . . . . . 77

Necessity of large areas to train troops , . . . . . . . . . 78

Necessity for supports . . . , . . . . . , . . . . 78

Kinglake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Skirmishers must not to sent by driblets . . . . . . . . . . 79

xin

PAOR.

Sir .Tolm Hiirijoyiii' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 70

Scherff, (inulcr .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 80-H2

Linos of battle .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 82

May 83

Fighting lino to curvy its own reserve . , . . . . . . . . 83

Chosnoy, Kingliiko, Niipior .. .. .. .. .. ,. .. g-i-St

Area of ii'-tion groat pr now than formerly .. .. .. .. .. 8't

General iiloas as to formation .. .. .. ,. .. ., 81

Zones of fire -Tolienbaeh .. .. .. .. .. ., ,. 86

Advaneing niulcr fire . . . , . . . . . . . , , . . 8(5 -B7

" Cabinet order of Emperor of Germany ". . . . . . . . . . 88

Skirmishing by sections .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 88-80

Circnmstaneos under whieli aa attack is now possible .. .. ,. 89

Frontal attack of infantry— Schcrff .. .. .. ., .. 90

Shock or bayonet now requisite as well as fire . . . . . . . . 91

Last stage of attack— Sclierfl", Gawlcr .. .. .. .. .. 92-93

Reason wliy small columns are preferable . . .. .. .. ., 93

Duty of supjiurts — Sclicrlf .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 94,

State of matters when the "genci'al advance " is ordered. , ., .. 95

Skirmishers not to be left behind — Scherff. . .. .. .. ,. 95

Frontal attack of infantry .. .. .- .. .. ,. .. 95

E fleet of development of tactics on British troops .. .. .. 96

Napier, Bugeaud .. .. ,. .. ,. .. ,. .. 96

Disadvantages; small numbers .. .. .. .. .. .. 98

Small comjianies preferable to large. . . . . . . , , . , . 98

Frontal attack of infantry .. .. ,. .. ,, ,. .. 99

Loss of oflleers. . .. .. .. .. .. ., 99

Paramount necessity of complete training of troops .. .. .. 100

Necessity for tactical information , . . , . . . . , , , . 101

Pro))osa' to extend the main body .. ., .. .. .. .. 102

Small columns suffer less from fire than lines . . . . . . . . 102

Desirable to advance with main body in small columns, to give moral

support to skirmishers ; frontal attack of infantry .. .. .. 103

The Defence (II.) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, i03

Pure defence useless — Von Moltke. . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Moral superiority of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Sir John Burgoyne .. .. ,. .. .. ,. .. .. 104

Advantages of defence .. .. .. .. ., .. ..105

Convergent and divergent fire . . . . . . . , . . , . 106

Occupation of positions .. .. .. ., .. .. .. 107

Vollies impossible — Boguslauski .. .. .. .. .. ., 107

Defence, taking the offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Defence should be offensive in character . . . . . , . , . . 108

Offensive use the defensive carefully ., .. .. .. ,. 108

Cavalry (III.) .. .. .. ,. .. 109

Cavalry in the field at the present day .. .. .. .. ..110

Duties of cavalry .. .. ., .. ,, ,, .. ,. hq

Action of cavalry by no means a thing of the past . . . . . . HO

Von Moltke, May .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. ., no

Bredow's charge at Mars-la-Tour .. .. .. .. .. ., m

Boguslauski, liorbstaedt .. .. ,. .. .. .. .111-112

Reserves indispensable — Wellington .. .. ,. .. .. 113

Second line — Prussian instructions . , .. .. ,. .. .. m.

Effect of rifled guns .. .. .. ., .. ,. .. .. 115

Opportunities afforded to small bodies of cavalry.. .. .. .. II5

Proposals for attack — Boguslauski ., .. ,. .. ., .. 116

Austrian regulations .. .. .. .. ., ,. .. .,116

Reconnaissance of ground requisite. . .. .. .. ., .. 117

Bonie: " Olficial account of war of 1866" — Napier .. .. .. lis

Flank attacks .. .. .. .. .. ,. .. .. ..11!)

Action of French cavalry at Gravelotte — Bonie .. .. .. .. 119

XIV

PAGE.

Cavaliy covering an anny — ^Yon Mirus . . . . . . . . . . 120

De Brack .. .. ..120

Necessity of sipreading cavalry out, -whether advancing or retreating .. 121

Boiiie ; "Tlirec months with the army of the Rhine " .. .. .. 123

Comparison of French and German cavalry . . . . . . . . 12'i

AUTILLEKT (IV.) '. 125

Difference between rifled artillery and smooth-bore guns. . . . . . 125

Use of artillery in the field . . . . . . . . • . • . • 126

Necessity of unity of action ; campaign of 1866 ; Wochenblatt.. . . 127

Coi-ps artillery and divisional artillery — Becker .. .. .. .. 128

Duties of divisional artillery— Todleben .. .. .. .. .. 129

Independence of artillery . . . . . . . • ■ • • • • • 129

Direction of corps artillery . . . . • . . • . • • • • • 130

Ai'tillcry escorts, not now required as a rule .. .. .. .. 131

Artillery to move seldom and rapidly . . . . . . . . . • 131

Position of Artillery— Hime ;" Campaign of 1866" 131

Necessity of artillery being in front — ilay. . . . . . . . . . 132

Masses of artillery— Boguslaiiski, Hohenlohe 133

What artillery should fire at— May, Waldersee 133-134

Mitrailleuse .. .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• 1^5

Engineeks (V.) 135

Peculiarities of Napoleon's campaigns .. .. .. .. .. 135

Field fortification most backward of branches of art of war— Napoleon 136
Use of field fortification— May, Duke of Wurtemberg, Viollct le Due 136-137
Fieldworks important, as partially solving the question of flank attacks

— Chesney .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 137

Duties of Engineers in the field twofold .. .. .. .. .. 138

Mounted sappers — Brialmount, Frederick . . _ 139

Tactical relation of fieldworks to the troops — Brialmont. . . . . . 140

Evil effects of separation of direction : Koniggriitz 141

Use in modern war . . . . . . • • . • . • • • • • 143

Village of Vionville— Frossard ; Battle of Gravelotte .. .. 142-143

Tools Iff

Necessity of tactical instruction for engineers 144

CHAPTER IV.

CoMBiKED Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 14,1

Arms of the service must not be interchangeable . . . . . . . . 144

Necessity of Generals having full control of auxihary arms — Vinoy 145-146

Proportions of the arms of the service . . . . . . . . . . 147

Napoleon ; Prussian army . . . . . . . . , . , , . . 147

Infantry the chief arm ; Losses in action . . .. ,, .. .. 148

Way in which battles begin . . . . . . . . , , . . . . 149

Mars-la-Tour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 150

Action of artillery and engineers .. .. .. .. .. ,, 151

Tendency of armies to extend ,. .. .. .. .. ., 152

Concentmton may be weakness ., .. .. ., ,. .. 153

Decisive points to be held ; parallel with permanent f ortfications . . 154

Concentric attacks — " Campaign of 1866 " . . . . . . . , 154-155

Reserves : many, and not one great one . . . . . , . , . . 156

Campaign of 1866 . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . , 156

Langensalza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 156

Numbers of troops to the yard . . . . . . . , . . , . 156

Artillery should never be kept in reserve .. .. ., .. .. 157

Action of small bodies of ca\alry . . . . . . . . . , . , 153

Penetration of the enemy's position and lodgment .. ,, .. 159

XV
Cn AFTER V.

TAGE.

Maucbes .. IGl

Importauco of marcbiiig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1G2

Annies cannot march in line of battle .. .. .. .. .. 162

Guibert, Chuisewitz 162

As a rule must adhere to tlio roads .., .. ,, .. ,. 162

Campaign of 1SG6 ; De Tornay, Napoleou «. •. .. ..162-163

Rates of marching — Colley .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 163

Length of columns .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 164

Opening out — Clausewitz, Fallot, Lagrange, Thiebaidt. . .. .. 165

Order of IMareh— Do la Pierre, Von VValdcrsee 166

Vcrdy du Vcrnois, Colley 167-168

Gerniiui march across the Lauter .. .. .. .. .. ,, 169

Army orders . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 170

Corps orders . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, 171

Advanced guard orders .. .. .. .. ., .. ,, 172

Position ot auxiliary arms .. .. .. .. ,. .. .. 173

Verdy du Vcrnois, Clausewitz, Le Eoiirg. . .. .. .. ..173-174

Keeping up the touch .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 174

Advanced guards .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 174

Rear- guard — Vcrdy du Vernois, Fallot, Lagrange .. .. ,, 175

Eugeaud, Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, ,. 176

Bazaine's retreat . . . , . . . . . . . . , , . , 177

Tendency to tm-n troops out too early .. .. ,. .. ..177-178

SrppLY OF Troops .. 178

Rations must be carried by the men . . . . . . . . . . 179

Men must be watched to sec they don't eat all their food at once . . 179

Rations carried by Prussians .. .. .. ., .. ..179-180

Distribution — De Gerlache, Grimoard .. .. .. .. ,, 181

Requisitions requisite — Clauzewitz ., .. ,, ,. ,, 182

Fallot and Lagrange. . .. ,. .. ,. .. .. ..182-183

Necessity of care . . . . . . . . . . . , , . , , 183

Lectiire of General V. Kirchback . , . . . . . , . . . , 183

The Organizatiox of the Communications of an Aemt, includino

Railways . . . . . . • . 185

JMcaning of " Organization of Line of Communications " ,, ,. 185

Three ways by which annies can be fed .. ,. ,, ,, ,, igg

Division of supply into two great branches .. «• ,, ,, 189

Division of transport into three portions . . , , . . . . . . 199

"Wellington's organization of his line of communications ,, .. 191

Organization of German line of communications. . ,, .. ,. 192

Changes in war caused by use of railways. . , . , , , . . . 196

Imaginary example of organization of railway communications in

England .. .■• ., .. .. .. ,. ,. .. 199

CHAPTER VI.

Attack AND Defence of Woods and Villages .. ., ,, ,. 203

Peculiarities of wood fighting : Prussians and French . . , . , , 203

Training of soldiers now more requisite than ever .. ., .. 204

Outskirts of wood to be held .. .. ,. ,, 205

Examination of a wood ,. .. .. .. ., ,. ,^ 207

i'uttiug a wood in a state of defence .. .. ., ,, ,, 207

Attack of a TV ood .. .. .. ,, ., ,, ,, ,, 210

ViLLAfiES .. .. .. 212

Great part they have played in war ,. .. ., ,. ,, 212

Must not now be held as foiTncrly. . .. .. ,, ,, ,, 213

Examination of a village .. .. .. .. ,, ,, ,, 214

XVI

TAGK.

How a village sliould be defended. . «« •• .. .. .. 2]5

Ideal case .. ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..217

Attack of villages — Frederick, Duke of Wurtemberg .. .. .. 211)

Positions round Paris ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. ;"20

Bougival 220

Eaincy 221

LeBourget .. .. , 222

APPENDICES.

Italian Committee on Infantry Tactics recommends section skirmishing;

German opinion opposed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 224-23 E

Order for marches — General Crawford .. ». .. ,. .. 235

War strength of Infantry ., •• .. .. .. .. .. 258

„ „ Cavalry 25t>

„ „ Artillery 260

„ „ Engineers •• •• •• .. •• .. .. 262

Losses in Battles .. •• •• •• •• •« •• •• •• 263

PREFACE.

In the following pag-es an attempt is made to compile a
book, that may be useful to students of tlie military art who
are not near good libraries, and who do not possess the
large number of volumes that are written on military subjects.
This book has been chiefly prepared to aid officers in the
examinations which they must pass for promotion, and to give
them the \'iews of a large namber of eminent soldiers. It is
lioped that it may direct the attention of officers to the military
Avriters referred to, and induce a study of their writings, as
opportunity may offer.

The form of this book is based on that of the well-known
work by Cliarles de Savoye, " Reglement sur le service des
armees en campagne amiote d'apres les meilleur auteurs qui ont
cent sm- I'art Militaire."

An attempt has been made to avoid all technicalities used
in either artillery or engineer science, except such as should
be well known to officers of every branch of the army, for
the duties of each arm of the Service overlap and blend into
one another, and the higher the grade an officer attains, th(3
more requisite it is that he should be acquainted generally with
the duties of those arms of the Service to wliich he himself does
not belong ; by this means alone can we hope to obtain that
intelligent co-operation, that harmonious working of all branches
of the Service together, which makes a pei'fect machine out
of the various elements composing an army, and at the same
time gives the surest guarantee of success. In armies, as
elsewhere, there is a tendency for everyone to think his
own branch, that which he has studied most and knows
best, the most important ; such feelings are very natural, and
in the lower grades often do much good ; but as men rise
in the Service it is desirable that they should know some-
thing of the duties of other branches, and the difficulties
others have to contend with : such knowledge tends to produce
cordiality and forbearance. Cavalry officers falling into com-
mand of mixed forces will not then expect their infantiy to
gallop, infantry officers will not seek to bind the cavalry to
the pace of their infantry. A knowledge of the ca|)abilities
of other anus will enable officers to use those arms to the best
advantage as occasion offers.

Jomini.

Bugeaud.

^lause'nitz.

Vial.

It should, however, be borne in miud, that it is impossible to
lay down fixed rules of action. Nearly every military regula-
tion should be followed by the words " according to the ground
and according to circumstances." Rules ai'e but guides, which
must be intelligently, not blindly, followed.

Suppose a committee of the greatest geueraln, — Napoleon, tlie Archduke
Charles, and Wellington, &c., — assembled, aided by the ablest artillery and
engineer officers, they could lay down no fixed and immutable laws on the
art of war, especially on Tactics.

Practice and experience alone can decide many points ;
practice and experience alone can give the power of applying
rules ; but theoiT, by which is really meant the exj»erience
obtained by others, is not the less important and valuable.

Wlien attempts are made to lay down principles in war, a large mimber of
officers at once solve the problems by saying everything depends on circum-
stances. As the wind blows, so must the sails be set. But if the pj-oper sail,
and the proper amount of sail suitable to each wind, is not known beforehand,
haw can sad be made at all \

A man who spends a portion of his life in seeking to thrnw light on the
various portions of a difficult subject will, in all probability, do more and go
further than he who seeks to understand it in a huri-y. The oliject of theory
is to spare each fi'esh stvident the trouble of cLissifjang and snijdividing the
subject he studies, in order that he may carefully examine it in iUl its beai-iugs.
Theory brings the subject before him classified and arrangetl : it forms the
mind of the futui-e commander, or, rather, it points out how he may form it
for himself. But theory must be left behind on the battle-field. A wise teacher
limits himself to the development of the intellectual capacity of his pupil,
he does not seek to keep him in lead rag strings all his life.

War is not, as some say, a game of violence and chance. It is, says
Napoleon, a game, but a very serious game, where reputation.^, ai-mies,
and empires are the stakes. It is the triumph of force, of force skilfully
prepared and organized, guided by intelligence and genius, acting in accordance
with certain principles of ai-t ; foree snbsei"^dent to the highest social virtues,
courage, self-denial, and devotion. As for cliance, doubtless; it jihiys its part
in war, but true ai't consists in rendering this part as small as possible, and
the object of principles is to subdue chance by prudence, wisdom, and calcula-
tion.

And it must be remembered that in war the instrument used is not an
inert, but a living mass, changeable, and susceptible of gi"eat enthusiasm or
the reverse.

Principles are but guides, which must be revised, examined
and verified after each war, after each discover}' that may be
lirought to bear on the military art. The great successes of
GnstaviTS Adolphus, Frederick, ]\iarlboro"ugh, Napoleon, \Velling-
ton, Von ^loltke, are but due to careful consideration and
appreciation of the effects of various discoveries on' the ai't
of war. There is no finalitv in the art of war.

CHAPTER I.

Organization.

The difference betweeu an army and a mol), is discipline,
and discipline alone confers on bodies of men the power of
nianoenvring.

Manoeuvres are the quick, orderly cluing.- of liighly-ti-ained and flexible Hamlcr-
masses from one kind of formation to another, or their transference from point
to point of a battle-field, for purposes which become suddenly feasible in the
changing course of the action.

Drill is a means to discipline, bnt drill is not discipline,
which may be defined as obedience to superiors.

It is perfectly clear that to establish and maintain disciphnc
there must be personal contact between the superior and
the inferior, and as one man can influence only a limited
number of his fellow men, it follows that the size of the first
" body," " unity," or " division " into which a mass of men is
divided, must bear some relation to the number of inferiors of
average attainments, that can be influenced by one superior,
also of average attainments. Upon this basis must ultimately
rest the di\asion of armed bodies of men into companies, bat-
talions, regiments, brigades. Divisions, army-corps, armies.

There is also another set of ideas that must be taken into
consideration, Avhen the organization of men into separate
bodies is considered ; not onh" must soldiers be disciplined, bur
tliey must also be paid, fed, armed and clothed. Hence the
division of men into organized bodies should be such as will
facilitate administration. There are therefore two distinct sets
of ideas that have to be taken into account; these may be
termed administrative ideas, and tactical ideas.

It has already been observed that discipline can be best
maintained by personal contact of a superior with inferiors, and
as the provision of food, arms, and clothing for men, keeps the
superior in contact with the inferior, and induces the latter
to lean on, be governed and guided by the former, it follows
that, if possible, the first tactical division should correspond
"vnth the first administrative division, or, in other words, that
the smallest inde]Kmdent tactical command (the company) should
also be the smallest administrative division.

B 2

rnissian
Infantry.
Captain May
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

ViaL

Tlie Captain comnuiiuliiig a company is tlie only officer between vliorr.
and the soldier a personal relation subsists in ])eace time. He knows evtiy
individual soldier in the nio.st intimate manner, and the soldier on his ])art s
aware that his Captiiin so knows him. It is ui)on this relation that tho
uncommon influence rests which he, above all (jther officei-s, has over the
individual soldier, as well as over the whole company.

The soldier sees his nearest home in liis comj)any, and he has under all
circumstances a decided feeling for his Captain, even though it be one of
hatred. In most cases, however, it is a feeling of love, confidence and i-espect.
The intimate and continual intercourse between them allows no room on either
side for acting ; each must ajjjiear as he really is, and thus, together with the
bad qualities, the good ones also which they both possess must come to light.
They become accust<mied to one another, have their tits of ill-temper at times
on both sides, but when at length the hour comes that they are finally to part,
there is an earnest feeling of sorrow which cannot be su])pressed. With
regard to the higher grades of otiicers, such as officers commanding battalions
or regiments, the soldier on the contrary has no personal relations with them,
neither have the officers with him ; he has a respect for them according to
regulation, otherwise he is for the most part indifferent. At the very most he
knows whether his General keeps him long at drill and annoys him or not,,
and particulai'ly whether he has any ridiculous habits. It requires very
esjiecial qualities in the higher ranks in oixler to make a real imjjression on
the soldier, and he who does not possess these qualities can at most try, by acting
and coquetry, to make himself take with the men, but which in the long lain
tends to an oi)posite effect. However proud of his position a Colonel may be
at the head of his regiment, the soldier looks on his Captain as by far the
most important per.sonage, and should the Colonel take to bullying the Captain
on parade, to show the soldier what a great man he is, the result usually is
that the soldier respects the Captain the less, but certainly the Colonel not the
more. The beautiful relation between the soldier and his Captain is a corner
stone of our army, and not one of the least firm ones. The highest reward
which the soldier can obtain during his service springs from his Captain, viz.,
the confidence of his company leader, and he on his part will find the attach-
ment of his subordinate the most precious reward which will fall to him in his
lifetime.

The art of war enables a mass of men to be so organized and disciplined
that their efforts may be directed towaiils the same object. It transforms a
confused multitude of men into a trained and obedient body of troo})s. Lastly,,
it allows an entire army to be moved on the field of battle in accordance with
one will, one idea, that of the General officer commanding. If only 100 men
have to be moved, certain subdivisions are requisite to give them a cadre and
commanders. There must be some definite instruction for both men and
officers, there must be, in a word, principles, rules, and theories. What is
true for a company is even still more the case for an army. To organize an
army is to establish subdivisions and give chiefs to each, in order that they
may be instnicted and moved in accordance with the will of one man. A
single man cannot command directly 100,000 men. Intermediate commanders
who command bodies of gi'eater or less extent, and who deal directly with a
smaller number of s\ibordinates, are requisite. Thus a General-in-Chief com-
manding 100,000 men deals directly with only the (jenerals of five or six Army-
Corps. Each General of an Army-C!orj)s deals oidy with four or five Generals
of Division, each General of Division Avith only two or three Generals of
Brigade, each General of Brigade with two or three Colonels, and so on to the
Corporal of a squad who commands only eight to twelve men. There is thus
a chain of resjjonsibility from the General to the last man.

In all anuies in the -world tlie company has been invariably
considcred as the first, or smallest independent command ; the
Captain of a company being the executive, and commanding-.

Jrilliiig'. payiug*, and looking after the men composing his
company. And Avith the view ot keeping up a company
feeling, ari-angements are generally made iu regiments for
working as much as possiljle by compaiiies. The size of the
company and the position occupied by tlic Captain, however,
vary much in diffi'rent armies.

in the English Army a company on a war footing has varied
from 80 to 120 men — the Captain being on foot, and the battalion
usually consisting of eight to ten companies. This system was
pretty generally adopted in most armies except the Prussian,
where the companies are about 2/)() strong and the Captain is
mounted. In no army is so inuch dependence placed on the
Captain, or company leader, as iu the Prussian ; but it is requi-
site that Prussian examples be not slavishly followed. Many
customs that suit the German temperament would be bad,
and positively dangerous, if introduced blindly amongst other
nations.

Some German waiters have proposed to do aAvay with
all links between Commanders of companies and Generals,
making the company the tactical unit. -= This is however
opposed by others, with perhaps inore reason, as will be seen by
the following extracts : —

One of the chief props of this edifice, built np of obedience and confidence,
is tlie Company Chief. On him falls the chief labour of training and instructing
the soldier. In constant connnunication with one another, the men come to
know him thoroughly, and he learns to know them. The namjt; by which the
Company Chief is commonly known to the Prussian soldier, that of " company
father," explains his position. In battle, the Company Cliief leads the principal
tacticiil unit and is first and most before the .soldier's eyes.

In action the mounted officers are obliged to dismount, which makes that
supervision and direction impossible which is so verj' easy in peace manceuvres.
Frequently the dismounted fielil officer, somewhat unaccustomed U> rapid
movements over stalk and stone, is .scarcely able to keep up with his battalion ;
the breaking up into columns of comjmnies is for him a solution of his difficulty.

He thinks that certainly the four officers commanding the companies will
know what to do, so he attaches himself to a company. The original officers
commanding lines are in the same ])redicament, their lines are broken up and
.scattered in all parts of the battle, thus they have to give uj) all ideas of
connuanding them, and attach themselves to the first comjmny of infantry that
lifters, and, in order to do something, command that. It thus happens that
.some companies, favoured by chance, have, besides their own Captain, a Major,
a Colonel, and a General as well.

The officer iu command of a battalion should not take the direction of
l)art of the companies on himself, but should rather lead all the four equally.
Should foreign armies think of imitating our company colunni fights they
nm.st take into consideration how it stimds witli them with regard to
fundamental principles, that is, the relation between their officers and men.
They will otherwise adopt the disadvantages without gaining the benefit.

Despite all the dissertations upon the definition of a tactical unit, the Scherff.
most fiuiatical pai'ti.sau of the company cohmm must allow that the company
[rt German company 250 men^ is too weak to suffice for the three phases of the
attack if an afi'air of any importance is to be undertaken. 12 company
■columns, each acting for itself, cannot fulfil what is required for the preparation

Bogushuiski.
(Translated
by Lumley
Cxraham.)

Captain May's
Tactical
Retrospect.
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

Prussian
Infantry.
O.'.'ptain M.ai
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

and execution of an attack, and d, fortiori they must fail in the last period. But
three battalions can undoubtedly accomplish what is requisite.

What is thus generally true for companies ap]>lies also, though in a less
degi'ee, to single battalions. Three ])attjilions, ;u;ting each for itself, may
succeed prett^> well in })reparing and executing an attack, but will find it
veiy difficult to accomplish the last stage. We will return more in detail to
this subject, we merely point or.t here that in breaking ujj the object of the
attack into several distinct i)ortions, that we consider it absolutely recpiisite
not to deal with any force smaller than a battalion.

The question as to Avliether a company on the German model
is, ov is not, a tactical unit, is really a very unimportant one,
and must depend to a great extent upon the meaning attached
to the words. If by ' tactical unit ' is meant a body that can
fight independently, it would appear tliat a division is the real
tactical unit, as it includes all arms of the service. A battery
of artillery is continually termed a tactical unit, but it does not
fight separately. The fact is that the words tactical unit vary
entirely according to the point of view. To a General Com-
manding an army the army -corps are tactical units; to a
General Connnanding a division, brigades are tactical units ;
to a General Commanding a brigade, battalions are tactical
units ; to an Officer Conmianding a battalion, companies are
tactical units. So far then as the company is the basis of
military subdivision it is a tactical unit, but no further.

The question as to how many companies should compose
a battalion may be well answered by referring to Napoleon's
words, — " No man can command more than five distinct bodies
on the same theatre of war." Taking also into consideration
tliat the size of the company is limited by the number of men
that can be influenced by one man, it appears that the Prussian
system of four companies is a correct one.

But it by no means follows that this is the only solution to
the problem, or even the best. The more personal intelligence
there is distributed tljrough a body of men, the larger the
number of officers there are in that body tmined and com-
petent to lead it, the more efficient will that body be when
placed in the difficult j)ositions of actual combat : ttijiing this,
and the fact that the PiTissiaji proportion of officers leaves no
maa'giu for sickness or loss, and that the front of a Prussian
company is, from the fact of its being three deep, smaller than
that of those nations that habitually form then* troops two
deep, alpp that the use of troops in extended order has been
greatly increased of recent years, it would appear desirable
to reduce the size of the companies considerably below the
Prussian standard. While at the same time every efltbrt
should be made to increase and draw tighter the bonds between
the Captain and his company, giving the Captain greater interest
in, ai^d control ovei^ t^e ooinpany. Taking al) the bearings of
tlie question into consideration, it appears that t^e formation
which best suitfi the requirpmeiitp of the; pr^esent day^ is one. of

the battnliou into wings, each wing into four companies of 100
to 125 men each. The wing -will thus be a small four-company
battalion, (iiul the number of uieu — 100 to 125 in each company
— will be such that it can be handled and led by one otiic;er
with ease. A half-battalion — a -w-ing — will then be nearly the
strength of a battalion ui peace time.

With iPi^aril to hali-battalious, they caiuiot be considered as altogether Scliellciulorf.

strange to our peace customs, as a peace battalion is just equal to a half- ( I'ranslated

battalion in war, and these half -battalion foriuations were proved to be good in by Ouvry.)
three glorious battles.

Two <jr more battalions united together compose a brigade,
Avhich is commanded by a General Officer of the lowest grade,
tenned a Brigadier ; a Brigadier has aLso a Staff Officer, termed
a Brigadc-^lajor.

A bi-iga'le means genenilly a tactical body composed of two or three Do Hardegg.
regiments of the same arm, either inf;uitry or cavalry. The term ' brigade' is
also apphcd tn fi-om four to eight batteries working togethei-. In the Engineers,
the term ' brig;ule ' is also a])plied to detachments destined to perform one and
the same duty, and whose force is variable (2 to 20 men).

A DiA'ision is the first body tliat is corapo.sed of all branches
of the Service, hence it comes more nearly to the definition of
a tactical imit of an army that any other body ; the Di^nsion
being compnsed of all armB, is thus at tiie base of all arniy
formations. An army composed in peace time of Divisions, aud
the organization of Avhich goes no further, can in war time be
easily foraied into army-corps. Doubtless it is desirable to
have army-corps, or even armies, formed ready to talse tke
field, but such formations entail nmch cost, and the advantages
they confer are so far problematical as hardly to warrant the
expenditure they entail. If then the Di^^sion be carefully
foimed. its various component portions coiTectly adjusted, and
it be furnished with a proper staff, it would seem that the
higher formations of army-coi-ps and army may be left to be
completed Avhcn absolutely requisite on the outbreak of war;
pro\dded the principles on which they should be formed, and
their composition, have been carefully elaborated, and clearly
laid down.

A Division is composed of tvro or more brigades of infanti-y,
two or more batteries of artillery, one <ir more companies of
engineers, one or more cavalry regiments.

In Prussia, military matters have received much attention,
perhaps more than in any other country in Europe, and it may
not be uninteresting to give the composition of a German
Division : —

Tabular Statement of the CompoRitiou and Strengtli
of a German Division.

Wab Establishment.

■^

Horse?.

E =
E £

■3.

c
E

E-t

c
3

a
1

5
2
2;

Staff of Division

(■Staff

1 St Brigade ■]

(.'i lleffiments Infantry

■>

13S

5,912

122

130

6,350

116

124

2nil Brigade

140

5,915

122

137

6,362

128

126

1 Rogimont Cavalry

589

C77

691

1 Division Kitld Artillery

561

4
56

30
354

634

14,066

140

370

Total Division

325

12,994

265

1,213

C40

115

This force is a very handy complete Division, but it will 1)e
observed that it does not embrace engineers, which, in the
Prussian Army, form a body attached to the corps, not to the
Division.

In France, there has been no definite ruk' laid down as to
Avhat a Division should consist of, but in the army that took
the field in 1870 a Division was usually comjDOsed as follows : —

Tabular State:ment of the Composition and Strength of a
French Division in 1870.*

Officers.

N.-C. Officers
and Men.

llorses.

Guns.

Staff of Division . .

'Staff

ItBi-Valp J Battalion of Eifles ..
° 1 2 Regiments of In-
fantry of the Line . .

r Staff

2nd Brigade < 2 Regiments of In-

[ fantry of the Line . .
Artillery (Divisional) . .
Engineers (Divisional) . .

|l26

|l28

773
•1,291

1,327

417
77

13
59

313
16

Total

306

9,885

485

* The Ist Division of the 4t}i Cor^js.

Note. — The want of Cavalry in this Division is apparent. Cavalry in the
French anny was attached to the Corps ; and separate Cavalry Divisions were
formed for the army. This system left the Divisions without even a couple of
iquadrons as orderlies^ escort, or messengers.

In the Biitisli Army, a Division will, on actual Kurvice, be
fonnetl as follows : —

A Division ok Infantry.

(Approved by Ilis Royal lli^lincss the Coiniuiinder-in-Chief, 18. 7. 71.)

Offlcers.

N.-C.

Oflieers

and Men.

All
Ranks.

Horses.

Guns.

Stuff'

*2 Brigades of Infantry (6 Bns.). .

191

6,398

6,601

—

1 Battalion of Rifles

1,066 •

1,099

—

1 Regiment of Cavalry . .

607

631

559

—

3 Batteries Field Artillery

5t7

568

436

18t

1 Company Roval Engineers . .

186

191

1 Troop Militiiry Police . .

—

1 Infantry and Artillery Reserve
Ammunition Column . .

}

206

212

253

—

Total

299

9,104

9,403

1,862

* Details of the actual War Strength of a Battalion of Infantry, a Cavalry
Regiment, a Battery of Artillery, and a Company of Engineers, are given in the
Appendix.

t One 9-pr. Battery ; two 16-pr. Batteries.

It is not known who first proposed the Division and army-corps. It is Decker.
rea.sonable to suppose that it was gradually an-ived at.

The .system of forming armies in Divisions was first thought of and tried Dc Preval.
by the Marshal Broglie in the war of 1760, but it w^as then very imperfect, as
ail useful things nmst be wliich have to contend at first against routine and
prejudice.

Turenne was the first in France who divided armies into Divisions, but Giustineani.
after his time this happy idea was for a long time forgotten. During the
Seven Ycare' War the French Army, and that of Duke Ferdinand, were formed
into units somewhat .similar to Divisions, but no rule seemed to govern this
formation, which was more apparent than real. In 1795, the Division
formation was adopted l)y the French Republican armies. The Divisions were
tlien composed of all arms of the Service. They had a special staff and
administrative bodies, each was composed of four demi-brigades of infantry,
or tw^elve battalions, four to eight squadrons of cavalry, one to two companies
of artillery, wath eight to twelve guns, the effective being 10,000 to 15,000 men,
according to the .strength of the battalions and squadrons. Austria adopted
this formation in 1805, Prus.sia in 1806, Russia in 1807.

Prior to this period armies were formed into advanced
guards, first and second lines and reserve, also into wings,
there being distinct commanders for these bodies, also distinct
commanders for the infantry, cavahy and artillery. Traces
of this formation remain in some armies even now. The com-
manders were often detailed for the day, and there was no bond
of union between the commander and those he commanded, as
there is between a Divisional General and his Division.

A division is either mixed, in which case it is termed an army Division ; or De Hardcgg.
it is composed of one arm of the Service, in which case it is termed a cavalry
or infantry Division. Such a Division is composed of two or three brigades.

I'O

Jouiini.

Le Bourg.

Dcckw..

De Tcrnay.

Do la Pierre.

De PrfiTftl.

De.la.Bocke-
Ajmon.

This word 'division' is also used in A nsfcria, Prussia, and Batvairia, to
denote a body composed of two squadrons. In the infantiy of a certain class,
as in rifles, it is used to denote a Ijody conipcjsed of two companies. The.-;?
cavah-y divisions have f]fenei-ally a field officer ui permanent command. In tlie
infantry, such divisions are conniiandud by the senior Captain. In Russia,
divisions of artillery are formed by the junction of four or hve batteries.

The preceding, says Jomini, shows how nuich impiOA'ement is requisite
in military nomenclature. It is absunl to call a body composed of twelve
battalions a Division at the same time that two companies are termed a
Division. I do not pretend to say if it was a confusion between these two words
that caused the formation of the heavy masses at Waterloo. However that
may be, it is requisite in all armies that perfectly distinct terms should be used
to denote a Division of twelve battalions and a Division of two compa;mes, or
one-fourth of a battalion.

The same confusion exists in English as to tlie "wojd^, — fort,
battery, brigade, staff, &c. No term should convey two distinct
meaning's, nor should a geneyml term be adopted to express a
separate, special, or definite meaning without an explanatory
word, otherwise inconvenience and confusion of ideas are
produced. Ternrs cannot be too clear and distinct.

It is, besides, desirable to have some Divisious of greater strength than
others, because a General may wish to give the comaiand of certain Divisions
to such trustworthy officer as he may wish to detach for important operations
requiring the aid of a large body of men. Many Generals wish that Divisions
should be composed of three brigades, because when a Division fights singly it
will then have two brigades in fine, one in reserve, wliilst the orga.nizatiou in
two brigades, by which only a portion can be in wserve,. is vicious.

Divisions should, as madi a« possible, be of t^e sftuue' strength and
organization, iij order that if possible they may be employed in th0 saroo: war,
and with equal coniidence. It is important to form Dis-isions in peace
corresponding to the territorial divisions ; if this be not done, when wai' breaks
out the General-in-Chief finds himself entirely ajasoi'bed in a long and difficult
operatioji.

It may be easily uiider.stood that a.Division newly formed cannot be-of the
aajue value as one that hag been in regular working order for some time. The
custom of fighting and working together causes to arise between the corps
a confidence and friendly feeling which tends greatly to produce swccess.
(ienerals.thus know completely the men, and ;u-e known and appreciated by
them.

If the milittH'V institutions of a country are so bad ;is to aeparate the
troofw of the s«iue Division in peace time, they sJiould be biugaded and put in
Diivisione as soon as ]>ossible. The manner in which tlie military machine is
])ut together at the opening of a campaign exorcises much influence over tlie
luanner in which it ])eifonns its duties.

ISIixed. Divisions and biigades.appear to be more generally uspd now than
formerly. In addition to the requisite artillery, a company of engineers to
execute various works, a detachment of police to maintain discipline, and a
sufficient numbej' of mmi of the adnunistjvitive services to transport tstoi^es,
hosjjital.^, and provisipus, ai>e attached, in short, a Division is orgaaiieeU so a»
to provide entirely for it.s- own waajts.

Na.poleon reGognized t^jetixith of- tliese facts, too late, wJwn be saw the
inconvenience of '"having no J[>iviaiQi>s.tU' brjgades^if^cavijry attadied to?the corps
and Divisions of infantry.

In approvijig of the di^^iiUiitiun of oavahy amount the-- Divisions ami
brigades, light .cavaltyoiUy is refferred'to ; Cuiiijtsaiei's or Tieav.y;cayflkj'. should
never be thus scattered. They form masses of reserve cavalry, and should be

used only in great actions and battles. General Hoclie, when lie took coniniaml
of the Ai"niy of the Sanibro and Jleuse, desiring to remove what he considered
to be an incon\'eniiMK'e, united all his cavalry into separate Divisions. But
in avoiding one error be fell into another not less dangerous, by destroying the
mutual su[n>ort of the various anus -depriving them of their reciprocal support.
He wonkl ha\ o d('ri\ed greater advantages from his cavalry, says Jomini, had
he left the llu.ssais, the (Jhasseui-s, and even the Dragoons with the Divisions,
forming his reserve oidy of hea\')' ca\';dry.

The advantage of mixed Divisions anil brigades has been so fully recog-
nized in the Prussian Army as a principle of organization, that each Division
is composed of cavalry, artillery, and infantry ; this combination allows them
to manoeuvre on all kinds of ground, and enables them to advance without
danger and inconvenience. This arrangement further forms General otHcers
and accustoms them to the comnKUid of mixed bodies, and enables them by
practice to detcnuiiio the strength and weakness of the various arms of the
Service.

Ai-my-corps are formed by tlip junction of Iavo or more
Divisions togetlior.

The folhnviiig- is a (Jeta^ of an a.rnjy-corps of the Gernian
Empire :—

Tabular Statement of the Composition and Strength of
a German Army-Corps.

Wah Establishment.

o
O

.2 "

.2 c

C OS

sis

■y

Horses.

Field Troops.

5
4

'5.

■•5

e
5

•3

C
S

General Commanding and Staff

1.50

121

124

126

370

...

1st Division —
Staflf of Division

("Staff

1st Brigade -? 2 Regiments >

(, Infantry S

2nd Brigade

1 Regiment Cavalry

1 Division Field Artillery ...

138

140
23

14
3

5,912

5,915
5-9

5t;i

122

122
13

12
3

24
4
4

130

137
37
30

6
4

31
12

6, .350

6,.362
677
634

14,066

26
12

116

12S
691
140

...
24

Total 1st Division

325

12,994

265

354

1.213

640

115

Total 2nd Division

325

12,994

263

354

14,066*1.213

640

115

*1 Battalion Rifles

985

116

24
732

1,056J 16

Total of 2 Divisions ...

672

26,273

.547

29,188 2,442

1,304

240

T Cavalry Division —

Staff

1st Brigade {.fjj'^giVuents-

2nd Brigade

1 Battery Horse Artillery

48
4

14
3

1,178

1,181

141

26
26

6
6

13
7
74
81
5

A
4

1,354

1,366

157

1,382

1,394

117

32
84
92

1
U
15
16

Total Cavalry Division

104

2,517

180

2,920

2,931

162

Artillery Reserve —

Regimental Staff

1 Kicld Division (4 Batteries)
I Horse Division ci Batteries)
Ainnuinition Train

18
10
20

561
283
767

1
8
4
18

5
3
10

4
9

6
30
20
784

4
4
10

634

328

1,627

10
140
244
239

370

186

1,358

41
21
230

24
12

Total Artilleiy Reserve

1,613

879

840

2,601

1,916

293

Pioneers

5
29
76

313

1,254

430

Military Train Battalion

495

.'i07

935

148 2,177

646

1,689

598

Administrative Services

127

328

381

18 974

232

328

Field Post

Grand Total of Field Troops

:3i

got;

32,613

647

234

207

987

.3,446

39,341 6,787

6,895

1,363'

* Till' Butt.ilion of Rifles is attached to either of the two Divisions at the discretion of the OfScer
Commanding the .\rmy-Corps.

t The Cavalry Divisions in the field are not attached to the Army-Corps, but to the armies; they
Vary, being sometimes comjjosed of two, sometimes three brigades, of two or three regiments each.

Tlie following is a detail of a French army-corps, as formed
at the beginning of the war of 1870; but, as has been already
stated, the French have no absolute form for an army-
corps : —

Tabular Statement of a FiL-nch anny-corps in 1870.

OtTicers.

N.-C. Olllcors
!ind men.

Horses.

Guns.

Genoml StafV

Artillci-v Sliiff

, ,

Engineer Staff . .

••

Military Stuff

Civil Stud"

Total Corps Staff

1st Division

306

9,885

185

2iid Division

312

9,995

.506

3rd Division . . . . ..

315

9,931

4-75

Cavalry Division

190

2,279

1,569

Reserve Artillery

925

778

Artillery Tniin, Small and Gre^l Gun
Ammunition ..

I S

503

563

• •

Pontouiers

133

, ,

Artificers. .

, ,

Reserve Engineers

140

, ,

Military Train . .

570

601

. ,

Administrative Corps ..

236

Hospital Department . .

236

67t

Police

Total

1,283

34,995

5,245

* The Ith Army Corps, f 22 Ambulances, 8 Wagons, 396 Cacolets.
NoTK. — None of the French Corps were completely horsed during the recent
war. The Pontoon Train, for example, requires 210 horses, it had but 6. The
Battalions were all under horsed, as were the other services.

The following is the establishment of a British army-corps
formed for active service : —

Ax Army-Corps.

(As approved by His Royal Highness tht

> Comman

der-in-Chief, 18. 7.

71.)

Onicers.

N.-C.

Officers
and Men.

All
Ranks.

Horses.

Guns.

Head-Quarter Staff

3 Divisions of Infantry . .

897

27,312

28,209

5,586

1 Brigade of Cavalry

2,039

2,131

2,001

Corps Artillery : —

Regimental Staff

—

3 Batteries Horse Artillery

516

537

2 Field Batteries

11-

382

396

308

Army-Corps Reserve Ammuni-
tion Column in 3 sections.

1 -

516

534

549

—

Engineers : —

Regimental Staff

—

1 Company Royal Engineers . .

186

191

— •

1 Pontoon Train

247

251

154

—

1 Telegraph Troop

245

249

120

-- ■

Total

1,082

31,458

32,510

0,376

The iViiicyii of two or more army-coi'ps forms an army. To
x\'hich is usually assigned in addition one or more Divisions
of cavalry, and sometimes a reserve of artillery, as was done by
the Austrians in the war of 18GG, and by the French in 1870.

Having thus given generally an account of the various
sections into which bodies of armed men must be divided,
in order that they may work together for one end. and be
submitted to one authority, it appears desirable to give some
account of the nature of the duties devohnug on the General
Avho commands, the Staff who aid him in carrpng out his duty,
and the various branches of the service.

In most annies the various functions are divided between
three great departments. The control, or intendance, the
artillery, and the engineers.*

The demarcation between the duties performed by these
various bodies differs in various armies, but the difference
between the three bodies is sufficiently marked to constitute a
well-defined distinction, although the exact line of division
between the duties of each, may not be the same in all armies.

In the Britisli Service, an army is commanded by either
a Field-Marshal or a Genea-al ; an army-corps by either a General
or Lieutenant-General ; a Division by cither a Lieutenant-
General or Major-General, and a brigade by either a Major-
General or a Colonel with the rank of Brigadier-General. The
following remarks upon the duties of a General Officer are
interesting, as showing how much depends on him, and how
requisite it is, that at all times he should receive the cordial
support of his subordinates.

Napoleon. Nothing is more impoi'tant in war than the command. Whei\ war is made

against a single power,.there should be but one army acting upon one line of
operations, and directed by one General.

Jomini. The most essential qualities for a Greneral will always be greatness of

character or moral courage, which produces resolution ; next, coolness or
physical courage, which masters danger ; knowledge comes only in the third
line, but it is a powerful auxiliary, it would he blindness to despise it. But,
as I have already said, I do not mean great erudition, a liiile well vinderstood
is bettei', but, above all, a General should have a mind thoroughly imbued
with guiding ]irinciples.

In addition to these qualities there is personal characiei'. A brave, just,
upright man, knowing how to value merit in others, but not jealous of it,
one who can use it for his own ends, such a person will .always be a good
General, and may even be a great man. Unfortunately an anxiety to be just
to merit, is by no means a common quality. Mediocrities are always jealous
and inclined to make bad selections, fearing lest the world should say that
they are led, and forgetting that he who is placed at the head of an anny has

* A Department of the Army is a body that serves the Army generally,
producing or supplying something that is of geneml utility, and for the supply
of which the Department is responsible. The Artillery nnd Engineers are thus
Departments of the Army. They are, however, dillerent from the Cmitrol Depart-
ment, inasmuch as tliay have a tactical relation with other troop.s, which it has not.

They are thus Arms of the Service VibvscW as Depart menfs of the Army ; andthi*
double function is the peculiarity of these two bodies.

almost tiie entire glory of succeas. however small may bo his sliai'e in obUiiniu^
it. I think then that the best Way of obfcuning a Crenera!, when thei'e is no
gi-eat leader wlio has mven proofs of ability, will b<j

1st. To select as Creneral, a brave man, bold iu action and unconquerable
in d;uiger.

•2nd. To give him, as his Chief of the StaH", a man of great capacity, of n
fnuik-honouraWe nature, with whom the Genend may live in good felloVship.
The glory is sufficiently great to yield a portion to a friend who lias helped to
j)repare success.

The first quality in a General is to be cool-headed, to estimate things at Napoleon,
their just value ; he must not be moved by good or bad news. The sensation.'!
that he daily receives must be so classed in his mind that each may occupy its
ajipropriate jilace. Reason and judgment are only the result of the comi);mson of
well-weighed ideas. There are men who from some physical oi' moral peculiaritv
of character, make of each thing a pictui-e. No matter what knowledge, intellect,
courage, or good qualities they may have, these men are unfit to cominand.
Generals-iu-Chief must be guided by experience or by their own genius.
Tactics, manojuvres, the science of the engineer or the artilleryman may be
learned from books ; but the knmvledge of gi-eat tactics can only be acquired
by experience and by the study of the histoiy of cam]iaigns of gi-eat Generals.

Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, Alexa.nder,"Haunibal, and Caesar
have all acted on the same principles, — holding their own force united,
being vulnerable nowhere, seizing rapidly, important points, — such are the
principles which lead to victory.

A Geueral-in-Chief should ask himself several times every day — 1£ the
enemy appeal- in my front, on my right or on my left, what would I do ? If
lie cannot at once give a satisfactory answer, he is in a bad position, he is not
acting wisely, he must alter his dispositions.

It is a general idea that coup d'oeil does not depend on the individual, Folard.
that in short it is born. We do not concur in this idea. We all have coiip
d'ceil in proportion to fhe intellect and good sense that Providence has
endowed us -v^ith, but it may be improved and trained. To this end oui'
imagination must think always of wai% when we hunt, travel, walk, or ride.

Xapoleon did not leave the front until the first attack took place. He Rocquaucoiu-t
then retired to some place where he might watch events. He genei-ally
selected one near the main attack, but out of fire. Had he occasion to quit
tliis place he left an officer to say where he had gone, and left others as he
went along to point out where he could be found.

It is needless to say that a certain amount of reticence is
requisite on the pait of a General, but this reticence may be
carried too far. Men will always \vork better when the reason
of the exertion demanded frcjm them is made apparent to them,
and vr[\\ qavyj out orders with greater precision when treated
as intellectiud beings, and not as machines. The contrast
between the two following extracts shows the progress modern
war has made in this respect. The more improved the arms
in use become the higher does the intellectual power of the
soldier rise in value as compared with brute force.

You cannot injure your enemy more than by concealing your in- Machiavelli.
tentions. It is for this re;ison that Metellus, who commajiided the 'army iu
Spain, being asked what he intended to do next day, replied : If my shirt knew
that, I would put it into the fire.

Mai-shal Bugeand is of a different oiiinion. He says the plan, at the Bugcaud.
moment of execution, should !■>€ known to ais many as possible of those who have
to caiTV it out Far too ofteji these things are wrapped in mysterioxte silence.

At the moment of action, if possible, even the soldiere should know tlie plan,
e;ich then, even the private, helps intelligently.

The duties of a General in command, even of a small army,
are so great, necessitating such constant thought and care, and
requiring him to be present at so many places at one time, that
it is impossible for any one man to perform these duties.
Hence in all armies a General is aided and assisted by officers
termed " Staff Officers."

Staff.

There are few words in the military vocabulary which are
used to denote a wider range of meaning than the Avord ' staff.'
Jomini has referred in strong terms to the errors that the
indiscriminate use of the word ' division ' may produce, and it is
therefore desirable to arrive at a clear definition of the word
' staff.' Staff is used in a twofold sense, — first, to denote all
officers not in actual personal command of troops ; for example,
the Paymaster, Adjutant, and Quartermaster of a regiment,
are termed the Regimental Staff, that is to say, they are officers
who deal with all the companies, and are not like the Captain,
Subaltern, or ]\Iajor, who actually command, or belong to certain
defined portions of the regiment, as the companies or wings.

In this sense, Surgeons not attaohed to regiments are
termed Staff-Surgeons. Similarly officers on the General
Service List of the Indian Army, are termed officers of the
Indian Staff Corps ; similarly, the commanding officers of
Artillery and Engineers, officers of the latter arm not attached
to companies, and officers of the Control Department and
subordinate branches are termed officers of the Staff. They
are for general duty with the army, and are not attached to
troops; but although all these officers belong to the Staff, they
are not Staff Officers in the proper acceptation of the word.

The Staff Officer is an officer who acts as the eye and ear
of the General, or other officer to whom he is attached, who
c(jnveys his orders, collects information for liim, and represents
him when he is not present. If the General of an army be
compared to the head, the Staff, as Hardegg says, may be
justly compared to the nerves which convey the volition from
the head to the different members.

The position of a Staff Officer should be clearly understood,.
in order that the duties falling on him may be properly
appreciated. He knows the General's plans, and from constant
personal intercourse with him, is fully aware of all his intentions,
and is conseqiiently able to say what he would order under
certain circ\nnstances. Having no real authority of his own
he can only act and give such orders as the General may direct.
He has no authority as the commanding officers of Artillery
and Engineers have over their own coi^ps and the Controller

has over liis OAvn department, he is simply a portion of the
General commanding. The dnties of a Staff Officer rcqnire great
tact, readiness, and knoAvledg'e of all branches of the army.

In foreign annies, as the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and
French, there is one Staff; that is to say, the staff duties are
inidiWded, and are performed by a body of officers -who are
selected in various ways, but who all perform staff functions.
There is an officer -with the head-quarters of each army, army-
•corps, or division, termed Chief of the Staff, who is the senior
Staff Officer and takes the orders of the General commanding
the army, army-corps, or Divnsion, on all matters; he is aided by
as many Staff Officers as may be requisite. All correspondence
"to and from the General with the commanding officers of army-
corps, Divisions, or bngades, and with the commanding officers
of Artillery and Engineers, and the Intendants or Controllers,
.passes through his hands, he registers the General's decisions and
orders, and conveys them to all concerned. It is his special
function to consider and bring to the General's notice, the
effect that any regulation proposed by the head of any
<lepartment, may have on the other departments, and to
obtain and submit to the General Officer the opinions of the
■departments so affected. Belonging to no deparfment or
arm of the service, the Staff Officer should know the ideas,
feelings, and pecuharities of all, and consequently be able
to arrange impartially between them ; this is a matter of no
Httle importance, for if any department has the power of settling*
questions relating to itself, or the responsibility of bringing
to the General's notice complaints against its o"^ti action or
negligence, suspicion is invariably produced as to the im-
partiality of its action.

Further, each head of a deparfment naturally looks on
his own department as the most important object, and hence
■s'iews everything from a lower stand-point than the Staff
Officer who sees the Avorking of all departments.

Every Staff Officer must be considered as acting uuder the direct orders Wellington,
and superintendence of the superior officer, for whose assistance he is employed,
and who must be considered .as responsible for his acts. To consider the
relative situation of General Officers and Staff in any other light would tend to
alter the nature of the Service, and in fact to give the command of the troops
to tiie subaltern Staff Officer instead of the General Officer.

The Chief of the Staff has no personal or immediate authority, except over Vaucbelle.
the Staff Officers of the ai-my ; but he exercises, in the name of the General
commanding, all such functions belonging to the latter as he may choose to
delegate. Consequently he opens and signs all the daily ordera, issuing and
signing, " by order" of the General, all orders that the General does not sign
himself. The Chief of the Staff is responsible for the whole detail of the army.
He collects and submits to the General accurate reports on the state of every
branch of the Service, and he directs all measures requisite to put these services
in order to be taken, if the officei-s commanding and the Intendant-in-Chief
have not of themselves done so.

The raison d'etre of the Chief of the Staff is to give the General, who is

Gvimoard.

Hardegg.

Jomini.

Griuioard.

Army of
NorthGerman
Confedera-
tion.

(Translated
by Colonel
Newdegate.)

Loth the will mill intelligence of the army, time and leisure for the thought
requisite to worthily accomplish his great mission.

The relations of the Chief of the Stafi' with the Generals commanding,
and with tlie Intendant-iu-Chief, are the same as those of the General, whose
mouth-piece he is.

There is this difference between the Chief of the Staff on one side, and the
General Otliccrs comuL'inding troops, the Artillery, the Engineers, and the
Intendant-in-Chief on the other, tliat the latter exercise under the direction
and in accordance with the orders of the General commanding-in-chief a
secondary but personal authority, which they derive both from their grades in
the Service and their letters of service, while the Cliief of the Staff, whose
duties are moi-e extended and more variable, exercises only a delegated and
variable authority. Thus his functions differ as he is employed under a
Turenne, or a Viileroi, a Pichegrn, or a Rossignol.

The Staff of an army consists of a number of selected ofHcers whose
chief or chiefs, if there are several, take the orders of the General with
reference to all details concerning the feeding, the movement, or quartering
of troops.

The object of the Staff in the existing state of warlike administration, is to
V)e the organ by which the commandant of an army or a fraction of an army
watches over tlie detail of the administration of the troops under his command
under every circumstance.

A good Staff, says General Jomini, is indispensable for the well-being of
an army ; it should be considered as the nursery from which a General selects
the instruments to serve him, as a collection of officers whose knowledge helps
his own. There is thus harmony between the genius which commands and the
talents of those who apply his designs.

The details that a Staff officer has specially to look after, are the subsis-
tence, the movement, and the quartering of troops, and as these three are the
most indispensable things in war, it is requisite to unite them in the same hand
as much as i)ossible, at the same time relieving the General of all details, and
leaving him all his faculties for the combination and execution of his military
plans. This is the reason that has led to the introdiiction of staffs in an army.
Their special duties are to maintain and watch over due order, in all branches
of the army, but having no particular authority over the troops, their duties
only embracing the weaving together of details.

Non-military men often hold wi-ong ideas of the rdle of the Chief of the
Staff of a large Division of the army, especially of the nature of his relations
with the Connnander-in-Chief in war. They think that his first duty is to act
as an adviser to his chief, and even that he officiates as the proper strategical
age)it at head-quarters. This is not the case. The Commander-in-Chief is
the deciding principal ; he alone bears the responsibility. His Chief of the
Staff is nothing more than his first assistant, the principal organ for commu-
nicating his individual will to the troops ; and if the Chief of the Staff* sketches
a plan of operations or the dispositions of a battle, he did not give his own
ideas but those of his Commander. The jiosition of a Chief of the Staff is no
doubt a most important one. He has even to rejjresent his chief under
certain circumstances, but he then only acts according to the intentions and
upon the principles imposed by the latter.

These relations do not prevent the General commanding from sometimes
desiring to learn the opinions and views of his Chief of the Staff, and even of
adopting them ; but it is then a voluntary act of confidence in the intelligence
of his subordinate. The history of wai-s no doubt shows that certain Generals,
otherwise very capable, do not unite all the qualities required for so high a
mission, and that a Chief of the Staff has been placed beside them who was
capable of supplying precisely the qualities in which they were deficient. One
can recall the combinations Bliicher-Gneisuau, Radetzky-Hess. But these are
exceptions to the normal rule.

The officer of tho General Staff is at hainl to assist the Divisional Venlv du
General. This officer has to exempt his General from the detail of connnuni- "V'^-nois.
eating ordei-s, ami in action he is specially destined to assist him in a (Iiiinslatcd
knowledge of the situation and of the ground, in order that the latter may be HiUlyard.)
able to make hrs dispositions judiciously. This can only be attained by
absenting himself temporarily from his commander, who cannot be everywhere
at once, and should change his place i\s seldom as possible, but he must not go
away oftener, nor remain absent longer, than appeai-s absolutely necessary ;
moreover, he should never absent himself on his own responsibility. TheStatV
Officer's place is at the side of his General, whom he should only leave on
obtaining his order or permission to do so. Occasions for this come often
enough ; even when the engaged line of a division is not immoderately
extended, its commander, from his station in I'ear, can, as a rule, only observe
the general features of the course of the action. He can see when the action
is at a standstill, whsn it advances or retires, but he frequently does not know
the reason why in one place no progress is made, wliile in another the
troops are even beginning to give way, yet if he wishes to go evei-y where
pei-sonally he must give up at once his superintendence over the whole ;
or the ground in front of his position hides the movements of a portion
of his troops, and of the enemy, the reports arriving do not suffice to give a
clear idea of them, yet the General must not leave his place, as he must keep
the greater portion of his troops in view. Further, even foi- the reconnoitring
of gruund, especially when on the offensive, there is not time enough for one
individual to take a view of the proportionally great extent of ground
necessary for a Division ; moreover, the troops arriving unistl)e provided with
orders, and still they cannot be judiciously disposed, without, at least, an idea
of the ground.

In all these cases the leader of great bodies of troops requires an officer
upon whose judgment he can rely, wlio can go to the different places instead
of himself and then observe for him, and for this purjjose the officer of the
General Stafi" is principally destined. The latter can only fulfil his ta.sk if he
has been specially trained for the duties of it. Moreover, apart from this, it
is also his business to look to eveiything by which he may be able to lighten
his commander's duties and assist him in their performance. The Staff Officer
must understand, therefore, in action, not only how to take in the situation of
the bodies of troops to which he is attached, with regard to the general state
of the engagement, but he must be able to judge rightly its several periods as
well as the features of the gi'ound, and this requires very- thorough training.
The gi-eatest difficulty he incurs with a Division is that a correct judgment can
only be ftirmed by his maintaining a constant view of the whole state of
affairs, whereas his duty often takes him from the spot from which alone
he is able to obtain it. This officer, therefore, on returning to his commander,
after having been despatched anywhere, must always immediately endeavour
to obtain information of anything that has occurred during his absence. He
cannot jjossibly trouble the Divisional General at suuh an important time with
questions, and inquiries in the Staff would only furnish him with incomi)lete
information. If, therefore, his (.reneral does not of his own accord impart to
him his knowledge on the subject, the Staff Officer easily loses the complete
information which is so necessary for him.

Arrangements for ]>roviding wagons for the eventual transjiort of the
wounded, the direction of the train and of the piisoners, the delivery of reports
to superior authorities, and the providing of a guide who knows the ground
belong to necessary details. The latter may appear superfluous, l)ut is far
from being so.

In the first place, even if in possession of the most detailed map, the
whole of its .sections cannot be carried in the sabretache, and an unex})ected
course of events may necessitate tho use of sections whose employment wa.s
only reckoned upon for the following day, and which are consequently not at
hand in the moment of need. Thus it happened that in the Stjifi' of an officer
holding a high command, which was richlv provided with materials for maps,

C 2

not a sinj^le section relating to tliat portion of the ground couM be found upon
entering the battle-field of Konniggriitz.

And even when tliey are on the spot errors cannot be avoided. During
a rajjid ride, in wliich the direction is often changing, and the attention ig
distracted by p;issing events, the run of a map may be lost even Avhen actually
in the hand. Lastly, with the best maps mistakes are easily made about points
some way off, church towers behind woods and such like.

The old saying, that a messenger tied to a string is better than the finest
map, has still its full force, and it is well in every large staff to comnu.ssiou
one ofHcer with the sole duties of reconnoitring the ground.*

We may take this opportunity of remarking that the training in reading
m<aps is not always undertaken in a sufliciently practical manner. The value
of survey maps in war requires no further proof ; but in order to ]>ractice
oneself in plans for use in action the looking over and general understanding
of them does not suffice. It is much more necessary to be able to observe, as -
it were, a landscape in one's mind, as has been often attempted in these
sketches. Let it be supposed that one arrives at any spot and asks which
portion on the map corresponds with the landscape from this position. In
this way previous practice will be so much the more useful at a future time
in making judicious dispositions of ground.

Napoleon. To be able to read a map, to understand a reconnaissance, to be able to

issue orders, to be able to give a clear statement of the most intricate move-
ments of an army, — such are the requirements of a Staff officer.

Tlie functions of a Staff Officer are thus of a very extensive
nature, and to discharge them well, he must have not only
considerable knowledge but also a great amount of tact and
good humour. A fussy Staff Officer does much harm, he is
always interfering with the heads of departments, pointing-
out itoio they should do their duty. It being his proper place
to take obstacles out of their way, to smooth their relations
with others, and to bring to the General's notice any neglect
on their part. The moment a Staff Officer, using his position
on the Staff of a General, prescribes how any definite action
is to be performed, he removes the responsibility for the
due execution from the shoulders of the executive officer
whose duty it is, on to his own. Confusion and friction must
ensue from such a course of action. It is impossible to over-
rate the importance of a Staff Officer's duties, or the knowledge
he requires to fulfil those duties adequately, but a Staff Officer
must never forget that more hami than good may be done
by interference with details. The way in which an executive
officer carries out his duty often depends on his peculiar tem-
perament, no two men placed in similar positions will act
exactly in the same way. Within wide limits their conduct
must be judged by results; to attempt to bind all to one
standard, would be to destroy all individuality: consequently
details should be invariably left to those whose duty it is to

* The following extract is remarkable, more especially when it is remembered
that the ground was that fought over by tJie great Frederick, and close to the
Prussian frontiers. " The wood of Maslowed was not distinctly marked on the
maps, 80 that its extent and depth were unknown. From east to west it is about
2,000, from north to 80uth about 1,200, paces long." [Prussian ofEcial account,
campaign 1866. Translated by Uozicr and Wright.]

execute orders. Throuf^li tlie Staff all correspondence of all
kinds should pass, and in the StatF office, that is to say, th»?
Generars office, all decisions should be carefully registered for
future reference. If this be not done there will be much con-
fusion.

Tlie ciniimainling officer of Artillery, the comm.anding officer of Engineers, Jomini.
aiul the Inteudant, claim to deal with the General-iu-Chief, and not with his
Chief of the St^iff. Nothing should i)reveiit the closest intercourse between
these functioniu-ies and the General, but he should see them only in presence of
the Chief of the Staff, and send him all their correspondence, otherwise
confusion is inevitable.

Control Department.

The Control Department is charged with the supply of all
stores of every kind, both munitions de guerre and de houclte.
The head of the Control Department in the British service
under existuig regulations does not deal ^vith the Staff but with
the General commanding; all correspondence for the Controller
is taken by that officer to the General commanding, who settles
it, the Controller being the means of communication on all
questions connected with barracks, fuel, light, powder, shot, arms,
engineer appliances, boots and clothes, as well for food, forage,
and money.

The Control Department in the English Army is unlike the
Intendance of any foreign army, performing many duties which
in foreign armies are not performed by that body, and, on the
other hand, having nothing to do with duties that in foreign
armies are performed by the Intendance.

The Controller is bound to be well acquainted with all the armament Extracted
of works within the command, and the stores required for the same. fi'om the

He is bound to repair all militaiy stores of every kind, and he is Control
bound to have all reserve stores kept up to the proper quantities and to Regulations,
concentrate them in reserve depots.

A Controller will consult with the officer commanding as to the
place of supply depots, and as to what things are to be got on the spot.

The Controller will conduct his duties under the direct orders of
the officer commanding, to whom he may be attached. He will be the
adviser and agent of the officer commanding in all matters connected
with the raising or issue of money, the supply of provisions, stores,
clotliing and transport. He will relieve him as far as possible of all
details connected therewith.

The Controller will hold towards the officer commanding, and
towards the heads of other departments within the command, with
reference to Control services, a position analogous to that held by the
officer of the General Staff, with reference to militaiy services; except-
ing that while the Controller is under the immediate command of the
officer commanding, he is at the same time responsible to the Secretary
of State for War that the duties of his department are conducted in
strict accordance with the instructions laid down in the regulations, and
with any special instruction that may be given to his predecessors, or
that may from time to time be conveyed to him.

The Controller will not be warranted in departing on any occasion
from his instructions upon his own authority. Should circumstances
at any time render a deviation therefrom in his opinion necessary or
expedient, before reference can be made to the War Office,hc will submit
the case to the officer commanding, and obtain a written sanction for
the deviation, reporting the full particulars to the Secretary of State
for AVar. The Controller will be held responsible for any measure that
may be adopted on his recommendation.

Should the Controller receive orders from the officer commanding
inconsistent with War Office Instructions or Regulations, and whichmay
not have proceeded from his (the Controller's) suggestion, it will be his
duty respectfully to point out this inconsistency to the officer command-
ing, and to solicit a special authority in writing for the deviation, which,
being granted, mu.st be implicitly obeyed. A report of the circumstance,
countersigned b}' the officer commanding, together with a copy of the
correspondence, will be transmitted bj'the Controller to the Secretary
of State for War, who will hold the officer commanding responsible for
the measures ordered by him.

Should the officer commanding and the Controller, or either of them,
consider that thev have not sufficient power, or shou.ld they be in any
doubt how to act, reference will be made to the Secretary of State for
War. When it is necessary to promulgate in "orders," a decision of the
General officer commanding, or an instniciion referring to Control
services, the Controller will submit in writing, for the approval of the
officer commanding, a draught or memorandum of the terras in which
the communication is to be made, and having obtained the initials or
signature of the officer commanding to the document, will then transmit
it to the Adjutant- General or proper military Staff officer to be put in
orders. In cases in which the decision of the officer commanding does
not requireproraiilgation by an order, the intervention of a railitary Staff
officer will not be required. The Controller will communicate the
decision to the persons concerned direct, and in writing with his
signature affixed, adding the words, ''by decision of the General officer
commanding."

When the troops are brigaded, the Controller will be in direct com-
munication with the Brigadier on all siibjects appertaining to Control
duties, and will submit any question which may require decision or
consideration to the officer commanding the division or garrison.

The Controller is charged with the appropriation of barracks, and
their custody when vacant and not dismantled.

In order to obtain information as to the best mode of suiDph^ing the
troops, the Controller will use every endeavour in all situations in which
he may be placed to ascertain the resources of the country in cattle,
grain, forage, fuel, &c., and the means of transport by land or water,
the established rates and prices of the countr}-, the state of the
roads, the communication by land and by inland navigation, together
with all other information of a local nature that may be useful.

The Controller will be responsible for the proper organization
and for the economical and efficient working of the transport service,
Avhether furnished by the Army Service Corps or provided locally.

The Controller will make himself acquainted with the quantity and
nature of the various articles for which land transport would be neces-
sary should the army take the field, and he will ascertain the resources
of his district in respect of auxiliary transport.

The Controller -will have in readiness plans for the movement of the
force or of jjarts of it, -with specifications of the equipment, animals, and
stores necessary. These plans will be kept corrected in accordance with
the progress of events.

The Controller will be the medium of communication with the War
Office on subjects relating to Control sei*viccs, but he will submit all
letters and communications for tlie perusal and observation of the officer
commanding, except those relating to matters of ordinary routine, which
the officer commanding -may not require to be submitted to him.

It will be the duty of the Controller to prepare for the officer com-
manding all correspondence on Control subjects, whether local or with
the Secretary of State for War. lie will ])reserve in his office all letters
and other records relating to those duties, including the corresponder.ee
addressed to the officer commanding. He will be prepared at all times
to lay those records before the officer commanding when required to do
so, and to furnish him with full information on all points connected with
Control duties.

The Controller is responsible that the officers of the Army Service
Corps preserve discipline and efficiency in the establishment under their
orders.

In France the organization and execution of the various administrative VauchfUe.
services, the supervision and continual control of the interior economy of
corps and detachments, forms a portion of the duty of the Intendance, as well
as the authorization of all expenses, the verification and audit of accounts of
issues and consumption of all kinds, either of money or articles obtained in the
country or of prizes made by the enemy — in short all the details of the admi-
nistration, except what is connected with the materiel of the Artillery and the
Engineers, form a portion of the duties of the Intendance. The Intendants
and Sous-Intendants have no duty transaction but with the commanding
officers or Chief of the Staff of the army, army- corps, division, oi- brigade to
which they are attached.

The Intendant, or Chief Commissary of an army, has under his direction Grimoard.
the agents who supply the following provisions : — Forage, hospital requisites,
clothing and camj) equipment transport, the supply of articles used bj' the
troops in barracks or on the line of march. The provision of the subsistence
of the army is the first duty of the Intendant, all else is subordinate to that.

Armies have frequently to be fed by forced requisitions ; these requisitions
are ordered by the General connuanding, the custody and distribution of what
is obtained by requisitions falls to the Intendant.

The following remarks on the subject of requisitions are inte-
resting : —

However careful and foi'eseeing the administration of an army may be, it Dc Gorlache.
will often be compelled to seek assistance from the inhabitants of the country
occupied by the army : compulsory demands for assistance are then made.
These demands are termed " requisitions " when they are in kind, " contribu-
tions " when in money.

Eequisitions are therefore demands on the enemy's country ; they are made
witliout any pi'etence of justice, only by the right of the strongest ; that
necessity commands them ; they are in short a kind of fine to help the cost of
the war.

The same right of war, which authorizes requisitions of provisions in an
enemy's country, also permits requisitions of money.

The adoption of such measures, and the amounts demanded, the mildness
or harshness with winch they are enforced, are entirely political questions.

The power of calling for contributions in money in an enemy's country
when occupied, belongs exclusively to the General commanding-in-chief. The

amounts so obtained are paid into the military chest to the credit of the
treasury, and are inchideil in the general resources, to meet the wants of the-
army.

When a General-in-Chief determines to call for a contribution in money,,
the Intendant-in-Chief will furnish him with a report on the state and resources
of the country, upon the taxes already charged on it, and upon the chances of
the sum demanded being realized.

Griiuoard. M. Paris du Vernei, the most able lutendantthe French ai'ray had, lays it

down as a principle, that so far as possible requisitions in kind, especially in-
grain, are to be avoided. He says with great ti'uth that when the inhabitants
get frightened about their own food they hide their corn, and famine often thus
succeeds rapidly to abundance. He considers it better at all times, even for
the coimtry itself, to demand money and buy corn with it.

If bread is demanded, the size and shape of loaf used in the countiy
should be accejited ; it will be easier to distribute it, than to insist on the bakers
providing loaves similar to those used by the army.

Dc Gerlache. Requisitions should if possible be moderate in amount and frequently

renewed, this will divide the pressure of their charges more equally ; they ai'e
at all times most vexatious to the people. If contributions in money can be
obtiiined they are always the safest, easiest, and most politic, it being far moi'e
economical to provision an army by purchase than in any other way. But
it always hajjpens that although the amount of a contribution is stateil in coin,
yet practically in war a portion must be taken in coin, a portion in paper,
a portion in provision, a portions in labour. This latter portion is termed
"a requisition."

One advantage of contributions in money is that they avoid waste, and.
produce a certain amount of trade in the country, which may slightly alleviate-
the burdens of the people.

A system of requisitions is essentially a bad one, and a wise administration
will use it as little as possible, and with great circumspection, and then only for
the first and pressing wants of the army, or if the people wish it to enable
them to pay the contributions more easily ; nevertheless, at certain times and
places requisitions have to be resorted to, and it is then advisable to place them
under strict rules.

It is most imprudent to give too much power to the local authorities, muck
time will be lost and very little done. An official of the army must be present
at the division of the amount, and must assure himself of the means of
executing the requisition ; otherwise the envy, small hatreds, and pa-ssions of
little towns influence the division, and when arbitraiy acts are either done or
authorized in war, such feelings should not be excited.

When an urgent requisition is demanded, the chief inhabitants are imme-
diately ordered to supply a certain portion, according to their estimated ability ;
and the representatives of the Government are the firet so called on. Shop-
keepers should only pay their pro rata share, whatever may be the state of
their stores.

When the leading men of a town are thus dealt Avith, it is unlikely that
they will spare any one, and they will be just to their fellow citizens ; if this
be not done there will be neither justice in dividing the requisition nor
punctuality in bringing it.

It is most essential to watch the agents entrusted with the duty of obtain-
ing the requisition for furnishing a requisition may be made the j^retext, and
furnish the occasion, for the most vexatious interference with the people.

However, if the orders are very explicit, and if civilians acting as com-
missaries assist the military commissaries, a great many abuses and vexations
may be avoided. But if the quantity or quality of the provisions has been
unsuitably fixed, and if the country be handed over to the agents of the
Intendance and these happen to be dishonest, avarice will find a thousand ways
of inflicting misery on the inhabitants ; and as Olennius, of whom Tacitus
speaks, demauded skins of a uniform pattern, the agents will be most difficult

to satisfy. The quality will never be fjfoixl onouglj, the nierusure will not he of
the proper weight, vr the weight of the ])r()per niensure, the corn will not be
clean enough, the bullocks will be too small, too thin, and everything will be
too little, or bad. These disputes will be finally settled, but the country and
the army will sutler.

Notwithstanding the most careful consideration and foresight, requisitions
must be made in every country where there is war. The armj/ must lire,
and no consideration should stop the staff when this im])erions law has to
be obeyed. A town or a village always contains food and snp))lies()f different
kinds for an army which is at hand ; — to find the means of extracting thoni,
that is the problem.

Under such circumstances, and in accordance with orders to be issued by DeLavarenne.
only the Commaniler-in-Chief or the Commandants of Corps, the Chief of the
Staff will select the i)laces on which a contribution is to be levied, its amount
and nature.

An officer or a Sub-Intendant (or better still, a treasury emploije if money
has to be received) is entrusted with overseeing the contribution in a certain
district, and when the duty is completed the Military Intenilance divide the
proceeds as may be directed. This officer or Sous-Intendant will be accom-
panied by a detachment composed of a force of cavalry and infantry, com-
manded by an officer whose duty it is to respond to all demands made on him,
either to furnish sentries over pei-sons' houses, to aid the local authorities, by
main force, or even to make house to house visits.

For such an operation (as for foraging) a party is told off ]iroj)ort;onate to
the value of the contribution, the neigh])ourhood of the enemy, or the dis])o-
sitions of the inhabitants. The commanding officer is responsible that all
requisite measures are taken to ensure the execution of the order.

This is one of the most delicate and unpleasant duties with which an De Cessac.
officer can be charged. The officer entrusted with this duty, prit)r to leaving
his garrison, camp, or post, should receive an exact list of the villages which
are to contribute, the nature and the amount of contribution each is to furnish.
lie should know the places that the provisions, forage, &c., should be sent to.
He should be informed of the roads leading from the place he is in to the
various villages, and from the villages to the magazines. He should be in-
formed if the enemy is in the neighbourhood of the country called on to con-
tribute, and what is the force assembled. He should also know the feelings anel
character of the inhabitants. He should ask information on all these points
in the gi-eatest detail, and he should ask for and get a covering order to protect
him against any odium that may arise from having to resort to extreme
measures. He should also keep a journal noting down all marches or opera-
tions of any kind, and he should call on the chief inhabitants to sign as to the
state of the contributions levied.

Prior to moving off he should inspect his men, and give the clearest
instrtictions as to pillage. As in reconnaissances, detachments to levy contri-
butions should not be too large — too large a detachment frightens the people,
who hide their cattle, their corn, and forage, leave their houses, and go to seek
and warn the enemy.

Large detachments fatigue an army — they can be followed and easily
attacked.

Small detachments on the contrary go everywhere, arrive at unexpectett
moments, return with ease, and, consuming little food, can easily hide in small
woods and ravines. For these reasons an officer sent to levy contributions
should take only a small detachment. A detachment sent for such a purjiose-
should })e composed one-half of infantry, one-half of cavalry ; it should l)e
accompanied by guides and interpreters ; fi-esh guides should be procured each
day, for peasants rarely know any Init the roads close to their own houses.

The Commandant of the detachment will arrange so as to arrive about the
middle of night near the village on which the contribution is to be levied.
He will place his men in an advantageous i)osition, and will send an iuterjn-eter.

accompanied by two iufantry officers, to find out if the enemy is in the village ;
tliey will go quietly tln-ough the streets, and will listen attentively, and
examine everything. If an enemy is in the village they will answer his
challenge, and return as quickly as possible. If nothing indicates the presence
of an enemy tliey will return and report to the Commandant if the enemy is
in possession ; so soon as the scouts return the party will retreat : if tliere is
no enemy, two mounted non-conunissioned officers and an interpreter will be
sent into the village. They will go to the chief man in the place, who repre-
sents the Government : it will be very advantageous if the guide or interpreter
knows the man. Pie will be at once told that a strong body of the enemy is
close at hand, and that guides are requisite, and that he must come and speak
to the commanding oflicer. This will generally induce him to 02)en his door ;
he will be then taken without noise to the Commandant.

While this is going on the Commandant will surround the village with
small parties of seven or eight men to prevent any one leaving it or going to
warn the eneiuy who may be near at hand.

As soon as the chief man shall have been brought to the Commandant, he
will be told of the orders given to require a sum of money, a quantit}' of
provisions, forage, carts, or labourers. He will be directed to {)lace in the hands
of the Commandant five or six hostages chosen among the chief people of the
place, also the cliildren of the jsrincipal inhabitants. When these hostages
have been given, the magistrate will be allowed to go, and a very short time
will be allowed to get the contribution ready and on the road for the ai-my. If
the contribution cannot be at once supplied, the hostages will be taken away,
and the people will be informed that if the contribution does not reach the
army on a certain day the village will be burned.

The following is an examiDle of a requisition : - -

" Notice.

^' Nancy, 2'ird January, 1871, A p.m.
"The Prefect of the Meurthe sends the Maire of Nancy the following order: —

"If to-morrow, the 24th January, at 12 noon, 500 workmen from the
workshops of the town are not at the railway station, the foremen first, and a
certain number of the workmen next, will be seized and shot."

If the magistrates refuse to furnish the contribution, the Commandant
wiU threaten to burn their houses and farms, and will prepare to carry out
his threats if the}' are not submissive.

To compel villages to pay their contingent, the magistrates should be
written to and informed that if, at a certain hour on a certain day, they have
not furnished the proper quantity of money, ])rovisions, forage, carts, oi-
labourers, a party will be sent to burn the farms and houses. On the day
appointed tlie detachments sent for this purpose will go to the village, burn
one house and threaten to bui'n all the rest if the contribution be not at once
forthcoming. As the weight of contribution becomes excessive, if it is not
equally divided, and as the magistrates of a country occupied by an enemy
invariably divide contribution in an unjxist way, the officer charged with this
operation will point out the means for raising this tax, and he will watch that
the contributions demanded are fairly divided.

So soon as the inhabitants have furnished the contributions levied on
them, the detachment will escort it close to head-quarters, leave a small party
to take it in, and proceed to the other villages.

When the whole of the contributions have been obtained, the detachment
will return to camp, the Officer Commanding will halt it a short distance from
the camp, and will examine the men's haversacks. If any stolen property be
found the culprits will be at once punished.

Saie. Before returning into quarters all the men should be marched to a certain

place, and if any stolen property be found the thieves must be hung without
mercy.

De Lavarcnne. It is prudent not to take the same road when returning, as the inhabitants

may obtain a small force of the enemy to attack the convoy, or even do 80
themselves.

C-ireat firmness is requisite to prevent deception on the part of tlie
inhabitants, and in sucli a delicate operation the return of tiie paily is likely
to be the most dillicidt. It will be ])rudent, therefore, to use j)ack horses to
carry money on ni i)lace of carnages. These animals can cross fields, bye-
roads, or bad gi-ound more easily than wagons.

Artillery.

The Artillery of an army is comifianded by a General Officer,
•who is styled the Commanding; Officer of Artillery. He has
to assist him, a staff "which is composed of two branches, one being-
charged "v^-ith the duty of Adjutant-General, or personnel, the
other being charged with the materiel ; the liead of the materiel
branch is termed the Director of Park ; both these subordinates
are if requisite helped by other officers of Artillery.

The Artillery of an army-corps is commanded by a Major-
General, or Brigadier-General, assisted by a similar staff.

The Artillery of a Division is commanded by a field officer
who has a staff officer charged with both the personnel and
materiel of the Di\'ision.

The Commanding Officer of Ariillery with an army is charged
not only with the command of all the Artillery, but also with the
supply of the 1st and 2nd reserves of small and great gun ammu-
nition, as well as with the important duties which devolve on that
corps at sieges.

The most suitable means of obtaining the greatest advantage from the Jomiui.
artillery is by giving the chief command of that arm to an Artillery General
•who is not only an artillerist but a good tactician and strategist. This General
disposes not only of the general Artillery Reserve, but also of one-half of the
gmis attached to the division and aimy-corps. He can thus, in conpcrt with
the General Coramanding-in-Chief, determine the moment and place wliere
large masses of artillery can best contribute to victory. But such a massing
of artillery must never be made, except by order of the General Commanding-
in-Chief. The Commandants of Ai'tillery and Engineers have always made a
portion of the Staff' of the army.

The Commandant of Artillery should be endowed with great coolness and Von IMiller.
intelligence. He should be close to the commanding officer of the Division so
long as his presence with his batteries is not absolutely requisite, in order that
he may follow the course of the action and subordinate the artillery to its
movements.

It is a duty of the Commandant of Artillery to know the whole of the Xupoloon.
operations of the army, since it is his duty to supply arms and ammunition to
the different divisions composing it. His connection with the Commanding
Officers of Artillery at the advanced posts should keep him aware of all the
movements of the army, and the direction of the great pare is subordinate to
these movements.

The General commanding the Artillery has authority over all the troops Lc Bourg.
of the arm. He may, with the approval of the General commanding, make all
such changes in the pei-sonnel and materiel as he thinks advisable. He issues
orders to the Generals commanding the Artillery of army-corps, and receives
their reports, the Central Reserve and Grand Park receive orders only from
him, he fixes the depots as v/ell as the marches ; finally, he sees to the supply
of the army from the parks and convoys.

The Army of
the North
German Cou-
fcderaiion.

Newdegate.

Captain Mav.
Tactical re-
trospect.
Ouyry.

Thiebanlt.
(Hand Book
of Staff
Duties.)

He lives clo.se to hea<l-quarters, and when marching to attack an enemy-
he accompanies the General in all his reconnai-ssances, in order to select the
places most snitable for liis guns. In action he remains close to tlie General
to receive liis orders, if he does not himself direct the movements of the
reserve at decisive moments.

The Chief of the Artillery Staff receives from the StalFs of coi-ps and
divisions rejiorts and states of their situation, both as regards persoiniel and
materiel. He sends them all orders issued by the commanding officer of
Artillery, ami the General Staff of the Army. The Director of Park is charged
with the sujiply of ammunition and all articles required for repaii-s, or
exclian^'es if these cannot be suj)plied l)y the Corps and Divisional Parks. He
keeps the commanding officer of Artillery aware of all expenditure of ammu-
nition. The commanding officers of the Divisional Artillery receive orders
from the Generals commanding the divisions to which they are attached as
reo-ards their marches and the military position they should occupy ; but,
as reo-ards interior economy and materiel they receive orders from the
commanding officer of Artillery, whom they keep acquainted with changes
from day to day, the state of their sujiplies, and their wants.

Althougli the cannon is the arm of all Artillery, yet the divereity of object
and manner of employment, as well as the difterent kinds of guns dependent
thereon, and the various modes of serving them, have necessitated a different
instruction for the men, and a division of all into two categories — siege artillery
and field artillery, which last is divided into field and horse, the latter provided
with mounted gunnere. This division, however, concerns the men of the
corps, not the officers. The artillery officer is not destined for one only of the
categories mentioned al)ove, but rather for employment in either, and is
educated accordingly. He is, as it were, a universal artilleryman.

The leader of the Artillery of an army should be a General of the first
class.

Engineers.

The Engineers of an army are commanded by a General,
Avho is styled the Commanding Engineer. He has to help
him a stall', composed of an officer discharging the functions of
Adjutant-General, and a Director of Park.

The duties of the Phigineers are the conduct of engineering
operations at sieges, the construction and maintenance of field
telegraphs, mining, bridging, surveying, or such other militaiy
engineerhig duties as the General Officer Commandmg may
chrect.

The works that the engineere are charged with make them as important
in peace ;i8 in war. During ])eace they make or repair everything connected
with their Service, everything that war may have destroyed. They perfect and
complete systems of defence. They fortify frontiers and the coast, taking
advantage of the ground — as water, marshes, woods, or mountains.

During war they are employed on reconnaissance, which they make either
themselves, or in which they accompany General and superior officers. They
open and make roails for the different arms of the Service ; they are emjiloyed
to choose positions, skett-li ground, and on the itinerary of routes, on the trace
and construction of field fortifications, the intreuchment of camps, the attack
and defence of fortresses.

In battles the Conniianding Engineer and his Staff remain close to the
General to give him all the information he requires as to the ground, the
positions he wishes to take or the movements he may desire to make, and to
execute inmiediately, with the companies of sappers held ready at hand and
provided with tools, any work the Genend may wish, either on the line, on the

flank, or rear. In addition to these duties wliich, as Engineers, tlicy arc
charged witli, these officers may in some cases be employed as SUifi' officers.

An engineer wlio emi)lnys all his time in fortifications, exchanges volun- Captain May.
tarily the position of a soldier for that of an artizan. An engineer who is a Tactical ro-
good soldier and an inilitferent architect, will always be serviceable ; even trosncct.
though his constructions may, in a measure, fail in an artistic jxiint of view, ^
an iudifterent construction at the right place, is better than an artistic produc- ^^T-
tion at the wrong one.

The great importance of the Commanding Engineer in an army can only
be appreciated when he is seen at the side of the General Conmianding-in-
Chief, superinteniling the whole strategic and tjicticjil position, and seizing the
opportunity when his own branch of the Service can advantageously co-operate
in the battle.

The Pioneei-s, the officei-s of which are taken from the Engineer corps, are Army of the
not ])roperly a tactical body, but a technical one ; that is, a body of soldiers NorthGermaa
appointed for the execution of such building and niniierous other technical Confcdera-
works as become indispensably necessary in war. Although they are not tion.
organized for combat, yet their role in war is none the less important, and is Newdegate.
one also of no less danger than that of other troops. They are very frequently
obliged to execute their works exi)osed to the efficacious fire of the enemy, and
with passive endurance. They are also charged with mining operations, the
most terrible warfare of its kind. In a technical point of A'iew the men of each
pioneer battalion are divided into pontoniers, sappers, and miners.

They are charged with the construction of field works, placing villages in
a state of defence, erecting barricades, piercing loopholes in the walls of houses
and gardens, t&c, they also render essential assistance to the infantry under
opposite circumstances at the capture of such localities, by the removal of
bai'ricades and the destruction of walls : all under the enemy's fire. A brilliant
example of this took place at the storming of Le Bourget(30th October, 1870).

Their duties also include the formation of obstacles to impede the enemy's
march, such a.s abattis, the destruction of bridges and roads, and, in antagonistic
circumstiinces, the removal of the same obstacles in favour of their own troops.
Finally, they furnish the men required for the technical service of the field
telegi'aph and field railway. The r6le of the Pioneers is therefore very com-
prehensive. At sieges the other arms, especially the Artillery, naturally had
their full share in the brilliant result (siege of Strasburg). But the chief merit
belongs to the Engineer, who has to determine, in such a war problem, the
basis of the whole attack, namely the choice of the attacking fronts and the
laying out of the parallels and works generally.

The Permanent Committee of Engineers, composed of the chief and
superior officers of the corps, which meets daily at Berlin under the orders of
the Inspector-General of Engineers, is of great importance. It decides the
necessity of new works of fortification, ordei-s their construction, and examines
and publishes new technical inventions and improvements.

The great requi-site for the Commanding Engineer of an Army, who must Napoleon,
design and direct all the works of his arm of the service, is sound common
sense.

The foregoing is a brief sketch of the duties performed by the
various departments of the Army, and the places they fill in the
military machine.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down hard and fast lines
dividing these duties one from the other.

In many cases they blend together, and there must always
be certain duties which are common to both. Consequently it is
most desirable that officers should see a little beyond the limits of
their own special branch of the army. To the effective working

of all departments lieartiiy, with good will, and without jealousy,
the gi-eiit result, success, is due.

As the liritish Army is not permanently formed in corps
and Divisions, and as a large force has made no field cam-
paign (Sebastopol was a siege) in continentual Europe since 1815,
it may not be uninteresting to give a brief account of how these
duties were performed under the Duke of ^\'ellington. The
following is taken fnmi the preface to liis General Orders, pub-
lished with his authority and approval by Colonel GurAvood.

Gurwood. The Staff of the army at head-quarters was composed as follows : —

Personal Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Military Secretary.

The Commandant at Head-Quarters. (Au Assistant Adjutant-General).

The Aides-de-Camj) to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Adjutant-0e7ieraV s Department.

The Adjutant-General.
The Deputy Adjutant-General.
Assistant Adjutant-Generals.
Deputy -Assistant Adjutant-Generals.

The officers of this department were charged with all the detail of duties,
i-eturns, correspondence, discipline, &c. Although the organs of head-quarters,
and of the General Officers Commanding Cor]>s and Divisions to which they
were attached, for all orders and communications, the responsibility of the
duties they performed rested with the General Officer under whose orders they
served, and for whose assistance they were employed.

The QuartermaBter-OeneraVs Department.

The Quartei-master- General.
The Deputy Quartermaster-General.
Assistant Quartermaster-Generals..
Deputy -Assistant Quartei'master-Generals.

The officers of this department were charged with embai'kation, disem-
barkation, equipment, quartering, halting, encamping, route marching, and
the occupation of positions of the difterent divisions and of the troops, at the
stations to which they were res]:)ectively attached, under the authority and
responsibility of the General, or other superior officer in command.

Staff attached to Head-Quarters.

An Assistant Quartermaster-General to superintend the billeting, the
quai'tering and baggage of the head-quarters.

A Staff Surgeon.

A Chaplain.

An Assistant Commissary-General.

An Assistant Provost-Marshal.

An Assistant Baggage-Master.

Corps attached to the Ilead-Quariers.

The commanding officer of Royal Artillery, with tlie Staff of his corps,
haying a general superintendence of the artillery and ammunition attached to
the cor})s and divisions, also the battering train and the reserve artillery and
ammunition. The Commanding Royal Engineer, with the Staff and other
officer belonging to his corps having a general superintendence over the officers
of Engineers, the corps of Sappers and Minei-s, pontoons, and the engineer park,

consiating of the siege material and the fntieiu'liiiijf tool.-i, &c., belonging to
the army.

The officer commanding the coi-jw of Guides (an Assistant Quartermaster-
( Jeneral), in cliarge of the post-office and the communications of the army.

The t)thcer commanding the Statt' Corps of Cavalry in charge of the
police of the army, and otlier contidential duties.

The Provost -Marslial anil his assistants, having charge of prisoners of
war, deserters from the enemy, and all ])risoners tried, or to be tried, by
general court-martial, and having autliority to inflict sunnnary punishment
for all ofleuces committed under their observation.

Civil Departments attached to Head-Quarters.

The Medical Dejiartment, consisting of Inspector-General of Ilosjiitals,
Deputy Inspector, Physicians, Staff Surgeons, Apothecaries, Disj.iensers,
Assistimt Staff Surgeons, Hospital Assistants, &c.

The Purveyor's Department, consisting of a Purveyor to the Forces, with
dejiuties and assistants in charge of the hospitals, hospital material, arms and
accoutrements, clothing and necessaries of men in hospital, also of the funeral
exjjenses of men who died in hospital.

The Paymaster-General's Department, consisting of Paymaster-General,
assLstants, (S:c.

The Commissariat De])artment, consisting of Commissary-General, Deputy
Commissary -Generals, Assistant and Deputy- Assistants, Commissariat Clerks,
&c. This department was divided into two branches — Stores and Accounts.
""^i; The Storekeeper-General's Department, consisting of the Storekeeper-
General and his assistants, having charge of the field equipment, tents, &c.,
and the hea-\y baggage of the army.

The Comptroller of Army Accounts, with inspectors, &c., to whom all
accountants, except Commissariat accountants, render their accounts.

Divisions.

The army in the field was divided into divisions, each commanded by a
Lieuteuant-General or Major-Geueral, having local rank as Lieutenant-Geueral,
with the following staff : —

Two Aides-de-Camp.
One Assistast Adjutant-General.
One Deputy- Assistant Adjutant-General.
One Assistant Quartermaster-General.
One Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster-General.
One or two officers of the Royal Engineers.
One Staff Surgeon.
One Chaplain.

One Assistant Commissary-General, with a deputy, clerks, &c.
One Assistant Provost-Marshal.

One Baggage Master, w^th assistants from the Staff Corps of Cavalry.
One Storekeeper of Ordnance in charge of reserve ammunition, under the
officer commanding the Royal Artillery attached to the division.

Each division was composed of two or more brigades, each consisting of
two, three, or four battalions, the light companies of which were formed when
in presence of the enemy into a battalion under the command of a field officer
or senior Captain of the light companies of each brigade.

The brigades were connnanded by a Major-General, or a Brigadier-
General, or Colonel on the Staff, with the following staff" : —

One Aide-de-Camp.

One Major of Brigade.

One Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General, with clerks.

To each division of infantry a brigade of Artillery was attached, the officer
commanding which was under the immediate orders of the General command-

ing the division, although iiuder the general suijerintendence of the com-
manding ofhcer of the Royal Artillery at the head-quarters of the army.

When two or more divisions were placed under the second in command,
or other officer of high rank, to act ius a corps, a similar Staff was attached to
the corps to assist him in the command of it.

One or more brigades of Artillery were in general attached to the corps,
in adiUtion to the divisional Artillery. Also a force of Cavalry in proportion
■to the duties of the corps.

The (/avalry was also composed of divisions, each division consisting of
two or more brigades, and each brigade of two or more regiments of Heavy or
Light Cavalry.

To each brigade of Hussars or Light Cavalry a troop of Horse Artillery
was usually attached when in the advance of the army or before the enemy,
under the immediate orders of the General commanding the brigade. The
General Officer commanding the Cavalry had a Staff attached to him similar
to that of a General Officer commanding a corps.

In addition to the foregoing, what is called the materiel was attached to
the army, independent of the army in divisions, viz., —

The Battering Train, under the orders of the officer commanding the

Royal Artillery.
The Pontoon Train, under the orders of the Commanding Royal

Engineer.
The Engineer Park and siege materiel.
The Wagon Train, under the orders of the Quartermaster-General,

attached to the hos})itals, to the conmiissariat, &c., or to divisions,

as circumstances might require.
The Ordnance Store Train.
The Commissariat Wagon Train, and the other transj^ort of the army.

In the principal towns through which the army passed a hospital station
■was usually formed, to which, besides the necessary medical and hospital staff,
there was a depot staff consisting of

A Captain Commandant.

A Subaltern Adjutant.

An Assistant Commissary-General.

An Assistant Provost- Marshal.
Particularly if the station should be a town of consideration, with a magazine
on the line of supply.

These stations, of course, changed as the army changed its lines of
operation.

The port of embarkation, or disembarkation, formed the chief depot of
the army, and was under the command of a superior officer, wdth officers of
the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General's departments attached to him,
exclusive of the usual garrison staff.

Officers of the Quartermaster-General's department, officers of the Royal
Engineers, and Royal Staff Corps,* were employed on topographical surveys,
reports of roads, bridges, and resources of the country.

* The Royal Staff Corps was formed in 1800, and termed originally the
" QuarteiTuastcr-Gcncral's Corps." It had tlie same establishment as a battalion of
infantry, both of ofliccrs and men. The officers were not allowed to serve on the
General Stall' (General Order, 14th April, 1815). This corps was organized and
armed as a body of infantry, but trained to the duties of field engineering. The officers
were mounted and expected to perform the services of the Quartermaster-General's
department. The Field Officers ranking as assistants, and the Captains and
Subalterns as deputy-assistants, receiving when in the field forage and other
allowances according to their Staff rank. The qualification for an officer was a
military education, and four-fifths of the soldiers were mechanics. This corps was
not broken up until many years after the termination of the late war, its services
having been made available in the colonies. — Jackson.

3;i

In a Ulitiou to these, regimental orticers were employed by the GeneralH
comnianiling divisious as othoera in observation beyond tlie outposts of their
respective divisions, to obtain information with respect to the movements of
the enemy in front, and for the purpose of rep<irting upon the resources, roads,
rivers, bridges, and other military features of the country unoccupied between
the outposts of the two armies.

CHAPTER II.

Brie^ sketch op the History of Tactics.

It is repeatedly said that tactics have been altered, that the
use of rifles and breech-loaders, supported by rifled artillery,
have completely changed the system of fighting, and that a
new leaf must be turned over. In one sense this is true ; in
another it is an error, and a mischievous error.

It is quite true that the introduction of improved arms has
produced very considerable modifications in the method of fight-
ing ; but those modifications are not so much changes, as the
growth and development of principles that have been known
for Imndreds of years. And it is a most dangerous thing to
ignore all experience obtained prior to the introduction of im-
proved arms, for it is only by a careful study of the development
of tactics, that the true direction in which improvement is pos-
sible can be determined.

There hasbeen no period when it could be justly said, "Those
are old, these are new tactics." The improvements have followed
gradually and naturally on each succeeding improvement in fire-
arms. The flint-lock, percussion-cap, rifle, and breech-loader
have each necessitated changes. And as the breech-loading rifle
is but a development of the flint-lock musket, so tactics, as
existing now, are but a development of what they were 100 years
ago. It is quite true that there are certain periods when great
changes seem to take place, but these are really periods coincident
with great wars, when the minds of people in general are turned
to military subjects, and many startling discoveries appear then to
be made, which Avere well known, discussed, and practised years
beforehand, but which have escaped notice until peculiar events
have forced them into prominence. It is desirable therefore,
before gi\ang an account of the development of tactics produced
by the introduction of breech-loading rifles, and tested in the
actual school of war in 186() and 1870, to give a brief sketch of
the gradual gi'owth of the art, compiling the sketch from the
many authors* that have written on the subject.

Going back to the history of Greece and Rome, w^e find that
the same causes that produce alterations in tactics now, were at

* Perhaps the most useful of these books is that of Griret, "Etudes sur la
Tactique," which has been freely used.

work then. We find ihr. nndisciplinod armies of Persia, composed
of nations and tribes of warriors, cliiL'fly mounted, overconiQ by
the steady discipline and firmness of tlie Greek phalanx. 'J'he
same phalanx was overcome by tlie Roman legion, which was
more mobile, employed a greater number of missile Aveapons,
and coidd work over rough ground with far greater ease than
the plialanx, wliich very quickly got disorganised on uneven
ground.
B.C. 216. The order of battle of the Ivomans (hd not apparently includt-

a regular reserve imtil after the Carthaginian Avars had taught
the lesson that victory often fell to the (leneral who could bring'
up a reserve at the last moment. Subsequently the Romans
invariably em])loyt'd strong reserves of both horse and foot.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, cavalry became almost
the oidy force used ; this arose chiefly from the political and social
state of Europe at that time, armies being to a great extent
formed of the retainers and followers of great feudal chiefs,
and the infantry being composed of the poorest people, of little
account and badly armed,
134g_ The English at this period were remarkable for gaining several

1415. gi'eat victories. Cressy, Poitiei's, and Agincourt — all gained by

tactical arrangements in consonance with the anns used. The
long-bow, the Aveapon the English infantiy used, being superior
both in range, accmacj', and rapidity of fire to the cross-boAA% the
usual Aveapon of foreign archers. The tactics of the English
were simple, and consisted i)i taking up a position Avhere the
enemy had to attack them, discharging great flights of arrows
on him as he charged Avith heavy masses of caA^ahy, and charging'
him when in disorder, on the flank, Avith caA'alry posted on the
wings for that purpose.

Subsequently the SAviss infantiy, by its victories atMorgarten,
Sempach. and Noefels, raised the estimation in Avhich inf;intry
was held in Europe, 4nd all armies soon had companies of SavIss
infantry, Tisually employed as the Guard of the Sovereign.

The general introduction of firearms showed that armies,

to be successful, must be composed of large bodies of men so

armed, and that they must be mobile. From this resulted a

gradual prej^onderance of infantiy and the reduction of the

defensiA'e armour men carried.

Gusta-nis (iustavus Adolphus Avas the first General Avho grasped these

Adolplius. facts, and who also saw that mobility must be dependent on

1611, discipline.

The changes introduced by Gustavus Adolphus Avere very-
similar in their tendency to those consequent on the use of
breech-loaders. They Avere increased mobility and deA^clopment
of fire.

The usual fonnation of the SAvedish troops Avas in six ranks,
but in action they deployed so as to form three ranks. Each
brigade consisted of two regiments, each regiment of 1,800 men,
diAided into eight companies, each of which had 72 muskets

ami 54 pike moii, the latter being in the front rank and iiKing
tlie pikes to cover aiul protect the niu.sket men wliihj tlu-y fired.
Tlie cavalry was formed three deep, and altliongh iurnished
witli firearms, its instructions were to charge, and not to trust
to fire.

The tactics adopted by Gustavus Adolphus conduced greatly
to his many victories, his opponents, adhering to the heavy deep
columns at that time in \ise. were compelled to guard against
being outtlanked by the formation of their opponents, to place
all their troops in one line, while the Swedes were enabled to
form the troops in several lines. Consequently, when the line
of tlie imperialists was forced at an}'' part they conld never bring
lip fresli troops to support the decisive point.

Many improvements in sokliers' ecpiipment Avere introduced
by Gustavns Adolplms, such as hghteiiingthe musket, dispensing
with the rest, introducing the wheel-lock in place of slowmatch,*
and also cartiidges, thus enabling the soldier not only to fire but
also to load more rapidly. He also made artillery more mobile,
and added regimental guns which filled case shot, to the battalions
of infantry.

The tactics of the groat Swodisli King were largely de-
pendent on his improvements in arms. And it was to the clear
conception he had of the effect of firearms on the movement
of troops, that much of his success was due. Few leaders have
ever equalled or surpassed him, in handling troops.

No one ever equalled Gustavus Adolphus in leading his army against an Chemmtz.
enemy or conducting a retreat so as to prevent loss, nor in encamping his
troops, or strengthening his camp with field works. No one knew fortifi-
cation, attack, and defence, so well as he did. No one could divine the in-
tention of his enemy or take advantage of the chances of war more ably than
he did. He took in at a glance the whole position, and drew up his troops so
as to profit by every opportunity. The three points that he exceeded all othei's
in were tactics, organization, and arms.

After the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the art of tactics re-
mained stationary for many years, although numerous improve-
ments, both in arms and organization, were made by Turenne
and Saxe. But no General appears to have taken up the ques-
tion of tactics, org-jinization, aiKJ arms, as a "svhole, until Fredeiick jTrederick
the Great, following in the footsteps of Gustavus Adolphus, 17.19.
showed that victory Avould fall to the General who distinctly
understood the bearing (;f these subjects on one another, and
again we find inq)roveinents taking the same direction — develop-
ment of fire and mobility. It is said that the fire of the Prussian
infantry Avas so rapid that each man had a piece of leather to
protect his left hand from the heat of the barrcLf The troops
were formed in three ranks, the battalion being composed often

* Fire was produced by means of a \»ece of pyrites, or flint, fixed in the cock
being broun;ht rapidly against a revolving hammer.

t Evidently due to the large charge of powder then used. It is not a little
remarkable that rapidity of fire lias twice placed Prussia at the head of the military
nations of Europe, in 1719 and 18GG.

D 2

companies, and the greatest care being taken to preserve correct
distances and alignments, so as to enable eveiy man to fire. The
movements were ahvays in open cohnnn, which wheeled into
line to the pivot flank and advanced on the enemy. There were
no skirmishers of any kind.

The cavalry was formed two deep, and trusted entii'ely to
the effect of its charge, and not to firearms.

The Pnissian order of battle was at that time invariably in
two lines, cavalry on the wings and infantry in the centre.

The battalions of the first line were deployed, with six paces
interval between them. The battahons of the second line were
also deployed but as the first line was usually stronger than the
second, the intervals between the battalions of the second line
varied and were greater than those of the first line. The cavalry
was also formed into two lines on the flanks, a few Hussars
being detached beyond the flank of the general line to cover it.
The artillery was usually placed in heavy batteries on the front,
Frederick's battles may be divided into two distinct phases, — •

Ist. The movement, termed his oblique order of battle, by
which he sought to place himself obliquely on the flank
of his opponent.

2nd. The action of the troops after they became engaged.

The very short range of weapons at the period to which we
reler enable troops to get personally engaged after passing
over short spaces. Frederick's tactics consisted, once the troops
were engaged, in rapid firing and repeated bayonet charges.

The method that Frederick adopted in forming his troops on
the line of march, and in order of battle are best given in his
own words : —

At eight o'clock the advanced guard composed of six battalions of
Grenadiers, a regiment of infantry, ten squadrons of Dragoons, and two
regiments of Hussars, will march. It will proceed fourteen miles, halt, and
form the camp. (Vide Fig. 1, Plate I.)

The following day the army will follow, the infantry of the two lines of
the right wing forming the second column, the infantry of the two lines of
the left wing the third column. The cavalry of the, two lines of the right
wing the first column, the cavalry of the two lines of the left wing the fourth
column, the baggage in rear, the heads of the column will be in line, preceded
by a small advanced guard. ( Vide Fig. 2, Plate I.)

One or two days before leaving, the baggage will be sent to the rear under
a strong escort : if the country is open the rear-guard will be formed of cavalry ;
if defiles have to be passed they must be occupied the day before by infantry.

When the army marched to the front in four columns, right in front, it
formed line of battle as follows : The battalions marched in open column of
companies, the cavalry in open column of troops or squadrons ; while the
advanced guard engaged the enemy and the King examined the ground, the
columns wlieeled to the right if right in front, to the left if left in front, and
marched in two long parallel columns, seeking to place themselves obliquely
on one of the enemy's wings ; when the signal was given, the two columns
halted, and wheeled right or left into hne. ( Vide Fig. .3, Plate I.)

When the army retreated the operation is precisely similar, only the
battalions or squadrons of the second line move off the first.

When near the enemy the ai-my invariably marched in two columns, all

PLATE. I

nil nil nil --nil

II ii^kbijlhjki I

Ar-Tfiy jizarchincf ^o (In fhon/ i7i fhixr coUumtH
C( ( valry lefty wvnq

□□ I I I I II I I I i I I I I g o

Second line First lut-e-

Int'anU-y left v/inxi

I? i=.u;_ □□Illlilljllllllll llllllllllllllll

5. il^il^" Strnrul hfic first hrui

1 .... J.

Iniantr-\' Ti^iJit \vinc

11.

o o

I • '

tr-\ ruiiit \nnq

M irj llllllllllllllll IIJIII'IIIIIIIIJI

Second Unr first Lute

CavaUy iv^fhf winq

-D n 1 1 II 1 1 r I I I ' I I I I

Second Izfie First little

Fig' ^1

O O

o o

Arjiiy inftr-rf)/n/j no tnur colu^nru; formx/vg Ufic tofJw.frnnJ }yv chancnnxi
idxhJf-y fiurxlioTi, tofAe rujYi/ Jrft -wind "^ '' ■

I I I I II M I 1/ I ll II I I I I I I! 1/

iMiiiiiiMiiiiiiii/ iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii/r

Infantry

llllllllllllll/ III!

('< ivfttry

llllllllllll/?

1 1 I i I I /

BcUhdijjriy

i 1

Lujht Coniparty

Fi^ G. J= H

Bitttabxnv in CoUtmrxj

. : \G.c.

Fig\ 5.

Rrqij itrrit

Flunk Cfnnpanjues

L C Zl

CrTrnciilier Compcuiy

Fig-. 7.
Regurienl in coluinrx'

«L

1.5

Fi^- 8.

-Deploy rru7<t. o/* 6 BattciUon.s

DftMCtBrifin LiTw 77 Rrr.cnno S^ Covfnt CaRDTM

the first line being in one column, all the second line in the second column.
The army thus moved in open cohimn of comptiniea along the front of the
position occupied by the enemy.

It is quite evident that troops to move in this manner must
have been most carefully drilled, as otherwise the distances
would be lost and great confusion ensue.

Such formations and movements could never take place iu
presence of an enemy who could manceu^Te, neither could they
have taken place in the presence of long-range weapons, as the
wheel into hue must have been made at a considerable distance
from the enemy, and a long advance m line under fire would
have been necessitated.

Frederick the Great himself showed better than anyone else
how such a method of attack should be defeated. To the better
understandmg of the tactics of the Prussian King, which have
had a great influence over English tactics, the following short 1757,
descriptions of the battles of Prague, Kollin, Leutheu, and
Rossbach are added. The battles of Prague and Kollin succeeded
one another, but Prague and Leuthen, which are successful
instances of a flank attack, are given first.

Frederick had invaded Bohemia with two columns, one, under Battle of
his personal command, advanced from Saxony ; the other, under ^T'^S"''- ^-'^''
the command of Marshal Schwerin, advanced from Silesia by '^^'
Buntzlau and Brandeis. These two columns converged on
Prague {vide Plate ID.

The Austrian leader. Prince Charles of Lorraine, took up a
position close to Prague, with his left resting on the Cziskaberg
heights close to the Moldau, his right resting at Kyge, being-
covered by a series of marshy ponds, extending from Nieder
Micholup to Kyge, where the stream that joined these ponds
turned to the left and ran along the front of the position, dis-
charging itself into the Moldau at Lieben. Another Austrian
army, under Daun, was advancing from Vienna, and was close at
hand, the road by which this force was advancing on Prague, ran
behind the Austrian position. The Austrians formed their lino of
battle, as was usual at that period, in two lines, with the cavalry
on the flanks. Prince Charles desired to keep the Prussians in
check until the an-ival of Daun ; hearing of Schwerin's near
approach, he threw back his right from Kyge so as to form a
crochet on the high ground extending from above Sterboholy
towards Plortlorzes.

A crochet can only be considered a good means of defence when the Joniini.
enemy, already moving to attack, has been compelled to divide his force to
reach the flank he threatens. In all other cases a crochet, or as it is better
known, the order " en potence," if used to protect a flank against an army that
can manoeuvre, is a remedy worse than the disease it is used" to cure. It is
manifest that the flank or extremity of the crochet Miust be as well jjrotected
.'US the line itself; if it is not, it is useless. It, iu addition, has this great fault,
that the troops near the salient angle cannot retire without getting mutually
jammed, and without falling into disorder and confusion.

Battle of
Leuthcn, 5tli
December,
1757.

Jomlni

If the troops have to advance, a gi-eat gap i« left at the salifent, -ftbich
mvist be filled by closing to the right or left, which may cause great dii^order,
.and have the most fatal consequences at tlie moment of attack. Further, a
skilful general will soon find means for opening a cross-tiie on the salient
angle, which will take the battalions at the salient both in flank and front.

Frederick, desirouR of Hiipporting Schwerin, and cruBliiuj^
Prince Charles before Daun could arriv^e, crossed the ]\Ioldau at
Podliaba.and effected a junction with Schwenn,the united armies
occupying a position extending from Streziskow on the right
towards Hattalitz on the left. Frederick's army was thus parallel,
or nearly so, to the Austrians.

He could not attack them on their left, which was supported
by the ]\Ialdau and Prague, their front was also too difficult to be
attacked, he therefore resolved to attack their right. To eifect
this he wheeled his army into open columns of companies left in
front, and circled round the Austiian right, penetrating between
the ponds Avhich extended from ]\licholup to Kyge. The Prus-
sians formed their line and attacked the high ground above
Sterboholy, which was undoubtedly the key of the Austrian,
position ; at the same time they attacked the villages of Kyge
and Hloupetin. The Austrians vainly attempted to resist, and
were rolled up and forced to retire into Prague.

It will be seen that the Aiistrian leader made no attempt to
attack the Prussians on their line of march, or to prevent the
junction of the two armies. The very strength of the Austrian
position in front prevented their leaving it to attack the Prussians,
who were thus to a great extent protected during the flank march.
The best roads by which the Austrians could advance to attack
Frederick during his flank movement were closed by his attacks
on the villages of Kyge and Hloupetin.

Frederick, although personally he had gained great successes
in the west at Rossbach,* had suffered much in Silesia, his armies
had been defeated, his toAvns and his generals captured, and
when he took command he found himself with only some 30,000
disjointed men to face 80,000 Austrians flushed with success.

A series of fortunate events may dull the greatest minds, deprive them of
their natural vigour, and level them with common beings. But adversity is a
tonic capalile of bringing back energy and elasticity to those who have lost it.
Frederick was in this state ; he assembled his generals and statl" officers, and
informed them of all his losses, told them he coinited on their zeal, constancy,
and that courage and love of country which hud always animated them, and
that they must snatch fi'om the enemy the advantages he had obtained.

He directed them to point out these things to the ofticers, and even the
soldiers of the army, to pre])are them for the great events that must take
place. That they must attack the Austiiaus wherever they coidd find them,
regardless of their numbei's.

The army moved at break of day from Parchewitz, and

* As this book does not pretend to deal with military history, or with stvutcgr,
but merely with tactical questions, it is not requisite to observe the chronological
order of Jrcdcrick's battles, or to do more than treat of each as a separate uncon-
nected event.

PLATE II

.•§

^^^^^^

:V>

■'ji ^^

/ r
\

\ ^ ■ • , :

D
O
<

u.
O

-J

Dancerfield. Lith 22 BcDroHiJ G'' Covent Garden

■"•F"

nrr

PLATE III.

xl 1

_-J--^

%^f -:^

Dancerfield. Lith 22. Bedford S'^ Covent Garden

PLATE. Ill*

DAvcERf itLD LiTM, 22 Bedford S'Covemt Cardek

marchcil in the folloAviiip; onlcM- to Neuinaivk . Plie advance
guard was composed of 800 volunteers and 10 l)attalions, M
squadrons of hussars, 15 squadrons of dragoons, and 10 <^unH.

The army folh) wed in four cohunns (Phites III and IILv), it
marched by Win^s ri^-ht in front, the fi)-st was composed of the
two hues of cavahy of the riglit Avinj;-, the second of the two hues
of uifantrv of the rig-ht ^nng, the third of tlie h'ft wing of the
infantry, the fourth of the left wing of the cavalry; the artillery
followed the two infantry columns.

The Prussian advance guard met and drove in a force of the
i?nemv near the ^'illage of Borna, and obtained information as to
the exact position of the enemy. The Austrian right rested on
Nipern, protected by a large wood and some ponds, their centre
rested on Leuthen, their left on Sagestchutz. A " crochet" was
thrown back to protect this flank, which extended from 8agest-
€hutz to the pond of Gohlau, the Austrian retreat being by
Goldschmiede.

The sharp attack made by the Prussian advanced guard on tlu'
Austrians at Borna, johied to their not being able to discover
what the Prussians were about, induced Daun, their leader, to
move his reserve to the right wing. Frederick, who kncAV the
ground, detei-mined to attack the Austrian left, and refuse his own.
So soon as the heads of his column had passed through Borna he
changed direction, to the right, and, hied into two lines. The
ground in front of the Austrian position favoured the manoeuvre ;
and the Aveather was cloudy. So soon as Frederick's advanced
guard passed the villages of Kartchutz and Strieg\\atz on their
right, they were ordered to wheel into line and attack. This was
done, and thev captured the village of Sagestchutz. Under fire of
its 10 guns the main body wheeled into line and advanced against
the Austrians, whose reserve having been moved to the right
were unable to Avithstand the Prussians. They formed a
" crochet " Avith Leuthen at the salient, tlius showing front ni
two directions, but the right of the '^crochet" being unsup-
ported Avas charged and destroyed by the cavalry of Frederick s
left Aving, and the Austrians fled in great conusfion.

This battle is an epoch in the annals of the military art, and contained Jomini.
not only the theory but also the practice of the system of which Frederick is
the author. It will be seen that his army formed an oblique angle with that ot
liis enemies. This oblique order, in the opinion of the ablest military men,
decided the victory ; hithei-to people had an imperfect idea of its applica-
tion, and no iieneral had been able to seize its advantages. Since then tlie
Ger-mau generals have for a long time made it the basis of all their orders of
battle. " , , .

The nature of this order shows that the attack must be made on a wing,
and that the part of the line to attack must be strengthened, m order to
crush and take in flank and reverse the wing. However, as the enemy has
also means of sending reinforcements to the threatened point, he must be
deceived, so as to keep him in doubt as to the actual point of attack, until
everything is ready, then he must be attacked with vigour, to surprise and
defji-ive him of the power of making a combined defence.

Joniini.

NapoleoJi.

Battle of
Kolin, l-l'li
June, 1757.

Speaking- of the conduct of the Austrian leader in deploying
liis whole force, Jomiui says : —

It is a great error when an army that is superior in numbers waits to be
attacked, and particularly when it deploys the whole of its force. It is far
better to show only a force capable of containing the enemy, and to hold the
remainder in hand iu three or four heavy columns ready to strike divers
places, and manoeuvre on the flanks of the enemy to gain various points. In
fact, a large army deployed is not so mobile a.s if it were iu columus. To
inmiobilise troops not engaged is to forget the first princij)les of tactics. A
portion only of the reserve should be deployed, if it be desired to awe the
enemy by a great display of force. In my opinion the conduct of the King
at Leuthen contains the principles on which all warlike action is based, namely,
to put iu action at the most important point of a line of operations, or of an
attack, a larger force than the enemy has there. This may be done either by
marching, or strategic movements, or by manoeuvres, or by a selection of the
form of attack.

The battle of Leuthen is a masterpiece of movements, manoeuvres, and
resolution. Alone it is sutiicieut to immortalise Fi'ederick, and place him in
the rank of the gi'eatest generals. He attacked a stronger army than his
own, in position and victorious, with an army composed partly of troops which
had been just defeated, yet he won a victory without paying too dearly for it.

All his manoeuvres at this battle are in conformity with the ]n'iinciple3 of
war. He made no flank march in sight of his enemy, for the armies were
not in sight. The Austrians expected him, after the combat at Borna, to take
position on the heights in front of them, and while they thus waited for him,
covered by rising grounds and fogs, and masked by his advanced guard, he
continued his march and attacked the extreme left.

Neither did he violate another principle not less sound, of not abandoning
his line of operations. Daun did evei-ything that could be done under similar
circumstances, but the Prussian cavalry and their masses continually came up
befoie his troops liad time to form.

These battles shoAv generally what is termed Frederick's
oblique order of attack, successful. The follo'U'ing is an instance
of its failm-e, or rather an instance of how, if the troops moving
to a flank are attacked on the march, it is exceedingly probable
it ^vill always fail.

The Austrian army sent to relieve Prince Frederick Charles,
blockaded in Prague, advanced along the Olmiitz-Briinu-Prague
road as far as Kolin ; Frederick, leaving a force before Prague,
moved to meet Daun. The King moved in his usual formation,
covered by an advanced guard consisting of 55 squadrons of
hussars and cbagoons, and seven battalions of infantry. On
debouching from the ^'illage of Planian, the Austrian army Avas
found posted on the southern side of the road on a semi-circular
range of heights, extending from Krzeczor on the right to
Brzesan on the left (Plate IV). The first line was posted half
way up the slope, the second on the crest, the front was
covered by villages and difficult ground, and bristled with
batteries Avhich swept all the approaches.

The King resolved to attack the Austrian right flank, or that
nearest their line of retreat. He directed his advanced guard to
advance along the main road until nearly opposite Krzeczor, and
then leaving the road to move towards Padosvcsnitz, intending
to support the advanced guard by the whole army and take up

PLATE IV.

**^'Vti

" *

L -? r < .

«? k IJ

fr,.l

i5-~

^-4^^

4i^

■>3

*'n.$^. 5^^ /L^^

-t-

Hf.'

Dancerfielo. Lith. 22. Bedford S' Covent G*ROiN

-!■

•>;

5 2-

His

1 c- ^ ^

•^■S

- ~ u; t

"5 ^

^t51^>

<4^

Sri ^"^

F^ 5

^ ^

,?^2^j

i t O- -5 tfcl S =

DahCERF lELD, LiTH 22, BtDFORO S'^ CovtNT CaROFN

the po8itii>ii XX, tVoin which he eould advauee aiid njll up the
Austrian liue. This projected inuvcnient is shown on Phite IVa
more distinctly. Tlie advanced guard had readied Zlatysluntz,
and the head of the main body NovimeBto, wlien it became
requisite to halt to correct the distances as much distance had
been lost by defiling through the town of Planiau, and regular
distances was one ot the things essential to Frederick's tactics.

The advanced guard moved as directed, wheeled into line,
and carried the village of Krzeczor.

But while this was being done, the army in its mai'ch along
the front of the Austrian position was much disquieted by the
Austrian light troops, who continually attacked their right flank ;
a battalion leader being much pressed, ordered his battalion to
wheel to its right, as this was the order to form line, it was
taken up by the whole army in rear, Avho wheeled into liue also
and attacked the Austrians near Chotzemitz while the leading-
portion continued its march ; a large gap was thus left in the
long columns, and the general commanding the first portion,
hearing the firing, looked back, saw the remainder of the army
in action, and wheeled to his right and attacked also ; thus,
instead of forming the line XX, the Prussian army made four
disconnected attacks along the front. The Prussians fought
well, and renewed their attack five or six times, but were
unable to carry any of the Austrian positions, and were com-
pelled to retreat with heavy loss.

The Prussians in their march formed an arc, of which their enemy were Jouiini.
the chord ; they coiiid then in less time place a greater force in action at the
jnincipal point ; this, even with two armies of equal force, is always decisive.

If it be acknowledged that the most advantageous attacks are those made
by a concentrated effoi't on the extremity of an enemy's line, it becomes abso-
lutely requisite to take measures to gain this extremity by masking the move-
ment.

If this precaution be neglected, the enemy can follow the march of the
columns which wish to outflank him, can offer them always his fi'ont, or take
them in flank, as was done by the King at Kossbach.

The march may be conceded by darkness, by the ground, or by a fierce
attack on the enemy's front, which may draw his attention to that side. The
last means are the best, as night movements are less sure and less regular
than those made in the day.

I think that to threaten a considerable front it is better to use small de-
tachments than a regular advanced guard. The size of the detachments should
Ije regulated by circumstances, and they should be supported by cavalrv' and
horse artillery.

This battle shows clearly the danger of flank movements iji
the presence of an enemy, even Avhen they happen to be as bad
tacticians as the Austrians then were ; why the King should
have undertaken a march along the front of the Austrians. to
attack their right flank when he might have attacked their left, it
is difficnlt to say. Success, had it been achieved, would doubtless
have been more complete by an attack on the right than the left.
But the latter Avas feasible, the former was not. The wheel t(»
the right made by the battalion commander, which upset the

Kings arningements, was not tlio cause of the attack failing,
so jnucli as it was the consequence of an attempt to move troops
under a close fire to a flank. If the troops front as they did in
this case, the movement miscarries, and the best troops will be
found to get demoralised if they suffer fi'om an enemy close at
hand, who they are directed to disregard and make no attempt
to resist. The Austrian light troops (Croats), who annoyed the
Prussians so much, appear to have been unopposed, Frederick
never using skirmishers. The only prospect of success his
movement could have, Avas by covering it "with a powerful
body of skirmishers to attack and drive back the Croats, while
the main body moved to the flank.

Napoleon. ^t the battle of Kolin it i.s difficult ts justify the attempt to turn Dauii's

right by the flank march made from 600 to 1,000 yards from the h'ji^dits occu-
pied by the enemy. This opei-aticn was rash, and opposed to the principle of
war. Never make a flank march before an enemy in position, especially when
he occupies the heights at the foot of which you must march.

The King might have attacked the Austrian left, he was admirably placed
for doing so ; but to try and march under afire of musketry and artillery from
an entire army, occupying a commanding ^iosition, is to imagine that that army
has neither guns nor small-arms. To say that the King's manceuvie failed
because a battalion leadei-, wearied with the fire of the Austrian skirmishei-s,
wheeled into line and attacked to his front is an eiTor. The movement the
Prussian array made was one demanded by the gi"eatest necessity, — viz., its
o%\ai safety, and that instinct which forbids men to allow themselves to be
killed without defending themselves.

A compaiison between the battles of Prague, Leuthen and
Kolin will show why the flank movement succeeded in the one
case and not in the other.
Eattle of The battle of Eossbach is especiaUy valuable as showing

Eossbach, 5ih i^^-^y^ "when an incompetent general tried to ape Frederick's
'' "* ' tactics and attack him on his flank, he managed to change hi«
front and deliver a crushing defeat. The King crossed the
Saale at Weissenfels, and advancing beyond Schortau, found
the Franco-German army occupying a position in three lines ex-
tending from Gu]gen Hugel on the left, to beyond Branderoda
on the right ; finding this position too strong to attack, Frederick
retired and took up a position extending from Bedra to Ross-
bach ; he occupied this position in three lines, the infantry being,
in the first two lines and the cavalry in the third line (i-ide l^lates
V and Ya). Soubise, who commanded the allied army, finding
the Prussian right and centre well protected by a small stream,
resolved to attack their left at Rossbach, this flank being slightly
en Vaii\ he moved off in three columns, cavalry in front and rear
at first, but subsequently with all the cavalrj^ in front. The
moment the movement was discovered, the King directed
Seidlytz to move with all the cavalry under cover of some slight
hills to circle round the Jams Hugel height, and meet the head of
the enemy's columns, by taking up a position between Liuidstaedt
and Reichertswerben. the infantry followed in the same direction.
Soubise, seeing the Prussians, as he thought, retreating,

PLATE V

Dancerficlo L^tm 22 BtoFoRO S'' CovtHT Garden

PLATE V*

<
m

O
q:

li.
O

-J
I-
h
<

u.
O

-I

UJ
(0

cdrOa

•£> I

', I

• L--^^--i- -T--^iL---u,---c:=^^--

"ll'll ,,,

• I, """"■" in

:::;:::::::::;;:r«'^

% I I

i «

/ /

...-^"
.^^"

DkNCERFIELD. LlTM 22 BcDFORD 5^ CovC NT GaSOT N

huiTied on to intercept them. As he debouclietl. past Reieherty-
werben lie saw SeidlytiJ, who had marched left in front, appear-
ing past the Jams Hugvl, and th()n<>;lit this Avas only a rear-
j^uard. Sfidlytz Avhct'lud his sipiadrons into two lines, placed
his artillery on the Jams Hngel. and immediately charged the
Franco-Anstrians. They were driven back ineonfnsion. tSonbise
attempted to deploy, but failed. The Prussian infantry coming
up to the support of the cavalry took the allied columns in
flank. The Tinnce de Soubise was consequently unable to
de])loy his army, and the whole fled in the greatest confusion.

Such w;is the buttle of Rossbach, where 22,000 men, let! with prudeuce aiitl Jomini.
A-igour, lost only 300 killeil and wounded,, while tliey defeated more than 50,000,
with a loss of 800 killed, G,000 prisoners, and 72 guns.

Fi'ederick hail watehetl his eneniy's movements without being disconcerted.
He guessed their intentions, and so soon a.s he knew wiiat they were going
to do he calmly took his me^isures. His march behind the Eeichertswerbeu
jjlateau gave him a gi'eat advantage. This apparent ilight ex(;ited the vanity
of the enemy, who neglected all precautions, and hurried on so fast that they
confused their ranks ; the heads of their columns got suddenly under the
Prussian fire, and could not deploy. The King seized the favourable moment,
ordered his cavalry to charge, and the small infantry force that was up attacked
without orders. An inch of ground, a moment lost, would have given the
allies the space and time requisite to deploy. But the manoeuvres of the King
were so exact that victory was compelled to croM'n them.

A General who commands an army that can manoeuvre should, as much
as possible, attack his enemy when on the line of march, even if he be superior
in number.

It will be observed that the Franco-Austrian army moved
without any advanced guard, and were consequently utterly
ignorant of Seidlytz's movements or of vdiat the King was
doing.

After remarldng on the quality of the Franco-Austrian army,
Napoleon says : —

Such troops, commanded by such officers, cannot undertake a flank move- Xaiioloon.
ment against a well coiLstituted army.

The manoeuvre of the King of Prussia was natural, and he merits less praise
than his adversaries do blame ; for their march, made without being protected
by a corps in oTiservation, or covered by flankers, or an advjinced guard to
secure them against surprise in a hilly country, and in a foggy season of the
year, wa-s so imprudent that it dictated to the King what he should do.
Frederick, at Kolin, Jost only his army ; Soubise, at Rossbach, lost both his
army and his honour.

Plate Va shows tlie movements of the two armies clearly, and
the striking similarity there is between Soubise's movement and
that of Marmont at Salamanca ; a study of the latter battle in
Napier's Peninsular War is strongly recommended as affording
an ilkistration not oidy of the evils of extendhig too nmch to a
flank, but also of how a flank attack can be met.

It will be seen that the system followed by Frederick had
many disadvantages. Amongst these were the slight depth ot
his line of battle, the want of reserves, the Avant of skirmishers,
the impossibility of properly commanding the troops when

spread out in such long lines and columns. General officers in
command had their troops scattered over a long front, which
they could neither overlook nor direct ; but the admirable drill,
steadiness, and manoeuvring powers of the Prussian Army gave
it, when opposed to troops who were not possessed of those
qualities, such a pre-eminence, that Frederick's successes were
due to these qualities rather than his tactics.

The Prussian Army formed for many years the model of
other armies, and the tactics of Frederick are the basis of what
are termed " Linear tactics."
177 i. In 1774, Mesnil Durand proposed a system which exercised

great influence over the tactics of the wars of the Repubhc and
Empire.

He proposed to form battalions in close columns of grand
divisions or double companies, and that all deployments should
be on the leading double company ; he recommended battahons
in ten companies, two of which were invariably to skirmish.

When the battalion was deployed these companies Avere on
the flanks shghtly in rear, so that between battalions deployed
in line there was the front of two companies, regiments being
composed of four battalions (Fig. 4, Plate I).

When several battalions worked together they were to be
formed in line of double company column at deploying intervals,
covered by the whole of the flank companies as skirmishers.

Columns,* said Mesnil Durand, mass the gi'eatest amount of
force in the smallest space, and alone can, on account of the
narrowness of the front and the gi-eatness of the intervals
between them, give free movement to cavalry or artillery, but
these columns must be linked together by thick chams of
skirmishers. Infantiy has two weapons to fight with, and it
should have two distinct formations : line is the best for firing,
column for manoeuvres and attack. In every case, without
exception, that formation should be used which is the most
suitable at the moment.

The primitive formation of all troops should be in line of
battalions at deploying intervals. So formed any requisite
manoeuvre may be easily carried out. The shallow formation
has a natural tendency to make men halt and fire, the order in
coluuni has a tendency to make men advance.

AVlien troops are deployed in tAvo lines Avith cavalry on the
Dunks, they are Aveak cA'-eryAvhere, are incapable of the least
manoeuAa'e, and the caA'alry, artillery, and infantry do not
support one another.

When, on the contrary, each battalion is in column, the flank
companies being in the battalion intervals, the caA^alry placed
in rear can easily and unexpectedly charge to the front : this
order is strong e\'ery\vhere. It threatens the enemy Avith the
iire t)f the skirmishers, the Av^eight of its columns, and the charge

* The following is a jprecis of Mesnil Durand's views.

PLATE VI.

z:
o
_i
o

co
<

Dancerfield. Lith. 22, Bedford ST Covent Garden

Napoleon's
Italian Cam-

of its cavalry. An army ro formed can mavcli and manoeuvres
Anth the greatest ease and rapidity.

Tlie views here given (which are a synopsiH of Mesnil
DiU'and's proposals) Avere those in vogue at the French military
schools,* Avhen Napoleon was a student. They fell in with the
peculiar character of the French revolutionary armies. Small
battalion columns, covered by clouds of skirmishers, was the
basis of these tactics; the long and difficult drill necessary to
acquire the exactness of movement required by the linear tactics
was needless, more depended on the courage and skill of
individuals than accurate drill. Hence the proposals of Mesnil
Uurand were adopted by the French Army, and formed the
basis of the regulations of 177(j and 179 l.f

These tactics were those which were more or less the basis
of the movements of the French Army in Italy in 1706. They
were by no means reduced to a system ; much was left to the 1'^'^"-
individual enthusiasm of the soldier, and to the effect produced
by tlie large number of educated men the revolution, and conse-
quent universal service, had placed in the ranks, which of course
greatly mcreased the moral power of the Republican Armies.

At Lonato and Castiglione the French worked in battalion 3rd and 5tli
columns at deploying intervals, the columns being columns of August, 1796.
double companies covered in front by skirmishers. At the latter
battle the division of Massena was formed with the centre
battalion of each demi-brigade, equivalent to a three-battalion
regiment, deployed, the flank battahons being in double column
of companies, or column of divisions,^ as termed by the French
{vide Plate VI).

At the battle of Rivoli, the French worked entirely by 14th January,
battalion columns, covered with skirmishers, and Avhen on the 1797.
defensive, as during the course of that celebrated battle they
often were, these battalion colmnns were deployed into line
three deep. The average strength of the French battalions
was on this occasion only 470 men: hence the units that actually
fought the battle were small columns, covered with skirmishers.
Deducting the skinnishers and men not in the ranks, the actual
strength of the columns handled could not have been much more
than 300 rank and file, which, formed in double column of
companies, Kould not be very different from the Prussian
company column of the present day.

When Napoleon forced the passage of the Tagliamento,

• Particularly Brienne.

t The same writer advocated the formation of company columns, for exactly the
same reason as he advocated battalion columns, — viz., that the formation could be
changed more readily from line to column when requisite ; these company columns
have since become celebrated. The formation of the battalion in grand divisions or
double company column is shown on Fig. 6, Plate I. The regimental column of four
battalions is shown on Fig. 7, Plate I, and the proposed method of deploying a six-
battaUon column from the centre is shown at Fig. 8. It will be observed that this
deployment is very similar to that of the British army at the Alma (vide Plate XII).

X Until 1870 termed "Grand Divisions " in the Britiih service.

16th March,
1797.

his fonnatioii was still that of demi-biigacles,* the centre
battalion deployed, Iho flank battalions in double company
columns covered by skinnishers (vide Plate VII. Fig'. 1). And
the reason assijrncd for this formation was that the demi-
brigade, consisting of 24 companies, a fire of 12 companies, or
one-half, was obtained, and the flanks of the lines were protected
by the colunnis ready to form square, if charged l)y the
superior Austrian cavahy. But the composition of the French
armies at this date was peculiar: they had large numbers of
intelligent, Avell-educated men in the ranks and infeiior grades
of officers, who sought the profession of arms, not only on
account of the law of universal service, but of the fact that the
revolution and consequent paralysis of trade and commerce had
destroyed almost all other openitigs for young men.
Marengo. The formation of Dessaix's column at Marengo was peculiar

as showing the same ideas at work.

Dessaix advanced in direct echelon from the left. The
leading demi-brigade, the 9th Light Infantry, having its flank
battalions in column of double companies, its centre battalion
deployed into line three deep. The next demi-brigade, the 30th
of the Line, was deployed, and the last, the G9th of the Line,
being formed as the Dth. This formation gave a very consider-
able amount of fire, pushed in like a wedge, and kept the flank
well protected from the Austrian cavalry, which were threaten-
ing the French advance (vide Fig. 2, Plate VII, also Frontispiece).

The formations which have been described as marking the
French tactics up to the year ISOO, may be summed up as
follows : — A large use of skirmishers, taken not from selected
regiments l)ut from companies of the l^attalions immediately m
rear, united Avith the independent action of small battalions.
The French battalions on paper did not exceed 700 men ; a
paper battalion of that strength can rarely put 600 men on
parade, which, Avhen skirmishers and staff Avere deducted, Avould
give some 400 to 500 men for the force composing the inde-
pendent command. Thus great latitude was gi^^en to individual
commanders.

Up to this time there were really no regiments in the French
Revolutionary Army; what Avere termed demi-brigades took
their place, and consisted of three battalions. The whole of
the aiTangoments Avero of tliat irregular character that must
characterise armies hastily put together.

After the assumptioji of the Imperial title. Napoleon prepared
for the invasion of England, and in the large standing camps
fonned at Boulogne and elscAvhere on the coast of the English
Channel, many improvements and alterations Avere made both in
•organization and tactics; conscription with substitution was
introduced in lieu of universal service, and the more settled
state of the country and Government, causing many openings

* Tliree battalions foi-mcd a demi-brigade.

PLATE VII.

Ta^Iiamonto

[

L i ^ L- ■ ,1

Formation of l)oKaix\s

! — [ n^^light ' — : Columji at Mai'eng'o

' . ' Fig". 2.

SO^Lvrte,

69^Li

-•- +
44-_ +4-

— Rxrmatioiiofa. 4 Battalion

Z Brig'ade atAueterlitz

Fig. 3 .

m -rnnr »,

Formation of a 10 Battalion Division at Austerlitz

Morarvdys Jiriqcule

fO^ ZZZLufht Fig\ 5 / 10^ Li^hb

SVHilaires Division at f/ie
moment of the attack on
the Pr-atzen heights .

W^ar-e's Briaobde ThveboMLb's Hrrgo'de.

55^ "^^ "^^ 36^

Danceofield Lith 22 Bedford S'^ Covent CAnocN

in civil life, drew ofl much of the iutcUigeiicc that liad 1)loii
previously forced into the army for want of a vent elsewhere.
The army formed at Boulogne still, however, possessed many
of tlie old elements that gave the early Kepubliean armies such
great moral power ; it possessed also that lirmness and steadiness,
Avhich it takes many months to give troo])s.

Formed for a most difficult enterprise (the invasion of Eng-
land), trained with the greatest care and skill, it undouljtedly was
the finest army the Emperor Napoleon ever commanded. One of
the changes, ])erha])S not an improvement, was tlic alteration of Austerlitz,
the old three-battalion demi-l)rigade into a reghuent of two hat- Dec. 2, 1805.
talions. It Avas this army that fought the battle of Austerlitz.
The tactics of the French during this battle are worthy of notice.

The allies, Austrians and Kussians, resolved to quit their
position at Olmntz and turn the light C)f the French Army ; they
marched m five cohmms, one being entirely composed of the
reserve cavalry ; the army was covered by an advanced guard
of three columns under Bagarthion. On the :^nd December the
French troops were drawn up in the following order : on the plain
between Girscikowitz and fSanton, CaiFarellis division, composed
of the 13th Light, the 17th, 51st, 30th, 61st, all two-battalion
regiments, or ten battalions. The division was drawn up in three
lines ot battalion double-company columns at deploying distances.

Suchet's division, composed of four regiments, or eight bat-
talions, was similarly drawn up in two lines.

The coips of Bernadotte in the centre was drawn up as
follows : Drouet's division, composed of thi-ee tlu'ee-battalion
regiments ; and Rivaud division, of three thi'ee-battalion regi-
ments, was ch'aAvn up in battalion double-company columns at
deploying distances. On the right, St. Hilaire's division in the
same formation in fi-ont of Puntowitz, Levassus' brigade of
Legrand's division was in front of Kobelnitz. Beyond Gir-
schikowitz was Vandanmio's division. On the extreme right,
upon a rising ground and in the ditches in front of Tellnitz,
General Legrand's division, the 2(3th regiment being at Sokol-
nitz. The batteries attached to each division of infantry were
in the brigade intervals. The reserve cavahy under ]\Iurat was
behind Lannes' corps, the guard upon the plateau behind Gir-
schikoAA'itz, drawn up in two lines of battalion close colunnis at
deploying distances, 40 gims being placed in the intervals. The
cavalry of the guard Avas in close column of squadrons.

Some days before the battle the Emperor had ordered a new
foiTuation for the Infantry. Each brigade Avas to liaAH! its first
regiment deployed, the second formed in close column of double
companies on the flanks, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment
beyond and in rear of the right of the deployed regiment, the
2nd Battalion on its left {vide Figs. 3 and 4, Plate VII). If the
diA^sion had five regiments, the fifth regiment Avas to be placed
100 yards in rear of the centre. The artillery in the intervals
between the brigades and on the flanks.

The Emperor Napoleon, writing to Soiilt and Bernadotte on
the 26th December, 1805, says : " You will, by observing this
" formation, be able to oppose a line of fire to the enemy, and
" yet have close columns ready to attack him if requisite."

These dispositions are a further instance of the fundamental
rule in infantry fights, that the second line must not be inde-
pendent of the first line, of which it is the support and immediate
stay. The order of linked brigades was thus conformable to
what history shows as having occurred in every battle. The
groimd on a battle-field is generally so cut iip by obstacles, and
so formed, that each brigade has usually a disthict object to
attain. The second line can rarely, if ever support the first line
without forcing it again into action, for the passage of lines, as
laid down in books, can rarely, if ever, be carried out. These
formations are also a condemnation of the system of deploying an
entire division in front line, and an entire division in second line.

At Austerlifez, when the heights of Pratzen were attacked, the
battalions pre\nously deployed were formed in double company
columns on the centre. St. Hilaire's division, upon which some
of the hardest fighting fell, was formed at the moment of actual
contact, as shown in Fig. 5, Plate VII.

Upon the Pratzen heights the infantry composing the 4th
Austro-Kussian column marched in open column of companies left
in front to follow the 3rd column marching towards Sokolnitz,
when it suddenly saw Soult and Levasseurs' infantry chmbing
quickly up the heights ; the tail of the 3rd column and the whole
of the 4th column wheeled to the right into line exactly according
to Frederick's tactics. Kutusoff, who saw that the Pratzen
heights were the key of the position, sent to seek assistance from
the Prince of Lichteustein who sent him four cavalry regiments.

The French columns did not reply to the fire of the Austro-
Russian infantry, but advanced Avith shouldered arms.

The 10th Light Infantry, papng no regard to the village of
Pratzen, where the two leading battalions of the 4th column were
posted, pushed straight up the heights.

It was supported by Thiebault's brigade, whilst Ware turned
the village, took the battalions posted there in flank, and
crowned the heights. Vandamme's division came into line with
Ware and attacked the Russian column, which was now formed
in several lines, its right thrown back on the high ground to-
wards Kzernowitz, where a considei'able force of artillery was
placed. When 100 paces off", the French deployed, and opened
a heavy fire from two ranks. But the Austro-Russians, owing
to their numerical superiority, held the French in check until
the latter advanced with the bayonets and forced the first line
back on the second. Six battalions, concealed by a rising-
ground, attacked the left of the division, but were driven back
by the 4th and 24th Regiments ; these regiments did not fire a
shot, but merely used the bayonet. Soult's divisions were
formed as shown on Fig. 4, Plate VII.

PLATE VIII.

hsi

^£

(UiicEBriiLO. LiTM. 22. Bedford ST Covent Garden

T'or-mation of Siiclirf's Division nf Jona

PLATE IX

Eank March of Mai?sena at Wagram

Pig-. 3.

Forinatiori of M^a-cdonaJd s Corps at Wa^rajn .

r ^

^^ j d-eployecL irv have .

Cuirassiers and^ Heavy CxxvaLry .

DfcNCERFlELD LiTH 22 BeDFORO S'' CoVENT CaROEN

Moantinu' tlie tail of the i^rd column had formed lino. Th(*
Russian re;j;inic'nts, Fanajj^orisky and KhynKky, of the 2nd column,
and the Austrian brigades, Guzczeck and Kottermunil, or 20
battalions, occupying a long line, advanced to surround a bat-
talion of the loth Light Iidkntry; they were, however, charged
by that battalion, supported by the 14t.h, 8Gth, and 4Hrd, and
driven back. The other battalion of the 10th Avas driven back
until supported by Levasseur's brigade. The French then
remained masters of the heights, and the allies fell back.

In the centre, Beruadotte and the guard got on the heights
without firing a shot.

Almost the last act of this battle was the destruction by the
Russian cavalry of the 1st Battalion of the 4tli Regiment, which
got into disorder when pressing the Russians. It is a common
fault of the French infantry to get into confusion during an
attack, and not to preserve their ranks : from this cause many
disasters have happened, for the enemy's cavalry coming up
unexpectedly always takes troops so dispersed at a great ad-
vantage.

At this period the French Army Avas at its highest point,
the old soldiers of the revolution were still in the ranks in con-
siderable numbers, the officers were Avell taught and trained in
the best of all schools, that of successful war.

On the breaking out of Avar with Prussia in 1806, the Emperor
Napoleon formed the flank companies of the various battalions
into permament battalions of grenadiers and voltigeurs; the
battalions of the line were thus reduced to six companies, each
of which had a normal strength of 100 men, but Avhich actually
in the field could not have had many more than 80 men.

At Jena the tactics of Frederick the Great came into actual Jena, lUh
contact with those of Napoleon, and although that battle was October, 1806.
decided by circumstances other than the actual fighting, yet
the formation of the French troops presents some points of
interest. The French troops were usually drawn u}) in line of
battalion double company columns at deploying distance, and
attacked in that order, covered by skirmishers.

Fig. 1, Plate IX., shows the formation and mode of attack of
Suchet's division, but the tactics at that time used by the
French Army are perhaps best shown by a study of the battle
■of Auerstadt, where Marshal Davoust, with his coips alone, de- Auerstadt,
feated the main body of the Prussian Army, about 6(5,000 men, I4tli October,
which, however, attacked him piecemeal, and not all at once. ^^^•
This battle possesses much that is worthy of study ; it was on
the part of the French, who were greatly out-numbered, for a
long time a defensive battle, and offers a good illustration of
French formations.

Believing that the French Army was moving towards Leip-
zig and Dresden, the main body of the Prussian Army, about
66,000 men, moved fi-om Weimar towards Naumburg, with the
vieAv of getting behind the Elbe, and obtaining support from

the fortress of IMagdcburg. One wing of the army, under the
l-*rince Holienloho, was left to cover the movement. I^he force
'.rnder the Prince Hohenkjhe fonght tlie battle of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davonst's corps, which should have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack of the Trussian Army.

The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant,
and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend
the bridge, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division
leading, covered by cavahy ; after a slight cavalry action,
Davoust formed Gudin's chvision, which consisted of the 25th,
85th, 12th, 21st Regiments of the line, or eight battalions, with
six squadrons of cavalry, on the north of the Weimar-Naum-
burg road, which here runs nearlv due east and west (vide Fig.
1, Plate X).

The 85th Regiment Avas placed in the village, with a strong-
body of skirmishers in some w^oods in front, the 25th was de-
ployed into hue on its right, the 21st also deployed, being in
second line and the whole of the 12th Regiment, that is to say,
two battalions, was formed in close column of double companies,
on the extreme right and slightly in rear, so as to cover and
protect the flank of the deployed line.

In this formation the division was attacked by the Pi'ussian
infantry (General Schmettau's division), who were unable to
make any impression on it ; they were then charged by large
bodies of cavalry under Blucher. The French met this attack
by forming the 12tli Regiment into regimental square, the
right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its right
company, the light battalion of the 25th into battalion square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Prus-
sian cavalry were beaten back with g-reat loss, and were charged
as they retired by the six squadrons of Gvidin's division which,
up to this pei-iod, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
i-ight of Gudin's diA-ision. Avhich, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12th Regiment from that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion -with
its light flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to forai square
slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of
Hasenhausen, and tried to turn then- left flank, where the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of the
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Wartensblen's division pushed well to the soiitb of Hasen-

PLATE X.

»-^l X

**.l.f*^ .

^c:*-
^<^i.

#''^ ':^U ' ^hu

^^ ^ ^F^

■<6 \ ^

^ t-i^^ ' r -, - =i />-

.X M i^

«u p 3 3 fit— rSif ■C-^'^ "

1 t^ ^ i \

1 ,^

<i 1,< f

5% -^M'^ f

^s^ ^*

<*^;t6«^'' J>m^

^^4 Mt

A(!<(,

tf^^-

Oa cri r ' H i2 B UFCRO S'"' CovL r C\ I c

the fortress of ]\Iagdebnrg-. One Anng of the army, nnder the
Prince Hoheulohe, was loft to cover the movement. The force
:mder the Pi-ince Hohenlohe fought the batth,' of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davoust's corps, which should have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack of the Pi-ussian Army.

The main road from ^A'^eimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Hasenhausen, crossing the 8aal at Kosen (rude Plate XV

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant,
and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the 8aal at Kosen, and lea^'^ng a battalion to defend
the brid " — '1 towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division

leading, "* - o Klie^];it cavalrv action,

Davousi ~~ '■ ■"^- '>.')th,

85th, 15
six squ
burg re
1, Plat

Th
bcdy I
ployei
secon
two 1
on tJ
protf

I
infa:

make any impresoi..^^
bodies of cavahy under Blucher. j.^^^
by forming the 12tli Regiment into regimental s^ti^. _,
right battalion of the 2 1 st into battalion square on its right
company, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Prus-
sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged
as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's diA-ision which,
up to this period, had been sheltered behmdthe infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's dix-ision. which, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion with
its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to foiTa square
slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of
Hasenhausen, and tried to turn theii- left flank, Avhere the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of ihe
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Wartensblen's division pushed well to tl>€ south of Haseu-

PLATE X.

the fortress of JMagdeburg-. One wing of the army, under the
Prince Hohenloho, Avas loft to cover the movement. 'J'he force
TUider the Prince Hohenlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davoust's coi-ps, which should have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army,

The main road from ^\'^eimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate X).

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant,
and Morand. Early on the mornuig of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend
the brid""'^ advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division
leading, ' "+Vat a slight cavalry action,

Davous " ■ ' -^' +l^^> 25th,

85th, 1!
six sqr
burg r(
1, Plat

Th
body I
ploye*
secon
two I
on tl
prote

I
infai
make
bodies

by formmg tne izm ±vcg,iii;.v>..^ -

right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its irgnt
company, the right battalion uf the 25th into battalion square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pnis-
sian cavalry were beaten back with gTeat loss, and were charged
as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which,
up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's diATision. Avhich, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to
the south (jf Hasenhauseii, when it deployed one battalion with
its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to foiTQ square
slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of
Hasenhausen, and tried to turn their left flank, where the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of the
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Waiiensblen's division pushed well to the south of Haseu-

PLATE X.

'*>'-

7>/z^/5^ > «^-

g V ^^

^ fl fl%^\ «r-t"^ „f

'*/»•.

Ll:_ii^

DA^,^^l!rlrlO.'.lT.^ ?2 BrcrcRD STCovt.jr CAiiDcri

the fortress of ]\Iagdeljurg. One ^v^ng of the army, under the
Prince Hohenloho, was loft to cover the movement. 'J'he force
binder the Prince Hohenloho fonght the battle of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Phnperor Napoleon.
Davoiist's coi-ps, which shonld have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army.

The main road from A\'eimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Haserdiausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate X).

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Guchn, Fiiant,
and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and lea^^ng a battalion to defend
the bridge, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division
leading " ' - -"-"oli-v -. after a slight cavalrv action,

Davous ■-^'■'^1 '^+' fhe 25th,

85th, 1
six sqi
burg r<
1, Plat

Th
body
ploye'
secon
two I
on tl
prote

I
infai
mak
bodies

by foia^xxxxg, ..... . ^

right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its rignx
compau}-, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the M'ood, still remained in line. The Pms-
sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged
as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which,
up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's di^^sion. which, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion "\vith
its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to foi-m square
slightly in rear (ride Figs. 3 and 4).

Wartensblen's division pushed well to the south of Hasen-

PLATE X.

#^"M,vv../fa.

XfAir s.

-;»»^

W-^ ...-4 ^^\i

ft '- fe/ju

? ii**

lAicn rir ' -i t2 D<-uroRo S'f Covl ir C\t iic i

the fortress of ]\Iag(lebiirg. One wing of the army, under the
Prince Holienk)he, Avas k^ft to cover the movement. 'J^he force
'.mck-r the Prince Hohenkihe fonght the battk; of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davonst's corps, which shoidd have been Kiipported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons Avhich it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain tlie attack of the I'russian Army.

The main road from A^'eimar to Naiuiiburg led through the
village of Hasenhausen, crossing tlie Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant,
and Morand. Early on the mornhig of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend
the bridce, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division
leading ' — ^i,.,, . ^fter a slight cavalry action,

Davous ■ ^ '^ -+■ +hH 25th,

85th, 1
six sqi
burg r<
1, Plat

Th
body
ployc'
secon
two 1
on tl
prote

I
infai
mak^
bodies
by form „.^

right battalion of the 2 1 st into battalion square on its^Ti^x
company, the right battalion of the 25th into battaliou square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pinis-
sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and Avere charged
as they i-etired by the six sqiuxdrons of Gudin's division which,
up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's diA^sion. Avhich, being thiis supported on the
right, moved the 12th Peg-imentfroni that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenhausen, Avhen it deployed one battalion Avith
its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to fonn square
slightly in rear (vide Figs. 3 and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of
Hasenhausen, and ti-ied to turn their left flank, Avhere the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Wartensblen's division pushed well to tl>e south of Hasen-

P LATE X.

*p I

■ '' .1

^ /

j#:-'

' • •

«t

\ -

»#

2S^

the fortress of JMagdelnirg-. One unno- of the army, nnder the
Prince Hoheulohe, AvaK loft to eover the movement. The force
'.mcler the Prince Holienlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the
main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davonst's corps, which .should have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army.

The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Haseidiausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV

Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant,
and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806,
he crossed the 8aal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend
the bridtre, advanced towards Hasenliausen, Gudin's division
leading ' "'""■ • after a slight cavalrv action,

Davous ' ^-'^ -+' ihn 25th,

85th, r
six sqr
burg r(
1, Plat

Tb
body
ploye.
sec on
two I
on tl
prote

infai

mak^

bodies

by forn-

right battalion of the 21st into battalion sqiiare on iTsn^nt

company, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square

on its left cttmpany, the left battalions of these regiments,

partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pms-

sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged

as they i-etired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which,

up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's (h\-ision. which, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12tli Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenliausen, when it deployed one battalion with
its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to fonu square
slightly in rear (vide Figs, o and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of
Hasenhausen, and tried to turn theii- left flank, where the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Wartcnsblen's division pushed well to tl>e south of Haeen-

r .- ^

PLATE X,

the fortresK of iNIagdcbiirg. One \nno- of the army, under the
Prince Hoheuh)ho, wa^ loft to cover the movement. The force
imder the Prince Hohenlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the
main body of the P'rcnch Army under the Emperor Napoleon.
Davoust's coi-ps, which shoidd have been supported by Bema-
dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was
not, had to sustain the attack (»f the Prussian Army.

The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the
village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen {inc/e Plate XV

Davoue ' '^ ^*' +hH 25th,

85th, 1'
six sqi
burg r<
1, Plat

Til
body
ploye
secon
two 1
on t]
protf

I
infai
makv.
bodies
by form

right battalion of t ^

company, the right KTc^wauun oi tne *^oth into battalion square
on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments,
partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pnis-
sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged
as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which,
up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantry (Fig. 2).

Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the
right of Gudin's di^•ision. Avhich, being thus supported on the
right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to
the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion ^vith
its right flank on tlie village, tlie left flank being covered by the
other battalion in double company column ready to fonn square
slightly in rear (vide Figs. 3 and 4).

The Prussians still attempted to ftirce the French out of
Hasenhausen, and tried to turn then- left flank, where the only
troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie
12th Regiment formed as above described.

Wartensblen's division pushed well to tlte south of Hasen-

PLATE X.

x'»ig>^-a' .A> ^u^

^•icri.rir.D Ll-^ 22 B'-orcRU S'^Covnr Cm iic-j

lumsen, threatened to tuni and take Gudin's and Friant's divisions
iu rear; at this mDmeut MoraiuVs division, composed of five
rt'gimeuts, airived on the <i;n)Tnid, it brou^'ht, however, only nine
battalions, one being left at the bridge of Kosen ; it had 12 guns
and some cavalry. This division advanced in mass of double
company colunuis with the artillery on its right, the 13th Light
Infantr}' leading, followed by the «Ust, 51st, 3()th, and 17th
Regiments of the Line (the latter luuing but one battalion).
Arrived near Wartensblcu's advanced troops, ^lorand threw out
a gi'eat mass of skirmishers, checking ^^'artensblen's advance,
and deployed the mass of double company columns into line of
double company columns at deploying intervals with artillery
on the Hanks ; in this order the division advanced a short dis-
tance {rick Fig. 4). thus relieving the left of the 12th Eegiment.
Morland now deployed all his battalions, except the battalion
of the 17th, on the left, and drove back the Prussians by a
heavy fire (Fig. 5). The Prussians, hoping to destroy the
French, deployed in single line, and Avithout reserves or sup-
ports, formed a mass of some 8,000 cavalry behind Wartens-
blen's division, and charged Morand, Avho formed his division
with the exception of the two battalions of the 13th Light
Infantry, into an echelon of battalion squares, with the artillery
at the angles (Fig. (5). On the cavahy retiring Morand reformed
his division into line of battalion double company columns, at
deploying intervals, covered by skii-mishers, and advanced (Fig.
7). The Pi-ussians were finally defeated and fell back. The
Prussians invariably advanced in open column of companies,
marching in two or more lines, and sought to form line, by
changing directions to the right or left and wheeling into line ;
they then attacked in echelons of battalions in line, but Avithout
a single skirmisher.

The French marched in mass of double company columns at
close order, threw out a number of skinnishers to the front,
who sought to overwhelm the enemy Avith fire ; they deployed
the mass into line of battalion double company columns at
deploying intervals, and finally into line. The advantages of
these cohnnns, both in rapidity of deployment and also in
rapidity of forming square to resist cavalry, are apparent, and
their combination Avitli skirmishers produce unity betAveen fire
and shock tactics.

The tactics of the French Army had now established their
superiority oA'er the Prussian or linear tactics. But tactics, such
as have been described, require for their complete deA^elopment
thoroughly framed and Avell-educated officers in the position of
company and battalion leaders, thoroughly trained and Avell-
disciplined troops, zeal, enthusiasm, skill and actiA^ity on the part
of the individual men.

Long wars sap discipline, trained men Avho fall from Avounds
or disease are replaced by untrained or partially trained recruits,
officers of experience are killed or Avounded, and their places

E 2

taken by men of less experience and intellip^cnco, and the more
ignorant and nndisciplined tlie men are the more mnst the
officers exert themselves and consequently the more they suffer.

These causes began to tell on the French Army, and though
two gi-eat Powers of Europe, — Austria and Prussia, — had been
overturned, yet war was not popular in France, the vast number
of substitutes purchased deteriorated the morale of the raw
material composing the armies, and showed that the mass of the
French nation did not desire war.

The natiu'al result of these things Avas that the moral valuo
of the French armies began to deteriorate, the supply of men
competent to command isolated bodies fighting, as the small
French battalion had hitherto fought, is unfortunately limited.
It takes years of careful study or practice to make such men,
and the enormous development of the French armies fighting
both in P^astern Europe, on t^e Danube, or in Russia, and at the
same time supporting a terrible struggle in Spain, enabled men
to become battalion and company leaders Avho were entirely
unfitted for such posts, men who perhaps could move a battalion
about, but who wanted that nerve and self-confidence that distin-
guished those who preceded them. The terrible losses sustained
in war, and the consequent anticipation of the various classes of
conscripts, further tended to reduce the value of the French
armies by filling them Avith young boys, Avliose half-groAvn
bodies gave way to hardship and crowded the hospitals.

Consequent on, and fblloAving from, these changes in the
composition of the army, changes in tactics took place, changes
Avhicli are Avorthy of notice. These changes Avere chiefly the
concentration of great masses of artillery to crush a portion of
the enemy's troops in position, the adA'ance of heavy columns
composed of entire diAnsions formed in mass of battalion columns.
Such formations Avere chiefly adopted to keep the troops under
the eye and control of superior officers, and partly to produce
that feeling of confidence Avhicli the thronging together of
masses of men in such columns is supposed to giA^e.

One of the first instances of the use of these heavy columns,
was Eylau, and the battle of Eylau folloAved not only the tAvo
campaigns of Austerlitz and Jena, but the terrible hardships
the French Army endured after its hasty march across Central
Europe to Poland. The difficidties of feeding the army and
looking after the sick and wounded had been much increased by
the enormous distance from France and the scA-erity of the
climate. On this point, Napoleon, writing to Joseph at Naples,
giA^es an account of his army as follows : —

" The officers of the Staff have not undressed for two mouths, many not for
four months. I, myself, have not taken off my boots for a fortuiglit. We are
in the midst of snow and mud, without wine, brandy, or bread. We
have nothing but potatoes to eat ; we make long marches and counter-
marches, without anytliing being ple.asant ; we have to fight with the
bayonet under a tremendous fire of grape ; the wounded have then to be

carrietl back l^O miles on open sleijijlis. We make war witli all its vigour,
but with all its liorroi-s. lu the uiiilst of such great hardships everyone is
more or less sick."'

Davoust's coi*ps numbered only 15,000 men; Soult's, which
had been the stronf^est, was reduced by dysentery and fever, to
1(),000; that of Angereau. Aveakenod by a p^reat number of
strag*i;lers and marauders, who had dispersed to seek food, was
only 7.000 strong.

At the batth^ of Eyhiu, Napoleon formed the whole of the Ej-lau,
Artillery, including that of the guard, in front of the general 8thleb.,l807.
line of battle and after a heavy fire, Davoust's Corps on the
right and Angereau's Corps in the centre, were ordered to
advance. The latter formed each of the two divisions compos- '
ing his corps in mass of close columns, and attempted to advance
under a heavy fire from the Russian Artillery ; his column
suffered terribly from the fire, and being charged by the
Russian Cavalry, it was destroyed, losing nearly 5,000 men.

After the peace of Tilsit, the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian
armies gave up the formation of troops in line, and formed their
troops on the French model.

The battles of Kssling and Wagram are very remarkable.
They show how from the deterioration of the French Army, and
the introduction of large bodies of allied troops, who were by no
means eager for French success, and who in many cases were a
very inferior class of soldier. Napoleon was compelled to alter
the whole of his tactics, and adapt them to the raw and motley
force he commanded.

At Esshng, Napoleon, wishing to break the Austrian centre,
which was composed of the Hohenzollern Corps of 22 battalions,
formed in two lines of battalions in close columns at deploying
intervals, ordered Lannes to advance with Oudinot's three
divisions on Breitenlee. The advance was made in an echelon Essling, 2l8t-
of divisions, each division being formed in mass of regimental 22nd May,
close columns.* When the French had to retreat the divisions ^^^-
commanded by Tharreau and Claparede suffered terribly from
the Austrian fire, because, when retreating, the Generals were
afraid to deploy such raw troops ; formed in these dense masses
entire companies Avere swept away by the Austrian fire. These
divisions were composed of IG battalions and were respectively
fi,000 and 7,000 strong, or the battalions were about 400 men.
Compelled to retu*e into the Island of Lobau by the breaking of
the bridges over the Danube, which prevented ammunition
coming over, the French army received large reinforcements and
supplies, and throwing seven bridges over the branch of the
Danube which separated them from the left bank, crossed and
turned the whole of the works erected by the Austrians between
the villages of Aspern and Essling. The battle of Wagram is Wagram, 6tli
remarkable in many points of view, especially as marking the ^^''

• The Regiment consisted of three Battalions at this period.

decadence of French tactics, and also the cause of that de-
cadence. It is further remarkable for the many manoeuvres
executed under fire, and also for the influence that the General-
in-Chief exercised over every portion of a veiy large sphere of
operations ; it is also remarkable not only for an enormous con-
centration of artillery fire, but also, what is by no means so well
known, a great dispersion of guns. Napoleon observing that
each regiment, then three battalions, required a considerable
number of horses and wagons, ordered guns to be also sup-
plied. Thus each regiment really equivalent to a British
Biigade, had a small battery of artillery attached to it.*

Although this curious return to battalion guns was never
completely carried out m the French Army, it was, however, to
a considerable extent at the battle now under consideration.
5tl) July. As the French Army issued from the small loop of the

Danube where it liad been formed in the closest order, after the
passage, it deployed across the Marchfeldt Plain, each corps
being formed in tw^o lines of regiments in mass of battalion
columns at deploying intervals — (that is, there Avas space be-
tween the regimental columns to deploy into line of contiguous
battalion columns, not for the battalions to deploy into line),
with Ai-tillery in the intervals. After the French Anny had
taken up its position an attempt was made to force the passage
of the little river Rusbach. The Austrians opposed this attack
in. line of battahon columns at deploying distance, covered by a

* The following is tlie Imperial Decree oi'dering this formation : —

" In Our Imperial Camp, Schoenbrun, 9fh January, T809.

" Ifapoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation
of the Ehinc, We hare decreed and We do decree as follows : —

"Article 1. — Each regiment of infantry of the line or light infantry will have 2
gtms, 3 or 4-pounders, attached to it, 3 ammxmition wagons, a field forge, 1 ambulance
wagon, 1 officers' wagon. These 8 carriages will, on the line of march, move with
the battalion where the eagle of the regiment is.

" Article 2.— There will be furtlier attached to each battalion 1 small-arm
aDomunition wagon and 1 provision wagon, which for four battalions will be 8 wagons.

" Article 3. — These lO carnages will be lool^ed after, horsed, and driven by
a company of Regimental Artillery. This company will be commanded by a
Lieutenant, a Sub -Lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, and 3 Corporals, and will be divided into
3 squads.

" The 1st squad wDl consist of 1 Serjeant, 1 Corporal, 20 Gunners, and 2 Arti-
ficers. The Corporal will perform the duties of Storekeeper, and will have the key
of the wagons ; he will be chiefly charged with the consumption of the ammunition.

" The 2nd squad ■will be composed of 1 Serjeant, 1 Corporal, and 20 train
soldiers, whose duty it will be to horse the 8 wagons which move with the battalion
carrying the eagle.

"The 3rd squad -n-ill be the same as the 2nd squad, and will horse the 8 other
wagons, tlie Lieutenant will command the whole, but especially the Artillery — the
Sub-Lieatcnant will have special charge of the train. Both these officers will be
moimted.
., . "Ai-ticle4. — Our War Minister will fix the amo\mt to be granted for outfit,

repair, and maintenance of the wagons.

" Article 5. — Our War Minister and Our Minister of Finance arc charged with
the execution of this Decree. It will be sent to Our Chief of the Staff, who will
order its eiecution for all the battalions composing the anny.

" Napoleon."

cloud of skirniishevs in trout. The French attoinptod to iidvauco
in mass of Divisional cohnuns, Tlie Divisions of General Dupas,
Grenier, and La ]\Iarque, which attacked the Austrian position,
being so formed. These oohmuis got into confusion at the
passage of the Kusbach, which flows along the foot of the pla-
teau of WagTam, fired into one another and were forced to fall
back.

The following day, the Austrians attempted to advance ah jui
between the French left and the Danube, so as to cut them off
from their bridges. Boudet's Division of Massona's corps had
been left at Essling to cover this point, the other three divisions
were in line of battalions at deplo^ang intervals exteiidiug from
the river towards Aderklau in the centre, Avhere Bernadotte's
corps was posted.

The Austrians, holding the plateau of Wagram as a pivot,
and wheeling their right forward, drove Bernadotte back, and
advanced in great force on the left.

Napoleon, whose whole plan was to crush the Austrian left,
before the Archduke John, who was hourly expected with
large reinforcements, could come up, directed Davoust's and
Gudinot's corps to cross the Rusbach, push in between the
Austrian reinforcements on the march and the Austrian left, and
ascend the plateau. Finding, however, that the Austrians were
making great progress on his left, and that Boudet's Division was
hard pressed near Aspern, he directed the whole of Massena's
corps, then in Ime of battalion columns at deplo^ang intervals,
to wheel into mass of columns, and take ground to its left and
support Boudet, covering the movement by cavalry (vide Fig. 2,
Plate IX).

Tliis movement left a large gap in the centi-e of the French
Ime which Avas filled first with cavalry, who checked the
Austrian advance, then with the GO guns of the guard, com-
posed of four horse and six field batteries, and subsequently
with 40 more guns drawn from the adjacent corps ; these guns
came up in columns of batteries and deployed mto line, filling
up the gi-eat gap formed by Massena's movement to tlie left.
Under cover of the fire from these guns, Napoleon formed i\Iac-
donald's corps into a column as follows (vidr. Fig. 3, Plate IX) : —
He deployed 8 battalions into line one behind the other at short
distances, 13 other battalions were formed in mass of columns
on the wings with cavalry closing the hollow square so formed :
in this order, this extraordinary column advanced, and pene-
ti-ated the Austrian centre, although suffering terrible losses.

While this attack was being made on the centre the turning
movement made by Davoust and Gudinot on the Austrian left
was successful. It is curious to observe the various formations
of the French divisional Generals, who were the same wdio had
fought at Auerstadt. Friant advanced with his regiments in line
of contiguous battalion columns, Morand in tAvo lines of bat-
talion columns at deploying intervals. Gudin advanced with

his first brigade in mass of regimental columns, his Recond
brigade in line of battalion columns. Puthod attacked in two
masses of brigade columns.

The Austrians, who were formed in one line of battalions at
deploying intervals, retired by alternate battalions.

General Oudinot's corps was formed in three lines, each line
being composed of a di\nsion, and each division being formed in
line of battalion cohmms at deploying intervals.

The deployment of the battalions forming the head of IMac-
donald's column was very peculiar, and it is difficult to see
what advantage was gained by this kind of formation. Troops
belonging to diiferent battalions and different regiments were
placed close behind one another, and formed a dense mass,
Avhich must have got into confusion — men of all battalions
mi.xcd up Avith one another — before it had gone very far.
Further, the deployment of the battalions must have rendered
the power of command of each regimental and battalion officer
so much the less. Why the battalions were not formed in hue
of contiguous columns it is very difficult to say.

Similarly, Oudinot's formation of each division in line of
columns behind the other offers the objection that in a short
time men of the various di\nsions got mixed together, which
would not be the case if each division had been formed in two
lines of columns.

It is, however, of more especial importance to notice how the
French formations had all become deeper, less dependence being
placed on the individual intelligence and firmness of the soldier.
Morand, Friant, and Gudin were men who had tried and knew
the value of the old formation. The connection that must exist
between the individual capacity of soldiers, their military train-
ing, and the tactical formation in which boches of soldiers fight,
is clearly shown by a comparison of the method of fighting
adopted by Davoust's corps at Auerstadt and Wagram.

The Austrian Army had completely given up the linear
tactics of Frederick the Great, and had adopted the old French
tactics of battalion columns at deploying intervals covered by
skirmishers. The quality of the French troops had much fallen
off since Austerlitz and Jena ; Napoleon himself said in com-
paring the Austerlitz Army -^ath that of Wagram, that he could
risk manoeuvrus with the former which he dare not try with the
latter. In the subsequent advance in pursuit of the Austrians,
in many regiments the killed and wounded amounted to 500,
while the missing men, that is the maurauders, were upwards,
of 1,000, three-fourths of the men falling out to pillage. That
Napoleon could obtain such results with such an army, larger
no doubt, but far inferior to former armies he commanded, is
surprising.

The attack of a position in a mass of brigade or divisional
columns of eight or sixteen battalions, one behuid the other,,
against troops occupying a position, whether those troops are

deployed or in battalion colunins, tends to produce the same
results as those that folhnved Scnibise's movement at Rossbach.
Forming troops for an attack on an enemy in position, in such a
manner appears, almost tantamount to wilfully exposing a flank
perpendicularly to an enemy.

The formation of the great battery of the centre, and the
introduction of regimental guns, conjoined with heavy columns,
marks an era in French tactics. It being an attempt to trust to
the tire of artillery alone, to demoralize and shake the enemy,
and use the infantry merely to advance and occupy their
position. Such tactics are tlu)sc that a leader, having a raw,
undisciplined army composed of various nations, would adopt,
trusting to the accuracy of the fire of his artillery, and the
gallantry of certain specially selected regiments who might be
placed to lead the long columns. The adoption by the Austrians
of the formation of battalion double company cohuuns at
deploying intervals marks the abandonment by the German
Powers of the linear tactics of Frederick the Great.

Prior to the Russian Campaign, the French regiments* were
increased to tour and five battalions, and the formations during
that campaign were more in consonance Avith the old French
tactics than they had been at Wagram. In the advance on
Moscow, Davoust, who occupied Mogilew on Bagarthion's lino I812.
of retreat, drew up his corps as follows: — The 85th deployed
into line Avitli four battalions behind the bridge of Saltanowka,
tlie 108th, composed of five battalions, formed in rear in line of
columns at deploying intervals, with the 61st in echelon, on the
right : in this formation, the French resisted and drove back
tlie Russians, who advanced in heavy brigade columns.

At Moskowa, the French Anny was formed in two lines,
e^ch division having one brigade in the first line, one in the
second. The attack on the great redoubt was made in two lines
of battalion columns at deploying intervals.

After the retreat from Russia, Prussia declared war against
France. During the interval that succeeded the battle of ,)ena,
the Prussians had abandoned the linear tactics. The King of
Prussia, in an order to his army, writes as follows —

Our enemy uses his infantry to delay and sustain the figlit as long
as possible ; he occupies villages, woods, houses, and hides himself behind
hollows in the ground and in ditches. He causes us much loss with
few men ; when we advance against him with large bodies, then he rein-
forces his troops with fresh men, and if we have no fresh troops to send
to the front we have to retire. We must therefore follow the example
set by the enemy ; we must husband our fire, feed the battle with fresh
troops until the decisive moment arrives when we can make our chief
atUick.

On account of the great number of volunteers who are armed with rifles,
skirmishers must be largely increased ; the advantage these rifles possess is,
tliey have a greater range and are more accurate. The duty of the Volunteer

* The French regiments preserved their regimental Artillery, two guns per
it^imcnt.

8o armed is to keep the enemy at such a distance that tlie nfle fire shall be
effective, and the smooth-bore fire ineffective. To send foi-Avard skirmishers
to attack a village occupietl by an enemy, with tlie bayonet, is to lose one of
the advantages of rifles ; men so armed must be })osted in woods or placetl
in defensive positions.

These wortls are very remarkable, as foreshadowing the
direction Avhich tactics of the present day are taking.

The hatred of French rule produced the same results in
Prussia that the revolution had done in France, it increased
largely tl)e amount of intelligence in the ranks, or, in other
words, raised the moral value of the army.

Prior to this period, the Prussians always advanced with
deployed battalions occup^dng tAvo long lines; after this period,
1813, they broke their lines u]) into brigades, acting indepen-
dently for one common object, and attacked in battalion columns.
At Lutzen the French wore generally forined in regimental
columns, and occasionally in brigade columns.

At Bautzen, Ney's corps, which made a long turning move-
ment, advanced m columns of divisions. The French corps in
front of the allies ".rere in two lines of battahon columns at
deploying intervals.

At Leipzic, Napoleon du-ected all the French battalions to
be formed two deep instead of three deep, giving as his reason
that this would largely increase the front of fire. Such changes,
hoAvever, on the eve of a great battle are to be deprecated.

In 1814, during the struggle in France, the French almost
always fought vnth battalion columns at deplo;sdng intervals,
covered by skirmishers.

In Spain, whenever the French and English came into con--
tact, and also at Waterloo, the deployed line met and invariably
overcame the heavy columns of the French infantry. The
tactics adopted by the Englisn were perfectly natural, and
invariably succeeded ; selecting a good position, they withdrew
their infantry, deployed a little behind the crest, covered the
front with skirmishers, and waited the attack. The French ad-
vanced to the attack in mass of columns, sometimes a whole divi-
sion so formed, each company three deep, and company behind
company ; these columns, covered by skirmishers, advanced,
suffering severely from the English artillery ; as they came near
the infantry line, the latter fired into them, the flank companies
lapped round the flanks of the columns, charged them in front
and on both flanks, and invaiiably beat them back. The battle
of Busaco is an admirable instance of these tactics (Plate XI).

Crawford, in a happy mood for command, made masterly dispositions.
The table land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to
conceal the 43rd and 52nd Regiments drawn up in line ; and a quarter of
a mile behind them, on higher gi'ound and close to the convent, the German
infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the
position. In front of the British regiments some rocks overhanging the
descent furnished natural embrasures, in which Eoss's guns Avero placed, and
beyond them the Riflemen and Ca^^adores were placed as skirmishers, covering

PLATE XI.

o
E-

z
g

CO c

> s

a:
o

I- ^

> o

I 5

i--^

■ t

Q ^-r Q

O
<

i il

^ UJ UJ

./; CO O

^ I. I

I ^ I

^ o

b N ^ "a ^^j ^ ft '^

L,. .A ■«t-*'^^Niv~.s-«i^ ^ 1..^. .. <y:..^,Mi,ii,

Dancerfield. LiTH, 22. Bedford S'' Covent G»

the slope of tlie mountain. While it w.os still dark a stracfglinjj; nmsketiy fire
was heard in the dee]) valley, and when the lij;Iit liroke, three heavy masses,
detached from the (ith Corps, were seen to enter the wood below and throw
forwanl a profusion of skirmishers. One of them, under (Jeneral Marchand,
emerging from the dark cluusm and following the main road, seemed intent to
turn the right of the light Division ; a second, under Loison, made straight iiji
the face of the mountain against the front ; the third remained in reserve,
Simon's Brigade, leading Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity,
and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the
artillery swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never
<listurbed nor its speed in the le;ist abated. Ross's guns were worked with
inci'edible quickness, yet the range was palpably contracted every round. The
enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key ; the English skirmishers,
breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of he ascent, the
artillery drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard Avithin
a few yards of the simimit.

Crawford, sbmdiug alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching
the progress of the attack, and now -with a shrill tone ordered the two
regiments in resen^e to charge. The next moment a horrid shout startled the
French column and 1,800 British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of
the hill. Yet so brave, so hardy, were the leading French, that each man of '
the first section raised his musket and two officers and ten men fell before them
— not a Frenchman had missed his mark, they could do no more. The head
of the column was violently thrown back on the rear, both flanks were over-
lapped at the same moment by the English wings, then terrible discharges at
five yards distance shattered the waving mass, and a long ti-ack of broken arms
and bleeding carcasses marked the line of flight.

The battle of Albuera affords a still more remarkable instance
of liOAV lielpless a column of great size is Avhen attacked by
steady infantry in line. At the crisis of the battle the Divisions
of Generals Girard and Darrican were in mass of close columns
of double companies, that is to say, the whole of these two
Divisions stood right in front, one behind the other, showing a
front only of two companies. They ascended the hill in this
formation, and fought in this order, covered by numerous
skirmishers. The fire of the English lines, three battalions
deployed, thrcAv these great masses into disorder, the ranks got
broken and mixed, and they became a mob, and when an
attempt was made to deploy them they were completely out of
hand. The reserve sent to support them only added to the
confusion.

It will be observed that at Albuera the English attacked a
mass of colmnus on a hill ; at Busaco the English Avere in line
on a hill and Avere attacked by a column coming np the hill.

At Salamanca, the 3rd, Pakenham's Division, sent to attack
Thomier's Division (which AA'as moving in columns to outflank
the English army in columns), advanced in quarter distance
columns, deployed, and attacking in line the head of the French
Division, overlapped it on both flanks, and drove it back in
confusion.

At Waterloo almost the same thing occurred. The French,
under Ney, attacked the English left, the whole of Ney's Coi-ps
being formed in four masses of columns of double companies.
In this formation they attacked the English, these four great

columns advancing in echelon, preceded by a number of
skirniishers. The Divisional Artillery limbered up and followed
the Divisions after they had passed the guns. The fire of the
English inflicted great losses on the heavy columns, the bat-
talions in rear being useless to support the front. The head of
the 3rd echelon charged by the 42nd and 92ud in line, shaken
by fire, and unable to deploy, was broken, and the English
Cavalry completed the defeat of the whole mass. " The columns
were far too few, they were formed in deep masses, which are
always difficult to deploy under fire, when all manoeuvres are
difficult, and when, if order be preserved, it is fortunate."

The Imperial Guard attacked in precisely the same formation,
and witli similar results, on the right of the English line.

Upon this subject General Jomiui remarks : —

Joraini. In discussion on these subjects I remark a fatal tendency in tlie clearest

minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, anil to cast in the
same mould all the fcictical formations a General may arrange, without taking
into consideration localities, moral circumstances, national characteristics, or
the abilities of the commanders.

I propose to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack. I never
intended to make it an exclusive system especially for the defence.

The Archduke Charles told me that such small columns resisted admirably
the furious charges of the French Cuirassiers under General d'Espagne.

At the Battle of Wagram the greater part of the Austrian army was so
formed. Wellington, in 1823, told me that he was convinced the manner of
the attack of the French upon him in column, more or less deep, was very
dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry, having confidence in its fire
and well supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed that these deep
columns were very different from the small columns I projjosed, a formation
which ensured in the attack — steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses
are much more exposed to the ravages of artillery, and afford no greater
mobility than a deployed line.

I asked the Duke of Wellington if he had not formed the foreign troops
under his command in columns at Waterloo. He said, " Yes, because I could
not depend upon them as well as upon the English."

I said, " This admission proves that you think a line so formed firmer, than
a deployed line." He replied, " They are certainly good also ; but their use
must depend on the ground and the spirit of the troops. A General cannot
act in the same way always."

Napoleon, in 1813, ordered his infantry to be formed in column of double
comjvinies two deep.

The Duke of Wellington admitted that the French columns at Waterloo,
particularly those of the right wing, were not small battalion columns, but
enf)rmous masses of columns. The Prussians say that Ney's four divisions
were formed in four columns extending from La Haye Sainte to Papelotte. I
was not present, but several officers have Jissured me that at one time the
troo])s were formed in columns, each column composed of an entire division,
tlie battalions being deployed one behind the other at six paces interval.*

I conclude —

1st. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.

2ud. That the system of one battalion deployed and one in double
company colunnis on each flank is as good for the offensive as for
the defensive as used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento.

3rd. That the most skilful tactician would experience great difficulty in
marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks
over an interval of twelve to fifteen hundred yards, preserving

• Tliis difTers from the French accounts.

sufficient order to attack an t'ueniy in position with any cliancc of
success, the front all the while lieing played on l)y artillery and
musketry.

I have never seen anytliing of the kind, and I regard it as inipossiMe, and
lira convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sulliciently
good order to have the force recpiisite for success.

It lias been pointed out Iioav, after tlie canipaig-n of Ansterlit/,
the Austrians adopted the formation of double eonipany battalion
columns, and how, after the retreat from Russia, the Prussians
adopted rlie same formatit)n.

The battahons were at that time usually weak, from 500 to
000 men, formed in eight companies.

Subsequent to the \V\aterloo campaign, the Prussian Army
adopted a battalion of 500 men on a peace footing, having the
power to draw 500 men from the Landwehr to complete the
battalion in case of war.

With the view of economising the cost of the army as much
as possible, this peace battalion was formed into four companies,
so that in war time each company was 250 men, or really a
small battalion ; thus the Prussian company column followed as
a natural consequence of the small battalion double company
column introduced during the revolutionary wars, and subse-
quently so often used Avith success. It was not originally a
formation devised for tactical purposes, but one that arose partly
from economical reasons, and partly from the old weak battalion
column.

When rifles began to take the place of smooth-bore arms,
many proposals were made for altering tactical formations, and
the eftect of these weapons was much discussed. It became
apparent that infantry fire had become of much more importance
than formerly, and that as the value of fire increased, so the
formation of troops must be altered, to give a greater develop-
ment of fire than formerly on the one hand, and greater protec-
tion to the men when advancing on the other.

The first battle after the introduction of rifles was the Alma,
there the British troops were, with the exception of the 4th
Division, armed with rifles, the French had certain picked corps
80 armed, and the Russians had very few rifles.

At the Alma the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and light divisions advanced
in mass of brigade columns (vide Plates XII and XIIa) from the
centre of divisions, the right brigade of each division being
left in front, the left brigade right in fi-ont ; consequently, when
the divisions were ordered to deploy, each brigade deployed
outwards on the two centre or leading companies. The
deployment took place at a distance of about one mile, or 1,700
yards from the Russian battery of 18 guns.

The advance in line was made on ground covered with
vineyards, across a river with steep banks, and on the right
through a burning village, the advance being covered by a por-
tion of the 2nd Battahon of the Rifle Brigade as skirmishers.

The distance between the columns of the hght and 2nd
(h visions had been over-estimated, and when the deployment
took place the 95th Regiment was obliged to form in second
line. The first line, therefore, consisted of 11 battalions, de-
ployed Avith one doubled behind. The second line of six
battalions deployed in line, and six more sliglitly in echelon on
the right rear; an entire division, the 4th, being in reserve.

In this order the army advanced. The Russians appear to
have been formed in heavy regimental columns of three and
four battalions,

A reference to the sketch will show the nature of the move-
ments. It will be seen that the 95th got split in two, a portion
attacking the main battery with the right brigade of the light
division, a part rejoinmg its proper brigade, the 2nd brigade of
the 2nd division.

To pass through the village of Bourliouk, the 1st brigade of
the 2nd division had to get into a column formation, and cross-
ing the river Avere reformed in mass of quai-ter-distance columns,
they then formed line obhquely to the Russian front.

The 2nd brigade of the 2nd division also wheeled into open
column and took ground to its right, marching up a ravine on
the advance of the 1st division.

The heavy columns of the Russians advanced and attempted
to diive back the Guards and Highland brigade, but were unable
to do so, one column being much maltreated by being fired into
in front by the Scots Fusilier Guards, and in flank by a portion
of the Grenadiers thrown back for that purpose.

But little use seems to have been made of skirmishers, the
Russians seem to have trusted to their powerful artillery fire
and the weight of their massive columns, and not to have used
their infantry fire to any great extent.

It Avill be observed that each of the English lines consisted
of two entire divisions deployed, or each line was about 2,400
yards in length, each division occupying about 1,200 yards.
To cover this front with skirmishers there was one battalion of
the Rifle Brigade. The troops in the first line were not under
the same command as those in the second line, and each General
of Division had a considerable length of line to supervise. The
skirmishing line, first line, and supports, thus foiTaed perfectly
distinct bodies.

Moltke.
(Translated
by Crawford.)

Of late years columns have never been actually opposed to lines except in
the Crimea. At the Alma the Knssians, occupying a purely def-ensive position,
had formed all their battalions into deep columns of attack. The English
adopted that line formation in which they had fought in the Peninsula, and
in which they had withstood the shock of Ney's veteran columns at Waterloo.
They now emi)loyed the same system on the offensive and experienced all its
advantages and disadvantages. Owing to the Avant of pi'actice they found
great difficulty in simply making a forward march of about a mile, and then
required several hours to deploy into two lines, the necessary space having
been under estimated by nearly 1,(100 yards. The front of the first line
extended two miles, and it was but two deep.

PLATE. All

!^ ^:k ^ ill

1+ ^it

S4<

1 JS

Uancerficlo. LiTH 22, Bedford S^ Covint Garocm.

PLATE XI!*

OancerfiIld, LiTH '22, BeoroRD STCovent Garden

In this formation they liad to cross a river witli steep banks and to ascend
a rocky slope in close proximity to a burning village, and among enclosed
vineyards. Opposed to the English stood at le;ust two-thirds of the Eussian
force ; so soon as the tii-st line had luscended the opjKisite bank the 2nd and
light divisions formed an irregidar chain of skirmisliers in which the men of
not only dift'erent companies, but even of different regiments, got so mixed up
together that it became no longer {Ktssible to fire volleys, or to make any
reg\dar movements.

The Russians felt confident of breaking this line at any point with their
Uiassive and powerful columns, but here the same thing occurred, ;i8 later on
in the advance of the 1st division, and the same results wei'e obtained
everywhere

The Russian army, formed into columns composed of several battalions
one behind the other, advanced with a resolute and imj)osing bearing, but
without firing, and the thin, weak-looking line of the English held its ground
and directed its firing on the dense mass at a range at which Indlets could not
fail to take effect.

Before they could come to close quarters or deploy, so as to deliver their
own fire, the attacking columiLs halted and a few badly-aimed shots were fired
frc>m the centre of the leading battalion, which, of course, was the only one
that could be em|)loyed.

Most of the officers, some of whom "were of the highest rank, liad fallen,
but still for a short time the columns stood fimi ; soon, however, it lost its wall-
like appearance, and, becoming more of the form of an irregular cloud, at
length gave way slowly and unwillingly, and with a jn-ojjortionally great loss.

On this occasion, according to the account of Anitschkoff, the Vladimir
Regiment lost 49 officers and 1,500 men, but this is probabh^ an exaggerated-
statement.

In these ever-recun-ing encounters of column against line the Russians
lost in barely three hours 5,700 men, or nearly one-fifth of their whole foi'ce.
The English, advancing in line, and keeping up their fire, twice broke into the
principal intreuchment of the Russians, which was defended by 16 guns.

Their total loss did not amount to 2,000 men, and, as the loss of the French
must have been very much less, this part of the engagement cost the Russians
at least twice as much as it did their opponents, and mainly decided the battle.
An actual hand-to-hand-fight occured at Inkermann, when the animosity was
at its highest ; on this occasion a thick fog gi'eatly facilitated the near
approach of the Russian columns, and enabled them to sui"prise their enemy.
Yet here again, they admit that they suffered enonuous losses from the fire of
the latter.

From these experiences, we infer that now, as heretofore, the column
fonnation affords the best means of handling troops, both in an attack and in
an actual fight.

Although the tire of ai-tilleiy at long ranges forces a column into an
early deployment, yet it does not prevent the approach of a line of columns so
small as to be able freqviently to obtain cover from the inequalities of the
gromid, and to advance with gi-eat rapidity.

On the other hand, that portion of an anny which is to sustain the imme-
diate attack of an enemy should receive that attack in line, for the success of
the defence depends on the fire of the deployed battalions, and it is only by
fully emplo}*ing the fii-e that the possibility at last arises of deciding the issue
vnth the bayonet. Our system of company columns, and the instiiiction
given in our schools of musketry, are adapted to meet all these contingencies.

CHAPTER III.

Captain May.
Tactical retro-
spect.

(Translated
by Ouvry.)

JNapier.

Infantry Tactics.

When wliat is meant by the word a " battle," between armies
provided with the weapons now used, is considered, it cannot
be denied that powerful influences must be brought to bear on
men to get them to face the dangers that have to be encountered.

The animal instinct of self-preservation is strong in men as
it is in other animals, and his superior knowledge and intellect
point out dangers more clearly to him, and it is by appealing
to moral faculties only, that men can be induced to meet the
dangers that they must face in war. Thus the very intellect
which gives man a clearer knowledge of approaching dangers
than other animals, is that Avhich enables him to meet and
grapple with those dangers as no other animal can.

He who considers that our men are all heroes because they are derived
from a brave class is very considerably mistaken. If only all soldiers of their own
accord would .simply do their duty in battle, an army would be perfectly
invincible, and would not require any tactical instruction at all.

But man has in his composition a natural desire of self-preservation, an
ef'otism and indolence united with many sensual desires, but at the same time
capable of being developed into higher qualities.

Who would ever maintain that death was indifferent to him ? for in the
tumult of battle danger is not so much despised as forgotten or ignored. The
less the powers of the mind have attained to this freedom of development of
its spiritual powers, so much the more will its sense hold sway. The man of
the people who is accustomed to rough or dangei-ous work has rather deadened
this sense by custom than conquered it.

Thus in war we often find the most extraordinary instances
of the victory of small bodies of men over large forces, produced
by moral causes. The most niunerons army is by no ineans
the most likely to conquer, but that which is the most highly
endowed with moral and physical qualities and the best trained
and disciplined. There are many different motives which tend
to produce the moral power that enables men to overcome the
natural instinct of self-preservation ; feelings of duty, fanaticism,
enthusiasm for some object or some leader, love of country,
pride, with perhaps even more sordid motives, as desire for
promotion, self-interest, love of plunder, or even, perhaps, in
rare instances, love of actual bloodshed.

These passions, working in different proportions in different
men's minds, produce that feehng which is termed bravery.

And men with these passions excited and influenced by
feelings of discipline or obedience to a superior, become
formidable troops.

The possession of Badajos had become a point of personal honour with
the soldiers of each nation, but the desire of glory with the British was dashed

Napier.

by hatred of the citizeus ou an old gnulge ; and recent toil and hardship, witJi
much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly savage, for these things
render tlie ni)l)lo-niiniietl, indeed, averse to cruelty, but iKWtlen the vulgar
sjiirit. >suniliers also, like Ca-sar's Centurion, who could not forget the
plunder of Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Ciudad Kodrigo
and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, tlie
wondrt)US power of discipline bound the whole t(.igether, as with a band of iron,
and in the priile of arms none doubted their might to bear down any obstacle
that man could oppose to the fury.

Experience has slio-wn that these feehiigs are by no means
constant, that the bravest and most AvarHke troops have, when
exposed to unexpected and mikn(nvn danger, yielded almost
"without a struggle.

Some of the soldiers called out "a mine." At that word such is the
power of imagination, those troops who had not been stopped by the strong
barrier, the deep ditcii, the high walls, and the deadly tire of the enemy,
staggered back appalled by a chimera of their own raising.*

Consequently it a leader desires to obtain great exertions from
those under his orders, he must seek to work on and excite their
feelings, he must carefully watch against any sudden or unex-
pected action of the enemy, and be careful that nothing shakes
the men's confidence in themselves. The object ot the leader of
bodies of men, whether great or small, should be to inspire those
under his command with the greatest moral force before an action,
to preserve that moral power during the action, and to seek to
demorahse the enemy.

There is nothing that tends to raise the moral power of an
army more than education ; the consciousness of possessing
superior knowledge adds greatly to the power of an army.

When, said the Prussian officers, our men came in contact with the Stoffel.
Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them found that they hardly knew their (Translated
right hand from their left, there was not one who did not look on himself as a by Home.)
god, in comparison with euch ignorant beings, and this conviction increased
our force tenfold.

j\Iany Asiatic races far exceed Europeans in their contempt for
death, but they are invariably defeated by the moral power that
superior education, civilization, training and discipline give. Men
Avho are accustomed to obey their superiors, look to them in
danger and take their ideas from them by a kind of sympathy.
If a leader be firm, clearheaded, and understands what he is
about, he Avill, from the mere fact of there being danger, be more
readily obeyed ; but if he is vacillating, uncertain in his action, and
appears to doubt and hesitate in the presence of danger, his men
will mistrust and disobey him.

Two Mamelooks could defeat three French hoi'semen, because they were Napoleon,
better armed, better mounted, and more skilful. 100 French horse have nothing
to fear from 100 Mamelooks, 300 would defeat a similar number, and 1,000
French would defeat 1,500 Mamelooks. So gi-eat is the influence of tactics,
order, and the power of manoeuvring.

This moral power is much increased by the feeling of security

* Students of Napier will recall tlie description of the panic that occurred to
the Ught diyision in the middle of the night, when no enemy was near.

which men have, when tbey arc conscious of being well-armed and
know how to use their weapons. The results produced by the
possession of superior arms, and being confident in their use, is
well shown by the following extract, descriljing an event in the
war of 1866.

Stoffcl. Our soKliers, yuid General Kessel, had rarely I'ecourse to a rapid fire, and

(Translated the proof of this is the small number of rounds per man exjjended during the
by Home.) campaign ; but for many years we have lost no oi>[iortunity of convincing the
men that they carried a weajion superior to that of all other Euiojjean armies,
and the jmins we took with rifle ])ractice only strengthened this conviction.
This confidence w;is increased and strengthened after the first action, when
they found the security aff'orded by an arm which lo;uls rapidly. People
si)eak continually of rajjid fire, the expression is not conect and gives a false
notion, they should rather say rapid loading. The 29th June, 1866, at
Kouigenhof, the Prussians had a sharp action with the enemy. After the
action, which took place in fields covered with high corn, Colonel Kessel went
over tlie ground, and what was his astonishment to find five or six Austrian
bodies for every Prussian. The Austriaus killed had been mostly liit in the
head. His men, far from firing fast, had hardly fired as many rounds ;xs the
enemy. The Austrian officers who were made prisoners said to the Prussians,
our soldiers are demor.Uized, not by the rapidity of your fire, for we could find
some means, perhaps, to counterbalance that, but because you are always ready to
fire. This morning your men, like ours, were concealed in the corn ; but in
this position yours could, without being seen, load their rifles easily and
rapidly ; ours, on the other hand, were compelled to stand uj) and show
themselves when they loaded, and you then took the opportunity of firing at
them ; thus we had the greatest difficulty in getting our men to stand up at all,
and such was their terror when they did stand u]> to load that their hands
trembled and they could hardly put the cai-tridges into the barrel. Our men
fear the advantage the quick and easy loading of the needle gun gives you ; it
is this which demoralizes them. In action they feel themselves disarmed the
greater part of the time, whereas you are always ready to fire.

In the first chapter, the advantage that constant intercourse
with the men gives a company leader, has been pointed out, but
if men learn to respect, follow, and trust a leader, in whose
knowledge of his profession they have confidence, they will from
that very intercourse learn to doubt and distrust one who is
ignorant of his duty ; and no matter how personally they may like
him, will never obey his orders as completely as he in whose
knowledge they confide.

When actually engaged, the noise of artillery and smaJl-armB,
the efi'ect produced by seeing killed and wounded men drop con-
tinually, causes a kind of nervous excitement ; at such momenta
men are peculiarly apt to be affected by trivial things, and at
such moments coolness, decision, and confidence in the leader of
small bodies, are of the highest importance.

The direction of great masses of troops, getting them into
position, or forming them in line of battle — such movements, in
short, as those by which Napoleon debouched from the Island of
Lobau and deployed his anny on the Slarchfeldt, or that by
which the Prussian army, after the battle of ]\Iars-la-Tour, fixcing
north advanced in direct echelon of corps from its left, and
pivoting on its right, changed front to the east, may be teimed
*' Manoeuvre Tactics,"' in contradistinction to the actual fighting,

(J7

"which really is often nothing more than the struggle for certain
positions on the battle-field, which may be termed " Fighting
Tactics." It is to the latter that the following observations
bear special reference ; and it must be remembered that all the
operations of war, the direction given to great masses of troops,
moving over lage areas of coiuitry, and concentrating on certain
places, termed strategy, the movement of these masses, so as to
place them in luie of battle, and attack certain definite points of
the enemy on his flank or centre, termed manoeuvi'e tactics, are
closely linked together and are really subordinate to fighting
tactics, or the actual collision of troops, by which victories alone
can be won.

The fu-st troops that come into contact with one another
before battles are fought, are small detachments. Military his-
tory necessarily passes over much that is done by these small
bodies ; but there can be no doubt tliat the coiTcct leading and
handling of these small bodies conduces greatly to bringing the
action of larger bodies to a successful conclusion. At the begin-
ning of any great battle, there are numerous straggles for im-
portant points, indeed great battles are often brought about by
the necessity for supporting small detachments seeking thus to
obtain some advantageous ground.

Now it is undoubtedly one of the consequences that flow from
the use of modern arms, that troops once actually engaged can
rarely, if ever, move to the right or left. Manoeuviing under fire,
idways difficult, may now be deemed almost impossible ; once
troops are really engaged it would appear that their movements
nmst be either forward or baclnvard. Fresh troops may be
brought up from the rear to feed the fight in front, but such
movements as those made by Massena at Wagram, are at the
present day impossible. As an example, at the battle of the
Alma, the Kussian battery Avas stormed by a confused mass,
composed of four battalions and a portion of a fifth ; one of
these battalions did not belong to the brigade actually em-
ployed on that part of the field and the odd portion belonged
to another division.

Death loves a crowd, and in some places our soldiers were j^ressiug so xjnelake
close together that when a round shot cut its way into the midst, it dealt a
sure havoc. Some of the clusters into which our men had gathered were
eight or ten deep, and the round shot, tearing cruelly through and through,
mowed down the men.

Moving to the attack, without being ordered to move to any given spot,
almost every officer and man luid instinctively proposed to liimself the same
goal, and that goal was the great Redoubt.

This description proves clearly that manoeuvres under a heavy
artillery fire, even of old guns, much more so with modern
artillery backed by breach-loaders, are impossible. AVho could
have turned that body of men, pushing on, either to right or left ?
Similarly at St. Privat, the Prussian Guards, when attacking,
could only advance, halt, or retire. Under the tremendous fire
that modern aims enable troops acting on the defensive, to pour

F 2

Boguslausti.
(Translated
by Graham.)

in, all movements to the right and left are vain. He who gives;
the order is the next moment down, and another pushes to the
front.

It becomes therefore apparent that the actual success ot
operations in war, must primarily rest on the action of small
bodies, good previous strategical movements, a correct formation
of the order of battle, a proper selection of the points to be at-
tacked, will make the success when obtained, of far greater im-
portance ; but the actual success must ultunately depend on the
correct handling of small bodies of men. The question how a
small body of men should be handled in actual fighting has now
become of far greater importance than formerly. Important as-
aiFecting the individuals concerned, perhaps more so, as reacting
on larger bodies. This is one of the features of modern fighting,
and one which must be carefully considered. A battle under
existing circumstances is a series of small battles or fights in
which bodies of troops, perhaps not greater than a brigade, are
engaged, and each of these bodies must be tactically complete,
must work for one object, and seek to carry one point. From
this fact several consequences flow which have to be carefully
considered {see page 153).

It follows that it is difficult to assign to several battalions the same definite
object of attack — house, village, wood, &c. In general it is to one and only one
battalion that the duty of attacking and cai'rying a definite point can be
entrusted.

The first thing to conduce to the proper leading or handlmg of
a small body, is a clear understanding of the various conditions
of the problem. A definite object to attain, a clear understand-
ing of the difficulties, and the best means of meeting those
difficulties, are the first essentials to success. It has been said
that for the future no direct attack can possibly be made on
troops occupying a position, and that all attacks must be made
on the flanks ; but experience shows that attacks on the flank,
unless supported by a front attack, can always be met and de-
feated. The battle of "Wagram, and perhaps still more, the coun-
ter strokes delivered at liossbach and Salamanca, show, that
unless front attacks are made at the same time, flank attacks
are unlikely to succeed; consequently, however difficult and
dangerous such attacks may be, yet it is requisite that they
should be made, in order that the change of front, which any
Avell-disciplined army can make if unopposed, may be prevented.

We said that on the German side the intention was generally evident of
attempting to turn the enemy. But the fight often developed itself in such a
manner that, after prepju'ing the way by artillery fire, the Germans made a
vigorous attack ujion the French centre, without waiting for the effect of the
movement on the flanks. This mode of action has often been criticised, and
attention has been called to the enormous sacrifices which it has genenilly
entailed ; but these critics forget that, when you wish to force the enemy to
fight, a fairly sharj) attack in front is necessary to hold him fa.st, otherwise he
would avoid the turning movement which is meanwhile going on, either by a
timely retreat, or by throwing himself upon the turning column and attacking;
it, whilst executing its movement.

A great deal has been \\aitten on tLe subject of flank attacks,
and it has been pointed out tliat troops, "when ordered to attack,
invariably spread out to the flanks, thiiniiny; the hue in the centre.
This may be, and undoubtedly is tlie case, looking to the attack of
brigades and divisions on isolated portions of a battle-field : but it
would not be the case if the centre of the enemy's position was
that from which the least fire came, or that which afforded the
greatest cover or the greatest facilities for attack.* In looking at
the actions of the recent war, it is absolutely requisite to bear in
mind that the array which made the flank attacks was either far
superior in numbers to thiit it attacked, or was dealing with troops
(as in the latter battles) that could not manoeuvre. This subject
is dealt Avith in more detail at page 155. We must not assume
that in all future battles such superiority on one side will exist.
If it does exist, then the attacker may really do pretty much as
he thinks fit ; attack both flanks and leave strong forces in the
centre. What is meant is this— if A B (Fig. 1, Plate XIII) be an
army opposed to another (C D) of equal strength, it is manifest
that if C D attempts to turn the flank A of A B, it may be met
either by a change of front as A^ Bj, or by a counter movement
A2 B2 : and if a flank be thus threatened when forces are equal,
the army threatening the flank either places itself in the position
of being caught in a flank movement, or simply making a toil-
some march to find its enemy still before it.

It is hardly safe to genera,Hse on recent experience and lay
down a rule that front attacks must not be made.

French tactics were entirely deficient of the offensive element on a large Boguslauski.
scale, by which, with inferior numbers even, you may gain great advantages (Translated
if you are in a position to make rapid concentrations and advances on desired by Graham.)
points.

Partial counter-strokes on isolated points of a battle-field, such as the
French made frequently and with great bravery at Sedan, can only have a
momentary effect.

The attempt to turn the flank of an enemy can only be justified by a great Clausewitz.
superiority, this superiority may be either actual superiority of numbers, or it
may follow from the way the lines of communication are placed.

When an army endeavours to attack another by making a
flank movement, and a corresponding change of front is made by
its adversary, the manoeuvring powers of the two armies come
into play, aiid each leader watches for^ and seeks to profit, by
the mistakes of his opponents.

The movements of the French and British armies prior to the
battle of Salamanca afford a good example of this.

The two armies were for some days in close proximity to one
another, each seeking to take the other at disadvantage ; for
some time the French out-marched the British, and had the best
of it until ^larmont made the fatal error of extending his left
too much, an en-or which WelHngton seized, and thereby won a
great victory.

* This gpreadinc^ out appears to be caused by an instinctive feehng that the
surest way to avoid an enemy's fire is to equal or exceed his front.

Ultimately a flank attack becomes locally a front attack,
or tlic troops whose flank is attacked mnst meet or try to
meet the attack by forming a crochet, throwing back a portion of
the line, or bringing up a reserve ; in any of which cases the attack,
althongh a flank attack as regards the general line of battle be-
comes locally in that place a front attack.

Thus the Prussians at Waterloo made an attack on the right
flank of tlie French anny, although it was locally a front attack
on the young guard under Lobau.

Similarly, the Saxons made a flank attack at the battle of
Gravelotte, on the French line of battle, although a front attack
on tlie troops at Roncourt, fomiing the right of the Vlth Coi-ps,
but these troops would have been in greater force had the Prussian
guard not held the French fast in front by a formidable attack.
It is quite true that the front formed to resist the flaidc attack
will not be posted as strongly as the troops holding the true
front ; but still the attack will, in the locality where made, be a
front and not a flank attack.

It is not meant that there are no circumstances under wliich
an army of equal or inferior strength should not attempt to turn
the flank of another. Such circumstances may undoubtedly
occur. Fig. 2, Plate XIII, shows an ideal case. An army, A B,
on the defensive has one v^ing strongly posted at A. It is induced
to spread the other out towards B by a demonstration in its front.
The attacking army, occupying the wood in its front strongly,
places a portion in a state of defence, so as to check any advance
of the enemy to the front, and seeing that the nature of the
gi'ound at A is such that a counter-movement in that direction
cannot be easily made, moves round to that flank, preser\ang the
line of communication towards D, and by concentrating a fire on
A, the attackers are enabled to cany that point ; such a case is
not an unfrequent one, and the power of the breech-loader on the
defensive, enabling a small body of determined men well posted
to delay a large force, appears to have given increased facilities
for making concentric attacks. The efiect of the breech-loader
in this respect appears to have introduced the greatest modifica-
tion in modern figlitmg. Vide page 155.

It is desu'able to review the problem as it at present
stands. If a reference be made to the battle of the Alma, it
must be acknowledged that the heavy guns used by the Eussians
com]'»elled the British troops to deploy into line earlier than they
would have done had the Russians been provided "uath the usual
field artillery. This is exactly what rifled artillery now does,
only to a greater extent ; it compels troops attacking to quit their
column formation (in which marches must be made) and open out
sooner than formerly. Breech- loading rifles also produce effects
at longer ranges than formerly. Hence the problem resolves
itself into the follo^\Tlng: A certain space of from 1,500 to 2,500
yards swept by fire, the intensity of which increases as troops

>•

PLATE XIII

lMt>- 1

.-^"v^ "V.

^ \ X. -

S-\

«,_ ,_^

"^^7=^

ILLUSTRATION OF A FLANK ATTACK

Dangerfield. Lith 22. Bedford ST Covent Garden

approach the powitioii from whicli that fire is delivered, has to bo
passed over. How shall it be crossed ?

It is requisite here to consider Avhat the peculiar nature of
the breech-loader is, as distinguished from the muzi^le-loader,
assuming both to possess equal accuracy and range. It can be
loaded ^Wth greater ease and rapidity, hence its defensive power m
greater than that of the nmzzle-loader, but if the position of men.
advancing to an attack be considered, it will be found that the
breech-loader (from the very great ease Avith which it may be
loaded) enables a well-sustained, well-directed fire to be kept up
from troops advancing in extended order, the operation of
loading being performed when lying doAvn or in confined places
with niTich greater ease than with the muzzle-loader. Hence
the ojfensive. power of the breech-loader is very much greater
than that of the muzzle-loader.* The defence has gained greatly,
but the oifensive has, relatively speaking, gained still more, or,
in other words, the superiority of the defence over the attack
is not now so marked as it was with muzzle-loading rifles.

It is desirable that those who read this statement should
understand that it icas until recently contested in Pru-%sia ; and it is
believed that it will meet icith much opposition in this conntyy. The
following extract shows the latest, and what is believed to be
the generally accepted opinion abroad.

Every improvement in firearms produces a powerful impression that the ScherfP.
Defcnsice lias thereby gained an accession of strength. This feeling is all the (Translated
more natural because a purely defensive attitude in the open field was first by Graham.)
rendered possible by the invention of fireai-ms and of gunpowder. In earlier
days battles took the form of encounters in which both sides took the offensive,
or else the defender was driven to make use of fortification to an extent far
surpassing the practice of the present day.

Firearms and the Defensive are as much allied in our minds as are
" Varme blanche " and the Offensive ; in neither case can we well imagine the
allies separated. " The better the fii-earm, the stronger the defence " is, there-
fore, a maxim the justice of which has always exerted its influence upon
miHtary operations since firearms have become general, and which has not
yet quite lost its power.

So it was after the Crimean "War, when the rifled musket, and so after the
Bohemian Camimign, when the breech-loader, respectively made their debut in
the field. In each case theory raised its voice very loudly in favor of the
principle of the Defence, and if the book-tacticians of those days had been
worthy of credit, the war of 1870-71 should have bloomed into one of the
finest sj^ecimens of a war of positions, in which, as is well known, the art of
beating gives place to that of not being beaten. ,

This theory was deduced in a curious manner from our latest war
experience, each time in an indu-ect way, that is to say, the new arm was in
both campaigns victorious in fence ; nevertheless we are told that it should
properly give more power to the Defence. The fact that in 1859 the Austrian
rifle did not hold its own against the smooth-bore with which the French were
still mostly armed, was accounted for by the action of the French rifled
cannon. But, as was still maintained, "rifled guns and muskets must
infallibly make the Defensive invincible."

* 'What is meant is, Noro the fire of the assailant's infantry is of far greater
importance than it ever was, the defenders suffer far more from this fire than formerly,
consequently every means must be taken, when attacking, to increase and develop
that fire.

It is a remarkable and interesting fact that at a time when these defen-
sive tlieories had obbiined jtretty general ajjproval, both in literature and even
in other ways, the Austrians in 1866 would have nothing to say to them,
and setting at naught the dicUites of natui'e and tradition, rushed almost
fanatically into the Offensive — to be everywhere beaten ; and that when the
tables were turned and many voices were raised against that one-sided theory
to reject it, the French in 1870 went upon the opposite tack, and like the
Austrians, acting contrary to their nature and traditions, servilely followed a
Defensive system — to be in like manner everywhere beaten !

These striking contradictions show plainly enough that the formula of the
"certain shot" is not infallible, when we have to decide upon the absolute
merit of this or that tactical formation.

It must be confessed that the critics recovered themselves pretty soon
from the first panic, so to say, which was created by the general introduction of
rifled arms, and resting upon the experiences of 1859, they met the theory of
the absolute Dcfoisive with the argument that it was not so much the accuracy
of the new arms as their low trajectory, which rendered them such valuable
allies to the Defence. With regard to breech-loaders, it was assertad even
before 1866 that their rapidity of lire w'oidd serve the assailant at least as well
as it would the defender.

In fact, the more portable, moveable, handy, and quick-firing a gun is, so
much the more suited is it to the attacking party which is compelled to be
constantly in movement, a condition unfavouraVjle to the use of firearms.
The development of Artillery from the gun of position to its present degree of
perfection was a consequence of this conviction, just as the rapid-firing
infantry of Frederick the Great, acting as it did on the offensive, was an
example of its justice.

Thus a very decided opposition to the defensive hobby grew out of purely
technical considerations. Is it necessary to enlarge upon the decisive question
of morale ?

We think not, after 1870, after 1866, after the whole of Prussia's history.
Indeed it may appear superfluous to moot the question at all at the present
day, and in our country ! The theory of the su]5eriority of the Ofensive is for
the time being so firmly rooted that a reaction is not much to be feared.

And yet even with us, the time of the doubters has not long passed
away ; a single instance of failure on the part of the Offensive — always a
possible event — would again wake up these theorists, who in accordance with
their critical German nature, would once more produce their coldly-reasoned
*^ demonstrations founded upon the nature of the arm."

Reverting to tlie battle of the Alma, the British advanced
firing, and it is quite evident that snch a fire must be heavier and
more deadly from an advancing body of men armed Avith breech-
loaders, than from a similar body armed with muzzle-loaders ;
and further, that the time a given number of men advancing
across a given space take to discharge a given number of bullets,
must be much less than formerly, or in other words a body of
men armed Avith 'breech-loaders, and advancing to attack a
position defended by men similarly armed, will inflict greater
loss, although suffering more, than if both were armed with
muzzle-loaders.* This is the chief peculiority of the breech-
loader, and to it must be subordinated the formation of the
troops ; or, whatever formation be adopted, it must, be such as
will enable tlie soldier to use his weapon, loadmg and firing as
he moves; at the same time that by the formation adopted the
undoubted power of the breech-loader on the defensive may be

* Vide the description of the action at Konigonhof, page 06, as an illustration.

reduced, that is t(> say, the offensive power of tlie weapon must
be developed, Avhile at tlie same time every means nuist bo
adopted to reduce its destructive effects. The following
description brings this point out clearly: —

The intensely effective and continnin;^ rolling fire of the Chassejiot Boguslausti.
ina<le it clear to all our commanders that a stroni^ deployment of skirmishers ( A '■'i"sliitL'u
was absolutely necessary, so as to answer the enemy's tire in an effective ^ uraliam.)
manner, not to expose too strong supports to its ellects, and at the same time
to prepare the way for our attack.

Or, in other words, the power of the breech-loader as an offensive
weapon had to be brought into play.

The French fire was at times so murderous that it was impossil)le to bring
up detachments in close order near, that is to say, within 100 to 150 paces of
the skirmishei-s. or to keep them in close oi'der if they were there. There
was, therefore, the choice of either keeping farther back, or of extending the
supports.

The latter course was followed all the more frequently, because the line
of skirmishers soon required strengthening in different j)arts, and gap3
caused by the enemy's fire refiuire<l filling up. In l)roken ground afibrding
more cover, it was often possible to bring the sujiports nearer to the skirmishers,
but in maving up they frequently scattered. In consequence of the necessarily
cautious nature of their advance, partly extending and joining the skirmishers.

What contributed to this was that it was very difficult for officers to keep
their men together, because the noise of a close conflict between breech-loader
and breech-loader often drowns the sound of the human voice, so that a great
part of the men cannot hear the word of command, and the officer can only
influence by his example and conduct, and this leads him also to the front,
even up to the line of skirmishers. Meanwhile the German line of skirmishers
w;is approaching the enemy by a succession of rushes. This was done either
by taking advantage of cover, or else they would advance, throw themselves
down, and then run on again.

Much address was displayed in this manoeuvre. In this manner the line
■of skirmishers got part to within 400 paces, part to within 1-50 to 300 paces
of the enemy, according to the nature of the ground, seldom without suffering
great and inevitable loss.

This advance would occasion separate strokes and coiuiter-strokes which,
naturally caused the tide of battle to roll backwards and forwards. At this
period the fight would attain its highest pitch of intensity. The fire of the
breech-loaders on both sides resounded unceasingly, and the work of com-
manding became more and more difficult. These were doubtless the right
tactics, and suited to the present arms, because one should use the offensive
power of the needle gun before attacking an enemy in position.

Neither French nor German ever succeeded in bringing troops in close
■order into front line, in a fight such as that described, or in pushing battalions
or companies forward to fire volleys. If fresh detachments came u|) from the
rear during a stationary musketry tight, whether to strengthen the line of fire
or m<ide an attack, it was necessary to double them up with the old
■skirmishers, because closing the latter to a flank was usually not to be thought
of ; thus men of many different battalions and regiments were intermingled.

To attain victory, it is requisite to be the strongest at a given moment on Sclierff.
a given j^oint. In order that troops attacking may have and utilise the
maximum amount of force, they must be guaranteed —

1. The greatest amount of mobility, which alone allows offensive

movements to be undertaken.

2. The greatest amount of protection from the enemy's fire.

3. The most efficient use of their own fire.

The masses used in the Napoleonic wars satisfied, more or less, the condi-
tions above referred to, and so long ;is arms were not improved, the individual

oi'tler was only an accessory ; improved arras made that order daily more
important. 185!) placed it on a level with the comjjact or massive order.
1870-71 gave it the su]jeriority. Everywhere in 1870 the real assault of
positions was with swarms of skirmishers followed more or less closely Avith
troops in line or cohnnn. The individual order has now become the only
practical means for infantry hjLihting.

When skinnisliing witli muzzle-loading lifles, the rale was
that two men, a file, should act together, one man being always
loaded. This rule was based on perfectly correct principles ;
the time it took to load rendered it absokitely requisite that
the soldier pushed out in front should have a support and
protection Avhile he loaded ; this protection was afforded to him
by the ftict that two men acted together. With a weapon that,
practically speaking, is always loaded, this is not now required.
With a Aveapon that loads and fires as fast as the breech-loader,
the same amount of fire may be obtained from a far smaller
number of men than formerly. If one man with a breech-
loader can load and fire four times as fast as formerly, the effect
he can produce is, in some respects, four times as great as formerly.

This is not the case, however, in all respects, for there is a
certain moral security given by the close contact of men Avith
one another ; and also men working close together excite one
another, and a certain amount of emulation ensues. Hence it
folloAvs that a line of skirmishers may now be thmner than
formerly, and yet produce a greater effect, and the thinner the
line the less likely is there to be great loss, fewer objects being-
exposed to be hit on the ground sAvept by fire.

Thus it folloAvs, not only that greater use must be made of
skinnishers, and that a smaller number of skirmishers may
produce a greater effect than formerly ; but it also folloAvs
that the chief portion of the fighting must be done by the
men fighting in extended not close order. It AA'ill be seen
hereafter that although a thinner line of skirmishers than
tliat formerly used may produce greater effect, yet it is requisite
that the skirmishing hue should be thicker not thinner, in order
that the offensive power of the weapon may be fully developed.

The expression " loose order " has been often employed to
describe the mode of attack, but the expression is an inaccurate
one. Tlie attack is not loose, Avhicli rather means a careless
haphazard action, but it is the individual action of the soldier
fighting in extended lines ; the real facts being that such a
method of fighting demands not only greater individual exertion
and intelligence, but far higher and more complete instruction
on the part both of officers and men. In the chapter on the
history of tactics it has been shown how, as the moral value of
the French army diminished, their fonnations became more
compact and denser from the necessity of keeping the men more
immediately iinder the superAnsion of the superior officers. The
converse of this is equally true, that to enable men to fight in
indiAddual order, not only must the captains and subalterns
be better trained, but also the privates themselves.

The word '" loose " is one that has a very clan<i;eroiis applica-
tion, its use should be carefully avoided. Continually the
expressions are used, " No troops can live under fire unless in
" lootie order," and " troops must attack in loose swarms of
" skirmishei-s," and the celebrated instance of the slaughter of
the Prussian Guard at St. Privat is quoted, as affording clear
])roof that troops must advance in loose order. Further, the
word '' loose " gives an impression to young officers that any
kind or description of drill is good enough, and that neither
thought, care, nor study are required. Now, the moment when
troops are hotly engaged, and suffering much from fire, is the
very time that looseness, or anything like irregularity, must be
as nuich as possible avoided ; then is the time that discipline
and training enable men to obey and follow their leaders ; to
introduce anything that savours of irregularity at such a time
is more than dangerous. If discipline, and the system of acting
under control, is to fail at the supreme moment, cid bono, why
have it all? The passage in the Duke of Wurtemberg's
pamphlet, descriptive of the attack at St. Privat, is well worthy
of study.

During the action at St. Marie aux Chenes, Prince Hohenlohe, com- Duke of Wur-
mandiug the Artillery of the Guard, had collected 84 guns opi)osite St. Privat, temburg.
and cannonaded the French position with great effect, at first at 2,640 paces (Translated
and afterwards at 2,000 paces. Abutit five o'clock in the afternoon the Com- by Eobinson.)
'iiiander of the Guard considered the enemy to be sicffi-ciently shaken for him to
risk an assault across the open and gently ascending (/round,

The 4th Brigade of the Guard (Kessel) first moved forward from Habou-
ville in the direction of St. Privat in line of columns in two lines, with
skirmishei-s thrown out in front ; and a quarter of an hour later the advance
of the 1st Division of the Guard (Pape) commenced in the same formation
from St. Marie aux Chenes, distant about 2,640 paces from the main French
position. Habouville is about 3,960 paces, therefore the three Biigades came
about the same time within the effective reach of the enemy's fire. The front
of attack including little more than 2,000 paces, so that there were about 10
men to the pace : this was, however, the closest formation of attack employed
by the Prussians in the campaign.

The effect of the enemy's fire, even at a distance of more than 1,500
paces, was so murderous, that according to the accounts received nearly
6,000 men fell in 10 minutes, and the advance had to be immediately dis-
continued.

The attack in line of columns over open ground was, in spite of the final
success of this one, marked out as an impossibility, and a useless loss of men,
and definitely rejected.

Now wliat does this amount to ? First, the words italicised
show a clear error of judgment. Troops wlio could pour in
sucli a fire as the French infantry did, could not have been
^' sufficiently shaken " to render it justifiable " to risk an
assault " over such a glacis as the ground in front of St. Privat.
Next, if a little consideration is given to the moral circumstances
attending this attack, it 'svill be found that the Prussian Guard
is a peculiar body of men selected from all Prussia, not a local
force as the other corps are ; that it includes the chief aris-
tocracy of the coimtry, and, hke the Guard of other nations, has

certain privileges, real or imaginary. Now there had been four
'Considerable actions Avith the French during the previous
14 days, the battles of Woerth, Spicheren, Borny, and the very
bloody contest at Mars-la-Tour but two days previously.

At none of these actions had the Guard been engaged.
Perhaps the Army did not expect more from the Guard than
from other corps, but the Guard most certainly did, and a certain
feeling of regret that they had not been engaged, undoubtedly
was felt throughout this body.

The Prussians, on the day of Gravelotte, were pivoting on
■their right, and circling their left round. On the right flank
("Von Steinmetz) the first attacks were made by the 33rd
Fusiliers (Von Weltzien's Division), on the Bois de Vaux, about
1.30 p.m., at the same time a brigade passed to the north of
Gravelotte to attack the Bois de Genevaux. Frossard's fore-
most detachments were driven in at 2 o'clock, and a verv severe
fight raged along the line from Gravelotte towards Amanvilliei'S.
Now, while all this was passing, the Guard were marching,
bearing the noise of the battle, perhaps getting a stray shot
now and then ; the feelings of these men, wrought up as they
must have been to the greatest tension on arriving about
o'clock opposite their enemy at St. Privat may be imagined.
Hence we conceive that the earnest desire to be in the fight
and doing ; the strong feeling that the mere weight of such
splendid troops would bear all opposition down, joined perhaps
to strong feelings of exultation at their own recent victories,
and a certain amount of contempt for their enemy, may have
carried even the leaders away, and produced a premature
attack, which this confessedly was, an attack in a formation
well ada[)ted for a rapid advance to seize a position feebly held
by deiiioralized troops, but not equally well adapted to attack
a j)osition determinedly defended.

Upon this subject, General Walker writes : —

General I repeat, with even more emphasis than when I made the same statement

Walker, C.B. ^^^ i]^^ United Service Institution, that the dense formation of the attacking
troop.^ w%as lint o))eoi the causes which led to the loss of between 6,000 to 7,000
officers and men of the Prussian Guard tluit day. The arguments, leased on a
false appreciation of the causes of that failure, have led to very erroneous
and hurtfid conckisions, and as one of the most earnest advocates for improve-
ment in infantry formations and modes of attack, I am anxious at the same
time to conibat tiie wikl passion for disorder which tlioughtless men con-
sider to be the only alternative and suljstitute for too great rigidity of forma-
tion.

The fact that the denseness of the formation (battalion
colunms) was not the only cause, is clearly shoAvn by the
folio v/ing Prnssian army order on the subject, issued three days
after; and it should be clearly understood that battalion
cohunns were not the proper Prussian formation for such
attacks, but company columns, or columns composed of one-
fourth of a battalion.

Army Order.

I havo gatlicreil from the reports on the detail of llie recent victorious
combats that the serious losses arose partly from the fact that the troops
frequently advanced to the assault in battalion colunnis foUcnving to(j closely
ou their skini-ishers.

I therefore point out the fact that the assault on a hostile ])osition must
in the first instance be sufficiently prepared by the artillery and a well-
directed tire of skirmishers ; and that in the infrequent cases wlien turning
or outflanking the enemy is not ])ossible, and a frontal attack over oi)en
gi'ound is therefore absolutely necessary, the formation of company columns
and half battalions, as laid down by regulation and applied on the practice
gi'ounil, must be employed.

I bestow the fullest acknowledgment on the gallant forwardness of the
infantry, to whom hitherto nothing has been too difficult, but expect from
the intelligence of the officeis, that they will be able, by taking closer advantage
of the ground, by a more thorough jn-eparation for the attack, and by the
employment of suitable formations, to obtain in future the same results with
inferior losses.

(Signed) William.

Head-Quarters, Pont d Mousson,

21st Auffusi, 1870, 11 a.m.

In this order there is no counseHing of loose formation, no
urging of wild swarms of skirmishers out of hand, but there is
a word of warning against premature attack, against pushing
battalion columns on the top of skirmishers, and a gentle ad-
monition to adhere to the company coiumn, the proper recognised
Prussian formation for such attacks. Further, the necessity of
making all formations subservient to the ground, and the
necessity of rapidly taking the formation suitable to the ground,
are clearly pointed out.

And the king points out that the intelligence of the indivi-
dual officers must be exercised : within certain limits, each man
must have individual freedom, it must be not a careless, reckless,
loose order of attack, but a cartful " mdividual " order of attack.

It cannot be too often repeated that words convey ideas,
and ideas govern actions. If officers think and speak of loose
order of fighting, the whole bonds of union that bind armed
bodies of men together, may become relaxed, and the whole
machine incapable of putting out its force when called on.
Modern fighting is not loose although it may be indivichial.

We must contrast the expressions '"individual" with that of "close" gcherff
order. We mean by the latter that formation of troops when each man has a
fixed place which he must not leave, while by the former we mean a formation
that assigns each man his place only in a general way, leaving to the man a
latitude within certain limits on his own initiative to modify or alter it.

Perhaps one of the most common and unsuspected causes
of failure in such attacks as that made on St. Privat by the
Prussian Guard is to be found hi the fact that troops are often
trained in confined positions, in barrack squares, or in small
spaces, the effect of Avhich is that the proper distance between
the supports, main body, and skirmishers is not given, but is
reduced to suit the ground ; the result being that in action men

eager to do what is right, do what they liave always seen done,
they act at such moments of intense excitement from instinct
more than from reason, and they do what tliey have done in
peace, forgetting that they are no longer confined by ground.
This is but another instance of the necessity of training men
on large areas.

A further source of failure arises from the fact that at m-
structional drill the long periods required for preparing the
attack are rarely given ; a manoouvi'e, especially if it be one on
a large scale, is looked on too much as a show, too little as
instruction, and the time spent in the preparation of attack in
peace time is rarely one-fourth of what it is in reality ; thus
the tendency on the part of men to act by instinct rather than
reason induces premature attacks.

Habits of action become instinctive : some men may have
undoubtedly peculiar gifts and powers in certain directions.
But there is no talent or gift required in doing things that are
done each day, because men do these things so continually that
the habit becomes second nature, becomes a portion of the men
themselves. This peculiarity of human nature to be governed
by habit should be enlisted as an aid to the man on the field
of battle; far too often, from the circumstances we have tried
to describe, it is allowed to act against the successful result
rather than in its favom*.

But no matter how devoted a skirmishing line may be, and
no matter how gallantly it may be led, it will in a short time
expend its force.

It appears that in action, any body of troops pushed out to
the front, has stored up in it a certain amount of energy, vis
viva, which will carry it forward over a certain space, bo it great
or small. This energy is due to various causes, either the
personal power of the leader, or the inherent pluck of the men ;
but once that distance has been reached, once its energy has
been expended, it can do httle more ; it has a tendency to halt,
consider it has done enough, and look less to the front than
the supports behind it.

This is the moment when those supports must be forth-
coming ; they can see then* own men in front, so far as they
have gone the supports can go ; and the mere natural emula-
tion of men will carry both on fm-ther. Thus it is that the
fight in the front must be mcessantly fed from the rear ; and
hence it follows that the troops first pushed on nmst be com-
posed of a portion of the same body m rear ; gTadually worldng
on in this way, men may reach a point sufficiently near the
enemy to make their fire tell heavily on him ; and what is of
still greater importance, be so close that any attempt at a
change of position on his part, which means a diminution of
fii-e, will enable a forsvard movement to be made, or a greater
number of the supports in a closer formatian, to be brought up.

The fi'ont, therefore, of all attacks must not only be covered

now as formerly by skmnisliers to feel the way and drive back
the enemy's skirmishers, bnt the fight must be fed by continuous
waves of skirmishers pushmg on in advance of one another, and
so passing over the ground swept by lire.

Yet the temlency to converge towards the Redoubt, as tliis goal had wo ICinglake.
closely compressed the assailing mass that its front now hardly outflanked
the piU'ape*,* and all the assailants of the Redoubt were either within the
work or closely gathered round it. They were, perhaps, 2,000 men ; our
soldiera were well inclined to rest and make themselves at home. But they
were only a crowd ; and they, all of them, wise and simple, now began to
learn in the great school of action that the most brilliant achievements of a
disordered mass of soldiers reijuire the speedy support of formed troops ; then,
as it is said, for the fiist time the men cast back a look towards the quarter
from which they might hope to see supports advancing.

Although troops must now light in extended order, — and for
the future, on such lines of closed skirmishers or opened files the
brunt of fighting must fall ; and although small bodies of men,
perhaps rarely exceeduig a brigade, often perhaps a battalion,
must attack definite positions or places, yet it is absolutely re-
quisite that the number of men sent forward must not be sent
in driblets. If a handful of men be pushed on, then another
handful, when the fu-st is beginning to be demoralized or
losing many men, it will simply subject the troops attacking in
such a fashion to be beaten in detail. Such a system is one
that courts disaster. It must invariably be borne in mind that
whatever attack is determined on should be made with a force
sufficient to give a reasonable hope of success, except mdeed in
cases where false attacks or demonstrations for a particular
object have to be made. The first consideration in all mihtary
actions is success. A successful attack always saves hfe, for
the men making it have to cross the shot-swept zone only once.
K beaten they must cross it twice, once in advance and again
when retreating, f Hence the losses caused by employing too
small a force to attack will really be far gTeater than by employ
ing a sufficient number, and these losses will not be confined to
the actual loss in killed and wounded of the actual attackers,
but will infallibly entail demoralization on the army generally,
perhaps a lavish expenditure of life in the future to recover the
lost ground.

Sir John Burgoyne, speaking of the assault of Burgos,
says :—

When the ladders were placed, an officer and 20 men were to advance Field-Marshal
from the cover and mount them, and when they were well up, 20 more were Sir John
to follow them, and so on, until the 200 men were in. By this mode the first Burgoyne.
small party has in fact taken the work by itself without the encouragement of
a close and strong support : and if they do not .succeed, the next party, who
coolly from behind their cover see them bayonetted, are valiantly to jump uj),
and proceed to be served in the same way ; the argument in its favour was,
" Why expose more men that can ascend the ladders, or enter the work at

* About 300 yards.

t This fact cannot be too closely impressed on men; once well under fire it is
much srrfer (o go forward than backward.

" one time, wlien Ly this mode the siipjjnrt is ordered to be up in tiixie, to
" follow the tail of the preceding party close I "

My answer is because large bodies encourage one another, and carry with
them the confidence of success ; because there is more chance of a few brave
men to lead.

The miserable doubting unmilitary policy of small storming parties, on
the plea that, " if we fail we can't lose many men," causes more mischief, loss^
and disgrace than any other proceeding in war.

These words, though referring to assaulting parties at sieges,
are just as true of all attaekiug parties. The point is to deter-
mine of how many men "a suffieient number" really consists?

The answer to this is to be found l)y considering that the
attacking force must move over rough ground at a rapid pace,
and muist be able to load and to keep ujj a continuous hre. Can
this be done with a deployed line ? Assume a battalion 800
strong in line, advancing for 250 or 300 yards over rough
ground, how many men would be squeezed out of the ranks,
doubled behind one another, or placed in such situation tliat
they could only fire in the air? In the advance of the Light
Division on the l(j-gun battery at the Ahna, the men were eight
and ten deep, the leading men only could fire, and thus the
attackers were deprived of a large number of nfles, and those
that could be used were not so efficiently used at they might
have been if there had been more room. The subject is very
clearly dealt with in the following extract : —

Scherff, Experience has demonstrated that the principle hitherto considered-

important of reinforcing a line of skirmishers only little by little, is more
dangerous, and costs more men, than the use of a, suthcieut force fi'om the
moment the troops are within easy range.

The moment this new rule is substituted for the old one, the questioa
arises, " What is meant by a sufficient force >. " Taking into consideration the
increase of the defensive power, we may rejjly, us many men as the ground will
permit to be placed in line, so that they may use their iveapons ej)ieicntly. In
order that the j^reparation for the attack may be really efficacious, that is to
say, that it may shattei- the enemy both jjhysically and morally, the chief
conditioji is that it should continue uninterruptedly from the beginning to the
end ; if the final assault follows the cessation of lire only after the lapse of
some time, the tire may have materially weakened the defenders, but as for
moral effect, in so far as good troops are concerned, it will have died out, and
on the other hand, the moment the attacking tire ceases, either really or appa-
rently, the spirits of the defenders rise.

Now, with the tirearms in use, the action of each man may be considered
to be continuous, and since each man, to use his rifle freely, requires one yard
and a half of space, it follows that the maximum number of men, that can be
placed in the line of skirmishers, should not exceed one man per yard and a
half. At this period of the action there is nothing to be considered but the
develoi)ment of fire. Every man in the skirmisher line who on account of a
want of space cannot take his share of the tiring is absolutely hurtful, at the
same time that he inci'eases uselessly the chances of loss.

It is desirable to determine what ought to be the extent of the front of
attack of a given number of men. We liave already pointed out that it is-
desirable to continue the prejjaratory fire uninterruptedly from the moment it
begins until the moment for the actual assault arrives, it becomes requisite ta
fix the exact time when the preparatory fire should begin. The object of
preparing the attack is to shatter the enemy ; the moment when this pr-epara-
tion can begin, must be that when the attacking troops will be sufficiently

near to make their fire tell heavily. With the arms at present used this dis-
tance will be when the att;iokers are altinit* 400 to 200 yards from the place
where the Hue is to be pierced. It follows froui human nature itself that the
best troops in the world can sustain such a heavy and uninterrupted fire for
only a few minutes, the defendei-s being iussumea as good troops, and as well
amied as the attackers. Leaving out of consideration the actual losses, which
rarely bear any proportion to the number of rounds firsd, the effect on the
nerves is such that iu a short time some decisive action must follow so great
excitement.

As regards the attackei-s, although it must be conceded that tlie defenders,
despite the advantage of the situation, have less moral 2>ower than the at-
tackei's, and are more disposed to retire, yet they cannot do so until after the
lapse of some short time during which some impulse may carry the attackers
(skirmishing line) forward or backward.

In either case the main body, whose function it is to carry the position,
must arrive exactly at the moment, or rather a little before, to support the
skirmishing line, who without this support would be quite incapable of making
the final assault.

It is evident that the main body is naturally interested in not closing on
the skirmishing line, who have been preparing the attack, that is to say, of
not entering into the zone where they will experience heavy losses, until the
fire of the skirmishing line has acted for a certain time, a length of time
which, if possible, ought to be prolonged until the moment when the crisis
arrives.

Until that moment the main body should remain as much as possible out
of the zone rendered dangerous by the enemy's fii-e. This main body must
then fulfil two distinct and contradictory conditions, and from an examination
of these conditions we may deduce the distance which should exist between the
skirmishing or i)reparatory line, and the troops who have to complete the
business.

Experience has shown during tlie recent war that, when there is a rapid
tire on both sides, such as we have jiist described, that it cannot be prolonged
more than five minutes before a crisis arrives. Hence we arrive at the con-
clusion that the main body must not be further from the skirmish or prepara-
tory line at the moment it begins to act than about 500 yards. If the ground
is perfectly open, the main body can only reach this distance about the time
that the quick fire begins in front of it.

But then, although even if it follows the line of skii-mishers at 300 yards
distance, it is requisite to have an intermediate line between it and the skir-
mi.sher line, which, in accordance with the principles we have just enunciated,
should be extended at one yard to a yard and a half intervals. Further, a
line of skirmishers advancing, as we have supposed, cannot advance to effective
range without suffering losses, perhaps very heavy losses ; if then the prepara-
tory fire is to be continued without interruption, there must be at hand a
support with which to fill up the gaps.

According as the ground offers shelter, more or less good, to approach the
enemy, this support or intermediate line ought to be stronger or weaker ; it
may, however, be admitted, as a practicable principle which is justified by
experience, and accepted in all theories, that the support should vary from
one-half to the whole number of the skirmishei-s. Now, in addition to these
two bodies, which from the beginning we may consider as acting on the offen-
sive, and which really both serve only to prepare the attack, it is absolutely
requisite to have a third force or main body at least equal to the other two.

From the digression we have made to describe the various phases of the
attack, we are again led to our first question, " What is to determine the
extent of front to be given to a fixed number of men ? "

The distance may be arrived at as follows : one-half or two-thirds of the
whole force as main body, and one-half or one-third as preparing the attack,

* This is with needle guns of course. The distance with an improved rifle
would perhaps be greater.

one-half of the last number spaced at one yard to one and a half yards, will
give tlie required front.

Oi-, in other words : if we take a battalion of 1,000 men, it will, caclres
and absent men beinff deducted, put 800 rifles on parade. Hence the normal
front of such a battalion in open ^rround should not exceed 300 yards ; there
being 200 rifles to prepare the attack, 200 in sui)p(jrt, to fill up ga])s, and 400
aa the main body.

It is very desirable that the reason ^vhy extended order
offers a protection from ainwd fire should be clearly understood,
and the distinction in this respect between close and individual
order as regards aimed fire is clearly put in the following ex-
tract : —

Col. GaMler Because the more open order invites the more direct oi- even divergent

fire, i.e., less intense fire ; the close order, as the men form an object, invites
the convergent or more intense fire. Thus, if 100 men in line are firing at 25
advancing towards them, the fire will be convergent or intense '\i the 25 are
formed in a body ; but if the latter extend themselves, say four ])aces, they
will occupy a front rather wider than the enemy. They then ofl'er no special
attraction, and therefore invite a direct or less iutense fire. One great safe-
giuu-d for those exposed to aimed fire is to equal the enemy's front.

"It has been said that the troops first pushed on must be
composed of a portion of the same tactical body as those im-
mediately in rear." Page 78.

This immediately brings up the question. What is meant by
" lines " ? It has been seen that Frederick formed his army in
two lines, each three deep, and that at the Alma the English
advanced in two lines, two deep, Avith a reserve.

From a two-deep line it is impossible to feed a fight or sup-
port the skirmishers, for a two-deep line is little more than a
compressed line of skirmishers. Hence the word " first line,"
" second line," must not be taken as meaning either a line of
skirmishers or two-deep lines, but the troops actually fighting in
the front line ; and if a brigade of three battalions be taken as
an example, one battalion skirmishers, one in support, in two
columns of half battalions, and one again behind it at a further
distance, collectively the whole form the first Ime, the General
Ofiicer's command extending from front to rear, over a far
greater extent of ground than formerly.

Although from the fact that the breech-loader enables the
same amount of fire to be procured from a much smaller
number of men than lormerly, or in other words, enables a
smaller number of men to occupy a given space than formerly,
it may follow that the front occupied by a brigade of three
battalions, formed in some .nich way as described above, may be
quite as great as formerly.*

The second luie of troops may be formed, until required, in
almost any formation that may be best suited for the ground
and most convenient. The action of the General Officer Com-
manding a Brigade or Division can no longer be that of accom-

* Such a method of fovniatiou is by no means suggested as a good one, it iflonly
intended os an illustratiun of a cliange.

E allying a line in its aclvaiico, which he can from its length
anlly supervise; he must watch the action of the troops in
front, and support them by ordering up fresh men from the rear
Continually it has been shown, that ground is won to the front
by some company officer who has taken advantage of the folds
of the ground, and pushed up where he is sheltered from fire, or
where the artillery and rifle fire has told heavily and conse-
quently reduced the number of defenders and shaken their
morale, and has so foiuid an opening somehow where he can
enter.

Generally the skirmishert<, the moment they saw that a superiority wan
gained on a certain point, rushed to it from all directions, and concentrated
their tire on it.

Watching for these movements the Brigade Commander can
push up fresh troops to keep the ground already won, and
support the troops who have Avon it.

The more the different parts of an army have a disposition to fight
separately the greater will be the strength of hand required to hold them
together and arrange matters so that all the unchained power, instead of
following their own ideas ecceutricall)^ and without plan, shall finally work
towards a point fixed upon by the eye of the Commander. A mere mechanical
leading will produce no result, because the leader would then not understand
how to use his precious instrument ; a faulty leading is still worse, for it would
ruin it.

This loose individual mode of attack requires a counterpoise which must
be twofold ; the first and most important is the Commander-in-Chief, who
remains out of the i-ange of fire. He watches over and has by him a strong
reserve to reinforce the front line, when requisite. The other counterpoise is
the officer commanding the front line, whose essential duty it is to execute all
necessary movements in the same.

The necessity of woi-king the first or fighting line, so that it
shall have in itself and under its own commander, a body
which may serve as a support and reserve, is all the more
requisite, as any sudden action on the part of the enemy, the
sudden advance of troops of all arms, the bringing up of a
reserve, or some unexpected action on the flanks, may suddenly
drive the fighting line back, if it be not at once supported ; if
the commander has nothing in hand to steady the fight, the
support fi-om the second line can hardly arrive in time ; hin-ry-
ing up from the rear it can hardly re-establish, although it may
renew the fight, and the probability is that what has been won
already Avill be lost and have to be again fought for : fortunate
if the retiring line does not throw the advancing troops into
confusion.

Many are the instances in war when a part of the defensive position of an
army, ranged on a long line, has been for the moment carried ; but the success
not being properly followed by support, or the defenders having brought up
reserves more quickly than the assailants, the latter have been cast out again
perhai)s with heavy loss. Such was the fate of the advance of Junot's corps at
Busaco, after it had fairly penetrated the English position on the west ot the
hilL No less unfortunate was the issue of the l:)old attack made by the centre
of the allies on Napoleon's works at Di'esden, although it succeeded for a time.
But as striking an instance of the uselessness of this kind of temporary advan-

G 2

MilitariBche
Gedanken
und Betrach
tungen.

Tactical
retroBpect.
Captain May.
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

Campaign in

Virginia.

Cheeney.

tage occurred more recently at the hill held by the allies at Inkermann. There
a Russian battalion having crowned the heights unopposed, at an unguarded
point, deployed, halted, and melted away again down the slope, without any
Ijressure, being timid and distrustful of their advantage from sheer want of
su|)port.
K'nglake We saw that wliilst the Grenadiers and the Coldstreams were still forming

under the bank, the battalion called the Scots Fusilier Guards had been
hurried forward by the appeal from the troops, then still clinging to the
Redoubt, had incurred the tire of the Vladimir column, and had aftei-Avards
encountered a mass of our men retreating, which broke the formation of its
left companies by sheer bodily force, and compelled them to fall back in
disorder.

Napier. In the excitement of success the English guards followed with reckless

ardour, but the French reserves of infantry and dragoons advanced, the
repulsed men faced about, the batteries smote the guards in flank and front
so heavily they drew back, and at the same time the Germans being sorely
pressed, got into confusion. Hill and Campbell stood fast on the extremities
of the line, yet the British centre was absolutely broken, and fortune seemed
to incline to the French. Suddenly the 48th, led by Colonel Donellan, was seen
advancing through the vast disordered ma.'ises, which seemed sufficient to
carry it away bodily ; but wheeling back by companies, that regiment let the
crowds pass throvigh, and then resumed its pi'oud and beautiful line. Then
the Guards and Germans rallied. In all actions there is a critical moment,
which will give the victory to the General who knows how to seize it. When
the Guards first made their rash chai-ge, Sir Arthur foreseeing the issue of it
had ordered the 48th do^vvn from the hill. These dispositions gained the day.
The British became the strongest at the decisive point.

The first or fighting fine must then be formed so that it
carries its own reserve or support with it, and when spoken of
as the first fine, it is not to be regarded as a deployed hne of
infantry.

From what has been said, it appears therefore that the for-
mation most suitable for the attack is one which, while occupy-
ing a front quite as long as that formerly held by a deployed
line, will do so with fewer men, and will give commanding
officers means of feeding the front, or in other words, the area, of
action of a commanding ofjicer icill be as long and far deeper than
formerly/.

And it also follows that the skill and intelligence of indi-
vidual officers of every grade, more especially their aptitude for
seizing favourable places for an advance, are now of more value
than they have ever been in war.

The foregoing are the general principles on which the forma-
tion of troops for an attack should be made. But it is manifest
that there can bo no definite or determinate rule laid down, the
words of Jomini, quoted at page (50, must be borne in mind, and
"the fatal tendency to systematize," to seek for "absolute
forms," and " to cast all tactical formation in one mould," must
be struggled against.

To recapitulate, it appears generally that troops foi-med for
attack, should be formed in at least three bodies, and that
these bodies should under one direction work for one object,
and be closely linked together, and be of such strength, that
each shall be a considerable force. It is evident iviiJe page 5)

that a company is tar too small a body to be so split up, lieuci'
the battalion miiHt be taken as the attacking- miit if any real
Avork has to be done. AVe thus arrive at tlu; formation of a
skirmishing line, a supporting line, and a main body. Taken
together these three form the first line.

It further appears that the men placed in the skirmishing line
should be extended so as to diminish loss, increase accuracy and
rapidity of fire, while at the same time a heavy and destructive fire
is maintained. The functions of the skirmishing line l)ehig to
crush and overwhelm the enemy with bullets. The object of
the supports being to fill up gaps among the skii-mishcvs, and so
sustahi the intensity of their fire. The duty of the main body
being to advance the moment the enemy is sufficiently shaken,
and drive him out of his position.

The distance between these three bodies must be governed
partly by the work they have to do, partly by the trajectory of
the arms in use^ partly by the ground ; to effectively support
the skirmishers, that is to say, to be able to feed them with
fi-esh men, the supports should be about 200 to 250 yards in
rear. The main body must be able to cross the interval that
divides them from the skirmishers in about five minutes, or they
must be 500 to (iOO yards off. And consistent Avith the due per-
formance of these functions the supports and main body may be
in any formation that from the shape of the ground, or other
circumstances, will protect them best fi-om loss, whether that
formation be extended order, line, or columns, and they must
change fi'om one formation to another as quickly as possible.
The principles which govern the formation of troops for attack
can only be given, their application must depend on the know-
ledge and abihty of the Commander in adjusting his formation
to suit the ground he is working over.

Thus the more cover there is, to take advantage of, naturally
the smaller will be the loss, and consequently the supporting-
body, Avhose function is to supply the losses of the skirmisliers,
may be reduced, and the length of the skirmishing line increased,
at the same time that the intervals between the lines may bo
diminished. But the original question embraced more than the
formation of the troops. It was, How^ shall the shot-sw^ept zone
be crossed?

Putting irregularities of ground out of consideration, this
zone is swept by fire of different kinds, in different places —

1. The artillery fire which may be said generally to begin
at about 2,500 yards.

2. The unaimed or random fire of the infantry which

may begin to tell at about 1,100 yards,
o. The' aimed fire of the infantry, Avliich will begin to tell
at about (500 to 700 yards.

Artillery employed in defending a position do not fire so
much on advancujg infantry in the early stage as on the attack-

Tellenbach.
(Translated
by Robinson.)

ing artillery, in addition to Avliich tlic actual loss by artillery fire
is in action comparatively small, bein^ from -^V^''^ ^^' tV^^^ *'^ ^^^®
loss caused by the musketry fire.* Hence it may, speaking in
general terms, be disregarded.!

The unaimed infantry fire produces many losses, but it
appears that the effects of such fire may be mitigated by
observing where it falls most, and avoiding those places.

Projectiles must not be considered only in relation to their mark, they
sweep and command the battle-field. There are cert;iin portions in the shot
sphere, varying in situation and with time, where the shot fall more or less
thickly ; and we can partly gather from general rules, and jjartly (jb.^^erve those
■where they fall least thickly. Therefore, ajjart from the question of increasing
the difficulty of aiming, there are means even on the open plain of lessening
the effect of the enemy's fire. These means consist in the attitude of the
men, the formation of the troops, the selection of the jjosition to I'enuiin in, of
the direction, and the manner of advancing, and they vary with circum-
stances.

The fire that causes heavy losses, and checks advancing
troops, is undoubtedly the aimed or directed fire of infantry.
The sooner and the quicker the space between, where the
deployment of the troops takes place, and the enemy's position
is crossed the better ; but if crossed at the double, one of the
objects of the skirmishing line, crushing the enemy with bullets,
Avould not be accomplished, hence, such a method of advance,
even if it were possible to run o^'er the 2,()()() yards without
stopping, would be undesirable. But it seems desiral)le that the
first 1,000 yards should be crossed Avithout firing, and as rapidly
as possible. It will be shown hereafter, that the attacker's
artillery usually fires on the enemy's infantry, not on his
guns, hence, until the attacking troops reach the zone of danger-
ous mfantry fire, or aliout 1,100 yards from the position, if
possible they shoidd advance witliout firing, and as cpiickly as
they can without being disordered, once the dangerous zone of
infantry fire is reached, not only will they begin to sufter, but
the power of inflicting loss on the enemy by means of their
own fire begins, and about this stage of the advance the skir-
mishers must begin to fire. How should they then advance ?
Bearing in mind that the fmu-tion of the skirmishing line is to
keep up a continuous rain of shot on the enemy, and exj)ose
themselves as little as possible, or to develope the offensive
power of the breach-loader, while reducing the destructive
effect it has when used on tiie defensive. Bearing this in mind,
it appears that the advance may best be made in a succession
of short rushes, lying down, firing rapidly, and again running
on, as described at page 73. This manoeuvre may be performed
in several ways ; the whole line may so act, or alternate men

* At Gravelott.e, wliere the French were in position, 94 per cent, of the Prussian
killed and wounded was from infantry fire, 5 per cent, from artillery, and 1 percent,
from bayonet, sabre and lance. At Fredericksburg the Northern loss was about
78 per cent, by infantry fire.

f At 2,200 yards the guns in the English service will strike a deployed lino of
infantry once in three rounds, once in 10 rounds at 3,300 yards.

may so act, or altcruato portions, sections, subdivisions, or
companies may so act. The first method entails the disadvan-
ta^-e of there behig a time, however short yet a small appre-
ciable time, "vvhen the hre ceases.

The second method has this objection, that the party in
advance are sure to mask the lire of" those in rear more or less, and
that soldiers are peculiarly apt to be discourag-ed by losing men
from their comrades' fire and that the men are apt to get out of
hand, and the ofKcers find their control reduced.

The rush forward of a portion of an extended line invariably
di'aws the enemy's attention, and con8e(piently his fire on that
portion; this is the moment for the other portion to seize and
rush on too, hence there is an advantage in the alternate advance
of portions.

It appears therefore advisable to adopt the third method,
the alternate advance of fractions. But hi what fractions? In
such fractions as are best adapted to the ground, and are of
such a nature as to constitute a definite command ac(.'Ustomed
to work together, and are led by an officer whose position gives
hiui influence with the men. If the formation of the British
battalion be considered, by which two companies, a double com-
pany, or about 250 to 200 men \dll be in the skirmishing line,
this alternate advance may be made by companies, each company
being then led and cnnnnanded by the officers who know the
men individually.

For what distance should these rushes be made ? They should
be of such a length that the men should not be exhausted and out
of breath after making them, even when the distance is run over
as rapidly as possible ; for tliis reason, it would appear that these
rushes should not exceed about (30 yards, but should be adjusted
so as to obtain cover ; if cover exists, the rush should be from
cover to cover. Before advancing, the officer commanding the
body about to make the rush should select the place he is going
to, point it out to his subordinates, and at a given signal (a shiiU
whistle is the easiest to hear) he should dash to the front, his
subaltern and men following ;* on getting into his new position
he will get liismen undercover as quickly as possible, kneeling,
lying down, or standing, as may best cover them, and will open fire
at once, and fire steadily and deliberately until the company on
his flank is rushing, when he should fire a few rounds as quickly
as he possibly can, to cover its advance.

It should be a standing rule that when any body of skirmishers
is rushing to the front, those on its immediate flank should fire
rapidly to cover its advance and reduce the effect produced by
the cessation of its fire.

From the foregomg, it would appear that about 2 companies
would form the supports and 4 companies the main body. It

* An officer, or a steady non-commissioned officer, should be left to see that the
mon follow.

is the function of the supports to fill up the gaps in the skinnish-
ing line, hence, companies must get mixed up together, it is
perfectly impossible to prevent it. }h\t it is possible, by careful
training, to obviate, or rather to mitigate, the e^^ls that may ensue
The Emperor of Germany has recently issued an order on this
subject, of which the following is an extract : —

n^v I'^'l'' The foreffoing general principles are intended to meet the requirements of

1 s^a^^ ' ' ^^^^ tactics of the jjresent day ; I ninst however Innng piominently to notice,

that in training comijanies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, according to
Sections 43, 88, i)8, 99, 112 to 115, and 130 of tlie Field Exercise, particular
care must be taken that the fretjuent disjjcrsiou and development of strong
lines of skirmishers, which is demanded by the present mode of Avarfare, may
not lead to a pernicious loosening of the tactical connection. This danger can
alone be met by great intimacy on the })art of officei-s with battle formation,
and by a high state of discipline in action and in tiring, combined with a
thorough and strict system of drill. In thus making increased demands on
the ti-ainiug of the infantry, I will also give relief, by abolishing some of the
formation in the field exercise, and putting restrictions on others.

Various proposals have been made to obviate the mixing up of
companies in the skirmishing line.* One of these is that each of
the four companies forming the skirmishers and supports should
be formed in column of sections, and that the feeding of the skir-
mishers should be carried out by each company feeding its owu
leadmg sections.f

It is manifest that the objection to this arises[from the fact that
each company will thus be about 200 to 300 yards deep, and sup-
posing it to consist of 100 men extended at one yard and a half
interval, its front section will cover 35 yards, or each captain will
have his command scattered over a wide area — too wide to allow
liim to lead in front, command in the centre, and judiciously
support from the rear. Further, the skirmishers Avould want that
cohesion which having whole companies in fi-ont gives ; and a
similar difficidty would occur with supports. Each hne must have
a definite commander and leader, and removing the captain from
the skirmishers removes the nerve from the place where it is
most wanting. But, it may be argued, if the captain is Idlled
the nerve is wanting. Hardly so, for the subaltern then com-
mands the skirmishers as captain on his own responsibility, not
as the subordinate of another, Avhich is a very difterent thing.

Companies icill get mixed up. Long-range weapons compel
an advance in extended order for long distances, and do what
officers may, men under such circumstances, exposed to a heavy-
fire, do get out oi' order. There is no use blinking this fact ; it is
impossible that it can be otherwise, so long as human beings
possess different physical and moral endowments. Some men
will be eager and anxious for the work, others -will hang back,

* This subject is dealt with more in detail in Appendix I, when describing the
new Italian infantry tactics.

t It should be understood that this proposal to skirmish by sections, is one
that meets with support, and the best method of formation, whether by sections or
companies, is an open question, ride Appendix, Italian formationsj for a further
statement of both sides of the question.

antl tlieir courage gradually oozoa^vay. Some can bo influenced
by example and encouragement, others cannot ; some art- stronger,
and better able to keep up than others, consequently -we must
expect such a mixing up of coni})anics amongst the skirmish-
ing line. It is better to foresee aud provide by training that an
evil which will take place may be as little of an evil as possible,
than attempt to guard against -what all experience shows cannot
be guarded against. No army ever went into action with bettor
drilled or steadier troops ihan the English did at the Alma ; they
Averc the results of years of careful drill and the finest and most

} perfect regimental organization and system that any army ever
lad, and yet what was the force that first carried the battery at
the Alma but a mob, composed of various regiments, biigades,
and divisions mixed up together, and such must ever be the ease
where a rapid advance under a heavy fire is made by a body
of troops for any distance. When line formations Avere intro-
duced into the British army, advances under fire, of the length of
that made at the Alma, Avere unknown, being quite needless ;
but even in the Peninsula, with the short distances there moved
over, such mixing up of companies Avas recognised as an CA'il
to be mitigated, but still one that Avould exist. The wisdom of
introducing any complication Avith the object of preventing
companies being mixed, is at least questionable.

The principles on Avhich troops should be formed, and Avhich
go^'ern their adA^ance, being such as liaA'e been described, it is de-
sirable to endeaA'our to realise as clearly as possible the circum-
stances mider Avhich, and the reasons Avhy an attack is at the
present day possible.

At a distance fi'om the enemy's position, A-arying according to
the nature of the ground, aud the state of the atmosphere, but
perhaps lying A^'ithiu the limits of 2,500 to 3,000 yards, troops
Avill have to deploy and quit the close order in which they have
preA'iously been formed. Noio an attack on an enemy j^Tfisvpposes
a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made* War,
whether viewed tactically or strategically, is but the art of being
the strongest at the right place at the right time. This superiority
of force may be numerical, moral, or local, or it may be composed
partly of all three, but for an attack to have a reasonable hope
of success, the attackers at the point the attack takes p)lace must
he superior.

NoAv, Avhen the first deployment takes place, the attacker's
infantry' Avill suffer but slightly from artillery tire. But the assail-
ant's artillery Avill shake down the Avails of A'illages, farms, or
houses in which the defenders are posted, thus driving the infantry
out. Their artillery will consequently become the object for the
defender's guns to fire at, as it Avill be stationary, or only
adA'ancing occasionally, and in masses of several batteries.

* To obtain tliis superiority is one of the chief objects of the maniruvrcs that
precede the actual collision of armies.

The frontal
attack of
Infantry.
(Translated
by Colonel
NcAvdegate.)

Scherff.

Hence the infantry Avill, in this tlie first stage, snffer bnt Httle
from the direct or aimed hrc, altliough a few losses may be occa-
sionedjby stray shots. As the infantry advances,fa hxrg-e portion
of the artiUery will advance also, not together, but l^y alternate
batteries, or brigades of batteries, so that a fire will be always
kept up. It will probably advance thus, until it gets near tu the
extreme range of the infantry fire, or about 1,200 to 1,400 yards
from the enemy's position. The moment the first or skirmishing
fine of the infantry comes near enough to the enemy's position to
become a mark for its aimed or direct fire, say about (300 to 700
yards, the troops in rear, that is to say, the supports and main
body, will suft'er but little, except fi-om the unaimed or random
fire. It is desirable that this point should be clearly undei-stood.
The fire of the assailant's artillery and the fire of his skirmishmg
line Mall have the effect of drawing on them both the enemy's
artillery and infantry fire, and hence it becomes possible to bring up
the main body in a much closer formation than is often supposed.

When the skirmishers are once involved in a fii-e action with the enemy,
close detachments can come forward with insigniticant losses. On the 19th
January, at St. Qniutin, two companies 1st Ehenish Infantry Regiment,
No. 70, upon the right wing of the 16th Division, were brought forward to
protect the batteries of the division from the enemy's infantry tire. One zug
of each company was sent out to skirmish with two close zlige following in
support at 100 paces ; these suffered heavy losses at a distance of 800 yards
Avhile passing over a hill, one-sixth of the effective state in a very few minutes.
On the other hand, the two remaining companies of the battallion which were
brought over the same height an hour later hardly suffered at all, although
no change had taken place in the French position. The attention of the
French was now completely directed upon the fire action at a distance of
about 400 paces.

Now here is one of the strong points of the attack, and vice
versa one of the weak points of the defence. The defenders, do
what they will, instinctively fire on the troops that are doing
them an injury and consequently the main body of the attack
escapes, or nearly escapes, from all but the imaimed or stray
shots that have missed the skirmishing fine. Hence in every
attack the fire both of the artillery supporting the attack, and of
the infantry skirmishing line, must be continuous, carefully directed
and brought to bear on the portion of the enemy's position Avhere
an entrance is to be forced.

From this moment Cthe first deployment) until that of the actual col-
lision, the attackers ai-e exposed to the fire of the defenders, and they may be
struck liy two classes of ]irojectiles, those which strike the mark, and those
■which miss the mark and do injury by chance.

This circimistauce has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the various
essays and theories that have been put forward by various wTiters, it deserves
to be most carefully considered, if the questions regarding the formation of
troo])s are to be resolved.

The artillery and in a short time the infantry of the defenders becomes
the object of the attackers fire. It follows that their fire will be diverted from
that ix)rtion of the attacking force which composes the main body (or the
true assaulting party). The more the troops charged with the preparation of

the attack succeed in drawing on thenisflves the defenders fire, tlie better they
will do their work ; a defence jnoperly eondiieted will seek not to Ix' so led.

Btit it cannot helj) itself, it may jierhaiis avuid the direction of all its fire
on the skinnisliing line, and may direct a ])ortion on the suj)])orts and the
Iwitteries. But the tiie on the main body will he nnich diminished, and
its action ou it will be merely accidental. If on the one hand the fire of the
defenders does ni)t cheek the iulvanced or skiiinishing line of the attiickera,
it will be ilestroyed by its fire (united to that of the atticking artillery). If
on the otiier the defenders concentrate their fire on the skirmishing line, they
indirectly facilitate the advance of the main body of the attickers.

Anil this is the dilemma on which the jiossibility of attick maiidy rests.
Aud hence the necessity of giving the troops ejigagetl in jjreparing the way a
consiilerable force.

AVe ct)nsider that the most advanced portion of the attacking troops will
thus become the mark of the defender's fire, and the main body will thus
receive a far less efiiciicious fire, that of random projectiles.

But no lire, however lieavy, Avell- directed, and continuous,
will drive good troops out of a position. A lieavy cross-fire of
musketry aud artillery may shake the morale, and disorg-anise
tlie defenders, may kill and wound many, may induce many of
the less brave individuals to seek some excuse to leave the
position either by assisting wounded men to the rear; or other-
wise, but still the men whose heart is in the work, the really
brave men, will remain to fight it out. So long as they have
amnmnition these men will hold their position, and it is only
the actual advance of .nvpeiior uiDnbers that will finally compel
them to retire. It is not meant that they will remain to be
bayonetted. But they will not go until the forward rush of the
main body of the assailant warns them that two hostile bodies of
men cannot stand on the same piece of ground. Hence all fire
must be looked on as paving the way for the object of getting
possession of the enemy's position, and in this resjjoct modern
weapons have made no dift'erence Avhatever ; a formed body of
the assailants must be placed in the enemy's position and must
maintain themselves there, in order that victory may be achieved.
The attack of an enemy's position is based entirely on the science
of the attack of a fortress. A mass of artillery fire is concentrated
on certain points ; under cover of that fire the infantry advance
until checked by uifantry fire. Again, the infantry fire is sub-
dued by the infantry fire added to the artillery fire of the
attackers, a breach is made in the enemy's position, and through
that breach a formed body of men is pushed, who make a lodge-
ment there. Such in general terms is the attack of a fortress,
snch in general terms is the attack of a position, with this
difference, the former is the work of days, the latter that of
hours. The necessity of bringing up a sufficiently strong body
formed, in hand and under control, to drive out the defenders,
occupy theu- positions, and reap the results of the fire, is manifest,
and the question arises : How shall this body be l)rought up ?
It must conform more or less to the movement of the skirmishers;
at what thstance from them should it be, and in wdiat formation ?
The answers to these questions have been generally given at

page 85, but it i.s desiiable to state the case somewhat more in
detail.

The three distinct zones of fire, through whicli troops must
pass in moving to tlie attack, have been ah'eady described ;
these zones, or rather the nature of the fu'c in these zones, must
govern the formation of the main body.

When entering the zone of artillery fire, which may be said
to begin at from 2,500 to 3,000 yards, from the enemy's guns,
the main bodies should be so formed as not to offer a mark
sufficiently large to induce the enemy to turn his guns on them.*
This formation will probably be found to be that of half-battalion
(juarter or double-company columns, at deploying intervals or
perhaps somewhat less, as many men will be lost during the
advance, and the number of men per yard thus diminished.

The great object of the defence is to retard the attack, and
as the attacking artillery will at this, the first stage, be partly
in action, partly moving up Avith the skirmishing hue, the
defenders must, if this force be, as it should be, a powerful one,
direct all their attention to it and not to the main body. Formed
in such a way, and kept at from 550 to 650 yards behind the
skirmishers, the main body may advance and experience but
little loss. On arriving at from 1,200 to 1,400 yards, the unaimed
fire of the infantry Avill begin to tell ; beyond this point, the
guns cannot advance, and at this point the formation of the
main body may be again extended. But at this stage the ex-
tension Avill not reduce the actual loss so much as the moral
effects of those losses.
Bclierrf. ^^ ^Ijjg stage (the second zone), if the artillery of the defence does not

direct its attention exclusively upon the artillery and troops engaged in pre-
paring the attack, it will begin to direct a portion of its lire on the main body,
which will then receive fire of two kinds, aimed and random. The whole
gi'ound will thus be swept by a nearly evenly divided fire, the effect therefore, un-
less the attackers be verybadly handled, and so formed as to induce the defenders
to concentrate their fire on certain points, will be nearly the same, no matter in
what formation they are. The more a mass of men is concentrated, the more con-
fidence is given in its force, and the greater the number of men likely to
be able to show a good example. Further, the greater the number of men to
exert this influence, the easier will it be to impress a motive power on the
whole mass. These are the views which in former days fixed columns as the
proper formation for attack, and it cannot be denied that these views are
sound.

But it must be equally admitted that a heavy loss occurring unexjiectedly,
and all at once, demoralises the minds uf men, more than if the siime loss ist
distributed over some time, and in different places. Hence we must con-
clude that the more a mass of men is disseminated, the less it will require
examples to lead it on. Let us assume a column of 400 men, 20 in front and
20 deep; a shell falling in the middle will knock over 8 or 10 men ; the moral
effect produced will be far greater than if the men were ranged two deep
at two paces interval, and 3 or 4 shells fell at the same time, but at different
places, althoiigh in the latter case the shells might produce even a gi-eater

* It may be most fairly questioned whether troops formed in small columns,
witli iutevTals equal to their front or double their front, are not much safer from
artillery fire than if in line. One shot in three will hit a line of infantry at 2,200
yards, but the probability of striking the small columns is very much less.

loss. Because if the formation be a shallow one, and nioviujf to the front, the
men who fall will 1)e left behind, and the loss will he thus concealed. The
question then is, AVliat front must we, what ilepth can we, give the troo])s uf
tne principal body at this moment ?

The size of the fractions into which tlie main body must now be divided,
must be such that the leader (who ha.s at this stage of the advance to dismount)
can exercise a personal influence, that they can move easily to the front
and yet be sulticiently compact to give the soldier the idea of solidity : this
is found in a front of from 30 to 40 yards, and a depth of G to 8 men. ,

It is important to observe, that in passing through the " unaimed shot Colonel
sphere,"' speed alone can diminish the risk of loss, avoid it or cross the least in- Qawlcr.
tense portion of it, if such be possible, but formation can affect the question in
no way whatever, except as it may affect the speed. Bullets ai'e flying at a given
rate within certain limits, and if all must j)ass through those limits, the indi-
vidual chances are not affectetl by being in company. It would be otherwise
reasonable to assert that a body of men marching in skirmishing order, would
be reached by fewer drops of rain, i.e., would get less wet, than if they jiassed
through at the same pace in column, or that you would get less wet walking
alone in the x'ain, than you would do in company with a friend.

The formation requires to be sucli as Avill enable tlie men to
advance with speed "without being demorahsed; and this
appears to bo more Hkely to be attained by small columns than
by either a line or extended formation.

At the point, tlierefore, that the main body enters the second
zone, at some 1,000 to 1,200 yards from the enemy, the half-
battalion columns, if at quarter distance, at deploying intervals,
or slightly less than deploying intervals, should deploy into
columns of two companies at deploying intervals.

This can be most easily effected if tlie half-battalion columns
have been formed in double-company columns on the centre, as
the right and left Avings can then incline to the right and left
without stopping their advance, moving to a flank diagonally,
by the leading of their officers. It is desirable that the reason
why these small columns are preferable to a line for this purpose
should be clearly understood. A line is the fonnation for firing —
the main body cannot fire, the supports and skirmishers being
in fi-ont of it. It is further requisite to remember that in any
attempt to advance in line over rough ground the inequalities
are proportional to the length of the line. The best drilled
troops in the world cannot advance 300 yards over rough
ground without being disordered — many men being squeezed
out, while the attention of both officers and men is devoted to an
attempt to preserve the straightness of the line and its true
direction. Any one who observes a line of 400 infantry advanc-
ing over rough gi'ound will see fluctuations running through all
its length, and wearing themselves out at the ends ; by splitting
up the line into several portions these fluctuations are diminished,
precisely as bracing a long bar or dividing it into a Qiimber of
short bars reduces its vibration ; and further, the action of such
small columns affords some protection to the weak points — the
flanks.

The action of the supports during the time that elapses from
the troops coming under fire should be now considered.

Scherff.

The duty of the 8\ipport8 is essentially to keep up the fire of
the first line, and fill ^aps. It is not so much for reinforcing
the skirinisliers that they are requisite, the skirmishing line
should originallv consist of a "sufficient number," their function
is to keep that lino up to "the sufficient number," feeding it to
fill up tlie gaps caused by the enemy's bullets. Hencf^ the
officer commanding tlie supports (two companies), must watch
the front, or skirmisliing line, and send up men wlien he sees
they are requisite. The nearer to the skirmisliers the supports
are the more they will suffer, but if too far off they will cease
to act as supports. It appears that the supports will suffer less,
that is to say, they will attract the enemy's fire less if they
advance in small groups; and it would appear desirable that
the two companies forming the supports sliould be formed into
as many sections as there are officers available, that is to say,
each company into two or three sections. The distance at which
the supports are from the skirmishers must be left chiefly to the
officer commanding those supports, but it should rarely exceed
800 yards. As the skirmisliing line advances toAvards the
enemy, and begins to get into the zone of aimed fire, or some
(300 to 700 yards from the enemy, the suj:»ports must be freely
pushed on, and take their places in the skirmishing line, and as
the advance of the skirmishers will, from the fact of their mov-
ing in successive rushes, be someAvhat slower than that of the
supports, the latter will close on them, and the main body Avill
also close somewhat on the supports (as it will experience less
loss, and consequently be less retarded). Vide page 90)

The Commander of the supj^orts must during his advance seek to find
out the places wliere his assistance may be most usefully sent. The best
points for the attack may be found when about 80 to 100 yards from the
enemy.

As the fire is kept up the main body will advance, and when
it comes near the line of supports the latter should rush to the
front and join the skirmishers.

The following rule should be absolute, the moment the main body arrives
near what is left of the line of supports, they shoukl dash to the front and
join the line of skirmishers, in order to give the impulsion requisite to cross
the last and most dangerous zone of all, and finally give the assault.

If an attempt be made to realise the state of afFaii-s at this
period of the attack, it will be seen that the skirmishers, rein-
forced l)y the su}>ports, are within 2r)0 to 300 yards of the
enemy ; that the main body is some 300 yards in rear of the
skirmishers; the divisional artillery perhaps some 1,200 to
1,400 yards oft', supported by a portion of the corps artillery,
the remainder of the corps artillery occupying advantageous
places up to 2,000 yards off, atid all bringing a heavy cross-
fire on the enemy's position ; the second line of troops following
up in rear of the main body of the first line, and perhaps some
500 to 600 3''ards in rear of it, a tremendous fire being maintained
by the now thickened skirmishers, and the whole front covered

with clouds of smoke. SiK-li a state of things cannot last
long ; the skirmishers may get a hundred yards nearer, and the
main body getting closer to them, must prepare to carry the
position ; gnwlually converging, the various porti(m8 of the main
l)ody must push rapidly to the front and drive the enemy out.
While the second line, seeing the advance and hearing the cheers
which accompany it, should })ush rapidly on also, ready to sup-
port the attack, meet the enemy's reserves, and conlirm the
success.

What should the skirmishers do when the main body
advances? The skirmishers, who have borne the heaviest por-
tion of the fighting, will undoubtedly have got much excited,
and heated ; the}' will have beeii brought close up to the enemy's
position, and l)y that time all the men whose heart is not in
the work will have disappeared, officers and men who have
worked through the zones of fire that have been described, who
have seen comrades and friends dropping, will be in such a
state of nervous excitement that the cheer and advance of the
main body will, no matter what orders are given, carry them
to the front. In all likelihood their cartridges are exhausted,
or nearly so, for they have done most of the firing, and the last
few minutes they must fire as fast as they can load and aim.
In addition to which their fire would be completely masked by
the main body advancing in front of them.

The idea of leaving tlie skii'inisliers lying down is contrary to the funda-
mental priucii^le of the attack, which is that all the disposable forces should
be ai)plied, leaving them behind really leads to nothing. This line left behind
cannot lire effectively on the enemy, it cannot collect and reform the debris of
the troops crushed by the enemy's fire, it will have done enough, and suffered
too much arleady to do that. Judging by all experience, what it must do, is to
push on with the rest. To leave it lying down is in the most favourable case
a useless theoretical course to i)ui'sue, generally it will be a dangerous one.

The moment the position is carried every effort must be
made to hold it. The troops should be reformed. A heavy
fire should be poured on the enemy as he retires, and the second
line following rapidly, must endeavour to occupy the ground,
and coming up in regulai* order can do so far better than troops
whoso nerves have been wrought up to the highest pitch of
excitement by a successfid attack.

The troops taking part in an energetically carried out attack are thrown
into the completest loose order. In this state they can certainly still follow up
the axisting object of the fight, but they are unavailable for action iu any
other direction.

The natnre of the attack described is illustrated by plates
XIV.-XVIIL, but although such sketches are useful as giving
expression to ideas, it should be clearly understood as regards
the supports and main body, that there can by no possibility be
any definite or fixed formation. The formation to be adopted
should be entirely suited to the ground, thus one company of
the supports may be in column of sections, another in line, and
after advaucmg 100 yards the formations may be entirely

Scherff.

Frontal
Attack of
Infantry.
(Translated
by Colonel
Kewdegate.)

altered, the company in column being extended, and that
lonnerly in lino now in column : similarly for tlie main bodies.
The plates cannot therefore be taken as recommending any
special formation.

It is perhaps fortunate in one sense for our country that the
direction wliich improvements in tactics are taking, is one pecu-
liarly adapted to the genius and temperament of her people.

For years British troops, formed in Hues two deep, have
met and defeated the best armies in Europe. Extended order h
hut an extension of the two-deep line. Britisli troops have for
hundreds of years been famed for their steadiness and coolness
under fire, the influence of infantry fire is becoming every day
more and more formidable, that influence to a gi-eat extent
depends on tlie coolness of the soldier delivering the fire. The
steadiness of the individual British soldier, his coolness, and
his proverbial ignorance of the time when he is beaten, tend to
make individual fighting simple and natural to him. Further,
the reliance of the British soldier on his officer and his confi-
dence in him, augurs well for the future, when British infantiy
have to meet a foreign enemy.

^^pi<'i*- The habitual French method of attacking in cohimn cannot be praised.

Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians it may have been successful ;
against the British it nuist always fail. The English infantry is sufficiently
firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined to wait calmly in lines for the adverse
masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The
column is good for all movements short of the actual attack, but as the
Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the Roman Legion, so will the close
column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a firm line aided by
artillery. The I'epugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded,
the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of cannon shots, as they
tear open the ranks, produce disorder, especially in the centre of attacking
columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, bewildered by words
of command coming from a multitiide of officers crowded together, can neither
see what is taking place, nor advance nor retreat without increasing the
, confusion.

No example of courage can be useful, no moral effect produced by the
spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often fii'm and even
victorious when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, columns are the
soul of military operations ; in them is the victory, and in them is safety to be
found after a defeat. The secret consists in hiouing when and where to extend
the front.

Bugeaud. The English generally occupied well-chosen defensive positions, having a

certain command, and they showed only a portion of their force. The usual
artillery action first took place. Soon, in great haste, without studying the
position, without taking time to examine if there were means to make a flank
attack, we marched straight on, taking the bull by the horns. About 1,000
yards from the English line the men became excited, spoke to one another and
hurried their march ; the column began to be a little confused.

The English remained quite silent, with ordered arms, and from tlieir
steadiness appeared to be a long red wall. This steadiness invariably pioduced
an cfl'ect on the young soldiers.

Very soon we got nearer, shouting " Vive I'Empereur ! en avant ! a la
baionette ! " Shakos were raised on the muzzles of the muskets ; the column
began to double, the ranks got into confusion, the agitation produced a
tumult ; shots were fired as we advance(K

PLATE XIV.

Fir si Slcige

tSkirmiJiherjf tuv (hniparu'e,9 .

HOC

Supports two (hmpaAjies

M(un Boily /oiir\ (hntpajt^,v

S]armisherZme2SO0 yards fi-ont the. maiit position of the enemy.

^2>.yca.hscbitc fcrmation icr the Supports and Jfain 6od^' ixin be given., they should he exte.rvded
in Une or columns as ma^- be best cbdapted to th/> ground t/i^ are advarwinq over.

PLATE XV.

Seamd Sta^e.

300

Skirmishzr Zirie 1W€ yards franv the' main,
jx/siturru of ttve/ enemy.

^^J^o ahsobite ibrmatwn ^dve- Supports an/lMcun. bcdycanhe gwerudiiy sfwidiLhe eJ:tincljed'
in Tine or ccbuimig, as TTuxy fe best adapted/to the cfroiaici th^' are acUtxnxun^ over.

PLATE XV!

Tlnrd Sia^e

J?. 300.

M kit H

^i' '.

M \ik

SkirnusherjLzn&SOOyarols^fiymt' mcajvpositiowcfiJie. enemy

N.B.JVb ahsolute^fbr^natioTvrfvrtJveSupports ancL Mtun/bodycaavhegwethi they SiouldJjt artgrvded
xn,lin£-orccbujrinjB,a6Tru]ufTyeheM^aJLapted/tot^

/are- ctdAXJuicaig over

PLATEXYII

Four^ Stage.

<:■-

300-

Skirrrvuf7ierZzfL^300^€crds iromrthey
ervemy^ mairv pcsvtiony

Seccivoi Lin£/
SoJf Bocttaihon/ DouMe- Compomy, columns at deploymg Tntervale ^.

H&So aisdute ibrmotion fortJwSuppcri.^ (ULdMocrivhody ccuvhe givavjlh^shxjiitiL }>e extende/i
uilLrworccUaiuhS.(xsrncu^beb€£taxi(ifjte£iU' thecfroutwU f^tey ar& culvajiajig over.

PLATE XVIIl

Pifth Slii^e

3(/0.

N . ^.J^o abschdz -^^muxtuwv ^ ffte-Supnorts anoLMxuv body cart tegixenftheyshouJUi bo &ctended'
irv line arCohanncas ma^ bo best adjxpt£dyto the, grviuicLthey are aji^cutajig over.

1)7

Tlie Euglish line reniaiueil still, silent and ininiovable, with ordered anus,
even when we were oidy ;J0(» paces dist;int, and it appeared to ignore the
storm al)out to break.

The contr;vst wjis striking ; in our inmost thoughts, each felt that the
*uemy was a long time in tiring, anil that this tire reserved for so long, would
l)e very unpleasjint when it did come. Our ardour cooled. The moral power
of steadiness, which nothing shakes (even if it he only in appearance),
over disorder which stupities itself with noise, (overcame our "minds. At this
moment of intense excitement, the English wall shouldered arms, an indescrib-
able feeling rooted many of our men to the spot, they began to tire. The
enemy's steady concentrated volleys swept our ranks ; decimated we turned
round seeking to recover our eiiuilibriuni ; then three de;ifeiung cheei-s l)roke the
silence of our opponents, at the third they were on us j)ushing our disorganized
flight But to oxir great surprise, they did not push their advantage beyond
a hundred yards, retiring calmly to their lines to await a second attack.

The British army, from its tradition and history, is in a posi-
tion better adapted for grasping, and appropriating, the
deveh)pment of taeties caused by the introduction of breech-
loading arms than the army of any other nation. All that is
requisite is to develop and carry out the identical principles
which led the British leaders to adopt a line formation in the
peninsula.

This point is one that must not be lost sight of, the peculiar
genius of a nation invariably comes out on the battle-field, and
it is essential that it should be clearly understood that the
British army, with its historic training, and traditions of
advancing and fighting never more than two deep, possesses
qualifications for modern fighting that the army of no nation
in the world does. As the line was an advance on the column,
giving greater power and effect to improved arms, and pro-
■ducing far less loss than the denser formation, so the extended
line, giving full eftect to the offensive poAver of the breech-
loader, and enabling troops to attack Avith less loss, is an
advance on the two- deep line. An advance which it is much
easier for British troops, who have never fought in columns,
and whose ideas and tactics have always turned on a large
development of infantry fire, to make, than for those who have
bad to step from the deep column to the individual or extended
order at one stride.

We were all astonished at the extraordinary firmness with which the red Choda
jackets, having crossed the river, opened a heavy fire in line upon the redoubt. Seiwitz.
This was the most extraordinary thing to us, as we had never before seen
troops tight in lines two deep, nor did we think it jx)ssible for men to be found
with suthcient firmness of morale to l)e able to attack in this aj)parently weak
formation our massive columns.

" The terrible English column which, advancing under a
murderous fire in front and flank, all but won the battle of
Fontenoy;" the victories of the British line on many fields,
mark two distinct phases in the tactics of this country ; the
latter being due to a clear appreciation of the effects of improved
anns. Following the same natural development, the individual
order will still further bring out the coolness, the self- rehance,
and courage of the British soldier.

We luive said that the direction tactics arc taking /.s fortunatt^
in one i^euKe {"or this country. It is desirable, however, that a
disadvantagi' should not be lost sight of, speaking in (jeneral
terms ; when we Ibrmerly defeated foreign armies we did so
because the front tif fire we directed against them was larger
than wliat they brought to bear on us, our lineH outjianked their
columns. But now that foreign armies fight wath as wide a
front as we can hope to do, and that extension of tiie front luis
become general in every army, and witli every nation, the small
numerical strength of a British army no longer compensated by
its comparatively Avide front of fire will be felt, and felt severely.
It is manifest that extension of front is limited, that there is a
pomt beloAv which it is impossible to reduce the number of men
per yard of position. That point once reached by the troops
composing two armies, the weaker must always suffer;
although the temperanieut of the British soldier is perhaps
better adapted for individual fighting than that of the soldiei's
of any other nation ; yet modern arms have undoubtedly
placed armies more on a footing of equality' and consequently
given to numbers an element of superiority they previously did
not possess. The greater the effect of the Aveapon the greater
the results produced by putting large numbers of such weapons
in action. Improved arms will undoubtedly enable a small
number of men so armed to resist a large body of men armed
with inferior weapons, but when the weapons are ^of eq;ual
power, then it appears that the cft'ect of numbers must
preponderate.

An unquestionable advantage is possessed by the British
army in its small companies, and consequently the number of
ofBicers in the battalion. It should be remembered that the
Prussian company was the result not so nmch of tactical, as of
economical motives, and that the Prussian army, formed from
the results of universal compulsory service, and education,
possesses an amount of intelligence in the raidvs that other
armies do not, Hence, to follow Prussian customs as regards
companies without following them in other thiugs would be
absurd. It is impossible to adopt one portion of a nation's
customs and ignore the basis on Avhicli the whole superstructure
is built.

Much has been recently said and written of the advisability
of altering the formation of a British, and asshnilating it to that
of a Prussian battalion. To do so Avould be to blindly copy
Prussian customs, and we might just as well copy Prussian
uniforms or Prussian words of command. Undoubtedly there
is much to be obtained by a careful study of the Prussian system,
but that study must be an intelligent fitudy, Avliich Avill enable
us to graft on our own framework Avliat is good, and suitable to
om- peculiar temperament. And the ft)rmation of the Prussian
battalion is not t>nly not suitable to British infantry, but it may

hv fairly (luestioiu'd if it is not one of the woukoBt points of ilie
I'lussiau system, wliicli. on account of the KUccesH attending
I'nissian armies, is so much admired.

Hoas V were the losses with whicli we paid fur our victorious attacks. FriJntal
The (liniiuution of the capitation however is not the onlv consequence of auch ^»^*t'>'<5l^ or
sHnguiuary l)attles. ' ?T kt d

The notion of the excellence of war -seasoned l)attalions h.'us vanished from [ ^^^ _,^
uuv army. According to ifeneial experience, tlie men went into action with '. ■.
the greatest ardour, an'd without dread of the tire, iiiitii they had once suffered "
veiy seveie losses.

Then even the exhilarating consciousness of victory cannot dissipate the
imjjressioii which such .sanguinary experience has made ujwn the spirits of
the troops. AJonths afterwartis this feeling has still not quite disappeared.

It is true that other causes contribute to produce this ; those who had
fallen were just the bravest men, because they exposetl themselves most in the
skirmisher line ; and ahoi'e all tliere were ceri] fexc ojjicers still remaining.*

After these great losses, how would this array have stood
the eftects of a defeat, and consequent demoralising retreat.^
True the losses in this case purchased victory, but it might
have been otherwise. To organise, as if victory were always
certain, is really to organise disaster.

Hence the necessity of not destroying, but modifying, our
existmg arrangements ; the one and only one advantage of a
strong company appears to be that it is a force of sufficient
strength to make an attack. 200 men extended in front of a
battalion Avill give a sufficient force to begin an attack ; 200
more will be sufficient to act as supports ; and each of these
being under one command, form a tactical body accustomed to
work together. But to obtain this advantage it is surely
not requisite to sacrifice the British battalion.

It has been pointed out (page 74) that the use of the breech-
loader enables troops to be more extended than formerly, hence
more supervision is required. The difficulties of command are
consequently greater than formerly. The necessity of proper
leading, of seizing points where cover exists, making them
bases for further advan(^es and getting the men out of covei-
again, are now of the highest importance. These reasons, and
the necessity of foruiing small groups, and seeking with them
to penetrate the enemy's line, clearly demonstrate the advan-
tages of small companies and many officers.

Further, as movements to the dght or left to close-in skir-
mishers, and so make rotjm lor fresh skirmishers coming up to
fill up gaps, would reduce the fire, Cfjmpel men who had won
certain advantageous places to leave them, not to advance on
the enemy, but merely to take gi'omid to the right or left, a
thing very difficult to do with any troops, more especially with
those Uke British troops, j^ossessing, as all Anglo-Saxons do,
a strong individuality, sure to come out under fire ; so com-

* The Prussians lost 1 ofFicor to 8 men at Wisserabom'<i; ; 1 to 20 at Wtierth ;
at Mars-lu-Tour and Graielotte, 1 to 18 or 19- The KJth Kpgiuiont and the Rille
Battalion of the Guard lost all their officers — (G^nenil Zeddelcr).

H 2

100

panies must p;et mixed up, precisely as bngades and even
divisions did at tlie Alma. Hence the move points of support,
and the greater the number of men accustomed to command
and lead, the greater will be the success of the troops.

Officers in action nuist command, not their own companies
only, but any men who they can get together and take
command of.

Bocusliuiski. Ill order to work with tolerable readiness iu such lines of skirmishers as

(Translated ""^e meet now a days in battle, a man should have gone through something
by Grahnni.) like it in peace time. He should have gained as good an idea of this sort of
thing as possible ; he should not merely know by heai-sjiy, but experience in
his own person, that if separated from his own company and unable to rejoin
it, he at once comes under command of the officer who may hajjpeu to be
where he is. He should be prejmred to get quickly at home amongst new
comrades. An ofticer, on the other hand, when he sees stray soldiei-s in action,
should take them under his command, eitlier forming them into a compact
body or leading them into the line of skirniishei-s.

It may, perhaps, be argued that this kind of fighting makes
troops unsteady ; but it may be fairly replied, that unsteady
troops cannot fight as descnbed, that they Avould inevitably get
into confusion and loose their heads. It is only really well-
disciphned, w^ell-commanded bodies of men, which can turn
apparent disorder into real order, and it consequently follows,
that the training and careful intelligent training of trot)ps, is
now more than ever requisite.

The real result of the introduction of the breech-loader is
not to introduce a loose, careless method of action. Its intro-
duction has rendered fighting far more difficult, — rendered it
requisite that much of the care formerly bestow^ed on the
ensemble of a dressed line, or perfect column, should be no"\v
devoted to the individual man, that the knowledge of each
individual, from the general to the private, must be greater than
formerly, while at the same moment the ensemble is still
preserved.

It is often said that, if troops do not change front and
manoeuvi'e under fire, it is needless to teach them more, than
what they do when actually engaged. This is founded cm an
entire misconception of what the duties of troops really are.
These things are but means to an end, and most important
means; for one day's fighting troops have 30 days' marching
and manoeuvring, and the power of marching and manoeuvring
is of the utmost importance, not only as giving that training
which enables the men to be placed in front of their enemies,
but producing that disciphne without which everything else is
useless.

But although men must be taught to manoeuvre, it is essen-
tial that manoeuvre tactics, important as they are, should not
be rated above their proper value, but that fighting tactics
should be practised, and studied, and carefully thought over
by officers. The Emperor of Germany's order of the li'tli
March, 1873, shows cleai-ly the necessity of both fighting and

101

raanocnvro tactics, and as i]\o. farmer have become more difficult,
the Emperor gives *' rehet""' to liis troops hy reducing the hitter.
The ditlcrent kinds of formation in which troops can advaiice best
over ditfcrent kinds of ground, can only be thought out by officers
who keep their minds continually bent on the subject, and who
in default of real experience endeavour to realise the power of
the arms in use and the effect of ground in modifying that power.
By such thought and by study alone can the really difficult
art ot handling troops under fire be acquired, Tactics are often
defined to be and generally considered inferior to strategy, but
for one man who really requires to practice strategy 500 are
needed who can handle troops. The General but gives the order
to attack ; the serious responsibility of making the dispositions
for attack, fixing and modifying the formation of the troops to
suit the ground, so that they shall suffer as little as possible,
rests, and must rest, with the field and company officers ; and
when it is remembered that neglecting to change from a close to
an extended formation at the right moment may cost the lives of
many men, the necessity for careful painstaking study really be-
comes a solemn duty, and a duty that the more it is studied the
more difficult it appears to be. It cannot be too often stated that
there is gTeat danger of officers being induced to consider that
now-a-days anything in the shape of drill is sufficient if the men
only can shoot. The drill book may be made very simple by
leaving out three-fourths of it. But doing so will not render the
soldiers', much less the officers' duties the easier, and it is impor-
tant that those who advocate sweeping reductions in the size of
the drill book, and imagine that when the officer or soldier
has mastered what is contained between its covers, liisi*
education Avill be complete, should remember that the great
difficulty is, the drill book, whatever its size, now, far less than
ever, can be taken as a imle ; it is merely a guide, which points
out the general direction. A knowledge of drill, and the power
of adjusting the formation of troops to ground, is at the present
day more requisite and more difficult than ever it was, and this
fact should be recognised ; and met by a thorough practical
training, on the part of the company officers to adapt not oidy
the formation of companies, but also of small bodies of men to
the ground worked over. Such training is not acquired in a day,
such knowledge cannot be learncil from a drill serjeant, in a
baiTack square or a drill shed, but must be imparted by men,
who have carefvdly and practically worked out these questions,
and it must be taught on diversified ground, of some extent.

Improved arms, far from reducing the labour of the infantry
officer and giving him more time to devote to kindred brandies
of the military art, have really increased it a hundredfold, and
converted what at one time might perhaps have been termed
machine-like action, into what at the present day most certainly
requires study, and ability of no mean order. In instructing
infantry soldiers, a defensive, as well as an attacking party,

l02

however small, should bo nsed, and should continually be
made to chanj^e places, so that each man may see how a forma-
tion altered to suit the ground tends to conceal the attackers
fi'om the defenders, and so reduce loss.

It has been proposed to extend not only the skirmishing line
but the supports and also the main body : advancing- in the latter
case, either in a deployed line or in a line with intervals of one
to tin-ee feet between the men. What is the; object of such a
formation ? It is evidently proposed with the view of preventing
loss among the supports and main body ; but until troops
come within infantry range, say 1,100 yards, it is theoretically
certain, that formed in small columns, pro^dded the columns are
not too deep, they vnW suffer much less from artillery than if in
line. After getting under infantry fire, it has been shoAvn that
the formation of the men has within certain limits, really very
little to do with loss. Further, such a formation tends not to
prevent but rather to produce and perpetuate Avhat is the great
Jlangcr of this kind of fighting, viz., a gTadual cessation of all the
elements of regular order, and a gradual dissolution of the whole
force into the skirmishing line.

The formation of troops Avhen they have to deliver a fire is
undoubtedly a line or extended order.but the duty of the supports
and main body is not to fire, they cannot fire without endanger
ing those in front of them, consequently the formation should be
such as is best suited for the work they have to perform i.e.. to
march over a certain space of ground; during this advance the
troops in front of them will, as has been shown, draAv n;)ost of
the fire, and that formation should be adopted which A^^^ enable
the leaders to hold the men most thoroughly in hand, keep them
completely under their eye, and at the same time advance as
rapidly and with as little confusion as possible.

Assume a support composed of two companies of 100 men
each extended at one and a half yards apart, the companies
would cover 150 yards, it is manifest that in an advance over
rough ground for a considerable distance, such a line will become
disordered, get out of hand, and not be a steady support to the
troops in front of it. It is manifest that if the two companies be
formed in two columns, each cobnnn composed of two sub-
divisions, that the captains can superintend their men better,
check irregularites, and serpentine the companies they comnuind
better out of fire, take gi'eater advantage of the sinuosities of the
groimd and be ready at all times to support the skirmishing line
if it be checked or threatened by a few cavalry. It is desirable
that the l\mctions of the main body be kept clearly in view its
duty is not to fire during the advance, but it is under cover of
the fire of other troops to which it acts as a, reserve to gain a
place sufficiently near the enemy to make a rush, to (.hive him out.
Also it may be fairly asked, looking to the gi-eat length of the
advance required at the present day (2,500 yards) how ^yi\\ a
support or main body, if deployed into a long extended line,

103

afford support to t'lie thanks of tlic attack? — tlio weakest point,
and that consequently sure to be assailed. A small column inay
afford such protection, an (>xtended lino cannot, and would be
perfectly helpless if suddenly attacked by a small body of horse.
The Avord column is one which g-ives the idea of a mass of men
one behind the other, but this disapi)3arsif it bo (;onsidored that
the columns are either double company columns of a half batta-
lion, (^r columns composed of two subdivisions. Further, it is to
the formed body of men acting behind the skirmishin.o; line that
that line looks for support, and its moral effect is very great.

In all the accouuta we see depicted the uneasy feeling with which skii--
niishing lines advanced Avhen there were no closed detachments following in
reserve ; and on the other hand the exhilaration of spirits, as soon as the
bayonets of the latter were seen, although only in the distance.

To advance with tliis main body in a deployed or extended
line would be really to remove all the moral effect that formation
has on the skirmishing- line. Further, if any slight cliange of
direction, such as converging towards a point, or a change of
direction to suit the nature of the ground, advanced over, has
to be made, the main body in a long spread out line, will
infallibly get into disorder. Hence, such a fu'mation is not on(^
that meets the requirements of the case.

Front al
Attack of
Infantry.
(Translated
by Colonel
Ncwdegiite.)

IT.

The Defen'ce.

The foregoing remarics have been chiefly coiifinod to tlic
attack, or to troops acting on the offensive.

A pure defence can never win a battle, it may perhaps enable
the troops acting on the defensive to preserve their position, but
the most that can be hoped for from a pure defence is a di-awn
battle, not a victory. The improvements in modern arms have
undoubtedly added much to the power of the defence, l)ut the
attack has benefited also.

At first siglit, it would appear that the defence would gain more from the yon Jlolike.
peculiarities of improved fire-arms, than the attack. An army acting on the (Translated
defensive, may have it in its power to choose such a position, as to oblige hy Crawford.)
the enemy to cross an ojien plain ; it will also jirobably have time to ascertain
the distance of certain fixed points, so a.s to ])roduce the greatest effect from
its fire. Ou the other hand, the advantages that an attacking force possesses
are also very considerable. As its commander has only to consult his own
judgment, he regulates his movements according to the dispositions of the
enemy. He, being the assailant, has a definite oljject before him, ami chooses
his own way of attaining it ; while the defender lias fii-st to find out his
adversary's intentions, and then to make the Ijest arrangements for frustrating
them. On the one side, coufiilence and resolution, on the othei", uncertainty
and anxiety. The defender, if he wish to bring about a decisive result, must
eventually himself become the assailant ; but here the question arises, whether
before atlvancing to the attack, he should not exhaust all the material

104

advantages to be gained from stationary fire, by employing it to the very last
moment.

One phase of this .superiority has ah*eady been dincnssed,
page 1)0. But there is another Avhich is deserving of attention.
When two armies come in contact, the one tliat acts on the
offensive or takes the initiative has tlie power of selecting the
point for attack, and of arraying against that point a superior
force. The defender does not know where lie may be attacked,
and has to provide for several possible, nay probable contin-
gencies. He is liable to be deceived, induced to disseminate
his force, and seek to be strong at all the threatened points,
while the assailant need be strong at one and that the decisive
point. Increased range and accuracy in weapons have given the
attacker the power of selecting far more advantageous positions
for covering and supporting his attack than formerly. Ground
which in the days of old artilleiy might be simply ignored must
now be held by the defender, thus compelling him to extend and
therefore weaken his whole line ; or it must be abandoned to
the enemy, who will quickly make use of it as a, point (rappni ior
an attack ; and as the area operated over has thus increased at a
much quicker rate than the actual effective range of the weapons,
the assailant benefits considerably. Let any person examine a
piece of gi-ound and consider how he would occupy it Avith a
given body of troops and he will find that a continued tendency
exists in his OAvn mind to occupy certain advantageous positions
in front of what must be his main Ime. Let him imagine troops
placed on these advantageous positions and he will find certain
places in front tempting him on to them too, and this without
end, until he will find himself compelled from tlie limited number
of his troops to abandon all hope of holding many points, which
he nevertheless can distinctly see must be most beneficial to an
attacker. If this problem be worked out it will be found that
the question will at last resolve itself into, not what is best to be
held, but what it is jwssihle to occupy. Further, the actual space,,
or neutral ground, between the outposts of armies closing on one
another, a space which acts as a kind of curtain between them,
through which neither can penetrate, must, from the increased
range of arms, be now far wider, and offer more concealment
than formerly. This space is really more dependant on the
action of musketry than artillery, and the army acting on the
offensive will usually, if not always, appropriate the greater por-
tion of it.

, J. , . It is of great advantage to an army in the field to push its advanced posts.

.tiela-3 ais a ,^^ ^^^, forward as it can in safety, in order to cover as much of the country and

-p" '^ ^ its resources as possible, to have longer and more precise warning of any

° ' movement of the enemy, and to impede his reconnaissances and proceedings

generally.

It is still of more importance to restrict the enemy to the narrowest limits.
Under ordinary circumstances midway between the respective forces may be
considered a reasonable line of demarcation that each ought to insist ujion,
but several circumstances may give a superior power to one side.

105

1. Tlie opposinj^ armies may be very unequal iu force, or one may liave
jjaineil a markeil ;usct'iulaiKy over the other ; iu which cjise, the superior will
he able to press the inferior into smaller limits.

2. One may hold some peculiarly strong, tlefeusible post or batteries, iu a
s;ilient [tosition, that may give him a command over the neighbouring ground,
in which «ise the line of demarcation will be midway between those parts and
the jKtsition of the other army.

3. There may be a river not fordable, or other essential obstacle between
the two which will naturally form the line of demarcation, although nearer to
one than the other.

Subject to tho.se sort of contingencies, it is very essential that no encroach-
ment should be allowed ; the greatest etibrts in ]«irticular should be made to
ju-event an enemy from holding ]>arts, or even temporaiy pos.«ession of the foot
of the heights on which jjart of an army is pcwted ; distant tire of artillery
is not sufficient to justify submitting to the disadvantage ; and if the enemy's
circumstances are such ;us really to enable him to enforce it ; the army wliich
is subject to it must l)e in a very insecure position.

There is a great deal of brag iu the mjxtter of keeping possession of a
greater extent of ground than a party is entitled to ; old campaigners know the
value of it, and will take all the liberties they are allowed, returning however
.•U5 soon ;i.s they are opposed.

There is a great moral power in the oifensive ; the assailants
are moving- — doing something behind a mysterious cnrtain that
the defenders know nothing of, there is something peculiarly
demoralizing to men in waiting anxiously with nerves at a high
state of tension, for something they know not what, to begin
somewhere. In these respects improved arms have not increased
the power of the defence.

No kind of fire tends so much to shake the morale of troops
as a cross fire, and this from the great extension of the area of
operatit)ns is the veiy fire that, increased range enables artillery
to pour into villages, houses, or intrenchments. !Men acting on
the def(;nsive may make up their minds to a fire coming in one
direction, they may so dispose themselves as to mitigate its
effects. But the moment shells and bullets come from other
directions the Avhole thmg is changed, and a feeling of inabihty
to resist or maintain a position so attacked makes itself felt.
The power that improved arms has given to the defence is that
of keeping the attackers for a longer time under a heavy fire
than formerly; it is also stated that the defenders derive nnich
advantage from the following causes : —

1st. Their fire is delivered by men in position, who can
take a better and more correct aim

2nd. That the force acting on the defensive may be better
covered and protected than that acting on the
offensive, suffer less loss, and consequently be cooler
and less excited.

3rd. That the ground may be better studied by the de-
fensive than by the attacking force, and not only
can advantage be thus taken of its conforniatioji,
but also additional force may be obtained l)y remov-
ing men from Avliere they are of no use to important
places.

lOG

If, however, tliesc advantages, or supposed advantages, be
analysed, they will be found to have hardly the imp(n-taiico that
thej at first sight appear to possess. With reference to the first,
it nuist not be forgotten that the assailants move rapidly and by
rushes of alternate fractions, which tenda to disconcert the aim
of the defenders, who are ever firing at a running target, while
the attackers are firing at a fixed target; therefore the superiority
of the defence in this case does not s(!em to lie very great.

AVith reference to the second, page 89 states the circum-
stances under which an attack is possible, and it appears that
the concentration of fire on one spot so demoralises a defender
that he can be neither cool nor calm. The fire of the attackei-
is always (jonvergent, that of the defender divergent.* Further,
the advance of troops takes tliem away from the dead and
Avounded who are left behind. The defcniders must remain in
one place, and the dead and ^\ounded can with difficulty be
removed, hence the morale of the defenders will suffer the most.

With reference to the third, there can be no doubt that the
defence will l>enefit greatly from its superiority in this respect;
and it is not only to its fire, but the power of bringing that fire
to bear on proper places, that the defender owes his superiority.

How then should a defensive position be occupied ? It
would appear that for the correct holding of a defensive position,
arrangements should be made to bring a heavy artillery and
infantry fire on the attackers at the very beginning of the action,
and to hold a few poAverful reserves in hand, to attack and drive
out any troops that may obtain a lodgment within the general
line.

It has been pointed out at page 89 that the assailant to liave
a reasonable hope of success must be superior at the point where
the attack is made. Now to counteract this superiority there
must be on the side of the defence large reserves kept ready in
hand to be moved the moment the attacker's project is developed,
and sufficiently near to be brought up in time to drive the enemy
back ; not merely to check his advance after he has penetrated
the position. Such reserves must be in the hands of the Generals
commanding the Divisions and Coi'ps, rather than those of the
General in Chief, and hence it follows that these bodies should
each form their oavu reserve.

On the defensive it may fairly l)e (juestioned if a deployed
line is now requisite. The breech-loader enables an extended
line to deliver more fire now than a closed line in former days.
It Avill perhaps be wiser, therefore, to keep back a large portion
of the first line until the attack has developer! itself, and then
to use it in thickening the Une of skirmishers where most
threatened. Such a method gives much additional power to

* The comparison between a siege and an attack liere holds good, the assailants
working on a wider front, direct their whole fire on one portion of tlie defender's
position, their fh-e is tluis convergent ; if the defender replies his lire must be
divergent.

i07

tlio men Avho see tliemselves stipported by tliose beliiiid, and
Avilo t'oel that tliey are not left alone to cope Avith the attackers.

The sudden increase of the defender's fire, by a large rein-
forcement of the snpports, has a poweiful effect in checking the
enemy's advance.

It appears, from the testimony of all continental writers, to
be the experience of recent war, that volky firing cannot be
nsed, and that independent firing, which oiables each man to
judge his own time and aim, is far more effective.

Even when on the defensive, to which, according to theory, volley firing Boguslauski.
is peculiarly applicable, it could so seldom he employed, tliat the few excep- (Translated
tious only serve to jn-ove the rule. Even behind cover, field walls, barricjides by Grnhani.)
the tire of dense crowds of skirmishers was ])referred to bringing forward
parties in close order to tire volleys. To fire a volley always takes up a certain
amount of time, which will be made use of by the enemy's skirmishers to pour
a heavy fire into the compact body then showing itself, causing serious loss
and in part hindering the volley.

The chief argument against \-olleys at such a moment is that they have
little eft'ect ujion skirmishers who are the first to come up. But if you wait
tiU the enemy's supports are visible, the party in close order which is intended
to fire the volleys would be for some time exposed to the skirraishei's' fire, and
would be a heap of corpses before it got a chance of acting.

It would appear, therefore, that in holding a defensive posi-
tion, the skirmishing line in front should be supported exactly
as in the attack, and this all the more so, as in most defensive
positions, the supports which feed the front line may be much
closer than in the attack. In occupying any defensive position,
small bodies of troops of all arms should be told off at favourable
places to make an advance on the enemy and check his move-
ment. Such a force advancing a short distance from the main
position disconcerts the assailant, compels liim to direct his fire
on the new opponent, relieving the actual defenders from fire,
and enables them to act Avith renewed vigour. For this purpose
small posts in front of a position are of great value, but they
should not be suiTendered or evacuated at the first attack, they
should be firmly held, and to do this they must be supported
fi-om the rear. The old rule, " Sahents should be fcAv and
marked " is as good now as ever it Avas.

But no defence has a chance of ultimately succeeding that
is not based on the offensiA^e, or that does not contemplate
taking the offensive Avhen an opportunity offers.

An army acting on the defensive should ncA^er altogether give up the ^'"n MoUko.
idea of itself assuming the offen.sive. (Translated

It has been already stated that there is a tendency on the ^
paii: of the assailants to avoid the centre of the defender's
position as being that Avhere usually the fire is heaviest, and to
tm-n off to the Hanks, and to cover their advance by seeking out
places unswept or only partly swept by fire, Such movements
must leaA'c gaps in their line, and these gaps, if not filled up
from the supports at once, are the very jDoints faA^ourable for the
defenders to attack, and by so doing threaten the assailant's

108

advance on the flanks. But in making such forward movements^
the greatest care is requisite that the main position be not hjst^
and hence arises another necessity for reserves. Generally, both
supports and main body may be much nearer the slcirmishing,
or firing line, than when attacking. The only thing is to place
them so that they shall escape fire as much as possible ; but
especially in the defence it must be remembered a small resei've
that arrives when it is wanted, is infinitely superior to a strong
one that arrives too late. Early deployment and a long march
over groimd, in extended order, exhausts an assailant ; the
defender should therefore seek to make the attacker deploy as
soon as possible. But it is questionable if this should not be rather
done by bodies of cavalry and artillery, pushed well out to the
fii'ont, and supported by infantry, who, using the containing
power of the breech-loader, Avill make the attacker deploy;
rather than by long shots from the main positions which are
not very efficacious, and mark the position held, better perhaps
than anything else.*

Seherff. The basis of a pure defence should be to fight the attack only at the

distance where its fire produces the greatest effects. But though this is so, it
is requisite to profit by the extreme range of arms and by the aid of small
detachments entrusted to selected officers, to keep up a fire on the general
advance of the enemy. The first line (sHrmishing or Jirmg line) will seek, by
means of the most rapid fire, to keep the last halt of the enemy's skirmii-hers,,
or that preceding the assault, as far off as possible. All the intensity, all the
power of the fire, will be develoj)ed against the real assault for 300 to 40O
paces. The defence should be convinced, that despite its fire, it may become
necessary to use the bayonet, and that this resort is less dangerous than a
retreat.

It appears, therefore, that both in defensive and offensive
fighting tactics, one great object is to develop the indi^'idual
action of the man, whether in the use of his weapons or as a
unit. For officers this development of independent action is the
power of leading and handling small groups or bodies of from
10 to 200 men ; but while this independence is developed, it
must be held in hand and directed, it must be freedom, not
license. It must be carefully watched by a commander who
has reserves in hand to support it, either by completing the
victory or checking defeat ; and above all it necessitates most
Ccireful training on the part of the soldier. It further appears,
that a general acting on the offensive, nmst (to secure his flanks-
and protect his line of battle partially denuded of troops to
concentrate a superior force on the point of attack) never lose
sight of defensive operations. That a general acting on tlie
defensive must impart to his defence as much of an offensive
chai'acter as is possible.

The foregoing pages give a general statement of what may
be termed the tactical problem of the present day, and some
general ideas as to how that pj-oblem may be dealt with.

* The effect of artillery fire is three times as great at 2,200 yards as it is at
3,300 yards.

109

Mai.oeuvre tactics are essentially different from fi^htin^ tactics,
the former admit of certain definite rnles bciup; laid down.
Time and distance, both of -wliicli are known factors, enter
lari;ely into such questions, and therefore it is most dt'sirable
that nianoeuvre tactics should be governed by rule ; but when
fighting tactics are dealt Avith, such indeterminate factors as
human passions, the gnmnd, the weather, and the enemy, com-
])licate the problem to such an extent that it would be as
dangerous as it is impossible to lay down fixed rules. It is
therefore desirable that officers should see these subjects from
as many stajid points as possible.

The Italian army have recently modified their tactics to a
gTcat extent, and a precis of the report of the committee entrusted
with this duty is appended. It Avill be observed that the
problem is stated in almost identical language to that used in
the foregoing pages, but the conclusions are slightly different.

III.

Cavalry.

At the close of the War of 1866, the action of the Prussian
military authorities was caref\dly watched, they had tried their
army on which years of careful thought and study had been
bestowed, they had tested its capabilities, gauged its powers and
seen its weaknesses. What they then, after seeing the machine
in motion, did, when an opportunity for repairing and over-
hauling it took place, was of peculiar interest.

Amongst other things, they largely increased their cavalry.
This of itself was the most effectual contradiction that could be
^iven to the statement so constantly made, that tlie breech-
loader had numbered cavalry amongst things of the past.

Recent events have shown that the duties of Cavalry, not
flnly as covering the advance of an army, as outposts or recon-
noiterers, but also on the actual field of battle, is perhaps more
brilliant than ever. True it is that the qualities and knowledge
noAv required of cavalry are different from what they were, or
to put it more correctly, the same qualities and a great deal
more besides are needed. Quickness, coolness and gallantry are
now as always requisite in a cavalry soldier. But more still is
needed, knowledge of countiy, knowledge of what the require-
ments of other troops are, power of observation and description,
ability to seize instinctively the object of the Connnander-in-
Chief, a certain acquaintance with engineering, all these are now
necessities for a cavalry officer. His sphere is greatly enlarged,
and to fill it properly his military knowledge nnist be for more
■extensive than that involved in leading a squadron and keeping-
it effective, all important as the latter is, as the basis of eveiy-
thing else. Far from doing away with cavalry, modem events
have clearly shown that there is no arm of the i?ei-vice from the
correct management of which the army can reap more benefit.

110

Von Moltke.
(Translated
by Crawford.)

Tactical
retrospect.
Captain May.
(Translated ;
by Ouvry.)

Tactical
retrospect.
Captain May,
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

If its action be paralysed, from any cause, there is none the Avant
of which will be more severely felt.

Because in modern warfare the long range and destructive fire of artillery
necessitates a .scattered forniation, there will be more frequent opportunities
for those brilliant dashes of small bodies of cavalry, in which, by taking
advantage of the critical moment, the cavalry of division so often distinguish
themselves.

So long as rapidity, boldness, and dash are active agents in war, cavalry
will retain its inij)()rtance. A cavalry devoid of these qualities, but merely
possessing good intentions, obedience, with ordinary bravery, and a laudable
modesty, is worse than none at all.

The dulies of cavalry in the field may be divided into two
classes. These duties although similar, are sufficiently distinct
to produce a real division.

They are : —

1st. The duties of the cavalry attached to a Division of

the army.
2nd. The duties of the cavalry Division.

A reference to page 8 shows that in the Prussian Armj^ a
regiment of cavalry is attached to each Division. The duties
of this cavalry is to cover the head of the Division, examine the
countr)-, provide small parties to look out for the enemy in
various directions, feel for and communicate ^vith troops march-
ing on roads parallel to that its own Di^^8ion is marching on,
keep up the communication with troops in front and rear, and
thus link the component portions of the army-corps together,
and lastly to proA^de orderlies and escorts.

The duties of the cavalry Division are similar, but on a far
larger scale ; it has to keep the army acquainted with every
movement of the enemy, to harrass him and conceal the move-
ments on their own side by keeping a strong curtain of posts
constantly in advance, so that the enemy shall know nothing
of what goes on within that curtain, to connect the various
army-corps moving together, and keep each informed of the
action of the other.

In speaking of the action of cavalry, we must distiuguisli between divi-
sional cavalry and the cavalry division. The lirst has to work in immediate
connection with the other branches of its division, the latter, the cavalry
division, as an independent tactical body stands more frequently in a sti'ategical
rather than a tactical connection with the rest of the army.

It may be questioned if the charges of masses of cavalry, as
executed during the wars of the early part of this century, such
as those at Essling. by General d'Espagne's caA-alry. tliose at
Echmiihl, or at Waterloo, can now be carried out, except for
some ver}' special object which warrants the great loss that
must ensue.

It appears that the action of cavalry on an actual battle-field
must now be generally limited to watching the fianks. checking
the action of the hostile cavalry, attacking broken and repulsed
infantry. There are, however, many instances when an able
cavahy leader can seize opportunities to use his arm Avitli great

Ill

effect. Such opportiiuitics do not oftni ot'ciir, but wIk-u they
do, the sueee.sb achieved a\ ill geuendly be verv great. The
opportune and unexpected charg'e of a snuill body of cavalry,
under Kellernian at Marengo, is an instance of such an
opportunity.

The charge of a small body of English cavalry, under Colonel
Taylor at Vinieiro, is an<jther instance. And ;i similar oppor-
tunity occured at the defence of St. Privat, when the Prussiau
guard halted staggering under the terrible etiect of the French
fire. Had the French cavalry been on the right in place of the
left, and had it circled out from behind the woods in rear of St.
Privat, and swept across the front, it would doubtless have
suffered terribly, but would have rolled up the Prussian attack.
Such attacks can however generally l)e best made by small
bodies of cavalry. Another use to which cavalry can be put on
the battle-field is to charge infantry Avhicli have gained a posi-
tioji and are disordered by their own success. Such, for instance,
as when the attackers have penetrated into the defenders' posi-
tion. ^Moments like these will doubtless always occur on every
1 )attle-field, but if not innnediately seized they quickly pass away.

The gallant charges made by the French cavalry against
the Prussian infantry when the latter were not disordered were
perfectly useless and eftected nothing, althougli the fact that the
(terman cavalry did succeed on one occasion shows that the
successful attack of cavalry agaiust breech-loaders and rifled
artillery, although exceedingly dangerous, is by no means im-
possible.

On the l(3th of August, the French army was seeldng to
retreat on Verdun from Metz, a «mall portion of the Prussian
infantry only was up ou the south of the Verdun road, and it
became a matter of the utmost necessity to pin the French to
the gi'ound and keep them there until the remainder of the
Prassiaii army could come up.

The Third Army Corps had fought since 9 a.ni. agaiust threefold numbers Boguslauski.
iUid closed the road to Verdun, along which Bazaine's army was retreating. (Translated
About one o'clock both the strength and the cartridges of the brave men of ^J Graham.)
Braudenbui-g began to fail, when an attack of several cavalry regiments,
ordered between one and two o'clock, gave them breathing time. The ground
on which the attack took place is chiefly flat, therefore favourable to cavalry.
The French first line was, like ours, extended into a long line of skirmishers ;
;ub a scarcity of ammunition had shown itself with the third Corps, it is
jjrobable that the enemy was no better off.

Several brigades charging on various points at full galio|t and with the
most reckless bravery, overwhelmed the first line ; then coming upon the
supports broke several battalions, rode through several batteries, were at
length repulsed by the masses which they encountered further ou, and, being
attacked by French cavalry, retired under a fearful fire.

Some of the regiments had indeed sounded the rally before coming upcm
the tliird line. A similar attack wjis made some hours later, now was this a
success ? Cei-tainly it was ; the French, surprised by the impetuous onset of
the German squadrons, paused in their advance, time was gained : the German
reinforcements, which eventually decided the victory, came into line. The
charge at Mars-la-Toiu', was doubtless an exijuisite stroke of higher tactics on

112

the part of the Geueral who gave the order, and a brilliant feat of arms on the
part of the cavalry l)rigade which executed it.

The attack had a great effect on the fate of the day. Our cavalry sacrificed
a third, some regiments indeed half their men, to hringthe French to a stand-
still. But here lies the difference between this charge and the great cavalry
attacks of former days, that the latter themselves decided the victory.

The following is another description of this charge : —

Boi'bstaedt. The French Sixth Corps still remained in its old position on the right,

opposed to Buddenbrock's division, which it completely overlapped, and
threatened to roll up with a Hajik attack. Lieutenant-General Von Alven-
slebeu received a report that one of the French corps, which had been
marching from Gravelotte towards Doncourt, had halted, reversed its columns,
and was about to climb up the plateau to the south of Bruville. It waw
requisite that Buddenbrock should be enabled to hold his ground till reinforce-
ments came up. In order to secure this, if possible, Bredow's Cavalry Brigade,
which had been previously withdrawn from the right wing and sent to the
main road, Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, was now ordered to advance between
the high road and the wood, against this formidable position of the enemy. It
was of coui-se to be apprehended that a cavalry attack, undertaken against
intact infantry and powerful lines of artillery, neither of which had been
previously shaken by artillery fire, must prove .a total failure, or at least cause
immense losses. Still it had become necessary to demand the sacrifice from
the cavalry for the good of the army, and above all, in order to check the
enemy's advance and gain time.

Bredow's Cavalry Brigade had present, at the moment it was ordered to
effect a breach in the front of the Sixth French Corps, only six squadrons, viz.,
three of the 7th Cuirassiers and three of the 16th Uhlans.

These six squadrons crossed the high road to the west of Vionville, taking
at fiist a northerly direction formed in a close column, the Cuirassiers leading
till they arrived near the wood.

Here the head of the column wheeled to the right, and when the new
direction had been gained, the word was given to deploy to the right, first
into squadrons and then into line of the brigade, all of which was done under
a heavy fire of the enemy's artillery.

The three Cuirassier squadrons, which being on the left first got into
line, commenced the charge forthwith the 16th Lancers having to wait until
its right squadi'on came into line, followed innnediately, so that at first a
charge in echelons took place unintentionally.

In a moment the batteries were reached and the gunners cut down at
their guns, when the whole brigade then in one line, charged the infantry in
the rear, who received the rush of the cavahy with a heavy fire.

These lines were broken through too, and at such speed, that few of the
French had time to fire a second shot. The main object of the charge had
been attained beyond all expectation, but carried away by the ardour of combat,
the impetuous band of horsemen swept irresistibly forward, des])ite of all
ende<ivoux's of the officers to rally and reform the mon. The latter ])ounced on
a line of mitrailleuses drawn up in rear of the infantry. Some of the foremost
horsemen had reached the line of mitrailleuses with the last efforts of their
lioi-ses, and begun to cut and stab at the artillerymen, when, quite unexpectedly,
the French 7th Cuinussiers of Forton's Division issued forth from the wood on
the old Roman road. One of its squadrons i)euetrated at once into the
intervals between the disordered Prussian squadrons, the remainder of the
regiment and a Dragoon Brigade followed at a trot. At the same moment
French Hussars and Chasseurs, jiassing through the intervals of the second
line of their own infantry, fell upon the right of the Uhlans, so that the six
hitherto victorious Prussian squadrons, finding themselves attacked on all
sides, were compelled to retreat, and with their blown horses to force a way
through the enemy's masses of infantry.

Of the 7th Cuirassiers only 7 officers and 70 men, of the 16th Uhlans

ii;;

o«Iy (> ofticersi ami 80 Uion, came out of tliis s;mg»iiniuy liaud-to-li;uiil
combat.

It is quite certain that the sacrifice (leniiinded from the cjivalrj in a most
<.-ritical moment of the engagement was repaid l)y tlie complete success of the
man am V re.

For the fatal attack of tlie fith French corjjs against the left wing of
Buddenhrock's Division was comi)letely checked and never resumed, a pnxjf
how nuich the French troops were shaken b}' the vehement attack of a few
Prussian squadrons.

The graves of liorses and men wliich remain on the ground
mark distinctly the conrse taken by tlie l^rus-sian cavalry in its
advance, and show the terrible eftects of the breech-loader and
rifled guns.

These descriptions prove the absohite necessity of cavalry
when it charges being supported by fresh cavalry.

IMie rapid advance over ground, often heavy, tends to blow
the horses to such an extent that no matter what may be the
success of a charge, if the cavalry making it are, when the
horses are blown, charged by fresh cavalry they must suffer
much. Hence the rule which has been laid down for many
years that cavalry should attack in lines, the second line bemg
ready to adv^ance to the support of the first line when its energies
are spent.

It is so desirable that a reserve should be kept in all cases in which the Wellington,
cavalry is desired to charge, that it appears to be a matter of necessity ; and
the ofiicei-s and men should be accustomed to form and conduct the reserve
at exercise.

The leserve of a body of cavalry cluu'ging is intended to answer two pui-
poses. 1st. To improve and complete the success of the charge ; 2nd. To
protect the retreat of the trooi)s retiring, supposing those who charge are
unsuccessful, or jwssibly to acquire success aftf^r their failure.

The proportion of the body of cavalry to be kept in reserve must depend
upon the nature of the gi-ound and of the body of troops to be attacked. It
should not be less than one-half of the body formed for the operation, nor
should it exceed two-thirds. It follows that every Iwdy of cavalry should l^e
formed in two or three lines. The second line shoidd be deployed, the third
■might be in columns of such a size as that they could be readily formed into line.

The next point for consideration is the distance at which these lines should
be placed, and should precede one another : and it will be observed that
this must depend upon the nature of the enemy to be attacked, and in some
degi-ee upon the nature of the gi-ound, and what may be the object of the opera-
tion. It has l>een already stated that one of the objects of the reserve is to
protect the retreat of the IxKly charging which has failed, or possibly to turn
the fortunes of the day by a fresh attack upon the enemy engaged in his
pursuit, and it is therefore obvious that the reserve or second line of the cavalry
should not be so near the first, as to be at all affected by the confusion int<j
which the first will naturally fall in its retreat from the charge.

Wellington then lays down the distjince of the lines when the attack is on
•cavalr}', to be about 450 yards ; that being sufficient to allow the beaten line to
pass through the intervals of the second line, anil yet near enough for the
second line to support the first. He adds, in the atfcick of infantry and
artillery, the encounters are difi'erent, and the distances between the lines should
be altered accordingly. In this case the object should be for the second line to
strike its blow as soon as possible after tlie first shall liave failed ; as there is
no chance of either the infantry or the artillery pursuing a line of cavalry,
whose attack it may have repulsed, there ajjpears no reason for guarding so
cautiously against the confusion into which the second line may he thrown

The Frencli
Cavalry.
Colonel Boiiic.

Prussian
RcgulationB.

liy the reti'eat of the first. 200 yards appears to be the distiiuce between Hues
of cavalry attacking bodies of infantry and artillery.

At Mars-la-Tour the Prussians appear to have attacked in
one line, ^vitllont supports of any kind. The object of tlie
attack was perfectly clear, and justified the sacrifice. But the
retreating' squadrons Avould have been far les^ roughly handled
had there been a second line in support.

On the side of tlie Germans as well as our own, charges were invariably
made at a gallop over too gieat an extent of ground ; horses get blown after
galloping 1,()()(» to l,r)00 yards. When horses get blown, and lose their wind,
on reaching the object of attack they become quite incapable of resisting an
attack or securing success. Look at tlie attack of Bredow's brigade. Taken in
flank by our cavalry, it was so exliausted that the tnen could get no more out of
their horses ; they were entirely at the mercy of our men, who cut them down
like sheep. This attack pi'oves the absolute necessity of a reserve, which,
following the movement of the attackers without pressing on them, and
arriving fi'esh, completes the success, and profits by the exhaustion, of the
enemy. The echelons of Bredow's brigade obtained a first success, but could
not preserve it ; having no sujjports, they were at oui' mercy.

Judging from the latter account, but six squadrons were
employed, and the success achieved by these squadrons shows
that cavalry used with decison, and at the right moment, will
still effect nmch cm the actual battle-field; and that its eftectivo
action may be secured perhaps, more by small Ijodies, than by
large divisions. The six squadrons which charged at Mars-la-
Tour were hardly more than the cavalry attached to a single
division. It is quite true that breech-loaders, placing the
soldier in the position of being always ready to fire, have given to
small bodies of infantry acthig together a far greater defensive
power than, formerly, but the extend et I order in Avhich troops
fight makes them peculiarly liable to be thrown into confusion
and driven back by charges of small bodies of cavalry, more
especially if the ground is such that cavalry can come out un-
expectedly on the extended infantry Ime. And this effect will
be all the greater that infantry so advancing can rarely be sup-
ported by cavalry to meet such attacks, which it would appear
should be made by a lightly-equipped active cavalry, never seek-
ing to pursue too far, but rather to drive the attacking infantry
into compact bodies, retiring as rapidly as possible to leave
those bodies exposed to fire before they can again open out.

The Prussians in their new Cavalry Instructions nave made
some alterations bearing on these points. By the old regula-
tions the charge was supposed to be made over (iOO yards, it is
now supposed to be made over about 1,150 yards, of which 750
are supposed to be crossed at a trot, 825 at a g'allop, and 75 at
full speed. The whole of that portion of the book bearing on
tlie movement of cavalry in two or more lines has been re-
"wiitten. The following is an extract.

The object of the second line when woiking in the presence of an enemy,
is to relieve the fir.st line of all anxiety as to its flanks or real'. When an
attack ia made it has to su}iport the first line by attacking itself if re(piisite.

11.

It aids the tir-st line in drivinu li;iek tlie c'neiuy ami i)ursiiiiii;- Iiini. A reserve
drawn fri)in the second line slionld Iv- held in hand as lony; as pcwsible, for
other conditions of the Hglit being equal, victory falls to him who at the last
moment, and when all the enemy's troojw are engaged, can jjroduce a reserve,
no matter how small, j)rovided only it is/VtW*. In such cases also, the prin-
ciple <Iirecting that as far as possible charges shoidd be inade on the tlank,
mnst be followed.

Leading the second line is more difficult than leading the tir.st, and much
more is re([uired from regiments in second line, both as regards manceuvring
power and speed, tlum fi-oni those in first line.

C-avalry cannot ride about within a few hundred yards of the enemy under Boguslauski
las ride tire. If that were possible, you would not see infantry mounted officers (Translated
dismount. In spite of the powerfid effect of fire, we cannot assert that the by Graham.)
square lias become absolutely useless. If cavalry in extended order attack
skirmishers in Hank the latter will often have nothing left but to form square ;
but if cavalry attacks in front or even obliquely, the skirmishers will find it
quite sufficient to draw up in line, if there be not sufficiently good cover for
them to remain extended.

Ill such attacks the cavahy leader, having conipelled the
extended hne of the enemy to ran together, must remember
that his object should then be to get away as quickly as
possible, and leave those masses to the fire of the infantry and
artillery which his presence in front of the general line masks.

Rifled guns will effect cavalry at far greater ranges than
formerly, but it may be questioned if (Avithin certain limits of
fire) they will have as much effect as smooth-bore guns, and
although cavalry advancing to attack Avill be longer under fire,
yet from the rapidity of their motion, the continually altering
range, and the fact that with rifled projectiles those that graze
short of the mark usually deflect, and do not, as is the case
with spheiical projectiles, follow the original path, it would seem
that the attack of artillery by cavalry has not been rendered
much more difficult than formerly. But whether this be the
case or not, such attacks should be exceedingly rare and only
for very special objects ; they are sm-e to put the cavalry
making them hors dc com/>af, and the value of cavalry in the
field is too great to allow it to be thus used, except for somc^
reason of paramount unportance.

The thiu and extended lines of formation in battle will, in future, afford Tactical rctro-
the cavalry opportunities of acting in a new asj)ect, by giving it occasions for spect.
energetic and immediate co-o]jeration with the infantry and artillery in action. Captain May.
If the infantry attacks with the cavalry at hand, the latter will then be in a (Translated
position to take advantage of the decisive movement, which has been prepared by Ouvry. )
for it by tlie artillery, and the })reseiit tactics with regard to skirmishers
which requires swarms of men in loose order, will reap the richest advan-
tages.

It will not be impo.ssible for them to throw themselves in gaps through
the enemy's line on their reserve ; and even if no success were to follow, they
would still spread teiTor and consternation. Indeed the moral effect that tin
efficient fire of musketry or shell always makes, even on the best infantry,
causes a favourable opportunity to arise for the use of cavalry.

The following proposals for the attack of cavalry are well
worthy of being considered. But it should be observed that
they make no provision for what is really the grand danger of

T '>.

IIG

Bogu^lau6li^.
(Translated
by Graham.)

Austrian
Regulations.
(Translated
by Captain
Cooke, 22ud
Rogt.)

cavalry, viz., being cliarged when the liorses arc blowni by
fresh cavalry, in -which case the cavalry on the blown horses
are perfectly helpless, and no gallantry or leading can help
them.

Prus.sian ciivalry lias for a long time axlopted the echelon form of att4\ck.
The principle is correct, for the squadrons follow one another at intervals, one
drawing the fire, the next breaking in. But the present fire-ai-ms are so
quickly loaded, that there is really no cessation of fire. You may, however,
mislead infantry into dealing its fire with precipitiition and want of regularity.
The attiick in skirmishing order seems to us here preferable to that of com-
pact squadrons.

Thus we will imagine the charge of a cavalry regiment to be execute*! as
follows : Two squadrons in extended order, throw then»selves upon the infantry
two following at a trot, about 300 paces in rear. The leading squadrons rush
at, or perhaps ride through the enemy's skirmishers, wheeling off l>efore his
masses, or galloping past them.

The Officer Commanding the two squadrons in close order, who with his
trumpeter accompanies those in advance, until pretty close to the enemy's
infantry, sounds the gallojj for his own squadrons, as soon as those in front
liave felt the first effective fire, and makes his charge.

This plan may be the most likely to induce the enemy's infantry to blaze
away in a hurry, thus aflfording greater chances of success to the real charge
which follows. We repeat, it may have the effect, but we are far from setting
it forth as an absolute recipe for restoring to cavalry its old power in battle
At all events this appears to us to be the best method, particularly as the
horsemen, in extended order, would suffer less than if they were in compact
bodies.

The Austrian cavalry regulations are very precise on the
subject of attacks, and are in some respects peculiar. The
following is a precis of the rules on this subject : —

In war, the attack is the decisive, therefore the most important rOle of
cavalry. The main conditions for success are rapidity and surprise in the
advance, vigor and momentum in the shock. The men must therefore be
practised in advancing over considerable distances, against the enemy, at speed,
without in consequence losing steadiness, order {i.e. close formation), and force.
" These essentials they seek to gain in peace, by invariably thi'owing out a
" skeleton enemy ; it is distinctly laid down that on no account is an attack
" to be delivered, no matter how small the unit, without showing a skeleton
" enemy,

" According as a section, squadron, regiment, or larger unit forms the
" attacking body, a corresponding imit or number of units is used ; each
" squadron being marked by the four section-leaders and the squadron leader,
" the whole under an officer or commander of the enemy." In practising the
attack, the attacking body should break into a gallop at from 800 to 1,(KX)
paces from the skeleton enemy ; after sounding the " gallop," the com-
mander gives the word " attack," which is the .signal for the men to draw
their swords ; when at 60 to 80 paces from the enemy, he orders the
"charge"; after pursuing about 200 or 300 paces, he orders the "rally,"
when the men fall into a trot and collect behind their leaders ; when all are
quietly at a trot, the line is halted. In presence of a real enemy, the
commf.n ler must judge the right moment for ordering the " attack." In
open ground, e.g., he should give the order when about 1,000 paces from the
enemy ; in a close country as soon as the enemy is discovered or his proximity
is reported by the patrols. The moment for breaking into the gallop nnist
depend upon circumstances, in which the condition of the horses, the nature
of the ground over whic i the attack must be delivered, and the object for
which it is made, must ;»e considered. When within 60 or 80 paces of the
enemy the "charge " must be ordered, the horses jmt to their full spee<i

117

.111(1 the riiiih made with shouts of " Hurrah.'' Tlie cliargo must not be
ordered at a greater distance than from (!() to 80 yards, for the oliarging pace,
if made over too gre.it a di.stance, would tend to open out the files, and con-
sequently to diminish the overwhelming force of a closed cavalry attack.
*****

Every attacking body whose front is m-eater than a. squadron, must always
detach j)arties for the protection of its Hanks, which should follow in echelon at
from 50 to 80 paces to the flank and re.ir ; these defensive flanks, if composed
of two or more sections, should be formed in column. As a rule, both flanks
of the attacking line should be followed by " defensive flanks," but if one flank
is covered bv the ground, the exposed flank only should detach a " defensive
flank."

There must always be a reserve, which should follow the attacking
line in column, at from 200 to 400 paces to the flank and rear. If the attack
is delivered against the enemy's front, the nature of the gi'Ound, the enemy's
formation for attack, etc., must determine in rear of which flank the reserve
should follow ; if the attack is delivered against the enemy's flank, the reserve
should, as a rule, protect the flank which is most exposed to the counter attack
of the enemy's reserve.

*****

It may sometimes be more advisable to attack in " swarms " than in a
closed body, e.g., when attacking guns, in order to sufler as little as }X)ssible from
their lire, or when attacking advancing infantry, when the object is rather to
check their advance than actually to charge them ; or to attract their fire, so
as to give gi'eater chances for a closed body following in rear ; or when the
appearance only of cavalry would be sufficient, or when the ground would not
jtermit of the advance of a closed body. A squadron attacking in "swai'ms,"
should always leave a section behind in reserve.

*****

Cavalry should be surprised, if possible, while deploying ; if deployed,
it should be attacked, if possible, in flank. A small body may attack a
considerably larger body in flank with every chance of success. Relative
numbei's in this case are of minor importance, but the flank attack, in order
to .succeed, must be executed with the greatest possible prompitude, so that
the enemy may have no time to change front. Carefully observing and
taking advautxge of ground, i.e., forming and advancing under cover, is the
main essential for the success of a flank attack.

Infantry should if possible be attacked when in motion, or be surprised,
so that they have no time to form squares. If this cannot be eff'ected, and
it is neces.sary to actually charge the squares, the attack should be delivered
against the faces of the squares with successive bodies, following each other
at from 80 to 100 paces.

Artillery should, if possible, be attacked in motion, when limbering uj»
or unlimbering, or in flank. The attack on the g\ins should be executed in
" swarms," while a closed and strong body attacks the escort ; if the attacking
body is a squadron, one section in swarms should go against the gims, the
remaining sections in a closed body against the escort.

It is a matter of the greatest importance, that before auy
forward movement of cavahy is made, the ground over wliich
it is to act should be reconnoitred. This reconnaissance may
be of the most rapid character ; two or three men, if well trained
and with quick eyes, riding rapidly over the ground, will bring
back intelligence as to its state, Avhether marshy or not, and
Avhether there are fences or hedges unseen from the main posi-
tion, where the enemy can place his infantry. A few men
galloping rapidly out in this way for intelligence, will rarely
be hit, if some are, one at all events will come back for infor-

118

The French
Cavalry.
Colonel Bonie.

Campaign of

L866; official

jccount.

^Translated

by Hozier and

W'right.

Napier,

niation. Tlie moment a body of cavalry halts in a position
from which they may be called on to advance rapidly to the
front, the officers should at once seek to learn all they can of
the ground over which they are likely to act ; and sucli know-
ledge must not be a general knowledge, but one obtained by
actual ol)servation of the ground.

It may be added that a really powerful telescope, mounted
so as to be carried in a lance bucket, would be a most useful
article of equipment for a cavalry regiment.

The cavalry in this charge* came close to the Prussians and without great
loss, when it was completely disordered by the numerous obstacles strewn on
the ground, biscuit c:ises, baggage wagons, and camp equipment hurriedly
abandoned by the troops in their retreat. 22 officers, 208 men, and 243 honses
were lost in this charge by the regiment of cuirassier.s. This would not have
Ijeen the case if the artillery had been in action a little longer, and we must
also deduce that it is indispensable at all times to reconnoitre the ground,
for if tlie obstacles on the ground had been known the cuirassiers would have
taken another direction.

In their eagerness to meet the enemy as soon as possible, the Hussara
omitted to throw out eclaireurs in their front, and when they were already in
full gallop they unexpectedly came upon a deep gully which had been hidden
from view in the high corn ; part of them pulled up in time, some got over to
the other side, but the greater part fell into the lavine.

Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson's Brigade of Cavalry,
composed of the 23rd Light Dragoons and 1st German Hussars, to charge
the head of these columns. These regiments, coming on at a canter, and
increasing the speed as they advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but
ill a few moments came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not per-
ceptible at a distance.

The action of cavalry on the actual battle-field is b}' no
means a thing of the past. The use of cavalry with skill at the
light moment and in the n"ght numbers has always been con-
sidered one OS the most difficult problems in war ; modern arms
have increased this difficulty many fold, but to say that the day
of cavalry on the field of battle if past, is merely another Avay
of sa;>ang that the knowledge of how it should be used is wanting.

The question of how flanks are to be protected during an
attack in extended order is one that continuall}" crops up, and
one to which as yet, no satisfactory answer has been given.
This weak point of the infantry attack is precisely that on
which the cavalry should fasten, and it is that where knowk-dge
of gi-ound, quickness and decision Avill continually aftbrd to
young officers in command of small bodies, an opportimity of
performing brilliant feats. The action of cavalry supported by
horse artillery on the flanks of an army will be of the greatest
importance by extending the line occupied by the troops on the
defensive, the enemy if he attempts a flank movement must con-
sequently be thrown further off", and compelled to make a longer

* Charge of Cavalry of the Imperial Guard at Mars-la-Toiir.

marrh. And the action of a po^vciful cavalry .supported ]>y
artillery on the head of the colunnis moving- to a tlank will at all
tinu'sdelay their progress, and give time for the army on the de-
fensive to manoeim-e. But to work cavalry and horse artillery
in this maimer it is recpiisitc that they shoidd he holdjy used, and
advantage taken of the rapi(Uty of their movement, "they must
not be kept close to or hanging on the infantry for support,
but must act boldly, seek to find out the enemy's flank movc-
inent, and once those movements have declared themitielves, the
cavalry must act on the head of his columns ; wlienever troops
move to outflank an enenn- in position they nmst always move
in long colunms, fV)r they "^attack to a flank not to their front.
Hence, the front being narrow, they themselves may be over-
lapped and taken on the flaidvs.

During the battle of Gravelotte the rule of our cavahy was without inipor- The French
tance, because tlie divi.sions Desveaux of the guard, Fortou of tlie reserve, Carah-y.
"V akbregue of the second corps, or in other words the mass of cavalry, was Colonel Ponie.
halted in the ravines of Less, Chatel Saint Germain, and Moulin Loiigeau,
Avhere the^y received shell without being able to do anything. CouKl thev'have
been usefully used on the open gi-ound in the front of St. Privat and Roncourt ?
The right wing of the army was the only place where the ground was suffi-
ciently open to allow the actiou-of caA'alry. There the previous day our cavalry
should have been assembled upon the banks of the Orne, in the villages of St.
Marie Aux Ch6nes, Saint Batilly, Habouville, it would have found excellent
bivouacs, a large open s]>ace, and ground sufficiently hard to work over.

Thus disposed it would have warned us of the gi-eat turning movement
made bv the enemy under cover of his cavalry. This cavalry did not charge
our line of Itattle, but it preceded the artillery and protected it in the great
change of front to the right, it covered the infantry columns in the Batilly
and Saint Ail ravines before the attack on Saint Privat.

Used in such a way our cavalry, with the help of its horse artillery, would
have checked the enemy's advance, and might have prevented him from
reaching the right wing until the close of the battle. If the cavalry divisions
we have named, useless where they were, had been jilaced on the right, they
might have enabled that wing to "take the offensive, supported as it would
have been by the two cavalry divisions of 3rd and 4th corps which remained
on the defensive, and consequently were useless all day.

Xo army that is able to manoeuvre, and the cavalry of wliich
is properly posted, and does its duty, should ever, under any
circumstances whatsoever, be surpiised by a flank attack.

But the great use of cavalry undoubtedly is in advance ot
the Army. Not a few miles oidy, but several marches ahead
feeling for and obtaining information of the enemy, and it is in
such operations that the skill and boldness of officers of com-
paratively lower grades comes so prominently to the front.
The action of good cavalry in thus protecting an army is in-
valuable, in giving the main body rest and repose, free from
the disturbance caused by vague rumours or alarms. Similarly,
the constant annoyance Avhich such cavalry can give an enemy,
demoralises his troops, and spreads an uneasy feeling of inse-
c'^mty through the best army in the world.

This duty of cavahy to the anny generally, is well ex-
plained, in the follo^-ing words.

120

Voii Minis. It is a nobU- ;iiul right feeling fur the soldier to think that my comrades

(Translated can sleep as I am awake : my comrades have nothing to fear ; 1 watch the
by Russel.) enemy.
De Brack. The mechanics of war really consist of two thingf^, fif/htivg a.nd slccpinf/,

using and jiroducing ]»hysical power ; to keep hoth in perfect equilibrium is

the science of war, it often takes far more skill to ]>roduce force than to use it.
In jiresence of an enemy the science of pi-ocuring repose is given to few,

no duty requires an officer to possess a surer, quicker, or better trained coup

(Poeil miUtaire.

The numeroite surprises of the French troops, such as tliat
of Fortoii's Cavahy Division, on tlie 1 6th August, a Division
specially sent out to feel the way of the arrny, and protect it
from all surjirises, and the similar surprise that took place at
Beaumont, are inexcusable, and are good examples of the use-
lessness of cavalry to an army, if it hangs on the infantry for
support and protection.

The action of cavalry in spreading a curtain round an army,
hiding its movements and seeking to obtain infonnation of the
enemy's position and intention is not the consequence so much
of improved arms, as it is a consequence of railways, telegraphs,
improA^ed roads, increased cultivation, and large armies. To
develop the full power of railways and telegraphs an army
must be a large one operating over a large area. A small army
of 30,000 to 60,000 in Europe will by no means reap the same
proportionate advantages from rapid means of communication
as an army of 300,000 to 400,000 men. But such an army
cannot work at all, unless it operates over a large area ; an area
again which is not proportionate to the size of the army, but
which increases at a rate much greater than the size of the
army does. Now, no trt)ops using railways even for supplies,
can be considered safe if those railways are sulyect to destruction
by small bodies passing through the columns and getting in
rear of them, consequently troops must be used to cover the
whole front and close' the openings between the columns.
Cavalry, from tlieir more rapid means of locomotion, are
evidently the troops to whom this duty must fall; and the
telegraph has given them a power of being useful by enabling
them to receive orders or send information more rapidly than
formerly. The object of cavalry employed for such a purpose
is not to fight, their object is to watch and report ; once the
enemy is felt, the touch should never be let go, and this cannot
be better kept up than by a number of horsejuen in two's and
three's scattered all over the country, feeling along every road,
ready to retreat the moment the enemy turns on them, never
pressing or attacking him, 1>ut always watclnng him.

The custom in former days for an army acting- on the defen-
sive was to retreat by one or more roads, " covering its line of
retreat by cavalry." Now what is meant by the words
*' covering the hne of retreat by cavalry?" AVe continually
find that the covering simply meant that when an army retired
along one or more roads, a mass of cavalry was placed on the

121

road or roadH iiHod by the army, and that they closed tlio
columns, the object f»f putting; cavalry there l)eiii_c^ that the
enemy in pursuit headed his columns with cavalry, his fastest
m(»vin^ fori-e. and that therefore cavalry were requisite to meet
and check that cavalry. Similarly the pursuing army " advanced
covered by cavalry," or in other words the heads of its columns
were composed of cavalry. Such a system of covering either
the advance or retreat of an army is manifestly an improper use
of one of the chief weapons of cavalry, the speed and power of
tJie horses.

It requires but a slight amount of thought to perceive that
the leader who follows with even a small force, and pushes on
as rapidly as possible, small parties of cavalry to hang upon the
flank of the column in retreat, to turn any obstacles they may
prepare, and show themselves past the actual tail of the re-
treating force, will reap great benefits.

Such a system will not only harass the retreating anny, far
more than a system of useless attacks on its rear-guard, but
will speedily demoralise it, by producing a constant feeUng of
uncertainty, and will compel the retiring force to hurry its
march, send out strong bodies to its flanks, and so weary the
men.

It is manifest that a cavalry very infeiior in number, but
skillfully directed, may, if the men composing it be well trained,
cope easily with a superior force badly handled. * Light rifled
guns have in this respect altered the part of cavalry ; for the
pursuer, using a light and mobile horse artillery, may cut in on
the flanks of lieavy masses of cavalry and speedily throw them
into disorder. Once that disorder makes itself felt the troops
lose confidence in theii* leaders, and want of confidence in their
leaders is a great step towards demoralisation. This nse of
cavalry and horse artillery to check troops retreating is one
capable of great development, but like all such operations in
war, is dependent on the skill of the leader.

The position of cavalry should be on the flanks ; that is to
say, there should be no mass of cavalry on the roads, following-
or leading the army, but the whole countiy should be filled
with horsemen, working on a broad front, pushing on at all
times, if checked simply halting, while those on the right and
left turn whatever stops the advance. In the rear of those
feelers must be the supports on which they retire, and again
in rear the main bodies. All information from a wide front is
brought into the main bodies, there collated, tabulated, and
telegi-aphed back to the directing head in rear. Thus the
cavalry of an army resembles more than anything else the
feelers of some insect, pushed out in front, and conveying im-
pressions to the animal, which guide its movements. To accom-
plish this duty thoroughly and completely the cavalry soldier
must be trained as an individual, not merelv as a unit of a

122

large masR. His individual knowledge and ability innst be con-
tinnally improved and strengthened while at the same time his
power of acting as a fraction in large masses should be kept
steadily in view. Thus, a8 previously said, the cavalry soldier
requires to be all he has ever been, together Avith a gi'eat deal
more he has hitherto not been.

There are few things more remarkable than the contrast of

the French and Prussian cavalry during the recent Avar ; the

former giiided entirely by old rales and ideas, the latter

guided not only by new ideas suitable to altered circumstances,

but Avith those ideas carcfidly based on the old customs.

The French If an army is retreating the i)lace of the cavahy can'no longer l»e in the

Cavalry. rear as forniei'ly laid down. This arm is incapable of struggling against a

Colonel Bonie. long ranging artillery, and it would be speedly crushed were it to be taken in

flank by many batteries, and fatal results would ensue to the army in retreat,

from a panic on the part of a mass of cavalry in its rear.

On the 7tli August, Clcrembault's cavalry division received the order to
cover the retreat of the 3rd Coi-]3s, which was to maich on Metz from St.
Avoid t-id Longeville. Fi"om St. Avoid to Longeville, a distance of 4^ miles,
the road passe;^ through woods, which at some jjlaces almost touch it on each
side and leave a space where only a very email force can de])loy. At Longe-
ville the road forks, and that to the left runs on an elevated ]>lateau of some
extent.

Clcrembault's division consisted of 6 regiments. The general seeing that
the least disorder in the rear guard would produce fatal consequences, as he
could not act on the sides of the road, pointed out to Mai-shal Bazaine that so
large a force of cavalry was likely to be more dangerous than useful.

The Marslfhl did not change his arrangements, and in conforaiity with
the firet order, at half past thx-ee a.m. the retreat commenced.

The infantry divisions moved in heavy columns on the road, followed by
an interminable convoy of requisitioned carts, which tailed out unceasingly,
owing to their interrupted, slow and irregular march.

While this column was defiling, the cavalry had to remain in the hollow
at St. Avoid, thus the men and horses were much fatigued without lieing able
to be of any use, as they could not jirevent the enemy from attacking the
flanks of the column, if he wished to do so.

At one p.m. the cavalrj- division received ordere to move. The general
formed it in ecltdons to the right and left of the road ; towai'ds the frontier
the gi'ound did not allow more than one squadron to be deployed.

A 4-ponnder battery, placed under the Genei'al's orders was jiosted so as
to command the Valley of St. Avoid ; at 2 ]).m. Decaens division moved out
of its ]:)osition in admirable order.

The cavali'y alone remained behind to protect the retreat, and very soon,
owing to the shape of the gi'ound, it had to form a cohunn on the road of great
lengtTi, as there were 24 squadrons.

It should be used on the flanks to prevent the enemy from ad\ancing,
cutting in on the convoys or infantry columns.

It is interesting to remark the action of the Prussian caA'alry
during this retreat ; they threatened the rear of the cohunn
Avith a small force, thereby inducing the French to keep these
24 squadrons fixed there, while small parties Avere pushed up
on the flanks of the column, exciting terror and confusion by
their sudden apparition amongst the convoys.

The engineer train of the 3rd corps marched Avith the
baggage of the leading infantry diA'ision, and tlic following is
from the journal of the oflicer in connnand of the train.

u:)

Uu> Hliine.
Ey an OflUer
of Euginccrs.

We saw on a liill aliuut 1,0(>(» to ',-2,000 yards uti', on our left, tlnve small Three Months
jjfroujis, one mounted, the other in advance disjnounted ; on the slopes of the with theArmy
little valley that divided us, we saw a single horseman entirely exposed alone
in the fields near a hamlet, the inhabitants of whidi stared at him with sur-
j)rise. We could not deceive ourselves, it was the enemy. One of the dis-
mounted parties mounted and disiip[)e;ired followed by the otheis, the single
hoi-seniau after carefully watching us, vauished also.

Tliese ssconts had i>assed not only tlie 24 P'rench squadrons
but two divisions of intantiy, the reserve artillery and baggage,
and Avere making their presence felt close in rear of the leading
infantry division, unchecked and mnnolested.

The action of the Prussian cavalry in -Nvatching, feeling, and
hanging on to the French troops retreating from Woerth on
Chalons, and the result thus produced by a mere handful of men in
demt)ralising an army, and the very small number of men recpured
lor that purpose, if only they be properly handled, are well shown
in the accompanying extract, which is descriptive of the French
retreat from Woerth. The writer was an actor in the scenes he
describes.

Arrived at Sarrebourg the regiments were reformed, and we then were
able to furnish tlie lists of killed, wounded and missing, which were truly
frightfid.

The genemls resumed command of their brigades and di^•isions, and
thinking Alsace would not Ije abandoned, without further resistance, Ave looked
for orders to take the offensive. We received iu the middle of the day of
the 8th August, orders to s<iddle and mount, because the enemy's cavalry was
in view. Some scouts were mistaken for the head of numerous columns ;
we then retired.

From that mmnent until v:e reached Luneville their scouts vatched iis
wiiceasingly. Linked to their army hy horsemen, they gave an exact account
of our positions, of our halts, of our movements ; and as they icatched ns from
some little distance, incessantly appearing and disappearing, they spread
uneasiness.

In place of acting in a similar way, we kept our cavalry in masses
difficult to move, which did not protect the army, and rendered no service
whatever.

The 10th August we arrived at Luneville, hoping to have time to ])rocure
there, those articles of camp equipment which we still wanted.

We were informed that regular rations both for horses and men would be
issued, a luxury which we had not known for some days, and we were
supplied with meat, sugar, coffee, oats, ;uid hay. The soldiers recovered their
good humour, lit their fires, made their soup, and looked forward to a rest for
one day. Suddenly we were ordered to march. The kettles were emptied,
the nose bags taken from the horses, and we bi-idled in haste. Why this
sudden alarm / It was again the enemy's cavalry. Hitherto it had only acted
the prologue, but now the real play began.

Prussia, by a terrible blow, had made a breach in our line of corps
scattered along the frontier. The line being cut in two she sought to beat
each portion separately, and consequently strove to prevent their junction.

The cavalry undertook this important duty, operating over a great space,
two regiments were pushed into Nancy. They stated that resistance was
useless, as they were followed by a considerable force. This news was sent to
us at Limeville, and the line of our i-etreat was consequently thrown off to the
left by Colombey, Beaumont, Xeufchateau, and Joinville.

This cavalry was that whi(;h destroyed the railway junction
near Nancy, and so prevented the Vlth French Corps receiving its

The Fvoncli
Cavalry.
Colonel Bonie.

124

reserve artillery, ammunition, and its engineers. It will be re-
membered that the Vlth Corps was that whieh defended St.
■ Priv^at, and mueh of the French disaster at that place is to be
traced to the fact that this corps was tactically incomplete. The
trains, Avith artillery and en^neers, had left Chalons and actually
arrived close to Nancy, before the news of the destruction of the
railway compelled them to return.* Indirectly the cavalry
excited gi-eat influence on the results of the battle of Gravelotte.
Similar action of Prussian cavalry is also noted by General
Vinoy in his retreat from Mezieres.

yinoT. From tliat moment we became the object of continual and rapid inspection

from the enemy's scouts. Thep kept galloping on our flank, just out of range,
seeking to see the head of oui- column and so calculate its force and report to
their supports.

But >vhy did the French not copy the Prussians? Baron
Stoff"el, a shrewd observer, and one Avno by no means deemed his
countrymen perfect, in his comparison of the French and Prussian
cavalry, gives to the former the praise of being better swordsmen,
better mounted, and acting together quite as well as the Prus-
sians. The Prussians, he thought, rode better. Courage was
most assuredly not wanting among the French cavalry, but old
customs and old prejudices are not to be dismissed on the battle-
field. We train men in peace, for what we wish them to do in
war. AVhen war comes we must be satisfied if they do what
we have taught them. If the instruction is faulty, th.e country
whose armies have been badly trained suffers. When war is
declared, the time of preparation, the time for training is past,
the day of action has come. If the weapon is not well tempered,
wants edge, and is useless, the responsibility rests with those
who have allowed it to become so.

Tlie Fioncli In place of pushing the cavalry out to a distance, it was kept compact. It

Cavah-y. marched in divisions of 5 or 6 regiments, hampered with its baggage wagons ;

Colonel Boiiic. it never sent out a vedette, it followed the great roads, and it was well con-
tented if it accomplished its day's march. In short, the rule of our cavalry
iluring this long retreat was simply nil, it neither fought nor scouted.

Why could we not imitate this cavalry, and why did we allow this
huudred-eyed Argus to ride round and rountl us as he wished ?

The answer to this question is, war is the harvest of peace.
The seed sown in peace is then reaped.

But it Avas not only in the pursuit of the enemy that the
careful individual training of the Prussian cavalry soldier told, it
told equally Avhen feeling the French advance. In Prussia the
necessity of teaching cavalry completely, has been so recognised,
and the labour entailed in that instruction so clearly appreciated

* Forty trains started, conveying the artillery, engineer?, and reserves of the
YIth Corps, on the 10th August, on the lltli the Uhlans cut the telegr:\pli at Pont
a, Mousson ; the trains however pushed on close to one another, some troops got out
of tlic carriages to firo on the Prussian cavalry, and the greater part of the trains
miglit have reached Metz if the Germans had not seized and torn up the rails
between Pont ii Mousson and Metz : the trains were then compelled to return to
Chalons (Jacqmin).

12-)

tliat every effort is made to retain men in the cavalry tni- a fourth
year, it is well known that practically infantry in J'russia arc
trained only for al)oiit 2^ years, but tlie cavalry generally re-
ceived their 3 years' training, and the men were in many ways
induced to re-enp;age for a fourth year.

This shows that the leaders of tiie Prussian army do not
tliink the day of cavalry over, and that the difficidties of teach-
ing men to lide, use their arms on horseback, and scout properly
are fairly faced. Scouting cannot be taught on a parade ground
uor on a Champ de ^lars. The perfection to Avhich the Trussians
reduced this system is shown by the following : —

For one uionieut the Prussian St<iiF lost our track in tlie plains of Cham- The French
paigne, because we suddenly changed our plans. But they (juickly found us Cavalrv.
again by means of their c;ivalry, wliich never lost the touch, and marched on Colonel Boine
our flank,* spreading out a curtain behind which their army worked.

When he ;irrived at (.'hCue Populeux, the enemy was 30 milesf l>ehind his
cavalry ; ;us we advanced we met groups of five or six horsemen who retired
slowly after examining our arrangements and informing those who folk>wed
them. If we wished to pursue, each fraction fell back on a support capable
of resisting iis and keeping us from penetrating the curtain. This service was
so well performed by the Prussian cjivalry, that we marched, so to sijeak,
within a net which enclosed us in its meshes.

Four years before the Prussian Cavalry perliaps scouted no
better than the French did.

For w^e read just before the Battle of Koniggratz. Campaign of

Thus the outposts of both armies faced each other on this day within a ^^" ' official
distance of 4k miles, without either army sus]jecting the near and concentrated z™ , ' ,
presence of tlie other. ^ byHozLand

The war of 18G6 taught the lesson ; it -was carefully learned, Wright.)
it was brilliantly applied. An army will never fail so long as it
can leani and apply a lesson.

IV.

Artillery.

The introduction of rifled artillery and breech-loading arms
lias caused considerable modifications in the action of artillery in
the field. These motlifications are based partly on the nature of
the infantry fighting, partly on the peculiarity of the rifled gun
itself.

It is undoubtedly true that rifled artillery is far more powerful
in accuracy and effect at long ranges than smooth-bore guns.
But at short ranges it is very questionable if such advantages
exist, and this is all the more the case that at short ranges the
eff'ect of rifles on artillery is now very greatly increased.

With smooth-bore guns, accuracy of laying at short ranges
was hardly required, the gun even badly laid was sure to produce
a good effect. With rifle projectiles this is not the case ; to
produce the full eff"ects of a rifled artillery, careful attention is at

* McMahon's march on Sedan,
t Two long marches.

12G

Jill times required, and this attention can hardly be given at
short ranges, when the gunners are suffering much from infantry
fire.

Two things follow from this : — 1st. That if the full value of
rifled artillery is to be brought out, it must come into action
much sooner than formerly, it must continue in action much
longer. 2nd. That it must move about far less than formerly.
Mobility is an essential for good artillery, as it is for all arms,
but it is the power to move rapidly when required, not continual
movement, that is requisite. Artillery when moving is useless,,
suffers injury, and does no good. Breech-loaders have enabled
infantry to advance firing if required, such is not the case Avith
ai-tillery, which can only fire when halted.

If the problem of the proper use of artillery on the field of
battle be considered, it becomes at once apparent that its chief
function is to pave the way for an attack. It may be accepted as
an axiom that the success of an infantry attack, on a body of
infantry favourably posted, is, with anything Hke equal numbers,
very doubtful. The position taken up by troops on the defensive
is sure to be always more or less ditficidt of approach, and there
are sure to be houses, walls, farmyards, villages, used as points
of support ; in such places, or behind even the smallest shelter
trench, or in rifle pits, an enemy usually suffers but little from
the fire of attacking infantry, and at the same time can inflict
loss aU the more that he is sheltered and preserves coolness and
can use his Aveapons deliberately.

It is then the province of artillery to drive the defenders out
of such places, and shake their momk by a heavy concentrated
fire, which will enable the infantry to advance to the attack.

It has been said that in an attack on an enemy in position,
the spaces unseen or partially imseen by fire in front of his posi-
tion must be sought for, and it is the duty of artillery to increase
such dead spaces by concentrating a heavy fire on a portion of
the enemy's position, breaching it in fact, and thus making an
opening through which the infantry can advance.

There is nothing which tends to produce so great a moral
effect as a heavy cross-fire of artillery. The best troops in
the world get shaken and demoralized by such fire. Loop-
holed houses or walls rapidly become untenable, and the shells
search out the trenches or rifle pits. The effect of a given
number of guns placed so as to bring a converging fire on a
portion of the defender's position is very much greater than if
they merely brought a direct fire. A direct fire may be more
or less guarded against, but a cross-fire on a position pioduces
the moral effect of an attack both on a flank and in front.

There are therefore two general rides for the use of artillery ;
it uuLst act in large bodies, and must seek to bring a converg-ing
fire on the point aimed at.

Except in certain special cases, it is doubtful if less than two

127

batteries sliouM act togx-thor. A 1)attrny actini;' .siii;;-ly lias full
Avork ill its iuana<:;(.'nK'nt and diivetion t'ov all the (it1i<M'rs Ix'ioiij^-
iii*»- to it. It c-aii spaix^ iiour to remain Avith the (.'ommaii<b.'r ot
the attacking' force. It can spare neither men nor horses to
carry or receive orders. Tavo l^atteries are usually provided
with a staft" who can perform this duty, and the Lieutenant-
Colonel in eomniand remaining with the Commander can receive
his orders, and see tin- effect of the guns and so direct them,
that they sliall sup})ort the infantry properly.

It may perhaps be urged that if the two batteries are separated
sonie distance they can bring a more convergent fire to bear on
the point aimed at. This is doubtless the case ; but on the field
of battle there are many batteries, and the additional etfect
produced by separating two by no means makes i;p for the
greatly increased difficulty of direction.

It is essentially reiiuisite that unity of action should be pre-
served amongst batteries of artillery, and that they should act
together, in bodies which have some cohesion, and arc under
some definite command. If this be not carefully observed,
much of the advantage of massing artillery is lost.

The .irtillery engagement soutli of the Sadowa wood did not proceed so Campaign of

favoural)ly; a want of unity in the direction of tlie artillery was painfully 1866; official

ev'ident on this i)art of the field, Two commandants of regiments were on account,

the s}X)t, but the eleven batteries then present belonged to five different (Translated

artillery divisions, some of them to the Divisional Artillery and some to the ^J Hozier and

Eeserve. Tliis accounts for the want of unity of action at this spot ; some Wright.)
l)atteries advanced perfectly iscjlated, whilst others retired behind the
Bistritz at the s;une time

Exactly a similar complaint was made by one of the French
corps leaders in IH7U. His artillery belonged to seven different
regiments, and there Avas only one field officer Avho had ever
done duty Avith any of the batteries before.

The adA^antage that rifled artillery possess in its great range,
in the greatly increased choice of positions a\"ailable, is im-
mense — the area on Avliich possible emplacements exist being
proportional to the square of the range ; hence guns are more
likely to find coA'er than Avas formerly the case. On a field of
battle every effort should be made to get large numbers of
batteries into line under one command, especially during the
earlier stages. These masses of artillery acting in concert with
one another, A\all, by the very Aveight of their fire, crush Avhat is
opposed to them, and the various points to be so attacked
should be selected in the order of their importance. An ex-
ample of this occured at the battle of XoisscAalle.

General "Woyiia (7th Coq)s) opened fire on Flanville, situated at a distance Militair
of about 1,200 yards ; the French infantry held this position strongly, and a Wochenblatt.
close musketry fire had no efiect on them ; after a very short time the two
batteries detailed for this purpose overwhelmed the village with shells, the
houses took fire and the infantry abandoned them ; the 53rd legiment then
advanced and took it. The guns weie next turned on Coincy, which in a
short time also became untenable, and the Fiench retired. The Germau
infantry during these operations remained with ordered arms.

128

'J'lie Kphere of action of artillery is tAvotold, viz., that of the
Divisioiial artillery, and that of the Corpn improperly termed
reserve artillery. The action of these two kinds of artillery
presents many points of similarity, and for certain pur2)0seR both
may be used for the same object, i)recisely as the Divisional
cavalry and Cavalry Divisions may on occasions both Avork
together for one object.

The distinction between their duties may perhaps be best
described by saying that the duties of the Divisional artillery are
special, and generally confined to support the Division to which
it belongs, while the action of the corps artillery is less res-
tricted, and directed to more general objects.

Names that do not express duties, or rather that express a
duty or function that no longer exists, are very pernicious.
Reserve ai-tillery has become so much an expression in military
books, that it is desirable that it should be got rid of entirely,
as conveying a false idea.

After 1868, the Reserve Artillery was termed Corps Artillery. Far fiom
being a reserve, this artillery is really like the Divisional artillery, an advaucetl
guard. Its duties are really those of an advanced guard. The duty of an
advanced guard is to see the enemy first and come first into action. Artillery
from its range ought to he the fii'st arm to attack the enemy. An advanced
guard cannot perform its duty of covering the deployment of the army, unless
it he powerfully supported by artillery.

The greatest fault a General can commit, is to have Reserve artillery at
all ; the preparation of an attack is the function of artillery. Looking to the
enormous power of its fire, nothing should prevent the concentration of all
available means, every battery, every gun should be in position, one gun may
even make a difference. It is by acting in accordance with these principles,
and placing in line as many batteries as possible, that Ave have won all our
victories.

It is one of the special duties of the Divisional artillery to
support the infantry of the Division to Avhich it belongs, whether
that infantry be acting on the oiiensive or defensive.

The necessity for artillery to perform these functions was
plainly evidenced by Napoleon's attaching 2 guns to each regi-
ment, or to 3 battalions of infantry, and this at the very time
and occasion when he developed the power of artillery in masses
to an extent that never previously had been attempted.

The close continuous support that Divisional artillery should
give to the infantry of the Division to Avhich it belongs is a
marked feature of British tactics.

Todleben. " I* should be remarked that the English artillery always thoroughly sup-

ported its infantry. It followed it everywhere, and opened a close fire ujjon
the Russian colunnis. On the one hand the artillery of Codrington's Brigade
established on the left side of the careening ravine, swept our reserves and
took in flank the troojis who advanced to att;\ck the left wing of the English
army.

On the other, our artillery which continously preserved its first position

battle ot ^^^^ ^j^^ ^j^j^g ^£ Cossack Hill, remained always in the same place, and did

InKcnimii. ^^^^ support the attiick of our battiilions. We must again reiterate what Ave

had previously said, that the English infantry wjus always opportunely sup-

129

ported by its artillery, which swept tlie Ilii.ssian cohnims and skirmishera with
case, whilst tnir troops uufortuuately were ilejjrived of tlie co-operation of
their artillery.

After ocLiipyinff the Cossack Hill, our artillery acted iiulej)eiideiitly with
much skill and coolness against the enemy's artillery, but it hardly at all sup-
ported the infantry. At the beginning of the battle it openetl its tire, and
thus to a certain extent paved the way for success ; but later, when the in-
fantry advanced to attack, the artillery continued to fire without altering
its position, until at last our own ti'oops marched into its fire as they
advanced.

The iiu])()rtauco of close eo]itiiiiioi;s artillery siip})()rt is here;
clearly shown, and that by the testimony of an enemy who felt
its value ; although as already stated the different nature of
rifled artillery will render movements much less frequent than
formerly, and enable batteries to effectually support infantry
when considerably in rear of them. Thus, the support of a
Division of infanti y by its artillery does not mean that the guns
are to move about with the infantry following it wherever it
goes. But it means that the fire of the Divisional guns is to be
directed to crush what is m front of the Division, to subdue the
enemy's infantry, and facilitate the attacks of the Division ; in
^o doing, the Divisional artillery may or may not be supported
by the corps artillery. But it must be directed by the Divisional
General as a portion of the tactical force he is handling. This
point is one of considerable importance. If by the tactical in-
dependence of artillery is meant that each battery is to engage
what it thinks fit, to halt and fire, or limber up and move as its
commander deems well, then the independence of artillery is
nothing but a loosening of the tactical union of the different
parts of an army, a loosening which will infalliby entail weak-
ness, if not disaster. But if by the independence of artillery is
meant that batteries are not to be treated as battalions of in-
fantry, but as an entirely different arm, belonging, however, to
the same tactical force although using a different weapon, and
requiru]g different arrangments; and working conjointly at all
times for one object, then the independence of artillery is an
advantage.

It is only when the infantry come within about 800 to 900
jards of the enemy that the best point for effecting an entrance
into his position becomes quite clear. The Divisional artillery
anust watch for any movement on the part of the infantry,
:fieeming to indicate the point of attack, and conform to it.
When dealing with the various zones of fire into which a battle-
field may be cUvided, it has been pointed out that the artillery of
the attack may come up to within some 1,000 to 1,200 yards of
the enemy's infantry, and this appears to be one of the special
duties of the Divisional artillery ; the Corps artillery, perhaps,
keephig a little further off, and taking up such a position that
it can at the proper moment reinforce with its fire C without
anoving; the Divisional artillery. The moment that this n^ay be
best done can be determined oidy by the Commanding Officer

130

of the Corps artillery, after a careful study of the progress and
phases of the attack.

Becker. He should be always well acquainted with the object of the action, and

tiie views of the general, all the ])atteries of the artillery should be at his
disposal to cany out liis orders completely.

The corps artillery is directed entirely Ijy the Officer Com-
manding the artillery of the corps, under the orders of the
Officer Commanding the Army-Corps, and its object is to rein-
force the Divisional artillery where requisite, or united to the
coi"ps artillery of other coi'ps to form a mass of artillery
sufficiently powerful to crush everything in front of it.

Artillery have been usually supported by s]-)ecial escorts told
off to the various batteries, composed of either cavalry or in-
fantry; on the actual battle-field, and indeed in general, it may be
questioned if such escorts are really requisite. The true escort
for artillery would appear to be the troops it is tactically acting
Avith. Sending squadrons or companies with batteries breaks
up units, and it may be fairly asked would a squadron or com-
pany constitute a real defence against any force that could
seriously threaten a battery ? To attach a company to a batter}^
is really to compel the battery to conform to a foot's pace when
it can go faster ; and very often should go faster ; or to forego
the advantage of the escort by leaving it behind. The position
of artillery, owing to its great range, will generally be sufficiently
near to the second line to enable it to receive effective support
from it. A few active, well-mounted, intelligent men attached
to a battery as a portion of its establishment, who could watch
the front and flanks, look into hollows and imseen gTound, and
bring back an intelligible and trustworthy account of what is in
front, would appear to be all that is really I'equired.

This by no means assumes that artillery should be left on a
flank unsupported, which it may lie, if a long line of guns has
been formed prior to any other troops coming up. But such
a support which the artillery commauder should see that he
has, is not a battery escort, it is a tactical support, and should
be on the flank some hundreds of yards in fi-ont.

The practice of sending artillery well to the front, Avhich has
become a necessity at present, appears to render the escort
system still more undesirable, as it will frequently happen that
a mass of artillery will be up, and in action, with such a lueagTe
force of cavalry and infantry to support it as Avould entirely
forbid escorts. Had the Prussians at ^lars-la-Tour told off a
company or a squadron to each battery they would have kept
a large proportion of their weak force out of action, and broken
up their brigades, and tactical formation entirely; companies
and squadrons as escorts to batteries, are very often so many
sabres and rifles lost to the army, for neither the one nor the
other, except in special cases, can help the general result of the
day. The infant ty being at too great a range, the cavalry being
in too small a fr-rce to have any useful effect. In addition to

131

which, such escorts increase the size of the mark to be fired at ;
and in case the batteries have to limber up, advance or retire
rapidly, they ai-o very likely to g'et in the "vvay.

When artillery appeared on the field of battle in small num-
bers, and short ran^'e ^uns only existed, such escorts were de-
cidedly requisite, but now that the effective range and accurac}'
of weapons has been largely increased, and the proportion of
artillery nearly doubled, it appears that these escorts, except in
special cases, are not requisite.

On the line of march, if the advance guard has done its duty
properly, there should be little fear of an attack on artillery,
although in such a case, more especially in a close country, an
infantry escoi't will doubtless be useful.

It has been said that artillery in action should move rarely,
and rather alter their elevation within certain limits than limber
up. Whatever movements artillery make imder fire should be
rapid ; not only is artillery so moving out of action a shorter
time, but it suffers far less when moving rapidly than when
moving slowl3^

At about 2,000 to 3,000 yards from us was the Conflans Road ; we saw a
Prussiau battery gallop up, halt, unliuil)er and o])eu tii-e iu a manner that
excited our admiration. It set the farm of Malmaison on lire ; at this moment
our sa])pers were very thick and attracted the enemy's attention, who sent a
shower of shell on them ; two of our guns then came up to fire on the enemy's
battery, but these guns came u}) at a foot's pace, in addition to which, being
able to conceal themselves behind a row of poplars before coming into action,
they disregarded the shelter and marched iu the open ; they then halted,
hesitated, and being fired at, retii-ed at a trot without firing one shot.

Artillery fire is far more effective when it is calmly delivered,
when every shot is carefully made to tell, than by hurried or
wild shooting. To shoot calmly, there must be a certain amount
of secmity, and hence, the actual position occupied by the guns
is one of the greatest importance. A common error is to place
guns on the most commanding positions, such positions are
often unsuitable, as not only are the guns better seen, but often
cannot themselves see the ground in front of the battery, and
consequently lose the benefit of their low trajectory.

The most favourable position for guns is a gentle hillock, sloping gradually
to the front and more abruptly to the rear, with a conuuand over the ground
occupied by the enemy, of about 1 in 100. As regards the ground in jilan,
guns may l)e drawn uj) with good effect behind a marsh, a pond, a river, or a
ravine, jn'ovided that such obstacles do not render an advance to the front
impossible.

The most obvious lessson to be learned from the campaigns of 1866 to 1870
is, that it is not alone desirable but necessary to cover the guns and horses of
a battery from the enemy's fire, either by field intrenchments or by the
accidents of the gi'ound ; for it is only when so covered that the battery can
be ensured against destruction from the enemy's infantry and artillery fire,
and that the men can preserve that sant/ froid \thich is essential for caiying
on an effective fire.

The importance of a thorough knowledge of a position cannot be over-
estimated by officers of the field artillery ; for the security of a battery depends
almost entirely, and the effect of its fire to a large extent, upon the use that is
made of the accidents of the ground.

K 2

Three months
with the Army
of the Rhine.
By an Officer
of Engineers.

Lieut. Hinie,
R.A., Prize-
Essay.

132

Campaign of
1866: official
account.
(Translated
by Hozier
and Wright.)

Tactical
retrospect.
Captain May.
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

This last is quite as true of the ground in rear as that on the
flanks, and it is very requisite that the eommunieation between
the guns and the wagons should be earefully seen to. The
Prussian artillery has been often reproached by Prussian writers
for not supporting the infantry effectively at Koniggriitz. A
great deal of this Avas due to the fact that the guns came into
action on one side of a small muddy stream over which there
Avere very few bridges, and across Avhich bridges might have
been put Avith ease, Avhile the Avagons remained on the other.

The difficulty of keeping \\\) the communication between the battei-ies and
their ammunition wagons was universally felt to be a very great inconvenience.

It arose from the scarcity of available passages over the Bistritz, only one
of the serjeant-majors succeeded in bringing his wagons u\) to their battery
and in supjilying it, as well as some of the neighbouring 4-pounder batteries,
with ammunition.

It is evident that artillery must, on the march, move very
near the head of the column, for nothing causes greater con-
fusion or delay than the attempt to pass troops up from the rear
of a long column to the front ; artillery being required early in
the action must be placed Avhere it can he got at. To haA^e long-
trains of guns in reserA^e if they exercise no influence on the
battle-field, is Avorse than useless. The eAdls of the system of
having guns in reserve is shown by the fact that the A'ery mo-
ment the French troops at St. PriA'at Avere being crushed by the
Pnissian artillery, there Avere many French guns in reserA'C
which never came into action at all. To place guns in reserA^e
is voluntarily to deprive oneself of a most powerful auxiliary
at the A^ery moment its aid is most urgently required. Vide
page 157.

We brought a numerous and imposing artillery into the field it is true, but
how many guns ever came into action I They planted themselves here and there
among the reserves and never found places anywhere to engage. Artilleiy
without tactical training and daring, who have merely a knowledge of technical
gunnery, will always find excuses and make impossibilities. What is the use
of an artillery that makes capital practice indeed, but which is never in the
right place ! much better one that blazes away cheerily, that at any rate
rejoices the heart of the men.

The efiective range of field artillery may be taken as from
2,000 to 3,()()0 paces, At the former distance and up to 2,500
paces its effect is A^ery considerable, beyond that range, unless
in special states of the Aveather, or under peculiar circumstances,
the effects of the shot cannot be detected, and it becomes
consequently impossible to correct the gun, DoAvn to 800
yards the action of artillery is very destructiA^e, within that
distance ?ts effect maybe considered to diminish, and Avithin that
distance the effect of tlic breech-loading rifle begins to get A'-ery
forn\idable, consequently the eftectiA'c fire of the artillery may be
said to begin just at the range that musketry becomes Avild.
Hence it should be borne in mind that artillery should rarely or
never come Avithhi 1,000 or 1,200 yards of infantry, and con-
versely, infantry should not be alloAved to come Avithin that
distance of guns, except in special cases, Avhen it may be

judged ri'qui.site to sac'vificr tlu' i;nn.s to the necessity of clieck-
iiijj; tliu eiR'iuy's advaiiCL'.

When ii luass of artiliery is duploycd it will be well to have the
buttciies not in one great line, but, so far as the ground achnits,
in echelons of two or three batteries, so as to allow troops to pass
throxigh if rcipiisitc.

The jjlaciiig and forming of sndi lines of o-nns are amongst tlie most i'<'giislauski.
ililliciilt things in the tactics of the tiiree arms. VVIiat ditHculties are often jn-e- | !?* , ''*^.
sentetl hy the gronnd, and how seldom have connnanding otticers the time to '■^ "'" "''"•)
reconnoitre it thoroughly before ordering uj) their batteries '. The (juestion is
not only to take position, but also to choose one wlience the enemy can be
eH'ectively cannonaded. They must further ])rovide for the jxissible advance
of the line either in echelon or by batteries, and, lastly, for retreat. If,
however, artillery wishes to cover effectively the advance and deployment of
infantry m;usses, and to render their attack possible in the shortest time, it
will often tinil it necessary to go ver}' much to the front, and perliaps to come
into action very badly protectetl against an attack from the enemy.

Itwa^na grand, inspiriting spectacle to see the German batteries overcome
all obstacles, form their line, and open tire. After allowing this a short time
to work, and one had not to wait long for the efiect to show itself, the long
line broke into sections, each of which advanced in turn towards the enemy's
position.

Artillery once engaged, even if many of the guns nnder fire are hn7-s de Ilohenlolic.
cnuib'tf, must not be relieved, although it may be supported b}' other artillery :
a superiority of guns gives great advantages in an artillery action.

The question what artillery should engage is a very impor-
tant one. If two armies are engaged with equal forces of artil-
leiy. and the guns engage one another, the artillery is simply
eliminated, and the other arms left to light it out between them.
Fighting under such circumstances ceases to be a scientific com-
bination of various military bodies, possessing different powers
and means of working, to nnitually support and remove one
another's deficiencies : it becomes a mere struggle of brute force.
If used in such a way, for all practical purposes both parties
might have left their artillery at home ; as infantry cannot ad-
vance and carry a position properly defended, if the defence be
not first shaken by artillei-y fire, it follows that for artillery
to simply engage artillery would be to deprive the attacking
army of many of its chances of success.

It has been said that ginis nmst come early into action, and
when acting (jn the offensive the guns must fire at ^voods, villages,
houses, and the enemy's infantry ; when the guns are acting on
the defen.sive, then they must fire on the attacking artillery from
the moment it shows itself.

If the attacking side shall have succeeded in establishing a superior Tactical
artillery, that is, as many batteries as it has at its disposition, the first question retrospect,
to lie ;usked is, Which is the iKjint to Ije attacked i Captain May.

If one battery exchanges shots with one of the enemy's l)atteries, another (Translated
with another, and the third tires on an occupied field work, while the fourth by Ouvry.)
thinks that it luvs discovered the ])osition of the enemy's reserve, we cannot call
this an artillery action having a common purijose. To silence the artillery of
the enemy cannot be the most important object of the side which takes the
offensive. Even if this should be done, the advance of the infantry on a
position defended by breech-loaders is not possible. To silence the attacking

Yon Walder-
8ee.

134

guns is the essential object of tlic aitillery on the dofensivo, then tlie infantiy
will know how to repulse the attuck of the enemy's infantry. F>ut artilleiy,
on the offensive, should, on tlie contrary, make it the ])rincipal obji-ct to play
upon the infantry of the enemy. An attack can only be thought of when this
lias been weakened ; it has oidy to engage with the artillery of the defensive in
so far as is absolutely necessary, alwa}s having the principal object in view.

Consequently tlie fii'c of artilleiy on the defensive must be
fsteady, careful, and every shot must be so aimed as to do mis-
chief to tlie enemy's guns. But althoug-h the attacker s artillery
must be one of the chief objects aimed at by the defender's aitil-
lery, yet it is erroneous to suppose that the advancing infantry
should be neglected. One of the objects of the deft-ndors is to
compel an early deployment; this can be best managed by a fire
on the attackers infantry, thereby compelling him to deploy
from heavy masses to an open formation, and this is such an im-
jiortant object with the defender, that small detachments of all
arms pushed out in front should be used for this purpose. The
artillery of the defenders actually in position shoukl therefore
direct there fire on the infantry, the moment it is within range
sufficient to allow an efticacious fire. But it should also Avatch
the moment any battery or brigade of batteries attempt to move
to the fi'ont, and should endeavour to crush it Avhen limbering up,
moving, or unhmbering. It should rarely fire at the skirmishing
line, but rather at the supports and main body. Such questions
as these have really to be settled to a great extent by the amount
of command the artillery has, and how the ground in front is
seen, the nature of the ground that has to be crossed, and how
the defending infantry are covered.

The moment a battery takes up a defensive position its com-
mander must ask himself — Where is the enemy most likely to
place his guns first? and as he advances. Where will he
place them next ? Having answered these questions, he must at
once measure his range, and carefully study the problem before
him, which is to place the attacking guns liori^ dr combat. Artil-
lery on the offensive should, on the contrary, while striving to
keep up as accurate a fire as possible,, fire more rapidly, its object
being to overwhelm a certain space with projectiles prior to the
infantry attack.

During the crisis of the action the artillery fire should be directed on the
attacking columns, this principle has no exception, unless some of the
attacking batteries are doing much harm to the defenders, when they may be
fired at also.

A new weapon, the mitrailleuse, has been introduced recently,
about the value of which opinions are divided. It may be justly
questioned if the Prussian opinion that they are useless is correct.
This weapon was concealed and only brought out by the
French just before the war ; its action was little understood and
its true jiosition entirely misunderstood : even artillery officers
of the highest rank in the French service appeared to be utterly
ignorant of its weaknesses. Fire was often opened with these wea-

135

pi»iis at a ran_i;c of 3.000 yards, Avlicn tlic luitiailleiiscs wcru use-
It' ss.

'The Gorniaii have, in their more recertt bookn, acknoM-ledged
the power of the mitrailleuse, nore especially in the last portion
of the attack, when its effect on mfautry is very great, and when
the nerves of the defenders are somewhat shaken. To be
brought out, hoAvever. at this stage of the attack, the mitrailleuse
must be carefully protected during the earlier portion of the action.

The FrcMich still adhere to it, and few who have seen the
graves in the hollow road above Woerth, or near Gravelotte,
will question its power in certain places.

It has been seen how Napoleon attached two guns to each
regiment of three battalions, thereby gix-ing it a powerful sup-
port if ordered to hold a village or wood, or to act on the
defensive. May not this be the true place of the mitrailleuse, to
support infantry when closely pressed, to be kept back until the
advance of the hostile infantry to a certain extent masks its
artillery, and then to be used on the advancmg infantry? The
range of the mitrailleuse liut very slightly exceeds that of the
lifle. But its effect in flaidving positions and firing down hollow
*l'oads or ravines must be very great ; attached to infantry
brigades in small numbers it might do good service without
being in the way.

EXGIXEERS.

The introduction of modern weapons has caused the develop-
nu-nt of tactics to take a peculiar direction, and has produced
clianges in the action of the various arms of the serAnce, but
nowhere are the changes more marked than in the art of the
Engineer.

Looking at the subject generally, we find that one of thefii'st
consequences of the development of fire-arms at the end of the
16th and beginning of the 3 7th centuries, was a large increase of
the offensive power of arms, a reduction of defensive armour;
aiid following from this a large increase of field-works. A his-
tory of war at this period would be the history ef entrenchments,
one army seizing a position, entrenching it and holding it, the
other watching it and afraid to attack.

The increase in roads, the opening up of the country, and the
greatly increased size of armies under Napoleon, united to his
peculiar strategy, the suddenness of action Avith which he sought
to overcome an enemy, and the great development which the
offensive received, all tended to the disuse of field-works and
entrenchments.

Although the rapidity of Napoleon^s marches tended to
develop other branches of the engineers art, that of bridging and
that of the pioneer, to a far greater extent than had previously
been knoAvn, yet Napoleon was clearly alive to the evils produced
by the neglect of field-works.

136

Napolcou. Field fortifications are always useful, never injurious when they are

rightly undurstoinl. The principles of field fortification stand in need of
improvement. This branch of the art of war is susceptiltle of great progress.

And in discnssinji; tliis subject lie points out one of the causes
Avliy field fortification has made such Kttle progress.

Ifapoleon. Engineer officers give up all their time to study i)ennanent works ;

infantry officers are ignorant of engineering.

It is often said that war is now so offensive in its character,
that in the field the use of earthworks is impossible, and except
in so far as the pioneer's duties are concerned, modern Avar finds
no room for field engineers. There is a great fallacy contained
in this statement, because the introduction of the breech-loader
has added so much to the power of tlie defence, that every means
should be taken to increase and develop it still more.

The campaigns of 1866 and 1870 are examples, on the part of
the Prussians, of the pure offensive being kept from the beginning
to the end. And yet we find a critic of the former writing as
follows : —

Tactical ^^ ^^® take a review of the battles of the campaign in this point of

retrospect. view we shall find that there were frequent occasions when the action

Captain May. ^^ ^'^^ engineera might have been iiseful. The reasons why that branch of the
(Ti'anslated service was less active than the others may be found in the remark that botli
by Ouvry.) were equally at fault. But, perhaps, the soldiers were not sufficiently

engineers, or the engineers soldiers enough, for this consideration to have

entered their thoughts.

The history of this century shows that field fortification, Avhen
it has been judiciously used, has invariably produced the greatest
results, and these results were produced by the application oftht^
same ideas, viz., the use of field-works to cover the frtrnt of a
large extended j)osition, one considerably larger than the troops
could hold in line of battle, the flanks being protected and the
communication for supplies being open to the rear.

The celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are an instance of this.
The English army with its flanks resting on the Tagus and the
sea, occupied Avith about 50,000 men a line of some 2o miles in
length ; it had its internal communications perfectly open, its sup-
plies were brought up by the sea and the French general could
do nothmg ; he Avas unable to outflank the lines, turn, or attack
them. They were so strong that any attack in front would have
failed ; the defenders could not be starved out, and urdess they
Avere regularly attacked by siege Avorks there Avas no means of
dealing Avith them. From those Hnes the tide of coiujnexf of the
French armies jirM began to recede.

Many years later the same thing happened at Sebastopol.
The Russians holding a straight line of weak field-Avorks Avith
their commimications open, actually adA^anced from their Avorks,
thrcAv up fresh trenches and Avorks, and almost besieged the allies
in their positions. Both these cases Avere brilliant examples of
what field-Avorks properly adapted to tactics can produce.

lo:

Duke of
Wiirtemberg.
(Translated
by Bobinsou.)

ViolletleDuc.

There were g-rcat opportunities in the Mockades of Paris and
Motz for the tactics displayed by the Russians to be repeated ;
and it is no exago-cration to say that had tJie g-arrison of Paris
been composed of good troops it might really have dug itself
out of Paris and through the German lines.

The Frencli put a singular, new and prdnii.sing mode of attack in practice
against Le Bourget and also against (.Chateau Ladonchanips, north of Metz.
They advanced from Drancyand Woip})y resi)eciively, against these })Iaces by
flying sjip. Tlie arnistice, and in the other case the capitulation, interrupted
this work which had already progressed far.

Hitherto the French corps of engineers has been rarely employed in line
of battle, but has been used almost entirely for the attack and defence of a
fortress, or fortifying some point, the preservation of which is of vital
importance. The recent campaigns have demonstrated the necessity of using
this arm in l)attle as well as at sieges. With long-range guns and the masses
of troops now ])ut in the field, battles become the work of days, not hours. It
follows from the many complicateil combinations, that the result will not
declare itself for 24 hours ; in order to work out these conditions troops must
be enabled to hold certain points at any cost, this can only be done by giving
the troops a certain amoiuit of security. The engineer arm has thus become
an essential to security.

There are many things which point at jiresent to a largely
extended use of tield-works in the future, and one of them is the
enormous extension of the great military powders of continental
Europe have given to field engineering, and the much larger
bodies of sappers that they now keep on foot than formeily.
History^ not unfrequently repeats itself, and the same causes that
produced the development of field-works in the days of the Duke
of Panna. and subsequently, appear to be again at work.

It fm-ther appears at the present day the necessity of making
flank attacks has given a fresh importance to field-works. When
speaking of this subject previously, the ease Avith wdiichan army-
having its flank threatened can change front and attack was
pointed out, and it was further pointed out that to prevent such
a change of front, an attack in front as well as on flank .was
needed. Now, is not it possible to check any attempted change
of front by the construction of field-W(irks '^. The Americans in
the civil war made a very extensive use of entrenchment^^ for
this pm-pose ; they covered their front, and then moved round to
a flank.

Lee, with two divisions of Longstreet's Corps, determined to keep the
enemy's front occupied for a time, whilst Jackson should make the cii'cuit of
the Federal right. The Federal work of entrenching consisting, as usual, chiefly
of making breastwoi-ks of felled trees, was continued through the night and
following morning, and Hooker strenuously pressed this labour on. as necessary
to the success of the design he had lately formed of remaining still and
receiving the attack which he expected. But Lee, as we know, was purposely
deceiving him as to its direction, and contimied on the morning of the 2nd,
as on the day before, to cover his own weak line by similar means. Mean-
while, Jackson began at dawn, with his wonted skill, to execute the movement
which crowned the brilliant successes of his life.

Flank attacks are alarming to the best troops, and are especially "Edinburgh
applicable to the case of a forest engagement, when the enemy's line, broken Kevicw."

Campaign in

Virginia.

Chesney.

1P,8

into ^skirmisllel•s eacli covereil liy a treo, could be forced back from the front
only by slow degrees, and witli consitlei'able ^"icritice of men ; and yet may be
approached without observation at eithei- extremity. At the period of the
war of which we are writing it had become a fixed habit of the armies to cover
every hundred yards gained by a breastwork wherever the materials could be
found.

Many similar quotations could be given as illustrating the
system by Avliich the comnianclers on both sides in the Anieiican
war sought to use tield fortification for its legitimate purpose,
viz.. that of enabling a small body of men to resist a large one, or
in other words to secure a portion of an army from a front attack,
while the remainder was used to strike on the flanks.

The whole spirit of modern Avar is to reduce everytliing to
calculation, to leave nothing to chance, to pro-vdde for and foresee
all possible combinations, whether arising from moral causes,
such as panics umongst the men, or from actual physical causes,
such as the enemy's fire, or the configuration of the ground :
Avhatever then increases the security of certain places or theii"
defensive power, is of the highest importance.

The duties of the engineers in the field may be divided into
two classes : —

1st. The duties of making, repairing, or destroying com-
munications, including, in the Avord communication,
roads, bridges railways, and telegraphs. Thef^c may
he claxsed iogetlier as iiioneer duties.

2nd. The preparation of positions for attack or defence,
irhich is the higher (Inty of the nnlitari/ engineer, and
where the art of fortification must be considered
entirely in a tactical point of vieAv.

With reference to the first class of duties, the men and
means must be iuA^ariably present Avhen required. The engineers
should march with the advance guard, and must be sufficiently
supplied Avith tools and materials, although the fact that they
must be mobile, should keep the number of carriages or other
transport accompanying them at the minimum. It is hopeless to
bring troops Avanted at the head of a column all the Avay up from
the rear, and like the artillery the engineers must march in front
if they are really to be useful. In an adA^ance on the track of a
retreating army, the destruction of large bridges does not entail
so much delay as the destruction of many small bridges, and the
formation of numerous small obstacles, all of Avhich cause halts to
be made, necessitate the deployment of a certain amount of force,
and in many cases the repair of roads, bridges, and removal of
obstacles. Hence it is desirable that all troops forming advanced
or rear-guards should be proAaded with engineers ; and as ad-
vanced and rear-guards are usually formed of caA'alry, some
military writers have advocated the employment of mounted
sappers. When Napoleon advanced on Charleroi in 1815, his light
caA^alry adA'-ance was detained for a long time at the bridge over

1 o\)

the vSanibri-' which Avas only ck^arcd by the sappers of llir ^-uurd
being" sent across coiuitry ou horseback.

If the ini])orUiiift' of tlie works, wliii'li foiiii tlif sjicciiLlity of ingiiietT Brailniont.
soldiere, be taken into account, it must Ite aekno\vle(lge<i that in most armies
there ai-e too few of tliem. The strengtli of these; troops, is by no means pro-
portioned to the (hitv they ha\e to perform. The Duke of Wellington con-
sidered that an army could not have too many. The engineer s(jldier can at
all times, when not employed executing the W(.rk for which he has special
training, act as an infantry soldier.

A good organireition would be that which nttaches to each division of
infantry a battalion of engineers comjiosed of four companies, or a company to
each regiment.

We think it would be also useful to attach to each divi.sion of cavalry a
company of mounted shippers to destroy oi- re-establish connnnnication, create
ambuscades, intrench posts ; operations which an advanced or rear-gnaixl
has frequently to jjcrform, or when a cavalry corps operates on the flank of an
enemy. The War of the Spcession (in America) has shown that it is often
requisite to destroy at great distances from the army lailways xiseful to an
enemy, or to re-establish a line which has been cut.

The idea of having- mounted sappers is by no means a new
one, it is referred to by Frederick the Great in the following-
te-i"ms: —

There is aii idea which has just struck me, it is (juite new ; I vrould like to Frederick,
give to the advanced gunrd mounted s:',ppers to break up the enemy's road,
cut down small woods, wdiich might interfeie with the vedettes, make a
small bridge, mark a ford, make connnunicatious or an endpacement for guns
when they come up, a jiarapet for the outposts, a retreuchmeut for infantry,
loop-hole houses, sink wells, nmke trous-de-lou]i, I'emove or place .stones, pull
down masonry, scarp or cut down the banks of a rivulet. To do this an officer
should be with the advanced guard ; he should be well-ni(junted and
intelligent.

In all such operations time is of the greatest importance,
and miless engineers are so equipped that they can be in the
place required at the proper time, the army must suffer by delays.
The organization of the engineers should therefore be such as
will admit of small bodies being detached if requisite, and yet
allow the whole to be reunited rapidly Avhen necessary. Such
operations, however, belong rather to the subject of marches
than to tactics.

It is the second class of duties, or those of the mllitav)/
engineer as distinguished from the pioneer w^iere the tactical
relation of field-works to the other arms is fully developed,
although at times the line between the two kinds of work may
be difficult to draw. In a tactical ]3oint of view every field of
battle may be divided into (.hstinct portions, the defensive and
offensive portions. The former is usually that which embraces
the key of the position. And it should be the object of all
field-works to strengthen such positions as shall enable them to
be held by a small force, and release the mass of the troops to
strike an offensive blow where it can be best delivered. No
defence can possibly be successful that has not an offensive as
its basis. The mere fact of field Avorks being constructed is far
too often considered as limiting the action of the troops to a-
strick defensive; viewed m such a light, entrenchments arc

140

useless, if" not liurtful, and lieuce arises the absolute necessity of
viewing all such works in their tactical relation to troops.

Napoleon. Those who neglect the su])j)oit which tlie art of the engineer can give in

the fiehl gratuitously dejirive themselves of a power and an auxiliary never
liurtful, always useful, and often indispensable. To maintain that victory falls
to him who can ailvance and manteuvre, and that it is not requisite to work,
is to say what tends to produce error, and is false.

Field-works mnst not be scattered about irrespective of the
plan of action of the g-eneral commanding- in chief; they must
at all times be made subservient to the action of the troops.

Brailmont. It is manifest d /j/'jVw/, that the defences of a jiosition mnst be in accord-

ance with the plan of the battle. Works must not be constructed or ordered,
except by the General Commanding.

A skilful General will always choose positions in such a way as to give
him the advantage of ground, or, in other words, those that enable him to
reinforce a portion of his front, occupying one position with a smaller number
of men and concentrating his ])rincipal force on the other, ready to take the
offensive.

Victory can only be the result of a successful attack ; it is requisite to
have the maximum force ready on the point and at the decisive moment of
attack.

In the opinion of some, shock tactics, for a long time in favour, must now
yield to fire tactics. This is an error. Neitlier one nor the other are good by
themselves, or absolutely. The shock must be prejiared by the lire, and the
fire without shock cannot give victory.

In organizing the defence of a position held by an army capable of taking
the offensive, the Engineer must keep clearly in view that the attack must be
lieljied. This may be done by strengthening a portion of the position of an army
which is on the defensive, so as to i-ender a large numljer t)f men disposable
for an attack at the right moment. When, therefore, a position offers this
double field, the offensive and the defensive, it is the best that can be found.

The defensive zone is that part the attack of which offei-s the most
difficulty, either because the ground is covered with obstacles, or because the
artillery can take favourable positions.

The offensive zone is that where large bodies of troops can act freely and
decisively.

The object of fortifications on the former should be to stoj) the enemy as
long as possiljle, with as few men as possible.

The object of fortification on the latter should be twofold, —

1. To shelter the troops of the lii-st line until the moment everything is

ready for attack .

2. To support the troops, if driven back after an unsuccessful attack, to

stop the i^rogress of the invader and prevent him establishing
himself in the position he has won.

Upon the offensive zone shelter trenches and epaulments only should be
constructed for a ])ortion of the battalions in first line, with Lirge intervals
for the troops to advance through.

The hedges in front should be cut and passages opened through the
woods.

Intrenchments on this zone are most useful ; they mark the limit of any
retrogratle movement, they give confidence and enable the troo])s to be re-
formed. On the defensive zone, batteries should be established to take the
enemy in flank as he advances towards the offensive zone. With the same
object posts, houses, and farms should be held in advance, which will be of
great use in sui)porting a retreat.

Works, which are the real points of support of an army, should be closed
at the gorge otherwise, once the enemy passes them the defenders will retire,.

141

iind experience pi'oves tli;it no reliance can be placed on troo])s which retreat ;
in danger, everyone thinks of himself.

The foreg-oing- is a clear definition of the principles on which
works should be ci»nstriictcd, and it is of great importance that
only such as can really be completed should be attempted ; in
almost every case in war (5 or 7 horn's may be calcrilated on to
put a 2:»osition in a state of defence, and if the engineers and
tools are where they should be, this period is ample ; in six
hours works of a Very powerful nature may be constructed
which will effectually support an army.* It is generally allowed
that an entrenchment occupied by 200 men offers as much
resistance as a battalicm not so covered, and that the labour of
1,000 men for G hours on the position occupied by a division is
equivalent to the reinforcement of a brigade. The whole history
of war is filled with examples of these truths.

The villages of Aspern and Essling, linked by a river
embaukment, saved the French army in 1809. The neglect of
the defences of the villages in front of Leipzig ruined the same
anny in 1814.

The Archduke Charles, speaking of field-works says, "Like
*' any weapon, they lose their value Avhen badly used, that is to
" say Avhen constructed without an object, without intelligence,
" and defended without bravery."

The engineer, in virtue of the character which is particular to his branch Tactical

of the Service, may hold an equilibrium in military operations. He may rctrospcfit.

render the success gained by an impetuous attiick secure by quickly throwing Captain May.

up field works Ijehind the attaching force, and in the same manner st(jp a (Translated

retreat by hastily constructed entrenchments, the holding of which then "J Ouvry.)
concerns the honour of the trooi)s.

At KonigrUtz the Austrians appear to have thrown up a good
many entrenchments, but there was no tactical connection
betAveen the Avorks and tlie troops ; that is to say, the Austrian
engineers, acting under the orders of the Commanding Engineer
of the army, made a number of works on the ground, ordered by
the General in Chief, Benedeck, to be occupied, but it seems
that the corps leaders and Division leaders knew nothing-
whatever of these works, or of the exact position they Avere to
hold; they extended far beyond the position intended, and the
Commanding Engineer riding roimd, some hours after the battle
had begun, found there Avere no troops near the works at all,
and Avheu they were occupied the Prussian tide of A^ctory Avas
rising too fast for anything to stop it. This is another of the
many proofs that the proper means of Avorking the auxiliary
arms of tlie serA-ice is not by making them independent of the
others, and thus forming an imperium in iiiqierio, but by preserv-
ing a close tactical connection betAveen all arms, Avhicli can only
"be done by Avorking through the Generals commanding the
tactical bodies. Thus if a Division be ordered to entrench a
position, the Divisional General should, on receiving the order,

* At Gravelotte, the French had certainly double this time at their disposal.

142

Tactical
retrospect.
Captain May.
(Translated
by Ouvry.)

give his iiistriictioiiB tliereon to the Divisional Eug'ineers, who
may, if requisite, be streng'thened by the Engineer Resei'ves,
precisely as the Divisional Artillery is worked under the
Divisional General, but supported, if requisite, by the CoqDS
Artillery. To form works under orders from the General in
chief command, Avithout reference to the Generals who command
the troops to occupy the Avorks, is an CAndent abandonment of
the principle of individual responsibility.

We often read in military history of villages being taken and
retaken several times in the course of the day ; these are the
moments when success may be secm'ed, and when the companies
of engineers should be forthcoming.

We were aware that as far to the rear as the Aupa thei'e was no reserve
woi'th mentioniug to relieve the hard ])ressed troops. An intrenched battery
on the Kapellenberg (for the construction of which there was ample time),
would have supplied the want of these reserves, and have re-established the
battle, but there were no pioneers, we had left them behind.

Time for the construction of works in the field does not so often fail,
as the presence of the engineers and tools at the right time on the right
place.

According to Prussian ideas intrenchments had fallen into disrepute ;
they were thought to be detrimental to that offensive spirit, which was the
leading principle in our conduct in the war. The example of that of the
Austri^uis led us to scout the idea, but we rejected the good with the bad. The
fault of the Austrians was, that they threw up their intrenchments beforehand
and then expected that the light woulil take such a course as would render
them useful. Instead of making the tight dependent on the intrenchments,
we would make the intrenchments dependent on the fight.

The same wiiter observes, in concluding his remarks on the
engineers : " the next campaign will show us this fourth arm
acting in rivalry with the others in the battle." His prophecy
was fulfilled, for not only were the pioneer duties of the Prussian
army admirably performed, but the true spirit of the use of field
engineering was in many cases seized ; one remarkable instance
was at Mars-la-Tour, — early in the day the Prussians gained
possessien of Vionville, on the Verdun road ; the instant the
infantry got in, two companies of engineers supplied with 6
Avagons of tools were pushed on ; they were charged by a
regiment of French hussars and lost some of the Avagons and a
section of one of the companies, but the remainder got in to the
village, and so strengthened it that all the attempts made to
retake it failed. And although at the close of the day the
Prussian right and left wings were forced back by the French,
yet the village of Vionville, forming the apex of the Prussian
position, was never lost, and effectually barred the road to
Verdun. Here fortification was used correctly; it confirmed
and established the success of the infantry, and secured the
object for which the Prussians struggled so hard on the KJth.

That niglit the French determined to hold the position ex-
tending from Gravelotte to the north, and, pivotting on their
left, they threw back their line a quarter of a circle on the 17th.
An examination of the gi-ound slioAve that the position they

14a

occupied was susceptible of diviHion into an ofl'ensive and a
defeusivo zone. Thr latter extended tVoni the high g-round
abore Gravelotte to the centre of the 3rd (Jorps near the farm-
house of Ijeipzig-. The former from that point to near tlie River
Orne, with numerous farm-yards, houses, Avoods, and posts in
the front. J^ut the French system of having almost all their
tools Avitli the reserve bag-g-age prevented advantage behig
taken of this; the mass of carnages belonging to tlie army
Avere parked at the back of their pcxsition in tlie St. Germain
ravine, the steep sides of which perfectly precluded the engineers
from getting at their tools.

The 2nd (^orps, Avhich was on the extreme left, entrenched
itsposition,andtheir entrenchments, united to the manyshalloAv
ijuarries made for road-metal, enabled General Frossard to hold
this position with comparatively little loss, althougli it was con-
tinually attacked b}'- the 1st Army under Steinmetz, Avhich
suffered much. AVriting of this, General Frossard says : —

If the losses of the 2nd Army-Corps, at the Battle of Gravelotte, were Frossavcl.
comparatively slight, this is undoubtedly owing to the pi'ecautions taken in
sheltering the men behind earth and epaiilnients, and to the care taken in
profiting be all depressions in or excavations of the ground, not by allowing the
troops to hide behind such things, but by using them to protect the luen when
firing. We have never seen so remarkable an instance of the advantages
which this method of entrenchment atFords. We jioint it out for the attention
of those who will hereafter exercise commands.

It was quite feasible for the French, knoAving the natural
and artificial strength of this portion of the position, to have
diminished the force holding it considerably, and so reinfoi-ced
the right or the portion of the army acting on the offensive
zone, either by extending the troops in that direction, or sending
the Avhole of the reserve to support it. But on the extreme
right the Aveakest corps in the army AA'-as placed, one that had
not a single engineer or tool with it. If the positions at St.
Privat and Roncourt had been strengthened with shelter
trenches, those villages properly placed in a state of defence,
and a poAverful reserA'^e AA^itli a second line of entrenchments
placed in rear, near the Jaumont Avoods, not only Avould this
portion of the position have been almost impregnable, but an
admirable field for taking the offensive andsAveeping down Avith
the right coA^ered by the Orne, Avould have been afforded. No
one who examines the history of this battle but must feel that
had fortifications been used to support the troops, Avith judg-
ment, a different result might have followed.

The Avant of tools A\'as sorely felt all along the French line,
from the fact of the tools not being in the front but in the rear.
In the centre, the 3rd Corps had to use its raihvay section to
make Avorks.

I was sent to try and bring up the corps supplies. I was told that doing 3 Months with
so would be of great use. These were mere words ; the order was impjssible the Army of
anybody who looks at a map can see that wagons could not come up the the Rhine,
slopes. About 7 o'clock the general sent for the railway section to do some Otiicier de

Genie.

144

Wright.

Boguslauski.
(Translated
by Graham.)

work in the first line ; as it descended the hill the enemy doubtless took it for
;i fresh batteiy, for they covered it with a shower of shells, but the little
coluiun broke into a trot, and not a shell struck the sappers or their wagons.

The moment the Prussians carried St. Privat their onguieers
stren^'thened it, and formed a slielter trench between it and the
cresst of the hill, Avithan epaulment on its right flank threatening
that portion of the French position still defended. It is requisite,
however, as was stated in the first chapter, that if the full advan-
tages of armies carefully trained in peace is desired by the State
that maintains them, officers must knoAv more than their own
special arm of the service ; and this is perhaps more essential for
officers of those arms of the service, cavalry, artillery, and
engineers, which are auxiliaries to the main force, — infantry, —
than for infantry officers themselves. And this is all the more
requisite now, when the power breech-loaders has given to
infantry is considered.

The conclusion I draw, says an American general, is that a simple trench,
defended by two ranks of infantry, covered by abattis or other obstacle, and
placed on ground which allows the range of their arms to develop itself, is
absolutely impregnable except by surprise.

This was before the days of breech-loaders, and undoubtedly
the power of musketry has since been increased many fold. The
following remarks are worthy of attention.

The works directed by Engineer Officers, however excellent they may
have been with regard to their technical execution, did not always show that
those Officers had, so to speak, understood how to reduce to practice the
tactical ideas of the present time.

One might not only often remark that they had missed a just comprehen-
sion of existing infantry tactics, particularly of the effects of fire of the
breech-loaders and other arms lately introduced, but also that they had not
understood the ground or made use of it according to correct defensive
tactical jirinciples. Field fortifications must be based upon tactics, and
especially u]Jon defensive tactics, and must keep pace with their progi'ess.

The art of planning works of this description is evidently quite different
from that of an engineer attack on a fortress.

In order to instruct Engineer Officers in tactics, it would appear advisable
to attach them to infantry for some weeks in summer in the same manner,
although on a larger scale, as they now are to pioneer battalions.

It is further "desirable that the latter should take a larger share in our
field mauojuvres, and that detachments of them should be furnished to
commands of the other arms.

CHAPTER IV.

Combined Tactics.

However desirable it is that officers should know more than
their own branch of the service, and should understand the
nature and action of other arms, yet it is a mischevours error
for any arm of the service to seek to undertake the duties of
others.

A correct tactical action is one in which the powers and pecu-

Harities of caeli arm of the service shall be developed to attain
one object. A g'ciieral looks on tlu; different arniR as instriniients
for attaining his object, precisely as a carpenter regards his
tools ; but no good carpenter woidd use his chisel as a saw, or
his mallet as a hammer.

Therefore, althongh officers must kuow and understand
something of the duties of the various branches of tlie army,
any attempt to make these branches interchangeable, to make;
artillery work as cavalry, infantry as artillery or engineers, is to
use a thing for a purpose it is not intended for, at all times a
slow and costly operation, producing a minimum amount of
result with a maximum expenditure. In armies, infantry un-
doubtedly takes the lead, and to its action that of the other
arms must be subordinated. An intimate knowledge of infantry
tactics consequently becomes most essential for officers of the
auxiliary arms, — cavalry, artillery, and engineers, it being their
duty to aid and facilitate the action of the infantry, and they
must seek, not what is most advantageous and best viewed from
a cavalry, artillery, or engineer point of view, but what is best
viewed from an infantry point of view.

Invariably the action of the auxiliary arms is either pre-
paratory, or supporting, and good results can only be obtained
when this tactical relation between the arms is clearly under-
stood and appreciated.

Hence it is that we find modern tactical ^niters laying great
stress on the fact, that commanding officers of artillery and
engineers should be first-rate tacticians and strategists, and that
connnands of these important auxiliary arms should in the field
be held by men who possess a good deal more than a technical
knowledge of their profession, which, however valuable in peace
time cannot in the field compensate for ignorance of the points
of contact between their own and the other arms.

The relative position of the officer commanding the artillery
and engineers as regards the Divisional and Corps generals, and
the Divisional and Corps artilleiy and engineers, should be
clearly understood. Nothing can be worse than the attempt to
centralize the direction of these arms in the hands of the senior
officer attached to the army, such a system entirely destroys
the tactical relation of the forces commanded by the Divisional
and Coi*ps generals. On those officers rests the responsibility of
success, it can be shifted on no one else. If the artillery and
engineers under their command are interfered Avith by the senior
officer of the arm, then responsibility must cease, and where there
is no power there can be no responsibility.

The Division being the tactical unit, its component portions
should never be intei-fered with. It has been pointed out, page
141, that disastrous consequences ensued to the Austrian army
at Koniggriitz by this system of interference ; the same results
appear to have followed at Paris.

146

Yinoy. The conceiitration of the various military departments, desinte tlie great

zeal of each, produced everywhere ilifficulties and delays which were irritat-
ing and much to be regretted. As regards the artillery and engineers it
followed from these arrangements that during the siege they were entirely
distinct from and independent of the commanding officers of corps and
Divisions, and tlie confusion consequent on these arrangements caused dis-
astrous consequences. Batteries were often built, armed, and even opened
fire without the commandant of the troops in the immediate A'icinity being
informed, thus these batteries were unsu])i)orted and in danger of cai)ture.
Friction of this kind has the great disadvantage that when the hoiu- for
action arrives, each commander thinks only of his special arm witliout any
leference to the functions of others, and from this AA^ant of co-Oj>eratiou
far too often results inferior to M'hat might fairly have been anticipated
under a better system ai'e obtained. The lire of artillery imdoulitedly paves
the way for an infantry attack, but it also may hamper it. Artillery must
receive support from infantry, but by our new regulations this cannot be
done, the two arms working quite independently of one another. This subject
■ is a most important one ; a conflict of authoi-ity in action is so nuich to be
depi'ecated that it is absolutely requisite that the faults of our organization
should be remedied. Although the commandant of the 13th corps could not
agree with the vieAvs of the Governor of Paris, he cheerfully obeyed his
orders. No serious action is possible without the most complete subordination
of the artillery and engineers to the officer's commanding corps and Divisions,
and our regulations must be altered.

The best way of obtaining- the results which General Vinoy
considers, and justly considers, so absolutely requisite, is to send
all correspondence and orders for the Divisional artillery and
engineers, to andTrom the senior officers of those arms, throug-h
the Divisional or corps generals. By these means the artillery
and engineers will be alwa}-s properly e7i rapport with the other
arms.

An army is composed of the various arms of the service in
proportions suitable for the work it has to perform.

If a campaign in a hilly difficult country is to be undertaken,
the cavah-y and artillery would be diminished, the engineers in-
creased. If a war Avas to be carried out in which frequent sieges
were anticipated, the artillery and engineers would be increased.
Further, the nature of the climate and the quality of the enemy,
the means of communication, and the possibility of getting
supplies, must be taken into account.

A campaign in New Zealand differs from one in Europe, and
a war in India from an Abyssinian campaign.

Certain definite proportions have been laid down by writers
as a general or normal proportion for the various arms.

Napoleon, ^^ *^^^ infantry of an army be represented by unity, the cavahy should

be ^, the artillery ^, the engineers •Jjj, the train g'g. But if the country be
mountainous the cavalry need be only ^.

Thus, if the infantry of an army be 3O,.00O :men-, the whole
force on this assumptiom -would be : —

147

Infantiy 30.000

Cavalry 7,500

Artillery 3,750

Engineers . . . . , . . . . . 750

Train 1,000

Total 43,000

These proportions seem to requii'e revision, the cavahy force
being very large, the artillery and engineers small. At the time
Napoleon wrote, there were no telegraphs or railways, and the
pontoon train in the French service formed a portion of the
artillery, not the engineer serAace.

The proportions of the different arms in a German army
coi'ps are :■ —

Infantry 26,486

Cavalry . . . . 4,128

Artillery 4,026

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . 1,254

Train 2,177

Administrative Servicer . . . . . . 1,054

Staff 223

24,768

9,478

34,246

23,214

7,524

, .

13,062

. ,

6,324

about

500

Total 39,341

This would give the following proportions : infantry 1,
cavalry J., artillery 4-, engineers Jj, train jL, administrative corps
■jL. If the totals of the Ilnd Anny in the last war be taken, it
will appear that the whole force was composed as follows :

Infantry .. 177,942

Corps Cavalry . .
Divisional Cavalry

Artillery

Engineers

Train

Administrative Services

Telegraph and Kailway Corps

The proportions, therefore, between the different arms in the
araay-corps and the army remain unaltered, except the cavalry,
which is increased from -^ to between -i- and -i-, and the engineers
slightly increased by the addition of the railway and telegi-aph
coi-ps. These proportions are of course those of field troops ; as
is well known, the whole of the Prussian lines of communication
are kept up by special bodies,* and the siege corps are also
formed specially. If these numbers for the North German army-
corps be compared with Napoleon's, it will be found that the
proportion of Cavalry is shghtly reduced, the proportion of
artillery, engineers, and train, increased.

* This fact is often forgotten when speaking of the Prussian Army. The
number of oflicers and the various arms of the service are calculated from the ainny-
corps, forgetting that the whole " Etappen," a force destined for the lines of
communication, are not included, and that staff officers and soldiers for these necessary
duties are in other armies drawn from the fighting bodies, which are consequently
weakened.

L 2

148

Clauscwil/!. Artilleiy being the 'most powerful arm for destruction, cavalry the

weakest, the question should be asked how much artillery can an army have ?
What is the necessary number of cavalry ?

But whatever be the proportion of the different arms of the
service, in fixing them, the manner in which the army is
raised, Avhether by universal service, conscnption, or voluntary
enlistment must be considered, and the nature of the service
the army is to be engaged on, should be well weighed before
they are definitely laid down.

Infantry is undoubtedly the main stay and the backbone of
all amiies, whether it be viewed in the light of immbers, ov its
action on the field of battle. Its fire is more deadly than that
of artillery, its action is sure, while that of cavalry is fitful.

On the infantry of an army the brunt of the fighting falls,*
it suffers more in action and more on the line of march, and to
it the action of all other arms are subordinate. Artillery fire
but to pave the way for an infantry attack, or to check an
infantry advance. Cavahy charge but to confirm an infantry
victory or to check a pursuit. Engineers open roads and make
bridges, to allow infantry to pass ; they strengthen positions,
and throw up earthworks, but to protect and cover the infantry,
or to enable a small body to resist a superior force. On infantry
tactics the whole superstructure of military operations must be
built.

But it must be borne in mind that in any tactical action, one

arm of the service without the others is really incomplete, and

the true function of tactics, is to so apply the action of each

arm, that not only its special power shall be developed, but that

it shall be developed at the time and place requisite for the

support of the other arms.

jS'apoleoii. A good infantry is doubtless the nerve of an army, but if it has to struggle

for any length of time against a very sui:»erior ai'tillery it gets demoralised

and will be destroyed.

Tactical retro- The expression, ' infantry tactics,' is essentially a scientific abstraction,

spcct. Captain necessary for the fixing of scientific ideas, elementary forms. In a battle

May. (Trans- there is no such thing as infantry tactics. Tactics are for the handling of

lated by the branches of the army united. It cannot be said at any moment during a

Ouvry.) battle, — here the artillery tactics cease, and those of the infantry conmience ;

both of whom ai'e constantly interwoven one with the othei'.

There are really only two ways in which a battle can arise :

1. When one army is on the defensive, and occupies a

strong position, the other moving forward to attack
it.

2. When the two armies meet, both being in movement.
Auerstadt, Solferino, Mars-Ia-Tour, are all examples of this

* The loss of the various arms of the Service during the recent war are given
for the German army as follows : —

Infantry . . 4,458 ofRcers, 112,C29 uicn, or 17 6 per cent, of the whole force.
Cavalry .. 279 „ 4,342 „ 6 3 „ „

Artillery.. 422 „ 5,597 „ 6-5 „

Engineers 48 „ 533 „ 2*8 „ „

Train .. 7 „ 105 „ -3

latter kind of battle, but in every case the rule of attacker or
defender falls to one side, sometimes to each side alternately,
and it may vary in difierent portions of the field, the same army
being on the defensive in cue place, and on the offensive in
another. However a battle may actually come abouc, the order
of march of the troops forming- the army miist be intimately
connected with the action of the troops in line of battle ; con-
sequently the order of march must be invariably detailed so as
to allow of the arms first required being near the head of the
column. If the way in which battles begin is considered, it will
be found that the cavalry of the advanced guard usually find
the enemy and report his position : if he is in a defensive position,
they report the circumstance, if on the move they report the
force immediately in front of them. In all probability they will
be driven in on the main body of the advanced guard, the com-
mander of which must then take up the best defensive position
he can, to cover the deployment of the troops in his rear. If
the enemy are holding a defensive position, he will not be much
troubled, because few generals will like to leave a carefully pre-
pared position, and to give up too soon the advantage of acting
on the defensive, or to move until the plans of the attacker have
declared themselves.

In such a case the commander of the advanced guard,
knowing that the enemy is to be attacked, must take up such a
position that he may protect and cover the advance of the main
body to the attack.

If the enemy ai-e not holding a defensive position, he "uall in
nil likelihood be hardly pressed, and have some difficulty in main-
taining a point (Vappui on which the troops in rear are to form
up to the right or left, such as Hasseuhausen, held by Gudin at
the battle of Auerstadt. Consequently it follows that those
arms of the service which can facilitate the formation, should be
near the head of the column. Hence there is a very close con-
nection between the tactical action of troops on a field of battle,
and their order of march, and it is essentially requisite that the
order of march be subordinated to the deployment of the army
into line of battle.

It is manifestly the object of the officer commanding the
advanced guard to find a position such as Avill compel the
enemy to develop a considerable force to attack him, and at
the same time enable him to make head against such an attack.

Such a position can generally be found ; it is often desirable
to occupy a small village or town, loop-hole some houses or
buildings, or form some trenches, which will enable the advanced
guard to remain in possession of the ground. It is requisite in
many cases to open passages to the right and left for troops
to move through and facilitate the formation ; a strong body of
engineers should therefore move with the advanced guard. If
the enemy is in position, and does not show any inclination to

150

attack, a portion of the engineers may be detailed to remove
obstacles, form any small bridges that may be required, such as
those that were needed for the passage of the Bistritz and Saner,
and facilitate the advance of the troops beyond the position
taken up by the main body of the advanced guard. But as the
line of advance of an army acting on the offensive will, if
defeated, be generally its line of retreat, it will be always well
to strengthen some points which in case of disaster may afford
a rall^'ing place to troops that are worsted. But no position
can be properly defended without artillery, consequently the
commander of the advanced guard should have a strong force
of artillery AAdth him, which he must use boldly, to search out
the enemy's position, compel him to unmask his guns, and
declare himself. The commander of the artillery of the ad-
vanced guard has a very responsible office thrown on him. He
must not only find positions for his own guns, but he sliould,
from the fire of the enemy, be able to select places for the corps
batteries as they come up, and to facilitate this object he
should place his batteries so as to leave room for others to come
up in support of them.

The battle of Mars-la-Tour offers an excellent example of
the action of an advanced guard on a large scale, when meet-
ing an army on the move. The object of the Germans was to
hold the French fast, and prevent their retreat on Verdun,
Avhile the remainder of their army came up. Thus the troops
that first attacked the French were really acting like all other
advanced guards, they were covering the front and giving time
for the deployment of the army.

The German general, Alvensleben, learning from his recon-
noitring officers that the French were encamped between Vion-
ville and Rezonville, determined to attack them with his own
corps, the Ilird, and what other troops were near.

At 9 A.M. the Germans established between Tronville and the
road by which the French were retreating, four horse artillery
batteries and three cavalry regiments, which surprised the
French encampments, compelled the French to retire and
deploy, facing west across, and at right angles to, the Verdun
road.

At 11, Vionville was taken by the Prussian infantry, and
immediately strengthened by tv/o companies of Fngiueers, and
it at once became a point cVappni, round which the whole
Prussian line pivotted throughout the day.

The four horse artillery batteries Avere soon supported with
four other batteries, which fired on the French infantry masses,
causing them to suffer severely ; soon, however, the German
anmiunition began to be exhausted, and the ammunition columns
left at Gorzc, although ordered up in time, could only come up
the ravine with great difficulty, and under a shower of French
shells. Then the corps artillery came into action to the east ot

151

Tartleville. The operation vran no easy one. Once in poaitioa
it -was received Avith a terrible infantry fire from FlaA-ig-ny. But
the batteries held their ground, being' shortly supported by four
more batteries, which extended the line of guns to the left
towards Vionville. The lire of the French infantry, although at
900 to 1,200 yards, caused great loss, covering tlie batteries
with a rain of bullets.

The eight batteries in position near Vionville, and the seven
near Flavigny, now concentrated their fire on Flaviguy and the
Cistern wood; these 15 batteries completely cleared that impor-
tant position, which fell to the Germans about 12 o'clock
without any serious infantry fighting. The 2nd French Corps,
shaken by the terrible artillery fire, called on its cavalry for
support, and a sharp cavalry action ensued, under cover of whicK
nine of the 15 German batteries advanced beyoud the Flavigny
road so as to embrace that place in the German line of battle:
three other batteries advanced almost simultaneously along the
main road betAveen Rezonville and Vionville ; but these move-
ments were only executed at the cost of Keavy losses ; some
batteries losing all their officers, others many of their horses.

It will be seen by this abridged account, that the Germaa
guns were not advancing in line with or following in rear of
the infantry. But the movements of the artillery, far from
being rigidly tied down to conform to those of the infantiy !
were tactically independent, that is to say, both arms were
Avorking each according to its own special peculiarities for the
attainment of one object. Long before the Prussian, infantry
could come on the ground in any force, the artilLer}^ was in
position, preparing the Avay for it, protected on its tianks by
cavalry and a small force of infantry. Tke manner m wliich the
German artilleiy was used to extend the line of battle, fill up a
gi'eat gap in its centre, and so not only occupy a longer front
themselves, but attack tlieir enemy over a larger fi-ont, is. well
worthy of notice ; they were working tactically together with
the cavalry and infantry to debar the French from the Verdun
road, and give time for the deployment of the German army.
The attack of the French cavalry on the Gemian batteries was
at once met by the German cavalry, and the fire of the guns
being then masked, both as regards their oAvn, and to a certain
extent their opponents' fire by the cavalry fight, the batteries
seized the opportunity and dashed to the front. At one o'clock
the Prussians had two cavalry divisions, one corps, and 21 bat-
teries in action, the French had one cavahy division, two corps,
and 26 batteries. The whole of the Prussian guns Avere really
in three batteries, of nine, seven, and five guns respectively,
Avhile the French guns Avere scattered about. After one o'clock
the French took the offensive, and drove back the Prussian
AAongs ; the centi'e, hoAveA'er, held fast to Vionville.

In this action, the use made of the artilleiy and engineexB to

152

check tlie French and gain time, — the action of the artillery,
especially, in seizing advantageous places, and rapidly bringing
up fresh batteries, and in concentrating masses of fire on certain
points, are well worthy of close examination. If the guns had
not been with the advance, the same result could never have
been obtained. It is worth noticing where the guns marched.
It appears that the four horse artillery batteries attached to
Rheinbaben's cavalry, and Avhich having bivouacked at Viou-
ville, first attacked the French, belonged three to the Xth, and
one to the IVth Corps, and Avere attached to the cavalry divi-
sion. The artillery had no special escorts, one battery marching
with the cavalry brigade forming the advanced guard, and the
other three with the main body of the division ; the divisional
artillery of the Ilird Corps marched between the brigades of
the leading division, the corps artillery between the divisions.
Although the Vlllth Prussian Corps hardly came into the
action at all, a large number of its batteries coming up towards
the close of the day, supported the exhausted artillery of the
Xth and Illrd Corps.*

It is evident that the order of march must be intimately con-
nected with the deployment of the troops, and this becomes all
the more important as the troops approach the actual point of
collision. As they do so, the number of roads on which they
are moving must be reduced, by the mere convergence of the
columns, and hence, the order of the troops in those columns
becomes of the utmost importance. It is further manifest that
there should be no definite order of march, but the actual order
in wliich the troops stand should be regulated by the work to
be done, and the nature of the country.

We have said that no matter how a battle may begin, the
role of attacker and defender will usually fall to one side, and
perhaps change several times during the course of the day, de-
pending on the number of men engaged at each place, the
strength of the positions, the mode of handling the reserves,
and the number of men defending the position.

There has been a gradual tendency for many years to
extend the front of an army occupying a given position, or to
reduce the number of men occupying a given piece of ground.
This has been evinced by the reduction of the number of ranks
in most armies.f Concentration is undoubtedly strength, but
we must clearly understand what concentration of force, in its
military sense, means. It means the assembling on a given
point, of a mass of military units sufficient to deny the use of

* At this action the Prussian artillrcy fired 19,638 rounds, or an avemge of 531
roiinds per battery, or 89 rounds per gun ; the greatest number of roimds fired was
by a horse battery, which fired 1,164 rounds or 194 rounds per gun.

+ Napoleon's reasons for reducing the depth of the French army at Leipzig
from three to two ranks, — viz., it enabled him to increase his front, — is a case in point.

]5;i

that poiut to tlie enemy if acting on the defensive, sufficient to
drive the enemy out if acting on the offensive.

But if the .■<ujic{ent number be exceeded, concentration becomes
dangerous, becomes unwieldly accumulation, and it deprives
other places of their proper defence. Further, -when military
units are massed together, or concentrated, it must be borne in
mind that if that concentration exceeds certain limits it prevents
the proper use of the men's arms ; hence under certain circum-
stances concentration and disorder may become convertible
terms. The sufficient nwnher must be concentrated in such a
way that they can use their arms so as to produce a maximum
effect; hence we arrive atone limit to concentration incident
on the action of one side. But it is fiu'ther limited by the effects
of the fire of the opposite side upon densely concentrated
masses ; hence it follows that a certain number of military units
are sufficient for the attack or defence of any position, and
to exceed or reduce that number is undesirable.

The result of the gradual appreciation of these facts is, that
the number of troops considered requisite to occupy a position of
given length is now much less than formerly; because the
power of the individual firearm is now so much greater.

The tendency to which we refer has been gradual and has
been going on for more than 200 years, but during the last
seven or eight years, however, the rapid strides made in im-
pro^^ng arms have produced a sudden expansion of the front
occupied by armies.

There has also been developed, especially of recent years, a
tendency to occupy long lines by holding certain points strongly
and leaving others, comparatively speaking, weak. This ten-
dency was first shown in permanent fortification, which, stand-
ing on the same basis (arms and contour of ground) as tactics,
often takes the lead in tactical questions. Of recent years the
curtains of fortifications have disappeared, the bastions have
been pushed far apart, in fact have been converted into " de-
tached forts." This tendency has been much strengthened by
the power of resistance that the breech-loader gives troops
when acting on the defensive, and the fact that even a small
body of men cannot be turned out of a position until regularly
attacked, thoroughly shaken, and their morale destroyed by fire.
From this tendency to form lines of battle with certain decisive
points strongly held, and others comparatively speaking unde-
fended, arises the fact refeiTcd to at page 68, that battles at the
present day tend to become a series of independent combats or
small battles. At page 08 we said several consequences re-
sulted from this breaking up of a great battle into many small
ones ; some of the results we have referred to, but to prevent
confusing the subject, others have been left to this part of the
work.

It follows fi-om this division of battles into numerous small

154

combats that the h)SseR are very disproportionate ; a glance at
the table in the Appendix shows that the relative proportion of
Icilled and wounded to the total force engaged has by no means
increased since the introduction of improved weapons. But if
modern battles be analysed, it will be found that the great mass
of the loss takes place at one place and in one corps, to whose
lot it has fallen to capture certain special and decisive points
in the field of battle. Thus the great projDortion of the Prussian
losses at Koniggratz took place in Fransecky's division, which
captured the Slaslowed wood, a most important point, as link-
ing the 1st and 2nd Armies together. Similarly the greatest
proportion of losses at Gravelotte was sustained by the guards,
who captured St. Privat, the key of the French position, and it
is a consequence of improved weapons that once a lodgement
is made on the key of the defender's position, the results extend
to the flank more rapidly and to a greater extent than formerly.
Hence every effort should be used to discover such points and
to strengthen and maintain them so long as they are held.
Attacks on the places of minor importance, the intervals be-
tween what may be termed tJie " detached forts," produce but
little effect ; another consequence is, that numerous flank attacks
may be made ; at first sight it appears that an army having only
two flanks, can only be subject to two such attacks. The fact
being that each distinct portion of the field v^dll offer such points
for attack, which become more marked by the swaying back-
wards and forwards of the general line accordmg as either side
gains or loses ground.

It further results that the formation of a large reseiTe for
the whole anny is now no longer admissible. The extension of
front is so great that the reserve, even if placed in the centre,
could hardly reach the flanks in time to be of use.

We therefore arrive at a general rule that no body of troops
should ever engage without forming its own reserve : thus if a
battalion engages, as already pointed out, the main body is
the reserve. The Division should form its own reserve, also the
corps, while the use of an army reserve, except under special
circumstances, may be fairly questioned.

The containing power of the breech-loader used on the de-
fensive, and the number of small battles, into which a great
battle divides itself, produces other remarkable results.

Great concentration destroys mobility, and the paradox ap-
pears of armies Avidely spread, with external lines of communi-
cation, defeating a (X)ncentrated force with interior lines. Jomini,
many years ago, pointed out that this might be the case, but it
has become so now in a marked degree. Take the battle of
Koniggratz as an example. The Austrian army offered, perhaps,
the maximum amount of concentration that was possible, the
Prussians were spread over a wide front, and were on exterior
lines.

155

Tlio whole Austrian Army of the North (about 206,000 men) was jvsseiiibloil Cain))aign of
behind the small river Bistritz, with the fortress of Koniggratz and the Elbe 1866 ; oflicial
in its rear. It extended over a space of about tive miles (or about 41,000 men account.
to a mile). (Translated

A state of concentration like that in which the army had been for the hyHozierand
last five days renders the subsistence of the troops extemely difficult, and only *^"6"*^-)
admits of bivouacking, thereby weakening the strength of the troops and
opposing the greatest obstacles to all further movements ; under these circum-
stances the march of the army on the 1st of July, although only nine miles
long, lasted 24 lioui-s. The Prussian armies had voluntarily kept a fi-ont of
nearly 23 miles breadth.

Generally speaking it will be remembered that the Prussian
armies, advancing from two different directions, were converg-
ing on Koniggratz.

Now Avhy could not a concentrated force like the Austrian
army leap on and crush one of the Prussian armies, each about
one-half its own strength, before it could be helped by the other ;
it had the advantages of being well in hand, completly concen-
trated, and had internal lines.

It is desirable that this question should be carefully con-
sidered. Writers and speakers sometimes write and speak as if
Priissia had discovered something new in the form of strategy
and tactics, and they point to the division of force in Bohemia
and France, and the double external lines of operation, as being
a contradiction to the Napoleonic experience, and speak of the
Prussian attack as being like " a pair of nut-crackers " or " a
pair of tongs." There is much danger in these ideas, as there
is in the general application of any law to every instance.
Jomini pointed out that with very large forces, the benefits of
concentration disappeared, and he says 100,000 men holding a
central position will have a better chance against three armies
of 30,000 or 35,000 men, than an army of 400,000 in the same
position against three armies of 135,000.

A concentrated army of large size moves so slowly, and
meets with such resistance if it attacks a force say of one-half or
one-third its size, that it cannot crush it before the arrival of the
other forces. This was precisely the Austrian case at Koniggratz ;
concentration had made them too miwieldly to attack either
Pnissian army.

And it appears that the resisting force of the breech-loader
on the defensive has still further reduced the advantages of the
army occupying the central position and closely concentratedy
when it attempts to attack one of two or three scattered detach-
ments.

An army that is concentrated too much is really as feeble as
one that is too much disseminated, and generally suffers more,
as it becomes the mark of a convergent fire from the attackers,
who quickly outflank it.

It is well known that the Austrian General Benedek intended *
to form his line of battle on tAvo sides of a square, of Avhich

* His orders wer^ only partially carried out.

156

Campaign of
1866: ofllcial
account.
(Translated
by Hozier and
Wright.)

De Loozc.

Chulni was about the salient, and lie detained as a reserve, to
act under his sole orders, the Lst and IVth array-corps with five
cavalry flivisions and the artillery reserve. At an early stage of
the battle the reserve behind the centre, near Sweti, was swept
by Prussian shells.

Tlie left wing had a reserve of tliree v/eak brigades behind it on the right
wing, oidy one brigade covered the ground between the right Hank and the Elbe.
On the other hand a main reserve of two corps and five cavalry divisions, stood
ready for action, full two miles behind the centre of the whole line of battle.

The battle of Koniggriitz affords also an example of the
value of numerous small reserves, as used by the Prussians, and
the comparative feebleness of huge reserves as formed by the
Austriaus.

In the attack on the wood of Maslowed, the Prussians formed company
columns, but very soon lost all tactical order, but their constant care to keep
small reserves formed of every man that they could rally as quickly as possible,
enabled them to sustain an heroic struggle for eight hours with 14 battalions
against 51 Austrian battalions.

At Gravelotte, the French reserve and their splendid reserve
artillery hardly fired a shot. Judging from these facts, reserves
must not be massed together but must be numerous; of a size
proportionate to the object to be attained, and mu«t be so dis-
posed as to be able to act without delay when needed.

In addition to a reserve there should be a second line. In
small affairs, or when the attack is made Avitli a narrow front,
not exceeding effective rifle range, the second line and the re-
serve Avould become the same body, but no commander should
ever be without a force held in hand. The moment that his
second line and reserves have passed out of his hands, his power
of directing and ruling the fight is gone, and has passed to his
subordinates, perhaps to the enemy.

A remarkable instance of this occm'ed at Langensalza. The
Prussian army was inferior to the Hanoverian ; in their endeav-
our to show an equal front they extended to the right and left.
The reserve came into action in the interval between the wings,
a single line of battle was formed, which was penetrated by the
Hanoverians, and once penetrated the Prussians were unable
to retrieve the day, being without any troops to make the
effort. A second line is therefore indispensable, but it may bo
composed of much fewer men than the first fine, speaking in
very general terms, for no rule can be given as an absolute
guide, the second line and reserve may perhaps be equal to the
first line.

If a position be held by 6,400, or 3 battalions of 800 men
each, and the position be a mile in extent, or 3^ men to the
yard, the formation might be —

Skirmishers, 8 Companies. . . . . . = 800 men

Supports, 8 Companies . . . . . . = 800 „

Main Body, 16 Companies . . . . = 1,600 „

Total of First Line, 4 Battalions = 3,200 „

157

Second Lino, 2 Battalions .. .. = 1,600 inin

Keaerve, 2 Battulious = 1,(500 „

Total, 8 Battalions .. .. = 6,400 „

In many sucli cases the reserve ;ind second line niif2,lit really
constitute one force, and would roruain together, the second
line battalions being those first called on. The question of keep-
ing artillery in reserve is one that demands some consideration ;
it has been already referred to at page 132.

Owing to the great range and accuracy of rifled guns it, is
possible to concentrate the fire of a great number of guns upon
a given spot ; this is of course favoiu-able to tlie defence, but
although this is the case, the attack is also benefited in a similar
way, and as the action of an attack is enveloping to a great ex-
tent, the range and accuracy of rifled guns allows them to sup-
port infantry making an attack until almost the moment of
actual assault. xVnd further, it would seem that there is no
reason whatever, but rather the reverse, why all guns should
not be brought into action as soon as possible and remain in
action until the very close of the engagement. In considering
the action of artilleiy it must be remembered that that arm
differs fi-om the others, inasmuch as it embraces more niatc'riel,
less personnel. Wit/tin certain limits it suff'ers less in both its
efiiciency and its morale from loss than infantry does.

Further, many of the losses it does suffer are not of a nature
to make it inefficient for that day's work, and many may be
•repaired and put to rights even under fire. We allude to
such damages as a wheel being struck, a carriage hit, &c., all
of which really affect the fighting power of the batteiy but
sUghtly, as they can be at once repaired. Consequently, to
keep artillery of any kind in reserve, with the view of bringing
it up fresh, at a critical moment, except under special cases,
appears to be a doubtful policy. So long as the batteries have
ammunition, the amount of loss they usually sustain, will rarely
put them hors de combat as fighting bodies.

If a tactical body, such as a division or corps, is kept in
reserve, there should be no hesitation in using its artillery freely.
Prussian critics of the recent war invariably blame the arrange-
ments by which the artillery of the Xth Prussian Corps, which
was the reserve at the battle of Gravelotte, was not brought
into action against St. Privat, " The affair woidd have been
completed much sooner had these 90 additional guns been in
position."

To keep artillery during an action in reserve is to neutralise a force, Ton Wakler-
which from the beginning to tlie end, should ])roduce an effect with its guns sec.
whenever they can see anything to fire at.

The great range of artillery enables it to be so placed that
with little change of position it can support, while receiving a
reciprocal support from both lines.

158

The Avhole essence of modern fighting;, whether it be the
attack or defence, Kes in these words : — Seek to overyjielm tlia
enemy with fire, and shake his viorale to such an extent that his fire
becomes so feeble that he may be attacked. Consequently every
means tliat can augment the fire and so crush an opponent
sliould be adopted.

If the combined action of tlie arms of the service are con-
sidered, it will be found that the side that attacks usually
fixes on some portion of the enemy's position and establishes a
cr_pss-fire on it ; if this point be a village, a heavy cross-fire will
soon shake the buildings so as to render them indefensible ;
watching the moment Avhen the enemy appear to be leaving
the village, the infantry should advance, the function of the
artillery here is to keep the enemy from returning to the village,
and for this reason it should continue to fire until its fire is
masked. The moment this is the case the guns, unable to do
more in this direction, should turn their attention to the enemy's
artillery, wjiich has been, in all probability, playing chiefiy on
them, although the advancing infantry have undoubtedly come
in for their sEare.

As the infantry advance, seeking to gain ground to the
fi'ont in extended order, the}^ must be not only carefully sup-
ported from the rear, but as they are peculiarly liable to the
attack of small bodies of cavalry on the flanks, cavalry must be
held in hand, under shelter in some convenient place, with orders
to watch any attempted action of the enemy's cavalry, and move
rapidly to the front if they show themselves. The cavalry must,
in such a case, act by instinct not by orders, and their leader
must be most careful to watch lest, in the smoke and dust, the
hostile cavalry move to the front without bemg noticed. In
such cases it is of great advantage to get as near the enemy as
possible ; often a small wood or inclosure will offer itself, or
some fold of the ground, behind which the cavalry may shelter
themselves, unseen from the enemy's position, and remain in
readiness. The approaches to such places may be over ground
heaAaly swept by artillery, and even musketry fire, but which it
is quite possible to cross ; so soon as a few infantry have got
into the wood or enclosure, the cavalry officer may push some
men rapidly out ; riding fast a few men, in extended order, will
usually escape ; they may be followed by a few more, until the
whole force is got over. But cavalry cannot remain in such
positions without the support of some infantry, who will pre-
vent the enemy's infantry from making a forward movement
with a small body and harassing the cavahy. In such positions
the cavalry must be prepared to venture everything to check
a hostile movement.

The infantry with them will always give a point of support
to rally on, and working thus a few cavalry may render very
efficient service on the field of battle. But no laxge body cuu

159

be so employed. If the ginnind enables cavalry to be thus pushed
on in small bodies and kept covered ironi the enemy's fire, they
Avill be of great value in checking any unexpected action on the
flanks of the attack.

When acting against the enemy's cavalry they have little to
dread from projectiles, as the enemy, on account of his own
cavalry, "will be afi-aid to fire much.

If the infantry are luiable to make way in front, as is very
likely to be the case, the battle will probably be decided by a
flank attack; but it has been already pointed out that however,
generally speaking, an attack may be termed a flank attack, it
must invaii-ably be, locally speaking, a front attack.

If the infanlrry penetrate the enemy's position they must be
at once larg-ely reinforced from the second line, and artillery and
engineers should be pushed up to support them. The mere fact
of the enemy's position being fiu-ced will have usually reduced
thejfire considerably, and left a dead space. Across this, guns,
and "Some sappers fiu-nished with tools, should be rapidly pushed,
-and every means taken to strengthen the position won. If the
enemy means fighting, in a short time lie Avill attempt to retake
the gTound won ; the minutes that elapse between the capture
of a position and the retaking of the offensive b}^ the enemy arc
invahu\ble ; no man should be allowed to stray or wander about,
the confusion incident on all successful attacks must be rapidly
remedied, the men's pouches seen to, and the engineers must
■work io form shelter and maintain the lodgment. As troops
come on they must be pushed to the right and left, and
extended in front, but nothing should interfere with the
strengthening of the foothold gained. If the eneni}' has his
reserves at hand he will shortly advance fresh troops to attempt
to retake the position, and will endeavour to concentrate a fire
of artillery on it. If guns have been brought up they should be
covered as much as possible, and should open on the enemy's
artillery when on the move, which it will in all probability be, at
a moderate range. The position being held firmly, the de-
fensive should not be simply taken, but a ft-esh advance made,
which wall usually enable large forces to brought up. The
penetration of the enemy's position will thus place the attacker
in the position of being on the flank of both of the two wings or
portions into which the army is split, and if that position be
maintained those wings must fall back. But supposing that a
front attack fails, or that the troops making it are unable to ad-
vance owing to the heavy fire poured on them, or that for other
reasons a flank attack has been resolved on, it then becomes
requisite iihat -the troops not employed in making the flank
attack should occupy the enemy, threaten his front, and at the
same time strengthen their position so as to check any forward
movement the enemy may make. It being possible that when
he finds a flank threatened he may refuse that flank by thi'ow-

160

ing it back, and strive to cheek the turning movement by an
attack on the troops immediately in his front, or he may move
large forces to the threatened flank ; either of these operations
would seriously interfere with the success of the flank move-
ment, hence it becomes requisite that every means should be
adopted to prevent the enemy leaving the position he has taken
up or modifying his line of battle to any great extent. For
such purposes as these, partial attacks on the enemy's position
may be undertaken, and various expedients resorted to to detain
and keep him in position, while the flank movement is being-
made.

The action of the Prussian 1st Army at Koniggi'utz offers a
good example of this. It was well known that the Austrians
could not hold their ground 02ice the Ilnd (Crown Prince's)
Army came Avell into action, and that its amval would be de-
cisive. The object then of the leaders of the 1st Army was to
threaten the Austrians, keep them in position, and establish
themselves firmly on the left in the Maslowed wood, so as to
feel for the Ilnd Army, and link the two armies together. The
fierce attack on the wood at Maslowed held the Austrians fast.

Campaign of One fact, however, nobody could foresee, namely that by far, the gi-eater

1866 : official part of those ti'oops which the enemy should have employed to guard against

account. an attack from the north were already engaged on the line, Cistowes-Maslowed-

(Translated Horenowes, and that his main reserve was at that moment further from the

by Hozier and latter place than the heads of the Ilnd Prussian Army.
Wright.) . . . .

The Prussians also used the line of the Bistritz to protect
their right, the 1st Army, from any offensive movement of the
Austrians, and placed the villages along its course in a state of
defence.

Such flank movements, if the whole attacking army be con-
centrated, must, owing to the long range of modern weapons,
be made on a circle of far greater radius than fonnerly, hence
a concentric attack, if feasible, offers many advantages.

Cavalry will often be of great use in such movements, for it
may be possible, from the more rapid movement of that arm, to
throw an overwhelming force of cavalry on the rear of the
threatened flank ; the moral effect of a force of cavalry appear-
ing there would undoubtedly exercise great influence on the
stand made by the troops attacked, who would find their
ammunition columns &c., assailed and taken in rear by the
cavalry, while they themselves were being pressed in front. It
is, perhaps, here that the tactical action of cavalry in large
bodies may be of great importance; but if cavalry be so used,
care must be taken that they do not separate to too great dis-
tance from the infantry moving to the flank ; and the cavaliy
leader must keep up a tactical cojuiexion with the infantiy at all
times, and warn it of all movements that the enemy may make
to meet the flank attack.

CHAPTER V.

Marches.

The influences of marches over tactics and strategy cannot
be over-rated ; indeed, in the older books on the miHtary art,
logistics was placed, and correctly placed, on an equivalent
footing to both, as a distinct and important branch of the
science of war,

It is quite evident that as the success of strategy is mainly
dependent on accurate calculation of the powers of marching,
the most brilliant conceptions, and the most profound combi-
nations, must fail if the troops do not move over the distances
cahailated on, and do not occupy the prescribed relative posi-
tions to each other.

Similarly, when the head of a column is attacked, the most
skilful tactics Avill not lielp it, if the artillery, cavalry, or infantry
that are required for any particular action cannot be found, if
the roads are blocked, and reinforcements cannot be brought up,
or ammunition be got at ; consequently the art of marching
forms a most important portion of the science of war.

It may generally be said that the direction of marches, and
the rate of progress, are connected more with strategy than
tactics, while the order of march, that is to say the position of
the troops in the column, is more closely connected with tactics.
The objects for whicli a march is made, and the nature of the
country through which it is undertaken, can alone decide the
number of columns that there should be, and the actual compo-
sition of those columns.

The fewer the number of men and horses on a road the easier
will they march, and the less will they suffer from checks, and
that wave-like motion which pervades every long column, by
wliich the intervals and delays increase in geometric progression
towards its tail. Hence an army should march on as many
roads as possible, and Avith as broad a front as possible, provided
always that the distances apart of the various columns are not
too great to allow them to support one another. Consequently
every officer commanding a column must know the whereabouts
of the columns to the right and left of him, and of what portion
of the army they are composed, and he must keep up a touch
M'ith them by means of a few mounted men, who should com-
municate generally where in the columns the different arms are
to be found, and where the commanders may be heard of.

It has been already stated that the increased power of
weapons enables a small body of men, who know they will
be supported, to hold a position longer than formerly, tliis
enables an advanced guard to check an enemy, compel him
to deploy, and bring up liis artillery before he can make
an impression ; consequently the distance apart of columns on
the march, or the front of an army moving in proximity to an

162

enemy, may now be enlarged to an extent that formerly wonlcl
have been unsafe. This is a matter of no little importance as
affecting rapidity of marching and pmictuality of suj)ply.

Guibcrt. An army cauiiot inarch in a dejiloj^ed line, even if the country were a com-

plete and o])en plain, the extent of the front would make its movements too
sluggish and difficult.

Neither can it move in a single column, because its immense length would
retaixl the column, increase the fatigue of the troojJs, and render the army
liable to be beaten in detail before it can deploy. To make a march at all, the
army must divide itself into several cor))s or columns, which shall move in the
same direction, and with the same object, and shall be ready by combined
action to take up a general position for lighting.

Clausewitz. It is requisite that the troops, marching by one road, constitute a com-

plete unit ; suppose an order of battle with two lines, one Division in each
line, and that an advance on the enemy on two I'oads is to be made, no one
would dream of putting half of each Division on each I'oad, but each Division
would take one road, the Divisional genei'als being then responsible that they
form their own reserves. Unity of command is of far greater importance than
a stupid adherence to the original geometric arrangement. The Divisions may
subsequently resume their projjer places.

The number of columns in which troops march must depend
chiefly on the number of good roads available. In almost every
country there are certain main roads, the distance between
which varies greatly, and between these roads are minor roads
and lanes. As a rule troops should only move on the main
roads, reserving the side roads and lanes for the flanldng
parties, and those keepmg up the communications, Little or
]io thing is gained by using the side roads, they never go straight,
but twist about to suit various farms, and troops marcliing on
them are very apt to lose their way: they are narrow, and
consequently if fenced tlie troops get janmied together. They
are either not macadamized, or very badly, hence it is desirable,
as far as possible, to adhei-e to the main roads of the country.

When the country admits, as it often does in continental
Europe, it is advisable to march the troops on the fields at the
side of the road, reserving the road for the wheeled traffic.

In some cases also, such as when many columns make a
concentric movement on one spot, it becomes absolutely requisite
to march right across country through high standing crops,
over hedges, &c. But as a rule wheel carriages adhere to the
roads until compelled to leave them.

The Division of Guards continued its mai'ch up and down hill, straight
across country, in order not to cross the line of march which tlie Commander-
in-Chief of the Ilnd Army had ajJpointed for the advance of the 1st Corps.
Soft and heavy as the rain had made the soil, the head of tire column reached
C'hoteborek as early as 11 o'clock. On the heights of Daubrowitz the Eeserve
Artilleiy was ordered to place itself at the head of the main body of the
1st Division of Guards.

The guns trotted past the cohuinis straight acro.ss country, and through
the high standing corn, but the long straw mixed with the clayey soil, wound
itself in thick wreaths lound the wheels, and rendered such extreme exertion
necessary that l)y the time they leiiched Jericek several horses hiui fallen dead
before the guns from sheer fatigue.

De Ternuy. In general an army-cori)s should maich by Divisions, one on each road, the

Campaign of
1866: ollicial
account.
(Translated
by Hozier and
Wright.)

103

advanced and rear guards being on tlie same road ; the least stony road
Iteing reserved for the cavahy, and the firmest road for the artillery corps.

Tlie strength of a cohmm should not exceed ii(),()()0 to 30,000 men. If a
calculation is made of the distances occupied on the line of march of such a
column it will be seen that in order to efi'ect a dei)loymeut before the enemy
jUTives, that number should not be exceeded.

There ai-e cases when an army must march in a single colunni, and cases Napoleon,
when it must march in several.* An army does not usually confine itself to a
path 12 feet wide, the main roads ai-e 24 or 3G feet wide, and on them two
lines of carriages, or 15to20men abreast may mai'ch ; almost always it is possible
to march right and left of the main road. I have seen an army of 120,000 men,
marching in one column, take up its line of battle in six houre. The advance
guai'd should be composed of light cavalry, heavy cavalry, selected infantry,
and a sufficient number of guns ; its duties are to manoeuvre, contain the
enemy, and give the army time to come uj).

The actual order of march is very important ; each column
should, as far as possible, be preceded by a detacliment of engi-
neers, with tools to level all obstacles which may retard the
march ; tlie engineers may be assisted by the people of the
coinitry or by infantry soldiers. This detachment should be
divided into two sections ; at the first obstacle the first section
halts and works, the other proceeds until a fresh obstacle
presents itself. An officer of engineers looks after the work.

It is desu'able to consider the rates at which troops can
march. A good walker can easily do four miles an hom*, but
this far exceeds the power of a soldier, moving as one of a
mass of men, and carrying a heavy weight, in addition to which
there is much fatigue from the necessity of sending out small
parties to the flank ; and further, the soldier on the completion
of his march does not find a bed and comfortable dinner, but
he often has to go on outpost duty at once, take his night duty,
always sleep on the ground, and usually have a spare and ill-
cooked meal. Consequently, exertions such as may be made by
private individuals cannot be made by an army, except at tlie
risk of destroying its efficiency, and leaving large numbers of
stragglers behuid. A few forced marches often reduce the
effective strength of an army more than a lost battle. Under
the influence of excitement, and urged by appeals to their
higher nature, men can be got to perform considerable feats of
marching, but a general who makes many forced marches may
be likened to a man who spends his capital, — in a short time
both will come to the end of then* resources. The rate of
marching of soldiers varies much fi'oni the state of their health,
the state of weather, roads, and very often whether or not the
roads are encumbered with traffic.

All nations allow about the same average rate of marching, viz., 2| to 3 Lt.-Col.Collej

miles an hour for infantry, 4 miles for field artillery, and 5 for cavalry and Lecture at '

hoi-se artillery. This includes short halts of five minutes or so, and represents U.S. Insiibu-

the pace at which they can get over fair marches with least fatigue. But lion,
these rates apply to small bodies only. With large bodies the rate is slower,
for every cheek is felt throughout the column, and multiplied by the length of

* In 1866 two Prussian Corps, the otli and 6Lli, adraucing on Xachod, used
but one road.

M 2

164

it. Tlius a division of infantry can seldom accomplish more than 2j to 2h
miles an hour, and a corps on one road even less — 2 miles an hour ; the in-
fantry, as the slowest marchers, regulating the rate of the whole ; and even
this late can only he depended on on good roads, and with gootl arrange-
ments. If the roads are bad, or crowded, it is still further reduced. Thus,
Vandamme, marching from Ligny to Wavre, and the Prussians marching from
Wavre to Waterloo, could only accomplish about li miles an hour, owing to
the bad state of the roads.

Napoleon's troojjs, trained marchers as they were, coidd only sometimes
accomplish 8 or 9 miles in as many hours in the sands and mud of Poland.

At Magenta, when supjiort was urgently required for the Guard, it took
five hours to briug up Canrobert's corps from Novara, a distance of 9 miles.
The road in this case w;is excellent, but encumbered. In 1886, before Sadowa,
the 8th Austrian corps took 14 hours to do 12 miles. In 1870, when the Crown
Prince was following MacMahon northwards his troops were sometimes on their
legs from 4 a.m. until 8 p.m., yet it is doubtful if they ever did 24 miles in one day.

By comparing a number of marches, I arrived at the conclusion that 10
miles a day is as much as should be reckoned on in ])rolonged operations, and
fi'om 12 to 15 miles for actual marching days ; and these calculations agree
curiously with the account of the operations of the 5th German corps in the
late war. It appears the distance actually traversed by this corps between
the Rhine and Paris was 520 miles in 50 days, or lOh miles a day. The average
for actual marching days was Vih, with a halt usually every fourth day ; the
longest march was 21 miles, when in pursuit of MacMahon's army northwards.

When troops are closely concentrated, the distance marched
is very much less ; in fact, Avhere a large army is closely concen-
trated, a march of 8 miles takes a long time.

A long convoy of heavily laden wagons cannot march more
than two miles an hour, the time taken up in putting on and
removing the skids at hills being included.

The space occupied by troops on the line of march is very
important. Lieut.-Colonel Colley gives a very good practical
rule, viz., to allow one yard for every two infantry soldiers, one
yard for each horseman, and 20 yards for a gun. The success
of a march is less interfered with by the actual length of the
columns of troops of the different arms, than by the continual
tendency troops have to tail off, or open out ; it is essentially
requisite that this tailing oft" should be checked and the distance
corrected at halts. A strildng example of this tailing off" occurred
when the 2nd Prussian Army was advancing on the Austrian right
at KoniggrUtz. The roads were so narrow that the infantry could
only march in double file, the artillery in column of single guns.

General Von Hassenfeldt had given instructions that the
close order of the columns should be carefully preserved, and a
report should be sent forward as each single battalion passed
the defile, or when its distance fi'om the preceding battalion
exceeded 800 paces. In spite of all these precautions it Avas
impossible for the troops to keep close up. When they
descended the hills, the guns had to put on the drag, and
even if they themselves could regain their lost ground
Avitliin the battery itself by increasing the pace, still the infantry
behind them necessarily fell further and furtlier to the rear.

The spaces left between troops on tlie line of march haA'e
for one of their objects that of absorbing such openings and

1 tM

preventing- n-ivgularities wliich may occur at the tVont ot" the
cohinin. being* passed to its rear. All donbling on the part of
men, or trotting on the part of horses or baggage-wagons, to
recover distances so lost, should bo discouraged as much as
possible. If it is allowed it Avill be found that those at the end
of a column will be either running or halting the whole time.
When a halt has to be made in front it should be at once taken
up along the whole column, so as to avoid any jamming. Tin;
amount to wliich troops Avill open out really depends on the
discipline of the army and the care of its officers. AVith well
drilled t'roops it may be perhaps one-sixth the length of the
column ; with careless officers and undisciplmed men the opening
will increase to perhaps two-thirds, or even the whole length.
The various rules to be observed in marches, and the details as
to baggage, times of assembly, marching oif, duties of vanous
officers, and all similar matters, are perhaps more clearly given
in General CraA\-ford"s orders for the Light Division in Spain,
than in any other book, and as these orders are very valuable,
and are out of print, they are given in the Appendix.

One march of a moderate length does not much aftect an army, but several Clausewitz.
such marches will do so, d fortiori^ if the marches are long the troojjs will
suifer.

Upon the theatre of war itself, the insufficiency of good nourishment and
accommodation, united to bad roads, broken up by the passage of carriages,
the incessant strain demanded by the necessity of being at all times ready to
fight, — all these causes produce an expenditure of force which breaks downi
the men, the animals, the material, and the equipments.

A great deterioration of power must be expected in a war in which many
movements are made ; plans must be carefully combined, and reinforcements
must quickly follow. Unless under some pressing necessity a long march must
not be made at first, because it strains the horses and men who are not in
training, and often from such a cause an army finds itself deprived not only
of private transport but even the commissariat and artillery draft cattle
damaged.

A column of 20,000, composetl of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, will, in Fallot
line of battle, occuj^y some three miles of front, so that the troops on the Lagrange,
wings will have to move about three miles daily to get into their places, if the
operation is only done once, but often it must be done several times ; and this
added to the distance gone over when defiling over bridges, through towns
and woods, which are very fatiguing, although they do not help the column
forward one bit, make 15 miles a day, the most that troops can do ; and often
to march even this distance they must be 12 hours under arms.

Frequent halts should be made during a march, and such halts should, if Thiebault.
possible, be made after passing a defile, to enable the troops to close up. It is
absolutely requisite that such halts should be carefully regulated ; a Division
must not halt when it is pleasant to do so, or when the troops are a little
tired. The larger the army the more necessity for moving together, and the
more requisite is it that the hours of departure and halting should be carefullv
regulated, especially if night marches are made. There should be a halt for
1^ hours in the middle of the march, half an hour at one-fourth and three-
fourths tlie march, and a halt for five minutes every hour.

The necessity of having large numbers of engineers and
artillery at the head of the columns has l)een already referred to.
It is absolutely rerpiisite that these engineers should be provided
with light bridghig materials, perfectly independent of the

166

pontoon equipment of the anny. The Prii.s.sians snliered much at
►Sadowa, owing to there being no bridges laid over the Bistiitz.
At Wtiei-thno less than 11 bridges were made over the Saner, a
little stream not 18 feet wide ; six companies were employed at
the work, and yet there were not bridges enough : in such
histances the more bridges the better, as it reduces the throng-
ing, and consequent crowding.

Dc la Purrc. "piie oi'der of march of a column should he such that the various arms may

take their places in line of battle as quickly as possible.

Now as the artilleiy is used first, then the infantry, then the cavalry, this
I should be the order of march. We would therefore place the. divisional

■ ' batteries in front, only to prevent their being captured bysm-prise some troops

must be placed in front to cover them.

The infantry then follows, and lastly the cavalry ; its ra])idity will enable
it to come up when it is needed. The cavalry should be preceded by its horse
artillery. The baggage and the reserve artillery march at the end of the
column.*

I So far as the position of the artillery is concerned, it may be

I stated as a general rule that the artillery of the advanced guard

should march between the battalions composing it.

The artillery of the Division between the brigades composing

it, and the corps artillery between the Divisions.

Von Walder- In a column composed of all arms, the point or extreme front shoidd be

^^^- formed of that arm that is the most mobile, because the regular advance of

the main body, and the space it ])asses over, must depend to a great extent on
the distances traversed in all directions by the advanced guard, which is charged
with the duty of feeling the way, — a difficult office and one subject to many
delays.

Everyone knows the fatigue, loss of time, and waste of power, entailed on
infantry who perform this duty, as well as the fatiguing checks that the troops
in rear sutler.

Consequently, with ti'oops of the dift'erent arms of the service, whenever
the ground will admit, mountains and woods not excepted, cavalry take the
head of the column, and furnish the flankers ; behind these cavalry patrols,
which precede the column at some dstance, and are entrusted both with the
duty of scouts and vedettes, some infantry should follow, forming the kernel
of the vanguard.t This infantry itself furnishes an advanced guard and
patrols. These must search all the hollows and inequalities in the gi'ound
which the cavalry has already rapidly gone over, without, however, checking
the advance of the main column.

As regards the artillery, it should be sufficiently far forward to be imme-
diately at hand to meet the first shock of the enemy ; experience jn'oves that
at least two guns must be in position at the beginning of the action if the
enemy is to be attacked vigorously and the initiative kept. This is requisite
if the column is not to be checked by a small force in front, if it has to gain
any pre-determined position, or the enemy are to be severely dealt with
before they can obtain cover.

This necessity of having guns at any moment at the front forbids that
they should mai'ch in rear, to bring them \\\^ woidd occasion a very
inconvenient loss of time, a loss of time a skilful enemy would quickly take
advantiige of to drive back the advanced guard, while the guns finding the
road blocked by the troops seeking to get to the front, would have much
difficulty in opening uj) a passage.

* One of the alterations iiiacic b3' the recent progress in tactics is that the reserve,
or corps artillery, must be placed further to the front than is here stated.

t The word " Yanguard " is used here really as the adraneed guard of the
advanced guard — the extreme point.

PLATE. Xiy

DANGERnELD. LiTH. 22. BcDrORD ST CovEUT CaRDEN

167

C'onst^([ueiitly ;irtillerv otHcevs are tle.^iroiis that tlie advanced guard gnus
should be placed with the vauguanl, either at its rear, ur iiniuediately after
its fii-st battalion if it be conijiosed of more than one.

ThefollowiiigtabloRliowst.hu arrangements of two columns,
one as proposed by W^aklersee the other by Vcrtly du Vernois,
with the length of the latter:—

A'on Walderscc.

Vcrdv du W'rncis.

Length of the latter
Column.

1st. I'aiiffuard.

Half Squadron.
Half Squadron.
A BattiUion.
A Battery.

2nd. Main Body of Ad-
vanced Guard.

Two Battalions.

A Section of Engineers.

A Section of Pontociers.

Zrd. Main Body of the
Column.

A Battalion.
Two Batteries.
Five Battalions.
Two Squadrons.
Hospital Detachment.
Light Baggage.

4M. Train.

Infantry Ammimition

Column.
Artillery Ammunition

Column.
Field Hospital.
Provision Columns.

4th

Vauffuard.

4th Div.,
300 yards.

3rd ^ Div.,
300 yards.
fl2th Com-

FusilierBat- P'^^J' ^^
. V c \ vards.

talion ot ,',., ^
, . Tj • i 11th Com-
1st Regi- ',

, ° panv.

uient iK., • ri

I lOtli Cora-

Lpany.

9th Company.

Two guns of a 4-pounder

Battery.
Company of Engineers.

600 yards.

Main Body of the
Advanced Guard.

2nd Battalion 1st Regiment.
Remainder of 1-pounder

Battery.
1st Battalion 1st Regiment.
Hospital Detachment.
2y Squadrons of Hussars,

1,000 yards.

Main Body of the Division.
of

100

yards

1,420
yards

2,190
yards
100
yards

640

yards

rHalf a Div.

J Hussars.

I 2nd Infantry Regi

(_ mciit.

r2nd Battery of

4-pounders.
J 1st Battery of
j 6-pounders.
2nd Battery
[ 6-pounders.
/4th Brigade
\ Infantry.
/ Hospital Dctacli-
\ ment.
Hospital Wagons
without the Di-
visional Train.

Advanced Guard.

Length of Column 2,570
Intervals .. .. 1,500

Total

Main Body.

4,070

Length of Column 4,770
Carriages . . . . 640

Total

5,440

Total Length of March.

Advanced Gruard. . 4,070

Intervals ., .. 1,000
Main Body with

Carriages . . 5,440

Total

10,480

Cavalry Brigade
with Horse Ar-
tillery .. ., 2,350

Total

12,830

Add train . . . . 1,220

Add distance be-
tween Train and
Column . . . . 2,600

Total length of the
Division . . . . 16,650

Plate XIX. shows the arrangement of Verdy du Vernois,
with the distances.*
* Tills plate is copied from that in Hildyard's translation of Verdy du Vernois' book

168

Lieiit.-Coloncl
CoUcy, Pro-
fessor of Mili-
tary Adminis-
tration, Staff
College.

No normal onlor of march for a British Division or Coips has
ever been autlioritatively hiid down ; it is desirable, therefore,
that some general idea of how a division or corps might lie
formed for a march shonld l)e here given. But in such a matter
tlie normal form can only be considered as tlie general arrange-
ment given, not so much to be followed, as to be altered to suit
tlie nature of the country and the proximity of the enemy.

Tlie ■ cjivalry should always, if possible, be pushed well to the front ; it
moves with greater freedom and ea.se for being indejjeudent, and covers the
niai'ch of the army better than any regidar advanced guard. In fact, the
chief use of the advanced guard (providing against surjjrise) ceases. But the
division into advanced guard and main ]if)dy has also its advantages for fighting
jiurposes — opening an engagement without compromising the main body, feeling
the way, amd making the enemy ileclaie himself, heuce it is usually retained.
The subdivisions of the advanced guard and intervals between the fractions
may however in such cases be dispensed with.

An army-corps so covered by cavaliy would be preceded by engineei-s,
with one or two companies of infantry, partly as escort and partly to furnish
exti'a working parties if required, and a troop or squadron of cavalry to
explore roads and maintain communications ; then would follow an advanced
guard comprised as usual, but moving in one compact body, and then at a
moderate interval the main body. Intervals are necessary to prevent surprise,
but when not required for that, are objectionable, on account of lengthening
the column.

If the cavalry cannot push forward without support, and therefore collision
may take place with very short warning, the advanced guard must be formeii
with a view to surjirise. It is very difficult to draw up a norm<il formation,
that best suited to England would be unsuited to most of the continent oi
Europe. Cavalry should always be used as much as possible, and unless the
country is peculiarly unfavourable, should accompany the advanced guard if
not lead it.

The following is a sort of compromise, it being undei'stood that the
cavalry always pushes to the front if it can : —

A British Divisiox.

Half Troop of Cavalry, with patrols
at least 400 yards in front.
40G yards.
Remainder of squadron.

1 Company of Rifles.

300 yards.

3 Companies of Rifles.

2 Guns without Wagons.

Section of Engineers (pack horses only,
if possible).

600 yards to -J mile.
Officer commanding Advanced Guard.

4 Companies of Rifles.
4 Guns.
Half Battalion (1st Battalion) from

l^t Brigade.
! i Squadrons

Canlry (H. Q. of
Regiment.)

Engineer Company with Section of
Train.

Wagons of Artillery.

S. A. Carts and Tool Wagons of In-
fantry of Advanced Guard.

Section of Ambulance.

1,000 yards to 1 mile.

Officer commanding Division ; and
Staff.

Troop of Cavalry

Officer commanding Ist Brigade.

1st Battalion, 1st Brigade.

2 Batteries R.A., with one wagon per
gun.

Remainder of 1st Brigade.

Officer commanding 2nd Brigade.

2nd Brigade.

Artillery Wagons (second line).

1st Brigade S. A. Carts and Tool
Wagons.

2nd ditto, ditto.

Reserve Ammunition Colmun.

Ambulance.

Ist Field Hospital.

500 yards.

Divisional Baggage Master and Detach-
ment of Police.

Supply Wagons carrying day's supply.

(Regimental Wagons if such are issued).

Baggage of Division, Head-Quarters.

PLATE XIX^

^
■^

Airilnil^rice
^nd F:dol
Mlos/nlal

4- Gujie *

^Companies ^"^
of Rifles ^aa

Off CammxxndJi
l'^3rv0cLcLe Q

ifiSiTdck Hursts

3 Cdnrpardis
of Rjfiet; ■

> Small arm -i
tCortMltoot - D

MTiffcuAe . u
dxUo g

)hTrooj)s of
CowaJry

'/iTyoop _
cf Ccwai^y ^

'.Amlmlcavce

as
1-

Cmpi'orinfl' ^L,

r, pfffan, [_5
Staff ^

-> ^2 t s c

I Baqqayjo of t«!

TJh'f^'tcn/i/ pi
Rpxid'Qiiatiyers; :

" .B(uiqfiiJeMnury0
DfcNCERFiEto. LiTH ?? Dedford S^ Covent Gahden

i DEPARTMEiVi

:ITY OF CALIFORNIAi

u;!i

Baggage of Cavalrv Ecgiincut.
Baggage of Start', 1st Brigade.

„ Kegiincnts of Ist Brigade.

„ „ 2nd Brigade,

llilitarj- Police.
Non-Combal4Uit Stall".

Baggage of ililto, and Traiisjmrt Cols.

Provisicn Columns, iStoi-es, &.c.

2 Field Hospitals.

1 Company Infantry from 2iid Brigade,

as rear guard, assisted by detachment

of Militaiy Police.

British Aumy Cokps.

(If Cavnlri/ cannot he pu-ihed forward.)

2 Battalions 2nd Brigade.
Annnunition Tool Wagons, Ambulance,

and 1 Field Hospital.
Corps Artillery.

(^Ist Brigade 2nd Division.
Artillery of „

2nd Brigade „

Kitles .,

Engineers ,,

Cavalry Regiment of 2nd Division.
Ammunition and Tool Wagons.
Ambulance.
1^1 Field Hospital.
3rd Division in same order.
500 yards interval.

Supply Wagons for Corps, for the day.
Staff and Regimental Baggage by
Divisions.

Half Troop of Cavalry.

400 yards.
IV Troop of Cavalry.

2 Companies of Rifles.

400 yards.
6 Companies of Ritlcs.

3 Guns.
Section of Engineers.

Half mile to 1,000 yards.

1 Battalion Ist Brigade.
1^ Batteries, R.A.

2 Battalions, 1st Brigade.
2^ Squadrons Cavalry.
Engineer Ammunition Wagons, Am-
bulance, &c.

1 to li miles.
Officer Commanding Corps.
1 Battalion 2nd Brigade.
1 Battery R.A.

Plate XIXa. sIioavs tlio aiTangeniciit for a British Division.

It is ahvays most useful and instructive to examine marches
that have been really made, and to see how in face of actual
Avar the theories which liave been thought out in peace have
been put in practice. The following orders for the march of
the Crown Prince's Anny, prior to the action of Wiessenburg, on
the 4th August, are worthy of the closest stud}-. At 4 P.M. on
the 3rd August the following disposition was issued by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army : —

Head-Quarters, Landau, 3rd August.
It is my inteutiou to-morx'ow to advance with the ai-niy as far as the
Lauter, and to throw vanguards across it. With this object the Bienwald
will be traversed ou four roads, the enemy is to be driven back wherever he is
found. The separate columns will march as follows : —

1. Bothmer's Bavarian Division will continue as advanced guard, move on
Weissenburg, and endeavour to gain possession of the town ; it will guard its
right flank by moving a suitable detachment rid Bolleiiborn to Bobenthal. It
will break up from its bivouac at a.m.

2. The remainder of Hartmann's Corps, inclusive of Walther's Division,
will break up from its bivouac at 4 a.m. and move, avoiding Landau, viCi
Impflingen and Bergzaljeru, upon Ober-Otterbach. The trains of the
corps will be moved forward as far as Appenhofen in the course of the
forenoon.

3. The 4th C'avalry Division will concentrate to the south of Morlheim, at
6 A.M. and march vid Insheim, Rohrbach, Billigheim, Barbelroth, Capellen, as
far ;is the Otterbach, 4,(i()(> paces eastward of Ober-Otterbach.

4. The Vth Corps will break up from its bivouac in Billigheim, at 4
A.M., and march viA Barbelroth and Nieder-Otterbach, to Gross Steinfeld and
Kapsweyer. It will form its own advanced gniard, wliich will cross the Lauter

The Franco-
German War.
German Ofii-
cial Account.
(Translatedby
Capt. Clarke.)

170

at St. Eemy, and the Wooghausern, and ])lac(' outposts on the heiglits on tlie
far side. Trains remain at Billigheim.

5. The Xltli (!()r])swill start at 4 a.m., and move vid Steinweiler, Winden
Scliaidt, across the Bienwakl to the Bienwald hut. It will form its owni
advanced guard, which will ])ress forward over the Lauter, and place outposts
on the heights on the further l)ank. Trains at Rohibacli.

(i. Werder's cori)S will niiirch along the main road to Lauterbui'g, and
endeavour to gain possession of that town, and i)lace out})osts on the far l)ank
Trains at Hagenbach.

7. Von der Tanns corj)S will brefik uj) from its bivouac at 4 a.m., and
move along the main road vid Riilzheim to Langenkandel, to the westward of
which village it will bivouac. Trains remain at llheinzjibern. Head-quarters
at Langenkandel.

8. My position in the forenoon will be on the heights between Kapsweyer
and Schweigen, and as far as I can foresee, my head-quarters will be transfeiTed
to Nieder-Otterbach.

(Signed)

Frederick William,

Crown Prince.

These orders are peculiar, they give iu the first paragi-apli in
few wordf, but very clearly, Avhat is the object the leader had
in view, and then detail generally the movements of each corps,
but are most careful not to interfere with the independence ot
the Corps Commanders, who are expected, knowing tlie object
in view, to lielp that object as much as possible. Such a sy.stem
is undoubtedly a correct one, it enables officers to substitute
intelligent co-operation for blind obedience. The last paragraph
is of gi-eat importance, the position of the commander of any
body should be known well by those whe must seek him Avith
reports or for orders.

On each of the paragraphs bearing reference to the move-
ments of a corps, the corps-order for its movement was based.
Major-General ^^"alker, C.B., has been good enough to fin-nish
us with the corps-order of the Vtli Corps, based of course on
paragraph 4 of the army order quoted, and it carries out the
principles of the army order, detailing what is be done clearly,
without interfering with the independent action of those re-
sponsible for the execution of the order.

Verdv du Such an interference is seldom useful, for the dispositions of the subor-

Vemois. dinate leaders are thwarted by it. Every commander, however, has the right,

(Translated ^o ^*Ji^g ^^ he does not commit conspicuous errors, to carry out liis tluty

by Hildyard.) according to his own ideas, and this can frequently be done in different ways ;

each chooses that whicli agrees most closely Avith his character and education.

He has l)eeu placed in the position he holds in the confidence that he will

fulfil the duties of it ; should he not justify this trust lie must be removed.

The duty of a commander is to impait the necessary orders clettrly to his
subordinate leaders, and to watch over their execution ; he must only interfere
when dispositions are made which endanger the attainment of the aim in view.

Billigheim, .3rd August, 1870, 4i o'clock p.m.
To carry out the above army disposition the following orders ai'e issued : —

171

Advanced Guard.

The Mil Roginiciit of Dragoons.

17th lufaiitn- Brigade.

69th Kt'f);iment of Infuntry.

1st Heavy, 1 Batteries, Lower Silesian

1st Light, J Regiiiient No. 5.

nSth Kegime)it of liifiintr^y.

5th Rille BattaUon.

Pontoon Company with Light Field

Bridge Train.
Half the Sanitary Detachment a^o. 1.
The Light Baggage of the Advanced

Guard.*
The second line of Battery Ammunition

Wagons and the Ammunition Wagons

of the Infantry of the Advanced

Guard.

Maiti Bod I/.

18th Infantry Brigade, with two Bat-
teries (1 heavy and 1 liglif j, half the
Sanitary Detachment, ]S'o. 1, Field
Hospital 1 and 2, Light Baggage of
the remain'ler of the 9th Division.

The Corps Commander icith the Staff,
but without the yon-Combatant Staff.

Corps Artillery 6 Batteries : — 2 Heavy,
2 Light, 2 liorse Artillery.

The 19th Infantry Brigade.

3rd Division Field Artillery.

20th Infantry Brigade.

14th Regiment of Dragoons.

Sapper and Miners Company, together
with entrenching tool column.

Sanitary Detachment No. 2.

Field Hospitals Nos. 3 and 4.

Light Baggage of the lOtli Division.

Staff of the 10th Division without the
Non-Combatant Staff

The second line of Battery Ammunition
Wagons, as well as the Ammunition
Wagons of the Infantry. Those of the
9tli Division in front, the lOth Division
following.

Second line of Ammunition wagons of
the Corps Artillery.

Sanitary Detachment No. 3.

Field Hospital No. 5.

1. Advanced Guard, Major-Gencral
V. Sandrart. Fonnation and order of
niareli as detailed opposite. Tliis ad-
vanced guard will be formed ready to
march off with the van at Billigheim
at :1 before 4 A.M. to morrow, and will
move off punctually at 4 o'clock.
General V. Sandrart will designate the
details of llio order of march.

The advanced guard moves past
Barbelroth and Neider Ottcrbach on
Kopswcier, from whence it will cross the
Lauter in two columns at St. Remy
and at Wooghauscrn, where further
orders will be issued. Connexion must
be kept up with detachments on the
flanks.

2. The remainder of ihe Army Corps
follows the advanced guard as main body,
at a distance of 3,000 paces, in order of
march as opposite, under the command
of the Commander of the 10th Division,
Lieut. -General V. Schmidt.

Trains.

Provision Columns Nos. 1 and 2.
Heavy Baggage of the Advanced Guard.

y on- Combatant Head-Quarter Staff".
Heavy Baggage of the remainder of the

9th Division.
Heavy Baggage of the Corps Artillery.
Heavy Baggage of the 10th Division.

3. The train and columns of the Anuy
Corps which are parked at Impflingen,
as well astlie heavy ba>rgage of the Staffs
and of the troops, will wait until the
Bavarian Corps Hartmann, including the
Division Walther,! bave passed Impf-
lingen, and move then in the order

* To the light baggage belonged the led horses, pack horses, company and
squadi-on carts, and the wagon for the Regimental Staffs. The other carriages were
considered as belonging to the heavy baggage.

•f Vide Army Orders, par .2.

172

Remount Dop6t.
Provision Colnrans 3, 4, and 5.
Field Hospitals 6 to 12.
Field Bakery Column.

Column Detachments.

1st echelon of Ammunition Columns.
Small- Arm Ammunition Columns No. 1.
Artillerj Ammunition Columns Nos. i

and 2.
2nd echelon of Ammunition Columns.
Small Arms Ammunition Columns Isos.

2 to •!■.

Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos.

3 to 5.
Pontoon Columns.

<;;ivcu opposite from Impflingen to the
northward of Billigheim, where they
will be parked. Formation and order of
march as opposite, each independent de-
tachment of the train or of the heavy
baggage, is to be under the command of
an officer of the corresponding branch.

The Train Escort Squadron under-
takes the convoy of the trains under the
special orders froni Major V. Herwarth.

4. Afterwards the ammunition column
will follow at a distance of about half a
mile,* with tlie pontoon column under
the command of the commander of the
detachments of the ammunition columns.

5. Reports to me personally will be
directed to the head of the main body.

(Signed) V. Kibchbach.
It is perfectly evident that these orders contain all that is
requisite for such a march, that the place of everything in the
column is clearly laid down, and has evidently been arranged
Avith reference to the country and the prospect of meeting the
enemy. No rivers were to be crossed requiring pontoons,
therefore they were at the tail of the column, the light bridge
equipage being, on the other hand, Avith the advanced guard.
The order in which the advanced guard was to march was left
to be detailed by General Y. Sandrart, and it appears that it
was fonned as follows : —

Vanguard, Colonel v. Rex.
1st Sqiiadron, 4th Dragoons.
2nd Squadron, 4th Dragoons.
1st Company, 5th Rifles.
4th Company, 5th Rifles.
1st Battalion, 58th Regiment.
1st Light Battery, 5th Field Artillery Regiment.
Fusilier Battalion, 58th Regiment.
Detachment 2nd Field Pioneer Company.
Main body of Advanced Guard, Colonel V. Bothmer.
Fusilier Battalion, 59th Regiment.
2nd Field Battery, otli Field Artillery Regiment.
Two Battalions of the 59th Regiment.
Remaining 2 Companies, 5th Rifles.
Remaining 2 Squadrons, 4th Dragoons.

2nd Field Pioneer Company, with intrenching tool columns.
Section of Xo. 1 Sanitary Detachment.

The order of march of the advanced guard are clearly
derived from the requirements of the case. Cavalry and rifles
form the extreme point of the vanguard; cavalry and rifles
close the march of the advanced guard, and in each case for the
same reason, they are more mobile than other troops, can feel
out to the front and flank in the one case, and feel out to
the flank and rear in the other, thus linking the maui

* German mile : half a German mile eqxial to about 4,000 yards.

173

body of the corps to its advanced guard. It will be
observed that (leiieral Sandrart, who commanded the 9th
Division, commanded the advanced guard, which was composed
of the 17th infantr}' brigade, strengthened witli cavalry,
artillery, and engineers. The other brigade of the 0th Division,
the l(Sth, forming the head of the main body, so that in case of
an action taking place General Santbart's command, the 9th
Division, Avould be complete.

It is desirable that the advanced guard should be always
composed of a portion of the unit that immediately follows it ;
thus if it be the advanced guard of a division it should be
composed of a portion of the leading brigade, so that if checked,
and a sldrmish ensues, it may be supported by the remainder of
its brigade. Units will thus be complete. It is a mistake, as
has often been done, to split a brigade in two, and place one
half as advanced, the other as rear guard.

Splitting up the 5th Rifles apparently was with the view of
breaking only one battalion ; had the 2nd and 3rd companies
followed the Ist and 2nd companies, a battalion of the 59th
would have had to be broken up ; in addition to which the
peculiar organization of the lifle battalions, which have more
company transport than others (in the Prussian army), allows
their being split up with gi'eater impunity.

Advanced guards should be invariably composed of all arms
of the service. As a rule the duty of the advanced guard is to
take the outposts of the division until the bivouac is regularly'
formed, and can be relieved, hence it is essential that all arms
should be represented.

The Engineers should not be too far from the head of the
column or they should march at the tail of the vanguard. A
bridge broken down would soon bring the column to a halt,
and it is essential that means should be at hand to repair it. It
is not advisable to have too great a force of cavalry at the head
of such columns ; it must be borne in mind that the cavalry
divisions should be, as a rule, at least a day's march ahead,
and this aifords considerable security.

If the mass of the infantry is allowed to follow close upon the cavalry,
in case of the latter being driven back it will be ridden down, as it would be
unable to get out of the way quickly enough, and the whole be thrown into
confusion.

It is especially dangerous in a mountainous country to have too many
cavalry at the head of the column, foi- if it be suddenly charged in one of the
many defiles that are to be found in such a country, it may be driven back
upon the infantry and artillery, and so deprive them of the means of
defence.

Artillery should be kept together as much as possible on the
march, and with the exception of the advanced guard artillery,
all the divisional guns should march together between the
brigades. They should never be divided by the various regi-
ments, and the tactical rule of having two or more batteries
together should be adhered to.

Verdy du
Veniois.
(Translated
by Hildyard.)

Clausewitz.

174

^LeBourg. In all skirmishes of the advauced guard, after the first moments the

artillery should fire slowly aud carefully, and husband their ammunition as

much as possible, because they are necessarily a long way from their reserves.

In level open countries horse artillery should accompany the advanced

guard ; in hilly or close countries, field batteries.

Verdj (ill Different views exist as to whether the advanced guard artillery should be

Yeniuis. heavy or light. In any case the artillery of the advanced guard comes into

(Transliit. d action fiist, and has to remain there the longest ; and therefore the battery
by Hildjurd.) every leader would prefer for the advanced guard is undoubtedly that which
carries most ammunition with it, and that the liglit battery does.

The duties of the troops of an advanced guard are very-
heavy, as they must send out many flanking parties and patrols,
^ " must carefuhy examine cross roads, and send men to the top of

liills to look out for an enemy. The immber of men to be sent
should be as feio as jyossible ; the object is to see as much as
possible without being seen, and a few selected men will do
this work better and have more chance of escaping observation
than many men sent together.

Less than two men however should never be sent ; one is
pretty sure to return with information. This is especially the
case with the cavalry — sending many men riding about up to
the tops of hills, galloping down cross roads and along lanes,
tends to knock up the horses without doing any good : on the
contrary the; dust and gleaming of arms draws attention to such
movements Avhich otherwise might escape notice. When a
dozen men are sent up a hill to look out, they invariably ride
one after the other on the top of the hill, well on the sky line, a
couple of selected men on selected horses -will do the work a
great deal better, and the force of the cavalry, viz., its horses,
will suffer less. In every troop of cavalry there are men
more specially suited for this Avork than others ; these men.
should be selected and specially taught this Avork in peace time,
and to them the chief part of the scouting should be intrusted.
Officers in command of troops and squadrons soon learn the
special ideas and Avays of their men, and also their method of
expressing themselves, AA'hich is really very important, as
different men I'arely report the same facts in the same AA^ay.

In a march the strength of the adA^anced guard should be
such as Avill enable it by manoeuvring to hold its ground, and
give time for the main body to come up to its assistance, or to
deploy into line of battle.

In an advance it is very questionable if there should be a
rear-guard beyond one for police puiposes. The flanlc of aii ■
army o)i the march should be Avell coA^ered by its cavalry, and
the escorts of its A'arious trains and convoys should be capable
of resisting a few men if any are able to Avork round the flanks,
Avhich is, hoAvever, most improbable. Hence it appears advis-
able to have no rear-guard on the adA^ance, but to diA-ide the
force only into adA^ance guard and main body. A strong bodj^
of police, with a proA'ost, should close the line of march to
arrest stragglers, check marauding, and keep order amongst

175

those camp followers who are the curse of every army, but who
art' often useful, and generally most difficult to get rid of.

The nature of war renders a reserve indispensahle to every leader in Vcrdy du
action up to the very moment when he must enipl()y it. Whatever joins Vornois.
dii-ectly in tlie fighting is, even in tlie most favourable case, only in a very (Translated
limited manner in the hands of the conmiander, and generally is entirely out by Hiklyard.)
of his control ; ^et a leader has a decisive influence only so far as he keeps
powerful masses of troops at his disposal, or as he understands how to form
them for this purpose according to the various movements of an action.
Battle therefore must not be given without a leserve, but why the separation
of a reserve should be necessary on the march is difficult to iraagint: ; indeed
it is not necessary, and a fighting reserve even, need only l)e formed just before
the commencement of the action.

Military nomenclature has gone too far here ; let us only consider what the
nature of a reserve comprises. All troops so far as they have not yet come
into action are reserves for the leader. Hitherto it has been settled in the
general projwrtion ; one quarter of the whole force advanced guard ; one half
main body ; one quarter reserve, only varying in a decimal degree. When an
action begins it cannot be foreseen whether the advance guard alone will
suffice to carry it through, or whether the whole force, to the last man, must
be brought to bear.

The advanced guard commences the action, and the whole of the
remainder of the troops are its reserves, from which as many are drawn as
necessary.

Why then another partition / Again, is a long interval necessary between
these masses of troops ( It certainly is not advantageous for action when a
portion an-ives half an hour later than it is requii^ed. This however is the
ca-se, if, for example, a corj^s on the march separates a I'eserve, and lets it
follow a mile in the rear of the main body. On the march there must be
intervals, lest checks in front should be imparted at once to the Avhole, Init by
no means so considerable as 1,000 to 2,500 paces ; even less intervals than
those laid down would suffice foi' the various bodies of troo2:)S. Besides, it
must be considered that these intervals are there in order to be lost uudei-
circumstances, and that when this takes place they can only be properly
made up in course of time.

Thus the separation of a reserve on the march appears utterly useless ;
ever>i:hing useless is for us dangerous, and danger undoubtedly lies in the
iisual division mentioned.

When an army is in retreat the real-guard becomes the most
important part^ the most dangerous and trying.

Where troops move to the front, the duties of the rear guard are con- Fallot,
fined to preventing the soldiers disbanding, in sending on stragglers and Lagi-auge.
arresting maraudei-s. Consequently in general the Provost-Marshal intrasted
with the police of the army, the mounted police and provosts, march with
the rear-guard. But when the army retreats the rule of the rear-guard is far
more important. Its duty is to stop the enemy at every point favourable for
that jiurpose, to procure time to the artillery Itaggage pares, convoys of sick
and wounded to march off. It. has to cut the roads, burn, destroy or blow up
the bridges ; it has to contain the enemy flushed with success, and to |)ush him
back with coolness, to maintain a good apjjcarance so as to prevent the enemy
discovering that demoralisation, which almost always takes place durincf a
long retreat. To fulfil this task the best troops and those that have suffered
least must be chosen. With the rear-guard the engineers march, intrusted
with rendering by their labour the i-etreat secure, precisely as at the head of '
the column they render its advance easy and pave the way foi' its success.
The rear-guard has nothing but the most requisite baggage, in order that
when it h;is provided time for the army to retire, it may again if possible
rejoin it by a forced march. But this is rarely possible, as rear-guards

176

necessarily get loaded with stragglers, badly horsed carriages, and iu fact
everything the ai*my leaves behind.

The duty of the rear-guard is not to fight, it is to detain
tlie enemy, to compel liim to deph)y his force, and biing up
large bodies of men. In selecting positions for this pm-pose
care must be taken that they can only be turned by a distant
Hank movement, and consequently cavalry scouts must be kept
well out on the flanks of a rear-guard, perhaps a day's march
distant ; these men should watch for and report any such move-
ment on the part of the enemy. Villages through which an
enemy must march should be well barricaded, the roacLs cut,
and a quantity of combustibles, straw, &c., collected, to set
fire to Avhen the rear-guard leaves; this retards the enemy
considerably.

Bugeaud. Rear-gnards often partially take the offensive ; this is sometimes indispen-

sable, to disengage the t;iil of the column if much pressed, but such an
offensive taken by a small body of men should not be pushed too far, for if
the rear-guard pursued the enemy too far, while the main body followed its
march, too gi'eat an interval woidd be left between the two.

Generally this kind of offensive should be avoided, it leads to small results,
and always some of the best men are killed. The troops should if possible be
withdrawn by alternate echelons. The commander of the rear-guard has two
grand objects to fulfil. To fall back and lose as few men as possible, to retard
as little as ])0ssible the main body, and to stop the enemy as much as possible,
Ajiy offensive movement to be really effective must come from the com-
mander of the main body, and in such cases a larger body than the rear-guard
.should be employed.

Horse artillery is better suited for a rear-guard than field
batteries, moving faster and being able to take up positions
to cover the retreat more rapidly.

Although a serious offensive movement is undoubtedly
dangerous, yet a sudden advance for a short, time often checks
a pursuing enemy, but such attacks should be for a special
object.
pJapier. j^^ ^j^g retreating troops approached the river, the ground became moie

open ; and the left wing, hardest pressed, and having the shortest distance,
arrived while the bridge was quite crowded with artillery and cavalry, and the
right wing was still distant. Major McLeod, of the 43rd, perceiving the
danger, then rallied four companies of his regiment on a hill covering the
line of passage ; he was joined by some of the riflemen, and at the same time
the Brigade-Major Rowan posted two companies on another hill to the left,
flanking the road.

These posts were maintained to cover the filing of the right wing over the
bridge, yet the French gathered in great numbers, made a serious rush, and
forced the companies back before the bridge could be cleared, and while a
l)art of the r)2nd was still at a considerable distance from it.

The crisis was imminent, but McLeod, a young man endowed with a
)iatural genius for war, turned his horse round, called the troops to follow,
and waving his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The sudden-
ness of the thing, and the animated action of the man, produced the effect
he designed : a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if
a whole army had been at their backs ; the enemy's skirmishers, astonisheil
at this unexpected movement, stopped shoi-t, and before they could recover
from their surprise the 52nd had passed the river. McLeod followed at a
run, and gained the other side without disaster.

177

Here the troops, retiring- by alternate wings, had to <^(it across
a bridge ; the rear wing covering was hard pressed, it took the
offensive, and gained time for tlie others to tile over. The hand-
ling of rear-guards is a most difficult and delicate operation, and
requires great tactical skill and knowledge, the power of judging
distance and time quickly, and penetrating the enemy's intention;
in short, in what is knoAvn as coujy (Vocll. Marshal Ney was re-
markable for the poAver he possessed in this way, and the retreat
of JMassena from Portugal, especially the action at Redinha, are
excellent examples of this. There is this great difference be-
tween a rear and an advanced guard, the former fights in order
that it may fall back, the latter fights to hold its ground until
supported and this distinction should be borne in mind.

A rear-guard commander should look for and expect no assist-
ance, he must detain the enemy and draw off his force ; to send
assistance to a rear-guard would be really to delay the retreat,
or to do exactly what the enemy is seeking to do. When
Bazaine was retiring his army on the 14tli of August from the
right bank of the Moselle, his object was to withdraw from both
flanks, and gradually reduce the circle, covering the rear-guard
under the guns of the detached forts Quelieu and Des Bottes.
When the Prussians attacked the Ilird Corps at Borny, and the
troops which had crossed the IMoselle were brought back again,
the French leader was really playing the game of his enemies,
and disregarding the protection which the fortress of Metz a
cJieval on the river gave him of withdrawing the Ilird Corps,
his rear-guard, when and how he pleased.

Every commander of a body of troops, large or small, should
see his command march before him each day. By this means
all sorts of irregularities can be stopped. This especially^ is
requisite in long marches, and should be observed by captains
of companies, as well as those of higher rank ; as troops file
into their bivouacs after a march is an excellent opportunity for
seeing the state of both men and horses, whether the march has
told on them, the columns straggled out unnecessarily, men in
their proper places, the order of march preserved, &c.

Another point Avell worthy of attention is the repose of the
men. Men cannot work without rest, and it should be a constant
object of leaders to procure this rest ; all kinds of noise and con-
fusion should be strictly forbidden, and constant care should be
taken that troops are not turned out too early. As an
example, suppose an army-order is issued, to march at 4 A.M.,
as the Pnissian orders of the 3rd August, 1870, were; this
necessitated a parade of the 5th Corps at 3.45 A.M. AVhen
did the divisions parade '? when the brigades ? when the batta-
lions ? Mounted troops whose horses have to be fed and watered
before the march, suffer especially in this way. Horses drink
badly in the early morning, and it will be always better (if by
any possible an-angement it can be managed) to water at a
halt.

178

Few who have Avntcbcd those things but will acknowledge,
that to march off at four, the artillery and cavaliy trumpets will
usually sound two hours sooner.

Prince do The execution of orders must never be kept waiting. If the Divisional-

I^'g"*-"- (Jeneral, Brigade-General, or Colonel is not in his proper place at the

proper moment, the next senior otticer must take command and march
otf. On the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that if the Commander of
an army ortlers the troojos to march at 4 A.M., the Cavalry or Infantry
Generals say 3"30 a.m., then subordinate Generals say 3 a.m., the Brigadiers
say 2'30 a.m., the Colonels 2 a.m., and so on down to companies ; it is exactly
the same case for a review or field day. If great care is not taken the ti-oo]j.s
will thus be under ju-ms three hours sooner than has been ordei-ed.

77ie Stipphj of Jroops icith Provuions on the Line of March.

The supply of troops with provisions hardly comes within
the s(;ope of this book, but it is desirable that a few words
should be said on it. Some knowledge of the difficulties to be
contended with, may reduce the ranks of both the grumblers
who never get rations at all, and tlie fortunate persons who
never want for them. Both are probably in error. But some
knowledge of how troops must be fed in the field may enable
officers to work into the hands of those whose function it is to
supply provisions, thus reducing friction and tending to produce
cordial co-operation, by Avhich the persons who have to be fed
Avill undoubtedly benefit.

If an attempt is made to realise Avhat was happening when
the Crown Prince's army advanced in accordance Avith the orders
given at Page 169, it will be found that long columns of men
and horses were spread along the different roads, and that the
trains of each corps were parked in the rear, that is to say, the
supplies of each corps were parked in rear. When each column
halted for the night at the places indicated in the orders, the
head of the column did not halt there with all the tail spread out
along the road it had marched on, but each corps drew ifs tail
up after it, and more or less formed a line of battle. Thus the
roads were cleared, and it then became possible for the trains to
advance with food. But it is manifest that if the soldier, having
to march 12 to 15 miles, and starting at 4 A.M., and probably
not getting settled into his bivouac until 3 or 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, had to wait for his food until the train arrived, he would
be simply starved. Therefore, it folhnvs that if troops are to be
fed in the field, they must carry rations with tliem, and the rations
consumed during the day must be replaced by the train during
the night, so that the men shall move off the following day with
the same number of rations as previously. Soldiers, if tliey are
not to Ktarve, must carry rations. No one who has considered this
sul^ject Avill question the truth of these words ; and it is essentially
requisite that this absolute necessity should be impressed on and
clearly iraderstood by the men. A ration of fresh meat and
bread put into a canvas haversack and carried under the arm in
the sun for 10 hours is not an inviting dinner, and the soldier
too often throws it away, refusing to eat it, which would be of

179

little moment if doing so did not render him useless as a fig-liting
element ; therefore it becomes absohitely rei^nisitc tliat some
means by Avhicli the ration may be carried, so as not to bo
disgusting when required, sliould be adopted, and that com-
manding officers should carefully watch that these rations are
properly used, and not all eaten at once. It is well knoAvn that
a soldier in peace time eats a quantity of potatoes, varying with
the nationality of the regiment, in addition to his regular bread
and meat rations. In the field potatoes, and STich bulky food,
must to a gTeat extent be viewed as luxuries to be procured
more by the skill and sharpness of the men and officers on the
Hne of march than by the efforts of the commissariat. But the
want of the large quantitii of food eaten in peace is for some time
not compensated by the larger amount of meat the soldier gets
in the field, and althoiigh the nutriment he receives may perhaps
be greater, yet there is for some time a craving for quantity.*
Hence officers must watch to see that the rations intended for
two days are not consumed in one.

The best food to carry is undoubtedly bacon, sausage, biscuit,
and coffee, it suffers less from carriage than any other, and con-
sequently bacon and biscuit, joined to rice, which can be easily
carried, swells much in the cooking, and is a capital substitute for
potatoes, must be looked on as the main provision to be carried
by the soldier.

Biit of whatever the ration is composed, some separate and
special place, which can be easily cleaned out, should be provided
to contain it. The best place for the meat is undoubtedly the
mess-tin, and it would be a great improvement if some special
place for biscuit, rice, &c., Avere provided.

One of the Prussian Army Corps, previously referred to,
drawn up on parade ready to march off, if inspected, would have
been found to have at least eight days rations with it.

These would be divided as follows : —

One day's common ration for immediate consumption, that is
to say, to be eaten on the 4th August ; three days' reserve
rations, consisting of biscuit, coffee, bacon, rice and salt, —
special places or bags for the two latter being provided for the
purpose in the packs. The five provision columns, viz., two for
each Infantry Division, and one for the Corps Artillery and
Cavalry, carrying four days' more ; the meat being driven. The
order to advance and leave the trains beliind was perfectly
feasible ; the anny could exist for four days without seeing its
train if requisite.

But the moment the trains get the order to advance, they
move up at night when the roads are clear, and fill up the

* The average weight of a great number of soldiers' dinners is 1 lb. 6^ oz.
cooked, of this the average weight of meat is 5 oz. ; it is apparent that the meat
ration may be doubled, and altliough tlie soldier will then take a nmcli greater
amount of nutriment into his system, yet from long custom he may feel his stomach
empty.

N 2

180

rations consumed by the trccps, halting again when the troops
advance.

How are the trains themselves filled up ? As far as possible
magazines told off previously in the same order as the corps
provision columns, are formed ; these magazines are the reserves
of which the trains themselves are the expense magazines ;
and hired transport carnages to the number of nearly 000
per corps are used to haul up the provisions from the maga-
zines to the trains, and fill them up, as they filled the soldiers.
It is manifest that there must be some limit to this operation ;
assuming that the train can move 1^ infantry marches, the limit
would be six days, when the magazines must, if the army is
advancing, be moved to the front. This would probably be done
by pushing up by railway from the great magazines of the
country large supplies of food to fresh advanced magazines
which would then fill up the train, and this process would be re-
peated. This supposes nothing to be bought in the country or
obtained by requisitions, but all brought from magazines.
Practically the commissariat arranges for relieving the strain on
the magazines as much as possible b}^ purchasing or requisitioning
flour, which is converted into bread by the bakery column, and
by the purchase or requisitioning of cattle, which are driven with
the train as they advance ; of course every purchase lightens the
strain on the magazines and train, and helps the advance m a
corresponding degree.

Food captured from an enemy has a similar effect, and the
rapid advance of the German armies after the battle of Spicheren
was not a little due to the vast stores of provisions belonging to
the French army captured in Forbach, St. Avoid, and other
small open towns of Lorraine. A great deal of the comfort
and efficiency of a division or corps thus depends on the
activity of its commissariat. If the commissariat officer depends
entirely on the train, there is every chance of it breaking down
exactly at the moment it is most wanted, namely, when the
soldier has eaten up all he carries. But an active commissariat
will seek to husband what the men carry as much as possible, by
the use of what can be procured on the spot ; consequently the
Prussian system of having the " eiserne " ration composed of
bacon and biscuit which will keep, is undoubtedly a correct one ;
the longer its use is staved off the better ; the moment it is
encroached on it should be filled up again.

It is impossible to read the many personal accounts of cam-
paigns without being struck hy the fact that a great deal depends
on the qualities of the individual commissary.

One French corps at ]\Ietz Avas well fed to the end of the
blockade, because, prior to the blockade, its Intendanco had
husbanded their resources and used what they could buy from
day to day; consequently its reserve stores were not encroached
on when the blockade began.

Too much regularity, punctuality, and care cannot be used

181

in evuiytliing' rcgMvding* distribution of rations ; it is in these
poiutf?. and in caret'ully watching the soldier that he docs not
waste his rations, tliat tlie regimental officers can do much to
lighten the work, and facilitate the duties of the supply depart-
ment.

In distributing rations it is always best to do so alternately
from the right and left as the troops stand on parade. But a
corps whose turn is first cannot, if it is not present, and has lost
its turn, stop the distribution of rations to another when it has
begun.

In the field, the hoiu'S of distribution and the number of days' rations to De Gerlacho.
be distributed must vary constantly, owing to the state of the disposable
resoui'ces, and the nature of the military operations, or the difiiculty and un-
expected delays which may impede the regularity of the distribution.

All these vai'iatious should be announced in daily orders by the Chief of
the Stiitf after consultation with the Intendant.

Whatever is done must be always governed by the resolve that nothing
shall delay or interfere with the military movements, and by the desii'e to spare
the soldiers as much as possible many or unexpected fatigue parties.

Hay and straw can rarely or ever be earned with troops, oats
may, but the rations of the two former must generally, at least
when on the line of march, be sought in the country.

If war is being made in summer, the horses can eat grass,
this, and an extra ration of corn will keep them in good health.

The Prussians have an " e.herne " rations of oats similar to the
rations for the men, this ration consists of one day's oats for
each cavalry horse, carried by the horse, and tlii-ee days' oats for
each horse of the artillery, train, staff, administrative, and regi-
mental wagons ; this is earned in the Avagons.

War cannot be made without food for men and horses, hence Generals Grimoard.
seek to seize jwsts that will give them the possession of a country abounding
in resources, and deny it to their enemy.

No sooner has a division taken up its position than the sous-intendant De Grerlache»
should, either himself or by deputy, examine all the farms, stores, and supplies
of all kinds, the mills and ovens which may exist in the place or its neighbour-
hood. He should at once prepare the establishments suitable for making use
of the supplies he finds, whether they belong to the enemy, to the country, or
private persons, being careful, however, to authorise his acts by proper requisi-
tions, and to leave to the loc;U authorities a sufficiency of food for the
inhabitants.

It is impossible to insist too much on order and rule in everything
that concerns the subsistence of ti'oops. Let us imagine a division where
things are wisely done and strict discipline maintained.

The General remains at the head of his division until everything has been
put to rights, its position fixed, the cantonments arranged, the supply of food
by requisitions on the villages, and the division of the villages to the force,
completed, the guards mounted, fatigues iletailed, the camp formed, bivouacs
arranged, and kitchens made. The detachments are then sent out in an
orderly way, they return in the same manner, bringing what is required.
No soldier is absent when the n)ll is called, and the camp is properly ])rovided.

Let us imagine on the other hand another division, where these details
are neglected. It arrives on its ground, halts, the moment it does so the
leaders abandon the men, the men scatter, the camp is deserted. One
seeks wood, another water, come food, straw, forage ; the houses of the

1.S2

Clausewitz.

Fallot atid
Legrangc.

people are forced open, provisions wasted, cellars broken into, granaries
emptied, the authority of officers des]iised, their bivouacs entered under pretext
of seeking what is requisite, and the furniture of the inhabitants taken from
their houses to tlie camp.

In this pillage (for things must Ije called by their proper names), the
soldiei-s on duty get nothing. A ])ortion of the others think they would be
more comfortable under roofs than in the ojien air, and they remain there,
and the general can hardly get hold of them when he wants them.

However, if this division has fallen on a village well provided, perhaps
few men will be lost, despite their disorder, but if the village is not well
provided, and a few of the most greedy have seized and wastetl ^^•hat would
have been sufficient for all, the last comers wander into the neighloouring
villages ; they spread over the whole country, live in the houses, and
when their corps marches, lose it, and liecome marauders for the rest of the
CJimpaign. Such a division wdl infalliljly lose 2,000 out of 8,000 men in a
fortnight, without seeing the enemy. All have seen these things, in that famous
campaign where, after having been for years masters of all countries, we were
compelled to fight pro aris et focis.

War cannot he maintained witliout requintions on the people,
and it is hopeless to attempt to do otherwise, the power that requi-
sitioniug gives a general of moving rapidly is so great, and eonse-
qnently the force of the army using a system of requisitions is so
enormously increased, that the army that does not adopt it ^^all
be infallibly beaten by that which does ; hence in self defence, all
armies must adopt this system, and like any other necessary evil,
the truest humanity is not to leave it to chance, but to lay down
clear and definite rules for making and enforcing requisitions,
rules which shall be such as may protect the inhabitants from
pillage and ill-usage, but will at the same time give security
to the army. Evils which are unavoidal)le, like war, and the
consequent march of armies in the midst of peaceful inhabitants,
may be best mitigated by reducing to system, and enforcing
with a strong hand, a strict code of rules. By so doing the misery
consequent on the march of hostile armies niay be greatly
mitigated.

Regular requisitions are undoul)tedly the simplest and best method of
feeding an army, and are the only system that can serve as the basis of UKjdern
war. War based on a system of requisitions, and living amongst the inhabit-
ants, possesses such a superiority over that which is based on the exclusive
use of magazines, that the latter is really a completely different weapon. No
State can dare to meet the former system with the latter, and if by jjossibility
there exists anywhere a Minister for War so narrow-minded, so ignorant , as to
despise the universal experience of all wars, and attempt at the beginning of a
campaign to use the old method, very soon the general, by force of cii-cum-
stauces, will find himself compelled to have recourse to requisitions, and the
system will begin again. If also the expense of the other system be considered,
it will be found that the amount of the armament and the extent of the force
must be diminished, since no State has money for such aniuigements, which
would be unprofitable unless both sides agi-eed to fight in the same way.
Such ideas are Utopian.

Troo{)s should never be allowed to take firewood as they jilease, but the
proper jilace to cut it, and the quantity to be cut, should be carefully deter-
mined, otherwise the men will cut fruit trees anil hedge-row.s, and commit
irrej)arable damage without any compensating advantage. Such vexations
exasperate the inhaltitants, and make them hostile to the soldiers of any army.

Similarly, when green foi'age is being cut the horses should not be allowed

183

to trample the fields dowu, but the bumlles cut and tied should be carried out
to the hoi-ses, who shouKl wait halted ou a road.

It has boon said that tro(ips can rarely marcli more than
four or five days witliout a halt ; when a halt takes place
every effort should be used to make it a day of rest, that is to
say, that the men should be well fed, and the food carefully
cooked; if possible, on such days the men should have an extra
ration.

He who imposes on the soldier great privations required for some object
of importance, l)oth from sympathy and policy, should not lose sight of the
compensation which idtered circumstances enable him to give.

Soldiers in quarters are reg'ularl}^ fed, the hours for meals
never alter, the food is excellent, well-cooked, and abundant, it
comes to the soldier's mouth without trouble or thought on his
part, if he is dissatisfied he complahis, and his wrong, if there
be one, is immediately redressed. He wants neither salt,
pepper, mustard, nor any such luxuries, to say nothing of bread
or potatoes. Durmg autumn manoeuvres he is fed with pretty
nearly the same regularity. He may occasionally have to eat
his biscuit and salt pork, but that is not always an unpleasant
change ; he does not slaughter his own cattle or bake his own
bread. This is not a duty connected with the regiment, it is
done by some one else, and the soldier and the officer are so
accustomed to this regular method of proceeding, so accus-
tomed to see food make its appearance, that both one and
the other regard it as coming in the natural course of events.
Consequently the necessity of husbanding it carefully, making
it go as far as possible, and preserving even stray crusts, is not
realised until stern want makes itself felt. It is said that
necessity teaches ; but far too often, when necessity reads her
lesson, those she reads it to are too exhausted, too Aveary, to
learn ; that lassitude, which long exhaustion produces, has come
on them, and the lesson is forgotten because the mind cannot
grasp it. Such lessons, to be profitable, should be taught and
learned in peace.

The improvidence of the British soldier in these respects is
proverbial, and it can only be checked by the constant, close,
\vatchful care of company officers. And this care must be
given if officers would bruig their compaiiies, that is the
weapon they fight with, the machine they work, into action as
efficient bodies. The following extracts from a lecture by
General v. Kirchbach, furnished by General Walker, are well
worthy of attention : —

Genei'al v. Kirchbach commanded the 10th Prussian Division in 1866.
He says : The first concentration of the Division, to the number of iy,r)00
men and 1,500 horses, took place on the 26th June ; that night the troops
bivouacked ; this day they were supplied partly from a provision convoy,
halted at Ober Schwedeldorf, and partly by contractors who had followed
them from Posen ; the straw, 1,600 cwt., and 65 cords of wood, were obtained
in the neighbourhood by the Divisional intendance.

The whole staff of the Divisional intendance (except one official left in

Clause wits.

Extract of
Lectvu-e, fur-
nished by
General
Walker,

184

charge at Schwedeklorf), crossed the frontier the uext day, and were left in
Nachod to make recjiiisitious while tlie troojjs were engaged with the enemy.

Each man carried one day's bread and one day's biscuit, and three day's
small stores and coflee, supposed to be renewed each day by the provision
convoys, which carried four days' supplies.

Four days' meat was driven with tlie Division, and 280 country carts
carried three days' supply of oats and straw for the corps (the 5th), further
supplies being reg\ilarly furnished from the magazines in rear. General v.
Kirchback remarks, " One would have thought that these measures would
have ensured n regular supply," but this was by no means the case, circum-
stances willed it otherwise. During the lirst half of the campaign the troops
were entirely dependent on the local resources of the country and on requisi-
tions, which, from the absence of the ordinary authorities, and the impossibility
of obtaining any reliable information, were often carried out by compulsion.
In Nachod, which had not been deserted by the local functionaries, the
supplies of the Division were obtained without much difficulty, 200 cwt. of
oats, 50 cwt. of hay, 30 cwt. of rice, 5 cwt. of coifee, 7 cwt. of salt, as well
as a considerable supply of bread and salt.

But no transpoi't could be found to cany these supplies to the bivouacs,
all the transport being appropriated for the wounded. The troops had there-
fore to fetch their own rations, which, after a 15 miles' march, and eight hours'
incessant fighting, was very inadequately carried out. On the 28th, requisitions
wei'e made on Skalitz, after the action fought that day, which furnished
little, and the troops were compelled to content themselves with a portion of
the provisions carried with them. The 29th, Skalitz was entirely cleared out,
and the little obtained the previous day, and the remainder of the carried
rations, were all the troops had to stoj) tlieir gnawing hunger. The following
night considerable supplies were found in Chalkowitz, and taken possession
of by the commissariat and a strong escort ; these consisted of a herd of
bullocks, 200 sheep, and a good store of beer. On the 30th June and 1st
July we had jjlenty of meat, beer, and spirits, but bread and other stores were
entirely wanting.

This arose partly from the fact that the men, accustomed to punctual
delivery of tlieir rations, had tltrown au-ay a great portion of that which they
curried durincj the actions of tlie 'ilth and 28th, and moreover had wasted what
they received from the requisitions.

This wan ^. would not have been so apparent if the provision columns had
punctually followed the troops to the camp at Gradlitz. But marching during
the night 29-30 June, a false alarm had caused them to turn back, and they
had retreated as far as the Prussian frontier, and when they did arrive on
the night 1-2 July, a great part of the provisions were spoilt. Also on their
retreat, 40 carts were seized by other corps and approjjriated by them during
nearly all the rest of the campaign. On the morning of the 3rd July, the
Quartermaster Serjeants received the regiilar rations. The intendant and his
staff endeavoured to follow the march of the corps, but encountered so many
delays that they only reached the bivouac at Eossnitz on the morning of the
4th, by which time all the villages near had been cleared of anything that
the inhabitants had left. While the provision columns of the corps, entangled
with those of others, and delayed by the confusion always existing in the rear
of a great battle-field, only reached the bivouac on the morning of the 5th to
find that a gi'eat part of the corps had marched off.

That is to say, from the 27tli June to the 5th July, or for
eight clays, the troops had only one distribution of rations, the
rations being spoiled in one case, and too late iji the other ;
during all those eight days, the rnen had to live on Avhat they
carried and could find. This extract shows perhaps more
clearly than any elaborate statement can do, hoAv much necessity
there is for constant care and watchfulness on the part of the
officers that the men do not waste and throw away their food.

185

The war of 18G6 was the first Prussian war of any extent for many
years, and the men, accustomed to the plenty of barracks, did
not realise the necessity of economy and care ; during; the next
war, 1870-1, the troops suffered far less from want of provisions.

The Organization of the Communications of an Army,
INCLUDING Railways.*

Our language is not rich in military terms, and the expression, Mcaninc of
the organization of the coinviunications of an army, is a clumsy one "Organization
to express what the Germans call " etapjien'' — a Avord which communica-
they have taken from the French 6tape. There is no English tiocs."
term Avhich expresses what is meant, and a term has therefore
been used which Avas adopted during the Peninsular, our
greatest Avar, for nearly the same thing. By the Avords, " the
organization of the communications of an army," is meant,
therefore, not the maintenance or repau* of roads, raihvays,
canals, or telegraphs, so much as the organization Avhich enables
an army to obtain the greatest benefit from those means of
communication.

"When an army advances into a hostile country, it has to be
supplied Avith food, ammunition, and other stores ; it has to
receiA'e reinforcements in men and horses from the rear ;
and it has to send back sick or Avounded men and horses
from the front. If an army of moderate size, say 50,000 men,
simply marches 100 miles, Avithout firing one shot, or seeing an
enemy, the number of sick that have to be got rid of is very
gi-eat. Experience has shoAvn that, in a good climate, Avitli
abundant food, easy marches, and fair Aveather, the waste from
ordinary causes in a ten days' march of such a force Avould be
between 2,000 and 2,500 men, while the number of galled, foot-
sore, or Avorn-out horses Avould also be very large. A few Avet
days or a sharp engagement Avould raise the number of both
very considerably. An inefficient man or horse at the front is
a positive disadA^antage ; he can do no Avork; and he consumes
food Avhich is difficult to get, and often occupies the time of a
sound man by requiring to be looked after ; consequently, if
an army is to be kept efficient in front, there must be a stream
of men and horses passing along the lines of communication
from the base of operations in the rear to supply the Avaste in
fi-ont, and a succession of depots Avhere sick men and horses
may be tended, cured, and again sent to the front.

Further, an army must be fed, and the magnitude of the
operation is what many people rarely consider. The action of

* This account of the Organization of the Communications of an Army, including
Bailway?, was contained in a lecture delivered by the late Col. Home at tlie Ruyal
United Service Institution, and is to be found in No. LXXXII, Vol. XIX, of its
Proceedings. It is entered here with the kind permission of the Council of the
Institution.

186

an army in tlie field, its inarches and its battles, the lists of
killed or wounded, are what chiefly strike the ej^e of the hjoker
on ; when a man is killed or wounded, or even when he is taken
prisoner, his loss is chronicled; but the man is just as much
lost if he dies or is invalided from want of food or medical aid.
We read of so many killed, wounded, and prisoners, and of so
many guns and standards captured ; l)ut who notices the losses
from privations and hardships ? Yet the losses from the latter
causes far outweigh those from the former. We read much of
the fight at Magenta and the battle of Solferino. Volumes
have been written in which you will find accounts of both in
the greatest detail ; but we rarely see an account of the
suffering endured by the French Army from the 9th to the 17th
June, 1859 ; during the first few days the troops were ordered
to live on the peasants, and latterly, although in a friendly
countiy, the order was repeated, with the words added, " even
to complete exhaustion" — words never used except in the
direst extremity.

We read much of the battles round jMetz : of the gallant
conduct of the soldiers of tAvo great nations ; of the sldll dis-
played by the Generals on this side, of the mistakes made by
those on that. We read long lists of killed and wounded, but
J we hear little of the many human lives lost by fever, cold,
hunger and want, roimd the beautiful city of Lorraine.

Few realise the fact that an army requires as much food as
a very large city. Each day a large city receives its daily
supply of food, there is no stint nor stay for those who can
purchase ; long custom and gradual improvements have opened
up easy means of communication between the consumer and
the producer. It is different with an army. An army is a city
flung down suddenly m the country, each day moving, each day
requiring fresh alterations in the aiTangements by wliich food is
conveyed fi'om the producer to the consumer. Yet this portion of
the art of war — one of the most important, if not the most im-
portant — receives but scant notice. " War is the art of being the
strongest at any given place," and that portion of the art of
war that keeps the greatest number of bayonets in the ranks is
surely not to be despised.

It is often asked, why this difficulty about food? The
number of mouths in a country is but slightly increased when two
armies meet ; the total number of mouths hi the two countries
at war is really diminished. Why then this difficulty ? The
answer lies here. Suppose there are 10,000 bakeries in England,
an addition of ten mouths to be fed by each would make but a
slight difference, if distributed. But suppose the additional
100,000 mouths all concentrated in one place, and reqinriug to
be fed all at once, the circumstances are altered.

Three ways by There are really but three ways by which, or by modifica-

which arnues nations of Avhich, armies can be fed m the field:—
can be letl. '

187

1st. The soldiers may obtain food by being billeted on the
inhabitants, or by living from hand to mouth as they march.

2nd. The whole of the provisions may be carted after Ihe
army.

3rd. The army may be fed from magazines.

Let lis consider these three methods. In the first case, the
ai-my -would soon cease to be a military body ; the men would
quickly become a mob of marauders, and cease to be an army.
Ill a thinly-peopled country, moreover, the dispersion of the men
in search of food would be so great that little or no progress to
the front could be made, and the moment a halt took place,
the troops having exhausted the district Avhcre they were, would
simply starve, precisely as a bullock tethered by a string Avill
eat up everything in its circle and, if not moved, die from starva-
tion, even in the midst of a rich meadow. This was the system
generally adopted by the great Napoleon ; it is one which we
do not read much about in ordinary militaiy histories, and into
which we only get an insight by reading personal narratives of
the Avars at the beginning of this century. And it must be con-
fessed that the genius of Napoleon as a strategist and tactician
appears all the more marvellous when the system under which
he made war is considered. The marches made by the French
Army Corjos to blockade Ulm were made in this manner, and
French wiiters say the men suffered severely for many days.
Pillage showed itself in that, the finest army Napoleon ever
commanded. This must be the invariable result of there being
no magazines. A victorious army may march on a broad front
in a rich country in such a way, but the moment it concentrates
to fight, or halt, it is plunged into the greatest difficulties.

After the capture of Berlin, in 1808, when the French under-
took the winter campaign in Poland, their sufferings were very-
great ; whole corps disappeared, broken up into bands of ma-
rauders seeking food in the scattered farms of that inlios23itable
country.

The serious check received by the French Army at E-ydau
was caused by the demoralisation consequent on this system.
The resources of a country cannot be utilised by an army
marching through it ; they are wasted and lost.

We now turn to the second method, that by which an army
is fed by provisions carried Avitli it on wagons ; this is jiossible
for a very small force, but for a force of any magnitude it is
impossible.

The Comte de Paris has furnished a remarkable calculation
on this subject. He says, one road will suffice for only a limited
number of carriages; if several roads are available, the number
of wagons must be limited, otlierwise the anuy cannot move.

A six-horse wagon will carry 2,000 lbs. ; and the supply for
each man per day, medical stores, ammunition, and food in-
cluded, may be placed at 4 lbs. per man.

188

Such a wagon will supply 500 mcu for one day ; but if the
army is a day's march from its base, it will only supply 250 men,
for it must go back empty to re-fill at the base. If it is two
days from its base, 4 Avagons for 500 men are requisite, or 8
per 1,000, or 800 wagons for 100,000 men. But if the army
of 100,000 men includes, as it Avould do, 10,000 cavalry and
artillery horses, 200 wagons would be requisite to carry a day's
forage, or 800 if the army Mas two days' march from its base ;
or 1,600 wagons, hoi-sed with 9,G0O horses, but these wagons
would be three days away from the base and one day there,
consequently they Avould require 360 more wagons, horsed by
2,460 animals, to feed them ; these would require 92 additional
Wagons, and so on, until we arrive at a total of 2,000 wagons,
horsed by 12,000 animals, as being absolutely requisite to feed
an army of 100,000 men two days from its base of operations.
If the army advances one day further, or three days' march from
its base, it would require 3,760 wagons, horsed by 22,000
animals, a column 38 miles long, if the intervals could be kept ;
but Avhich would extend over 48 miles or the whole four marches ;
and even this number of Avagons does not give a true picture,
for there must be a fresh set of Avagons to carry the food from,
the divisional depots to the regiments. To move ten days from
the base operations, on the basis furnished by the Comte de
Paris, Avould require 10,975 Avagons, horsed by 65,850 horses.
This is a number Avhich it would be practically impossible to
deal with, coA^ering no less than 108 miles, if the distances be
kept, but AAdiich avouIcI really be more than the Avhole length of
the ten days' march.

The third method, or that of magazines, is consequently the
only sure, safe, and possible means of making war, provided it
be judiciously combined Avith a system of requisitions.

Along the roads, railAvays, or canals forming the line of com-
munication of an army, there must be two distinct streams
ahvays flowing, Anz., that Avhich supplies the army Avith fresh or
convalescent men and horses, as Avell as food and Avarlike stores
of all kinds (this stream floAvs from the base to the army), and
that floAving in the opposite direction, Avhich carries back sick
and Avounded men, horses, and prisoners, either to depots on the
line of communication, or to the base itself, and also the empty
AA'agons returning for fresh supplies.

It is manifest that there must be some organization which
shall kee^i order and discipline amongst the heterogeneous masses
Avhich compose these tAvo streams, Avhicli shall form depots in
proper places ; see to the supply of the sick and Avounded ;
push on Avliat is urgently Avanted ; economise and utilise the
resources of the country, Avhether friendly or hostile ; direct
those resources to proper places; maintam and repau- the
telegraphs, roads, railAvays, and bridges; garrison important
points; protect and patrol the communications; check disorders ;
look after the dispatch of letters ; and lastly, be such that, Avith

189

but a short delay, can direct the whole of the vast traffic into
another channel, should the movements of the Army necessitate
this being done.

This oro-anization. which the Germans term etappen, and
which has beeJi paraphrased as the " ori^anization of the line
of connnunications of an army," is that portion of the military
art Avhere study and forethought come most into play. It is
that portion of the science of war where the bright scintilla-
tions of genius, the sudden inspirations of the heaven-born
leader, can do little or nothing. But it is on that account the
more important ; as careful, accurate, painstaking, study, and
forethought applied to it, will go far to remove many of the
indeterminate causes Avhich mar the most brilliant schemes.

In war there can be nothing absolutely fixed, nothing
ligorously systematic. But while "this is true, "it is equally true
that the military macliine is composed of many different parts
that cannot be made to work for one end unless they all fit
into a well-arranged scheme. If all the details of such an or-
ganization be not clearly sketched out, well understood and
thought over by everyone, no amount of inspiration or feverish
excitement A\dll make things go straight when the machine is
tried.

Such an organization can only be tried in actual war, it
cannot be exercised in peace ; but if the principles of such an
organization be clearly laid down, and the functions of each
person well understood by all concerned, the organization itself
y.\nl\ quickly get into workmg order when wanted.

While, then, rigidity of form is inadmissible, yet it is desira-
ble to have a standard or model, to reach which every exer-
tion should be made, even although such a standard may never
be reached. It is very desirable in this matter, as in every-
thing else, to establish some definite and clear principles of
organization ; details, however important, quickly arrange them-
selves if the framework or sketch be based on sound principles.

The first great principle which modern experience has Division of
pointed out, is the division of the whole subiect of supplv into ^""PP^^' '"*°
two great branches. "^ ^™e;~^

1st. That which works in rear of the army.
2nd. That which accompanies the army

These two great branches should be perfectly distinct, their
functions are different, and the class of men and conveyances to
be used is in each case different.

The function of the first is to look after and forward stores
massed in large depots, and to push them up, as far as possible,
after the array. Referring to the illustration of the bakeries iii
England, it is the duty of the organization in rear, to seek out,
as it were, the food Avhich each soldier would have eaten if he
had remained at home, or in garrison, and to send it after him.

The function of the second is to bring up the food from the

190

advanced magazines to the divisional depots, at every oppor-
tnnity, more es})ecially during halts, and at the same time to
seek to utilise tlie resources of" the country by reriuisitions in the
inunediate neighbourhood of the marching troops.

It is manifest that the service in rear may be of a semi-pivil
character, the transport may be by rail, hired vehicles, or canals,
while the service in the front must be miHtary, and must be
performed l)y bodies having a military organization. As an
army advances into a hostile country, the requisitions in the
inunediate neighbourhood of the line of march will have, to a
certain extent, exhausted the country; one object, then, of the
semi-civil organization following in rear, will be to extend the
area of requisitions, and to tap fresh supplies. In every case the
furthest advanced point of the department working in rear
should be as near as possible to the army in front, should follow
it, and keep, if possible, within one or two marches of it, reliev-
ing the guards and detachments left in rear, completing any
work that may have been done by the advance, strengthening
bridges, repairing roads, laying telegraphs, and bringing np
supplies. The transport working in front must, to prevent
confusion, be under perfect military control, and must be able to
bring up tlie supplies from the rear, that is to say, from the
head or advanced portion of the rear-organization to the
Divisional depots.

The food or supplies, however, have to be carried from

those Divisional depots to the regiments themselves, and a fresh

organization is requisite for this, Avhich, being responsible for

the supply of the units within the Division, that is to say, the

battalions, batteries, and regiments, must be a part or portion

of these battalions, batteries, or regiments themselves.

Division of Thus we are led to a division of transport into three portions

transport into ^y^^i attention is drawn to tliis division, for in it lies the key of

three portions. -ii-i ip,i if "^

success m this branch ot the art oi war.

1st. General transport, embracing railway, canal, and road
transport, Avorking along the line of communication from the
base to the most advanced magazine.

2nd. Departmental transport, which shall convey the supphes
from the advanced magazine to the Divisional depots.

3rd. Regimental transport, which shall bring the supplies
from the Divisional depot to the battalions, batteries, or regi-
ments.

Accuracy of detail and economy of power are only to be
found in an intelligent division of labour. By such a division
of the transport, the smallest portion is that which, havmg to be
always close to the troops on all roads, and even in the fields,
must be highly organized and well horsed. The Departmental
transport, wliich need not move so rapidly, and generally moves
at niglit, and always on roads, may cany heavier loads, or, what
is the same thijig, may use fewer horses, — while the transport

191

workiiiii; on the Hue of coiniuunication may, if it i« not railway
transport, be wagons hauled by relays of horses pressed from
the inhabitants, and working a stage elose to their own homes,
thus avoiding the necessity of sending men and horses to the
front, and lurther, relieyiug the magazuies of the task of feeding
horses and men so employed. The first description, General
transport, must be under the Commandant of the line of com-
munications, and under him alone ; the second description, or
DepartniL-ntal transport, must be under the heads of depart-
ments — artillery, engineer, and commissariat; and the third, or
Regimental transport, nnist be under the officers commanding
regiments. When it is stated that the transport is to be under
these different directions, it is not meant that the horses detached
for any one service are invariably to be so employed, but that
these are to be their nonnal or general duties ; it being always
distinctly imderstood that any horse or au}^ man in an army is
liable for any duty the General commanding may chose to order-
It would appear almost needless to say this, but it used to be an
axiom in the French army that the " intendant" was responsible
for the supply of food, the commanding officer of artillery for
that of ammunition, and the commanchng engineer for entrench-
ing tools, each haying its own train, while the general was
responsible for handling the troops in action. This led to its
natural results, the heads of each branch of the service rarely
helped one another, and the general, shorn of half his attributes,
lost his power. In an army-corps. Division, brigade, or regiment,
the commanding officer is alone, and can alone be responsible,
for not only handling, but also for suppUning the wants of his
men. He may, and doubtless must, have persons under him
responsible to him for carrpng out certam duties, but their
responsibility is to him, and to no one else.

Many of the arrangements adopted in foreign armies, and Wellington'
which are too often supposed to be modern discoveries, will be organization
found to have existed under diffiirent names and altered circum-
stances, in the Peninsular War. Wellington began wdth no
organization, but originated as he went along, and his organi-
zation, adopted from experience, was in principle almost identical
vrith what now holds in the German army. It is well worthy
of study as given by Gurwood.

These Avere — 1st. The regimental mule equipment (pack
animals, to follow the troops through the difficult country they
had to traverse in Spaui). 2nd. The departmental transport,
represented by the artillery train, the engineer train, and the
commissariat train. The two first chiefly, though not altogether,
composed of the corps of artillery drivers, and the latter com-
posed chiefly of the Royal wagon train, while the general
transport was represented by vast numbers of hired carriages
and animals, comprising the ordnance and commissariat trans-
port, and by boats on the Tagus and Dom-o, worked by seamen ;
the whole of the latter being under the general direction of the

of his line of
communica-
tions.

192

Organization
of German
line of com-
munications.

general
working

officer in charge of the communications. Allowing for the altered
circumstances, and the absence of railways and telegraphs, the
system used in the Peninsular bj" Wellington was very similar
to that ]iow adopted in Europe, with, however, one • important
difference, Avhich will be hereafter explained.

Viewing then the question generally, we arrive at this point,
that if an army is to be kept up to its fighting strength in front,
the communications must be worked by an organization separate
and distinct from that in front. It is by no means meant that
this organization should be distinct from and independent of the
commanding the army, far from it; the organization
on the line of connnunications should occuj)y the
position, as regards the army, that an army-corps does, that is
to say, the officer in command of the communication should hold
to the general commanding, the position that an army-coips
leader does. This is most distinctly laid down in foreign armies.
If an army-corps is working by itself it is really composed not of
two, but of three Divisions — one taking charge of the line of
communication, and not being classed or counted as troops of
the fighting line ; similarly, if several army-corps forming an
army are working together, there is another on the line of
communication not counted or classed with the fighting troops.

Now this is the point where the modern foreign organization
differs from that of Wellington, a difference undoubtedly
caused by the small force at Wellington's disposal.

He was obliged to endeavour to look after his communications
by means of detachments and convalescents — the results were
constant abuses. We read continually in the pages of Napier of
the cavalry regiments being dangerously weakened by detach-
ments acting on the lines of communication really as military
police. We read of constant abuses, arising from convalescents
being detained in rear, and the fighting battalions in front being
thereby weakened. Now, in modern armies, the force told oflf
for the communications is complete — it has its own battalions,
its own commissariat, artillery and engineer staffs, which hold to
the heads of those departments with the army the relations that
similar officers do in Divisions to the senior officers of those
departments. Thus the troops in front are never weakened by
detachments, and a Division of 10,000 men on paper is really as
nearly as possible of that strength on parade. The advantages
of this as regards discipline are enormous — iniits such as regiments
or battalions are not broken up to find garrison for tliis post or
that important railway junction.

There is nothing more remarkable in examining from time to
time the strength of the Prussian army in France than to see
hoAv closely the real strength of each corps corresponded A\ith
the regulation strength.

The advantages of doing away with detachments is too well
known to require to be dwelt on here.

Indeed, if an army Avere to advance into a hostile country

193

■without Buch organization, it would soon reacli the end of itf*
tetlier, the fighting men in front woukl be gradually disseminated
along the "svhole line of communication, and nothing would be
left in front "vvith which to meet the enemy.

In every army there are and must be a very large number of
semi-military bodies, that is to say, bodies possessing a certain
amount of military organization, and yet whose function is not
to fight, but to work for those who do. These bodies are in-
valuable ; but in front, their presence is absolutely hurtful ; in
rear, their duties are all important. Amongst these bodies are
the bakers, the butchers, the great mass of the telegraph corps,
the railway corps, and a large proportion of the medical depart-
ment. Further, the protection and guard of the various posts
in rear may be given to troops inferior in marching power to
those in front, and consequently we are again brought by
another set of reasons to the fact that a separate and special
organization is required for the line of communications.

Nothmg more clearly demonstrates the value and importance
of a careful preparation of these details than the Franco-German
war. Prussia conquered France, not so much from valour on
the field of battle, as by the most painstakmg care in every
detail.

As the Prussian army advanced, it drew Prussian civil
institutions after it ; and the French statement, that France was
invaded not by the Prussian army but by the whole Prussian
nation, was literally true. As a general statement, it may be
said that the collection of supplies at the base of operations is
really the work not of the military leaders so much as of the
civil administration of the State.

Acting on this idea, Coblentz, ]\rayence, and Mannheim were
the bases, or great depots of the German armies at first ; stores
were accumulated at these places chiefly by the civil govern-
ment, organized bodies in charge of the communications worked
from those points to the army ; gradually, as the army advanced,
these semi-military bodies followed, and were in their turn
followed by a civil organization. First, a Governor of Alsace
was appomted, next a Governor of Lorraine : and each func-
tionaiy exercising the civil government of the State, allowed
the semi-military bodies in charge of the communications to be
pushed to the front, and finally the grand depots, originally on
the Rhine, Avere pushed to the Moselle ; the force in fi'ont,
thoroughly military, gradually shading off along its line of
communication to the civil governors of the various provinces
in the heart of Germany, where each corps had its home and
peace station. The yomig unmamed men were m fi.-ont,
fighting and exposed, the older and married men in rear, each
in proportion to his age and his power, doing his country's
work.

To place higlily-trained military bodies to guard communica-

194

tions, to see after tlic police duty, to prepare relays of horses,
or convoys of stores is manifestly a waste of power. Looking to
the two recent campaigns of 1866 and of 1870, it appears that
in this organization the Prussians showed their superiority more
than in anything else, the Avliole power of the State being
devoted to one object. The Military Estimates in peace
mamtained the fighting men, and but a very feeble nucleus of
these semi-military bodies ; their peculiar institution of universal
service enabling them to put their hands on as many men as
they required at a moment's notice.

Thus when war broke out, every man in the country found
his place in the vast machine by which the fighting men in front
were kept supplied. The French army had no such organiza-
tion ; and Avas so frittered away m detachments, and there was
so much confusion, pillage, and waste in rear of their army,
that, taught by experience, the new French military laws
provide that men, who from their stature, or from some slight
physical infirmity, are not placed in the ranks, are enrolled for
these auxiliary branches of the army, In war, the more complex
the military machine becomes, the more important becomes the
moral power of armies ; and it may be observed that armies
only get more complex, because society itself gets more complex:
because discoveries and inventions introduced into civil life are
adopted into armies ; because, in short, men are better educated,
and the general standard of knowledge is everywhere higher ;
consequently, moral force, as a lever that sways bodies of men
of the size of modern armies, is more important now than when:
Napoleon said it was three times as important as physical force.
Nothing tends to preserve moral force in armies so much as well
ordered communications. It is not merely that regular supplies
of food are brought up, that the men are regularly fed — although
that goes for something — but the sick and wounded are got out
of sight rapidly. Men's minds are not allowed to dwell on
horrors, and above all, the reinforcements coming up from the
rear, seeing regularity, order, and strict discipline in the rear of
the army, are impressed mth the sense of the power of the
whole machine at work, and spread a healthy tone through the
ranks they join.

It has often been said, and with great truth, that German
military institutions have not been tried by defeat, that a con-
catenation of peculiar events has helped Germany in her great
successes. This most undoubtedly is true ; but if we examine
her military institutions, we shall find that her leaders take
precisely this view, and they have striven to produce a sj'^stem
that shall be available in the day of defeat as well as in that of
victory ; and nowhere is this anxious care more evident than in
the organization of commmiications.

The service Avorkiug in rear must therefore have a special
and separate organization. In Germany (France and Austria

195

liavc followed German arrangements to a great extent) there is
an oilicerwho commands the whole line of communications; his
place is Avith tlic (Tcneral commanding, or one march in rear of
him, and imder his orders he has six distuict branches working :

1st. The route service.

2nd. The railway serA^ce.

3rd. The field intendance. or commissariat.

4tli. The field medical depot.

5tli. The route telegraph.

Gth. The field post ofiice.

Each of these departments has its own head, and each is of
a civil, or quasi-civil character. Each lias its purely militaiy
branch in front.

The telegraph department is a good example of the way in
which the civil shades off into the military.

It is divided into three distinct branches, all under one head.

1st. The State or home telegraphs.

2nd. The route telegraphs along the line of commumcation,
usually a light, overhead wive.

3rd. The field telegraph detachments which communicate
with the Division and army corps. The latter being under the
Generals commanding, the Dhector of military telegraphs deals
with them through the Generals.

As the army advances, the route telegraphs are rapidly laid,
and the first, or State telegraph department, follows and com-
pletes the work, connecting it with the general telegraph-network
of the kingdom, the Director-General of State Telegraphs having
as his assistant, or deputy, the Director of Military Telegraphs.

Thus there is no attempt to spread the field telegraph detach-
ments out along the line of communications ; being well horsed,
and an entirely military body, their functions are to make a line
each day to unite the Divisions, a line that must be rolled up and
re-made the next day. The route telegraphs are more permanent
but less military in their character, the great object being to
push the State telegraph as rapidly as possible in rear. Thus,
by a proper division of labour, the actual number of soldier-
telegraphists is but small, and the money spent by the State on
soldiers is thus kept as much as possible to pay for the actual
fightmg men, those who work in rear, being, on account of theh
prospective service in this way, relieved of a certain portion of
the scr"sdce they otherwise would have to do in the ranks. Men
so employed do not require periodical training as soldiers, they
do not require more than a distinctive dress, and a habit of
respect for superiors. It is not intended to attempt to describe
these six divisions or branches of the communications of an army, .

19G

but the second, or that of fichl railways, cannot bo dismissecr

without a few words on tliis very important special branch of

the subject.

Changes in The iise of railways has introduced great changes into war,.

war caused by and it is believed that these changes may be summarized some-

us^^ofrail. what as follows :—_

Viewed strategically, they have given an enormous power in
concentrating masses of mtsn and horses from the distant portions-
of a country on certain points ; such concentrations, in short, as
those effected by the Germans in 1870, on Coblentz, Mayence,
and Mannheim, VieAved tactically, their use is restricted. Armies
may be massed by these means at a secure distance from an
enemy in a short time ; but the moment that the distance
between two contending armies becomes such that a powerful
force must be ready to form in line of battle to meet an opposing
army, the railway becomes for the pui-pose of moving troops of
httle value ; but for the purpose of supplying troops, and re-
moving sick and wounded, its value is at all times very gi-eat.
Although universal compulsory service is more than sixty years
old, we may fairly doubt the possibility of keeping the vast
annies in the field that are thus placed in it, if railways did not
exist. Suppose there had been no railways during the recent
Franco-German Avar, it is exceedingly doubtful if Germany
could ha\^e kept 400,000 or 500,000 men m the field. No amount
of wagon transport Avould have fed them in France ; and it
such a force had attempted to advance, feeding on the country,
it must have spread over so Avide a front to seek subsistence,
and its power to concentrate would liaA^e been diminished to
such an extent that its numerical value would have been greatly
reduced.*

Railways must, therefore, be viewed in two distinct lights : —

1st. As means for concentrating armies from distant points,
and for placing them on the theatre of Avar.

2nd. As means for supplying those armies AA^hile operating
on the theatre of Avar.

This division is really that between railways actually in the
zone of military operations and outside it.

In the former case the military element predominates; in the
latter, the civil.

It is manifest that there must be a line of demarcation
between these tAvo. This the Germans term the transfer station.
Take, for instance, the adA'ance march of the Germans from the
Rhine towards the Sarre. The Rhine Avas for some time the

* The invasion of Russia by Napoleon is a case in point. Ifany writers liave
carefully exannned tins great cjiisode, and all agree that no organization of carts or
wagons could have fed so great a force so far from its base, but that a single line
of railway would have done so with case.

197

^dividing line, Mayence, Mannheim, and Coblentz being the trans-
fer stations. East of these points the civil element prevailed ;
west, the mihtary element was all powerful. The object being,
iis the army advanced, to push these transfer stations after it as
quickly as possible, they were moved first to the Moselle, and
ijubsequeiitly to the ]\Ieuse, in each case the civil railways of the
State exteudiuj;- their field of operations further to the west, and
allowing the mihtary organization to follow the army. The
reason of this distinction is, tliat an army in the field depends
for its supply on the productions of the country m rear of it, and
it becomes essential not to dislocate the means of production,
iind to interfere Avitli the trade and commerce of the country as
Jittle as possible. At the same time it is requisite that for a
certain space in rear of the army it should have complete control
over the railways ; hence, a station must be selected where
the separation takes place. The French made no such
separation ; and the consequence was that all kinds of stores,
men, and horses were sent from all France to the army when
actually in motion, there being no halting place out of the
immediate zone of action, where the mass of supplies so sent
could be arranged and forwarded as required ; consequently
the railways immediately in rear of the army were blocked and
useless, and the wagons containing the things that really were
wanted, never could be got at. No more extraordinary
description exists than that of the blocks of railway carriages in
rear of the French Army at Le Mans, or in the town of Metz.

At the latter place nearly 7,000 carriages were blocked
together in a solid mass ; none of the people on the spot knew
what the wagons contained — ammunition, food, clothes, arms,
intrenching tools, pontoons, and hospital arrangements being
mixed up in a confused mass — the power of the railway as a
•carrying agent being destroyed by its carriages being used as
moving magazines. Had a transfer station been used, much of
xhis confusion would have been prevented.

There is always a tendency to follow the lead of those who
have been successful, and consequently since the successes of
Prussia, there is a great tendency to Prussianize military
matters. There is danger in this. There can be no doubt
that, broadly speaking, the principles of war must be the same in
every country, })reci8ely as the principles which govern the
a,dministration of justice, the principles of music, painting,
sculpture, &c., amongst civilized nations are identical. But each
nation works out those principles in a different way ; and any
one who is a judge, will a tell a French picture from a German,
French music from German. So it must be with Avar — the
prmciples which each nation has to deal with are identical. But
in working those principles out, the peculiar idiosyncrasy of the
nation must come into play. The outline of the j)icture in each
sase will be the same, but the colouring and detail will vary.

198

Altliougli it is not m-o-ecl that wo should adopt German
customs in this country, it is well to see what German customs
are, and hoAv the Germans have worked out the problem of
utilizing their railways. When paying a visit to a German
oflScer who filled an important position in a large fortress, the
author saw a table which looked Hke a kind of BradshaAv, and
on asking what it was, was told it was the ainiual mobihzation
table. " See here," the officer said, " if we will have war, and
to-moiTOw is the fii'st day, I know that at four o'clock a train
containmg so-and-so A\dll arrive, at half-past five another, and
so on, for the nine days duiing which the operation of mobiliza-
tion takes place." And he added that each year tliis table was
altered, and eveiy officer of certain gi-ades had a copy of it.
This table is really a very simple affiiu-. An army is composed
of men, horses, and stores ; those men, horses, and stores must
in peace time be in certain laiown places. In war time they
must be concentrated m other known places. Consequently
it becomes a matter of simple calculation to determine where
each of the scattered bodies or imits can be best embarked in
the railway wagons, and the tune it will take to reach its point
of destination. The table of mobihzation is merely the result of
a careful study of the subject. In Germany, a section of the
Head Quarter Staff, aided by the Government Inspectors of
Railways, prepares these tables and prepares a Bradshaw, which
in war takes the place, while the army is concentratmg, of the
ordinary Bradshaw ; certaiii of the ordinary trains ceasing to
be civil and becoming military, and additional trains being
added. On the completion of the mobilization, the railway
section simply directs what trains are to run as military trains,
and all the rest work as usual.

Further, as every unit has its fixed head- quarters, so each
army corps has its head-quarters. And it is one of the functions
of the railway section of the General Staff, aided by the Kail way
Inspectors, to select for each corps what is termed a ''route
depot station" ; to this station everything belonging to the
corps is sent, whether going to it. or coming from it.

100

These route depot stations have each a commaiulaiit. They
are selecteil after careful consideration, and if plenty of store
and platfonn accommodation docs not exist, during peace it^is
made ; at this station the commandant is supreme.

/St. „

Slid

onf.

Vr/fM D

p/////7/^ E

^^L^^.]

ARAUf^RPS.

ARMY CO(RP.S.

ARKr c.Ohps.

ARJ

/, lit.

ronuinal station, or
furthest advanced point
of railwaj^transport.

Collecting or transfer
station.

Route depot Eoute depot Eoute depot Eoute depot

station of 1st station of 2nd station of 3rd station of -ith
Ai-my Coi-ps. Army Corps. Army Corps. Army Corps.

a,l, c, important points wliich should be the head- quarters of the railway work-
ing commission.

A, B, c, road transport by wagon to the route termini B and c, c D, c E, b F, B G,
the lines on which the departmental transport works feeding the Army Corps from
the route termini B and c.

Fm-ther, in peace time a committee for each Hue, consisting
of the traffic manager and a mihtary officer, is appointed. The
duties of this committee are the following : — In case a country- is
plunged into war, there can be only a limited number of possible
contingencies. These contingencies are determined carefully.
The route-depot station, and the places to which the troops and

200

Imaginary
example of
organization
of railway
communica-
tions in Eng-
land.

stores are to be moved, are also determined. The Kne com-
mittee determine where halts have to be made, where men and
horses are to be fed and watered, and on single lines the passing
places for trains. These points are all clearly laid down and
every one knows them. The commandant at the depot station
simply loads the men, horses, and stores he receives from the
district of the coi-ps ; the line committee take charge of them
and deliver them at the transfer station. It is manifest that
the whole of these arrangements require nothing more than a
little care and forethought, and a mixture of railway knowledge
and military knowledge on the part of those who make them.
There is no science required at all.

Let us suppose for a moment that Scotland was a foreign
country, with whom we were as likely to fight as we once
were. And suppose we had 30,000 men stationed in Hampshire
and Dorsetshire, 30,000 in the Midland counties, and 30,000
in Kent. The first step towards a mobilization of these forces
for a Scottish war would be the selection of points of concentra-
tion for each body of troops ; the determination of a route ;
depot station ; a detail of how the men, horses, and stores should
get to that station ; and the selection of a line ot railway over
which each corps was to move ; the appointment of a line com-
mittee, consisting of military officers and the traffic managers of
each line afiected ; and the determination of certain fixed trains to
be used for through-traffic, and also certain places Avhere men
and horses might be fed, either breakfast, dinner, or tea, say six
hours after starting. These conditions are clear and definite,
and require only a httle time to arrange. But where are these
trains carrying all these men and stores to go to ? — where ^\'ill
you disembark your loads? Here we come to one of the most
difficult problems to determine, and one on the correct deter-
mination of which much depends. Are the Scotch likely to be
more advanced in their preparation for war than we are ? What
is the political state of the country ? What is the character of
the leader ? Is the war popular ? Have they many railways to
concentrate their troops with 1 All these questions enter into the
determination of this point. It is manifest that if the point of
disembarkation is chosen too far to the front, the troops and
stores coming up in a long column by rail are liable to be greatly
inconvenienced, perhaps not by the actual attack so much as by
the threatened attack of the enemy.

If the point is too much to the rear, the full value of the rail-
ways will not be obtained, consequently the determination of this
point is one of the greatest importance. Let us suppose York is
the station selected, then that station becomes the transfer
station or collecting station.

Behind that, all transport is worked as described under the
regulations prepared carefully beforehand, as much as possible
peace-traffic is maintained, and after the first concentration of

201

ti-oops take place certain military trains only arc run. The points
of departure and the pouit of arrival once fixed, the concentrations
of troops become a simple matter.

Beyond York, no civil traffic of any kind Avould be allowed ;
and a military railway director, with very cxtendcul powers, would
be appointed to work all the railway traffic north of York, acting,
however, ahvays under the orders of the officer in chief command
of the communications. But let us carry our arrangements a
little further, the Collecting Station, York, becomes then at once
a. great store.

The troops as they arrive are pushed through it at once, some
by rail, some by road, towards definite points, where each of the
three corps coming from Kent, Hampshire, and the ]\Iidland
counties would be formed. The station at York would be placed
under a commandant, who would issue orders somewhat similar
to the following : —

" No trains containing military stores are to pass York."

" Trains Avith troops and ammunition may, unless specially
ordered, pass."

" No train wmII go to the front that is not full."

" All provision trains will be unloaded, except in special cases,
when definite instructions will be given."

" All trains coming from the army will run pa st York, and not
stop there."

Meantime, let us suppose that the Commissary-General of the
army in front finds, or thinks he will find difficulties in feeding
the troops, on account of some flank movement that is going to
he made against the Scotch army. He notifies the commandant
of the line of communications of the quantity of provisions he is
likely to require suddenly. These are loaded up, formed into
trains, and pushed into sidings a few miles north of York, with a
small guard which encamps beside them ; a telegram from the
fi.-ont brings them on at once.

Similarly an action is expected, and hospital trains are formed,
placed m sidings, with nurses, medical comforts, and a guard ;
a telegram brings them to the front at once, and the sick or
Avounded are carried far past York to the south.

North of York the traffic would be entirely military, and
worked under a military railway director, who would have under
him a proper staff for that purpose, and who would arrange for all
the traffic being worked in a regular way. But how far can such
traffic be worked ? How close to the army can the railway trans-
port be brought up to the front ? The ansv/er to these questions
depends on many things : —

1st. The line ; is it destroyed, or hkely to be destroyed ?
2nd. The nature of the stations available as terminal stations.
3rd. The prospects of a collision with the enemy.

202 •

• 4tb. The nature of the roads and the liorsc-transport of the
army corps.

5th. The situation of the army as regards the railway, and
the front it was occuj^ying.

But let us suppose a station selected, we will say Darlington,
the enemy's army being somewhere in the neighbourhood of
Newcastle. Beyond Darlington, railway transport would, except
in special cases, cease, and each army coi'ps would have to send
its departmental transport to Darlington for supplies. Darling-
ton, the route-terminus, would be the point where the organiza-
tion of the line of communications would cease ; it would be the
great point where distribution would commence.

Let us suppose, however, a little further, that the railway
has been destroyed north of Darlington, and that the enemy, the
Scotch, retreat ; the army advances, and the distance from the
route-terminus to the corps becomes too great for the depart-
mental transport to work. The officer m command of the
communications foreseeing this, and knowing the direction the
army is marching in, fixes a fresh route-terminus and establishes
a line of horse transport from the railway terminus, Darlington,
to the points he has selected ; to these points the departmental
transport now send for supplies, the transport of those supplies
to the route-terminus resting with the officer in charge of the
communications, while a strong body of workmen would be put
on the railway to repair it, and relay the rails, when the railway
terminus would be again advanced, and so on. Att he Collect-
ing Station, York, supplies would be sought, not only in the
south, but m the whole region round York, and each com-
missariat officer of the army corps would seek by requisitions
pmchased, or other means,to relieve the strain on the communica-
tion as much as possible.

Such are the principles on which the Germans work railways,
and undoubtedly, so far as we can judge by the application of
cause and effect, they are correct. Details have not here been
entered into, nor descriptions of how the complicated arrange-
ments requisite for the organization of lines may be best divided
between the departments of the army. If the principles are
sound, the details will quickly settle themselves. But this we
may feel sure of, that though good men may make bad sj-stems
work, yet all systems should provide for being worked by
mediocre or indifferent men, and many details of the German
regtilations do not appear to be so framed. But the general
principles which prevail the whole are logical, clear, and definite,
and this account of them will be concluded by quoting the
opening words of their new regulations on tliis subject.

" The regular working of railways is of the first importance,
"not only for waiiike operations, but also as most materially
" affecting national mterests. The greatest care should be taken

203

"that tlioy arc rcgiilai-ly workcHl; on the lines in rear of trans-
'• fer-stations, the ordinary traffic will not be interfered with for
" military pnrposcs, except when absolutely requisite. As a rule,
" the ordinary public trains will run, extra ones being- added for
"military purposes. The carrying- powers of a railway are best
" developed by constant steady traffic at regular intervals."

''Any interference with tlie regularity of the railway is fatal."

CHAPTER VI.

The Attack axd Defence of Woods and Villages.

If the reports of newsj^aper correspondents duiing the recent
war (often incorrect as to large questions, but also very often
singularly accurate as to minor details coming under their own
personal obsei-vation) are examined, we find that woods played
a very prominent part in producing victories on the one side,
in accounting for defeats on the other. Somehow a wood
generally helped, or was turned to some useful purpose by the
Germans, and as often it injured their opponents. The more
careful records of the war that have since appeared, although
couched in more general terms, confirm tlie reports of tlie
newspaper "^Titers.

The woods on the flanks of the French position at
Spicheren, the woods on the slope of the ravines at Mars-la-
Tour and Gravelotte, are examples familiar to every military
student. The question at once arises, why did the woods help
the Germans? Why were they not equally utilized by the
French.

The answer to this may be found by looking at our New
Zealand fighting ; on open gi-ound the Maories could not have
stood up to a body of British troops even of inferior numbers
for five minutes, but in the bush they were at least a match
for them. Most certainly m this case efficient arms had little to
do ^\-ith success, indeed, long-range weapons in a wood lose
much of their power. What enabled the ]\raories to check
regular troops in a wood was, by long habits, customs, and
ideas they were accustomed to the wood, and nature had given
them individual self-reliance, while the British soldier had been
trained to lean not on liimself as an individual, so much as on
the discipline and concerted action of the body of which he
formed a unit.

It was the same cause that produced a similar result in the

204

Franco-German war. One of the results of the Prussian method
of instruction pursued for many years had been to develop the
individual moral force of tlie soldiers, and to accustom them to
fight in small bodies, at the same time accustoming many sub-
ordinate officers to the responsibility of command.

The tendency of French instruction ever since the Crimean
war had been to control and check what is termed " French
dan,'' and to induce officers and soldiers to lean on and seek
confidence from the concerted action of large bodies. In a
wood such bodies canuot exist, and the direction of events
must, to great extent, pass out of the heads of supeiior into
those of subordinate officers. Consequently, selt-confidence
and habits of individual action within certain limits are, for
such fighting, invaluable, both amongst officers and men. Wood
fighting is incompatible with the action of masses of disciplined
troops. It comes more to be a trial of skill between small
bodies or individuals than the concerted action of disciplined
men, and the difficulty of seeing what is going on, the personal
qualities of the leader produce a smaller result than in open
ground.

It cannot be too often repeated that the training of the
soldier, if the full advantage of modern arms is to be obtained,
must be of a far higher character than it has ever before been,
not only must he be able to move and act Avith others, so that
if requisite the full force of a large body in perfect order,
acting under one will, may be brought to bear on one point,
but he must have confidence in his own individual action. To
be able to attain these necessary qualifications, not only must
the man originally have an elementary education, without
which he cannot grasp what he has subsequently to learn,* but
he must be carefully trained to use his OAvn powers of mind and
body. Here lies the main difierence produced by giving to the
soldier improved weapons ; to use them properly the man him-
self must be improved. And to the care bestowed by the
Prussians in this individual training and in developuig the
powers of the man himself is chiefly to be ascribed the power
they always seemed to possess of utihzing woods, while the
French seemed perfectly unable to do so.

Here more than anywhere else success will be found to
spring, from a clear appreciation and recognition of the fore-
going facts by regimental officers ; without this recognition it
is vain to expect constant careful instruction to be given to
men in peace by subordmate officers. On such instruction
tactics really rest, and the responsibility that officers have thus
to bear is far hea\aer than many will perhaps be ready to admit.

* The system of rifle instruction is precisely a case in point ; perhaps not one man
in fire understands the theory that is taught to him, but the one man who docs
understand, generally can read and write, and the four others, though they may not
understand, are improved by trying to understand.

205

It is tactics wliich win battles, and through battles exercise a preponderat Pelet.
ing iutluence on the fate of stixtes.

It is all the more requisite that these points should be
brought prominently to notice, because some people, dazzled by
Prussian success, and knowing- that Prussian infantry are trained
for 2i to 3 years only, are somewhat inclined to run away
with the idea that any kind of training does for an infantry
soldier. A very cursory examination of Prussian military
institutions will show that this is not so.

1st. It is often forgotten that the military raw material of
countries where education and military service have been com-
pulsory and universal for two generations must be superior to
that of countries where such is not the case, and consequently
that the same amount of military teaching goes further in one
case than in the other.

2nd. The length of service in Prussia being so short and
being compulsory, enables a far greater amount to be demanded
and obtained from the recruit, than could under other cu'cum-
stances be the case. Stoflfel says, speaking of the Prussian
Army, " The recruits work like niggers."

These causes account for the small time that suffices to train
a Prussian infantry soldier both as a fi'action of a large mass,
and also as an individual.

The method of dealing with woods, callages. Sec, may be
best examined by referring to first principles. To troops
acting on the defensive it is of importance to see without being
seen, and to be so placed as to be able to use their weapons
with freedom.

Troops acting on the offensive must seek to overwhelm their
enemies with fire, and by advancing in individual order, seek to
draw off" the fire from the main bodies in rear.

Now it is apparent that if both parties are in a wood, neither
party Avill benefit, the shelter afforded by the trees being
common to both sides. Consequently, if a wood is to be used
for defensive purposes, the defenders must hold the outskirts of the
loood in that portion nearest the enemy, and must seek to
prevent the attackers penetrating into it ; if they once gain
the wood, unless further arrangements are made for internal
defence, the cover afforded by the trees become common to both
sides, what is meant may be illustrated by the rules for " loop-
holing walls." Loop-holes to fire through should be about 4 feet
3 inches fi-om the gi'ound, but if they are that height from the
bottom of the wall on both sides, two parties can use them, both
the attackers and defenders, hence, on the side next the enemy
they should be too high or too low for him to use.

Long range weapons lose much of their value in a wood,
consequently the object of the defenders should be as long as
possible to deny the edge of the wood to the attackers, and
keep them under fire. Once the latter get into the wood the

200

figlitiiig is on even terms physically, morally it is all in favour
of the attackers who have gained the woods. Woods, as a
rule, check, impede, and render the movements of cavalry and
artillery difficult and dangerous, they further disordei' infantry ;
but they at all times afibrd a useful position and protection for
the latter arm.
Jomini, No one who has ever seen a battle but will acknowledge the incontestible

importance of a wood situated on the flank of a line to be attacked or
defended.

Upon the oifensive zone of a field of battle, woods, if of
great extent, are injurious to the army taking the offensive,
breaking up its formation and producing crowding and disorder.
Woods of small size, however, aid the offensive considerably,
helping to mask bodies of troops, and concealing the positions
of reserves. They are more especially of value if they are of
such a nature as will admit of cavalry being concealed beliind
them, which can be brought out at an opportune moment to
act on the flanks of an attack.

Woods properly held on the defensive zone are of great
value, enabhng the front of the army holding them to be
extended. A wood of very great extent camiot be so treated,
because its perimeter, which must be held, becomes too exten-
sive, and the force acting on the defensive would become too
much disseminated. In such cases the position taken up should
be in rear of the "wood, and sufficiently near to crush the heads
of the hostile columns as they attempt to debouch.

Clauzewitz, -^^^ impracticable forests, that is to say, those which can only be traversed

by certain roads, offer to a defence advantages similar to mountains, viz., they
enable the defenders to fight a battle in a favourable position^

An army may, beliind these forests, and in a position more or less
concentrated, await the enemy as he debouches from the defile to attack him
with advantage.

Such a forest has more analogy as regards its effect with mountains than
with a river, for it offers long and difficult defiles.

The battle of Hohenlindeu affords an example of this.
Moreau met the Austrian columns as they debouched from the
forest of Ebersburg, and sent Richepanse to attack their flank
through the woods from Ebersburg. The Austrians, unable
to see in the wood what was going on on their flank, Avere
broken in two, and the moment Moreau saw the wavering in
his front j^roduced by the attack on their rear, he assafled and
drove them back.

The difficidty of defending a wood of any extent is that
the troops are apt to lose in a short time all tactical connection,
and escape out of the control of their officers. The difficulty
in attacking a wood is that the attackers are in entire ignorance
of what the wood contains, how the defenders are disposed,
and that the defenders arc sheltered from fire, and can shoot
down the attackers wdth all the more ease, because they them-
selves suffer but little.

207

If the attack is difticult, the defence is not less so, botli may be considered Fisch,
tlie most difficult problems of modern tactics.

It is only by bearing cloavly in mind the object in view that
any definite ideas can be worked out. To defend a wood by
troops, effort sliould be made to increase the power of the
breech-loader on the defensive by opposing obstacles to the
enemy and covering the defenders from fire, rendering them as
secm'e as possible, and thus enabling them to pour in a well-
directed fire on the attackers. These are the principles of all
defences, but in addition, in a wood it is requisite to take
special precautions that the troops actually firing, and on the
outskirts of the wood, know where their supports are, and that
effective measures be taken to communicate between the
skirmishmg line, the supports, and the main body.

Before putting a wood in a state of defence, it should be
carefully examined, and the following points should be chiefly
kept in view during the examination : —

(a.) The size of the wood, its length and breadth.
(b.) The nature of the wood, whether open or thick.
(c.) The nature of the edge of the wood, whether
marked or indefinite, whether belts of underwood
and straggling trees intervene between the main
wood and the open ground ; whether there are
any outlying clumps, or belts of trees, theh size,
and at what distance from the main wood.
(d.) Whether there are many roads or paths in the wood,
whether there are houses, clearings, or open
spaces in the wood itself. Whether there are
streams or wet places in the wood, and whether
the gi'omid is broken or smooth,
(e.) The nature of the position in rear of, and on the
flanks of the wood.
Woods in civilized countries are usually cut up by roads,
sometunes these are main roads, sometimes mere tracks used to
haul timber out ; in a wood it is very easy for troops to lose
themselves, and it is very advisable that marks should be made
on the trees to denote the direction in which different places
are to be found. The principal roads may be marked by a
staff officer with an axe and a paint pot ; but it is requisite
that each battahon commander should also mark the way from
the skirmishers to the supports, and from the supports to the
main body. A simple blow made on the trees with an axe will
do tliis, and a few men should be left to pass orders back ; and
it is desirable that the skirmishers should know that the supports
are close behind them, for, of coui'se m a wood they cannot be
seen.

In putting a wood in a state of defence the first tlnng to
be attended to are the salients, and any small detached clumps
of trees within 500 or 600 yards, should be either cut down or

208

occupied, such small clumps arc peculiarly dangerous as,
affording a point (Vapjmi for an attack. Plate XX gives a
general idea of the defence of a wood. Trees round the
salient portions should be cut so as to form a rough abattis.
A little thouglit is requisite m felling these trees, some trees
"uall be better if felled with their heads out, some better if
felled parallel to the front ; some trees aid the defence and
should be left standing. By far the best way to solve all such
problems is for the officer so employed to ask himself, " If I
were attacking this position, what would do me most harm"?
Generally, large trees should not be touched, they afford cover
for two or three men, and take time and experienced woodmen
to cut.

It is far better to begin operations upon all the salients at
once, and make them thoroughly strong than to attempt
smTomiding the whole wood with a belt of abattis. Cutting
down trees is by no means an easy task to men who are
unaccustomed to use an axe, with unskilled men perhaps a
cross-cut saw will work faster. Although trees afford good
shelter from the front, it is desirable not to neglect making
shallow lifle pits, which will protect the men on the flanks,
while the trees afford cover in front. All cover should, as far
as possible, be removed from the front of the position occupied
for GOO to 700 yards. This is a very difficult operation, and
one, although most desirable, that can rarely be performed.
When a wood has an undefined edge, with brashwood, under-
growth, and tongues of trees running into the open ground, it
becomes a very difficult question to decide bow much shall be
defended, how much given up to the enemy.

From 100 to 200 yards of abattis will usually be ample in
each place, and the space between, which may be 400 to 500
yards, will afford openings through which an offensive attack
may be made.

In all cases every nerve should be sti-ained to prevent the
enemy getting into the wood, as he will see the abattis in front
of the salients, and as such salients are usually on spurs, it is
likely that he may seek to turn them and penetrate by the
flanks ; to check this, each flank of the abattis should have a
return behind it, prolonged into the wood, and should not
terminate abruptly ; if the enemy then penetrates he will be
taken in flank as he tries to advance, and the flank of the
defenders of the salients will be covered.

Great care should be taken in using artillery in a wood, if
the wood is in front of a line of battle, and can be flanked from
the main line, few guns should be put into it; if it forms a
portion of the main line, and guns must be placed in the wood,
they should never be placed on the roads leading out of the
wood where they offer marks to an enemy, but at slight
distances to the right or left of the roads in places specially

PLATE XX.

-:'^';5-'<r<?-:5&'>

^'^dl

Oancerfielo.Litm. 22, Bedford STCovent Garden

209

prepared ; they should be phiced at considerable distances
apart, as tlie splinters from trees do nuich dania«2;e ; and, if
possible, each i!;un should have two or more places from which
it can lire, previously prepared for, sufficiently near to allow it
being moved by hand from place to place.

Troops are really safer in a wood than in a village or in
houses, the masonry knocked about by artillery fire is more
dangerous than the splinters from trees, which often stop
splinters of shells; and above all the retreat is far more secure.

Koads should never be blocked in the wood or at its
entrance ; unless for special reasons, it is better to break them
up at a form-yard, a village, or some place 700 or 800 yards to
the front, and form a small post there to cover the barricade.
It is always desirable to prepare for disaster, although never
desirable to parade that preparation. Consequently, although
the edge of the wood is the place where the great struggle
should take place, a second line should be provided somewhere
within the wood ; this may be at a clearing or barren spot,
which often exists in a wood, or behind a watercourse or river ;
in every case it is desirable to make some line of abattis para/Ze/
to the line of retreat ; such an abattis held firmly, acts as a flank
attack on the enemy, and may prevent him extending, when
once he has joenetrated the wood.

In many woods there is a spot where all the roads converge,
at such points there is often a farm, a house, or a small village,*
such a position should be put in a state of defence, and a strong
reserve put there, which should embrace a few cavalry.

Sometimes in a wood, when the edge has been lost, a
skilful use of a reserve will turn the attackers out. When
troops have found theii- way hi there will always be some eager
spirits who will push on, and others Avho won't like to hold
back ; the main body maybe disconnected, the second line not
yet up, and consequently the hold on the wood but a weak one.
The front on which the attackers have entered will in all proba-
bility be a narrow one, and a rapid advance, especially on their
flanks, will often restore the fight. True, everywhere, in a
wood especially, reserves properly held in hand and brought
up steadily, will usually turn the day. And this does not refer
alone to either an army-corps reserve or a Divisional reserve,
but to brigade, battahon, and even company reserves.

In a wood the supports may be weaker than in the case of
an attacking force, because the skirmishing or firing line will
suffer less, and the true function of the support being to fill up
the gaps in the skirmishers' line, it will not be so much needed ;
hence, the skirmishing line may be longer or occupy more
ground, and as there is less likelihood of the skirmishers being
taken in flank, than there is if the ground be open, the supports

* At Talarera the rear was supported by a large house in the wood, well placed
in cuse of defeat to cover a retreat leading from Talavem to Arzobispo and Lopeza.
— Napier.

210

War of 1866 :
Prussian Staff.
(Translated
by Hozier.)

Von Miilken.

may be distributed in smaller bodies along the rear, ^vliile at
the same time they may be brought much nearer to the front ;
this is all the more requisite, as, to supp(jrt effectually, the officcu*
conunandiug- the supports nnist be in front to watch the effect
of the fire, and on a long hue in a wood he cannot see Avhat is
going on, consequently the supports must be sufficiently near
at hand for the subordinate officers to act on their own responsi-
bility. All the commander of the supports can do is to try and
find the most dangerous place, that where the enemy seems
most disposed to direct the attack, and post himself there.
The connnaiider of the main body cannot watch the fight from
the rear, but must do so from the front, and he has therefore to
remain in front and send back orders to the main body, which
consequently must not be too far off.

Cavalry should be posted on the flanks and in rear of the
wood, if an opportunity offers, and they can circle out suddeidy,
they may produce a great eftect. If a small body of cavalry
can be concealed in the wood itself and pushed rapidly out,
fi'om the fact of cavlary not being expected, it may eftect much,
btit this must be determined by the nature of the w^ood. If
the wood be in front of a position, arrangements should be
made to biing a heavy fire to bear on it, and a line of retreat
for the defenders should be pointed out to the commanding
officer, so that fire may be opened the moment the wood
is abandoned, without interfering with the retiring troops.
Whenever troops who have once attacked get into cover after
heavy loss, there is some difficulty in inducing them to come
out again, more especially if met by heavy fire on the other
side when they try it.

The 15th Infantry Brigade now received orders to jmss through the wood
of Sadowa. This wood forms almost a regular square, and measures about
1,000 paces each way. In the immediate neighbourhood of the road it contains
a good deal of high timber, oak, beech, and fir, but the other part of it consists
priucii)ally of very den-e undergrowth. Only trifling detachments of the
enemy were found in it, which fell back at all points, but in pursuing them
through the thickets the Prussian companies could not retain therr close order,
and when they reached the skirts of the wood on the other side were received
with a i)erfect hailstorm of shells. It was utterly impossible to advance, and
General Bose gave orders to desist from ;my attempt of the kind, but to hold
the skirts of the wood under all circumstances.

The attack of a Avood is one of the most difficult and
dangerous operations in war.

The attack of a wood strongly held is only justifiable when the object in
view can be attained in no other way.

One of the great difficulties is to know^ how^ the wood is
held, Avhere the gmis and infantry are, and which are the weak
points. The reconnaissance of wood prior to its attack should
embrace not only the ground in front and on the flanks, but
information as to the inside of the wood should be souglit from
country people, and fi'om maps. The position of the defenders

211

cau be best found out by some false attacks, which may induce
the enemy to show his position.

It is better to make two or three distinct thuuy;h simulta-
neous attacks on a wood than to trust to one ; the reason of
this is, that the defenders, from the difficulty of intercommuni-
cation offered by the trees, have their supports and reserves
less under control than w^oukl be the case in open ground, a
fact which the soldier very soon realises ; and the demand for
supports sent back from the front, if not promptly responded to,
tends to demoralise men who cannot be properly supervised by
their officers. The attackers in the open have the benefit not
only of intercommunication, but of being completely under the
6uper\asion of their officers. Conse(]^uently several attacks, if
made at the same moment, Avill produce emulation amongst the
men, while at the same time it will have the effect of dis-
concerting the defenders.

It is desirable to bear in mind that the attack of troops
^rmed \\ath a breech-loader, and holding an open position, is a
dangerous and difficult operation, and can be undertaken with
a reasonable hope of success only under the cncumstances pointed
out at page 89.

But when troops armed with a breech-loader are covered by
trees, shelter trenches, walls, &c., the attack becomes far more
dangerous, because the effective fire of the troops acting on the
offensive is seriously interfered with, the defender's fu'e becomes
at the same time all the more accurate and deadly because they
suffer but little from the attackers' bullets ; consequently the
attack on troops occupying a wood or village, or an intrench-
ment, requnes a longer preparation and a greater quantity of
artillery tire than if the defenders had no cover. But although
it is better to make several attacks, these attacks should not be
separate and disconnected, but should work together, one or
more being directed on the flanks, while one or more assail the
front. The exact nature of the attack can only be determined
by the nature of the ground and the amomit of cover in front of
the wood.

In the attack on a wood, as in all other attacks, as many
guns as possible should be got into position, and should be
divided into as many divisions as there are attacks ; it possible,
these guns should be so placed as to fire on all the pomts
selected for forcing an entrance. It is not likely that there will
be many guns in the wood, and hence the artillery may push up
to some 1,400 or 1,500 yards; a very rapid fire should be begun
on the wood, those guns that can support all the attacks firing
for a short time in support of each in succession, the actual
attack being made by the infantry as previously described.
Under fire of the artillery an attempt should be made to
penetrate into the wood, through the breach effected by the fires ;
once the edge of the wood is gained no great advance should be
made until a sufficiently strong body of men is in hand, and then

P 2

212

a careful steady advance should be made with the flanks -weir
supported, as, if the enemy have not been demorahsed by the-
artillery, they Avih seek to attack and drive out the intruders by
operating on their flanks.

De Looze At the attack of the wood of Skahtz, 28th June, 1 866, the Prussians made

two attacks. Loewenfeld on the right, witli eight half -battalions of the 37th
and 58th, Witzleben on the left, with four half -battalions of the 38th sujjportctL
by six battalions of grenadiers under Voigts Rhetz. The half-battalions at the
liead of each column were formed in company columns, covered by the skir-
mishing section, the remainder in a line of coluiuns of half-battalions ; the
attack was prepared by one 12-pouuder and two 4-pounder batteries.

There is one special danger in all wood fighting, — viz., the risk
of the general line of attack or defence getting dislocated-
Constant attention must be given by officers to this point, and
the men should be urged to keep a connection with thuse on
their right and left ; should the line get dislocated, the enemy,
finding no fire coming from one place, Avill jm&h in, and by thus-
dividing it and acting on the flank, compel the retreat, perhaps
the flight, of the Avhole line.

The most remarkable instance of wood fighting that has
occured of recent years was undoubtedly that at the wood oF
Maslowed at Koniggriitz. The Austrians made little or no effort
to hold the edge of the wood, but fell back and allowed the
Prussians to get into the interior and take possession of a great
part of the outskirts on their (the Austrian) side, but not of the
whole, " because of the great extent of the wood, and the fierce
" struggle raging in parts of interior." The Prussians got the
whole of a division into the Avood, and although they were rc^
peatedly driven back, their line divided and cut in two by large
Austrian forces, yet they never could be driven out. This was
due to the very skflful way in which the Prussian officers made
flank attacks on the Austrians viith small bodies of men.

Campaign of The companies had all become mingled together as the fight swayed

1866 : oiBcial backwards and forwards in the dense wood. No unity of guidance was

account. possible on gTound where hills and woods shut out all view of the surrounding

(Translated country, and all that the commanders of the different detachments could do was

hyHozierand to lead their men by their own personal example. In all pai'ts the officers

Wright.) rallied rountl them whatever men were in their neighbourhood, no matter to
what regiment they belonged.

During some of these sanguinary struggles an Austrian
battalion lost its way, as troops are A^ery likely to do, and
wandering out of the Avood on the Prussian side, w"as charged
by and surrendered to a Prussian Hussar regiment, placed
behind the Avood.

Villages.

Villages have at all times played a very important point in
battles. The history of Avar is full of the accounts of sanguinaiy
struggles for the possession of Aallages. The A'illages of Asjiern
and Kssling, Avith the trench connecting them, saA'ed Napoleon
from destruction in l<SOi). The neglect of the A-illages in front

213

•of Loi[izic, undoubtedly helped to bring about the great defeat
iie sustained there.

In jnore recent wars the struggles round the villages of
Solfuriuo, WiJerth, Vionville, may be quoted.

It is fairly open to (piestion, however, if one of the eiTects of'
rifled artillery has not been to reduce the value of villages,
houses, and such posts, for the following reasons : increased
range and accuracy have enabled artillery to render such places
untenable at a greater distance than formerly. A small village
put in a state of defence, with houses loopholed, Avill have its
walls so shaken and knocked about by artillery fire that the
defenders cannot remain in the house ; each shot that comes in
bringing down a large number of splinters, and the shells*
setting thatch, wooden buildings, hay, &c., so quickly on fire
that the villages becomes untenable, this is all the more felt
because the defenders of the village are at that state of the fight
quiescent, and the mere fact of remaining under a heavy fire of
.shells, without being able to do anything to reply, tends to
demoralise troops rapidly.

Troops when defending a village were usually placed in the
houses which were loopholed, some central house, usually the
church, being chosen as a reduit to the whole village. Holding
a village in this way when modern artillery can be brought
against it is simply impossible, and other arrangements must be
made.

The whole village, or such portion of it as may be deemed
advantageous, must be used as the reduit or redoubt, and must
be loopholed and put in defence precisely as ever it was. The
streets being barricaded, traverses, &c., made exactly as laid
down in books on this subject. But while this is done, arrange-
ments must be made for placing the first or shooting line outside
the village. A village is usually surrounded more or less with
i^nclosures, such as hedges, walls, and fences ; when these can be
taken advantage of, they should be used, and an enceinte formed
round the villages by their use combined with that of shelter
trenches ; in the selection of fences for this purpose, and in the
construction of shelter trenches, care should be taken to place
them sufficiently far from the houses of the village to prevent
the troops lining them being struck by splinters. A distance of
40 yards will suffice for this. But is also desirable that when the
defences forming the outer line are carried, the defenders should
be able to fire into it from the houses, consequently it will be
better to place the outer line at 150 to 200 yards from the
"houses, if such an arrangement does not give too great an
extension to the front; if such be found to be the case, the
distance between the outer and inner lines may be reduced one
half. The form which the outer line takes must always be an
UTegular one. If possible, a closed redoubt, even of the weakest

* The Prussians have special incendiary shells with each battery for this purpose.

Brailmont.

214

profile, should be })lacc(l at tlic angles. Artillery may bo placed
in these redoubts, but it is much better in most cases not to do
so, but to put the guns under epaulmcnts in rear of the village
in such places as will enable them to flank it and cross fire in front.
In the defence of villages and woods mitrailleuses will be of
great advantage, their lightness enabling them to be readily
moved by hand from place to place, and the very efficacious fire
they give over a limited area renders them suitable for such
purposes. It has always been laid down as a rule that obstacles
which detain an enemy under fire are of importance. But
obstacles for such a purpose are very apt to give an attacker
shelter where he may establish himself, and should be very care-
fully considered before being used. The most dangerous and
difficult ground for troops to advance over is undoubtedly a
gentle slope completely seen and perfectly open, and in placing
a village in state of defence, the more open the ground is in
front and to the flanks the better.

Obstacles may be viewed as opposing the enemy's advance,
hampering the defenders if they take the offensive, and furnish-
ing cover to the attackers. The position of obstacles must
therefore be carefully considered ; perhaps the most efficacious
kind of obstacle is a wire entanglement, as it affords no shelter,
and is not affected by artillery fire. But a wire entanglement
completely forbids the action of cavalry ; a fcAv men armed with
breech-loaders, and surrounded by wire, would be perfectly safe
fi.*om a cavalry attack.

Villages may be held for various purposes, and the amount
of work to be done to them of course varies with the purposes
for which they are held.

Au army may entrench a village. 1st, to shelter a detached post ; 2ud,
to shelter an advanced jjost ; 3rd, to supjjort a line of battle, either in front or
on the flank.

Villages in hollows shonld never be held, but if on elevated gi-ound,
surrounded by woods, and near a river or stream, they may become good
posts.

Villages are also of great value when used to support the
front of an army deploying into line of battle.

In examining a village prior to putting it in a state of de-
fence, the following points should be chiefly considered : —

(tf.) The nature of the ground round the village, the
amount of cover offered to an attack, the nature of
the fences, and whether suitable for defensive pur-
poses or not.
(/>.) The line selected to form the outer enceinte should
be carefully examined, and such Avails, hedges or
fences as may be aA'ailable for forming a portion of
the line, shordd be selected, and the places where
shelter-trenches or earth-works are re(piired should
be marked.
(c.) The houses forming the inner enceinte should be
selected, those with timber outbuildings being

215

avoided if the Vt'()(,)dwurk cannot Lc })ulli'd down.

The roads ]ea(lin.<;- throng-li the villai^'c shonhl bo

examined, undtlie plaees lor l)aiTicades seleeteil and

fresh openings and passaget? made where requisite.

It is essential that these points should be quickly determined

on. There are two errors which officers arc apt to fall intf)

under such circumstances ; one acting iiastilj and midertaking

too much work for the time and means at tlieir dis})()sal, the

other thinking too long of wliat they are going to do. The

outer line should be begun first, and so eoon as it is in a fair way

of being completed in time, men may bj set to Avork on the other

portions.

If the village is held as a detached post it should be carefully
surrounded, and everything done to make it as secure as possible,
for the troops placed in it have, in such a case, notJiing but
their own exertion to depend on. When held as an advanced
post, tlie village gets support from the general line of battle, and
should be made as strong as possible on three sides, but on the
side nearest the defender's position should be open, having a line
of shelter-trench, about 25() yards in rear of it. with epaulments
for artillery, so that the enemy, when the village is captured,
Avill not be able to use it as ii j)oint d\ippul for further operations.
Such a line of shelter-trench in rear of the village will effectually
prevent the attacker's Hank attack (which he is sure to make)
from getting into the rear of the village, and will further cover
the retreat of the troops engaged in its defence. Any defen-
sive work may be cari'ied by surprise, or by some accident, sucti
as thick weather, which enables the attackers to come close
up ; but the moment it is captured is always the very best time
for driving out the intruders, before they have time to get into
order; hence the garrison of all works, great or small, should
have a reserve ready to act rapidly. In defending a village the
places where supports are to be placed shoiild be carefully se-
lected, they will be safer when placed in small bodies clear of
the village, and unmediately beliind the troops they are to sup-
port. AVhen time is available it will be judicious to cover them
by shelter trenches. Although the houses composing the village
should be loopholed, troops should not be put into them until
the last moment, the men to occupy the different places should
be carefully told off, and when the attack gets sufficiently near,
they should be taken into the village in small numbers, and care-
fully posted in the houses by ofHcers. For this purpose a rough
sketch of the village should be prepared, and the position of the
different bodies intended, to hold it should be noted {vide Plate
XXII, which shows the defence of Le Bourget by the Prussians).
At this stage of the attack the assailant's artillery will probably
have moderated its fire, being partially masked by its own
infantry, and hence the men who should previously have been
as much as possible kept under shelter, will come up fresh and
in good heart.

Decker.

216

So soon as the main body of the troops engaged in the
defence of tlie village are taken into the village, their place in tlie
rear shonld be snpplied by troops from the second line, who
shonld line the shelter trench in rear of the village, and throw
forward a strong line of skirmishers between the trench and the
village. Feeding the fight in this manner invariably helps the
defenders, who are much less likely to be demoralised, when they
know fresh troops have come up to support them from the rear.
It obtains thus for the defence a part of the advantage which
the offensive always possesses, namely, the moral effect of a
forward movement, and preserves the same general distribution
of troops, both for attack and defence.

Important as villages are, too much value must not be
assigned to them. And here, as everywhere, a recurrence to
first principles is of importance. Fortification is the art of
enabling a small body of men to resist a large force. If the
fortification or village requires more men to defend it than
would be assigned to a shnilar front of open ground, it really
does more harm then good. Shutting up too many men in a
village is a great error. The object of holding a village is two-
fold. 1st. To deny the cover it offers to the enemy. 2nd. To
make a certain point secure, and thus liberate men, who other-
wise would be employed at that point as defenders, for offensive
action. This latter is the true principle on which all field for-
tification should be carried out.

If too many men are placed in a village, and the general line
of battle is forced, the men garrisoning the village can do little
or nothing to restore the battle, and if the second line and
reserve fail to drive the enemy back it is likely that the defenders
of the village will be captured. Blenheim affords an example of
this. The French General Tallard placed a very large force of
infantry in the village, situated in a loop of the Danube ; when
Marlborough forced the French line, the infantry in Blenheim
were completely cut off, and had to surrender.

The defence of villages should not take too many troops which might be
useful on the line of battle, and although a position sui)ported by villages is
good, it must be given up if their defence requires too many men. It must be
always remembered that the defence of villages when men are behind
intrenchments acts unfavourably on the morale of the soldiers from the very
security they appear to give. All the troops so employed weaken the general
line of battle, and the combats which follow are always bloody.

Field fortification can never be a panacea for weakness. And
it never ought to be viewed otherwise than in its tactical re-
lation to the general action of the troops fighting. By judiciously
using it, it becomes an important and valuable auxiliary. The
true key to all such questions is to be found by keephig steadily
m view that tlie j^f^^^wc defence of any ^:)Oc»izY/o?i by an army is an
ah.mrdity.

When an inferior force finds itself in presence of a superior
and compelled to fight, it is in danger of having its flank turned
by the extension the larger army can afford to make. To obviate

PLATE XXI.

QjkNCERFIELO. LiTH. 22. BEDFORD ST CoVENT GaRDEN

217

"this clanger the army acting* on the defensive may, by a judicious
use of villages and field works, seek to extend their line, and
concentrate the mass of this force on one })lace Avhere it can
strike an offensive blow ; the chief use of fortifications should be
to assist this by so strengtiiening a portion of the line of battle
that it may be held by a reduced number of men.

The rules for making shelter trenches, loopholing houses, and
putting villages in a state of defence, are given in many of the
books on this subject, and need not therefore be repeated. But
it is desirable to give an example of a village entrenched as has
Idccu just described.

Plate XXI shows a village situated from GOO to 800 yards
in front of a general line of battle : it is supposed to be defended
by three battalions, two batteries, two squadrons, and a detach-
ment of engineers. About seven hours is supposed to be the
time availalile for putting it in a state of defence.

The object of holding it is twofold : —

1st. To deny it to the enemy, who, making use of it, the
stream, wood, and ponds, could shortly establish a

, firm foothold within effective musketry range of the

defenders' position.

2nd. To delay the attack, to compel the enemy to deploy

and extend his forces at a spot 800 yards further off

than he otherwise would do, thereby causing him

I labour and loss of time. Further, to compel him to

attack the troops posted in the village, and suffer
the consequent loss, before he can unite his attack
against the main position. The front covered and
protected by the village, extends from the lower

;' pond on the left to the ]\Iill D on the right, a space

of about 2,000 yards, guarded by—

3 Battalions 2,400

2 Batteries 260

2 Squadrons 200

Detachment Engineers 50

Total 2,910

A force which could not pretend to hold such a front, with-
out the aid of field fortification. The outer enceinte has been
selected so that in front it is composed almost entirely of shelter
trenches, with two closed redoubts of weak profile at the angles,
close to and covering the barricades across the roads ; on the
flanks, walls are available, Avhich have been used as the line of
defences, being of such a height that they can be fired over.

The fence along the road, leading to the Mill D on the right
flank, is also put in a state of defence, as is the boundary wall
of the Wood E. The wood and the mill thus support tlie flanks
of the village. The little stream, ponds, and marsli K on the
left protect that flank, the wood being held by half a company
of infantiy.

218

An epaulmciit to cover a battery, is placed behind the pond
near the mill on the right, a similar epaulment covers the other
battery on the left.

A shelter trench with two large openings in it, through which
the roads pass, is placed 250 yards in rear of the village -which is
OjDen.

An inner enceinte is formed by loophoHng the houses and
joining the walls W, Y, K, L.

One battalion is placed in reserve in half-battalion columns
under cover of tlie slope. A squadron is placed near one half-
battalion, the other squadron near the left battery, with a couple
of men pushed out to watch the road parallel to the wood.

Two half-battalions are sent to line the outer encemte. which
they divided between them. Each half-battalion extending two
companies along the front it has to cover, and retaining two com-
panies in support.

The other wings of these battalions are placed in the shelter
ti'ench.

The supports AA and BB are kept clear of the houses as
much as possible. When the attacker advances to within about
600 yards, the support must be freely used to supply losses, and
the two half-battalions, behind the shelter trench, should advance
and occupy the inner enceinte, the reserve battalion taking their
place boliind tlie shelter trenches. This advance will give con-
fidence to tlie defenders, Avho see their own people coming on in
support of them. The batteries will, from their positions, flank
the village.

If the outer enceinte be carried, the troops defending it
should be instructed to fall back towards R and Z; the de-
fenders of the inner enceinte will then be free to use their rifles
from the houses, wliich the attacking artillery dare not now fire
at, as they will be afraid of injuring their own men, and the de-
fenders not having been previously in the vfllage, will not have
suffered from the demoralizing effect of the cross-fire of the attack-
ing artillery. The cavalry on the flanks will, during the enemy's
advance, watch for an opportunity to charge him unexpectedly.

When the enemy get [)ossession of the outer enceinte, the
battery on the right should retire to the epaulment, I, prepared
for it in rear of the shelter ti'ench, and fire on the assailants when
it can see them.

The battery on the left will subsequently retire to H.

Should the attackers succeed in carrying the iimer enceinte,
the defenders should fall back along selected lines, as shoAvn by
the dotted arrows ; the battalion in reserve covering their retreat
with its fire, and the two batteries firing into the village to check
the attackers.

The first two battalions should then reform under cover of the
slope. If the village is to be re-captured, the reserve battalion,
supported by troops from the second line, should at once under-
take the work.

PLATE XXII.

D&MCERriELO, LiTH 22 BEDFORD ST CoVENT GaRDEN

'2l[)

l^V a(l(^pting such an arraiigH'uient (he defence may obtain
some of the moral advantages of the attack, and tlie demorali-
zation consequent on leaving; infantry in loopholed houses,
exposed to a heavy artillery lire, and unable to reply, may be
reduced.

As soon as possible after the front is clear of the retreating
uifantry, the counter attack should be made before the enemy
have been able to close the rear of the village which has been
purposely left open.

'flic attack of a village is a difficult and generally a costly
operation, and should be attempted only when the object
justihes the loss. Many of the hardest fought actions have
been those where the attack and defence of villages formed a
prominent feature. At Ligny 20 Prussian battalions struggled
for the Avhole day against o2 Frencli battalions, and much of
the loss both sides suffered was round the village of Ligny
itself.

Attacks on villages cost so mauy, usually the best men, but I make a rule Frederick,
to avoid them as much as possible.

Burning the village will often turn the defenders out, but
some thought is requisite before doiug so.

To buru a village is the surest way of dislodging the enemy, but if the Kocquancoi;rt,
attackers must pass through the village, doing so stops their advance, and aids
the enemy retaking the oii'ensive.

Generally speaking, the attack should be undertaken some-
what as described at page 95, as heavy a fire of artillery as
possible being concentrated on the village, and a considerable
time allowed for the artillery to take effect before the mfantry
are pushed forward.

The attacking troops should be accompanied by small jDarties
of engineers with tools, and a strong body of engineers should
be held in hand, ready to push up the moment the outer enceinte
is carried, to assist in tin-uing the defenders of the houses out,
and strengthening the village against a counter attack of the
defender's reserves.

The attack on Le Bourget, at Paris, is a good example of
the attack on villages.

Le Bourget is a village of some length, the gardens of which are surrounded The attack of
Ijy long straight walls 6 feet in heiglit, intersecting each other at right angles, the Prussian
These were ]3repared for defence by loopholing and heaping up earth, and the Infantry,
entrance to the village was barricaded. Duke of

The attack was undertaken from three sides, viz., from Blanc-Mesnil Wurtemberg.
Dugny, and along the road between them. The two flanking columns sent to (Translated
the front clouds of skirmishers, which gained ground at the double, and then ^J Robinson.)
threw themselves down. The sup]i(n-ts and reserves followed these, spread out
in extended order, and also at the double. As these latter threw themselves
down to rest, the skirmishers again ran forward, and at the same time bore off
towards the flanks. When they arrived within range, they again threw them-
selves down, and opened fire upon the enemy. The gaps which occurred from
drawing off towards the flanks were filled u}) by extending subdivisions. lu
like manner the flanks were jn'olonged by single companies advancing one
after the other, but always in extended order, so that the concentric attack

220

which had moreover — as tlie enemy was approached— become denser in
cliaracter, kept always assuming a more enclosing form. Each of the extended
Ixxlies of troops took advantage of whatever cover offered, in order to rally
behind it and collect togetlier. Thus in front of the nf)rth-east Hank a row of
dung-heaps had lieen left njwn the field, whicli afforded a rallying ]»lace for an
entire corai)any, which o])ened from behind these a destructive tire upon
troops who came forward to attack. On the other Hank the bed of the brook
Le Moleret aff(jrded a slight jjrotection and was at once turned to account by
a few formed c()mi)anies, in order to cover an onset against a counter attack
delivered from Drancy.

The mechanism of the attack consisted principally in the rapid change
from open to dose order directly the most trijliwf cover admitted of the rallying of
a subdivision or company. On the other hand, every advance over open ground
took place in widely extended skirnushing lines, which moved on like ants.

The right wing was left behind ; the centre had not sufficiently extended
itself, and had renounced old forms too little, and its losses were enormous ; Init
the attacking left wing, under Lieutenant-Colonel Graf Waldersee, pressing
forward in long thin lines, succeeded in making good an attack of skirmishers
up to the garden walls, in silencing the fire from them, and iu breaking into
the long village, both from its flanks and rear. Its defenders now gave way,
( general Budritzky was able to enter from the front, and the right flank column
to reach the rear entrance without very severe loss.

The recent Fraiico-Gcnuan War oifers many examples of
villages, woods, and posts being defended, and advantageously
made use of by the Germans, especially in the blockades of
Paris and Metz ; in every case the principles on which these
posts Avere held were identical, — viz., the exterior of the wood
or village was held strongly by a thick line of skirmishers, and
an interior trench, or defence of some kind, was invariably
provided. Thus, if the first line of defence was carried, the
second helped the reserve in retaking the first ; in every case
such posts were used not as the defence itself, but as adjuncts
to the defence, and as means of holding certain important points
while the troops acted on the off'ensive.

The following description of some cf the posts is abridged
chiefly from the Memoir on the defence of Paris by Viollet
Le Due, from which plates XXIV and XXIII have been
copied.

The road to Versailles, the German head-quarters during
the siege of Paris, passed across the neck of the peninsula
formed by the Seine, having the village of St. Cloud on its
eastern, and that of Bougival on its western side, the distance
between being about 5,500 yards. The French fort Valerien
prevented the Prussians advancing on Paris in this direction,
and the Prussians were desirous to check any forward advance
of the French towards Versailles. Some high wooded ground
runs across this peninsula, gently falling towards Valerien, and
steep towards Bougival, St. Cloud, and Villeneuve. ( Vide
Plate XXIV.) The French advanced posts were pushed out
as far as liouse marked A. The Prussian advanced posts as
far as the Buzanval Park, B and C. The Prussian line then
extended from these places through Garchcs and Villeneuve.
The French redoubt of Montretout. Avhich had been abandoned,
was occasionally used as an advanced post by the Prussians,

PLATE XXIV.

Dancerfield. LiTH 22 Bedford S'^ Covent Garden,

PLATE XXIII

Dancerfielo. Lith. 22, BtoroRO S'^ Covent Garden

221

but not always, and from its position appears to luivo been of
little value to either side.

The Haras, an open eminence, formed the central "work of
the Avhole, and Avas the place where the reserves were posted.
At one corner of it, D, a hole was broken, and covered with
an epaulement, a long* barricade, between the Haras and La
Bergerie, was formed to take in flank any troops Avho, having
carried the edge of the wood in the Bouzanval Park, should
attempt to advance on the Haras, some guns were placed
behind epanlements at F, for the same purpose. Small block-
houses were placed at the corner of the Haras to give flank
defence, and also as places Avhere guards might be placed at
all times. A small interior entrenchment, I, was made in the
Haras itself, to prevent its being carried by a rush. I'hree
redoubts, XXX, were constructed to sweep the flat top of the
hill. They were ft)rmed with a blockhouse in the interior and
surrounded vrith an abattis. At Y Y two epaulements were
made to cover the gims sweeping the road leading to Bougival,
The outer wall of the Bouzanval Park was loopholed, as was
also an interior wall, M N. Celle Saint Cloud was loopholed
and barricaded. When the French attacked this position on
the 19th January, they carried the first defence, the Bouzanval
Park, but were stopped by the Avail M N., past AAdiich they
could not get. They eudeaA'oured to turn it by an attack at
the point and the point R on its right and left. But neither
attack succeeded, and both suffered greatly from the fire of the
guns on the top of the hill.

It Avill be observed that the flanks of this position are open,
and this fact alloAved the Prussians to take the oftcnsiA^e from
Bougival and the Avood in front of it, threatening the right
flank of the French troops engaged at R and in the wood about
the Avail M N.

The plan of these defences is well worthy of careful study ;
it Avill be seen that the first or advanced line being carried,
there is a second line to support it, and that the position
occupied is admirably adapted to the ground, advantage has
been taken of the hedges, Avails, and existing fences. Troops
have not been so much placed in houses as used to defend long
lines Avith skirmishers, thus checking the enemy, and offering a
wide front of fire to his advance.

The trace of tliese works is dictated by au advanced knowledge of forti- VioUetleDuc.
fication : the hand of au able officer of engineers is seen everywhere. The
precautions dictated by prudence are still more numerous. Retreat is])ointed
out and provided for. In examining these works nothing is so evident as the
constant forethought of the Prussian staff to husband their troo])s and never
to comi^romise them for a trifling result.

Plate XXIII shoAvs the system pursued on the heights of
Raincy. The contour of the hill is carefully folloAved : the edge
of the AA'Ood held and covered by abattis, and in all cases an
iimer line taken up to meet the enemy if he succeeds in

222

carrying the first Hue. Such posts as those shown on Plates
XXIV and XXIII are of course the Avork of time, but they
are reproduced here to show the principles on which points of
similar importance should be held. And it is manifest that the
construction of all such defences must be subservient to a large
development of fire, a provision for taking the oifensive, and
above all, such arrangements as shall enable the skirmishing
line to be fed and supported from the rear, thus infusmg into
the defence the principles of the attack.

In preparing defences of this nature it is essential that the
line of retreat of the troops be marked out, so that when the
men fall back they may not interfere with the fire of those in
rear of them : and it is further essential that distinct notices be
clearly put up detailing the names of the various districts
into which the defences are divided, and pointing out the
nearest road to those districts. No amount of zeal, courage,
devotion, or knowledge compensates for the neglect of such
details.

Plate XXII. gives a sketch of Le Bourget at Paris as
prepared for defence by the Prussians after its capture
(described at page 219). This drawing is worthy of study,
more especially the care taken to give each part of the defence
a reserve in rear, and also the care taken to point out the exact
position each detachment should occupy.

223

APPENDICES.

Page.
Appendix I.

Proposed alterations in the Tactical Formation of Infantry in Italy .... 224

Appendix II.

The Instrvictions of Major-General Crawford for Marches, as issued

to the Light Division in the Peninsular War 235

Appendix III.
"War Establishments of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers .... 257

Appendix IV".
Table of Losses in various Great Battles „. '^ ^, .... 263

ii24

APPENDIX I.

PROPOSED ALTERATIONS IN THE TACTICAL FORMATIONS OF
INFANTRY IN ITALY.

The Italian infantry formations wore laid down in 18G9. The
result of tlie war of 1870 has been to turn the attention of the
Italian military authorities to tactical formations, and a. committee was
appointed to inquire into the whole subject ; this committee has verj;
recently concluded its labours, and nearly the wbole of its recommen-
dations have been introduced into the Italian army since the 1st May
last. The report of this committee contains much, useful matter : the
following is a hvief precis of the proposed Italian infantry tactics.

An Italian battalion is formed of four companies, each company of
four subdivisions (so long as tlie company is not less than 128 men),
each subdivision of two sections, each section of two squads. With a,
battalion at its full strength, each squad would be about 10 men. The
company would be 160 men = 10 X 2 X 2 X 4. With four companies,
cadres, &c., the battalion would consequently be about 1,000 men, the
squad being the first or elementary unit. The squad, working by
itself, is commanded by a corporal, who leads it in front of the centre.

When two squads are put together to make a section the corporal's
place is on the flanks of their respective squads, their section being
commanded by a serjeant. AVhen the two sections are put together ta
make a subdivision, the subdivision leader is on the right, the sectional
commanders becoming serrefiles, but the corporals retain their position
on the flanks of their squads at all times. There is no pivot flank, and
both, the sections in subdivision and the subdivisions in company may
be inverted, whether standing in line or column.

Whether halted or on the march, the squads, sections, and sub-
divisions, at the word of command from their respective commanders,
can open out to one, two, or three paces interval.

When not under fire, and indeed on all occasions when a battalion
quarter-distance column would usually befoi'med, the Italian battalion
moves in what may be termed a line of contiguous company columns ;
that is to say, each company is formed in column of subdivisions, with
an interval of four paces between the companies, which interval is
always preserved. (Vide Plate XXV.) It is evident that such a for-
mation has some advantages as regards pliability and power of moving
over rough gi-ound. The new regulations fix 50 paces, in place of 20
paces as the interval between battalions in brigade. This peculiar
battalion column is that formation best adapted to an object the
Italians keep in view — working b}'- the wing instead of the line, or,
in other words, pushing the flank or wing of the company to the
front, the object being to prevent mixing up companies. {Vide
page 88.)

The following is an extract : —

" Henceforward we must admit as an indisputable fact that no body

225

of men can remain in close onliT uudei- tlio efficacious fire of an
enemy's infantiy witliout being exposed to great losses.

"The extended order, which allows an advance to be made wit) i
comparatively moderate losses, has, at the present moment, become of
so much importance that it must be looked on no longer as a means for
preparing for the fighting in close order, but as the normal and only
means of lighting both on the offensive and deleusive.

" Without seeking to develop the principles upon which large masses
of troops are divided into two or more lines, principles which have not
varied on account of the introduction of modern arms, all that is
requisite here is to point out that for the troops of the first line who
come undci- an cflfective infantry fire it is requisite that there should
be some normal formation.

" Such a noi-mal formation should not be stereotyped, but it ought
to lay down such a distribution of the force with reference to the space
occupied or disposable, as may allow the greatest possible development
of extended fighting, and yet be sufficiently elastic to adapt itself in
all cases to the ground and circumstances. The object therefore in view
is to find the best normal formation for a battalion fighting in the first
line when acting in concert with other troops.

" The condition of working beside other battalions, also in first
line, limits the front that the battalion can and ought to occupy. For,
viewing the way troops are engaged, there should be no great differ-
ence between the action of a battalion working by itself and with
others. What characterizes fighting at the present day is the general
battle resolves itself into a number of partial battles, having for their
object the attack or defence of definite points, such as woods, houses,
&c., so that really each battalion in first line, in a general action, has
usually its definite object pretty much as if it were working by itself.

" As we must never lose sight of the principle that a passive
defence can produce no useful result, and that it ought to be combined
with, or at least followed by the offensive, it results that the normal
order of fighting should be such as is best adapted to the offensive.

" In order that an offensive may be successful it must be handled with
energy, and with the greatest amount of force possible. Successive
efforts almost always fail. They break down the ■inorule of the troops
making thein, and confirm and improve that of their opponents.

" When troops are acting offensively, generally they are ignorant of
the strength of the enemy with whom they are dealing ; and it is
always better to attack with too strong a force than to expose portions
to be beaten in succession.

" Carry these views to their legitimate conclusion. It would seem
at the first blush that the whole battalion should bo engaged at once ;
but when it is considered that the front occupied by a battalion in the
front line is usually equal to that it would occupy if it were deployed
into line, and as it is requisite to fight in extended order, it follows that
the battalion must be divided into two portions, one intended to be
used at once, the other to be used subsequently ; one to prepare, the
other to complete the action. What should be the proportion between
these two portions ? Let us suppose the front of the battalion covered
by a chain of skirmishers ; granting that each skirmisher, to use freely
and effiectually his arms, requires a space of one and a-half yards ; the
battalion having an average strcngth'of 320 files present. On the
field of battle one company is needed to cover this front. Is it, how-

220

ever, a-equisite to deploy all the coinpany as skirmishers at the beginning
of the action ? In the first moments it is not necessary to have a fire
of the gi'catest intensity ; success is not so much the object at first as
feeling the enemj^, to compel him to show himself, and to get acquainted
with the ground and the state of affairs.

" For this object a company seems too large a force ; extending all
as skirmishei's produces useless loss. An error in the direction at
this stage is veiy difficult subsequently to rectify. It will, therefore,
be better at this stage to have a moderate fire, and increase it as
■wanted. The company should then be divided into two equal portions,
the one intended to reinforce the other when required ; the first Avill
be termed the chain, the second tlie reinforcements.

"Half a company will then form the chain, half a company the
reinforcements. It should be remembered that the question at first,
is only one of quantity, the method of dividing the tactical elements of
the battalion will follow further on. What should be the distance
between the chain and its reinforcements ? It ought to be such that
the reinforcements should be able to support the chain effectually.
Placing them too far off will violate the principle that efforts should
not be successive, but that the whole force from the beginning should
be in action ; if too near they will suffer from the fire directed against
the chain. Let us assume the chain 300 to 400 yards from the enemy's
skirmishers. The ground behind the chain swept by bullets, even
with the lowest ti-ajectory, will not exceed 60 yards; the reinforce-
ments should, therefore, be placed about 100 yards in rear. They
will thus be supports near enough to form one body with the chain,
sufficiently far off to escape the fire directed against it. As regards
fire aimed against them, they may seek to preserve themselves from it,
either by taking an extended formation by laying down, or by the
folds in the ground. As for unaimed fire, it is hopeless to try and
guard against it. Every commandant of a subdivision who sees his
men too much exposed to fire of this kind, must, as soon as possible,
change his position.

" The second portion of the battalion, intended not to act at first,
and of which the strength is not yet given, we will call the main body.
In order not to enforce a passive attitude on it when suffering useless
loss, the mean body should at the beginning of the action be kept as
much as possible out of fire. With this object it should be placed
at 700 to 800 yards from the enemy's skirmishers. But, as we have
supposed 300 to 400 yards between the enemy's skirmishers and the
chain, 100 yards between the chain and the reinforcements ; the dis-
tance between the reinforcements and the main body will be about 300
yards. This distance alone is sufScient to point out the advisability
of interpolating a fresh line between the I'cinforcements and the main
body, to keep up the connection ; but thei"e are still other reasons for
this interpolation. It has been pointed out that in lieu of successive
efforts, the greatest possible number should be engaged at once. It
has been pointed out that to proportion this greatest possible number
to the disposable front, and at the same time leave the skirmishers
room sufficient to use their arms, a company is all that can be employed
in the first line. It has been further pointed out that, at the beginning
of the action, this company must be divided into two lines — the chain
and the reinforcements. It is easy to understand that the reinforce-
ments being intended to move up into the line of fire, it is requisite to

227

have in rear other bodies to support, both morally and materially, tho
chain, and fill up its gaps ; and direct movements to a flank, seeing
the impossibility in most cases with modern arras of making a front
attack ; lastly, to keep up a connection between tho advanced troops
and the main body. This interpolated line is called the line of
supports.

" What should be its force ? To fulfil all its functions, it does not
seem advisable to make it of less strength than the chain and rein-
forcements taken together, or one company.

" As regards its distance from the reinforcements and tho main
body, it has been fixed by what we hav^e previously said. The supports
ought to hold an intermediate position between the reinforcements and
the main body, or 150 yards, from each.

" At this distance the supports may be sufficiently covered from the
enemy's fire to be able to send effectual assistance to troops placed in
advance, and also maintain a connection with those in rear. It should
be observed once for all that the intervals given are those that would be
given on level open ground. In a close country they may bo diminished ;
but in every case they are limited by the necessity of having the lines
sufficiently near to mutually support one another, and sufficiently dis-
tant that any retrograde movement of the first may not disorganize the
second.

" From the preceding it follows that, taking into consideration the
front occupied by a battalion, the division of the battalion into two
portions, and the sub-division of the first of these portions into three
lines, and the functions assigned to each of these lines, that the proper
division of the battalion will be as follows : —

1 company as chain and reinforcements,

1 company as supports,

2 companies as main body ;

in other words : ^ of the battalion ., .. chain,

s }j » • • • • reinforcements,

i „ „ .. .. supports,

^ „ „ . . . . main body :

these proportions being definitely laid down.

'' The most convenient means of working the various companies in
the different lines will be as follows: —

" It has been said that the strength of one company is required for
the chain and reinforcements, and the strength of another company
for the supports. Whether it is better to use one entire company for
chain and reinforcements, and another entire company for supports,
or to cover the front by portions of the two companies ? each portion
of tho chain having" behind it reinforcements and supports belonging
to the same company ; or, in other words, is it better to work the two
companies in line or from a flank ?

" The formation from a flank seems the preferable for sevei-al
reasons.

" It has been seen that the average front of a battalion on a war
footing is about 300 yards, it will consequently be difficult, not to say
impossible, for a single captain to overlook so wide a front, while by
tlividing it between two captains, they can better perform the duty
assigned -to them, and at the same time preserve all the requisite
freedom of action, limited only by having to work in concert with

Q 2

228

troops beside them, and conformably with tlie instructions of the com-
mandant of tlie battalion.

"Also, as it must bo acknowledged, that it is impossible for any
body of troops to remain in ck)Se order under the eifoctive fire of in-
fantry, it being admitted that the normal method of fighting can only
be individual order, it follows that the chain, the reinforcements, and
the supports must get mixed up. When the formation is linear, this
mingling of different companies is very inconvenient ; •when formed
from a flank, the mingling of men of various sections but of the samc^
company is less objectionable, and easier to put to rights.

" This formation from a flank, in preference to tliat from a line,
must be applied not only to a battalion, but also to the companies as-
also to the largest tactical bodies, always with the view of aiding the-
commandants of the fractions in the duties of the action in front, and
reducing as miTch as possible the mingling of the lines.

" It follows from what has gone before that the normal order of
fighting of a battalion in first line, acting in conjunction with other
battalions, is the following: —

" Two companies should be pushed forward, termed advanced com-
panies, or first line companies, the others being termed companies of
the main body. The first are intended to prepare and develop the
attack ; the second to clincli it, as will be shown hereafter.

"The two advanced companies, each divided into chain, reinforce-
ments, and supports, will work in one or other of the normal forms
established for a company in a following chapter, according to the
ground and circumstances* and the object in view. It is further
requisite to deal with a last question — the means of obviating asmuclv
as possible the results of mingling the three lines. In other words,
what should be the disposition of the chain and reinforcements in the
same company ? In accordance with the division of the battalion, it
follows that each of tbe leading companies will have one-fourth of its
strength in the chain, one-fourth in the reinforce line, and one-half in
support; that is to say, there will be one subdivision in the chain, one
in the reinforce line, and two in supjiort. As regards the subdivisior.
intended to form the chain and supports, the principle of working from
a flank must be applied in preference to that of working in line, so
that tv/o sections of two different subdivisions may be extended in
the chain at the beginning of tlie action, and the two other twin sections
shall be in rear ready to be extended when required.

"As the force requisite to cover the front has been divided into two
portions — chain and reinforce line, if a fixed interval of a yard and
a half is given between each skirmisher, the chain will only cover one-
half the front of the battalion, the other half being that left to be
covered by the reinforce line afterwards. Should, therefore, more space
be given between the skirmishers, so that the whole front may be
covered ? or, Should they only occupy one-half the front, leaving
between them the intervals to be filled up by the reinforcements when
extended ? If the chain cover all the front when it is thickened from
the reiTiforce line, either the men from the latter line must be interpo-
lated between the others, or the sections of the chain must be made
to close in, and so leave room in the intervals for the reinforcements,
to extend.

* .Not translated.

PLATE XXV.

I^orm«l fbmwttion {'or nitixck <»(' <iii Ilvili.ai Hi*ij[iVuJe of
('» HrtUalioiis or 2 Ro;L;iineTit.s.

bibdI

^ iiai|

:fl-

E.I

M^5

'■^

■5

An lUiUfUi BcUUdion on a \y(ir- f(n>tiiiy i-onsi.fr.s- of ■ iitdpfji'Julcnt

!('• .Siib Divi.'iivius - .yi' Sertion.t^ fi4 Sqiuid^ - &i'> Mc^' rar/i of'
//it'.vr /rticUoti,-! /i(LS ti ifpecifil cvnimtaidtfr.

D*NCERriELD LiTH 2? Bedford S^ Covent Garden

220

" The first motliod produces a Tningling- of men togctlicr from the
first, and thus renders tlic advantapfc of forming the subdivisions from
Ji ihink illusory. The second -would be impracticable under fire, and
v^ould produce disorder and considerable loss. It would also be im-
possible to ask men who had obtained cover to give it up to others.
The ])ortious of chain must consequently keep spaces between themj
Avhere the reiid'orcements may be i)laccd. These gaps in the line of fire
■will not at first cause any inconvenience ; they are small, and are
•covered by the cross fire of the skirmishers on each side.

" It has been clearly shown how the battalion and each of the
ndvanced companies are divided. The front of each battalion is
divided and sub-divided so that each body has a limited zone of action,
in which it works under the orders of its own leader; each beiuf able
within his own sphere, to act on his own initiative, and this must
be carried down to even a single man. However limited this last
may be, it is not without impoi-tance. The great principle of ex-
tended order, is not so much a question of loose formation as it is of the
snbstitution of individual and intelligent action, in place of passive,
blind, and mechanical obedience, and of the necessity for clear, definite,
detailed personal instruction of the soldier, teaching him how to obtain
the greatest advantage from his arms and the ground, in order to
compensate for the far greater difficulties encountered by the superior
leaders. Also the necessity of maintaining very strictl}-, especially in
very small portions, the bonds of tactics and discipline. In action,
the section forms the smallest of the elements into which the ex-
tended order divides itself, whilst the squad forms the smallest tactical
clement — two squads acting always under one head. An endeavour
should be made to keep the section intact at all times ; if this cannot
be done for the section, it should be always done for the squad.

" The best m.ethod of obviating as much as possible the bad conse-
quences of mingling men, and the dissolving action of modern fighting,
is the frequent exercise of soldiers in peace to rapidly reform the sub-
division to which they belong, and in case this cannot be done, to put
themselves under the orders of the nearest officer or non-commissioned
ofHcer, even if they belong to other subdivisions or corps.

" Conversely, it should be required that at all manoeavres the officers
or non-commissioned officers should assemble dispersed men as quickly
as possible, leading them into action, and placing them under the orders
of the nearest superior."

The above extract from the report of the Committee is worthy of
•study ; but before drawing attention to some peculiarities, it will be
well to enter a little more into the Italian formations.

Plate XXV gives the formation of an Italian brigade, consisting
of six battalions, for attack, showing the smallest tactical element.

In general, the squad when deployed as skirmishers, has its men
formed in single rank, the front rank men placing themselves according
to the ground, but never more than three paces apart, the rear rank
men coming up on their left. But, if requisite, the whole squad, con-
sisting (normally) of 10 men, may be formed in a knot or group under
its own leader, either two deep or in a rallying group, or in such a way
as shall best sAveep the ground with fire.

Skirmishers are ordered to fire only when halted, and never as they
advance ; men are not to fire when they do not see the enemy. Under
fire all movements are made at the double, in a successiou of rushes

230

of not more than GO yards, in order tliat the men may not be out ot
breatli ; when cover is available it is to be used ; on open level ground
the men throw themselves down.

The two squads of a section are never separated, and always
support one another. If both are extended as skirmishei-s they
move in echelon, one supporting and covering the other. If one squad
is acting as reinforcement, while the other skirmishes, the reinforce
squad may be formed two deep, or with open files, or extended with
one or two paces between the files, or extended in single rank with a
pace or two between the files, according to the gi'ound. and the circum-
stances of each case.

The subdivision may be extended altogether as skirmishers, orA\Tth
one section as skirmishers the other in the reinforce line ; or, better
still, with each section having a squad as skirmishers and a squad in
the reinforce line.

As regards the company, its normal formation of attack includes
the three lines, chain, reinforcement, and support, which may be formed
in three different ways as shown on Plate XXV (1, 2, 3).

(1.) Two subdivisions being in support, two others extended each
a section to the right or left, keeping each a section in the reinforce
line.

(2.) The two sections extended toucliing one another, always ex-
cepting the regulation interval of four paces .- the two squads are then
behind the two wings of the chain.

(3.) One subdivision extended, one the reinforce line and_^ two in
support, all being in echelon.

It is laid down that it is far better to work so as to suit the ground,
than seek to maintain regular and symmetrical formations.

The line of skirmishers has, it will be observed, gaps in it, to be
afterwards filled up by the reinforce line. The inversion of the sec-
tions in a subdivision, or of the squads in a section, is not considered
of any consequence, but the mingling of men of different squads or
sections is to be carefully guarded against. One of the chief things
recommended is to leave to every person, down to the corpoi'als of
squads, complete liberty within certain limits.

In considering the proposals here made, it will be observed that the
whole formation of the battalion is based on the squad of 10 men com-
manded by a corporal. In an Italian battalion there are 116 distinct
commands, viz., 64 squads, 32 sections, 16 subdivisions, and 4 com-
panies, or 116 officers and non-commissioned ofiicers. If any of theso
commanders are killed, the confusion must be great. Suppose a captain
killed, a squad leader has to lead the section, a section leader a sub-
division, a subdivision leader a company. The division is carried too
far, The ultimate unit into which any body of men is divided shoiild
be based on the reasons given at page 3. This complicated subdivision
is probably caused by the introduction of the large German company
into the Italian army, which with a two-deep* formation cannot be
commanded by one man, and when the company is extended the diffi-
culty is of course increased.

There must be a limit to subdivision, and there must be some point
at which the commander directly commands his subordinate officers,
who replace him, if he becomes hors de coiMat. The point where

* The Germans stand thi'ee deep.

231

division should cease is undoubtedly the company, and for the reason
stated.

The opinion expressed by the Italian Committee, that the skir-
mishers in front of a battalion, 280 to 300 yards, occupy too longj a
line to be commanded by one man, and the result follo'winc^ on the in-
troduction of the larn-c company into Italy, viz., the cutting up the
company into a number of distinct portions in order to get it in hand,
are confirmatory of what has been already stated at ])ago 98, of tho
advantages of the small company ; two small companies covering the
front of the battalion. It cannot be too often repeated that the large
company is in some respects tho weak point of the Prussian system,
and that a double company formation gives all the advantages (there
undoubtedly are some) of the large company without its glaring
disadvantages. The advantages of the reinforce line are very question-
able, it makes a fresh division without any apparent reason. From
the moment that troops are engaged there must, as we have already
seen, be a sufficient number of men in the skirmishing line. Acknow-
ledging the truth of the pi'inciple " that the offensive should be taken
as energetically and with the greater force possible, and that siTccessive
efforts usually fail " in theory, it would seem that it is neglected in
practice. Suppose the skirmishers meet an enemy with a number of
skirmishers double what they bring up. The reinforce line must then
come forwai'd, and before it can come up the skirmishers will have
suifered much, and the arrival of the reinforcements will not place
them in as good a position as if they had been originally in large
numbers. The true reason for this reinforce line is apparently to link
the supports to the skirmishers, and to avoid splitting the company,
the captain's command, into two portions, by too great a distance.

The space left between the sections extended for the reinforce
sections to come up would be very difficult to preserve ; without the
most accurate leading, these spaces would be lost, and then the men
must mingle with the others.

Another great objection to such a system is, the captain has his
work scattered ; he has to lead the skirmishers, order up the reinforce
line, and direct the supports, his command being 250 yards deep from
front to rear, and about 150 yards wide.

The proposals to woi'k from a flank have been already discussed, the
only object in so doing is to preveiit mixing the men of various com-
panies together. With large companies this evil is much greater than
when they are small, but the evil cannot be avoided, and anyone who
looks at the sketch of how it is proposed to work an Italian battalion,
will acknowledge that if it advance under heavy fire over rough
ground, the men, despite all the complicated arrangements, Avould get
mingled ; it is far better to train the men to act when this emergency
takes place than to attempt to prevent it. Indeed the Italian instruc-
tions provide for this, thereby acknowledging that its prevention is
impossible.

The principles laid down are clearly correct, but the method in
which those "principles are worked out appears questionable.

No formation, however symmetrical, has a chance of success that
is not simple, and that will bear that mingling of men that is incident,
and must be incident, to every advance over rough ground, especially
if the advance is in extended order.

It has been stated in the note to page S8 that this method of

232

Schcrff.
(Trinslated
by Graiiam.)

skirmishing, from a flank or by sections, meets with much support.
The foregoing extract from the report of the Italian Committee puts
the case clearly. The following extract from the best and most recent
German authority on the subject is worthy of attention : —

" The first or skirmishinp; line has in the supposed case of a battalion
with an assigned object of attack, most undoubtedly a task coniidete in itself
and with one object in view. This task consists in endeavouring to over-
whelm with its tii-e from a front not originally exceeding 300 yards some
always smaller ]>ortion of the enemy's position which has been pointed out, and
thus to shake the defenders before the onslaught of the main body.

" The jJoint which the latter is to force should be first quite clearly made
out, the most favorable spot being chosen, after you have approached pretty
close to the enemy's position.

" Upon this point the fire will then be concentrated as m\ich as possible,
which, with a front of only 300 yards may, with our present arms, ]>ro-
ceed from the whole line, even if the selected point chance to be opposite one
flank.

" It is evident that all this may be attained most successfully by unity of
command, and that on the other hand considerations of space by no means
render this unity impossible. The advantages of this unity of command have
indeed misled French tacticians into wishing to break ujj a whole battalion
into skirmishers, when the attacking force consists of several battalions. This
is carrying it too far, and the arrangement must break down, because no one
separate objective can be assigned to such a line. Let us now compare the
case of a skirmishing line composed of one company with that of one made up
of two halves of different companies (of course we su]ipose the number of
skirmishers in both cases to be equal). In the latter case, we see the line led
by two independent commanders of equal powers, in close proximity to one
another. This nmst, of necessity, produce greater difficulties in the way of
command than when, as in the former case, the skirmishers are all under one
leader. "When it comes to advancing by successive fractions, the full value,
will not be got out of the two half companies as it will out of the one company
accustomed to the signs and signals of its officers. Moreover, the opinions of
the two commanders as to the moment at which it is advisable to extend the
full number of skirmishers, or as to when it is necessary to ask for further
reinforcements from the supports, will agree no better than will their views
as to the time when the line should, according to the existing state of affairs,
commence the rapid independent fire, which must be continued to the verj"-
moment of the final rush.

" As we must understand the effective range for this fire to extend from
200 to nearly 400 paces, it is evident that the line of skirmishers nms tlie risk
of partial checks from the different appreciation of the proper distance from
which to commence rapid firing, which may be formed by the two officers,
each of whom will only ilirect his attention to the other, so far as to avoid
being left behind l)y him. Now these partial checks are the worst things that
can happen in the preparatory stage.

" Besides, it by no means follows that the two leaders will agree as to the
best point for forcing the enemy's line ; hence, there will not be the concen-
tration of fire which is so requisite for the .success of the whole enterprise, for
we should prefer the less well-chosen point of attack which has been well fired
upon, to one better selected but less well fired upon.

"Again ; whilst a skirmishing line composed of one entire company
gravitates naturally to its centre, because the one chief will, and nmst, have
influence enough over his lieutenants to control their jierhaps conflicting aims,
it is not a mere matter of fancy to affirm that two separate companies moving
side by side will have a decidedly centrifugal tendency, and (for we must
always make allowance for human nature) will be sure to act accordingly in
reality, in spite of all theorj'.

" It will not be a sufficient answer to reply that the battalion commander
wiil be on the spot to remedy all these drawbacks arising from the subdivision

233

of units. It is the l)usiiK'ss of tliis officer to conduct tlie entire attack ; the
most ini])ortant part of his duty is to jjoint out the jjrojjcr direction for the
main body to follow, as on this the success of his battalion will depend. If he
undertakes in person the guidance of his advanced conii)anies, those of his
main body will be very likely to take a wrong direction, even to get (piite out
of hand (and this is no idlesu])position, but an event of which there have been
numerous examples in war), ilc nmst, therefore, confine himself to iussigning
a general direction to the advanced line, whilst he certainly will do well to
leave the execution of details to one sul)ordinate rather than to two. Then,
again, the other available remetly, namely, that of giving the seniorof the two
captains in the front line the command of both comjiaiiies, seems insufficient,
on account of the uncertain nature of such an ill-defiued office — an office in-
consistent with the custom of the service, which, indeed, admits of an officer
taking over the command of those of like rank in rear, whilst the chief recon-
noitres in front, but is very much opposed to the same being done under the
actual ])ressure of danger and emergency.

"There could be, neither in theory nor in practice, any fair argument to
oppose to the formation of the skirmishing line uniler one sole leader, were it
not for the second phase of the question, that of reinforcements.

" If you had said to a tactician of the time of Frederick the Great, ' It
must come to this : every single foot soldier will shoot whenever he chooses
<anil has the chance ; and the battalion, company, or jjlatoon volley will be a
thing of the past ' — he would only shrug his shoulders with contempt for such
■'an awful state of disorder.'

" Nevertheless, the time has come when the army, without disowning its
old traditions, has got on very well in this very state of disorder.

" May not the same thing occur in the matter of mixing up tactical
units ] It is an undoubted fact that the practice of doubling in files out of
their proper order (a greater innovation when made than any we have now to
attempt) has already been adopted as a matter of regulation in the army, has
been em])loyed by generals with war experience, and carried out by our
recruits twenty, thirty, forty years ago. Cannot our present recruits also do
as much ] To this it will l)e answered that the ]jractice was abolished because
impracticable ; and no one will deny that this was at the time a wise measure,
because in their then existing state of development, elementary tactics did not
require the formation.

" It is no longer possible for skirmishers within effective range of the
enemy, and in face of the breech-loader, to take ground to a flank, or to
diminish their intervals, without suffering fearful loss, hence nothing is left
for a reinforcement coming u]) from the rear but to double itself up with the
skirmishers.

" But if it be once established that we cannot avoid the practice either
on a large or on a small scale, it would appear well to accept it frankly.

" As the jiroverb has it, a danger once recognised ceases to be a danger.
Well, then, on the same principle, regulated disorder ceases to be disorder. In
the C[uestion now before us we do not then escape this conclusion — we must
break up tactical fomnations either by mixing up the divisions of the same
company together or by mixing one comjxxny up with another. We maintain
that the latter measui'e is only in appearance worse than the former. If once
the original distribution of troops in line of battle is disturbed, it does not
much matter, during the heat of action (and we are only treating of that
period) by whom the disturbance is occasioned. When such mixing up of men
occurs in action, in these moments of danger and of excitement, strained to
the highest pitch, personal influence on its own merits will affect the soldier
more than the influence of his immediate superior merely as such. He will
follow the lead of the brave man, the hero, whether belonging to his own
company or not.

" It is in such moments that a superior officer, often entirely unknown to
the men about him, will carry them away with him, and that lieutenants have
gained their s])urs with the aid of men whom they never came across before or
since. In such moments, we assert, it does not matter whether the original

234

order is disturbed by men of the same or of another body. But when the fight
is over, when it is advisable to restore the original order of things after the
momentary disorder, this will be more quickly accomplished if only two units
ai-e in question instead of the fractions of one unit, for every soldier knows his
own company : thus officers and non-commiasioned officers quickly find out the
men of their company in the crowd. But many a man may forget to which
division (zug) he happens to be attached on the particular day, and the officer
who knows the whole company by sight cannot be expected to remember
whether John Smith forms part of his division on this occasion.

235

APPENDIX II.

THE INSTRUCTIONS OF MAJOR-GENERAL CRAWFORD FOR
MARCHES, AS ISSUED TO THE LIGHT DIVISION IN THE
PENINSULAR WAR.

STANDING ORDERS.
SECTION I.

Preparations for the lunch.

1. All sounds preparatory to turning out and marching will com-
mecce at the quarters of the brigade-major, and be immediately
repeated by the orderly bugles attending on the officers commandino-
regiments.

2. As soon as possible after the first sound, all the buglers ai'o to
assemble at the quarters of the commanding officers of regiments,
from whence all the other sounds will be repeated.

3. On ordinary occasions, the first horn will sound one hour and
a-half before the time of marching, upon which the non-commissioned
officers must take care that the squads dress and accoutre, and the
baggage, both private and regimental, must be packed and made ready
for patting on the horses and mules.

4. In the interval between the tirst and second horn, the subal-
terns, in succession, will visit the whole company, in order to see that
the non-commissioned officers are doing their duty. The bao-o-ao-e must
be loaded on tlie horses or mules at least 10 minutes before the second
horn sounds.

5. The second horn, or rouse, will sound one hour after the first,
upon which the companies will turn cut on their respective parades.

6. The tbird horn, or assembly, will sound a quarter of an hour
after the second, upon Avhich the captains will march their companies
to the regimental parades, and fiend the baggage to the place appointed
by the commanding officer. No officer's servant, or any but the
regular batman, are to be suiTered to be with it after the sounding of
the third horn.

7. The fourth horn, or advance, will sound a quarter of an hour
after the thn-d, upon which the battalions will march off to tlie place
of the assembly of the brigade.

23G

8. Ou ordinary marclics, wbcu not near the enemy, tlicrc will be
one subaltern per res^iinent in charge of the baggvige ; but when near
the enemy, the staff-serg-cants who actually march with the baggage,
will have charge of that belonging to each regiment, and the assistant
provost will have charge of the whole.

9. The quartermaster or, in his absence, the officer who marches in
charge of the baggage, Avill assemble it on the regimental parade at the
hour appointed previous to the march, and will conduct it from thence
to the place assigned by the assistant quartermaster-general, for the
assembly of the baggage of the brigade.

10. If any bfitman do not come at the proper time to the place of
assembly of the regimental baggage, it mast bo reported by the
quartermaster to the commanding cfficar of the regiment, who will
hold ofBcers of companies i-esponsible for it.

11. All guards and inlying picquets will join their companies on
the sounding of the second horn.

12. The outlying picquets will receive ordei's according to circum-
stances, with respect to the time of their quitting their posts, and
whether they are to form the advance or rear-guard of the column, or
are to join their respective regiments.

13. It will be con.sidei'ed as a standing order, when not near the
enemy, that each regiment will be preceded by two officers for the pur-
pose of taking up quarters ; one of whom will march 24 hours before
the regiment, and on his arrival will receive the necessary information
from the assistant quarteimiaster-general, or from the quartermaster of
the regiment preceding that to which he belongs. The other officer
will march the same day as the regiment does, but sufficiently earl}^ to
arrive at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, when he will have the quarters
pointed out by the officer who went on the day before, and who, after
having done this, will proceed to the next station.

14. The camp colour men — viz., one man per company, under the
command of the quarterraaster-serjeants of each regiment, and one
officer per brigade — will assemble at the brigade-major's quarters every
morning on the sounding of the first horn, viz., one liour and a-half
before the hour appointed for the march of the brigade.

15. The officer in charge of these parties will march them in perfect
order, and as expeditiously as possible, to the next station, where he will
find the officer gone forward with the assistant quartermaster-general,
and, after marking out the quarters of each company, he will take care
that each party shall remain together until the regiment arrives.

16. The commissary and the cattle, with two butchers per regiment,
under charge of the commissary's storekeeper, Avill, when it is ]iossible,
be one march ahead of the brigade. Thus, if the brigade marches on
the 15th, the commissariat will be sent forward on the 14th, and either
that evening, or early in the morning of the 15th, the meat will be
slaughtered, and all the provisions will be in perfect readiness to be
delivered over to tlie quartermasters before they arrive.

17. The quartermasters will march t'.vo or three hours before the
brigade, or, it' possible, the preceding evening'. They will ride on as
fast as they can, and as soon as they arrive, which will be eaily in the
forenoon, the commissary's storekeeper, butchers, and cattle will pro-
ceed to the next station.

18. When the regiments march separately, the quartermaster-Ser-
jeants must be sent forward with the cattle and butchers.

237

10. One of Ihc first duties of ofliccrs coniniaiKlirijij^ regiments on
arrival in ramp or quarters is to cause the communication from tbo
position or quarters of the regiment to all the principal roads by which
the brigade may possibly march to be thoroughly examined, and all
obstacles removed, in order that each regiment, without the assistance
of a guide, and without delay may be able to move in the night, if
required, to whatever road in the vicinity of the camp or quarters may
be pointed out for the assembly of the division.

2(>. The number of guides usually requii-ed will be six ; namely, one
mounted guide to attend the comnaanding othcer of the division, one to
march at the head of the column, one for the baggage, and three for
the sick ; namely, one for each of the divisions as directed in the
Gth Article of the Second Section.

21. These guides will be assembled at the appointed hour at the
quarters of the assistant quartermaster- general, and by him sent to
their stations and delivered over to the proper officers, for which as
well as for other ]iurposes, the assistant quartermaster-general will be
furnished with such a number of steady orderlies as he may require
from the brigade-major or adjutants.

SECTION 11.

Of the March

Article I.
Stations of Officers.

1. All officers are to remain constantly in their stations during the
march.

2. The majors are to march in rear of their respective wings ;
namely, the first major in rear of the right, and the second major in
rear of the left wing ; if there is only one major his post is in rear of
the regiment.

o. The captains or officers commanding companies are to march in
rear of their companies.

4. Commanding officers of battalions, assisted by their adjutants,
"will move from one part to another as occasion may reqtiire their pre-
sence for the preservation of oi'der, and particularly for the prevention
of unnecessary defiling.

5. In like manner, the majors and commanding officers of compa-
nies will quit their habitual stations when their presence is required in
any other part of their wings or companies, but will return to them
as soon as the purpose for which they quitted them shall be effected.

6. All staff officers, officers of engineers, &c., attached to the
division will constantly march at the head of the infantry of the
division.

Article II.

Marching — Silence — Marching at Ease — Halt during the March —
Forming ivp after the March.

1. On all occasions of marching out of camp or quarters, or of
moving after a regular halt upon the march, the battalions are to march

238

off by word of command (and Avitli music, unless particularly ordered
to the contrary).

2. The men must be perfectly silent, dress, and keep the step just
the same as when manoouvrlng on a field-day, until the word '• March
at ease " is given by the commanding officer of the battalion and
repeated by the captains.

3. All words of command addressed to men marching at case must
bo preceded by the word " Attention," upon which the men will
slope their arms, and take up the step, and the most perfect order and
silence must be resumed and enforced until the word is given to march
at ease.

4. The words " Attention " and " March at ease " coming from the
commanding officer of the battalion must be repeated by the officers
commanding companies, who, in doing so, must look to the rear, and
speak loud enough to be heard distinctly at least by the officer at the
head of tlie company in his rear.

5. When marching at ease the ranks may be opened and the files
loosened ; but each rank, section, or division must be kept perfectly
distinct, and every man must remain exactly in his place.

6. When, at the end of a march, it happens that a line is to be
taken up by successive formation, each company may slope arms as soon
as formed byword of command from its own officer ; but the compa-
nies must not order arms or stand at ease until they are directed to do
so by the commanding officer of the battalion, which will not be done
until the whole is formed.

7. When either of the majors or officers commanding companies
want to pass any notice to the commanding officer of the battalion, or
to any other company or section, or to direct the men to keep to the
right or left, in order to allow mounted officers to pass through the
column, the word must be passed by the officers or seijeants only.

8. Whenever the bugles sound the halt, the head of each battalion
is to stand fast, even although it should not be closed up to the pre-
ceding one, but the following divisions of each battalion must close
up to half or quarter distance, unless the column is entering an
alignment or making any other movement preparatory to a formation
to a flank.

9. When it is intended that the whole brigade should close up, the
head will be halted without sound of bugle, and the word of command
" Quarter, half, or wheeling distance " will be passed from front to
rear ; and when the rear is closed up, the bugle of the rear battalion
will sound the halt as a notice.

10. When the brigade is marching independently of any other, the
officer commanding the leading regiment will sound the halt half an
hour after it marches off, and afterwards once an hour ; each halt to
last at least five minutes. After the men have piled arms, if a longer
halt is thought necessary, the commanding officer of the brigade will
direct it.

Article III.
Defiling to he Prevented, or Executed by Word of Command.

1. Ko b.attalion, company, or section is at any time to defile or
diminish its front, or attempt in any way to avoid any bad spot in the
road unless the preceding battalion or company has done so.

2. Whenever defiling is necessary, it must be executed with order

230

and precision, as in manceuvrinq* at a field day, by the proper word of
cominaiul, preceded by the word '" Attention."

3. "When a battalion or company comes to a defile, stream, or bad
place of the i-oad, "where it might be more convenient for the men to
defile individually, the officers must be on the alert, and call out to the
men to keep their ranks or sections.

4. Any man who, for the sake of avoiding water or other bad
places, or for any other reason, presumes to step on one side or quit
his proper place in the ranks, must be confined.

6. Whenever a stream, ditch, bank, or other obstacle is to be
crossed, it will be generally found that, instead of defiling or diminish-
ing the front, the very contrary should be done, not only by causing
the files of each section to extend gradually before they arrive at the
ditch or obstacle, but even by forming subdivisions or companies.

6. When a bad place is to be passed, the majors and captains will
go to the head of their respective wings and companies to see it
regularly executed, if ordered. They will remain at the spot till the
whole of their wing's or companies have passed, and then will resume
their stations in the rear.

7. It is proved that the defiling of one battalion on the march,
even if done with as much promptitude as is practicable on such
occasions, will cause a delay of 10 minutes, one such obstacle, if not
passed without defiling, would therefore delay the brigade half an
hour, and, in the winter, when obstacles of this kind are frequent and
the days are short, a brigade which is constantly defiling without
cause, will arrive at its quarters in the dark, whereas, if it had per-
formed the march regularly, it would have got in by good time.

8. This order respecting defiling is, therefore, as much calculated
to provide for the personal ease and comfort of the men, as it is essen-
tial for the due performance of the movements of an army.

Article IV.
Stragglers.

1. No man is to remain behind, or quit the ranks for any purpose
or on any account whatever without permission from the captain or
officer commanding the company.

2. Officers are never to give permission to any man to quit the
ranks, excepting on account of illness, or for the purpose of easing
themselves, or for some other absolutely necessary purpose.

3. The officers must be particularly attentive to prevent the men
from going out of the ranks for water ; when this is required, the
battalion or brigade \vill be halted.

4. Every man who is obliged to quit the ranks on account of
illness must apply to the commanding officer of the company for per-
mission to remain behind and for a ticket or certificate, which will
be given him if the officer thinks it necessary that he should remain
behind.

5. Those tickets are to be made out in the following form, viz. : —

" The bearer marched off with the regiment, but was unable to
keep up with it.

" (Signed)

" Commanding Conqmiiy."

240

6. These tickets must be taken back by tlie orderly serjeants as
soon as the men who fall out rejoin their companies.

7. Officers commandino- companies are always to be provided wiMi
a sufficient number of tickets, which must be dated on the Luck
before the regiment marches off, and the date scratched out aiier the
march.

8. The captain, or the serjeant walking by his side, must Avrite
down the name of every man to whom he gives a ticket or certifi-
cate.

9. Men who obtain permission to fall out for a short time to ease
themselves, or for any other cause than illness, are not to receive
tickets, but they must invariably leave their packs and arms to be
carried by the section they belong to until they return.

10. Every man who quits the ranks without leave of the com-
manding officer of the company without having received a ticket, or
having left his arms and pack with his company, as the case may be,
must be brought to a court-martial. If ill, he must be tried as soon
as recovered ; but if not ill, it must be done on the drum-head as soon
as the regiment arrives, or as the man comes up, and the punishment
inflicted forthwith.

11. The only case in which any man is to escape punishment who
falls out under the plea of illness without taking a ticket is that,
which can rarely happen, of the illness being so sudden and severe as
to deprive him of the power of asking for a ticket.

12. If the orders of No. 10 were not regularly observed and
enforced, illness would always be pleaded, and the whole of these
regiilations for the prevention of straggling Avould be rendered
abortive; and, on 'the other hand, there can be no cruelty in requir-
ing of the man who is really ill that he should ask his officer for a
ticket.

13. No part of the punishment awarded by a court-martial for being-
absent without leave on the march is to be remitted without permis-
sion of tne commanding officer of the brigade.

Article V.

JSurry and Stepjilnij Out to he Prevented.

1. It is of the greatest importance that the men should not on any
account be hurried on the march ; they are to be instructed that they
are never to step out beyond the regular step, still less to run, unless
by word of command.

2. When the proper distances of companies or sections cannot be
preserved without an alteration in the step, it must always be effected
by making the head of each battalion or company step short, instead
of allowing the others to step out.

3. After passing an obstacle or ascending a hill, the leading com-
pany of each battalion will step short until the last company of the
battalion has passed and closed up, although a large interval should
be thereby occasioned between it and the preceding battalion.

4. The leading section of each company will also step short until
the last section has passed and closed up, even although a large in-
terval should take place between that and the preceding battalion.

5. When the head of a company — suppose No. 4 — cannot keep up
without overstepping or leaving its own sections at too great a distance,
the officer commanding must call out " No. 4 cannot keep up," which

241

must b3 repeated aloud by the sorjeants on the flanks of tlie loading
sectious of the companies in front of No. 4, until it comes up to the
commanding officer, who will of course shorten the step at the head of
the column, unless he perceives that some obstacle, ascent, or difficult
ground in front will give time to No 4 to close up in the meantime.
No. 4, if no answer is returned to the notice of its having increased
distance, will continue at the regular step.

G. In like manner, if the head of a battalion cannot keep up with
the preceding battalion, the commanding officer will forward the
notice to the head of the brigade, detaching files at the same time to
preserve the communication with the preceding battalion.

7. When obstacles which delay the march are frequent, it may be
desirable or necessary in order to avoid loss of time, that each com-
pany after passing, should march on at the usual rate without
shortening its step, as the following company may overtake it at the
next obstacle or ascent ; but it can never be necessary, and must
never be suffered, that the leading section of a company should
march on until the rear section has completely passed and closed up.
The intervals between companies may be occasionally increased with
advantage and without disorder, but unless each company in itself be
kept compact, disorder and disorganization will ensue.

Article VI.
Baggage.

1. Both private and regimental baggage must be packed and got
ready for putting on the horses and mules as soon possible after the
sounding of the fii-st horn, and the mules must be actually loaded at
least 10 minutes before the sounding of the second horn, which denotes
the turning out of the companies on their respective parades.

2. No officer's servant, nor any but the regular batmen who march
with the baggage, are to be suffered to be with it after the sounding of
the third horn.

3. The following is the regulation of batmen, hospital guards,
&c. : — No man of atiy description is upon any account whatever to be
allowed to be out of the ranks for any other purpose.

Distribution.

4. The batmen for camp-kettle mules will be given by the two
adjoining companies, viz., 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9
and 10 alternately.

242

5. On oi'dinaiy marches, there will be one subaltern per regiment
with the baggage, who must bo provided with tickets to give to any
batman who is under the absolute necessity of remaining behinel.

G. The quartermaster or, in his absence, the officer who marches in
charge of the baggage, will assemble it on the regimental parade at
the hour appointed previous to the mai-ch, and will conduct it from
thence to the place assigned by the assistant quartermaster general for
the assembly of the baggage of the bi-igade.

7. If any batmen do not come at the pro2)er time to the place of
assembly of the regimental baggage, it must be reported by the
quartermaster to the commanding officer of the regiment, who will
hold officers commanding companies responsible for it.

8. The baggage of the different regiments must not be allowed to
intermix with each other ; that of each regiment must be kept col-
lected and perfectly distinct — one serjeant at the liead of it and one in
the rear, and must follow in the same order as the regiments do in
column.

9. The baggage and camp-kettle mules of each company must be
tied together, and the five batmen allotted for the camp-kettle mules
Avill then be employed generally to use their assistance where it may
be wanted.

10. The batmen must be informed that anyone wlio quits the
regimental baggage without a ticket, either for the purpose of pushing-
forward, or under pi'etext of inability to keep up, will be punished by
the provost as a straggler, or brought to a drum-head court-martial.

11. If a load happens to fall off, the whole of the baggage of the
regiment must stop, and the other batmen assist in reloading the
mules, and in order not to stop the column the baggage of the regi-
ment must be drawn to the side of the road. The loads can never
fall off if proper attention is yjaid by the officers with respect to the
arrangement of baggage, and by the bfitmen to the putting it on;
and, therefore, if the baggage of one company occasions frequent
delay, it must be reported to the commanding oflicer of the regiment,
who will take care that it be rectified, or that any superfluous baggage
shall be left behind.

12. The quartermaster will take care that these orders relating to
baggage be fully explained to every individual who marches with it,
and will be answeral)le for its execution, and the provost will punish
as stragglers all batmen whom he finds separated from the regimental
baggage without a ticket.

13. Whenever there is an expectation of meeting the enemy, the
baggage will be entrusted solely to weakly men, musicians, &c., and
the batmen, being effective soldiers, will be put into the i-anks.

SECTION III.
Article I.

Mc'xns to he adopted for ascertaining the Number of Meuvho Jmre Fallen
out vpontlte March, and for Brinrjintj to Punishment those vho may
have done so without a Ticket.

1. A guard of one subaltern, one non-commissioned officer, and six
privates of each regiment, must be left at the entrance of the town or
camp as soon as the i-egiment arrives.

2. The subaltern of this guard may be taken from the inlying

243

picquets, and sometimes one subaltern per brigade may be sufficient ;
when this is ilie case, the brigade-major will notify it; if he does not
it must be understood tliat each regiment furnishes one subaltern.

0. The officer of this guard will be i-espoiisiblo for stopping and
detaining eveiy man that conacs up afterwards without a ticket or pass
certifying that he is sick oi- a batman.

4. A list of the names and companies "of the men so detained by
this guard must be sent to the commanding officer of each regiment
by the officer commanding it.

5. As soon as the battalion is formed, the captains will count the
files of their com])anies, in order to ascertain the number of absentees,
and the rolls will then be called in order to ascertain their names.

6. The names of all absent men who are not upon the list of
those who received tickets are to be reported to the commanding officer
as absent without leave.

7. The number of those who remain behind with tickets must also
be reported to the adjutant, for the commanding officer's information,
before the regiment is dismissed.

8. The list of men reported absent Avithout leave by their compa-
nies must be compared by the adjutants with the list of those detained
by the guard mentioned in No. 4, and if the guard report contains
names not stated in the company's list, the circumstance must be re-
ported by the adjutant to the brigade- major.

Akticle II.

Of the Interior Regimental Arrangements which are to talce place on
Arriving in Camp or Quarters before the Regiment is Dismissed.

1 . On entering the camp or quarters each battalion must form on
the same ground which it is to assemble upon in case of alarm, and
when formed, the ranks are to bo open.

2. If the companies have to form up in succession, each will slope
arms and open ranks as soon as formed, by word of command from its
own officer ; but they must not order arms or stand at ease until
directed to do so by the commanding officer of the regiment, which
will not be done until the whole battalion is formed.

3. After the reports are collected, as ordered in the preceding-
Article, the men may be allowed to sit down or walk about behind
the ground of formation, which will be marked out by a sentry placed
on the right flank of each company ; but they must not be allowed to
go 10 yards from the spot until the guards and pickets are placed, and
all other necessary ai'rangements are made, unless it rains hard and
no enemy is near ; in which case the men, except those who do duty,
may be dismissed as soon as reports are collected ; but no state of
n-eather nor any other circumstance is to prevent the regiment
being kept under arms until the reports of absentees are regularly
collected.

4. As soon as the regiments are formed and the reports collected,
the guards must be placed, and the men or companies warned for in
or outlying pickets.

5. In camp the best water and the wood for cooking and hutting
will also be pointed out before the men are dismissed, and the neces-
sary directions for opening communications, &c., given.

6. The places for cooking in camp must be pointed out to the
orderly Serjeants of companies by the captain of the day, and must be

R 2

244

particularly chosen Avitli a view to avoid danger of the grass taking
fire, and for the greater facility of superintendence all the companies
must cook as near together as possible.

7. It must be explained to the men as a standing order that, when
no regular necessaries are made, nor any particular spot pointed out
for casing themselves, they are to go to the rear at least 200 yards
beyond the sentries of the rear guard. All men disobeying this order
must be punished.

8. The captain of the day and the quartermaster under the com-
manding officers are particularly responsible for the cleanliness of the
camp of each regiment ; and the field officer of the inlying picket,
who is charged with the superintendence of the police and cleanliness
of the camp or quarters of the brigade, will give such orders upon the
subject as may be necessary to the captain of the day.

9. If the arms are not piled on the ground of formation a stake
must be fixed, or some other conspicuous mark must be made on the
right and left flanks of the ground on which each company when
called out is to form.

10. In towns or villages the alarm post will be fixed, the disposition
made for the defence of that portion of the circumference falling
within the district of the regiment, and all other necessary directions
will be given by officers commanding battalions, and the distribution
of billets made by those commanding companies before the men are
dismissed.

Article III.

Of the Tjxterior Arrangements fo7' the Securltrj of the Cainp or Quarters,
and Duties of the Field Officer of the t)ay, on Arrival.

1. On arriving in camp or quarters all the officers of the division
and brigade staff, and all the field and staff officers of regiments, will
remain mounted and in readiness to assist in placing pickets and in
making all the arrangements for the security and internal regulations
of the camp or quarters.

2. The field officers of the day for the in and outlying pickets will
report themselves to the brigadier, and the adjutants and quarter-
masters to the brigade-major, as soon as the troops are formed.

3. Whilst the field officer for the outlying picket is taking the
necessary precaution to prevent surprise, the field officer of the inlying
picket will superintend all the arrangements for the internal defence
or police of the camp or cantonments.

4. The field officer of the inlying picket (or if that duty is done by
a captain, the field officer next for duty) must as soon as possible make
himself acquainted with the position of all the pickets of his brigade,
and of the adjoining posts of the brigades on his right and left ; as
must also the officer commanding the company first for outlying picket,
with the position of the company which he is to relieve and its con-
nection with those on its right and left.

5. J^fter visiting the quarter and rear guards and inlying pickets,
he will also inspect the guards directed in Article 1 to be placed at
the entrance of the camp for the purpose of detaining all men who
arrive after their brigade ; and he Avill receive written reports of the
number of men so detained, as directed in that Article, and will deliver
them to the general himself.

215

G. The field ofiicer and comjiaiiy of the inlying picket will always
be those "who arc next for the outlying pickets.

Akticijo IV,

Of the QnartcDi or Sfaficnis of Officers in Camj) or Cantonments, and of
the Measures to be adopted for Insurimj a Ready Coniniunication between
all parts of each Company, Battalion, or Briyade, and Pivviid Cirada-
tion of Orders wlthont Sound of Bxyle.

1. When the troops are encamped, the officers' tents must, of
course, be 2)itched in the proper places, and when hutted and lying out
without cover, the officers will choose convenient spots as near as pos-
sible to the station where the tents w^ould be pitched in a regular
encampment.

2. When the brigade is in towns or villages the ofiicers must
always occupy a part of one or more of the houses allotted to theii*
respective companies.

3. After every marcher change of position or quarters, the house,
the tent, or station,? of all the officers of each company, is to be
pointed out to all the non-commissioned officers present, before, or as
soon as the company is dismissed.

4. Officers commanding companies will also take care that at least
one non-commissioned officer and two orderly privates may imme-
diately find out the quarters of the commanding officer of the regi-
ment and of the major of their wing.

5. The adjutant and quartermaster and the commanding officer's
orderlies, consisting of one private per company and one bugler per
battalion, are to have a quarter allotted to them, either in the same
house as the commanding officer, or in that immediately adjoining.
In camp they are to remain close to the station of the commanding
officer.

G. The commanding officer's orderlies must ascertain the quarters
of the officers commanding their respective companies before they
come to him.

7. In camp, when the battalion is collected, or in quarters after the
battalion has been some days in it, so great a number of orderlies in
attendance near the quarters of the officer commanding the battalion
may, perhaps, not be necessary ; but, on first arriving in cantonments
or in an extensive or intricate position, it must not be dispensed
with.

8. If the field officers are not in the same house with the command-
ing officer, their quarters should be in as central a situation as may
be in the district of their respective wings, and must be made known
to at least two or three of the commanding officer's orderlies as soon
as the regiment is dismissed.

9. The brigadier-general's orderlies must be sent to his quarters by
the adjutant immediately after the arrival of the brigade, having first
made themselves acquainted with the quartei-s of their commanding
officer. The commanding officers of regiments must also send some
of their orderlies to make themselves acquainted with the brigadier-
general's quarters.

10. The field officers of the day will take care that the officers
commanding the in and outlying pickets may always know where to
find them without the smallest delay, and the officers on duty or in
waiting in camp or quarters, as directed in No. -5 of the first article

246

of the fourth section, will always leave word at the regimental
guard, as well as at their own quarters or tent, where they are to be
found.

Article V,

Equal Allotment of Billets.

1. Commanding officers of regiments, in the course of the first
day after their arrival in a town, will particularly investigate the manner
ill which their men have been distributed in the houses of the district
allotted to their respective regiments. It is very im])robable that the
officers employed in the subdivision should in no short a time as is
allotted to them previous to their eutiy have been able to fix the por-
tions to be occupied by the companies with that accurac}" Avhich, in a
quarter where the troops may '■emain a considerable time, is necessary,
both for the accommodation oi the men and in justice to the inhabi-
tants.

2. This allotment, therefore, of equal distribution to companies
Avill be the first object of revision, and after it is completed, officers
commanding companies will talce the greatest pains to distribute the
men in such a manner that no housekeeper may have reason to com-
plain of having more than a due proportion. Commanding officers
of companies will also be responsible that the men in each house shall
be accommodated with as little inconvenience as possible to the in-
habitants.

SECTION" IV.

Duties in Camp or Quarters.

Article I.
Numher of Officers on Duty.

1. Wiien circumstances require outlying pickets there will be two
field officers of the day per brigade, namely, one for the outlying
picket and another for the inlying picket and internal duties of the
camp or cantonments of the brigade.

2. \Vhen there is not a sufficient number of field officers to do this
duty withoijt material inconvenience, the senior captain of one or more
regiments of the brigade will take the duty of field officer of the in-
lying picket, but he will take his tour of outlying pickets.

3. When there are no outlying pickets there will be only one field
officer of the day per brigade.

4. The field officer of the day will see that the officers eommandino-
the in and outlying pickets may always know where to find him.

5. The number of officers on duty or in waiting in each battalion
(exclusive of those on outlying pickets) will at all times, as lon<r as the
brigade remains abroad, and whether in camp or cantonments, consist
of one captain and two subalterns of each wing, who must constantly
remain in camp or quarters. Lieutenants commanding companies may
be ranked as captains for this duty, but the roster must be so regulated
that there shall not be less than one effective captain.

G. The officers on duty or in Avaiting in the lines, as directed in the
preceding paragraph, will have charge of the inlying picket by day,
vvhen there is one, and will besides do all the orderly and other inter-
nal and regimental duties, including the quarter guards.

7. They will always leave word at the quarter or barrack o-nard and
at their own tent cr quarters, where they are to be found.

247

Article IL
Pickets.

1. The outlying pickets will, in general, consist of one company
per battalion, when moi'o are required or less are sufficient, it will be
notified in orders.

2. The inlying picket will, by night, in general consist of two
companies per battalion.

3. When inlying pickets are required by day they will consist of
one-fourth of the iion-conimissioned officers and privates of each com-
pany who are not upon duty, and will be commanded by the officer on
duty or in waiting, as mentioned in paragraph No. 5 of the 1st Article
of this section.

4. The company's picket will be allowed to leave off duty a suffi-
cient number of men to draw provisions and cook, and the brigade-
major will therefore, from time to time, give out in brigade orders
the number of rank and file which the companies of the several regi-
ments ai'e to produce under arms on picket.

5. The inlying picket Sdll be inspected, after the evening parade
of the brigade, by the field officer of the day, and will remain accoutred
and in constant readiness to turn out during the night.

6. If the brigade is ^^nder arms before daylight, which will
generally be the case in sitaations which require pickets, the inlying
pickets will parade with their regiments ; but it will be observed as a
constant rule that all pickets are to be under arms before daylight,
even if the rest of the troops are not, and, in that case, the inlying
pickets of each regiment will place themselves close in front of the
centre of their respective regiments.

Article III.
Guards.

1. The quarter guards in camp will consist of 1 subaltern, 1 Ser-
jeant, 2 corporals or lance corporals, and LSpi'ivates; the rear guai^d
of 1 Serjeant, 2 corporals or lance corporals, and 12 privates.

2. In garrison or cantonments the strength of each regimental
guard must be sufficient to give four reliefs ; the utmost strength will, of
course, depend upon the number of sentries ; but it must never be
less, when a battalion is assembled, than 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 2 cor-
porals or lance corporals, and 18 privates.

3. Exclusive of pickets and quarter and rear guards, there must
always, in camp, be a company's guard or watch of one non-commis-
sioned officer and four privates of each company, furnishing one sentry.
This watch, except the sentry, may be allowed as much ease in point
of dress as if not on duty ; in the daytime they must remain within
the company's lines, and at night they must remain together in the
rear of its centre ; the sentry may mount with sidearms, unless when
near the enemy.

Article IV.

Orders to Guards.

I. The officer on guard or picket is to write down all orders which
he receives, whether these orders come to him verbally or in writing,

248

and deliver over tlieso orders, in writing, to tlie officer who relieves
him.

2. In order to simplify the duties of the sentries, each individual
man is to retain the same post during the whole of the guard or picket ;
that is to say, each time a man goes on duty as sentry he must have the
same post that he had the first time ; the most intelligent, trusty, and
experienced soldiers being chosen for the most difficult and important
posts.

3. The officers will most particularly examine each sentry npon his
post respecting the orders that he has received immediately after he is
placed there for the first time ; and before he is marched off to take the
same post a second time, the officer will question him for the purpose
of ascertaining whether he recollects his orders.

4. It is the du.ty of the officers to ascertain that every individual is
instructed in what he has to do, and it is to them therefore that the
responsibility attaches if any accident or irregularity shall occur in
consequence of orders not being accurately given.

Article V.
Parades and Roll Calls.

1. The time for morning and evening parade Avill be indicated by
the sounds of the bugle, commencing in camp with the regiment that
finds the field officer of the day for the inlying pickets, and in garrison,
from the main guard.

2. In camp, the field officer of the day of the inlying picket will
regulate the times at which the rolls are to be called.

3. At the roll callings, the companies must fall in regularly, and
the men must not be permitted to answer louder than is necessary to
make themselves heard.

4. The reports of the companies after each roll calling are to be
made to the captains of the day, who will be in front of the centre of
their respective regiments to receive them ; and if any man is absent
they will immediately report it to their own commanding officer and to
the field officer of the day of the inlying picket.

5. The captain of the day will only report to the field officer of
the day half an hour before he is relieved.

Article VI.
Police and Cleanliness.

1. The field officer of the day of the inlying picket is particularly
charged with the police and cleanliness of the camp, and will give such
orders as he may think necessary for working parties or otherwise, to
the captain of the day of each regiment.

2. The captain of the day, and quartermaster of each regiment, are
particularly responsible to the field officer of the day of the inlying
picket, as well as to their own commanding officer, for the police and
cleanliness oi' the camp or quarters.

3. Each regimental guard will send frequent patrols after tatoo
beating to take up all men found out of quarters.

4. The patrols of each regimental guard will confine themselves to
their respective regiments, and if they take up any stragglers of other
regiments, they will be sent to the main guard next morning.

5. All applications for patrols from any guard, either from the

240

provost or fi-oin the magistrates, for the purpose of preserving tlio
police of tlie town are to be coiuplied with.

G. Each regiment will place sentries from its own regimental guard
on all the Avine-houses within its own district, which must be fre-
quently visited by the captain and subaltern of the day.

7. If any inhabitant should have any just cause of complaint
against the conduct of the troo])s, and it should be impossible to find
out the offenders so as to bring them to punishment, some general
resti'aint, by way of punishment, Avill be laid on the regiment in whose
district the offence has been committed. The officers commanding
regiments will therefore establish the most vigilant police, each in
his own district.

8. Commanding officers of regiments, with the assistance of their
field officei's and staff, will ascertain the state of all the houses occu-
pied by their regiment, once a week, and if they discover any damage
done to them which has not been reported by officers commanding
the companies, they will report it to the commanding officer of the
brigade, and also, through the assistant quartermaster-general, to the
general commanding the division.

9. The most strict orders must be given for the prevention of fire ;
and the custom, not unusual, of setting fire to huts or straw on
leaving a camp must be strictly forbidden.

10. The places for cooking in camp must be pointed out to the
orderly Serjeants of companies by the captain of the day, which in
the summer time must be particularly chosen with a view to avoid
danger of the grass taking tire.

11. Towns in which many troops are quartered, and in which there
are not proper necessaries and drains, and camps in which troops
remain many days, become exceeding filthy, owing to the men easing
themselves in improper places. Officers commanding regiments will
give due orders to prevent such nuisances.

12. It must be explained to the men that when no regular neces-
saries are made in camp, nor any particular spot pointed out for easing
themselves, they are to go to the rear at least 200 yards beyond the
sentries of the rear guard.

13. In toAvns necessaries must be dug in the yards of the houses, or
in the most convenient situations adjoining any large building occupied
by the troops. They must be covered over daily, and fresh ones made
as often as expedient.

14. Fatigue parties will be frequently employed in removing and
covering the filth which, notwithstanding these regulations, may have
so accumulated as to render parts of the town or ramparts offensive ;
and if the quarters of any particular corps be found dirty, some re-
straint or additional fatigue duties will be imposed on that regiment.

15. When the brigade is stationed in fortified towns, a portion of
the ramparts will be allotted to each regiment, which will be con-
sidered as its alarm post. The regiment must also be kept responsible
for the cleanliness and preservation of the portion of the ramparts
allotted to their districts, and the commanding officers will forthwith
place the requisite sentries from their regimental guard ; the number
of which they will report to the brigade-major.

18. The field officer of the day will inspect the ramparts at 1 o'clock
daily. The point on which he is to commence and the direction in
which he is to make his tour will be settled in orders ; and the captain

250

of the day of eacli regiment will be in readiness to receive liim at the
commencement of its portion of the ramparts. The field officer of the
day will immediately report to the commanding officer of the division
any regiment which has not properly cleansed its district.

17. Those regiments in whose district there is any breach in the
ramparts will place a sentry on it, with ordsrs not to allow any person
to go up or down the breach.

18. No non-commissioned officer or soldier is to be allowed to go
out of the town after retreat nor before daylight.

19. The gates are to be locked at eight o'clock every night. The
keys will remain in possession of the officers of the gate guards.

SECTION V.

Issue of Provisions.

1. The quartermaster is to be allowed two assistants, beside the
quartermaster serjeant.

2. One quartermaster will superintend the issue of each species of
provisions, namely, bread, meat, and wine or spirits.

3. The following will be the distribution for one day of the quarter-
masters and their assistants : —

Bread.

Q.M., 1st Eegiment.
Q.M., 2nd Regiment.
Q.M., 3rd Eegiment,

Meat.

Q.M., 2nd Regiment.
Q.M., 3rd Regiment.
Q.M., Ist Regiment.

Wine.

Q.M., 3rd Regiment.
Q.M., 1st Regiment,
Q.M., 2nd Regiment.

4. In order that the fatigue parties may not be kept waiting any
longer than is absolutely necessary, the bread and meat Avill be weighed
and counted out for each regiment and company before the parties go
for it, for which purpose a subaltern officer of each regiment, and one
man per company, will attend at each place of issue ; and when the
provisions are divided out for the companies the parties will be sent
for and marched regularly to the places of issue.

5. One of the subalterns of the day of each regiment will attend
the issue of bread, one that of meat, and a third that of wine and
w^ood,

6. When there is not a sufficiency of any articles of provisions to
affijrd a full ration to the whole, care must be taken that each regiment
has its due proportion allotted to it before the subdivision for the
companies of any one regiment commences,

7. The captain of the day of each regiment wnill be responsible for
the regular performance of all that is directed respecting the reception
of provisions. The subaltern of the day will report to him the time
and place of issue, and will also inform him when the provisions were
received. If there is any in-egularity or delay, he will immediately
send a report to the commanding officer of his regiment, and to the
field officer of the day.

8. After a march, the commanding officer of each regiment w^ill
send a report to the brigade-major as soon as the men have received
their bread, meat, and wine, in order that the commanding officer of
the brigades inay be aware of any unusual delay.

251

9. The commissary and the cattle, with two butchers per regiment,
under charge of the commissary's store-keeper, will, when it is possi-
ble, be one day's march ahead of the brigade ; thus, if the brigade
marches on the 15th, the commissariat will be sent forward on the
1-tth, and either that evening or early on the morning of the 15th,
the meat will be slaughtered, and all the provisions will be in perfect
readiness to deliver over to the quartermasters before they arrive.

10. The (i^uartermasters Avill march two or three houi-s before the
brigade, or, if possible, the preceding evening. They will ride on as
fast as they can, and as soon as they arrive, which -will be early in the
forenoon, the commissary's storekeeper, butchers, and cattle will pro-
ceed on their march to their next station.

SECTION VI.

Fatigue and Fonnjimj Parties.

Article I.

Fatigue Parties.

1. All fatigue parties ai'e to be marched regularly to and from the
place where the provisions are to be received or this duty to be
performed.

2. The men are not to be suffered to caiTy bread or other articles
in their greatcoats ; each man must take a safficieut number of haver-
sacks for bread.

3. The meat must be carried by two men upon sticks, in order that
the clothing may not be soiled and made filthy, as is the case when
the men carry the meat on their backs.

Aeticle II.
Foraging Parties.

1. As many irregularities take place under pretence of going for
forage, no batman is allowed to go singly for forage, except within the
chain of posts within the quarter or rear guard of the division, or wdtbin
such limits of the vicinity of the camp as ofl&cers commanding brigades
shall point out.

2. When it is necessary to go for forage, regular parties, with a
Serjeant and corporal of each regiment and that proportion of the
camp-kettle mules or horses Avhich officers choose to send, will assemble
in the centre of the rear of the regiments under charge of one officer
per brigade, who will march them regularly to the forage place, and
will be responsible for bringing them all back together, and no officer
whatever will be permitted to .send beyond the vicinity of the camp
otherwise than by the above-mentioned parties.

SECTION VII.

Commissariat.

1. Whenever the division is in settled quarters commanding officers
of regiments will investigate in their several disti-icts the best method of
supplying their regiments, and the prices which ought to be paid. If,
after this investigation, it appeai-s that the mode adopted by the com-
missary might be improved, they will immediately report it through

252

tlie brigade-major to tlic officer commandiug the brigade, suggesting
such alterations in the mode of supply as they may think advisable. The
major of brigade, after laying them before the brigadier, will transmit
them to the assistant cpiartermaster-general for the information of
the officer commandi%ig the division.

2. Commanding officers of regiments will at all times make it a
particular part of their duty to ascertain whether the provisions issued
are the best that can be procured, whether the prices paid by the com-
missary are reasonable, and whether the people who furnish the supplies
are regularly and fairly paid by the contractor.

3. The commissary will always report the prices of the provisions
and forage for the ensuing week, in his weekly report to the assistant
quartermaster-general, who will transmit them to the assistant adju-
ta,nt-general, after they have been sanctioned by the commanding officer
of the division. The assistant adjutant-general will then promulgate
them in division orders.

4. A ration loaf will be sent with the weekly returns to the com-
manding officer of the division by each regiment, in order that he may
ascertain whether it is eqnal to that contracted for.

5. The computed weight per measure of corn issued as forage will
be notified in division orders at the same fime with the prices of the
provisions and forage.

6. The commanding officers of artillery and cavalry -will state in
their weekly report what the corn has weighed per measure on an
average during the preceding week.

7. Commanding officers of infantry regiments will also frequently
cause the corn issued to them to be weighed, and report the average
weight on the back of the weekly states.

8. Whenever any abuse or defect in the provision department is
discovered it is to be reported, through the above channel, to the com-
manding officer of the division without loss of time.

9. If everything goes on reg-nlarly and well, it will be notified at
the foot of each weekly state, viz. : — " 1 certify that I have carefully
" investigated the mode in which the regiment has been supplied with
" provisions and forage during the preceding week, and I believe it to
" be the best that circumstances would admit of ; the quality as good
" as can be procured, the prices reasonable, and the people in this
" district regularly paid by the contractor in hard money at the fol-
*' lowing rates."

10. In fixed quarters the meat will be killed, in cold weather, 24
hours at least before it is used.

11. A weekly muster of the commissariat mules of each brigade,
in presence of the brigade-major and assistant quartermaster- general,
will take place on the day previous to the weekly retm-ns. The com-
missary of the brigade will attend this muster.

12. A return made out at this muster, of the state and distribu-
tion of these mules, signed by the commissary, and countersigned
by the assistant quartermaster-general, or, in his absence, by the majors
of brigade, will Ibrm a part of the commissary's monthly report.

13. Whenever, in situations of scarcity, provisions of any kind
are procurable by any regiment, the quality and quantity, how pro-
cured, and to whom receipts were gi^'en, must be reported to the com-
missary.

14. Whenever regiments or individual officers, either from being de-

253

tached or from any other circumstance, cannot get their rations from
the commissary, they must, purchase thorn at tlio usual prices, talcin"-
regular receipts for the same.

15. The commissary will furnish each regiment, and each stafE
officer; with a form of the receipts which he is to "take from the persons
from whom he may have occasion to purchase forage or provisions.

16. The account of forage and provisions purchased l)y regimental
officers must be confirmed by the commanding officer and quarter-
master, who are to certify what circumstance made it necessary for the
officer or officers to purcliase them ; and that his or their rations were
not drawn from the commissariat.

17. The commissary will furnish each regiment and each staff
officer with a form of this account or voucher.

SECTION VIIL

Article I.

Inspections and Returns — Weeldij Inspection — Nature and Period of
Delivery of Reports.

1. The regimental weekly reports are to be delivered by the adju-
tant to the majors of brigades on the 1st, 8th, 15th, and 25th of each
month, before 10 o'clock in the forenoon.

2. The regiments are to parade in marching order on the preceding
day : every man fit for duty (excepting only the hospital attendants)
must be actually under arms at this parade. All private and regi-
mental mules are also to be paraded, with officers and regimental bag-
gage and camp kettles loaded and ready to march. The reports of the
companies are to be strictly examined and compared with their sti*ength
under arms, and the weekly reports of the regiments to be grounded
upon the actual field state at this inspection,

3. The arms and appointments, and the men's necessaries — particu-
larly shoes, the blankets, canteens, haversacks, billhooks, camp kettles,
and intrenching tools, are, on the same day, to be minutely inspected,
for the purpose of filling up that part of the report ; nothing but a
march raust be allowed to prevent this inspection. If the weather
should be very bad on the day appointed for it, the companies must be
inspected in their quarters, but no circumstance will be permitted as
an excuse for not delivering the weekly report at the time appointed.

4. Whenever this inspection (which is ordered to take place the
day before the weekly reports are given in, viz., on the 7th, 14th
24th, and last day of each month) is prevented by a march or other
circumstance, it is to be mentioned at the bottom of the report, and the
inspection made the next halting day, and an extra report sent to the
brigade-major of appointments, &c., wanting to complete.

5. The officers commanding the artillery and cavalry attached to
the division are also to send weekly reports to the assistant adjutant-
general on the 1st, 8th, 15th, and 25th of each month.

6. The weekly reports are to be delivered by the majors of brigades
to the assistant adjutant- general of the division, and by him to the
general commanding, at 11 o'clock precisely on the above-mentioned
days.

7. The medical reports are to be delivered to the general, by the
stafi" surgeon of the division, eight times in each mouth, viz., a weekly

254

report on tlie Ist, 8t1i, IStli, and 2.5th, in which the admission and dis-
charges are to be reckoned from the preceding weekly report, viz., the
8th fi'om tlie 1st, in that of the 15th from the 8th, the 25th. from the
15th, and the Ist fi'om the 25th.

8. A half-yearly report of admissions and discharges only will be
made on the 4th, 12th, 20th, and 28th of each month, showing the
alterations which have taken place since the preceding weekly report,
viz., tlie 4th from the 1st, the 12th from the 8th, the 2()th from the
15th, ;ind the 28th from the 25th.

9. The regimental medical reports are to be countersigned by the
commanding officer, and delivered personally by the surgeons of regi-
ments to the staff surgeon at the headquarters of the division.

10. The assistant quartermaster-general, on the same days, viz.,
1st, 8th, 15th, and 25th of each month, will make out a general report
— 1st, of necessaries, ammunition, and articles of field equipment
wanting to complete ; 2nd, of ammunition in store ; 3rd, of means of
subsistence. The materials for the first be will collect from the above-
mentioned weekly reports, Avbich will be communicated to him by the
general's aide-de-camp ; the second and tbird from reports which be
will cause to be made to him by the commissary of provisions and
conductor of stores. This report, signed by the assistant quarter-
master-general, will be delivered to the general on the following days,
viz., 2nd, 9th, 16th, and 26th, when he will receive instructions re-
specting the completing and equipment of the regiment.

11. Whenever the brigade is assembled, a morning report will be
given in every day ; on'ibalting days at 9 ; on marching days, if the
brigade moves too early for them to be made out before it marches off,
they will be made out on the march, and collected by the brigade,
major as soon as possible afterwards.

Article II.
Of Receiving and DispatcJdng Letters, and of tlie Payment of Giiides.

1. All orders are to be issued by the brigade-major to the adjutant
in person, or when sent in writing-, they are to be returned with a
receipt.

2. Officers receiving orders or letters upon service are always to
give a receipt to the bearer, stating the time of delivery.

3. The precise time of dispatching letters upon service is always to
be marked on the outside of them, and also the rate at which they are
to be conveyed.

4. All letters upon service are to be forwarded from intermediate
stations, in the same manner as that in which they arrive ; that is to
say, if an officer brings them, they are to be forwarded by an officer, if
a dragoon brings them, they are to be forwarded by a dragoon or
mounted orderly.

5. When officers or dragoons dispatched with orders do not know
the road, they must be accompanied by well-mounted 'guides.

6. Peasants sent with letters are never to be paid "by the person
receiving the letters nnless an order to that effect is written on the
cover, but they are to be paid as soon as they bring back a receipt to
the person who dispatches them.

255

Article III.

Manner of Keejnnr/ Ordei\<, and at wJiat Periods then '""^ ^^ ^'^ Head

to the Men.

1. All general, division, or brigade orders tliat are intended to be
permanent, or continue in force for any length of time, are to be
entered in a book kept by the brigade-major and adjutants for that
piirpose only ; the orders of a temporary nature are to be entered in
another book.

2. At the bottom of each permanent order entered in this book the
brigade-major will, with his own hand, enter a note by -whom and in
•what manner it was issued.

3. These books must have a methodical index for the sake of
reference.

4. Those orders which relate to the conduct of the non-commis-
sioned officers or soldiers, or otherwise concern them, are to be read by
the officers.

Manner of Keeping Orders.

Officers commanding companies at three successive jiarades, and
subaltern officers and Serjeants will be responsible for their being read
to every individual of their respective divisions or squads, who may
have been absent when they were read to the company.

5. Those brigade orders relating to the non-commissioned officers
and soldiers which are of a permanent nature, besides being read at
three successive parades after issuing them as above directed, are also
to be read at every weekly inspection during the first month, and
afterwards once a month.

APPENDIX III.

WAE ESTABLISHMENTS OF INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY,
AND ENGINEERS.

258

Infantry.
Establishment in the Field of a Battalion of Tnfantiy.

Officers, N.-C. Officers and Men.

Ranks.

"■j .

02 o

i^^

c3 T^

1— I

02 a

KPh

1— 1

Lieutenant-Colonels

Majors .. ., .,

Captains .. .. ..

. ,

Subalterns ..

- ••

31^

Adjutant .. .,

••

Paymaster , . . . . .

, ,

Quartermaster'

Medical Officer

Serjeant-Major .. .,

Quartermaster-Serjeant

J-

Baud Serjeant

Drum Major..

Orderly Room Clerk

Annourer Serjeant . .

(- ..

Paymaster Serjeant. .

••

Regimental Transport Serjeant . .

Serjeant Cook

Color Serjeants . .,

Serjeants . . . . . .

Pioneer Serjeants ..

Drummers . . . . . .

. ,

• •

Corporals

Pioneers and Artificers . . . ,

Band . . . . . . , .

!- 1,000

Priratesf

903

DriTcrsf .. .. ..

Total . .

1,000

1,097

Transport.

"S,

•

Comjjany , . . . . ,

p , f Intrenching Tools . .

\ Small- Arm Ammunition . .

Wagons, General Service

Spare . . . .

••

Total

11.

Add for Tents, Wagons G. S.

Grand T

otal

••

* Transport Officer.

t If Tents are not carried the Privates will be 910, Drivers 18, with 3G Draught Horses.

259

Cavalry,
ESTABLISHMEXT of a Remlment in the Field.

Officers, N.-C. Officers anJ Men.

Nos.

Chargers.

Troop.

Draught.

Lieutenant-Colonel

Majors

Captains

Subaltirns
Adjutant
Paymaster
Quartermaster ...
MeJieal Officer...
Veterinary Surgeon

Total

SeKJEAJiTS.

Serjeant-Major

Quartermaster-Serjeant

Band Serjeant

Paymaster Serjeant

Armourer Serjeant

SaiUUer Serjeant

Fanicr Serjeant ... ..

Serjeant Cook

Trumpet Major

Orderly Room Clerk

Transport Serjeant

Troop Serjeants-Major
Serjeants

ABTrFICERS.

Farriers

Saddlers

Shoeing Smiths

Wheelers and Saddle Tree Makers .

Total Seijeants and Artificers
Trumpeters

Eank and File.

Corporals

Bandsmen

Privates*

DriTcrs* (Transport)

Total Eank and File

Total all Ranks

Transport.
(Without Tents.)

\ ••

32
15

480

Wagon, Forge

Wagon, General Service... .

Total ...

If Tents are carried, .Vdd —
Wagons, General Service.

Grand Total .

Carriages.

Drivers.

Draught

Horses.

* If Tents are not caiTled, the Privates will be increased hy 8, the Drivers reduced to 14, and the
Draught Horses to 28.

200

Artillery.

Establishment iu the Field of a Horse Battery, 16 and
9-pouiider Field Battery.

Field.

Officers and Men.

E. H. A.

16-pr.

9-pr.

Officers.

Horse and Field Batteries.

Maior 1

Captain 1

Lieutenants 3

Assistant Surgeon 1

Veterinary Surgeon > 1

Total Officers

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MES.

Serjoant-Major

Quartermaster-Serjeant

Serjeants

Corporals

Bombardiers

Gunners

Drivers

Trumpeters

1
1
(i
G
6
70
70

1
1
G
6
6
87
73

1
1
6
6
6
72
62

Aetificebs.

Farriers

Shoeing Smiths

Cellar-Makers

Wheelers

1
5
2

1
4

Total

179

19S

172

ElDINO HOBSES.

Officers

Staff Sergoan'.s

Non-Commissioned Officers

Farrier ...

Shoeing Smiths

Trumpeters

Gunners

Spare

1
3

36
6

1
1

12
1

Total Eidiug

Draught.

Guns

Ammunition Wagons

General Service Wagons and Forge

Spare

36
36
18
12

48
48
18
10

36
36
18

Total Horses

179

ir)4

128

Guns

Careiages.

Gun

Ammunition Wagons'

General Service Wagons and Forge

C
6
3

6
6
3

6
6

Total

ir>

■>{M

>
•1-1

r-C

-+5

Is
o

•uotsiAia auQ

: : :<»•* :

-1

•iidioo Xuuv

•IBHoreuia

o> •<)< eo « (M -H

c : : : : :

•^

■?.a1?<?'P • ■

2 oi

SS^"" • =

13.

O
5-

J. -a

c -r; a '- ■g

■2 3 bo bt.g

■UOISIAICI auQ

I- -1 - — ~) -i

„

•si-Uoo Xiujv

. . .^^

•[tinDtsiAici

—

lO C^ rH t^ ^

e. 1

£^ ;h

; : : p,o, : : •

ti m

•"•

S .Co..

S s '• 3 H g,

O cc 2; '* H v;

« .2 ^ ^ .
Q S : a ^ •

3 . '.S S g

2 3§Q.^'«

«2

■uoist.vta .iu()

. -H -^. ^ -H W

-1 r-i -o » '.a o r;. ->

-H O CO CO

•sdJ03 iJiuiv

•{•BUOtsiAio:

rt .-J_„_

— . -H o -o to O -• 0)

—1 -O CO CO

•'■

■

•3
3

:^ : : : : : :

U
t.

„

; : I icg

r^ : : : : : :

-i^

: : : :

c tc

: : ^ " gw

.= 1 . - . . .

III •
g a i —

.2,^3 b.2 a

■s.s-si.s-ac.>§

till

03 xu;^

262

Engineers.

War Establishment of a Field Companv.

Officers,

N.-C. Officers & Men.

Horses.

Eauks.

'So

"3
"o

Major . . , .
Lieutenants , .

I-

Serjeants

. .

Corporals

.. ..

1 21

<^i

^•

2nd Corporals

)

Buglers .. .. ..

Carpenters . . . . . .

Masons . . . . . .

Bricklayers . . • • • • . .

Smiths .. .. ..

Wheelers

Coopers

Painters , , . . , , , .

6
4

-..

137

Tailors . . , .

Collar-makers

Clerks

Printer

Photograpliist .. ..

Miners and Qiiarrymen . ,

Pack Equipments . . . • . .

Tlirec Store Wacrons . . . .

"1
1

Camp Eqviipao'e and Office ditto . .

Tentape ditto . .

J- 28

Forge ditto ..

r22<i

Spare Men and Horses

•1

Batmen .. ,. .. ..

J L

Total ..

137

191

2G3
APPENDIX IV.

TABLE OF LOSSES IN YARTOUS GREAT BATTLES.

'Name of Battle.

year.;

Numbers.

On each side.

Killed and Wounded.

Number.

Proportion to
Total Forces.

Malplaquet
llohen Friedbcrj

Prague

Rossbach

Breslau

Lissa

Zomdorf
Hoch Kirch
Marengo
Austerlitz

Jena

Preussch Eylau
Friedland

Talavera

Wagi-am

Salamanca
Borodino
Lcipsic ....

Vittoria

Waterloo

Magenta

Solferino

Koniggriitz

Wissemberg

Woerth

Spicheren
Mars-la-Tour ..,
Gravelotte

1709
1745
1757
1757
1757
1757
1758
1758
1800
1805
1806
1807
1807
1809
1809
1812
1812
1813
1813
1815
1859
1859
18G6
1870
1870
1870
1870
1870

f 70,000
1 70,000
f G4,000
I 74,000
C 22,000
I .55,000
f 25,000
t 60,000
C 36,000
I 80,000
? 32,000
I 50,000
C 50,000
I 30,000
( 28,127
I 30,850
C 90,000
I 80,000
f 100,000
'( 100,000
( 8.5,000
I 75.000
(• 80,000
( 50,000
C 52,000
(^ 50,000
C 150,000
(. 130,000

R.&A

E. <fcS7

F. ;

F. )

A. J

( 125,000 F.
■( 1-5.000 K.
f 1.50,000 F.
(.280,000 Allies
r 70,000 E. &c.
( 27,000 F.
? 67,600 E. &c.
I 68,900 F.
f 48,090 F. & S.
(^ 61,640 A.
( 135,234 F. & S.
<. 163,124 A.
(230,000 P.
(18.5,000 A. &S.
? 2.5,000 P.
I 8,000 F.
f 90,000 P.
( 40,000 F.
r 41,000 p.
I 38,000 F.
( 60,000 P.
I 140,000 F.
f 270,000 P.
1 135,000 F.

188,000

140,000

138,000

77,000

85,000

116,000*

82,000

80,000

58,977t

170,000t

200,00011

160,000

130,000

102,000

280,000

90,000

250,000

430,000

97,000

136,500

109,730

298,358**

415,000

33,000

130,000

79,000

200,000

415,000

18,250 Allies.

f 5,000
I 9,000
( 16,000
I 8,000
f 500
i 2,800
( 5,000
I 6,286
( 5,000
(. 6,574
f 11,385
1 21,531
f 5,000
1 7,000
f 7,000
1 6,800
( 12,000
I 11,000
f 14,000
I 20,000
( 30,000
I 25,000
C 10,000
( 17,000
f 5,928
I 7,200

24,000

(■ 8,000 E.
I 22,800 F. §

50,000 f
Not known,

10,000

14,000
Not known.

4,000

5,700
14,415
13,020

28,000

1,528

1,200
10,530

7,501

4,866

4,078
14,820
16,9.54
20,527
15,810

* 21,000 Austrian prisoners and missing. t 1,000 French and 3,000 Austrian prisoners,

t 19,000 Austrian prisoners. Q 20,000 Prussian prisoners. § Includes missing.

% Includes some prisoners. ** 2,770 Allies and 9,290 Austrians missing.

The losses in recent battles cannot be taken as more than approximate, the official account of the
war not having been published.

The losses in battles before 1870 are given on the authority of a paper in the Eoyal Engineer
Corps Papers by Colonel Cooke, R.E.

LONDON :

Printed for Her Majesty's Stationbey Office.

BY HARRISON AND SONS,

Printers in Ordinary to Her Majesty.

[Wt. 25095. 1000—3 | 86— 4346]

MAP OF THE ENVIRONS OF METZ

,^ -^— T^.» - ' "

If' "."T-^^ "'^^'l^'

f^^^

f-
^

Y'^^s^'^ /^^^^j^T^- ^

flr,l,^/r .Sl„l,u,- Mil,:-

MILITARY BOOKS, published by Authority— oontumedi.
GUNNERY— coH<.

7-inch B.M.L. of Q^ and 7 tons, on Sliding: and Moncrieff

Carriagre (Land 'Service). 1883. Price 2s. Gd.
7-inch B.B.L. of 72 cwt. and 82 cwt. On Moncrieff and Slidiner
r iagres. (Land Service). 8vo. 24pp. 4 plates. Wrapper,
1885. Price \s.
12 and 11 inch R.M.L. of 26 tons. (1879.) Price 1«. M.
0-46-lnch aATIiINQ, for LAND SERVICE. SrdEd. (1880.)

Price 6d
O-45-inch GATLINQ, for NAVAL SERVICE. (1880 ) Price M.
Rang-e Tables for —
13-PR. R.M.L. Gun of S cwt. \

^Q " " ^« " > 1882. Price 8rf. each.

7-PR. Gun of 400 lbs. J

RANGE-FINDER. DEPRESSION. For Elevated Batteries.
Laud Service. With Appendices. I., Observa-
tions on the Choice of Positions. II., Information
to be supplied and PreUniinary Work to be carried
out by Royal Engineers. 8vo., 14 pp. IlUistreied.
Wrapper. Price (Jrf.
Do. NOLAN. MARK I. : Land Service, Handbook

for. 1882. Price 1*.
Do. WATKIN. Regulations for the Instruction

in, and Practice with. 1882. Price 1*.
Do. WELDON. Provisional Handbook for. May,

1884. Price 6c?. (New Edition in preparation.)

fiASHFORTH CHRONOGRAPH : Report on Experiments with.
(1870.) Price Is.
Do. Final do. do. (1878-80.) Price 2s. 3d

MUSKETRY:—

RIFLE AND CARBINE. Manual Exercises for the. And
Bayonet Exercise. Horse Guards, War OfBce, 1885. 12mo., 95 pp.,
25 plates. Wrapper. Price M.
RIFLE EXERCISES AND MUSKETRY INSTRUCTION :—
Alterations made by General Orders in, since date of first issue
in July, 1879. (1882.) Price 2d.
INSTRUCTION : Regrulations for. (Issued Provisionally.) 1884.

Price 6(f,
TEXT BOOK ON THE THEORY OF THE MOTION OF PRO-
JECTILES. Addenda to. Translated from the Aide Me'moire k I'usage
des OflBciers d'Artillerie. (Quatri^me Edition.) 1881. Price Get
SCHOOL OF MUSKETRY AT HYTHE : Report on the Instruc-
tion carried on at, and of the Progress of Musketry Instruction in the
Army during the Year ending 31st March, 1884. Price 4s. Also,
REPORTS FOR THE YEARS 1859 to 1861. Price Is. each.
„ „ 1862 to 1881. Price 2s. each.

„ „ 1882 and 1883. Price 3s. Qd. each.

REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1884. Price 4s.
EDUCATIONAL, &c. :—

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, ADMISSION TO, AND FIRST
APPOINTMENTS THEKEFKOM TO THE ARMY: Regulations
for. War Office, 1st August, 1884. Issued with General Order No. 11(J
of 1884. 8vo. 16 pp. tStitclied. Price Id.
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE : SyTiopsis of Course of Instruc-
tion at. 1882. Price Qd.
MILITARY EXAMINATION PAPER-S, viz.:—

Royal Military Academy, Woolvrich. June and July, 1885. Price Is.
Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and Royal Marine Light Infantry.

July, 1885. Price Is.
Staff College. Admission to. Report of the Examination for. June,

1885. With copies of the Examination Papers. 1886. Price 1«
Staff College. Final Examination. Report on. December, 1884. With

copies of Examination Papers. 1885. Price Is.
Militia. Lieutenants of. Military Competitive Examination of, for
Commissions in the Lino. Report on. April, 1885. Withoopieaof
the Examination Papers. Price Is.

(JPaper$ of earlier dates can still be had.')

MILITARY BOOKS, published by Authority— oontumQdi.
OTJNNERY— con<.

7-inch B.M.L. of Q\ and 7 tons, on Sliding: and Koncrieff

Carriagre (Land 'Service). 1883. Price 2«. ijd.
7-inch B.B.Ii. of 72 cwt. and 82 cwt. On Moncrieff and Slidiner
r iag-es. (Land Service). 8vo. 24pp. 4 plates. Wrapper,
1885. Prico U.
12 and 11 inch B.M.L. of 26 tons. (1879.) Price 1*. Gd.
0-45-lnch aATLINQ, for LAND SEBVIOE. SrdEd. (1880.)

Price 6c/.
O-45-inch GATLINQ, for NAVAL SEBVIOE. (1880 ) Price &d.
Bangre Tables for—
13-PB. B.M.L. Gun of 8 cwt. ^

^Q " " ^« " >■ 1882. Price 8rf, each.

7-PB. Gun of 400 lbs. J

BANGE-FINDEB. DEPBESSION. For Elevated Batteries.
Land iService. With Appendices. I., Observa-
tions on the Choice of Positions. II., Information
to be supplied and Preliminary Work to be carried
out by Royal Engineers. 8vo., 14 pp. lUustreied.
Wrapper. Price (jrf.
Do. NOLAN. MABK I. : Land Service, Handbook

for. 1882. Price Is.
Do. WATKIN. Begrulations for the Instruction

in, and Practice with. 1882. Price 1*.
Do. WELDON. Provisional Handbook for. May,

1884. Price 6d {Neiu Edition in preparation.')

BASHFOBTH CHBONOGBAPH : Report on Experiments with.
(1870.) Price 1«.
Do. Final do. do. (1878-80.) Price 2s. 3d

MUSKETBY:—

BIFLE AND CABBINE. Manual Exercises for the. And
Bayonet Exercise. Horse Guards, War Office, 1885. 12mo., 95 pp.,
25 plates. Wrapper. Price Zd.
BIFLE EXEBCISES AND MUSKETBY INSTBXJCTION :—
Alterations made by General Orders in, since date of first issue
in July, 1879. (1882.) Price 2d.
INSTBUCTION : Begrulations for. (Issued Provisionally.) 1884.

Price Qd,
TEXT BOOK ON THE THEOBY OF THE MOTION OF PBO-
JEGTILES. Addenda to. Translated from the Aide Me'moire k I'usage
des Officiers d'Artillerie. (Quatri^me Edition.) 1881. Price 6dL
SCHOOL OF MUSKETBY AT HYTHE : Beport on the Instruc-
tion carried on at, and of the Progress of Musketry Instruction in the
Army diuring the Year ending 31st March, 1884. Price 4s. Also,
BEPOBTS FOB THE YEABS 1859 to 1861. Price Is. each.
„ „ 1862 to 1881. Price 2s. each.

„ „ 1882 and 1883. Price 3s. Qd. each.

BEPORT FOB THE YEAB 1884. Price 4s.
EDUCATIONAL, &c. :—

BOYAL MILITABY COLLEGE, ADMISSION TO, AND FIBST
APPOINTMENTS THEEEFIiOM TO THE ARMY: Regulations
for. War Office, 1st August, 1884. Issued with General Order No. lltj
of 1884. 8vo. 16 pp. ytitclied. Price Id.
BOYAL MILITABY COLLEGE : SyTiopsis of CoTirse of Instruc-
tion at. 1882. Price 6c?.
MILITABY EXAMINATION PAPEB-S, viz.:—

Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. June and July, 1885. Price Is.
Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and Royal Marine Light Infantry.

July, 1885. Price Is.
Staff College. Admission to. Report of the Examination for. June,

1885. With copies of the Examination Papers. 1886. Price Is
Staff College. Final Examination. Report on. December, 1884. With

copies of Examination Papers. 1885. Price Is.
Militia. Lieutenants of. Military Competitive Examination of, for
Commissions in the Lino. Report on. April, 1885. With copies of
the Examination Papers. Price Is.

(Papers of earlier dates can still be had.")

rUEPARED TN THE

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

OF THE

QUARTERMASTER-GENER AL'S DEPART MENT, HORSE GUARDS.

ARMED STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. By Captain W. S. Cooke,

22nd Foot. Part I. 10s. 6d.
^^— ^— — Part II. Price 11*. 6d

ARMED STRENGTH OF BELQITTM. 1882. Price 2«.
ARMED STRENGTH OF DENMARK. By Captain "W. S. Cooke,

22ud Regt. Price 3s.
ARMED STRENGTH OF FRANCE. By Major C. J. East,

67tli Regt., D.A.Q.M.G. 1877. Price 7s. 6d.
ARMED STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE. Part I.

Organization and Administration. With Map. By Captain F. C. H. Clarke,

K.A., D.A.Q.M.G. 1876. Price 8s. 6d.
ARMET) STRENGTH OF ITALY. Translated from the German,

by Lieutenant W. A. H. Haee, E.E. 1875. Price 5s. 6af.
ARMED STRENGTH OF THE NETHERLANDS. By Captain F.

C. H. Clarke, E.A., D.A.Q.M.G. With Map. Price 4s.
ARMED STRENGTH OF RUSSIA. 1882. Price 12s.
ARMED STRENGTH OF SPAIN. With Map. 1883. Price 3j.
ARMED STRENGTH OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY. By Captain

W. S. Cooke, 22nd Eegt., D.A.Q.M.G. With Map. Price 3s. Gd.
ARMED STRENGTH OF SWITZERLAND. By Major Frank S.

Russell, 14th Hussars. 1880. Price Is. 6c?.
ATTACK FORMATION FOR INFANTRY IN THE AUSTRIAN,

FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN ARMIES : OutHne of. 1881.

BRITISH MINOR EXPEDITIONS, 1746— i814. Cloth. Price 2s. 6d

CAVALRY. Instructions for the Trailing, Employment, and

Leading- of. By Major-General Carl xon Schmidt. Compiled by

Captain von Vollaud-Bockelberg, 2nd Silesian Dragoons. Translated

by Captain C. W. Bowtler Bell, 8th Hussars. (1881.) Price 3s. 6d.

CYPRUS. Compiled by Captain A. R. Saville, 18th Foot. 1878.

Price 2s. 6d. , ,
DENGHIL— TEPE : Siege and Assault of. General Skobeleff's Eeport.

Translated by Lieut. J. J. Leverson, R.E. 1881. Price 3s.
EGYPT: MAP OF. 4 Sheets. 1882. Price 4s.

ENGLISH-ARABIC VOCABULARY AND DIALOGUES FOR
THE USE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY. By Captain C. M. Watson,
E.E. 82 pp. Cloth. 1885. Price Is.
FRANCE: Military Reports, Addressed to the French War Minister
by Colonel Baron Stoffel, French Military Attach^ in Prussia, 1866 — 1870.
Translated by Liout.-Col. Home, C.B., E.E. Eoyal 8vo. Price 8».
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71. Authorised Translation from
tlie German Official Account by Major F. C. H. Clarke, C.M.G.,R.A.
First Part : — History of the War to the Downjcdl of the Empire.
Vol. I. : — Sections 1 to 5. From the Outbreak of Hostilities to the Battle of

Gravelotte. With case of Maps and Plans. Price 26s.
Vol. II.; — Sections 6 to 9. From the Battle of Gravelotte to the Downfall
of the Empire. With case of Maps and Plans. Price 22s. (Oat oj print. ^
Second Part : — History of the War against the Republic.
Vol. I. ; — Sees, 10 to 13. From the Investment of Paris to the re-occupation

of Orleans by the Germans, with case of Maps and Plans. Price 26s.
Vol. II. : — Sees. 14 to 18. Events in Northern France from the end of
November. In the North-west from the beginning of December. And
the Siege of Paris from the commencement of December to the Armistice ;
the Operations in the South-east from the Middle of November to the
Middle of January. (1883.) Price 26s.
Vol. III. : — Sees. 19 and 20. Events in South-cast France from the Middle
of January to the Termination of Hostilities Rearward Communications.
The Armistice. Homeward March and Occupation. Retrospect. 1884.
Svo. 374pp. Cloth. With Case of Maps and Plans Price 31s. 6c^.
A/so separately, in paper covers: —
1st Section; — The Events in July. Plan. Price 3s.

2nd Section : — Events to the Eve of the Battles of Worth and Spicheren.
3rd edition, revised and corrected. 1882. 3 Plans. Price '6i.

YD 0050n

WORKS prepared in Intelligence Branch — continued.
Franco-German War, 1870-71 — continued.

3rd Section: — Tho l^attlcs of Worth and Spicheren. 3rd edition, revised

and corrected. 1.S82. 2 Plans and 3 Sketches. Price 5«.
4th Section: — Advance of the Third Anny to the Moselle, Ac. 2nd

edition, revised and coiTected. With 1 Plan and 7 Sketches. 4*.
5th Section: — Operations near Metz on 15tli, 16th, and 17th Aug^ist. Battle

of Vion\-illo — Mai-s-la-tour. 2nd edition, revised and corrected. 1S81.

4 Plans and Sketches in the Text. Price 6s. 6d
6th Section:— The Battle of Gravelott»— St. Privat. With 2 Plans and

Sketches in Text. Price bs.
7th Section: — Advance of Third Army and of tho Army of the Meuse

ap^ainst the Army of Chalons. With 2 Plans, a general Map, and

numerous,Sli:etches. Price 6s.
8th
9th

lot

lit

12t

14<
15

16
17

ISl

lOtl
M

20tl

FRENCi

Traii.s
Price

14 DAY USE

RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED
LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or

on the date to which renewed.

Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

3CJiin58RK

R*rr'

O t-D

JUN

19SE

RECDLD AUG

7 M-ilAMod

^TP^

c. :

FFvENCI

d'Avd

GTIRMA]

of Mil

Colone

Henri

8vo., c;

HOSTIIil

torical

Civiliz

Bt. Lie

PKUSSIi

for the

by Ma;

INTER-HBRARY
tOAH

-24.

AUG 1 4

LD 21A-50ni-8,'57
(C8481sl0)476B

General Library

University of California

Berkeley

! 6s.
3 of
d.

ine.
. of

I to

nd
the

. ;nt

" he
ent

"the
md

ep-
ace

-{.'he
lis-
)fet,

-aps

a?.

-/er.

jor
ike

jnt

by
;ain
>yal

.is-

een

-By

>ns

-vted