MILITARY BOOKS. lublis^ci) b2 ^tttjoritg. Ii'itUed under the Superintendence of Utr Majesty's Stationery Office, AND SOLD BY W Olowbs ife Sons, Limited, 13, Charing Cross ; Harrison & Son8,59, Pall Mall ; \V H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place; W. Mitchell, 39, Chariug Cross; Longmans & Co., Paternoster Kow; Tkubner & Co., 57 & 59, Ludgate Hill; SxANfOKD, Cbaring Cross; and Kegan Pavl,Trknch & Co., 1, Paternoster Sq. ; Also by UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. —JO blin. T Received ^. Accessions No. "^^ ^^^ Slielf No. < m M •rH (A CQ M CD Q 2 O y Major Foster. , ^ ^ Frederick. " Secret Sti-ategical Instructions of Frederick the Second to his Inspectors-General." Translated by Colonel Hamilton Smith. Coventry, 1811. ' Napier. " History of the Peninsular War." London : Boone, 1832. ^ Thiers. " Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire." Paris : Paulin, 1849. "^ Alison. " History of Europe from 1774 to 1852." London, 1849 and 1850. G rivet. " Etudes sur la Tactique." Paris: Dumaine, 1865. '1-. Stofcl. "Military Reports." Translated by Captain Home, P.E., Topo- graphical and Statisticid Dei^artmeut, War Office, London, 1872. ^ Wolseley. " The Soldiei-'s Pocket Book for Field Service." Macmillau, 1871. ^ Kinglahe. " Invasion of the Crimea." 1863. Burgoync. " Militaiy Opinions." Field-Marshal Sir J. Burgoyne, G.C.B., edited by Colonel the Hon. G. Wrottesley, E.E. London, 1859. ^ " The Army of the North German Confederation." Translated by Colonel Newdegate. King & Co., London. ■J-' ' Verdy du Vernois. "Studies in Leading Ti'oops." Translated by Hildvard. King & Co. ' " La Fwtification Tmprovisee." Par A. Brialmont, Colonel d'Etat Major. Paris : Dumaine, 1872.* ■ ^^Franco-German War, 1870-71 ; official account." Translated by Captain Clarke, E.A., Topographical and Statistical Department, War Office. .' Vinoy. "Campagne 1870-71; Siege de Paris ; Operations de 13° Corps." Paris : Plon, 1872. Prince de Ligne. " Ouvres Military." Vienna, 1806. Decker. " Tactique des Trois Amies." Traduit jiar Brack . Bruxelles, 1835. Von Miller. "Lerons sur la Tactique des Trois Armes." Traduit de rAllemand, by Huybrecht. Bruxelles, 1846. " The Frontal Attach of InfaMtry." Translated by Colonel Newdegate. London, 1873.t " The Elementary Tactics of the Prussian Infantry!' Translated by Cajitain Baring, E.A., Topographical and Statistical Dejiartment, War Office, 1872. " The British Line in the Attack : I'ast and Future." Colonel Gawler. London, 1872. Jackson. " Course of Military Surveying." * Has been translated by Lieutenant Eni)3soii, E.A. King & Co. t This little book is wortliv of the closest study, and from its portability might Weil be in ereiy officer's possession. Chesnci/. "Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland." Smith, Elder, and Co., London, 1873. Borbstacd. " The Franco-German War." Translated by Major Dwyer. ^^ Regulations for the Trainimj of Troops for Service in the Field, and for the Conduct of U rand Manceiivres." Translated by Captain JBai-ing R.A., \Sll. De Brack. "Outposts of Light Cavalry." 4th Edition, 1869. Von MoUkc. " Observations on the Influence that Arms of Precision have on Modern Tactics." Translated by Lieutenant Crawford, E.A. Mitchell, 187 L Todlehen. " The Siege of Sebastopol." Hoheidhoe. " On the Eniploynient of Field Artillery." Translated by Captain Clarke, R.A., i87i. Tellenbach. " The Art of Operating under the Fire of an Enemy." Trans- lated by Captain Robinson, Rifle Brigade. Mitchel, 1872. Bonie, Colonel.* " La Cavalerie, Fran§ai^e, 1870." Paris : Amyot, 1871. " Campaign of 1866 in Germani/J^ Official Account. Translated by Hozier and Wright, Topogi-aphioal and Statistical Department, Wai- Office, 1872. " Conference Militaires Beiges.^' Brussels, 1872. La Guerre des Bois. De Looze. " Notions Soiumaires de Tactique des Ti'ois Amies." Viollet le Due. "Memoiresur la Defense de Paris," Paris. Morel, 1871. Frossard. " Rapports sur les Operations des 2ud Corps, de F Armoe du Rhiu dans la Campagne, 1870." Dumaine, 1870. Paris. Von Mirus. " Cavalry Field Duty." Translated by Russel. King and Co 1872. KScherf.f " A Study of New Infantry Tactics." Berlin, 1873. De Cessac. " Guide Particulier de I'Officier en Campagne." Bruxelles, 1837. De Folard. " Nouvelles decouvertes sur la Guerre." fiaxe. " Mes Reveries." De la Roche Aipnon. " Introduction de I'Ai-tde la Guerre." Paris. Dumaine, 1857. Thiers. " La Defense de Belfort." Paris, 1871. " The Wellington Prize Essay." Lieutenant Maurice, R. A. Blackwood, 1872. ."Essays u-ritten for the WellinQtnn Prize." Crawford, Wolseley,' PRussel, ■ Hildyard, Waller, King, 1872. " Three Months icith the Army of Metz," by an Officer of Engineers, 1871. Chesney. " Waterloo Lectures." " Experimeivtal Tactics of Infantry." Colonel Newdegate, 1872. • " Military Memorial of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia." Translated br Chai'les Harcourt Graham, M.A. " The Minor Tactics of Field Artillery," by H. W. Hime, R. A, Pelet. " Memoires sur la Guerre de 1809, en Allemagne." Paris, 1824-6. Fisch. " Etudes sur la Tactique." Brussels. Muquault, 1872. * Has been translated by Lieutenant C. F. Thomson, 7lh Hussars. t A translation of this very valuable and important book has been prcijared by Colonel Graham, and is published by Kiiif^ & Co. It is perhaps a clearer ciiwiient of modern Prussian views than any other work. VIU Lectures given by Colonel Hamley, C.B., when Professor of Military History at the Stuff College. Lectures given by Colonel Chesney, E.E., at various places. Edinburgh Review. (.Quarterly Review. Articles in Magiizines. Journal of the United Service Institution, Proceeilings of the Royal Artillery Institute. Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Lectures given at the School of Military Engineering. Articles in Military and other Newspapers. Many valuable hints and much assistance from Major-General Walker, C, Military Attache at Berlin ; and many other officers. IX LIST OF PLATES. PAGE Sketch of Dessaix's advanee at Marengo Frontixpiece. I. Formations introduced by Frederick the Great and McsnQ Duraud 36 II. Battle of Prague 38 III. Battle of Leuthen 39 IIIa. Skeleton map of the battle of Leuthen .. .. .. .. 39 lY. Battle of Kolin 40 IVa. Skeleton map of the battle of Kolin. . 40 V. Battle of Koi^sbach 42 Ya. Skeleton map of the battle of Rossbach . . . . . . . . 42 YI. Battles of Lonato and Castiglione .. .. .. .. .. 45 \'1I. French formations .. .. ,. .. .. .. .. 46 A' III. Battle of AusterUtz 48 IX. French formations .. .. >. .. .i .. .. 48 X. Battle of Auerstadt 50 XI. Battle of Busaco c 58 XII. Battle of the Alma 62 XIIa. Details of battle of the Alma ,. ,. .. .. .. 62 XIII. Illustration of a flank attack . . .. .. .. .. .. 70 XIY.^ XY. XYI. XYII. I XYUI.J XIX. March of a German Division .. •« .. •• .. 166 XIXa. March of an English Division . . • • . . • • . • 168 XX. Defence of a wood .. .. •• t. .. .. •• 208 XXI. Defence of a village .. .. .. .. .. t. .. 217 XXII. Defence of Le Bourget 219 XXIII. Post on the heights of Eaincy 221 XXIY. The heights of St. Cucufa and Celle St. Cloud 220 XX Y. Xormal formation of an Itahan Brigade . . . . . . • • 229 Map of the environs of Metz, at the end. -Illustrations of an infantry attack t« .. .. •• .. 96 XI TABLE OF CONTENTS. PREFACE. r.vGi:. Ni'cessit J of general militurv information for olllcers . . .. .. .. 1 Tlicory not an absolute guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Advantages of theory .. .. .. .. .• .. .. .. 2 OHAPTEE I. Organizatiox .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 Division of armies into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, &c. — May, Vial . . . . 4 Companies — Boguslauski, May, Scherff . . . . . . . . . . 5 Battalions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 6 Brigades — De Hardegg . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 7 Strength and composition of a German Division . . . . . . . . 8 „ „ French „ .. .. .. 8 „ „ British „ 9 Decker, De Preval, Giustineani, De Hardegg. Necessity for clear definitions — Jomini . . . . . . . . . , 10 Le Bouvg, Decker, De Ternay, Dc la Pierre, De Preral, De la Roche- Aymou . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IC* Strength and composition of a German Army Corps . . . . . . 12 ° „ French „ 13 British „ 13 Generals, Staff, AKD Departments 14 Napoleon, Jomini, Folard, Rocquancourt 14-15 Plans should be known— Machiavelli, Bngcand 15 Staff, Duties of .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 16 Wellington, Yauclielle, Grimoard, Hardegg, Jomini, "Army of North German Confederation ". . .. .. .. .. .. .. 17-18 Verdy du Ycrnois, Napoleon .. .. •• .. .. .. 19-20 Staff should not interfere 20 Correspondence to go through staff — Jomini .. .. ,. .. 21 Control Department, Duties -1 Extract from Control Regulations, Vauchelle, Grimoard, De Gerlache, De Lavarenne, De Cessac, Saxe , . .. •• .. .. .. 21-2G Artillery, Duties — Jomini .. .. .. .. .. •• •• -7 Yon Miller, Napoleon, Le Bourg 27 "Army of North German Confederation," May 28 Engineers, Duties .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• -^ Thiebault, May, "Army of North German Confederation," Napoleon, " Organisation of Peninsular Army " .. .4 • 28-33 Xll CHAPTER II. TAGE. l'i;n;F Sketch OF THE IIisTOKY OF Tactics .. .. .. .. .. 33 Tactics liave developed, not changed ., .. .. .. .. 33 Gustaviis Adolpliiifi, Clieiunitz . . . . . . . . . . . . 3i-35 Frederick — Formations .. .. .. .. .. ., .. 35 Prague — Joniini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Leuthen — elomini, Napoleon .. .. .. .. .. .. 38— JO Kolin — Jomini, Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-42 .Rossbach — Joniini, Nai)oleon .. .. .. .. .. ,. 42-43 Peculiarity of Fredrick's Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. 43 Mesiiil Durand's jjroposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Revolutionary Armies .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45 [talian t'ampaign, 1700 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45 Lonato, Castiglioue, Eivoli ., .. .. .. ., .. .. 45 Taglianicnto, Marengo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45-16 Austcrlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Jena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Auerstadt . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 49 Eylau, Hardships, Army exposed to — Napoleon . . . . . . . . 53 Essling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Wagram .. 53 Regimental Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Si Formation of Macdonald's Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Alterations in French Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Invasion of Russia . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 57 Alteration of Prussian Tactics, " King of Prussia's Order, 1813 " . . 57 Busaco — Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 58 Albuera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 59 Waterloo — Jomini's conversation with Wellington . . . . . . 59-GO Origin of Prussian Company . . . . . . , . . . . . Gl The Alma 61 „ Moltke's remarks on . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 CHAPTER III. IxFAXTBT Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 64 Motives which sway men — Napier . . . , . . . . . . 64 Discipline — Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 61r-65 Panics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Education — Stoffel . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . ()5 Training and Discipline — Napoleon . . . • ' . . . . . . 65 Good arms— Stoffel 66 Manceuvring under fire impossible . . . . . . . . . . 67 Kinglake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Action of small bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Breaking up of battles into detached fights — Scherff . . . . . . 68 Flank attacks — Boguslauski, Clausewitz ,. . . . . . . . . 69-70 Problem to be solved at present day . . . - . . . . . . 70 Relatively xpeakiiij, attack has gained more than defence — Scherff, Boguslauski . . . , . . . . .... . . . . 71 Breech-loaders enable a greater fire to be given now than formerly . . 74 Danger of the indiscriminate use of the word " loose ". . .. .. 74-75 Attack on St. Privat — Duke of Wurtemberg .. .. ,. .. 75 floral causes at work — General Walker .. .. .. .. .. 76 •' King of Prussia's Order, 21st August, 1870" ». 77 Attack, individual, not loose — ScheriJ . . . . . . . . . . 77 Necessity of large areas to train troops , . . . . . . . . . 78 Necessity for supports . . . , . . . . . , . . . . 78 Kinglake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Skirmishers must not to sent by driblets . . . . . . . . . . 79 xin PAOR. Sir .Tolm Hiirijoyiii' .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 70 Scherff, (inulcr .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 80-H2 Linos of battle .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 82 May 83 Fighting lino to curvy its own reserve . , . . . . . . . . 83 Chosnoy, Kingliiko, Niipior .. .. .. .. .. ,. .. g-i-St Area of ii'-tion groat pr now than formerly .. .. .. .. .. 8't General iiloas as to formation .. .. .. ,. .. ., 81 Zones of fire -Tolienbaeh .. .. .. .. .. ., ,. 86 Advaneing niulcr fire . . . , . . . . . . . , , . . 8(5 -B7 " Cabinet order of Emperor of Germany ". . . . . . . . . . 88 Skirmishing by sections .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 88-80 Circnmstaneos under whieli aa attack is now possible .. .. ,. 89 Frontal attack of infantry— Schcrff .. .. .. ., .. 90 Shock or bayonet now requisite as well as fire . . . . . . . . 91 Last stage of attack— Sclierfl", Gawlcr .. .. .. .. .. 92-93 Reason wliy small columns are preferable . . .. .. .. ., 93 Duty of supjiurts — Sclicrlf .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 94, State of matters when the "genci'al advance " is ordered. , ., .. 95 Skirmishers not to be left behind — Scherff. . .. .. .. ,. 95 Frontal attack of infantry .. .. .- .. .. ,. .. 95 E fleet of development of tactics on British troops .. .. .. 96 Napier, Bugeaud .. .. ,. .. ,. .. ,. .. 96 Disadvantages; small numbers .. .. .. .. .. .. 98 Small comjianies preferable to large. . . . . . . , , . , . 98 Frontal attack of infantry .. .. ,. .. ,, ,. .. 99 Loss of oflleers. . .. .. .. .. .. ., 99 Paramount necessity of complete training of troops .. .. .. 100 Necessity for tactical information , . . , . . . . , , , . 101 Pro))osa' to extend the main body .. ., .. .. .. .. 102 Small columns suffer less from fire than lines . . . . . . . . 102 Desirable to advance with main body in small columns, to give moral support to skirmishers ; frontal attack of infantry .. .. .. 103 The Defence (II.) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, i03 Pure defence useless — Von Moltke. . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Moral superiority of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Sir John Burgoyne .. .. ,. .. .. ,. .. .. 104 Advantages of defence .. .. .. .. ., .. ..105 Convergent and divergent fire . . . . . . . , . . , . 106 Occupation of positions .. .. .. ., .. .. .. 107 Vollies impossible — Boguslauski .. .. .. .. .. ., 107 Defence, taking the offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Defence should be offensive in character . . . . . , . , . . 108 Offensive use the defensive carefully ., .. .. .. ,. 108 Cavalry (III.) .. .. .. ,. .. 109 Cavalry in the field at the present day .. .. .. .. ..110 Duties of cavalry .. .. ., .. ,, ,, .. ,. hq Action of cavalry by no means a thing of the past . . . . . . HO Von Moltke, May .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. ., no Bredow's charge at Mars-la-Tour .. .. .. .. .. ., m Boguslauski, liorbstaedt .. .. ,. .. .. .. .111-112 Reserves indispensable — Wellington .. .. ,. .. .. 113 Second line — Prussian instructions . , .. .. ,. .. .. m. Effect of rifled guns .. .. .. ., .. ,. .. .. 115 Opportunities afforded to small bodies of cavalry.. .. .. .. II5 Proposals for attack — Boguslauski ., .. ,. .. ., .. 116 Austrian regulations .. .. .. .. ., ,. .. .,116 Reconnaissance of ground requisite. . .. .. .. ., .. 117 Bonie: " Olficial account of war of 1866" — Napier .. .. .. lis Flank attacks .. .. .. .. .. ,. .. .. ..11!) Action of French cavalry at Gravelotte — Bonie .. .. .. .. 119 XIV PAGE. Cavaliy covering an anny — ^Yon Mirus . . . . . . . . . . 120 De Brack .. .. ..120 Necessity of sipreading cavalry out, -whether advancing or retreating .. 121 Boiiie ; "Tlirec months with the army of the Rhine " .. .. .. 123 Comparison of French and German cavalry . . . . . . . . 12'i AUTILLEKT (IV.) '. 125 Difference between rifled artillery and smooth-bore guns. . . . . . 125 Use of artillery in the field . . . . . . . . • . • . • 126 Necessity of unity of action ; campaign of 1866 ; Wochenblatt.. . . 127 Coi-ps artillery and divisional artillery — Becker .. .. .. .. 128 Duties of divisional artillery— Todleben .. .. .. .. .. 129 Independence of artillery . . . . . . . • ■ • • • • • 129 Direction of corps artillery . . . . • . . • . • • • • • 130 Ai'tillcry escorts, not now required as a rule .. .. .. .. 131 Artillery to move seldom and rapidly . . . . . . . . . • 131 Position of Artillery— Hime ;" Campaign of 1866" 131 Necessity of artillery being in front — ilay. . . . . . . . . . 132 Masses of artillery— Boguslaiiski, Hohenlohe 133 What artillery should fire at— May, Waldersee 133-134 Mitrailleuse .. .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• 1^5 Engineeks (V.) 135 Peculiarities of Napoleon's campaigns .. .. .. .. .. 135 Field fortification most backward of branches of art of war— Napoleon 136 Use of field fortification— May, Duke of Wurtemberg, Viollct le Due 136-137 Fieldworks important, as partially solving the question of flank attacks — Chesney .. .. •• •• •• •• •• •• •• 137 Duties of Engineers in the field twofold .. .. .. .. .. 138 Mounted sappers — Brialmount, Frederick . . _ 139 Tactical relation of fieldworks to the troops — Brialmont. . . . . . 140 Evil effects of separation of direction : Koniggriitz 141 Use in modern war . . . . . . • • . • . • • • • • 143 Village of Vionville— Frossard ; Battle of Gravelotte .. .. 142-143 Tools Iff Necessity of tactical instruction for engineers 144 CHAPTER IV. CoMBiKED Tactics .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 14,1 Arms of the service must not be interchangeable . . . . . . . . 144 Necessity of Generals having full control of auxihary arms — Vinoy 145-146 Proportions of the arms of the service . . . . . . . . . . 147 Napoleon ; Prussian army . . . . . . . . , . , , . . 147 Infantry the chief arm ; Losses in action . . .. ,, .. .. 148 Way in which battles begin . . . . . . . . , , . . . . 149 Mars-la-Tour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 150 Action of artillery and engineers .. .. .. .. .. ,, 151 Tendency of armies to extend ,. .. .. .. .. ., 152 Concentmton may be weakness ., .. .. ., ,. .. 153 Decisive points to be held ; parallel with permanent f ortfications . . 154 Concentric attacks — " Campaign of 1866 " . . . . . . . , 154-155 Reserves : many, and not one great one . . . . . , . , . . 156 Campaign of 1866 . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . , 156 Langensalza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 156 Numbers of troops to the yard . . . . . . . , . . , . 156 Artillery should never be kept in reserve .. .. ., .. .. 157 Action of small bodies of ca\alry . . . . . . . . . , . , 153 Penetration of the enemy's position and lodgment .. ,, .. 159 XV Cn AFTER V. TAGE. Maucbes .. IGl Importauco of marcbiiig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1G2 Annies cannot march in line of battle .. .. .. .. .. 162 Guibert, Chuisewitz 162 As a rule must adhere to tlio roads .., .. ,, .. ,. 162 Campaign of 1SG6 ; De Tornay, Napoleou «. •. .. ..162-163 Rates of marching — Colley .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 163 Length of columns .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 164 Opening out — Clausewitz, Fallot, Lagrange, Thiebaidt. . .. .. 165 Order of IMareh— Do la Pierre, Von VValdcrsee 166 Vcrdy du Vcrnois, Colley 167-168 Gerniiui march across the Lauter .. .. .. .. .. ,, 169 Army orders . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 170 Corps orders . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, 171 Advanced guard orders .. .. .. .. ., .. ,, 172 Position ot auxiliary arms .. .. .. .. ,. .. .. 173 Verdy du Vcrnois, Clausewitz, Le Eoiirg. . .. .. .. ..173-174 Keeping up the touch .. .. .. .. .. .. ., 174 Advanced guards .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ,. 174 Rear- guard — Vcrdy du Vernois, Fallot, Lagrange .. .. ,, 175 Eugeaud, Napier .. .. .. .. .. .. ,, ,. 176 Bazaine's retreat . . . , . . . . . . . . , , . , 177 Tendency to tm-n troops out too early .. .. ,. .. ..177-178 SrppLY OF Troops .. 178 Rations must be carried by the men . . . . . . . . . . 179 Men must be watched to sec they don't eat all their food at once . . 179 Rations carried by Prussians .. .. .. ., .. ..179-180 Distribution — De Gerlache, Grimoard .. .. .. .. ,, 181 Requisitions requisite — Clauzewitz ., .. ,, ,. ,, 182 Fallot and Lagrange. . .. ,. .. ,. .. .. ..182-183 Necessity of care . . . . . . . . . . . , , . , , 183 Lectiire of General V. Kirchback . , . . . . . , . . . , 183 The Organizatiox of the Communications of an Aemt, includino Railways . . . . . . • . 185 JMcaning of " Organization of Line of Communications " ,, ,. 185 Three ways by which annies can be fed .. ,. ,, ,, ,, igg Division of supply into two great branches .. «• ,, ,, 189 Division of transport into three portions . . , , . . . . . . 199 "Wellington's organization of his line of communications ,, .. 191 Organization of German line of communications. . ,, .. ,. 192 Changes in war caused by use of railways. . , . , , , . . . 196 Imaginary example of organization of railway communications in England .. .■• ., .. .. .. ,. ,. .. 199 CHAPTER VI. Attack AND Defence of Woods and Villages .. ., ,, ,. 203 Peculiarities of wood fighting : Prussians and French . . , . , , 203 Training of soldiers now more requisite than ever .. ., .. 204 Outskirts of wood to be held .. .. ,. ,, 205 Examination of a wood ,. .. .. .. ., ,. ,^ 207 i'uttiug a wood in a state of defence .. .. ., ,, ,, 207 Attack of a TV ood .. .. .. ,, ., ,, ,, ,, 210 ViLLAfiES .. .. .. 212 Great part they have played in war ,. .. ., ,. ,, 212 Must not now be held as foiTncrly. . .. .. ,, ,, ,, 213 Examination of a village .. .. .. .. ,, ,, ,, 214 XVI TAGK. How a village sliould be defended. . «« •• .. .. .. 2]5 Ideal case .. ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..217 Attack of villages — Frederick, Duke of Wurtemberg .. .. .. 211) Positions round Paris ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. ;"20 Bougival 220 Eaincy 221 LeBourget .. .. , 222 APPENDICES. Italian Committee on Infantry Tactics recommends section skirmishing; German opinion opposed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 224-23 E Order for marches — General Crawford .. ». .. ,. .. 235 War strength of Infantry ., •• .. .. .. .. .. 258 „ „ Cavalry 25t> „ „ Artillery 260 „ „ Engineers •• •• •• .. •• .. .. 262 Losses in Battles .. •• •• •• •• •« •• •• •• 263 PREFACE. In the following pag-es an attempt is made to compile a book, that may be useful to students of tlie military art who are not near good libraries, and who do not possess the large number of volumes that are written on military subjects. This book has been chiefly prepared to aid officers in the examinations which they must pass for promotion, and to give them the \'iews of a large namber of eminent soldiers. It is lioped that it may direct the attention of officers to the military Avriters referred to, and induce a study of their writings, as opportunity may offer. The form of this book is based on that of the well-known work by Cliarles de Savoye, " Reglement sur le service des armees en campagne amiote d'apres les meilleur auteurs qui ont cent sm- I'art Militaire." An attempt has been made to avoid all technicalities used in either artillery or engineer science, except such as should be well known to officers of every branch of the army, for the duties of each arm of the Service overlap and blend into one another, and the higher the grade an officer attains, th(3 more requisite it is that he should be acquainted generally with the duties of those arms of the Service to wliich he himself does not belong ; by this means alone can we hope to obtain that intelligent co-operation, that harmonious working of all branches of the Service together, which makes a pei'fect machine out of the various elements composing an army, and at the same time gives the surest guarantee of success. In armies, as elsewhere, there is a tendency for everyone to think his own branch, that which he has studied most and knows best, the most important ; such feelings are very natural, and in the lower grades often do much good ; but as men rise in the Service it is desirable that they should know some- thing of the duties of other branches, and the difficulties others have to contend with : such knowledge tends to produce cordiality and forbearance. Cavalry officers falling into com- mand of mixed forces will not then expect their infantiy to gallop, infantry officers will not seek to bind the cavalry to the pace of their infantry. A knowledge of the ca|)abilities of other anus will enable officers to use those arms to the best advantage as occasion offers. B Jomini. Bugeaud. ^lause'nitz. Vial. It should, however, be borne in miud, that it is impossible to lay down fixed rules of action. Nearly every military regula- tion should be followed by the words " according to the ground and according to circumstances." Rules ai'e but guides, which must be intelligently, not blindly, followed. Suppose a committee of the greatest geueraln, — Napoleon, tlie Archduke Charles, and Wellington, &c., — assembled, aided by the ablest artillery and engineer officers, they could lay down no fixed and immutable laws on the art of war, especially on Tactics. Practice and experience alone can decide many points ; practice and experience alone can give the power of applying rules ; but theoiT, by which is really meant the exj»erience obtained by others, is not the less important and valuable. Wlien attempts are made to lay down principles in war, a large mimber of officers at once solve the problems by saying everything depends on circum- stances. As the wind blows, so must the sails be set. But if the pj-oper sail, and the proper amount of sail suitable to each wind, is not known beforehand, haw can sad be made at all \ A man who spends a portion of his life in seeking to thrnw light on the various portions of a difficult subject will, in all probability, do more and go further than he who seeks to understand it in a huri-y. The oliject of theory is to spare each fi'esh stvident the trouble of cLissifjang and snijdividing the subject he studies, in order that he may carefully examine it in iUl its beai-iugs. Theory brings the subject before him classified and arrangetl : it forms the mind of the futui-e commander, or, rather, it points out how he may form it for himself. But theory must be left behind on the battle-field. A wise teacher limits himself to the development of the intellectual capacity of his pupil, he does not seek to keep him in lead rag strings all his life. War is not, as some say, a game of violence and chance. It is, says Napoleon, a game, but a very serious game, where reputation.^, ai-mies, and empires are the stakes. It is the triumph of force, of force skilfully prepared and organized, guided by intelligence and genius, acting in accordance with certain principles of ai-t ; foree snbsei"^dent to the highest social virtues, courage, self-denial, and devotion. As for cliance, doubtless; it jihiys its part in war, but true ai't consists in rendering this part as small as possible, and the object of principles is to subdue chance by prudence, wisdom, and calcula- tion. And it must be remembered that in war the instrument used is not an inert, but a living mass, changeable, and susceptible of gi"eat enthusiasm or the reverse. Principles are but guides, which must be revised, examined and verified after each war, after each discover}' that may be lirought to bear on the military art. The great successes of GnstaviTS Adolphus, Frederick, ]\iarlboro"ugh, Napoleon, \Velling- ton, Von ^loltke, are but due to careful consideration and appreciation of the effects of various discoveries on' the ai't of war. There is no finalitv in the art of war. CHAPTER I. Organization. The difference betweeu an army and a mol), is discipline, and discipline alone confers on bodies of men the power of nianoenvring. Manoeuvres are the quick, orderly cluing.- of liighly-ti-ained and flexible Hamlcr- masses from one kind of formation to another, or their transference from point to point of a battle-field, for purposes which become suddenly feasible in the changing course of the action. Drill is a means to discipline, bnt drill is not discipline, which may be defined as obedience to superiors. It is perfectly clear that to establish and maintain disciphnc there must be personal contact between the superior and the inferior, and as one man can influence only a limited number of his fellow men, it follows that the size of the first " body," " unity," or " division " into which a mass of men is divided, must bear some relation to the number of inferiors of average attainments, that can be influenced by one superior, also of average attainments. Upon this basis must ultimately rest the di\asion of armed bodies of men into companies, bat- talions, regiments, brigades. Divisions, army-corps, armies. There is also another set of ideas that must be taken into consideration, Avhen the organization of men into separate bodies is considered ; not onh" must soldiers be disciplined, bur tliey must also be paid, fed, armed and clothed. Hence the division of men into organized bodies should be such as will facilitate administration. There are therefore two distinct sets of ideas that have to be taken into account; these may be termed administrative ideas, and tactical ideas. It has already been observed that discipline can be best maintained by personal contact of a superior with inferiors, and as the provision of food, arms, and clothing for men, keeps the superior in contact with the inferior, and induces the latter to lean on, be governed and guided by the former, it follows that, if possible, the first tactical division should correspond "vnth the first administrative division, or, in other words, that the smallest inde]Kmdent tactical command (the company) should also be the smallest administrative division. B 2 rnissian Infantry. Captain May (Translated by Ouvry.) ViaL Tlie Captain comnuiiuliiig a company is tlie only officer between vliorr. and the soldier a personal relation subsists in ])eace time. He knows evtiy individual soldier in the nio.st intimate manner, and the soldier on his ])art s aware that his Captiiin so knows him. It is ui)on this relation that tho uncommon influence rests which he, above all (jther officei-s, has over the individual soldier, as well as over the whole company. The soldier sees his nearest home in liis comj)any, and he has under all circumstances a decided feeling for his Captain, even though it be one of hatred. In most cases, however, it is a feeling of love, confidence and i-espect. The intimate and continual intercourse between them allows no room on either side for acting ; each must ajjjiear as he really is, and thus, together with the bad qualities, the good ones also which they both possess must come to light. They become accust rapid movements over stalk and stone, is .scarcely able to keep up with his battalion ; the breaking up into columns of comjmnies is for him a solution of his difficulty. He thinks that certainly the four officers commanding the companies will know what to do, so he attaches himself to a company. The original officers commanding lines are in the same ])redicament, their lines are broken up and .scattered in all parts of the battle, thus they have to give uj) all ideas of connuanding them, and attach themselves to the first comjmny of infantry that lifters, and, in order to do something, command that. It thus happens that .some companies, favoured by chance, have, besides their own Captain, a Major, a Colonel, and a General as well. The officer iu command of a battalion should not take the direction of l)art of the companies on himself, but should rather lead all the four equally. Should foreign armies think of imitating our company colunni fights they nm.st take into consideration how it stimds witli them with regard to fundamental principles, that is, the relation between their officers and men. They will otherwise adopt the disadvantages without gaining the benefit. Despite all the dissertations upon the definition of a tactical unit, the Scherff. most fiuiatical pai'ti.sau of the company cohmm must allow that the company [rt German company 250 men^ is too weak to suffice for the three phases of the attack if an afi'air of any importance is to be undertaken. 12 company ■columns, each acting for itself, cannot fulfil what is required for the preparation Bogushuiski. (Translated by Lumley Cxraham.) Captain May's Tactical Retrospect. (Translated by Ouvry.) Prussian Infantry. O.'.'ptain M.ai (Translated by Ouvry.) and execution of an attack, and d, fortiori they must fail in the last period. But three battalions can undoubtedly accomplish what is requisite. What is thus generally true for companies ap]>lies also, though in a less degi'ee, to single battalions. Three ])attjilions, ;u;ting each for itself, may succeed prett^> well in })reparing and executing an attack, but will find it veiy difficult to accomplish the last stage. We will return more in detail to this subject, we merely point or.t here that in breaking ujj the object of the attack into several distinct i)ortions, that we consider it absolutely recpiisite not to deal with any force smaller than a battalion. The question as to Avliether a company on the German model is, ov is not, a tactical unit, is really a very unimportant one, and must depend to a great extent upon the meaning attached to the words. If by ' tactical unit ' is meant a body that can fight independently, it would appear tliat a division is the real tactical unit, as it includes all arms of the service. A battery of artillery is continually termed a tactical unit, but it does not fight separately. The fact is that the words tactical unit vary entirely according to the point of view. To a General Com- manding an army the army -corps are tactical units; to a General Connnanding a division, brigades are tactical units ; to a General Commanding a brigade, battalions are tactical units ; to an Officer Conmianding a battalion, companies are tactical units. So far then as the company is the basis of military subdivision it is a tactical unit, but no further. The question as to how many companies should compose a battalion may be well answered by referring to Napoleon's words, — " No man can command more than five distinct bodies on the same theatre of war." Taking also into consideration tliat the size of the company is limited by the number of men that can be influenced by one man, it appears that the Prussian system of four companies is a correct one. But it by no means follows that this is the only solution to the problem, or even the best. The more personal intelligence there is distributed tljrough a body of men, the larger the number of officers there are in that body tmined and com- petent to lead it, the more efficient will that body be when placed in the difficult j)ositions of actual combat : ttijiing this, and the fact that the PiTissiaji proportion of officers leaves no maa'giu for sickness or loss, and that the front of a Prussian company is, from the fact of its being three deep, smaller than that of those nations that habitually form then* troops two deep, alpp that the use of troops in extended order has been greatly increased of recent years, it would appear desirable to reduce the size of the companies considerably below the Prussian standard. While at the same time every efltbrt should be made to increase and draw tighter the bonds between the Captain and his company, giving the Captain greater interest in, ai^d control ovei^ t^e ooinpany. Taking al) the bearings of tlie question into consideration, it appears that t^e formation which best suitfi the requirpmeiitp of the; pr^esent day^ is one. of the battnliou into wings, each wing into four companies of 100 to 125 men each. The wing -will thus be a small four-company battalion, (iiul the number of uieu — 100 to 125 in each company — will be such that it can be handled and led by one otiic;er with ease. A half-battalion — a -w-ing — will then be nearly the strength of a battalion ui peace time. With iPi^aril to hali-battalious, they caiuiot be considered as altogether Scliellciulorf. strange to our peace customs, as a peace battalion is just equal to a half- ( I'ranslated battalion in war, and these half -battalion foriuations were proved to be good in by Ouvry.) three glorious battles. Two 1 13S 5,912 122 6 12 24 130 6 6,350 116 124 32 2nil Brigade 140 5,915 122 6 12 24 137 6 6,362 128 126 33 1 Rogimont Cavalry 23 589 13 1 3 5 4 37 2 C77 691 16 7 1 Division Kitld Artillery 18 561 8 5 4 4 56 30 354 4 IS 634 14,066 140 370 41 24 Total Division 325 12,994 265 13 32 1,213 C40 115 24 This force is a very handy complete Division, but it will 1)e observed that it does not embrace engineers, which, in the Prussian Army, form a body attached to the corps, not to the Division. In France, there has been no definite ruk' laid down as to Avhat a Division should consist of, but in the army that took the field in 1870 a Division was usually comjDOsed as follows : — Tabular State:ment of the Composition and Strength of a French Division in 1870.* Officers. N.-C. Officers and Men. llorses. Guns. Staff of Division . . 'Staff ItBi-Valp J Battalion of Eifles .. ° 1 2 Regiments of In- fantry of the Line . . r Staff 2nd Brigade < 2 Regiments of In- [ fantry of the Line . . Artillery (Divisional) . . Engineers (Divisional) . . 10 2 23 |l26 2 |l28 11 4 773 •1,291 1,327 417 77 13 59 54 313 16 18 Total 306 9,885 485 18 * The Ist Division of the 4t}i Cor^js. Note. — The want of Cavalry in this Division is apparent. Cavalry in the French anny was attached to the Corps ; and separate Cavalry Divisions were formed for the army. This system left the Divisions without even a couple of iquadrons as orderlies^ escort, or messengers. In the Biitisli Army, a Division will, on actual Kurvice, be fonnetl as follows : — A Division ok Infantry. (Approved by Ilis Royal lli^lincss the Coiniuiinder-in-Chief, 18. 7. 71.) Offlcers. N.-C. Oflieers and Men. All Ranks. Horses. Guns. Stuff' 13 6 19 36 . *2 Brigades of Infantry (6 Bns.). . 191 6,398 6,601 82 — 1 Battalion of Rifles 31 1,066 • 1,099 10 — 1 Regiment of Cavalry . . 27 607 631 559 — 3 Batteries Field Artillery 21 5t7 568 436 18t 1 Company Roval Engineers . . 5 186 191 41 1 Troop Militiiry Police . . 2 73 75 65 — 1 Infantry and Artillery Reserve Ammunition Column . . } 6 206 212 253 — Total 299 9,104 9,403 1,862 18 * Details of the actual War Strength of a Battalion of Infantry, a Cavalry Regiment, a Battery of Artillery, and a Company of Engineers, are given in the Appendix. t One 9-pr. Battery ; two 16-pr. Batteries. It is not known who first proposed the Division and army-corps. It is Decker. rea.sonable to suppose that it was gradually an-ived at. The .system of forming armies in Divisions was first thought of and tried Dc Preval. by the Marshal Broglie in the war of 1760, but it w^as then very imperfect, as ail useful things nmst be wliich have to contend at first against routine and prejudice. Turenne was the first in France who divided armies into Divisions, but Giustineani. after his time this happy idea was for a long time forgotten. During the Seven Ycare' War the French Army, and that of Duke Ferdinand, were formed into units somewhat .similar to Divisions, but no rule seemed to govern this formation, which was more apparent than real. In 1795, the Division formation was adopted l)y the French Republican armies. The Divisions were tlien composed of all arms of the Service. They had a special staff and administrative bodies, each was composed of four demi-brigades of infantry, or tw^elve battalions, four to eight squadrons of cavalry, one to two companies of artillery, wath eight to twelve guns, the effective being 10,000 to 15,000 men, according to the .strength of the battalions and squadrons. Austria adopted this formation in 1805, Prus.sia in 1806, Russia in 1807. Prior to this period armies were formed into advanced guards, first and second lines and reserve, also into wings, there being distinct commanders for these bodies, also distinct commanders for the infantry, cavahy and artillery. Traces of this formation remain in some armies even now. The com- manders were often detailed for the day, and there was no bond of union between the commander and those he commanded, as there is between a Divisional General and his Division. A division is either mixed, in which case it is termed an army Division ; or De Hardcgg. it is composed of one arm of the Service, in which case it is termed a cavalry or infantry Division. Such a Division is composed of two or three brigades. I'O Jouiini. Le Bourg. Dcckw.. De Tcrnay. Do la Pierre. De PrfiTftl. De.la.Bocke- Ajmon. This word 'division' is also used in A nsfcria, Prussia, and Batvairia, to denote a body composed of two squadrons. In the infantiy of a certain class, as in rifles, it is used to denote a Ijody conipcjsed of two companies. The.-;? cavah-y divisions have f]fenei-ally a field officer ui permanent command. In tlie infantry, such divisions are conniiandud by the senior Captain. In Russia, divisions of artillery are formed by the junction of four or hve batteries. The preceding, says Jomini, shows how nuich impiOA'ement is requisite in military nomenclature. It is absunl to call a body composed of twelve battalions a Division at the same time that two companies are termed a Division. I do not pretend to say if it was a confusion between these two words that caused the formation of the heavy masses at Waterloo. However that may be, it is requisite in all armies that perfectly distinct terms should be used to denote a Division of twelve battalions and a Division of two compa;mes, or one-fourth of a battalion. The same confusion exists in English as to tlie "wojd^, — fort, battery, brigade, staff, &c. No term should convey two distinct meaning's, nor should a geneyml term be adopted to express a separate, special, or definite meaning without an explanatory word, otherwise inconvenience and confusion of ideas are produced. Ternrs cannot be too clear and distinct. It is, besides, desirable to have some Divisious of greater strength than others, because a General may wish to give the comaiand of certain Divisions to such trustworthy officer as he may wish to detach for important operations requiring the aid of a large body of men. Many Generals wish that Divisions should be composed of three brigades, because when a Division fights singly it will then have two brigades in fine, one in reserve, wliilst the orga.nizatiou in two brigades, by which only a portion can be in wserve,. is vicious. Divisions should, as madi a« possible, be of t^e sftuue' strength and organization, iij order that if possible they may be employed in th0 saroo: war, and with equal coniidence. It is important to form Dis-isions in peace corresponding to the territorial divisions ; if this be not done, when wai' breaks out the General-in-Chief finds himself entirely ajasoi'bed in a long and difficult operatioji. It may be easily uiider.stood that a.Division newly formed cannot be-of the aajue value as one that hag been in regular working order for some time. The custom of fighting and working together causes to arise between the corps a confidence and friendly feeling which tends greatly to produce swccess. (ienerals.thus know completely the men, and ;u-e known and appreciated by them. If the milittH'V institutions of a country are so bad ;is to aeparate the troofw of the s«iue Division in peace time, they sJiould be biugaded and put in Diivisione as soon as ]>ossible. The manner in which tlie military machine is ])ut together at the opening of a campaign exorcises much influence over tlie luanner in which it ])eifonns its duties. ISIixed. Divisions and biigades.appear to be more generally uspd now than formerly. In addition to the requisite artillery, a company of engineers to execute various works, a detachment of police to maintain discipline, and a sufficient numbej' of mmi of the adnunistjvitive services to transport tstoi^es, hosjjital.^, and provisipus, ai>e attached, in short, a Division is orgaaiieeU so a» to provide entirely for it.s- own waajts. Na.poleon reGognized t^jetixith of- tliese facts, too late, wJwn be saw the inconvenience of '"having no J[>iviaiQi>s.tU' brjgades^if^cavijry attadied to?the corps and Divisions of infantry. In approvijig of the di^^iiUiitiun of oavahy amount the-- Divisions ami brigades, light .cavaltyoiUy is refferred'to ; Cuiiijtsaiei's or Tieav.y;cayflkj'. should never be thus scattered. They form masses of reserve cavalry, and should be 11 used only in great actions and battles. General Hoclie, when lie took coniniaml of the Ai"niy of the Sanibro and Jleuse, desiring to remove what he considered to be an incon\'eniiMK'e, united all his cavalry into separate Divisions. But in avoiding one error be fell into another not less dangerous, by destroying the mutual su[n>ort of the various anus -depriving them of their reciprocal support. He wonkl ha\ o d('ri\ed greater advantages from his cavalry, says Jomini, had he left the llu.ssais, the (Jhasseui-s, and even the Dragoons with the Divisions, forming his reserve oidy of hea\')' ca\';dry. The advantage of mixed Divisions anil brigades has been so fully recog- nized in the Prussian Army as a principle of organization, that each Division is composed of cavalry, artillery, and infantry ; this combination allows them to manoeuvre on all kinds of ground, and enables them to advance without danger and inconvenience. This arrangement further forms General otHcers and accustoms them to the comnKUid of mixed bodies, and enables them by practice to detcnuiiio the strength and weakness of the various arms of the Service. Ai-my-corps are formed by tlip junction of Iavo or more Divisions togetlior. The folhnviiig- is a (Jeta^ of an a.rnjy-corps of the Gernian Empire :— 12 Tabular Statement of the Composition and Strength of a German Army-Corps. Wah Establishment. o O .2 " .2 c C OS II go ll sis ■y i Horses. 00 *p 5 Field Troops. i 3 1 .. 5 4 9 9 5 '5. o ■•5 c '5 e 5 1 i •3 r* C S O General Commanding and Staff u 93 1 41 1.50 121 10 124 126 16 370 4 ... 1st Division — Staflf of Division ("Staff 1st Brigade -? 2 Regiments > (, Infantry S 2nd Brigade 1 Regiment Cavalry 1 Division Field Artillery ... 4 138 140 23 IS 14 3 5,912 5,915 5-9 5t;i 122 122 13 8 6 G 1 12 12 3 24 24 4 4 56 1 130 137 37 30 e 6 4 18 31 12 6, .350 6,.362 677 634 14,066 26 12 116 12S 691 140 1 1 32 33 7 41 ... 24 Total 1st Division 325 12,994 265 13 32 354 1.213 640 115 24 Total 2nd Division 325 12,994 263 13 32 56 354 18 14,066*1.213 640 115 24 *1 Battalion Rifles 22 985 17 1 2 IS io 10 1 21 4 116 24 732 1 1,056J 16 24 10 Total of 2 Divisions ... 672 26,273 .547 27 66 37 29,188 2,442 1,304 240 48 T Cavalry Division — Staff 1st Brigade {.fjj'^giVuents- 2nd Brigade 1 Battery Horse Artillery 4 46 48 4 14 3 1,178 1,181 141 26 26 2 6 6 1 8 1 13 7 74 81 5 A 4 31 12 1,354 1,366 157 26 12 1,382 1,394 117 32 84 92 1 1 U 15 16 6 Total Cavalry Division 104 2,517 54 4 13 17 180 10 2,920 2,931 162 41 G Artillery Reserve — Regimental Staff 1 Kicld Division (4 Batteries) I Horse Division ci Batteries) Ainnuinition Train 18 10 20 50 30 561 283 767 1 8 4 18 31 15 5 3 10 1 4 9 4 9 6 30 20 784 4 4 10 12 634 328 1,627 10 140 244 239 370 186 1,358 1 41 21 230 24 12 Total Artilleiy Reserve 1,613 879 18 16 15 840 18 2,601 63 1,916 293 36 Pioneers 6 5 29 76 12 4 313 1,254 82 430 83 Military Train Battalion 35 495 16 .'i07 935 148 2,177 646 1,689 598 Administrative Services 1 43 127 328 381 18 974 232 328 92 Field Post Grand Total of Field Troops 53 24 :3i 77 56 12 got; 32,613 647 234 207 70 987 .3,446 39,341 6,787 6,895 1,363' 1 90 * Till' Butt.ilion of Rifles is attached to either of the two Divisions at the discretion of the OfScer Commanding the .\rmy-Corps. t The Cavalry Divisions in the field are not attached to the Army-Corps, but to the armies; they Vary, being sometimes comjjosed of two, sometimes three brigades, of two or three regiments each. Tlie following is a detail of a French army-corps, as formed at the beginning of the war of 1870; but, as has been already stated, the French have no absolute form for an army- corps : — i; Tabular Statement of a FiL-nch anny-corps in 1870. OtTicers. N.-C. Olllcors !ind men. Horses. Guns. Genoml StafV 16 62 Artillci-v Sliiff 7 , , Engineer Staff . . 8 •• Military Stuff 35 62 Civil Stud" Total Corps Staff 41 62 1st Division 306 9,885 185 18 2iid Division 312 9,995 .506 IS 3rd Division . . . . .. 315 9,931 4-75 18 Cavalry Division 190 2,279 1,569 Reserve Artillery 24 925 778 36 Artillery Tniin, Small and Gre^l Gun Ammunition .. I S 503 563 • • Pontouiers 5 133 6 , , Artificers. . 1 75 2 , , Reserve Engineers 4 140 67 , , Military Train . . 12 570 601 . , Administrative Corps .. 19 236 2 Hospital Department . . 42 236 67t Police 5 87 62 Total 1,283 34,995 5,245 90 * The Ith Army Corps, f 22 Ambulances, 8 Wagons, 396 Cacolets. NoTK. — None of the French Corps were completely horsed during the recent war. The Pontoon Train, for example, requires 210 horses, it had but 6. The Battalions were all under horsed, as were the other services. The following is the establishment of a British army-corps formed for active service : — Ax Army-Corps. (As approved by His Royal Highness tht > Comman der-in-Chief, 18. 7. 71.) Onicers. N.-C. Officers and Men. All Ranks. Horses. Guns. Head-Quarter Staff 21 12 33 64 3 Divisions of Infantry . . 897 27,312 28,209 5,586 51 1 Brigade of Cavalry 92 2,039 2,131 2,001 6 Corps Artillery : — Regimental Staff 4 2 6 11 — 3 Batteries Horse Artillery 21 516 537 537 18 2 Field Batteries 11- 382 396 308 12 Army-Corps Reserve Ammuni- tion Column in 3 sections. 1 - 516 534 549 — Engineers : — Regimental Staff 2 1 3 5 — 1 Company Royal Engineers . . 5 186 191 4 — • 1 Pontoon Train 1. 247 251 154 — 1 Telegraph Troop 1. 245 249 120 -- ■ Total 1,082 31,458 32,510 0,376 00 14 The iViiicyii of two or more army-coi'ps forms an army. To x\'hich is usually assigned in addition one or more Divisions of cavalry, and sometimes a reserve of artillery, as was done by the Austrians in the war of 18GG, and by the French in 1870. Having thus given generally an account of the various sections into which bodies of armed men must be divided, in order that they may work together for one end. and be submitted to one authority, it appears desirable to give some account of the nature of the duties devohnug on the General Avho commands, the Staff who aid him in carrpng out his duty, and the various branches of the service. In most annies the various functions are divided between three great departments. The control, or intendance, the artillery, and the engineers.* The demarcation between the duties performed by these various bodies differs in various armies, but the difference between the three bodies is sufficiently marked to constitute a well-defined distinction, although the exact line of division between the duties of each, may not be the same in all armies. In the Britisli Service, an army is commanded by either a Field-Marshal or a Genea-al ; an army-corps by either a General or Lieutenant-General ; a Division by cither a Lieutenant- General or Major-General, and a brigade by either a Major- General or a Colonel with the rank of Brigadier-General. The following remarks upon the duties of a General Officer are interesting, as showing how much depends on him, and how requisite it is, that at all times he should receive the cordial support of his subordinates. Napoleon. Nothing is more impoi'tant in war than the command. Whei\ war is made against a single power,.there should be but one army acting upon one line of operations, and directed by one General. Jomini. The most essential qualities for a Greneral will always be greatness of character or moral courage, which produces resolution ; next, coolness or physical courage, which masters danger ; knowledge comes only in the third line, but it is a powerful auxiliary, it would he blindness to despise it. But, as I have already said, I do not mean great erudition, a liiile well vinderstood is bettei', but, above all, a General should have a mind thoroughly imbued with guiding ]irinciples. In addition to these qualities there is personal characiei'. A brave, just, upright man, knowing how to value merit in others, but not jealous of it, one who can use it for his own ends, such a person will .always be a good General, and may even be a great man. Unfortunately an anxiety to be just to merit, is by no means a common quality. Mediocrities are always jealous and inclined to make bad selections, fearing lest the world should say that they are led, and forgetting that he who is placed at the head of an anny has * A Department of the Army is a body that serves the Army generally, producing or supplying something that is of geneml utility, and for the supply of which the Department is responsible. The Artillery nnd Engineers are thus Departments of the Army. They are, however, dillerent from the Cmitrol Depart- ment, inasmuch as tliay have a tactical relation with other troop.s, which it has not. They are thus Arms of the Service VibvscW as Depart menfs of the Army ; andthi* double function is the peculiarity of these two bodies. 1j almost tiie entire glory of succeas. however small may bo his sliai'e in obUiiniu^ it. I think then that the best Way of obfcuning a Crenera!, when thei'e is no gi-eat leader wlio has mven proofs of ability, will b€ known to ais many as possible of those who have to caiTV it out Far too ofteji these things are wrapped in mysterioxte silence. 16 At the moment of action, if possible, even the soldiere should know tlie plan, e;ich then, even the private, helps intelligently. The duties of a General in command, even of a small army, are so great, necessitating such constant thought and care, and requiring him to be present at so many places at one time, that it is impossible for any one man to perform these duties. Hence in all armies a General is aided and assisted by officers termed " Staff Officers." Staff. There are few words in the military vocabulary which are used to denote a wider range of meaning than the Avord ' staff.' Jomini has referred in strong terms to the errors that the indiscriminate use of the word ' division ' may produce, and it is therefore desirable to arrive at a clear definition of the word ' staff.' Staff is used in a twofold sense, — first, to denote all officers not in actual personal command of troops ; for example, the Paymaster, Adjutant, and Quartermaster of a regiment, are termed the Regimental Staff, that is to say, they are officers who deal with all the companies, and are not like the Captain, Subaltern, or ]\Iajor, who actually command, or belong to certain defined portions of the regiment, as the companies or wings. In this sense, Surgeons not attaohed to regiments are termed Staff-Surgeons. Similarly officers on the General Service List of the Indian Army, are termed officers of the Indian Staff Corps ; similarly, the commanding officers of Artillery and Engineers, officers of the latter arm not attached to companies, and officers of the Control Department and subordinate branches are termed officers of the Staff. They are for general duty with the army, and are not attached to troops; but although all these officers belong to the Staff, they are not Staff Officers in the proper acceptation of the word. The Staff Officer is an officer who acts as the eye and ear of the General, or other officer to whom he is attached, who c(jnveys his orders, collects information for liim, and represents him when he is not present. If the General of an army be compared to the head, the Staff, as Hardegg says, may be justly compared to the nerves which convey the volition from the head to the different members. The position of a Staff Officer should be clearly understood,. in order that the duties falling on him may be properly appreciated. He knows the General's plans, and from constant personal intercourse with him, is fully aware of all his intentions, and is conseqiiently able to say what he would order under certain circ\nnstances. Having no real authority of his own he can only act and give such orders as the General may direct. He has no authority as the commanding officers of Artillery and Engineers have over their own coi^ps and the Controller 17 has over liis OAvn department, he is simply a portion of the General commanding. The dnties of a Staff Officer rcqnire great tact, readiness, and knoAvledg'e of all branches of the army. In foreign annies, as the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and French, there is one Staff; that is to say, the staff duties are inidiWded, and are performed by a body of officers -who are selected in various ways, but who all perform staff functions. There is an officer -with the head-quarters of each army, army- •corps, or division, termed Chief of the Staff, who is the senior Staff Officer and takes the orders of the General commanding the army, army-corps, or Divnsion, on all matters; he is aided by as many Staff Officers as may be requisite. All correspondence "to and from the General with the commanding officers of army- corps, Divisions, or bngades, and with the commanding officers of Artillery and Engineers, and the Intendants or Controllers, .passes through his hands, he registers the General's decisions and orders, and conveys them to all concerned. It is his special function to consider and bring to the General's notice, the effect that any regulation proposed by the head of any roviding wagons for the eventual transjiort of the wounded, the direction of the train and of the piisoners, the delivery of reports to superior authorities, and the providing of a guide who knows the ground belong to necessary details. The latter may appear superfluous, l)ut is far from being so. In the first place, even if in possession of the most detailed map, the whole of its .sections cannot be carried in the sabretache, and an unex})ected course of events may necessitate tho use of sections whose employment wa.s only reckoned upon for the following day, and which are consequently not at hand in the moment of need. Thus it happened that in the Stjifi' of an officer holding a high command, which was richlv provided with materials for maps, C 2 20 not a sinj^le section relating to tliat portion of the ground couM be found upon entering the battle-field of Konniggriitz. And even when tliey are on the spot errors cannot be avoided. During a rajjid ride, in wliich the direction is often changing, and the attention ig distracted by p;issing events, the run of a map may be lost even Avhen actually in the hand. Lastly, with the best maps mistakes are easily made about points some way off, church towers behind woods and such like. The old saying, that a messenger tied to a string is better than the finest map, has still its full force, and it is well in every large staff to comnu.ssiou one ofHcer with the sole duties of reconnoitring the ground.* We may take this opportunity of remarking that the training in reading mractice oneself in plans for use in action the looking over and general understanding of them does not suffice. It is much more necessary to be able to observe, as - it were, a landscape in one's mind, as has been often attempted in these sketches. Let it be supposed that one arrives at any spot and asks which portion on the map corresponds with the landscape from this position. In this way previous practice will be so much the more useful at a future time in making judicious dispositions of ground. Napoleon. To be able to read a map, to understand a reconnaissance, to be able to issue orders, to be able to give a clear statement of the most intricate move- ments of an army, — such are the requirements of a Staff officer. Tlie functions of a Staff Officer are thus of a very extensive nature, and to discharge them well, he must have not only considerable knowledge but also a great amount of tact and good humour. A fussy Staff Officer does much harm, he is always interfering with the heads of departments, pointing- out itoio they should do their duty. It being his proper place to take obstacles out of their way, to smooth their relations with others, and to bring to the General's notice any neglect on their part. The moment a Staff Officer, using his position on the Staff of a General, prescribes how any definite action is to be performed, he removes the responsibility for the due execution from the shoulders of the executive officer whose duty it is, on to his own. Confusion and friction must ensue from such a course of action. It is impossible to over- rate the importance of a Staff Officer's duties, or the knowledge he requires to fulfil those duties adequately, but a Staff Officer must never forget that more hami than good may be done by interference with details. The way in which an executive officer carries out his duty often depends on his peculiar tem- perament, no two men placed in similar positions will act exactly in the same way. Within wide limits their conduct must be judged by results; to attempt to bind all to one standard, would be to destroy all individuality: consequently details should be invariably left to those whose duty it is to * The following extract is remarkable, more especially when it is remembered that the ground was that fought over by tJie great Frederick, and close to the Prussian frontiers. " The wood of Maslowed was not distinctly marked on the maps, 80 that its extent and depth were unknown. From east to west it is about 2,000, from north to 80uth about 1,200, paces long." [Prussian ofEcial account, campaign 1866. Translated by Uozicr and Wright.] 21 execute orders. Throuf^li tlie Staff all correspondence of all kinds should pass, and in the StatF office, that is to say, th»? Generars office, all decisions should be carefully registered for future reference. If this be not done there will be much con- fusion. Tlie ciniimainling officer of Artillery, the comm.anding officer of Engineers, Jomini. aiul the Inteudant, claim to deal with the General-iu-Chief, and not with his Chief of the St^iff. Nothing should i)reveiit the closest intercourse between these functioniu-ies and the General, but he should see them only in presence of the Chief of the Staff, and send him all their correspondence, otherwise confusion is inevitable. Control Department. The Control Department is charged with the supply of all stores of every kind, both munitions de guerre and de houclte. The head of the Control Department in the British service under existuig regulations does not deal ^vith the Staff but with the General commanding; all correspondence for the Controller is taken by that officer to the General commanding, who settles it, the Controller being the means of communication on all questions connected with barracks, fuel, light, powder, shot, arms, engineer appliances, boots and clothes, as well for food, forage, and money. The Control Department in the English Army is unlike the Intendance of any foreign army, performing many duties which in foreign armies are not performed by that body, and, on the other hand, having nothing to do with duties that in foreign armies are performed by the Intendance. The Controller is bound to be well acquainted with all the armament Extracted of works within the command, and the stores required for the same. fi'om the He is bound to repair all militaiy stores of every kind, and he is Control bound to have all reserve stores kept up to the proper quantities and to Regulations, concentrate them in reserve depots. A Controller will consult with the officer commanding as to the place of supply depots, and as to what things are to be got on the spot. The Controller will conduct his duties under the direct orders of the officer commanding, to whom he may be attached. He will be the adviser and agent of the officer commanding in all matters connected with the raising or issue of money, the supply of provisions, stores, clotliing and transport. He will relieve him as far as possible of all details connected therewith. The Controller will hold towards the officer commanding, and towards the heads of other departments within the command, with reference to Control services, a position analogous to that held by the officer of the General Staff, with reference to militaiy services; except- ing that while the Controller is under the immediate command of the officer commanding, he is at the same time responsible to the Secretary of State for War that the duties of his department are conducted in strict accordance with the instructions laid down in the regulations, and with any special instruction that may be given to his predecessors, or that may from time to time be conveyed to him. 22 The Controller will not be warranted in departing on any occasion from his instructions upon his own authority. Should circumstances at any time render a deviation therefrom in his opinion necessary or expedient, before reference can be made to the War Office,hc will submit the case to the officer commanding, and obtain a written sanction for the deviation, reporting the full particulars to the Secretary of State for AVar. The Controller will be held responsible for any measure that may be adopted on his recommendation. Should the Controller receive orders from the officer commanding inconsistent with War Office Instructions or Regulations, and whichmay not have proceeded from his (the Controller's) suggestion, it will be his duty respectfully to point out this inconsistency to the officer command- ing, and to solicit a special authority in writing for the deviation, which, being granted, mu.st be implicitly obeyed. A report of the circumstance, countersigned b}' the officer commanding, together with a copy of the correspondence, will be transmitted bj'the Controller to the Secretary of State for War, who will hold the officer commanding responsible for the measures ordered by him. Should the officer commanding and the Controller, or either of them, consider that thev have not sufficient power, or shou.ld they be in any doubt how to act, reference will be made to the Secretary of State for War. When it is necessary to promulgate in "orders," a decision of the General officer commanding, or an instniciion referring to Control services, the Controller will submit in writing, for the approval of the officer commanding, a draught or memorandum of the terras in which the communication is to be made, and having obtained the initials or signature of the officer commanding to the document, will then transmit it to the Adjutant- General or proper military Staff officer to be put in orders. In cases in which the decision of the officer commanding does not requireproraiilgation by an order, the intervention of a railitary Staff officer will not be required. The Controller will communicate the decision to the persons concerned direct, and in writing with his signature affixed, adding the words, ''by decision of the General officer commanding." When the troops are brigaded, the Controller will be in direct com- munication with the Brigadier on all siibjects appertaining to Control duties, and will submit any question which may require decision or consideration to the officer commanding the division or garrison. The Controller is charged with the appropriation of barracks, and their custody when vacant and not dismantled. In order to obtain information as to the best mode of suiDph^ing the troops, the Controller will use every endeavour in all situations in which he may be placed to ascertain the resources of the country in cattle, grain, forage, fuel, &c., and the means of transport by land or water, the established rates and prices of the countr}-, the state of the roads, the communication by land and by inland navigation, together with all other information of a local nature that may be useful. The Controller will be responsible for the proper organization and for the economical and efficient working of the transport service, Avhether furnished by the Army Service Corps or provided locally. The Controller will make himself acquainted with the quantity and nature of the various articles for which land transport would be neces- sary should the army take the field, and he will ascertain the resources of his district in respect of auxiliary transport. 23 The Controller -will have in readiness plans for the movement of the force or of jjarts of it, -with specifications of the equipment, animals, and stores necessary. These plans will be kept corrected in accordance with the progress of events. The Controller will be the medium of communication with the War Office on subjects relating to Control sei*viccs, but he will submit all letters and communications for tlie perusal and observation of the officer commanding, except those relating to matters of ordinary routine, which the officer commanding -may not require to be submitted to him. It will be the duty of the Controller to prepare for the officer com- manding all correspondence on Control subjects, whether local or with the Secretary of State for War. lie will ])reserve in his office all letters and other records relating to those duties, including the corresponder.ee addressed to the officer commanding. He will be prepared at all times to lay those records before the officer commanding when required to do so, and to furnish him with full information on all points connected with Control duties. The Controller is responsible that the officers of the Army Service Corps preserve discipline and efficiency in the establishment under their orders. In France the organization and execution of the various administrative VauchfUe. services, the supervision and continual control of the interior economy of corps and detachments, forms a portion of the duty of the Intendance, as well as the authorization of all expenses, the verification and audit of accounts of issues and consumption of all kinds, either of money or articles obtained in the country or of prizes made by the enemy — in short all the details of the admi- nistration, except what is connected with the materiel of the Artillery and the Engineers, form a portion of the duties of the Intendance. The Intendants and Sous-Intendants have no duty transaction but with the commanding officers or Chief of the Staff of the army, army- corps, division, oi- brigade to which they are attached. The Intendant, or Chief Commissary of an army, has under his direction Grimoard. the agents who supply the following provisions : — Forage, hospital requisites, clothing and camj) equipment transport, the supply of articles used bj' the troops in barracks or on the line of march. The provision of the subsistence of the army is the first duty of the Intendant, all else is subordinate to that. Armies have frequently to be fed by forced requisitions ; these requisitions are ordered by the General connuanding, the custody and distribution of what is obtained by requisitions falls to the Intendant. The following remarks on the subject of requisitions are inte- resting : — However careful and foi'eseeing the administration of an army may be, it Dc Gorlache. will often be compelled to seek assistance from the inhabitants of the country occupied by the army : compulsory demands for assistance are then made. These demands are termed " requisitions " when they are in kind, " contribu- tions " when in money. Eequisitions are therefore demands on the enemy's country ; they are made witliout any pi'etence of justice, only by the right of the strongest ; that necessity commands them ; they are in short a kind of fine to help the cost of the war. The same right of war, which authorizes requisitions of provisions in an enemy's country, also permits requisitions of money. The adoption of such measures, and the amounts demanded, the mildness or harshness with winch they are enforced, are entirely political questions. The power of calling for contributions in money in an enemy's country when occupied, belongs exclusively to the General commanding-in-chief. The 24 amounts so obtained are paid into the military chest to the credit of the treasury, and are inchideil in the general resources, to meet the wants of the- army. When a General-in-Chief determines to call for a contribution in money,, the Intendant-in-Chief will furnish him with a report on the state and resources of the country, upon the taxes already charged on it, and upon the chances of the sum demanded being realized. Griiuoard. M. Paris du Vernei, the most able lutendantthe French ai'ray had, lays it down as a principle, that so far as possible requisitions in kind, especially in- grain, are to be avoided. He says with great ti'uth that when the inhabitants get frightened about their own food they hide their corn, and famine often thus succeeds rapidly to abundance. He considers it better at all times, even for the coimtry itself, to demand money and buy corn with it. If bread is demanded, the size and shape of loaf used in the countiy should be accejited ; it will be easier to distribute it, than to insist on the bakers providing loaves similar to those used by the army. Dc Gerlache. Requisitions should if possible be moderate in amount and frequently renewed, this will divide the pressure of their charges more equally ; they ai'e at all times most vexatious to the people. If contributions in money can be obtiiined they are always the safest, easiest, and most politic, it being far moi'e economical to provision an army by purchase than in any other way. But it always hajjpens that although the amount of a contribution is stateil in coin, yet practically in war a portion must be taken in coin, a portion in paper, a portion in provision, a portions in labour. This latter portion is termed "a requisition." One advantage of contributions in money is that they avoid waste, and. produce a certain amount of trade in the country, which may slightly alleviate- the burdens of the people. A system of requisitions is essentially a bad one, and a wise administration will use it as little as possible, and with great circumspection, and then only for the first and pressing wants of the army, or if the people wish it to enable them to pay the contributions more easily ; nevertheless, at certain times and places requisitions have to be resorted to, and it is then advisable to place them under strict rules. It is most imprudent to give too much power to the local authorities, muck time will be lost and very little done. An official of the army must be present at the division of the amount, and must assure himself of the means of executing the requisition ; otherwise the envy, small hatreds, and pa-ssions of little towns influence the division, and when arbitraiy acts are either done or authorized in war, such feelings should not be excited. When an urgent requisition is demanded, the chief inhabitants are imme- diately ordered to supply a certain portion, according to their estimated ability ; and the representatives of the Government are the firet so called on. Shop- keepers should only pay their pro rata share, whatever may be the state of their stores. When the leading men of a town are thus dealt Avith, it is unlikely that they will spare any one, and they will be just to their fellow citizens ; if this be not done there will be neither justice in dividing the requisition nor punctuality in bringing it. It is most essential to watch the agents entrusted with the duty of obtain- ing the requisition for furnishing a requisition may be made the j^retext, and furnish the occasion, for the most vexatious interference with the people. However, if the orders are very explicit, and if civilians acting as com- missaries assist the military commissaries, a great many abuses and vexations may be avoided. But if the quantity or quality of the provisions has been unsuitably fixed, and if the country be handed over to the agents of the Intendance and these happen to be dishonest, avarice will find a thousand ways of inflicting misery on the inhabitants ; and as Olennius, of whom Tacitus speaks, demauded skins of a uniform pattern, the agents will be most difficult 25 to satisfy. The quality will never be fjfoixl onouglj, the nierusure will not he of the proper weight, vr the weight of the ])r()per niensure, the corn will not be clean enough, the bullocks will be too small, too thin, and everything will be too little, or bad. These disputes will be finally settled, but the country and the army will sutler. Notwithstanding the most careful consideration and foresight, requisitions must be made in every country where there is war. The armj/ must lire, and no consideration should stop the staff when this im])erions law has to be obeyed. A town or a village always contains food and snp))lies()f different kinds for an army which is at hand ; — to find the means of extracting thoni, that is the problem. Under such circumstances, and in accordance with orders to be issued by DeLavarenne. only the Commaniler-in-Chief or the Commandants of Corps, the Chief of the Staff will select the i)laces on which a contribution is to be levied, its amount and nature. An officer or a Sub-Intendant (or better still, a treasury emploije if money has to be received) is entrusted with overseeing the contribution in a certain district, and when the duty is completed the Military Intenilance divide the proceeds as may be directed. This officer or Sous-Intendant will be accom- panied by a detachment composed of a force of cavalry and infantry, com- manded by an officer whose duty it is to respond to all demands made on him, either to furnish sentries over pei-sons' houses, to aid the local authorities, by main force, or even to make house to house visits. For such an operation (as for foraging) a party is told off ]iroj)ort;onate to the value of the contribution, the neigh])ourhood of the enemy, or the dis])o- sitions of the inhabitants. The commanding officer is responsible that all requisite measures are taken to ensure the execution of the order. This is one of the most delicate and unpleasant duties with which an De Cessac. officer can be charged. The officer entrusted with this duty, prit)r to leaving his garrison, camp, or post, should receive an exact list of the villages which are to contribute, the nature and the amount of contribution each is to furnish. lie should know the places that the provisions, forage, &c., should be sent to. He should be informed of the roads leading from the place he is in to the various villages, and from the villages to the magazines. He should be in- formed if the enemy is in the neighbourhood of the country called on to con- tribute, and what is the force assembled. He should also know the feelings anel character of the inhabitants. He should ask information on all these points in the gi-eatest detail, and he should ask for and get a covering order to protect him against any odium that may arise from having to resort to extreme measures. He should also keep a journal noting down all marches or opera- tions of any kind, and he should call on the chief inhabitants to sign as to the state of the contributions levied. Prior to moving off he should inspect his men, and give the clearest instrtictions as to pillage. As in reconnaissances, detachments to levy contri- butions should not be too large — too large a detachment frightens the people, who hide their cattle, their corn, and forage, leave their houses, and go to seek and warn the enemy. Large detachments fatigue an army — they can be followed and easily attacked. Small detachments on the contrary go everywhere, arrive at unexpectett moments, return with ease, and, consuming little food, can easily hide in small woods and ravines. For these reasons an officer sent to levy contributions should take only a small detachment. A detachment sent for such a purjiose- should })e composed one-half of infantry, one-half of cavalry ; it should l)e accompanied by guides and interpreters ; fi-esh guides should be procured each day, for peasants rarely know any Init the roads close to their own houses. The Commandant of the detachment will arrange so as to arrive about the middle of night near the village on which the contribution is to be levied. He will place his men in an advantageous i)osition, and will send an iuterjn-eter. 26 accompanied by two iufantry officers, to find out if the enemy is in the village ; tliey will go quietly tln-ough the streets, and will listen attentively, and examine everything. If an enemy is in the village they will answer his challenge, and return as quickly as possible. If nothing indicates the presence of an enemy tliey will return and report to the Commandant if the enemy is in possession ; so soon as the scouts return the party will retreat : if tliere is no enemy, two mounted non-conunissioned officers and an interpreter will be sent into the village. They will go to the chief man in the place, who repre- sents the Government : it will be very advantageous if the guide or interpreter knows the man. Pie will be at once told that a strong body of the enemy is close at hand, and that guides are requisite, and that he must come and speak to the commanding oflicer. This will generally induce him to 02)en his door ; he will be then taken without noise to the Commandant. While this is going on the Commandant will surround the village with small parties of seven or eight men to prevent any one leaving it or going to warn the eneiuy who may be near at hand. As soon as the chief man shall have been brought to the Commandant, he will be told of the orders given to require a sum of money, a quantit}' of provisions, forage, carts, or labourers. He will be directed to {)lace in the hands of the Commandant five or six hostages chosen among the chief people of the place, also the cliildren of the jsrincipal inhabitants. When these hostages have been given, the magistrate will be allowed to go, and a very short time will be allowed to get the contribution ready and on the road for the ai-my. If the contribution cannot be at once supplied, the hostages will be taken away, and the people will be informed that if the contribution does not reach the army on a certain day the village will be burned. The following is an examiDle of a requisition : - - " Notice. ^' Nancy, 2'ird January, 1871, A p.m. "The Prefect of the Meurthe sends the Maire of Nancy the following order: — "If to-morrow, the 24th January, at 12 noon, 500 workmen from the workshops of the town are not at the railway station, the foremen first, and a certain number of the workmen next, will be seized and shot." If the magistrates refuse to furnish the contribution, the Commandant wiU threaten to burn their houses and farms, and will prepare to carry out his threats if the}' are not submissive. To compel villages to pay their contingent, the magistrates should be written to and informed that if, at a certain hour on a certain day, they have not furnished the proper quantity of money, ])rovisions, forage, carts, oi- labourers, a party will be sent to burn the farms and houses. On the day appointed tlie detachments sent for this purpose will go to the village, burn one house and threaten to bui'n all the rest if the contribution be not at once forthcoming. As the weight of contribution becomes excessive, if it is not equally divided, and as the magistrates of a country occupied by an enemy invariably divide contribution in an unjxist way, the officer charged with this operation will point out the means for raising this tax, and he will watch that the contributions demanded are fairly divided. So soon as the inhabitants have furnished the contributions levied on them, the detachment will escort it close to head-quarters, leave a small party to take it in, and proceed to the other villages. When the whole of the contributions have been obtained, the detachment will return to camp, the Officer Commanding will halt it a short distance from the camp, and will examine the men's haversacks. If any stolen property be found the culprits will be at once punished. Saie. Before returning into quarters all the men should be marched to a certain place, and if any stolen property be found the thieves must be hung without mercy. De Lavarcnne. It is prudent not to take the same road when returning, as the inhabitants 27 may obtain a small force of the enemy to attack the convoy, or even do 80 themselves. C-ireat firmness is requisite to prevent deception on the part of tlie inhabitants, and in sucli a delicate operation the return of tiie paily is likely to be the most dillicidt. It will be ])rudent, therefore, to use j)ack horses to carry money on ni i)lace of carnages. These animals can cross fields, bye- roads, or bad gi-ound more easily than wagons. Artillery. The Artillery of an army is comifianded by a General Officer, •who is styled the Commanding; Officer of Artillery. He has to assist him, a staff "which is composed of two branches, one being- charged "v^-ith the duty of Adjutant-General, or personnel, the other being charged with the materiel ; the liead of the materiel branch is termed the Director of Park ; both these subordinates are if requisite helped by other officers of Artillery. The Artillery of an army-corps is commanded by a Major- General, or Brigadier-General, assisted by a similar staff. The Artillery of a Division is commanded by a field officer who has a staff officer charged with both the personnel and materiel of the Di\'ision. The Commanding Officer of Ariillery with an army is charged not only with the command of all the Artillery, but also with the supply of the 1st and 2nd reserves of small and great gun ammu- nition, as well as with the important duties which devolve on that corps at sieges. The most suitable means of obtaining the greatest advantage from the Jomiui. artillery is by giving the chief command of that arm to an Artillery General •who is not only an artillerist but a good tactician and strategist. This General disposes not only of the general Artillery Reserve, but also of one-half of the gmis attached to the division and aimy-corps. He can thus, in conpcrt with the General Coramanding-in-Chief, determine the moment and place wliere large masses of artillery can best contribute to victory. But such a massing of artillery must never be made, except by order of the General Commanding- in-Chief. The Commandants of Ai'tillery and Engineers have always made a portion of the Staff' of the army. The Commandant of Artillery should be endowed with great coolness and Von IMiller. intelligence. He should be close to the commanding officer of the Division so long as his presence with his batteries is not absolutely requisite, in order that he may follow the course of the action and subordinate the artillery to its movements. It is a duty of the Commandant of Artillery to know the whole of the Xupoloon. operations of the army, since it is his duty to supply arms and ammunition to the different divisions composing it. His connection with the Commanding Officers of Artillery at the advanced posts should keep him aware of all the movements of the army, and the direction of the great pare is subordinate to these movements. The General commanding the Artillery has authority over all the troops Lc Bourg. of the arm. He may, with the approval of the General commanding, make all such changes in the pei-sonnel and materiel as he thinks advisable. He issues orders to the Generals commanding the Artillery of army-corps, and receives their reports, the Central Reserve and Grand Park receive orders only from him, he fixes the depots as v/ell as the marches ; finally, he sees to the supply of the army from the parks and convoys. 28 The Army of the North German Cou- fcderaiion. Newdegate. Captain Mav. Tactical re- trospect. Ouyry. Thiebanlt. (Hand Book of Staff Duties.) He lives clo.se to heas and Divisions to which they were attached, for all orders and communications, the responsibility of the duties they performed rested with the General Officer under whose orders they served, and for whose assistance they were employed. The QuartermaBter-OeneraVs Department. The Quartei-master- General. The Deputy Quartermaster-General. Assistant Quartermaster-Generals.. Deputy -Assistant Quartei'master-Generals. The officers of this department were charged with embai'kation, disem- barkation, equipment, quartering, halting, encamping, route marching, and the occupation of positions of the difterent divisions and of the troops, at the stations to which they were res]:)ectively attached, under the authority and responsibility of the General, or other superior officer in command. Staff attached to Head-Quarters. An Assistant Quartermaster-General to superintend the billeting, the quai'tering and baggage of the head-quarters. A Staff Surgeon. A Chaplain. An Assistant Commissary-General. An Assistant Provost-Marshal. An Assistant Baggage-Master. Corps attached to the Ilead-Quariers. The commanding officer of Royal Artillery, with tlie Staff of his corps, haying a general superintendence of the artillery and ammunition attached to the cor})s and divisions, also the battering train and the reserve artillery and ammunition. The Commanding Royal Engineer, with the Staff and other officer belonging to his corps having a general superintendence over the officers of Engineers, the corps of Sappers and Minei-s, pontoons, and the engineer park, 31 consiating of the siege material and the fntieiu'liiiijf tool.-i, &c., belonging to the army. The officer commanding the coi-jw of Guides (an Assistant Quartermaster- ( Jeneral), in cliarge of the post-office and the communications of the army. The t)thcer commanding the Statt' Corps of Cavalry in charge of the police of the army, and otlier contidential duties. The Provost -Marslial anil his assistants, having charge of prisoners of war, deserters from the enemy, and all ])risoners tried, or to be tried, by general court-martial, and having autliority to inflict sunnnary punishment for all ofleuces committed under their observation. Civil Departments attached to Head-Quarters. The Medical Dejiartment, consisting of Inspector-General of Ilosjiitals, Deputy Inspector, Physicians, Staff Surgeons, Apothecaries, Disj.iensers, Assistimt Staff Surgeons, Hospital Assistants, &c. The Purveyor's Department, consisting of a Purveyor to the Forces, with dejiuties and assistants in charge of the hospitals, hospital material, arms and accoutrements, clothing and necessaries of men in hospital, also of the funeral exjjenses of men who died in hospital. The Paymaster-General's Department, consisting of Paymaster-General, assLstants, (S:c. The Commissariat De])artment, consisting of Commissary-General, Deputy Commissary -Generals, Assistant and Deputy- Assistants, Commissariat Clerks, &c. This department was divided into two branches — Stores and Accounts. ""^i; The Storekeeper-General's Department, consisting of the Storekeeper- General and his assistants, having charge of the field equipment, tents, &c., and the hea-\y baggage of the army. The Comptroller of Army Accounts, with inspectors, &c., to whom all accountants, except Commissariat accountants, render their accounts. Divisions. The army in the field was divided into divisions, each commanded by a Lieuteuant-General or Major-Geueral, having local rank as Lieutenant-Geueral, with the following staff : — Two Aides-de-Camp. One Assistast Adjutant-General. One Deputy- Assistant Adjutant-General. One Assistant Quartermaster-General. One Deputy- Assistant Quartermaster-General. One or two officers of the Royal Engineers. One Staff Surgeon. One Chaplain. One Assistant Commissary-General, with a deputy, clerks, &c. One Assistant Provost-Marshal. One Baggage Master, w^th assistants from the Staff Corps of Cavalry. One Storekeeper of Ordnance in charge of reserve ammunition, under the officer commanding the Royal Artillery attached to the division. Each division was composed of two or more brigades, each consisting of two, three, or four battalions, the light companies of which were formed when in presence of the enemy into a battalion under the command of a field officer or senior Captain of the light companies of each brigade. The brigades were connnanded by a Major-General, or a Brigadier- General, or Colonel on the Staff, with the following staff" : — One Aide-de-Camp. One Major of Brigade. One Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General, with clerks. To each division of infantry a brigade of Artillery was attached, the officer commanding which was under the immediate orders of the General command- 32 ing the division, although iiuder the general suijerintendence of the com- manding ofhcer of the Royal Artillery at the head-quarters of the army. When two or more divisions were placed under the second in command, or other officer of high rank, to act ius a corps, a similar Staff was attached to the corps to assist him in the command of it. One or more brigades of Artillery were in general attached to the corps, in adiUtion to the divisional Artillery. Also a force of Cavalry in proportion ■to the duties of the corps. The (/avalry was also composed of divisions, each division consisting of two or more brigades, and each brigade of two or more regiments of Heavy or Light Cavalry. To each brigade of Hussars or Light Cavalry a troop of Horse Artillery was usually attached when in the advance of the army or before the enemy, under the immediate orders of the General commanding the brigade. The General Officer commanding the Cavalry had a Staff attached to him similar to that of a General Officer commanding a corps. In addition to the foregoing, what is called the materiel was attached to the army, independent of the army in divisions, viz., — The Battering Train, under the orders of the officer commanding the Royal Artillery. The Pontoon Train, under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer. The Engineer Park and siege materiel. The Wagon Train, under the orders of the Quartermaster-General, attached to the hos})itals, to the conmiissariat, &c., or to divisions, as circumstances might require. The Ordnance Store Train. The Commissariat Wagon Train, and the other transj^ort of the army. In the principal towns through which the army passed a hospital station ■was usually formed, to which, besides the necessary medical and hospital staff, there was a depot staff consisting of A Captain Commandant. A Subaltern Adjutant. An Assistant Commissary-General. An Assistant Provost- Marshal. Particularly if the station should be a town of consideration, with a magazine on the line of supply. These stations, of course, changed as the army changed its lines of operation. The port of embarkation, or disembarkation, formed the chief depot of the army, and was under the command of a superior officer, wdth officers of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General's departments attached to him, exclusive of the usual garrison staff. Officers of the Quartermaster-General's department, officers of the Royal Engineers, and Royal Staff Corps,* were employed on topographical surveys, reports of roads, bridges, and resources of the country. * The Royal Staff Corps was formed in 1800, and termed originally the " QuarteiTuastcr-Gcncral's Corps." It had tlie same establishment as a battalion of infantry, both of ofliccrs and men. The officers were not allowed to serve on the General Stall' (General Order, 14th April, 1815). This corps was organized and armed as a body of infantry, but trained to the duties of field engineering. The officers were mounted and expected to perform the services of the Quartermaster-General's department. The Field Officers ranking as assistants, and the Captains and Subalterns as deputy-assistants, receiving when in the field forage and other allowances according to their Staff rank. The qualification for an officer was a military education, and four-fifths of the soldiers were mechanics. This corps was not broken up until many years after the termination of the late war, its services having been made available in the colonies. — Jackson. 3;i In a Ulitiou to these, regimental orticers were employed by the GeneralH comnianiling divisious as othoera in observation beyond tlie outposts of their respective divisions, to obtain information with respect to the movements of the enemy in front, and for the purpose of rep H I / ■'ji ^^ \ / r \ \ ^ ■ • , : u D O < 0. u. O UJ -J < QQ Dancerfield. Lith 22 BcDroHiJ G'' Covent Garden ■"•F" -\ nrr PLATE III. xl 1 ^ ^ _-J--^ %^f -:^ Dancerfield. Lith 22. Bedford S'^ Covent Garden PLATE. Ill* DAvcERf itLD LiTM, 22 Bedford S'Covemt Cardek 39 marchcil in the folloAviiip; onlcM- to Neuinaivk . Plie advance guard was composed of 800 volunteers and 10 l)attalions, M squadrons of hussars, 15 squadrons of dragoons, and 10 <^unH. The army folh) wed in four cohunns (Phites III and IILv), it marched by Win^s ri^-ht in front, the fi)-st was composed of the two hues of cavahy of the riglit Avinj;-, the second of the two hues of uifantrv of the rig-ht ^nng, the third of tlie h'ft wing of the infantry, the fourth of the left wing of the cavalry; the artillery followed the two infantry columns. The Prussian advance guard met and drove in a force of the i?nemv near the ^'illage of Borna, and obtained information as to the exact position of the enemy. The Austrian right rested on Nipern, protected by a large wood and some ponds, their centre rested on Leuthen, their left on Sagestchutz. A " crochet" was thrown back to protect this flank, which extended from 8agest- €hutz to the pond of Gohlau, the Austrian retreat being by Goldschmiede. The sharp attack made by the Prussian advanced guard on tlu' Austrians at Borna, johied to their not being able to discover what the Prussians were about, induced Daun, their leader, to move his reserve to the right wing. Frederick, who kncAV the ground, detei-mined to attack the Austrian left, and refuse his own. So soon as the heads of his column had passed through Borna he changed direction, to the right, and, hied into two lines. The ground in front of the Austrian position favoured the manoeuvre ; and the Aveather was cloudy. So soon as Frederick's advanced guard passed the villages of Kartchutz and Strieg\\atz on their right, they were ordered to wheel into line and attack. This was done, and thev captured the village of Sagestchutz. Under fire of its 10 guns the main body wheeled into line and advanced against the Austrians, whose reserve having been moved to the right were unable to Avithstand the Prussians. They formed a " crochet " Avith Leuthen at the salient, tlius showing front ni two directions, but the right of the '^crochet" being unsup- ported Avas charged and destroyed by the cavalry of Frederick s left Aving, and the Austrians fled in great conusfion. This battle is an epoch in the annals of the military art, and contained Jomini. not only the theory but also the practice of the system of which Frederick is the author. It will be seen that his army formed an oblique angle with that ot liis enemies. This oblique order, in the opinion of the ablest military men, decided the victory ; hithei-to people had an imperfect idea of its applica- tion, and no iieneral had been able to seize its advantages. Since then tlie Ger-mau generals have for a long time made it the basis of all their orders of battle. " , , . The nature of this order shows that the attack must be made on a wing, and that the part of the line to attack must be strengthened, m order to crush and take in flank and reverse the wing. However, as the enemy has also means of sending reinforcements to the threatened point, he must be deceived, so as to keep him in doubt as to the actual point of attack, until everything is ready, then he must be attacked with vigour, to surprise and defji-ive him of the power of making a combined defence. 40 Joniini. NapoleoJi. Battle of Kolin, l-l'li June, 1757. Speaking- of the conduct of the Austrian leader in deploying liis whole force, Jomiui says : — It is a great error when an army that is superior in numbers waits to be attacked, and particularly when it deploys the whole of its force. It is far better to show only a force capable of containing the enemy, and to hold the remainder in hand iu three or four heavy columns ready to strike divers places, and manoeuvre on the flanks of the enemy to gain various points. In fact, a large army deployed is not so mobile a.s if it were iu columus. To inmiobilise troops not engaged is to forget the first princij)les of tactics. A portion only of the reserve should be deployed, if it be desired to awe the enemy by a great display of force. In my opinion the conduct of the King at Leuthen contains the principles on which all warlike action is based, namely, to put iu action at the most important point of a line of operations, or of an attack, a larger force than the enemy has there. This may be done either by marching, or strategic movements, or by manoeuvres, or by a selection of the form of attack. The battle of Leuthen is a masterpiece of movements, manoeuvres, and resolution. Alone it is sutiicieut to immortalise Fi'ederick, and place him in the rank of the gi'eatest generals. He attacked a stronger army than his own, in position and victorious, with an army composed partly of troops which had been just defeated, yet he won a victory without paying too dearly for it. All his manoeuvres at this battle are in conformity with the ]n'iinciple3 of war. He made no flank march in sight of his enemy, for the armies were not in sight. The Austrians expected him, after the combat at Borna, to take position on the heights in front of them, and while they thus waited for him, covered by rising grounds and fogs, and masked by his advanced guard, he continued his march and attacked the extreme left. Neither did he violate another principle not less sound, of not abandoning his line of operations. Daun did evei-ything that could be done under similar circumstances, but the Prussian cavalry and their masses continually came up befoie his troops liad time to form. These battles shoAv generally what is termed Frederick's oblique order of attack, successful. The follo'U'ing is an instance of its failm-e, or rather an instance of how, if the troops moving to a flank are attacked on the march, it is exceedingly probable it ^vill always fail. The Austrian army sent to relieve Prince Frederick Charles, blockaded in Prague, advanced along the Olmiitz-Briinu-Prague road as far as Kolin ; Frederick, leaving a force before Prague, moved to meet Daun. The King moved in his usual formation, covered by an advanced guard consisting of 55 squadrons of hussars and cbagoons, and seven battalions of infantry. On debouching from the ^'illage of Planian, the Austrian army Avas found posted on the southern side of the road on a semi-circular range of heights, extending from Krzeczor on the right to Brzesan on the left (Plate IV). The first line was posted half way up the slope, the second on the crest, the front was covered by villages and difficult ground, and bristled with batteries Avhich swept all the approaches. The King resolved to attack the Austrian right flank, or that nearest their line of retreat. He directed his advanced guard to advance along the main road until nearly opposite Krzeczor, and then leaving the road to move towards Padosvcsnitz, intending to support the advanced guard by the whole army and take up PLATE IV. ^ h i LU **^'Vti " * L -? r < . «? k IJ fr,.l i5-~ ^-4^^ 4i^ I ■>3 ^^ *'n.$^. 5^^ /L^^ -t- Hf.' Dancerfielo. Lith. 22. Bedford S' Covent G*ROiN -!■ •>; 5 2- His 1 c- ^ ^ ^? ^ •^■S - ~ u; t "5 ^ ^4 § 11 ^t51^> <4^ Sri ^"^ F^ 5 V ^ ^ ,?^2^j i t O- -5 tfcl S = DahCERF lELD, LiTH 22, BtDFORO S'^ CovtNT CaROFN 41 the po8itii>ii XX, tVoin which he eould advauee aiid njll up the Austrian liue. This projected inuvcnient is shown on Phite IVa more distinctly. Tlie advanced guard had readied Zlatysluntz, and the head of the main body NovimeBto, wlien it became requisite to halt to correct the distances as much distance had been lost by defiling through the town of Planiau, and regular distances was one ot the things essential to Frederick's tactics. The advanced guard moved as directed, wheeled into line, and carried the village of Krzeczor. But while this was being done, the army in its mai'ch along the front of the Austrian position was much disquieted by the Austrian light troops, who continually attacked their right flank ; a battalion leader being much pressed, ordered his battalion to wheel to its right, as this was the order to form line, it was taken up by the whole army in rear, Avho wheeled into liue also and attacked the Austrians near Chotzemitz while the leading- portion continued its march ; a large gap was thus left in the long columns, and the general commanding the first portion, hearing the firing, looked back, saw the remainder of the army in action, and wheeled to his right and attacked also ; thus, instead of forming the line XX, the Prussian army made four disconnected attacks along the front. The Prussians fought well, and renewed their attack five or six times, but were unable to carry any of the Austrian positions, and were com- pelled to retreat with heavy loss. The Prussians in their march formed an arc, of which their enemy were Jouiini. the chord ; they coiiid then in less time place a greater force in action at the jnincipal point ; this, even with two armies of equal force, is always decisive. If it be acknowledged that the most advantageous attacks are those made by a concentrated effoi't on the extremity of an enemy's line, it becomes abso- lutely requisite to take measures to gain this extremity by masking the move- ment. If this precaution be neglected, the enemy can follow the march of the columns which wish to outflank him, can offer them always his fi'ont, or take them in flank, as was done by the King at Kossbach. The march may be conceded by darkness, by the ground, or by a fierce attack on the enemy's front, which may draw his attention to that side. The last means are the best, as night movements are less sure and less regular than those made in the day. I think that to threaten a considerable front it is better to use small de- tachments than a regular advanced guard. The size of the detachments should Ije regulated by circumstances, and they should be supported by cavalrv' and horse artillery. This battle shows clearly the danger of flank movements iji the presence of an enemy, even Avhen they happen to be as bad tacticians as the Austrians then were ; why the King should have undertaken a march along the front of the Austrians. to attack their right flank when he might have attacked their left, it is difficnlt to say. Success, had it been achieved, would doubtless have been more complete by an attack on the right than the left. But the latter Avas feasible, the former was not. The wheel t(» the right made by the battalion commander, which upset the 42 Kings arningements, was not tlio cause of the attack failing, so jnucli as it was the consequence of an attempt to move troops under a close fire to a flank. If the troops front as they did in this case, the movement miscarries, and the best troops will be found to get demoralised if they suffer fi'om an enemy close at hand, who they are directed to disregard and make no attempt to resist. The Austrian light troops (Croats), who annoyed the Prussians so much, appear to have been unopposed, Frederick never using skirmishers. The only prospect of success his movement could have, Avas by covering it "with a powerful body of skirmishers to attack and drive back the Croats, while the main body moved to the flank. Napoleon. ^t the battle of Kolin it i.s difficult ts justify the attempt to turn Dauii's right by the flank march made from 600 to 1,000 yards from the h'ji^dits occu- pied by the enemy. This opei-aticn was rash, and opposed to the principle of war. Never make a flank march before an enemy in position, especially when he occupies the heights at the foot of which you must march. The King might have attacked the Austrian left, he was admirably placed for doing so ; but to try and march under afire of musketry and artillery from an entire army, occupying a commanding ^iosition, is to imagine that that army has neither guns nor small-arms. To say that the King's manceuvie failed because a battalion leadei-, wearied with the fire of the Austrian skirmishei-s, wheeled into line and attacked to his front is an eiTor. The movement the Prussian array made was one demanded by the gi"eatest necessity, — viz., its o%\ai safety, and that instinct which forbids men to allow themselves to be killed without defending themselves. A compaiison between the battles of Prague, Leuthen and Kolin will show why the flank movement succeeded in the one case and not in the other. Eattle of The battle of Eossbach is especiaUy valuable as showing Eossbach, 5ih i^^-^y^ "when an incompetent general tried to ape Frederick's '' "* ' tactics and attack him on his flank, he managed to change hi« front and deliver a crushing defeat. The King crossed the Saale at Weissenfels, and advancing beyond Schortau, found the Franco-German army occupying a position in three lines ex- tending from Gu]gen Hugel on the left, to beyond Branderoda on the right ; finding this position too strong to attack, Frederick retired and took up a position extending from Bedra to Ross- bach ; he occupied this position in three lines, the infantry being, in the first two lines and the cavalry in the third line (i-ide l^lates V and Ya). Soubise, who commanded the allied army, finding the Prussian right and centre well protected by a small stream, resolved to attack their left at Rossbach, this flank being slightly en Vaii\ he moved off in three columns, cavalry in front and rear at first, but subsequently with all the cavalrj^ in front. The moment the movement was discovered, the King directed Seidlytz to move with all the cavalry under cover of some slight hills to circle round the Jams Hugel height, and meet the head of the enemy's columns, by taking up a position between Liuidstaedt and Reichertswerben. the infantry followed in the same direction. Soubise, seeing the Prussians, as he thought, retreating, PLATE V Dancerficlo L^tm 22 BtoFoRO S'' CovtHT Garden PLATE V* X o < m CO O q: li. O UJ -J I- h < tu z H u. O 0. < E Z o t- ui -I UJ (0 cdrOa •£> I ', I • L--^^--i- -T--^iL---u,---c:=^^-- "ll'll ,,, • I, """"■" in :::;:::::::::;;:r«'^ % I I i « / // / / ...-^" .^^" DkNCERFIELD. LlTM 22 BcDFORD 5^ CovC NT GaSOT N 43 huiTied on to intercept them. As he debouclietl. past Reieherty- werben lie saw SeidlytiJ, who had marched left in front, appear- ing past the Jams Hugvl, and th()n<>;lit this Avas only a rear- j^uard. Sfidlytz Avhct'lud his sipiadrons into two lines, placed his artillery on the Jams Hngel. and immediately charged the Franco-Anstrians. They were driven back ineonfnsion. tSonbise attempted to deploy, but failed. The Prussian infantry coming up to the support of the cavalry took the allied columns in flank. The Tinnce de Soubise was consequently unable to de])loy his army, and the whole fled in the greatest confusion. Such w;is the buttle of Rossbach, where 22,000 men, let! with prudeuce aiitl Jomini. A-igour, lost only 300 killeil and wounded,, while tliey defeated more than 50,000, with a loss of 800 killed, G,000 prisoners, and 72 guns. Fi'ederick hail watehetl his eneniy's movements without being disconcerted. He guessed their intentions, and so soon a.s he knew wiiat they were going to do he calmly took his me^isures. His march behind the Eeichertswerbeu jjlateau gave him a gi'eat advantage. This apparent ilight ex(;ited the vanity of the enemy, who neglected all precautions, and hurried on so fast that they confused their ranks ; the heads of their columns got suddenly under the Prussian fire, and could not deploy. The King seized the favourable moment, ordered his cavalry to charge, and the small infantry force that was up attacked without orders. An inch of ground, a moment lost, would have given the allies the space and time requisite to deploy. But the manoeuvres of the King were so exact that victory was compelled to croM'n them. A General who commands an army that can manoeuvre should, as much as possible, attack his enemy when on the line of march, even if he be superior in number. It will be observed that the Franco-Austrian army moved without any advanced guard, and were consequently utterly ignorant of Seidlytz's movements or of vdiat the King was doing. After remarldng on the quality of the Franco-Austrian army, Napoleon says : — Such troops, commanded by such officers, cannot undertake a flank move- Xaiioloon. ment against a well coiLstituted army. The manoeuvre of the King of Prussia was natural, and he merits less praise than his adversaries do blame ; for their march, made without being protected by a corps in oTiservation, or covered by flankers, or an advjinced guard to secure them against surprise in a hilly country, and in a foggy season of the year, wa-s so imprudent that it dictated to the King what he should do. Frederick, at Kolin, Jost only his army ; Soubise, at Rossbach, lost both his army and his honour. Plate Va shows tlie movements of the two armies clearly, and the striking similarity there is between Soubise's movement and that of Marmont at Salamanca ; a study of the latter battle in Napier's Peninsular War is strongly recommended as affording an ilkistration not oidy of the evils of extendhig too nmch to a flank, but also of how a flank attack can be met. It will be seen that the system followed by Frederick had many disadvantages. Amongst these were the slight depth ot his line of battle, the want of reserves, the Avant of skirmishers, the impossibility of properly commanding the troops when 44 spread out in such long lines and columns. General officers in command had their troops scattered over a long front, which they could neither overlook nor direct ; but the admirable drill, steadiness, and manoeuvring powers of the Prussian Army gave it, when opposed to troops who were not possessed of those qualities, such a pre-eminence, that Frederick's successes were due to these qualities rather than his tactics. The Prussian Army formed for many years the model of other armies, and the tactics of Frederick are the basis of what are termed " Linear tactics." 177 i. In 1774, Mesnil Durand proposed a system which exercised great influence over the tactics of the wars of the Repubhc and Empire. He proposed to form battalions in close columns of grand divisions or double companies, and that all deployments should be on the leading double company ; he recommended battahons in ten companies, two of which were invariably to skirmish. When the battalion was deployed these companies Avere on the flanks shghtly in rear, so that between battalions deployed in line there was the front of two companies, regiments being composed of four battalions (Fig. 4, Plate I). When several battalions worked together they were to be formed in line of double company column at deploying intervals, covered by the whole of the flank companies as skirmishers. Columns,* said Mesnil Durand, mass the gi'eatest amount of force in the smallest space, and alone can, on account of the narrowness of the front and the gi-eatness of the intervals between them, give free movement to cavalry or artillery, but these columns must be linked together by thick chams of skirmishers. Infantiy has two weapons to fight with, and it should have two distinct formations : line is the best for firing, column for manoeuvres and attack. In every case, without exception, that formation should be used which is the most suitable at the moment. The primitive formation of all troops should be in line of battalions at deploying intervals. So formed any requisite manoeuvre may be easily carried out. The shallow formation has a natural tendency to make men halt and fire, the order in coluuni has a tendency to make men advance. AVlien troops are deployed in tAvo lines Avith cavalry on the Dunks, they are Aveak cA'-eryAvhere, are incapable of the least manoeuAa'e, and the caA'alry, artillery, and infantry do not support one another. When, on the contrary, each battalion is in column, the flank companies being in the battalion intervals, the caA^alry placed in rear can easily and unexpectedly charge to the front : this order is strong e\'ery\vhere. It threatens the enemy Avith the iire t)f the skirmishers, the Av^eight of its columns, and the charge * The following is a jprecis of Mesnil Durand's views. PLATE VI. UJ z: o _i o >' __ H CO co < o Q z < < CQ Dancerfield. Lith. 22, Bedford ST Covent Garden 45 Napoleon's Italian Cam- of its cavalry. An army ro formed can mavcli and manoeuvres Anth the greatest ease and rapidity. Tlie views here given (which are a synopsiH of Mesnil DiU'and's proposals) Avere those in vogue at the French military schools,* Avhen Napoleon was a student. They fell in with the peculiar character of the French revolutionary armies. Small battalion columns, covered by clouds of skirmishers, was the basis of these tactics; the long and difficult drill necessary to acquire the exactness of movement required by the linear tactics was needless, more depended on the courage and skill of individuals than accurate drill. Hence the proposals of Mesnil Uurand were adopted by the French Army, and formed the basis of the regulations of 177(j and 179 l.f These tactics were those which were more or less the basis of the movements of the French Army in Italy in 1706. They were by no means reduced to a system ; much was left to the 1'^'^"- individual enthusiasm of the soldier, and to the effect produced by tlie large number of educated men the revolution, and conse- quent universal service, had placed in the ranks, which of course greatly mcreased the moral power of the Republican Armies. At Lonato and Castiglione the French worked in battalion 3rd and 5tli columns at deploying intervals, the columns being columns of August, 1796. double companies covered in front by skirmishers. At the latter battle the division of Massena was formed with the centre battalion of each demi-brigade, equivalent to a three-battalion regiment, deployed, the flank battahons being in double column of companies, or column of divisions,^ as termed by the French {vide Plate VI). At the battle of Rivoli, the French worked entirely by 14th January, battalion columns, covered with skirmishers, and Avhen on the 1797. defensive, as during the course of that celebrated battle they often were, these battalion colmnns were deployed into line three deep. The average strength of the French battalions was on this occasion only 470 men: hence the units that actually fought the battle were small columns, covered with skirmishers. Deducting the skinnishers and men not in the ranks, the actual strength of the columns handled could not have been much more than 300 rank and file, which, formed in double column of companies, Kould not be very different from the Prussian company column of the present day. When Napoleon forced the passage of the Tagliamento, • Particularly Brienne. t The same writer advocated the formation of company columns, for exactly the same reason as he advocated battalion columns, — viz., that the formation could be changed more readily from line to column when requisite ; these company columns have since become celebrated. The formation of the battalion in grand divisions or double company column is shown on Fig. 6, Plate I. The regimental column of four battalions is shown on Fig. 7, Plate I, and the proposed method of deploying a six- battaUon column from the centre is shown at Fig. 8. It will be observed that this deployment is very similar to that of the British army at the Alma (vide Plate XII). X Until 1870 termed "Grand Divisions " in the Britiih service. 16th March, 1797. 46 his fonnatioii was still that of demi-biigacles,* the centre battalion deployed, Iho flank battalions in double company columns covered by skinnishers (vide Plate VII. Fig'. 1). And the reason assijrncd for this formation was that the demi- brigade, consisting of 24 companies, a fire of 12 companies, or one-half, was obtained, and the flanks of the lines were protected by the colunnis ready to form square, if charged l)y the superior Austrian cavahy. But the composition of the French armies at this date was peculiar: they had large numbers of intelligent, Avell-educated men in the ranks and infeiior grades of officers, who sought the profession of arms, not only on account of the law of universal service, but of the fact that the revolution and consequent paralysis of trade and commerce had destroyed almost all other openitigs for young men. Marengo. The formation of Dessaix's column at Marengo was peculiar as showing the same ideas at work. Dessaix advanced in direct echelon from the left. The leading demi-brigade, the 9th Light Infantry, having its flank battalions in column of double companies, its centre battalion deployed into line three deep. The next demi-brigade, the 30th of the Line, was deployed, and the last, the G9th of the Line, being formed as the Dth. This formation gave a very consider- able amount of fire, pushed in like a wedge, and kept the flank well protected from the Austrian cavalry, which were threaten- ing the French advance (vide Fig. 2, Plate VII, also Frontispiece). The formations which have been described as marking the French tactics up to the year ISOO, may be summed up as follows : — A large use of skirmishers, taken not from selected regiments l)ut from companies of the l^attalions immediately m rear, united Avith the independent action of small battalions. The French battalions on paper did not exceed 700 men ; a paper battalion of that strength can rarely put 600 men on parade, which, Avhen skirmishers and staff Avere deducted, Avould give some 400 to 500 men for the force composing the inde- pendent command. Thus great latitude was gi^^en to individual commanders. Up to this time there were really no regiments in the French Revolutionary Army; what Avere termed demi-brigades took their place, and consisted of three battalions. The whole of the aiTangoments Avero of tliat irregular character that must characterise armies hastily put together. After the assumptioji of the Imperial title. Napoleon prepared for the invasion of England, and in the large standing camps fonned at Boulogne and elscAvhere on the coast of the English Channel, many improvements and alterations Avere made both in •organization and tactics; conscription with substitution was introduced in lieu of universal service, and the more settled state of the country and Government, causing many openings * Tliree battalions foi-mcd a demi-brigade. PLATE VII. Ta^Iiamonto [ L i ^ L- ■ ,1 Formation of l)oKaix\s ! — [ n^^light ' — : Columji at Mai'eng'o ' . ' Fig". 2. SO^Lvrte, 69^Li -•- + 44-_ +4- — Rxrmatioiiofa. 4 Battalion Z Brig'ade atAueterlitz Fig. 3 . m -rnnr », Formation of a 10 Battalion Division at Austerlitz Morarvdys Jiriqcule fO^ ZZZLufht Fig\ 5 / 10^ Li^hb SVHilaires Division at f/ie moment of the attack on the Pr-atzen heights . W^ar-e's Briaobde ThveboMLb's Hrrgo'de. 55^ "^^ "^^ 36^ Danceofield Lith 22 Bedford S'^ Covent CAnocN 47 in civil life, drew ofl much of the iutcUigeiicc that liad 1)loii previously forced into the army for want of a vent elsewhere. The army formed at Boulogne still, however, possessed many of tlie old elements that gave the early Kepubliean armies such great moral power ; it possessed also that lirmness and steadiness, Avhich it takes many months to give troo])s. Formed for a most difficult enterprise (the invasion of Eng- land), trained with the greatest care and skill, it undouljtedly was the finest army the Emperor Napoleon ever commanded. One of the changes, ])erha])S not an improvement, was tlic alteration of Austerlitz, the old three-battalion demi-l)rigade into a reghuent of two hat- Dec. 2, 1805. talions. It Avas this army that fought the battle of Austerlitz. The tactics of the French during this battle are worthy of notice. The allies, Austrians and Kussians, resolved to quit their position at Olmntz and turn the light C)f the French Army ; they marched m five cohmms, one being entirely composed of the reserve cavalry ; the army was covered by an advanced guard of three columns under Bagarthion. On the :^nd December the French troops were drawn up in the following order : on the plain between Girscikowitz and fSanton, CaiFarellis division, composed of the 13th Light, the 17th, 51st, 30th, 61st, all two-battalion regiments, or ten battalions. The division was drawn up in three lines ot battalion double-company columns at deploying distances. Suchet's division, composed of four regiments, or eight bat- talions, was similarly drawn up in two lines. The coips of Bernadotte in the centre was drawn up as follows : Drouet's division, composed of thi-ee tlu'ee-battalion regiments ; and Rivaud division, of three thi'ee-battalion regi- ments, was ch'aAvn up in battalion double-company columns at deploying distances. On the right, St. Hilaire's division in the same formation in fi-ont of Puntowitz, Levassus' brigade of Legrand's division was in front of Kobelnitz. Beyond Gir- schikowitz was Vandanmio's division. On the extreme right, upon a rising ground and in the ditches in front of Tellnitz, General Legrand's division, the 2(3th regiment being at Sokol- nitz. The batteries attached to each division of infantry were in the brigade intervals. The reserve cavahy under ]\Iurat was behind Lannes' corps, the guard upon the plateau behind Gir- schikoAA'itz, drawn up in two lines of battalion close colunnis at deploying distances, 40 gims being placed in the intervals. The cavalry of the guard Avas in close column of squadrons. Some days before the battle the Emperor had ordered a new foiTuation for the Infantry. Each brigade Avas to liaAH! its first regiment deployed, the second formed in close column of double companies on the flanks, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment beyond and in rear of the right of the deployed regiment, the 2nd Battalion on its left {vide Figs. 3 and 4, Plate VII). If the diA^sion had five regiments, the fifth regiment Avas to be placed 100 yards in rear of the centre. The artillery in the intervals between the brigades and on the flanks. 48 The Emperor Napoleon, writing to Soiilt and Bernadotte on the 26th December, 1805, says : " You will, by observing this " formation, be able to oppose a line of fire to the enemy, and " yet have close columns ready to attack him if requisite." These dispositions are a further instance of the fundamental rule in infantry fights, that the second line must not be inde- pendent of the first line, of which it is the support and immediate stay. The order of linked brigades was thus conformable to what history shows as having occurred in every battle. The groimd on a battle-field is generally so cut iip by obstacles, and so formed, that each brigade has usually a disthict object to attain. The second line can rarely, if ever support the first line without forcing it again into action, for the passage of lines, as laid down in books, can rarely, if ever, be carried out. These formations are also a condemnation of the system of deploying an entire division in front line, and an entire division in second line. At Austerlifez, when the heights of Pratzen were attacked, the battalions pre\nously deployed were formed in double company columns on the centre. St. Hilaire's division, upon which some of the hardest fighting fell, was formed at the moment of actual contact, as shown in Fig. 5, Plate VII. Upon the Pratzen heights the infantry composing the 4th Austro-Kussian column marched in open column of companies left in front to follow the 3rd column marching towards Sokolnitz, when it suddenly saw Soult and Levasseurs' infantry chmbing quickly up the heights ; the tail of the 3rd column and the whole of the 4th column wheeled to the right into line exactly according to Frederick's tactics. Kutusoff, who saw that the Pratzen heights were the key of the position, sent to seek assistance from the Prince of Lichteustein who sent him four cavalry regiments. The French columns did not reply to the fire of the Austro- Russian infantry, but advanced Avith shouldered arms. The 10th Light Infantry, papng no regard to the village of Pratzen, where the two leading battalions of the 4th column were posted, pushed straight up the heights. It was supported by Thiebault's brigade, whilst Ware turned the village, took the battalions posted there in flank, and crowned the heights. Vandamme's division came into line with Ware and attacked the Russian column, which was now formed in several lines, its right thrown back on the high ground to- wards Kzernowitz, where a considei'able force of artillery was placed. When 100 paces off", the French deployed, and opened a heavy fire from two ranks. But the Austro-Russians, owing to their numerical superiority, held the French in check until the latter advanced with the bayonets and forced the first line back on the second. Six battalions, concealed by a rising- ground, attacked the left of the division, but were driven back by the 4th and 24th Regiments ; these regiments did not fire a shot, but merely used the bayonet. Soult's divisions were formed as shown on Fig. 4, Plate VII. PLATE VIII. hsi ft fk ^£ II (UiicEBriiLO. LiTM. 22. Bedford ST Covent Garden T'or-mation of Siiclirf's Division nf Jona PLATE IX Eank March of Mai?sena at Wagram Pig-. 3. Forinatiori of M^a-cdonaJd s Corps at Wa^rajn . r ^ ^^ j d-eployecL irv have . ^1 Cuirassiers and^ Heavy CxxvaLry . DfcNCERFlELD LiTH 22 BeDFORO S'' CoVENT CaROEN 49 Moantinu' tlie tail of the i^rd column had formed lino. Th(* Russian re;j;inic'nts, Fanajj^orisky and KhynKky, of the 2nd column, and the Austrian brigades, Guzczeck and Kottermunil, or 20 battalions, occupying a long line, advanced to surround a bat- talion of the loth Light Iidkntry; they were, however, charged by that battalion, supported by the 14t.h, 8Gth, and 4Hrd, and driven back. The other battalion of the 10th Avas driven back until supported by Levasseur's brigade. The French then remained masters of the heights, and the allies fell back. In the centre, Beruadotte and the guard got on the heights without firing a shot. Almost the last act of this battle was the destruction by the Russian cavalry of the 1st Battalion of the 4tli Regiment, which got into disorder when pressing the Russians. It is a common fault of the French infantry to get into confusion during an attack, and not to preserve their ranks : from this cause many disasters have happened, for the enemy's cavalry coming up unexpectedly always takes troops so dispersed at a great ad- vantage. At this period the French Army Avas at its highest point, the old soldiers of the revolution were still in the ranks in con- siderable numbers, the officers were Avell taught and trained in the best of all schools, that of successful war. On the breaking out of Avar with Prussia in 1806, the Emperor Napoleon formed the flank companies of the various battalions into permament battalions of grenadiers and voltigeurs; the battalions of the line were thus reduced to six companies, each of which had a normal strength of 100 men, but Avhich actually in the field could not have had many more than 80 men. At Jena the tactics of Frederick the Great came into actual Jena, lUh contact with those of Napoleon, and although that battle was October, 1806. decided by circumstances other than the actual fighting, yet the formation of the French troops presents some points of interest. The French troops were usually drawn u}) in line of battalion double company columns at deploying distance, and attacked in that order, covered by skirmishers. Fig. 1, Plate IX., shows the formation and mode of attack of Suchet's division, but the tactics at that time used by the French Army are perhaps best shown by a study of the battle ■of Auerstadt, where Marshal Davoust, with his coips alone, de- Auerstadt, feated the main body of the Prussian Army, about 6(5,000 men, I4tli October, which, however, attacked him piecemeal, and not all at once. ^^^• This battle possesses much that is worthy of study ; it was on the part of the French, who were greatly out-numbered, for a long time a defensive battle, and offers a good illustration of French formations. Believing that the French Army was moving towards Leip- zig and Dresden, the main body of the Prussian Army, about 66,000 men, moved fi-om Weimar towards Naumburg, with the vieAv of getting behind the Elbe, and obtaining support from £ 50 the fortress of IMagdcburg. One wing of the army, under the l-*rince Holienloho, was left to cover the movement. I^he force '.rnder the Prince Hohenkjhe fonght tlie battle of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davonst's corps, which should have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack of the Trussian Army. The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend the bridge, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading, covered by cavahy ; after a slight cavalry action, Davoust formed Gudin's chvision, which consisted of the 25th, 85th, 12th, 21st Regiments of the line, or eight battalions, with six squadrons of cavalry, on the north of the Weimar-Naum- burg road, which here runs nearlv due east and west (vide Fig. 1, Plate X). The 85th Regiment Avas placed in the village, with a strong- body of skirmishers in some w^oods in front, the 25th was de- ployed into hue on its right, the 21st also deployed, being in second line and the whole of the 12th Regiment, that is to say, two battalions, was formed in close column of double companies, on the extreme right and slightly in rear, so as to cover and protect the flank of the deployed line. In this formation the division was attacked by the Pi'ussian infantry (General Schmettau's division), who were unable to make any impression on it ; they were then charged by large bodies of cavalry under Blucher. The French met this attack by forming the 12tli Regiment into regimental square, the right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its right company, the light battalion of the 25th into battalion square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Prus- sian cavalry were beaten back with g-reat loss, and were charged as they retired by the six squadrons of Gvidin's division which, up to this pei-iod, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the i-ight of Gudin's diA-ision. Avhich, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12th Regiment from that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion -with its light flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to forai square slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn then- left flank, where the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of the 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartensblen's division pushed well to the soiitb of Hasen- PLATE X. \% \ >^ »-^l X u **.l.f*^ . ^c:*- ^<^i. #''^ ':^U ' ^hu ^^ ^ ^F^ e \ ■<6 \ ^ ^ t-i^^ ' r -, - =i />- .X M i^ «u p 3 3 fit— rSif ■C-^'^ " ^^ / 1 t^ ^ i \ \. 1 ,^ V ^ m^ ^^4 Mt *w A(!<(, ^ tf^^- # Oa cri r ' H i2 B UFCRO S'"' CovL r C\ I c 50 the fortress of ]\Iagdebnrg-. One Anng of the army, nnder the Prince Hoheulohe, was loft to cover the movement. The force :mder the Pi-ince Hohenlohe fought the batth,' of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davoust's corps, which should have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack of the Pi-ussian Army. The main road from ^A'^eimar to Naumburg led through the village of Hasenhausen, crossing the 8aal at Kosen (rude Plate XV Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the 8aal at Kosen, and lea^'^ng a battalion to defend the brid " — '1 towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading, "* - o Klie^];it cavalrv action, Davousi ~~ '■ ■"^- '>.')th, 85th, 15 six squ burg re 1, Plat Th bcdy I ployei secon two 1 on tJ protf I infa: make any impresoi..^^ bodies of cavahy under Blucher. j.^^^ by forming the 12tli Regiment into regimental s^ti^. _, right battalion of the 2 1 st into battalion square on its right company, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Prus- sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's diA-ision which, up to this period, had been sheltered behmdthe infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's dix-ision. which, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion with its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to foiTa square slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn theii- left flank, Avhere the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of ihe 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartensblen's division pushed well to tl>€ south of Haseu- PLATE X. 50 the fortress of JMagdeburg-. One wing of the army, under the Prince Hohenloho, Avas loft to cover the movement. 'J'he force TUider the Prince Hohenlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davoust's coi-ps, which should have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army, The main road from ^\'^eimar to Naumburg led through the village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate X). Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the mornuig of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend the brid""'^ advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading, ' "+Vat a slight cavalry action, Davous " ■ ' -^' +l^^> 25th, 85th, 1! six sqr burg r( 1, Plat Th body I ploye* secon two I on tl prote I infai make bodies by formmg tne izm ±vcg,iii;.v>..^ - right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its irgnt company, the right battalion uf the 25th into battalion square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pnis- sian cavalry were beaten back with gTeat loss, and were charged as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which, up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's diATision. Avhich, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to the south (jf Hasenhauseii, when it deployed one battalion with its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to foiTQ square slightly in rear (ride Figs, o and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn their left flank, where the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of the 12th Regiment formed as above described. Waiiensblen's division pushed well to the south of Haseu- PLATE X. '*>'- 7>/z^/5^ > «^- g V ^^ ^ fl fl%^\ «r-t"^ „f '*/»•. Ll:_ii^ DA^,^^l!rlrlO.'.lT.^ ?2 BrcrcRD STCovt.jr CAiiDcri 50 the fortress of ]\Iagdeljurg. One ^v^ng of the army, under the Prince Hohenloho, was loft to cover the movement. 'J'he force binder the Prince Hohenloho fonght the battle of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Phnperor Napoleon. Davoiist's coi-ps, which shonld have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army. The main road from A\'eimar to Naumburg led through the village of Haserdiausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate X). Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Guchn, Fiiant, and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and lea^^ng a battalion to defend the bridge, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading " ' - -"-"oli-v -. after a slight cavalrv action, Davous ■-^'■'^1 '^+' fhe 25th, 85th, 1 six sqi burg r< 1, Plat Th body ploye' secon two I on tl prote I infai mak bodies by foia^xxxxg, ..... . ^ right battalion of the 21st into battalion square on its rignx compau}-, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the M'ood, still remained in line. The Pms- sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which, up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's di^^sion. which, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion "\vith its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to foi-m square slightly in rear (ride Figs. 3 and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn their left flank, where the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartensblen's division pushed well to the south of Hasen- PLATE X. #^"M,vv../fa. XfAir s. -;»»^ W-^ ...-4 ^^\i ft '- fe/ju ? ii** lAicn rir ' -i t2 D<-uroRo S'f Covl ir C\t iic i 50 the fortress of ]\Iag(lebiirg. One wing of the army, under the Prince Holienk)he, Avas k^ft to cover the movement. 'J^he force '.mck-r the Prince Hohenkihe fonght the battk; of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davonst's corps, which shoidd have been Kiipported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons Avhich it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain tlie attack of the I'russian Army. The main road from A^'eimar to Naiuiiburg led through the village of Hasenhausen, crossing tlie Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the mornhig of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend the bridce, advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading ' — ^i,.,, . ^fter a slight cavalry action, Davous ■ ^ '^ -+■ +hH 25th, 85th, 1 six sqi burg r< 1, Plat Th body ployc' secon two 1 on tl prote I infai mak^ bodies by form „.^ right battalion of the 2 1 st into battalion square on its^Ti^x company, the right battalion of the 25th into battaliou square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pinis- sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and Avere charged as they i-etired by the six sqiuxdrons of Gudin's division which, up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's diA^sion. Avhich, being thiis supported on the right, moved the 12th Peg-imentfroni that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenhausen, Avhen it deployed one battalion Avith its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to fonn square slightly in rear (vide Figs. 3 and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and ti-ied to turn their left flank, Avhere the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartensblen's division pushed well to tl>e south of Hasen- P LATE X. *p I ■ '' .1 X ^ / j#:-' \^ ' • • «t ^ v\ \ - ^ »# / 2S^ 50 the fortress of JMagdelnirg-. One unno- of the army, nnder the Prince Hoheulohe, AvaK loft to eover the movement. The force '.mcler the Prince Holienlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the main body of the French Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davonst's corps, which .should have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack of the Prussian Army. The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the village of Haseidiausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen (vide Plate XV Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the 8aal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend the bridtre, advanced towards Hasenliausen, Gudin's division leading ' "'""■ • after a slight cavalrv action, Davous ' ^-'^ -+' ihn 25th, 85th, r six sqr burg r( 1, Plat Tb body ploye. sec on two I on tl prote r infai mak^ bodies by forn- right battalion of the 21st into battalion sqiiare on iTsn^nt company, the right battalion of the 25th into battalion square on its left cttmpany, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pms- sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged as they i-etired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which, up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantiy (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's (h\-ision. which, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12tli Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenliausen, when it deployed one battalion with its right flank on the village, the left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to fonu square slightly in rear (vide Figs, o and 4). The Prussians still attempted to force the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn theii- left flank, where the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartcnsblen's division pushed well to tl>e south of Haeen- r .- ^ PLATE X, 50 the fortresK of iNIagdcbiirg. One \nno- of the army, under the Prince Hoheuh)ho, wa^ loft to cover the movement. The force imder the Prince Hohenlohe fonght the battle of Jena, with the main body of the P'rcnch Army under the Emperor Napoleon. Davoust's coi-ps, which shoidd have been supported by Bema- dotte, but, for reasons which it is superfluous to mention, was not, had to sustain the attack (»f the Prussian Army. The main road from Weimar to Naumburg led through the village of Hasenhausen, crossing the Saal at Kosen {inc/e Plate XV Davoust had three infantry divisions, those of Gudin, Friant, and Morand. Early on the morning of the 14th October, 1806, he crossed the Saal at Kosen, and leaving a battalion to defend the bridp-e. advanced towards Hasenhausen, Gudin's division leading -' — after a slight cavalry action, Davoue ' '^ ^*' +hH 25th, 85th, 1' six sqi burg r< 1, Plat Til body ploye secon two 1 on t] protf I infai makv. bodies by form right battalion of t ^ company, the right KTc^wauun oi tne *^oth into battalion square on its left company, the left battalions of these regiments, partly covered by the wood, still remained in line. The Pnis- sian cavalry were beaten back with great loss, and were charged as they retired by the six squadrons of Gudin's division which, up to this period, had been sheltered behind the infantry (Fig. 2). Meantime Friant's division came up, and was pushed to the right of Gudin's di^•ision. Avhich, being thus supported on the right, moved the 12th Pegimentfrom that flank along the rear to the south of Hasenhausen, when it deployed one battalion ^vith its right flank on tlie village, tlie left flank being covered by the other battalion in double company column ready to fonn square slightly in rear (vide Figs. 3 and 4). The Prussians still attempted to ftirce the French out of Hasenhausen, and tried to turn then- left flank, where the only troops as yet in position consisted of the two battalions of tiie 12th Regiment formed as above described. Wartensblen's division pushed well to tlte south of Hasen- PLATE X. x'»ig>^-a' .A> ^u^ ^•icri.rir.D Ll-^ 22 B'-orcRU S'^Covnr Cm iic-j 51 lumsen, threatened to tuni and take Gudin's and Friant's divisions iu rear; at this mDmeut MoraiuVs division, composed of five rt'gimeuts, airived on the s > o a: o I- ^ > o I 5 I c ^i M i--^ ■ t Q ^-r Q O < i il z ^ UJ UJ ./; CO O ^ I. I ^1 I ^ I ^ o < o b N ^ "a ^^j ^ ft '^ L,. .A ■«t-*'^^Niv~.s-«i^ ^ 1..^. .. 2 Uancerficlo. LiTH 22, Bedford S^ Covint Garocm. PLATE XI!* OancerfiIld, LiTH '22, BeoroRD STCovent Garden 63 In this formation they liad to cross a river witli steep banks and to ascend a rocky slope in close proximity to a burning village, and among enclosed vineyards. Opposed to the English stood at le;ust two-thirds of the Eussian force ; so soon as the tii-st line had luscended the opjKisite bank the 2nd and light divisions formed an irregidar chain of skirmisliers in which the men of not only dift'erent companies, but even of different regiments, got so mixed up together that it became no longer {Ktssible to fire volleys, or to make any reg\dar movements. The Russians felt confident of breaking this line at any point with their Uiassive and powerful columns, but here the same thing occurred, ;i8 later on in the advance of the 1st division, and the same results wei'e obtained everywhere The Russian army, formed into columns composed of several battalions one behind the other, advanced with a resolute and imj)osing bearing, but without firing, and the thin, weak-looking line of the English held its ground and directed its firing on the dense mass at a range at which Indlets could not fail to take effect. Before they could come to close quarters or deploy, so as to deliver their own fire, the attacking columiLs halted and a few badly-aimed shots were fired frc>m the centre of the leading battalion, which, of course, was the only one that could be em|)loyed. Most of the officers, some of whom "were of the highest rank, liad fallen, but still for a short time the columns stood fimi ; soon, however, it lost its wall- like appearance, and, becoming more of the form of an irregular cloud, at length gave way slowly and unwillingly, and with a jn-ojjortionally great loss. On this occasion, according to the account of Anitschkoff, the Vladimir Regiment lost 49 officers and 1,500 men, but this is probabh^ an exaggerated- statement. In these ever-recun-ing encounters of column against line the Russians lost in barely three hours 5,700 men, or nearly one-fifth of their whole foi'ce. The English, advancing in line, and keeping up their fire, twice broke into the principal intreuchment of the Russians, which was defended by 16 guns. Their total loss did not amount to 2,000 men, and, as the loss of the French must have been very much less, this part of the engagement cost the Russians at least twice as much as it did their opponents, and mainly decided the battle. An actual hand-to-hand-fight occured at Inkermann, when the animosity was at its highest ; on this occasion a thick fog gi'eatly facilitated the near approach of the Russian columns, and enabled them to sui"prise their enemy. Yet here again, they admit that they suffered enonuous losses from the fire of the latter. From these experiences, we infer that now, as heretofore, the column fonnation affords the best means of handling troops, both in an attack and in an actual fight. Although the tire of ai-tilleiy at long ranges forces a column into an early deployment, yet it does not prevent the approach of a line of columns so small as to be able freqviently to obtain cover from the inequalities of the gromid, and to advance with gi-eat rapidity. On the other hand, that portion of an anny which is to sustain the imme- diate attack of an enemy should receive that attack in line, for the success of the defence depends on the fire of the deployed battalions, and it is only by fully emplo}*ing the fii-e that the possibility at last arises of deciding the issue vnth the bayonet. Our system of company columns, and the instiiiction given in our schools of musketry, are adapted to meet all these contingencies. 64 CHAPTER III. Captain May. Tactical retro- spect. (Translated by Ouvry.) JNapier. Infantry Tactics. When wliat is meant by the word a " battle," between armies provided with the weapons now used, is considered, it cannot be denied that powerful influences must be brought to bear on men to get them to face the dangers that have to be encountered. The animal instinct of self-preservation is strong in men as it is in other animals, and his superior knowledge and intellect point out dangers more clearly to him, and it is by appealing to moral faculties only, that men can be induced to meet the dangers that they must face in war. Thus the very intellect which gives man a clearer knowledge of approaching dangers than other animals, is that Avhich enables him to meet and grapple with those dangers as no other animal can. He who considers that our men are all heroes because they are derived from a brave class is very considerably mistaken. If only all soldiers of their own accord would .simply do their duty in battle, an army would be perfectly invincible, and would not require any tactical instruction at all. But man has in his composition a natural desire of self-preservation, an ef'otism and indolence united with many sensual desires, but at the same time capable of being developed into higher qualities. Who would ever maintain that death was indifferent to him ? for in the tumult of battle danger is not so much despised as forgotten or ignored. The less the powers of the mind have attained to this freedom of development of its spiritual powers, so much the more will its sense hold sway. The man of the people who is accustomed to rough or dangei-ous work has rather deadened this sense by custom than conquered it. Thus in war we often find the most extraordinary instances of the victory of small bodies of men over large forces, produced by moral causes. The most niunerons army is by no ineans the most likely to conquer, but that which is the most highly endowed with moral and physical qualities and the best trained and disciplined. There are many different motives which tend to produce the moral power that enables men to overcome the natural instinct of self-preservation ; feelings of duty, fanaticism, enthusiasm for some object or some leader, love of country, pride, with perhaps even more sordid motives, as desire for promotion, self-interest, love of plunder, or even, perhaps, in rare instances, love of actual bloodshed. These passions, working in different proportions in different men's minds, produce that feehng which is termed bravery. And men with these passions excited and influenced by feelings of discipline or obedience to a superior, become formidable troops. The possession of Badajos had become a point of personal honour with the soldiers of each nation, but the desire of glory with the British was dashed 65 Napier. by hatred of the citizeus ou an old gnulge ; and recent toil and hardship, witJi much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly savage, for these things render tlie ni)l)lo-niiniietl, indeed, averse to cruelty, but iKWtlen the vulgar sjiirit. >suniliers also, like Ca-sar's Centurion, who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Ciudad Kodrigo and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, tlie wondrt)US power of discipline bound the whole t(.igether, as with a band of iron, and in the priile of arms none doubted their might to bear down any obstacle that man could oppose to the fury. Experience has slio-wn that these feehiigs are by no means constant, that the bravest and most AvarHke troops have, when exposed to unexpected and mikn(nvn danger, yielded almost "without a struggle. Some of the soldiers called out "a mine." At that word such is the power of imagination, those troops who had not been stopped by the strong barrier, the deep ditcii, the high walls, and the deadly tire of the enemy, staggered back appalled by a chimera of their own raising.* Consequently it a leader desires to obtain great exertions from those under his orders, he must seek to work on and excite their feelings, he must carefully watch against any sudden or unex- pected action of the enemy, and be careful that nothing shakes the men's confidence in themselves. The object ot the leader of bodies of men, whether great or small, should be to inspire those under his command with the greatest moral force before an action, to preserve that moral power during the action, and to seek to demorahse the enemy. There is nothing that tends to raise the moral power of an army more than education ; the consciousness of possessing superior knowledge adds greatly to the power of an army. When, said the Prussian officers, our men came in contact with the Stoffel. Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them found that they hardly knew their (Translated right hand from their left, there was not one who did not look on himself as a by Home.) god, in comparison with euch ignorant beings, and this conviction increased our force tenfold. j\Iany Asiatic races far exceed Europeans in their contempt for death, but they are invariably defeated by the moral power that superior education, civilization, training and discipline give. Men Avho are accustomed to obey their superiors, look to them in danger and take their ideas from them by a kind of sympathy. If a leader be firm, clearheaded, and understands what he is about, he Avill, from the mere fact of there being danger, be more readily obeyed ; but if he is vacillating, uncertain in his action, and appears to doubt and hesitate in the presence of danger, his men will mistrust and disobey him. Two Mamelooks could defeat three French hoi'semen, because they were Napoleon, better armed, better mounted, and more skilful. 100 French horse have nothing to fear from 100 Mamelooks, 300 would defeat a similar number, and 1,000 French would defeat 1,500 Mamelooks. So gi-eat is the influence of tactics, order, and the power of manoeuvring. This moral power is much increased by the feeling of security * Students of Napier will recall tlie description of the panic that occurred to the Ught diyision in the middle of the night, when no enemy was near. which men have, when tbey arc conscious of being well-armed and know how to use their weapons. The results produced by the possession of superior arms, and being confident in their use, is well shown by the following extract, descriljing an event in the war of 1866. Stoffcl. Our soKliers, yuid General Kessel, had rarely I'ecourse to a rapid fire, and (Translated the proof of this is the small number of rounds per man exjjended during the by Home.) campaign ; but for many years we have lost no oi>[iortunity of convincing the men that they carried a weajion superior to that of all other Euiojjean armies, and the jmins we took with rifle ])ractice only strengthened this conviction. This confidence w;is increased and strengthened after the first action, when they found the security aff'orded by an arm which lo;uls rapidly. People si)eak continually of rajjid fire, the expression is not conect and gives a false notion, they should rather say rapid loading. The 29th June, 1866, at Kouigenhof, the Prussians had a sharp action with the enemy. After the action, which took place in fields covered with high corn, Colonel Kessel went over tlie ground, and what was his astonishment to find five or six Austrian bodies for every Prussian. The Austriaus killed had been mostly liit in the head. His men, far from firing fast, had hardly fired as many rounds ;xs the enemy. The Austrian officers who were made prisoners said to the Prussians, our soldiers are demor.Uized, not by the rapidity of your fire, for we could find some means, perhaps, to counterbalance that, but because you are always ready to fire. This morning your men, like ours, were concealed in the corn ; but in this position yours could, without being seen, load their rifles easily and rapidly ; ours, on the other hand, were compelled to stand uj) and show themselves when they loaded, and you then took the opportunity of firing at them ; thus we had the greatest difficulty in getting our men to stand up at all, and such was their terror when they did stand u]> to load that their hands trembled and they could hardly put the cai-tridges into the barrel. Our men fear the advantage the quick and easy loading of the needle gun gives you ; it is this which demoralizes them. In action they feel themselves disarmed the greater part of the time, whereas you are always ready to fire. In the first chapter, the advantage that constant intercourse with the men gives a company leader, has been pointed out, but if men learn to respect, follow, and trust a leader, in whose knowledge of his profession they have confidence, they will from that very intercourse learn to doubt and distrust one who is ignorant of his duty ; and no matter how personally they may like him, will never obey his orders as completely as he in whose knowledge they confide. When actually engaged, the noise of artillery and smaJl-armB, the efi'ect produced by seeing killed and wounded men drop con- tinually, causes a kind of nervous excitement ; at such momenta men are peculiarly apt to be affected by trivial things, and at such moments coolness, decision, and confidence in the leader of small bodies, are of the highest importance. The direction of great masses of troops, getting them into position, or forming them in line of battle — such movements, in short, as those by which Napoleon debouched from the Island of Lobau and deployed his anny on the Slarchfeldt, or that by which the Prussian army, after the battle of ]\Iars-la-Tour, fixcing north advanced in direct echelon of corps from its left, and pivoting on its right, changed front to the east, may be teimed *' Manoeuvre Tactics,"' in contradistinction to the actual fighting, (J7 "which really is often nothing more than the struggle for certain positions on the battle-field, which may be termed " Fighting Tactics." It is to the latter that the following observations bear special reference ; and it must be remembered that all the operations of war, the direction given to great masses of troops, moving over lage areas of coiuitry, and concentrating on certain places, termed strategy, the movement of these masses, so as to place them in luie of battle, and attack certain definite points of the enemy on his flank or centre, termed manoeuvi'e tactics, are closely linked together and are really subordinate to fighting tactics, or the actual collision of troops, by which victories alone can be won. The fu-st troops that come into contact with one another before battles are fought, are small detachments. Military his- tory necessarily passes over much that is done by these small bodies ; but there can be no doubt tliat the coiTcct leading and handling of these small bodies conduces greatly to bringing the action of larger bodies to a successful conclusion. At the begin- ning of any great battle, there are numerous straggles for im- portant points, indeed great battles are often brought about by the necessity for supporting small detachments seeking thus to obtain some advantageous ground. Now it is undoubtedly one of the consequences that flow from the use of modern arms, that troops once actually engaged can rarely, if ever, move to the right or left. Manoeuviing under fire, idways difficult, may now be deemed almost impossible ; once troops are really engaged it would appear that their movements nmst be either forward or baclnvard. Fresh troops may be brought up from the rear to feed the fight in front, but such movements as those made by Massena at Wagram, are at the present day impossible. As an example, at the battle of the Alma, the Kussian battery Avas stormed by a confused mass, composed of four battalions and a portion of a fifth ; one of these battalions did not belong to the brigade actually em- ployed on that part of the field and the odd portion belonged to another division. Death loves a crowd, and in some places our soldiers were j^ressiug so xjnelake close together that when a round shot cut its way into the midst, it dealt a sure havoc. Some of the clusters into which our men had gathered were eight or ten deep, and the round shot, tearing cruelly through and through, mowed down the men. Moving to the attack, without being ordered to move to any given spot, almost every officer and man luid instinctively proposed to liimself the same goal, and that goal was the great Redoubt. This description proves clearly that manoeuvres under a heavy artillery fire, even of old guns, much more so with modern artillery backed by breach-loaders, are impossible. AVho could have turned that body of men, pushing on, either to right or left ? Similarly at St. Privat, the Prussian Guards, when attacking, could only advance, halt, or retire. Under the tremendous fire that modern aims enable troops acting on the defensive, to pour F 2 G8 Boguslausti. (Translated by Graham.) in, all movements to the right and left are vain. He who gives; the order is the next moment down, and another pushes to the front. It becomes therefore apparent that the actual success ot operations in war, must primarily rest on the action of small bodies, good previous strategical movements, a correct formation of the order of battle, a proper selection of the points to be at- tacked, will make the success when obtained, of far greater im- portance ; but the actual success must ultunately depend on the correct handling of small bodies of men. The question how a small body of men should be handled in actual fighting has now become of far greater importance than formerly. Important as- aiFecting the individuals concerned, perhaps more so, as reacting on larger bodies. This is one of the features of modern fighting, and one which must be carefully considered. A battle under existing circumstances is a series of small battles or fights in which bodies of troops, perhaps not greater than a brigade, are engaged, and each of these bodies must be tactically complete, must work for one object, and seek to carry one point. From this fact several consequences flow which have to be carefully considered {see page 153). It follows that it is difficult to assign to several battalions the same definite object of attack — house, village, wood, &c. In general it is to one and only one battalion that the duty of attacking and cai'rying a definite point can be entrusted. The first thing to conduce to the proper leading or handlmg of a small body, is a clear understanding of the various conditions of the problem. A definite object to attain, a clear understand- ing of the difficulties, and the best means of meeting those difficulties, are the first essentials to success. It has been said that for the future no direct attack can possibly be made on troops occupying a position, and that all attacks must be made on the flanks ; but experience shows that attacks on the flank, unless supported by a front attack, can always be met and de- feated. The battle of "Wagram, and perhaps still more, the coun- ter strokes delivered at liossbach and Salamanca, show, that unless front attacks are made at the same time, flank attacks are unlikely to succeed; consequently, however difficult and dangerous such attacks may be, yet it is requisite that they should be made, in order that the change of front, which any Avell-disciplined army can make if unopposed, may be prevented. We said that on the German side the intention was generally evident of attempting to turn the enemy. But the fight often developed itself in such a manner that, after prepju'ing the way by artillery fire, the Germans made a vigorous attack ujion the French centre, without waiting for the effect of the movement on the flanks. This mode of action has often been criticised, and attention has been called to the enormous sacrifices which it has genenilly entailed ; but these critics forget that, when you wish to force the enemy to fight, a fairly sharj) attack in front is necessary to hold him fa.st, otherwise he would avoid the turning movement which is meanwhile going on, either by a timely retreat, or by throwing himself upon the turning column and attacking; it, whilst executing its movement. 69 A great deal has been \\aitten on tLe subject of flank attacks, and it has been pointed out tliat troops, "when ordered to attack, invariably spread out to the flanks, thiiniiny; the hue in the centre. This may be, and undoubtedly is tlie case, looking to the attack of brigades and divisions on isolated portions of a battle-field : but it would not be the case if the centre of the enemy's position was that from which the least fire came, or that which afforded the greatest cover or the greatest facilities for attack.* In looking at the actions of the recent war, it is absolutely requisite to bear in mind that the array which made the flank attacks was either far superior in numbers to thiit it attacked, or was dealing with troops (as in the latter battles) that could not manoeuvre. This subject is dealt Avith in more detail at page 155. We must not assume that in all future battles such superiority on one side will exist. If it does exist, then the attacker may really do pretty much as he thinks fit ; attack both flanks and leave strong forces in the centre. What is meant is this— if A B (Fig. 1, Plate XIII) be an army opposed to another (C D) of equal strength, it is manifest that if C D attempts to turn the flank A of A B, it may be met either by a change of front as A^ Bj, or by a counter movement A2 B2 : and if a flank be thus threatened when forces are equal, the army threatening the flank either places itself in the position of being caught in a flank movement, or simply making a toil- some march to find its enemy still before it. It is hardly safe to genera,Hse on recent experience and lay down a rule that front attacks must not be made. French tactics were entirely deficient of the offensive element on a large Boguslauski. scale, by which, with inferior numbers even, you may gain great advantages (Translated if you are in a position to make rapid concentrations and advances on desired by Graham.) points. Partial counter-strokes on isolated points of a battle-field, such as the French made frequently and with great bravery at Sedan, can only have a momentary effect. The attempt to turn the flank of an enemy can only be justified by a great Clausewitz. superiority, this superiority may be either actual superiority of numbers, or it may follow from the way the lines of communication are placed. When an army endeavours to attack another by making a flank movement, and a corresponding change of front is made by its adversary, the manoeuvring powers of the two armies come into play, aiid each leader watches for^ and seeks to profit, by the mistakes of his opponents. The movements of the French and British armies prior to the battle of Salamanca afford a good example of this. The two armies were for some days in close proximity to one another, each seeking to take the other at disadvantage ; for some time the French out-marched the British, and had the best of it until ^larmont made the fatal error of extending his left too much, an en-or which WelHngton seized, and thereby won a great victory. * This gpreadinc^ out appears to be caused by an instinctive feehng that the surest way to avoid an enemy's fire is to equal or exceed his front. 70 Ultimately a flank attack becomes locally a front attack, or tlic troops whose flank is attacked mnst meet or try to meet the attack by forming a crochet, throwing back a portion of the line, or bringing up a reserve ; in any of which cases the attack, althongh a flank attack as regards the general line of battle be- comes locally in that place a front attack. Thus the Prussians at Waterloo made an attack on the right flank of tlie French anny, although it was locally a front attack on the young guard under Lobau. Similarly, the Saxons made a flank attack at the battle of Gravelotte, on the French line of battle, although a front attack on tlie troops at Roncourt, fomiing the right of the Vlth Coi-ps, but these troops would have been in greater force had the Prussian guard not held the French fast in front by a formidable attack. It is quite true that the front formed to resist the flaidc attack will not be posted as strongly as the troops holding the true front ; but still the attack will, in the locality where made, be a front and not a flank attack. It is not meant that there are no circumstances under wliich an army of equal or inferior strength should not attempt to turn the flank of another. Such circumstances may undoubtedly occur. Fig. 2, Plate XIII, shows an ideal case. An army, A B, on the defensive has one v^ing strongly posted at A. It is induced to spread the other out towards B by a demonstration in its front. The attacking army, occupying the wood in its front strongly, places a portion in a state of defence, so as to check any advance of the enemy to the front, and seeing that the nature of the gi'ound at A is such that a counter-movement in that direction cannot be easily made, moves round to that flank, preser\ang the line of communication towards D, and by concentrating a fire on A, the attackers are enabled to cany that point ; such a case is not an unfrequent one, and the power of the breech-loader on the defensive, enabling a small body of determined men well posted to delay a large force, appears to have given increased facilities for making concentric attacks. The efiect of the breech-loader in this respect appears to have introduced the greatest modifica- tion in modern figlitmg. Vide page 155. It is desu'able to review the problem as it at present stands. If a reference be made to the battle of the Alma, it must be acknowledged that the heavy guns used by the Eussians com]'»elled the British troops to deploy into line earlier than they would have done had the Russians been provided "uath the usual field artillery. This is exactly what rifled artillery now does, only to a greater extent ; it compels troops attacking to quit their column formation (in which marches must be made) and open out sooner than formerly. Breech- loading rifles also produce effects at longer ranges than formerly. Hence the problem resolves itself into the follo^\Tlng: A certain space of from 1,500 to 2,500 yards swept by fire, the intensity of which increases as troops >• PLATE XIII lMt>- 1 .-^"v^ "V. ^ \ X. - >^ \\ S-\ c «,_ ,_^ 1> "^^7=^ ILLUSTRATION OF A FLANK ATTACK Dangerfield. Lith 22. Bedford ST Covent Garden 71 approach the powitioii from whicli that fire is delivered, has to bo passed over. How shall it be crossed ? It is requisite here to consider Avhat the peculiar nature of the breech-loader is, as distinguished from the muzi^le-loader, assuming both to possess equal accuracy and range. It can be loaded ^Wth greater ease and rapidity, hence its defensive power m greater than that of the nmzzle-loader, but if the position of men. advancing to an attack be considered, it will be found that the breech-loader (from the very great ease Avith which it may be loaded) enables a well-sustained, well-directed fire to be kept up from troops advancing in extended order, the operation of loading being performed when lying doAvn or in confined places with niTich greater ease than with the muzzle-loader. Hence the ojfensive. power of the breech-loader is very much greater than that of the muzzle-loader.* The defence has gained greatly, but the oifensive has, relatively speaking, gained still more, or, in other words, the superiority of the defence over the attack is not now so marked as it was with muzzle-loading rifles. It is desirable that those who read this statement should understand that it icas until recently contested in Pru-%sia ; and it is believed that it will meet icith much opposition in this conntyy. The following extract shows the latest, and what is believed to be the generally accepted opinion abroad. Every improvement in firearms produces a powerful impression that the ScherfP. Defcnsice lias thereby gained an accession of strength. This feeling is all the (Translated more natural because a purely defensive attitude in the open field was first by Graham.) rendered possible by the invention of fireai-ms and of gunpowder. In earlier days battles took the form of encounters in which both sides took the offensive, or else the defender was driven to make use of fortification to an extent far surpassing the practice of the present day. Firearms and the Defensive are as much allied in our minds as are " Varme blanche " and the Offensive ; in neither case can we well imagine the allies separated. " The better the fii-earm, the stronger the defence " is, there- fore, a maxim the justice of which has always exerted its influence upon miHtary operations since firearms have become general, and which has not yet quite lost its power. So it was after the Crimean "War, when the rifled musket, and so after the Bohemian Camimign, when the breech-loader, respectively made their debut in the field. In each case theory raised its voice very loudly in favor of the principle of the Defence, and if the book-tacticians of those days had been worthy of credit, the war of 1870-71 should have bloomed into one of the finest sj^ecimens of a war of positions, in which, as is well known, the art of beating gives place to that of not being beaten. , This theory was deduced in a curious manner from our latest war experience, each time in an indu-ect way, that is to say, the new arm was in both campaigns victorious in fence ; nevertheless we are told that it should properly give more power to the Defence. The fact that in 1859 the Austrian rifle did not hold its own against the smooth-bore with which the French were still mostly armed, was accounted for by the action of the French rifled cannon. But, as was still maintained, "rifled guns and muskets must infallibly make the Defensive invincible." * 'What is meant is, Noro the fire of the assailant's infantry is of far greater importance than it ever was, the defenders suffer far more from this fire than formerly, consequently every means must be taken, when attacking, to increase and develop that fire. 72 It is a remarkable and interesting fact that at a time when these defen- sive tlieories had obbiined jtretty general ajjproval, both in literature and even in other ways, the Austrians in 1866 would have nothing to say to them, and setting at naught the dicUites of natui'e and tradition, rushed almost fanatically into the Offensive — to be everywhere beaten ; and that when the tables were turned and many voices were raised against that one-sided theory to reject it, the French in 1870 went upon the opposite tack, and like the Austrians, acting contrary to their nature and traditions, servilely followed a Defensive system — to be in like manner everywhere beaten ! These striking contradictions show plainly enough that the formula of the "certain shot" is not infallible, when we have to decide upon the absolute merit of this or that tactical formation. It must be confessed that the critics recovered themselves pretty soon from the first panic, so to say, which was created by the general introduction of rifled arms, and resting upon the experiences of 1859, they met the theory of the absolute Dcfoisive with the argument that it was not so much the accuracy of the new arms as their low trajectory, which rendered them such valuable allies to the Defence. With regard to breech-loaders, it was assertad even before 1866 that their rapidity of lire w'oidd serve the assailant at least as well as it would the defender. In fact, the more portable, moveable, handy, and quick-firing a gun is, so much the more suited is it to the attacking party which is compelled to be constantly in movement, a condition unfavouraVjle to the use of firearms. The development of Artillery from the gun of position to its present degree of perfection was a consequence of this conviction, just as the rapid-firing infantry of Frederick the Great, acting as it did on the offensive, was an example of its justice. Thus a very decided opposition to the defensive hobby grew out of purely technical considerations. Is it necessary to enlarge upon the decisive question of morale ? We think not, after 1870, after 1866, after the whole of Prussia's history. Indeed it may appear superfluous to moot the question at all at the present day, and in our country ! The theory of the su]5eriority of the Ofensive is for the time being so firmly rooted that a reaction is not much to be feared. And yet even with us, the time of the doubters has not long passed away ; a single instance of failure on the part of the Offensive — always a possible event — would again wake up these theorists, who in accordance with their critical German nature, would once more produce their coldly-reasoned *^ demonstrations founded upon the nature of the arm." Reverting to tlie battle of the Alma, the British advanced firing, and it is quite evident that snch a fire must be heavier and more deadly from an advancing body of men armed Avith breech- loaders, than from a similar body armed with muzzle-loaders ; and further, that the time a given number of men advancing across a given space take to discharge a given number of bullets, must be much less than formerly, or in other words a body of men armed Avith 'breech-loaders, and advancing to attack a position defended by men similarly armed, will inflict greater loss, although suffering more, than if both were armed with muzzle-loaders.* This is the chief peculiority of the breech- loader, and to it must be subordinated the formation of the troops ; or, whatever formation be adopted, it must, be such as will enable tlie soldier to use his weapon, loadmg and firing as he moves; at the same time that by the formation adopted the undoubted power of the breech-loader on the defensive may be * Vide the description of the action at Konigonhof, page 06, as an illustration. 73 reduced, that is t(> say, the offensive power of tlie weapon must be developed, Avhile at tlie same time every means nuist bo adopted to reduce its destructive effects. The following description brings this point out clearly: — The intensely effective and continnin;^ rolling fire of the Chassejiot Boguslausti. ina. " Taking into consideration the increase of the defensive power, we may rejjly, us many men as the ground will permit to be placed in line, so that they may use their iveapons ej)ieicntly. In order that the j^reparation for the attack may be really efficacious, that is to say, that it may shattei- the enemy both jjhysically and morally, the chief conditioji is that it should continue uninterruptedly from the beginning to the end ; if the final assault follows the cessation of lire only after the lapse of some time, the tire may have materially weakened the defenders, but as for moral effect, in so far as good troops are concerned, it will have died out, and on the other hand, the moment the attacking tire ceases, either really or appa- rently, the spirits of the defenders rise. Now, with the tirearms in use, the action of each man may be considered to be continuous, and since each man, to use his rifle freely, requires one yard and a half of space, it follows that the maximum number of men, that can be placed in the line of skirmishers, should not exceed one man per yard and a half. At this period of the action there is nothing to be considered but the develoi)ment of fire. Every man in the skirmisher line who on account of a want of space cannot take his share of the tiring is absolutely hurtful, at the same time that he inci'eases uselessly the chances of loss. It is desirable to determine what ought to be the extent of the front of attack of a given number of men. We liave already pointed out that it is- desirable to continue the prejjaratory fire uninterruptedly from the moment it begins until the moment for the actual assault arrives, it becomes requisite ta fix the exact time when the preparatory fire should begin. The object of preparing the attack is to shatter the enemy ; the moment when this pr-epara- tion can begin, must be that when the attacking troops will be sufficiently 81 near to make their fire tell heavily. With the arms at present used this dis- tance will be when the att;iokers are altinit* 400 to 200 yards from the place where the Hue is to be pierced. It follows froui human nature itself that the best troops in the world can sustain such a heavy and uninterrupted fire for only a few minutes, the defendei-s being iussumea as good troops, and as well amied as the attackers. Leaving out of consideration the actual losses, which rarely bear any proportion to the number of rounds firsd, the effect on the nerves is such that iu a short time some decisive action must follow so great excitement. As regards the attackei-s, although it must be conceded that tlie defenders, despite the advantage of the situation, have less moral 2>ower than the at- tackei's, and are more disposed to retire, yet they cannot do so until after the lapse of some short time during which some impulse may carry the attackers (skirmishing line) forward or backward. In either case the main body, whose function it is to carry the position, must arrive exactly at the moment, or rather a little before, to support the skirmishing line, who without this support would be quite incapable of making the final assault. It is evident that the main body is naturally interested in not closing on the skirmishing line, who have been preparing the attack, that is to say, of not entering into the zone where they will experience heavy losses, until the fire of the skirmishing line has acted for a certain time, a length of time which, if possible, ought to be prolonged until the moment when the crisis arrives. Until that moment the main body should remain as much as possible out of the zone rendered dangerous by the enemy's fii-e. This main body must then fulfil two distinct and contradictory conditions, and from an examination of these conditions we may deduce the distance which should exist between the skirmishing or i)reparatory line, and the troops who have to complete the business. Experience has shown during tlie recent war that, when there is a rapid tire on both sides, such as we have jiist described, that it cannot be prolonged more than five minutes before a crisis arrives. Hence we arrive at the con- clusion that the main body must not be further from the skirmish or prepara- tory line at the moment it begins to act than about 500 yards. If the ground is perfectly open, the main body can only reach this distance about the time that the quick fire begins in front of it. But then, although even if it follows the line of skii-mishers at 300 yards distance, it is requisite to have an intermediate line between it and the skir- mi.sher line, which, in accordance with the principles we have just enunciated, should be extended at one yard to a yard and a half intervals. Further, a line of skirmishers advancing, as we have supposed, cannot advance to effective range without suffering losses, perhaps very heavy losses ; if then the prepara- tory fire is to be continued without interruption, there must be at hand a support with which to fill up the gaps. According as the ground offers shelter, more or less good, to approach the enemy, this support or intermediate line ought to be stronger or weaker ; it may, however, be admitted, as a practicable principle which is justified by experience, and accepted in all theories, that the support should vary from one-half to the whole number of the skirmishei-s. Now, in addition to these two bodies, which from the beginning we may consider as acting on the offen- sive, and which really both serve only to prepare the attack, it is absolutely requisite to have a third force or main body at least equal to the other two. From the digression we have made to describe the various phases of the attack, we are again led to our first question, " What is to determine the extent of front to be given to a fixed number of men ? " The distance may be arrived at as follows : one-half or two-thirds of the whole force as main body, and one-half or one-third as preparing the attack, * This is with needle guns of course. The distance with an improved rifle would perhaps be greater. a 82 one-half of the last number spaced at one yard to one and a half yards, will give tlie required front. Oi-, in other words : if we take a battalion of 1,000 men, it will, caclres and absent men beinff deducted, put 800 rifles on parade. Hence the normal front of such a battalion in open ^rround should not exceed 300 yards ; there being 200 rifles to prepare the attack, 200 in sui)p(jrt, to fill up ga])s, and 400 aa the main body. It is very desirable that the reason ^vhy extended order offers a protection from ainwd fire should be clearly understood, and the distinction in this respect between close and individual order as regards aimed fire is clearly put in the following ex- tract : — Col. GaMler Because the more open order invites the more direct oi- even divergent fire, i.e., less intense fire ; the close order, as the men form an object, invites the convergent or more intense fire. Thus, if 100 men in line are firing at 25 advancing towards them, the fire will be convergent or intense '\i the 25 are formed in a body ; but if the latter extend themselves, say four ])aces, they will occupy a front rather wider than the enemy. They then ofl'er no special attraction, and therefore invite a direct or less iutense fire. One great safe- giuu-d for those exposed to aimed fire is to equal the enemy's front. "It has been said that the troops first pushed on must be composed of a portion of the same tactical body as those im- mediately in rear." Page 78. This immediately brings up the question. What is meant by " lines " ? It has been seen that Frederick formed his army in two lines, each three deep, and that at the Alma the English advanced in two lines, two deep, Avith a reserve. From a two-deep line it is impossible to feed a fight or sup- port the skirmishers, for a two-deep line is little more than a compressed line of skirmishers. Hence the word " first line," " second line," must not be taken as meaning either a line of skirmishers or two-deep lines, but the troops actually fighting in the front line ; and if a brigade of three battalions be taken as an example, one battalion skirmishers, one in support, in two columns of half battalions, and one again behind it at a further distance, collectively the whole form the first Ime, the General Ofiicer's command extending from front to rear, over a far greater extent of ground than formerly. Although from the fact that the breech-loader enables the same amount of fire to be procured from a much smaller number of men than lormerly, or in other words, enables a smaller number of men to occupy a given space than formerly, it may follow that the front occupied by a brigade of three battalions, formed in some .nich way as described above, may be quite as great as formerly.* The second luie of troops may be formed, until required, in almost any formation that may be best suited for the ground and most convenient. The action of the General Officer Com- manding a Brigade or Division can no longer be that of accom- * Such a method of fovniatiou is by no means suggested as a good one, it iflonly intended os an illustratiun of a cliange. 83 E allying a line in its aclvaiico, which he can from its length anlly supervise; he must watch the action of the troops in front, and support them by ordering up fresh men from the rear Continually it has been shown, that ground is won to the front by some company officer who has taken advantage of the folds of the ground, and pushed up where he is sheltered from fire, or where the artillery and rifle fire has told heavily and conse- quently reduced the number of defenders and shaken their morale, and has so foiuid an opening somehow where he can enter. Generally the skirmishert<, the moment they saw that a superiority wan gained on a certain point, rushed to it from all directions, and concentrated their tire on it. Watching for these movements the Brigade Commander can push up fresh troops to keep the ground already won, and support the troops who have Avon it. The more the different parts of an army have a disposition to fight separately the greater will be the strength of hand required to hold them together and arrange matters so that all the unchained power, instead of following their own ideas ecceutricall)^ and without plan, shall finally work towards a point fixed upon by the eye of the Commander. A mere mechanical leading will produce no result, because the leader would then not understand how to use his precious instrument ; a faulty leading is still worse, for it would ruin it. This loose individual mode of attack requires a counterpoise which must be twofold ; the first and most important is the Commander-in-Chief, who remains out of the i-ange of fire. He watches over and has by him a strong reserve to reinforce the front line, when requisite. The other counterpoise is the officer commanding the front line, whose essential duty it is to execute all necessary movements in the same. The necessity of woi-king the first or fighting line, so that it shall have in itself and under its own commander, a body which may serve as a support and reserve, is all the more requisite, as any sudden action on the part of the enemy, the sudden advance of troops of all arms, the bringing up of a reserve, or some unexpected action on the flanks, may suddenly drive the fighting line back, if it be not at once supported ; if the commander has nothing in hand to steady the fight, the support fi-om the second line can hardly arrive in time ; hin-ry- ing up from the rear it can hardly re-establish, although it may renew the fight, and the probability is that what has been won already Avill be lost and have to be again fought for : fortunate if the retiring line does not throw the advancing troops into confusion. Many are the instances in war when a part of the defensive position of an army, ranged on a long line, has been for the moment carried ; but the success not being properly followed by support, or the defenders having brought up reserves more quickly than the assailants, the latter have been cast out again perhai)s with heavy loss. Such was the fate of the advance of Junot's corps at Busaco, after it had fairly penetrated the English position on the west ot the hilL No less unfortunate was the issue of the l:)old attack made by the centre of the allies on Napoleon's works at Di'esden, although it succeeded for a time. But as striking an instance of the uselessness of this kind of temporary advan- G 2 MilitariBche Gedanken und Betrach tungen. Tactical retroBpect. Captain May. (Translated by Ouvry.) Campaign in Virginia. Cheeney. 84 tage occurred more recently at the hill held by the allies at Inkermann. There a Russian battalion having crowned the heights unopposed, at an unguarded point, deployed, halted, and melted away again down the slope, without any Ijressure, being timid and distrustful of their advantage from sheer want of su|)port. K'nglake We saw that wliilst the Grenadiers and the Coldstreams were still forming under the bank, the battalion called the Scots Fusilier Guards had been hurried forward by the appeal from the troops, then still clinging to the Redoubt, had incurred the tire of the Vladimir column, and had aftei-Avards encountered a mass of our men retreating, which broke the formation of its left companies by sheer bodily force, and compelled them to fall back in disorder. Napier. In the excitement of success the English guards followed with reckless ardour, but the French reserves of infantry and dragoons advanced, the repulsed men faced about, the batteries smote the guards in flank and front so heavily they drew back, and at the same time the Germans being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill and Campbell stood fast on the extremities of the line, yet the British centre was absolutely broken, and fortune seemed to incline to the French. Suddenly the 48th, led by Colonel Donellan, was seen advancing through the vast disordered ma.'ises, which seemed sufficient to carry it away bodily ; but wheeling back by companies, that regiment let the crowds pass throvigh, and then resumed its pi'oud and beautiful line. Then the Guards and Germans rallied. In all actions there is a critical moment, which will give the victory to the General who knows how to seize it. When the Guards first made their rash chai-ge, Sir Arthur foreseeing the issue of it had ordered the 48th do^vvn from the hill. These dispositions gained the day. The British became the strongest at the decisive point. The first or fighting fine must then be formed so that it carries its own reserve or support with it, and when spoken of as the first fine, it is not to be regarded as a deployed hne of infantry. From what has been said, it appears therefore that the for- mation most suitable for the attack is one which, while occupy- ing a front quite as long as that formerly held by a deployed line, will do so with fewer men, and will give commanding officers means of feeding the front, or in other words, the area, of action of a commanding ofjicer icill be as long and far deeper than formerly/. And it also follows that the skill and intelligence of indi- vidual officers of every grade, more especially their aptitude for seizing favourable places for an advance, are now of more value than they have ever been in war. The foregoing are the general principles on which the forma- tion of troops for an attack should be made. But it is manifest that there can bo no definite or determinate rule laid down, the words of Jomini, quoted at page (50, must be borne in mind, and "the fatal tendency to systematize," to seek for "absolute forms," and " to cast all tactical formation in one mould," must be struggled against. To recapitulate, it appears generally that troops foi-med for attack, should be formed in at least three bodies, and that these bodies should under one direction work for one object, and be closely linked together, and be of such strength, that each shall be a considerable force. It is evident iviiJe page 5) 85 that a company is tar too small a body to be so split up, lieuci' the battalion miiHt be taken as the attacking- miit if any real Avork has to be done. AVe thus arrive at tlu; formation of a skirmishing line, a supporting line, and a main body. Taken together these three form the first line. It further appears that the men placed in the skirmishing line should be extended so as to diminish loss, increase accuracy and rapidity of fire, while at the same time a heavy and destructive fire is maintained. The functions of the skirmishing line l)ehig to crush and overwhelm the enemy with bullets. The object of the supports being to fill up gaps among the skii-mishcvs, and so sustahi the intensity of their fire. The duty of the main body being to advance the moment the enemy is sufficiently shaken, and drive him out of his position. The distance between these three bodies must be governed partly by the work they have to do, partly by the trajectory of the arms in use^ partly by the ground ; to effectively support the skirmishers, that is to say, to be able to feed them with fi-esh men, the supports should be about 200 to 250 yards in rear. The main body must be able to cross the interval that divides them from the skirmishers in about five minutes, or they must be 500 to (iOO yards off. And consistent Avith the due per- formance of these functions the supports and main body may be in any formation that from the shape of the ground, or other circumstances, will protect them best fi-om loss, whether that formation be extended order, line, or columns, and they must change fi'om one formation to another as quickly as possible. The principles which govern the formation of troops for attack can only be given, their application must depend on the know- ledge and abihty of the Commander in adjusting his formation to suit the ground he is working over. Thus the more cover there is, to take advantage of, naturally the smaller will be the loss, and consequently the supporting- body, Avhose function is to supply the losses of the skirmisliers, may be reduced, and the length of the skirmishing line increased, at the same time that the intervals between the lines may bo diminished. But the original question embraced more than the formation of the troops. It was, How^ shall the shot-sw^ept zone be crossed? Putting irregularities of ground out of consideration, this zone is swept by fire of different kinds, in different places — 1. The artillery fire which may be said generally to begin at about 2,500 yards. 2. The unaimed or random fire of the infantry which may begin to tell at about 1,100 yards, o. The' aimed fire of the infantry, Avliich will begin to tell at about (500 to 700 yards. Artillery employed in defending a position do not fire so much on advancujg infantry in the early stage as on the attack- 86 Tellenbach. (Translated by Robinson.) ing artillery, in addition to Avliich tlic actual loss by artillery fire is in action comparatively small, bein^ from -^V^''^ ^^' tV^^^ *'^ ^^^® loss caused by the musketry fire.* Hence it may, speaking in general terms, be disregarded.! The unaimed infantry fire produces many losses, but it appears that the effects of such fire may be mitigated by observing where it falls most, and avoiding those places. Projectiles must not be considered only in relation to their mark, they sweep and command the battle-field. There are cert;iin portions in the shot sphere, varying in situation and with time, where the shot fall more or less thickly ; and we can partly gather from general rules, and jjartly (jb.^^erve those ■where they fall least thickly. Therefore, ajjart from the question of increasing the difficulty of aiming, there are means even on the open plain of lessening the effect of the enemy's fire. These means consist in the attitude of the men, the formation of the troops, the selection of the jjosition to I'enuiin in, of the direction, and the manner of advancing, and they vary with circum- stances. The fire that causes heavy losses, and checks advancing troops, is undoubtedly the aimed or directed fire of infantry. The sooner and the quicker the space between, where the deployment of the troops takes place, and the enemy's position is crossed the better ; but if crossed at the double, one of the objects of the skirmishing line, crushing the enemy with bullets, Avould not be accomplished, hence, such a method of advance, even if it were possible to run o^'er the 2,()()() yards without stopping, would be undesirable. But it seems desiral)le that the first 1,000 yards should be crossed Avithout firing, and as rapidly as possible. It will be shown hereafter, that the attacker's artillery usually fires on the enemy's infantry, not on his guns, hence, until the attacking troops reach the zone of danger- ous mfantry fire, or aliout 1,100 yards from the position, if possible they shoidd advance witliout firing, and as cpiickly as they can without being disordered, once the dangerous zone of infantry fire is reached, not only will they begin to sufter, but the power of inflicting loss on the enemy by means of their own fire begins, and about this stage of the advance the skir- mishers must begin to fire. How should they then advance ? Bearing in mind that the fmu-tion of the skirmishing line is to keep up a continuous rain of shot on the enemy, and exj)ose themselves as little as possible, or to develope the offensive power of the breach-loader, while reducing the destructive effect it has when used on tiie defensive. Bearing this in mind, it appears that the advance may best be made in a succession of short rushes, lying down, firing rapidly, and again running on, as described at page 73. This manoeuvre may be performed in several ways ; the whole line may so act, or alternate men * At Gravelott.e, wliere the French were in position, 94 per cent, of the Prussian killed and wounded was from infantry fire, 5 per cent, from artillery, and 1 percent, from bayonet, sabre and lance. At Fredericksburg the Northern loss was about 78 per cent, by infantry fire. f At 2,200 yards the guns in the English service will strike a deployed lino of infantry once in three rounds, once in 10 rounds at 3,300 yards. 87 may so act, or altcruato portions, sections, subdivisions, or companies may so act. The first method entails the disadvan- ta^-e of there behig a time, however short yet a small appre- ciable time, "vvhen the hre ceases. The second method has this objection, that the party in advance are sure to mask the lire of" those in rear more or less, and that soldiers are peculiarly apt to be discourag-ed by losing men from their comrades' fire and that the men are apt to get out of hand, and the ofKcers find their control reduced. The rush forward of a portion of an extended line invariably di'aws the enemy's attention, and con8e(piently his fire on that portion; this is the moment for the other portion to seize and rush on too, hence there is an advantage in the alternate advance of portions. It appears therefore advisable to adopt the third method, the alternate advance of fractions. But hi what fractions? In such fractions as are best adapted to the ground, and are of such a nature as to constitute a definite command ac(.'Ustomed to work together, and are led by an officer whose position gives hiui influence with the men. If the formation of the British battalion be considered, by which two companies, a double com- pany, or about 250 to 200 men \dll be in the skirmishing line, this alternate advance may be made by companies, each company being then led and cnnnnanded by the officers who know the men individually. For what distance should these rushes be made ? They should be of such a length that the men should not be exhausted and out of breath after making them, even when the distance is run over as rapidly as possible ; for tliis reason, it would appear that these rushes should not exceed about (30 yards, but should be adjusted so as to obtain cover ; if cover exists, the rush should be from cover to cover. Before advancing, the officer commanding the body about to make the rush should select the place he is going to, point it out to his subordinates, and at a given signal (a shiiU whistle is the easiest to hear) he should dash to the front, his subaltern and men following ;* on getting into his new position he will get liismen undercover as quickly as possible, kneeling, lying down, or standing, as may best cover them, and will open fire at once, and fire steadily and deliberately until the company on his flank is rushing, when he should fire a few rounds as quickly as he possibly can, to cover its advance. It should be a standing rule that when any body of skirmishers is rushing to the front, those on its immediate flank should fire rapidly to cover its advance and reduce the effect produced by the cessation of its fire. From the foregomg, it would appear that about 2 companies would form the supports and 4 companies the main body. It * An officer, or a steady non-commissioned officer, should be left to see that the mon follow. 88 is the function of the supports to fill up the gaps in the skinnish- ing line, hence, companies must get mixed up together, it is perfectly impossible to prevent it. }h\t it is possible, by careful training, to obviate, or rather to mitigate, the e^^ls that may ensue The Emperor of Germany has recently issued an order on this subject, of which the following is an extract : — n^v I'^'l'' The foreffoing general principles are intended to meet the requirements of 1 s^a^^ ' ' ^^^^ tactics of the jjresent day ; I ninst however Innng piominently to notice, that in training comijanies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, according to Sections 43, 88, i)8, 99, 112 to 115, and 130 of tlie Field Exercise, particular care must be taken that the fretjuent disjjcrsiou and development of strong lines of skirmishers, which is demanded by the present mode of Avarfare, may not lead to a pernicious loosening of the tactical connection. This danger can alone be met by great intimacy on the })art of officei-s with battle formation, and by a high state of discipline in action and in tiring, combined with a thorough and strict system of drill. In thus making increased demands on the ti-ainiug of the infantry, I will also give relief, by abolishing some of the formation in the field exercise, and putting restrictions on others. Various proposals have been made to obviate the mixing up of companies in the skirmishing line.* One of these is that each of the four companies forming the skirmishers and supports should be formed in column of sections, and that the feeding of the skir- mishers should be carried out by each company feeding its owu leadmg sections.f It is manifest that the objection to this arises[from the fact that each company will thus be about 200 to 300 yards deep, and sup- posing it to consist of 100 men extended at one yard and a half interval, its front section will cover 35 yards, or each captain will have his command scattered over a wide area — too wide to allow liim to lead in front, command in the centre, and judiciously support from the rear. Further, the skirmishers Avould want that cohesion which having whole companies in fi-ont gives ; and a similar difficidty would occur with supports. Each hne must have a definite commander and leader, and removing the captain from the skirmishers removes the nerve from the place where it is most wanting. But, it may be argued, if the captain is Idlled the nerve is wanting. Hardly so, for the subaltern then com- mands the skirmishers as captain on his own responsibility, not as the subordinate of another, Avhich is a very difterent thing. Companies icill get mixed up. Long-range weapons compel an advance in extended order for long distances, and do what officers may, men under such circumstances, exposed to a heavy- fire, do get out oi' order. There is no use blinking this fact ; it is impossible that it can be otherwise, so long as human beings possess different physical and moral endowments. Some men will be eager and anxious for the work, others -will hang back, * This subject is dealt with more in detail in Appendix I, when describing the new Italian infantry tactics. t It should be understood that this proposal to skirmish by sections, is one that meets with support, and the best method of formation, whether by sections or companies, is an open question, ride Appendix, Italian formationsj for a further statement of both sides of the question. 89 antl tlieir courage gradually oozoa^vay. Some can bo influenced by example and encouragement, others cannot ; some art- stronger, and better able to keep up than others, consequently -we must expect such a mixing up of coni})anics amongst the skirmish- ing line. It is better to foresee aud provide by training that an evil which will take place may be as little of an evil as possible, than attempt to guard against -what all experience shows cannot be guarded against. No army ever went into action with bettor drilled or steadier troops ihan the English did at the Alma ; they Averc the results of years of careful drill and the finest and most } perfect regimental organization and system that any army ever lad, and yet what was the force that first carried the battery at the Alma but a mob, composed of various regiments, biigades, and divisions mixed up together, and such must ever be the ease where a rapid advance under a heavy fire is made by a body of troops for any distance. When line formations Avere intro- duced into the British army, advances under fire, of the length of that made at the Alma, Avere unknown, being quite needless ; but even in the Peninsula, with the short distances there moved over, such mixing up of companies Avas recognised as an CA'il to be mitigated, but still one that Avould exist. The wisdom of introducing any complication Avith the object of preventing companies being mixed, is at least questionable. The principles on Avhich troops should be formed, and Avhich go^'ern their adA^ance, being such as liaA'e been described, it is de- sirable to endeaA'our to realise as clearly as possible the circum- stances mider Avhich, and the reasons Avhy an attack is at the present day possible. At a distance fi'om the enemy's position, A-arying according to the nature of the ground, aud the state of the atmosphere, but perhaps lying A^'ithiu the limits of 2,500 to 3,000 yards, troops Avill have to deploy and quit the close order in which they have preA'iously been formed. Noio an attack on an enemy j^Tfisvpposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made* War, whether viewed tactically or strategically, is but the art of being the strongest at the right place at the right time. This superiority of force may be numerical, moral, or local, or it may be composed partly of all three, but for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success, the attackers at the point the attack takes p)lace must he superior. NoAv, Avhen the first deployment takes place, the attacker's infantry' Avill suffer but slightly from artillery tire. But the assail- ant's artillery Avill shake down the Avails of A'illages, farms, or houses in which the defenders are posted, thus driving the infantry out. Their artillery will consequently become the object for the defender's guns to fire at, as it Avill be stationary, or only adA'ancing occasionally, and in masses of several batteries. * To obtain tliis superiority is one of the chief objects of the maniruvrcs that precede the actual collision of armies. 90 The frontal attack of Infantry. (Translated by Colonel NcAvdegate.) Scherff. Hence the infantry Avill, in this tlie first stage, snffer bnt Httle from the direct or aimed hrc, altliough a few losses may be occa- sionedjby stray shots. As the infantry advances,fa hxrg-e portion of the artiUery will advance also, not together, but l^y alternate batteries, or brigades of batteries, so that a fire will be always kept up. It will probably advance thus, until it gets near tu the extreme range of the infantry fire, or about 1,200 to 1,400 yards from the enemy's position. The moment the first or skirmishing fine of the infantry comes near enough to the enemy's position to become a mark for its aimed or direct fire, say about (300 to 700 yards, the troops in rear, that is to say, the supports and main body, will suft'er but little, except fi-om the unaimed or random fire. It is desirable that this point should be clearly undei-stood. The fire of the assailant's artillery and the fire of his skirmishmg line Mall have the effect of drawing on them both the enemy's artillery and infantry fire, and hence it becomes possible to bring up the main body in a much closer formation than is often supposed. When the skirmishers are once involved in a fii-e action with the enemy, close detachments can come forward with insigniticant losses. On the 19th January, at St. Qniutin, two companies 1st Ehenish Infantry Regiment, No. 70, upon the right wing of the 16th Division, were brought forward to protect the batteries of the division from the enemy's infantry tire. One zug of each company was sent out to skirmish with two close zlige following in support at 100 paces ; these suffered heavy losses at a distance of 800 yards Avhile passing over a hill, one-sixth of the effective state in a very few minutes. On the other hand, the two remaining companies of the battallion which were brought over the same height an hour later hardly suffered at all, although no change had taken place in the French position. The attention of the French was now completely directed upon the fire action at a distance of about 400 paces. Now here is one of the strong points of the attack, and vice versa one of the weak points of the defence. The defenders, do what they will, instinctively fire on the troops that are doing them an injury and consequently the main body of the attack escapes, or nearly escapes, from all but the imaimed or stray shots that have missed the skirmishing fine. Hence in every attack the fire both of the artillery supporting the attack, and of the infantry skirmishing line, must be continuous, carefully directed and brought to bear on the portion of the enemy's position Avhere an entrance is to be forced. From this moment Cthe first deployment) until that of the actual col- lision, the attackers ai-e exposed to the fire of the defenders, and they may be struck liy two classes of ]irojectiles, those which strike the mark, and those ■which miss the mark and do injury by chance. This circimistauce has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the various essays and theories that have been put forward by various wTiters, it deserves to be most carefully considered, if the questions regarding the formation of troo])s are to be resolved. The artillery and in a short time the infantry of the defenders becomes the object of the attackers fire. It follows that their fire will be diverted from that ix)rtion of the attacking force which composes the main body (or the true assaulting party). The more the troops charged with the preparation of the attack succeed in drawing on thenisflves the defenders fire, tlie better they will do their work ; a defence jnoperly eondiieted will seek not to Ix' so led. Btit it cannot helj) itself, it may jierhaiis avuid the direction of all its fire on the skinnisliing line, and may direct a ])ortion on the suj)])orts and the Iwitteries. But the tiie on the main body will he nnich diminished, and its action ou it will be merely accidental. If on the one hand the fire of the defenders does ni)t cheek the iulvanced or skiiinishing line of the attiickera, it will be ilestroyed by its fire (united to that of the atticking artillery). If on the otiier the defenders concentrate their fire on the skirmishing line, they indirectly facilitate the advance of the main body of the attickers. Anil this is the dilemma on which the jiossibility of attick maiidy rests. Aud hence the necessity of giving the troops ejigagetl in jjreparing the way a consiilerable force. AVe ct)nsider that the most advanced portion of the attacking troops will thus become the mark of the defender's fire, and the main body will thus receive a far less efiiciicious fire, that of random projectiles. But no lire, however lieavy, Avell- directed, and continuous, will drive good troops out of a position. A lieavy cross-fire of musketry aud artillery may shake the morale, and disorg-anise tlie defenders, may kill and wound many, may induce many of the less brave individuals to seek some excuse to leave the position either by assisting wounded men to the rear; or other- wise, but still the men whose heart is in the work, the really brave men, will remain to fight it out. So long as they have amnmnition these men will hold their position, and it is only the actual advance of .nvpeiior uiDnbers that will finally compel them to retire. It is not meant that they will remain to be bayonetted. But they will not go until the forward rush of the main body of the assailant warns them that two hostile bodies of men cannot stand on the same piece of ground. Hence all fire must be looked on as paving the way for the object of getting possession of the enemy's position, and in this resjjoct modern weapons have made no dift'erence Avhatever ; a formed body of the assailants must be placed in the enemy's position and must maintain themselves there, in order that victory may be achieved. The attack of an enemy's position is based entirely on the science of the attack of a fortress. A mass of artillery fire is concentrated on certain points ; under cover of that fire the infantry advance until checked by uifantry fire. Again, the infantry fire is sub- dued by the infantry fire added to the artillery fire of the attackers, a breach is made in the enemy's position, and through that breach a formed body of men is pushed, who make a lodge- ment there. Such in general terms is the attack of a fortress, snch in general terms is the attack of a position, with this difference, the former is the work of days, the latter that of hours. The necessity of bringing up a sufficiently strong body formed, in hand and under control, to drive out the defenders, occupy theu- positions, and reap the results of the fire, is manifest, and the question arises : How shall this body be l)rought up ? It must conform more or less to the movement of the skirmishers; at what thstance from them should it be, and in wdiat formation ? The answers to these questions have been generally given at 92 page 85, but it i.s desiiable to state the case somewhat more in detail. The three distinct zones of fire, through whicli troops must pass in moving to tlie attack, have been ah'eady described ; these zones, or rather the nature of the fu'c in these zones, must govern the formation of the main body. When entering the zone of artillery fire, which may be said to begin at from 2,500 to 3,000 yards, from the enemy's guns, the main bodies should be so formed as not to offer a mark sufficiently large to induce the enemy to turn his guns on them.* This formation will probably be found to be that of half-battalion (juarter or double-company columns, at deploying intervals or perhaps somewhat less, as many men will be lost during the advance, and the number of men per yard thus diminished. The great object of the defence is to retard the attack, and as the attacking artillery will at this, the first stage, be partly in action, partly moving up Avith the skirmishing hue, the defenders must, if this force be, as it should be, a powerful one, direct all their attention to it and not to the main body. Formed in such a way, and kept at from 550 to 650 yards behind the skirmishers, the main body may advance and experience but little loss. On arriving at from 1,200 to 1,400 yards, the unaimed fire of the infantry Avill begin to tell ; beyond this point, the guns cannot advance, and at this point the formation of the main body may be again extended. But at this stage the ex- tension Avill not reduce the actual loss so much as the moral effects of those losses. Bclierrf. ^^ ^Ijjg stage (the second zone), if the artillery of the defence does not direct its attention exclusively upon the artillery and troops engaged in pre- paring the attack, it will begin to direct a portion of its lire on the main body, which will then receive fire of two kinds, aimed and random. The whole gi'ound will thus be swept by a nearly evenly divided fire, the effect therefore, un- less the attackers be verybadly handled, and so formed as to induce the defenders to concentrate their fire on certain points, will be nearly the same, no matter in what formation they are. The more a mass of men is concentrated, the more con- fidence is given in its force, and the greater the number of men likely to be able to show a good example. Further, the greater the number of men to exert this influence, the easier will it be to impress a motive power on the whole mass. These are the views which in former days fixed columns as the proper formation for attack, and it cannot be denied that these views are sound. But it must be equally admitted that a heavy loss occurring unexjiectedly, and all at once, demoralises the minds uf men, more than if the siime loss ist distributed over some time, and in different places. Hence we must con- clude that the more a mass of men is disseminated, the less it will require examples to lead it on. Let us assume a column of 400 men, 20 in front and 20 deep; a shell falling in the middle will knock over 8 or 10 men ; the moral effect produced will be far greater than if the men were ranged two deep at two paces interval, and 3 or 4 shells fell at the same time, but at different places, althoiigh in the latter case the shells might produce even a gi-eater * It may be most fairly questioned whether troops formed in small columns, witli iutevTals equal to their front or double their front, are not much safer from artillery fire than if in line. One shot in three will hit a line of infantry at 2,200 yards, but the probability of striking the small columns is very much less. 98 loss. Because if the formation be a shallow one, and nioviujf to the front, the men who fall will 1)e left behind, and the loss will he thus concealed. The question then is, AVliat front must we, what ilepth can we, give the troo])s uf tne principal body at this moment ? The size of the fractions into which tlie main body must now be divided, must be such that the leader (who ha.s at this stage of the advance to dismount) can exercise a personal influence, that they can move easily to the front and yet be sulticiently compact to give the soldier the idea of solidity : this is found in a front of from 30 to 40 yards, and a depth of G to 8 men. , It is important to observe, that in passing through the " unaimed shot Colonel sphere,"' speed alone can diminish the risk of loss, avoid it or cross the least in- Qawlcr. tense portion of it, if such be possible, but formation can affect the question in no way whatever, except as it may affect the speed. Bullets ai'e flying at a given rate within certain limits, and if all must j)ass through those limits, the indi- vidual chances are not affectetl by being in company. It would be otherwise reasonable to assert that a body of men marching in skirmishing order, would be reached by fewer drops of rain, i.e., would get less wet, than if they jiassed through at the same pace in column, or that you would get less wet walking alone in the x'ain, than you would do in company with a friend. The formation requires to be sucli as Avill enable tlie men to advance with speed "without being demorahsed; and this appears to bo more Hkely to be attained by small columns than by either a line or extended formation. At the point, tlierefore, that the main body enters the second zone, at some 1,000 to 1,200 yards from the enemy, the half- battalion columns, if at quarter distance, at deploying intervals, or slightly less than deploying intervals, should deploy into columns of two companies at deploying intervals. This can be most easily effected if tlie half-battalion columns have been formed in double-company columns on the centre, as the right and left Avings can then incline to the right and left without stopping their advance, moving to a flank diagonally, by the leading of their officers. It is desirable that the reason why these small columns are preferable to a line for this purpose should be clearly understood. A line is the fonnation for firing — the main body cannot fire, the supports and skirmishers being in fi-ont of it. It is further requisite to remember that in any attempt to advance in line over rough ground the inequalities are proportional to the length of the line. The best drilled troops in the world cannot advance 300 yards over rough ground without being disordered — many men being squeezed out, while the attention of both officers and men is devoted to an attempt to preserve the straightness of the line and its true direction. Any one who observes a line of 400 infantry advanc- ing over rough gi'ound will see fluctuations running through all its length, and wearing themselves out at the ends ; by splitting up the line into several portions these fluctuations are diminished, precisely as bracing a long bar or dividing it into a Qiimber of short bars reduces its vibration ; and further, the action of such small columns affords some protection to the weak points — the flanks. The action of the supports during the time that elapses from the troops coming under fire should be now considered. 94 Scherff. Scherff. The duty of the 8\ipport8 is essentially to keep up the fire of the first line, and fill ^aps. It is not so much for reinforcing the skirinisliers that they are requisite, the skirmishing line should originallv consist of a "sufficient number," their function is to keep that lino up to "the sufficient number," feeding it to fill up tlie gaps caused by the enemy's bullets. Hencf^ the officer commanding tlie supports (two companies), must watch the front, or skirmisliing line, and send up men wlien he sees they are requisite. The nearer to the skirmisliers the supports are the more they will suffer, but if too far off they will cease to act as supports. It appears that the supports will suffer less, that is to say, they will attract the enemy's fire less if they advance in small groups; and it would appear desirable that the two companies forming the supports sliould be formed into as many sections as there are officers available, that is to say, each company into two or three sections. The distance at which the supports are from the skirmishers must be left chiefly to the officer commanding those supports, but it should rarely exceed 800 yards. As the skirmisliing line advances toAvards the enemy, and begins to get into the zone of aimed fire, or some (300 to 700 yards from the enemy, the suj:»ports must be freely pushed on, and take their places in the skirmishing line, and as the advance of the skirmishers will, from the fact of their mov- ing in successive rushes, be someAvhat slower than that of the supports, the latter will close on them, and the main body Avill also close somewhat on the supports (as it will experience less loss, and consequently be less retarded). Vide page 90) The Commander of the supj^orts must during his advance seek to find out the places wliere his assistance may be most usefully sent. The best points for the attack may be found when about 80 to 100 yards from the enemy. As the fire is kept up the main body will advance, and when it comes near the line of supports the latter should rush to the front and join the skirmishers. The following rule should be absolute, the moment the main body arrives near what is left of the line of supports, they shoukl dash to the front and join the line of skirmishers, in order to give the impulsion requisite to cross the last and most dangerous zone of all, and finally give the assault. If an attempt be made to realise the state of afFaii-s at this period of the attack, it will be seen that the skirmishers, rein- forced l)y the su}>ports, are within 2r)0 to 300 yards of the enemy ; that the main body is some 300 yards in rear of the skirmishers; the divisional artillery perhaps some 1,200 to 1,400 yards oft', supported by a portion of the corps artillery, the remainder of the corps artillery occupying advantageous places up to 2,000 yards off, atid all bringing a heavy cross- fire on the enemy's position ; the second line of troops following up in rear of the main body of the first line, and perhaps some 500 to 600 3''ards in rear of it, a tremendous fire being maintained by the now thickened skirmishers, and the whole front covered 95 with clouds of smoke. SiK-li a state of things cannot last long ; the skirmishers may get a hundred yards nearer, and the main body getting closer to them, must prepare to carry the position ; gnwlually converging, the various porti(m8 of the main l)ody must push rapidly to the front and drive the enemy out. While the second line, seeing the advance and hearing the cheers which accompany it, should })ush rapidly on also, ready to sup- port the attack, meet the enemy's reserves, and conlirm the success. What should the skirmishers do when the main body advances? The skirmishers, who have borne the heaviest por- tion of the fighting, will undoubtedly have got much excited, and heated ; the}' will have beeii brought close up to the enemy's position, and l)y that time all the men whose heart is not in the work will have disappeared, officers and men who have worked through the zones of fire that have been described, who have seen comrades and friends dropping, will be in such a state of nervous excitement that the cheer and advance of the main body will, no matter what orders are given, carry them to the front. In all likelihood their cartridges are exhausted, or nearly so, for they have done most of the firing, and the last few minutes they must fire as fast as they can load and aim. In addition to which their fire would be completely masked by the main body advancing in front of them. The idea of leaving tlie skii'inisliers lying down is contrary to the funda- mental priucii^le of the attack, which is that all the disposable forces should be ai)plied, leaving them behind really leads to nothing. This line left behind cannot lire effectively on the enemy, it cannot collect and reform the debris of the troops crushed by the enemy's fire, it will have done enough, and suffered too much arleady to do that. Judging by all experience, what it must do, is to push on with the rest. To leave it lying down is in the most favourable case a useless theoretical course to i)ui'sue, generally it will be a dangerous one. The moment the position is carried every effort must be made to hold it. The troops should be reformed. A heavy fire should be poured on the enemy as he retires, and the second line following rapidly, must endeavour to occupy the ground, and coming up in regulai* order can do so far better than troops whoso nerves have been wrought up to the highest pitch of excitement by a successfid attack. The troops taking part in an energetically carried out attack are thrown into the completest loose order. In this state they can certainly still follow up the axisting object of the fight, but they are unavailable for action iu any other direction. The natnre of the attack described is illustrated by plates XIV.-XVIIL, but although such sketches are useful as giving expression to ideas, it should be clearly understood as regards the supports and main body, that there can by no possibility be any definite or fixed formation. The formation to be adopted should be entirely suited to the ground, thus one company of the supports may be in column of sections, another in line, and after advaucmg 100 yards the formations may be entirely Scherff. Frontal Attack of Infantry. (Translated by Colonel Kewdegate.) 96 altered, the company in column being extended, and that lonnerly in lino now in column : similarly for tlie main bodies. The plates cannot therefore be taken as recommending any special formation. It is perhaps fortunate in one sense for our country that the direction wliich improvements in tactics are taking, is one pecu- liarly adapted to the genius and temperament of her people. For years British troops, formed in Hues two deep, have met and defeated the best armies in Europe. Extended order h hut an extension of the two-deep line. Britisli troops have for hundreds of years been famed for their steadiness and coolness under fire, the influence of infantry fire is becoming every day more and more formidable, that influence to a gi-eat extent depends on tlie coolness of the soldier delivering the fire. The steadiness of the individual British soldier, his coolness, and his proverbial ignorance of the time when he is beaten, tend to make individual fighting simple and natural to him. Further, the reliance of the British soldier on his officer and his confi- dence in him, augurs well for the future, when British infantiy have to meet a foreign enemy. ^^pi<'i*- The habitual French method of attacking in cohimn cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians it may have been successful ; against the British it nuist always fail. The English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is good for all movements short of the actual attack, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the Roman Legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a firm line aided by artillery. The I'epugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of cannon shots, as they tear open the ranks, produce disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, bewildered by words of command coming from a multitiide of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor advance nor retreat without increasing the , confusion. No example of courage can be useful, no moral effect produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often fii'm and even victorious when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, columns are the soul of military operations ; in them is the victory, and in them is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in hiouing when and where to extend the front. Bugeaud. The English generally occupied well-chosen defensive positions, having a certain command, and they showed only a portion of their force. The usual artillery action first took place. Soon, in great haste, without studying the position, without taking time to examine if there were means to make a flank attack, we marched straight on, taking the bull by the horns. About 1,000 yards from the English line the men became excited, spoke to one another and hurried their march ; the column began to be a little confused. The English remained quite silent, with ordered arms, and from tlieir steadiness appeared to be a long red wall. This steadiness invariably pioduced an cfl'ect on the young soldiers. Very soon we got nearer, shouting " Vive I'Empereur ! en avant ! a la baionette ! " Shakos were raised on the muzzles of the muskets ; the column began to double, the ranks got into confusion, the agitation produced a tumult ; shots were fired as we advance(K PLATE XIV. Fir si Slcige tSkirmiJiherjf tuv (hniparu'e,9 . HOC Supports two (hmpaAjies M(un Boily /oiir\ (hntpajt^,v S]armisherZme2SO0 yards fi-ont the. maiit position of the enemy. ^2>.yca.hscbitc fcrmation icr the Supports and Jfain 6od^' ixin be given., they should he exte.rvded in Une or columns as ma^- be best cbdapted to th/> ground t/i^ are advarwinq over. PLATE XV. Seamd Sta^e. 300 Skirmishzr Zirie 1W€ yards franv the' main, jx/siturru of ttve/ enemy. ^^J^o ahsobite ibrmatwn ^dve- Supports an/lMcun. bcdycanhe gwerudiiy sfwidiLhe eJ:tincljed' in Tine or ccbuimig, as TTuxy fe best adapted/to the cfroiaici th^' are acUtxnxun^ over. PLATE XV! Tlnrd Sia^e J?. 300. M kit H ^i' '. M \ik SkirnusherjLzn&SOOyarols^fiymt' mcajvpositiowcfiJie. enemy N.B.JVb ahsolute^fbr^natioTvrfvrtJveSupports ancL Mtun/bodycaavhegwethi they SiouldJjt artgrvded xn,lin£-orccbujrinjB,a6Tru]ufTyeheM^aJLapted/tot^ /are- ctdAXJuicaig over PLATEXYII Four^ Stage. <:■- 300- Skirrrvuf7ierZzfL^300^€crds iromrthey ervemy^ mairv pcsvtiony Seccivoi Lin£/ SoJf Bocttaihon/ DouMe- Compomy, columns at deploymg Tntervale ^. H&So aisdute ibrmotion fortJwSuppcri.^ (ULdMocrivhody ccuvhe givavjlh^shxjiitiL }>e extende/i uilLrworccUaiuhS.(xsrncu^beb€£taxi(ifjte£iU' thecfroutwU f^tey ar& culvajiajig over. PLATE XVIIl Pifth Slii^e 3(/0. S N . ^.J^o abschdz -^^muxtuwv ^ ffte-Supnorts anoLMxuv body cart tegixenftheyshouJUi bo &ctended' irv line arCohanncas ma^ bo best adjxpt£dyto the, grviuicLthey are aji^cutajig over. 1)7 Tlie Euglish line reniaiueil still, silent and ininiovable, with ordered anus, even when we were oidy ;J0(» paces dist;int, and it appeared to ignore the storm al)out to break. The contr;vst wjis striking ; in our inmost thoughts, each felt that the *uemy was a long time in tiring, anil that this tire reserved for so long, would l)e very unpleasjint when it did come. Our ardour cooled. The moral power of steadiness, which nothing shakes (even if it he only in appearance), over disorder which stupities itself with noise, (overcame our "minds. At this moment of intense excitement, the English wall shouldered arms, an indescrib- able feeling rooted many of our men to the spot, they began to tire. The enemy's steady concentrated volleys swept our ranks ; decimated we turned round seeking to recover our eiiuilibriuni ; then three de;ifeiung cheei-s l)roke the silence of our opponents, at the third they were on us j)ushing our disorganized flight But to oxir great surprise, they did not push their advantage beyond a hundred yards, retiring calmly to their lines to await a second attack. The British army, from its tradition and history, is in a posi- tion better adapted for grasping, and appropriating, the deveh)pment of taeties caused by the introduction of breech- loading arms than the army of any other nation. All that is requisite is to develop and carry out the identical principles which led the British leaders to adopt a line formation in the peninsula. This point is one that must not be lost sight of, the peculiar genius of a nation invariably comes out on the battle-field, and it is essential that it should be clearly understood that the British army, with its historic training, and traditions of advancing and fighting never more than two deep, possesses qualifications for modern fighting that the army of no nation in the world does. As the line was an advance on the column, giving greater power and effect to improved arms, and pro- ■ducing far less loss than the denser formation, so the extended line, giving full eftect to the offensive poAver of the breech- loader, and enabling troops to attack Avith less loss, is an advance on the two- deep line. An advance which it is much easier for British troops, who have never fought in columns, and whose ideas and tactics have always turned on a large development of infantry fire, to make, than for those who have bad to step from the deep column to the individual or extended order at one stride. We were all astonished at the extraordinary firmness with which the red Choda jackets, having crossed the river, opened a heavy fire in line upon the redoubt. Seiwitz. This was the most extraordinary thing to us, as we had never before seen troops tight in lines two deep, nor did we think it jx)ssible for men to be found with suthcient firmness of morale to l)e able to attack in this aj)parently weak formation our massive columns. " The terrible English column which, advancing under a murderous fire in front and flank, all but won the battle of Fontenoy;" the victories of the British line on many fields, mark two distinct phases in the tactics of this country ; the latter being due to a clear appreciation of the effects of improved anns. Following the same natural development, the individual order will still further bring out the coolness, the self- rehance, and courage of the British soldier. n 98 We luive said that the direction tactics arc taking /.s fortunatt^ in one i^euKe {"or this country. It is desirable, however, that a disadvantagi' should not be lost sight of, speaking in (jeneral terms ; when we Ibrmerly defeated foreign armies we did so because the front tif fire we directed against them was larger than wliat they brought to bear on us, our lineH outjianked their columns. But now that foreign armies fight wath as wide a front as we can hope to do, and that extension of tiie front luis become general in every army, and witli every nation, the small numerical strength of a British army no longer compensated by its comparatively Avide front of fire will be felt, and felt severely. It is manifest that extension of front is limited, that there is a pomt beloAv which it is impossible to reduce the number of men per yard of position. That point once reached by the troops composing two armies, the weaker must always suffer; although the temperanieut of the British soldier is perhaps better adapted for individual fighting than that of the soldiei's of any other nation ; yet modern arms have undoubtedly placed armies more on a footing of equality' and consequently given to numbers an element of superiority they previously did not possess. The greater the effect of the Aveapon the greater the results produced by putting large numbers of such weapons in action. Improved arms will undoubtedly enable a small number of men so armed to resist a large body of men armed with inferior weapons, but when the weapons are ^of eq;ual power, then it appears that the cft'ect of numbers must preponderate. An unquestionable advantage is possessed by the British army in its small companies, and consequently the number of ofBicers in the battalion. It should be remembered that the Prussian company was the result not so nmch of tactical, as of economical motives, and that the Prussian army, formed from the results of universal compulsory service, and education, possesses an amount of intelligence in the raidvs that other armies do not, Hence, to follow Prussian customs as regards companies without following them in other thiugs would be absurd. It is impossible to adopt one portion of a nation's customs and ignore the basis on Avhicli the whole superstructure is built. Much has been recently said and written of the advisability of altering the formation of a British, and asshnilating it to that of a Prussian battalion. To do so Avould be to blindly copy Prussian customs, and we might just as well copy Prussian uniforms or Prussian words of command. Undoubtedly there is much to be obtained by a careful study of the Prussian system, but that study must be an intelligent fitudy, Avliich Avill enable us to graft on our own framework Avliat is good, and suitable to om- peculiar temperament. And the ft)rmation of the Prussian battalion is not t>nly not suitable to British infantry, but it may 99 hv fairly (luestioiu'd if it is not one of the woukoBt points of ilie I'lussiau system, wliicli. on account of the KUccesH attending I'nissian armies, is so much admired. Hoas V were the losses with whicli we paid fur our victorious attacks. FriJntal The (liniiuution of the capitation however is not the onlv consequence of auch ^»^*t'>'<5l^ or sHnguiuary l)attles. ' ?T kt d The notion of the excellence of war -seasoned l)attalions h.'us vanished from [ ^^^ _,^ uuv army. According to ifeneial experience, tlie men went into action with '. ■. the greatest ardour, an'd without dread of the tire, iiiitii they had once suffered " veiy seveie losses. Then even the exhilarating consciousness of victory cannot dissipate the imjjressioii which such .sanguinary experience has made ujwn the spirits of the troops. AJonths afterwartis this feeling has still not quite disappeared. It is true that other causes contribute to produce this ; those who had fallen were just the bravest men, because they exposetl themselves most in the skirmisher line ; and ahoi'e all tliere were ceri] fexc ojjicers still remaining.* After these great losses, how would this array have stood the eftects of a defeat, and consequent demoralising retreat.^ True the losses in this case purchased victory, but it might have been otherwise. To organise, as if victory were always certain, is really to organise disaster. Hence the necessity of not destroying, but modifying, our existmg arrangements ; the one and only one advantage of a strong company appears to be that it is a force of sufficient strength to make an attack. 200 men extended in front of a battalion Avill give a sufficient force to begin an attack ; 200 more will be sufficient to act as supports ; and each of these being under one command, form a tactical body accustomed to work together. But to obtain this advantage it is surely not requisite to sacrifice the British battalion. It has been pointed out (page 74) that the use of the breech- loader enables troops to be more extended than formerly, hence more supervision is required. The difficulties of command are consequently greater than formerly. The necessity of proper leading, of seizing points where cover exists, making them bases for further advan(^es and getting the men out of covei- again, are now of the highest importance. These reasons, and the necessity of foruiing small groups, and seeking with them to penetrate the enemy's line, clearly demonstrate the advan- tages of small companies and many officers. Further, as movements to the dght or left to close-in skir- mishers, and so make rotjm lor fresh skirmishers coming up to fill up gaps, would reduce the fire, Cfjmpel men who had won certain advantageous places to leave them, not to advance on the enemy, but merely to take gi'omid to the right or left, a thing very difficult to do with any troops, more especially with those Uke British troops, j^ossessing, as all Anglo-Saxons do, a strong individuality, sure to come out under fire ; so com- * The Prussians lost 1 ofFicor to 8 men at Wisserabom'xtended lino cannot, and would be perfectly helpless if suddenly attacked by a small body of horse. The Avord column is one which g-ives the idea of a mass of men one behind the other, but this disapi)3arsif it bo (;onsidored that the columns are either double company columns of a half batta- lion, (^r columns composed of two subdivisions. Further, it is to the formed body of men acting behind the skirmishin.o; line that that line looks for support, and its moral effect is very great. In all the accouuta we see depicted the uneasy feeling with which skii-- niishing lines advanced Avhen there were no closed detachments following in reserve ; and on the other hand the exhilaration of spirits, as soon as the bayonets of the latter were seen, although only in the distance. To advance with tliis main body in a deployed or extended line would be really to remove all the moral effect that formation has on the skirmishing- line. Further, if any slight cliange of direction, such as converging towards a point, or a change of direction to suit the nature of the ground, advanced over, has to be made, the main body in a long spread out line, will infallibly get into disorder. Hence, such a fu'mation is not on(^ that meets the requirements of the case. Front al Attack of Infantry. (Translated by Colonel Ncwdegiite.) IT. The Defen'ce. The foregoing remarics have been chiefly coiifinod to tlic attack, or to troops acting on the offensive. A pure defence can never win a battle, it may perhaps enable the troops acting on the defensive to preserve their position, but the most that can be hoped for from a pure defence is a di-awn battle, not a victory. The improvements in modern arms have undoubtedly added much to the power of the defence, l)ut the attack has benefited also. At first siglit, it would appear that the defence would gain more from the yon Jlolike. peculiarities of improved fire-arms, than the attack. An army acting on the (Translated defensive, may have it in its power to choose such a position, as to oblige hy Crawford.) the enemy to cross an ojien plain ; it will also jirobably have time to ascertain the distance of certain fixed points, so a.s to ])roduce the greatest effect from its fire. Ou the other hand, the advantages that an attacking force possesses are also very considerable. As its commander has only to consult his own judgment, he regulates his movements according to the dispositions of the enemy. He, being the assailant, has a definite oljject before him, ami chooses his own way of attaining it ; while the defender lias fii-st to find out his adversary's intentions, and then to make the Ijest arrangements for frustrating them. On the one side, coufiilence and resolution, on the othei", uncertainty and anxiety. The defender, if he wish to bring about a decisive result, must eventually himself become the assailant ; but here the question arises, whether before atlvancing to the attack, he should not exhaust all the material 104 advantages to be gained from stationary fire, by employing it to the very last moment. One phase of this .superiority has ah*eady been dincnssed, page 1)0. But there is another Avhich is deserving of attention. When two armies come in contact, the one tliat acts on the offensive or takes the initiative has tlie power of selecting the point for attack, and of arraying against that point a superior force. The defender does not know where lie may be attacked, and has to provide for several possible, nay probable contin- gencies. He is liable to be deceived, induced to disseminate his force, and seek to be strong at all the threatened points, while the assailant need be strong at one and that the decisive point. Increased range and accuracy in weapons have given the attacker the power of selecting far more advantageous positions for covering and supporting his attack than formerly. Ground which in the days of old artilleiy might be simply ignored must now be held by the defender, thus compelling him to extend and therefore weaken his whole line ; or it must be abandoned to the enemy, who will quickly make use of it as a, point (rappni ior an attack ; and as the area operated over has thus increased at a much quicker rate than the actual effective range of the weapons, the assailant benefits considerably. Let any person examine a piece of gi-ound and consider how he would occupy it Avith a given body of troops and he will find that a continued tendency exists in his OAvn mind to occupy certain advantageous positions in front of what must be his main Ime. Let him imagine troops placed on these advantageous positions and he will find certain places in front tempting him on to them too, and this without end, until he will find himself compelled from tlie limited number of his troops to abandon all hope of holding many points, which he nevertheless can distinctly see must be most beneficial to an attacker. If this problem be worked out it will be found that the question will at last resolve itself into, not what is best to be held, but what it is jwssihle to occupy. Further, the actual space,, or neutral ground, between the outposts of armies closing on one another, a space which acts as a kind of curtain between them, through which neither can penetrate, must, from the increased range of arms, be now far wider, and offer more concealment than formerly. This space is really more dependant on the action of musketry than artillery, and the army acting on the offensive will usually, if not always, appropriate the greater por- tion of it. , J. , . It is of great advantage to an army in the field to push its advanced posts. .tiela-3 ais a ,^^ ^^^, forward as it can in safety, in order to cover as much of the country and -p" '^ ^ its resources as possible, to have longer and more precise warning of any ° ' movement of the enemy, and to impede his reconnaissances and proceedings generally. It is still of more importance to restrict the enemy to the narrowest limits. Under ordinary circumstances midway between the respective forces may be considered a reasonable line of demarcation that each ought to insist ujion, but several circumstances may give a superior power to one side. 105 1. Tlie opposinj^ armies may be very unequal iu force, or one may liave jjaineil a markeil ;usct'iulaiKy over the other ; iu which cjise, the superior will he able to press the inferior into smaller limits. 2. One may hold some peculiarly strong, tlefeusible post or batteries, iu a s;ilient [tosition, that may give him a command over the neighbouring ground, in which «ise the line of demarcation will be midway between those parts and the jKtsition of the other army. 3. There may be a river not fordable, or other essential obstacle between the two which will naturally form the line of demarcation, although nearer to one than the other. Subject to tho.se sort of contingencies, it is very essential that no encroach- ment should be allowed ; the greatest etibrts in ]«irticular should be made to ju-event an enemy from holding ]>arts, or even temporaiy pos.«ession of the foot of the heights on which jjart of an army is pcwted ; distant tire of artillery is not sufficient to justify submitting to the disadvantage ; and if the enemy's circumstances are such ;us really to enable him to enforce it ; the army wliich is subject to it must l)e in a very insecure position. There is a great deal of brag iu the mjxtter of keeping possession of a greater extent of ground than a party is entitled to ; old campaigners know the value of it, and will take all the liberties they are allowed, returning however .•U5 soon ;i.s they are opposed. There is a great moral power in the oifensive ; the assailants are moving- — doing something behind a mysterious cnrtain that the defenders know nothing of, there is something peculiarly demoralizing to men in waiting anxiously with nerves at a high state of tension, for something they know not what, to begin somewhere. In these respects improved arms have not increased the power of the defence. No kind of fire tends so much to shake the morale of troops as a cross fire, and this from the great extension of the area of operatit)ns is the veiy fire that, increased range enables artillery to pour into villages, houses, or intrenchments. !Men acting on the def(;nsive may make up their minds to a fire coming in one direction, they may so dispose themselves as to mitigate its effects. But the moment shells and bullets come from other directions the Avhole thmg is changed, and a feeling of inabihty to resist or maintain a position so attacked makes itself felt. The power that improved arms has given to the defence is that of keeping the attackers for a longer time under a heavy fire than formerly; it is also stated that the defenders derive nnich advantage from the following causes : — 1st. Their fire is delivered by men in position, who can take a better and more correct aim 2nd. That the force acting on the defensive may be better covered and protected than that acting on the offensive, suffer less loss, and consequently be cooler and less excited. 3rd. That the ground may be better studied by the de- fensive than by the attacking force, and not only can advantage be thus taken of its conforniatioji, but also additional force may be obtained l)y remov- ing men from Avliere they are of no use to important places. lOG If, however, tliesc advantages, or supposed advantages, be analysed, they will be found to have hardly the imp(n-taiico that thej at first sight appear to possess. With reference to the first, it nuist not be forgotten that the assailants move rapidly and by rushes of alternate fractions, which tenda to disconcert the aim of the defenders, who are ever firing at a running target, while the attackers are firing at a fixed target; therefore the superiority of the defence in this case does not s(!em to lie very great. AVith reference to the second, page 89 states the circum- stances under which an attack is possible, and it appears that the concentration of fire on one spot so demoralises a defender that he can be neither cool nor calm. The fire of the attackei- is always (jonvergent, that of the defender divergent.* Further, the advance of troops takes tliem away from the dead and Avounded who are left behind. The defcniders must remain in one place, and the dead and ^\ounded can with difficulty be removed, hence the morale of the defenders will suffer the most. With reference to the third, there can be no doubt that the defence will l>enefit greatly from its superiority in this respect; and it is not only to its fire, but the power of bringing that fire to bear on proper places, that the defender owes his superiority. How then should a defensive position be occupied ? It would appear that for the correct holding of a defensive position, arrangements should be made to bring a heavy artillery and infantry fire on the attackers at the very beginning of the action, and to hold a few poAverful reserves in hand, to attack and drive out any troops that may obtain a lodgment within the general line. It has been pointed out at page 89 that the assailant to liave a reasonable hope of success must be superior at the point where the attack is made. Now to counteract this superiority there must be on the side of the defence large reserves kept ready in hand to be moved the moment the attacker's project is developed, and sufficiently near to be brought up in time to drive the enemy back ; not merely to check his advance after he has penetrated the position. Such reserves must be in the hands of the Generals commanding the Divisions and Coi'ps, rather than those of the General in Chief, and hence it follows that these bodies should each form their oavu reserve. On the defensive it may fairly l)e (juestioned if a deployed line is now requisite. The breech-loader enables an extended line to deliver more fire now than a closed line in former days. It Avill perhaps be wiser, therefore, to keep back a large portion of the first line until the attack has developer! itself, and then to use it in thickening the Une of skirmishers where most threatened. Such a method gives much additional power to * The comparison between a siege and an attack liere holds good, the assailants working on a wider front, direct their whole fire on one portion of tlie defender's position, their fh-e is tluis convergent ; if the defender replies his lire must be divergent. i07 tlio men Avho see tliemselves stipported by tliose beliiiid, and Avilo t'oel that tliey are not left alone to cope Avith the attackers. The sudden increase of the defender's fire, by a large rein- forcement of the snpports, has a poweiful effect in checking the enemy's advance. It appears, from the testimony of all continental writers, to be the experience of recent war, that volky firing cannot be nsed, and that independent firing, which oiables each man to judge his own time and aim, is far more effective. Even when on the defensive, to which, according to theory, volley firing Boguslauski. is peculiarly applicable, it could so seldom he employed, tliat the few excep- (Translated tious only serve to jn-ove the rule. Even behind cover, field walls, barricjides by Grnhani.) the tire of dense crowds of skirmishers was ])referred to bringing forward parties in close order to tire volleys. To fire a volley always takes up a certain amount of time, which will be made use of by the enemy's skirmishers to pour a heavy fire into the compact body then showing itself, causing serious loss and in part hindering the volley. The chief argument against \-olleys at such a moment is that they have little eft'ect ujion skirmishers who are the first to come up. But if you wait tiU the enemy's supports are visible, the party in close order which is intended to fire the volleys would be for some time exposed to the skirraishei's' fire, and would be a heap of corpses before it got a chance of acting. It would appear, therefore, that in holding a defensive posi- tion, the skirmishing line in front should be supported exactly as in the attack, and this all the more so, as in most defensive positions, the supports which feed the front line may be much closer than in the attack. In occupying any defensive position, small bodies of troops of all arms should be told off at favourable places to make an advance on the enemy and check his move- ment. Such a force advancing a short distance from the main position disconcerts the assailant, compels liim to direct his fire on the new opponent, relieving the actual defenders from fire, and enables them to act Avith renewed vigour. For this purpose small posts in front of a position are of great value, but they should not be suiTendered or evacuated at the first attack, they should be firmly held, and to do this they must be supported fi-om the rear. The old rule, " Sahents should be fcAv and marked " is as good now as ever it Avas. But no defence has a chance of ultimately succeeding that is not based on the offensiA^e, or that does not contemplate taking the offensive Avhen an opportunity offers. An army acting on the defensive should ncA^er altogether give up the ^'"n MoUko. idea of itself assuming the offen.sive. (Translated It has been already stated that there is a tendency on the ^ paii: of the assailants to avoid the centre of the defender's position as being that Avhere usually the fire is heaviest, and to tm-n off to the Hanks, and to cover their advance by seeking out places unswept or only partly swept by fire, Such movements must leaA'c gaps in their line, and these gaps, if not filled up from the supports at once, are the very jDoints faA^ourable for the defenders to attack, and by so doing threaten the assailant's 108 advance on the flanks. But in making such forward movements^ the greatest care is requisite that the main position be not hjst^ and hence arises another necessity for reserves. Generally, both supports and main body may be much nearer the slcirmishing, or firing line, than when attacking. The only thing is to place them so that they shall escape fire as much as possible ; but especially in the defence it must be remembered a small resei've that arrives when it is wanted, is infinitely superior to a strong one that arrives too late. Early deployment and a long march over groimd, in extended order, exhausts an assailant ; the defender should therefore seek to make the attacker deploy as soon as possible. But it is questionable if this should not be rather done by bodies of cavalry and artillery, pushed well out to the fii'ont, and supported by infantry, who, using the containing power of the breech-loader, Avill make the attacker deploy; rather than by long shots from the main positions which are not very efficacious, and mark the position held, better perhaps than anything else.* Seherff. The basis of a pure defence should be to fight the attack only at the distance where its fire produces the greatest effects. But though this is so, it is requisite to profit by the extreme range of arms and by the aid of small detachments entrusted to selected officers, to keep up a fire on the general advance of the enemy. The first line (sHrmishing or Jirmg line) will seek, by means of the most rapid fire, to keep the last halt of the enemy's skirmii-hers,, or that preceding the assault, as far off as possible. All the intensity, all the power of the fire, will be develoj)ed against the real assault for 300 to 40O paces. The defence should be convinced, that despite its fire, it may become necessary to use the bayonet, and that this resort is less dangerous than a retreat. It appears, therefore, that both in defensive and offensive fighting tactics, one great object is to develop the indi^'idual action of the man, whether in the use of his weapons or as a unit. For officers this development of independent action is the power of leading and handling small groups or bodies of from 10 to 200 men ; but while this independence is developed, it must be held in hand and directed, it must be freedom, not license. It must be carefully watched by a commander who has reserves in hand to support it, either by completing the victory or checking defeat ; and above all it necessitates most Ccireful training on the part of the soldier. It further appears, that a general acting on the offensive, nmst (to secure his flanks- and protect his line of battle partially denuded of troops to concentrate a superior force on the point of attack) never lose sight of defensive operations. That a general acting on tlie defensive must impart to his defence as much of an offensive chai'acter as is possible. The foregoing pages give a general statement of what may be termed the tactical problem of the present day, and some general ideas as to how that pj-oblem may be dealt with. * The effect of artillery fire is three times as great at 2,200 yards as it is at 3,300 yards. 109 Mai.oeuvre tactics are essentially different from fi^htin^ tactics, the former admit of certain definite rnles bciup; laid down. Time and distance, both of -wliicli are known factors, enter lari;ely into such questions, and therefore it is most dt'sirable that nianoeuvre tactics should be governed by rule ; but when fighting tactics are dealt Avith, such indeterminate factors as human passions, the gnmnd, the weather, and the enemy, com- ])licate the problem to such an extent that it would be as dangerous as it is impossible to lay down fixed rules. It is therefore desirable that officers should see these subjects from as many stajid points as possible. The Italian army have recently modified their tactics to a gTcat extent, and a precis of the report of the committee entrusted with this duty is appended. It Avill be observed that the problem is stated in almost identical language to that used in the foregoing pages, but the conclusions are slightly different. III. Cavalry. At the close of the War of 1866, the action of the Prussian military authorities was caref\dly watched, they had tried their army on which years of careful thought and study had been bestowed, they had tested its capabilities, gauged its powers and seen its weaknesses. What they then, after seeing the machine in motion, did, when an opportunity for repairing and over- hauling it took place, was of peculiar interest. Amongst other things, they largely increased their cavalry. This of itself was the most effectual contradiction that could be ^iven to the statement so constantly made, that tlie breech- loader had numbered cavalry amongst things of the past. Recent events have shown that the duties of Cavalry, not flnly as covering the advance of an army, as outposts or recon- noiterers, but also on the actual field of battle, is perhaps more brilliant than ever. True it is that the qualities and knowledge noAv required of cavalry are different from what they were, or to put it more correctly, the same qualities and a great deal more besides are needed. Quickness, coolness and gallantry are now as always requisite in a cavalry soldier. But more still is needed, knowledge of countiy, knowledge of what the require- ments of other troops are, power of observation and description, ability to seize instinctively the object of the Connnander-in- Chief, a certain acquaintance with engineering, all these are now necessities for a cavalry officer. His sphere is greatly enlarged, and to fill it properly his military knowledge nnist be for more ■extensive than that involved in leading a squadron and keeping- it effective, all important as the latter is, as the basis of eveiy- thing else. Far from doing away with cavalry, modem events have clearly shown that there is no arm of the i?ei-vice from the correct management of which the army can reap more benefit. 110 Von Moltke. (Translated by Crawford.) Tactical retrospect. Captain May. (Translated ; by Ouvry.) Tactical retrospect. Captain May, (Translated by Ouvry.) If its action be paralysed, from any cause, there is none the Avant of which will be more severely felt. Because in modern warfare the long range and destructive fire of artillery necessitates a .scattered forniation, there will be more frequent opportunities for those brilliant dashes of small bodies of cavalry, in which, by taking advantage of the critical moment, the cavalry of division so often distinguish themselves. So long as rapidity, boldness, and dash are active agents in war, cavalry will retain its inij)()rtance. A cavalry devoid of these qualities, but merely possessing good intentions, obedience, with ordinary bravery, and a laudable modesty, is worse than none at all. The dulies of cavalry in the field may be divided into two classes. These duties although similar, are sufficiently distinct to produce a real division. They are : — 1st. The duties of the cavalry attached to a Division of the army. 2nd. The duties of the cavalry Division. A reference to page 8 shows that in the Prussian Armj^ a regiment of cavalry is attached to each Division. The duties of this cavalry is to cover the head of the Division, examine the countr)-, provide small parties to look out for the enemy in various directions, feel for and communicate ^vith troops march- ing on roads parallel to that its own Di^^8ion is marching on, keep up the communication with troops in front and rear, and thus link the component portions of the army-corps together, and lastly to proA^de orderlies and escorts. The duties of the cavalry Division are similar, but on a far larger scale ; it has to keep the army acquainted with every movement of the enemy, to harrass him and conceal the move- ments on their own side by keeping a strong curtain of posts constantly in advance, so that the enemy shall know nothing of what goes on within that curtain, to connect the various army-corps moving together, and keep each informed of the action of the other. In speaking of the action of cavalry, we must distiuguisli between divi- sional cavalry and the cavalry division. The lirst has to work in immediate connection with the other branches of its division, the latter, the cavalry division, as an independent tactical body stands more frequently in a sti'ategical rather than a tactical connection with the rest of the army. It may be questioned if the charges of masses of cavalry, as executed during the wars of the early part of this century, such as those at Essling. by General d'Espagne's caA-alry. tliose at Echmiihl, or at Waterloo, can now be carried out, except for some ver}' special object which warrants the great loss that must ensue. It appears that the action of cavalry on an actual battle-field must now be generally limited to watching the fianks. checking the action of the hostile cavalry, attacking broken and repulsed infantry. There are, however, many instances when an able cavahy leader can seize opportunities to use his arm Avitli great Ill effect. Such opportiiuitics do not oftni ot'ciir, but wIk-u they do, the sueee.sb achieved a\ ill geuendly be verv great. The opportune and unexpected charg'e of a snuill body of cavalry, under Kellernian at Marengo, is an instance of such an opportunity. The charge of a small body of English cavalry, under Colonel Taylor at Vinieiro, is an ofticersi ami 80 Uion, came out of tliis s;mg»iiniuy liaud-to-li;uiil combat. It is quite certain that the sacrifice (leniiinded from the cjivalrj in a most <.-ritical moment of the engagement was repaid l)y tlie complete success of the man am V re. For the fatal attack of tlie fith French corjjs against the left wing of Buddenhrock's Division was comi)letely checked and never resumed, a pnxjf how nuich the French troops were shaken b}' the vehement attack of a few Prussian squadrons. The graves of liorses and men wliich remain on the ground mark distinctly the conrse taken by tlie l^rus-sian cavalry in its advance, and show the terrible eftects of the breech-loader and rifled guns. These descriptions prove the absohite necessity of cavalry when it charges being supported by fresh cavalry. IMie rapid advance over ground, often heavy, tends to blow the horses to such an extent that no matter what may be the success of a charge, if the cavalry making it are, when the horses are blown, charged by fresh cavalry they must suffer much. Hence the rule which has been laid down for many years that cavalry should attack in lines, the second line bemg ready to adv^ance to the support of the first line when its energies are spent. It is so desirable that a reserve should be kept in all cases in which the Wellington, cavalry is desired to charge, that it appears to be a matter of necessity ; and the ofiicei-s and men should be accustomed to form and conduct the reserve at exercise. The leserve of a body of cavalry cluu'ging is intended to answer two pui- poses. 1st. To improve and complete the success of the charge ; 2nd. To protect the retreat of the trooi)s retiring, supposing those who charge are unsuccessful, or jwssibly to acquire success aftf^r their failure. The proportion of the body of cavalry to be kept in reserve must depend upon the nature of the gi-ound and of the body of troops to be attacked. It should not be less than one-half of the body formed for the operation, nor should it exceed two-thirds. It follows that every Iwdy of cavalry should l^e formed in two or three lines. The second line shoidd be deployed, the third ■might be in columns of such a size as that they could be readily formed into line. The next point for consideration is the distance at which these lines should be placed, and should precede one another : and it will be observed that this must depend upon the nature of the enemy to be attacked, and in some degi-ee upon the nature of the gi-ound, and what may be the object of the opera- tion. It has l>een already stated that one of the objects of the reserve is to protect the retreat of the IxKly charging which has failed, or possibly to turn the fortunes of the day by a fresh attack upon the enemy engaged in his pursuit, and it is therefore obvious that the reserve or second line of the cavalry should not be so near the first, as to be at all affected by the confusion intaf, and the value of cavalry in the field is too great to allow it to be thus used, except for somc^ reason of paramount unportance. The thiu and extended lines of formation in battle will, in future, afford Tactical rctro- the cavalry opportunities of acting in a new asj)ect, by giving it occasions for spect. energetic and immediate co-o]jeration with the infantry and artillery in action. Captain May. If the infantry attacks with the cavalry at hand, the latter will then be in a (Translated position to take advantage of the decisive movement, which has been prepared by Ouvry. ) for it by tlie artillery, and the })reseiit tactics with regard to skirmishers which requires swarms of men in loose order, will reap the richest advan- tages. It will not be impo.ssible for them to throw themselves in gaps through the enemy's line on their reserve ; and even if no success were to follow, they would still spread teiTor and consternation. Indeed the moral effect that tin efficient fire of musketry or shell always makes, even on the best infantry, causes a favourable opportunity to arise for the use of cavalry. The following proposals for the attack of cavalry are well worthy of being considered. But it should be observed that they make no provision for what is really the grand danger of T '>. IIG Bogu^lau6li^. (Translated by Graham.) Austrian Regulations. (Translated by Captain Cooke, 22ud Rogt.) cavalry, viz., being cliarged when the liorses arc blowni by fresh cavalry, in -which case the cavalry on the blown horses are perfectly helpless, and no gallantry or leading can help them. Prus.sian ciivalry lias for a long time axlopted the echelon form of att4\ck. The principle is correct, for the squadrons follow one another at intervals, one drawing the fire, the next breaking in. But the present fire-ai-ms are so quickly loaded, that there is really no cessation of fire. You may, however, mislead infantry into dealing its fire with precipitiition and want of regularity. The attiick in skirmishing order seems to us here preferable to that of com- pact squadrons. Thus we will imagine the charge of a cavalry regiment to be execute*! as follows : Two squadrons in extended order, throw then»selves upon the infantry two following at a trot, about 300 paces in rear. The leading squadrons rush at, or perhaps ride through the enemy's skirmishers, wheeling off l>efore his masses, or galloping past them. The Officer Commanding the two squadrons in close order, who with his trumpeter accompanies those in advance, until pretty close to the enemy's infantry, sounds the gallojj for his own squadrons, as soon as those in front liave felt the first effective fire, and makes his charge. This plan may be the most likely to induce the enemy's infantry to blaze away in a hurry, thus aflfording greater chances of success to the real charge which follows. We repeat, it may have the effect, but we are far from setting it forth as an absolute recipe for restoring to cavalry its old power in battle At all events this appears to us to be the best method, particularly as the horsemen, in extended order, would suffer less than if they were in compact bodies. The Austrian cavalry regulations are very precise on the subject of attacks, and are in some respects peculiar. The following is a precis of the rules on this subject : — In war, the attack is the decisive, therefore the most important rOle of cavalry. The main conditions for success are rapidity and surprise in the advance, vigor and momentum in the shock. The men must therefore be practised in advancing over considerable distances, against the enemy, at speed, without in consequence losing steadiness, order {i.e. close formation), and force. " These essentials they seek to gain in peace, by invariably thi'owing out a " skeleton enemy ; it is distinctly laid down that on no account is an attack " to be delivered, no matter how small the unit, without showing a skeleton " enemy, " According as a section, squadron, regiment, or larger unit forms the " attacking body, a corresponding imit or number of units is used ; each " squadron being marked by the four section-leaders and the squadron leader, " the whole under an officer or commander of the enemy." In practising the attack, the attacking body should break into a gallop at from 800 to 1,(KX) paces from the skeleton enemy ; after sounding the " gallop," the com- mander gives the word " attack," which is the .signal for the men to draw their swords ; when at 60 to 80 paces from the enemy, he orders the "charge"; after pursuing about 200 or 300 paces, he orders the "rally," when the men fall into a trot and collect behind their leaders ; when all are quietly at a trot, the line is halted. In presence of a real enemy, the commf.n ler must judge the right moment for ordering the " attack." In open ground, e.g., he should give the order when about 1,000 paces from the enemy ; in a close country as soon as the enemy is discovered or his proximity is reported by the patrols. The moment for breaking into the gallop nnist depend upon circumstances, in which the condition of the horses, the nature of the ground over whic i the attack must be delivered, and the object for which it is made, must ;»e considered. When within 60 or 80 paces of the enemy the "charge " must be ordered, the horses jmt to their full spee