onal ity CONFIDENTIAL: [ERMAN AND AUSTRIAN ACTICAL STUDC.S TRANSLATIONS OF C AI'Tl RFT> < \M) AISTRIAN DO( iMi'NTs AND INFORMATION OBTAINKD I ''ROM (.F.RMAN AND Al'STRIAN PRISONKRS FROM THK BRITISH, I RF.NTH AND ITALIAN STA1 V (MMI'IIII) AM) 11)1111) A I llll AK.\n \\ \ l< ((M.II.Cl DECEMBER EOJVLY WASHINGTON (;o\ I:KN.\TT-:NT PKIMIM; OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL! GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES TRANSLATIONS OF CAPTURED GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PRISONERS FROM THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN STAFFS WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 WAR DEPARTMENT. Document No. 708. Office of the Adjutant General. WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, December 7, 1917. The following pamphlet, entitled " German and Austrian Tactical Studies," is published for the information of all con- cerned. [062.1, A. G. O.] BY OKDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR : JOHN BIDDLE, Major General, Acting Chief of Staff. OFFICIAL : H. P. McCAIN, The Adjutant General. 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS. German- Austrian tactical studies: I. Experience gained from the September (1915) of- fensives on the fronts of the Sixth and Third Armies 9 II. Report on the execution of the raid in the Spion, April, 1916 29 III. Experiences of the Fourth German Corps in the bat- tle of the Somme, July, 1916 49 IV. Lessons drawn from the battle of the Somme by Stein's group 87 V. The German attack of July 31, 1917, on the Cerny plateau 103 VI. Notes on the German attack at Bois le Chamne, Sep- tember 25, 1917 115 VII. German defensive tactics 121 VIII. The construction of positions for the coming winter. 139 IX. Information gathered concerning the enemy's ar- tillery '..... 147 X. Employment of machine guns in trench warfare. . 161 XI. The German attack of August 10, 1917, south of La Royere 169 XII. Experiences gained during the English-French of- fensive of the spring of 1917 179 XIII. The battle of Malmasson 195 XIV. Actions on the Carso, August-September, 1917 205 XV. German principles of elastic defense 223 5 I. EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM THE SEPTEMBER (1915) OFFENSIVES ON THE FRONTS OF THE SIXTH AND THIRD ARMIES. [Translation of a German document.! CONTENTS. Pago. Experience gained from the September offensives on the front of the Sixth and Third Armies 9 A. Enemy's preparation for the attacks 9 B. The execution of the attack 10 C. Experiences 12 General : 13 Tactical 14 Command 14 Infantry 16 Machine guns 18 Trench mortars 19 Artillery 19 Preparation of defenses 22 Bringing up supplies, etc 23 Medical service 25 8 I. EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM THE SEPTEMBER (1915) OFFENSIVES ON THE FRONTS OF THE SIXTH AND THIRD ARMIES. The events of the great September offensives, as far as can be ascertained from subsequent discussion with the staffs con- cerned, may be summarized as follows : A. ENEMY'S PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACKS. For weeks prior to the commencement of operations the enemy threw out saps practically along the whole front of his attacks to within 100-50 meters or less from our trenches. Our aviators were continually locating new support and com- munication trenches. The latter extended in the Champagne as far back as 10 kilometers (6i miles). The number of hostile aerodromes kept on increasing. In the Champagne there were finally about 200 enemy aeroplanes in action against 60 of ours. Near Arras squadrons of about 20 machines each appeared. Im- portant air raids were undertaken against railway junctions. The task of our own aviators was rendered very much more diffi- cult by the additional number of hostile machines. The French and English artillery kept on increasing. In several corps as many as 130-140 active enemy battery positions, as against about 36 of our own, were located in each corps sector by aero- plane photographs and the survey sections. From the middle of September onward the enemy's artillery and trench-mortar activ- ity was always on the increase and numbers of mines were blown. All these preparations made it clear that an attack was coming. After six days' registration and three to four days before the great offensive of September 25, the hostile artillery started its methodical bombardment with guns of all calibers and with ever-growing intensity. Continuous bombardments of several hours' duration were interspersed with periods of slow fire and short bursts of rapid fire. The bombardment was equally in- tense along the whole stretch of front-line trenches. Heavy fire was directed against the communication trenches, rear lines of defense, rest billets, and villages to a distance of 15 kilometers (9J miles) behind the front. Our batteries were subjected to 10 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. severe shelling by guns of large caliber, and the observation posts, even those farthest back, were heavily fired on. In the Champagne, the Bazaucourt-Challerange railway was cut in .several places, so that we were obliged to unload trains farther back than we had intended. During the last few hours before the infantry attack the enemy made use of gas shells, so that with our infantry and artillery positions hidden in smoke clouds the observation posts were, to some extent, rendered useless. B. THE EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK. 2. In the Champagne the main attack was launched simulta- neously on a front of 32 kilometers (25 miles). The French infantry advanced, under cover of gas-shell clouds, in thick skirmish lines in considerable depth ; each wave was succeeded closely by another, and the regiments of , division followed each other, a divisional front extending over about 1 kilometer. After a French attack on the 24th had been repulsed a second attack, preceded by another severe bombardment, was launched on the 25th. This, too, was, generally speaking, driven back. Only in the neighborhood of Souain did the French achieve any success. Some days before we had withdrawn an infantry brigade from that sector. The resulting gap had been tempo- rarily filled by thinning out the line on either side and bringing up a "cavalry battalion." The relief by freshly arrived in- fantry units was impossible to carry out owing to the intensity of the bombardment. Only at this weak point in the position were the French suc- cessful in breaking through. The advancing masses swung right and left, and got behind the fire trenches which had so far held out, took them and thus pierced a wide gap in the front system. The artillery which was in position between the first and second lines, owing partly to the communications having been cut and partly to the smoke clouds, did not notice the advance of the hostile infantry in time and a number of batteries fell into the enemy's hands. The advance came to a standstill in front of our second line, which had been promptly occupied by all available reserves, including recruit depots. During the night we were successful in saving many guns from between the first and second lines. Fierce close fighting took place in the area between the first and second lines which had been overrun by the enemy. This is GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 11 the sole explanation that can be given as to why the French, who broke through about midday, did not reach the second line (2.-A kilometers back) until several hours later. We have to thank the stubborn resistance of our troops and the irresolute action of the French infantry, who failed to make quick enough use of their initial success that the second line was not pierced and that time was secured in which to occupy it in sufficient strength. The large number of prisoners taken by the enemy leads to the assumption that some of the occupants of the front- line trenches surrendred as soon as they perceived that the enemy was in rear of them. On the other hand, companies of other regiments engaged the enemy from behind and took sev- eral thousand prisoners between the two lines. Evidently counting on successfully breaking through, the French had prepared a special communication trench for their cavalry to come up by in columns of half sections. Through this a French cavalry regiment advanced up to our old front line, crossed it, and appeared in column of troops before the second-line positions held by the One hundred and fifty-eighth Infantry Regiment. This cavalry regiment was entirely anni- hilated. 3. In the Sixth Army the Seventh Corps completely repulsed a gas attack made by the English. The One hundred and seven- teenth Division, just farther south, was likewise attacked with gas. Under cover of this cloud, rendered more dense by a smoke-producing contrivance, the English, whose trenches in this sector were separated from ours by a stretch of 300-500 meters, succeeded in capturing the positions of both wing regi- ments of the division. Further, on the southern flank, the sup- port companies occupying the cellars of the well-known village Loos were overrun and several batteries were captured. The center regiment of the division waited for the gas clouds to pass over it and then repulsed the attacking Englishmen, who were equipped with smoke helmets. Not until it found itself practically surrounded by the Englishmen, who had broken through on its right and left, did the regiment, from sheer neces- sity, fall back. By putting in all the reserves, as well as the recruit depot and also a part of the eighth division, which was in army reserve, the second line was held and part of the ground gained by the Englishmen was immediately recovered. The enemy on a front of 6 kilometers had driven a semicircular wedge into our posi- 12 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. tion, forming a salient, the extreme easterly point of which lay 3 kilometers behind our original line. The present line con- sists partly of our old second line as it was before the attack and partly of newly dug trenches connecting the first and second lines. As regards the Sixth Corps, the result of repeated attacks by the French, who considerably outnumbered us both in infantry and artillery, was that the corps was to some extent pushed back. The right wing the Thirty-eighth Fusilier Regiment only gave way when it was entirely outflanked from the north by the French, who had broken through near Souchez. On the right wing the ground lost amounted to about 1 kilometer, while on the left wing a line of trenches situated, generally speaking, some 250-500 meters behind the original line was held. The behavior of the French infantry opposed to the Sixth Corps is described in the report of the Twenty-third Infantry Regiment as follows : " The first French attacking line consisted of a thin skirmish line equipped with hand grenades. As soon as this had reached our front trenches, attacking columns in close order left the enemy's trenches. These consisted either of parties about 50 strong, formed in column of fours, or irregular lines in close order. For purposes of close combat the French were armed with bayonets and hand grenades. Whereas in the trenches the fighting was principally carried out with hand grenades, in the open country the bayonet was successfully employed by the com- panies of our regimental reserve during the counter attack. Sec- tions for bringing up materiel followed the enemy's attacking columns. The French showed remarkable skill and speed in consolidating the positions which they won. In places where we seriously threatened them they offered little resistance and were soon prepared to give themselves up. Each French infan- try company carried red and yellow flags into the attack with it to act as indications to their own infantry and artillery of the newly-won positions." C. EXPERIENCES. 4. The experience gained from the September offensives con- firms in the main the correctness of the observations made by the Second Army. Certain points have been particularly empha- sized ; only a few new points have come to light. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 13 The very instructive reports handed in by the units of the Sixth Corps form the basis of the following summary. GENERAL. 5. The infantry, after enduring in its dugouts the 70 hours' artillery preparation of unparalleled intensity, repulsed, prac- tically along the whole front, an attack, preceded by gas clouds, launched by a considerably superior opponent. In certain places the enemy broke through in close masses and appeared in rear of our troops, but the trench occupants, under courage- ous and determined leadership, fought their way backward with the result that they made thousands of French prisoners. On the other hand, at a few other places, under apparently similar conditions, the front line gave way before the gas attack or surrendered when attacked from the rear, but this merely demonstrates afresh the enormous value of good " morale." 6. Every officer, noncommissioned officer, and man must be- lieve (as has indeed been once more proved by the experiences of this battle) that our infantry is superior to that of the enemy, even though the latter be superior in actual numbers. Even if strong hostile detachments penetrate into our trenches or succeed in getting in rear of our front-line system, the fight must be carried on in any circumstances and with all possible means. If the supports press forward at the right time (see p. 17), it will almost always be possible with their help to drive the enemy out of the trenches again and to take prisoners. At the very least, a stubborn resistance to the last man will provide the necessary time for reserves .to be brought up to occupy the rear positions, and thus prevent the enemy from breaking through, as well as the loss of any artillery. 7. The moral effect of almost three days of the most intense preparatory bombardment is naturally very great. The strain on the infantry under such conditions is quite terrific. In order to render officers and men capable of a supreme effort and to preserve their fighting energy through the exhaustive strain of days of continuous battle it is necessary to provide in the most careful and farseeing manner for the bodily comfort of the troops. It is also important that the men should not be accommodated in the dugouts in small parties of three or four, but in two or more groups under responsible leaders. This will enhance the prospects of a successful resistance. Another essen- 14 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. tial for insuring a feeling of confidence among the troops is the timely supply of all material for trench warfare (small-arm ammunition, hand grenades, extemporized obstacles, sandbags, wooden props, etc), and, above all, the assurance of reliable artillery support. Gas attacks proved ineffectual wherever the troops applied the means of protection provided quickly enough and in the proper manner and allowed the gas clouds to pass over them. Hostile gas attacks can only achieve success when the advancing cloud causes a panic. Everything depends, there- fore, upon the troops being imbued with the knowledge that hostile gas attacks are harmless. TACTICAL. COMMAND. 8. Wherever the front line is protected by a strong broad obstacle surprise attacks are impossible. Even with the assist- ance of gas an attack over a good obstacle can not be carried out without artillery preparation. The preparations, therefore, for an attack on a large scale have so far always been recog- nizable. This enables the higher command to bring up its re- serves of men and ammunition in good time. 9. During the battle itself the higher command has the great- est difficulty in forming a correct picture of the situation. For this reason it is essential that all means of communication (telephones, light signals, cyclists, mounted orderlies, runners, etc.) should be provided, so that if one or more means of com- munication fail it may still be possible to pass on orders and messages. Divisional staffs must from the outset detail officers for the tactical observation of the battlefield from prepared and well-chosen posts, and must be in communication with them and with the observation balloons by means of telephones. 10. The telephone connections forward from the regiment and battalion were for the most part cut. The surest means of communication proved to be daring, reliable men, who worked their way backwards and forwards from shell hole to shell hole. The provision of some special means of recognition (arm band) for these men proved of value. Otherwise they were often held back by officers in the front line and used for other purposes. Regular relay posts in the communication trenches appear to have been less useful, because these were either killed GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 15 or buried by artillery fire. Fairly good results were achieved in certain places with light signals (motor lamps can be used for this purpose as an improvised measure). 11. The light rocket signals proved on the whole satisfactory. Light pistols should also be kept handy in the fighting posts of sector commanders, in order that signals may be sent from the front line. Barrage fire must, however, only be called for in cases of absolute necessity. Light-pistol signals sent unneces- sarily out of nervousness led, in certain cases, to such an ex- penditure of ammunition that artillery support failed at the critical moment, owing to lack of sufficient ammunition supply. (See la No. 161, Secret, of 9/10/15.) 12. The connection between the infantry sector commander and the artillery group commander, which is so essential to the satisfactory cooperation of the two arms, is best provided for if these two are near enough to one another for verbal communica- tion during the battle. When this is impossible, artillery officers who are intimately acquainted with the whole sector must be allotted to the infantry commanders and must be in telephonic communication with the artillery staffs. It is very advantageous if it can be arranged that the limits of each infantry sector coincide exactly with those of the corresponding artillery group. Difficult points opposite the front line, for Instance, villages, or strips of dead ground affording covered approaches to the enemy (copses, wooded river banks, etc.), must never form the boundaries of sectors. Boundaries should, in the first instance, be chosen with this object in mind. 13. It has already been laid down in Second Army No. 161, Secret, of 1/10/15, that the front line must everywhere be marked by boards painted diagonally red and white. In order that the trench positions must be shown as soon as possible after the gain or loss of ground, the infantry should render sketches to headquarters with the least possible delay. Similar sketches for the use of the artillery should be prepared and sent in by the artillery officers attached to the respective in- fantry staffs. This is the sole means of preventing losses amongst the infantry from our own artillery fire, and of insur- ing that the enemy's forces which have penetrated our trenches are dealt with by our artillery. 14. The number of spare maps available showing the regi- mental sectors (1/10,000 or thereabouts) must be such that all the officers, down to platoon commanders, of newly arrived re- serves can be immediately provided with a good trench map. 16 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 15. The question of careful training of special officers and other suitable individuals (also cavalry) as guides (both by day and by night) to freshly arrived units, has already been referred to in the Pioneer General's 846/15 of the 1st of August. INFANTRY. 16. At many points of the front attacked, and wherever the breadth of the regimental sectors admitted of it, only four com- panies held the front-line trenches, each company, as far as can be ascertained, holding a sector of 300-600 meters. As a rule the regiment had four companies in support, the rest form- ing regimental or brigade reserves, etc. In this connection it should be noted that the billeting of supports in villages im- mediately behind the front was a failure. The speedy collection of the support companies, which were accommodated in the numerous cellars of the heavily bombarded villages, proved impracticable. Supports are better kept (at any rate during critical periods) in the rearmost trenches of the first-line system or in the intermediate line; this will at the same time form the best means of improving these defenses. 17. The reserves at the disposal of the corps headquarters were in some cases very small, often only one battalion per division. These, too, were soon placed at the disposal of the divisions. In many cases portions of the supports had already been sent into the front line while the artillery preparation was sfill being carried out in order to replace losses. 18. The experience of the recent offensives emphasizes the advisability of a considerable distribution in depth. The avail- able front-line troops are insufficient for a close occupation of the support trenches, but a weak garrison will be enough to bring the enemy to a standstill* here after he has broken through the first positions. The all-important point is that the enemy should be engaged from the support positions as well as from the front positions. This should be insured by means of well- placed machine guns and emergency garrisons, mainly in the neighborhood of points where the communication trenches run from the front positions into the support line. 19. The front trench of the first-line system must be suffi- ciently strongly garrisoned (but no more) to make it certain that, provided the parapet be promptly manned, a hostile attack GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 17 will be driven back. The better the arrangements are for enfilading the front trenches, more especially by machine-gun fire, the smaller can be the infantry garrisons. 20. Again, in the September battles, there were several points in the line at which the men were surprised in their dugouts. For this reason it has several times been suggested that the front trenches should be held more or less strongly by sentry posts. On the other hand, it has been proved that in most places the parapet was manned promptly enough. It is of the utmost importance that a good lookout should be kept, good alarm arrangements provided, suitable exits to dugouts built, and that the alarm should be duly rehearsed. (See Second Army, No. 138, Secret, of Aug. 1.) Above all, however, every group commander and individual man must know that the suc- cess or failure of the defense depends entirely on the timely manning of the parapet. All must be made to understand that the moment the enemy- enters our trenches he begins bombing the dugouts. The great point, therefore, is not to lose a second, but even if the alarm is not given in time to hurry to the firing line the moment the artillery fire lengthens. If, as was suggested, the greater part of the companies is kept in the support trenches, the men will come up too late for the defense of the front line, and the latter is sacrificed. In this army the standing order that the front-line trenches must in- variably be held is to be absohitely adhered to. 21. As soon as an attack threatens the first support line will be occupied by the supports, of which a portion will defend the trenches themselves, particularly the entrances to communica- tion trenches, and the rest will form strong bombing parties who will be ready to advance in aid of the front line. 22. The remaining available troops will never suffice for a simultaneous occupation of the second support line. Here there will be a few odd reserve companies, with a few emergency gar- risons at points of special importance. Supports and reserves occupying the first and second support lines can only properly fulfill their task if, from these positions, also, as careful an observation of the enemy's movements is carried out as in the front line. 23. For the defense of the intermediate and main second lines only the corps or army reserves come into consideration. The bringing up of the last reserves namely, recruit depots, cavalry, 29267 18 2 18 GEEMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. and train must also be carefully prepared (ammunition, iron rations, etc.). 24. If the enemy breaks through at any point it is the duty of the neighboring troops to take him immediately in flank whether by rifle or machine-gun fire or by bombing parties from traverse to traverse, which nearly always have the desired effect. In beating off an attack, as well as in the recapture of lost trenches, hand grenades have always played a most prominent and successful part. Meo who are not familiar with the use of hand grenades proved more dangerous to themselves and their comrades than to the enemy. They threw their grenades away at random from sheer fright of the unfamiliar weapon. All infantrymen and pioneers must be trained in bombing just as thoroughly as they are in the use of the rifle. An effort should be made to see that every individual man throws at least one live hand grenade during the course of his training. During the defense there was too great a tendency on the part of the men to throw their grenades too soon. First of all rifles must be used, and not until the enemy has approached quite close will hand grenades be employed; it is then that their effect is so good. MACHINE GUNS. 25. Machine guns which were in position on the parapet or in the trenches during the artillery preparation were, of course, destroyed. As a result of this it was to some extent considered that machine guns were no longer suitable for use in the front- line trenches. This is a fallacy. Machine guns must remain in the machine gunners' own dugouts until the enemy attack is launched, then quickly transferred to a convenient position on the parapet without the sledges, which are too heavy for work in the trenches. Employed in this manner they w 7 ill achieve excellent results. It is important that the machine-gun forma- tions should secure light improvised sledges, pivots, or some- thing of the kind, and, apart from this, that they should train all their men to shoot without sledges and with sandbag sup- ports. This method of shooting must be learned. The large errors which occur when shooting in this manner are of no consequence when the enemy is at assaulting distance. 26. The number of machine guns allotted to every regiment js now so high that a proportion of the guns ordinarily used GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 19 in commanding positions in the first and second support lines and firing over the front line can easily be employed as emer- gency guns in the intermediate and main second-line defenses. This will not unduly reduce the fighting strength of the front line. Machine-gun formations (machine-gun sections, also cavalry machine-gun sections) are particularly suitable for use, as mobile reserves in the hands of commanders. If ordered into action from prepared emplacements in either the intermediate or main second line these would stop the fur- ther advance of an enemy who has overrun the front-line system. TBENCH MOETABS. 27. Owing to their slow rate of firing, the heavy trench mortars are not well suited for beating off an assault. Their limited range necessitates their coming into action close behind the front-line trenches, where they would nearly all be quickly destroyed or buried by the hostile artillery before they could change positions, a task rendered all the more difficult by their excessive weight. Nevertheless, their value before an attack in the engagement of hostile trench mortars and targets which our artillery would not dare to touch, owing to their proximity to our own front line, must not be overlooked. Their emplace- ments must, therefore, be well built with ample dugout accom- modation for the men and ammunition. Bullet-proof shields must also be provided for the mortars themselves. Alternative emplacements must be prepared. Good results were secured with medium and light (also improvised) trench mortars. These are not hampered by any want of mobility. ARTILLERY. 28. The support of the artillery has been described by tho infantry in many places as excellent, and especially where the infantry and artillery commanders were in constant close touch with one another through having command posts adjoining. The artillery only failed where ammunition was lacking, and this was already the case in several places on the evening after the first attack. 29. The number of rounds allotted to each field battery for the event of a hostile attack should ordinarily amount to 2,000 ; for the light field howitzers and 10-centimeter guns, 1,500 20" GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. rounds each per battery ; for heavy field howitzers, 200 rounds per gun ; for 21-centimeter mortars, 100 rounds per gun will be sufficient. There is no necessity to keep a corresponding num- ber of rounds constantly in readiness in the ammunition stores, especially for the field-gun batteries. In ordinary circumstances stocks of 1,000 to 1,500 rounds will suffice. But as soon as signs of a hostile attack are recognized the stocks of ammunition must be made up to the above-named figures and kept up to this level without fail throughout the days of increased artillery activity preliminary to the attack. Deep dugouts for storing ammunition must be prepared everywhere, including the posi- tions eventually intended for the use of the extra reinforcing batteries. 30. Wherever the battery emplacements and dugouts for the men were well built, the effect of the hostile heavy artillery was comparatively small. All the reports of the Sixth Corps agree in stating that the numerically superior hostile artillery never succeeded in silencing our batteries for any length of time. It often happened, however, that batteries could only make use of three of their guns at a time, so that their effectiveness was reduced, at any rate, in forming a barrage. 31. The majority of the losses were sustained during the bringing up of ammunition. Firing was in no way hindered by gas shells. The gas was harmless and the bursting capacity of the gas shells insignificant. 32. Losses of materiel were not always made good quickly enough. It is essential that reserve materiel should be kept close at hand. It proved useful to employ one of the reinforcing batteries to replace individual guns which had been put out of action. It is more important that batteries which have carried out their registration should be maintained at their full strength than that a new battery should be put in which is unfamiliar with the various targets and ranges. The enemy often engaged batteries, which he was particularly anxious to put out of action, from as many as three different directions. The fact that in spite of his numerical superiority he was unable to achieve the desired result only goes to prove how futile it is to attempt the same thing with weaker artillery. And the artillery of the defender is always the weaker. During the days of the enemy's artillery preparation, it will be possible, given good observation, to engage with heavy field howitzers or mortars such batteries as are particularly objectionable to our infantry, GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 21 and at the same time to bombard hostile observation posts. As a general rule, however, as soon as an intended hostile attack is recognized, the attention of our artillery must be concentrated on the enemy's infantry, their preparatory work, and their dug- outs. But as soon as it becomes obvious that an immediate attack is contemplated, and particularly when the assembly of troops is reported in the enemy's trenches, these last must con- stitute the artillery's sole objective until the attack has taken place and been driven back (see C. G. S. of 30/9/15, No. 8533r). If, during the critical hours, fire were still to be directed against the hostile artillery, the barrage batteries would have too wide a target to deal with, and there would be gaps in the barrage which the enemy would recognize and profit by. 33. It is desirable that each field battery should be allotted a sector of not more than 200 meters in breadth for barrage purposes. This is only feasible in the case of attacks on a narrow front in the repulse of which all the batteries in the neighboring sectors would participate. For attacks on a wider frontage, each barrage sector will have to be considerably broader at first and will only be reduced to the desired breadth after the extra reinforcing batteries have been able to come up. 34. In order that light pistol and light signal messages from the front line may be picked up, in spite of smoke and gas clouds, it is desirable to have elevated observation posts near the batteries. 35. The fact that, after the enemy had pierced the front line in the Champagne, a large number of guns were captured by him renders special precautions necessary. If possible, ar- rangements should be made to protect all batteries by means of a continuous well-built intermediate line. Steps must also be taken that an enemy who has broken through is engaged by the batteries at close range and finally received with case shot. 36. Small caliber case-shot guns for instance, the 5.7-centi- meter Belgian gun will be best employed in the close defense of rear positions or in the vicinity of such batteries as are not supplied with case shot, and which are therefore incapable of defending themselves at close quarters. The provision of special gunners is, in the latter instance, unnecessary. If the enemy approaches within case-shot range a few of the gunners of the batteries concerned can be employed on the case-shot guns. Practice in firing with case shot must be carried out. 22 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 37. The bringing up of guns of any kind into the front-line trenches has been proved a serious mistake ever since the intro- duction of intense bombardments. They are sure to be de- stroyed or buried. Guns which were in the front line near Souchez never fired a single shot. PBEPABATION OF DEFENSES. 38. The defenses on the front of the attacks were for the most part inferior in construction to those on the second-army front. At many points the energetic artillery work of the enemy had rendered a steady improvement of the trenches impossible, par- ticularly the erection of strong wire entanglements. 39. The front-line system everywhere consisted, as far as is known, of a network of trenches over which the enemy's shell- ing was about evenly distributed. This goes to prove that the preparation of a second support line has its advantages, even if the available forces are insufficient to admit of its occupation, as it encourages the enemy to scatter his artillery fire over a wider area. Dummy trenches served the same purpose with equal success. Broad, deep fire trenches with unrevetted interior slopes, broad berms, and strong traverses offer the best resistance to an intense bombardment. On the whole, mined dugouts about 10 feet below the surface have proved satisfactory. The losses from the intense bombardment were comparatively slight. The entrances to the dugouts were often destroyed or blocked. The frames of these must, therefore, be well braced and specially strong. Steep slopes above the entrances must be avoided. Very heavy shells (28 centimeter) penetrated into these dug- outs. 40. The wire protecting the front line in certain corps sectors amounted to a mere emergency obstacle, owing to the enemy's persistent shelling, and was soon cut. On the other hand, good entanglements on posts proved efficient in holding the enemy up even after the heaviest bombardment. In places the obstacles in front of back defenses had not been destroyed by hostile shelling; these were extremely effective. In general the neces- sity has been recognized of protecting all defensive lines, even the second and third lines of the various systems, with good strong entanglements on posts, constructed wherever possible in several rows. GEKMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 23 41. To meet the attack itself, all firing was done over the parapet. Steel shields or loopholes are only necessary for sentries ; a few of these will suffice. 42. It was often observed that the French directed their attacks more particularly against those points in the front line into which the long communication trenches ran. If they gained possession of these points they immediately tried to set up their machine guns there in order to prevent German supports from coming up, and at the same time cut off the occupants of the front trenches between any two such points. This shows the necessity of having numerous communication trenches, but of avoiding building them straight from front to rear. The entrances to communication trenches must be so designed that they can be blocked immediately and defended. The zigzag form is preferable to the straight line with traverses. The com- munication trenches, too, should be broad and deep, with sloping walls revetted as little as possible and should be pro- vided in numerous places with good recesses for defense. Front line: 2 First support line : Second support line : (a) Wrong system, (b) Correct system. 43. The reports of the various units show in particular that traffic up to the front line during a battle can only be properly regulated if each battalion sector possesses at least one through communication trench for traffic towards the front, and another for traffic towards the rear. In principle these trenches should, in ordinary circumstances, only be used for traffic in one direc- tion. Wherever there was an insufficiency of communication trenches, which resulted in the traffic being blocked, reinforce- ments were unable to come up and losses were increased be- cause the men, in their endeavors to move forward, climbed out into the open. BRINGING UP SUPPLIES, ETC. 44. It Is most essential that thorough preparations should be made for bringing up supplies to the front line. The following 24 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. measures, based on the experiences of regiments of the Sixth Corps, are recommended : The entire supply service should be placed under the charge of an energetic officer or sergeant major in each regimental sector. Sufficient lighting material and rations for three days (including iron rations for each man) must always be kept ready in the front line. The same amount of supplies must be stored in the first and second support lines as soon as the sup- ports and reserves are brought up. 45. During times of great nervous strain the men suffer far more from thirst than they do from hunger. Therefore drink should be provided for before anything else coffee, tea, and soda water. Alcohol should only be given in moderation, be- cause of the lassitude which ensues. Tobacco, cigars, matches, and chocolate were extensively consumed. Bacon and smoked meat were often more popular than tinned meat, probably because the former could be carried in the pocket and occa- sional bites taken. As a thirst quencher dried fruit is recom- mended. Solidified alcohol for warming up tinned meat was found useful. For the transport of drink and food, large quan- tities of specially suitable barrels and baskets must be available. 46. It was found necessary to post a noncommissioned officer in front and in rear of a ration party, otherwise the men went astray and the food did not arrive intact. Depots in rear-line trenches were found useful. Above all, it is necessary that the officer in charge of the supplies should have a thorough knowl- edge of the line and be kept well informed as to the situation, so that he can" be relied upon to send up the necessary supplies without waiting for requests from the front. When communi- cations were cut, it sometimes happened that the troops were subjected to terrible thirst. Certain men state that they had nothing to drink for 48 hours. The firing line was, for the most part, so thinly held that it was necessary to avoid sending men back. It is therefore necessary from the very start to detail special carrying detachments. 47. The bringing up of supplies of small-arm ammunition, light and signal cartridges, grenades, emergency obstacles, sand- bags, infantry shields, entrenching tools, etc., must be regu- lated in a similar manner. Above all, the supply of grenades must never run short. Never wait until all the front-line sup- plies are exhausted and the troops are in trouble, for then it will be too late. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 25 48. It is recommended that a pioneer depot (communication- trench park) for each company sector should be formed in a bullet-proof dugout somewhere about the second-support line, in any case not too far forward. The company parks will draw from regimental parks, situated in as central a position as pos- sible ; these again will draw from brigade or divisional parks. MEDICAL SERVICE. 49. Motor ambulances should be sent as far forward as pos- sible. Medical dugouts should be approached by ramps or steps. Steep steps are not convenient for moving wounded. , (Signed) v. BELOW, Commanding Second German Army. n. REPORT ON THE EXECUTION OF THE RAID ON THE SPION, APRIL, 1916. [110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, in the field, Apr. 15, 1916.] 27 CONTENTS. Page. Report on the execution of the raid on the Spion, April, 1916 . 29 A 29 B 29 C 30 D 31 E 33 F 33 Deductions 33 Distribution 35 Report on the feint on the evening of April 11,1916 35 Capt. Wagener's report on the raid on the evening of April 11, 1916 37 Appendix A 42 28 II. REPORT ON THE EXECUTION OF THE RAID ON THE SPION, APRIL, 1916. [110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, in the field, Apr. 15, 1916.] A. 1. By order of fhe division, regimental orders were changed in the following respects : (a) The bombardment of the Weisse Steinmauer by Minen- werfer on the morning of the day before the raid was canceled in order that the enemy's attention might not be drawn unneces- sarily to that locality. ( b ) An additional medium Minenwerfer was detailed to cut the wire at the point of entry, making altogether one heavy and three medium Minenwerfer detailed for this purpose ; consequently, apart from the close-range weapons of the pioneers and the light Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company, only one me- dium Minenwerfer cooperated in the feint. (c) Stradtmann's patrol was instructed not to leave the Hohl- weg at the twenty-third minute, but to wait for the conclusion of the intense bombardment in order to avoid, at all costs, un- necessary losses from the splinters of our own shell. 2. An increase in the amount of "K" gas shell available and the arrival of " T " gas shell led to changes in the " number of rounds " in Appendix 2. Furthermore, a reduction in the amount of (21 cm.) mortar ammunition available led to altera- tions in the corresponding figures of Appendices 2 and 4. B. 3. The registration of the batteries already in position began on April 5 and, as arranged, was concluded by the 9th. On the evening of the 8th one light and one heavy battery of the 29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment bombarded the 29 30 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. enemy's wire in front of 76y for 45 minutes in order to allay any possible suspicion aroused in the enemy in spite of the pre- cautions observed. 4. During the night of April 8-9 one (21 cm.) mortar, and on the night of the 9-10th two 4-gun heavy field howitzer batteries and the 1st Battery, 29th Regiment, took up the positions indi- cated by the artillery commander. 5. The heavy, the four medium, and the five light Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company took up their allotted posi- tions by night between the 3d and 7th of April. The 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, installed two "Albrecht-Mb'rser " on the Lehmgrubenhohe for bombarding the Nordrondell. 6. On April 9 the commander of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, decided that, apart from the mine in- cluded in the project of the raid, it would very shortly be neces- sary to fire another mine, seeing that the enemy was working only a few yards away from the head of the gallery. It was arranged to combine the latter with the feint bombardment to be carried out on the morning of April 10. As, however, the enemy always showed most activity in his gallery between 6 and 8 a. m., the mine was to be fired during these two hours under all circumstances, with a view to causing him the greatest possible number of casualties. On account of the mist the feint bombardment to be carried out in conjunction with the registra- tion of the newly installed batteries could only commence at 11.15 a. m. The mine was fired at 7.43 a. m., after the presence of the enemy's miners had been definitely ascertained by means of the microphone. The effect of the mine was extraordinarily powerful below ground ; a new crater, however, was not formed, for the mine chamber was 105 feet below the surface. Immedi- ately after the explosion our field artillery and close-range weapons bombarded the enemy's trenches in that neighborhood. At 8.05 a. m. all our close-range weapons opened another burst of fire. C. 7. The feint bombardment came in consequence as a further surprise to the enemy. From 9-10.15 a. m. the heavy and the three medium Minen- werfer registered the point of entry and considerably damaged the wire, firing in all 8 heavy and 28 medium Minenwerfer shell. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 31 Apparently one medium Minemverfer shell penetrated a dugout, from which cries were heard. 8. At 11.15 a. m. the artillery feint bombardment commenced in accordance with " Orders for a raid on the Spion." It was carried out as prearranged. This alone caused the enemy an appreciable number of casualties, according to the statements of prisoners. ( See Appendix ; examination of Englishmen, Z. D., 14. )* A new crater, about 66 feet in diameter, was formed by the ex- plosion of the mine Z on the left flank of the mine field. The heavy Minenwerfer and the close-range weapons of the 1st Re- serve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, took part in the feint bombardment to the extent of a few rounds. The five light Minenwerfer had registered on the enemy's trenches behind the craters from 9.30-10.30 a. m. and fired 261 rounds during the feint bombardment. 9. From 3.10-5.25 p. m. on the afternoon of April 10 the four medium Minenwerfer registered at intervals, with 22 rounds, on the enemy's trenches and wire at 76y. 10. The enemy replied to the feint bombardment by shelling our trenches in La Boisselle and toward Pozieres, while a sec- tion of heavy caliber howitzers (8-inch) shelled the neighbor- hood of the battalion command post in La Boisselle. D. 11. On the morning of April 11 it was decided to commence the operation at 8 o'clock that evening. Watches were com- pared afresh at 7 p. m. Owing to the change in the weather, the error of the day for the artillery was considerable; it had to be worked out by in- dividual batteries and allowed for. Further, the first five min- utes after opening fire had to be devoted to correcting by deliberate ranging. 12. The whole operation, as far as concerns the infantry and also the artillery and pioneers, was carried out entirely as pre- arranged. During the whole period the enemy's artillery was in complete uncertainty as to our point of entry. At about 8.06 p. m. the enemy's artillery opened a feeble and aimless fire and for a while shelled the English front-line trenches in sector 77. The feint drew their fire to the neighborhood of the Blinddarm, * No copy of this Appendix was captured. Translator. 32 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. and until shortly before 8.50 p. m. not a single shell fell in the neighborhood of sap No. 3. Only at 8.47 p. m. did the enemy begin to sweep from Becourt Valley toward Besenhecke with 4.7-inch shrapnel ; at 8.51 p. m. the first of the enemy's shells fell near our front-line trench east of sap No. 3. 13. Consequently, the feint met with entire success and throughout the entire raid drew almost the whole of the enemy's artillery fire and the fire of several machine guns (see "Report on the feint on the evening of April 11, 1916," p. 17). 14. The course of events with the raiding party may be fol- lowed in Capt. Wagener's report on the raid (see p. 18). 15. The fire for effect of the Minemverfer on the point of en- try, with 14 heavy and 70 medium Minemverfer shell, destroyed the enemy's wire so completely on a width of 44 yards that on breaking into the enemy's trench the raiding party did not notice when they crossed the wire entanglement. 16. The effect of our artillery fire on the enemy's personnel and trenches was quite remarkable. Indeed, from the start, the gas clouds from the " T " and " K " gas shell, of which the grouping was perfect, were blown back over our lines by the strong west wind, so that all sentries and machine-gun lookouts were obliged to wear masks. That the gas completely confused and paralyzed the enemy was apparent from the condition of prisoners imme- diately after their capture and from the fighting in the enemy's position. The gas had even such an effect on our own men that the commander and one man of the 1st patrol, on leaving the trenches, were violently sick, and another man fell down over- come by sudden gas poisoning. However, the latter was on his legs again in a couple of minutes and could not be prevented from hurrying after his patrol. That the resistance offered by the enemy in the sector occupied by No. 1 platoon should have been greater than that met with in the sector held by No. 3 platoon, depended, in the opinion of the regiment, not only on the fact that the commander of No. 1 platoon showed conspicuous smartness and bravery in encourag- ing his men to hold out, but that, owing to the line curving back somewhat, only a small proportion of gas shell actually fell in the trench. 17. As his batteries became free after the artillery prepara- tion of the raid, the artillery commander switched them on to those of the enemy's batteries which appeared to him of most importance : 703, 767, 724, 713, 714, 702, and 707. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 33 On the part of the enemy, 4 heavy and 10 field batteries were actually engaged. 18. On the whole, the expenditure of ammunition was as laid down in the " Tables of Distribution of Artillery Fire " for the feint bombardment and for the raid itself. The total expenditure amounted to 3,543 field gun. 829 light field howitzer. 540, 9-cm. (gun). 30, 10-cm (gun). 110, 12-cm. (gun). 984 heavy field howitzer (including 200 " K " and 178 "T" gas shell). 25, 21-cm. (mortar). According to the estimate of the 29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment, the enemy fired a total of about 1,500 rounds. E. 19. The result of the raid may be gathered from Capt. Wage- ner's report (see p. 18), and from the confirmatory report of Lieut. Boening. The following were captured : Twenty-four unwounded and five wounded Englishmen. In addition, 1 Lewis machine gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, and 20 ordinary rifles, as well as a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks, and gas helmets. Our casualties are : One man, slightly wounded in the fore- head by a hand grenade splinter, who was bandaged in the ad- vanced dressing station and immediately rejoined the raiding party. All other injuries sustained by Dumas' patrol in the course of the fighting are quite negligible and can not be con- sidered as wounds. F. DEDUCTIONS. 20. The regiment of Royal Irish Rifles created a most favor- able impression, both as regards the physique of the men and their mode of repelling an assault. But for the effect of gas shell it would not have been possible to clear the section of trench held by one entire company and the flank of the com- pany on its left, so thoroughly that not an Englishman remained alive in the trench. 29267 18 3 84 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. Consequently, the regiment attaches the greatest importance to a bombardment with gas shell, but considers it necessary that the enemy should, at the same time, be shelled with H. E. shell, in addition, in the event of strong bodies of troops not being available for the subsequent assault. In an operation like that of the evening of the llth, which was to be carried out with the lowest effectives possible, it was essential that the enemy should have already suffered ap- preciable losses from our artillery, so that the patrols were not confronted by strong compact detachments but only by isolated groups, whose morale had suffered by the sight of their dead and severely wounded comrades around them. 21. The artillery was most successful in mastering the flank- ing defences, but the regiment considers that the more gas shell are employed the easier this, too, will be. 22. The present experience shows that there is no risk of endangering one's own position and one's own raiding party, for the wind could not be more unfavorable than it was in this case. In the most unfavorable circumstances the raiding party would have to advance close up to the enemy's trench, wearing gas masks, and remove them when on the point of breaking in.- In any case an attack with gas masks on would appear to be scarcely feasible. However well the masks are fitted and how- ever thoroughly the men are practiced, the mask hinders a gen- eral survey and makes it impossible to pick up one's bearings, which the patrol commander must do of necessity. In addition it overstrains the lungs, which are already severely tried by running and by the impression caused by passing events. 23. If the enemy's front-line trench has been successfully cleared on a width of 150 to 200 yards, as in the present case, and if the enemy has not up to that moment opened a barrage on the point of exit, then, in the opinion of the regiment, a far- ther advance into the enemy's second-line trenches offers no great difficulty. It is only necessary for fresh assaulting parties to be launched and for the necessary arrangements with the artillery to be made in good time. In the opinion of the patrol commanders, no further obstacle would have been encountered had fresh patrols advanced in and parallel to the communication trenches and cleared out the Weisse Steinmauer position. The regiment is also of opinion that, without a doubt, a further inroad into the enemy's third trench and into his last positions in the Labyrinth could have been achieved with inconsiderable loss. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 35 24. After the raid Lieut. Boening, one of the participants, acting under regimental orders, examined the English prisoners on prearranged points and brought to light many details of especial importance to the regiment. For this reason the regi- ment considers it desirable that, in all cases, prisoners should be examined by officers with personal knowledge of what is of importance for the regiment to know, and that the majority of prisoners should only be taken away after this examination. (Signed) FBHR. v. VIETINGHOFF, Colonel and Regimental Commander. Distribution. 28th Reserve Division , 1 56th Reserve Infantry Brigade 1 29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 1 Ersatz Abteilung, 76th Field Artillery Regiment 1 I Abteilung, 29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 1 109th Reserve Infantry Regiment 1 lllth Reserve Infantry Regiment r 1 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion 1 228th Minenwerfer Company 1 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment : Headquarters _ 2 3 battalions 3 12 companies 12 Labor company 1 1st Machine Gun Company 1 2d Machine Gun Company 1 55th Machine Gun Section 1 Capt. Wagener 2 Reserve __ 5 37 REPORT ON THE FEINT ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 11. 1916. [110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, in the field, Apr. 15, 1916.] 1. The feint fulfilled its object in every way. 2. From April 5 onward, the artillery repeatedly shelled the trenches and wire at 76y. In particular, on the evening of April 8 the wire at 76y was shelled continuously for 45 minutes by the heavy and light artillery. In the same way the close- range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Bat- 36 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. talion, kept up daily a deliberate bombardment with " Erd- morser " and Minenwerfer on the whole extent of the wire be- tween La Boisselle Cemetery and the Galgen. A machine gun, posted every night in the Blinddarm, prevented the enemy from repairing the wire. On April 10, from 3.10 to 5.25 p. m., a medium Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company registered on the wire and the position at 76y with 22 rounds, so that by this time the wire there had been in great measure destroyed. 3. On April 4 I posted the dummies, which had been previ- ously prepared, in the Blinddarm and between the Blinddarm and the southwest corner of La Boisselle. The dummies were arranged in three groups, which were fastened on to laths, op- erated by strings leading to dugouts, thus insuring the safety of the men operating them, even in the event of the heaviest enemy fire. 4. On the evening of April 11 the artillery opened fire at 8 p. m. as arranged, supported by the close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, and by one medium Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company. At 8.14$ p. m. the mine "A" was fired at the right extremity of the mine field. A column of flame shot up to an extraordi- nary height and stones of appreciable size were scattered to a distance of 330 yards. The crater formed is quite shallow, but has a diameter of 50 feet. Whereas at 8.06 p. m. the enemy's artillery was already aim- lessly shelling the English front-line trenches in sector 77 and then the trenches in the southwest corner of La Boisselle, im- mediately after the explosion it concentrated on the positions adjoining the mine and on the Blinddarm. At this moment the heavy artillery opened on the Blinddarm, the majority of the shells being blind. At 8.15 p. m. our artillery ceased their intense bombardment of the English front-line trenches ; 30 seconds later I gave the order for the dummies to be exposed above the parapet of the Blinddarm. The dummies between the Blinddarm and the southwest corner of La Boisselle could only be hoisted a few minutes later, because they were partly covered with stones from the mine explosion. Immediately the dummies appeared, a brisk fire was opened by two of the enemy's machine guns, one in the neighborhood of the Scheere and the other near the Gal- gen. The machine gun in the Galgen fired less on the Blind- GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 37 darm itself than on the depression in front of the enemy's wire. A few minutes later the dummies disappeared, but on reap- pearing were greeted afresh with intense fire. Five dummies were hit by bullets from rifles or machine guns ; nearly all were more or less knocked about by shell fire or fragments of stone ; one was torn off the lath by a shell. At 8.25 p. m., when our artillery and Minenwerfer again opened a terrific fire on the enemy's trenches, the enemy's ma- chine guns immediately ceased fire, while the artillery con- tinued firing until about 9 p. m. The expenditure of ammunition by the close-range weapons was as follows : Rounds. Lanz Minenwerfer 204 Erdmorser 26 Albrecht Morser 57 1 medium Minenwerfer of 228th Minenwerfer Company 48 5 light Minenwerfer of 228th Minenwerfer Company 474 5. I am under the impression that the enemy was completely deceived by the feint attack. (Signed) BACHMANN, Second Lieutenant. CAPT. WAGENER'S REPORT ON THE RAID ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 11. 1916. [In the field, Apr. 12, 1916.] At 4 p. m. the raiding party marched from Martinpuich through Pozieres, then by the Lattorf Graben Regiment- strichter Krebs Graben to the appointed dugouts on the left of sap No. 3, where the evening meal was found ready pre- pared. At 8 p. m. the artillery preparation commenced as pre- arranged. Shortly after fire was opened, the whole of the enemy's position from Windmuhle to Besenhecke was wrapped in grayish-white smoke, which the wind drove back over sap No. 3 into our lines. By 8.10 p. m. it was impossible to remain in our trench east of sap No. 3 without wearing a gas mask. This was still the case at 8.20 p. m., when the patrols moved forward from their 38 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. dugouts to the Hohlweg, in the following order : Stradtmann, Dumas, Bohlefeld, and Freund. Lieut. Boening followed close behind Lieut. Stradtmann. By 8.25 p. m. the party was posted ready in the Hohlweg. The clouds of gas and smoke, however, still hung so thick over the enemy's trenches that it was impossible to distinguish whether our own shells were still falling on the point of entry or whether our artillery had already lengthened their range. At 8.27 p. m. Lieut. Stradtmann received the order to advance to the attack with his patrol. Lieut. Boening, with the six stretcher bearers, left the Hohlweg simultaneously and in rear of Stradtmann's patrol, and posted connecting files, whose posi- tions were marked by red signal lamps shaded to the front and to the sides. At 8.28 p. m. Dumas' and Bohlefeld's patrols advanced. Fol- lowing the line of connecting files, they reached the point of entry, to find that Stradtmann's patrol was already in posses- sion of 16 yards of trench, and had captured three prisoners. The latter had come out of their dugouts just as Lieut. Stradt- mann appeared in front of the enemy's trench. They carried hand grenades and rifles with bayonets fixed, but were immedi- ately disarmed by Lieuts. Boening and Stradtmann. Dumas' patrol immediately turned to the left down the trench, and in a few steps came upon a half-destroyed machine- gun emplacement. Reservist Nadolny, of Stradtmann's patrol, was already occupied in digging out the buried machine gun. Lieut. Dumas penetrated farther along the enemy's trench, and soon reached the communication trench which runs, roughly, along the dividing line between target sectors 79 and 80, to- ward the Weisse Steinmauer. At this point a large dugout had been wrecked, apparently by a direct hit. Lieut. Dumas had previously sent three men of his patrol along behind the enemy's trench ; they reached the communication trench about 11 yards behind the front-line trench. A few Englishmen, who came out of this communication trench, endeavored to reach the parados of the front-line trench, whence they evidently intended to de- fend it. They were, however, surprised by our three men and bayoneted. Meanwhile, Lieut. Dumas, with the rest of his men, forced his way farther along the trench, and just north of Besenhecke reached the communication trench which leads to the brown prolongation of the Weisse Steinmauer (white stone wall). GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 39 They passed another wrecked dugout, in which dead bodies were' seen. Adjoining the above-mentioned communication trench, another large dugout was found, which the patrol in- tended to clear. As, however, a number of Englishmen ad- vanced upon Dumas' patrol from the communication trench and alongside it, a melee ensued with grenades, rifles, and pistols, In the course of which the enemy, after suffering evi- dent loss, either retreated or surrendered, while none of Du- mas' patrol received wounds of any account. Meanwhile, Lieut. Bohlefeld advanced along the enemy's trench to the right of the point of entry, and in a few yards came to three large dugouts, of which one was wrecked and full of dead and wounded. At his summons, the enemy came out of the others and surrendered without more ado. Lieut. Bohlefeld sent back the prisoners and asked for reinforcements in order to clear the dugouts, undertaking, meanwhile, to hold the enemy's trench with two men. At 8.30 p. m., as no noise came from the point of entry or from the right of the same, while from a point some 65 yards to the left shots and reports of grenades could be heard, I or- dered Vice-Sergt. Maj. Elb to advance with five men and re- inforce Dumas' patrol. Lieut. Erb, the regimental adjutant, attached himself to this party. He was wearing an oxygen- breathing apparatus and had been waiting in the Hohlweg. Shortly after the sounds of fighting ceased on the left, and the first batch of prisoners was brought back from the enemy's trench. I had come to the conclusion that we had the upper hand everywhere, especially on the right, and with a view to exploiting fully our success, I ordered Lieut. Freund to cross the enemy's trench at the point of entry with 15 men of the supports, and to attack the Spion from the rear. At the same time, I sent forward Vice-Sergt. Maj. Wolfle with four men to reinforce Lieut. Bohlefeld. In order to have a reserve in hand for meeting all eventual- ities, I ordered up the commanders of the two groups on the flank of the 12th Company, which was stationed immediately to the right of sap No. 3. The groups had been warned in the after- noon and given the necessary instructions. Whilst Vice-Sergt. Majs. Elb and Wolfle, with their men, went in search of Dumas' and Bohlefeld's patrols, Lieut. Freund dashed across the enemy's trench at the point of entry and followed it along to the right as far as the communication trench which leads into the front- 40 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. line trench near the Spion. Freund's patrol leaped into the enemy's front-line trench on both sides of the communication trench, captured 10 men almost without a struggle, and secured several rifles and articles of equipment. A few Englishmen who offered resistance were bayoneted ; Volunteer Herrmann, of the 7th Company, and Lance Corpl. Haufler, of the 4th Com- pany, particularly distinguished themselves. A few English- men attempted to get away, but were shot dead. Volunteer Herrmann further discovered an extemporized trench mortar. The latter could not be carried off, however, as it was securely built in. Vice-Sergt. Maj. Wolfle, who arrived on the scene shortly after, destroyed the trench mortar as well as he could with hand grenades and pistol shots. Bb'hlefeld's reinforced patrol had accompanied the advance of Freund's patrol along the trench, and came across three or four more wrecked dugouts, which were filled with dead. Indivi- duals standing about in the trench were killed by the patrol or made prisoners. During this affair Under Officer Nossler, of the llth Company, repeatedly distinguished himself. Whilst our party was breaking into the enemy's trenches or perhaps even before, a party of the enemy, approximately 25 to 30 strong, succeeded in getting away from the front-line trench and making their way back to the AVeisse Steinmauer, but were again driven back by our artillery fire, and now came running toward Stradtmann's patrol. The latter, apprehending a coun- ter attack, opened fire. Ersatz Reservist Walzer, of the llth Company, followed by Under Officer Staiger, of the 10th Com- pany and others, raised a cheer and charged the Englishmen, bayoneting two of them. Those who did not put up their hands and surrender were killed. Lieut. Erb had soon caught up to Dumas' patrol and took part in the subsequent fighting, which was practically continuous for almost every one of the enemy offered resistance. With hand grenade and pistol, Dumas' patrol killed more than 20 of the enemy besides wounding a large number. In this fighting Volunteer Hees, of the 6th Company, particularly distinguished himself. Always to the fore, he alone accounted for several Englishmen. On our side only one man was slightly wounded. In consequence of the events described above, Dumas' patrol remained in the enemy's trench considerably longer than in- tended. When all the other patrols had returned to the Hohl- weg, the Dumas-Erb patrol was still missing. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 41 Hereupon, Lieuts. Boeniug and Stradtmann, with several non- commissioned officers and men, went back to the enemy's lines and searched the trench to the left until they met the Dumas- Erb patrol on its way back. Here again Under Officer Mossier, of the llth Company, 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, dis- tinguished himself. At 8.50 p. m. the last men of the entire party had returned to the Hohlweg and went back to their dugouts. At 8.51 p. m. the first shell fell on the front-line trenches east of sap No. 3. At 8.57 p. m. the artillery commander was informed that the artillery fire could be gradually broken off. At 9 p. m. a heavy battery near Albert dropped a few shells near sap No. 3. At 9.05 p. m. the conclusion of the operation was reported. The following were captured : Twenty-four unwouuded and five wounded prisoners, 1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles, and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks, and gas helmets. Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the advanced dressing station and immediately returned to the patrol. Forty copies, as appendices to the report of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of April 11, 1916. ( Signed ) WAGENEK, Captain and Company Commander. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. ".7 s S M >, ex *4 Sg^-Sfe .SS ijrfhfcgj filfs 553SSU.S 138 a. JS-3 -3 X X * o> o 3 s3 a jS w 3*1 ? H M H S fe H ^ 05 | S h cc O 5 r. S 1 - S 'S H H S 5 ft fi Q ft fl n w GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 43 .3 5 "2 g 1 1 1 1 minute. The 212th ounds. HEX O O p. p, p. p t> p 5 i P first to the thirtietl r on 23 with a few r ft ft K $ fc>i 03 4^"*"* S I iii j 1|! . o_ ffl fl ra5 "* .11 it JE S * ill I ll ft ft W w |> fcl| .g ^ o 3 2 5 8 u o,9 * ,3 cS? * ^ a|s o S II 3 'i^ft . 7; o-O 9 H ' SB'S "" 1 ill .M HjJ)** o I III P | 55 gig * w-S 9 ^r~* ^~* ^r~* 8 jj| r- * 1 53 m. EXPERIENCES OF THE FOURTH GERMAN CORPS IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME DURING JULY, 1916 45 CONTENTS. I. English tactics: Page. 1. Infantry 49 2. Artillery 49 3. Cavalry 50 II. Organization: 4. Allotment of special formations for the battle 50 5. Increasing the staffs 51 6. Corps headquarters 51 7. Drafts in reserve for the infantry com- panies 51 8. Infantry pioneer companies 51 9. Increase in machine guns 52 III. Training: 10. Training 52 IV. Lessons from the fighting: A. Construction of positions and the defense 11. Infantry positions 53 12. Artillery positions 54 13. Battle headquarters 54 14. Relief of Infantry and pioneers 54 15. Engagement and relief of the Artillery. 55 16. Distribution of the Infantry 56 17. Organization of the Artillery 57 18. Reserves of personnel and materiel for the Artillery 57 19. Artillery barrage fire 57 20. Barrage fire of Infantry and snipers. . . 58 21. Action to be taken during continuous heavy shelling 58 22. Employment of "Green Cross" (gas) shell 59 23. Bomb throwers and trench mortars 59 24. Strong points 60 25. Retired Infantry positions and switch lines 60 26. Retired Artillery positions 61 46 CONTENTS. 47 IV. Lessons from the fighting Continued. Page. B. Attack 27. Method of attack and time required... 61 28. Approach march and deployment 62 29. Methodical attack 62 30. Assaulting parties 63 31. Attacks in woods 63 32. Procedure after a successful attack 63 C. Cooperation of Infantry and Artillery 33. Communications between commanders. 63 34. Communications in the front line 64 V. Means of communication: 35. Telephone communications 65 36. Wireless communications 66 37. Runners 66 38. Motorcycles and bicycles 66 39. Light-signaling lines 66 40. Light-pistol signals 67 41. Balloon and aeroplane observation 67 42. Antiaircraft measures 68 43. Special reporting detachments 69 VI. Arms: 44. Small arms 69 45. Machine guns 70 46. Hand grenades 70 47. Guns 71 VII. Ammunition: 48. Various kinds of ammunition 71 49. Expenditure of ammunition 72 50. Ammunition supply .' 73 VIII. Engineer stores: 51. Pioneer park detachment 74 52. Pioneer parks and the supply of engi- neer stores 75 IX. Clothing and equipment: 53. Steelhelmets 76 54. Jackets and footgear 76 55. Packs 76 56. Water bottles... 76 48 CONTENTS. IX. Clothing and equipment Continued. Page. 57. Entrenching tools 76 58. Hand stereotelescopes 76 59. Maps 77 60. Illuminating material 77 X. Horses and vehicles: 61. Horses and vehicles 77 XI. Food supply: 62. Rations 78 63. Canteen stores 78 64. Ration supply 78 65. Carrying up rations 79 XII. Medical services: 66. Reliefs 79 67. Motor ambulances 79 68. Stretcher bearers 80 69. Communication between medical units. 80 XIII. Billeting and traffic behind the front: 70. Billeting 80 71. Military police 80 72. Road traffic 81 XIV. Railways: 73. Railway buildings 81 74. Detraining personnel 82 III. EXPERIENCES OF THE FOURTH GERMAN CORPS IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME DURING JULY, 1916. I. ENGLISH TACTICS. 1. JNFANTBY. The English infantry has undoubtedly learned much since the autumn offensive. It shows great dash in the attack, a factor to which immense confidence in its overwhelming artillery prob- ably greatly contributes. The Englishman also has his physique and training in his favor. Commanders, however, in difficult situations showed that they were not yet equal to their tasks. The men lost their heads and surrendered if they thought they were cut off. It was most striking how th'e enemy assembled and brought up large bodies of troops in close order into our zone of fire. The losses caused by our artillery fire were conse- quently large. One must, however, acknowledge the skill with which the English rapidly consolidated captured positions. The English infantry showed great tenacity in defense. This was especially noticeable in the case of small parties, which, when once established with machine guns in the corner of a wood or a group of houses, were very difficult to drive out. Generally speaking, however, our infantry returned from the fight filled with the conviction that it was superior to the English infantry. 2. ARTILLERY. Particularly noticeable was the high percentage of medium and heavy guns with the artillery, which, apart from this, was numerically far superior to ours. The ammunition has appar- ently improved considerably, 29267 18- 49 60 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. All our tactically important positions were methodically bom- barded by the English artillery, as well as all known infantry and battery positions. Extremely heavy fire was continuously directed on the villages situated immediately behind the firing line, as well as on all natural cover afforded by the ground. Registration and fire control were assisted by well -organized aerial observations. At night the villages also were frequently bombed by aeroplanes. 3. CAVALEY. The frontal attacks over open ground against a portion of our unshaken infantry, carried out by several English cavalry regi- ments, which had to retire with heavy losses, give some indica- tion of the tactical knowledge of the higher command. II. ORGANIZATION. 4. ALLOTMENT OF SPECIAL FORMATIONS FOR THE BATTLE. The reports on the experience gained in fhe Battle of the Somme submitted to corps headquarters unanimously agree as to the necessity for an increased allotment of weapons, means of communication and transport of all kinds, such as Flammen- werfer, antiaircraft sections, antiaircraft machine guns, captive balloons, reconnaissance and battle planes, double telephone sec- tions, motor lorries, horse-drawn vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, light-signaling detachments, wireless stations, etc. The heavy fighting has undoubtedly proved the great value and the necessity for the allotment of all these means of warfare. On the other hand, it is not considered possible to allot all these permanently to and as part of the war establishment of divisions and corps on as large a scale as is required. It is therefore necessary to hold ready in reserve for large operations sufficient numbers of additional units of the above- mentioned description, under army or general headquarters, just as is done in the case of heavy artillery, battle-plane squadrons, and pioneer formations, and to place them at the disposal of new corps ^brought up for the battle. In this memorandum a permanent increase in personnel and materiel has only been asked for on the scale considered neces- sary for the normal conditions of trench warfare. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 51 5. INCREASING THE STAFFS. The composition of the staffs of the higher commands, which have been reduced during the war, proved inadequate in actual fighting. It is necessary to detail to staffs, as soon as the nature of the tasks is known, a sufficient number of orderly officers and intelligence and liaison officers. The orderly officers are at the disposal of the commander concerned, chiefly for the collection of intelligence in the front line. 6. COKPS HEADQUARTERS. The staffs of the Fourteenth Reserve Corps and the Fourth Corps were quartered for several days in the same building. They had to share the available telephone communications during that time. This caused difficulties, which were particu- larly felt during critical periods in the fighting, when all branches of both staffs were working at extremely high pressure at the same time. 7. DRAFTS IN RESERVE FOR THE INFANTRY COMPANIES. In the fifth division a fourth platoon was formed in the in- fantry companies. At first these reinforcements for replacing casualties were kept back with the first-line transport (field kitchens). They were sent forward only when the losses of the three other platoons made reinforcements necessary. When they went forward the fourth platoon took with it all that had been found necessary in the particular fighting (hand grenades, entrenching tools, rations, etc.). This arrangement proved very successful. 8. INFANTRY PIONEER COMPANIES. The infantry pioneer companies of each iafantry regiment of the corps proved of great value. Full use, however, was not made of their special training, as the fighting provided them with more urgent work. These companies, which consisted of men of experience and accustomed to work together, proved most valuable in the many difficult and unexpected problems which continually faced the regiments for instance, in the provision of the front-line trenches with the materiel neces- sary for carrying on the fight. 52 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 9. INCREASE IN MACHINE GUNS. A wish is generally expressed for an increase in the number of machine guns. Their value in defense has again been shown, particularly in those cases where gaps in our position caused by a long continued, concentrated, heavy artillery fire could not be filled. Machine-gun reserves, with the necessary men, ought un- doubtedly to be provided for every regiment, brigade, and divi- sion. On the whole, it is considered to be very desirable to have at least 30 machine guns for every infantry regiment. III. TRAINING. 10. TRAINING. The instructions based on our previous experience in defense and attack all took for granted a carefully constructed trench system. The troops on the Somme found practically no trenches at all. The front line, and the ground for a considerable distance behind the fighting front, was kept under fire by the enemy's artillery; this fire was almost continuous and of a volume never before experienced. Several lessons for the training of the troops were learned as the result of this bombardment ; the most important ones, on which all the troops are agreed, are the following : Every individual must be trained to the highest possible de- gree of self-reliance, so that he may know how to act during the critical periods of his own or the enemy's attacks, when he must generally be left to his own resources and is beyond the control of his superiors. Crossing ground which is being heavily shelled. Training of the infantry in establishing relays of runners. Increase in the personnel trained in the use of our own and captured machine guns (oQcers and men). Training in the use of all kinds of German hand grenades. Training as many men as possible in the use of the enemy's hand grenades. Attacks by sectors according to time-table, following close up to our barrage. Formations organized in as great depth as possible to be able to cope with surprises. The absolute neces- GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 53 sity of this has again been proved in attacking in wooded coun- try with a restricted range of vision. Rapid execution of counter attacks over open ground under different conditions. Bombers in front, skirmishers about 10 meters behind them, a number of small bodies in support slightly farther in rear. In wooded country these move in file, other- wise in extended order. Training in the rapid preparation of shell holes for defense and in digging trenches by small parties in captured ground. Marching in file to form up on the tracing tape. The employment of improvised materials in constructing de- fenses if prepared materials are not available. IV. LESSONS FROM THE FIGHTING. A. CONSTRUCTION OF POSITIONS AND THE DEFENSE. 11. INFANTBY POSITIONS. Narrow trenches with steep sides again proved very disad- vantageous and caused considerably more casualties (men being buried) than shallower trenches with a wide sole. This result is due to the fact that the splinter effect of the majority of English shells is not as good as their destructive effect. One regiment is of opinion that the garrison is better protected if the men lie down or crouch at the bottom of the trench without any further cover than it is if the so-called " rabbit holes " are used. A cover trench roughly parallel to the front fire trench is not sound. Such trenches are destroyed by the enemy's fire at the same time and in exactly the same way as the actual fire trenches. To obviate this, trenches sited more in accordance with the ground, and consequently with a certain irregularity of trace, are recommended instead of the formal type of cover trench hitherto in vogue. The Lochmann wire entanglement ("carpet" entanglement) has not proved satisfactory, as its transport Is too difficult. A better method is that of screw posts and barbed wire, which is cut up into 20 to 30 meter lengths under cover, and then fastened to the posts. Curved sheet-iron frames are considered a suitable substitute for timber frames, as their elasticity frequently enables them to keep out heavy shells. 64 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 12. ARTILLERY POSITIONS. The English custom of shelling villages heavily led to the adoption of the principle that batteries should never be sited in the villages themselves, but at least 100 meters away. In this manner the casualties of the artillery were considerably dimin- ished. The employment of steep slopes for battery positions must also be discarded for similar reasons. When not possible to site batteries alongside existing fire trenches, etc., which are not in use, it has been found best, having regard to English methods of fighting, to select sites for batteries in open country which is merely concealed from direct observation. The main essential is, of course, that such positions in the open should be immediately concealed from aeroplane observation. Wire netting, tent squares, etc., covered with material found on the surface of the ground around the position have proved useful. As material for the construction of dugouts arrived a greater degree of security was attained. 13. BATTLE HEADQUARTERS. Battle headquarters, also, when the artillery fire is so heavy, should not be sited in villages, on steep slopes, or at other points which stand out conspicuously on the ground or on the map. In cases where the existing telephone system necessitated the utilization of such unsuitable points as battle headquarters, it resulted in frequent interruptions in personal and telephone traffic by artillery fire and overcrowding in the few available cellars in the villages. Staffs when going into their battle headquarters must see that there are as many clear signboards as possible to indicate the way to them. Owing to lengthy searches for battle head- quarters, many casualties have occurred which might have been avoided. 14. RELIEF OF INFANTRY AND PIONEERS. When troops are relieved in the trenches it is of the utmost importance that the outgoing troops are careful in handing over the position. Whenever the tactical conditions permit, this should take place on the spot, the various commanders and sub- ordinate commanders meeting together for the purpose. At any rate, it is absolutely essential that the incoming troops should be thoroughly informed as to the tactical situation, by means of GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 55 personal conferences between the outgoing and incoming com- manders, with the assistance of maps and sketches, which will be taken over by the latter. A perfectly clear picture must be given of the state of the positions, etc., particularly of their weak points, and also of any work which it had been intended to carry out, the degree of importance attached to it being specified. In order that a relief may be properly carried out, it is also necessary that the commanders of the incoming troops should acquaint themselves, by daylight, with the lie of the ground ; it may be necessary to send them on ahead in motor cars. The troops, too, must, if possible, be able to gain a general idea of the position while it is still daylight. Reliefs must, therefore, unless there are cogent reasons against it, be begun at dusk and completed during the early hours of the night. If it is impossible to give the incoming troops an idea of the ground beforehand, then detachments of the outgoing troops must be left behind in the trenches. It is very important that the junction points with other troops should be absolutely clearly indicated, as these are so easily forgotten when reliefs are car- ried out under heavy fire. Losses on the march up to the trenches can be minimized if the stretches of ground which are under fire are crossed in as small parties as possible. One infantry brigade recommends that the relief be carried out by platoons, at short intervals of time, and considers that the troops should move up in file. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. The choice of the forma- tion in which the troops are to move will always depend on the nature of the ground. When troops which are advancing are to be relieved, as much engineer and constructional material as possible must be taken with the relieving troops. In all cases the men must carry as many large entrenching tools as they can. ir>. ENGAGEMENT AND RELIEF OF ARTILLERY. The same principles hold good for the relief of batteries as for infantry. If the tactical situation is such that reinforcing batteries have to be brought up at night, without having had time to reconnoiter by day, then the want of knowledge of the ground must at least be counterbalanced by getting into touch as soon as possible with the artillery already in position, and by making the fullest possible use of the knowledge of the ground which 66 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. that artillery possesses. If the reenforcements come under the orders of artillery commanders who are already in command in the sector, the staffs and officers already engaged must, as soon as it is known that reinforcing batteries are to be brought up, be detailed to reconnoiter battery positions for the commanders who have not yet arrived. The officers who carry out these reconnaissances must then be allotted as guides to the new batteries when these move up into position. 16. DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY. One of the most important lessons drawn from the battle of the Somme is that, under heavy, methodical artillery fire, the front line should be only thinly held, but by reliable men and a few machine guns, even when there is always a possibility of a hostile attack. When this was not done the casualties were so great before the enemy's attack was launched that the possibility of the front line repulsing the attack by its own unaided efforts was very doubtful. The danger of the front line being rushed when so lightly held must be overcome by placing supports (in- fantry and machine guns), distributed in groups according to the ground, as close as possible behind the foremost fighting line. Their task is to rush forward to reinforce the front line at the moment the enemy attacks, without waiting for orders from the rear. In all cases where this procedure was adopted we suc- ceeded in repulsing and inflicting very heavy losses on the enemy, who imagined that he had merely to drop into a trench filled with dead. The essential conditions for success are, therefore, that the various formations should be organized in depth, but that their units should be employed side by side. Only in this way is it possible to insure that a counter attack in sufficient strength and with unmixed units can be made, if the enemy has succeeded in penetrating the line, an occurrence which can not always be avoided when the artillery fire is so heavy. Even the company commander must, in any circumstances, neglect to provide himself with a reserve consisting of a few groups, and, if possible, of machine guns as well. The subsector commanders must also have at all times sufficient troops at their disposal to be able at once to drive the enemy out, by means of a counter attack, should he succeed in penetrating into the posi- tion. It is self-evident that regimental and higher commanders GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 57 must have complete units at their disposal as a reserve. The more troops that are held in reserve the better. A considerably greater allotment of machine guns by army headquarters when troops are moved to the battle front is absolutely necessary, as this will enable infantry to be held in reserve on a sufficiently large scale. The great advantage offered, by the increased possi- bility of exchanging the garrison of the front line with the re- serves is perfectly obvious. 17. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTILLERY. The formation of corps artillery was ordered by army head- quarters with the object of avoiding, at any rate as far as the more permanent heavy artillery was concerned, the frequent changes in command, due to the frequent changes of the field artillery brigades. From the experience now gained, it seems advisable to place a few heavy batteries under the commanders of the divisional artillery, in order to enable them to carry out all the tasks allotted to them as rapidly as possible. 1 8. RESERVES OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL FOR THE ARTILLERY. The supply of fresh guns was usually carried out rapidly. Nevertheless, it is very desirable that each field artillery brigade should retain a few guns, with their detachments, to act as a re- serve. Possibly it might be sound only to engage two of the three batteries of an Abteilung at first, and to retain one in reserve to replace casualties. Heavy batteries of four guns should only have three of their guns in position during such critical fighting, in order to have a reserve available for imme- diate use. 19. ARTILLERY BARRAGE FIRE. It was found very difficult to form a continuous barrage, with- out gaps, in front of our own lines, owing to the occasional uncertainty as to the position of our front line, which was con- tinually changing during the fighting, the frequent changing of batteries, the regrouping of the artillery, which was often neces- sary, the bad conditions for observation, the permanent inter- ruption of the telephone communications, and the practically continuous heavy fire which was maintained behind our front line. 68 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. Whenever we were successful in establishing such a barrage in a comparatively short time, it was entirely due to the forward artillery observation officers. The only means of communication which these officers possessed, as a rule, were light pistols and runners. By full use of these means it was possible to carry out an approximate registration. The method employed was for the battery, at the exact time previously agreed upon, to open fire with a definite number of rounds on a point which was easy to observe. The fall of the shell relative to this point served as the basis of the registration for the barrage in front of a specified sector. It was necessary to supplement these observa- tions by means of personal verbal reports. It was found specially useful for the artillery observation officers who relieved each other to go forward twice a day. This, unfortunately, led to heavy casualties among artillery officers, but saved the infantry many losses. (Regarding the action of the artillery observation officers during an attack, see Par. IV, ch. 34.) In cases where it was not possible to register for the barrage in the ordinary manner, the employment of various natures of shell (time shrapnel, time H. E. shell and percussion H. E. shell), fired at various ranges, proved to be a useful expedient for a barrage. The different effects of the various natures of shell at any rate caused the fire to be distributed in depth and breadth over a considerable area. The disadvantage of this method is the large expenditure of ammunition incurred, with- out which the desired effect can not be obtained. 20. BARRAGE FIRE OF INFANTRY AND SNIPERS. Over ground which can not be observed and at night the un- aimed but horizontal barrage fire of infantry and machine guns, during and immediately after critical periods, affords rest and protection to troops, who are probably shaken for the moment, and not only scares the enemy but inflicts losses on him. The excellent results obtained from selected snipers posted at good viewpoints, in trees, etc., are particularly emphasized by one regiment. 21. ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING CONTINUOUS HEAVY SHELLING. It has been found to be a good plan, during the continuous heavy bombardment of incomplete front-line positions, for the garrison to advance 100-200 meters and to lie down in the open without any cover. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 69 It is advisable for a battery, the position of which has been discovered by the enemy, not to change its position in such circumstances but to increase its cover as much as possible, as every new battery position is soon discovered when the enemy's aerial activity is so great. Further, frequent changes of posi- tion, involving new digging-in and the removal of the ammuni- tion during the same night if possible, are beyond the strength of the detachments which has already been taxed by continuous firing. 22. EMPLOYMENT OF " GBEEN CROSS" 1 (GAS) SHELL. The wish expressed in many quarters that the question of firing with "green cross" (gas) shell should be left to the artillery commanders of divisions, with a view to taking better advantage of the tactical situation, could not be acceded to, as the employment of this ammunition depends too much on the nature of the ground and weather conditions, which can only be fully appreciated by experts, and these were all, in the case in question, at the army group headquarters. It is, however, sound, if sufficient field artillery is available, to allot permanently several batteries for the purpose of firing with " green cross " ammunition so as to avoid taking away batteries for firing with it from the divisional artillery com- manders, without previous notice, at a time when their services are being relied on for the execution of other tasks. During the periods when it is not possible to fire with " green cross " ammu- nition (for instance, almost always during the day time), the batteries will be at the disposal of artillery commanders as rein- forcements. According to apparently reliable information, the effect of the " green cross " ammunition was good. 23. BOMB THROWERS AND TRENCH MORTARS. The " Priester " bomb thrower again proved itself to be a very effective weapon in the fighting on the Somme. Trench mortars, at least the light pattern, should be brought up into position at the earliest possible moment, even if the trenches are bad or if there are no trenches at all. They must not be held in reserve for fear of possible losses. 1 The exact nature of this ammunition is not known, but the expres- sion "green cross" probably refers to some form of gas shell. (Trans- lator.) 60 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 24. STRONG POINTS. The preparation for subsequent defense of villages and other strong points afforded by the form of the ground behind the front line can not be begun too soon. Villages Should be divided into sectors for purposes of defense, and should be provided with -garrisons, however small these may be, and machine guns. Supports and reserves must not be quartered in the villages close to the line owing to the particularly heavy shelling to which these are exposed. The boundary of a sector should never run through a village. 25. KETIRED INFANTRY POSITIONS AND SWITCH LINES. The first necessities for retired positions and the extremely important diagonal switch lines are entanglements, dugouts, and communication trenches. The number of these positions should be increased by continual work and by making the fullest possible use of all available forces. It is always possible to dispense with digging the fire trench, which can be comparatively quickly constructed. This point must also be kept in mind from the start when constructing retired positions in quiet sectors. In view of the experience gained the following scheme appears to provide the most practical organization for the construction of retired positions and communication trenches while fighting is in progress : In the front-line area (the rearward limits of which vary according to the circumstances) the work will be done by the divisions. A responsible commander and a party of pioneers, who do not change when the division is relieved, will be allotted to each of these positions, etc., to assist the divisions. The working parties detailed by the divisions will be under the com- mand of officers from those divisions, who are responsible for the quantity of work that is done. Particular conditions may make it necessary to attach working parties to the divisions to prepare positions, the rapid construction of which is of great importance. These must be detailed from troops not intended to take part in the fighting, otherwise they must be provided from the divisional reserves. It is an established principle that any detachment of troops which is holding a position in the rear must work at strengthening it. The supervision of the labor formations working at night re- quires much personnel. It is better to avoid the use of labor GEKMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 61 formations in the construction of positions which, though only occasionally, are under heavy fire. Special officers must be detailed for the construction of posi- tions, etc., required in the area behind the lines. These will be immediately under the orders of the army group or of army headquarters. In order to furnish the necessary labor, pioneer and labor companies must be permanently allotted to them, as well as reliefs of other available troops and the necessary trans- port for bringing up materials. 26. RETIRED ARTILLERY POSITIONS. Experience has shown that the important point in the construc- tion of artillery positions behind the lines is to begin with the construction of observation posts, cable trenches, and communi- cation trenches. Battery positions can be constructed by a bat- tery in one night, if necessary, provided that the materials are available. B. ATTACK. 27. METHOD OF ATTACK AND TIME REQUIRED. Insufficiently prepared attacks and counter attacks nearly al- ways fail through being too hurried. The greatest care must be taken to differentiate between counter attacks, which are undertaken immediately after the loss of a length of trench, or of any other section of ground, with reserves which are on the spot, and those which are ordered by a higher commander and for which the reserves of a higher formation must be brought up. In the latter case the full time necessary for the preparation of the attack and the disposition of troops in the front line is frequently not sufficiently considered. In this respect it is to be noted that the transmission of orders to the front line occupies more time than is often supposed ; the telephone lines are de- stroyed, and messengers can only work their way slowly through the enemy's barrage. Even if the order has reached the front line, it requires some time to circulate it and explain the method of carrying out the attack and its objective to the troops, dis- tributed as they are in groups. Similar difficulties arise in the case of reserves which have been brought up. They advance slowly across country with which they are generally unac- 62 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. quainted, and which lies under heavy fire. The commanders of the reserves have to form an idea of the tactical situation, and for this purpose are obliged to get into communication with commanders already in the front line. This all requires time and creates friction, both of which are increased at night and in country where the view is restricted (village or wood). In the case of counter attacks, which are to be carried out with the aid of strong reserves, a thorough artillery preparation is necessary. This, too, requires time. The experience of the battle of the Somme has again and fully confirmed the long- established principle : A counter attack must either follow immediately, and the deci- sion to counter attack must come from the front line and the forces, for it must be ready to hand before the enemy's attack is entirely finished, or the counter attack must be methodically and thoroughly prepared by the artillery and carried out with reserves who have been instructed as to the tactical situation and the nature of the ground. // counter attacks which, on account of the situation, ought to be methodically prepared are hurried, they cost much blood and ca.use the troops to lose their trust in their leaders if they fail, which nearly always happens in such a case. 28. APPROACH MARCH AND DEPLOYMENT. Before bringing up troops into the zone of the enemy's artil- lery fire, the commander must obtain a clear idea, by means of clever scouts and by his own observation, how the enemy's fire is distributed over the ground to be crossed. When selecting the route, areas which are hardly or not under fire will be taken into consideration rather than the nature of the ground and the cultivation. Depressions and sunken roads which are in- visible to the enemy are, as a rule, under such heavy barrage fire that it is not advisable to make use of them. Villages which lie in the enemy's zone of fire are to be avoided on principle. 29. METHODICAL ATTACK. An advance to the assault with a simultaneous lifting of our own artillery fire has proved extremely successful in the attack. This was also the case when a definite rate of advance for the infantry was settled and our artillery fire was lifted, step by step, in accordance with this, on a prearranged time table. Only GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 63 in cases where the infantry, through lack of practice in this new method of attack, pushed right through, was the progress of the attack checked. 30. ASSAULTING PARTIES. The detailing of assaulting parties in an attack has proved very useful. Their chief advantage lay in the freshness of the specially selected personnel who had not been engaged in pre- vious fighting. The careful training beforehand of the assault- ing parties resulted in these troops proving themselves quite equal to all tasks which fell to their lot in village or wood fight- ing. They felt that they were a body of elite troops, which indeed they proved themselves to be. 31. ATTACKS IN WOODS. When attacking in a wood, it is preferable, instead of the usual skirmish lines following one after the other, to employ small assaulting columns following a single line of Assault. The employment of small Flammenwerfer in wooded country which is full of obstacles and in which there is no extended view suffers in an attack with a distant objective under the disad- vantage of the heavy weight of the apparatus. It is better to use the Flammenwerfer from a well-prepared assaulting position and against well-defined, close objectives which have been pre- viously reconnoitered. The " Priester " bomb throwers have been successfully used to clear out shell holes which could not be reached with hand grenades. 32. PROCEDURE AFTER A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK. In order to be able to entrench rapidly and hold captured ground, carrying and working parties (see also Par. XI, 65) must follow the assaulting troops, under the leadership of ener- getic officers. C. COOPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY. 33. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COMMANDERS. When the corps was put into the battle the units of the troops already engaged were very much mixed. The arrange- ments for artillery command were not sufficiently clear in all cases. 64 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. The bringing up of new divisions had, on account of the tactical situation, to take place as quickly as possible and in the dark. Necessary reliefs and movements of troops were taking place almost daily. Owing to ajl these circumstances and to faulty telephone communications it was very difficult to establish touch between infantry and artillery. In many places it was a long time before touch was obtained, greatly to the disadvantage of our infantry, which was heavily engaged. The greater the difficul- ties in establishing this absolutely necessary touch between infantry and artillery the greater must be the efforts of both sides to secure communication. The best means to this end is for the infantry regimental commander and the artillery group commander to be near each other. If this is impossible their posts must be connected by telephone as soon as possible, in order that there may be continuous exchange of important information. One artillery liaison officer of each of the groups in question (in certain circumstances several groups) must remain continuously with the infantry regimental commander. 34. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE FRONT LINE. The number and position of artillery observation officers (see also Par. IV, A 19) depend on the tactical situation and the ground. They must be connected with the subsector (bat- talion) commanders in front of whose sector their artillery is working, in order to be able to receive and forward rapidly all requests and messages which come from the front line. In an attack artillery observation officers must be sufficiently far forward to be able to observe our own front line continuously. It is not usually sound for them to remain in the foremost firing line. In country with a restricted view,, as was the case in Delville Wood and Longueval village, our own front line could only be seen by the artillery observation officers if they followed immediatey behind the foremost line. There still remain, of course, the difficulties of sending back important messages as rapidly as possible, especially those with reference to shells which fall short and so endanger our own infantry. These difficulties can be overcome by means of signals with light pistols and by orderlies (relays), if proper arrangements are previously made, and the most reliable officers and orderlies (cyclists) are detailed for the responsible task of artillery observation and for the delivery of messages during an attack. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 65 It may nevertheless happen that events on the battle field, especially if the fire is as heavy as that in Delville Wood and Longueval, may prevent important messages from the artillery observers from reaching the fire commander sufficiently quickly. One regiment, therefore, has made the very valuable sugges- tion that artillery information centers should be pushed for- ward as an additional safeguard. Battalions and companies should be informed of the position of these centers, so that the result of their observation and their requests can be sent there as well as to the normal centers. V. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. 35. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS. The existing telephone system proved totally inadequate in consequence of the development which the fighting took. This was aggravated by the division of the sector hitherto held by Stein's army group into two separate army groups, which re- quired the provision of several new lines. The conditions here were, therefore, particularly unfavorable. But in trench war- fare difficult conditions must always be reckoned with in this relation. It is therefore considered necessary to allot a double telephone section to each division to reinforce the corps tele- phone detachment, and to extend the existing lines by means of the stores in reserve, as soon as the division arrives in the front line. The shortage of lines which was discovered to exist reacted most disadvantageously on the communication between the infantry and the artillery, and could only be, by degrees, made good. It is advisable as far as possible to avoid erecting lines through villages, as they are subject to a heavy fire there. If lines start from villages, they should be diverted by the shortest route over open fields in the desired direction. To enable lines which have been damaged by shell fire to be repaired as quickly as possible it has been found useful in prac- tice to establish permanent telephone parties in dugouts along the lines ; it is the duty of these parties to test the lines fre- quently and see that they are in working order. It is most desirable that the staffs of every field artillery regi- ment and Abteilung, as well as those of every foot artillery regiment and foot artillery battalion, should be permanently 29267 18 5 66 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. provided with the larger pattern folding telephone box, so as to avoid the large number of separate boxes otherwise necessary at a regimental, or Abteilung, or battalion command post. These take up room and are difficult to supervise properly. The usual practice of changing telephone apparatus when reliefs were carried out proved to be a source of very marked interruption. It must not take place when the fighting is so severe. The outgoing units should hand over their apparatus to the units which are relieving them. These remarks apply par- ticularly to folding telephone boxes, the removal of which caused considerable interruption in the service. 36. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS. It is desirable that light wireless stations should be allotted to the staffs of infantry regiments and battalions, in order to improve the communications in the front area. They could be formed from the stores in reserve. 37. RUNNERS. Runners and the establishment of relays of runners have proved very useful everywhere. The casualties were compara- tively slight. All important information and orders should always be sent in duplicate. One infantry brigade recommends that 100 meters should be the normal distance between the relay stations of runners in the fire zone. 38. MOTORCYCLES AND BICYCLES. The headquarters of corps, divisions, and brigades must each have two motorcycles from the reserve stores placed at their disposal when they go into the front line. The establishment of motorcycles proved insufficient for the heavy fighting; this deficiency was painfully evident. The establishment of ordi- nary bicycles was also not sufficient for the work to be done. 39. LIGHT-SIGNALING LINES. The existing organization of the light-signaling service does not meet requirements. It is considered urgently necessary that a complete light-signal detachment should be formed in each corps. A total of about 30 signal lamps of medium range is required to enable a signal line to be established for every GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 67 infantry regiment and every artillery group. Besides these, four light-sign'al sections, with apparatus of a greater range, are required to establish long-distance light-signal communica- tions in the divisional sectors. The temporary allotment of light-signaling apparatus from reserve stores can not be con- sidered satisfactory, as the full utilization of this method of communication depends mostly on the signal stations working well together and with their respective command posts. Until this urgent demand can be complied with it is sug- gested that an auxiliary light-signal detachment should be formed in each division by making use of the personnel of the searchlight sections. It was not possible to employ the search- light sections for their proper work in the fighting on the Somme. Good results were obtained by an attached division, which had already formed an auxiliary light-signal detach- ment. Another division of the corps succeeded in forming two auxiliary light-signal stations and in maintaining satisfactory communication over a distance of 12 kilometers by flashes on the horizon, although direct vision was not obtainable. The great value of communication by light-signaling was made doubly clear by the continual interruptions of the telephone communications. 40. LIGHT-PISTOL SIGNALS. The communication between the front line and the artillery for the direction of barrage fire was entirely confined to light- pistol signals. It was found that three light pistols per com- pany are not enough and that the ammunition supply is too small. It is considered necessary that the establishment of light pistols should be at least doubled by additional pistols from the reserve stocks, and that a large supply of ammunition should be provided before units go into the front line. As a result of the difficulties experienced corps headquarters were obliged, when the fourth corps was relieved, to order all the light pistols which were still available, together with their ammunition, to be handed over to its successors, although the light pistols were part of the war establishment. 41. BALLOON AND AEROPLANE OBSERVATION. The means for providing the artillery with aerial observation has proved to be insufficient. It has again been shown, as, indeed, had already been recognized under less difficult condi- 68 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. tions, that it would be a great advantage to add a captive bal- loon and at least two observation aeroplanes to the war estab- lishment of each field artillery brigade (of two regiments). Matters would not be improved by temporarily allotting these important means of obtaining observation, for good results can only be attained by continual cooperation between the observer and the fire commander. The numerical superiority of the enemy's airmen and the fact that their machines were better were made disagreeably appar- ent to us, particularly in their direction of the enemy's artillery fire and in bomb dropping. The English aeroplane observers also made use of sound signals to communicate with their batteries while in the air. It is very likely possible that a rapid means of communication with the batteries can be established in this way ; it might be very serviceable as a complement to wireless messages, which are frequently interrupted. Experiments in this direction are being carried out in the fourth corps. 42. ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES. The number of our battle planes was also too small. The enemy's airmen were often able to fire successfully on our troops with machine guns by descending to a height of a few hundred meters. The German antiaircraft-gun sections could not con- tinue firing at that height without exposing their own troops to serious danger from fragments of shell. This has produced a desire for the antiaircraft defenses to be supplemented by ma- chine guns; these must, if necessary, be supplied from the re- serve stocks. A further lesson to be learned from this surpris- ingly bold procedure on the part of the English airmen is that the infantry make too little use of their rifles as a means of driving off aircraft. The best defensive weapons among the antiaircraft guns were the batteries of four 10-centimeter guns of the foot artillery. The antiaircraft guns mounted on motor cars are considered less useful for the present conditions of fighting than the sta- tionary guns, as they continually require new telephone con- nections with the antiaircraft telephone exchange system as they alter their positions. It has already been found necessary, even in quiet sectors, to fit up some field-gun sections as auxiliary antiaircraft defenses, GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAI STUDIES. 69 to supplement the regular antiaircraft-gun sections. This was still more necessary in the battle of the Somme. It is desirable that at least one battery of each field artillery brigade should be equipped with guns mounted on light field-howitzer carriages, so as to have guns at hand which can be quickly employed either for antiaircraft purposes or for forming a barrage. To make these guns still more useful for defense against aircraft, it is also desirable that each field artillery brigade be equipped with portable antiaircraft mountings (pivots) for two antiaircraft- gun sections. It would be possible to arrange for the transport of these mountings by the light-ammunition column, on two- wheeled trailers. 43. SPECIAL KEPOBTING DETACHMENTS. In consequence of the comparative slowness with which re- ports from the front-line trenches reach the higher commanders, When sent by the usual channels, it has been found necessary for commanders to make arrangements independent of these channels, and to keep themselves informed by their own agents of the course of the fighting. For this purpose the most prac- tical method is the employment of so-called " spy troops " (spah trupps) as well as the orderly officers who go forward from time to time. These special reporting detachments consist of one officer and a few picked noncommissioned officers and men, equipped with infantry telephone apparatus, to connect up with existing lines. They should choose their own position so that they can observe any particular sector in which fighting is tak- ing place. Their duty is to insure that reports on the progress of the fighting reach the commander by whom they have been sent out, as quickly as possible, by means of a combined system of telephones and runners. To enable these detachments to work successfully in action, they should be formed in the divisions during quiet periods and be thoroughly trained in the duties which they have to perform. VI. ARMS. 44. SMALL ARMS. Numerous complaints have been received of rifle breech ac- tions being completely clogged with dirt both in attack and defense. It is therefore advisable to fit a cover over the breech 70 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. of the rifles, like that used in the English Army, which can be easily unfastened and then hangs from the rifle. The 1908 pattern pistol has proved to be a very useful weapon for hand-to-hand fighting in villages and woods. It is also recommended by several units as a useful weapon for machine- gun detachments in close fighting. One field-artillery regiment recommends the adoption of the new pattern sword bayonet with saw edge, which has already been experimentally adopted for mounted troops. Automatic rifles (musketen) are stated to be useful weapons for trench warfare. 45. MACHINE GUNS. Machine guns usually have to be brought up over open ground under a heavy barrage. The great weight of the gun has again proved to be a serious disadvantage under these conditions. Even if the gun is dismounted, it is very difficult to drag up the heavy sledge over ground which is under fire. All regiments are unanimous in recommending the introduction of a lighter form of gun carriage, modeled on that of the improvised gun carriage used by the machine-gun marksman sections. One regiment has obtained good results with a gun carriage of its own invention, which is even lighter. Complaints have also been received that the ammunition boxes and water jackets of the machine guns are too heavy. It is proposed that the lighter boxes and jackets used by the machine- gun marksman sections should be generally adopted. The wheels of the machine-gun hand carriages, used by the marksman sections, are not strong enough for paved roads, so that these carriages are not adapted for use on the march, but they have proved suitable for bringing the machine guns into action, and very useful for the transport of ammunition, rations, and wounded. Spare parts for machine guns must be kept in readiness in large quantities behind the front line, so that they can be brought up to the troops quickly if required. 46. HAND GRENADES. The hand grenade was the most important infantry weapon both in attack and defense. It is universally suggested that the supply of hand grenades should be increased. If it is possible to insure a supply of different kinds of hand grenades, the gen- GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 71 eral opinion is in favor of the use of " ball " and " egg " grenades for attack, despite their small effect, in preference to cylindrical grenades with handles, as a larger supply of the two former can be taken into action. It would appear advisable to use only one kind of hand gre- nade. This would simplify training in the use of hand grenades. In fighting such as we have had on the Somine defense and attack continually alternate. It is not always possible to bring up sufficient quantities of the particular hand grenade which is best suited to the conditions of the fighting at the moment, but as the cylindrical grenade with handle is on the whole the most effective it is recommended that this pattern should be universally adopted. 47. GUNS. The guns of the field artillery proved on the whole to be thor- oughly satisfactory. Their failure was usually due to the am- munition, or to the fact that the number of rounds fired was greater than the life of a tube permits. Jams were frequently experienced with field guns. These were due to steel cartridge cases (manufacturer's mark A. E. G.) and brass cartridge cases with steel base ( Sp : 61 ). These cartridges often jammed when the breech was opened and could only be removed by the use of the rammer. The rate of fire was in consequence con- siderably reduced. Repeated forcible opening also damages the breech. It is true that many jams may have been due to the fact that the necessary care in the storing and handling of ammuni- tion could not be observed under the conditions which existed on the Somme. The buffer proved to be the weakest point of the howitzer. The leather washers burn through and the glycerin runs out. The bad working of the buffer affects the sides of the carriage, which are rather weak, so that damage easily occurs. VII. AMMUNITION. 48. VARIOUS KINDS OF AMMUNITION. A supply of good ammunition of even quality and character is an absolute necessity for rapid preparation for action, a high rate of fire, and accurate shooting, particularly if a barrage is to be placed close in front of our infantry. 72 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. The long shell of the light field howitzer was supplied with five different fuses, of which two kinds had to be fired with safety precautions. Fresh registration or ranging is required when a change is made from one ammunition to another. At critical moments, or in the dark, it is not possible to ascertain with what kind of fuse every shell is fitted. This ammunition besides is supplied without shell baskets. It is therefore diffi- cult, and takes time, to bring the reserves of long shell up to the guns. The old pattern of field-gun ammunition has proved efficient. The use of the " green cross " l ammunition is very hard on the guns, for in consequence of the limited possibilities of using it, a great quantity of ammunition has to be expended in a short time. For example, a light field howitzer battery fired over 3,500 rounds of this ammunition in 24 hours. 49. EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION. The average daily expenditure of ammunition per gun during the whole period of the fighting was : Rounds. (Field) guns 145 Light field howitzers 170 Heavy field howitzers 119 10-cm. guns 118 (21-cm.) mortars 51 The small expenditure of (field) gun ammunition is to be attributed to the small supplies available. Instructions had to be issued to the troops to be economical with (field) gun shell. The highest daily average expenditure per gun reached during the period of fighting in the army group for the different kinds of guns was : Rounds. (Field) guns 322 Light field howitzers 479 Heavy field howitzers _ 233 10-cm. guns ._ 321 (21-cm.) mortal's _ 116 1 The exact nature of this ammunition is not known, but the expres- sion " green cross " probably refers to some kind of gas shell. (Translator.) GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 73 The following quantity of ammunition is considered necessary : Battery. In the bat- tery posi- tion. In reserve with the division. In reserve with the corps. (Field) guns Rounds. 2,200 Rounds. 500 Rounds. 2,200 Light field howitzers . . . 2,200 600 2,200 Heavy field howitzers. 1,400 300 1,400 10-cm. guns 1,600 400 1,600 (21-cm.) mortars (2 mortars) ... . 300 80 300 Large quantities of ammunition can only be provided near the battery by extensive distribution in the surrounding country. Carrying ammunition over long distances by men must be avoided, as their endurance is fully taxed day and night by firing and entrenching. The more ammunition is collected near the battery position, the more will be exploded by being hit. Another result of storing large quantities of ammunition in the battery position is that on changing position a large part of it must be left behind in the old position, the subsequent removal of which, if, indeed, this is possible, can only be accomplished with the greatest difficulty. 50. AMMUNITION SUPPLY. The supply of artillery ammunition of all kinds during the first days of the battle did not equal the great expenditure. Reserve supplies were only available in very small quantities. On July 14 an English attack took place which necessitated a great expenditure of ammunition. It was impossible to re- plenish the supply in the battery positions from the ammuni- tion brought up by the L. of C., or from the ammunition depots of the army groups, to such an extent as to insure that the requirements for the next day would be met. The army group was compelled to ask for ammunition from Stein's army group, and this had to be partly brought up by night, under difficult conditions, from the advanced ammunition depots of the two divisions nearest to the army group in the north. From July 15 onward the supply of ammunition was better. The amount sent up to the batteries was made up by supplies from the L. Of C. in such quantities that, as a general rule, the amount of ammunition laid down in paragraph 49 as being 74 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. necessary in the battery positions and in reserve with the divisions was always available. The army group was also able to collect gradually a small reserve of ammunition (exclusively field-gun ammunition), but the supply was never sufficient to make good the expenditure in the event of the railway being blocked for one or two days. The lack of gun ammunition was always felt, and large reserves were never available. It is true that army headquarters always succeeded in bringing up the gun ammunition trains quickly and sending the ammunition from these trains to the battery positions, but a block on the railway might have had serious consequences. It is absolutely necessary to place so much ammunition at the disposal of the army groups that the above-mentioned " iron rations " are available in the battery positions and in the divisional and corps ammunition depots. The supply of ammunition was arranged for by corps head- quarters* as far as the corps and divisional depots. Motor lorries, artillery ammunition columns, and infantry ammu- nition columns, supply parks, and supply columns equipped with heavy country carts, were all tinder one organization. As soon as the arrival of the trains was announced the columns were despatched to the detraining stations. The means of transport were sufficient. The divisions had at their disposal the battery and light ammunition columns, one supply park or supply column, and in some cases a foot artillery ammuni- tion column as well. Motor lorry columns have been very efficient and have car- ried out their duties very satisfactorily. The allotment of the country carts to the columns, which were used as a temporary measure to bring up artillery ammunition, proved a practical arrangement. There should be ammunition depots for a large quantity of ammunition close to the detraining stations. In addition, light railways are required from the detraining stations to the depots. These were not provided, and consequently a large quantity of ammunition was piled up along the railway lines immediately beside the detraining station. VIII. ENGINEER STORES. 51. PIONEER PARK DETACHMENT. A pioneer park detachment must be available in every corps to take over the management of the parks and the supply of GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 75 engineer stores as soon as the corps is moved into a new posi- tion. Until an establishment for it is approved the detachment must consist of troops drawn from the corps, but it must be formed before the corps takes up its new position. The pioneer commander must have a suitable officer at his disposal, who will be in charge of the supply of stores ; he should not, if pos- sible, be on the establishment of any pioneer unit. The park detachment must be sent to its sphere of action as soon as the employment of the corps is decided upon. In the interest of the troops only specialists should be attached to it. The officer in charge of the supply of stores must be able to move about, so that he can take personal action quickly should blocks occur. A small motor car should, therefore, be allotted to him. 52. PIONEER PARKS AND THE SUPPLY OF ENGINEER STORES. A special pioneer railhead for pioneer stores must be pro- vided. In order to facilitate supervision and traffic, ammuni- tion and food supplies should not be unloaded at this station if possible. Entire trains loaded with pioneer stores must be brought up to insure an ample supply. This will also obviate the necessity of shunting at the stations in the zone of opera- tions. To enable him to send pioneer stores quickly up to the parks, the officer in charge of stores must have sufficient transport at his disposal ; motor lorries from the reserve depots are most suitable. Each divisional pioneer park must have half a motor lorry column at its disposal. Horse-drawn vehicles are only to be used in cases of emergency, owing to their limited capacity and speed. In front of the divisional pioneer parks small regimental parks containing pioneer stores, rations, and the most important articles of equipment must be pushed forward for the battle and established in convenient positions, distributed along the front immediately behind the trenches. The farther forward these regimental parks are the better for the fighting troops who have to fetch their material from them. They should be under the supervision of officers or senior noncommissioned officers. It is the duty of the regimental store officers to see that the parks are constantly kept filled. 76 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. IX. CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. 53. STEEL HELMETS. The steel helmets, issued immediately before and during the battle, gained a great reputation among the troops in a very short time. It is considered desirable to equip artillery ob- servers and antiaircraft posts with steel helmets. 54. JACKETS AND FOOTGEAE. Owing to the fact that the buttons down the front of officers' jackets are now covered up it is impossible to attach field glasses and pocket torches to them. For the assaulting parties lace boots and puttees proved satisfactory. 55. PACKS. Generally speaking, the knapsack has proved superfluous in such critical fighting, both in defense and attack. The fighting kit is sufficient. A sandbag converted into a knapsack, in addi- tion to the haversack and jacket and trouser pockets, has proved useful for taking a larger amount of supplies into the fighting line. 56. WATER BOTTLES. It has been found necessary during hard fighting to supply infantry with large tin water bottles (capable of being slung) from the reserve depots, in order to carry a double supply of water, as infantry fighting in the front line suffers more from thirst than from hunger. 57. ENTRENCHING TOOLS. Repeated requests from all arms for an increased supply of entrenching tools must be met by their provision from the reserve depots behind the battle sector. 58. HAND STEREOTELESCOPES. It is very desirable that the troops be supplied with hand stereotelescopes as they are easy to carry and are therefore more convenient than stereotelescopes or semistereotelescopes for observers during heavy fighting. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 77 59. MAPS. The original supply of maps was insufficient, not only as regards quantity but also as regards detail. The latter was particularly apparent owing to the fact that during the un- favorable conditions for observing which prevailed firing had at first to be carried out chiefly by the map. Even if it could not be expected that all the numerous battery positions (which in comparison to the original front in June are well behind the line) could not be reconnoitered and fixed beforehand it would nevertheless have been of advantage if a large number of points on the ground in question had been fixed and in- serted on the map. The subsequent supply of maps was also inadequate. 60. ILLUMINATING MATERIAL. Arrangements can be made for the troops to have at their disposal a sufficient supply of illuminating material by the issue of a certain quantity from the reserve supply of paraffin, lights, and spare batteries for electric pocket lamps. For the artillery, illumination is absolutely essential when firing at night to enable it to distinguish the reference points, to set fuses, etc. X. HORSES AND VEHICLES. 61. HORSES AND VEHICLES. The horses have stood their strenuous exertions comparatively well. This may be attributed to the fact that oats were avail- able in considerable quantities. The supply of horses and vehicles to the troops has reached the utmost limits owing, on the one hand, to the permanent re- duction in the establishment of horses, and, on the other hand, to the permanent increase in fighting material and articles of equipment. For bringing up trench material and sending forward food and ammunition at times when there are heavy demands for transport, it is very desirable that divisions should be allotted motor lorries and sections of horse-drawn columns from the reserve supply. In the case of machine guns the absence of spare horses, which had been struck off the establishment, was badly felt. In one 78 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. machine-gun company all the riding horses, including that of the company commander, had, owing to the lack of spare horses, to be used as draught horses. XI. FOOD SUPPLY. 62. RATIONS. It is necessary that fresh troops -going into the line, when the precise state of the battle is uncertain, should be supplied with the third iron ration. All troops were unanimous in their request for increased supplies of bread, rusks, sausage, tinned sausages, tinned fat, bacon, tinned and smoked meat, and to- bacco, in addition. There was also urgent need for solidified alcohol for the preparation of hot meals. In various quarters the necessity for a plentiful supply of liquid refreshments of all kinds, such as coffee, tea, cocoa, mineral waters, etc., is emphasized still more. On the other hand, the supply of salt herrings, which increase the thirst, was found to be, as a general rule, very undesirable. There is no necessity for an issue of alcoholic drink in warm and dry weather. Similar requests for improved rations, suited to the prevailing conditions, when in position, were made by the artillery. 63. CANTEEN STORES. The fact that individual batteries of a field artillery Abteilung are often, for tactical reasons, some little distance apart, and the supply wagons are engaged in bringing up rations, has the result that the field artillery is in a less favorable position than the infantry as regards the supply of canteen stores, which are carried on the supply wagons of the Abteilung staffs. A large number of other units, by regulation, carry no canteen stores with them and have to depend upon the friendly assistance of other troops. It is therefore necessary, on principle, that in- fantry units should allow the sale of canteen goods to artillery units, etc. 64. RATION SUPPLY. No special difficulties arose. The supply columns proved sufficient. The corps arranged for rations to be brought up to the divisional depots. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 79 65. CARRYING UP RATIONS. The formation of carrying parties (see- also Par. IV, B 32) was of great use in bringing up rations and also in supplying troops with ammunition and stores. Wherever infantry pioneer companies were not used for this purpose these carrying parties were formed within companies ; this has the advantage of the feeling of cameraderie which prevails between such carrying parties and their fighting troops. During a battle it is advisable to provide each battery with four " food carriers " from the reserve supplies. XII. MEDICAL SERVICES. 66. BELIEFS. The medical units of the corps went into the line with the divisions. The reliefs necessitated by this proved very useful, and this arrangement is preferable to taking over medical units already in the line and belonging to other corps, when the latter are relieved. The duties of the medical services during continuous fighting in trench warfare are so strenuous that the medical personnel urgently requires relief at the same time as the troops. Furthermore, the medical personnel takes greater pleasure in its difficult task and carries it out with more devo- tion if it is assisting the formation to which it belongs. The relief of a field ambulance presents, it is true, many difficulties. It is best for the incoming personnel to arrive in the morning and for the outgoing personnel to leave during the afternoon of the same day. Should both parties be spending the night in the same place, the outgoing personnel must, if necessary, bivouac, in order that the quarters may be at the dis- posal of the personnel on duty. t!7. MOTOR AMBULANCES. The attaching of a motor-ambulance column to the army group proved itself very useful. In this connection it was found suffi- cient to place only a small proportion of the cars at the dis- posal of the casualty clearing stations (Hauptverbandplatze). The majority must be kept together, so as to have a supply of cars available for use wherever they are most needed for the moment. This motor-ambulance reserve was principally used to transport cases to hospital trains. 80 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 68. STRETCHER BEARERS. It was of great advantage that before the corps was sent into line 50 stretcher bearers had been trained in each of the divi- sional field recruit depots, and were still there at the time the corps went in. The great demand for stretcher bearers, which was universal, was in this way met to a certain extent. 69. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MEDICAL UNITS. Telephone communications also assumed great importance in consequence of the wide distribution of the medical arrange- ments. It is desirable that the regulations should point out the importance of having ample telephone communications between all the various medical units in the line, so that these are not neglected until all the other telephone communications have been provided. XIII. BILLETING AND TRAFFIC BEHIND THE FRONT. 70. BILLETING. Owing to troops in the front line being constantly relieved, a frequent change of town majors was necessary. In the case of extensive billeting, difficulties occurred owing to town majors having first to acquaint themselves with the billeting conditions whenever troops moved in, and, further, agricultural products, special buildings, and orders in force could not be properly handed over. Permanent town majors must be appointed for villages in the areas in which the columns and trains are work- ing and in the rear portions of the divisional billeting areas. At times, when there is no great activity at the front, arrange- ments must be made for the construction of large wooden sheds in the back areas to accommodate men and horses. 71. MILITARY POLICE. The police service behind the front is of the utmost impor- tance. During any protracted fighting, men of sufficient au- thority and energy should be posted on all roads leading to the rear from the battle zone. Points of concentration for suspects should be arranged by the divisions as close as possible to the dressing stations and casualty clearing stations. In the villages behind the fighting line not only should there be a strict control GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 81 on all exits but an internal control should also be inaugurated. Detailed regulations should be issued by the town major, who will appoint sergeant majors and other personnel for carrying out this service. 72. ROAD TRAFFIC. Regulation of traffic on all roads is the duty of the field mounted police, assisted by cavalry. Each division should have at least one through road allotted to it whenever possible. XIV. RAILWAYS. 73. RAILWAY BUILDINGS. The fighting front of the army group Stein (later Armin) was at first dependent on the railway station at Bapaume for the whole of its supplies. This station was complete and well con- structed. During the first days of the operations the railway buildings came under fire, trains could only run into Bapaume during the night, and the detraining station could no longer be used. The stations under construction further to the rear were not yet complete. In addition to the detraining stations required in normal times, well-constructed detraining stations must be provided so far back that even if the first or second line has to be abandoned the enemy's artillery will not be able to shell them (about 13 kilometers). Even in quiet times all railway construction must be carried out from this point of view, taking into consideration the fact that during operations on a large scale at least three times the usual number of men must be provided for. The wish expressed by the troops that railways should be provided to facilitate the transport of material to the front-line trenches, and that the pioneer depots, sawmills, etc., which in normal times are close to the front, should be connected by railways is easily under- stood. On no account, however, should comprehensive railway establishments further in rear be neglected; during the battle period these insure supplies, although during quiet periods their importance is not so apparent. All such railway stations must be provided with long sidings for ammunition, pioneer, supply, and hospital trains. In addi- tion, each siding will be provided with good roads to and from it and good dumping places. 29267 18 6 82 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 74. DETRAINING PERSONNEL. During important operations the detraining personnel must be permanent. The changes in commanders and men detailed from the front for this duty caused by the continual reliefs of the fighting troops had a very disturbing effect, and every one of these men is urgently required in the front line. The work at the detraining stations requires a staff with knowledge of local conditions, under the leadership of an experienced and ener- getic official. Insufficient staff is the cause of slow detraining, congestion at the stations, and blocks in the traffic along the whole section of the line. One officer provided with a motor car must be made responsible for the whole of the detraining arrangements. (Signed) SIXT v. ARMIN, General Officer Commanding. IV. LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME By STEIN'S GROUP 1 1 General von Stein (commander of the Fourteenth Reserve Corps) was actually in com- mand of all the German troops between Monchy and the Somme at the beginning of the allied offensive. 83 CONTENTS. 1. Construction of trenches: Page. First line position 87 Obstacles 88 Dugouts 88 2. Method of holding the position ! 88 3. Strength of garrison 89 4. Reserves 89 Position 89 Strength 90 5. Machine guns 90 Siting 90 Employment 90 6. Effect of British artillery 91 7. Communications 91 Buried cables 91 Efficiency of telephone system 91 Methods recommended 92 Buried telephone cable 92 Light signaling 92 Wireless 92 Carrier pigeons 93 8. Signals for barrage fire 93 9. Construction of battery positions. 93 Gun emplacements 93 Accommodation for men and ammunition 93 10. Artillery ammunition supply 94 Quantity in battery positions 94 Corps reserve 94 Average daily expenditure 94 Highest expenditure 95 Quantity which should be maintained in the battery- positions 95 Gas shell, effect of 95 11. Widths of zones of barrage fire 95 84 CONTENTS. 85 Page. 12. Employment of aeroplanes, with special reference to their cooperation with artillery 96 Establishment recommended 96 13. Food supply 96 14. Medical services 97 Dressing station 97 Halting places for ambulance vehicles 97 Main dressing stations 97 Collecting stations for slightly wounded 97 Field hospitals 98 Ambulance sections 98 15. British tactics 98 Infantry, machine guns and trench mortars , 98 Artillery 99 Gas and smoke clouds. . . 99 IV. LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME. To First Army Headquarters: Herewith replies to the questions raised in the memorandum from Gallwitz's army group. 1. Have the principles on which the construction of trenches has been carried out up to date proved to be sound, par- ticularly as regards entanglements, the depth and dimen- sions of mined dugouts, and the nature and size of the entrances to dugouts? The following orders were issued by corps headquarters : " The first-line position will be held if the enemy attacks. It must therefore be repaired immediately before any other work is undertaken. It consists of the first, second, and third trenches, and should have, if possible, two rows of wire entanglement in front of each trench. There should be at least two communica- tion trenches in each company sector from the third trench to the first trench, but the points at which they enter and leave the second trench should not be opposite one another. The number of dugouts should be increased until there are suffi- cient to accommodate the infantry garrison which the division considers necessary for the repulse of a prepared attack. "Accommodation should be provided first of all for the pres- ent garrison and supports in the first trench and for the present sector reserves in the second and third trenches. Further con- struction may then be taken in hand. Each battalion sector must have at least two through communication trenches. ***** "The intermediate and second-line positions consist of at least two trenches, each provided with two rows of wire en- tanglements, which should be on pickets, and the same number of communication trenches as in the first-line position. Each of 87 88 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. the present regimental sectors must be provided with sufficient accommodation for at least one battalion. " In view of the heavy guns which the enemy is employing, the thickness of earth above dugouts should be increased for any new ones that are constructed. It may be as much as 19J feet, depending on the nature of the soil, but the depth below ground must not prevent a quick response to an alarm. All dugouts must have at least two entrances. Dugouts should be constructed under the parapet, not under the parados, and the entrances should be in the front slope of the trench." These principles have on the whole proved sound. Partly owing to the increase in the number and effect of the enemy's heavy artillery, the following alterations are suggested : Obstacles. There should be two or three rows of wire en- tanglement, each from 3 to 5 yards deep, with an interval of from 5^ to 11 yards between each, this interval being provided with trip wires. The outer edge of the farthest entanglement should be about 55 yards from the trench. The wire should not always run parallel with the trench, but should follow the lie of the ground. Dugouts. The thickness of earth overhead should be from 23 to 26 feet, and more in the case of command posts and the dugcJuts for the medical services, telephones, and kitchens. The dugouts for the men should have sufficient accommodation for two groups (i. e., 16 men), with two entrances separated by a traverse. Several dugouts should be connected up to form corridor dugouts with accommodation for a platoon. The dug- out recesses should be on the same side as the entrances not facing them. Entrances should be 4 feet by 5J feet, and should be well stayed and braced to increase their power of resistance. Inclined galleries offer more resistance than frames built in on steps one below the other. 2. What were the garrisons of first, second, and third trenches and of the retired positions? The following orders were issued by corps headquarters : "The garrison of the first trench of the first-line position should be strong enough to repulse the enemy's attack, assum- ing that the men reach the parapet in time, but no stronger. " The second trench of the first-line position- is garrisoned by the supports, one portion of which is specially detailed to de- fend the entrances to the communication trenches, while the other portion consists of strong specially formed bombing parties, GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 89 which are held in readiness to rush forward at ouce to the support of the foremost trench. This maneuver must be prac- ticed as if it were a regular drill. Local conditions may make it necessary to station part of the support in the third trench. " The fighting strength of both the front trenches would soon be exhausted if the sector reserves were not put in. These must therefore be brought close up in good time, either into the third trench or into special reserve trenches. In case of an at- tack they should be moved forward into the second (or third) trench to replace the reinforcements which have already gone forward (the supports) and continue the task allotted to the latter." The method in which the trenches were occupied on the morning of July 1 is shown on the attached 1/80,000 map. (Not attached. ) From this it will be seen that the first-line and intermediate positions were occupied by the regiments holding the foremost line. Where the line ran more or less straight the companies were organized in depth, so that part were in the first trench, part in the second, and sometimes even in the third. The bat- talion reserves were in the third trench, the regimental reserves in the intermediate position. 3. Did the garrison prove to be too strong or too weak? Most regimental sectors were too wide. The width of front held by an infantry regiment which has to resist a hostile attack prepared by heavy artillery fire should not exceed 1,300 yards, so that the regiment can be organized for action in depth. It is, as a rule, sufficient to have one man to every 2 to 3 yards as an emergency garrison in the first trench. 4. Where were the reserves, and were they strong enough? Were the complete units held in reserve posted in the villages or in the trenches? The positions of the reserves are marked on the attached 1/80,000 map. (Not attached.) The following orders were issued by corps headquarters : " The sectojr commander must be relieved of anxiety as to his forces being exhausted too soon by moving up the divisional reserves. They should not be left behind in villages in the rear, but should be brought up to reserve trenches on the battle field as soon as the threatened sector can be ascertained from the direction of the enemy's artillery fire. Whether they stay there one day or several days is a matter of indifference. 90 QEKMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. "In critical situations it is not sound to quarter reserves in villages immediately behind the front. It has nearly always proved impossible to assemble the troops quickly when they were scattered in numerous cellars, etc., in a village which was being heavily shelled. In such cases the reserves should be in the trenches." In accordance with these orders, the greater part of the divi- sional reserves was stationed on the second-line position. In cases where, owing to the shortage of working parties, there were not enough dugouts in the second-line position, a small part of these reserves was obliged to remain in villages beyond the principal zone of fire. In the case of the second guard reserve division, the tactical situation made it possible to retain a battalion in the huts at the Bois de Logeast. The reserves for the 28th Reserve Division and 12th Division were not sufficient. In the case of the 12th Division, they con- sisted, on the evening of June 30, of troops which had been with- drawn from the first-line position because the divisional com- mander considered that they had been badly shaken by artillery fire. The corps reserves consisted, on the morning of July 1, of the 16th Bavarian Infantry Regiment, four squadrons of dis- mounted cavalry, and the Wiirttemberg Cyclist Company. These were too weak. To be able to meet all possible situations, two complete divisions would have been necessary, one of which should have been in and near Bapaume and the other south of that place. 5. How can our machine guns be most effectively placed and employed? For instance, on commanding points, firing from trees (raised platforms). The following orders were issued by Corps headquarters : " When the ground permits of machine guns being employed on commanding points in the second and third trenches, with a view to firing over the first trench, every advantage should be taken of it. It is advisable to employ the bulk of the machine guns not in, but behind, the first trench. When fixing their siting the possibility of delivering both frontal and flanking fire must not be forgotten. " Used as an emergency garrison for the intermediate or second-line position, they may prevent a break through if the enemy succeeds in overrunning the first-line position. " Machine-gun units are particularly suitable for employ- ment as a commander's mobile reserve. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 91 " Machine guns which are left in breastworks or trenches dur- ing the enemy's intensive bombardment will be destroyed unless they are covered by very strong concrete emplacements. It will generally be impossible to erect such concrete structures in the first trench. Machine guns must, as a rule, be kept in the dug- outs of their crews until the enemy assaults, and must then be placed rapidly in position at suitable points on the parapet, without making use of the sledges, as these are too heavy for trench warfare." No alterations are necessary in these orders. The effect of the machine guns and the surprise of the English at finding so many intact machine guns after a seven days' artillery prepara- tion, as ascertained from numerous prisoners' statements, are well known. No machine guns were placed in trees. 6. What nature of the enemy's guns, trench mortars, and projectiles caused the largest number of casualties, and what caused the most damage to the trenches? The largest number of casualties was caused by artillery fire (H. E. shell and shrapnel up to 12 centimeters, i. e., 4.7 inches). The trenches were damaged most by heavy trench mortar projectiles ; next to these, heavy shell from 15 centimeter (6 inch), upwards caused the most destruction. 7. Was communication maintained between the front line and battalion and regimental battle headquarters? What means were employed? Have you any proposals? The following orders were issued by corps headquarters: " Buried cables have proved very successful in the reserve corps. When crossing the open they are buried to a depth of at least 5f feet, and in trenches they are laid at least 2J feet below the surface of the sole of the trench. When laying new lines, a greater depth is advisable (6 feet and 3| feet). Further, when cables are led into dugouts, command posts, etc., they must be laid underground." In the sectors which had been prepared by the 12th Division from Mametz to the Somme, the lines were for the most part laid above ground. On 26-6-16 the corps reported to army headquarters in its morning report: "The telephone communications on the old front of the re- serve corps have proved reliable. In the Mametz sector, which 92 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. has just been taken over, and in the 12th Division they are conspicuously bad." On 30-6-16 the telephone communications in the 2d Guard Reserve Division, 52d Division, and 26th Reserve Division were still, on the whole, good. In the Thiepval sector, which was particularly heavily shelled by the enemy's heavy artillery, communication between battalions and companies had to be maintained by means of runners. In the 110th and lllth Reserve Regiments of the 28th Reserve Division, which were also much shelled by heavy artillery (9.2 inch), it was possible to make uninterrupted use of the telephones on the buried cable lines in the first-line position and in the artillery posi- tion. The lines between the artillery and the infantry were, in the course of time, entirely destroyed. In the sector of the 109th Reserve Regiment and 62d Regiment telephone communication ceased almost entirely by 25-6-16, while in the sector of the 63d Regiment much damage was caused a little later. On 30-6-16 runners took the place of telephone communication in all three regimental sectors of the left wing. Proposals. Exposed telephone lines should be laid only far behind the front line; if possible, never in front of the third- line position ; even in rear of this position they should be re- placed by buried cable in those villages which, on account of the proximity of a railway station, etc., are liable to bombard- ment by heavy artillery. In front of the third-line position buried cable (armored cable) should be laid at a depth of 10 feet across open country and 5 to 6i feet when beneath the sole of a trench provided with trench boards. The construc- tion of the cable trenches must be concealed as much as possi- ble from the enemy (work to be carried out by night or in misty weather, and trenches covered up so as to conceal them from aeroplane observation). The routes of the cable trenches must be marked on the ground by stone slabs and recorded on maps which can be given to the repair detachments. Telephone communications alone, however carefully they may be constructed, are not sufficient. Several means of com- munication must always be available. At many points on the front the light-signaling stations have proved very successful. Small wireless stations are said to be under trial. No information as to the result of these experi- ments is yet available. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 93 Carrier pigeons and communication by means of aeroplanes are also said to have been effective at other points on the western front. The Fourteenth Reserve Corps has not had sufficient experience with these. When all others fail, the runner still remains as the last means of communication. Numerous runners must be trained to know the ground. Dugouts should be constructed at inter- vals along the routes used. Runners should never be sent out singly. 8. Have the signals for requesting barrage fire proved ef- fective? The barrage fire signals have proved effective. The light- signals should always be followed, immediately if possible, by detailed reports by telephone from the front line to the artil- lery group commanders. Better arrangements should be made for the supply (of signal lights). The English imitated our barrage fire signals. To meet such eventualities, an ample supply of a different kind of signal should be available in the Army, or better still with the corps, so that the signal can be changed immediately. 9. Has the construction of the battery positions proved satis- factory? What is the best method of storing the reserve of ammunition with the batteries? The gun emplacements should be covered in with concrete overhead cover only if the latter is sufficiently thick to keep out 9.2-inch shells. Weaker concrete cover is harmful, as the damage to the guns is thereby increased if he concrete is penetrated, and buried guns take longer to extricate. Further, it requires a very long time to repair concrete emplacements. If it is not possible to protect the gun emplacements against shell of the largest calibers by providing concrete of sufficient thickness or strong cover of logs dogged together, it is better to put up with splinter-proof cover (without concrete). This will be the most usual form of cover. To guard against the incendiary effect of shell, very little timber should be used for concealing gun emplacements ; if used, it should *be covered with sheet iron or painted with asbestos paint. Gun detachments and ammunition should be accommodated in and close to (50-100 meters) the batteries, in dugouts pro- vided with at least 23 feet of earth cover. The ammunition 94 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. dugouts situated close to the batteries should be connected with the latter by blinded trenches or by mined galleries. 10. Were the supplies of ammunition sufficient? What re- sults were obtained with T-shell (lachrymatory gas shell)? The supplies of ammunition on 24-6-16 consisted of 1. The ammunition stored in the battery positions. 2. The ammunition in the divisional columns. 3. The corps reserve in columns or in depots. The quantities stored in the battery positions were: For a field gun battery, 2,400 rounds. For a light field howitzer battery, 2,000 rounds. For a heavy field howitzer battery, 1,200 rounds and 300 T gas shell. For each (21 cm.) mortar, 220 rounds. The light ammunition columns of the field artillery were full, the battery columns for the heavy field howitzers each contained an average of 300 rounds, and the battery columns for the (21 cm.) mortars were almost empty. The corps reserve consisted of: 25,000 rounds for field guns. 3,750 rounds for light field howitzers. 1,200 rounds for heavy field howitzers. 750 rounds for (21 cm.) mortars. The average daily expenditure during the artillery duel from the 24th to the 30th of June amounted to For a field-gun battery, 1,500 rounds. For a light field-howitzer battery, 1,050 rounds. For a heavy field-howitzer battery, 520 rounds. For each (21 cm.) mortar, 100 rounds. On July 1, the day of the infantry attack, the average ex- penditure was : For a field-gun battery, 2,270 rounds. For a light field-howitzer battery, 1,800 rounds. For a heavy field-howitzer battery. 940 rounds. For each (21 cm.) mortar, 200 rounds. The quantities stored in the battery positions conseqxiently sufficed to meet the average expenditure. There are, how- ever, occasions which involve a specially high expenditure by individual batteries; for instance, individual batteries on indi- vidual days fired: GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 95 Field-gun battery, over 4,500 rounds. Light field-howitzer battery, over 3,000 rounds. Heavy field-howitzer battery, over 1,200 rounds. A single (21 cm.) mortar, over 250 rounds. Although it is probably not possible to raise the " iron ration " of the field-gun batteries as high as 4,500 rounds, nevertheless the figures for the highest expenditure show that the average expenditure should not be taken as a basis for determining this " iron ration." Consequently, it is considered essential that the following amounts should be maintained in the battery positions: For a field-gun battery, 3,000 to 3,500 rounds. For a light field-howitzer battery, 3,000 rounds. For a heavy field-howitzer battery, 1,500 rounds and 300 T gas shell. For each (21 cm.) mortar, 250 rounds. Batteries to which ammunition can be brought up by day can manage with a smaller "iron ration." As the supplies were brought up in good time, no serious want of ammunition was felt. It is considered essential that the whole of the divisional columns be kept filled. The corps reserve must be regulated in accordance with the facilities for bringing up supplies from the army to the corps. If these had not been good as regards the Fourteeth Reserve Corps (some of the ammunition trains were able to run beyond Bapaume), the reserves, especially in the case of light and heavy field howitzers, would certainly have proved inadequate. The bombardment of hostile groups of batteries with T gas shell repeatedly caused a marked diminution in the enemy's fire, a fact which was also observed by the infantry in the front line. T gas shell should be stored in special dugouts. 11. How wide were the zones of barrage fire? What width is necessary? The average widths of the zones of barrage fire for a field battery were: 24-6-16 1-7-16 In the 2d Guard Reserve Division Yards. 395 Yards. 440 In the 52d Division 410 385 In the 26th Reserve Division. . 455 440 In the 28th Reserve Division 620 440 In the 12th Division 550 435 96 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. The widths of these zones were too great. A field battery is unable to cover more than a width of 220 yards and yet insure that the barrage is effective in spite of guns being put out of action and of the absence of support from neighboring sectors. 12. What suggestions have you for the employment of our aviators, with special reference to cooperation between the artillery flights and the artillery? On June 24 the reinforced Fourteenth Reserve Corps, holding the front from Monchy to the Somme (i. e., a front of more than 19 miles), had at its disposal 4$ flights and a pursuit flight ( Jagclstaffel), making a total of 28 machines. This allotment was insufficient to maintain command of the air against the enemy who was far superior in numbers. Fur- ther, the new English battle planes were superior to our ow r n. The organization of the aviation units w r as not suited to their effective employment. Reconnaissance machines and single- seater battle planes should form part of the same unit. Proposals. (1) A corps flight should consist of 12 reconnais- sance machines and 8 single-seater battle planes, which mutually assist each other. (2) The artillery of every division must be allotted an establishment of one artillery flight, consisting of six machines. The permanent cooperation of the same battery and artillery commanders with the same artillery aviators is absolutely essential. The machines of both the ordinary and the artillery flights must be employed offensively. The flights of hostile machines behind our front can only be restricted by forcing the enemy to defend himself over his own ground. The artillery machines with their escorts should form a continual protection for our own front. 13. How was the feeding of the garrisons of the trenches carried out during the fighting? The quantity of " iron ration* " in the position was increased to 5 days' rations. Ample supplies of mineral water, cigars, chocolate, and solidified alcohol for warming up food were provided. The arrangements proved exceptionally satisfactory. The provision of kitchens and storerooms in mined dugouts and of spare kitchens is necessary. Carrying parties with baskets, etc., to carry up food into the front line during pauses in the artillery fire, are also required. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 97 14. Medical services. Dressing stations (Truppenverbandpldtze) . In rear of every battalion sector it is advisable to have one bombproof medical dugout with accommodation for 30 wounded, or two dugouts each for 20 wounded. It is necessary to provide these dugouts with an ample supply of medical stores, rations, and lighting materials sufficient for five days or longer. Telephone appara- tus, stretchers (hand and wheeled) and oxygen breathing appa- ratus are also necessary. The medical personnel should include squads from the medical companies under competent leaders who know their way about the whole sector. As regards the artillery, it is necessary to provide a bomb- proof medical dugout, a surgeon, the necessary personnel, and the stores mentioned above for every four batteries, assuming that they are not far apart. This dugout should have a cen- tral position close to a main road. Halting places for ambulance vehicles (Wagenhaltepldtze) . These should be situated not more than 4,400 yards behind the front, as otherwise the transport from the dressing stations is too exhausting for the stretcher bearers and lasts too long for the wounded. Bombproof dugouts for 30 to 40 men should be constructed at these halting places. Experience shows that a large number of wounded tends to collect at these points. Main dressing stations (Hauptverbandplatze). These should as a rule be sited beyond the zone of artillery fire, in bomb- proof shelters near a main road. It is necessary that eight motor ambulances, instead of four, should be provided for the front held by a division. One medical company per division is not sufficient to provide the necessary number of stretcher bearers in trench warfare if the battle lasts for several days. Owing to the much greater difficulties of transport in the trenches, the stretcher bearers quickly become exhausted and must be frequently relieved if the removal of the wounded is to be carried out without a hitch. The establishment of a division should comprise not less than two medical companies. Collecting stations for slightly wounded (Leichtverwundeten- Sammelpldtze) . A collecting station for slightly wounded was established in each division, from which men who were slightly wounded were dispatched to the ambulance section (Kranken- transport Abteilung). This was not sound in practice, as a 29267 18 7 98 GERMAN AND ATTSTEIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. large number of wounded collected at the ambulance sections and it was not possible to arrange immediate transport for them. It would be better to arrange for a corps collecting station for slightly wounded, where these could be treated and be properly bandaged. They would then be evacuated as ambu- lances became available. Field hospitals (Feldlazaretten). Field hospitals which have been formed should have four motor ambulances allotted to them. Ambulance sections (Krankentransport Abteilungen) . Where the sector held by a corps is of considerable width am- bulance sections must be divided up and allotted to more than one railway station. Hospital trains should be shunted on to sidings so that they do not interfere with other railway traffic. 15. What experience was gained regarding the enemy's tac- tics, infantry, machine guns, artillery, and trench mortars? Infantry, machine guns, and trench mortars. Previous to the attack the enemy's infantry patrols showed increased activity. The foremost trenches were probably lightly held during the intense artillery fire. The troops for the assault were appar- ently assembled in the trenches in rear. The attack on July 1 was well prepared, and the infantry was splendidly equipped with all kinds of weapons for the close combat. It was provided with a large number of Lewis guns, which were brought into action very quickly and skillfully in newly captured positions. It is very desirable that our infantry should be equipped with a large number of light machine guns of this description in order to increase the intensity of its fire. The individual English soldier is well trained and shows per- sonal bravery. The majority of the officers, however, are not sufficiently thoroughly trained. They are lacking in ability to exploit a success and to follow it up quickly. Small blue lights and small flags are said to have been used by the enemy to communicate to the rear and to indicate the line reached. Telephone connections were established very rapidly. The enemy's trench mortars were skillfuly served and pro- duced effective results. The German infantry is, nevertheless, superior to the English and will be still more so when it is better equipped with weapons for the close combat and with light portable machine guns. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 99 Artillery. The enemy's artillery registered skillfully and inconspicuously. The guns proved accurate; the effect of the shells was good, but the percentage of blinds was high. On many occasions the enemy purposely refrained from shell- ing batteries and observation posts, the positions of which were obviously known to him before the offensive began. It was obvious that all the artillery which he must have had on the ground was not used for the purpose of repelling our trench raids. It was a mistake on his part to make the limits of the zone covered by his intense bombardment on the front of the 2d Guard Reserve Division coincide exactly with the limits of the zone of attack. This made it easy for us to switch bat- teries, at the very outset, from sectors which were not threat- ened on to those which were being intensely bombarded. Gas and smoke clouds were employed before the attack in the hope not only of causing us casualties but also of drawing our barrage fire, thus enabling the enemy to ascertain its intensity and location, and the positions of our batteries. In the actual attack, gas and smoke clouds were employed alternately. At some points on our front the last cloud was a smoke cloud, under cover of which the first waves of the attack appeared suddenly just in front of our trenches. (Signed) V. STEIN, Lieut. General. V. THE GERMAN ATTACK OF JULY 31, 1917, ON THE CERNY PLATEAU. Translation from the French Bulletin G. Q. G., Aug. 28, 1917.] 101 CONTENTS. Page. The German attack of July 31, 1917, on the Cerny plateau ... 103 I. Objective of the attack and division of forces 103 A. Objective 103 B. Division of the forces and of the command. . 104 Reserve troops 104 II. Preparation of the attack 105 A. Infantry 105 (a) The infantry is allowed to rest up to the hour of attack 105 (ft) Special instruction in view of the attack 105 B. Preparation of the ground 106 C. Artillery preparation 107 III. The carrying out of the attack 107 A. Stosstrupps 107 B. Method of progression 108 C. Liaisons in the assault 110 Conclusions Ill Annexed document Ill Distribution of machine guns in ' ' Blucher " Ill Itinerary of the assaulting machine guns -. Ill Food supplies 112 102 V. THE GERMAN ATTACK OF JULY 31, 1917, ON THE CERNY PLATEAU. (Translation from the French Bulletin G. Q. G., Aug. 28, 1917.) HEADQUABTEES AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FOECES, GENERAL STAFF, INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A), October 15, 1917. NOTE. The information which follows is derived from cross- examinations held at the third C. A. and at the tenth army, as well as from documents found on prisoners. The study of "the German attack of July 31, 1917, on the Cerny Plateau " gives in a very complete way the details of a divisional attack with limited objectives. The characteristics of this attack follow: 1. Extreme brevity of preparation fire as such ; this fire lasting only 5 minutes, the assailants arrive in the position when the defenders are just beginning to shelter themselves. 2. Suppleness of the attacking arrangements of the battalion and the company, arrangement which varies with each unit. 3. Companies were dislocated in view of the attack, in order to form, with men picked from the various groups, a certain number of " stosstrupps," and a reserve troop, detached. 4. Role of the " stosstrupp " which is in fact merely an " advance guard " which " leads and shows the way." I. OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK AND DIVISION OF FORCES. A. OBJECTIVE. Since the cessation of our attacks the enemy wishes to re- capture the entire Siegfried position, on the Cerny-la-Bovelle Plateau, the enemy wishes to reach the line, consisting of the 103 104 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. Hayden-Mahler-Memel trenches, and the Fourragere trench, and unite with the elements which they have already taken of the Franconie trench. Thrown back in April-May on the northern slopes of the La Bovelle Plateau, they succeeded at the end of June in reestab- lishing themselves on the plateau from the south of La Bovelle up to the eastern approaches of Cerny. To the south of Cerny they are clinging to the northern slopes of the Chemin-des- Dames. They therefore have to capture a salient easy to approach at the center and on the left wing (east), but difficult to approach on the right wing, where they have not yet retaken a foothold on the heights. B. DIVISION OF THE FORCES AND OF THE COMMAND. The command is in the hands of one man (general commanding the Thirteenth D. I.), thus insuring in the best way the com- bination of efforts. There are three regimental sectors : (a) Sector of the 13th R. I.: This is a maneuver sector, with a difficult outlet (first and third battalions placed side by side; the second in immediate reserve). The first battalion, wing battalion, is spread out over a front of about 375 meters, having probably three companies in line and one company in support The third battalion, on its left, placed holding a front of 450 to 500 meters, has three companies in line and one company in support. (b) Sector of the 15th R. I.: This is the center of the line. The second battalion is spread out over approximately 750 meters, having its four companies in line. (The first and third battalions being held in reserve. ) (c) Sector of the 55th R. I. : This is the left wing; the second battalion has two companies in line. RESERVE TROOPS. (a) The second battalion of the 13th R. I. is placed as reserve on the right wing (eastern shelter of Cerny). GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 105 (&) The first battalion of the 15th R. I. is placed behind the center of the attack (probably as a brigade reserve), having detached a company to the left wing (shelter of the eastern tunnel). (c) The third battalion of the 15th R. I. is placed on the northern borders of the plateau (probably as a divisional reserve) and furnishes Tragertrupps to the assaulting units. II. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK. A. INFANTRY. (A) THE INFANTEY IS ALLOWED TO REST UP TO THE HOUR OF ATTACK. The attacking battalions, all of which have held the Cerny- La Bovelle sector, sent back to rest on the 21st and quartered 8 or 9 kilometers from the front (Parfondru, Veslund). To give them rest the lines are taken over by parts of the Eleventh B. D. They only return to the sector in the night of the 30th to the 31st. On their arrival they are sheltered in " stollen " near the first line, and do not take their position of departure until a few minutes before the attack is launched. The assaulting troops are really fresh, not weakened by the demoralizing influence of bombardments, losses, or fatigue; fresh troops, without being new, familiarized with the sector which they have occupied and knowing their objectives of attack well from previous observations made on the spot. (B) SPECIAL INSTRUCTION IN VIEW OF THE ATTACK. The whole of the positions to be taken had been represented with a great deal of exactitude on the ground north of Vesbud ; trenches and communicating trenches had been dug to a depth of 30 or 40 centimeters; positions of departure and objectives had been staked out with flags having the same conventional numbers as those marked on sketches distributed before the attack. While they were resting, starting on the 22d, rehearsals of assaults were held, to begin with, simply with battalions and regiments ; then, on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of July, rehearsals of the whole were carried out, one of which was held in the presence of the general commanding the division. Stosstrupps were likewise formed and trained for their special mission. 106 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. The mechanism of the attack was minutely foreseen ; every man knew his place of departure, his objective, his mission ; for the men handling machine guns the itinerary and the posi- tion of the battery were fixed for every piece. (See annex sheet No. 1.) Every battery chief, every commander of Stoss- trupp or Kampftrupp received a sketch marked according to the numbers of the flags used in the rehearsal, and showing the itinerary to be followed. Nothing is left unforeseen in the mission to be carried out; it has been endeavored to have everyone reach a state of reflex action during the attack. Thus the troops will only have to repeat a known maneuver on known ground. This technical and moral preparation of the infantry will cause the blow to be delivered with the maximum of vigor. Finally, to make sure of surprising the e.nemy as much as possible, the commanding officer leaves his troops in ignorance as to the hour of attack up to the very last moment ; they only know the day X ; they do not know the hour X. In the eighth company of the 15th R. I., the company commander had told his men on the evening of the 30th that they would attack on the 31st at 9 o'clock in the evening. But the next day at 12 o'clock they found out that the preparation would begin at 12.55 and the assault at 1 p. m. B. PREPARATION OF THE GROUND. It has been entrusted to troops which will not carry out the attack ; some of them only will participate in it as supporting units (second battalion of the 13th R. I.; third battalion of the 15th R. I.). Discreet preparations are commenced, the purpose of which is difficult to discern ; lines and numerous defense accessories are built ; old trenches (Franconie trench) repaired ; of machine guns installed on the Franconie. The creation of a continuous trench removing a noticeable indentation (between the Le Meduse trench and the Zouave Charlet trench) would be like- wise justified by the defensive. More precise indications as to the purpose of these prepara- tions appear only during the last days in the work on the old Yser tunnel (which is prolonged under our lines) and especially with the creation of new emplacements of mine throwers. On the whole, a summary and rapid organization. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 107 C. ARTILLERY PREPARATION. The Germans noticeably increased their artillery strength a few days before the attack, by bringing up a number of trench mortars; these mortars tried out the range in a very discreet manner (few shots). They were to form the nucleus of the German artillery preparation. The artillery (field and heavy) is grouped together without being moved, in order to form provisional units which will be able to produce a concentrated fire. An important bombardment is started on the 27th, on the whole Cerny-Ailles front, having without doubt a destructive effect, but also appearing to be an isolated artillery rehearsal. On the 28th occurs an intermittent sprinkling of the first lines. The actual preparation lasts only from 12.55 to 1 p. m. on the 31st, thus combining to the greatest degree the effects of violence and of surprise ; the assailants reach the position when the defenders are just beginning to seek shelter. III. THE CARRYING OUT OF THE ATTACK. A. STOSSTRUPPS. They are made up of men drawn from the normal personnel of the companies. These men are, if possible, volunteers; if there are not enough volunteers, the remainder are chosen by the officers. Every " Stosstrupp " is especially trained for its mission on the rehearsal ground. NOTE. The company " Stosstrupp " is not a permanent part of the company. Formed for the attack, it is generally dis- banded afterwards and the men go back into their various platoons. In fact, it is becoming more and more usual for all the men in the companies to receive the instruction of " Stoss- trupps." But it seems that, besides the three regular sections, the exist- ence of a fourth section is becoming more and more general. This section acts as a sort of reserve of the company com- manders, remaining at his disposal, to be used by him at the difficult point of combat, in the offensive as in the defensive. It is composed in general of the best squads and of special- ists ; three squads of light machine guns, three squads of grenade throwers. Strength. Variable; varies from 8 men (one group) to 20 men. 108 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. It almost always includes foot soldiers, to whom the attack is entrusted ; pioneers entrusted with the destruction of shelters and obstacles ; and always, it seems, one light machine gun to defend the captured ground (with three gunners, one non- commissioned officer, chief of the piece, and at times a gun- smith). In certain cases the " Stosstrupp " is formed almost entirely of pioneers (as was the one ordered to take the southern outlet of the Yser tunnel ; it seems that a flame thrower went with it). Armament. Foot soldiers always carry 10 grenades and their gun. (NOTE. This equipment is lighter than that of the foot soldiers of the following waves, who carry 20 grenades besides gun). Pioneers. They carry shears, etc., and their rifle (those of the Garde are armed with a revolver). Men handling machine guns carry their revolvers. The number of Stosstrupps and their composition are ex- actly determined according to the mission of the companies and the depth of the objectives to be reached, thus : There were three Stosstrupps of 20 men at the seventh com- pany of the 15th R. I., which made up the flank of the attack and had a distant objective assigned to it. There were two Stosstrupps one of 10, the other of 23 men, 1 officer, and 1 ensign bearer at the eighth company of the 15th R. I. ; this company was placed at the center, but had more than 600 meters to cover. There were three Stosstrupps of 10 men at the ninth and twelfth companies of the 13th R. I. ; this company attacked on a more narrow front and had been assigned closer objec- tives. B. METHOD OF PROGRESSION. The Stosstrupps play a double part leaders and scouts. They leave in waves, advancing in open order as far as the first French line, then spread out in the trench and try to clear it. The first wave joins them ; relieved by it, they rush on again toward the second line, and so on, as far as the final objective which they themselves clean out, assisted by the following wave. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 109 Their normal method of progression is in extended waves and in open country. As soon as a strong resistance is offered, they advance through the communicating trenches in the following order (example taken from the seventh company of the 15th It. I., see plan No. 2) : The Stosstrupp leader goes first ; then grenade throwers in a row or " teil " of 6 ; then pioneers, in a row of 3, 1 ensign bearer ; again grenade throwers in a row of 6 ; finally the ma- chine-gun men (4 plus 1 noncommissioned officer). The speed of the advance is very carefully regulated in agreement with the artillery : From 12.55 to 13 o'clock, fire on the Iglan and Deimling trenches. From 13 to 13.03 o'clock, the fire is carried back to the Dresde and Mirberg trenches. From 13.03 to 13.06 o'clock, the fire is carried back to the Brahms and Bruckner trenches. From 13.06 to 13.10 o'clock, the fire is carried back to the Memel and La Fourragere trenches. From 13.10 o'clock on the fire is carried to the south of the Chemin des Dames. The Stosstrupps arrive with the last shells ; they have barely two minutes to spend in each trench, and they leave the actual fighting to the following waves. The distance between the waves (or "fight waves") and the Stosstrupps is likewise very precisely regulated ; before the start, the various waves are massed in the most advanced trenches (parallels, sapheads) with the Stosstrupps; they run forward automatically as soon as they see the Stosstrupps, or the preceding wave arrive in the first trench ; when the objec- tives are farther away, the distance between waves is prede- termined (in the ninth company of the 13th R. I., 10 meters be- tween the Stosstrupp and the first wave ; 15 meters between the first and second waves). The carrying troops (Tragertrupps) themselves follow at a short distance, then the reserves, which unite the captured posi- tion with the position of departure. In short, everything is set in operation so as to obtain first of all an extremely rapid action ; the speed of the blow seems to be the first element of success, in the opinion of the German commanding officer. The object of this rapid progression is to 110 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. reach commanding stations by surprise, neutralize the local commanding staff by isolating them from their troops; then attack, in case the range was too short, and to inform the com- ing continues in the first line the third should already be oc- cupied. In the rapidity of this advance no trace is found of the hierarchy which the German order of May 11, 1916, established. (NOTE. "Principles for the execution of an infantry attack in trench warfare." Translation of the G. Q. G. of July 13, 1916, under No. 9178), between the various assaulting waves. Assaulting wave (Sturmwelle) ; clearing-out wave (Aufrau- mungswelle) ; strengthening wave (Verstarkungswelle). The common mission of all the waves is to fight ; the waves follow each other in succession and without stopping. There is but one distinction; the Stosstrupp does not give battle; its mission is to open the way ; the other waves fight. The Ger- mans rely especially on the following maneuver: Overrun the enemy and pass beyond him to reduce the strong positions. C. LIAISONS IN THE ASSAULT. They are very thoroughly planned out. (a) Liaison with the artillery. In each battalion one artillery officer with a few gunners starts with the Stosstrupps and the first wave to insure the lengthening of the range during the attack, in case the range was too short, and to inform the com- manding staff of the objectives reached. Variously colored rockets are used to ask for a lengthening or a shortening of the range. (&) Liaison with aerial observation. The . stosstrups were supplied with white panels and newspapers to mark the front. An infantry avion must follow the attack. (c) Liaison with the commanding staff. With the company staff go : 1. Runners (melder). 2. Signal men (winker) with small electric searchlights (a different colored light for each battalion). 3. Finally, two out of three companies of the first wave were equipped with two -couples of carrier pigeons and two pigeon attendants. If the final objective was reached the infantry immediately signaled the fact by means of white rockets. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. Ill CONCLUSIONS. From the few items of information which precede, it seems that one can deduce the following principal points of the technique used by the enemy in sudden attacks with limited objectives : I. Stosstrupps are being used more extensively. II. Stosstrupps have a tendency to become more mixed in their composition. They are tending to become a chance group- ment, instead of a selected formation (Elite group). III. The number of Stosstrupps varies (as does the whole plan of attack) according to the mission and to the ground to be covered. There is no rigid formula ; there are merely fixed categories which are altered according to the demands of the situation. IV. Increasing importance given to the violence of the blow : 1. During the preparation ; 2. In the attack, not only by the leading units (progression at fixed time and very rapid), but by the waves (following very close and automatically). ANNEXED DOCUMENT. [Twelfth R. I., No. 435, machine gun.] DISTBIBUTION OF MACHINE GUNS IN " BLUCHEB." Itinerary of tl\e assaulting machine guns. Gun No. 5 will follow Stosstrupp No. 5 into the first French line and will be' placed in position at point 370K. Gun No. 6 of the second machine-gun company will follow Stosstrupp No. 10 in the first French line and will be placed in position at point 370. Gun No. 2 (of the first machine-gun company) will follow Stosstrupp No. 9 into the first French line, point 370. After the successful outcome of the attack, it will be placed in position at point 371 p. in our new first line. Gun No. 10 (of the first machine-gun company) will follow Stosstrupp No. 12 in the first French line to point 279.1. After the successful outcome of the attack, it will be placed in posi- tion in the first French line just to the right of exit S of the Cerny tunnel. 112 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. Gun No. 11 (of the third machine gun company) will follow Stosstrupp No. 18 into the first French line, and will be placed in position at point 278K. There are munition depots near guns 2 and 3. There will be one machine-gun man in line as a reserve for every machine gun used in the attack. FOOD SUPPLIES. Each man is to have two days of reserve food supplies and two water cans. The first machine-gun company will insure the sup- ply of hot nourishments ; the rations will have to be handed over to it. (Signed) GOESMANN, Officer in Charge of the Hachine-Gun Service at the General Staff. VI. NOTES ON THE GERMAN ATTACK AT BOIS LE CHAUME, SEPTEMBER 25, 1917. [Translated from Bulletin, Second Bureau, Standard French Army.] 29267 18 8 113 CONTENTS. Page. Notes on the German attack at Bois Le Chaume, September 25, 1917 115 Preparation 115 Formation of the attack 116 The attack 116 Result 117 Conclusion 118 114 VI. NOTES ON THE GERMAN ATTACK AT BOIS LE CHAUME SEPTEMBER 25, 1917. [Translated from Bulletin, Second Bureau, Second French Army.] HEADQUAETEBS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, GENERAL STAFF, INTELLIGENCE SECTION (A), October 16, 1917. Object : Occupation of Bois de Chaume. General of infantry, Von Soden, at present commanding the western Meuse army group, summoned together on Sunday, the 23d, the officers taking part in the attack and declared to them : " The former German positions must be carried at any cost and must be maintained. Our present position is not tenable without holding the Croix de Vaux (Vaux crossroad)." Gen. Von Kuhne addressed his division (the 13th D. R.) in similar terms and added : " We must sacrifice ourselves ; above all things the height must be carried in order to prevent the enemy attacks." PREPARATION. (o) Effectives taking part in the attack, two companies of storming troops the 13th division reserves divided up as follows : For assault : One battalion of 39th reserves, 1 battalion of 57th reserves, 2 battalions of 13th reserves, 1 battalion of each regiment in reserve for attack, 1 battalion of 39th reserves, 1 battalion of 57th reserves, were already holding the sector and were charged with organizing it after the attack. (These units had relieved on the twelfth units of the 35th D. R. and 56th D. I. ) A regiment of the 78th D. R. and the 258th reserves. ( 6 ) Effectives supporting the principal attack : On west flank, the 223d reserves of the 48th D. R. ; on east flank, the 259th re- serves of the 78th D. R. 115 116 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. These two regiments were to attack the first French trench and to- maintain it as long as possible. The rehearsal took place on a terrain representing the posi- tion to be attacked, at the Schmiedeckerlager, near Romagne, where the two companies of storming troops tried out the attack, with the units which were to follow and support them. The storming company attacking on the west, commanded by Lieut. Balderman, was trained (practiced) with the battalion of the 39th reserves (13th D. R.). The storming company attacking on the east, commanded by Lieuts. Habel and Stellvertretor Schwoer, trained with the units of the 258th reserves (78th D. R.). The units of the 57th reserves and the whole 13th reserves (13th D. R.) trained separately. Two rehearsals of the whole action, Friday, 22d, and Satur- day, 23d, took place in the presence of Gen. von Gallwitz, com- manding the fifth army ; Gen. von Soden, commanding the west- ern Meuse group ; Gen. von Kuhne, commanding the 13th D. R. FORMATION OF THE ATTACK. The storming company on the west, supported by the 39th re- serves ( 13th D. R. ) , was to follow the Louvemont-Azannos Road and envelope the La Chaume trench as far as the point 29.44. The storming company on the east, supported by the 258th reserves (78th D. R.), was to envelope the Gaulois and Cevennes trenches, and reach likewise the (x) point 29.44 ( (x) point de raccordement junction, meeting point). The 57th reserves and the 13th reserves were to make a frontal attack up to the La Chaume and Cevennes trenches (see plan). If the attacks succeeded, the commanders of the attacking troops were to retire, without waiting for the order, three hours after the attack. The battalions assigned to occupying the trenches were to set to work immediately. THE ATTACK. After a minute preparation lasting eight days, the troops for the assault were carried in autos from the Schmiedeckerlager (starting at 8 p. m. on the 23d) and unloaded between Azannes and Gremilly, reaching their positions between 1 and 2 o'clock of the morning of the 24th. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. 117 The assaulting troops immediately took up their assaulting positions in the sector between the Louvemont-Azannes Road and the Croix de Vaux, in front of the troops occupying the sector. These were stationed as follows, counting from west to east : One battalion 39th reserves, 1 battalion 57th reserves, 1 battalion 260th reserves. The attack was delivered at 5.30 a. m. Although bothered at first by the volleys of the preparation fire of their own artillery (falling too short), the assaulting troops nevertheless made fast enough progress in the western section ; but on being caught by our artillery barrage, and especially by our machine-gun bar- rage, they ran against a stubborn resistance of the French troops, and fell back in disorder into the Bois le Chaume. Our own men, counter attacking promptly, threw the enemy's lines into complete disorder. The enemy's left wing seems to have been blocked from the very beginning of the attack. Last of all, the enemy's frontal attack (57th and 13th re- serves) was caught on the flank by our troops, who were fol- lowing up their counter attack (coming from the west and the southeast). After hand-to-hand and grenade fighting lasting several hours the enemy was completely driven back and left about 120 prisoners in our hands. BESULT. Thanks to the magnificent resistance of the French troops (which both officers and men among the prisoners willingly acknowledged), the enemy suffered' a complete check, with very heavy losses ; e. g., Lieut. Balderman, commanding the western storming company, on reaching the La Chaume trench had only two noncommissioned officers and five men left besides himself. Lieut. Matthies, of the 57th reserves, attacking with the third wave, had to use them to make up the losses of the three as- saulting companies and had all his own section wiped out. Lieut. Offer, of the 13th reserves, was left alone with 2 men out of the 40 who started out. The rest were all killed during the grenade fighting, which, according to him, lasted more than three hours. Lieut. Balderman, commanding western assaulting company (Rohr battalion) made the following statement: "They told us we had in front of us a division of working troops (travailleurs), but they (the 245th and 348th French regi- ments), counter attacked like tigers. 118 GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TACTICAL STUDIES. CONCLUSION. The enemy seems to be absolutely determined to retake the position of Bois le Chaume, which is absolutely indispensable for him, and does not hesitate to engage on this very narrow front the strength of six battalions (admitting that all the troops who were in reserve for organizing the position once taken were not able to come into action). An officer taken prisoner, questioned in regard to this, re- plied : " If it is necessary to take the height, cost what it may, we will begin again ; although," he added, " we have suffered very heavy losses there." 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