*^e l^etters Containing Hints for the Improvement of stablishments in India /**^W UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THREE LETTERS , CON TAI N I N G HINTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT O F OUR ESTABLISHMENTS I N INDIA. . ADDRESSED TO A NOBLE LORD, B Y A PROPRIETOR OF EAST INDIA STOCK. Printed in the Year MDCCLXXXL > LETTERS, & c . LETTER L MY LORD, TH E recefs of Parliament, by giving your Lordfhip a temporary releafe from the fatiguing duties of the Houie, has left you the leifure to examine, with more y attention, the various interefls of the nation at this important crifis. Poffibly there is no one of * thefe fo difficult for your Lordfhip to decide upon, no one fo little underftood by the public, as that which relates to our dominion in India ; whether it be confidered on the fide of com- merce, of revenue, or of politics : had it fortu- nately been otherwife, the interefts of the Com- pany, and thofe of the nation, would never for a moment even have been confidered in different )oints of view; nor would thof9 advantages A which .'J54786 C J which have been obtained, by the exer* rlons of the Company, under the counte- nance and fupport of government, at any time have been made the fubject of contention be- tween them. It is with a view, my Lord, to obviate, as far* as lies within' my narrow abili- ties, fuch prejudices, and to conciliate interefts which, from their nature, mould ever be infe- parable, that I prefume to addrefs the following fketches immediately to your Lordmip. Aware of the value and importance of your jLordfhip's time, I mall confine myfelf to the mere outline of fuch ideas as have occurred to me. The few arguments which I lhall venture to adduce, are principally drawn from experience : thofe of wider fpeculation, and of more en- larged policy, will be more effectually fupplied by the abilities and judgment of your Lordfhip. The chart of India will point out how the poffeflions of the Englim are fnrrounded, on every fide, by the powerful rival ftates that have been formed there out of the ruins of the Mogul empire : the march of the army from Bengal to Surat has (hewn, by the apprehenfion it excited* the inconveniencies and dangers attending this peculiarity of fituation : and the conqueil and reftitutkm of Tanjore, with the yet undecided claims of the Nabob of Arcot, are incontrover- tible t .3 3 cible proofs that, from the want of fyftem in our political conduft, we are daily adding to thefe . v difficulties. Nor are our commerce and revenues in a flate of better fecurity than our pofieffions ; for, in- dependently of the influence which our political fituation muft always have upon them, the for- mer is now diverted into foreign channels from the want of a more regular courfe of remittance ; and the latter cannot long refill the effects of an accumulating fpecie, locked up in the treafury of Calcutta - 9 for the expences of the Maratta war have caufed but a temporary draft from that treafury, which will be reimburfed with intereft by the fuccefs that we have now every reafon to hope from it. Thefe are fuggeftions that will have little weight with thofe who think the natives of the Bail incapable of military exertion; and who confider the empire and the commerce of India as decidedly fecured to us by the expulfion of the French. But your Lordlhip's better judg- ment will have feen, in the late treaty concluded by the government of Bombay with the Marattas of Poonah in 1779, that the poffelTion of Pon- V dicherry and of Mahe could not fave the army of Bombay from fubmitting to the moft hu- miliating engagements: and the expedition pro- /\ A 2 jeded [ 4 ] jefted from the French iflands, though now rendered abortive by the fuccefs of the Bengal troops under general Goddard, muft evince to your Lordfhip the neceflity of the mod vigilant policy on our fide, to watch over, and to coun- teract the wily machinations of our enemies. With regard to our commerce, the increafed navigation of the Portuguefe, the Danes, and the Dutch, with the reviving trade of Oflend, are proofs, that the extirpation of the French has only ferved to increafe the number of our competitors , and that while individuals are precluded from a direct remittance to England, neceflity will compel them to give their money to foreigners, who by means of a very high exchange, of funds for which they pay no in- tereft, and of low wages to feamen, are enabled to underfell the Englifh India Company in all X the markets of Europe. It is unneceflary to urge to your Lordfhip the evils attendant upon a reduced circulation of Ipecie ; but I cannot omit to remark, that it is not long fmce they were feverely felt in Bengal, in confequence of the vaft fums which were exported from thence to China -, and it can need no argument to mew, that whether the fcarcity of money be occafioned by the fending of it abroad, or by the locking of it up in a treafury, the t 5 3 the effefts upon fociety for the time muft be alike. The fliort period of the Eaft India Company's charter has hitherto fupplied the Court of Dk reflors with too good an excufe for the -tem- porizing, undecided plan which lias of late been purfued. It is now expiring, and the public have reafon to hope that your Lordfhip, in giving it a new eftablifhment, will give exertion and vigor to the machine of government. It is from this view that I derive an additional motive to intrude this letter upon your Lord- fliip, and that I propofe (in my next) to enlarge upon fome of the points that I have Jiere but ppened to your obfervation. I have the honor to be, My LORD, &c. & c . LETTER LETTER II. MY LORD, IT is not yet a century fmce the Mogul empire attained its greateft extent, and was governed with wifdom and vigor by the politic Aureng- zebe ; yet the fucceflbr of Aurengzebe doth not at th'is time poffefs a town which he can call his own. Thirty years are fcarcely paft, fmce the vaft provinces of Berar, Malva, the Deccan, Vreiapour, and the Carnatic, to Cape Comorin, were united under the government of the cele- brated Nizam-ul Mulluck ; yet the fon of Ni- zam-ul Mulluck finds difficulty in keeping the disjointed Deccan fubject to his authority ; and the vaft power of the Maratcas, which within thirty years impofed tributes throughout Indof- tan, is now divided into three feparate and dif- cordant ftates. Revolutions fo quick, and of fuch importance, (hew how much our political ideas upon India ihould be determined by the particular characters of its refpective rulers. If further proofs of this mould be thought neceflary, they are offered to jus in events ftill nearer to our own time. The govern- t 7 ] government of Myfore, weak and contemptible under its Raja, became powerful and formida- ble as foon as the enterprifing Hyder Ally af- famed the reins : whilft the provinces of Bengal were no fooner deprived of the ileady rule of Aliverdy Cawn, than they were plunged into diforder, and ripened for revolt. The military abilities of Mahadarow enabled the Marattas of Poonah, in the years 1770 and 1771, to revive the exorbitant claims of that nation, and to lay the Deccan and Myfore under contribution ; when the early death of that chieftain, with the divifions that followed relative to his fucceffion, prefcribed new limits to the ambition of that ariftocracy, and added whole provinces to the dominions of the Soubah of the Deccan, and of Hyder Ally Cawn. At prefent, the preponderating power is with- out a queftion in the Englilh 5 but this tenure too, my Lord, is precarious, for we no longer hold military difcipline in monopoly - y and it cannot derogate from the high reputation of Lord Clive, to afcribe the rapid growth of this power, in fome meafure, to the enemy's igno- rance in that art : this ignorance no longer fub- fifts j every Mahommedan prince has now his battalions and artillery ; and the creation of a refpectable army, within the fpace of three years, by r s j by the Nabob of the Carnatic, not only unaided j- but publicly difcountenanced by the govern- 1 ment of Madras, proves within how fhort a time we might be formidably oppofed ; for by the the fame means whereby the Nabob of the Car- natic fucceeded, that is, by employing the mili- tary adventurers who find their way to India, every other prince may form fimilar eftablifh- ments, and no other will certainly have the com- plaifance to difband them at our defire, as that Nabob has done. Good policy, therefore, now calls upon us to provide againft a danger, which, if left to ex- tend itfelf, may threaten the very exiftence of our government-, and happily our own immediate interefts-, as well as the general tranquillity of India, point out to us the remedy. From the fituation of our poflefiions, we have neceflarily been led into political connections with 1 all the great powers of India -, and from a variety of caufes it has happened, that our arms arc iow employed in the North, to protect the domi- nions of Oud ; in the South, to fnpport the Na- bob of the Carnatic ; and in the Weil, to give a Chief to the government of Poonah ; whilft we (fond engaged, by treaty, to fend a military aid to Myfore and the Deccan, in the events of un- provoked hoftility againft thofe powers ; and are opening t 9 1 opening a negotiation with the Raja of to eftablifh a brigade in his dominions. Circumftanced in this manner, it is no longer a queftion, whether we can withdraw ourfelves within the limits of our own pofleffions, and confine our attention to their fecurity and im- provement ; as we are evidently involved, under the fanction of public treaties, in all the intri- cacy of a wide and yet unformed fyftem : but we have it in our power to give fhape and confift- ency to this fyftem ; and in doing fo, to fecure permanency to our empire. A In Bengal, the foundation of this great ftruc- ture has been already laid by the treaty with the Nabob of Oud, which, by transferring to the Englifh arms the protection of that country, has converted into a fubfidiary ally the only formi- dable neighbour we had in the North. The treaty with the powerful Raja of Berar, whofe pofleffions lie to the fouth-weft, has the fame objefts in view ; and if it fhtJuld take place, will relieve the rich provinces of Bengal from every apprehenfion of danger, and reduce the charges of the military eftablimment under that govern- ment, by nearly a fourth part of their prefenc amount : as the Raja, like the Nabob of Oud, is to affign funds equal to the expenditure for the troops that may be ftationed in his country. B Thus t 10 ] Thus far, my Lord, we are well advanced towards this great object in the North ; nor are we lefs forward in the South, where every refource of the Carnatic lies open to our power: yet, to complete it, we are flill at a diftance. The vail fpace between thefe extremities forms fuch a V barrier to our communication, and feparatesBom- bay fo entirely from the other prefidencies, that until we have converted the cold, difregarded treaties of defenfive alliance, which now unite us to Mifore and the Deccan, into a firm boi\d of union that lhall give us military ftations in thofe countries, we can have no abfolute fecurity for our own pofieffions, nor can we hope to maintain a controlling influence over the government of Poonab, without which the tranquillity of India can never be eftablifhed and preferved. It may not be uninterefting to your Lordfiiip to advert to the caufes which have hitherto kept back a fyftem fo advantageous to the public, and to the reafons whpthe prefent moment is parti- cularly favourable for bringing it forward. When the capture of Pondicherry, in 1761, had removed the laft and only formidable obfta- cle to the eftablilhment of Mahommed Ally Cawn in the Carnatic, the policy of our go- vernment faw the necefilty of forming a counter- poile to the increafed power and riches of that ; t " ] ally v and the general ftate of India being thea little known to us, this counterpoife was fought y for in Tanjore. The ceffion of the northern circars in 1765, by leading us into negociation with the Sou- bah of the Deccan, firft extended our political views on the fide of Coromandel, beyond the Carnatic, and gave us a territory to protecl:, not only independent of, but entirely feparated from, that country. It was impoffible that Mahommed Ally could fee with indifference this new connection, or that the principle which had engaged us to feek a counterpoife to him in the Carnatic, mould not now operate on his part to make him oppofe the progrels of our union with his former fuperior (the Soubah of the Deccan), as well as that which we afterwards contracted with Hyder Ally Cawn, the friend and fupporter of his late rival Chunda Saheb. Here, therefore, a political difiention com- menced between the Nabob of the Carnatic, and v the Eaft India Company , and it is in this diffen- tion that we are to look for the caufe of the little intercourfe that has hitherto taken place between the Englifh. and the governments of Myfore and the Deccan. For the Nabob, jealous of the in- fluence which thefe powers might have upon our B ? coilnfels, counfels, and fearful of the decline of his con- fcquence with us, in proportion to the dignity and confideration of fuch allies, oppofed any communication with them, but fuch as fhould pafs through his agency ; and the fufpicions which thefe powers entertained of him, precluded the negotiation of any important object through him. Fortunate would it have been for the Na- bob, and for us, if our political diffentions had produced no greater evils j and if by mutual concefiions, in fome inftances, we had always kept in mind, that the reduction of the French, the eftablimment of the Nabob's family, and the profperous fituation of our own affairs, had been the happy effects of our mutual confidence, and united efforts : we Ihould then have had no reafon to charge him with dtftruft in forming a feparate military eftablimment, which threatened foon to render the aid of our troops unneceffarjr for his protection ; nor fliould we have been lia- ble to the recrimination of having (after affifting him with our forces to reduce Tanjore) compelled him to reflore that country to the Raja, under conditions of great pecuniary advantages to the Company. But it is not my defign to lead to invidious reprofpection \ jealoufies are not to be healed by [ '3 ] it ; and befides, the prefent date of India requires a more enlarged fcale of conduct than has hitherto been purfued. Syftem and vigorous exertion are become abfolutely necelTary in the adminiftration of our affairs there ; and neither the one or the other can be hoped for, until, forgetting pad injuries and fufpicions, we cordially return to pur former confidence ; and until we adopt fome honorable and confident plan for uniting the power of the Carnatic, and bringing it effec- tually under our direction. This fubject is probably now under your Lord- fhip's consideration : I will therefore only obferve upon it, that the late revolutions at Tanjore, by making the Nabob feel our power, and by leav- ing him dill to hope from our friendfhip, have now totally removed the caufe which kept us A fo long at a diftance from the Soubah and from Hyder Ally : that the fubfidy drawn from the Tanjore country, of near 200,000 a year, has greatly increafed our refources : and that no lon- ger alarmed by the ambition of the Nabob, who, in difbanding his army mud have appeafed our jealoufy, we are more than ever prepared to form an union with thofe powers, upon the broad bafis of mutual intereft and fecurity. The hour, therefore, feems now arrived, when your Lordihip may, and I mud add, when the intereft [ H ) intereft of the nation makes it necefiary, that you fhould adopt a general and a decided plan of conduct, in refpect to our pofleffions and government in India. We are at this moment free almoft from the intrigues of the French ; our army is augmented ; the Soubah of the Deccan continues to folicit the aid of our friend- Jhip j the fituation . of the Maratta affairs calls for vigorous exertion , and the government of Myfore, though ftill animated by the fpirit of Hyder Ally, is not yet become powerful enough to difpute our fuperiority, or to difregard the terms of our alliance. Under circumftances fo favourable, can we hefitate to render ourfelves the umpires of India ? we want no further extenfion of territory : we leek no new revolutions : we are at the zenith of our power : our intereft, our future fafety, and the common good of India, all unite in calling upon us to employ this happy crifis of our influence, for perfecting, with moderation and juftice, a fyftem that mail fet bounds to, the future ambition of our neighbours, pre- fcribe limits to our own, and effectually fecuro to them, and to ourfelves, the undifturbed poA feffion of our prefent refpective dominions. I have faid, that the Soubah of the Deccan continues to folicit the aid of our friendlhip : we I '5 ] impatiently defire, on our part, that .he convert our reverfionar-y right to the province of Guntoor into prefent occupancy } v' for the mod profitable articles f our trade are drawn from that province, which abounds with manufactures 5 its revenue is confiderabje ; and it feparates our northern pofTefTions from theCar- natic. The government of Madras opened a nego- ciation lail year upon this -fubject with Bazalet- Jung, he being, under his brother the Soubah, tenant for life of Guntoor ; but either the mode they adopted, or the matter with which they accompanied their negociation, proved fo offen- five to the Soubah, and has been thought fo exceptionable by the fuperintending council of Bengal, that it has been judged neceffary to interpofe the controuling power of that govern- ment : and the negociation with the Soubah js now in their hands. Under the direction of Mr. Haftings it cannot N fail of fuccefs, though it muft be believed, that he will think no fuccefs complete, until, with the full pofieflion of the province of Guntoor, he can obtain for the Company an abfolute re- leafe from the tribute of 86,000 a year, which they are bound by treaty to pay to the Soubah, for t '6 ] for that and the other provinces now in their pofiefiion, and known by the name of th Northern Circars* But conceflions of fuch importance afe not to be obtained, my Lord, without fome return j and the only one of any value which we can make to the Sou bah, will be to lend him the affiftance of our troops to be em- ployed for the fupport of his government, -and the protection of his dominions ; that is to lay, for retaining in due fubjeftion thofe of his dependants, who, prefuming upon the general eonvulfions of India, arm upon every occafion to oppofe his authority ; or thofe, who feeing an exemption from tribute in the public dif- turbances, cabal with the neighbouring powers to excite them, and in the moment of neceflity ftipulate with their fuperior, before they will fend him that aid to which he is entitled by the general conftitution of Indoltan. The impoverimed ftate of the Soubah's trea- fury can be no objection at this time to osr giving him the afliftance of our troops, as the charges incident to fuch a fervice might be defray-, ed from the funds we fhould hold in our own hands ; as the tribute of ^86,000, and the re- \J venue of Guntoor, which may be eftimated at 100,000 [ '7 ] ,iGo 5 ooo a year, would be more than adequate to the expence, and fhould in reafon be applied to it, until the fervices we might render to the Soubah, fhould enable him to make us other alignments. Powerful, and confident as Hyder Ally may be in his own refources, the jealous fears of an In- dian court would not fuffer him to fee, without uneafmefsj fo marked an afllirance of our attach- ment to the intereft of the Soubah, whofe claim of fuperiority over the country of Myfore is ftill unimpaired, even by any pretended concefllon of the Mogul. It may too be prefumed that, drawing near the verge of life, the favorite object of Hyder' s mind muft now be to eftablifh the fucceffion in his family : and this might be endangered, if he were to die at enmity with us, for he is ftill confidered by the Myfo- reans as an ungenerous ufurper ; and their at- tachment to the Raja, whofe place he has afiuna- cd, would probably difcover itfelf under the coun- tenance of an Englifh army, co-operating on the North with the Soubah, on the South with the Nabob of the Carnatic, and in the Weft, uphold- ing the government of Poonah. Hyder Ally is too wife and too experienced a politician not to fee all the extent of fuch a dan- G ger; t 18 J get ; and feeing it, not to provide againft it in time, by foliciting that the government of My- fore may not be the only one excluded from our protection. Hyder Ally will therefore requeft a military aid from us, and propofe afiignments for its fupport : fo that our very rivals, upon the prin- ciple of their own intereft and fecuricy, will be- come inftruments to put us in pofTeffi'on of what we are called upon, from fo many motives, to make the firft object of our policy. The balance of India will thus necelTarily be placed in our hands. With a decreafe of expence we mall have a great increafe of force : and our attention, drawn from our affairs ac home by one object, only, will leave us the leifure to inveftigate our internal fyftem, and to correct its defects. Our population and induftry will increafe ; plenty and happinefs will diffufe themfelves amongft our own im- mediate fubjects ; and every inhabitant of that cxtenfive region will have caufe to bkfs and pray for the prefervation of that juflice, policy, and moderation, which feeure, upon the bafis of Bri- tifh power and wifdom, the peace and happinefs of India. Inducements fuch as thefe become their own advocates. They need no ornaments of diction to give them weight. Founded upon facts, they are urged t '9 ] urged with confidence ; and having reference to the great interefts of the nation, they are addreffed to your Lordfhip. J have the honor to be, My LORD, &c. &c. LETTER J LETTER III. Mr LORD, IN the preceding letter I have endeavoured to, trace the outline of a political plan for the conduct of our interefts in India, and to point out the advantages that may be derived from fuch a fyftem. I mufl not, however, conceal from your Lordfhip, that the national wifdom hath not yet relieved the India Company from one great embarraflment in their military arrangements ^ and that without this aid, we may, in the very exertion of our policy, fow the feeds of our ruin. I allude to the manner of recruiting the army in India, and the confequent difficulties, not only of completing the regiments, but of pro- curing any men fit for foldiers to engage in the. fervice of the Company -, although it is a fact beyond contradiction, that the appointments of the foldier are no where fo high, nor more regu- larly paid j and I may venture to add, that the nation is no where more interefted in having a well-formed European army, whether we con- fider its comparative numbers with the native troops in the fervice of the Company, the extent of t ] of empire to be protected, or the vaft importance of its revenue, and of its commerce. I will not intrude on your Lordmip's leifure by a detail of the embarraffments and evils at- tending the prefent method of enlifting for India, as I am confident no man, who can be confulted upon it, will undertake its defence i nor will I examine why the bills, that have at different times been propofed to parliament for removing thefe cmbarraffments, have failed of fuccefs. The neceflity of adopting fome plan, by which the army in India may be well and completely re- cruited, has never before, perhaps, been felt in its full force. It is now only, that every motive of national honor, intereft, and fafety unite in calling the attention of the public to this object : ic would therefore be unjuft to conclude from any former difappointments, that any man, or body of men, will now be found fo wanting in duty to their country, as to oppofe a meafure calculated folely for the improvement of an efta- blifhment, upon which our very exiftence in the Eaft is known to depend. I underiland the ufage in his Majefty's fervice in time of war is, to attach two additional com- panies to each regiment, the officers of which are conftantly employed in England to enlift jr.en, who, as they are engaged, are fent to Chatham, Chatham, where they are difciplined, and held in readinefs to be drafted, as the exigencies of the fervice, or the particular wants of the different regiments, may render it necefiary* In India, my Lord, we are always to be confidered in a flate of warfare, at leaft good policy requires that we mould be at all times prepared for a&ive fervice ; an inftitution, therefore,' upon the fame principle would be highly ufeful for recruiting the army in that country. Permit me then to aflc, my Lord, why may not the Company be allowed to appoint officers from the different pre- fidencies, to recruit publicly in this country and in Ireland ? and why may they not be permitted to fix a general rendezvous, like that at Chat- ham, where their recruits may be formed to dif- cipline, and kept to the healthful exercifes of a foldier, until the moment of embarkation ? By fome fuch means, I will venture to fay, that the army in India might be made to receive a difciplined foldier in every recruit who might be fent thither ; whereas, by the mode at prefent obferved, they arrive raw and untaught, and one half at leaft are, from difeafe and decay, unfit for fervice. I will aflert with equal confidence, that every recruit would then become a ready vo- lunteer ; for what foldier, who knows that he can purchafe provifions in ^ndia>t half the price he C *3 ] he pays for them in England; that tobacco," linen, and arrack are in a flill cheaper propor- tion ; that the pay of a foot foldier is d. a-day more than in a marching regiment at home ; that he enlifts but for a limited time ; and that, if invalided by fervice, he can return to his own country with a daily allowance of one milling, to fpend where he may chufe his retreat j What foldier, I repeat it, could refift fuch arguments? And permit me to afk, my Lord, what argu- ments can be urged that mould prevent govern- ment from inverting the Eaft India Company with the liberty of recruiting the army for the pro- tection of our valuable dominion in the Eaft, upon a plan found ufeful in the fervice of the crown. If there are any objections to this plan, which I confefs do not occur to me, but which poffibly may to others ; yet I truft they will be found inconfiderable, -when compared with the folid ad* vantages which I have endeavoured to fuggeft to your Lordfhip. I know it may be objected, that a mode fo ef- fectual for recruitiug an army at fuch a diftance, muft unavoidably be a great drain upon that part of our population which is fit for military fer- vice ; but as fome effective mode muft be ad- opted, and as every fuch mode muft be followed by a fimilar confequence, this cannot be main- tained as a particular exception to that which is f J is here propofed. As a general objection, ifi muft ever be confidered as of ferious import > and therefore I will hope to meet your Lord- (hip's indulgence, as well as the wifhes of every reflecting man, in propofing a meafure which can- not fail to leflen this drairt j and which, while it promifes to fupply our army with fome ufeful fubjects, will at the fame time deprive the differ- ent powers of India of one of the principal fources from whence they now draw their ftouteft and bed difciplined troops : I mean the off- fpring of our foldiery. All the governments of Europe, even thofe where the ablblute power of the fovereign fub- jects every man to military fervice, have feen the utility of forming eftablimments for the children of foldiers; and they are now adopted almoft every where upon the continent, as certain and great refources. In this country, and in our fifter king- dom, inftitutions of this kind have been formed upon the larger ground of providing fo many ufeful members to fociety ; .the principles of our government, and the happy fecurity we live un- der, rendering it equally unconftitutional and tmneceflary to confign any individual to a mili- tary profefliori before he is qualified to make a choice for himfelf. Were our pofieflions in India cdnftituted as thefe iflands are, or were they capable of receiv- ing f 25 ] ing fuch a conftitution, it would be criminal to propoie any lefs liberal plan : but whilft every profefiion .is confidered by the natives as an in- herita-nce not only of the family, but of the caft ; whilft the religious prejudices of a whole people are found to oppofe the communication of thefe privileges to any out of their own tribes ; it would be impracticable to form eftablilhments in India upon the principle of our national inititu- tions. Whether then, my Lord, by fome fmali abridgment of that national liberty which we, with fo much reafon, pride ourlelves on in this country, mail we incorporate thefe children into a fociety, ; which commands refpect in every pare of the world ? or ftiall we, by an inattention to the common duties of humanity^ as well as policy, continue to augment 'the number of 'the already too numerous tribes of Pariars and Hallencores ? of fellow-creatures, born out-cads of fociety, and whofe lives, in many parts of India, are at the abfolute mercy of every individual, whom accident has exempted from fimilar pro- fcription ! Your Lordfhip cannot hefitate upon the option to be made. Your decifion muft be in favor of a public eftablifhment, and you will D yield . I * yield to the necefilty which diredls that fuch cftablifhments fliould be merely nurferies for the army, in which, from the habits of early exerciie, the boys may be formed tci difcipline, and fitted for the fervice. The marine force of India does not lefs claim V the attention of your Lordmip: nor are the im- provements which may be made in its eftablifh- ment, lefs confequential than thofe which may be fuggefted on the part of the military. It is a fact of general notoriety, that the cli- mate of India is fo particularly unfavorable to the. \ fhips built of the materials of Europe, that thofe which are fent thither are found barely equal to the ftation of three years, which is ufually fixed for the fquadron in thofe feas : while every man who has refided in India can inform your Lord- fhip, that the mips built in that country, are of an extraordinary duration, infomuch that if is not uncommon to hear of a fhip that has been in conftant fervice, thirty-five and forty years*, except, during the more intervals of repairing. * Voyage en Arable, &c. 6cc. par Niebuhr, 1 780. " Le bois dont les Indians fe fervent pour leurs vaifleaux " (Tak) eft fi dur, que les vers n'ofent pas s'y frctter? " et de la vient que Ton trouve fouvent, chez eux, des " vaifleaux qui ont 80 jufqu'a 90 ens." This circumftance amounts in itfelf to a de- monftration, that it would be for the public fer- vice, that the mips deftined for the Indian ftation mould be built in India, provided the timber of that country fhould be found of dimenfions pro- per for (hips of the line-, and if there are, or can be made, docks of fufficient extent and ca- pacity for fuch a purpofe. With refpe<5b to timber, it is known that the Teak wood of India yields only to maho- gany in its dimenfions j and I queftion whether even the mahogany can rival it in its ftately growth. This wood is produced in great abundance upon the coafts of Orixa and Malabar ; and in ftill greater abundance in the country of Pegu, upon the eaftern fide of the bay of Bengal : fo that whether we look to Bom- bay, as the great magazine for creating our Indian, navy \ or whether we carry our attention in part to the iflands of Nicobar and Andaman in the bay of Bengal ; in either, or in both events, timber fit for the conflruclion of large {hips is to be found with fo little inconveniency, that it would feem no difficulty could be fuggefted upon that head. If it mould be objected, that the Teak wood is not applicable to all the purpofcs of the fhip- wright > yet that will be no difcouragement, as P I there there grows, in moft parts of India, another fpe- cies of timber, the moft eligible perhaps in the \J world, to fupply what arc termed the Knees in Ship-building, in general fo difficult to be ob- tained of fufficient dimenfions ; the excellence of this timber refults not only from its tortuous growth, but from the peculiar property it pof- fefTes, of acquiring ftrength and durability in the fea water. How far the docks, already eftablimed at Bombay, may be proper for the conftruction of {hips of the line, or how far it may be practi- cable to render them convenient for fuch a fer- vice, I will not prefume to determine. But there are men of local knowledge, and of pro- fefiional ability, now in England, whofe infor- mation may decide your Lordfhip's judgment upon thefe fubjects. It were to be wifhed your Lordmip could be referred to fources of equal in- telligence with refpeft to the iflands of Nicobar and Andaman ; for their fituation in the bay of Bengal, between the 8 th and 1 2th degrees of north- ern latitude, is particularly convenient for the command of that fea, and confequently for the protection of our pofleflions in Bengal, and on the coaft of Coromandel. But though I cannot pretend to direct, your ip's enquiries upon this fubject, I can yet, with with great confidence, venture to encourage them, by requeuing you will be pleafed to turn for a moment to any chart of the Bay of Bengal : your Lordfhip will there find, that -two of the Nicobar iilands are placed in fo happy a pofition, oppofite to each other, and formed fo particu- larly for the purpofe of giving fhelter to fhipping, and of offering them a free paflage at all times, either to the Eaft or to the Weft, that our moft fanguine imaginations could not picture to us a harbour with greater advantages for our fleets, than this one poffefles. .It has depth of water for our largeft mips, and capacity for a greater fleet than we have ever yet maintained in the caftern fea. It lies in the latitude of 8 9 north. Its diftance from Madras and from Bengal is in- coniiderable, and the paflage is often effected in five or fix days : at the worft feafon of the year, in fifteen. With a port like this to the eaftward, our fleet would at all times be able to guard the en- trance of the bay ; for in the violence of the monfoon on the coaft of Coromandel, all is tran- quil on the coaft of Tenaflerim, and in the neigh- bourhood of thefe iflands. The port of Mer- guey,to which the French retired in the monfoons during the laft war, would no longer afford them a retreat j for without a fuperiority at fea, they would [ 3 J would never venture to approach fo near the place of our naval ftrength, Merguey lying ftill to the eaftward of the Nicobars, on the coaft of Tenaflerim. In addition to thefe advantages of fituation, the vicinity of thefe iflands to the kingdom of Pegu gives them a particular recommendation -, not only on account of the Teak timber, with which that country abounds, but for the many valuable articles of commerce that may be drawn from it. We want but the countenance of fuch a fup- port as our fleet, to revive our trade with Pegu, and to make the filver mines of that country con- tribute to incite the induftry of our Indian ma- nufacturers , the painted callicoes of Bengal and the coaft of Coromandel having been, till of late years, in great requeft in Pegu, where a large vent would again be opened, the moment the far- mers of the cuftoms there mould be made to re- fpect the Englifh flag, and to allow us the privi- lege of a free commerce, to which we were in- tided by former treaties, though it has been de- nied us of late by the exacting avarice of thefe men. The climate of India, though not fo deftrue- tive of our feamen, as of our mips, does never- thelels, by expofing them to the ardent influence of [ 3i J of the fun, fubjeft them to very violent and dan- gerous diforders. I fay, my Lord, by expofing them to the ardent influence of the fun ; for, ab- flradled from that, I am convinced the climate of India is not unfriendly to our people. It is therefore particularly upon that account that I am induced to fuggeft ro your Lordfhip, the idea of allotting to each Ihip of war, while in India, a certain number of Lafcars, or Indian failors, who mould be charged with the boat fervice, and fuch other duties as may relieve the Engliih failor from the violence of this heat, and which may be performed by the native Indians without dan- ger ; for, accuftomed from their infancy to the hot fun of the Eaft, there would be neither hard- (hip nor inhumanity in impofing fuch duties upon them. If I may be allowed to extend this idea, I would carry it to a temporary exchange, in India, of the marines belonging to the fquadron, for an. equal number of difciplined Lafrars, to be re- turned when the fleet fhould be called back to Europe, or relieved by other mips. We have fuch unqneftionable proof in our Seapoys, of what the natives of India are to be brought to, by difcipline and regulations, that it cannot now be doubted, but that, under proper management, they may be made equal to any fervice. The regimented Seapoys being compofed of men [ 3 I drawn' intfifcrirrtinately from the different cafts of the country, it would be impoffible to prevail oji them to fubmit to the duties of marine fer- vice; but a corps under the denomination of Lafcar Seapoys, . might be formed for that pur- pofe, and they would, without a murmur, take the place of the marines who might be landed, arid who, by becoming a temporary reinforce- ment to the eftablifhment, would enable us to make exertions of our own ftrength, at times when we mould not venture to hazard them without fuch affiftance. This further advantage' would attend fuch a plan, that in the event of any foreign expedition againft Manilla, or to the continent of America, a body of men would be ready formed for embarkation, upon whofe willing fervices we might fafely rely. I will detain your Lordihip no longer : I will reft allured of finding my apology in the apparent confequence and utility of my fubject : in its moft homely drefs, it may awaken the at- tention, and claim the indulgence of your Lordfhip. I have endeavoured to confine my* felf to fuch fads and proportions, as, from the experience of the evils they are intended to re- medy, become in a great meafure their own ad- vocates: nor have I intruded upon your Lord- fhip I 33 ] (hip a fingle idea, that I did not think, from the pureft conviction of my heart, was equally di- rected to the interefls of the Company and of the nation. Should thefe, or any meafures fimilar to thefe. fuggefted, have the good fortune to meet the ap- probation of government, the Eafl IndiaCompany may foon hope to find themfelves inverted with powers adequate to carry them into execution j and the liberal exertions of the nation may hap*, pily co-operate in producing the extenfion of a lyftem replete with reciprocal and permanent ad- vantages. Upon fuch principles the Company may hope, both in the Cabinet and in the Senate, to find an advocate in the influence and abilities of your Lordfhip j and with fuch wimes, your Lordmip will permit an humble individual to himfelf, with the higheft refpec"b, Your Lordlhip's moft obedient and moft humble fervant. It [ 34 3 It was my original intention to have troubled your Lordlhip with fome further fketches upon the fubjects of the circulation and com- merce of India j but as thofe points would carry me to a great length, and as the latter of them has been treated in a late addrefs to the Court. of Directors, I have fupprefied them here, to give place to the following original letter, the date of which may afford authority, and in fome degree tend to illuftrate the general ideas before fug- gefted to your Lordlhip. To , Efq. May 2 ^th 1774. IN my liift I promiled to confider with you, .how far policy makes it necefiary that the Com- pany fliould interfere in the general fyftem of India, and what benefits they may expect to draw from fuch a conduct. The Act of Parliament you have fent me, is come in time to encourage me to go on : for the preamble declares, that the prefent powers in the Company's reprefentatives are infufficient, and therefore inftitutes a new and fuperior authority, which in all political matters is to direct the whole machine. Whatever [ 35 ] Whatever fufpicions may be entertained of the views of government in this aft, the experience of fome years has fully fhewn, that the plea upon, which it is founded is juft, and that a divided authority was very unequal to preferve the pof- feflions in Bengal, Bombay, and this coaft, from the infults or invafions of the very powerful neighbours we have on every fide : even this au- thority united will be infufficient for fuch a pur- pofe, unlefs the influence of it, and of our mili- tary reputation, mould be improved by policy ; and unlefs we take advantage of the peace in Eu- rope, of the diftracted (late of the Maratta affairs, of the embarraflments of the Soubah, and the good difpofitions of Soujah Dowlah and Hyder l Ally, to extend and eftablifti it in fuch a man- j ner as may give us the direction of the whole machine. Do not call me chimerical for fuggefting fuch an idea. Could I fee by what other means the intereft and honor of the nation could be fecured, this idea mould not long have obtained with me ; but when it is acknowledged by every one who has confidered the ftate of India, and our fitua- tion on this and the Malabar coaft, that ourpre- fent military eftablifhments are unequal to the protection of our own porTeffions, and thofe of our allies which we have engaged to protect; and 3 when t 36 ] when it is as well known that our refources are unequal to the fupport even of thefe eftabliih- ments, it muft I think be confefied, that our authority is but poorly fupported ; and that, un- lefs we either go from our engagements and con- tract our pofleflions on both coafts, or form fuch further connexions with our neighbours, as may not only relieve us from our apprehenfions of them, but give us the addition of their ftrength- both in men and money, we fhall be conftantly expofed to alarms and invafions, and of courie the advantage of the India pofiefiions to- the na- tion', be made very precarious. Call to mind what apprehenfions were raifed in Europe, and in every part of India, when the news was received that a large armament was at Mauritius. How many good reafons were then brought by thofe who thought a Maratta alliance mod favorable to the French for their landing troops near Bombay, and attacking us on that fide : and what confequences were drawn from a fuppofition of their fuccefs on that quarter. On the other hand, how many inducements were they fuppofed to have for joining themfelves with Hyder -, and what confequences were drawn from the fuppofition of their union. Even an alliance with the Soubah, or with the Cuttack Marattas, was well fupported. In [ 37 ] In fhort, to judge from the variety of opinions and apprehenfions which prevailed at that time, one would be inclined to fuppole every power in India the inveterate enemy of the Englifh^ and proportionably attached to the interefl of the French. I do not mean to adopt this opinion ; but yet there generally is enough of good fenfe in the public opinion to juflify my introducing it here , and to conclude from it, that in propor- tion as thefe different apprehenfions difcovered our weaknefs, a firm eftablifliment with the prin- cipal powers in our neighbourhood would add to our ftrength. In this belief, and in compliance with 'your defire, I have reflected much upon the fubject of forming a confederacy with thefe powers ; and for that purpofe I have examined, as far as my poor abilities will allow me, all the arguments that have been urged againft fuch a plan. Before I attempt to anfwer them, I will acknwledge to you, that if the queftion was, Whether the Com- pany (hall or fhall not extend their political con- nexions on the coaft of Coromandel, their trade and their dominions being as well fecured to them now, and as free from being difturbed, as they poffibly can be rendered by any extenfion of their connexions ? I would be foremoft in faying, [ 38 ] faying, that nothing 'but wild ambition could hefitate upon the fubjeft. But as the experience of all countries, and particularly of India, tells us, that where there is no balance eftablifhed there muft neceflarily be contention, until fome one power gains a decided fuperiority over the reft , and as the Company, it is to be believed, never will afpire at a domi- nion extenfive enough for that, the queftion now is, Whether they will fuffer any other power to obtain this afcendency ? or, Whether they will take advantage of the unexpected and moft for- tunate opportunity which is now opened to them, for eftablifhing a balance, and holding the fcale in their own hands ? There are but few, I think, who will hefitate in declaring for the former ; and the general voice will be to demand, how this can be eftablifhed ? Were I to anfwer fuch a queftion, it fliould be by defiring that public minifters might be fent di- rectly to the Soubah's court, and to that of Hyder ally, with orders to correfpond together, and with the minifter at the Maratta court, and all feparately with the prefidency of Madras, which being the refidence of the Nabob of the Car- natic, fhould be confidered as the feat of politi- cal government on the Peninfula, ftill fubject to the [ 39 1 the controuling power of the Supreme Council of Bengal. But I may be told, that hitherto neither the poffcffions of the Company, nor of the Nabob, have been invaded without provocation ; and that as our united ftrength has been encreafing, while that of the Marattas has been waiting by their divifions and cabals, it may be hoped that by leaving things to themfelves, they may work into a fyftem , or that the difagreements amongft the other powers, may weaken them fo much as to throw the afcendancy into our hands. Thofe, however, who have read the records of the Company, will not fay this, for they know, that although the pofleflions of the Na- bob, and of the Company, have not been in- vaded without provocation ; that yet they have been often threatened, and that if the extraor- dinary abilities of Hyder Ally, joined to the great refources he had for money, had not made the Marrattas fufpend hoftilities againft him (I think it was in 1771) and if the death of Mahadirow, their Chieftain, had not foon followed this ; the Carnatic, as well as Hyder's country, might by this time have been in their hands. Nor will thofe who know any thing of the character of Hyder Ally, and of the immenfe {hides [ 40 ] ftrides he has made fmce the death of Mahadi- row, fay, that our apprehenfions fhould ceafe, becaufe the greatnefs of the Marattas is no more. Let any one look to the fituation of Hyder's dominions, fpreading almoft from coaft to coaft of the Peninfula, I might have faid entirely, for the Guntoor Circar, with its port, will always be open to him, whilft Bazalet Jung lives ; and let any one reflect what a government fo compact, rich in all kinds of productions, and ruled by fuch a man as Hyder Ally, or as his fon Tippo Saib, at the head of the beft eftablifhed Black army that has ever been feen in India, is capable of doing. Let him reflect that this government mud necefiarily increafe in power and ftrength, as that of the Marattas declines, from the ceflions which will be made to it, and the feizures it will itfelf make from the dominions of that power ; that the Soubah's weak, and comparatively with Hy- der's, defencelefs ftate, may afterwards render him an eafy prey ; and that with thefe additions of ftrength, Hyder may fall upon our northern Circars, and upon the Carnatic at the fame time ; that with the Circars and the Carnatic, we have a neck of coaft of near eight hundred miles from North Eaft to South to defend, and a flip of country [ 41 ] country of near four hundred miles from Haft to Weft, and both coaft and country fkirted by the pofleflions of Hyder Ally. Let any one reflect on thefe circum (lances, and then fay, whether our apprehensions fhould ceafe, becaufe the Maratta greatnefs is'no more. He will, I think, rather fay, that a much greater power is riling up, and that all may be endan- gered, if timely meafures are not taken to pre- vent it. I think too he will confefs that no other mea^ fure can be effectual, but that of eftablifhing a balance of power, by dividing and yet uphold* ing the Marattas ; by ftrengthening the Soubah, in obtaining for him the diftricts which they have pvomifed to cede to him ; by getting a grant as loon as poflible from him of the Gun- toor Circar j by eftabliming a refpectable black cavalry, under the command of the Company's officers 5 by becoming principals through the medium of our own agents at the feveral courts, .Hill acting in concert with the Nabob -, and by lending a military afiiftance to the Soubah, for the ESTABLISHMENT OF ORDER in his own govern- ment , the expence to be deducted from the an- nual tribute for the Cir'cars, which, upon the ceflion of that of Guntoor, will become feven F lacks [ 4* ] lacks of rupees, and- the releafe from which would certainly be the reward of the fer vices the Soubah would receive, in point of finance and authority, from the afiiftance of our troops. By thefe means, and by continuing a detach- ment with the Marattas, we mould not only infure thofe two powers in our intereft, but from the influence that would give us, obtain a con- fideration with Hyder, which might make him feek for an intimate connection with us, with as much warmth as he did in 1771, when he was fo prefled by the Marattas, as I have before, obferved. It has been faid that the fort of Trichinopoly is a check upon Hyder on one fide, and that the Bombay government bridles him on the other j and I know this opinion has prevailed, and with reafon, fo far as thofe terms mean the preventing him from extending his conquefts either in the neighbourhood of the fort of Trichinopoly, or of that of Bombay. But we have no reafon as yet to fear any at- tempts to take our forts from us ; what we have to apprehend is, that our countries may be laid wafte from year to year, and neither Bom- bay nor Trichinopoly (if Trichinopoly, inftead of a ruin, was as ilrong as Bombay) could pre- vent [ 43 ] vent Hyder or the Marattas from doing this, whenever either mould be tempted to difre- gard us. For what prote&ion can a garrifon give to a country that is open almoft on every fide, when large armies of cavalry break in to lay it wafte ? All our troops can do in fuch cafes, is to extend their protection for a few miles around their forts, and to fhelter the poor inhabitants who may fly from their defolated villages to feek fecurity for the little they may bring away with them. But if we are in clofe alliance with Hyder Ally, the Marattas cannot difturb us in the Car- natic, becaule to do it they muft pafs through his country ; and if we are in alliance with them, we can have nothing to fear from him on the Malabar fide, where they are all powerful ; and the Soubah lying between both, rj)ufl, as a friend, be a kind of barrier againft each of them, and flrengthened as we mould flrengthen him, would be a great check upon them both. But it may be urged, that the Company's troops mould be kept as much together as pof- fible, and that the ftationing any part at Hydra- bad, or any where in the Soubah's dominions, would he removing them too far from the coaft, and that in cafe of an alarm from the French F 2 . very t 44 ] very bad confequences might attend this. And certainly if the queftion was fimply, Whether the Company's troops would be in better order and difcipline, and better prepared to refift an invafion from the French, when kept together near Madras, than when divided, the anfwer would be felf-evident. . But as this can never be the queftion, while \ve have fuch a powerful neighbour as Hyder encir- cling us on all fides ; as to guard againft him, troops muft always be kept in Tanjore, Trichi- nopoly, and Tennevelly, the latter of which is. four hundred miles from Madras ; as the Cir- cars, befides the forts upon the iea coaft, which extend fix hundred miles from Madras, ought to have a back fupport, and as the centre of thq Soubah's dominions is but about three hundred miles from Mafulipatam on one fide, and not five hundred miles from Bombay on the other ; I confefs I do not fee any more danger to be ap- prehended from flationing a detachment with the Soubah, we having the funds in our own hands for paying it, than there is in ftationing one in Tanjore. At leafl the great advantages of eflabliming and keeping the balance bf power in our own hands ; the immediate pofiefiion of the Guntoor Circar j, arid from it of a revenue of ^ioo,ooo^more, ap- pear [ 45 ] pear to me fo greatly to counter-balance every objection that can be urged againft the meafure, that I am perfuaded, if ever it is thoroughly confidered, they muft prevail for its eftablifh- ment. It may be faid, all this may be very juft, but that yet, as the plan is a very extenfive one, the fentiments of the Supreme Council, and of the Prefidencies of Madras and Bombay, mould be received upon it, before it is attempted to put it in execution ; and that as we are now in per- fect peace, encreafing in riches and in flrength, no bad confequences can attend the waiting for fuch farther explanations as the public advices from the feveral prefidencies may give. I know arguments of this kind are often ufed, and fometimes even by thofe who wifh well to the public, and have minds capable of difcerning its true intereft, but who want refo- lution f.o bring forward their fentiments when fhe novelty and boldnefs of them make it pro- bable that they may be oppofed. To fuch men one might fay, revolutions in India are often but the work of a day ; that the Marattas, who but five years ago made all the other powers on the peninfula tremble, are now in need of being fupported ; that Hyder Ally, who not longer ago was almoft reduced to naked- nefs, t 46 ] nefs, is now a moft formidable power ; that the Company, having undertaken the mediation be- tween the Marattas, are bound, as much in inte- reft as honour, to prevent the interference of any other power for that purpofe , that Hyder is ready, on one fide, to feize upon thofe diftricts of their country which adjoin to his own ; whilft the Soubah, on the other fide, is prepared to take pofleffion of thofe which they have cededj or rather engaged to reftore to him ; that the Com- pany are under feparate defenfive engagements with the Soubah and with Hyder ; and that now being engaged in the fame manner to the Ma- rattas, they are actually involved in all the extent of the fyftem. r: It is worth (lopping a little here to fee how, without any plan laid down, without any concert between the prefidcncies of Madras and Bombay, without any uniform principle of condu