THE GIFT OF MAY TREAT MORRISON IN MEMORY OF ALEXANDER F MORRISON AMERICA'S FOREiaN POLICY AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES BY THEODORE SALISBURY WOOLSEY M. A. PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF YALE UNIVERSITY NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1898 Copyright, 1886, by Allen Thokndike Rice. Copyright, 1895, 1896, by Tm; Forum Publishing Co. Copyright, 1893, 1896, 1897, 1898, by The Yale Law Jouknal. Copyright, 1892, 1894, 1895, 1896, by The Yale Publishing Compant. Copyright, 1898, by The Century Co. The DeVinne Pre88. s 1415 W88*- T INTRODUCTION HE essays and addresses gathered in this little volume, with few exceptions, have been called ont by pnblic events during the 5 past four years. For the courtesy of a permis- j|r sion to reprint certain of them, I return sin- 5 cere thanks to the publications where they first appeared. They were adapted for spe- cial occasions, or to meet special questions, g and differ much in stjde and form on this J2 account. Nor has pains been taken to re- move from them the references to time which they contain. Nevertheless, it is hoped that they have a certain unity and present value ^ in a discussion of the foreign policy of the 52 United States. Z For some years our national government o has seemed to me to be on the eve of an im- t portant change of policy in its aims and 5 ideals. It has shown an ever-growing dispo- sition to break away from our early habit of political isolation, and to assert itself in the rivalries of the world's politics. This change V 432555 Tl INTRODUCTION I have dreaded, and the opposite, the con- servative view, animates many of my pages. How this change was to come, no man could anticipate. That we, as a people, are nearer to its realization to-day than ever before, is a fact which stares us in the face. One important step in the new program, call it colonialism or imperialism or what you will, has been taken in the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. And the motive for it largely was their strategical imjior- tance and their convenience as a stepping- stone to the Philippines. The terms of peace to be agreed upon with Spain will go far to decide our future des- tiny. A wonderful chance of aggrandize- ment seems to be within our grasp. Shall we seize it? Ought we to resist it? Is it consistent with our true mission, with our highest development? There are two sets of advocates of this policy of imperialism. One reasons thus: The capture of the Philippines is a divinely ordered responsibility. Whether we wish it or not, the civilization and Christianization of these populous islands have been suddenly laid upon our shoulders. Let us not prove unworthy of the trust. The other sees in the retention of Spain's colonies a chance to provide ourselves with foreign markets, and extend our foreign trade, which may never recur. These views are both weighty, both INTKODUCTION vii sincere, yet both may be mistaken. How can we be sure that this opportunity is a re- sponsibility to be borne, and not a tempta- tion to be resisted ? An opportunity is not necessarily a reason. And, again, does the possession of colonies, for a people organized as we are, promise a healthful growth of trade and markets, or such an entanglement with the rivalries, jealousies, and ambitions of other and powerful nations as to injure both ? Already in the manoeuvering of the Ger- mans for position at Manila, we may see a sample of the difficulties of the situation. In this connection, let me say very frankly that, if I understand the nature of the American aright, the one thing which he will not put up with is an attempt to limit his prerogatives as conqueror or treaty- maker. Generous and broad-minded he may be in his terms of peace ; but to have those terms dictated by a European concert, to be put on the plane of Turkey or of Greece, or even to be curbed in victory like Russia or Japan, is a thing not to be endured. He would fight in preference. And yet it is to just such a necessity that the new policy would expose him. From a single power like Germany he has nothing to fear, because Germany's real influence is continental. It does not touch him nearly. It is not trans- latable into colonial importance and naval Mil INTKODUCTION effectiveness. The mere cost of a contest with the United States would endanger her place in the European equilibrium. But let a European coalition attempt the same thing, and how can one power resist it, imless an ally be called in, and the world be set by the ears ? The old theory of the balance of power confined its working to the European system, to land power, and to political, not commer- cial, growth. There are signs that every one of these limitations is being overridden. The scramble for land in Africa and in China, the reaching out for new markets, the inclu- sion of Japan in the world's balance, all show that we cannot be within the sphere of the concert, yet not of it. We have to take the bitter with the sweet, the limitations with the privileges. Much is said by irresponsible persons of the erection of the United States into a great military power as a result of the Spanish war. But clearly this depends upon the policy which we elect to pursue. If we choose imperialism, then it is true, and the lessons of organization and of armament which the war is teaching are valuable in- deed. On the other hand, if we are content with our own ideals, the fact of this war will be a bulwark of defense. For it shows that this is a warlike people; that it does not count the cost in following an ideal ; that it INTKODUCTION ix does not threaten merely, and that it knows how. Such a reputation is worth armies and navies in defense, while the small establish- ment, small but efficient, which has been our usage, is a pledge of unaggressiveness. In one respect I believe that we might well copy the older powers — in the protection given to our subjects and their property the world over. Not like a swash-buckler, but like a guardian, calm but strong, we should protect our interests and collect our dues. And if this duty led us to Smyrna, to seize an equivalent from the Porte for the Ameri- can losses in Armenia, it might prove a use- ful lesson to all the world. A few words, finally, as to our attitude toward Great Britain. The cordial sympa- thy of that country with this during the Spanish war; its belief in our honesty of purpose in commencing that war ; a fancied identity of commercial interests in China — these reasons, together with a sense of our common heritage of speech and law and ideal, have led many to believe that these two great nations could l^e harnessed to- gether by a treaty of alliance, and made to pull with even trace the car of progress. Cordiality, mutual sympathy, belief in one another's sincerity, pride in our joint inheri- tance — these qualities the two peojjles maj^ cherish and should cherish; an alliance be- tween the two governments is a far different X INTRODUCTION and more doubtful policy. It would entail for us an immediate plunge into the whirl- pool of continental politics ; the assumption of unwelcome and unwonted responsibilities ; the straying from the path of our natural and wonted development. For, if either party is attacked, alliance means war. Har- mony, agreement, a good understanding — these we can strive after ; these we can per- haps insure by aid of an arbitration treaty, upon which as a foundation the entente can be built up. But let each nation play its own hand, judge of its own duty, solve its own problems in its own way. What destiny the coming century has in store for our beloved land, who can tell ? It depends upon the moral qualities of our race, exemplified in government. We shall need high aim and integrity of purpose. We shall need robust common sense. If these pages contribute in any degree to a calm and sober judgment of the vital issues of the future, they will have served their end. T. S. WOOLSEY. Yale University, July 21, 1898. CONTENTS Our Foreign Policy, and its Relation to ^^^^ Domestic Problems 1 The Consequences of Cuban Belliger- ency 25 Our Duty to Spain 37 Responsibility for the ^' Maine" ... 53 Cuba and Intervention 61 The War with Spain 71 The Future of the Philippines .... 103 The Law and the Policy for Hawaii . 115 An Interoceanic Canal in the light of Precedent 133 An Interoceanic Canal from the Stand- point OF Self-Interest 153 An Inquiry Concerning our Foreign Re- lations , 169 The Fishery Question. 195 The Bering Sea Award .• 213 The President's Monroe Doctrine . . . 223 Some Thoughts on the Settlement of International Controversies . . . 241 Some Cojdient upon the Arbitration Treaty 261 The United States and the Declaration OF Paris 273 OUR FOREION POLICY, AND ITS RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AN ADDEESS Before the American Social Science Association, Saratoga, September, 1897 OUR FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS C1TATE policy is an ever-changing thing. 1^ Rarely can a country, in the nature of things in this mutable world, pursue an iden- tical line of action seeking a certain end until that end is accomplished. Sovereigns and ministers die or change; unexpected problems, unforeseen difficulties, arise ; the nightmare of one generation may become the ideal of another. Moreover, new outlets for national expan- sion are found, and a spirit of colonial adven- ture crops out now and again which tempts nations to their hurt. Thus the German Empire to-day has been led into a policy of naval development and African land-grab- bing which is quite inconsistent with its traditions, its genius, and its capacity. Or the march of events brings about the inevitable, and we see a state with its mind made up to accept what a previous generation 2 OUK FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS would have aeceptecl only at the cost of war. Even uow we are wondering whether Eng- land has not acquiesced in Russia's passion- ate deijire for a ,Me»il'itpiTanean outlet. If so, in this centur'y-loiig hi'Ovement of Russia we shoiiM ii;n>i: '^n • <3Xce^faon^: to the rule : she would have pursued a single end until its accomplishment. And in her case this would be more probable than in that of any other power, for her government reflects the arbitrary rule of a single family. The more representative the government, the less con- tinuous the foreign policy. This is the law which we should expect, and in our own case this law obtains. As one party succeeds an- other in power, it does not hesitate instantly to undo what its predecessor had arranged. Thus, to go back a few years only, Mr. Bay- ard tried to protect seal life by diplomatic agreement, Mr. Blaine by assertion of own- ership; President Harrison attempted the annexation of Hawaii, President Cleveland negatived it; one party built up a set of reciprocity treaties upon its tariff foundation, the other altered the tariff and the treaties lapsed. This want of continuity in its for- eign policy must be a sad obstacle to our successful diplomacy, but it is inevitable in a government by the popular will. As it limits the reliance which other states may place upon our aid and our attitude, so it must RELATION TO DOMESTIC rKOBLE:\rs 3 necessarily weaken our right to leadership and powers of initiative. While all this is true, in one respect this country has pursued with fair consistency a policy of abstention from European com- plications. Maintaining an attitude of self- defense and insisting upon its rights, throughout the century now closing, it has enlarged and defined its borders as against Great Britain and Russia and Mexico, France and Spain; but again and again it has declined those steps which would tend to make it a sharer in the problems of continental Europe. Washington's posi- tion at the end of the eighteenth century has been our position throughout the nine- teenth. And the reason is easy to see. Our national expansion has been upon internal lines. There has been room at home for all the energy, the commercial growth, the national development of which the countiy was capable. A broad belt of continent was to be conquered, and the century has been devoted to the task. Is the work finished? Must we now look outside of our own borders to find room for our exj^ansive energy? Have we achieved such results in material growth, in political development, and in the solution of social problems that we can fairly go to less fortunate peoples, with our birth- right in our hands, and say to them, " Come, 4 OUB FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS share our heritage with us " ? Is a forward policy, an aggressive poHcy, an expansive policy for the future, consistent with our in- ternal growth and the wise solution of the problems confronting us ? This is likely to be one of the serious questions of the next quarter-century. Already there is evident a tendency to view our foreign relations from a new point of view. We are dividing into conservatives and forwards — to use a term which avoids characterization. We do not as yet share directly in European politics; we do not lift our voice in the "concert" of the powers. Our changing attitude is seen, rather, with regard to European relations with the states of the American continent. If we examine various significant acts of our national government and couple with them the passionately urged opinions of many of our senators and congressmen, backed by a fairly extensive portion of the press, we shall find, I think, a somewhat indefinite i:)rogram, but one positively held and urged, and with a single end in view — the territorial growth of the United States and the extension of its influence upon this continent. Disclaiming— as yet, at least— a desire to share in European affairs, these forwards say : " America for the Americans." They as- sert that because we play no part in Europe, EELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 5 European powers must in turn refrain from niingiing in American affairs, and that, in fact, the time is ripe for a declaration that no European sovereignty can be 23ermitted to control territory on this side of the Atlantic. It is, of course, a 110)1 sequltur to argue that, since we havx no hand in European affairs, they must put no finger into ours. For our policy— as every policy must be— was and is determined by our own sense of expediency ; it is not a matter of right or of reciprocity. One of the phenomena which indicates this change of attitude alluded to is the growth of belligerent feeling which has accompanied the recent increase in our naval strength. Perhax^s the naval growth is itself a sign, but I prefer to think not. For the revolu- tion in naval architecture since our Civil War has demanded a completely new navy to put us in the same relative position as formerly. The prime object of a navy is to protect the persons and the commerce of a state's sub- jects the world over. In building a navy before enacting such laws as will give us a share in the world's carrying-trade, we are open to the charge of putting the cart before the horse. Nevertheless there are many in- terests to guard in foreign ports besides a carrying-trade, and the United States must perform, with other powers, the duty of policing the seas, of furnishing protection 6 OUR FOEEIGN POLICY, AND ITS to its subjects among the uncivilized races, of ceremonial observance, of neutrality en- forcement, besides making itself ready for a possible war of self-defense. But if, instead of trying to build up our trade and protect- ing our citizens and enforcing our laws, we use this weapon to threaten others with, it is an abuse. Fortunately there are as yet no very flagrant instances of such abuse. The truculent spirit which I have in mind, which we are apt to call Jingoism, has not been often translated into action. But it is sug- gested by our attempt, during the Harrison administration, to protect the seals of Bering Sea as a matter of right instead of by inter- national agreement ; by the sensational chase of the Chilian ship Itata^ a vessel, as our courts later declared, engaged in legitimate commerce ; by the reproof of a navy officer who failed to protect General Barrundia from the laws of his own country, violated by him, when he was within its jurisdiction; most of all, by the frequent and ridiculous outbursts of temper on the part of individuals in and out of Congress, who insist that the navy shall blow some one or something which displeases them out of the water. It is the unpleasant habit of " pulling a gun," which obtains in certain parts of our country, raised to a national usage. Another example of a similar tendency is RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 7 seen in the extension and more emphatic assertion of that article of out national policy which we call the Monroe Doctrine. When we were small and weak as a people, it was natural to think that the imposition of a European sovereignty upon a minor Ameri- can state, against its will, might threaten us as well as hurt it. But the richer and more powerful we grow, and the less this danger really exists, the more vociferously we pro- fess to fear it. This topic has been so thoroughly threshed out in recent discussion, however, that I turn to another which is perhaps more important, namely, the position we shall elect to take in regard to a Central American canal connect- ing the oceans. Here what is wanted now, and what has been consistently planned for in our past diplomacy, is such a condition of security and stability, of peaceful construc- tion and peaceful maintenance, as will enable such a beneficent public work to be built. This has been attempted by guaranteeing its neutrality and its freedom from the exclusive control of any single nation. This policy the forwards seek to change. If a treaty stands in their way, as the Clayton-Bulwer conven- tion does, it must be abrogated. If a canal is to be built, we, and we alone, they declare, must control it. And why ? Solely because such control will add to the effectiveness of 8 OUK FOllEIGN POLICY, AND ITS our fleet by giving it peculiar facilities of mobilization and operation upon both our coasts. The price which we must pay for this privilege is such an increase of our army as to garrison and hold the canal against local insurrection or foreign attack ; a large increase of our vulnerable sea-coast ; and the reputation of a national breach of faith. To this heavy cost in taxes, in risk of foreign embroilment, and in dishonor, should be added the damage to our commerce which would be likely from its use of a canal sub- ject to the hazards of war, instead of free from those hazards, as an international guaranty of neutrality would make it. Perhaps the most striking feature of that wave of public excitement which was aroused by the Venezuelan difficulty of 1895-96 was the revelation, by Congress and by a large section of the public press, of deep-seated hatred of England. Was this an inheritance from the last century ! Was it an outgrowth of the Civil War ? Was it the result of Irish influence in American politics, or because England was a gold-standard country or believed in free trade ? Or was it simply an evidence of the nervous, excitable, volatile American temper- ament, which now and then leads this peace- ful people into an absurdity of warlike desire such as followed the Virginius capture and RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 9 the attack upon the Baltimore's crew in Val- paraiso ? Whatever the explanation may be, whether it is one or all of these, the existence of the feeling is a phenomenon which has snrprised calm observers in this conntry and has shocked and amazed the British people. More and more it can be used by demagogues in this country to further their own ends. Is it a question of tariff I Then that tariff which will make England smart must be the right one. Is it a question of currency? Our system must run counter to that of the " rob- ber" nation to be satisfactory. Or is there an arbitration treaty proposed to lessen the chance of war and insure a ready and peace- ful settlement of nearly all disputes ? It must, per se, be a mistake because of its origin ; some insidious British wile lies hid in it. There was another reason for the defeat of the arbitration treaty. It came up for ratifi- cation at a time when the Senate was engaged in contest with the executive branch of the government over the right of initiative in our foreign relations. "We order you to recognize the independence of Cuba," said the Senate. " You cannot, and we will not," replied Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Olney, follow- ing an unbroken line of precedents. Accord- ingly, the arbitration treaty was so amended by the Senate as to keep the power of refer- ence to the treaty courts in its own hands, 10 OUR FOEEIGN POLICY, AND ITS which was one of the very things which the people at hirge desired to avoid. To curtail the powers granted by the Con- stitution to the executive, to keep alive an active distrust of and hostility to Great Britain, to play an aggressive part in our relations with other powers, to assume a headship of the states of the American con- tinent, with a vague yet dangerous responsi- bility for them to correspond — such is the forward policy. And it is more — and more definite— than this. It contemplates the an- nexation of Hawaii, on account of its stra- tegical position at the meeting-place of the lines of travel in the Pacific. This, the first and easiest step in the program, is also the least objectionable, judged by itself alone, yet seems to be not without complications. It desires some form of control over Cuba also, because Cuba would be the key to a Central American canal. It even dreams of Mexico and Canada as our eventual possessions. Thus it aims at extension of territory as an aid to extension of power. The question whether this people needs now, or will soon need, more land to grow over, is one about which anybody may have an opinion. We see now that the Louisiana purchase was a far-sighted sagacious step. The annexation of Texas and conquest of California may be criticized as a wrong to Mexico, but were RELATION TO DOMESTIC PEOBLEMS 11 essential to our symmetrical development. And lately Alaska has begun to evidence Mr. Seward's skill in land-speculation. May it not be that further extension, in years to come, will prove to be equally praiseworthy I Possibly. Yet there are two or three consid- erations which should not be lost sight of. Except in the case of Alaska, these earlier additions were of contiguous territory. They did not present the problem of ingrafting dis- tant colonial government upon our system. Moreover, they were of territory practically unoccupied. They did not involve the diffi- culties of administering the affairs of alien races in full control and ownership of foreign soil. And, most of all, they were to provide room for a nation's growth of population, not to enhance its strategical position. If the annexationists allege the need of wider limits for our growing millions, it is one thing. With the census maps before us, we can judge of the necessity. But if their reasons are political and military, if their coveted soil is already thickly settled, it is quite another. When Jingoism ceases to be merely the stock in trade of the demagogue, and aspires to expression in political action, it is time to judge it seriously. What now is the conservative policy to contrast with these aspirations ? It may be expressed by a single phrase— the settlement 12 OUK FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS of domestic problems uncomplicated by for- eign questions. Slavery and States' rights, as great political problems, have been settled. But the currency, the tariff, the way of escape from machine politics, are difficulties which still confront us, besides various minor but by no means unimportant movements, such as the reform of the civil service, a better banking system, forest preservation, reform in municipal administration, and railway- traffic regulation. The first two of these have formed the dividing-lines of our politi- cal parties since the war. It has been hoped that a compromise tariff could be framed which might be stable. Although drawn on the lines of protection, it should be so mod- erate and so productive of revenue as to dis- arm the opposition of the free-traders. But of this, unhtippily, there is no sign. The pendulum even now has swung back, the highest of high tariffs has been enacted, after a year or two of over-stimulation the reaction will come, and the whole dreary contest must be fought over again. Even more dangerous is the currency question, with which a faulty banking system is entangled. Our currency defects have grown out of a popular delusion which was fostered by the necessities of the Civil War and the legal-tender decisions. By this delusion a large number of honest and in the main sensible citizens have been led to EELATION TO DOMESTIC PEOBLEMS 13 believe that the government stamp upon metal or paper originates value. If value is created by stamp in accordance with a vote, the next step is naturally to create as much value as possible and put it in the hands of the people as widely as possible. This menace to the stability of our measures of value introduces a cause of insecurity, of bad times, from which our chief commercial rivals are free. Like us, they may suffer from over-production, from over-expansion of credits ; they are liable to vast strikes and serious panics ; they are peculiarly subject to the malign influences upon connnerce of the hostile rivalries, the attitude of armed ex- pectancy, which pervade Euroj^e; but they at least know in what medium their contracts are to be carried out. They are free from the supremest blight which trade can be sub- ject to. This is all a commonplace; we shut our eyes to it when we can ; Init now and then the evil rises to tragic proportions, and all proj^erty interests are forced together into an ill-assorted union in simple self-defense. Now, to cure this most dangerous condition will require not only long-continued agita- tion and education and the honest and able efforts of a whole united party ; it needs also an exemption from the kind of complication which caused it, that is, from war, or any 14 OUR FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS other great national expenditure which its ordinary resources are unequal to. This, perhaps, will suggest a certain subtle connec- tion between Jingoism and the fiat-money advocates. Still more of a commonplace is the effect upon legislation of our caucus system and of the mastery of the party through the mastery of the intricate machinery of the party. That mastery will always be better understood by the man with special interests to serve than by the man who only tries to serve his coun- try. How much wearisome talk there is as to the duty of good citizens to go into poli- tics ! They do go in, if they can get in, but their families must be supported meanwhile ; and unless they too make a living out of politics, except in rare instances, they will find the machine men in control. They are powerless in the grip of the caucus. If you change the machinery by some popular up- rising, and flatter yourself that by so doing virtue is secured, you presently find that the rascals have got the better of the new machi- nery but too easily. If you do away with all machinery, and legislate by the direct vote of the people, you will but substitute govern- ment by newspaper for government by caucus. If you attack the evil at its root, and try to limit universal suffrage by quali- fications, you attempt the impossible. The EELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 15 tendency is all in the other direction. " Fa- cilis descensus Averno ; . . . sed revocare graduni, . . . hoc opus, hie labor est." With these various evils we are face to face. Even now cool-headed men, not too optimistic, are asking themselves whether we are not watching the breakdown of our representative system of government. Un- less that system can be reformed and puri- fied, the breakdown may come, and it will not be a safe oi* an agreeable spectacle. Perhaps I have been led aside from my argument a little. What I desire to insist upon here is the urgent and absolute neces- sity, if we are to have a strong, a united, a prosperous nation, of settling these vital questions, settling them right, and settling them soon. And this leads us to our main contention, namely, that such settlement is absolutely impossible if the program of the forwards is carried out ; for we cannot set our house in order if we must spend our energies in its defense or in attacks upon a neigh l)or. An aggressive policy is the forward policy, and it leads to foreign complications, to ex- pensive armaments, and to war. This was clearly true of the problems that are now so happily behind us. Slavery required slave territory for expansion and for the political balance. This led to a desire for Cuba, to 16 OUK FOKEIGN POLICY, AND ITS filibustering in Nicaragua, to the annexation of Texas, the conquest of Cahfornia, and the shame of the Mexican War. The States' rights doctrine was also an aggressive one. It bred civil war and threatened the dissolution of the Union. And this is natural; for every policy which threatens the rights of others, abroad or at home, must inevitably lead to a defense of those rights. Aggression implies resis- tance. There is one unvarying demand in all the forward policy, in the cry for more territory, in the hostility toward Great Britain and Spain, in the assertion of our headship of this continent, in the claim of control over an isthmus canal, and that is for ships, sol- diers, and money. Without these this policy is pure bluster. To make it effective no one can tell the cost. This means heavy taxa- tion. Thousands of miles of seaboard, dozens of harbors and coast cities, must be pro- vided Avitli defense. We must build a navy to match England's, must maintain an army to man our defenses, to garrison our foreign possessions, to hold our canal, to warrant our claim to dictate to a continent. Our wonderful progress in wealth has been owing hugely to two causes, cheap land and the freedom from a standing army, that millstone about the neck of an RELATION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 17 industrial nation. As our cheap-land sup- ply is giving out, we are asked voluntarily to throw after it the other advantage and assume the military burden. We spent in 189G upon our army and nav}^ establishments seventy-eight millions of dollars. Yet in return for this large expenditure our navy stands only fifth in armored ships and seventh in officers and men, while the army, with less than twenty- five thousand enlisted men, is little more than a police force to secure internal secu- rity. Simply plea in behalf of the status quo of the world, while inconsistently it threatens to disturb that status by enforcing the just claims of some states against others. The justice of the claim, it is natural to infer, will be de- cided by an ex-parte commission. There are other statements which are equally faulty,— as where it is said that the doctrine was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, which is something that neither the President nor we can know,— but I pass to the final sentence. While deprecating the idea of war — a war which no one dreamed of until the mes- sage threatened it— the President exclaims : " There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self- 228 THE president's moneoe doctrine respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness." Here is a complete mixing up of two persons: the one submitting to injustice, namely, Venezuela; and the one losing its self-respect, that is, ourselves. Or does the President mean that we have a divine mission to follow Great Britain or any other state around and check its aggressions? Does he mean that we are knights errant, in search of wrongs to right, of injustice to repel, under penalty of losing our safety and greatness? Whichever version we adopt, — whether we merge our individuality in that of Venezuela, or tilt at windmills like Don Quixote,— it may be questioned if our safety and greatness are thus best preserved. This is more than mere dialectics. The President has threatened Great Britain with war in a certain contingency ; he has thrown business already into great confusion, and jeopardized the nation's finances, on the ground that our Monroe Doctrine is a bind- ing law, is necessary to the safety of our institutions and form of government, and is applicable to the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute. If these contentions cannot be main- tained, his action must be condemned as an offense to a friendly power, and a very seri- ous blunder. THE president's MONHOE DOCTRINE 229 His argument for the applicability of the Moiiroe Doctrine is entitled to fair considera- tion and is a principal point at issue. It is as follows: Speaking of the allied powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France (England hav- ing withdrawn), President Monroe said that " we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their SJ^stem to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [that is, the South American republics whose independence we had recognized] or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The President, with these words in mind, says: "If a European power, by an exten- sion of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring repub- lics, against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby at- tempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Moin'oe declared to l^e ' dangerous to our peace and safety,' and it can make no difference whether the European system is 230 THE president's moneoe docteine extended by an advance of frontier or other- wise." The argument is perfectly clear and needs no elaboration. An unsettled boundary dispute between a British colony and Vene- zuela, a disposition to " edge up " on the latter in the matter of territory, is an at- tempt to extend the European system to a sister republic and to control its destiny. On the face of it this is a possible inference, but only by emphasizing the letter — not the spirit and real intent — of Monroe's message, and by almost a perversion of words. Apply the same language to our Maine boundary. The valley of the St. John was disputed ground. By the Ashburton compromise it was divided between the disputants. Is it a proper use of language to say that the suc- cess of Great Britain in acquiring the coun- try north of the St. John River to the St. Lawrence watershed, which we had justly claimed, " extends a European system to the United States, or controls its destiny"? Venezuela's is a perfectly parallel case. Were she to lose the whole region in dispute by arbitration or by aggression, in neither case would a new system be extended over her, or her destiny be controlled. But let us look at the real spirit and intent of the Monroe Doctrine. One hesitates to repeat its origin, so often has it been related. THE PEESIDENT'S MONllOE DOCTRINE 231 The allied powers had twice tried their hand at intervention — in Spain and in Naples. This intervention was in favor of absolntism, not of estal)lisluHl government ; for in Naples a liberal movement was put down, in Spain a royalist insurrection was helped up. Em- boldened by success, they then proposed to apply their new principles to this continent, and to restore to Spain those colonies of hers which were trying to gain or had gained their independence. Then Monroe declared that such intervention would be regarded by the United States as dangerous to itself. He announced a policy. That policy forbade the substitution of monarchical for republi- can forms of government on this continent by European force. It did not forbid the existence of monarchies here, as Dom Pedro could testify. It did not forbid any step which the republics themselves chose to take, but simply what was forced upon them. It was the policy which fitted the liour and the occasion. It was opportunism. This is shown by the sequel. When Clay, in Januarj^, 1824, proposed, in moderate language, a legislative resolution embodying the President's doctrine, no action was taken upon it. As the latest authoi'ity, Professor Snow,^ well says: "The attempt to give a permanent character to the Monroe Doc- ^ "American Diplomacy," p. 294. 232 THE PKESIDENT'S MONROE DOCTRINE trine failed. It would appear that Con- gress, considering the danger past, did not approve of adopting a general policy of this kind in the absence of specific cause." In 1826 came the Panama Congress. A league of states was proposed, which, among other things, was " to take into consideration the means of making effectual the declara- tion of the President of the United States respecting any ulterior design of a foreign power to colonize any portion of this con- tinent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments." After much debate and delay, delegates were" appointed from the United States. They never left this country, and the con- gress amounted to nothing. Mr. Dana, in his edition of Wheaton's " Elements of Inter- national Law," comments upon it as follows : ' " It seemed to aim at introducing, in behalf of republicanism, the same principle of inter- ference which had been attempted abroad in behalf of despotism." In 1848, Yucatan, in the throes of internal conflict, offered its dominion to the United States, to Spain, and to Grreat Britain. Presi- dent Polk urged Congress to prevent its transfer to any European power as a colony, and to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine. Cal- houn was a member of Monroe's cabinet in THE president's MONROE DOCTRINE 233 1823. He was in a j)osition to know what the Monroe dodarations meant and to what they were ap})Ueable. Speaking in opposi- tion to Polk's suggestion, he said: "They were but declarations— nothing more; . . . we are not to have quoted on us, on every occasion, general declarations to which any and every meaning may be attached." And, again, he argued that the doctrine must be limited by the conditions under which it was spoken, else "it would have involved the absurdity of asserting that the attempt of any European state to extend its system of government to this continent, the smallest as well as the greatest, would endanger the peace and safety of our country." The dec- laration, then, according to Calhoun, was a policy only, to be followed or not, as inter- est dictated, and was based upon the right of self-defense and nothing else. We approach now the Mexican adventure of Maximilian. By the power of French bayonets Napoleon III overturned the re- public, and had that Austrian prince chosen emperor by a travesty of an election ; in short, he committed exactly those aggres- sions from which the Monroe Doctrine warned foreigners away. It was a genuine case of self-defense on the part of the United States, for the French action was really taken to check the growth of our commerce 234 THE president's MONROE DOCTRINE and influence in that quarter. A demon- stration of force was proper, since the offen- sive act had been ah'eady consummated. The hands of our government having been tied during the Civil War, after the close of that struggle a force was moved to the Mexican border. The French support was withdrawn, and Maximilian fell. Thus was the Monroe Doctrine reapplied on its origi- nal lines. This episode proves two things : first, that the principles announced by Presi- dent Monroe were not obsolete in 1867, and are presumably still our guidance; second, that the doctrine, forty years after its birth, had met with no enlargement. Mr. Sewai'd, in a despatch to Mr. Kil- patrick in 1866, gives his idea of the Mon- roe Doctrine thus (I quote from the United States " Digest of International Law," by Wharton, the official collection of the gov- ernment) : " The government of the United States will maintain and insist, with all the decision and energy which are compatible with an existing neutrality, that the repub- lican system which is accepted by any one of those [South American] states shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers ; but beyond this position it will not go, nor will it consider itself bound to take part in wars in which a South THE president's MONROE DOCTRINE 235 American republic may enter with a Euro- pean sovereign, when the object of the latter is not the establishment, in place of a sub- verted republic, of a monarchy under a European prince." This history and these comments suffi- ciently show that it was the substitution of a monarchical for a republican form of government, by European forces, at which the Monroe Docti'ine was aimed. President Woolseyi concludes his treatment of the subject with this most applicable sentence: " To lay down the principle that the acquisi- tion of territory on this continent by any European power cannot be allowed by the United States would go far beyond any measures dictated by the system of the balance of power ; for the rule of self-j^reser- vation is not applicable in our case — we fear no neighbors. . . . But to resist attempts of European powers to alter the constitutions of states on this side of the water is a wise and just opposition to interference. Any- thing beyond this justifies the system which absolute governments have initiated for the suppression of revolutions by main force." Such icas the Monroe Doctrine. Any- thing other than this is the doctrine of somebody else. 1 "Introduction to thi! Study of luternational Law,'' 6th ed., p. 56. 236 THE peesident's monkoe doctrine There is another striking difference be- tween the old version and the new. Presi- dent Monroe's message nowhere threatens force. This fact has been often commented upon. His strongest expression is that we should look upon certain actions as evidence of an unfriendly disi^osition. But President Cleveland is not so tame. After suggesting a commission to report upon the Venezuelan boundary, he says: "When such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggres- sion upon its rights and interests, the ap- propriation by Great Britain of any lands, or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory, which, after investiga- tion, we have determined of right belong to Venezuela." But for this threat the message would have been regarded as a political manifesto ; with this threat it is a menace to the peace of two great states. There is one more consideration,— one already suggested,— the vital point of the whole matter. We may grant, though con- trary to fact, that the Monroe Doctrine is applicable to the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute. Proof must still be furnished that a failure to enforce it would endanger our peace and safety. If they are not so en- dangered, we have no ground for interfer- THE president's MONROE DOCTRINE 237 ence. The Monroo Doctrine declares this. President Cleveland implies it. The com- mentators who have been quoted say it. Does British control over the wild frontier region in dispute between Venezuela and Guiana really threaten the safety of the United States f If so, why and how? We are entitled to specifications. For, unless the danger can be shown, an interference is unwarranted. Does Canada put our in- stitutions in jeopardy"? Does British Co- lumbia imperil our form of governments If not, why does this danger lurk in distant Guiana I England has as constitutional a form of government as our own. She is a good colonizer. She carries order, justice, capital, into the wilds with her. Are such developments inimical to our safety ? Is there anything which can truly imperil our institutions or which we should truly fear, except the consequences of our own igno- rance, our own dishonesty, our own con- ceit? At the risk of tediousness, may I gather again the threads of my discourse! The Monroe Doctrine is not a law ; it binds us to no action ; it was a policy devised to meet a particular case. That case was the forcible substitution of monarchical for republican forms of government in American states by European action. It was an act of self -de- 238 THE PllESIDENT'S MONROE DOCTRINE fense, on no other ground justifiable. It was not backed by threats of force. Mr. Cleveland's doctrine is an entirely distinct one. Under threats, it attempts to settle for them the disputed boundary-line of two friendly states. It ^drtually asserts the right to pass judgment upon any con- troversy over territory which an American state may have with a European one, and to enforce the decision. It is interference in the affairs of another state which the neces- sity of self-defense does not justify. It is a long and dangerous step toward that assump- tion of the headship of this continent which Mr. Olney so tersely describes when he says that the United States is " practically sov- ereign" throughout America, and that "its fiat is law." A glorious and happy future this, where the responsibilities are ours, the profit another's; where dreams of empire under the guise of a protectorate replace peaceful development; where our own will is our only law ! SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLE- MENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES Paper Read June 16, 1896 SOME THOUaHTS ON THE SETTLE- MENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES EVER since the early years of this cen- tury the British government has been attempting to secure a riglit to search for- eign ships suspected of trading in slaves. Through diplomatic pressure, and even by direct purchase, many treaties have been negotiated for this purpose, and largely by this instrumentality the slave-trade on its old lines has been well-nigh abolished. This is a rare and remarkable, perhaps even a unique, instance of national humanitarian- ism. States are not altruistic. From the nature of their organization they cannot be. The object of a state's existence is to secure the greatest possible good for its own sub- jects, not for the subjects of another. We do not expect a business corporation, a col- lege, or even a church, to prefer the welfare of a similar institution to its own. That 16 241 242 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT would be wrong as well as foolish ; it would be a betrayal of trust. So it is with the state. In the present condition of human society, then, selfishness rather than altruism is the necessary and fundamental principle of the state. Now, since each state will be reaching out for certain advantages for its subjects, it may often happen that two states at the same time grasp after the same advantage and thus come into conflict. Conflict is the law of state life and growth. It is as inevi- table as a law of nature. But conflict, the striving after the same good, each for its own, does not mean war. In the early stages of human society it might have done so. Now, however, the restraining influ- ences are numerous and intricate. They are of two general kinds, humanitarian and economic. A powerful deterrent is also found in the growth in importance of the neutral influence, which discourages war betAveen its friends because it dislikes to have its trade disturbed. I need not enlarge upon these facts; they have come under the observation of all of us; I wish merely to bring into juxtaposition the inevitable- ness of collisions between states and the remoteness of war nevertheless, to show the great middle ground whioh we are to at- temjjt to explore. OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 243 Where the Niagara Kiver emerges from Lake Erie it is a broad and sluggisli flood of waters almost imperceptibly flowing seaward. But after sixteen miles of gentle current there come two of tumultuous rapids and then the fall itself. This is a not inapt image of the march of events between the breaking out of an international difficulty and the catas- trophe of war. The quiet flow of river typi- fies the diplomatic discussion of the dispute, long drawn out, perhaps, and devious, but there is safety in it all. At no point is the ship of state helpless in the grasp of the seetliing waters. The rapids are the type of measures of a different sort, which the publicists call preliminary to war. These are retorsion, the law of tit for tat, to pun- ish particularly some legal discrimination; reprisals, the seizure of property of the offender or his subjects in order to make him realize his wrong and your own sense of it; and embargo, a form of retorsion, which, as we see in the events leading up to the War of 1812, may be laid either to exert pressure and remedy injustice or avowedly as a war measure. Even here, in the midst of the rapids, there are places and moments when safety is not impossible. Our good ship may hug the shore, the helmsman may realize his danger, and the final mad rush and deadly plunge be saved. The simile 244 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT must not be pushed too far, but it will answer to bring vividly before us the three steps of negotiation and amicable arrange- ment, of preliminary war measures, and of war itself. With one more subdivision, our toj^ic lies before us. An amicable interna- tional settlement may be brought about through simple and direct negotiation, through the mediation of a third power, or through arbitration. Each method has its virtues. Neither one can be dispensed with. It is a mistake to emphasize one to the ex- clusion of the others. To insist upon a due estimate of the three, to beg you to preserve a j)roper proportion in your valuation of them, is my very earnest desire. When two sensible men quarrel, if sensible men ever do quarrel, the best thing they can do is to get together and talk their differ- ence over. In nine cases out of ten they can bring about a settlement. The claim is seen to be unfounded or is softened; the words or acts misunderstood become clear and harmless; friendly and rational views assert themselves. This typifies diplomatic agreement. Or, on the contrary, our dispu- tants are suspicious and stubborn. Their quarrel is a misery to their neighbors. Pres- ently a mutual friend begs them both to let him examine their difference and sug- gest a settlement. He is allowed to do so; OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 245 both are impressed by the good sense of his concdusions and agree to abide by them. That is mediation. The settlement is sug- gested, not asked for ; it is recommendatory, not binding. Or, thirdly, and probably, this kindly neighbor will be asked to be good enough to go about his business, and the quarrel grows brisker, with a lawsuit in the background. But they are practical men and economical men. A five-hundred-dollar fee to litigate a fifty-dollar claim appeals to neither, confident though he is of the justice of his cause. In this frame of mind they chance to meet, and agree to refer their dis- pute to some other neighbor and to accept his judgment as final. That is arbitration. The submission is voluntary ; the decision is final and binding. But there is one remark to make if we would exhaust the possibilities. Should one of our disputants, in the passion of the mo- ment, reflect upon the character of the other or threaten his person, up goes the latter's cane or fist, and the breach becomes a fight. So a nation resorts to arms to defend its honor or its national life. This is a homely but a true simile of the differences of states and their settlement. Now, I believe it is accurate to say that the mediator in international, as in private, quarrels is apt to be shown the door. This 246 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT is but natural, for he suggests a settlement .before the contestants have shown that they desire one. Mediation was unanimously agreed upon as a means of settling future difficulties by the signatories of the epoch- making declaration of Paris in 1856. They have fought one another since then, more often than they have mediated. The media- tion suggested ])y Napoleon III in our Civil War was declined unheard. Our north- eastern boundary disjiute was referred to the arbitration of the King of the Nether- lands in 1831. Instead of passing upon the question submitted, he dodged it and recom- mended a certain compromise line. This was virtual mediation ; both parties de- clined it. Without multiplying examples, we may fairly say, tlien, that mediation has not proved, and is not likely to prove, a very useful instrument, and turn rather to the others described. Here at the outset let me say, without hesitation and with all possible emphasis, that in diplomatic correspondence we have the simj^lest, the easiest, the most natural, the best way of settling international con- troversies. Whatever detracts from the proper working of this is mischievous. It is a quiet way. Many and many a question is raised, discussed, and settled without ex- citing the attention of Congress, the notice OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 247 of the newspapers, the passions of the people. How much better tliis is than to expose the moves of a state department to the daily inspection and criticism of the undiplomatic world ! How much of national excitement, alarm, hatred, and all uncharitableness might have been saved these last few months, both in England and in America, if the Venezuelan and the Transvaal discussions had been con- fined to dii3lomatic channels in the good old Avay, instead of taking both publics into un- usual confidence ! It is an effective way. Great victories have been neutralized by it, as in the Con- gress of Vienna in 1815. Important treaties have been negotiated by it; commerce has been doubled or cut off, boundaries laid down, nations founded, by it. The very successes of arbitration are largely ascrib- able to it. It was diplomacy that inserted the " three rules " in the treaty of Washing- ton as the standard of neutral duties by which Great Britain agreed to be judged. These rules made the Geneva arbitration a success, but the British case a failure. It is a friendly way. It is both melan- choly and ludicrous to read the frequent criticisms, from certain sources, upon the conduct of our resident foreign ministers. If they dine out, and make pretty speeches afterward (grace after meat), they are " un- 248 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT American." If they observe punctiliously the forms of diplomatic society, they are "truckling to an aristocracy." If they ob- serve ordinary judgment and common sense in their dealings, they are charged with " cowardice." If they fail to right the indi- vidual complaint offhand, they "lack sym- pathy." The ideal minister, in the eyes of such critics, is the noisy bully who carries a chip on his shoulder and has designs on the tail of that beast or bird which symbolizes the country of his residence. This is not a fancy sketch, and the existence of tihis ideal of conduct is most unfortunate. Ambassa- dors are the friendly representatives of their monarchs or executives, resident in a foreign state in order to cultivate and maintain peaceful relations with it. Whatever interferes with their capacity for this makes them undesirable. When a man has an unfriendly feeling for another country, he is persona non grata to it ; he is, moreover, useless to his own government. If a man be a boor in manners, a meddler in politics, disagreeable instead of affable in his personal relations, he cannot successfully carry out the object of his mission. When, as is the case with the United States, much of our diplomacy is carried on directly by the Department of State, this cultivation of international good will becomes the chief, OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 249 almost the sole, reason for the maintenance of a resident at a foreign court. And, finally, it is a responsible way. Here is where the duty of adjusting foreign differ- ences belongs. If capable of solution, in nine cases out of ten diplomacy can and will and does solve them. Such solutions stir up no feeling, create no war scares, leave no scar behind. They imply no inter- national contest, while even so peaceful and satisfactory a method as arbitration does imply contest. It follows, therefore, as it seems to me, that our State Department and our diplomatic service and methods should be strengthened in every possible way. It should be a service, in fact, trained in law and language, based upon fitness and upon promotion from within, guided by experience, able to compare in character with that of any other country. It follows, also, that whatever tends to weaken the diplomatic method of settlement is to be deprecated. Here lies a valid objection to any permanent court of arbitration or even to any perma- nent arbitral system which will work without diplomatic adjustment. For, the moment such a court or system is created, the sense of responsibility of the diplomatic department will be lessened. This is inevitable, for re- sponsibility is proportioned to the possession of power and the consequences of inaction. 250 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT When any minor question between states, at the instance of either, could, be sent to a court for settlement, their departments of foreign affairs would take very little interest in effecting an earlier adjustment. To strengthen the settlement by arbitra- tion independent of diplomacy would there- fore imply a weakening of the settlement by diplomacy. This is not to discredit the arbitration principle ; it is only putting it in its proper place, locking hands with the diplomatic principle, and not trying to work independently of it. What is the nature and what are the rules of international arbitration! This is our next inquiry. When the diplomatic repre- sentatives of two disputant states have failed to reach an agreement from within, they may call in outside aid. The question in dispute is accurately stated; the choice of arbitrators is made; their time and place of meeting, their form of award, the rules which shall govern them, are arranged for. Read any treaty which has created such a tribunal, and you will see how minutely it attempts to provide for every contingency. Where a detail is not thus laid down, it is governed by the rules of the Roman law. Thus if a unanimous award is not necessary under the treaty, a majority award is bind- ing, because the Roman law so provides. OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 251 This very point came up in the Halifax fishery award. Certain defects will vitiate the decision of a board of arbitration. If it fails to pass upon the exact questions submitted; if it is unintelligible ; if it is inii)ossible of execution or tainted with fraud— in all these cases the award is not binding. It will be convenient here to sum up the arguments for arbitration as a means of set- tling international disputes, and the objec- tions to it, as well. It is a peaceful substitute for the very great evil of war. Taking a dispute out of the hands of interested parties who have failed to agree, it refers it to disinterested parties, so constituted that there must be an agreement. It has been tested, and it works. Under a definite agreement to arbitrate, rumors of war would cease, because the ex- pectation of arbitration would take their place in men's minds. On the other hand, arbitration leaves a sting, a sense of being cheated, in the mind of the loser. It cannot settle all disputes, for those which involve the honor or the existence or the policy of the state are incapable of submission. This is almost universally admitted. A good illustration may be found in the Venezuelan imbroglio. The question of boundary be- tween Great Britain and Venezuela is a 252 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT question of fact; it can be and should be arbitrated. The question whether the in- terests of the United States are seriously involved in an attempt by a European power to extend its territory in this hemisphere is a delicate, almost intangible, question of pol- icy, and quite unsusceptible of settlement in this way. Again, it is a surrender of the sovereignty of the state. This is not a serious thing where the end can be seen from the begin- ning. Where, however, a permanent system is entered upon, and whole classes of cases are to be tried in this way, it is a serious thing. It means that, unless a breach of faith is committed, the state has surrendered the right of war, one of the highest rights of sovereignty, even if a matter comes up which is deemed vital. Thus that first law of na- tions, as of individuals, the right of self-de- fense, is lost. Comparing these considerations with one another, I think it is clear that arbitration is an expedient of the highest value for de- ciding certain questions between states, but one which must be used judiciously and under restrictions. Questions of fact, of damages, — speaking generally, questions of a business nature, — are suited to this kind of settlement, and these will largely outnum- ber the others. But just as it has been urged or INTEENATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 253 that diplomatic methods of settlement should be improved by improving the machinery, so perhaps can the method by arbitration be bettered. This brings us to tlie consideration of its scope and its details. These are the ques- tions which fill men's minds to-day. When we speak of arbitration as it now exists, we mean the ai^plication of that principle to a single definite point, the decision to be made by a judge or body of judges appointed for the purpose. But when we dream of the arbitration of the future, we picture to our- selves a i^ermanent court of unblemished character and the highest dignity, which shall be always ready to pass upon all ques- tions submitted, and to which most questions shall be submitted. I do not say that this is only a dream, but perhaps we do not realize the tremendous step from the one method to the other, and the very serious difficulties in the way. The believers in the new system generally make up their court out of an equal number of the highest judges of the nations engaging. Some believe that no further provision need be made for a tie vote; others would dis- solve a tie by giving two votes to some one, perhaps to a judge of each nation alternately. But the plan depends upon a belief that na- tionality would be sunk, and that partizan- 254 SOME THOUGHTH ON THE SETTLEMENT ship would be triuinj^lied over by the judi- cial instinct. A justice of the Supreme Court of the United States has testified to this belief. I do not believe that he knows the secrets of his own heart. When the Tilden election commission w^as chosen, cer- tain of its members w^ere drawn from the Supreme Court. Every member, every judge, voted according to his political bias. In the various causes celehrcs of arbitration, in all vital points, the judges drawn from the nations involved have voted for their own cause and have been its most efficient pleaders. Many a question between Great Britain and this country has been referred to a joint commission, but that commission has rarely failed to divide, in matters of law and matters of fact, upon the lines of nationality. The idea of foreign judges does not seem to appeal to the advocates of this permanent court, but I believe such a make-up to be preferable. And yet here, too, we find difficulties. We can perhaps answer for their impar- tiality at the outset, but who can guarantee the permanence of this quality, or, of the friendship of their native states'? A fre- ({uent result of arbitration is the belief that a certain member of the court has been unfair. In a special case, where the court has been immediately dissolved, this is bad OF INTERNATIONAL CONTliOYEESIES 255 enough. But with a permanent court, wliere the dislike or distrust of the man might destroy confidence in all his subse- quent decisions, it would be infinitely worse. Besides such difficulties as these in the make-up of the court, there are other and weightier ones. It must administer international law, with its many uncertainties, a law which has never been codified, and cannot be, in the present state of opinion, so diverse are the interpretations of the jurists and the politi- cal interests of different states. It is easy to say in reply that such a court would quickly frame its own code by interpretation and decision. It might attempt this, if the los- ing state permitted. But would not the novelty of a rule or its interpretation be a valid ground of appeal from the decision? The building up of a code would hardly be a consolation to the defeated litigant. Yet his condition of mind and will must never be lost sight of. For it must not be forgot- ten that the sanction of the court is to be found in the popular backing and approval of its actions. When its decisions have to be enforced by war, it is a failure. When its decisions do not command the confidence of both disputants, its usefulness is gone. We have not yet reached a golden age where love is law, where suspicion and selfishness 256 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SETTLEMENT have fled away. This is by no means the whole ease against a permanent court of arbitration. I am merely trying, somewhat disjointedly, to point out what a very violent change from the present usage it involves, and what serious objections there are to it. But let us recur to a question already put, and ask whether the principle of arbitration cannot be enlarged, but in some other way, and without so largely dispensing as a per- manent court would do with the diplomatic method. Cannot a permanent system of arbitration be devised, instead of a perma- nent court, which shall make constant use of diplomacy and avoid the difficulties de- scribed? In my opinion this is the true course to pursue. We have a system, or at least a usage, at present, which will work, which has rarely failed of success when tried, and which is, in truth, the basis for the cur- rent demand for something wider and better. Broaden and perfect the present usage, then, and retain in it the resources of diplomacy, rather than throw it aw^ay and jeopardize the arbitration principle by adopting a new and untried scheme. The time seems ripe for such an experiment as this. Let Great Britain and the United States define by treaty those classes of cases which they can safely submit to arbitration. As being only an experiment, the treaty arrangement OF INTEllNATIONAL CONTKOVERSIES 257 should be made for a limited time, say ten years, with extension thereafter in case neither state wishes to terminate it. When- ever a question under the treaty arises, pro- vide that a certain interval shall elapse before further action is taken. If an agree- ment has not been reached within this time, bind the state departments of the two coun- tries to refer the matter to a special board of arbitration, whose make-up and compensa- tion, the conditions of its award, and the law applicable to that award, if need be, in case other than questions of fact are to be passed upon, shall be laid down through the channels of diplomacy. Such a system as this preserves the volun- tary element which is the distinctive mark of arbitration. By it the board can be adapted in its character to the nature of the question submitted. By it, too, the im- partiality of the judges can be always more nearly preserved. We retain the possibility of settlement through diplomacy, but upon failure of this method within a reasonable time there succeeds the certainty of a trial by arbitration to check the outburst of popu- lar passion and threatenings of war. So, too, we can test the wider development of arbitration, yet without undue danger of its breakdown. We can try in a single case a board made up of the judges of the highest 17 258 INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES courts and determino its likelihood of impar- tiality, remembering, however, that such judges have but a mortal capacity for toil, and that their time is already fully occupied. Such a plan I believe to have the possi- l)ility of success ; a permanent court I believe would be doomed to failure. But let us never forget our sense of pi'oportion. Put the power and the duty to settle internation- al disputes where they belong, in the hands of the diplomatists, and strengthen those hands. Upon their failure try arbitration, and broaden, fortify, popularize arbitration. For those questions which involve the honor, the policy, the very existence of the state, reserve that supreme exercise of its sover- eignty, the right of war. War is a tremen- dous waste, a crime against humanity, a great evil, but not the greatest of evils. SOME COMMENT UPON THE ARBITRATION TREATY The Forum, March, 1897 SOME COMMENT UPON THE ARBITRATION TREATY REDUCED to its simplest terms, the ar- ' bitration treaty which has been signed by representatives of Great Britain and the United States provides as follows : There shall be created three tribunals. To one or more of these tribunals three classes of questions shall be referred. The make-up of the tribunals, their juris- diction, and the classes of questions to be submitted, may be seen in the table on the next page. The objections commonly urged against any general arbitration agreement between states are of three sorts: (1) Those based upon the weakening in efficiency of the diplomatic methods of settlement ; (2) those springing from the impossibility of submit- ting all questions to arbitral settlement ; (3) those inherent in the make-up and working of the tribunal as ordinarily devised. Let us examine these objections, and see 2G1 262 SOME COMMENT how the treaty laid before the Senate for consideration succeeds in meeting them. Diplomacy is the natural, friendly, effec- tive, and quiet method of settling interna- tional disputes. Whatever tends to weaken its efficiency is to be deplored. The pre- sumption should always ])e that a difference will be arranged by diplomacy, not sub- TRIBUNAL A. TRIBUNAL B. TRIBUNAL C. QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED. Tliree members: one chosen by each state, with provision for choice of third. Five members: two named by each state, with provision for choice of fifth. Six members : three higher judges from each state. No provi- sion for breaking a tie. I. Pecuniary claims under £100,000 in value. Original and final jurisdiction, award by majority vote. n. Pecuniary claims over £100,000 in value. Also claims growing out of rights "under treaty or otherwise," but not terri- torial. Original juris- diction, which is also final if by unanimous vote. Jurisdiction up- on appeal, if A does not render unanimous award. Majori ty vote final. III. Territorial claims such as relate to servi- tudes, naviga- tion, access, fisheries, boun- daries, etc. Original juris- diction. Award final if by vote of five to one, or if by majority vote, and no appeal is made witliin three months. If pro- tested, mediation to be tried before hostilities. UPON THE AllBITlUTION TREATY 2G3 mitted straightway to aii)itration. Imagine the standing of a business house which made a practice of collecting its bills by legal pro- cess before their friendly presentation and adjustment through correspondence ! Arbi- tration is sought after as a substitute for war, not as a suljstitutc for diplomacy. It has been feared that the existence of a tribu- nal ready to settle international differences would greatly lessen the potency of the diplomatic method. Diplomatists would feel less responsibility for, and take less interest in, a matter which, in all likelihood, was soon to be transferred to other hands for settlement. Thus the amount of international litiga- tion would largely increase. Thus the etfi- ciency of processes which now arrange nine tenths of the differences between states, without causing a ripple of excitement, would be seriously weakened. Arbitration, like all other litigation, arouses hard feeling. It is infinitely better than war; but it is much inferior to diplomacy, because less flexible and with no capability for com- promise or adjustment. In some measure the arbitration treaty recognizes this, though not so fully as could be wished. In its first article, the contract- ing parties agree to submit to arbitration "all questions in difference between them 264 SOME COMMENT which they may fail to adjust by diplomatic negotiatiou." Here the presumj^tion is ex- pressed that diplomacy will have been tried. That is right and wise. But tliere is an under- lying presumption that diplomacy will fail. That is a fault inherent in the arbitration prin- ciple. Possibly it might be minimized by ex- cluding the first class of differences, the minor claims, which neither country would fight over in any case. Or where individual, rather than national, claims are being pressed, the cost of arbitration could be deducted from the amount recovered. Or a certain delay might be compulsory, before recourse was had to a treaty tribunal, during which the state de- partments must try to effect a settlement. Perhaps in some such way as this the too free use of the international tribunal could be checked, and the methods now effectively employed could be preserved. It has often been urged that no nation can afford to tie its hands in advance by sub- mitting to arbitration all possible questions, including those wdiich involve its national policy, its national honor, its national life. To do so would be a surrender of national sovereignty in its highest expression, a waiver of that right of self-defense which is the first law of nations. This is fully recog- nized by the treaty. It specifies the classes of questions which shall be submitted. These UPON THE ARBITRATION TREATY 265 are : pecnniaiy claims ; differences involving rights under treaty or international law; territorial claims. By inference, all other questions are held to be incapable of sub- mission, those involving national policy among them. So that we may direct the search-light of the Monroe Doctrine at will upon this continent ; we ma.v declare British aggression upon Patagonia dangerous to our safety and free institutions, without the risk of being brought to book before a court of arbitration. On the other hand, the treaty does re- quire the submission of just those differ- ences the like of which the two nations have already so often arbitrated. Fishery dis- putes, as at Halifax; pecuniary claims, as at Geneva; boundaries, as in the San Juan case — all such must be referred to the new tribunal, if not otherwise settled, and very properly. They are questions of law, or fact, or treaty interpretation, usually capa- ble of this kind of settlement. A few cases perhaps remain where national policy and treaty obligations are so intermingled that they ought not to be, as they seem to be, included among the differences to be finally decided by Tribunal B. For example, under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the United States binds itself to abstain from exclusive control over an isthmian canal in Central America; 2GG SOME COMMENT nevertheless tlie prevalent national belief is that such exclusive control is our prerogative and our policy. Here a question of policy, under the guise of a right under treaty, might be referred for final decision. For myself, I am strongly inclined to the opinion that the proper status of any canal across Cen- tral America will be found to be its neutrali- zation guaranteed by the commercial powers. But its disposition is certainly a question of policy open to argument ; and very likely the Senate may withdraw this particular case from the operation of the treaty. Turn now to the third class of objections to any permanent arbitration agreement— those relating to the framing and working of its machinery. It is here that the treaty deserves most praise and confidence. It is an ingenious, and should prove a successful, attempt to substitute the judgment of a court for the self-pronounced judgment of a people. It does this, not by promising an award, but by furnishing a trial. All pe- cuniary claims are, it is true, to be finally disposed of by it. The same is true of dif- ferences growing out of rights whether under treaty or the general law of nations. But a majority of the serious cases which may arise, which are called territorial claims by the treaty, and include questions of access, navigation, fisheries, boundaries, — in fact, UPON THE ARBITRATION TREATY 267 most of those rights for which a nation would go to war,— must go to trial, ])ut with no certainty of a final judgment. Through this failure to insure a binding verdict, i^aradoxically enough, the treaty is strong where it seems to be weak. It is safe, because it does not attempt too much. It bids fair to be effective, because it does not promise efficiency. It is a hopeful attempt at arbitration, although, technically speaking, not arbitration at all; for the very essence of arbitration lies in the finality of its award, ^^^lat it offers is a refuge from popular excitement— the chance of a settle- ment, the certainty of a breathing-spell. What it does not offer is a binding award on all the questions between its members, to fit like a strait- jacket upon the body politic and tempt it irresistibly sometimes to break the bonds. Notice the procedure in the third class of cases. If the award is unanimous or made by a vote of five to one, it is final. But if made by any less majority it may be protested, and is " of no validity." The next step is a recourse to mediation, which is the offer of good advice, with no obligation to take it. Then diplomacy may try its hand again. Finally, the question may be put to the arbitrament of war. In this chain of processes a final award is reached, if the matter in dispute is clear to 268 SOME COMMENT an overwhelniing majority of the tribunal. But the certainty remains that if the question has elements of doubt in it, two out of the three judges who comprise each half of the court can and will prevent a verdict. For in matters essential yet uncertain they will retain their national bias and point of view. Nationality and human nature are stronger than the judicial temperament. It has always been so ; it is even desirable that it should be so. We may safely conclude that the framers of the treaty relied upon this fact in inserting this provision, and did so to prevent the infinite risk of a Ijreakdown of machinery, in case a beaten litigant re- fused to accept the award. They rested upon the presumption of peace which it contains, not upon the strength and com- pleteness of its procedure. Criticism there may be of this and that detail. No code of international law exists to guide the tribunals. The judges who are to form Tribunal C are already overbur- dened. The method of naming the umpires may prove clumsy or bad. Still, such ob- jections as these are overshadowed and out- balanced by the strong probability that the plan would work. It would prevent war scares, because the popular mind, always ready to take fright or to take fire, would be conscious of various and lengthy pro- UPON THE AKBITRATION TllEATY 269 cesses which must precede war; and the ]^opnlar interest soon tires. It would tend to prevent war, because it insures a trial of most differences, gathers light upon them from several quarters, prevents action in hot l^lood, and presupposes peace. Being an experiment, to last for five years only unless proved satisfactory, it is a working basis upon which to build. It does not im- peril the arbitration principle by attempting too much. It is a step — a considerable step —toward a better order of things. When mountain-climbers reach ice they put on the rope, and, cutting step after step, slowly and carefully mount to their goal; they do not risk all by a hasty scramble up the incline. Here are two nations, in speech, in laws, in blood, in institutions, in ideals, akin. Together they climb the slippery slopes of the Mount of Lasting Peace and Brother- hood. With this treaty they rope them- selves together. The step-cutting has be- gun. The ascent is slow ; but if it be made sure, who can venture to set a limit to their upward progress ? THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLAEATION OF PARIS Yale Law Journal, February, 1894 THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF PAEIS THERE is a possibility that the acces- sion of the United States to the decla- ration of Paris is shortly to be urged upon the Secretary of State. In such event the reasons favoring this action may well be worthy of our study. The articles of this important international compact, made in 1856, at the close of the Crimean War, were as follows: " 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 2, The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of con- traband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force suflicient really to prevent access to the coast of the en- emy." This declaration was to be binding only as between the parties to it. Spain, Mexico, 18 273 274: THE UNITED STATES and the United States are the only commer- cial states of importance which have thus far failed to give in their adhesion, the two former being restrained by the refusal of the latter. The action of the United States was thus exj)lained : The policy of this country was against the maintenance of a large navy. To supplement that navy in the work of commerce-destroying and of enforcing the rules of naval war against neutral trade, the issue of letters of marque might be neces- sary ; so that unless the declaration were so amended as to exempt all innocent private property, neutral or hostile, from capture, the accession of the United States was de- clared impolitic. This " Marcy amendment " was not carried, owing to the influence of Great Britain. The question of accession again came up during the first year of the War of the Re- bellion. Dropping this Marcy idea, Mr. Seward was willing to accede uncondition- ally. The obstacle came from France and particularly from Great Britain. For Mr. Seward was warned that the accession of his country could have no retroactive effect to "invalidate anything already done," could not be held, that is, to apply to the hostili- ties already broken out between North and South; with this limitation understood it would be accepted. Mr. Henry Adams, in AND THE DECLAIUTION OF PARIS 275 an interesting essay/ enlarges upon the duplicity of Lord Russell in considering and replying to this offer. But to my mind, for its failure, Mr. Seward was not wholly blameless. For, as always in the early years of the war, he was proceeding on the assumption that the United States could not, and that foreign powers must not, recognize the belligerency of the South. ISFow, in point of fact, the government of the North had itself recog- nized Southern belligerency, by refusing to punish the crews of Southern men-of-war as pirates in spite of the decision of the court (Prize Causes, 2 Black, 635), and by establishing a blockade of Southern ports, which is a war measure. Holland, France, and Spain, as well as Great Britain, had already made formal recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States. President Davis had been asked to bind his country to ob- serve the rules of the declaration, and had declined. Under these circumstances, why was it not reasonable to impose as a condition, upon a convention of accession, the proviso that the said accession should be prospective merely and should not be held applicable to the struggle at hand ! But such a proviso con- flicted with that false and hampering theory that the North was not at war with a bellig- 1 "Historical Essays," by Henry Adams (Scribner, 1891). 276 THE UNITED STATES erent power, and the offer of accession was withdrawn. This was more than thirty years ago. Now, however, in a time of peace, with no ulterior motives possible, the question of accession is likely to be again brought for- ward, and can be argued on general grounds. The object of the present paper is to make very briefly a plea for such action. As the article relating to paper blockades has been formally advocated by this country, it may be left out of consideration. The three other provisions of the declaration may be arranged in a balance-sheet, somewhat as follows : The United States in account with The Signatories of the Declaration of Paris. Dr. Cr. For adoption of rules that (1) Free ships make free goods. (2) Enemy sliips do not infect the neutral goods on board. E. & O. E. For renunciation of the right to commission privateers. The following propositions are laid down without argument as our premises : 1. The interests of the United States are, on the whole, on the side of neutral rather than of belligerent rights. 2. The two rules on the debtor side of the balance are already adopted by the policy of the United States. 3. If the United States should engage in war, the chances are largely that such war AND THE DECLARATION OF PAKIS 277 would be with a power weaker than itself in its war navy and naval resources. The history of the American carrying- trade during the Napoleonic wars is a strik- ing illustration of the value of neutral privi- leges. Although our ships had no right to shelter enemy goods under their neutral flag ; although the doctrine of occasional contra- band enforced by Great Britain, sometimes softened into preemption, greatly interfered with our chief article of export, provisions ; although the restrictive decrees of each bel- ligerent, culminating in the utterly unjust and unlawful paper blockades declared by both, at times threw our trade into con- fusion, nevertheless American tonnage in- creased thirty, sixty, even one hundred, thousand tons per year. If the economists are correct, we are prob- ably now approaching a time when our vanished foreign carrying-trade will revive. Cheaper production will enable our manu- facturers to exchange commodities with foreign countries more freely. Cheaper ships, operating under less repressive ship- ping and port regulations, will reach out for their share of our own increased commerce and of the commerce of the world. What does such trade need in view of the chances of war between our friends ? It needs, first, fixed and stable conditions; second, the 278 THE UNITED STATES greatest freedom possible, the least possible iuterfereuce from the exercise of belligerent rights. Now, very little argument is required to show that in these respects the neutral shipper is better off under the declaration than the neutral shipper without it. Sup- pose war between Grreat Britain and France. Dutch or Danish ships, under the declara- tion, could carry safely French goods not contraband nor bound to a blockaded port, while on a United States ship those same goods, being unprotected by the declaration, would be liable to capture. Under such circumstances French goods would seek other flags than ours. And, again, since France until the declaration condemned neutral goods sailing under an enemy's flag, and since the declaration binds its signato- ries only as relates to one another, every ton of American wheat, every bale of American cotton, borne on an English ship would be subject to capture by French cruisers. This state of things would be similarly true in the event of any war between our friends unless a prior treaty with them forbade. We have treaties which lay down the prin- ciple of " free ships, free goods," with Spain, Russia, Prussia, Italy, and Sweden alone of important commercial powers. Probably France alone would claim the right to con- demn our goods for seeking carriage on her AND THE DECLARATION OF PAllIS 279 enemy's ships. Uucler the principles stated it is clear that our neutral ships could not compete on even terms with other neutral ships for the carrying-trade. And if France were a belligerent our goods might be sub- ject to great inconvenience and even danger. The rights of the declaration, then, are of vital importance. Turn now to the credit side of the account, and estimate what we should be obliged to surrender as the equivalent for these bene- fits, the right to commission privateers. It is the clinging to this right which has hitherto stood in our way. It is not a little curious that, while insist- ing upon the right to issue letters of marque to subjects of other countries, the United States forbids its own subjects, by statutes of 1797 and 1816, to take part in the equip- ment or manning of privateers to act against nations with which it is at peace. While retaining this demoralizing form of warfare, it denies to its citizens the right to share in its profits when other nations employ it. From this fact may fairly be drawn the inference that privateering is a trade of which this country in the abstract disap- proves. More than this, the United States has negotiated eleven treaties which recipro- cally contain the same prohibition. The value of privateering is still fm^ther 280 THE UNITED STATES narrowed when we consider what it accom- plishes. As the distinction in build and equipment and armament between men-of- war and other ships grows more marked, the privateer grows less important in waging war. War in the sense of an exercise of force upon armed ships is not really the object of privateering. Its reason for being lies in its -capacity for attacking an enemy's commerce, which, while primarily enriching the privateersman, incidentally benefits the state commissioning him. He may also, though less readily, be useful in enforcing the laws relating to the carrying of contra- band and to blockade. But, to-day, war navies are themselves built for a twofold purpose— the heavy armored ships for fight- ing, the fast protected or unarmored cruisers with large coal-capacity for preying upon commerce and enforcing belligerent rights against the neutral. The rise of ships of this latter class, virtually doing a privateer's work, detracts from the necessity for his existence. His importance is lessened by still another consideration. The value of privateering should be estimated not only absolutely but relatively. It helps the weaker naval power relatively more than the stronger. Its abolition was the reason, for instance, which induced Great Britain, the strongest of all naval powers, to consent AND THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 281 to allow the neutral to carry her enemy's goods free under his flag. This surrender of a right consistently exercised by Great Britain since the time of the Consolato del Mare was a very great concession. Granting the premise that the United States is more likely to be at war with a power weaker in naval resources than itself, than with one stronger, it follows that priva- teering, considered apart from any equivalent gained in return for its abolition, would be more valuable to other countries than to us. The safety of our own commerce is more important than the destruction of the com- merce of such an enemy. If these arguments are sound, the United States is in this position : A very valuable privilege, involving a freedom of neutral trade which would put it on the same foot- ing with the most favored nations, is offered it in exchange for the abolition of priva- teering. It disapproves of privateering in the ab- stract. It forbids its citizens to engage in it when neutral. It has not itself employed privateers for two thirds of a century. It has ships which can do a privateer's work better than a privateersman, and with fewer evil results. Privateering would, by the doctrine of chances, help our enemies more than ourselves. In itself considered, the 282 THE DECLAEATION OF PAEIS retention of the right to commission priva- teers is not valuable to the United States. When the equivalent gained by its abolition is kept in view, the argument for accession to the declaration of Paris is overwhelming. The freedom from capture of all innocent private property at sea, even an enemy's, is the next step in the neutral program. Our accession to the declaration should help to- ward this. Our accession should be coupled with that of Spain and Mexico. A foreign war affecting American commerce may break out at any time and with scant warning. If our accession to the declaration is a proper step, it should be taken noiv, [Note.— The fact that neither Spain nor the United States in the war now in progress has seen fit to employ privateers, that both have conformed in their usage to the rules of the declaration of Paris, may be men- tioned as confirming the view here taken.] INDEX INDEX Absolutism, 231 Acapnlco, the Barrundia affair at, 177 "Acapulco," tbe case of Gen- eral Barrundia and the, 177-180 Adams, Henry, on the Declara- tion of Paris, 274, 275 Adams, John C^uincy, denies Russian jurisdiction over Be- ring Sea, 174 Africa, land-grabbing in, x, 1 Aggressive policy, an, 15, 16, 18, 188-191 " Alabama," the case of the, 38- 40, 46, 196, 217, 247, 265 Alaska, acquisition of, 11, 107, 173-176: the waters of, 173-177; the sealing question, 215 Aleutian Islands, the seal-fisher- ies, 171 Alexandria, bombardment of, 138 " Allianca," the case of the, 31 Alsace-Lorraine, 104, 105 Altruism, not an attribute of states, 241, 242 America, non-interference of Eu- rope in affairs of, 4, 5 ; the headship of, 10, 16, 73, 156, 190, 238; the expulsion of Europe from, 75 " America for the Americans," 4 American temperament, the, 8, 9 " Amy Warwick," the case of the, 27 Arabi Pasha, outbreak by, 138 Arbitration, 9, 21. 56, 67, 213, 230, 244-247, 249-258, 261-269 Armed neutnility, the first, 85, 86 Armenia, Amcricaii losses in, xi Army, the United .^tates, 16, 17, 99, 189 Arthur, Chester A., on the recog- nition of the Peru\'ian govern- ment, 116 Asylum, the right of, 179, 180, 184-186 Atlantic Ocean, American inter- ests in the, 108 Atrato, proposed canal route at, 142 Australasia, the pearl-fisheries of, 219 Austria, signatory to Suez Canal agreement, 141 ; the Monroe Doctrine and, 229 Autonomy, Cuban, 65 Balance of power, 106, 223 Ballot, the purification of the, 189 Balmaceda, General, tiie case of the " Itata," 180-186 ; defeat of, 183 Baltic league, the, 85 "Baltinioic," the, affair in Val- paraisii, 9, 186-188 Banking sytstem, the, 12 Barrundia, General, the case of, 6, 177-180 Bayard, Thomas F., sealing pol- icy, 2, 218 Belgium, neutrality of, 160, 223 Belligerency, the recognition of, 25-34, 62. See also lNsr]!(;ENTS Belligerent interests subservi- ent to neutral interests, 156 Bering Sea controversy, 6, 170- 177, 213-220 Blaine, James G., the sealing jiolicy of, 2; on the United States' Hawaiian policy, 126; Panama Canal policy, 146 ; on the Clavton-Bulwer treaty, 146, 162, 164 Blockades, 28-32, 86, 88, 92, 95, 182, 273, 275-278, 280 Blount, Commissioner, action in Hawaii, 119 Bolivia, war with Chile and Peru, 116 Bounties on fish, 197 British Columbia, the seal-fish- eries, 171 285 286 INDEX Britisli Guiana, the boundary question, 77, 224. 237 Brown, Justice, decision in the case of the " Caroudelet," 47 Bryanism, 18 Bulgaria, Russian intervention in, 74 Calderon, President, recognition of his government of Peru, 121 Calhoun, John C, on the right of asylum. 186 ; on the Monroe Doctrine, 232, 233 California, the conquest of, 10, 16, 107 Canada, the United States look- ing toward, 10; relations with the United States, 18; possi- bilities of profit by Spanish- American war, 89; Usheries disputes, 176, 195-209 ; recipro- city, 194-196, 198-200, 202-206, 209; the sealing coutroversy, 218 Canal neutralization, the princi- ples of, 147-149, 153-165 Canals. See Central Ameri- can Canals; Interoceanic Canal Canso, Gut of, the fisheries of the, 201, 203, 207 Cape Cod, the fisheries of, 201 Capital and labor, 189 Capture, right of, 86-93, 95, 96 Carlism, 72 " Carondelet," the case of the, 47 Carrying-trade, the world's, 5. 6 Castiue, Me., during War of 1812, 98 Caucus system, the, 14 Central America, self-govern- ment in, 115; application of the Monroe Doctrine in. 1").") Central American canals, 7, 8, 10, 16, 108, 133-149, 153-165, 265, 266. See also Interoceanic Canal Chauiperico, the case of Gen- eral Barrundia at, 177 " Charleston," chase of the "Itata" by the, 181, 182 Chile, war with Bolivia and Peru, lie ; the case of the "Itata," 180-183; right of asylum in, 184-186 ; the case of the "Baltimore," 186-188; straincil rclatimis lictweeu the United States and. l,ss. 189 China, the land-seranible in, x; relations with the United States, 18 ; an American sena- tor's criticisms of, 80; the China — continued treaty of Simonoseki, 105; American interests in, 108 Chinese imniigi'atiou, 18 Citizens, protection of, 6 Civilized nations, their duties among uncivilized races, 6 Civil-service reform, 12 Civil War, the, 16, 27, 29, 32, 38- 40, 43, 46, 93, 95, 234, 246, 274, 275 Clay, Henry, on the Monroe Doc- trine, 231 Clayton, John M., on the United States' Hawaiian policy, 124; on the right of asylum, 186 Clavton-Bulwer treaty, the, 7, 143, 146, 159, 162-165, 265 Cleveland, Grover, attittide to- ward Hawaii, 2; attitude on the Cuban question, 9, 25; in- terference in the Venezuelan boundary case, 76-78, 224, 228- 230, 236-238 ; sealing policy, 218 ; his Monroe Doctrine, 223-238; threats against England, 228, 236, 238 Coal, its status, 93, 94 Coaling-stations, 99, 108 Coast defense, 16, 17, 88 Coast fishermen, exemption from capture, 92, 196 Colonial adventure and aggran- dizement, 1, 73, 110 Commerce, the protection of a nation's, 5; the blight of, 13; effects of war on, 26, 28-32, 38, 39, 43-45, 49, 85-98, 273-282 ; the modern customs of, 85-87, 89, 95 ; war upon, 88 Commerce-destroyers, 88 Commercial rivalry. 13 Compromise tariff, 109, 110 Concert of nations, 157 " Concert" of the Powers, 4 Confederate States, recognition of their belligerency, 27, 29, 38, 275 ; trade with England, 32, 38-40 Conflict, the law of state life and gro\vth, 242 ; not war, 242 Congress of Vienna (1815), the, 247 Conquest, the right of, 105 "Conservatives," the policy of the. 11. 12, 100 Constantinople, the Russian jxdiey eoncerniiig, 74; Suez Canal con\ ention at, 137, 140 Contraband of war, 28, 30-32, 39, 40, 43-45, 86, 89, 92-95, 181, 182, 273, 277, 278 INDEX 287 Contracts, eflfect of war on, 96 Coi'iuto, Eugland's possible de- signs against, 164 Corn Island, England's possible designs on, 164 Costa Rica, tlie provisional gov- ernment of, 121; the Clayton- Bill wcr provisions concerning, 164 Credit, 12, 13, 18 Crimean War, the, 273 Cross versus Harrison, the case of, 97 Cuba, its strategical position, 10, 108; American desire to annex, 15; (luestiou of recognition of bellii,^erenc.v in, 25-34, 37, 43, 48, 62, 78 ; American losses in, 26, 63, 77, 78; question of recogni- tion of independence of, 33, 34, 62, 78, 86; American expedi- tious to, 37, 39, 40, 45-48; the shipment of arms to, 38-40, 45- 48; relations with tlic United States, :j'.i-4;» ; American sym- pathy for, 40, 45, 64; the condi- tion of the insurgents in, 47, 48 ; the question of intervention in, 61-67, 74, 80 et seq.; United States' trade with, 63 ; the re- concentra(U)S, 64, 65, 76 ; auton- omy in, i;.-), 80, 81; possibilities of Unite5 Harbor defense, Ifi, 17 Harrison, Benjamin, Hawaiian policy, 2, 127 ; the scalinj; policy of,C Havana.the case of the "Maine," 53-57, 01, 67,81, 82 Hawaii, its strategical i)osition, 10; annexation of, viii, 2, 10, W, 108; the Japamsc (jiicstion in, 18; the law and the' policy for, 115-129; tlic iiruvisiomtl government rec<>i;iiized by the United States, 118-120 ; the po- sition of the Queen, 118, 122, 127; its trade and population, 123, 124, 120-129 ; the opium traf- fic and Louisiana lottery scheme in, 127 Hayes, Rutherford B., on recog- nizing de facto governments, lie, 117 Hayti, rehitious with Germany, 72; the right of asjdum iii, 184 High seas, extraordinary juris- diction over the, 219 Hippolyte, President, 47 Hoar, (4eorge F., views in the " Caromlelet" case, 47 Holland, recognizes Confederate belligerency, 27,275; signatory to iSiiez Canal agreement. Ml Honduras, proposed canal route in, 142 Honolulu, revolution in, 118. See also Hawaii Humanitarianism, natioiuil, 241 Humanity, the claims of, G3, 04, 74-70, 99, 106 Ibrahim Pasha, 74 Hicome tax, 18, 110 Independeiu^e, the right of, 223 Independent parties, li) India, the Sue/ (anal and, 138 Insuraiu-e policies, etl'ect of war on, 96 Insurgents, the status of, 25-34, 40, 42, 43, 63 19 Intentourse, freedom of, 156 Internal development, 100 Internal revenue, 17, 18, 110 International controversies, the settlenu'ut of, 241-258 International law, the applica- tion of, 41, 43, 45, 48, 49; fh(- Monroe Doctrine and, 225, 226, 228 Interoeeanic canal, in the light of precedent, 133-149; from the standpoint of self-interest, 153- 105; the question of an, 205 Intervention, in Cu])a, 61-67 ; the l)rinciples of, 73-77 Italy, attitude concerning coal, 94; signatory to Suez Canal agreement, 141; the New Or- leans hneliinus, 187; treaties with Uiiited States, 278 " Itata," the case of the, 6, 46, 180-183 Japan, the new status of, x ; re- lations with the United States, 18; the Japanese in Hawaii, 18 ; the treaty of Simonoseki, 105; the sealing controversj', 217 Jingoism, 0, 11, 14, 67, 100, 155 Joint commissions, 254 Kalakaua, King, 119 Kent, Chancellor James, denies Russian jurisdiction over Be- ring Sea, 174 Kilpatrick, Judson, despatch from W. H. Seward to, 234, 235 Labrador, the fisheries of, 200 I>ake fisheries, 208 Linigston, Minister, instructions fioni Mr. Frelinghuysen to, 184 r.egal-tender decisions, 12 Legare, Hugh S., on the United States' Hawaiian policy. 123, 124 Letters of marque. See Pkiva- TEERING Lincoln, Abraham, war mea- sures, 29 Little Belt, the, 134 Livingston, Edward, on recog- nized governments, 116 Locke, Judge, decision in the case of the "Thi-ee Friends," 47, 48 Logan, John A., despatch from F. T. Fi'elinghuysi'U, 110 Logic and human passions, 82, 83 290 INDEX London, the sealskin industry of, 172 LoDir, Joliu D., Secretary of the Navy, ;)7, 40 Louisiana lottery, scheme to in- troduce it in Hawaii, 1'27 LouiBiaua Purchase, the, 10, 107 Lowell, James Russell, despatch from James G. Blaine, 164 McCanlev, Mr., instructions from I);mi<'l Webster, 186 Machine ixilitics, 12, 14 McKialey, William, Cuban pol- icy. 65,'7G, 80, 81, 83, 91 Magdalen Islands, the fisheries of the, 200 Magellan's Straits, 134 Mail service on the seas, 86, 95 Maine, the fisheries of, 201, 205; the boundary question, 230, 246 " Maine," the case of the, 53-57, 61, 67, 81, 82 Managua Lake, proposed canal route via, 143 Manila, the Germans at, ix ; the American victory at, 85, 103; the status of foreigners in, 96 ; effect of capture on, 96-99 ; the question of keeping, 111. See also Philippines Marcy, Williaiii L., on the United States' IIa\v;iii;iu iidlicy, 125 Marcy anunduiciit, tlic, 274 Mare clausum, the question of a, 172-177, 215 Martial law in captured terri- tory, 97 Mason and Slidell attair, the, 179 Massachusetts, the fisheries of, 201 Maximilian, his Mexican em- pire, 233, 234 IVIediation, 244-246 Mediterraueau Sea, Russian hopes in the, 2 ; iimiKised ship- canal across France to the, 134 Men-of-war, resiionsibility for visiting, 53-57, 67 Metternieli, Pi'iiice, on the Suez Canal project, 137 Mexican War, 16, 97 Mexico, relations with theUnited States, 3 ; United States' ac- quisition of territory from, 10 ; French intervention in, 74,155, 233, 234 ; recognition of dt; facto gdverniiieiits in, 117 ; pro- posed interoceaiiie cinal in, 142; the IJaniuidia affair, 177- 180; the sealing controversy. Mexico — cnnlinued 217 ; non-signatory to the Dec- laration of Paris, 273, 282 Militarism, lo'.) Military occupation and sover- eignty, 104 Military supplies, trade in, 31, 32, 38-41, 43-45, 49, 62, 78, 79, 181-183 Mississippi River, free naviga- tion of the, 197 Mizner, Mr., and the Barrundia affair, 177-ls() Modus Vivendi, the, 217 Mohammed Ali, on the Suez Canal project, 137 Monroe Doctrine, the, 7, 8, 33, 73, 128, 154-156, 190, 223-238, 2.52, 265 ; its origin, 155 ; President Cleveland's, 223-238 ; a policy, not a law, 226 Monroeism, 73 Morgan, Senator, dissent in the Bering Sea award, 215 Mosquito Coast, the protector- ate of the, 162, 164 " Most-favored-uation clause," 18, 106, 156 Municipal corruption, 189 Municipal reform, 12, 109 Naples, intervention of the al- lied powers in, 231 Napoleon III, intervention in Mexico, 74, 233, 234 (see also Mexico) ; suggests mediation in the Civil War, 246 Napoleonic wars, the American carrying-trade during the, 277 National credit, 12, 13, 21, 85 National debt, 110 National growth, 1, 11 National hunianitarianism, 241 Naturalized citizens, effect of war on, 96 Naval architecture, revolution in, 5 Naval supremacy, 85 Navarino, battle of, 74, 75 Navigation, freedom of, 156 Navy, the duties of a, 5 ; the United States, 16, 17, 1H9 Netherlands, the partition of Belgium from the, 223 ; the Northeast boundary dispute referred to the King of the, 246 Neutral goods under enemy's tlag, HH,'273, 274, 276, 278 Neutial interests paramount to belligerent interests, 156 INDEX 291 Neutrality, enforcement of, 6; the i-iKlitH aurt duties of, 27-32, 37-4'.t, i)2-6i, 70, 78, 85-90, 242, 27;i-2.s2; ine.siTvatiim liy the United States, 37-ti) Neutralizatidii, Wliarton ou, li7, 148 ; of iutei'oeeauic eauals, 7, 8, 133 et seq., 200 Neutralization versus protection, 117-1-1'J, 137 New Brunswick, tlie fisheries of, 201 Newfoundland fisheries, the, 200, 201, 205 New Granada-, treaty with the United States, U2, 143, 147, 154. See also United States of COLOMIUA New Mexico, the acquisition ot, 107 New Orleans, the Italian lyneh- iugs in, 187 New York, the " Vizcaya " in the port of, 57 ; dangers to commerce of, 89 Nicaragua, filihusterins in, 10; treaty with the United States, 144, 145; possibilities of the United States' position in, 159 Niearauiia (anal, the, 09,135,139, 142-144, 149, 154, 158, 101, 104, 165 Non-intervention, the principle of, 156 Northeastern houndary dispute, 246 North Sea Canal, the, 134, 135 Nova Scotia, the fisheries of, 201, 203 ; the trade of, 203 Occupation, does not vest sov- ereignty, 97 Occupied territory, the law con- cerning, 98, 99 Oluey, Uicliiird. attitude on the Cuixin question, 9; on the headship of the United States, 238 Opium traffic in Hawaii, 127 Opportunism, 231 Pacific Ocean, American inter- ests in the, 108; the sealing cimtroversy, 170-177, 215, 216 Palma, Senor, 25 Panama, Isthmus of, neutrality of, 143-149 Panama Canal, the, 135, 142, 145, 146 Panama Canal Company, agree- ment with the United States of Colombia, 145 Panama Congress, the, 232 Panama Railway, the, 143, 154 Panics, 13 Paper blockades. See Block- ades Paris, Suez Canal convention at, 140 Paris, Declaration of, 87, 88, 90, 240 ; the United States and the, 273-282 Parties, the disintegration of, 19 Partnerships, etfect of war on, 95, 96 Party politics, 12, 14, 19 Patriotism, 19, 20, 100 Pedio, Dom, 231 Pensions, 17, 110 Pei'u, war with Chile and Bo- livia, 116 ; recognition of the government by the United States, 116 ; the right of asylum in, 185 Peyton, Mr., instructions from Daniel Webster to, 185, 186 Philippines, the conquest and future of the, viii, 99, 103-111 Piracy, 27, 32, 182, 226, 275 Pitts, Captain, and the Barnmdia affair, 177-179 Policing the seas, 5 Politiea) parties, succession of, 2; the dividing-lines of, 12; dis- integration of, 19 Political refugees, the rights of, 180 Politics, the citizen in, 14 Polk, James K., on the Monroe Doctrine, 232 Populism, 19 Populistic Democracy, the, 19 Port Harford, CaL, sealing limits, 216 Porto Rico, eff'ect of capture of, 96; the acquisition of, 99; American operations in, 103 ; the future of, 100, 108 Portugal, the ease of the "Gen- eral Armstrong," 53, 54; ex- tinct naval dominion of, 173 - Postal service ou the seas, 86, 95 Power, abuse of, ('> Preston, Minister, insti'uctions from Hamilton Fish, 184 Prit)vloff Islands, the sealing question, 171. 214-216, 218 Prince Edward Island, the fish- eries of, 201 Privateering, 32, 33, 86-90, 273, 274, 270, 279-282 Prizes, 92 Proclamation of a state of war, 91 Protection, 12, 17 292 INDEX Protection of the fisheries, 197, 206, 208, 209 Protectiou ccrs^s neutralization, 147-149, 157 Provisional governments, the status of. 118-121 Prussia, the Monroe Doctrine and, 229; treaties with the United States, 278 Railway traffic legislation, 12 " Ranwr," the Barrundia affair and the, 178-180 Reciprocitv, 2, 194-196, 198-200, 202-206, 209 Reconcentradoe, the, 64, 65, 76 Red Cross Society, the, 76 Reiter, Coiiiinaiuler, and the Barrundia afl'air, 178-180 Representative government, 2, 15 Reprisals, 243 Retorsion, 243 Revenue laws, violations of, 45, 46, 49, 182, 183 ; in captured ter- ritory, 97, 98 "Robert and Minnie," the case of the, 183 Roman law, the, 250 Russell, Lord John, attitude con- cerning the Declaration of Paris, 275 Russia, autocracy in, 2 ; relations with England. 2 ; her Mediter- ranean policy, 2 ; relations with the United States, 3; in- terveiitioTi in Bulgaria, 74; her Dardanelles policy. 74: attitude concerning coal, '.t4 ; interfer- ence with Japan, 105 ; war witli Turkey, 137 ; Suez Canal policy, 137, 141; the sealing contro- versy, 171-177, 215. 217, 218 ; the sale of Alaska, 174-176; treaties Avith United States, 174, 278; claim of jurisdiction over Alaskan wat<'rs. 174-176; treaty with l<;ngl;nul (1K25), 175; the Moni'oe Doctrine and, 229 Sagasta, Seiior, 83 St. John River, the Maine boun- dary question. 230 St. Lawrence River, the fislieries of the. 173, 201. 202, 207; the Maine lioundni'v question, 2:!0 Sallsliui-y, Lon!, on non-user, 175; the Venezuelan boundary case, 226 " Salvador," the case of the, 48 San Diego, Cal., the case of the "Itata" at, 46, 181-183 Sandwich Islands. See Hawaii San Francisco, the case of the "Baltiuiiire" at, 187 San Jose. Guatemala, the Bar- rundia affair at. 178-180 San Juan, Porto Rico, American operations at, 103 San Juan bouudar.y case. 265 San Juan River, proposed canal route via, 142, 143 Santo Domingo, anti-annexation feeling concerning, 128 Scientific expeditions, exemp- tion from capture, 92 Sealing controversy, the, 2, 18, 170-177, 213-220 Search, right of, 28, 31, 32, 39, 43, 44, 86, 95, 241 Self-defense, wars of, 6; the right of. 42, 44, 73, 74, 76-78, 223- 225, 227, 238, 264 Self-government, 21, 100, 115 Seward, WilliamiH., acquisition of Alaska, 11, 215 ; jiosition con- cerning the "Sumter." 27; on the recognition of revolution- ary governments, 117; on the United States' Hawaiian policy, 125, 126; on the right of asylum, 185 ; on the Monroe Doctrine, 234, 235 ; attitude to- ward the Declaration of Paris, 274, 275 "Shenandoah," case of the, 40 Ship-canals. See Central Amer- ican Canals; Interoceanic Canal Shipping, effects of war on, 26, 28-33, 39, 40, 43^6 Silver Democracy, the, 19 Silver Republicans, 19 Simonoseki, tlie treaty of, 105 Sixty-mile limit, tlie, 216 Slavery, 12, 15 Slave-trade, the, 226, 241 Snow, Professor, on the Monroe Doctrine. 231.2;i2 South America, self-government in, 115; de fa<'to governments in, 116, 117 ; api>lic:itioii of the Monroe Doctrine in, 155, 229 et seq,; the right of asylum in, 184- 18<;; projiosed intervention of the allied powers in, 231 SovereinntN-, not vested by occu- pation, 97; financial control and the rights of, 139 Spain, relations with the United States. 3, 18; American hostil- ity toward. 16; the Cuban (luestimi. 18; rights under rec- ognition of Cuban Ijelligereucy, INDEX 293 Spain— continued 31-34; treatios botwoon the Uuited States and, 32, 33, '.)4, 278; the diitv of tlie Uuited Btates to, 37-4'.); neutrality duriujtc tlie Civil War, 4;t; re- spousibility for the " Maine," 53-57, 61, 07, 82 (see also "Maine ") ; relatious with the Uuited States, 53-57, 61-67, 78, 94 ; the war with, viii, 71-100, 282; the victim of cireum- stauces, 72 ; the national policy of, 72 ; her expulsion froiu Cuba, 75, 90 ; bad faith of, HI ; national character, 83; posi- tion on privateering, 87-89; question ot expulsion of Amer- icans from, 94; position as to the Declaration of Paris, 87, 88,273, 282; her rights iu the Philippines, 104 ; signatory to Suez Canal agreement, 141 ; extinct naval dominion of, 173; the right of asylum iu, 185 ; intervention of the allied powers in, 331 ; offer of Yuca- tan to, 232 ; recognizes the Confederate States, 275 Spanisli taritf, its enforcement in eonciuend territory, 98 Spirited foreign policy, the doc- trine of a, 101, 189 Standing army, a, 10 State policy, l States' lights, 12, 16 Statutes, interpretation of, 41, 46^9 Stevens, Minister, action in Ha- waii, 119 Stowell, Lord, on the right of search, 95 Strikes, 13 Suez CJaual, the, 136-141, 146, 148, 154, 160 " Sumter," the case of the, 27 Sweden, treaties with TJnited States, 278 Sweetwater Canal, Suez, the, 140 Tariff question, the, 2, 9, 12, 17, 21,99 Taxation for war ])urpoHes, 10, 17, 189 Tehuantepec. proposed canal at, 142 Territorial claims, 262, 265, 266 Texas, the annexation of, 10, 16; recogniti