e9iyi.i,/^ ' :y'r'/7y9?t^ ^ ' ^^ THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TEUSTEES THE DITTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES SIX LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE INNER TEMPLE DURING THE HILARY SITTINGS, 1S96, AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, M.P. ONE OF HER majesty's COUNSEL ilonbon MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. NEW YORK : MACMILLAN & CO 1896 ^^ IticHARD Clay and Sons, Limited LONDON AND BUNGAY. PEEFACE These Lectures were delivered at the request of the Council of Legal Education, and are now printed at the request of a good many people who did not hear them. I have only a word to say by way of preface. My learned friends in Lincoln's Inn with whom it has been my happiness to associate for twenty years, have no concern with this little volume. Courage- ous as they already are in their attack upon a Trustee, and wily (if retained on his behalf) in his defence, what is there for me, of all men, to teach my brethren ? Nothing whatever. VI PREFACE My sole ol)ject has l)een, and I shall be sorry if I have wholly failed to effect it, to bring out in bold relief the plain duties and the equally plain, but none the less disagreeable, liabilities of express Trustees, in such a manner as to engage the atten- tion alike of the student of our law, and of the many men and women, who, though not lawyers, are yet Trustees. In considering the provisions of the recent Trustee Act of 1893, I have found an edition of that Act edited with notes by my two learned friends, Mr, Rudall and Mr. J. W. Greig, and published by Jordan and Sons of Chancery Lane, price six shillings net, most useful and trust- worthy. A. B. li, New Square, Lincoln's Inn. CONTENTS FIRST LECTURE. The Law of Trusts not yet codified — Importance and interest of the subject — Different kinds of Trusts : Express Trusts (Executed and Execu- tory), Implied Trusts, Resulting Trusts, Con- structive Trusts, Public Trusts and Private Trusts — Object of these Lectures to ascertain and explain present legal position of persons who have accepted an express executed private Trust either under a Will or Deed — In order to ascertain this position reference must be had to both Ca.se Law and Statute Law — Important changes liave lately been made in the Law on this subject by Statute, and a new disposition and temper towards Trustees has been shown by the Judges in important cases decided re- cently — The present time is therefore a favour- able opportunity to survey the subject, and to consider, first, the Duties of Trustees, and then their Liabilities — The First duty of a Trustee is to make himself acquainted with the terms of his Trust — His Second duty is always to bear VIU CONTENTS PAGE those terms in mind— His Third duty is never to depart from them — His Fourth duty is to take as much care of the Trust property as (being a prudent man of business) he is accus- tomed to take of liis own 1 — 35 SECOND LECTURE. The Fifth duty of a Trustee is, in all investments, and particularly in the case of investments on mortgage of real or leasehold estate, to observe to the letter both the provisions of the Trust, Deed, or Will and the requii-ements of Parlia- ment — His Sixth duty is to give the persons beneficially interested in the Trust complete information as to the state of the Trust Funds, and otherwise, whenever required so to do, and to furnish such persons with accounts .... 3G — G5 THIRD LECTURE. The Seventh dutj' of a Trustee is not to make a penny piece of personal profit out of the Trust business, unless a professional man speciallj' authorised bj' the Trust, Deed, or Will so to do — His Eitjhth duty is to co-operate with liis co-Trustee or co-Trustees in a friendly and reasonable spirit, and to consult him or them about all matters connected with the Trust, and to retire (on being paid costs, charges, and ex- penses) whenever requested so to do by the parties interested — And Ninthly and Lastly, CONTENTS IX PAGE whenever any question of difficulty actually arises as to the extent of his powers or the nature of his duty, to take the opinion of a Judge in Chambers by way of Summons . . 66 — 89 FOURTH LECTURE. The Liabilities of Trustees are measured by their duties — Every plain neglect of duty is a Breach of Trust, and if a Breach of Trust results in pecuniary loss, the Trustee committing it is personally liable; e.g., to make an investment of a kind not authorised by the terms of the Trust is to neglect duties Nos. I., II., and III., whilst to make an improvident investment on a mortgage security (mortgage securities being authorised by the Trust), is to neglect duties Nos. IV. and V. — Active and Passive Breaches of Trust — Liability for Breaches of Trust of a Co-Trustee — Acquiescence — Concurrence and Instigation of Beneficiaries in and to Breaches of Trust 90—124 FIFTH LECTURE. Two of the most frequent of innocent , Breaches of Trust are Improper Investments, and continuing to carry on Farming and other business opera- tions for the benefit of Widows and Infants — The present Law as to Investments and as to carrying on business considered — What is Wilful Default 125—152 CONTENTS SIXTH LECTURE. PAOE The Statute of Limitations may now be pleaded by Trustees in certain circumstances : these cir- cumstances considered — The delegation of Trusts — Power of Trustees to authorise receipt of money by their Solicitor — Forgery — Proposal to have Official Trustees 153 — 183 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TEUSTEES THE DUTIES LIABILITIES OF TKUSTEES My distinguished predecessor in this place, for chair I must not call it, Mr. Willis, was luckier than I in his choice of a subject, for abstruse though the law of negotiable securities may Ije, it has this advantage over my unwieldy theme — it has been made the sul^ject matter of scientific legislation. The whole law was embodied in a Bill carefully drafted by a most accomplished lawyer ; this Bill was submitted to IE B 2 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. revision l)y select committees of l)otli Houses of Parliament, and then passed into Law without amendment or murmur. After a decent interval the draftsman was made a County Court judge. There are thino's even in this world which are o exactly what they should be. The student tliouoh he will not Ijc able without much reading to comprehend the full significance of the one hundred clauses of 45 and 46 of the Queen, chap- ter 61, intituled "An Act to codify the law relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes," yet has the satisfaction, and in legal matters it is a very real satisfaction, of knowing that with the statute kept open before him he is not likely to overlook or be unmindful of anything it really behoves him to remember. How different is my plight. My sub- ject, The Duties and Liabilities of Trustees^ is still at large in the library, I OF TRUSTEES 6 where it lurks in volumes of reports to be counted by hundreds, or lies buried, but with a hideous power of inopportune resurrection, in some partially repealed statute. It is terribly easy not only to over- look or (speaking frankly) to be ignorant of a case, but to forget an Act of Parlia- ment. Towards the end of last sittings and almost at the close of a case relating to Trustees then being tried in the Chancery division, it became apparent from an observation made from the bench that all the four counsel engaged in the case, learned and experienced men as they were, had not considered the provisions of the most recent Trustee Act, that of 1894, though such provisions bore directly upon the subject matter. I advise the young practitioner which- ever volume of the Law Reports he may choose to neglect, not to let it be the one B 2 4 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. containing the statutes. Nobody knows what oocs on in Parliament— our laws are reformed in the dead of night in silence and obscurity — yet none the less are these statutes, unless wholly unintelli- gible, l)inding alike upon the most head- strong and self-opinionative of County Court judges, and upon those sublimer beings who, regardless of authority, oc- cupy the scarlet benches of the House of Lords. But if I am oppressed by the difficulty of my suljject, I am encouraged both by its importance and its personal interest. I am addrcssino- those who are or who o hope shortly to l)ecome lawyers ; in other words I am addressing those who are already or are almost certain to become Trustees. Here 1 have an advantasxe over Mr. Willis, and I must make the most of it. 1 liave never, nervous and timid man that I am, drawn a Ijill, or accej^ted a bill, I OF TRUSTEES or endorsed a bill, and unless I strangely misread my destiny, I shall never do any of these things ; but despite his nervous- ness and timidity, the unhappy being who addresses you is the legal personal re- presentative of nine deceased persons and the Trustee of five marriage settlements. It is our fate ; we can hardly hope to resist it, and therefore to study the subject becomes if not a pleasant, at all events a pressing duty. The chart I have to draw is of waters through which most of you will have to plough your way. First, let me make plain the scope and "purport of this course of lectures. I do not propose to inflict upon you any learning as to uses and trusts before the Statute 27, Henry VIII. ch. 10, or after it. I hope I shall never be guilty of speaking disrespectfully of our old law, the ancient learning. I would far sooner spend an evening or tw^o re-reading 6 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. Mr. Sanders' flimous essay on Uses and Trusts, a treatise rendered delightful by the precision of its language quite apart from the fascination of its theme, than 1 would lose my time and temper over many of the novels of the day ; but it so happens that these lectures of mine as I have planned them do not involve the old law. I need not do more than remind you of the familiar classes into which trusts are divided, for all this you can more readily read for yourselves in the early pages of Mr. Lewin's now swollen volume, or in Mr. Godefrois' later work. A trust is a confidence reposed in and accepted by some person or persons, ;iiier, 1 McN. and G., page 664. One can well understand how Lord Cottenham came to this decision which indeed is sensible enough, yet it has been a troublesome decision, and has established an anomaly in the practice. If you care- fully read the decision of the judges in the Court of Appeal in re Coy'sellis, you will notice how tenderly anomalies are 74 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lkct. treated by English judges. They soon ])ecome like ancient monuments or tombs in tlie Abbey, things too old to be removed. For what after all was Cradock V. Piper ? No more than a rule in the Taxing Master's OfHce since 1850. No- body has allowed his conduct to be affected hy it ; no solicitor has ever accepted the office of Trustee on the fcdtli of it. It has in no way affected the title to property, or the liberty of the subject, or the freedom of contract. Still there it is, and there it has been allowed to remain out of respect to a tradition, the origin of which is certain, and the date recent. But it is fiercely restricted to proceedings in Chancery, in cases where the solicitor- trustee is co-defendant with trustees who are not solicitors. By special provision in the instrument creating the trust, the Trustee being a pro- fessional man, may Ije allowed to make the usual charges ; and such a provision is now Ill OF TRUSTEES 75 usually inserted in carefully drawn docu- ments. It runs as follows : " Any Trustee being a solicitor, or other person engaged in any profession or business, sliall be entitled to ])e paid all usual professional charges for business transacted, and acts done by him, or any partner of his in connection with the trusts hereof includ- ing acts, which a Trustee, not Ijeing in any profession or business, could have done personally." In this connection it is well to remember that a solicitor or other professional Trustee or executor will not be entitled to the benefit of this pro- vision if he is an attesting witness to the will — and this upon the ground that this right, conferred upon a Trustee to make professional charges, is a beneficial interest arising under the w^ill, from claiming which, an attesting witness is precluded by the Wills Act, 1 Vict. Cap. 26, Sec. 15. See re in Pooley, 40 Ch. Div., page 1. 76 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lf.ct. The cirjlith duty of n Trustee is a commonplace, as indeed most duties are. It is to co-operate ivith the co-Trustee or Trustees in a reasonahle and proper spirit, and to consult ivith them about all matters connected ivith the trust, and to retire on being requested so to do by all concerned. A Trustee should never get into the hal)it of either leaving a co- Trustee out of account or allowing him- self to be so left out. The English law does not recognise the distinction between an acting and a non-acting Trustee. As a matter of business, one Trustee must usually take the initiative, and the other or others be more or less lookers on, l)ut they must be informed and critical lookers-on, else they neglect their duty. No step should be taken without the conscious approval of all the Trustees. Here the formal spirit of the Scotch practice is in remarkable contrast to the happy -go-luckiness of the English. With in OF TRUSTEES 77 US private express Trustees rarely meet in conclave, nor is it usual to preserve a record of their decisions. The trust business is transacted through the post, at odd moments of time, and in scraps of conversation, and yet in theory our law is stricter than the Scotch law. The Scotch law allows a majority of the Trustees to override a minority and recognises a quorum sufficient for the transaction of any trust business. Our law does not recognise a majority, and we have no quorum. All the Trustees must be like-minded, and unless the unwilling Trustee is obviously corrupt he cannot be compelled, save by administra- tion of the trust estate by the court, to give up his opinion in deference to that of his brethren. The duty of a Trustee to retire is worded too strongly. It is not the (hity of a Trustee to retire even when called upon so to do by all concerned. Unless guilty 78 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. of misconduct, mentally incapable, per- manently resident abroad, or a bankrupt, lie is irremovable. Even the court will not remove liim. But it always creates a very bad impression when a man insists upon retaining an unpaid office against the wishes of his beneficiaries who are pre- pared to nominate his successor. It argues either corruption or cantankerousness, and either disposition — the former legally, the latter only morally — is a disqualifica- tion for the office of a Trustee. It is how^ever necessary to add that a Trustee should never retire if he knows that the object of the l)eneficiaries in getting rid of him is to fill the vacant place with some one whom they know will not refuse his consent to a contemplated l)reach of trust. The tmith and last duty of a Trustee is, ivhenever any question of difficulty arises in the administration or manage- ment of his trust estate to take the nr OF TRUSTEES 79 ojnnion of thejicdge in chaiiihers hy way of summons. Great revolutions are usually wrought in silence, and such a revolution in our Chancery practice was effected by what is now called Order 55, Rules 3 to 13a, of the rules of the Supreme Court. You must all of you who intend to practice the law in the Chancery Division make yourselves intimately acquainted with these rules and with the practice which has grown up under them, which you will find in what we call the " White " book, namely the Annual Practice for each year, edited by Mr. Thomas Snow. These rules, or something more or less like them, have now been in operation for twenty years, and a practice has grown up under them of enormous benefit to the suitor and to the huge relief of Trustees. The costs saved by these rules would build a fleet of ironclads, I am old enough to remember as a 80 THE DUTIES! AND LIABILITIES lect. student the old j)ractice of tlie Court of Chancery, and the evolution of a particu- lar kind of Chancery suit. A case was in the first instance laid before a Chancery counsel, as to the true construction of a will, a copy of which accompanied the papers. An experienced counsel was usually able in a few moments to tell into which of the many well- known pitfalls the unhappy testator had fallen. Sometimes he had left it uncertain when the gifts he fondly in- tended for his descendants vested — he had employed the word "issue," did he mean "children"? — when is the precise period of distribution — or what the effect of a gift over on death without issue ? Either one of these, or some one or more of the half hundred other teasing ques- tions so apt to arise on every ill-drawn will, was, or were, usually detected in a more or less violent form. Tlitit was the first step in a Chancery suit. The second Ill OF TRUSTEES 81 was for the counsel to write an opinion in which he cited one or two of the cases with which the courts were only too familiar, Hill V. C/i ajwiayi, Leake v. Rohinson, King V. Isaacson, Leeming v. Sheratt, &c., &c., and to conclude by saying it was impossible for the executors and Trustees to take upon themselves the responsibility of administering the estate under such a will except under the direction of tlie court. Then the papers left counsel's chambers to return in a few days with instructions to draw a bill of complaint. These would be handed over to a pupil, who would prepare the Bill according to instructions, probably making a beneficiary plaintiff, and the executors and Trustees defendants. In the first paragraph the will was set out omitting merely formal parts — the date of the death occupied the second paragraph — that of the probate the third ; a few facts as to the state of the family of the deceased were spread G 82 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. over tlie remaining paragraphs except the last, which stated that doubts and diffi- culties had arisen as to the true con- struction of the testator's will, and it had become necessary to administer his estate under the direction of this honourable court. To this bill an answer was not usually considered necessary, and the cause would be set down for trial and marked " short," and some Saturday morn in o; an order would be made directing; the usual accounts and inquiries as to debts, funeral, and testamentary ex- penses, legacies, and incumbrances, and so on. These accounts and inquiries were taken, made, and answered by the chief clerk, and involved numerous attendances before him. In due course he would file his certificate containing the result of the accounts, and the facts elicited by his inquiries — facts about which there was as often as not no dispute at all, but all of which had been proved strictly by affi- Ill OF TRUSTEES 83 davits and certificates of Ijirtlis, marriages, and deaths. The cause would then be ripe for hearing on furtljer consideration. In July the courts of the Vice-Chan - cellors and the Master of the Rolls used to be blocked with Further Considerations, and it rained briefs in Lincoln's Inn. The briefs consisted frequently simply of the pleadings, copy of the original decree, and of the will ; the chief clerk's certifi- cate, and draft minutes of the order it was proposed to take on further con- sideration. The cause would be called on, and it was then not infrequently dis- covered that having regard to the decided cases the original doubt or difficulty, whatever it was, which had given rise to all these costly proceedings, was really not capable of argument at all, and an order was made in a couple of minutes declaring the true construction of the will, and dividing the residue, after payment of costs, accordingly. G 2 84 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lf.ct. This waste of money, this squandering of the scanty portions of orphans, is pain- ful to contemplate even in the retrospect of life. All this is now over and done wdth. Walk round the Chancery end of the High Court on a Monday morning and you will find only one judge, of first instance, sitting in his robes trying wit- ness actions ; the other judges are all sitting in chambers, that is in their courts, but at the talkie, and not upon the bench, up to their eyes in summonses, mostly originating summonses, taken out under the order referred to. Leaders are con- spicuous by their absence, and junior counsel only are to be seen holding briefs marked, it must be said, witli unreason- ably low fees. It is hardly to exaggerate to say that each one of these summonses is a strangled Chancery suit. Although I cannot here usefully go through these rules or say anything likely ni OF TRUSTEES 85 to save you the trouble of making your- selves personally acquainted with their terms, I will set out that l^y them — 1. The Trustees under any deed or instrument, or any of them, may take out an Orisfinatino' Summons in the chambers of a judge of the Chancery Division for the determination without an administra- tion of the trust of any of the following questions or matters : — (a) Any question affecting the rights or interests of the person claiming to be amongst others a cestui que trust. (b) The furnishing of any particular accounts by the Trustees, and the vouching, when necessary, of such accounts. (c) The payment into Court of any money in the hands of Trustees. (d) Directing the Trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act. 86 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lkct. ((') The approval of any sale, purchase, compromise, or other transaction, and (f) Determination of any question arisino' in the administration of the estate. 2. In like manner an order may be obtained in^ chambers for — («) The administration of the personal estate of a deceased man. (b) The administration of his real estate, and (c) The administration of any trust. Eule 10 of Order 55 expressly declares that it shall not be obligatory on the court or a judge to pronounce or make a judgment or order, whether on summons or otherwise, for the administration of any trust or of the estate of any deceased person, if the questions between the parties can be properly determined with- out such judgment or order. And by llule 10a— Ill OF TRUSTEES 87 Upon an application for administration or execution of trusts by a creditor or beneficiary under a will intestacy or deed of trust, where no accounts or insufficient accounts have been rendered, the court or a judge may in addition to the powers already existing — («) Order that the application shall stand over for a certain time, and that the executors and adminis- trators or Trustees, in the mean- time shall render to the applicant a proper statement of their accounts, with an intimation that if this is not done they may be made to pay the costs of the pro- ceedings. (h) When necessary to prevent pro- ceedings by other creditors, or by persons beneficially interested, make the usual judgment or order or administration, with a proviso that no proceedings are to be taken 88 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. under such judgment or order with- out leave of the judge in person. The young practitioner, nevertheless, must be very careful as to his practice in this matter of originating summons. You will have solicitors' clerks bursting into your chambers demanding that you should off-hand settle what they call " Origin- ators," but you must keep your head cool and remember that an originating sum- mons is to all intents and purposes an action, and that though no doubt the old rules as to parties have been somewhat relaxed, nevertheless the judge, sitting in chambers though he be, will insist upon proper parties appearing before him, and will not determine important points in their absence. The rules of practice as to, parties will be found in the White Book I have before referred to. Next, it must be remembered that there are certain remedies wliich cannot l)c pursued by way of originating summons, Ill OF TRUSTEES 89 tind especially remember tluit Trustees cannot be charged with a breach of trust hy originating summons. Sec Dowse v. Gorton (1891), App. Cas. page 202. Further, remember that the question about which you wish to obtain the opinion of the court, must actually have arisen — it not being the practice of the court to decide hypothetical questions which, in the course of events, may never actually arise. IV. Well, Gentlemen, this concludes my l^i'ief summary of the Duties of Trustees. I now approach the subject of their Liabilities. I have already said the lia- bilities of Trustees are to be measured by their duties. Unless there is a breach of duty there can be no breach of trust. Every plain dereliction of duty is a Ijreach of trust and if a breach of trust results in pecuniary loss, the Trustee committing it is personally liable : e.g. to make an investment of a kind not authorised !»}' the terms of the trust is to neglect duties Nos. 1. IJ. and HI., LECT. IV THE DUTIES OF TKUSTEES 91 whilst to make an improvident invest- ment on a mortgage security (mortgage securities Ijeing authorised ly the trust) is to neoiect duties IV, and V. o A Trustee cannot be made liable to make good out of his own pocket any loss which has accrued to the estate unless it can be shown that such loss w^as occa- sioned by his doing what he ought not to have done, or from his having omitted to do what he ouo;ht to have done — he must be guilty of sin either of commission or omission. Breaches of trust must therefore be either active or j^ctssive. Active breaches of trust rarely present difficulty except in their proof. It is unusual for an honest and ordinarily careful Trustee to commit an active breach of trust. To buy the trust pro- perty on his own account is an active breach of trust. In no circumstances must a Trustee do this, nor should he get 92 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. liis wife to do it out of her separate estate — not even though the sale be by public auction and he be away from home at the time. To lend trust money on a second mort- gage or other unauthorised security — to mix trust funds wdtli their own private money' — these are active breaches of trust ; and you can easily imagine others besides the one I shall hereafter refer to. at some length — the continuing to carry on a testator's business without being; authorised so to do by the terms of his will. Passive breaches of trust, i.e., breaches resulting from omissions, are more likely to be committed by the unwary Trustee. I will proceed to give a few examples by way of illustration. A. Non-conversion of tlie trust estate directed to be converted. Here it specially l)ehoves the Trustee to be on the look-out, for in times like IV OF TRUSTEES 93 these in which we live, depreciation of property of every kind is at all events not unlikely to occur. Under a will it is upon the executors rather than the Trustees that the duty of realisation of the estate is cast, but as after the payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and legacies, a will frequently declares trusts of the balance, and very frequently appoints the same persons Trustees who had been named as executors, it is difficult in this branch of the case to keep executors and Trustees quite distinct in one's mind. Although there is no fixed rule of law on the subject, executors are allowed a year in which to manipulate their estate, and, if they admit assets, to pay the debts and pecuniary legacies. Executors ought to adhere to this rule, for if they do not and there is such a fall in the value of the testator's estate as makes it 94 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. impossible for tliem to pay the pecuniary legatees in full, those gentlemen may say to the executors — If you had sold with- in your year you would have realised enough to pay us in full, and as you neg- lected so to do, you must make good the difference out of your own pocket, and, unless special circumstances can he shown, the pecuniary legatees will not sa}^ this in vain. The motives for non-realisation are usually pure. Stockbrokers advise that a rise in a particular security largely held by the testator is probalde, and that if it occurs not only will there be enough to pay pecuniary legatees in full, but some- thing will l)e left over for the residuary legatees. But to take this advice is to run risk. Executors have no right to nurse the estate at the possible expense of the pecuniary legatees for the possible l)cnefit of the residuary legatees. On this point sec Buxton v. Buxton, 1 My. IV OF TRUSTEES 95 & C, page 80, and Grayhurn v. Clarh- son, 3 L.R. Ch. App., page 605. In the case of Trustees properly so- called, there is no actual rule about a year, but by analogy this period should be kept in mind. See Sculthorpe v. Tiqoper, 13 L. R. Eq., 232, where a testator gave all the residue of his estate to four Trustees upon trust, to sell either immediately after his decease or so soon thereafter as the Trustees might see fit to do. Included in the testator's per- sonal estate were shares in the Bir- mingham Banking Company, which was of high standing and repute at the testator's death. The Trustees retained these shares for two years and a quarter. The bank suspended payment. It was held that the Trustees, although they had acted in perfect good faith, and as they considered best, for the interests of the beneficiaries, were bound to have sold the bank shares within a reasonable time, 96 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. wliicli was one year from the testator's death and they were therefore lia])le to make good the loss. Trustees very frequently, and indeed in all properly-drawn wills and settlements, have a discretion given to them as to when they should realise, and a power to postpone realisation. If they have such a discretionary power of postpone- ment they may safely act as they may be advised ; but they must never forget that it is their duty to realise whenever they think the right time has arrived, and that the power conferred upon them of postponement was not meant indefi- nitely to allow them to keep things as they are, but simply to enable them to realise to the best possible advantage and at the best possible moment. See in re Northington, 13 Ch. Div., 654. See also, and consider, inre Croivther (1895) 2 Ch., p. 56; and in re Smith (1896) 1 C*li., p. 171. In the latter case, Mr. Justice IV OF TRUSTEES 97 North held that a power to postpone the sale of all or any part of the residue devised and bequeathed on trust to sell, and particularly to sell the testator's business of a pawnbroker with all con- venient speed, did not give power to carry on the business for an indefinite time. Whilst on this subject of the duty of conversion, it would be a crime not to refer to the famous case of Hoive v. Earl of DartrtioutJi, which you will find reported and noted in the second volume of White and Tudor's Leading Cases. That case established the rule that wdiere property of a wasting or perishable nature, such, for example, as leaseholds, is given to persons in succes- sion, such property must at once be converted in such a way as to produce capital bearing interest. In Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth there was no trust to convert. If there is a direction to con- H 98 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. vert, there is no need of the rule of Hoive V. Earl of Dm^tmouth, for the will containing the direction must be o])eyed, and disobedience is a breach of trust. But the rule of Hoive v. Earl of Dart- mouth is this, that even when there is no direction to convert, if the property is of a wasting or perishable nature, and the testator has, by the way in which he has disposed of it, shown an intention that different persons should enjoy it one after the other, then conversion must take place; subject of course to this, that the whole will or settlement must be carefully read, to see whether or no it contains any evidence of a contrary intention. A power in the will to retain any por- tions of the testator's property in the same state in which it should be at his decease takes the case entirely out of Howe V. Earl of Dartmouth, because of the power given to the Trustees to retain IV OF TRUSTEES 99 the property in specie. See Gray v. Siggers, 15 Ch. Div., p. 74, and see in re Thomas (1891), 3 Ch. p. 482. In my opinion, any person would be well advised if he refused to be a Trustee under a will which did not give the Trustees complete discretion as to when they should realise, and a power to post- pone such realisation. B. The second example I will give of a passive breach of trust is non-accumula- tion of the income for the benefit of the person ultimately entitled. See in re Emmett, 17 Ch. Div., 143. c. A third example, and not an in- frequent one, is neglect to enforce a covenant. The case of Fenivick v. Greenivell, 10 Beav., p. 412, is an example of this kind of breach of trust. By a marriage settlement it was covenanted and agreed that £5,000 consols, part of the intended wife's property, should be transferred to H 2 100 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. Trustees upon certain trusts for tlie husband, wife and children. At the time of the settlement a sum of £4,946 25. 8c/. Three per cents, was standing in the name of the wife — but the Trustees took no steps to compel a transfer, and some eleven years after the marriage the husband and wife sold out the fund and the husband misapplied it, and in due course became bankrupt. The date of the settlement was 1806, and the bill was filled in 1846 by one of the children of the marriage to make the Trustees liable for the £5,000, which had been lost by their neglect to get it transferred into their names. The Master of the Kolls came to the conclusion that he could not see any sufficient reason why the Trustees should not have procured the transfer of the stock which belonged to the lady at the time of the marriage, and he observed: "It is with some reluc- tance that I have come to the conclusion IV OF TRUSTEES 101 that tliese Trustees if tliey had used due diligence might have recovered this sum to the extent of £4,946. It is a case of very great hardship. It does not appear that these Trustees ever looked into the settlement, but having contracted obligations by the execution of the deed they attempt to excuse themselves by saying that they were ignorant of the trust. This cannot avail them." A declaration was made that the Trustees were liable to make good the £4,946 2s. 8d. bank three per cent, annuities, and to pay the dividends which might have accrued thereon from the date of the husband's death, and also the plaintiff's costs of the suit. D. The last example I will give of a passive breach of trust is the neglect to ask for, and obtain, title-deeds relating to the settled property. The neglect of this duty is to fail to observe duty No. IV. Every prudent 102 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. man of business keeps in his own possession or under his own exclusive control the documents of title of his property, whether deeds of conveyance or of mortgage bonds, scrip or whatever else they may be. To let other people have access to these documents is to invite fraud, and it may be to give to third parties a superior equity to your own. See Lloyd's Banking Company v. Jones, 29 Ch. Div. 221, wdiere a husband having deposited with his bankers certain title-deeds together with a memorandum of deposit as a continuing security to the bankers for any over- draft of his wife's current account, died having bequeathed all his property to his wife and appointed her his executrix. After his death the deeds remained with the bankers and the widow was allowed to overdraw her account. Six months after her husband's death the widow married again. Prior to her re-marriage IV OF TRUSTEES 103 she assigned the houses to which the title-deeds referred to her Trustee on trust for herself for life, and after her death in trust for an infant son of her first marriage. The Trustee made no inquiry about the title-deeds, and no notice of the settlement was given to the bankers, who obtained from the lady and her new husband a fresh memorandum of deposit, making the deeds a con- tinuing security for any overdraft of the husband's current account. At the date of the wife's death the deeds were still with the bankers, and at that moment of time the husband's current account was in credit. Five years after the wife's death the Trustee made inquiries and discovered that the deeds which he had believed to be in the custody of the solicitor, who had prepared the settlement, were with the bankers. He then gave the bankers notice of the settlement and claimed the deeds, but it 104 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lecT. was held that the omission of the Trustee to inquire for the title-deeds was negli- gence of such a character as prevented him from availing himself of the legal estate, to give him priority over the equitable charge of the hankers, and that his cestui que trust stood in no better position. It was also held that the bankers were entitled to priority in respect of the amount due to them on their security at the time at which they received notice of the settlement. On this point of custody of title-deeds it is not easy to say what the precise rule is, if, as ought always to be the case, there are several Trustees. Supposing there are three Trustees which of them is to have physical custody of the deeds ? A box with three different locks opened by three different keys one to be kept Ijy each of the three Trustees is not a very practical idea, and then, after IV OF TRUSTEES 105 all, wliere is the box to be kept ? Such a precaution as this is not considered in accordance with the habits of mankind, see Cottam v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 1 J. and H., 247. The case of Mendes v. Guedalla in 2 J. and H. 259, is well worth your study. It deals with the case of stocks and securities payable to bearer and which pass by delivery, and upon which the interest is payable upon coupons half yearly. Lord Hatherley, whilst Vice-Chancellor, held that such securities may without breach of trust be deposited in a box kept at a banker's on account of all the Trustees, one being allowed to keep the key in order to obtain coupons, the Vice-Chancellor ob- serving that he saw no irregularity in one of the Trustees being left in posses- sion of the key so long as the box was deposited in the safe at the banker's. The key must have been entrusted to some person in order to get access half 106 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. yearly to the coupons, and to no person could it be entrusted for that purpose with greater propriety than to one of the Trustees. Still my advice to Trustees is, do not hold securities payable to bearer at all, but purchase inscribed stock in the names of all the Trustees. Why should any man gratuitously run such risks ? Besides, as already observed, bearer securities are not investments "in the names" of the Trustees and therefore are not authorised by the great majority of investment clauses, and to hold them is in most cases a breach of trust. Passing away now from examples of passive breaches of trust, we approach an interesting and important point, the lia- bility of one Trustee for the improper acts or omissions of another. Let me state the rule broadly and affirmatively, and then consider by the light of the cases, what qualifications it may require. IV OF TRUSTEES 107 A co-Trustee is not liable for the acts and defaults of his co-Trustee. This has been the law for many a long day, and is at least as old as the time of Charles I. The 24th Section of the Act of 1893 does but express in statutory form what was already, and had long been, the law when the Act was passed. Still you will do well to get its language into your heads. " A Trustee shall, without prejudice to the provisions of the instrument, if any, creating the trust be chargeable only for moneys and securities actually received by him, notwithstanding his signing any receipt for the sake of conformity, and shall be answerable and accountable only for his own acts, receipts, neglects, or defaults, and not for those of any other Trustee nor for any banker, broker or other person with whom any trust moneys or securities may be deposited, nor for the insufficiency or deficiency of any secvu'ities, nor for any other loss unless the same happens through his own wilful default, and may reimburse himself or pay or discharge out of the trust 108 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. premises all expenses incurred iu or about the execution of his trusts or powers," In the case of Barnard v. Barnard, 3 D. a J. and S., 355, Lord Westbuiy said — " Ev^en if that which is assumed had been proved, namely that Boyle (a Trustee) struck out the crossing from the cheque and then I'eceived and employed the money, I should have refused to make the other Trustees liable for moneys which their co-Trustee got into his possession without their consent or knowledge, and by an act of dis- honesty in fraudvilently substituting a new crossing on the cheque to that affixed by the Trustees." The case of Cottam v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, is a valuable case to study. There one of three Trustees Nvas allowed to keep two railway debentures in his hands and receive the interest. He forged the signatures of his two co- Trustees to a deed purporting to be a transfer, and he delivered the debentures with the transfer to the purchasers, who acted throughout in })erfect good faith. IV OF TRUSTEES 109 The Eailway Company registered the transfer and paid subsequent interest to the purchasers. The forger was con- victed of his crime. The two Trustees then filed their bill praying that the purchaser might be decreed to deliver up the debentures, and that the Eailway Company might be ordered to cancel the transfer — and it was held that they were entitled to the relief they sought. Had the decision been otherwise the Trustees would of course have been liable to their beneficiaries to make good the loss. On this head see the cases collected in the second volume of White and Tudor s Leading Cases, under the leading case of Townley v. Sherho7me. Unless therefore a breach of trust can be alleged and proved against a Trustee he cannot be made liable simply because a co-Trustee of his has committed default, but as I have already had occasion to point out, negligence is a breach of 110 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. trust, and if it is ]:)y the negligence of one Trustee that another has been able to commit a fraud, the negligent Trustee is liable, not for the fraud of which he is wholly innocent, Init for his negligence which permitted it. I will give one example of this obvious application of the rule. In the case of Trutch V. Lamprell, 20 Beav., 116, two Trustees having properly sold out trust money, one of them handed the cheque for the proceeds to the other, who speedily applied it for purposes of his own. It was held that both Trustees were liable, and as the one who had misappropriated the money had disappeared, the effect of course was that the honest, but careless Trustee, had to replace the wdiole fund. The Master of the Eolls observed : " This is one of those painful cases which unfor- tunately this court has constantly to deal with, where Trustees, innocent of any desire to benefit themselves, have failed to perform their duties, and IV OF TRUSTEES 111 the court is compelled to make them responsible. It is constantly argued by counsel, but the conclusion is as constantly rejected by the court, that a person who acts is not an active Trustee and is not liable becaiise he has only acted for conformity's sake. It is a contradiction in terms to say that a Trustee who acts is not an active Trustee by taking upon himself the office of Trustee and acting. He be- comes in that transaction at least an active Trustee, and is bound properly to perform all the duties appertaining to his office. I am of opinion that it is impossible for Holmes to contend with success that he was jvistified in paying over the cheque to his co-Trustee." I may here remark that there is no obligation upon the Trustee who is a defaulter to indemnify his innocent but negligent brother. See Baliin v. Hughes, 31, Ch. Div., page 390. I pass on now to a difficult yet in- teresting branch of the law, namely, Acquiescence. A beneficiary who has acquiesced in a breach of trust is debarred from com- plaining of it. 112 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. Acquiescence is a familiar defence to an action for breach of trust, but it is by no means a defence easy to establish at the trial. What is acquiescence ? It means as- sent. It denotes an assenting state of mind. A beneficiary who acquiesces is a beneficiary who has assented. Acquiescence is less than concurrence, still less than instigation, it is merely assent. But assent to what ? Why — to a breach of trust ! There can be no assent in the sense of acquiescence unless there is complete knowledge of all the circum- stances which went to make up the breach of trust. A partial knowledge, good grounds for suspicion, are not sufficient foundation for the state of mind known to the law as acquiescence. I do not know that you will find in any case any authoritative once-for-all definition of acquiescence in a breach of IV OF TRUSTEES 113 trust, but there is no great difficulty in extracting from the cases a good working knowledge of what is meant by acquies- cence. There must, I have already said, be knowledge of the breach of trust, and the knowledge must be positive and complete. It is not enough to say that the bene- ficiary was put upon inquiry, for a beneficiary cannot be put upon inquiry as he is not bound to do anything in self- protection. It is the duty of his Trustee to protect him. And the knowledge must be complete, for the beneficiary cannot be bound by acquiescence unless he has been fully informed of his rights, and of the material facts and circumstances of the case. But knowledge by itself is not ac- quiescence ; you may know without assenting, and if you do not assent you do not acquiesce. I 114 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. It is clear that a beneficiary is not bound the moment a past breach of trust comes to his knowledge to call the Trustee to account, or to take proceedings to make him liable. He may stand by for, at all events, a reasonable time, but if he waits too long the equitable doctrine of laches and stale demands may successfully be invoked against him. This equitable doctrine of laches and stale demands must be carefully distin- guished from the Statute of Limitations, which, as we shall see in the last Lecture, was for the first time applied to express trusts in the year 1888. Leaving out of our minds for the moment the Statute of Limitations and considering only the equitable doctrine of laches and stale demands, you may ask, what is a reasonable time during which a beneficiary may stand by ? Twenty years is an unreasonable time. A testator died IV OF TRUSTEES 115 in 1832 — tlie bulk of his property was distributed in 1847, and on the 19th of February, 1872, a bill in Chancery was filed against the surviving Trustee, an old gentleman of eighty-one, for adminis- tration and for wilful default in respect of a principal sum of £815. The bill was dismissed, but without costs, as the Trustee had failed to preserve accounts and vouchers. Payne v. Evens, 18 L.R. Eq., 356. But a delay of three years or four years will not prove fatal. See the case of in re Cross, 20 Ch. Div. 109, but in read- ing this case bear in mind the change in the law introduced by the Trustee Act of 1888, Section 8, and consider how in re Cross would have been decided had this Act been then in force. It follows from what I have fjaid that it is very difficult to prove mere ac- quiescence. It is a word constantly used, and the judicious pleader seldom fails to I 2 116 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. plead it as a defence, but it is not very frequently proved at the trial or inferred by the judge. Concurrence and Instigation are differ- ent matters. Few things are more com- mon than for a beneficiary to concur in and even — such is the desire of poor mortals for an increase of their income — to instigate breaches of trust. First Concurrence. If the beneficiary actively concur in the breach of trust he at all events can- not call his Trustees to account. But as the common run of English trusts are for the benefit of a man or woman for life and then to children, and as i\vQ bene- ficiary who concurs in or procures the breach of trust is usually tJie life-tenant anxious for a larger income — though his mouth may be closed, those of his fledg- lings, his callow brood, remain wide open, and they can on their parents' death call the Trustee to account who has foolishly IV OF TRUSTEES 117 been tempted to try to increase the in- come which maintained these ingrates in the past. However, the concurring beneficiary cannot complain. But concurrence just as much as ac- quiescence implies complete knowledge. Nothing must be kept back by the Trustee, and the beneficiary must under- stand the exact position and must know that what is intended to be done and what he wishes to be done is a breach of trust. Second Instigation. This needs no expansion.^ A beneficiary who concurs in or insti- gates to a breach of trust cannot complain of it. That is rudimentary law — elemen tary justice. 1 " The ' legal mind ' chiefly consists in illus- trating the obvious, explaining the self-evident, and expatiating on the common-place. "^ — Ml'. Disraeli writing to his sister. 118 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. But it does not rest there. It has Ions; been law that a beneficiary, at whose instance or request a breach of trust has been committed, can be required to in- demnify the Trustees to the extent to which the beneficiary had received benefit from the breach of trust, and this upon the ground that the liability ought primarily to fall upon the person who procured the breach of trust, and who, having got the benefit of it, ought not to be allowed to victimise the Trustees by treating them as scapegoats. The leading case on this subject is Rahy v. Ridehalgh in 7 D.G. M. and G., page 104. In that case personalty was bequeathed upon trust for tenants for life with executory trusts in remainder, but with- out directions as to investment. The Trustees, at the instance of the tenants for life, abandoned their original inten- tention of investing in the funds, and invested on mortgage, so as to obtain an IV OF TRUSTEES 119 increased income. The securities proved insufficient. The chiklren filed their bill charging the Trustees with breach of trust, and seeking to make them liable for the deficiency. It was found, as a fact, that the tenants for life were anxious to secure as large an income as they could, and that it was at their instance or request that the moneys were lent upon mortgage. The Lord Justice Turner in the course of his judgment observed : " Now the cestuis que Trustent for life who instigated the Trustees to commit the breach of trust have derived from that breach of trust the advantage of enjoying the increased income of the fund not duly invested according to the trust, and the consequence of that is that the cestuis que Trustent in remainder have a right to have that income refunded and made good by the cestuis que Trustent for life. It is trust money received by them under a breach of trust to which they were privy, and the effect, I apprehend, must be^ that as the loss which ovight to fall on those who instigated the breach of trust has been laid by the court upon the Trustees, the Trustees are entitled to stand in the place of the cestiiis que Trustent in remainder for 120 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. the purpose of recovering from the cestuis que Trustent for life who instigated the bx'each of trust or their estates the benefit actually received by them in consequence of such breach of trust." This is unquestioned law, hxxt the facts must always be investigated very closely before it is applied in order to discover that the beneficiaries who are alleged to have concurred, were fully informed of the state of the case. In Saivyer v. Saivyer, 28 Ch. Div. 598, Mr. Justice Chitty says : '* I hold that the law is that for the Trustees to be entitled to the order which they now ask against the estate of the tenant for life, it must be shown that the breach of trust was committed at the instance and request of the cestuis que trust. I make no distinction between instance and request, but it must be shown clearly that the breach of trust was instigated by them and that they were acting and moving parties in it. It strikes me as a novelty in law and a proposition not founded on principle to say that the person who merely consents is bound to do more than what he says he consents to do.'' IV OF TRUSTEES 121 Accordingly in that case, the learned judge held that the beneficiary in ques- tion, who was a married woman, had not done anything to charge her separate estate. However, since Rahy v. Ride- halgh and Saivyer v. Sawyer and other cases of a like character we have a statute to help us, namely, Section 45 of the Act of 1893, repealing Section 6 of the now partially repealed Act of ,1888. Section 45 is as follows : — " Where a Trustee commits a breach of trust at the instigation or request or with the consent in writing of a beneficiai'y, the High Court may, if it thinks fit and notwithstanding that the beneficiary may be a married woman entitled for her separate use and resti'ained from anticipation, make such order as to the court seems just for impounding all or any part of the interest of the beneficiary in the trust estate by way of indemnity to the Trustee or person claiming through him." This section adopts the old law, but also extends it, for by the old law, the liability was only to the extent to which 122 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. a concurring beneficiary had benefited, but here there is no such limitation. Be it also observed that the consent of the beneficiary must be in writing, but not the instigation or request. See Giiffith V. Hughes (1892), 3 Ch., 105. There used likewise to be a distinction between the beneficiary who was himself a Trustee and one who was not, but this distinction has now ceased. The statute, however, does not in any way afTect what I may call the metaphy- sics of the question. In order to make a beneficiary liable under the Act in re- spect, for example, of an improper invest- ment, it must be shown not only that he instigated, requested, or gave his written consent to the investment, but that he knew the facts which would make it a breach of trust. Thus if a beneficiary puts pressure upon his Trustees to invest money on mortgage, full well knowing that they were expressly forbidden by IV OF TRUSTEES 123 the instrument creating the trust so to invest trust moneys, his interest in the trust estate may be impounded by way of indemnity. But if the trust deed authorised such an investment, and all he did was to put pressure upon his Trustees to make an investment of that character, and the Trustees proceeded so to do but made an improper investment on insuffi- cient security, the beneficiary could not properly be said to have concurred in, or instigated, or consented in writing: to a breach of trust. But if the facts of the security were brought to his notice, and it was pointed out to him that it was of insufficient value, and none the less he pressed for its acceptance — in that case he would fall within the section. See, and carefully consider, the important case of in re Somerset (1894), 1 Ch,, page 231. As to married women restrained frcm anticipation instigating to a breach of trust (a thing they are quite capable 124 THE DUTIES OF TRUSTEES lect. iv of doing), Judges still feel some hesita- tion in impounding their interest by way of indemnity to the too complaisant Trustee. Were the Judge to l)e con- vinced that the Trustee had consented to commit the breach relying upon his being able to impound the interest of the married women he would probably refuse to make the order. V It will be, perliaps, useful to consider in this Lecture two of tlie most usual breaches of trust committed by honest Trustees. With the fate of dishonest Trustees we cannot be expected to concern ourselves ; they may safely be left to the tender mercies of the law. The breaches of trust most frequently committed by honest Trustees are — im- proper investments, and continuing to carry on a testator's business for the benefit of his family when they are not specially authorised so to do by the terms of his will. I will take investments first, for al' 126 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. though I have already said a good deal on this subject, I think I can usefully add a little more. Investments are of three kinds : 1. They may belong to a class of security which is authorised by the instrument creating the trust ; or (2), They may belong to a class of security which is un- authorised Ijy that instrument ; or (3), Though they may belong to an authorised class of security they may be improper, because insufficient, or for some other special reason. Note, first, it is the instrument creating the trust which determines by its own language what class of investment may be made by the Trustee. A Trustee cannot be blamed for making an investment authorised by the terms of his trust, unless it can be shown that the investment so made was not made in good faith — that is, with the honest desire to make a wise investment. For example V OF TRUSTEES 127 if a Trustee were to be told by competent persons that a particular security though authorised by the terms of the instru- ment was a bad one, and that from facts which had come to their knowledge it would soon be worthless, and yet in the face of such advice the Trustee persisted in making that investment, he might be held responsible for it. Second — For a Trustee to make an in- vestment outside the scope of his authority as defined by the instrument is to commit a breach of trust ah initio, and to incur the penalties I have already explained to you. If the investment turns out well, all the profit, though it be £100 per cent, per annum, belongs to the beneficiaries ; if it turns out ill, the whole loss falls upon the Trustee. If there is any uncertainty about it, it rests with the beneficiaries and with them alone to decide what they will do — whether to take the security or to fall upon the Trustee. 128 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. I do not tliink tliere ought now to be any great difficulty in determining in any given case what is an authorised invest- ment ; but Trustees will do well io con- sider each investment separately as the occasion for it arises, and to satisfy them- selves before making it that it is w^ithiu the scope of their authority. If a Trustee first studies his investment clause, and then, if necessary, carefully considers the 1st Section of the Trustee Act of 1893, and requires from the stockbroker a written statement of the nature and character of the proposed investment, he will seldom, I think, be in a difficulty as to the scope of his authority. A few technicalities he must remember, as, for example, that a second mortgage is not a real security, and that neither a contributory mortgage nor a Bearer security is an investment in his own name. And if he chooses, being authorised so V OF TRUSTEES 129 to do, to lend trust money on mortgage of real security, he must slavishly regard the provisions of the 8th Section of the Act of 1893, all of which I have already gone through in detail. The 9th section of the Act of 1893, already printed on p. 54, relates to in- vestments of the third class, namely, those which though authorised by the trust are yet improper by reason of their insufficiency. Another example of this third kind of investment, is when Trustees lend money on an authorised security but to one of themselves. This is an active breach of trust. If we seek a reason for its being so, we may find it in the assumption of the law that the whole number of the Trustees bring to bear upon the question whether or not there is to be a particular loan, an impartial mind, and no man is to be taken to be an impartial judge of either his own K 130 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES i.ect. solvency or the real value of his pro- perty. But there is really no need to seek a reason for so elementary a rule. Trustees are appointed to preserve an estate in order that its usufruct, and ulti- mately its capital value, may be applied in a particular way, and if the guardians of the estate become debtors to it, their office can no longer be properly dis- charged. There may be three Trustees and the loan may be but to one of them, but the two lenders may die leaving the borrower the sole Trustee. I do not think I can usefully add more on the subject of investments. There is, perhaps, no more frequent honest breach of trust than that which is committed by executors and Trustees who continue to carry on their testator's business with his assets though not authorised so to do. A farmer dies leaving behind him growing crops and a small stock, worth V OF TRUSTEES 131 hardly anything at an auction. His widow is a handy woman accustomed to the management of the farm, and two or three of the elder children are useful about the house. They all implore the executors and Trustees not to break up their old home, where living is cheap, and occupation provided for the elder children, and the younger ones are left free to obtain a few brief years of educa- tion. The executors and Trustees, being- good-natured men, yield to these entreaties, postpone realisation, and allow the few hundreds of ready money that were in the bank, at the testator's death, to be drawn upon for outgoings connected with the business, which is carried on after the usual fashion of farmers in this country, without either books or balance sheets. One of the younger daughters marries early, and goes away to live in a neighbouring town with her husband, who begins to think that he K 2 132 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. would like to liandle his wife's share of his dead father-in-law's estate. He con- sults his cousin, a solicitor's clerk, who pricks up his ears, gets a copy of the will, and in due course writes a letter to the Trustees asking for an account. These gentlemen consult their solicitor, who advises them to wind the whole thing up, which they proceed to do. The result is a net loss of a round sum of money for every penny of which these Trustees are personally liable, unless they can plead the statute in manner hereafter appearing. There is no getting out of it. Pity is not only akin to love as the poet tells us, but to breaches of trust as well. I know it is impossible to block up the way to men's hearts by legal maxims, but it is the duty of a lawyer to make known those maxims, and to explain the direful consequences of disregarding them. Executors and Trustees are not bound the moment after a trader's death to put V OF TRUSTEEvS 133 an end to his trading concern, even though they are not authorised to carry it on. Their duty is to realise it as early as possible as a going concern — for were they not allowed this latitude they would have to put up the shutters on the day of the funeral, discharge the clerks and shopmen, and thus destroy the goodwill. They are allowed a reasonable time to wind up. Mr. Justice North considered two years not an unreasonable time within which to dispose of a pawnbroker's business. Li re Smith (1896), 1 Ch., 171. But unless specially authorised by the will to carry on the business and employ the testator's assets or some portion of them in it, it is a breach of trust to carry it on save for the purpose of a speedy realisation. What is the penalty ? It is the old familiar one. Are there any profits ? They belong to the beneficiaries who may pocket them without so much as a " thank 134 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. you," and without allowing the Trustee a halfpenny for personal remuneration. Are there no profits, but only losses ? Then those losses must be borne by the Trustees. This is the pleasing option which belongs to the beneficiaries, to take all the profits or to have all the losses made good. But tJie case is sometimes a little com- plicated. Supposing the Trustees have carried on the business in conjunction with others, or have mixed up their own moneys in such a way as to make it difiicult to determine what share of the profits can be properly allocated to the testator's assets — then, it may be, the beneficiaries will have to be content with having their capital returned to them with commercial interest, namely five per cent, per annum. Partners who are not Trustees, but have shared profits derived from the use of trust property, arc, if personally impli- V OF TRUSTEES 135 cated, under the same liability as if them- selves Trustees. Flockton V. Bunning, which is reported in a note to the well-known case of Vyse V. Foster in 8 Ch. App. 309, was a case of this kind. There a testator had for several years prior to his death carried on business as a turpentine and tar distiller in partnership with his brother, who pre- deceased him. At the testator's death the business was in course of being wound up and the assets sold and realised. The proceeds of sale were received by his widow, w4io was sole executrix under his will, by the terms of which she was en- titled to half the income of his real and personal estate for her life, and the whole fund, subject to such life-interest in a moiety, was to be held uj)on trust for such of his children as should attain twenty-one equally. The testator had thirteen children. Mrs. Flockton thought it would be a o-ood tliino; for herself and 136 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. children to carry on the turpentine trade, and accordingly she entered into a part- nership arrangement with the defendant Bunning and another man— she con- tributing a portion of the capital. The partnership arrangements were from time to time altered and readjusted, and the business w^as carried on until 1864, when the partnership was determined and the widow was under a power in the articles bought out at a valuation. She shortly afterwards became bankrupt. Six of the thirteen children being still infants filed their bill against the widow, her late partners, and others, asking for an account of the dealings of the partners with the partnership assets since the last account, and for inquiries and other relief. It was clear on the documents that Mrs. Flock- ton's partners knew perfectly well that she was working with trust funds. On appeal Lord Hatherley, then Lord Justice, said : — V OF TRUSTEES 137 " If, therefore, there ever can be a clear case fixing persons with the legal consequences of dealing with trust funds, this is that case. The case of embarking assets in a new trade is a much worse case than that of continuing the assets of a deceased partner in a trade, for there is generally great inconvenience in suddenly withdrawing them from the business, and the retaining them too long may be morally justifiable or at all events excus- able. But I see no justification or excuse for taking what you know to be trust property and putting it into your business as part of your capital. What then are the consequences follow- ing from that act 1 The consequences, I apprehend, must be these : The partners make themselves co-owners of the fund and use it as co-partners. In such a state of things they are just in the same position as an original Trustee. Of the cases cited Travis v. Milne, 9 Hare 141, was more to the purpose than any other. The Vice-Chancellor there makes a distinction between a fund advanced by way of loan and a fund mixed up with the consequences and liabilities of trade. In the one case the firm are borrowing money, their liability as to which may be probably more restricted than their liability as to trust money which they appro- priate as part of their capital. But in the case before us there was a clear appropriation of the trust fund by all the three partners. I cannot. 138 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. therefore, feel any difficulty in saying that the case is one to which Travers v. Milne is applicable, and that it is brought to the ordinary case of Trustees employing a trust fund and being un- answerable for the use they make of it. The decree therefore is substantially i-ight." The decree tlius affirmed declared tliat Mrs. Flockton and her late partners were bound to restore and make good to the plamtiffs such part of the assets of the testator as had been employed by the defendants in trade tooether with all profits made by such employment, or with interest at the rate of £5 per cent, per annum upon what had been so employed. Having mentioned Vyse v. Foster, I will just say that in that case the court held that by the terms of the articles of partnership a deceased partner's share retained in the l)usiness was retained in such a way as to amount to a debt due from the partnership firm to the executors V OF TRUSTEES 139 of the deceased partner, and that although the executors had unduly delayed the calling in of this debt, such delay did not entitle a beneficiary to share in the profits of the business, and this not- withstanding the fact that one of the executors was himself a partner in the firm. I hope I have said enough to warn executors and Trustees of the danger of consenting to carry on any trade or business save for the purpose of speedy realisation unless they are expressly authorised by the will so to do. But suppose they are authorised the consequences even then are disagreeable enough. In the first place they become per- sonally liable for debts, although only acting as executors or Trustees. See Lahouchere v. Tucker, 11 Moore's Privy Council Cases, 198. In the case of in re Morgan, Pillgrem 140 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. V. Pillgrem, 18 Ch. Div., page 93, Mr. Justice Fry, as he then was, observed — " It appears to me that the principles which regulate questions of this sort are y^ery clear. As I understand them, where a Trustee or executor carries on a business under the directions contained in the will of the testator and in that character contracts a debt, the debt is one for which an action must be brought against the executor per- sonally, and for which judgment must be obtained de bonis 2}'>'02Jriis of the executor, and no action can be succcessfvilly brought against the executor as executor and no execution can be had de bonis testatoris for this very simple reason that the debt was not the debt of the testator." The distinction must of course be borne in mind in cases of this kind between debts contracted in the business by the testator himself whilst he was carrying it on, and debts subsecpently contracted by the executors or Trustees who continue to carry on the business after the testator's death in pursuance of directions contained in his will. The creditors of the testator V OF TRUSTEES 141 himself have of course a right to be paid out of his assets, and can take proceed- ings to render such assets available for the payment of their del:)ts. But the subsequent creditors can only look to the executor, and to the goods of the execu- tor, and they have no original right to be paid out of the testator's assets, nor does it make any difference that the executor has carried on the business in his own name, or that the testator's assets employed in it are ostensibly the executor's own property. See Dmvso7i V. Wood, 3 Taunt, page 256, and other cases cited in in re Morgan, 18 Ch. Div., 99. But though the executor or Trustee carrying on a business pursuant to the directions contained in the will, is per- sonally liable for debts contracted in so doing, he is entitled to indemnity in respect thereof out of the estate of the deceased. This is a claim or right which 142 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES leot. lie lias as against all persons claiming under the will. This right to an indemnity will be restricted to that specific portion of the trust estate which the testator authorised to be employed in the conduct of his business. If he authorised the whole of his estate to be so employed, of course the Trustee may look to that whole, but if, on the other hand, he stated the specific amount he wished to be so employed, the Trustee can only look for his indemnity to that specific amount. On this right of the executors and Trustees to an indemnity a further right has been grafted by legal decision, namely the right of the creditors of the trade to stand in the place of the executor and Trustee, and to claim the benefit of that right so as to obtain payment of their debts. An excellent exposition of this law will be found in the judgment of the late Master of the Rolls, Sir George V OF TRUSTEES 143 Jessel, in the case of in re Johnson Shearman v. Robinson, 15 Ch. Div., 548. Sir George Jessel says on page 552 : " I understand the doctrine to be this, that where a Trustee is authorised by a testator or by a settlor — for it makes no diiference — to carry on a business with certain funds which he gives to the Trustee for that pvirpose, the creditor who trusts the executor has a right to say : ' I had the personal liability of the man I trusted and I have also a right to be put in his place against the assets ; that is, I have a right to the benefit of indemnity or lien which he has against the assets devoted to the purposes of the trade.' The first right is his general right by contract, because he trusted the Trustee or executor ; he has a personal right to sue him and to get judgment and make him a bankrupt. The second right is a mere corollary to these numerous cases in equity in which persons are allowed to follow trust assets. The trust assets having been devoted to carrying on the trade it would not be right that the cestui que trust should get the benefit of the trade without paying the liabilities, therefore the court says to him : ' You shall not set up a Trustee who may be a man of straw and make him a bankrupt to avoid the responsibility of the assets for carry- ing on the trade.' The court puts the creditor, so 144 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. to speak, as I understand it, in the place of the Trustee." In sucli cases it is a matter of necessity that there shoukl be a special part of the estate appropriated to carry on the lousiness. See Strickland v. Symons, 26 Ch. Div., 245, whereby a marriage settle- ment a lunatic asylum was assigned to Trustees on trust at the request of the husband to sell, but the Trustees were to allow the husband to carry on the business of the asylum on certain terms. The husband became bankrupt, and thereupon the surviving Trustee of the settlement took possession of the asylum and carried on the Inisiness there until it was sold for a large sum of money. A tradesman had supplied the Trustees with goods for the use of the asylum. He brought his action claiming payment out of the trust funds of the settlement. But it was held that he liad no right so to do, as no special part of the estate V OF TRUSTEES 145 had been appropriated for carrying on the asylum. Lord Selborne stated in his judgment that it was impossible to compare the case with ex parte Garland 10 Vesey 110, and the case of re Johnson, which is referred to, and the other cases where there has been an express direction by the testator to carry on a business, and where he specially ap- propriated part of his property for that purpose. And the Lord Chancellor added : "Those authorities proceed on this principle, that where a particular part of a trust estate is specifically dedicated to a particular purpose which involves trade debts and liabilities, it is a trust to use it for that particular purpose, and the Trustee though personally liable for the debts which he contracts in the course of the business, has a right to be paid out of the specific assets appropriated for that purpose, and the trade creditors are not to be disappointed of payment so far as the assets so appropriated are concerned." I may add that creditors cannot be in L 146 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. any better position than the executor or Trustee in whose shoes they seek to stand, and if therefore the Trustee is in default, the creditors are not entitled to have their debts paid out of the specific assets, unless and until the default is made good. See in re Johnson 15 Chy. D. 548. An executor or Trustee who consents to carry on the testator's business, even when authorised so to do by his will, certainly exposes himself to greater liabilities than anybody ought to be expected to accept at the request of another. I must now leave the subject and pass on. There are two familiar and ominous words often used in connection with Trustees which require explanation — they are, wilful default. A Trustee is in wilful default who has been guilty of a passive breach of trust, that is to say, who has omitted to do V OF TRUSTEES 147 something which he ought as a Trustee to have done. There were two forms of calling a Trustee to account in the old Court of Chancery — one ran thus : — An account of the principal money subject to the trusts of the will or settlement received by the defendants, the Trustees or either of them, or by any person or persons by their order, or for their use as Trustees or Trustee. The other ran thus : — An account of the principal money subject to the trusts of the will or settle- ment as have been received by the Trustees or either of them, or by any person or persons by their order or for their use, or ivliich might hut /or their ivilfid default have been so received. Under the first or common decree or order, a Trustee could not be made to account for moneys he had not actually received. For example : in re Fryer 3 K and J. 317, lands were devised L 2 148 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. to three Trustees, upon trust for sale. They were sold and the purchase money- paid to one of them who was a solicitor, and who acted in the matter of the sale as solicitor for himself and the other Trustees. This solicitor retained the money and lost it, and the suit was commenced for the administration of the testator's estate and the common decree was made. When the cause came on for further consideration, counsel for the plaintiff sought to charge one of the defendants with the money so allowed to remain in the hands of the solicitor. But the Vice-Chancellor held that the Trustee who had not received the money could not upon the common decree by which the question of wilful neglect and default was not put in issue, be made liable for its loss. Had the decree been in the second form he might very likely have been found liable to make good the loss on account of his V OF TRUSTEES 149 negligence in allowing his co-Trustee to retain the trust funds in his hands for longer than was reasonably necessary. To obtain an order on the footing of wilful default, some one act of wdlful default must be alleged and proved. This was Lord Eldon's rule. In order to obtain an inquiry as to wilful neglect and default against an executor or a Trustee, the plaintiff must allege and prove at least one act of wilful neglect or default. See observations of Lord Justice Knight Bruce in Coape v. Carte?' 2 D.G. M. and G. 298, and of the Vice-Chancellor Wood in Sleight v. Laivson, 2 K. and J. 292. Under the old practice some one instance of wilful default had to be proved at the hearing because no such inquiry could be added afterwards. At the present day the substance remains the same. If in the prosecution of inquiries under an ordinary decree, facts come out which if proved 150 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. at the liearina: would have enabled the plaintiff to obtain an inquiry as to wilful default, then such an inquiry will be added. But the rule still remains that an account on the footing of wilful neglect or default will not be granted unless it has been pleaded, and until evidence has been given of at least one instance of wilful default. See obser- vations of Lord Justice Cotton in re Youngs, 30 Ch. Div., 431. Mr. Justice Fry in Barber v. Mackrell 12 Ch. Div. 538, put the law thus :— "Those cases" (as to wilful default) "appear to me to come to this, that where wilful default is not pleaded no order can be made on the footing of wilful default either at the hearing or at any sub- sequent time ; but that where wilful default has been alleged, and a case is made for it on the pleadings, an account on the footing of wilful default can be directed either at the hearing or trial of the action, or at any subsequent stage." It is, however, the duty of the plaintiff to be ready to prove his allegation at V OF TRUSTEES 151 the hearing, and if he is not ready the court will not, unless a strong case is made, postpone inquiry into the conduct of the Trustees. See Smith v. Armitage, 24 Ch. Div.,727. I may here repeat that accounts on the footing of wilful default cannot be directed on an originating summons, even though the parties to be charged are plaintiffs submitting to an account. Where a beneficiary's action is not confined to seeking relief in respect of a particular breach of trust, but seeks a general account of the trust estate on the footing of wilful neglect and default, all the Trustees and the personal repre- sentatives of such of them as may be dead are necessary parties to the suit — Caj^pard v. Allen, 2 D.G. J. and S., 173. This rule is still one which requires attention, though it has been more lately decided that in an action brought by cestui que trust against a sole surviving 152 THE DUTIES OF TRUSTEES lect. v Trustee for an account, and asking for a declaration that he had committed breaches of trust, the plaintiffs were not l^ound to make the representatives of a deceased Trustee parties — but this upon the ground that if the defendant required them he could get them added under tlie new rules. See m re Harrison (1891), 2 Ch. 349. As a rule of pleading, it must be remembered that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any wilful default the particulars of it must be stated in the pleading. See Order 19, Rule G. VI I HAVE reserved as the main subject of my last Lecture, a great novelty intro- duced into tlie law of express trusts by the Trustee Act of 1888, the 8th Section of which still remains unrepealed. By that section Statutes of Limitation may be pleaded by Trustees subject to certain exceptions which I will carefully consider in a minute or two. The principle of ])^'escription and limi- tation of actions is a principle of some antiquity in our law, and one which is to be found in the codes and systems of both eastern and western nations. Our ow^n Statutes of Limitation have been made the sul)ject of great praise. 154 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. They have been called by eminent judges Statutes of Repose and Acts of Peace ; in these respects resembling the thirty -nine articles of our religious faith as by law established. In my mind they are always associated with an eloc_[uent passage in a speech delivered in the House of Commons in the year 1844 by a distinguished member of our profession, Mr. T. B. Macaulay. Speaking on the second reading of the Dissenters Chapels Bill he reminded the House that the principle of prescription was to be found all the world over, and said something like this — "It is in every known part of the world, in every civilised age ; it was familiar to the old tribunals of Athens, it formed part of the Roman jurisprudence, and was spread with the imperial power over the whole of Europe. It was recognised after the French Revolution, and when the code Napoleon was formed that very pi-inciple of pre- scription was not forgotten. We find it both in the east and the west ; it is recognised by tribunals beyond the Mississippi and in countries that had VI OF TRUSTEES 155 nevei' heard of Justinian and had no translation of the Pandects. In all places we find it acknow- ledged as a sacred principle of legislation. In our own country we find it coiival with the beginning of our laws. It is found in the first of our statutes — it is close upon our great first Forest Charter ; it is consecrated by successive Acts of Parliament ; it is introduced into the Statute of Merton ; it is found in the Statute of Westminster ; and the principle only becomes more stringent as it is carried out by a succession of great legislators and statesmen down to our own time. " Now, how is it possible to believe that the Barons Avhose seals are upon our Great Charter would have perfectly agreed with the great Jurists who framed the Code Napoleon with the most learned English Lawyers of the nineteenth cen- tury, and with the Pundits of the Benares unless there had been some strong and clear reason which necessarily led men of sense in every age and country to the same conclusion. Lord Macaulay, it is well known, was very adverse to the republication of his speeches. However, an unscrupulous publisher relying upon the then state of the law on such subjects published 156 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. without the great orator's permission an edition of his speeches both in Parliament and out of it. This piracy was in its turn pirated by the pirates of the United States, where there was a great sale of the volumes. In both the English and the American edition, instead of the word " Pundits of the Benares," there occur the words " Pandects of the Benares." The nonsense thus made of his rhetoric drove Macaulay well-nigh distracted, and was the main cause which induced him to see through the press the authorised edition of his speeches which certainly have justly swelled his fame.^ In ancient times the principle of limitation had naturally most application to the recovery of real estate, and as defined by Lord Coke "is a certain time ^ It is interesting to compare Mr. Vizetelli's " pirate " Edition witli the orator's own corrected Edition. Neither the one nor the other repro- duces the speeches as actually delivered. VI OF TRUSTEES 157 prescriljed by statute within the which the demandant in an action must prove himself or some of his ancestors to be seized." Lord Coke proceeds : "In ancient times the limitation in a Writ of Eight was from the time of Henry I. After that by the Statute of Merton the limitation was from the time of Henry H. , and by the Statute of Westminster the limitation was from the time of Richard I." Subsequently a Statute of Henry Vni. reduced the time to sixty years next before the writ, but now the Statutes of Limitation, which are still numerous, begin with the well-known statutes of James L, which, however, as to real estate have been subsequently much modified. To go into detail on this subject would be out of place, but I may just say that as the law now stands actions of debt and of account and so on, must be brought within six years next after the cause of such action and not after, and actions 158 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. for the recovery of land must be brought within twelve years next after the time at which the right to bring such action shall have first accrued. The admiration felt and expressed for Statutes of Limitation by common law judges and Lord Macaulay has never been so cordially expressed by the authorities in equity ; for though the Chancery judges have always been un- willing to give encouragement to the notion that there was of necessity any- thing morally wrong in a defendant rely- ing upon a Statute of Limitation, still they were usually careful to point out that the defence was the creature of positive law and not therefore to be extended to cases not strictly within the enactment. See observations of Lord Cran worth in Roddam v. Morley, 1 D. G. and ^., 23. About one thing the Chancery judges never allowed any doubt, and that was that express trusts were not within the statutes. The Lord VI OF TRUSTEES 159 Justice Turner, a most eminent master of equity, in Ohee v. Bishop, 1 D. G. F. and J., 137, said (in 1859) that it would be most dangerous to hold that a demand against the assets of a deceased Trustee or personal representative in respect of a breach of trust or misappropriation com- mitted by him was barred at the expira- tion of six years from his death. It will be observed that the Lord Justice did not strike the distinction between an honest breach of trust and a dishonest one. So recently as the Judicature Act of 1873, it was enacted by Section 25, sub- Section 2, that no claim of a beneficiary against his Trustee for any property held on express trust or in respect of any breach of such trust, should be held to be barred by any Statute of Limitation. I have pointed out in a former Lecture that the distinction must always be borne in mind between the plea of the statute 100 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lecT. and the equitable doctrine of laches or stale demands. Before the Act of 1888, a cestui que trust might be barred by the application of the equitable doctrine of laches or stale demands, but in the case of an express trust it would have l^een idle and ridiculous for a Trustee, or for the representatives of a deceased Trustee, to have pleaded in a Chancery suit the Statutes of Limitations, or any of them. Then all of a sudden, like a bolt from the blue, came the Act of 1888. This Act is an interesting example of how, in this country, those laws are made, which affect (far more than hotly-contested constitutional changes) the habits and lia- bilities of Her Majesty's liege subjects. It is, I believe, quite true to say, that democratically governed as we are alleged to be, the laws which most nearly affect us are never subjected to our review, nor is our opinion (speaking of the people generally) ever sought upon the subject. VI OF TRUSTEES 161 I have been told, though I cannot vouch for the truth of the story, that the genesis of the Act of 1888 was some- thing like this : A Chancery practitioner, who was also a Member of Parliament, happening to meet the Chancellor of the day, an emi- nent common lawyer, remarked to him, that it had sometimes struck the Chancery practitioner, in the course of his practice, as somewhat of a hardship that a Trus- tee, or the representative of a deceased Trustee, was not allowed to plead the Statute of Limitations as a defence to an honest breach of trust. The eminent Chancellor expressed great surprise at hearing that this was the actual state of the law, and suggested to the practitioner that he would do well to draft a bill for its alteration. This was done, and the bill became law, as such bills are apt to do without much notice or discussion ; and so in a moment the well-considered M 162 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. judgments and opinions of a long race of eminent Chancery judges were contempt- uously disregarded, and to the great and wholly unexpected relief of Trustees the Act of 1888 came upon the Statute Book. Turning now to Section 8, and reading it, in the first instance, without the ex- ceptions, it runs as follows :— " In any action or other proceeding against a Trustee or any person claiming througli him, the following provisions shall apply : — " (a) All rights and jn-ivileges conferred by any Statute of Limitations shall be enjoyed in the like manner and to the like extent as they would have been enjoyed in such action or other proceeding if the Trustee or person claiming through him had not been a Trustee or person claiming through him." An eminent judge of the Chancery Division once threw a distressing doubt upon the value of this sub-section, going so far as to say that he could not discover in it any meaning at all. lie pointed VI OF TRUSTEES 163 out that as an action for breach of trust could not possibly be brought against any- body who was not a Trustee there were no Statutes of Limitation which, under this sub-section, a Trustee coukl enjoy. See the observation of Lord Justice Fry in in re Boivden, 45 Ch. Div., 448. If this criticism is just, the common- law Chancellor and Chancery practitioner, in their first shot, at all events, only fired a blank cartridge. However, there is a sub-section (6), which is as follows : — " If the action or other proceeding is brought to recover money or other property and is one to which no existing Statute of Limitations applies, the Trustee or person claiming through him shall be entitled to the benefit of and be at liberty to plead the lapse of time as a bar to such action or other proceeding in the like manner and to the like extent as if the claim had been against him in an action of debt for money had and received, but so nevertheless that the statute shall run against a married woman entitled in possession for her sepai'ate use, whether with or without a restraint upon anticipation, but shall not begin to M 2 164 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. run against any beneficiary unless and until the interest of such beneficiary shall be an interest in possession." This is intelligible, and full effect has been given to it by the judges, and it now therefore may be taken as certain that whenever what I have called an honest breach of trust has been committed (for we have yet to consider the exceptions), the passage of six years will, as against anybody who has been throughout that period entitled in possession, bar the remedy of the cestui que trust. The exceptions must now be stated, they are as follows : — 1. — Where the claim is founded upon any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the Trustee was party or privy, or 2. — Where the claim is to recover trust property, or the proceeds thereof, still retained by the Trustee, or which has been VI OF TRUSTEES 165 3. — Previously received by the Trustee and converted to his use. These exceptions seem to explain themselves. Any fraud or fraudulent breaches of trust are outside the statute, no one wishes to protect rogues. If the Trustee still has in his pocket trust funds, the fact that they have been there a long time cannot give him any right to retain them against the person whose property they really are. See and consider Thome v. Heard (1894), 1 Chy., 599. And if the Trustee has received the money and con- verted it to his own use, here again the fact that he has chosen to alter the char- acter of the property cannot give him any equity to retain it. Upon this last exception I may refer to the case of in re Gurney, Mason v. Mercer (1893), 1 Ch., 590, merely for the purpose of quoting the language of Mr. Justice Romer. In that case two Trustees 166 THE DLTIES AXl) LIABILITIES LECT. had made, in the year 1878, an invest- ment on mortgage said to be improper, and the money advanced by the Trustees to the mortgagor was paid to the mort- gagor's account with the bank of which one of the Trustees was a partner, and w^as applied by the bank in reduction of the mortgagor's debt to the bank. The action was brought more than six years after the date of the investment, but the plaintiff sought to get out of the statute by the argument that the Trustee, who was a partner in the bank, had converted the money to his own use. But Mr. Justice Romer held that it would be a perversion of the language used in the section if he were to hold that such a transaction as that, heing an honest transaction, was to be treated as a con- version to his use by the Trustee who happened to be a partner in the bank, of the money lent on mortgage. One of the first cases under the statute VI OF TRUSTEES 167 was the case already referred to, of in re Bowden, 45 Ch. Div., 444, which was an action brought against a former Trustee and the representatives of two deceased Trustees, to comjDel them to make good losses arisinii; from investments ne^li- gently made on insufficient security more than six years before the action. Lord Justice Fry said that in his opinion the defendant had a good defence under the 8th Section of the Act, Sub-section (b), and added : "If this had been an action for deljt, for money had and received, and the debt had arisen more than six years aero and no acknowledo-ment had taken place in the meanwhile, the lapse of time would have furnished a defence," And he dismissed the action with costs. Another case may be mentioned, for it illustrates very well the utility of the Act of 1888, and its wide-reaching effect. I mean the case of Swain v. Bringeman (1891), 3 CL, 233. In that case the 168 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. Trustees of a fiirmer's will, instead of realising the residuary personalty as they were Ijound to do, allowed the testator's widow to reside on the farm carried on ])y the testator, and themselves carried on the farm, maintaining the widow and the children out of the profits until the youngest child attained twenty-one, when the residuary personalty and the realty were sold. The result of this course of conduct was an alleged loss of £1,800, and tw^o of the sons sought to make the surviving executor and Trustee liable. The argument for the plaintiif proceeded on the view that accordino; to the true construction of the will the interest of the plaintiffs was for legacies charged upon land, and that accordingly there was a Statute of Limitations ap^Dlicable to such an action, namely the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, Section 8, which substitutes a period of twelve years for a VI OF TRUSTEES 169 period of twenty, which was necessary under the former Statute 3 and 4, Will IV., Cap. 27, Sec. 40. But Mr. Justice Romer was of opinion that the action was not one for a legacy but for relief in respect of a breach of trust, and that as more than six (though less than twelve) years had elapsed since the loss occasioned by the breach of trust had occurred. Sub- section (b) of Section 8 of the Trustee Act 1888, applied, and that accordingly the action could not be sustained. Again in 1892 a case arose in which the section was held to apply, in re Page Jones V. Morgan (1893), 1 Ch., 304. In that case an infant was entitled to the residue of the estate of a testatrix which was to be held by the Trustees of the will in trust for him, and to be paid to him, on his attaining twenty-one. The testatrix died in May 1875. The infant attained twenty-one in December 1880, and in May 1892 he took out a summons against the 170 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. two Trustees and executors, claiming an order for tlie administration of the estate. One of the defendants did not appear, and the other deposed that he had expended the whole residue during the plaintiff's minority in maintaining and educating him. He admitted that he had never rendered any account to the plaintift', but said that he had told him during his minority how the fund had Ijeen applied. The plaintift' did not allege that the defendant had Ijeen party or privy to any fraud, or fraudulent breach of trust, and there was no evidence that the defendant had converted any part of the trust fund to his own use, or that he retained any part of it. Mr. eTustice North held that the Act applied, and he dismissed the summons. I will only refer to one other case upon this section — that of Somerset v. Earl Poulett (1894), 1 Ch., 231— a case which has been already referred to for another purpose. VI OF TRUSTEES 171 But l^efore referring to tliis case, and in order to make it intelligible, I must say a word about how debts can be taken out of the Statutes of Limitation by acknoivledg- ment. This law arose on the common law side under the Statutes of Limitation ; for not- withstanding the express words of those statutes, the judges soon held that an acknowledgment of a debt by the debtor within six years of action took the case out of the operation of the rule, and they admitted (until prevented by statute) parol evidence of such acknowledgment. Lord Tenterden's Act 9, Geo. IV., Cap. 14, Sec. 1, required acknowledgments to be in writing. This statute merely altered the mode of proof, and left the nature and effect of an acknowledgment untouched. See Dai^hy and Bvsanquets Statutes of Limitation, 2nd Ed., page 66. The common law cases on the subject are well worth reading as proofs of refine- 172 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. ment and subtle distinction. Some judges based the theory of acknowledg- ment on a new promise to pay. Others held that no more was required than an admission of the existence of the debt even though that admission were accom- panied by a point blank refusal to pay, or a claim to the Ijenefit of the statute. This view was justified on the ground that Statutes of Limitation were founded on a presumption of payment arising from lapse of time, and as an admission of non-payment got rid of that presumption the statute could not ajoply. However, ever since Tanner v. Smart, 6 Barn and Cress, 603 (a decision of Lord Tenterden's), it has been settled law that upon a general acknowledgment where nothing- is said to prevent it, a general promise to pay may, and ought to be, implied, but where the party guards his acknow- ledgment and . accompanies it with an express statement to prevent any vr OF TRUSTEES 173 such implication no sucli promise can be implied. Now that Statutes of Limitation apply to express trusts, the rules of law as to acknowledgments become material, and if a Trustee who had been guilty of an honest breach of trust was ever ill- advised enoug-h to admit in writino- his obligation to make good the loss, he would thereby deprive himself of the benefit of the plea of the statute until a fresh six years had run from the date of the admission. Returning now to Somerset v. Poulett. In that case, in 1878, the Trustees of a settlement committed an innocent breach of trust by investing the trust money upon mortgage of property of insufficient value. The mortgagor paid the interest on the money advanced direct to the tenant for life until 1890. In 1892 the tenant for life and remaindermen brought an action against the Trustees to compel 174 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. them to make oood the amount of the o investment. It was conceded that so far as the infant plaintiffs were concerned, the Trustees were liable to make good the loss to the estate, but it was held by the Court of Appeal affirming the decision of Mr. Justice Kekewich, that the right of action by the tenant for life against the Trustees was barred after six years from the time when the investment was made, and that although the payment of interest by the mortgagor direct to the tenant for life amounted in law to a payment by the mortgagor to the Trustees, and by them to the tenant for life, such payment ivas not an admission or acknoivledgment ivhich ivoidd take the case out of the statute. This is a decision of great value to Trustees ; for had it been held that pay- ment of interest on an improper invest- ment by the Trustees to the tenant for life, and the taking of a receipt from liim, was VI OF TRUSTEES 175 an acknowledgment within the statute, Trustees would very rarely in the case of an improper investment have been ahle to avail themselves of this defence, and, as we have already seen, improper in- vestments are amongst the most usual of honest breaches of trust. The judges in deciding in the way they did, relied upon some common law authorities, one of which, Morgan v. Rowlands, in L.E. 7 Q.B., page 493, should be read, as it con- tains a valuable judgment of Blackburn, J, It must always be remembered that the time of limitation does not beffin to run until the beneficiary's interest is one in possession ; and therefore so long as there is a tenant for life in existence the statute can only run against him and cannot begin to run against the persons ultimately entitled until the tenant for life is under the sod. This is w^ll illustrated by the case just referred to of Somerset v. PouJett. 17G THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. The Act, tliougli only applicable to actions or otlier proceedings commenced after the 1st of January, 1890, applies to all existing trusts irrespective of their date. It is perhaps worth remarking that ])y the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, the liabilities for honest breaches of trust were for the first time made provable in bankruptcy, and that an order of dis- charge releases the bankrupt from debts so provable ; therefore bankruptcy is now one way out of an honest breach of trust. Turning away from this subject alto- gether, I wish to say a word upon what is sometimes called the delegation of trusts as distinguished from the employ- ment of agents. A Trustee cannot properly delegate his trust. He is bound to give liis bene- ficiaries the benefit of his mind upon every matter as it comes up concerning VI OF TRUSTEES 177 the trust affairs. He does not properly discliarge the duty which he has assumed towards others if he allows a co-Trustee to conduct the trust business without reference to himself ; but as we have already seen, particularly in our first Lecture, Trustees are entitled to employ agents to carry out trust transactions in the same way as reasonable men are ac- customed to employ agents to carry out similar transactions in which they are personally interested. As we have already seen when such agents have been employed, and when, n consequence of such employment, loss has arisen to the trust estate, the question always is, whether the agents were en- trusted with the trust property either for a longer period than was necessary, or further than they ought to have been entrusted, having regard to the nature of their employment. I only go over this ground again in N 178 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. order to call attention to the I7tli Section of the Trustee Act of 1893, the first Sub- section of which got rid of some very troublesome earlier law. That Sub-section is as follows : — " A Trustee may appoint a solicitor to be his agent to receive and give a discharge for any money or vahiable consideration or property receivable by the Trustee under the trust by per- mitting the solicitor to have the custody of and to produce a deed containing any such receipt as is referred to in Section 56 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, and a Trustee shall not be chargeable with breach of trust by reason only of his having made or con- curied in making any such appointment ; and the producing of any such deed by the solicitor shall have the same validity and effect under the said section as if the person appointing the solicitor had not been a Trustee." Prior to this enactment it had been held by Chancery judges that it was no part of the ordinary duty of a solicitor to receive purchase-money belonging to his client (the vendor), even though the VI OF TRUSTEES 179 solicitor had possession of the deed of conveyance. As a matter of fact, as all professional men knew, nothing was more in accordance with the ordinary practice than for the vendor's solicitor who at- tended the completion of the purchase with the deed in his hands signed by his client to receive the purchase-money. But questions of this kind are determined not by practitioners, but by the judges. It therefore became the practice for the solicitor for the vendor to he specially authorised in writing to receive the pur- chase-money in those cases where the vendor did not attend the completion. By the 56th Section of the Convey- ancing Act of 1881, purchase-money could be safely paid to the solicitor who actually produced the deed with a receipt in it, or on it ; l^ut it was held sub- sequently to that Act by the judges of the Appeal Court that Trustees selling were not within the section. See Bellamy 180 THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES LECT. and Metroj)olita7i Board of Worki<,24: Cli. Div., 387. But the sub-section 1 have just quoted gets rid of that law and enables persons buying from Trustees to pay the purchase-money to the solicitor for the Trustees, who produces the deed duly executed by his clients and containing a receipt for the purchase-money either in the body of the deed or on the Imck of it. The other sub-sections of Section 17 must be studiously considered, and in reading the whole statute care must be taken to observe what sections are made retrospective and what dates are fixed in other sections for the commence- ment of their operation. I promised in an earlier lecture to say a word on the subject of forgery. Trustees have been held liable if they pay trust funds to the wrong party, though they have done so honestly, relying upon the genuineness of docu- VI OF TRUSTEES 181 ments. Thus in Eaves v. Hickson, 30 Beav., 136, Trustees paid over the trust fund to wrong persons, trusting to a marriage certificate which turned out to be a forgery and were made responsible for so doing to the extent to which the trust fund could not be recovered from those who had wrongfully received it. The Master of the Rolls said : — " This is a very hard case on the Trustees, who were deceived by the forgery of the date in the marriage certificate, which had been altered in a manner which deceived them and would have deceived any one who was not looking out for forgery or fraud. The question is, where a forgery is committed and a person wi^ongf ully gets trust money which cannot be recovered from him, on whom is the loss to fall ] I am of opinion that it falls on the person who paid the money. Here the loss falls on the Trustees, and the persons to whom the fund I'eally belongs are not to be de- prived of it. The Trustee is bound to pay the trust fund to the right person." This still seems to be the law, and it exposes Trustees to an unreasonable 182 THK DUTIES AND LIABILITIES lect. amount of peril. If the fraud practised upon them is one which probably would not have escaped detection by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their own affairs, it seems hard and contrary to the principle of in re Belchier and Speight v. Gaunt that Trustees should be made personally responsible for a perfectly honest and not unreasonable mistake. 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