V 
 
 /
 
 The Campaign of 1815
 
 The Campaign of 1815 
 
 Ligny : ^uatre-^ras : Waterloo 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM O'CONNOR MORRIS 
 
 Sometime Scholar of Oriel College, Oxford 
 
 ' Ac nescio, an mirabilior adversis quam 
 secundis rebus fuerit.' 
 
 Livy, xxviii. 12. 
 
 London 
 
 Grant Richards 
 
 New York 
 E. P. Dutton & Co. 
 
 1900 
 
 ^^
 
 I DEDICATE THIS BOOK 
 TO 
 
 CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N., 
 
 THE GREATEST LIVING AUTHORITY ON 
 
 NAVAL W^ARFARE, 
 
 WITH MANY EXPRESSIONS OF ADMIRATION 
 
 AND ESTEEM
 
 PREFACE 
 
 My object in this work has been to combine a succinct 
 but complete narrative of the campaign of 1815 with 
 a careful running commentary on its military operations, 
 and thus to satisfy, as well as I could, the requirements 
 of the general reader and of the real and scientific student 
 of war. It is not for me to say how I have accomplished 
 my purpose ; but I think there is no book exactly of this 
 character in English literature, and the very favourable 
 reception accorded to my ' Napoleon ' in the * Heroes 
 Series,' and to other writings of mine on the grand passage 
 of arms of which Waterloo was the consummation, has 
 induced me to hope that this volume will be not unaccept- 
 able to the public. For many reasons I offer no apology 
 for making an attempt to elucidate and to criticise the 
 memorable events of the campaign of 1815. Our know- 
 ledge on some points in this great drama of war is still, 
 and perhaps will always remain, imperfect ; for example, 
 the conduct of Wellington on the night of June 15 has 
 not been fully explained ; the same remark applies to the 
 relations between Napoleon and Grouchy on the 17th and 
 the i8th. An effort to arrive at the truth on these most 
 important subjects can hardly be without some value. 
 Again, our information respecting the campaign has of 
 late years been largely increased. The history of Ollech 
 has thrown a good deal of fresh light on some of its 
 incidents ; the ' Memoirs ' of Marbot have directed atten-
 
 viii PREFACE 
 
 tion, more fully than was the case before, to the ideas of 
 Napoleon with regard to Grouchy's operations; and this 
 volume, unlike nearly all other works, is at all events 
 up to date on these subjects. It is, perhaps, even more 
 important to bear in mind that until quite recently it 
 has been almost impossible to examine the series of events 
 that ended at Waterloo with strict impartiality, apart 
 from the blinding influences of national prejudice and 
 passion, and to place them in their true proportions 
 and real historical aspect. Most French writers have 
 exaggerated the Napoleonic legend of 1815 ; a certain 
 number have made the reverse that befell the Emperor's 
 arms an occasion for clever and brilliant, but unjust and 
 mendacious, detraction from the renown of the greatest 
 of the masters of modern war. A large majority of English 
 writers have followed the Wellingtonian legend, far more 
 untrue than the Napoleonic, though it is only fair to 
 observe that this misrepresentation of plain and incon- 
 trovertible facts has of late years found little favour in 
 England. German writers have been at least equally 
 biassed and carried away ; in addition many parts of 
 the campaign, as, for instance, the D'Erlon incident on 
 June 16, and, above all, the conduct and the movements 
 of Grouchy on the 17th and the i8th — passages of supreme 
 importance — have not been treated in this country, or in 
 Germany, with the fulness and the accuracy these subjects 
 require ; indeed, they have usually been slurred over or 
 misdescribed, without regard to historical truth. I have 
 done what in me lay, even though it be a little, to dis- 
 sipate all these false conceptions, and to supply these 
 omissions ; to arrive, with a strict regard to impartiality 
 and to truth, at sound and reasonable conclusions with 
 respect to Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo ; and to add 
 something to the sum of the real knowledge we possess 
 with reference to the events of the campaign of 1815. 
 To understand the military events of 1815, it is neces-
 
 PREFA CE ix 
 
 sary to understand the political events of the time, were 
 it only clearly to perceive how a great nation, which rose 
 superior to Blenheim and Ramillies, and which, after Metz 
 and Sedan, resisted invaders in overwhelming strength 
 with heroic energy, suddenly collapsed after the defeat 
 of Waterloo. With regard to this subject, the general 
 reader may be referred to the nearly contemporaneous 
 histories of Capefigue, Thibaudeau, and Lamartine, and 
 to the later histories of Thiers, Alison, and H. Houssaye. 
 For the more thorough student of the period the sources 
 of primary information are various and amply sufficient. 
 The conduct and the policy of the allies, as regards 
 France, at the Congress of Vienna, and after Napoleon 
 had regained his throne, are fully illustrated in the 
 Despatches and Supplementary Despatches of Wellington 
 for the years 1814 and 1815; in the Parliamentary Debates 
 of 1815 ; in the Correspondence of Castlereagh ; in the 
 ' Memoirs ' of Metternich ; and in the Correspondence of 
 Gentz and of Fozzo di Borgo. The foreign policy of 
 Louis XVIII. will be found in his correspondence with 
 Talleyrand, in the Talleyrand * Memoirs ' ; as regards 
 Napoleon's overtures for peace, when he had returned 
 from Elba, his correspondence for the year 1815 may 
 be consulted, and also the pseudo ' Memoirs ' of Fouche, 
 to a great extent truthful and valuable ; there are, besides, 
 the * Memoirs ' of Metternich, and several despatches of 
 Caulaincourt contained or referred to in different histories. 
 With respect to the internal government of Louis XVIII., 
 and the state of France and of French opinion, large and 
 often curious information is afforded in the * Memoirs ' 
 of Vitrolles and Pasquier, of Villele, Villemain, Hyde de 
 Neuville, Barante, Marmont, Chateaubriand, Lafayette, 
 Benjamin Constant, Carnot, Lavallette, Savary, Mollien, 
 and others ; and in the * Memoires ' of Blacas and of 
 Carnot, the Souvenirs of Macdonald, and the Journal 
 of the Duke of Orleans. Most of these authorities throw
 
 PREFACE 
 
 light on the internal government of Napoleon during the 
 Hundred Days, and on the condition of France ; but we 
 may add to these the * Memoirs ' of Benjamin Constant 
 during the Hundred Days ; parts of the Correspondence 
 of Davout and of Napoleon himself; the reports of 
 Grouchy and other French Generals employed in putting 
 down risings in the South and elsewhere ; the ' Memoirs ' 
 of Lamarque ; passages from Madame de Stael's work on 
 the French Revolution ; Lucien Bonaparte's ' La Verite 
 sur les Cent Jours,' the letters of Sir J. C. Hob- 
 house, and the very interesting narrative of Miss Helena 
 Williams. As regards the intrigues relating to Marie 
 Louise at Vienna, see the touching Souvenirs of Meneval ; 
 and as regards the designs to deport and perhaps to get 
 rid of Napoleon by violence, consult the authorities cited 
 by H. Houssaye. With respect to Napoleon's return from 
 Elba, the reader may be referred to the Napoleon 
 Correspondence in 1814-1815 ; to Sir N. Campbell's 
 'Napoleon at Elba'; to the ' L'!le d'Elbe et les 
 Cent Jours ' in the Napoleon Correspondence ; to the 
 valuable ' Memoirs ' of Fleury de Chaboulon reviewed 
 by Napoleon at St. Helena ; to a very curious publi- 
 cation, * L'ltineraire de Buonaparte de I'lle d'Elbe 
 et St. Helene'; and to the reports of the trials of Ney, 
 Labedoyere, and Cambronne. The French press of this 
 whole period reflects the violence, the animosities, and 
 the divisions of the nation in 1814 and 1815. 
 
 Passing to the military events of 1815, the secondary 
 sources of information are very abundant. I may refer 
 again to the narratives of Thiers and Alison, both valuable, 
 though in different degrees ; to the elaborate and very able 
 but unjust and partisan history of Charras ; to the careful 
 and well-informed resume of Prince La Tour d'Auvergne, 
 which contains nearly all the original documents ; and 
 especially to the recent and admirable work of H. Houssaye, 
 a model of industrious research, and, as a rule, marked by
 
 PREFACE xi 
 
 an impartial judgment. On the Prussian side the volumes 
 of Wagner contain the Prussian official account ; those of 
 Damitz are well informed but rather one-sided ; the work 
 of Clausewitz is brilliant and even masterly, but in several 
 places very uncandid ; Ollech's history is, on the whole, 
 a good book ; and Muffling's * History of the Campaign ' 
 is not without importance and merit. The best narrative 
 from an English pen is that of Siborne ; it is well written 
 and rich in instructive details, but it wants breadth of 
 view and insight, and it is especially deficient as regards 
 the conduct and the operations of Grouchy. The * Cam- 
 paign of Waterloo,' by Mr. Ropes, an American writer, 
 is excellent as a commentary ; the criticism it contains 
 is, as a rule, judicious and well conceived ; this is notably 
 the case as regards the movements of Grouchy on the 17th 
 and the i8th of June; but the learned author scarcely 
 attempts to describe the course of events consecutively 
 and in their completeness ; his book can hardly be called 
 a history in the full sense of the word. The ' Waterloo ' 
 of Hooper faithfully reproduces the Wellingtonian legend ; 
 it is well written, but utterly one-sided, and is now obsolete. 
 As regards the Dutch-Belgian operations, and, indeed, the 
 campaign generally, the work of Van Loben Sels is re- 
 markable for its impartiality and good information ; and 
 Brialmont's * Life of Wellington ' contains some valuable 
 remarks on the campaign of 1815. Mr. Dorsey Gardner's 
 book * Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo ' is not without 
 merit ; it adds something to our knowledge respecting 
 the state of Napoleon's health in 1815, a consideration 
 of no little importance. 
 
 Besides these more elaborate works, I may refer to a 
 great number of minor works on the campaign and its 
 incidents. Foremost, perhaps, of these is Jomini's ' Precis 
 de la Campagne de 1815,' a tract, in places not well in- 
 formed, and not always judicious, but on the whole 
 marked with true insight, especially as regards the opera-
 
 xii PREFACE 
 
 tions of Grouchy. Other French publications of more or 
 less value are : * Napoleon a Waterloo, par un Officier de 
 la Garde Imperiale'; Baudus' 'Etudes sur Napoleon,' 
 very useful as respects the D'Erlon incident, and now 
 completed by H. Houssaj'e ; Quinet's ' Histoire de la 
 Campagne de 1815,' really a review of Charras ; Vaudon- 
 court's * Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815'; 
 Rogniat's criticism of Napoleon's conduct in 1815, de- 
 molished by the Emperor at St. Helena ; the apology 
 made for Grouchy by his son, the Marquis de Grouchy ; 
 Berton's ' Precis des Batailles de Fleurus et Waterloo ' ; 
 ' Le General Pajol,' by his son ; and ' Le General Van- 
 damme ' and ' Le General Drouet d'Erlon.' As to 
 Prussian literature of this class, Muffling's ' Passages from 
 my Life ' is a work of some importance, and reference 
 may be made to a few other German publications. The 
 English works in this category are numerous and some 
 very valuable ; I may mention Lord Ellesmere's com- 
 ments on Waterloo, written under the eye of Wellington ; 
 General Shaw Kennedy's ' Notes on the Battle of 
 Waterloo,' a very careful analysis ; General Hamley's 
 chapter on the Waterloo Campaign in his ' Operations of 
 War,' and his * Life and Career of Wellington ' ; the Life 
 of Lord Hill ; Chesney's ' Waterloo Lectures,' far from 
 impartial or correct, but still useful ; a series of articles by 
 General Maurice in the United Service Magazine for the 
 3'ears i8go and i8gi called ' Waterloo,' abounding in 
 paradox, but containing some good comments ; and, last 
 but not least. Lord Wolseley's too brief sketch of the 
 campaign in his ' Decline and Fall of Napoleon.' The 
 reader must judge for himself of my contributions to this 
 passage of military history, 'The Campaign of 1815 ' in 
 my ' Great Commanders of Modern Times,' and ' Disputed 
 Passages of the Campaign of 1815 ' in the English 
 Historical Review for January, 1895. The ' Relation 
 Beige ' of the campaign may be studied with profit.
 
 PREFACE xiii 
 
 The true student of war, of course, seeks the primary 
 sources of information on the campaign of 1815 ; he 
 ascends to the fountain-head, he does not merely follow 
 the stream. I refer, in the first instance, to these 
 sources as they have been supplied to us by the principal 
 actors in the great drama. The writings of Napoleon, 
 especially the twenty-eighth volume of his Correspondence, 
 and the Correspondence of Davout, give us a full account 
 of the preparations made by the Emperor for his last con- 
 flict with Europe ; the Despatches of Wellington, and his 
 correspondence with Blucher and Schwartzenberg, con- 
 tain an account of the preparations of the allies. Napoleon 
 has written two narratives of the campaign ; the first 
 a sketch published under the name of General Gourgaud, 
 the second originally appearing in his * Memoires,' but 
 now forming a part of the fifth volume of his ' Com- 
 mentaries ' — these are referred to in the text by this title ; 
 and he has besides made additional remarks on the 
 subject in his ' Notes on the Art of War ' in the sixth 
 volume. These compositions, written at St. Helena with- 
 out sufficient or proper books of reference, are in places 
 incorrect, and abound in errors of detail. With respect 
 to some passages of the campaign, notably to the D'Erlon 
 incident, they are unsatisfactory and even disingenuous. 
 But I agree with Thiers, a great historian, many as are 
 his faults, they describe often accurately, and always with 
 great power of insight and expression, the broad features 
 of the campaign ; they are admirable and unanswerable 
 on most of the questions of strategy it suggests ; the 
 tendency of modern research and inquiry has been to 
 confirm the views and the conclusions of their renowned 
 author ; nothing can be more contemptible than the paltry 
 and carping criticism to which they have been subjected. 
 Wellington has written very little on the campaign ; his 
 report of Waterloo and of the events that preceded the 
 battle is a mere official narrative, dashed off on the spur
 
 xiv PREFACE 
 
 of the moment ; and his reply to the strictures of 
 Clausevvitz, composed in his old age and when he was 
 in bad health, is not trustworthy, and abounds in mistakes. 
 Interesting remarks of the Duke, however, on Waterloo 
 will be found in the first volume of the Greville Memoirs, 
 when the event was recent. Wellington's high estimate 
 of the first operations of Napoleon is sufficiently known. 
 As regards what Blucher has left on the subject, little 
 remains but a few characteristic letters of no permanent 
 importance ; but Gneisenau's correspondence with the 
 King of Prussia is of some value, and his letters referred 
 to by his biographer, Delbruck, if not of much historical 
 worth, are significant as showing his dislike and distrust 
 of Wellington, a sentiment that on the i8th of June was 
 very dangerous to the cause of the allies. 
 
 A good deal has been written on the campaign of 1815 
 by Generals and officers not in supreme command. Ney 
 died and left no sign, except that he wrote a letter to 
 Fouche reflecting on Napoleon, which he ought not to have 
 written. Soult, perhaps wisely, was reticent about him- 
 self; in conversations with Sir William Napier he rightly 
 attributed the failure of the Emperor's operations largely 
 to Ney, but he has not vindicated himself as chief of the 
 French staff. The son of Ney collected in 1840 a series of 
 papers called * Documents Inedits sur la Campagne de 
 181 5,' which in no sense exculpate his ill-fated parent, 
 but are of much value. The ' Relation ' of Heymes, 
 Ney's aide-de-camp, deserves little credence. Grouchy 
 has laboured hard to make apologies for his conduct on 
 June 17 and 18, but his ' Observations sur la Relation de 
 la Campagne de 1815,' and his ' Relation Succincte' abound 
 in erroneous statements. He has garbled documents ; he 
 actually suppressed the all-important Bertrand letter on 
 June 17 until he was confronted by it as late as 1842. 
 Such contrivances require no comment. History has 
 vindicated Gerard ; his ' Observations ' in reply to Grouchy
 
 PREFACE XV 
 
 are somewhat exaggerated and incorrect, but he has sub- 
 stantially made out his case. Had he commanded in 
 Grouchy's place, Waterloo would not have been a 
 disaster for France — nay, might have been a victory. 
 The Life and the Correspondence of Davout contain some 
 references to the campaign and more to the events imme- 
 diately preceding the capitulation of Paris. Vandamme 
 and D'Erlon have left some papers on those subjects ; 
 D'Erlon especially has tried to excuse himself, but with 
 little regard to truth, for his false movement on June i6. 
 I am not aware of anything of value written by the sub- 
 ordinate Prussian commanders, but a controversy was 
 maintained for some time between Gneisenau and Bulow 
 with reference to the absence of Bulow from Ligny. We 
 possess some instructive and very interesting papers and 
 documents from the pens of British officers relating to the 
 campaign. By far the most important of these are ' The 
 Waterloo Letters,' a collection compiled by Siborne; 
 these are excellent materials for history, not, of course, 
 accurate, but truthful in intention and often very graphic. 
 They are instinct with the chivalrous, manly, and generous 
 spirit which has always been characteristic of British 
 officers. The ' Journal ' of the late General Mercer is also 
 important, especially as regards the British artillery at 
 Waterloo. We may refer besides to the letters and 
 correspondence of the late Sir William Gomm, and to 
 the collection of original papers in Jones's ' Waterloo.' 
 
 April 2P, 1900.
 
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 IN 1815. 
 
 Grant Hix.hiOJ'dLi^S'anSan
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS IN 1814-15— NAPOLEON'S 
 DESCENT FROM ELBA 
 
 PAGES 
 
 State of France and of French opinion at the Restoration of 
 Louis XVIII. — Hopes of an auspicious future — Monarchic 
 and revolutionary France widely opposed — The emigrds, the 
 noblesse, the priesthood, the people, the army — Unwise 
 policy of the Government, especially as regards the confis- 
 cated lands and the army — General discontent — A great 
 change felt to be imminent — Napoleon at Elba — The first 
 months of his exile — He resolves to return to France — How 
 he was treated by the allies — He escapes from Elba — His 
 triumphant march to Paris — Fall of the Government of 
 Louis XVIII. — Napoleon at the Tuileries - - i — 18 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 
 
 The Empire quickly restored in France — The allies proclaim 
 Napoleon an outlaw — Europe again in arms against him 
 — Large parts of France fall away from the Emperor— His 
 Government necessarily weak — He could not, and would not, 
 make himself a Jacobin dictator — His military preparations 
 — Formation of a field and an auxiliary army — His -"fiforts 
 astonishing, and worthy of him, considering the difficulties 
 in which he is placed — The plans of the coalition for the war 
 — Alternative plans of Napoleon — He resolves to attack the
 
 xviii CONTENTS 
 
 rAGBS 
 
 northern column of the allies in Belgium, while it is separated 
 from the eastern column — Ruin and fall of Murat — Rising in 
 La Vendue disastrous to Napoleon — The Acte Additionnel — 
 The Champ de Mai— Napoleon leaves Paris to join his army 
 
 19—46 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON— THE BELLIGERENT ARMIES 
 AND THEIR LEADERS 
 
 Sketch of the theatre of war in Belgium^ — The positions of the 
 armies of Wellington and Blucher — The arrangements of 
 the allied chiefs to resist attack defective — The true reason 
 of this — Napoleon resolves to attack the allied centre — 
 Reasons for this project — His forces considerably less than 
 he had expected — Concentration of the French army on the 
 verge of Belgium — Admirable skill shown in effecting this 
 operation — Positions of the French army on June 14, 181 5 — 
 Numbers and characteristics of the French and the allied 
 armies — Napoleon, Wellington, Blucher, and their lieutenants 
 
 47—71 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1 5, 1815 
 
 Napoleon at Beaumont — His address to his army — His orders 
 for the march into Belgium— Advance of the French army — 
 Delays — Vandamme — The desertion of Bourmont — The 
 French army crosses the Sambre — Napoleon at Charleroy — 
 His orders — The loss of time caused by delays and accidents 
 unfavourable to the French — The retreat of Zieten — Arrival 
 of Ney — Napoleon's orders to the Marshal — Ney does not 
 occupy Quatre Bras — Combat at Gilly — Positions of the 
 French army on the evening of the 15th — Great advantage 
 already secured by Napoleon — Dispositions of Blucher and 
 Wellington — The Prussian army directed to Sombreffe— 
 Bulow cannot join it— Delays and hesitations of Wellington 
 — Part of his army directed to Quatre Bras, but very late — 
 Examination of the allied strategy— The allied armies in a 
 critical position ---... 72 — 102
 
 CONTENTS xix 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE l6— LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS 
 
 PAGES 
 
 The French army on the morning of June i6 — Alleged inaction 
 of Napoleon — His orders to Ney and Grouchy — -Conduct of 
 Ney since the evening of the 15th — His delays and remiss- 
 ness — March of the main French army to Fleurus — Positions 
 of the Prussian army — Arrangements of Blucher, and his 
 faults — Interview between Blucher and Wellington — Skilful 
 arrangements of Napoleon — His letter of 2 p.m. to Ney — 
 The Battle of Ligny, attack on Blucher's right and right 
 centre — Desperate fighting — Napoleon's order to Ney of 
 3.15 p.m. — Order to D'Erlon to march to the field — Con- 
 tinuation of the battle — Apparition of D'Erlon towards 
 Fleurus — He retires from the field — Napoleon breaks 
 Blucher's centre and defeats the Prussians — Battle of Quatre 
 Bras — Conduct of Ney and Reille — Ney's attack late — 
 Progress of the battle — Different attacks of Ney — He recalls 
 D'Erlon — Wellington compels Ney to retreat to Frasnes — 
 Napoleon's success on the i6th great, but not decisive, 
 chiefly owing to Ney's conduct — Reille and D'Erlon gravely 
 to blame — The position of the allies very critical - 103 — 152 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1 7 
 
 Retrospect of the operations since the beginning of the campaign 
 — Advantages obtained by Napoleon — Great opportunities 
 presented to him on the morning of June 17— The two alter- 
 native movements he might have made, of which either 
 should have secured him decisive success — Authorities cited 
 on the subject — Napoleon at Fleurus the night of the i6th 
 — Exultation of the French army after the victory of Ligny — 
 Overconfidence and negligence — The retreat of the Prussians 
 not followed or observed — Conduct of Ney and of Soult — 
 No communication between them — Letter of Soult to Ney 
 on the morning of the 17th— Intention that the French army 
 was to halt for that day— The state of his health the real
 
 XX CONTENTS 
 
 PAGES 
 
 cause of the inaction of Napoleon— He proceeds to Ligny— 
 Review of his army — He resolves to pursue Blucher with 
 (Irouchy, and to attack Wellington — This combination 
 correct, but very late— Orders to Grouchy — The Ucrtrand 
 despatch — Its great importance— Retreat of the Prussian 
 army to Wavre— Napoleon reaches Quatre Bras and follows 
 Wellington — Character of the pursuit — Napoleon halts before 
 Waterloo — Movements of Grouchy — He reaches Gembloux 
 — His letter of lo p.m. to Napoleon— His faulty dispositions 
 — Napoleon on the night of the 17th — His dispositions and 
 confidence — Dispositions of Blucher and Wellington — The 
 prospect for June 1 8 ... - - 153 — 198 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1 8 — THE PRELUDE TO 
 WATERLOO 
 
 The night of June 17 — The condition of the two armies— Con- 
 fidence of the French — Ominous symptoms — Feelings that 
 prevailed in the allied army — Wellington prepares for battle 
 at an early hour — Overconfidence of Napoleon — He post- 
 pones the attack — This unfortunate for him — The position of 
 Waterloo — Its great natural strength — Disposition of Wel- 
 lington's forces to resist Napoleon's attack — Blucher at 
 Wavre— Hesitation of Gneisenau — The Prussian army begins 
 its march on Waterloo — It is dangerously and unnecessarily 
 delayed — Blucher sets off to join Wellington — Grouchy — He 
 misdirects his army— He marches towards Wavre, very late, 
 and slowly — Magnificent appearance of Napoleon's army 
 before the attack — The Emperor — Soult — Grouchy - 199—326 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 the battle of waterloo to the defeat of 
 d'erlon's corps 
 
 Napoleon's reliance on his lieutenants — This very marked on 
 the day of Waterloo — Description of Hougoumont and its 
 enclosures — The feint converted into a real attack — Advance 
 of the division of Jerome — Bold and persistent attacks —
 
 CONTENTS xxi 
 
 PAGES 
 
 Stubborn and successful defence — Waste of the strength of 
 the French— The apparition of the advanced guard of Bulow 
 — Soult's letter of i p.m. — His postscript— Grouchy directed 
 to march to the field of Waterloo — His movement on Wal- 
 hain — His despatch of ii a.m. — With other officers he hears 
 the cannon of Waterloo— Admirable advice of Gerard to 
 march and join the main army — This rejected by Grouchy, 
 who continues to march directly on Wavre — Napoleon's first 
 grand attack — Advance of D'Erlon's corps — Vicious forma- 
 tion of its columns— Attack on La Haye Sainte — Stubborn 
 defence — The charge of Somerset and Ponsonby — Defeat of 
 cuirassiers— Complete defeat of D'Erlon— State of the battle 
 at 3 p.m. ...... 227—250 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO TO THE REPULSE OF 
 BULOW AND HIS CORPS 
 
 Napoleon receives the news of Grouchy's tardy and false move- 
 ment, and of Bulow's advance from St. Lambret towards 
 the Bois de Paris — The Emperor's plan of attack profoundly 
 modified — His orders to Ney — Intense cannonade — Ney 
 masters La Haye Sainte probably about 4 p.m. — Disregard- 
 ing Napoleon's orders, he projects a grand cavalry attack 
 against the allied right centre— Extreme imprudence of this 
 conduct — The attacks of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoettes 
 — The French cavalry fail — Napoleon not aware of the 
 attacks until it was too late — Renewal of the cavalry attacks 
 by Milhaud, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, Kellermann, and Guyot — 
 Why the Emperor gave his sanction to them— Attack of 
 Bulow on the French right — It becomes very dangerous — 
 Napoleon compelled to strengthen Lobau by the Young 
 Guard — Magnificent resistance made to the cavalry attacks 
 — They ultimately fail — Ney and Wellington — Part of the 
 Old Guard sent to retake Plancenoit — Bulow repulsed — 
 Fresh attacks made on the allied line — The position of Wel- 
 lington still critical — State of the battle ; this is still undecided 
 
 251 — 279
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 87, line 6, for " Gerard " read " Girard." 
 ,, 115, ,, 24, /or "eighty-eight guns " r^a^;? "forty-eight guns." 
 .. 133. .. i3./o>"'Perponcher to his right" read " Perponcher to 
 
 his left." 
 ,, 225, ,, 24, /oy "lowlands were dense " r^a^" uplands were dense."
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ravages of war had ceased to spread ; peasant conscripts 
 were no longer torn from their homes to be * forced,' as 
 the phrase was, ' to the shambles '; the nation was not 
 racked and convulsed by a hopeless struggle with the 
 multitudinous hosts of embattled Europe. Agriculture 
 and industry had begun to revive, the tiller of the soil was 
 safe in his fields, the trader could apply himself to the 
 pursuits of commerce, the country was recovering from 
 its misfortunes with the energy and speed it has so often 
 shown in its ever-changing annals. 
 
 Nor were hopes wanting that the Bourbon monarchy 
 would rally the majority of Frenchmen around the throne, 
 and would inaugurate an era of content and of well- 
 ordered liberty. Paris had welcomed the King with 
 general acclaim ; the heads of the army, the great bodies 
 of the State, the magistracy, and the class of the bour- 
 geoisie had loyally declared for the Restoration ; and 
 though the attitude of many of the provinces was very 
 different, these were, for the present at least, quiescent. 
 There was a good prospect, too, that the ancient regime 
 was not even thought of in the royal councils, and that 
 the aspirations of the great and growing Liberal party of 
 France for constitutional freedom would be satisfied. The 
 Comte d'Artois had bowed to the will of the Senate when 
 he had been made Lieutenant-General of the King ; 
 Louis XVI IL had bestowed a charter upon his subjects 
 which, restricted as it was, was of happy promise, and 
 had pledged himself to rule through two Chambers ; his 
 Ministry was partly composed of men of the revolu- 
 tionary age. Spite, too, of occasional murmurs of dis- 
 content rising ominously in several districts and towns, 
 the authority of the Government was nowhere challenged; 
 the old Republican party and the adherents of the fallen 
 Empire had well-nigh shrunk out of sight ; the army, 
 immensely reduced by desertion, and without the chiefs 
 it had had at its head, was unable for the moment to stir.
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS IN 1814-15 3 
 
 or even to show its feelings. A rainbow of hope shone 
 over the still troubled waters ; it was generally believed in 
 France, and even in Europe, that the new order of things 
 would take root and flourish. 
 
 Grave elements of disorder and peril lurked, neverthe- 
 less, under this attractive surface ; it was ere long to appear 
 that the France of the monarchy was widely separated 
 from the France of 1789-1814. Louis XVIII., indeed, 
 and many of his Ministers, although they committed fatal 
 mistakes, and, as a Government, were weak and divided 
 in mind, were not false to the professions they had made, 
 and endeavoured, on the whole, to rule, not without 
 regard to what seemed to them the national interests. 
 But the great body of the genuine adherents of the House 
 of Bourbon formed factions that stood aloof from the 
 nation, and, in different degrees, were even hostile to it ; 
 they became a danger to the State and to the public 
 v^elfare. The extreme emigr6 party clamoured for a 
 return to the old order of things, which the Revolution 
 had swept away ; even the more moderate Royalists 
 looked askance at a throne based on constitutional right, 
 and really dependent on the popular will. At the same 
 time, the heads of the Church and a majority of the 
 clergy denounced the Concordat, which had reconciled 
 France with Rome ; and they were loud in their com- 
 plaints of the conforming priesthood, and against the 
 religious liberty which the Concordat had secured. 
 
 These murmurs, however, would have had little effect 
 had they not been seconded by movements which out- 
 raged the feelings and threatened the well-being of the 
 greatest part of the nation. The noblesse had regained 
 its dignities ; in hundreds of parishes proud and unknown 
 gentlemen claimed the feudal homage which had once 
 been their due, but had been abolished since the days of 
 Louis XVI. ; and a cry went forth from every part of 
 France that this was but a prelude to the resumption of 
 
 I — 2
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the vast tracts of land which had passed into the hands 
 of the cultivators of the soil and the lower middle classes 
 in the great confiscations of 1792-94, but which were now 
 to revert to a detested order of men. The peasantry, and 
 even the inhabitants of many towns, became thoroughly 
 alarmed in almost every province ; and their terrors were 
 increased by what they heard from their priests in most 
 places — that the tithes and the exactions of the old 
 Church would be again imposed on them, and that it was 
 a crime to resist the demands of the noblesse. Simul- 
 taneously, the army was enormously swelled in numbers 
 by the return of the garrisons of fortresses in foreign 
 countries, and of prisoners of war in tens of thousands. 
 These masses seethed with angry discontent, which an 
 injudicious policy was to make infinitely worse; and thus 
 the most numerous and widely-extended parts of the 
 nation, and the force which in a revolutionary state must 
 form the chief and the best support of a government, 
 became gradually more and more opposed to the 
 monarchy. Nor were dissatisfaction and even ill-will 
 absent among the classes most attached to the constitu- 
 tional throne. Disenchantment had soon followed illu- 
 sions. Liberal France quickly discovered that the Charter 
 fell far short of what it had expected, and it resented that 
 this had been made a concession by the ' special favour ' 
 of the King. The bourgeoisie, too, of the capital and of 
 the chief towns were irritated at the arrogance of the 
 noblesse, and disliked the pretensions of the emigres and 
 the Court ; and the keen wit of the Parisians scoffed at 
 the forgotten etiquette of Versailles paraded at the 
 Tuileries with costly pomp, and at the claims of the 
 champions of ruling by right Divine. 
 
 The difficulties in the way of the Government were 
 immense, as this state of things developed itself by 
 degrees ; it would have required the genius of Henry IV., 
 backed by the power of Richelieu at its height, to have
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS /iV 1814-15 5 
 
 overcome, or really to cope with, them. For example, the 
 finances were well administered, but the Treasury was 
 unable to meet the demands made on it by ruined pro- 
 vinces and towns ; and it could not support even half of 
 the ever-growing army, though the attitude of this had 
 become most threatening. The King and his Ministers, 
 besides, were hampered and thwarted, and repeatedly 
 placed in a false position by the conduct of the Bourbon 
 Princes around the throne. The Comte d'Artois had put 
 himself at the head of the Emigres, who wildly denounced 
 the constitutional regime ; the Pavilion Marsan echoed 
 the cries of Coblentz, and condemned Louis XVIII. as a 
 crowned time-server. The Due d'Angouleme was a mere 
 princely nullity, the Duchesse not unnaturally hated the 
 Revolution which had destroyed her parents ; the Due de 
 Berri was a braggart who aped the soldier, and earned 
 the contempt of the army he courted. Nevertheless, 
 after making every allowance, the Government of the 
 Restoration was a bad Government, infirm of purpose, 
 and, in notable instances, the instrument of an evil and 
 most disastrous policy. The King was a scholar, a wit, 
 and, in a sense, a statesman ; but he was indolent, and 
 carelessly let things drift. He boasted that he held his 
 throne from God, but little heeded that it was treated 
 with contempt by man. He was ever stickling for pre- 
 rogatives he was afraid to maintain ; his chief thought 
 was of his personal ease and comfort. More than one of 
 the Ministers were really able men, but in Wellington's 
 phrase ' they were Ministers, not a Ministry '; they had 
 no fixed or well-settled policy, they were divided, vacillat- 
 ing, unequal to rule. Their measures were thus usually 
 weak and half-hearted, when they were not thoroughly 
 unwise — nay, deplorable. Their first task should have 
 been to keep the Emigres down, to put an end to the 
 ruinous pretensions of the noblesse, especially as to the 
 possessions they had lost, and to bring the Church under
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the control of the law and the Crown ; but they only 
 trifled with orders of men who were a most formidable 
 danj^jer to the State. Some, indeed, secretly espoused 
 their cause. 
 
 On one subject of the very greatest moment the Govern- 
 ment quickened and exasperated the discontent and fear 
 already pervading the mass of the nation, and heaped fuel 
 recklessly on a devouring flame. The Charter, the King, 
 and both Chambers had declared that the confiscated 
 lands were not to be restored to their former owners ; but 
 these professions had had little effect, regard being had to 
 the claims made by the noblesse and the clergy. In an 
 evil hour the Ministry proposed to give back the domains 
 which had not been sold by the State to those who had 
 forfeited them, but had been their possessors ; incautious 
 language was most unwisely used ; and rumour, multiplied 
 by thousands of tongues, spread far and wide that the 
 confiscations of the past were to be followed by a confis- 
 cation more unjust and grievous. The heart of the nation 
 was stirred to its depths ; thenceforward probably five- 
 sixths of Frenchmen became completely estranged from 
 the monarchy. 
 
 The policy of the Government was even worse as regards 
 the army which it should have made the mainstay of its 
 power. It was inevitable, indeed, in the existing state of 
 the finances, that a large part of this force should be dis- 
 l^anded ; but no effort should have been spared to make 
 the part that remained loyal to the existing order of things. 
 Exactly a contrary course was adopted ; not only were 
 the soldiery cast adrift in multitudes, without a thought 
 as to what was to be their fate, but those who were left to 
 form the diminished armed strength of France were de- 
 graded, nay, insulted, in every conceivable way. The old 
 organisation of the army was broken up ; it lost the 
 revered eagles, long the signs of conquest ; the tricolour 
 was replaced by the white flag, unknown, or seen only in
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS /N 1814-15 7 
 
 the ranks of the enemy ; the Imperial Guard was not 
 permitted to attend the King ; the most famous regiments 
 were recklessly dispersed. But what was most galling 
 and cruelly unjust was that, while the veterans of the past 
 were dismissed in thousands, and the troops who were 
 retained were ill-paid and treated with neglect, a great 
 force of Household soldiery was arrayed, which engrossed 
 every good appointment and place, and literally starved 
 the whole of the rest of the service. These ' lackeys of 
 the antechamber,' as they were called, were solely en- 
 trusted with the guard of the King ; they were splendidly 
 accoutred, and had the rank of officers ; they had a lion's 
 share of promotion in every grade, and they drove from 
 the ranks thousands of trained officers, who were aban- 
 doned to poverty on a miserable half-pay. From this 
 moment the army became the bitter enemy of the Restora- 
 tion and its heads. 
 
 The policy and conduct of the men in power were also 
 in other respects unfortunate. The Comte d'Artois, in 
 the heyday of his first coming, had pledged himself that 
 taxes should be largely remitted. It would have been 
 impossible, perhaps, to redeem this pledge, but it was 
 contemptuously broken amidst general discontent. The 
 liberty of the press had been guaranteed by the Charter, 
 but it had been deemed necessary to set this guarantee at 
 naught. This increased the ill-will of those who com- 
 plained that this compact was a mere gift which the 
 Sovereign could withdraw, especially as it bore the date 
 of the nineteenth year of his reign, as if the Revolution 
 and the Empire had been blotted out from history. The 
 spirit of the administration, too, of the State was irritat- 
 ing, unpopular, provoked distrust and suspicion. Many 
 of the functionaries of the Empire, indeed, were retained 
 in their posts, for the centralised system of government 
 could not otherwise work ; but these were regarded at 
 Court with dislike and aversion. Royalist functionaries
 
 8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15 
 
 alone were in real favour. The administration of the 
 army, besides, only made worse the exasperation due to 
 the disastrous changes which had been made in it. It 
 was not only that Marmont — Marshal Judas, as he was 
 called — was singled out for distinction at the Tuileries, 
 and that other Marshals were loaded with wealth and 
 honours, while the mass of the soldiery were left in dis- 
 credit and indigence. Dupont, the disgraced General of 
 Baylen, was made Minister of War. The suspicions of 
 corruption which his surrender had caused were at least 
 augmented by his conduct in office. He was succeeded 
 by Soult, no doubt an able man, but a courtier of fortune 
 utterly without principle. The extravagant loyalty of 
 which he made a parade, the recompenses he lavished on 
 the Chouans of the North, the extreme severity he showed 
 to officers on half-pay, and to Excelmans, an old com- 
 panion in arms, made him the most hated of the military 
 chiefs. 
 
 Other instances of want of official sense and tact were 
 exhibited, and had the natural results. The observance 
 of Sundays after the English fashion — Puritan strictness 
 hitherto unknown in France — was made compulsory by a 
 Court in part foolishly devout. This bitterly vexed Paris, 
 fond of her holidays, and since the Revolution given a 
 free rein to license. The religious ceremonies which 
 were seen in the half-infidel capital aroused cries against 
 the superstitions of the old regime ; the refusal of a priest 
 to give an actress burial provoked a popular demonstra- 
 tion for a moment dangerous. So, too, if it was not un- 
 becoming solemnly to inter the remains of Louis XVI. 
 and of Marie Antoinette, the violent addresses that were 
 made were of evil omen. It was shameful to give a 
 public funeral to Georges Cadoudal, a plotter against the 
 life of the First Consul ; and the anniversary of the death 
 of Louis XVI. was made an occasion of scenes of loyalist 
 excesses which provoked angry murmurs and threatened
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS IN 1814-15 9 
 
 the public peace. Instances of extravagances of this kind 
 were but too frequent ; as was said, indeed, commemora- 
 tions that ought to have raised altars of concord only 
 raised altars of revenge and hatred. 
 
 An immense majority of Frenchmen and the whole 
 army had thus become alienated from the Bourbons and 
 their government. Even the Liberal party had little 
 sympathy with them, nor were the classes held in special 
 favour by the reigning powers contented with their posi- 
 tion in the State and their prospects. The Ministers 
 flattered the emigres, the noblesse, and, as a rule, the 
 Royalists. They lavished decorations and bestowed 
 places ; but while they succeeded in terrifying the holders 
 of the forfeited lands, they did not dare to restore these 
 to their old owners. France was filled with needy and 
 discontented gentlemen, who angrily contrasted the mag- 
 nificence of the Court with the indigence which was their 
 bitter lot. * If he entered his own chateau, he should let 
 us enter ours,' was a phrase current on the Faubourg 
 Saint Germains. * The King, with his bloated civil list, 
 has left us starving,' was the cry of many an indigent 
 seigneur returning hopelessly to England to eat the scanty 
 bread of exile. 
 
 Nor were the petted Marshals and Generals of the 
 Empire satisfied with the existing regime and what it 
 had brought with it. They felt that they were in a false 
 position, and had deserted their great master. They were 
 humiliated at the degraded state of the army ; they were 
 vexed that they had been deprived of their dotations, the 
 spoils of conquest. They were irritated, too, at the con- 
 descending courtesy and half-veiled sarcasms of the old 
 noblesse, which treated them as the grandees of Spain 
 treated the aristocracy of inferior rank ; they resented the 
 ostracism to which their wives and daughters were sub- 
 jected by the fine ladies of the Court. The foreign policy 
 of the Government, besides, had given occasion to grave,
 
 lo THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 if far from just, complaints on the part of many thought- 
 ful, though hardly impartial. Frenchmen. The Ministers, 
 as a condition of a coveted peace, had surrendered for- 
 tresses which France had held on the Scheldt, the Rhine, 
 the Oder, and the Po. This party now insisted that these 
 should have been retained, in order to obtain better terms 
 from the conquering League of Europe. Though France, 
 too, had been nearly confined to her former limits, the 
 idea was widespread that by some means she might be 
 aggrandised at the Congress of Vienna ; and there was a 
 strong feehng of resentment that, instead of this, that 
 assembly showed that one of its main objects was to place 
 solid barriers against French ambition and conquest. Nor 
 was it contrary to human nature that hundreds of patriotic 
 Frenchmen felt indignant that France, but yesterday the 
 Queen of the Continent, had become a vanquished and 
 almost a second-rate Power. Nor can we wonder that 
 they laid this to the charge of the Government. 
 
 The prospect, therefore, so bright in the summer of 
 1814, had become ominously darkened before the close of 
 the year ; the sounds of a coming tempest were heard in 
 the air. It had become evident that the France of the 
 Bourbons and the France of the Revolution and the 
 Empire were in fierce antagonism, and would not 
 coalesce ; their interests, their aspirations, their senti- 
 ments were opposed. This rapid change, doubtless, was 
 partly due to the variableness of the French national 
 character ; but it must chiefly be ascribed to deep-seated 
 causes. Whatever excuses may be made for them, the 
 King and his Ministers had contrived to make the people 
 and the army hostile to the throne ; they were not popular 
 with any part of the nation ; their rule was felt to be 
 weak and ignoble. The precariousness of their position 
 was shown by a wide expression of opinion, in Paris and 
 elsewhere, that the present order of things could not last ; 
 the King, it was common talk, was tottering to his fall.
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS /iV 1814-15 11 
 
 One of the symptoms of a revolution dimly foreseen was 
 that the Republican and the Imperialist parties, deadly 
 enemies under the rule of Napoleon, lifted again their 
 heads, and joined hands to assail the Government ; and 
 the air was thick with rumours of plots and deeds of 
 blood, of wild movements and of coups d'etat, signs of 
 the restlessness and discontent that prevailed every- 
 where. 
 
 In this position of affairs the army naturally turned its 
 eyes to its great chief on his Mediterranean rock, the 
 object of its passionate devotion for years. There were 
 numerous petty military revolts ; the soldiery displayed in 
 a thousand ways their contempt of the Bourbons and 
 their love of Napoleon. The peasantry, too, were deeply 
 moved. They dreaded, indeed, the memory of ruinous 
 wars, and the despotism of the tyrannous Empire ; but 
 Napoleon, they felt, would save their farms from the 
 spoiler, would keep the noblesse and the priests under, 
 and was a champion of a cause essentially their own. 
 Yet the only real conspiracy formed at this time had not 
 as its object the restoration of the fallen Emperor. It 
 was a military conspiracy of no importance ; but its 
 master-spirit was the base intriguer Fouche. His aim 
 was to set up a Regency under Marie Louise, or to place 
 the Duke of Orleans on the throne, in either case making 
 himself supreme in the State. It is a proof how com- 
 pletely the monarchy was undermined that such a project 
 was thought of by a man vile indeed, but most able. 
 ' Louis XVIII. is falling ; put anyone in his place,' was 
 the remark of one of the minor agents in the plot.* 
 
 Napoleon, meanwhile, had in his little island been con- 
 templating the state of France and of Europe. For some 
 time he had devoted himself to the administration and the 
 improvement of the speck in the sea left to him out of the 
 
 * ' Moi, tout qa. m'est bien egal pourvu que le gros cochon s'en 
 aille,' a general officer exclaimed. — ' 1815,' H. Houssaye, i. 120.
 
 12 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 wreck of his colossal Empire. He placed the govern- 
 ment of Elba on a new basis, enlarged and fortified Porto 
 Ferrajo, opened the rural districts with excellent roads, 
 built houses, drained marshes, encouraged the production 
 of silk, planted vineyards, and laid out avenues of mul- 
 berry-trees — in short, gave proof of his organising genius 
 in the arts of peace. And he especially took care of the 
 handful of troops, for the most part veterans of his Old 
 Guard, who had followed their loved chief to his retreat in 
 exile. By degrees, however, the disorders and troubles of 
 France, the evident failure of the Bourbon regime, the 
 attitude of the mass of the people and the discontented 
 army, and notably the discords of the coalition, which had 
 begun to quarrel at Vienna over the spoils of Europe, re- 
 awakened in his mind the thoughts of Empire, and 
 inspired him with a hope that he might again appear a 
 commanding figure on the stage of events. 
 
 His purpose, however, was slowly formed, and was care- 
 fully concealed from all around him. It was not until the 
 month of February, 1815, that he determined to effect 
 his escape from Elba, and, at the head of a few hundred 
 men, to overthrow the throne of Louis XVHI., and to 
 restore the fallen Empire in the face of his late conquerors. 
 His decision appears to have been fixed by the visit of an 
 emissary, sent by his faithful Bassano, who informed him 
 of the position of affairs in France, of the discredit in 
 which the Bourbons were held, of the plot which had 
 been arranged by Fouch6, of the hopes of the army and 
 five-sixths of the people — that the Emperor would come to 
 support their cause. It is not improbable, whatever had 
 happened, that Napoleon would have undertaken his 
 daring enterprise. A favourable opportunity presented 
 itself, and it had become impossible for him to maintain 
 his state at Elba. But if he had resolved to break the 
 pledges he had given to Europe, and to run the risk of 
 defying a world in arms, the conduct of the allies to him
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS IN 1814-15 13 
 
 had been simply shameful, and they had placed terrible 
 temptations in his way. The Bourbon Government had 
 withheld the funds secured to him by a solemn treaty, 
 and without which he could not remain at Elba. Marie 
 Louise had been cut off from him by an odious intrigue, 
 and lured into adulterous arms ; his infant son — the 
 Astyanax of the House of Bonaparte — had been kept a 
 hostage among his enemies ; his family had been deprived 
 of rights they had been promised ; at the Congress of 
 Vienna it had been seriously discussed whether he should 
 not be deported from Elba by force, and imprisoned at 
 St. Helena or one of the Azores. Projects of assassinating 
 him, too, had been certainly formed, though the Bourbons 
 and the allies were not privy to these ; and Talleyrand 
 seems to have agreed to a scheme to carry him off and 
 shut him up in one of the St. Marguerites, where a prison 
 would have been but the portal to a grave.* 
 
 On February 26, 1815, the Emperor set off on his 
 wonderful venture. His military preparations, as was 
 nearly always the case with him, had been carefully 
 matured and skilfully masked ; his departure was kept 
 secret until the last moment. A flotilla of a few petty 
 vessels, with about eleven hundred troops on board, bore 
 the modern Caesar and his fortunes over the Mediterranean 
 wastes. The voyage was slow, and more than one 
 enemy's sail was descried; but Fate smiled treacherously 
 on her old favourite. Napoleon showed the calm and 
 serene confidence he had shown fifteen years before, on 
 his return from Egypt. The little expedition landed near 
 Cannes on March i, but the experiences of the adven- 
 turers at first were of evil omen. Provence had cordially 
 disliked the Empire ; the garrison of Antibes arrested a few 
 men of the Old Guard ; the attitude of Cannes and Grasse 
 was, at best, doubtful. Napoleon, however, with true 
 
 * See the conclusive evidence as to these foul machinations accumu- 
 lated by H. Houssaye, ' 1815,' i. 169-172.
 
 14 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 instinct had resolved from the outset to advance through 
 Dauphine, a province attached to the Revohition and 
 himself. He was soon threading his way with extra- 
 ordinary speed through the rugged hills and defiles which 
 lead to the Durance, the peasantry gradually surrounding 
 his little band, and welcoming a deliverer with joyous 
 acclaim. 
 
 The descent was kept a secret for about two days ; but 
 Massena, in command at Marseilles, received the intelli- 
 gence on March 3. The telegraph sent it to the Tuileries 
 on the 5th. The first impression on the mind of the 
 veteran Marshal, and of the officers and Ministers around 
 the King, was that the enterprise was either wholly a 
 myth, or that it was the despairing effort of a disordered 
 intellect. Proclamations were issued denouncing Napoleon 
 as * a mad bandit.' That of Soult was in outrageous 
 language ; a hired press teemed with ferocious invec- 
 tives. Preparations for resistance, however, were made 
 on a great scale when it was known that Napoleon was 
 on his way through Dauphine ; they seemed to assure 
 certain and immediate success. At the instance of Talley- 
 rand, Soult had set on foot an army nearly 30,000 strong to 
 support the claims of France at Vienna ; and as most of 
 these troops were in the Southern provinces, it was confi- 
 dently expected that * the usurper and his handful of 
 brigands ' would meet a speedy fate. At the same time, 
 Massena, who, like all the Marshals, thought the enter- 
 prise one of audacious foolishness, despatched a column 
 to arrest the march of Napoleon — at least, to follow him, 
 and to close on his rear. ' He will soon be in a mouse- 
 trap,' the old chief exclaimed ; * this will be the end of his 
 insensate venture.' The same ideas, though mingled with 
 those of hatred and fear, prevailed at Vienna for some 
 time ; it was the general conviction, in Pozzo di Borgo's 
 words, that ' Napoleon would soon be strung up on a tree.' 
 
 The Emperor, however, had reckoned on the spell of
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURBONS /N 1814-15 15 
 
 his name, and had rightly estimated the overwhelming 
 power of the moral forces arrayed against the House of 
 Bourbon. For some days he was not joined by half a dozen 
 soldiers ; but as he passed through Sisteron and Gap, 
 on his way to Grenoble, the inhabitants of the neighbour- 
 ing districts crowded from all sides to greet him ; his 
 march became a triumphant popular progress. A single 
 incident determined the course of events. Part of a 
 regiment had been sent to La Mure to stop the adventurer 
 on his path ; but Napoleon, calmly advancing to the edge 
 of the ranks, bared his breast and said, * Who will slay 
 his father ?'* The effect was instantaneous, and almost 
 past belief. The soldiery, who hitherto had appeared 
 faithful, broke away from their astounded officers, gathered 
 around their old master with enthusiastic shouts ; the 
 lilies of the Bourbons were trampled in the dust ; the 
 tricolour reappeared as if by enchantment ; the exulting 
 band, preceding the column of Elba, sped on to Grenoble, 
 now not distant. Another regiment, led by the ill-fated 
 Labedoyere, rallied around the Emperor with the same 
 passionate delight ; and as the little army approached 
 Grenoble, the garrison and the mass of the townsmen 
 bore Napoleon within the fortress, its gates having been 
 broken open by the peasantry outside the ramparts. 
 
 On March 10 the already victorious chief had reached 
 Lyons, at the head of some 8,000 men. It was in vain that 
 the Comte d'Artois, the Duke of Orleans, and Marshal 
 Macdonald had assembled a body of troops, and 
 endeavoured to recall them to a sense of duty ; the 
 scenes of Grenoble were repeated ; the soldiery of either 
 side gave Napoleon the same welcome; the authority of 
 the Bourbons, without a hostile effort, suddenly disap- 
 peared in the second city of France. The Emperor now 
 assumed the tone of a Sovereign. He issued a series of 
 decrees from Lyons, almost breathing the spirit of the 
 
 * This striking scene took place at Laffray, near La Mure.
 
 I 6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Convention of 1793 ; the monarchy, the noblesse, and 
 feudal rights were declared abolished ; the two Chambers 
 were summarily dissolved ; the Household troops were dis- 
 banded ; the white flag proscribed ; the dmigr^s ordered 
 to quit the territory of France.* The Emperor left Lyons 
 on March 13. He disposed of fully 14,000 armed men ; 
 his march through Burgundy into the Valley of the Yonne 
 was a succession of ever - increasing triumphs. One 
 notable defection from the Bourbons took place. Ney, 
 impetuous and unreflecting, had promised the King that 
 ' he would bring Bonaparte back in an iron cage.' He 
 remained loyal for several days, but the contagion of 
 events was too strong for him. ' He was swept away,' he 
 said, * by a sea which he could not stop with his hands.' 
 He assembled the few thousand troops he commanded, 
 told them * that the cause of the Bourbons was lost,' and 
 hastily joined his old master at Auxerre, his agitation 
 betraying the anguish that tortured his soul.t 
 
 From this time forward the advance of the Emperor 
 was like that of some mighty influence impossible to 
 resist. Nearly all the Eastern provinces had pronounced 
 for him ; town, village, and country sent their delighted 
 multitudes ; his army was clamouring for vengeance, and 
 breaking out into joy. The Emperor on his way had 
 skilfully aroused the passions and the sentiments which 
 swayed the people and the troops. The old phrases of 
 despotism were dropped ; he had come to vindicate the 
 rights of French citizens ; he would make short work of 
 disloyal nobles and priests ; he would establish his throne 
 on the national will ; he was the protector of the interests 
 the Revolution had made. To the army he appealed in 
 the magical language which he well knew would go to 
 
 * Only one of these decrees will be found in the Napoleon Corre- 
 spondence, xxviii. 7, 8. 
 
 t The disdain shown to Ney's wife at Court, especially by the 
 Duchesse d'Angoulcme, had also influence on him.
 
 FRANCE UNDER THE BOURDONS IN 1814-15 17 
 
 their hearts : * They had not been conquered, but had 
 been betrayed. Would the ^migr^s bear the sight of 
 their eagles ? Were they not the soldiers of Marengo, ol 
 Jena, and Austerlitz ?' For the rest, 'the Eagle and the 
 Tricolour would fly from steeple to steeple until they 
 appeared on the towers of Notre Dame.' 
 
 The falling Government attempted for a few days to 
 make head against this overwhelming movement. One 
 circumstance gave a moment of hope ; the conspiracy 
 planned by Fouche failed ; it ended in a petty demonstra- 
 tion which came to nothing. The bourgeoisie of Paris, 
 too, out of temper as they were, but feeling that the return 
 of Napoleon meant war with Europe, proclaimed their 
 loyalty to Louis XVIII. ; the Chambers, meeting in 
 solemn session, pledged themselves to resist the usurper 
 to the last. Renewed efforts were made to bring together 
 troops still believed to be loyal to the Bourbon throne ; 
 edicts were made to array a huge force of National Guards ; 
 Soult, suspected of treachery, was dismissed from his post ; 
 appeals were made to volunteers to * defend the country.' 
 All these efforts, however, were of no avail ; an army, 
 indeed, rather imposing on paper, was brought together 
 on the Seine to cover Paris, but the bourgeoisie, tongue 
 valiant as they were, did not venture to appear in arms ; 
 the National Guards proved of no use ; only a few hundred 
 volunteers took up arms ; authority had deserted the 
 perishing monarchy. 
 
 Meanwhile, Napoleon, his forces swelled by auxiliaries 
 of all kinds, had advanced rapidly into the valley of the 
 Seine ; every obstacle to his progress seemed to vanish, or 
 became a means to increase his power. On the night of 
 March ig, the King left the Tuileries accompanied only 
 by a few faithful servants ; the army on the Seine either 
 melted away or joined the ranks of the imperial army ; 
 the Household troops were soon the only armed force 
 that remained loyal to the sinking House of Bourbon. 
 
 2
 
 i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Louis XVIII. sadly made his way to Lille, and thence 
 took his departure for Ghent ; he was surrounded by a 
 petty Court of Emigres of his late Ministers, and of exiles 
 of the noblesse. Napoleon had in the meantime left 
 Fontainebleau and pushed on to the capital, finding simply 
 no one to oppose him on his path. Paris was left without 
 a Government on March 20, but the great functionaries of 
 the Empire had filled the Tuileries, and the Tricolour 
 floated on all public buildings. Night had closed before 
 a shouting cavalcade, lost in the flood of an exulting 
 populace, made its way into the court adjoining the palace ; 
 Napoleon was dragged out of his carriage by his enthusiastic 
 followers, and was almost stifled amidst their passionate 
 greetings. This, he afterwards said, was the happiest 
 hour of his life ; he had successfully performed the most 
 astonishing feat of his career.* 
 
 * This striking historical scene is admirably described by H. Hous- 
 saye, ' 181 5,' i. 361-363. See also Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de 
 TEmpire,' vi. 286, 289, 1862 edition. In the case of this, as of the 
 subsequent chapters, the principal authorities and sources of informa- 
 tion to which a reader may be referred will be found in the list at the 
 beginning of this book.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 
 
 The Empire quickly restored in France — The allies proclaim 
 Napoleon an outlaw — Europe again in arms against him — 
 Large parts of France fall away from the Emperor — His Govern- 
 ment necessarily weak — He could not, and would not, make him- 
 self a Jacobin dictator — His military preparations — Formation of 
 a field and an auxiliary army — His efforts astonishing, and worthy 
 of him, considering the difficulties in which he is placed — The 
 plans of the coalition for the war — Alternative plans of Napoleon 
 — He resolves to attack the northern column of the allies in 
 Belgium, while it is separated from the eastern column — Ruin 
 and fall of Murat — Rising in La Vendde disastrous to Napoleon 
 — The Acte Additionnel — The Champ de Mai — Napoleon leaves 
 Paris to join his army. 
 
 Napoleon having seized the helm of the State, after the 
 most audacious effort recorded, perhaps, in history, had 
 well-nigh formed his Government before the Tuileries had 
 ceased to shake with the acclaim which greeted his return. 
 With one notable exception, his Ministry was composed of 
 high-placed servitors of the former Empire, Cambaceres, 
 Caulaincourt, Davout, Savary, Gaudin, Mollien, and others; 
 but it was an ominous symptom that several of these men, 
 fearing the signs of the times, were disinclined to take 
 office. The stern Republican Carnot, however, who had 
 ' organised victory ' in the tremendous upheaval of 1793-94, 
 who had kept aloof from Napoleon in the day of his power, 
 but had rallied to his cause in the disasters of 1814, became 
 
 2 — 2
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Minister of the Interior ; he was to give valuable assistance 
 to his new master, but it was maliciously remarked that 
 he had to accept the title of Count, to don the imperial 
 trappings, and to shed off the slough of the Jacobin Com- 
 mittee of Public Safety. Fouch^, for many years almost 
 proscribed and disgraced by Napoleon, returned to the 
 post he had long held at the head of the police ; it was 
 a sign of the diseased and demoralised state of France, 
 and of the difficulties already in the Emperor's way, that 
 he was induced to make an appointment really against his 
 will. But Fouch6 had, a few days before, been arrested 
 by the order of the Bourbon Government ; his unquestion- 
 able ability could not be denied, and he had the credit of 
 having made himself the master-spirit of a secret con- 
 spiracy, pervading the chiefs of the army, to place 
 Napoleon again on the throne. This rumour, however, 
 was wholly untrue ; the heads of the army had had no 
 relations with him. Fouche had plotted, indeed, against 
 the Bourbons, but he had plotted in the interest of Marie 
 Louise and of the Duke of Orleans ; the plot, such as it 
 was, had, we have seen, failed. The triumph of Napoleon, 
 in fact, was due, not, as some writers have falsely supposed, 
 to a military conspiracy in any real sense : the Marshals 
 and chief officers, discontented as they were, dreaded the 
 return of their old master, and were faithful to the 
 Bourbons for a time. It was due to an enthusiastic 
 popular movement, backed by the soldiery almost to a 
 man, and the officers of inferior rank ; and it was as 
 unpremeditated and spontaneous as it was widespread. 
 Fouche at his post was to go on with the game of 
 tortuous intrigues, but on a larger and more ambitious 
 scale, which had been the business and pastime of his 
 life ; he was to justify Napoleon's contemptuous phrase, 
 ' That dog puts his dirty foot into every shoe which he 
 thinks will fit him.' 
 
 Within less than five weeks after March 20 the Empire
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 2r 
 
 was restored in all parts of France ; the Tricolour floated 
 from the shores of Brittany to the shores of Provence. 
 Few events, indeed, have been more surprising than the 
 sudden collapse of the government of the Bourbons in 
 every part of the country, however distant from the scenes 
 of Napoleon's march, and the speedy re-establishment of 
 the imperial power ; this recalled the days of Brumaire 
 and the Consulate. But the adherents of the Bourbons 
 and all classes opposed to the Empire were affrighted by 
 the astonishing revolution they beheld ; and France in 
 every age has been ready to bow to triumphant force. The 
 Household troops, when disbanded, fled to their homes, 
 tracked out, in many places, by peasants in wrath ; the 
 bourgeoisie accepted facts that seemed, for the time, ac- 
 complished ; the Liberals, numerous and really powerful as 
 they were, kept away from the capital, and made no real 
 effort to protest against the imperial regime until it had 
 prevailed everywhere. 
 
 Faint attempts, indeed, at armed resistance were made 
 in provinces still at heart loyal ; but they had soon sub- 
 sided and come to nothing. The Due de Bourbon tried 
 to arouse the population of La Vendee, but the peasantry 
 showed little of the enthusiasm of twenty years before ; 
 their chiefs, willing to wound, but afraid to strike, bade 
 them bide their time until aid from abroad should come. 
 The Duchesse d'Angouleme, * the one man of the family,' 
 Napoleon called her, made an earnest and really a noble 
 effort to retain the great city of Bordeaux for the King ; 
 but the soldiery of the garrison fell away : she was obliged 
 to take refuge under the British flag. Vitrolles, one of 
 the most active partisans of the Bourbons, endeavoured to 
 take possession of the tracts around Toulouse and to stir 
 up Royalist movement in the South ; but he was soon 
 a prisoner, and the rising instantly collapsed. The Due 
 d'Angouleme was more successful, for a few short days ; 
 he assembled bodies of volunteers in Languedoc and
 
 22 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Provence, provinces always hostile to Napoleon's rule ; 
 he assumed the command of two or three regiments given 
 him by Massena, and supposed to be still faithful. He 
 marched upon Lyons, two of his columns advancing into 
 Dauphind and Auvergne ; but he was discomfited in some 
 slight skirmishes ; nearly all the regular troops declared 
 for Napoleon ; he was surrounded as he fell back, and 
 compelled to surrender. This petty rising was the only 
 approach to civil war at the moment ; it afforded the one 
 instance in which a regiment obeyed the command of its 
 officers, and actually fired on the Tricolour ; and it gained 
 for Grouchy, the chief of an imperial detachment, the great 
 prize of the staff of a Marshal of France, with what results 
 was ere long to appear. Napoleon gave proof of extra- 
 ordinary clemency in these passages of arms ; he did not 
 take vengeance on one of the House of Bourbon ; he per- 
 mitted his prisoner, the Due d'Angouleme, to leave France. 
 Meanwhile, nearly all the military leaders, if some of these 
 were far from sincere, had again surrounded the imperial 
 throne ; they were lavish of professions, in several cases 
 mere lip-service. 
 
 But if the Empire had been easily restored in France, 
 it was threatened from abroad by appalling dangers. 
 Napoleon had hoped before he left Elba that the 
 Congress of Vienna would have been dissolved, and 
 this league of his enemies broken up; but this expecta- 
 tion had proved fruitless. He had scarcely landed in 
 France before he sent a message to the Emperor of 
 Austria giving a pledge of peace. He promised, after he 
 had regained the throne, that he would respect the treaties 
 of 1814, which had reduced France within greatly 
 narrowed limits. He wrote to the allied Sovereigns, 
 assuring them that his last thought was of war. In 
 these professions he was, doubtless, sincere ; but, re- 
 membering what his career had been, we cannot be sur- 
 prised that he was not believed, and history would not
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 23 
 
 have blamed the alhes had they taken the most stringent 
 precautions against him. 
 
 But they were carried away by passion or terror ; they 
 feared they might have to disgorge the spoils of Europe 
 which they had been dividing among themselves. Some 
 saw in imagination the conqueror of 1800 to 1809 bestriding 
 once more a subdued Continent ; their conduct must be 
 almost unreservedly condemned. Having already really 
 broken faith with Napoleon, they issued a furious pro- 
 clamation when he was on his way to Paris, denouncing 
 him as an outlaw and a public enemy ; he was a filibuster- 
 ing pirate who had no title to exist. At the same time 
 their Embassies were withdrawn from Paris ; the emis- 
 saries, avowed and secret, despatched by Napoleon to 
 attempt to negotiate were arrested ; his letters were not 
 answered, or were left unopened ; the Ruler of France, 
 and France herself, were placed under the ban of the 
 civilised world. Cruel insult was added to wrong that 
 cannot be justified. Marie Louise, weak and worthless, 
 was compelled to declare that she had no part in her 
 husband's fortunes ; the infant King of Rome was torn 
 from his French attendants, and taken to Vienna a captive 
 in all but the name, his mother having sold her son to 
 obtain an interest for life in Parma secured to her in full 
 possession by a solemn treaty.* Meanwhile, another 
 coalition against France was formed ; every Power in 
 Europe was invited to join it. England, as always, 
 promised enormous subsidies. Austria, Prussia, and 
 Russia were to take the field, each with an army not 
 less than 150,000 strong, if necessary to be indefinitely 
 increased ; and England was to make up in money for 
 any deficiency in her contingent of men. War to the 
 knife, deadly and universal, was to be waged against the 
 usurper, who had made France his own. The allies did 
 
 * For a description of this pathetic scene see Mendval, ' Mdmoires,' 
 ii. 325-327.
 
 24 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 not reflect, in their savage temper, how they had violated 
 the pledges they had made to him, and how terrible was 
 the contrast between their vindictive fury and the mag- 
 nanimity he had shown to Bourbons, whom he might 
 have made his victims. 
 
 While Europe was rising up in arms against Napoleon, 
 France had ceased to be enthusiastic in his cause ; large 
 parts of the nation were falling away from him. This 
 change of sentiment and opinion was partly due to the 
 fickleness of the French character, and partly, as had 
 happened in the case of the Bourbons, to the reaction 
 from illusions when found to be false ; but it is mainly to 
 be ascribed to more potent causes. Napoleon, in his 
 progress from Cannes to Paris, announced himself as an 
 apostle of peace ; his military career was for ever ended. 
 The multitudes which gave him welcome believed in his 
 words. This conviction spread far and wide through the 
 country. But the hopes of the nation were quickly dis- 
 pelled when the proclamation of the allies was circulated 
 far and near, when hosts of invaders were on their way 
 to the Rhine and the Scheldt, when it was evident that a 
 tremendous conflict was at hand. The peasantry and the 
 humbler classes felt themselves deceived. In the general 
 alarm coming war inspired they became intimidated, and 
 began to dread that the restored Empire would bring 
 with it the horrors of the past. The Liberals and the 
 bourgeoisie, too enlightened from the first not to perceive 
 that a frightful struggle was at hand, shared in and en- 
 couraged these sentiments ; and the Royalist party, still 
 with much influence, though for the moment unable to 
 rise, held up Napoleon to execration as the scourge of 
 France in countless publications artfully diffused. 
 
 Special causes, too, concurred to estrange from the 
 Emperor the classes which at first had given him their 
 hearts. The soldiery, indeed, and the officers of the lower 
 grades, remained devoted to their old chief. Their loyalty
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 25 
 
 to the death is the one noble feature which history recog- 
 nises in the France of 1815. But the Emperor had, we 
 have seen, in his triumphant march appealed to the 
 passions of angry masses, filled with hatred of the 
 Emigres, the noblesse, and most of the priesthood ; he 
 had declared himself the deliverer of the people from their 
 worst enemies. There was a general expectation, when 
 he had regained the throne, that he would take vengeance 
 on these orders of men. He was adjured in addresses, 
 speeches, and writings of all kinds to put down once for 
 all the adherents of the House of Bourbon, and to save 
 France and himself from traitorous factions dangerous to 
 both. But Napoleon, always at heart detesting popular 
 movements, had no notion, when he had become the head 
 of the State, to give a free rein to the vindictiveness he 
 saw around him. He would be ' the Ruler of France,' he 
 said, * not of a jacquerie.' He showed studious modera- 
 tion towards the very classes which, as an adventurer, he 
 had exposed to the odium of mobs. When, therefore, the 
 peasantry and the populace of the towns saw that the 
 emigres were left alone if they did not take part against 
 the Government, that the noblesse were neither pro- 
 scribed nor banished, that priests were not molested if 
 they did not preach sedition — that, in a word, they could 
 not wreak the vengeance on which they had set their 
 hearts — hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen who had 
 pronounced for the Empire became indifferent to it, or 
 even hostile. The circumstance that the men in office 
 were nearly all instruments of the old despotism increased 
 greatly these adverse sentiments. 
 
 A dictatorship, placed in the hands of Napoleon, was 
 obviously at this tremendous crisis the one hope for the 
 safety, perhaps the existence, of France, nor can history 
 doubt that the Roman people would have made this 
 choice in a trial of the kind, as it did when Hannibal was 
 within a few marches from Rome. But France, enervated
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 by revolution and years of war, split into hostile and 
 reckless factions, sick of a despotism which had proved 
 a curse to her, though she had long glorified and bowed 
 down to it, had no thought of making a dictator at this 
 time, still less of giving Napoleon power without control. 
 It might have been expected, however, that a nation 
 which had made Napoleon once more its chief, with full 
 knowledge of the almost inevitable results, would have 
 given him, for its own sake, loyal support — at least have 
 secured him a strong Government. But within a few 
 weeks after the Empire had been restored it had become 
 evident that France was a house divided against itself, 
 and that she would not even unite against the common 
 foreign enemy. The Royalists began to plot and intrigue, 
 and to some extent to paralyse the arm of the State ; the 
 great Liberal party, and the higher middle classes, dis- 
 liking and dreading Napoleon's return, and unfriendly to 
 the Empire from the first moment, had ceased to conceal 
 their aversion to it ; the nation, we have seen, was in 
 part lukewarm, in part was becoming almost hostile. 
 Treason, distrust, suspicion, even widespread ill-will, were 
 conspiring to impair Napoleon's hold on France. Under 
 these conditions his Government could not be strong. 
 ' Where,' he once bitterly remarked, * is the arm of the 
 old Emperor ?' 
 
 Peculiar circumstances, besides, increased the weakness 
 of the authority of the State at this conjuncture. The 
 feeling was almost universal in France that no attempt 
 should be made, in any event, to recur to the hated 
 despotism of the past ; that France must be under a con- 
 stitutional regime ; that the Emperor could only rule as 
 a constitutional Sovereign ; that the nation must have 
 political liberty, though the invasion of the hosts of 
 Europe was near the frontier. The men in office, and 
 even Napoleon himself, felt the influence of this over- 
 mastering sentiment. They hesitated to do acts and to
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 27 
 
 adopt a policy perhaps necessary to the pubHc weal at the 
 time ; they were unduly lenient to offenders against the 
 State; they spared in several instances in which they ought 
 perhaps to have struck. The Government was, therefore, 
 an essentially feeble Government, when it ought to have 
 possessed the greatest energy ; Napoleon was hampered 
 and thwarted, when he ought to have had a free hand. 
 Another circumstance worked in the same direction. The 
 provincial and local administration in France, so effective 
 when in the hands of men loyal to existing powers, was 
 largely composed of functionaries of the Bourbons ; and 
 these men did much to weaken and cross the central 
 Government, especially when they found that comparative 
 impunity followed their acts. 
 
 It has been said by well-informed and real thinkers — by 
 Benjamin Constant, Madame de Stael, and Jomini — that 
 had Napoleon, at this crisis of his fate, yielded to the 
 revengeful passions of the multitude in France, and 
 especially of the masses of peasants ; had he carried out 
 unflinchingly measures of proscription and blood, revived 
 the evil days of the Reign of Terror, and acted the part 
 of the Committee of Public Safety, he would have rallied 
 the nation in patriotic fervour to his cause, have made 
 every Frenchman a devoted soldier, and have triumphed 
 over the coalition of 1815, as the Convention had 
 triumphed in 1792-95.* This view, however, we believe 
 is wholly erroneous. It disregards the essential facts of 
 the time, and ignores elements of the situation of supreme 
 importance. Had Napoleon let loose the fury of the mob, 
 and hounded it on even against the emigres, nobles, and 
 priests — that is, ultimately, against social order and 
 property — he might have gained momentary and partial 
 success ; but he would have had Liberal France and 
 every other class against him ; he would have been 
 
 * See the list of authorities quoted at length in H. Houssaye, ' 181 5,' 
 i. 489, 490.
 
 28 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 repudiated by his own Government ; the Robespierre of 
 1815 would soon have found his Thcrmidor. Nor could 
 he certainly, without provoking civil war, and causing a 
 revolution of the most frightful kind, have made himself a 
 Jacobin tyrant of France. The attempt, in all probability, 
 would alone have led to his ruin. 
 
 But even if he could have succeeded in this desperate 
 policy, he could not have aroused the enthusiasm of 
 twenty years before, and united France in arms against 
 the foreign invader. The nation was hopelessly divided, 
 enfeebled, and exhausted by protracted wars ; the days 
 of the fourteen armies of the Republic had passed away 
 for ever ; the bright visions of 1789-92 had vanished ; 
 apathy, listlessness, and a desire for ease and peace had, 
 in the minds of hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen, 
 replaced the aspirations which had secured victory in 
 1793-94.* It is unnecessary, too, to remark how very 
 different was the feeble coalition of 1792-95, with its 
 Yorks, its Coburgs, and its Brunswicks at its head, from 
 the armed League of Europe in 181 5, directed by Generals, 
 some of a very high order. Napoleon could never have 
 had the time to make France ready for the field given the 
 Convention by the allies of that day. A dictatorship 
 really backed by the nation might perhaps have saved 
 France, but a Jacobin dictatorship would have been 
 fatal ; and, in fact, any dictatorship, especially that of 
 Napoleon, was simply out of the question. For the rest, 
 this kind of speculation is vain. Napoleon would never 
 have been a mere revolutionary chief; he would be the 
 Caesar of France, or nothing. Even at St. Helena he did 
 not regret that he had not staked his fortunes on a venture 
 hateful to his mind.t 
 
 ♦ This is well pointed out by Hooper, ' Waterloo,' 27, 1890 edition. 
 
 t His words recorded by Las Cases, ' Mdmoires,' vi. 93-95, are 
 significant : ' Une revolution est le plus grand des fleaux. Tous les 
 avantages qu'elle procure ne sauraient egaler le trouble dont elle 
 remplie la vie de ceux qui en sont les auteurs.'
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 29 
 
 France was thus largely forsaking Napoleon, while he 
 had been proclaimed the outlaw of Europe. Neverthe- 
 less, gravely as the allies were to be blamed, and what- 
 ever may be laid to the charge of Frenchmen, he had to 
 thank himself for much that he beheld around him. 
 Nemesis had commended the poisoned chalice to his 
 lips ; he was paying the penalty for the excesses of con- 
 quest, and of despotism unrestrained and above law. Yet 
 he was not wanting to himself in these terrible straits. 
 The efforts he made to restore the military power of 
 France, and to enable her to confront the hosts of 
 Europe, were in the circumstances wonderful, and 
 worthy of him. He did not, indeed, summon the nation 
 to arms, and the summons would in a great measure have 
 failed ; but, within the limits of the resources available to 
 him, he effected all, and more than all, that could be 
 expected from such a man. France, doubtless, at this 
 juncture contained elements of strength adapted to war, 
 of immense value, in veterans, prisoners of the late wars, 
 and trained officers ; but these were as yet dispersed and 
 unorganised ; time was required to fashion them into 
 armies able to take the field. 
 
 When Napoleon became head of the State in 1815, the 
 military force of France was not more than from 180,000 
 to 200,000 men, allowing for troops in depots and strong 
 places ; there were hardly 50,000 that could be employed 
 in active service. Of this force, the cavalry was little 
 more than 20,000 sabres ; the artillery only about 12,000 
 strong ; the infantry, as the least expensive arm, was out 
 of due proportion, the most numerous. The National 
 Guards only existed on paper ; they were no more than a 
 police for the protection of towns. The material of the 
 army was in a deplorable state ; there were only about 
 200,000 muskets in reserve, and nearly a third of these 
 were worn out ; and if there was a sufficient supply of 
 guns, there was a great lack of projectiles. The supple-
 
 30 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 mentary services, too, were out of joint and neglected. 
 The accoutrements of many regiments were in rags ; the 
 store of gunpowder, of clothing, of a hundred other things 
 of the kind, was lamentably deficient, even for a small 
 force. Metternich had said a short time before, with no 
 less truth than malice, that the army of the Bourbons was 
 the mere shadow of a name. 
 
 Napoleon probably did not believe* that the allies 
 would take heed of his pacific overtures ; he made pre- 
 parations from the outset for a conflict with Europe. 
 One of his first measures was to break up and recast the 
 organisation of the royal army. The regiments received 
 their former numbers ; their loved eagles were soon to be 
 restored to them ; the Imperial Guard was placed on its 
 old footing. Within a week after the reins were in his 
 hands, he arrayed and sent towards the frontier the 
 skeletons of eight corps d'armee — four in station between 
 Lille and Metz, one holding the tract around Soissons, 
 one covering Alsace and the borders of the Middle Rhine, 
 one observing the French Alps, the last the Pyrenees — 
 these bodies being the centres to which the troops who 
 were to raise them to their full force were to move. At 
 the same time, he left nothing undone to strengthen and 
 improve his trusted Guard ; and though this noble array 
 could not be what it once had been, the veteran Tenth 
 Legion of the Cassar of France, he composed it for the 
 most part of picked men, including some thousands of 
 choice volunteers, and he made it not unworthy of its old 
 renown. 
 
 Meanwhile he addressed himself, as early as the close 
 of March, though his orders were deferred for a time, for 
 he did not wish prematurely to alarm France, to gather- 
 ing together the materials of military power abounding in 
 the country, but not combined, which would make his 
 
 * See his remarkable conversation with Davout on the night of 
 March 20 : Thiers, vi. 294.
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 31 
 
 armies capable of appearing in strength in the field. Had 
 he had the authority of 1800 to 1812, he would doubtless 
 have summoned into the ranks all his old soldiers, have 
 compelled late prisoners of war to serve, have called out 
 the conscription of 1815, and even of 1816 ; nay, though 
 this is unlikely, he might have adjured the nation to rally 
 around him for the defence of France. All this, however, 
 had become out of the question. Napoleon felt that he 
 must act strictly within the law, for he well knew that his 
 power was jealously watched ; he could only make use 
 of the forces available under these conditions. These 
 were about 33,000 men on long leave, and about 85,000 
 who had deserted, but were of course liable to serve again. 
 This contingent, added to 180,000 or 200,000 under the 
 flag, would make up an army perhaps 260,000 strong — 
 making allowance for losses and absent men — 150,000 
 being probably all that could be opposed to an enemy in 
 the field. This obviously was a quite inadequate force. 
 There remained the resource of the National Guards, who 
 could be raised to very large numbers — Carnot actually 
 calculated to 2,000,000 ; of the conscription of 1815, 
 which might yield 120,000 men ; and of volunteers, 
 veterans, seamen, and foreign soldiers, who might be 
 induced to join the ranks. By these means a really 
 imposing force might be arrayed ; but it was uncertain to 
 what extent this could be forthcoming, and Napoleon 
 hesitated for some weeks to call the conscription out, for 
 it had been declared abolished by Louis XVIII. 
 
 The object of Napoleon was to increase and strengthen 
 the army intended to take the field, and to supplement it 
 by a great auxiliary army, which would enable the first to 
 cope with the enemy with a prospect of success, and would 
 be available for operations of a less active kind. Recol- 
 lecting his position, he achieved wonders. Within the 
 space of a little more than two months he had assembled 
 nearly 500,000 armed men, and within three more he
 
 32 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 would have assembled 800,000, an array which he said 
 * would have made the frontiers of the Empire a wall of 
 brass.' We may glance at the condition of the armed 
 strength of France as it existed in the first week of June, 
 1815. About 53,000 of the men on leave and of the 
 deserters had rejoined the colours ; some 23,000 were on 
 the march. The National Guards had furnished 150,000 
 men, all in the flower and vigour of life, to be employed 
 with the regular army ; some thousands of these had 
 entered the ranks, and proved themselves to be very good 
 soldiers. The veterans did not supply more than 25,000 
 men, the volunteers only 15,000 ; but several regiments 
 were drawn from Corsica ; and to these should be added 
 four or five regiments of foreign troops, for the most part 
 of excellent quality. Besides these forces there was an 
 immense array of National Guards, of worn-out soldiers, 
 of seamen from the fleets, gendarmes, partisans, even 
 Custom-house officers ; this was to support the regular 
 army, to strengthen or form the garrisons of strong places, 
 to undertake subordinate services of many kinds — in short, 
 to set the regular army free to act with all its power in 
 the field. The combined masses, taking the grand total, 
 were formed into a field army about 284,000 strong, some 
 198,000 men being under arms and present with their 
 corps, and into an auxiliary army of about 222,000 men, 
 which, we have said, was to sustain the regular army, and 
 to perform much of its ordinary work. These forces, we 
 repeat, would in a short time have been increased by 
 300,000 men, for Napoleon resolved at last to call the 
 conscription out, though he gave the levy a different name. 
 The young soldiers had proved themselves willing to join 
 the army, and 200,000 more National Guards could have 
 been collected. Napoleon's efforts, as affairs stood, had 
 been astonishing ; he had raised France out of a state of 
 impotence, and made her ready to undertake a great war.* 
 
 ♦ For the numbers of the field and auxiliary army of France in the 
 beginning of June, 181 5, see H. Houssaye, ' 181 5,' ii. 37. The able
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 33 
 
 France did not earnestly second, at first, the efforts of 
 Napoleon to increase her military power. The provinces 
 of the East, indeed, which had felt the effects of the 
 terrible invasion of 1814, sent from the outset their tale 
 of National Guards to the standards ; but the South, the 
 West, and large parts of the North held back. By degrees, 
 however, the martial spirit of the people awoke ; the 
 vindictive and insolent attitude of the allies provoked 
 resentment almost universally felt ; the publication of the 
 proclamation declaring Napoleon an outlaw, and of the 
 overtures he had made for peace, disseminated by the 
 Government far and wide, aroused multitudes of French- 
 men to take up arms. There were few signs of the exulting 
 fervour of 1792-93, or of the prodigious effort made in 1813 ; 
 but there was not the general despondency of 1814, and 
 France, divided and alarmed as she was, did enable 
 Napoleon to assemble the masses he had collected in 
 June, 1815. The large numbers of officers on half-pay 
 and of veteran officers to be found in the country gave 
 him the means of organising his levies with comparative 
 Success ; even the newly-formed regiments of National 
 Guards seem to have had capable men at their heads. 
 
 It was a gigantic task, however, to find the material 
 required to arm and prepare the bodies of men being 
 brought together ; this, indeed, proved to be in many 
 respects deficient. The supplies of small arms, we have 
 seen, were far from sufficient, but through extraordinary 
 exertions of many kinds about 370,000 muskets were 
 fabricated, repaired, or purchased ; these added to those 
 of the former royal army were nearly adequate — at least, 
 for the moment. Munitions of war and projectiles for 
 cannon were manufactured in large quantities, but spite 
 of every effort there was here a deficiency. The chief 
 
 and conscientious author has studied the subject with the greatest 
 care ; his figures do not widely differ from those of Thiers, and may 
 be accepted. The estimate of the partisan Charras is quite false. 
 
 3
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 difficulty, however, consisted in finding the means for 
 procuring clothing and uniforms for the National Guards, 
 and even the army. The Bourbon Government, we have 
 seen, had been culpably remiss in this matter ; few con- 
 tractors had received orders, and many had failed ; and 
 though Napoleon contrived to obtain funds for the purpose, 
 a most essential requirement could not be made good in 
 a few weeks. Some regiments of the regular army, and 
 even, it has been said, of the Imperial Guard, were not 
 properly accoutred when hostilities began ;* and more 
 than half the National Guards were without the uniform, 
 which alone would entitle them to rank as soldiers. The 
 forces, therefore, arrayed by Napoleon — apart from the 
 defects inherent in hasty organisations of the kind — were 
 to a great extent ill prepared for the severest trials of war ; 
 but they were formidable in numbers, and a large part of 
 them possessed military qualities of a high order. 
 
 The field army, about 198,000 strong, was composed 
 almost wholly of regular troops, especially along the 
 frontier of the North. The Imperial Guard was the best 
 part of this fine force ; it had been raised, by extraordinary 
 exertions, to 28,000 men. The cavalry, too, had been 
 increased to 40,000 sabres, the artillery to nearly 17,000 
 men ; these two arms were well supplied with horses, 
 which had been obtained by requisitions, purchases, and 
 dismounting the gendarmerie. As to the distribution of 
 the field army, the eight original corps d'armee had been 
 left in their stations — that is, four along the borders of 
 Belgium, one on the Aisne, two in the East, and one 
 on the Pyrenees ; but the numbers of these had been 
 largely increased, especially of the four corps in the North. 
 To these, however, should be added four new corps, one 
 observing the defiles of the Jura, another Provence and 
 the line of the Var, a third watching the region of La 
 
 * Part of the Imperial Guard had not its full uniform at Ligny : 
 H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 180.
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 35 
 
 Vendue, a fourth the Western Pyrenees and the adjoining 
 country ;* and the great array of the Imperial Guard was, 
 for the most part, assembled in and around Paris. 
 
 But, besides the field army. Napoleon had to provide 
 for the security of the triple barrier of the fortresses of 
 France. These had suffered little from the invasion of 
 1814, but in some instances they were strengthened and 
 improved. They were supplied with sufficient stores of 
 provisions ; they were given garrisons mainly composed 
 of National Guards and veterans, but with a small admix- 
 ture of regular soldiers. The value of the arrangements 
 of the Emperor was here distinctly seen. These strong 
 places were held by forces able to defend ramparts, but 
 were not permitted to absorb the real army ; this was for 
 the most part left free to encounter the enemy in the 
 field. Napoleon, too, especially addressed himself to the 
 defence of Lyons, at this time almost an open town. 
 Redoubts were constructed, and armed lines made ; the 
 passages of the Rhone were fortified ; a large body of 
 National Guards was thrown into the place. His chief 
 attention, however, in this province was given to shielding 
 Paris from attack. The city had been unprotected since 
 the day of Louis XIV., though Vauban had wished to 
 surround it with walls ; and this had been Napoleon's 
 intention likewise, if he had never had time to carry it 
 into effect. He remembered that had the capital held 
 out, even for a few days, in 18 14, he might have compelled 
 the allies to withdraw from it, perhaps have placed them 
 in the gravest straits. He resolved to fortify it as far as 
 was now possible. t Paris was placed, to some extent, in 
 a state of defence along the northern bank of the Seine ; 
 
 * It will be remarked that three, at least, of these corps were 
 employed in observing the far from obedient southern and western 
 provinces. All the subsidiary corps were weak. 
 
 t For the admirable remarks of Napoleon on the defence of Paris, 
 see 'Comment.,' v. 104-108, 1867 edition. 
 
 3—2
 
 36 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 but the work was begun late, not to alarm the citizens. 
 By June little had been done along the southern bank. 
 The garrison was formed partly of regular troops, partly 
 of nearly 40,000 National Guards, and partly of irregular 
 levies, these last, however, being not yet armed, if it was 
 ever really meant to give them arms. It remains to add 
 that the immense expenditure required for all these pre- 
 parations for war was defrayed either from funds left by 
 the Bourbon Government — the administration of its 
 finances, we have said, had been good — or from taxation, 
 loans, and other fiscal devices. 
 
 The allies, meanwhile, had been making gigantic exer- 
 tions to overwhelm Napoleon and to invade France. 
 Their armies had been on their way homewards when 
 the intelligence arrived of the escape from Elba. Part of 
 the forces of England were across the Atlantic ; the hosts 
 of Germany were spread from the Danube to the Oder ; 
 the Russian hordes had approached the Vistula. But the 
 decision for war was no sooner taken than immense efforts 
 were made to combine these masses, and to direct them 
 as speedily as possible against the common enemy. Peace 
 with America set thousands of British soldiers free. Wel- 
 lington had reached Brussels in the first days of April, 
 and was soon in command of a considerable force ; his 
 colleague, Blucher, was ere long on his way from the 
 Rhine with a Prussian army ; large bodies of troops, in- 
 creasing in numbers, were assembled in the Low Countries 
 between the Lys and the Meuse. 
 
 The more distant armies were, meantime, advancing. 
 By the first days of June, from 600,000 to 750,000 men 
 were brought together to avenge Europe on France and 
 her ruler. Wellington and Blucher were now at the 
 head of 220,000 men, Barclay de Tolly of about 150,000 
 Russians, Schwartzenberg of some 250,000 Austrians and 
 Germans of the Lesser States, and an Austrian and Sar- 
 dinian force, perhaps 80,000 or 100,000 strong, was being
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 37 
 
 directed from Italy upon Dauphine and Provence. It 
 deserves notice that Wellington desired to take the offen- 
 sive as quickly as possible. As early as April he proposed 
 to invade France with 300,000 men,* who could be on 
 the frontier in a few weeks ; but the other chiefs of the 
 coalition, if we except Blucher, recollecting the events of 
 1813-14, rejected the bold counsels of the English com- 
 mander, the only one of the allied Generals who had not 
 felt the terrible strokes of Napoleon, and resolved to 
 advance only when apparently irresistible strength pro- 
 mised to render decisive success certain. Their plan was 
 to march into France with four great armies, extending 
 from the edge of the Channel to the Mediterranean ; 
 these, which may be broadly described as the columns of 
 the North and the East, were to converge on Paris, and 
 in much lesser force on Lyons, the march beginning 
 about July i ; and as they would be three or four fold 
 superior in numbers to any army which Napoleon could 
 place in the field, scarcely a doubt seemed possible but 
 that he would be overwhelmed and crushed. t But even 
 this enormous array of force was to be seconded by other 
 means. La Vendee was incited to rise against the 
 Emperor, and Metternich set on foot an intrigue with 
 Fouche in order to increase the divisions of France, an 
 intrigue, however, which had no immediate results, save 
 to irritate Napoleon against his false-hearted Minister. 
 
 Two plans of operations offered themselves to Napoleon, 
 confronted as he was by the armed hosts of Europe. 
 Assuming that some 600,000 men would invade France 
 between the Belgian and the Swiss frontiers, 150,000 
 
 * The Wellington Despatches, xii. 295 ei seq,, 304 et seq. 
 
 t For the numbers of the forces of the coalition, Alison, ' History 
 of Europe,' xii. 207, 1854 edition, followed by Siborne and Hooper, 
 may be compared with Thiers, 'Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' 
 vi. 333; with Charras, ' Campagne de 1815,' i. 14, 1858 edition; 
 with Napoleon, 'Comment.,' v. 115, 116, 1867 edition; and with 
 H. Houssaye, ' 1815,' ii. 91-94.
 
 38 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 would be required to mask the French fortresses ; 450,000 
 only, therefore, could appear before Paris, and they could 
 not reach the capital before the end of July. If Napoleon 
 chose to act on the defensive, and to await the enemy 
 outside the city, he would have an army by this time 
 more than 200,000 strong ; Paris would be armed with at 
 least 600 cannon, and w^ould possess a garrison of about 
 70,000 men behind completed works of considerable 
 strength. The conditions, therefore, of the contest 
 would be much better than they were in the campaign 
 of 1814 ; and if we bear in mind what the Emperor 
 achieved in that magnificent passage of arms, he cer- 
 tainly would have had many chances of success. In the 
 same way, if 100,000 more men were to cross the south- 
 eastern borders of France, not more than 60,000 or 70,000 
 could reach Lyons. Suchet, the one fortunate French 
 General in Spain, would command around the city and 
 its fortified lines at the head of 30,000 or 40,000 men ; it 
 might be reasonably expected that he could hold the 
 enemy in check. This plan, therefore, was not without 
 real promise. Excellent judges have thought it much 
 the best ; but in the circumstances in which France was 
 placed, divided and disheartened, torn by faction, there 
 were objections insuperable, perhaps, to it. The nation, 
 in a word, would not endure a repetition of the scenes of 
 1814. 
 
 Another plan presented itself, no doubt daring in the 
 extreme and perilous, but in conformity with the true 
 principles of war, and exactly the same in conception as 
 those which led to the operations of 1800 and 1805, and 
 had as their results Marengo and Ulm and Austerlitz. 
 The allies, we have seen, were divided into two great 
 masses, separated from each other by immense distances ; 
 the column of the North was in Belgium in June, the 
 column of the East approaching the Rhine, the French 
 Alps, and the Var. It might be possible, therefore, to
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 39 
 
 make a sudden spring on the most isolated part of the 
 huge front of invasion — the two armies of Blucher and 
 Wellington — to attack, separate, and beat these in detail ; 
 and though they were 220,000 strong, their position, we 
 shall see, made them dangerously exposed to defeat even 
 by a largely inferior force. Napoleon resolved to adopt 
 this project. He calculated that he could have 150,000 
 men in hand to advance into Belgium by the middle of 
 June, and subsequent events show that had he possessed 
 this force, in all probability he would have emerged vic- 
 torious from the strife. Having overcome the column 
 of the North, the Emperor would march against the 
 eastern column and encounter it on the Rhine and the 
 Moselle.* 
 
 Two events at this juncture threw a grievous weight 
 into the scales of fortune against the Emperor. Napoleon 
 had been reconciled with Murat, who had abandoned his 
 benefactor in 1814 ; he had entreated his brother-in-law, 
 when he was leaving Elba, to assure the Austrian Govern- 
 ment of his pacific intentions ; and at the same time he 
 advised Murat, if necessary, to prepare himself for war, 
 but in no event prematurely to march into Northern 
 Italy. The triumphant progress of Napoleon through 
 France, however, turned the head of the ill-fated King 
 of Naples ; from whatever motives he advanced to the Po, 
 at the head of about 50,000 men, an ambiguous letter of 
 Joseph Bonaparte seemed to approve of the movement. 
 He made a bold effort to cross the great river, and to 
 carry the war into the Austrian Italian States. The 
 invasion was, without difficulty, repelled. An Austrian 
 army, in superior force, had soon compelled Murat hastily 
 to retreat. After a fruitless display of his characteristic 
 valour, he was routed, near Tolentino, in a decisive battle. 
 The King escaped in disguise from his enemies ; he 
 
 * The best account of Napoleon's celebrated plans of operations in 
 1815 will be found in ' Comment.,' v. 114, 118, 1867 edition.^
 
 40 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 landed a helpless fugitive in Provence. He vainly entreated 
 Napoleon, justly incensed, to give him a command in the 
 French army. The only result of his insensate venture was 
 to deprive France of an ally who might have been of use 
 had he conducted himself with the simplest prudence, 
 and to set free a large Austrian force to take part in the 
 crusade against the Emperor. 
 
 The other event was even more disastrous in view of 
 the operations in Belgium planned by Napoleon. The 
 allies, we have seen, had designed a rising in La Vendee 
 against the Ruler of France ; this proved to a certain 
 extent successful, though the peasantry had apparently 
 been quiescent for some weeks. Their chiefs, however, 
 having received some help from England, and promises 
 of aid on a much greater scale, were able to stir up a 
 considerable population to revolt. The movement seemed 
 for a time to threaten civil war. Napoleon felt it neces- 
 sary to send a powerful detachment to support his corps 
 in the West, and to keep La Vendee down. The rising 
 had before long collapsed, mainly perhaps owing to the 
 machinations of Fouche, who contrived to persuade the 
 Royalist leaders that it was useless for them to shed their 
 blood in a quarrel soon to be decided elsewhere. In this 
 way he seemed to serve Napoleon and the Bourbons 
 alike, for he was perfectly ready to assist and to deceive 
 both, and, whatever the event, to hedge with Fortune. 
 La Vendee was in a few weeks at peace, but in the mean- 
 time from 15,000 to 20,000 excellent troops, including two 
 regiments of the Imperial Guard, had been prevented 
 from joining the French army on the Belgian frontier.* 
 
 * Napoleon, 'Comment.,' v. 119, 1867 edition, makes the number 
 20,000 men, and is followed by Alison, ' History of Europe,' xii. 217, 
 and by Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 200. H. Hous- 
 saye, ' 18 15,' seems to make the figures less ; but the detachment sent 
 to the Army of the West is perhaps not included. The immense im- 
 portance of this diversion in favour of the allies is hardly noticed by 
 most English commentators. Napoleon properly describes it as 
 ' un dvdnement bien funeste.'
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 41 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon had been addressing himself to an 
 attempt to reconcile Liberal France to his rule, and to 
 gain the loyal support of the great mass of the nation, 
 for some weeks partly estranged from him. In the 
 decrees he had issued from Lyons he had pledged him- 
 self to a reform of the institutions of France, and to 
 assemble the electorate from all parts of the country, in 
 a solemn convention to be held in Paris, in order to assist 
 him in this great work, and to witness — a vain hope — the 
 coronation of Marie Louise.* He felt that he must 
 redeem this pledge. The Liberals, a powerful and the 
 most energetic party in the State, which regarded the 
 Empire with alarm and dislike, would otherwise remain 
 a real danger to his throne ; the great body of the people 
 would have cause for complaint ; and, besides. Napoleon 
 knew that he must establish a regime as constitutional, 
 at least, as that formed by the Charter, and was desirous 
 to prove to Europe that he was not a mere despot, the 
 author of a revolution of sheer military force, accomplished 
 against the will of the people, a reproach common in the 
 mouths of the Royalists and the allies. 
 
 He adopted a course which had the semblance, at least, 
 of conspicuous frankness and an honest purpose ; he 
 summoned Benjamin Constant, one of the heads of the 
 Liberal party, supposed to be the constitutional Sieyes 
 of the day, and a bitter enemy of Napoleon up to this 
 moment ; and he entrusted him with the task of framing 
 a new Constitution for France, on a broad and even a 
 popular basis. Benjamin Constant found the Emperor 
 generally willing to accept his views ; he applied himself 
 sincerely to his work, and in a short time he had sketched 
 out a series of institutions for France, certainly more 
 liberal than those of the Charter, and securing, on paper 
 at least, a large measure of social and political liberty. 
 The freedom of the press, before withheld, was conceded 
 
 * ' Correspondence,' xxviii. 7, 8.
 
 42 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 almost without restriction ; the freedom of worship, a gift 
 of the Concordat, indeed, but lately threatened by the 
 Bourbon Government, was declared the heritage of every 
 Frenchman ; the electorate was increased sixfold ; the 
 special tribunals which had been the disgrace of French 
 justice for ages were abolished wellnigh without excep- 
 tion ; the scope of trial by jury was largely extended. 
 The Constitution, in its strictly political aspect, was 
 fashioned, in the main, on the model of that of England. 
 There was to be a House of Hereditary Peers and a House 
 of Deputies ; the responsibility of Ministers was assured by 
 law ; the right of taxation and of raising troops — in short, 
 the power of the purse, and nearly that of the sword — was 
 confined to the Legislature, and the Legislature alone.* 
 
 For three reasons, however, the new polity, contemptu- 
 ously called ' La Benjamine,' found little favour in the 
 sight of the greater part of the nation. The Liberals, 
 and even the electorate, looked forward to a Constituent 
 Assembly like that of 1789, charged to make the Constitu- 
 tion itself; they resented that this had been the work of 
 Napoleon and a subordinate. The name, too, of Acte 
 Additionnel given to the Constitution, liberal as it was, 
 savoured too much of the Actes of the Empire ; it was 
 generally thought that the Constitution was a mere piece 
 of the furniture of the old despotism furbished up and 
 given an attractive look. The prevalent distrust of 
 Napoleon was here distinctly seen ; but Napoleon had 
 insisted upon the title : he would no more forego the rights 
 he had gained by genius and his sword than Louis XVHL 
 would abandon his right Divine. The hereditary peerage 
 was also regarded with dislike, and the Executive Govern- 
 ment — that is, the Emperor — retained the power of confis- 
 
 * See a copy of the Acte Additionnel, Napoleon Correspondence, 
 xxviii. 122, 129; and the admirable analysis of H. Houssaye, '1815,' 
 i. 542, 543. See also Thiers, 'Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' 
 vi. 353-356, 1862 edition.
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 43 
 
 cation in his hands, which, with other Sovereigns of France, 
 he had often abused. The Constitution therefore was 
 from the first unpopular ; * opinion,' Napoleon acknow- 
 ledged, ' had turned against it ' ; and when it was put to 
 the vote for acceptance, the votes for it were little more 
 than a third of the votes for the Consulate and for the 
 Empire in 1804. 
 
 The Emperor, on the advice of Benjamin Constant, 
 backed by Lafayette and other chiefs of the Liberals, was 
 induced to bring the Constitution into being at once, and 
 to summon the Chambers without delay, though this 
 was against his real wishes. He dreaded, and rightly 
 dreaded, what such assemblies, newly formed, and with- 
 out experience in affairs of State, might do in the presence 
 of the coalition and its hosts. The Chambers, however, 
 were quickly convened ; they represented to a consider- 
 able extent, at least, the feelings uppermost in the middle 
 and lower middle classes, if not in the army and the 
 mass of the peasantry. In the House of Deputies, com- 
 posed of more than 600 members, little more than eighty 
 were friends of Napoleon at heart ; there were thirty or 
 forty of a revolutionary type ; the immense majority were 
 Liberals inspired with the new ideas. As to the House 
 of Peers, it was, for the most part, formed of ennobled 
 functionaries of the Empire, and of a few members of the 
 old noblesse ; but it was also pervaded by the prevailing 
 sentiment ; it was jealous of its own rights and of consti- 
 tutional freedom ; it was completely different from the 
 late servile Senate. The spirit of both assemblies was 
 very much the same : both were averse to the Bourbons 
 and the fallen Government ; both really wished to sup- 
 port Napoleon, while victorious at least, and to continue 
 the war until an honourable peace was made ; both were 
 loud in eager professions of loyalty. But both betrayed 
 symptoms of the profound distrust which at this juncture 
 Napoleon inspired ; both were not fully alive to the perils
 
 44 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 of a tremendous crisis. The Chamber of Deputies echoed 
 with babble about reforms in the law when the hostile 
 League of Europe was upon the frontier. Napoleon 
 censured this unreflecting and unwise attitude in charac- 
 teristically grave and dignified language ; but his remarks 
 gave offence and provoked ill-will ; the rift in the lute was 
 even now manifest. 
 
 The Emperor had abandoned the project of summoning 
 the electorate to Paris,* announced at Lyons ; but he had 
 resolved to inaugurate the Empire of the Acte Additionnel 
 by an imposing ceremony within the capital. This cele- 
 brated pageant was held on June i ; the Champ de Mai, 
 as it was called, was remembered for years as the farewell 
 of Napoleon to the French people. A vast structure was 
 erected by the Ecole Militaire ; a throne and an altar 
 were placed in the midst ; on either side spread an amphi- 
 theatre filled with the Court, with the great bodies of the 
 State, with the magistracy, newly-elected deputies, and 
 representatives of the electorate ; beyond, in rank upon 
 rank, were the long lines of 50,000 men of the army and 
 the National Guards ; in the near distance was an immense 
 assemblage crowding the Champ de Mars. The ceremony 
 was opened by a solemn Mass, for Napoleon, as was his 
 wont, felt the power of religious effect. The Emperor 
 received a loyal address from the deputies of the elec- 
 torate, who had recorded their votes ; then, rising from 
 the throne, he made a characteristic answer, identifying 
 the rights and interests of France with his own, and 
 calling on Frenchmen to unite and to second his efforts. 
 
 As the ceremony proceeded. Napoleon took an oath to 
 observe the Constitution lately established. It closed with 
 a really heart-stirring sight : the Emperor, amidst the 
 thunder of cannon, the deafening cheers of the armed 
 masses on the spot, and the acclamations of the great 
 
 * The electorate under the Charter of Louis XVIII. comprised 
 only some 30,000 men.
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS UNTIL HOSTILITIES BEGIN 45 
 
 audience, presented eagles to the soldiery and the National 
 Guards, and adjured them to defend these sacred emblems 
 to the death. This feature of the scene was grand and 
 noble, for it corresponded with the facts and the feelings 
 of the hour. But there were other features of a different 
 kind. The imperial mantle on Napoleon seemed out of 
 place ; it was a sign of despotism and of lost conquests ; 
 he would have appeared more becomingly in the garb of a 
 soldier. His family of discrowned Kings and Princes 
 sitting by his side was also unwelcome ; the absence of 
 Marie Louise and the young King of Rome was significant 
 of the conflict with Europe at hand. Fouche, too, like a 
 bird of evil omen hovered about ; he poured base and evil 
 counsels into many ears ; the Emperor should abdicate, 
 and make a noble self-sacrifice ; the coalition would 
 accept a constitutional France under Marie Louise or the 
 Duke of Orleans. But the most sinister symptom of all, 
 perhaps, was seen in the attitude of the soldiery and the 
 Imperial Guard : they had the look of men nerved to fight 
 to the death ; but care and anxiety sat on their faces ; 
 they were the * Ave, Cassar, morituri !' as they defiled 
 before their chief. 
 
 Within a few days Napoleon's arrangements were com- 
 plete for his venturous spring against the allies in Belgium. 
 The four corps stationed along this frontier had been 
 gradually brought near each other ; the corps around 
 Soissons and the Imperial Guard were on the march to 
 effect their junction with these; the combined masses 
 were being directed against the point deemed by their 
 great leader the most favourable for his attack. Napoleon 
 left the capital at daybreak on June 12. He let drop the 
 words, ' I am going to rub myself against Wellington.' 
 He had abandoned for the moment the torturing cares of 
 State ; something of the confidence and high spirit of the 
 past had revived as he saw himself within reach of his true 
 empire, the camp. He had not lost all faith in his genius
 
 46 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 and his sword ; but the perils of the situation were fully 
 before his mind, and the burden of these was almost 
 unbearable. He was about to struggle against a world in 
 arms ; the Generals and the army of 1815 were not the 
 Generals and the army of the days of victory ; he was 
 leaving a divided and a revolutionary France behind him. 
 Nor was he himself the man he had been : his physical 
 strength had been long in decline ; he was subjected to 
 diseases occasionally giving severe pain, and making him 
 almost prostrate for hours. And though his intellect 
 retained its splendour and force, his energy and moral 
 power had been impaired. Years of defeat and disaster 
 had told on Napoleon ; the prodigious and disheartening 
 toil of the last few months — above all, his consciousness of 
 the appalling dangers around him — had weakened the 
 faculties most required in the terrible stress of war.* He 
 might have exclaimed, like Richard before Bosworth : 
 
 ' I have not that alacrity of spirit 
 And cheer of heart that I was wont to have ;' 
 
 and he has told us himself that he had sad forebodings, 
 and ' an instinct of failure,' in the contest before him.-f* 
 Genius, all the more thoroughly because it was genius, 
 knew that it was battling with supreme fact ; Prometheus 
 had defied the rule of Zeus ; the Titan already felt the 
 approach of Force. 
 
 * For an account of the state of Napoleon's health at this time, see 
 the striking narrative of H. Houssaye, ' 1815,' i. 614, and the remark- 
 able description of the Emperor's worn, unnerved, and almost woe- 
 begone aspect in the 'Memoirs of General Thicbault,' v. 341, 342. 
 We shall recur to this subject in considering the operations of the 
 campaign. 
 
 t ' Je n'avais plus en moi le sentiment du success definitif. Ce 
 n'dtait plus ma confiance premiere. Je sentais la fortune m'aban- 
 donner. . . . J'avais I'instinct d'une issue malheureuse.' — Las Cases, 
 vii. 179-183.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON — THE BELLIGERENT 
 ARMIES AND THEIR LEADERS 
 
 Sketch of the theatre of war in Belgium — The positions of the armies 
 of WelHngton and Blucher — The arrangements of the alhed 
 chiefs to resist attack defective — The true reason of this — 
 Napoleon resolves to attack the allied centre — Reasons for this 
 project — His forces considerably less than he had expected — Con- 
 centration of the French army on the verge of Belgium — Admir- 
 able skill shown in effecting this operation — Positions of the 
 French army on June 14, 1815 — Numbers and characteristics of 
 the French and the allied armies — Napoleon, Wellington, Blucher, 
 and their lieutenants. 
 
 It is necessary to have a distinct idea of the theatre of 
 war, and of the positions of the hostile armies upon it, in 
 order to understand the great contest of 1815, and the 
 operations that led to the final issue. Belgium, nearly 
 identical with the old Spanish Netherlands, is in its main 
 features a land of plains, here and there broken by short 
 ranges of hills, intersected by large and numerous streams, 
 dotted over with ancient and flourishing towns, and rich 
 with manufacturing and agricultural wealth. On its 
 southern borders, enlarged since 1815, it meets the northern 
 frontier of France, which, mainly owing to the exploits 
 of Turenne, had been extended from Picardy over Bur- 
 gundian Artois, and over parts of Spanish Flanders and 
 Hainault, and which forms its boundary from the North
 
 48 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Sea to the verge of Lorraine. The whole tract is divided 
 by a series of rivers, forming in most instances military 
 lines, the Lys, the Scheldt, the Dender, the Senne, the 
 Dylc, and others, i^owing from the South northwards ; 
 but the Sambre, joining the Meuse at Namur, their united 
 waters reaching the mouths of the Rhine, runs, with the 
 Meuse, in a general way, from the south eastwards, and 
 makes a defensive barrier in that direction. 
 
 The territory of Belgium, notably to the west and the 
 south-west, is protected by a succession of strong places, 
 rising, nearly all, along the watercourses they guard — 
 Courtray, Tournay, Oudenarde, Ath, Mons, and several 
 others ; along this region they confront the French 
 fortresses of Lille, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Avesnes, and 
 three or four more constructed to cover the borders of 
 France to the north. To the south and east the fortresses 
 are less numerous ; but Charleroy,* Namur, Huy, Liege, 
 and Maastricht — the last a place belonging to the Dutch — 
 extend along the course of the Sambre or of the two 
 rivers, and increase the natural defensive strength of parts 
 of this district. In 1815, as at the present time, several 
 main roads led from France into Belgium, especially to 
 the west and the south-west : one from Lille, along the 
 valley of the Lys to Ghent ; three from Lille, Valenciennes, 
 and Maubeuge, along the valleys of the Dender or the 
 Senne, and by the fortresses on these lines to Brussels. 
 To the east there were only two principal roads, one by 
 Givet down the valley of the Meuse, the other far to the 
 right by Sedan to Liege; but neither of these was of much 
 importance, or easily available for the march of large 
 armies. Due south, however, a great main road extended 
 from Charleroy to Brussels — that is, ran nearly through 
 the midst of Belgium ; but in 1815 it was not connected 
 with any main road leading from Charleroy to the French 
 frontier ; the communications were here by roads of an 
 * Charleroy in 181 5 was almost an open town.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 49 
 
 inferior kind.* Excellent lateral roads ran along the 
 borders of France and Belgium, uniting the fortresses on 
 either side, and facilitating the march, by these, of masses 
 of troops. 
 
 The two armies of Wellington and Blucher, some 
 220,000 strong, we have said, and forming, as we have 
 called it, the northern column of the huge invasion, were 
 disseminated, in June, 1815, over nearly three-fourths of 
 the territory we have described, and were spread on a 
 front of about a hundred miles in breadth, from near 
 Ghent, on the west, to Liege, eastwards, and of from 
 thirty to forty miles in depth, from Brussels near to the 
 fortresses on the French frontier. The forces of Welling- 
 ton held the right and the right centre of this great space, 
 those of Blucher the left centre and the left ; the middle 
 distance was certainly the least carefully guarded. The 
 army of the Duke was divided into three corps d'armee, the 
 2nd under the command of the skilful Hill, the ist under 
 that of the young Prince of Orange, the 3rd, or the 
 reserve, under that of Wellington himself, assisted by 
 some of his best lieutenants. The 2nd corps, Wellington's 
 right and right centre, was rather more than 27,000 
 strong ; it was encamped in the valleys of the Scheldt and 
 the Dender, a few detachments being in the valley of the 
 Lys ; it was covered by the fortresses along this front — 
 Tournay, Ath, Oudenarde, Lens, Leuze, and one or two 
 others ; it observed the main roads, leading from the west 
 and the south-west by Lille and Valenciennes, across the 
 Belgian frontier. The ist corps, Wellington's left centre 
 and left, was composed of nearly 32,000 men ; it lay, to a 
 large extent, in the valley of the Senne, holding Braine 
 le Comte, Soignies, Enghien, Nivelles, and other places ; 
 it had a small detachment on the main road from Charle- 
 roy to Brussels, to which we have before referred ; it had 
 the great fortress of Mons in its front ; and, similarly to 
 
 * This is important, and should be carefully kept in mind. 
 
 4
 
 50 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the 2nd corps, it watched the main roads running from 
 Valenciennes and Maubeuge to Brussels. The 3rd corps, 
 otherwise the reserve, about 23,000 strong, was for the 
 most part in cantonments around Brussels ; it was some- 
 what in the rear of the corps it supported, but its advanced 
 divisions approached both of these ; and it was aggregated 
 in or near the Belgian capital, to the possession of which 
 Wellington attached the greatest importance. Besides 
 these forces there was a large corps of cavalry, com- 
 manded by Uxbridge, and about 10,500 sabres ; this was 
 mainly in the valley of the Dender, with the 2nd corps ; 
 but detachments were in the valley of the Lys, to the 
 extreme right. 
 
 As for the army of Blucher, it comprised four corps 
 d'armee, the ist corps with Zieten as its chief, the 2nd 
 and 3rd under Pirch and Thielmann, the 4th led by the 
 experienced Bulow. As we have said, it formed the left 
 centre and the left of the two allied armies. The ist 
 corps, Blucher's right wing, more than 32,000 men, ex- 
 tended almost along the course of the Sambre — that is, 
 not far from the French frontier, from Marchiennes by 
 Charleroy, towards Fleurus. It came nearly in contact 
 with part of Wellington's left near Fontaine I'Eveque, 
 and other places to the west of the main road from 
 Charleroy to Brussels. Zieten's corps, and a portion of 
 that of the Prince of Orange, thus formed the centre of 
 the allies, but did not occupy this front at any point in 
 force. The 2nd corps, to the east of the ist of Blucher, 
 was also more than 32,000 strong. This, too, was placed 
 along the Sambre, and thence to the Meuse, but further 
 from France, from Namur to Huy ; and it had detach- 
 ments extending to Hottomont and Hannut. The 3rd 
 corps was considerably to the south of the 2nd ; it 
 numbered some 24,500 men. It was encamped, for the 
 most part, around Ciney and Dinant, observing the road 
 leading from Givet along the Meuse, and ending at the
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 51 
 
 great stronghold of Namur. The 4th corps, rather more 
 than 31,000 strong, formed the left wing of the army of 
 Blucher ; it was in cantonments northwards around Li6ge. 
 It was separated by a wide distance from the three other 
 corps. 
 
 This far-spreading dispersion of the allied armies might 
 obviously expose them, if assailed, to really grave dangers. 
 Four or five days or more were required to enable them 
 to concentrate on their right or their left, two at least to 
 concentrate upon their centre. They were thus liable to 
 perilous attack on the part of an enemy of resource and 
 skill, and the excuse that it was necessary widely to 
 scatter the troops because otherwise they could not find 
 subsistence in one of the richest countries of Europe has 
 long ago been dismissed as scarcely worthy of notice. 
 This faulty disposition, however, was only a part of the 
 faulty dispositions to be ascribed to the allied chiefs. 
 Their armies were weakest at the centre of their front, 
 the points where their inner flanks met. This was 
 traversed from south to north by the main road from 
 Charleroy to Brussels, an avenue into the heart of 
 Belgium. Could this line, therefore, be seized and held 
 by an enemy in force, they might be rent asunder and 
 defeated in detail, with disastrous, possibly fatal, results. 
 Nor was this all, or even nearly all. Wellington was con- 
 vinced that, should he be attacked, he would be attacked 
 on his right or his right centre*; he had thus, not reckon- 
 ing the reserve around Brussels, accumulated the largest 
 part of his forces in the valleys of the Scheldt and the 
 Dender, and thence towards the Senne. His left wing 
 was comparatively — nay, very — weak at the points where 
 it reached Blucher's right, both forming, we have said, the 
 allied centre on both sides of the main road from 
 Charleroy to Brussels, and he clung to the idea that 
 
 * Wellington's Despatches, xii. 337 et seq.^ April 30, 1815. See 
 also Charras, i. 67, 68. 
 
 4—2
 
 52 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 he might be attacked on his right or his right centre until 
 it was all but too late — nay, to the last moment. 
 
 As respects Blucher's army, the ist corps was danger- 
 ously near the French frontier from Marchiennes to 
 Charleroy along the Sambre, and was exposed to attack 
 in that direction. The 2nd and 3rd corps were chiefly 
 engaged in observing and covering the approaches to 
 Namur, in view of the possible advance of an enemy, as 
 was far from probable, by the road from Givet. The 4th 
 corps was far from its supports, and Blucher's right wing, 
 like Wellington's left, parts of both being, we repeat, the 
 allied centre, was not in nearly sufficient strength on the 
 points traversed by the main road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels. In addition to this, Wellington had his head- 
 quarters at Brussels ; the head-quarters of Blucher were 
 at Namur ; the intervening distance was upwards of 
 thirty miles. The communication between the two com- 
 manders could not, therefore, be very easy or rapid, 
 especially if they were suddenly attacked, a circumstance 
 which might have unfortunate results.* 
 
 The real cause of these defective arrangements was that 
 Wellington and Blucher, knowing well that their armies 
 must be largely superior in numbers to any army 
 Napoleon could oppose to them, did not at heart believe 
 they would be assailed in Belgium ; they thought they 
 would securely march into France when the eastern 
 column of the allies had passed her frontiers. They had 
 contemplated, indeed, the possibility of being attacked, 
 and they had agreed, should their adversary fall on their 
 
 * For the positions of the allied armies, and their distribution on 
 the theatre of operations, now all but universally recognised as having 
 been ill-conceived, see Napoleon, ' Comment.,' v. 204-206 ; Charras, 
 i. 67-71 ; La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 35-37 ; Shaw Kennedy, 
 'The Battle of Waterloo,' 169-173; Chesney, 'Waterloo Lectures,' 
 47-50 ; and Wolseley, 'The Decline and Fall of Napoleon,' 143, 144. 
 The reasoning of Hooper, to the contrary, still followed by a very 
 few writers, ' Waterloo,' 40-47, only proves the weakness of his case.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 53 
 
 centre, that they would unite forces to defend this front, 
 though it is not probable that, as has been alleged, they 
 had chosen beforehand the points on which they subse- 
 quently tried to carry out their purpose.* But, we say 
 again, they did not thoroughly grasp the idea that they 
 might be attacked in formidable force, pressed home. 
 Their correspondence at the moment when hostilities 
 began places this beyond question. t 
 
 The positions of the allied armies in Belgium did not 
 escape the far-reaching eye of Napoleon, who, we have 
 said, had resolved to take the offensive. With character- 
 istic attention to details, he had considered every line on 
 which he could advance ; but his resolution, it would 
 appear, was quickly made. Were he to march against 
 Wellington's right or right centre, he might sever the 
 communications of the Duke, and force him away from 
 Brussels ; but he could not prevent him joining hands 
 with Blucher, and both would almost certainly drive him 
 back into France, perhaps would overwhelm him with 
 their superior numbers. Were he to advance, on the 
 other hand, against the left centre or the left of Blucher, 
 he would have to move through a difficult and intricate 
 country. At best, the issue would probably be the same 
 as that which reasonably might be expected in the case of 
 an attack on the right or the right centre of Wellington. 
 An attack on the allied centre remained. Many considera- 
 tions showed that this was the only movement that 
 promised well, or could have decisive effects. Napoleon 
 was well aware that the allied armies were very much 
 larger than his own in numbers. His one solid chance 
 of success, therefore, was to separate and defeat them in 
 
 * See, on this point, the judicious remarks of Ropes, * The Campaign 
 of Waterloo,' 71, 72, and of H. Houssaye, '181 5,' 114, 115. 
 
 t See Wellington's Despatches, xii. 462, 470 ; and Blucher to his 
 wife, cited by H". Houssaye, ' 181 5,' ii. 107. These letters were written 
 in June.
 
 54 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 detail, and the only means through which he could attain 
 this end was to fall on their centre and strike them when 
 apart, as he had fallen on Beaulieu and Colli in 1796, and 
 on other adversaries in his wonderful career. 
 
 There were reasons, too, to suppose that, in this 
 instance, an attack upon the hostile centre would have 
 very great results. The allied armies rested on divergent 
 bases — that of Wellington ultimately on Ostend and the 
 sea, that of Blucher ultimately on the Rhine and Cologne. 
 Their centre, therefore, where their inner flanks met, 
 would probably be the weakest part of their front, for it 
 would be the most distant from their sources of supply. 
 Napoleon had perhaps ascertained that this was actually 
 the case, and should their centre be pierced through, it 
 might fairly be hoped that they would divide, and recoil 
 towards their bases, and they would expose themselves to 
 the terrible strokes by which their adversary had often 
 struck down enemies severed from each other in rapid 
 succession. Besides, Wellington and Blucher were allied 
 chiefs with perhaps dissimilar views and aims. They 
 were certainly men of different natures — Blucher im- 
 petuous, and even rash to a fault ; Wellington, in 
 Napoleon's judgment, overcircumspect and cautious. It 
 was probable, therefore, that, were they assailed on their 
 centre, Blucher would advance hastily and offer battle, 
 and Wellington would at least be slow in moving to join 
 his colleague. An opportunity of beating both in detail 
 was thus here presented. In addition to this, the ist 
 corps of Blucher, that of Zieten, formed the principal 
 part of the allied centre, and was in a dangerous position 
 near the French frontier. This circumstance, doubtless, 
 had its effect on Napoleon's mind, and contributed to 
 inspire his purpose.* 
 
 * The reasons that made Napoleon resolve to attack the centre of 
 the allies are set forth in 'Comment.,' v. 130, 198. See also Charras, 
 i. 81.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 55 
 
 The centre of the allies, therefore, their most vulnerable 
 point, was to be assailed, pierced through, and mastered 
 by the French ; and incidentally the exposed corps of 
 Zieten was to be caught and, if possible, overwhelmed 
 and crushed. The forces, however, available for the 
 enterprise were, we have seen, less than Napoleon had 
 expected to have ; the rising in La Vendue had made a 
 large deduction from the 150,000 men on whom he had 
 reckoned ; he was unable to assemble even 130,000 ; and 
 it was a perilous, if a daring, venture to attack enemies 
 not far from twofold in numbers. But the great gambler 
 with Fortune had thrown the die ; it was now too late to 
 abandon the mighty hazard. 
 
 The operations of Napoleon in bringing his army 
 together, and placing it in positions from which it could 
 spring into Belgium, were as brilliant and admirable as 
 any of his life. The four corps d'armee, which, we have 
 seen, had been in station between Lille and Metz, had 
 been approaching each other by degrees. They were 
 rapidly concentrated in the first days of June ; by the 
 14th they had all but effected their junction. The long 
 march near the edge of the frontier of France, though 
 made quickly on the good lateral roads, and behind the 
 screen of many a fortress, was not far from the allied 
 outposts, and was thus difficult to conceal, and dangerous ; 
 but it was masked by that consummate skill in stratagem 
 in which Napoleon has no equal among leaders of modern 
 war. The French troops advanced behind detachments 
 of National Guards placed near the frontier at different 
 points ; offensive demonstrations were made against "Wel- 
 lington's right in order to deceive the British commander ; 
 communication with Belgium was prevented along the 
 whole line. Meanwhile, the single corps originally placed 
 at Soissons had been moved from Laon to the verge of 
 Belgium ; the Imperial Guard and a great body of cavalry 
 followed, and by June 14 these masses were in line with
 
 56 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the four corps which had marched from between Lille and 
 Metz. 
 
 The positions chosen for this great concentration of 
 force had been indicated by Napoleon with characteristic 
 skill. A strip of territorj^ now Belgian, but at that time 
 French, extended beyond the fortresses of Maubeuge and 
 Phiiippeville, from a centre, Beaumont, to within a few 
 miles from Charleroy ; this small tract, therefore, was 
 opposite the great main road from Charleroy to Brussels, 
 dividing the allied centre, and approached the camps of 
 the corps of Zieten. It was crossed by lateral roads from 
 Maubeuge to Phiiippeville, but it was separated from 
 Charleroy by the stream of the Sambre. It was in part 
 covered by woodland and forest, and it was connected 
 with Charleroy by country roads only, which, we have 
 seen, then alone existed on this part of the frontier. The 
 whole French army, except a small detachment to the 
 right, 128,000 strong all told, was aggregated on this strip 
 by the night of June 14, on a front of some twenty miles 
 in breadth by six or eight in depth ; it was not more than 
 half a day's march from Charleroy, and was almost within 
 reach of part of the corps of Zieten ; and it approached the 
 weak allied centre on either side of the great main road 
 from Charleroy to Brussels. This operation was one of 
 the finest ever accomplished in war. By this time Blucher's 
 army was in part in motion, but Wellington's army had 
 not stirred, and the allies were still extended on their 
 immense front, while their enemy was concentrated well- 
 nigh within striking distance.* 
 
 The French army thus assembled, close to the edge of 
 Belgium, with extraordinary celerity, secrecy, and skill, 
 
 * The concentration of the French army has been admired by all 
 historians and commentators. It would be superfluous to multiply 
 authorities. Napoleon remarks, ' Comment.,' v. 108, ' Ce plan fut 
 coni-u et executd avec audace et sagesse.' Wellington said to (ireville, 
 ' Memoirs,' i. 40, ' Bonaparte's march upon Belgium was the finest 
 thing ever done.'
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 57 
 
 consisted of five corps d'armde, of nearly all the Imperial 
 Guard,* and of four corps of the cavalry of the reserve — 
 the usual organisation of this arm in the wars of the 
 French Empire. The ist corps, commanded by D'Erlon, 
 was very nearly 20,000 strong ; by the night of June 14 
 it was on the verge of the Sambre, between Solre and 
 Solre-sur-Sambre, its advanced divisions but a short 
 distance from Zieten's outposts. The 2nd corps, more 
 than 24,000 men, and with Reille, an experienced chief, at 
 its head, was also close to the Sambre, at Leers, a few 
 miles to the right, and was even nearer Zieten's outposts, 
 now at Lobbes and Thuin. The 3rd corps, rather more 
 than ig,ooo strong, was under the able but quarrelsome 
 Vandamme, and was farther to the right, but not far from 
 the Sambre. Behind Vandamme was the 6th corps of 
 Lobau, about 10,500 strong ; and, again, at a little 
 distance in the rear was the Imperial Guard, almost 
 21,000 men, directly under the Emperor's orders, but 
 with well-known lieutenants in command, both corps 
 being just north of Beaumont — the centre, we have seen, 
 of the whole army's position. Some miles to the right 
 was the 4th corps, not quite 16,000 strong, with the 
 brilliant and ambitious Gerard at its head ; it was nearly 
 all assembled around Philippeville, but one of its detach- 
 ments was not yet in line — the single body that had not 
 completely fulfilled its mission. In the rear of the five 
 corps and the Guard were the four corps of the cavalry 
 reserve, with Grouchy, for the present. General in chief, 
 but having Pajol, Excelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud 
 — names of distinction in many a campaign — as subor- 
 dinate leaders ; they were composed of more than 13,000 
 men ; they lay south of Beaumont, in the rear of the 
 Imperial Guard. 
 
 The corps of D'Erlon and Reille, together nearly 
 
 * Part of the Imperial Guard, we have seen, had been sent into 
 La Vendee.
 
 58 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 45,000 strong, formed the left wing of the French army ; 
 the corps of Vandamme, Lobau, the Imperial Guard, and 
 Grouchy's cavalry, in all about 64,000 men, were the 
 centre ; the corps of Gerard, almost 16,000 strong, was 
 the right wing ; and the whole army, reckoning some 
 3,500 non-combatants, made up, we have seen, a total of 
 128,000 men, with from 340 to 350 guns. The allied 
 armies, we have said, were 220,000 strong. They had 
 about 500 guns in the field, against 340 or 350 ; the dis- 
 proportion between the forces of the belligerents was thus 
 very great. But the disproportion was much greater in 
 the memorable campaign of 1814, and even in other 
 passages of Napoleon's career, and the Emperor had 
 already gained a distinct advantage through the admirable 
 concentration that had just been accomplished.* 
 
 * The numbers of the French army are those given by Charras, 
 who has studied the subject with great care. The estimates of other 
 writers are not widely different. 
 
 First Corps, D'Erlon : 
 Infantry 
 Cavalry 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 Total ... 
 
 Second Corps, Reille : 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 Total 
 
 Third Corps, Vandamme : 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 Total ... 
 
 Sixth Corps, Lobau : 
 Infantry 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 Total 10,465 
 
 Men. 
 16,885 
 1,506 
 1,548 and 46 
 
 guns. 
 
 19,939 
 
 
 20,635 
 1,865 
 1,861 and 46 
 
 guns. 
 
 24,361 
 
 
 16,851 
 
 
 1,017 
 
 1,292 and 38 
 
 guns. 
 
 19,160 
 
 
 9,218 
 
 1,347 and 32 guns.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 59 
 
 We may now offer a few remarks on the qualities and 
 the characteristics of the three armies soon to encounter 
 each other in a terrible conflict. English and German 
 writers have, not unnaturally, described the French army 
 of 1815 as, perhaps, the finest ever led by Napoleon. 
 This, however, is a complete mistake. This army was 
 not to be compared as an instrument of war with the old 
 Grand Army of Austerlit2, Jena and Friedland, by many 
 degrees the best of the imperial armies. It was, indeed, 
 composed, with scarcely an exception, of good regular 
 troops, many veterans, nearly all having had years of 
 service. It was animated by a fierce — nay, an heroic — 
 spirit ; it burned to meet enemies it regarded with deadly 
 hatred ; it deemed itself the avenger of France for many, 
 and prolonged disasters. But its organisation was quite 
 
 Fourth Corps, Gerard : 
 
 Men. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 ... 12,800 
 ... 1,628 
 
 1,567 and 38 guns. 
 
 Total 
 
 ... 15,995 
 
 Imperial Guard, Napoleon : 
 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery, etc. 
 
 ... 13,026 
 
 - 3,795 
 
 4,063 and 96 guns. 
 
 Total 20,884 
 
 Reserve of Cavalry, Grouchy : 
 
 Four Corps under Pajol, Excelmans, Kellermann, and 
 MiLHAUD (Sabres and Artillerymen) : 
 
 Men. 
 
 Pajol and 12 guns 3,046 
 
 Excelmans and 12 guns ... 3,515 
 Kellermann and 12 guns ... 3,679 
 Milhaud and 12 guns ... 3,544 
 
 Total 13,784 
 
 Non-combatants 3,500 
 
 Grand total (in round numbers) 128,000 and 344 guns.
 
 6o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 new, and was hastily made. Men and officers in the 
 regiments scarcely knew each other, and had not been 
 accustomed to act together ; they had not the noble free- 
 masonry of comrades in the field. The army, therefore, 
 wanted stability, coherence, and power of endurance. 
 The staff, seldom of real excellence in the army of France, 
 was in this instance weak in numbers and ill-trained; 
 the cavalry and artillery arms were, in the main, very 
 good ; but the infantry, except that of the Guard, was not 
 equal in quality. 
 
 The material defects of the army, however, were less 
 grave than those of a moral kind, and these greatly 
 impaired its military strength and value. The soldiery 
 had been shifted from one flag to another ; they had been 
 demoralised by the events of the last few months ; their 
 discipline had been much injured ; the return from Elba 
 had, so to speak, turned their heads, made them violent, 
 disobedient, not easy to command. Worse than all, they 
 had lost confidence in most of the highest chiefs, even in 
 many officers at the head of regiments ; they had seen 
 these men abandon Napoleon in 1814, abandon the Bour- 
 bons a short time afterwards, and then return to Napoleon 
 again. They looked on several Generals and Marshals 
 with profound distrust. Their faith in the Emperor, 
 indeed, remained unbounded ; he was the god of their 
 idolatry, perhaps more than ever ; but they had learned 
 from him the fatal lesson that treason had been the real 
 cause of their defeats. They had laid this evil teaching 
 to heart, and they were ready to believe that treason was, 
 as it were, in the air around them. It has been truly said 
 that this army was at once a most formidable but a most 
 fragile instrument of war.* 
 
 The army of Wellington, all told, was about 106,000 
 
 * For an admirable and exhaustive description of the French army 
 of 181 5, the reader may be referred to H. Houssaye, ' 1815,' ii. 72-83. 
 The sketch, too, of Charras (i. 59) is good. The English and German 
 accounts are refuted by evidence that cannot be gainsaid.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 6i 
 
 men, with very nearly 200 guns ; but more than 10,000 
 were left in garrisons. The field army was some 95,500 
 strong, with 186 pieces, a few heavy guns having been 
 rather unaccountably not made use of. This army hardly 
 deserved the angry reproach of its chief ; it was not ' an 
 infamous and very weak' army, but as a whole it was 
 much the worst army he ever commanded. It was a 
 motley array of many races and tongues, exhibiting the 
 defects and mischiefs this necessarily involves, different 
 modes of organisation and equipment, and differences in 
 command. In the field army there were only about 
 34,000 British troops. Some regiments were Peninsular 
 veterans, who ' could go anywhere and do anything ' ; 
 but others were only second battalions, and had had little 
 or no experience of the realities of war. The King's 
 German Legion, more than 6,000 strong, was not inferior 
 to the best British soldiers ; but the Hanoverian and 
 Brunswick contingents, not less than 22,500 men, were 
 young levies, to a great extent landwehr ; the Dutch, 
 Belgians, and Nassauers, together more than 32,000, were 
 largely composed of mere militia. The regular troops 
 had served under the imperial eagles ; the fidelity of this 
 whole contingent was in some degree suspected. On the 
 whole Wellington had not 50,000 thoroughly good troops, 
 and though many of his auxiliaries did excellent service, 
 they were not the men of the invincible Peninsular army. 
 The Duke greatly complained of his staff, and it certainly 
 failed him once or twice, and some of his subordinate 
 officers had not much experience. 
 
 Turning to the three arms, the British cavalry was the 
 best in the three armies, in some respects, especially in 
 the shock of battle ; but the rest of WeUington's cavalry 
 was not very good ; part of it, indeed, was of little value. 
 The artillery, British and German, was an excellent force, 
 but this can hardly be said of the artillery of the other 
 contingents ; as for the British infantry, and that of the
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 German Legion, it was incomparable for the precision 
 and the power of its fire, for its steadiness, constancy, and 
 stern endurance. Even the young British infantry had 
 the same high quaHties ; the other infantry were not the 
 * robur peditum ' of Roman story. On the whole, though 
 Wellington's composite army was very imperfect as an 
 instrument of war, it contained many elements of the very 
 best kind, and it was held together by the orderly and 
 strict discipline characteristic of every army under Well- 
 ington's command.* 
 
 '•= See, for a very fair and impartial account of Wellington's army, 
 Chesney, ' Waterloo Lectures,' 67, 71 ; and also Charras, i. 73, 75. 
 The subjoined estimate of its numbers is that of Charras, not widely 
 difterent from that of Siborne, Hooper, and other writers : 
 
 First Corps, the Prince of Orange 
 
 Infantry 
 Cavalry 
 Artillery 
 
 Total 
 
 Second Corps, Hill: 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavliy 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Total 
 
 Reserve, Wellington : 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery ... 
 
 Total 
 
 Corps of Cavalry, Uxbridge 
 22 squadrons heavy 
 49 squadrons light ... 
 Artillery 
 
 Total 
 
 Non-combatants 
 
 Grand total 
 
 Men. 
 ... 25,942 
 ... 3,405 
 
 2,198 and 64 guns. 
 
 - 31,545 
 
 
 ... 24,499 
 
 1,277 
 
 ... 1,472 
 
 and 40 guns. 
 
 ... 27,248 
 
 
 ... 20,315 
 
 822 
 
 1,900 
 
 and 52 guns. 
 
 - 23,037 
 
 
 2,605 
 
 ... 7,908 
 
 1,300 
 
 and 30 guns. 
 
 ... 11,813 
 1,860 
 
 
 ... 95,503< 
 
 ind 1 86 guns, and 
 I rocket battery.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 63 
 
 The army of Blucher, according to the best estimate — 
 this is, however, higher than that of most German writers 
 — was just more than 124,000 strong, with, it is said, 312 
 guns. This great force was partly composed of landwehr, 
 and had had a mutinous Saxon contingent, which had 
 certainly set a bad example, but had been severely 
 punished and sent away from the theatre of war. It had 
 the defects of the admixture of a militia with regular 
 troops ; but it was on the whole a formidable military 
 array. Napoleon certainly underrated its intense moral 
 energy ; perhaps, owing to the memories of Jena, Mont- 
 mirail and Vauchamps, he thought it immeasurably in- 
 ferior to the army he led. But it had nothing in common 
 with the serf-like levies of Hohenlohe and Brunswick ; it 
 was the living incarnation of the hatred Prussia bore 
 towards France ; it was animated by fierce resentment 
 for the oppression of years, for the wrongs of a nation 
 trodden down by a despot. In 1814 it had risen superior 
 to defeat ; it was to prove that it was capable of most 
 remarkable efforts. 
 
 Of its arms the cavalry was not equal to the French ; 
 the artillery was distinctly inferior ; but the regular 
 infantry were probably better, always excepting the foot- 
 men of the Imperial Guard, foemen worthy of the steel of 
 the best British and German infantry. In one respect, of 
 supreme importance, the Prussian army had a decided 
 advantage over its enemy. The French soldiery, we have 
 seen, had become in some degree demoralised — deficient, 
 at least, in coherence and staying power ; above all, they 
 had little confidence in most of their chiefs, and even in 
 many of their regimental leaders. It was exactly the con- 
 trary in the case of the Prussian soldiery ; they had the 
 passion for vengeance, but also the steady Teutonic con- 
 stancy ; they looked up to their Generals and officers with 
 implicit trust, and followed their bidding with eager and 
 loyal obedience. As for their aged Commander-in-Chief — 
 their beloved " Marshal Vorwarts' — whether in victory or
 
 64 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 in disaster — they had known both — they were as devoted 
 to him as his Guard was to Napoleon ; they had done, 
 and were to do, great things under his inspiring guidance.* 
 
 * The reader maybe referred to Charras (i. 75) for an accurate and 
 vivid description of the Prussian army of 181 5. This corresponds to 
 that of some German writers ; and see Hooper (39) and Chesney's 
 ' Waterloo Lectures,' 67. It may be remarked here that Ropes 
 (' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 25) thus fairly sums up his estimate of 
 the three armies : ' It is not correct to say that the army which 
 Napoleon led into Belgium was the finest he had ever commanded, 
 but it is quite certain it was the best of the three armies then in the 
 field.' With respect to the numbers of the Prussian armies, the 
 estimate of Charras has been followed, as in the case of the two 
 others ; it is probably accurate, but certainly, as before observed, it 
 exceeds the estimate of some German commentators. See, as to the 
 authorities relied on by Charras, the notes A, 15, C, at the end of the 
 work (ii. 2r4-2i6). No writer seems to have so thoroughly studied this 
 part of the subject. 
 
 First Corps, Zieten : Men. 
 
 Infantry 27,887 
 
 Cavalry ii925 
 
 Artillery, etc. 2,880 and 96 guns. 
 
 Total 32,692 
 
 Second Corps, Pirch : 
 
 Infantry ... ... ... ... 25,836 
 
 Cavalry 4,468 
 
 Artillery, etc. 2,400 and 80 guns. 
 
 Total 32,704 
 
 Third Corps, Thielmann : 
 
 Infantry ... ... ... ... 20,611 
 
 Cavalry ... ... ... ... 2,405 
 
 Artillery, etc. 1,440 and 48 guns. 
 
 Total 24,456 
 
 Fourth Corps, Bulow : 
 
 Infantry 25,381 
 
 Cavalry 3,081 
 
 Artillery, etc. ... 2,640 and 88 guns. 
 
 Total 31,102 
 
 Non-combatants 35'20 
 
 Grand total 124,074 and 312 guns.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 65 
 
 From the belligerent armies we turn to their chiefs, and 
 first to the Napoleon of 1815. Spite of the malice of petty 
 detractors, history has long ago marked out this extra- 
 ordinary man as foremost among the masters of modern 
 war. His powerful imagination, his supreme faculty of 
 seeing what is essential to be done in a sphere of action, 
 his penetration, his intense application to details, made 
 him unrivalled in the grand domain of strategy ; in form- 
 ing the combinations on which the issue of large military 
 operations so often depends, he has had no equal, if, 
 perhaps, we may except Hannibal. Nor was he less 
 admirable as a strategist on the field of manoeuvre ; in his 
 fine movements between divided enemies, in reaching the 
 communications, the flank, and the rear of a hostile army, 
 he was pre-eminent among the commanders of all time. 
 The most distinctive of his excellences, perhaps, as a 
 strategist was his power in perceiving and occupying the 
 decisive points on a theatre of war; this was exhibited 
 over and over again — never more clearly than in his last 
 and fatal campaign. As a tactician Napoleon was less 
 conspicuous ; he commanded in chief at too early an age 
 to have perfectly understood the uses of the three arms ; 
 he was often too ardent and obstinate in the stress of 
 battle; but in the domain of the greater tactics, where 
 strategy and tactics run into each other, his superiority 
 almost, if not altogether, reappears. He has been sur- 
 passed in tenacity and perseverance in war ; but in 
 dexterity, in the gift of stratagem, of concealing his opera- 
 tions to the latest moment, of extricating himself from 
 surrounding dangers, scarcely any commander can be 
 compared to him. Nevertheless — for humanity is not 
 
 This estimate is considerably higher than that of Wagner, who has 
 composed the official Prussian account of the campaign of 18 15, 
 and of Damitz, also a Prussian writer. Siborne (' The Waterloo 
 Campaign,' 76, 1895 edition), makes the numbers 116,807 men and 
 312 guns; Ropes ('The Campaign of Waterloo,' 32, 33) follows Charras. 
 
 5
 
 66 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 perfect — the great master was sometimes untrue to his 
 art ; errors and extravagances may be seen in much that 
 he accompHshed in it. Overconfidence was Napoleon's 
 distinctive fault ; his conceptions and projects were 
 occasionally too ambitious ; no General has run such 
 tremendous risks, or has so boldly played double or 
 quits with Fortune. We see this in his career from 
 Montenotte to Waterloo. This defect, too, was increased, 
 not diminished, by long experience ; it was aggravated by 
 success that has never had a parallel. 
 
 Napoleon defied Nature and space in the campaign of 
 1812 ; in that of 1813 he attempted what was far beyond 
 his power ; even in his magnificent campaign of 1814 he 
 struck for an Empire already lost, and threw away resources 
 that might have saved his throne. It was a kindred fault 
 that he was given to underrate his enemies: in 1813 he 
 thought he could conquer Europe with newly-raised levies; 
 he undervalued Wellington and Blucher in 1815 ; it was 
 unfortunate for him that he had never beheld a British 
 army, save in a disastrous retreat, and would not acknow- 
 ledge its best qualities until it was too late. As age 
 advanced, too. Napoleon became almost obstinate in the 
 convictions he had once formed in the field ; he had been 
 so often right that he believed he could never be wrong ; 
 he grew fixed in ideas he would not give up ; he had lost 
 the nimbleness, so to speak, of the General of 1796. In 
 1815, however, what was most wanting in him was, we 
 have seen, physical health and moral energy ; these failings 
 became manifest in several passages of the campaign. 
 
 As for Napoleon's lieutenants, for many reasons they 
 were not very good subordinate chiefs ; they were inferior 
 to their predecessors in the old Grand Army, inferior to 
 what they had been in the day of success. Nearly all, 
 indeed, had had large experience in the field ; all were in 
 the vigour and prime of manhood ; several had a military 
 reputation of a high order. But they were ill-fitted in
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 67 
 
 many respects for the positions they held ; this was the 
 more unfortunate because Napoleon, though his superiority 
 and despotism bowed them to his will, expected great 
 things from them when in independent command. Soult, 
 the new chief of the staff, a post of the first importance, 
 was a very able but an indolent man ; he had had no 
 experience in the office so well filled by Berthier ; he was 
 disliked — nay, detested — throughout the army ; he was to 
 prove himself unequal to his task in 1815.* Grouchy was 
 a good — nay, a brilliant — cavalry officer ; but he had failed 
 at Bantry in 1796 ; he had never been at the head of a 
 large separate force ; his name since Waterloo has become 
 a byword. f As for Ney, the third of the Marshals in the 
 present campaign, he was an heroic soldier of the best 
 type; but he had not the qualities of a General-in-Chief; 
 he was heady, impetuous, easily carried away ; in 181 5 he 
 was the prey of remorse caused by the consciousness of a 
 double treason ; he was to fight, so to speak, with a halter 
 around his neck ; his companions in arms — nay, the 
 Emperor — regarded him with distrust. 
 
 The commanders of corps d'armee, as a rule, were capable 
 men ; but D'Erlon had been a laggard in Spain ; Van- 
 damme had not forgotten the disaster of Culm ; Reille 
 had Vittoria deeply engraved in his mind. All these 
 chiefs were bad successors of men like Desaix, K16ber, 
 Massena, Lannes, Davout, and others ; and, with the 
 exception of Gerard, who ought to have had the place of 
 Grouchy, they were to be inferior to their former selves. 
 Nevertheless, personal defects and failings like these were 
 not the only, or perhaps the principal, causes of the in- 
 efficiency, in the higher commands, in the French army. The 
 
 * Soult had neglected, a bad beginning, to send orders to the 
 cavalry reserves, when the march to the frontier was made : H. Hous- 
 saye, ' 1815,' ii. 100. 
 
 t Pasquier (' M^moires,' iii. 232) relates that Soult and other Generals 
 warned Napoleon beforehand not to give Grouchy an independent 
 command in 181 5. 
 
 5—2
 
 68 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Marshals and Generals, better informed than the soldiery, 
 knew that Europe was in arms against their master, were 
 terrified and unnerved at the prospect before them. A 
 few, too, regretted, at least, the fall of the Bourbons, who 
 had secured for them a season of repose ; sighed that they 
 could not enjoy their riches and honours in peace ; saw in 
 Napoleon an assurance of internecine war, of disaster for 
 France, of ruin for themselves. Nearly all, besides, felt 
 that they did not possess the full confidence of their 
 troops, as had been the case in the years of victory ; that 
 they were looked upon with more or less suspicion ; that 
 they were not at the head of devoted followers. These 
 things all concurred with evil effects to demoralise and 
 impair the worth of most of Napoleon's lieutenants in 
 1815.* 
 
 Passing on to the leaders of the allied armies, Welling- 
 ton properly demands our first attention. This great 
 General, greater still as a man, was not a strategist of the 
 first order ; in the great combinations of war he is not to 
 be named with Napoleon. He was to give conspicuous 
 proof of this in the campaign of 1815. Even in his 
 admirable and triumphant career in Spain he did not 
 shine in the sphere of strategy, though the Emperor was 
 utterly in the wrong in describing him as ' incapable and 
 unwise.' His advance on Talavera, excuse it as we may, 
 very nearly involved him in a great disaster. It was well 
 that Napoleon was not in his front when, at Busaco, he 
 offered Massena battle, for in all probability he would 
 have had his left flank turned, and could hardly have 
 reached the celebrated lines. He was outmanoeuvred by 
 Marmont before Salamanca. But Wellington had in 
 the highest degree quick and clear perception, and a 
 thoroughly sound judgment. He was well acquainted 
 
 * H. Houssaye (' 181 5,' ii. 70-75) has given us an admirable descrip- 
 tion of the French Generals of the campaign of 181 5. See also 
 Napoleon,,' Comment ,' v. 198, 199, and Charras, i. 59, 60.
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 69 
 
 with the uses of every arm, especially of the great arm 
 of infantry. He was a tactician of the very first quality, 
 brilliant and energetic when on the offensive, in defence 
 giving proof of real genius. His supreme excellence, 
 however, was tenacity and strength of character. No 
 commander in the great struggle of 1793 to 1815 presented 
 a grander or more imposing spectacle than when he hung 
 to a rock in Portugal, defying the gigantic military power 
 of France, and, spite of neglect in England and a pros- 
 trate Continent, confident that success would ultimately 
 attend his efforts ; and in all his campaigns we see in him 
 this master-faculty, the best Napoleon has said that a 
 soldier can have. Wellington had not encountered 
 Napoleon before. He had had to deal only with French 
 Generals immeasurably inferior to their great master, and 
 divided besides by jealous discords ; and there can be no 
 doubt that in 1815 he not only did not fathom his mighty 
 adversary's designs, but was disconcerted by his splendid 
 and well-concealed movements. He was to be out- 
 generalled in the first instance, he was to commit un- 
 questionable strategic mistakes; but his best qualities 
 were to appear in complete fulness on the great day of 
 Waterloo. For the rest, Wellington's lieutenants, if we 
 except Hill and Picton, were not Generals of a high 
 order ; but many were tried and excellent soldiers. Two, 
 Perponcher and Chasse, in the Dutch service, were on 
 critical occasions to stand him in the best stead.* 
 
 * Charras has given in i. 77 this discriminating and striking 
 portrait of Wellington : 'II n'dtait qu'un general de talent, mais d'un 
 talent, si complet, ent^ sur de si fortes qualit^s, qu'il atteignait presque 
 au gdnie. Dou^ d'un bon sens extreme ; politique profond ; religieux 
 observateur des lois de son pays ; excellent appreciateur des hommes ; 
 instruit k fond de tout ce qui constitue la science et le metier des 
 armes ; faisant parfois des fautes, mais sachant ne pas s'y obstiner 
 apr^s les avoir reconnues, soigneux du bien etre de ses soldats, 
 menager de leur sang ; dur au desordre, impitoyable aux deprd- 
 dateurs ; habile k concevoir et k executer ; prudent ou hardi, tem- 
 poriseur ou actif selon la circonstance ; in^branlable dans la mauvaise
 
 70 THE CAMPAIGN OF iSij 
 
 The master-spirit of the Prussian army differed widely 
 from Wellington in many respects, yet the two chiefs had 
 several points in common. Blucher was a veteran of the 
 school of Frederick. He had been a fighting man from 
 his first youth ; but if, as a soldier, he had heroic qualities, 
 he had no knowledge of the highest parts of war. He 
 was sometimes imprudent — nay, reckless — in the field. He 
 had over and over again been struck down by Napoleon, 
 whose skill, resource, craft, and strategic genius had 
 turned his faults to the best account, and had inflicted on 
 him terrible defeats ; but he had always risen superior to 
 adverse fortune, and more than once, even after a grave 
 reverse, he had baffled his great adversary by his bold 
 movements, and by the energy and vigour of his strokes. 
 
 Blucher was not a tactician of a high order ; he too 
 often threw away his troops to little purpose. His 
 arrangements on the field were sometimes very faulty. 
 But he had one advantage which Wellington did not 
 possess : long and bitter experience had made him familiar 
 with Napoleon's methods in war. However unable he 
 was to cope with these, he perfectly understood how 
 promptitude was required to deal with the antagonist he 
 had met from Jena to Montmirail. In tenacity and 
 endurance Blucher resembled his colleague. It was said 
 of him that * he never knew when he was beaten,' a 
 phrase since applied to the British soldier ; and, like 
 Wellington, he was not afraid of Napoleon, here very 
 different from the Archduke Charles, who, though a 
 better strategist than either, could not overcome his 
 dread of his great enemy, which had something to do 
 with the result at Wagram. Blucher was superior to 
 Wellington in one great quality : his officers and men 
 
 fortune rebelle aux enivrements du succ^s ; ame de fer dans un 
 corps de fer ; Wellington avec une petite armde avait fait de grandes 
 choses ; et cette arm^e dtait son ouvrage. II devait rester ; et il 
 restera une des grandes figures militaires de ce sit;cle.'
 
 THE ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON 71 
 
 were passionately attached to him, and he obtained from 
 them astonishing efforts. The British General, unlike 
 Marlborough, was here wanting ; he was respected as a 
 commander, not loved. This was one reason that he was 
 never supreme in victory. As for Blucher's lieutenants, 
 his chief of the staff, Gneisenau, was a learned and scientific 
 officer ; but he was suspicious, irritable, and disliked 
 Wellington. The one great movement he was to make 
 in 1815, extolled as it has been by the worshippers of 
 success, was a dangerous half-measure that ought to have 
 been fatal, and he was to be irresolute at the moment of 
 extreme trial. Apart from Bulow, who, however, was to 
 do little in this campaign, Blucher's other subordinates 
 were not remarkable men, but all were to prove them- 
 selves to be good soldiers. Their chief, nevertheless, 
 towered over all his fellows ; he was to exhibit in the 
 impending contest his defects, indeed, but his very best 
 qualities. In a deadly encounter the rude but undaunted 
 swordsman was to deceive, and finally to pierce through, 
 the perfect fencer.* 
 
 * Charras has also described Blucher well (ii. 76) : ' Esprit peucultiv^, 
 nature rude, passiond pour le plaisir autant que pour la guerre, Blucher 
 n'atteignait pas au premier rang ; mais un caractere indomptable, un 
 patriotisme ardent, une activity extreme, en depit de la viellesse, une 
 perseverance que rien ne laissait, une grande audace et une grande 
 habitude de la tactique et de la strategic de Napoleon, en faisait un 
 adversaire de rdelle'valeur.'
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE I5, 1815 
 
 Napoleon at Beaumont — His address to his army — His orders for the 
 march into Belgium — Advance of the French army— Delays — 
 Vandamme — The desertion of Bourmont — The French army 
 crosses the Sambre — Napoleon at Charleroy — His orders — The 
 loss of time caused by delays and accidents unfavourable to the 
 French — The retreat of Zieten — Arrival of Ney — Napoleon's 
 orders to the Marshal — Ney does not occupy Quatre Bras — 
 Combat at Gilly — Positions of the French army on the evening 
 of the 15th — Great advantage already secured by Napoleon — 
 Dispositions of Blucher and Wellington — The Prussian army 
 directed to Sombreffe — Bulow cannot join it — Delays and hesita- 
 tions of Wellington — Part of his army directed to Ouatre Bras, 
 but very late — Examination of the allied strategy — The allied 
 armies in a critical position. 
 
 Having left Paris, we have seen, at the earhest dawn, 
 Napoleon made a halt at Laon on June 12 ; he stayed at 
 Avesnes, near the frontier, on the following day ; he had 
 reached his camp at Beaumont by the fourteenth. The 
 army welcomed its chief with frenzied acclaim ; ' it was 
 maddening,' an eye-witness wrote, * to come to blows with 
 the enemy.' Every precaution had been taken to conceal 
 the positions it held ; it lay behind woodlands stretching 
 towards the Sambre ; the fires of the bivouacs had been 
 lit in folds of the ground. The Emperor had spoken to 
 his troops in an address despatched from Avesnes ; he 
 reminded them of the glories of the past, but let them
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 73 
 
 know that a tremendous struggle was at hand, and that 
 everything must depend on their efforts. In the impas- 
 sioned and magical language he had made his own, 
 * This,' he said, * is the anniversary of Marengo and Fried- 
 land, which had twice decided the fortunes of Europe ; 
 but then, as after Austerlitz, as after Wagram, we had 
 been too generous ... to the Kings we had left on their 
 thrones.' These men * had now formed a league to sub- 
 vert the most sacred rights of France ; they had set the 
 most unjust of aggressions on foot ; let us therefore march 
 forward to meet them ; are not we and they the same 
 men ? . . . At Jena, the Prussians, so arrogant to-day, were 
 three to one against you ; at Montmirail you were one to 
 six ; as for the English, let those who have been their 
 prisoners tell the tale of the miseries and tortures of their 
 hulks!' Napoleon then held out hopes that the League 
 of Europe would break up. ' The Saxons, the Belgians, 
 the men of Hanover, the soldiers of the Confederation of 
 the Rhine, are groaning that they are forced to lend their 
 arms to the cause of Princes, foes of justice and of the 
 rights of nations ; they know that this coalition will never 
 have enough. . . . Madmen ! a moment of good fortune has 
 blinded their eyes. The oppression and the humiliation 
 of France is above their power ; let them enter her borders, 
 they will find a grave. Soldiers, we have forced marches 
 to make, to fight battles, to encounter perils, but with 
 perseverance victory will be ours ; the rights, the honour, 
 the happiness of our country will be regained. For every 
 Frenchman who has a heart the time has come to conquer 
 or to die.'* 
 
 Within a few hours Napoleon had issued his orders for 
 the leap into Belgium on which he had staked his fortunes. 
 The whole army, converging on a narrowing front, was to 
 cross the Sambre, and, assembling in or near Charleroy, 
 to take possession of the town, and thus to reach the 
 
 * See the address at length, Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 288.
 
 74 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 southern end of the great main road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels. The dispositions of the great master, admirably 
 designed, were arranged to assure celerity, certainty, and 
 regularity in this fine movement.* Reille, on the left, 
 was to break up his camp at three in the morning; he 
 was to march down the southern bank of the Sambre, 
 to seize any bridges on the river in his way, to be at 
 Marchiennes, a small town two or three miles from 
 Charleroy, and to take possession of the bridge at that 
 place, where * he was probably to arrive by nine in the 
 forenoon.' D'Erlon was to follow the movement from 
 Solre and Solre-sur-Sambre, leaving his camp at the same 
 hour as Reille, but keeping some distance in his rear; 
 he was to occupy Thuin, a few miles to the west of 
 Marchiennes, and he was to send small detachments 
 across the Sambre towards Mons and Binche, where it 
 was known that a part of Wellington's left was in station. 
 At the centre Vandamme was to be on the march at three 
 in the morning, preceded by Pajol and a body of light 
 cavalry ; Lobau and his corps were to be on the track of 
 Vandamme at an hour's interval. The Imperial Guard 
 was to be in motion at five and six ; Grouchy and most of 
 his cavalry were to cover the Hanks of the columns. This 
 great mass was to make straight, from around Beaumont, 
 for Charleroy — a distance of from ten to fifteen miles — and 
 to become master of the town as quickly as possible. To 
 the right, Gerard was to begin the movement also at 
 three, if practicable, having called in his detachment ; he, 
 too, was to advance with his corps on Charleroy, and 
 therefore to come into line with the centre, which was 
 thus to be in very great force. The Emperor announced 
 that it was his purpose ' that the army should have got 
 over the Sambre before noon,' at the two points of 
 Marchiennes and Charleroy ; and admirable precautions 
 
 * For these orders, see Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 281, 286. 
 They have been praised by all historians and critics.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 181 5 75 
 
 had been taken to ensure in all respects the success of 
 the movement. The sappers of every corps were to be 
 close to the front, and the materials for bridging the river 
 at these places were ready, for Napoleon evidently ex- 
 pected that he would find the bridges on the Sambre 
 broken down, and had made provision for this contin- 
 gency. At the same time the impedimenta of the whole 
 army were to be left in the rear, in order that the march 
 should be made with extreme rapidity ; any vehicles found 
 on the line of the movement, in contravention of this 
 order, were to be instantly burnt. 
 
 The objects of Napoleon in designing this march are 
 evident to a certain extent, but some have been questioned 
 by different writers, though little doubt can now exist on 
 the subject. His first intention was, if possible, to destroy 
 the corps of Zieten, which, we have said, was dangerously 
 exposed; one of its divisions, that of Pirch II.,* being 
 along the Sambre, from beyond Marchiennes to the east 
 of Charleroy ; another, that of Steinmetz, being around 
 Fontaine I'Eveque ; and further, in communication with 
 the left of Wellington, a third, at Fleurus, rather distant 
 from the other two ; a fourth, still at a greater distance, 
 at Moustier-sur-Sambre. It might be practicable, there- 
 fore, to attack this corps — to cut off and overwhelm its 
 two first divisions, and, not improbably, to strike down 
 the third by making a rapid movement across the Sambre, 
 and reaching the enemy at an early hour ; and this was 
 primarily, so to speak, Napoleon's purpose. t It may be, 
 too, he hoped that Blucher, so often rash, would hastily 
 advance to support Zieten, and thus would lay himself open 
 to defeat, though this would seem to be hardly probable. 
 
 But Napoleon, we believe, had a deeper ulterior object, 
 which seems to be established by clear evidence, if a few 
 
 * This general is not to be confounded with Pirch, the chief of 
 Blucher's 2nd corps. 
 + Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 286 : letter to Davout.
 
 76 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 critics remain sceptical. His great aim in his opera- 
 tions, we have said, was to pierce through the weak centre 
 of the alHes, and thus to gain an opportunity of defeating 
 them in detail ; this was the calculation on which his 
 hopes rested. But to attain this end it was essential, 
 if he was not to run great risks, to secure a position on 
 the allied centre, from whence he could strike the heads 
 of the enemy's columns, should these converge against 
 him from either side, and where he could safely maintain 
 his ground, until he could successfully throw back their 
 forces and fall on their armies when fully apart. Such a 
 position existed, and was well known to the Emperor ; it 
 extended upon a wide lateral road running from Namur 
 to Nivelles, and thence to Brussels, and forming the main 
 communication between Blucher and Wellington in their 
 headquarters at Namur and Brussels. At Quatre Bras 
 it crossed the great main road from Charleroy to Brussels, 
 and at Sombreffe, about seven miles from Quatre Bras, 
 it reached a point, on the lateral road, not far from 
 Namur. Could Napoleon, therefore, occupy the two 
 places of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, in force, he would 
 be able to confront either Blucher or Wellington, or both 
 — their armies being widely dispersed, they would, in all 
 human probability, be very inferior in numbers to his 
 own — with the prospect of almost assured success, and 
 then he would have every chance of separating and beat- 
 ing them in detail. The main and paramount object of 
 the Emperor was, accordingly, to advance to Quatre Bras 
 and Sombreffe on June 15, to seize and to occupy both 
 points, and this was the true reason why he was to make 
 a forced march of extreme celerity on the first day of the 
 campaign. Quatre Bras and Sombreffe are considerably 
 more than twenty miles distant from the encampments of 
 the French army on the night of the 14th.* 
 
 * Mr. Ropes is much the ablest of the writers who have argued that 
 it was not Napoleon's intention to take possession of Quatre Bras and
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 77 
 
 The execution of Napoleon's projects for June 15 was, 
 from different causes, unequal to the design. Reille, on 
 the left, was on the march by the appointed time; he 
 advanced along the edge of the Sambre by difficult roads ; 
 but he had soon mastered the bridge at Thuin, had driven 
 in the Prussian outposts and made prisoners — the troops 
 of Pirch II. steadily fell back before him— and had 
 reached Marchiennes by about ten in the forenoon, having 
 effected his movement rapidly and with success. He 
 found the bridge at Marchiennes intact, a circumstance 
 very favourable to the French. He proceeded to cross 
 the river with his troops, an operation, however, which 
 necessarily took some time. His colleague, D'Erlon, 
 had been much less active ; he had not left his camp 
 
 Sombreffe on June 15. In a learned and exhaustive note (' The Campaign 
 of Waterloo,' 8-15), he contends that Napoleon's real purpose was 
 only to fight the Prussians on that day, and that he did not aim at 
 Quatre Bras or Sombreffe. He cites Napoleon, Wellington and 
 Clausewitz as authorities. Now, it is true that Napoleon, in a con- 
 troversy with Rogniat ('Comment.,' vi. 146), did assert that he did not 
 mean to occupy Sombreffe on the 15th ; but in his elaborate narrative 
 of the campaign ('Comment.,' v. 199) he has declared that his inten- 
 tion ' was to have his headquarters at Fleurus on that day,' which 
 necessarily implied the occupation of Sombreffe. And Charras very 
 properly remarks that a statement in a mere literary dispute may be 
 rejected. As for Wellington, writing through Lord EUesmere, and 
 Clausewitz, they only point out that it could not have been Napoleon's 
 only object to interpose at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe between the 
 hostile armies ; and this is really a truism. But that Napoleon had 
 resolved to occupy Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the 15th is proved 
 by overwhelming evidence. The Motiiteur oi June 18 and Napoleon 
 Correspondence (xxviii. 288) expressly state that Ney v.'as at Quatre 
 Bras on the evening of the 15th, of course by Napoleon's orders ; and 
 Grouchy, cited by H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' 1 20, 1 2 1 ), positively says that 
 he was directed to occupy Sombreffe, and Ney to occupy Quatre Bras, 
 on that day. Jomini, too, a contemporaneous writer, who knew the 
 opinions prevailing in the French army, has no doubt on the subject 
 (' Precis de la Campagne de 1815,' 153) ; and he is followed by Charras 
 and many other authorities. On the whole, the evidence seems con- 
 clusive that Quatre Bras and Sombreffe were to be held by the French 
 on June 15.
 
 78 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 until after four, and he did not reach the Sambre at 
 Marchiennes until the early afternoon, a circumstance 
 not without untoward results afterwards. At the centre 
 Pajol had with his horsemen made for Charleroy ; he was 
 in the saddle at three in the morning, and had approached 
 the town by about nine. He tried ineffectually to seize 
 the bridge on the Sambre, but he was compelled to make 
 a halt and to wait for infantry. Like Reille, he, too, 
 had taken a few hundred prisoners, and the Prussians 
 had shown a disposition to retreat. Vandamme ought to 
 have been in the immediate rear of Pajol, but Soult had 
 sent the Emperor's orders by a single officer, who had 
 not delivered them owing to a severe hurt.* Vandamme 
 and his corps were still in their bivouacs by seven in the 
 morning ; in fact, he had heard nothing of the intended 
 movement until Lobau and his troops had come into line 
 with him, these having not left their camp until four, as 
 had been directed, and being a considerable distance 
 behind. The advance of Napoleon's centre had been 
 thus retarded ; unfortunate occurrences also had kept 
 back his right. Gerard had been unable to move until 
 five in the morning, his detachment having taken some 
 time to join him. He also had to march by bad roads 
 through an intricate country. It was after seven before 
 he reached Florennes, a village only a few miles from his 
 camp at Philippeville. His advance had besides been 
 checked by an incident of inauspicious omen. One of his 
 subordinates, Bourmont, an old 6migr6, had suddenly 
 deserted with two or three officers, and gone over to the 
 enemy's camp ; Gerard was compelled to halt and to 
 address the infuriated troops, suspicious, restless, wanting 
 
 * We know from the ' Souvenirs ' of the Due de Fezensac that the 
 staff service in the French army, even at its best, was far from perfect. 
 But it was bad in the campaign of 18 15, and Soult was not up to his 
 work. See, as to Soult, Thidbault, 'Mdmoires,' v. 354. Thidbault, 
 however, disliked Soult.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 79 
 
 in strict discipline, and this had detained him for some 
 time. 
 
 The march of the French army had thus been delayed, 
 in different degrees, along the whole line ; the success of 
 the Emperor's plans was already threatened. Napoleon 
 made an effort at once to repair the mischief done ; he 
 pushed forward a part of the Imperial Guard,* taking a 
 road by the left to support Pajol ; he directed Vandamme 
 to advance as quickly as possible ; he ordered Gerard not 
 to march upon Charleroy, but to reach Chatelet, a few 
 miles to the east of Charleroy, and to cross the Sambre 
 by the bridge at that place. The Emperor then pressed 
 onwards to Charleroy, at the head of his central column. 
 He found the bridge on the Sambre, as at Marchiennes, 
 unbroken ; Pajol's cavalry and the detachment of the 
 guard defiled, as rapidly as they could, through the narrow 
 streets of the old town, the Prussians having evacuated 
 the place. It was now about noon. Napoleon passed 
 through Charleroy, the soldiery and the population greet- 
 ing him with enthusiastic shouts. He took his station 
 just outside the town, at the end of the great main road 
 from Charleroy to Brussels, having thus gained the first 
 move in his memorable game. To his right were the 
 soldiery of Pirch II. in retreat ; in his front, but at a 
 distance, was the division of Steinmetz, falling back from 
 its positions around Fontaine I'Eveque and beyond, at 
 the intelligence of the advance of Reille. To the north- 
 wards, from twelve to fourteen miles away, were the two 
 important points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, the first 
 on the great main road from Charleroy to Brussels, the 
 second near a main road from Charleroy, by Fleurus, the 
 Emperor, we have said, having resolved to reach and 
 occupy both. Had the French army — as had been 
 Napoleon's purpose, and as, indisputably, was quite 
 
 * This was part of the Young Guard, composed, to some extent, 
 of picked volunteers.
 
 So THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 possible — been in force across the Sambre * before noon,' 
 it is difficult to see how the two exposed divisions, at least, 
 of Zieten could have escaped destruction, and Quatre 
 Bras and Sombreffe could have been mastered before the 
 evening had closed. 
 
 But invaluable time had been unfortunately lost. 
 D'Erlon, on the left, and Gerard, on the right, were still 
 far from the positions they had been expected to hold. 
 The centre had been long kept back by the misadventure 
 of Vandamme ; some hours were required before Van- 
 damme and the other corps of the centre could be at or 
 near Charleroy. Napoleon was, therefore, compelled to 
 pause ; but he made preparations for a forward move- 
 ment, intending, no doubt, to carry out his object. The 
 troops of Pajol had been already despatched to observe 
 the enemy on the great main-road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels so often mentioned, and on the road from 
 Charleroy to Sombreffe by Fleurus ; the Emperor sent 
 Lefebvre-Desnoettes with the light cavalry of the Guard 
 and one regiment to support Pajol on the first road, and 
 a small part of the infantry of the Guard on the second, 
 for the same purpose. A short time afterwards he 
 directed Reille and D'Erlon to advance from Marchiennes 
 to occupy Gosselies, a village upon the great main-road, 
 and 'to attack the enemy, who seemed to be making a 
 stand at that place.'* This enemy was the division of 
 Steinmetz in retreat ; it had been joined by part of the 
 division from Fleurus sent on by Zieten. 
 
 It was now between three and four in the afternoon. 
 Part of the Guard in the rear and the corps of Vandamme 
 were issuing from the streets of Charleroy,t but Lobau 
 had not as yet come up. To the left Reille was on the 
 march to Gosselies, but D'Erlon had hardly reached 
 
 * See Soult's letters to D'Erlon, 3 and 4.30 p.m., on the 15th : 
 La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 63, 66. 
 t Charras, i. 88.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 81 
 
 Marchiennes. The heads of Gerard's columns had only 
 attained Chatelet, where, too, the bridge on the Sambre 
 had not been broken. Five, or even six, hours had thus 
 been lost. This delay, we repeat, had probably saved 
 half, at least, of the corps of Zieten ; but Zieten not the 
 less deserves praise for his skilful operations on June 15. 
 He had long before informed his chief that the French 
 were at hand, Blucher had ordered him to fall back on 
 Fleurus, but to hold the enemy in check as long as was 
 possible. He had very ably fulfilled his mission. One 
 great mistake had, no doubt, been made — the bridges on 
 the Sambre had not been broken, as Napoleon expected 
 would have been the case, and this had facilitated the 
 Emperor's march ; but the very same mistake, we shall 
 see, was made in the campaign on a greater occasion, and 
 Zieten may have acted on superior orders.* Zieten had, 
 on the whole, admirably performed his task ; his two 
 divisions of Pirch H. and Steinmetz had retreated with 
 comparatively little loss. The first was safe, for the 
 moment, beyond Charleroy, on the way to Fleurus, its 
 point of assembly ; the second was near Gosselies, also 
 on the march to Fleurus, and it was to escape an attack 
 without much injury. Zieten had judiciously sent rein- 
 forcements to both, and he was not to lose more than 
 2,000 men in the day.f He had also in some measure 
 retarded the enemy, and he had now placed the division 
 of Pirch n., supported by detachments from the rear, in 
 a position of vantage a few miles east of Charleroy, where 
 he was to delay for a time the advance of Napoleon. Few 
 operations of the kind have been better conducted in war.ij: 
 
 * Charras (i. 71, 104) implies this. See also some remarks of Colonel 
 (now General) Maurice, United Service Magazine, ' Waterloo,' October, 
 1890. 
 
 t The Prussian official account only makes the loss of Zieten 1,200 
 men, but nearly all writers make it 2,000. See Chesney, ' Waterloo 
 Lectures,' 94, 95. 
 
 X General Hamley ('Operations of War,' 133, 134, 1889 edition) 
 
 6
 
 82 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 While Napoleon had been pressing forwards the advance 
 of his troops — that is, between three and four in the 
 afternoon* — Ney joined the Emperor at his station out- 
 side Charleroy. The Marshal had not as yet obtained a 
 command ; he had been summoned to the scene at the 
 very last moment ; he had hurried from Paris, without a 
 staff, without orders, and with only one aide-de-camp. 
 Napoleon bade him welcome, and gave him directions, 
 the import of which can be no longer doubtful. Ney was 
 to take the command of the corps of Reille and D'Erlon — 
 that is, of the left wing of the army ; he was also to have 
 in his hands the light cavalry of the Guard, sent forward, 
 we have said, a short time before ; but he was not to 
 make use of this choice force, because he would be sup- 
 ported on the following day by Kellermann's body of 
 heavy cavalry ; and with the troops at present under his 
 orders — that is, about 45,000 men — he was to occupy the 
 position of Quatre Bras, and to drive back any enemy he 
 might find on the great main road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels. t The Marshal set off at once to perform his 
 
 singles out Zieten's operations as a fine specimen of the value of a 
 'retarding force.' See also General Maurice, ante. It seems to be 
 not exactly known where Zieten was on the 15th. Charras also 
 highly praises Zieten. 
 
 * The time — a matter of some importance — is fixed by H. Houssaye 
 (' 1815,' ii. 119) beyond dispute, by conclusive evidence. The only 
 statement to the contrary is that of Heymt!:s, Ney's single aide-de- 
 camp; but Heymes wrote to exculpate his chief, and his work, too 
 easily credited by many writers, abounds in errors, and even false- 
 hoods, and is not in any sense trustworthy. 
 
 t The substance of this order is that which is found in the narrative 
 of Heymtjs, with the exception of the direction to occupy Quatre Bras, 
 which Heymcs — from an obvious motive — Charras, and other writers 
 have omitted. IJut, as has been pointed out attte, the Mofiiieur of 
 June 18, the Napoleon Correspondence, and Grouchy — contem- 
 poraneous evidence — prove that Ney was ordered to occupy Quatre 
 Bras on June 15, 18 15. The reader should refer to the statements 
 of Grouchy, who had no interest here not to tell the truth : ' Observa- 
 tions sur la Campagne de 1815,' 1818 edition, p. 32; and 'Relation
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 83 
 
 task ; but in this, as in all the passages of the cam- 
 paign, he was to be utterly inferior to his old self. As 
 we have said, he had been demoralised by his late flagrant 
 treason ; he knew that even Napoleon viewed him with 
 distrust ; he stood ill in the opinion of the army and of 
 the public ; he detested Soult, the new chief of the staff ; 
 he was unnerved by remorse and conflicting passions. He 
 had been so injudicious, too, as to repeat to his master 
 the unhappy phrase about the iron cage ; he had been 
 relegated to a kind of obscurity during weeks, after the 
 return from Elba ; his discomposure had been noticed at 
 the Champ de Mai ; the Emperor had abstained from 
 giving him a command until the army had passed the 
 frontier, and he had received his command under the 
 very worst conditions. Ney was to show that he was a 
 different being from the warrior of Elchingen, and of the 
 retreat from Moscow ; and it should be added that, if 
 he was still * the bravest of the brave,' he had never 
 exhibited the powers of a General-in-Chief. 
 
 Ney had reached Gosselies — some five or six miles from 
 Charleroy — by about half after four in the afternoon ; he 
 found Reille engaged with the division of Steinmetz, in 
 retreat, we have said, from Fontaine I'Eveque, and still 
 further, on Fleurus. The Prussians effected their escape 
 without much loss — they had been admirably led by 
 Steinmetz* — and they made their way to Heppignies, 
 
 Succincte de la Campagne de 181 5,' p. 12, and appendices. Heym&s, 
 indeed, says in his work that Napoleon, he infers, did not give this 
 part of the order ; and Soult said, many years after the event, that he 
 did not recollect its being given. But Heym^s is not a faithworthy 
 witness, and Thiers (' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 436, 437) 
 has proved that Soult acknowledged the order was made. Jomini, 
 again ('Precis de la Campagne de 1815,' 153, and see 265 et seq.), has 
 no doubts on the subject. That the order was given is established as 
 certainly as anything in the campaign. 
 
 * This distinguished soldier survived to see the war of 1870, and 
 held an important command at Gravelotte. 
 
 6-2
 
 84 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 whence they reached, without difficulty, the point where 
 they were to assemble. Ney was now in command of the 
 whole corps of Reille, composed of four divisions of 
 infantry and of a body of light horsemen ; the corps of 
 D'Erlon from Marchiennes was, in part, not far off; the 
 great main-road from Charleroy to Brussels had been 
 laid open by the enemy's retreat ; it was hardly more 
 than five in the afternoon ; Quatre Bras was not more 
 than seven or eight miles distant. It might have been 
 supposed that the Marshal would push forward a con- 
 siderable part, at least, of the corps of Reille, to carry out 
 the Emperor's orders and seize Quatre Bras ; but at this 
 point the hesitations and delays began, which he was to 
 exhibit on many occasions in the campaign. He de- 
 tached, probably by Napoleon's directions, one of Reille's 
 divisions, that of Girard, to follow and to observe Stein- 
 metz ; but he left two, those of Jerome Bonaparte and 
 Foy, at Gosselies. He marched the fourth, that of Bachelu, 
 only to Mellet, about two miles on the road to Quatre 
 Bras, and he advanced with the light cavalry of the Guard, 
 which, it will be borne in mind, he was not to engage, 
 and perhaps with the light cavalry of the corps of Reille, 
 under Pire. 
 
 On reaching Frasnes, rather more than two miles from 
 Quatre Bras, the Marshal found an enemy in his path ; 
 this was a single battalion of Nassau troops, which young 
 Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar, an illustrious name, had, on 
 hearing the news of the advance of the French, moved 
 forward very judiciously from Genappe, anticipating his 
 orders by several hours ; and he had supported this small 
 force by four battalions, the five about 4,000 strong, 
 which he had kept in reserve at Quatre Bras. The 
 battalion at Frasnes, threatened by the French cavalry, 
 had soon fallen back on the battalions in its rear. Infantry 
 was required to attack this force. Ney sent orders to 
 Bachelu to hurry forward a single battalion, it would
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 85 
 
 appear, only, which was to come to his assistance at 
 Frasnes. This reinforcement was in line at perhaps seven 
 in the evening; but if it was only one battalion, it was not 
 strong enough, even with the aid of the cavalry, to over- 
 throw an enemy very superior in numbers ; and Ney, 
 after making demonstrations to no purpose, placed his 
 troops in camp for the night at Frasnes. Had he em- 
 ployed even two of the divisions of Reille, he could have 
 crushed Saxe-Weimar's detachment, and have seized the 
 important point of Quatre Bras, as he had been directed 
 to do by Napoleon.* 
 
 Sombreffe, like Quatre Bras, was not occupied on the 
 other side of the field of manoeuvre. Zieten, ably carrying 
 out his preconcerted plan, had, we have seen, placed 
 Pirch II. and his division, partly reinforced, in a strong 
 position east of Charleroy. Pirch had very skilfully 
 arrayed his troops behind a marshy stream just beyond 
 Gilly, three or four miles only from Charleroy, his flanks 
 covered by woodland and broken ground, his left observing 
 the heads of Gerard's columns, beginning, at Chatelet, to 
 cross the Sambre. The line was extended as far as pos- 
 sible, in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of 
 this force. The Prussians were, in all, about 10,000 men. 
 Grouchy, who had ridden to the front with Excelmans' 
 horsemen, in order to support the squadrons of Pajol, 
 believed that he had 20,000 before him, and returned to 
 
 * This skirmish at Frasnes was not without importance, but writers 
 differ widely with respect to the numbers on both sides. We have 
 followed the narrative of H. Houssaye (' 181 5,' ii. 127-129), founded 
 on a careful study of the original reports and documents. It might 
 ' be inferred from Charras (i. 90, 91) that certainly Fh6 and his cavalry 
 accompanied the light cavalry of the Guard, and that perhaps more 
 than a single battalion of Bachelu's reached Frasnes. Thiers (' Histoire 
 du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 438) gives Ney 9,000 men at Frasnes, 
 but this is an error. H. Houssaye specifies the names of the five 
 Nassau battalions (p. 129). It may be that the first-named battalion 
 was not sent forward by Saxe- Weimar (p. 27), but this is most im- 
 probable.
 
 S6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Charleroy to ask Napoleon to give him the help of infantry. 
 The Emperor, having reconnoitred the position in person, 
 went back and pressed forward the corps of Vandamme. 
 The attack began at about half-past five in the afternoon. 
 Pirch, as before, fell back, having made a brief resistance, 
 losing only 500 or 600 men. Napoleon was so irritated at 
 the escape of the enemy that he launched his personal 
 escort against the retreating columns, and Letort, one of 
 his best officers, received a fatal wound. 
 
 The Prussians, excellently handled, made their way to 
 Fleurus, only a short distance from Sombreffe ; but had 
 Gerard been on the Sambre in force, they either could not 
 have made a stand, or if they did would probably have 
 been cut off.* Grouchy now advanced, and requested 
 Vandamme to march on Fleurus, and take possession of 
 Sombreffe, according to his master's directions ; but Van- 
 damme, surly and discontented at the events of the morn- 
 ing, and jealous of a man he deemed his inferior raised 
 over his head, gave a positive refusal, and placed his corps 
 in camps, at a distance of a few miles from Fleurus.f 
 Sombreffe, therefore, was not occupied by the French. 
 Napoleon had gone back to Charleroy ; yet he had more 
 than sufficient forces at hand to seize and hold this point ; 
 and possibly he might even now have caught Zieten, 
 who, at Fleurus, had only a comparatively small force. 
 Already, however, the physical decline, which was to 
 prove so disastrous in the campaign, was telling upon 
 Napoleon's powers ; he had fallen asleep during part of 
 the dayt ; he went to rest at Charleroy 'overwhelmed 
 
 * Charras has given us the best account of this combat (i. 91-93). 
 The road from Charleroy to Fleurus was obstructed by a stockade by 
 Pirch's orders. Chesney (' Waterloo Lectures,' 87) notices the results 
 of the absence of Gerard's corps in force. 
 
 t See Grouchy, ' Relation Succincte,' 12, 13, and Appendix. 
 
 X See H. Houssaye, ' 1815,' ii. 118, and Napoleon Correspondence, 
 yxviii. 286 : letter of Fain, Napoleon's private secretary. We repeat 
 we shall recur to this important subject.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 87 
 
 with fatigue.' We miss the General of 1796 at the close of 
 June 15. 
 
 The French army, when night had fallen, was in posi- 
 tion, as on the 14th, in three masses. On the left Ney 
 had his detachment at Frasnes ; the greater part of the 
 corps of Reille lay around Gosselies, Gerard and his 
 division being at Wangenies, not far from Fleurus ; the 
 corps of D'Erlon was, for the most part, between Mar- 
 chiennes and Gosselies, one division not having crossed 
 the Sambre. At the centre the corps of Vandamme had 
 approached Fleurus, covered by the horsemen of PajoF" 
 and Excelmans ; the Imperial Guard was at Gilly and 
 Charleroy, at no great distance ; but the corps of Lobau 
 was still beyond the Sambre, and so was the heavy cavalry 
 of Milhaud and Kellermann. To the right, about half of 
 the corps of Gerard had marched beyond Chatelet, and 
 was drawing near the centre ; but about the other half 
 had not got over the river, Gerard's movement having 
 been very difficult. The day, therefore, Charras has truly 
 said, * had been incomplete ' ; the exposed corps of Zieten 
 had not been destroyed ; Quatre Bras and Sombreffe had 
 not been reached ; not only had the army failed ' to be 
 over the Sambre before noon,' but about a fourth part of 
 it was still south of the river. 
 
 Nevertheless, Napoleon had gained most important 
 strategic success ; his prospects for the next day were of 
 the brightest promise. He had broken through the weak 
 allied centre, left open by the retreat of Zieten ; he had 
 mastered the great main road from Charleroy to Brussels 
 up to Frasnes ; he had made his way far into Belgium, 
 and was close to the line of the communications of his 
 adversaries between Namur and Brussels ; Quatre Bras 
 and Sombreffe were almost within his reach ; should he 
 encounter his enemies at these points, all the chances 
 
 * All the cavalry of Pajol seem to have been assembled in front of 
 Vandamme.
 
 88 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 \sere that they would meet defeat ; his army was concen- 
 trated upon a narrow space, and nearly stood between 
 hostile armies, scattered widely apart.* A few hours 
 would carry all his forces across the Sambre. He would 
 have 124,000 fighting men to oppose to Wellington and 
 Blucher, who, large as was the superiority of their 
 numbers were they once united, would now be almost 
 certainly inferior on the immediate scene of action. Un- 
 questionably he regretted the delays of the 15th, especially 
 the delay of the central column ;-|* but he rightly observed 
 that ' his manoeuvres had been successful ; he had the 
 means of defeating his enemies in detail. '| 
 
 From Napoleon we turn to his antagonists, and to their 
 operations on June 15. Blucher had probably heard that 
 French corps were in movement along the frontier as early 
 as the loth ; but on the 13th the fires of the invaders' 
 bivouacs, concealed as they had been, were descried by 
 Zieten's troops, and this intelligence was sent to the old 
 Prussian Marshal. Up to this time Blucher had not 
 stirred ; but on the 14th, it would appear by nightfall, he 
 despatched the orders to Zieten before referred to ; and 
 he directed Pirch, Thielmann, and Bulow, with the 2nd, 
 the 3rd, and the 4th corps, to make a general movement 
 towards Sombreffe, where he had long before resolved to 
 assemble his army. Pirch and Thielmann, from their 
 headquarters at Namur and Ciney — the first place about 
 fifteen miles from Sombreffe, the second more than thirty 
 
 * Napoleon had, in fact, secured the position which he thus de- 
 scribed (' Correspondence,' i. 520) with reference to his famous opera- 
 tions against Wurmser in 1796 : ' Si mon armee etait trop faiblc pour 
 faire face aux deux divisions de I'ennemi, elle pouvait battre chacune 
 d'elles sdparement.' 
 
 t ' Comment.,' v. 199. Heymc;s says that Napoleon did not complain 
 that Ney had not occupied Quatre Bras when the Marshal went back 
 to the Emperor's headquarters at Charlcroy ; but it is probable that 
 Ney did not go there at all. See H. Houssaye, ' 181 5, ii. 186. 
 
 X ' Comment.,' v. 136.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1 815 89 
 
 — brought their troops together with extreme activity. 
 By the early morning of June 16 the greatest part of their 
 forces was not far from Sombreffe, while the corps of 
 Zieten, drawn back from Fleurus, with the exception of a 
 small advanced guard, was not far from Sombreffe, at 
 St. Amand and Ligny. 
 
 Owing to a mistake made by the Chief of the Prussian 
 Staff, the movement of Bulow had been retarded. Bulow 
 received two orders upon the 15th, enjoining him only to 
 march on Hannut — that is, to a point twenty-five miles 
 from Sombreffe, and with no reference to an enemy at 
 hand ; and Bulow was not on the march from his head- 
 quarters at Liege until an early hour on June t6. An 
 angry controversy raged for years on the subject. 
 Gneisenau and Bulow seem to have been both to blame ; 
 but Liege is upwards of fifty miles from Sombreffe.* 
 Bulow could not possibly have reached that place in time 
 on the i6th, whatever was done ; the mistake in the 
 orders could make no difference. Blucher, therefore, 
 could have had no right to expect that his lieutenant, in 
 any event, could have reached the point of assembly on 
 the i6th, and could come to his support, should, as was 
 the Marshal's purpose, Sombreffe be the scene of a great 
 battle on that day. Bulow, indeed, fairly informed his 
 chief that he could not be at Hannut until mid-day on the 
 i6th — that is, twenty-five miles from Sombreffe. t 
 
 * Several of Bulow's detachments, too, were north of Lidge — that is, 
 still further from Sombreffe. 
 
 t For the time when Zieten's outposts discovered the presence of 
 the French army, see Prussian official account, pp. 7-9, and Chesney's 
 'Waterloo Lectures,' 71. As to the directions given by Blucher on 
 the 14th, and the movements of Pirch, Thielmann and Bulow, the 
 reader may be referred to Charras, i. 105, 106 ; to Ropes, ' Campaign 
 of Waterloo,' 69-73; and to Chesney's 'Waterloo Lectures,' 82. With 
 respect to the controversy about Gneisenau and Bulow, see the same 
 authorities z'n loco. This dispute is really beside the question ; what- 
 ever orders were given, Bulow could not be at Sombreffe in time on 
 the I 6th.
 
 90 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Blucher was thus assembling his forces at Sombreffe, 
 and was about to offer Napoleon battle, with the certainty 
 that three-fourths of his army only could be gathered 
 together on the spot in time, and that a fourth must 
 necessarily be absent from the field. This was charac- 
 teristic of the impetuous, often reckless, haste which was 
 the great fault of the old warrior, and which his mighty 
 adversary had calculated, from long experience, that he 
 might be expected to display. German writers, indeed, 
 have declared that Blucher would not have directed his 
 army to Sombreffe had he not been assured of the support 
 of Wellington, but this is an error designed to excuse the 
 Marshal. It is true, we have seen, that Blucher and 
 Wellington had agreed, several weeks before this time, 
 that, should Napoleon assail their centre, they would 
 concentrate forces to repel his attack ; but Sombreffe was 
 not referred to as the point of junction ; this was to be 
 at points nearer the Belgian frontier.* It is true also 
 that very probably Blucher expected Wellington to come 
 to his aid, perhaps by the early morning of June 16 ; but 
 he had received no promise to that effect ; the operations 
 of the Duke on the 15th give a distinct negative to this 
 conclusion. On the other hand, abundant proof exists 
 that Blucher had determined to assemble his army at 
 Sombreffe of his own set purpose, and without having 
 had any message from his colleague upon the subject. 
 He wrote to the King of Prussia on the 15th that ' he 
 would concentrate his army at Sombreffe next day, and 
 that he had not received any news from Wellington. 'f 
 
 We pass on to the conduct of Wellington on the 15th, 
 to this day not completely explained. The Duke's army, 
 
 * See anie, Ropes, 'The Campaign of Waterloo,' 71, 72, and 
 H. Houssaye, '1815,' ii. 114, 115, See also especially Muffling, 
 ' Passages from my Life,' 231, 232. 
 
 t See Blucher, 90 ei seq.j and H. Houssaye, '1815,' ii. 142, and 
 the authorities collected in the note.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 181 5 91 
 
 we have seen, had been widely extended, with a special 
 view to the protection of his right and right centre, but 
 with comparatively little regard for his left, the 2nd corps 
 holding the valleys of the Scheldt and the Dender, the 
 1st being largely in the valley of the Senne, at Braine le 
 Comte, Soignies, Enghien, Nivelle and other places, with 
 one detachment alone reaching the great main-road from 
 Charleroy to Brussels, the reserve being in and around 
 the chief town of Belgium. The Duke had been in 
 correspondence with Fouch^ and other traitors, and 
 certainly as early as the first week of June had been 
 informed that an attack was impending ; between the gth 
 and the 13th of the month he had learned that French 
 corps were upon the frontier.* Like Blucher, however, 
 he made no movement for a time ; but on the 15th he 
 received an express from Zieten, perhaps at nine in the 
 morning, more probably about three in the afternoon, t 
 announcing that his outposts had been driven in near 
 Charleroy. The Prince of Orange, at Brussels, gave the 
 same intelligence, referring, however, to the attack in 
 Thuin ; and similar reports came in afterwards, all indi- 
 cating a movement against Charleroy. 
 
 Wellington, nevertheless, refused to stir. The reasons 
 of this immobility have long been known. He thought 
 that his right and right centre might be attacked ; he was 
 convinced that Napoleon could not advance by the bad 
 roads leading from Beaumont to Charleroy, that his left 
 was, accordingly, secure, a signal proof of his adversary's 
 skill in selecting this line. He had been apprised, it is 
 said, that a false attack would be made from the Sambre 
 
 * Supp. Despatches, x. 451, 465, 471, 476, 478 ; and see especially 
 523 ef seq. 
 
 t The evidence preponderates that the Duke did not receive this 
 despatch until three ; but see his letter to Clarke, Despatches, xii. 473. 
 Zieten sent the despatch at four in the morning : Prussian official 
 account, p. 17 ; and see Chesney, 'Waterloo Lectures,' 83.
 
 92 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 upon his left.* He therefore had resolved to see how 
 things would develop themselves, not reflecting, perhaps, 
 what the loss of time might involve * against a man 
 dangerous to neglect for an hour ' ; but later in the after- 
 noon a despatch from Zieten, announcing that Charleroy 
 had been attacked, caused him to issue orders for his first 
 movement on June 15. These orders were despatched 
 between five and seven, or, as the Dutch archives report, 
 about nine.t The purpose of Wellington was not doubtful. 
 The 2nd corps was practically to remain where it was — at 
 least, to make nothing like a decided movement ; but a 
 large part of the reserve was to make ready to march 
 from Brussels ; the ist corps was to make a change in its 
 stations. Its first division, the British Guards of Cooke, 
 was to advance to Ath ; its third division, that of Alten, 
 British, was to march to Braine le Comte, and thence to 
 Nivelles, ' should that point have been attacked ' ; its two 
 Dutch Belgian divisions, under Perponcher and Chasse, 
 were to assemble at Nivelles. But Alten's division was 
 not to move to Nivelles ' until it is quite certain that the 
 enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, 
 and the left of the British army'l — in other words, upon 
 the allied centre. 
 
 These dispositions very clearly show what was passing 
 in Wellington's mind at this time. The virtual immo- 
 bility of his 2nd corps, and even the arrangements he was 
 making for the ist — that is, placing it between Ath, Braine 
 le Comte, and Nivelles — prove that he was anxious about 
 his right and his right centre, and was not in much 
 apprehension for his left. He directed, indeed, a partial 
 
 * See Supp. Despatches, x. 523 el seq., and OUech, 72)' ^^^ ^^^o 
 Greville, 'Memoirs,' i. 41, written in 1820. 
 
 t See Ropes, ' Campaign of Waterloo,' 77 ; Chesney, 83 ; and, to the 
 contrary, Charras, i. 109. Charras seems right here. 
 
 X Wellington Despatches, xii. 472. It is unnecessary to say that 
 every line of these despatches relating to the campaign should be 
 carefully studied.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 93 
 
 concentration of the ist corps towards his left ; his two 
 Dutch Belgian divisions were to assemble at Nivelles ; 
 Alten's division was to march to that place, but onl}^ 
 when the left and the allied centre were assailed. But 
 Nivelles is about seven miles to the west of the great 
 main-road from Charleroy to Brussels ; the Duke, there- 
 fore, could not have been convinced that his left and the 
 allied centre were in immediate danger ; and this, though 
 he had been informed for some time that the French 
 army had attacked Charleroy ; and though, as a matter 
 of fact, a powerful French force had advanced to Gosselies, 
 with a detachment to Frasnes, had mastered the great 
 main-road up to these points, and even might easily have 
 occupied Quatre Bras ! Nor was this all. The order 
 to assemble the Dutch Belgian divisions at Nivelles in- 
 volved the withdrawal from the great main-road of the 
 detachment which up to this had held it, and the retreat 
 of Saxe- Weimar from Quatre Bras ; that is, it completely 
 exposed the left of Wellington, and completely uncovered 
 the allied centre ! The order, therefore, was founded on 
 false assumptions, and directed a movement which in 
 some respects would have been utterly false, and pregnant 
 with danger.* 
 
 Some time afterwards, probably after nine at night, a 
 despatch from Blucher was placed in Wellington's hands 
 — the first he had received upon the 15th, the head- 
 quarters were so widely distant — announcing that the 
 Prussian army was being assembled at Sombreffe. The 
 Duke told Muffling, the Prussian Commissioner in his 
 camp, that, as had been requested, he would concentrate 
 his own army, but that he could not fix the points until 
 he had heard from Mons, showing thus that he was still 
 thinking of his right centre.f At ten at night new or 
 
 ■* This is very ably shown by Charras, i. 109. 
 
 + Muffling, ' Passages,' 229. The solicitude of the Duke about 
 Mons may indicate that D'Erlon had made the demonstration against
 
 94 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ' after ' orders were issued ; these also plainly indicate 
 their author's purpose. The 2nd corps was now to be set 
 in motion, and to advance eastwards from the valleys of 
 the Scheldt and the Dender, in a general way, into the 
 valley of the Senne ; it was largely to assemble around 
 Enghien ; it was thus to approach Wellington's left, but 
 still at a distance. As to the ist corps, Cooke's Guards 
 were to march on Braine le Comte ; Alten's division was 
 to move on Nivelles; Perponcher's and Chasse's divisions, 
 it was assumed, were being assembled at that place. 
 Nothing was said expressly about the reserve, but it 
 was, of course, implied that, according to the previous 
 orders, a large part of it was to be prepared to make a 
 march from Brussels.* 
 
 These orders also prove that, even by this time, Wel- 
 lington was chiefly solicitous for his right centre, and was 
 not thinking much about his left and the allied centre; 
 they certainly indicate that he had not made up his mind. 
 Had they been carried into effect, his 2nd and ist corps 
 would have held positions between Enghien, Braine le 
 Comte, and Nivelles — that is, on a curved line some 
 eighteen miles in extent, in front especially of the fortress 
 of Mons ; the reserve, though ready, was not to move 
 from Brussels ; the chief part of the ist corps would have 
 been concentrated around Nivelles ; in other words, the 
 great main -road from Charleroy to Brussels would not 
 have been occupied by a single man ; the Duke's left and 
 the allied centre would have been without protection, and 
 wholly exposed ; the wide space between Nivelles and 
 Sombreffe — a distance of about fourteen miles — would 
 have divided Wellington and Blucher's armies. Napoleon, 
 already near Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, could easily have 
 
 Binche and Mons before referred to. See Maurice, United Service 
 Magazine, May, 1890. 
 * See order, Wellington Despatches, xii. 474.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 95 
 
 moved against either, or both, and in all probability could 
 have gained most important success.* 
 
 But 'the intelligent disobedience,' as it has rightly been 
 called, of a subordinate of the Duke averted, in some 
 measure at least, the peril of dispositions that might have 
 proved fatal. Saxe-Weimar, we have seen, had advanced 
 some 4,000 men to Quatre Bras and Frasnes, and had 
 held the detachment of Ney in check ; he sent a report 
 of the skirmish to Perponcher, his chief, in command of 
 one of the Dutch-Belgian divisions of the ist corps. 
 Perponcher, having received this news, and having also, 
 perhaps, learned that Charleroy was occupied by the 
 enemy in force, took boldly on himself to direct his whole 
 division on Quatre Bras, in order at once to support Saxe 
 Weimar, and to retain possession, at that point, of the 
 great main-road from Charleroy to Brussels, and of the 
 lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, the principal link 
 between Blucher and Wellington. He acted, no doubt, 
 upon instructions from the Chief of the Staff of the Prince 
 of Orange, but he disobeyed the positive commands of 
 Wellington, directing him to assemble his division at 
 Nivelles ; and in adopting this course he gave proof of 
 no common insight, and of undertaking a great but 
 necessary responsibility at the gravest risks. ' Quatre 
 Bras was thus occupied on the evening and night of the 
 fifteenth, not only without orders from Wellington, but 
 against his orders ;'t the gap was closed for a moment 
 against Napoleon. But Quatre Bras was held by a very 
 small force, which ought to have been overwhelmed the 
 next day. J 
 
 * This, too, is admirably explained by Charras, i. no. 
 
 t Ropes, ' Campaign of Waterloo,' 122. 
 
 I General Maurice {United Service Magazine, July, 1890) has 
 argued that Wellington was right in concentrating a very large part 
 of his army at Nivelles — at least, in giving orders to that effect — on 
 the principle that you should not expose your forces piecemeal to the 
 blows of a concentrated enemy. Now, it is quite true that, as
 
 96 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 The dispositions of Wellington, therefore, had^ up to 
 this time been unworthy of him. From the outset his 
 army had been too dispersed. Though made aware that 
 an attack was being threatened, he had done nothing to 
 assemble it until late on the 15th ; he held to a fixed idea 
 that his right and right centre were aimed at, if, indeed, 
 an attack was to be made at all. Being separated from 
 Blucher by a wide distance, he had no information from 
 him until very late ; at his headquarters at Brussels he 
 could not easily ascertain what was going on, even in his 
 own front ; and when he gave orders for the movement 
 on Enghien, Braine le Comte, and Nivelles, these exposed 
 Blucher and himself to defeat, perhaps to disaster.* At 
 some time, however — we should infer about midnight — 
 that is, after the orders made two hours before,i- the Duke 
 issued a new set of orders, which certainly point to a great 
 movement of his army to his left, and of a considerable 
 part of it to Quatre Bras, and upon the great main-road 
 from Charleroy to Brussels. 
 
 These orders, it is alleged, have been lost, owing to the 
 
 Napoleon has conclusively shown ('Comment.,' v. 205-207), Blucher 
 ought not to have concentrated at Sombreffe,and Wellington ought not, 
 as he afterwards did, to have tried to concentrate at Quatre Bras ; both 
 ought to have fallen back. But, as Blucher did concentrate at Som- 
 breffe, Wellington was bound to concentrate, not at Nivelles, but, as 
 he afterwards attempted to do, though very late, at Quatre Bras. The 
 argument of General Maurice, which has found no supporters, is fully 
 disposed of by Mr. Ropes, ' Campaign of Waterloo,' 93-95. For much 
 the same reasons General Maurice condemns the advance of Saxe- 
 Weimar, and the admirable movement by Perponcher, of his division 
 to Quatre Bras, which may have saved the campaign for the allies. 
 But he is contradicted by every authority, and, in fact, this whole 
 argument is mere paradox. 
 
 * See the bitter remarks of Gneisenau, who, however, disliked 
 Wellington : letter to the King of Prussia, cited by Van Loben Sels ; 
 ' Prdcis de la Campagne de 181 5,' 225 ; and see 97. 
 
 t Mr. Ropes (' Campaign of Waterloo ') makes the hour much 
 later ; but Charras (i. no) seems to have most of the evidence on 
 his side. He gives the time at ' about eleven.'
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 97 
 
 death of Wellington's Chief of the Staff, on June 18 ;* but 
 their purport has been made manifest, to some extent, if 
 by no means conclusively proved. In the report made by 
 Wellington of the events of the campaign, dated on the 
 igth, the day after Waterloo, he wrote that * on the even- 
 ing of the i6th he ordered the troops to march to their 
 left,' and that he ' directed the whole army to march 
 upon Quatre Bras,' at an hour not specified, but which 
 probably was on the night of the 15th, or the early morn- 
 ing of the next day.t Muffling states that ' towards mid- 
 night,' on the 15th, the Duke ' entered his room and said ' 
 that he had * given orders for the concentration of his 
 army at Nivelles and Quatre Bras,' and that this was 
 while the ball of the Duke of Richmond was in full swing.! 
 This is fully confirmed by a well-authenticated report of a 
 conversation between Wellington and his host at the ball. 
 The Duke, with other particulars of much interest, said 
 ' that he had ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre 
 Bras.'§ Lastly, Wellington wrote to Blucher on the 
 morning of the i6th — the letter has been discovered not 
 very long ago — that a considerable part of the army, at 
 least, was at Quatre Bras and Nivelles, and that the 
 greatest part of the army was not distant ; and we know 
 for certain that most of the reserve had been directed at 
 a very early hour on the i6th to march from Brussels 
 towards Nivelles and Quatre Bras.|| It is true that the 
 letter to Blucher was far from accurate ; it magnified the 
 extent of the movement on Quatre Bras and Nivelles, 
 
 * Search should be carefully made for these orders, for they are of 
 the greatest importance. Mr. Ropes (' Campaign of Waterloo,' p. 2) 
 rightly says they may, possibly, be yet found. 
 
 t Wellington Despatches, xii. 478. The report is not quite 
 correct. 
 
 X Muffling, ' Passages,' 230. 
 
 § ' Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury,' i. 445. 
 
 II Letter of Wellington to Blucher, in French, Ollech, opposite 
 p. 124. 
 
 7
 
 98 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 owing probably to mistakes made by Wellington's staff. 
 But this body of evidence distinctly shows that at some 
 time in the night of the I5th-i6th he had directed a great 
 part of his army to move towards his left, and especially a 
 certain part to Quatre Bras. These orders, however, were 
 issued at a very late hour ; time was needed to carry them 
 into effect, notably for the 2nd corps of Wellington's 
 army ; and, as a matter of fact, only Perponcher's corps 
 was in line at Quatre Bras until the afternoon of the 
 i6th. Could this weak force stop an attack made by Ney, 
 already at Frasnes, and in command of the whole left 
 wing of the French army ? had not Wellington's left and 
 the allied centre been left uncovered and exposed, so that 
 it had become impossible to turn aside for any length of 
 time the blows of Napoleon ?* 
 
 * The question of the disposition of Wellington's army after the 
 orders of ten at night, and all the evidence relating to the subject, are 
 very ably and exhaustively considered by Mr. Ropes, ' Campaign of 
 Waterloo,' 80 et seq. The letter of the Duke to Blucher, which, no 
 doubt, represented the Duke's army to be nearer Ouatre Bras than it 
 actually was, became the foundation of the charge made by Delbruck, 
 the biographer of Gneisenau, to the effect that Wellington deceived 
 his colleague, and induced him to stand and fight on the i6th in order 
 to extricate himself from the difficulties in which his bad strategy had 
 involved him. The charge has been well examined by Mr. Ropes, 
 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 109, no, and by General Maurice, United 
 Sendee Magazine^ June, 1890, and is certainly false. The mistake 
 made by Wellington was probably caused by his having had before 
 him a most misleading and scarcely intelligible document, prepared 
 by some officer on his staff, and called ' Dispositions of the British 
 Army at 7 a.m., on June 16,' and which grossly misrepresented the 
 real facts. At the same time, the charge was not unnaturally made, 
 for the letter of the Duke was very incorrect, and the inference, if 
 strained, was not without apparent foundation. The Duke's staff in 
 the campaign was not good ; he had reason to complain of it on 
 June 15 and 16, both on account of the imperfect intelligence sent 
 from the frontier (sec Siborne, 1844 edition, i. 164), and especially of 
 the document referred to. It should be added here that the Duke's 
 reply to Clausewitz '(-Supp. Despatches, x. 523), dealing with these 
 events, is full of errors. It was written when Wellington was more 
 than seventy-two, and in bad health.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 99 
 
 Let us now glance for a moment at the positions of the 
 belligerent armies after the movements of the 15th, and in 
 the early morning of the following day. The corps of 
 Zieten, reduced by some 2,000 men, was, we have seen, at 
 St. Amand and Ligny, near Sombreffe ; Pirch and Thiel- 
 mann were hastening to join Zieten ; but some hours were 
 required before they could come into line.* Bulow could 
 not reach Sombreffe on the i6th in time. On the other 
 side of the theatre of events, Perponcher's single division 
 alone held the important point of Quatre Bras. Though 
 Wellington's army was upon the march, it could not be 
 at Quatre Bras, even in part, for a considerable time — as 
 it happened, not until the afternoon — and the allied armies 
 were widely apart. Napoleon, on the other hand, had a 
 powerful force near Sombreffe, and another powerful force 
 near Quatre Bras ; he had broken and all but laid hold 
 of the allied centre ; he had 100,000 men within easy 
 reach of his enemy, if part of his army had not yet crossed 
 the Sambre. In this position of affairs he probably had 
 the means of falling on the isolated corps of Zieten, and 
 defeating it, after a rapid movement, before it could 
 receive its supports ; in that event, three-fourths of the 
 Prussian army could hardly have escaped a very grave 
 disaster. At the same time, the Emperor certainly had 
 the means of overwhelming, by Ney, the corps of Per- 
 poncher ; he then could turn against Wellington or 
 Blucher, or both ; indisputably, he could have caught and 
 routed the Prussian chief. 
 
 He had gained, in a word, a position of vantage, in 
 which he could strike down the heads of his enemy's 
 columns, and could afterwards, in all probability, defeat 
 one or both, attacking Blucher and subsequently Welling- 
 ton in detail. And if accidents of war, and the fact that 
 
 * Thielmann was not at Sombreffe until noon. As to Pirch the 
 authorities differ: H. Houssaye, '1815,'ii. 141; Chesney, 'Waterloo 
 Lectures,' 82. 
 
 7-2
 
 loo THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 a large part of the French army was still beyond the 
 Sambre, and the fatigues of a harassing march on the 
 15th, were to prevent him accomplishing all this, the 
 Emperor, nevertheless, had wellnigh secured a consider- 
 able measure at least of success. He could hardly fail, 
 were his operations reasonably well conducted, to crush 
 Perponcher, to keep Wellington back, and to fall on 
 Blucher in preponderating force. His adversaries, in fact, 
 had been outmanceuvred ;* inferior in numbers as his army 
 was, all the chances were that he would be superior to 
 them at the decisive points on the immediate scene of 
 action. 
 
 The strategy of Napoleon on June 15 was as admirably 
 designed as in any passage of his career, if not as well 
 carried out as it might have been ; few will defend the 
 strategy of his foes. It should be observed, however, that 
 the grave dangers in which Blucher and Wellington were 
 now involved are largely to be ascribed to the faulty 
 arrangements they had made before hostilities broke out. 
 Their armies were disseminated over much too wide a 
 space ; the concentration of these was therefore difficult, 
 were they suddenly attacked ; their centre was weak 
 where their inner flanks met ; Napoleon successfully 
 assailed and pounced down on it. Wellington had so 
 placed his army as to cover his right and right centre, 
 thinking little of his left ; he held obstinately to this 
 belief ; he was scarcely able, therefore, to assemble forces 
 in time to protect in any real sense his left and to give 
 sufficient support to the Prussian army. Blucher and the 
 Duke, too, were too far from each other at their head- 
 quarters at Namur and Brussels ; their means of com- 
 munication were accordingly bad ; Wellington did not 
 
 * Wellington frankly acknowledged this. His celebrated remark 
 to the Duke of Richmond at the ball : ' Napoleon has humbugged me ; 
 by God ! he has gained twenty-four hours' march on me,' speaks 
 volumes. See ' Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury,' ii. 445.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15, 1815 lor 
 
 hear that his colleague was assembling at Sombreffe until 
 late in the evening of the 15th. Both chiefs, no doubt, 
 had to complain of their staffs ; but it is confounding 
 lesser with greater causes to attribute faults to subordinates 
 and to pass over their own ; they ought not to have been 
 so widely apart. 
 
 All this accounts for much that took place, but Blucher 
 and Wellington each committed mistakes, even after the 
 campaign had really begun. Napoleon has argued with 
 conclusive logic that even as early as the middle of May 
 Blucher and his army ought to have been near Fleurus, 
 Wellington and his army around Brussels, but with 
 detachments upon the frontier ; that is, their forces and 
 themselves should have been nearer each other than they 
 actually were.* However this may have been, both 
 Blucher and Wellington had been made aware days 
 before they were attacked that a great French army was 
 upon the frontier ; they ought, therefore, to have begun 
 to concentrate at once, and assuredly ought to have 
 approached each other ; they remained motionless, and 
 waited upon their enemy. In addition, Blucher ought 
 not to have advanced to Sombreffe when Napoleon had 
 seized Charleroy and was on the allied centre ; this was 
 violating the well-known principle that an army should 
 not be assembled within an adversary's reach ; and 
 though Blucher's movement, so to speak, compelled 
 Wellington to march towards Quatre Bras, if he was not 
 to desert his ally, both commanders certainly ought to 
 have fallen back and united their forces at points in the 
 rear, so that Napoleon could not have an opportunity to 
 strike either at once, and fall on them with forces not yet 
 drawn together.t Owing to all these mistakes and short- 
 comings, Blucher and Wellington were now in no doubt- 
 ful peril. It was only through a mere accident, we shall 
 
 * ' 
 
 Comment.,' v. 204-206. t Ih'd., v. 205-207.
 
 102 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 see, that Blucher was not completely routed upon the 
 i6th, in which event Wellington could have scarcely 
 escaped.* 
 
 * Impartial and competent judges have long ago, with scarcely an 
 exception, found fault with the operations of Blucher and Wellington 
 on June 15. Without referring to French and German invectives, 
 Charras, a great admirer of Wellington, remarks (i. 3) : ' Dans cette 
 journee du 15 Juin, si mal employde, on ne reconnait ni sa perspicacity 
 si profonde, ni son coup d'oeil si sur, ni son activity habituelle.' 
 English commentators, too, are severe on the British Chief. Lord 
 Wolseley ('Decline and Fall of Napoleon,' 143) dryly says: 'Had 
 the Duke been beaten at Waterloo, history would surely have con- 
 demned the position of his army on June 13, 14, and 15, and also his 
 decision to maintain it until the French attack had been fully de- 
 veloped, instead of at once concentrating when he first learned that 
 the enemy's columns had reached Maubeuge.' Chesney, another 
 admirer of Wellington, and a detractor of Napoleon, remarks, 
 'Waterloo Lectures,' loi, that Wellington's inaction during the 15th 
 ' can hardly escape notice in the most cursory view of the strategy of 
 this campaign. . . . The balance of strategy was, up to this point, 
 on Napoleon's side.' Shaw Kennedy (' The Battle of Waterloo,' 
 148) observes with truth : ' Wellington and Blucher determined to 
 continue in their cantonments until they knew positively the line of 
 attack. Now, it may safely be predicted that this determination will 
 be considered by future and dispassionate historians as a great mis- 
 take, for, in place of waiting to see when the blow actually fell, the 
 armies should have been instantly put in motion to assemble. Nor 
 was this the only error. The line of cantonments occupied by the 
 Anglo-allied and Prussian armies was greatly too extended.' Napo- 
 leon's comments are severe, and no doubt are partial ; but it is 
 impossible to see how they can be answered (' Comment.,' v. 204-207).
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE l6 — LIGNY AND QUATRE 
 
 BRAS 
 
 The French army on the morning of June i6 — Alleged inaction of 
 Napoleon — His orders to Ney and Grouchy — Conduct of Ney 
 since the evening of the 15th — His delays and remissness — March 
 of the main French army to Fleurus — Positions of the Prussian 
 army — Arrangements of Blucher, and his faults — Interview be- 
 tween Blucher and Wellington — Skilful arrangements of Napo- 
 leon — His letter of 2 p.m. to Ney — The Battle of Ligny, attack 
 on Blucher's right and right centre — Desperate fighting — Napo- 
 leon's order to Ney of 3.15 p.m. — Order to D'Erlon to march to 
 the field — Continuation of the battle — Apparition of D'Erlon to- 
 wards Fleurus — He retires from the field — Napoleon breaks 
 Blucher's centre and defeats the Prussians — Battle of Ouatre 
 Bras — Conduct of Ney and Reille — Ney's attack late — Progress 
 of the battle — Different attacks of Ney — He recalls D'Erlon — 
 Wellington compels Ney to retreat to Frasnes — Napoleon's 
 success on the i6th great, but not decisive, chiefly owing to Ney's 
 conduct — Reille and D'Erlon gravely to blame — The position of 
 the allies very critical. 
 
 Very differently from what had happened on June 15, 
 the French army made scarcely any movement on the 
 i6th until between nine and ten in the forenoon. D'Erlon, 
 indeed, who, we have seen, had been backward, and had 
 been urged more than once to effect his junction with 
 Reille,* seems to have marched his last division across 
 
 * See letters of Soult, 3 p.m. and 4.30 p.m., on the 1 5th : ' Documents 
 in^dits,' collected by the son of Ney in 1840, Nos. 5 and 6. These 
 letters are in La Tour d'Auvergne's ' Waterloo,' 63, 66.
 
 I04 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the Sambre at a very early hour on the morning of the 
 i6th ; his whole corps was assembled around Jumet, a 
 village about two miles from Gosselies, the headquarters 
 of Reille and the 2nd corps, at probably from ten to 
 eleven o'clock.* But the rest of the French army had 
 not stirred ; Reille, as in the evening, lay around 
 Gosselies, with a detachment at Frasnes, and Girard at 
 Wangenies ; Vandamme, Excelmans and Pajol were near 
 Fleurus ; the Imperial Guard between Gilly and Char- 
 leroy ; Lobau, Milhaud and Kellermann beyond the 
 Sambre ; Gerard, half of his corps north, half south, of 
 the river. None of these Generals had received orders 
 from headquarters until between eight and ten. 
 
 Napoleon has been severely censured for this seeming 
 inaction by many able critics.t These charges cannot be 
 lightly passed over. Napoleon, we have seen, had he 
 marched forward at an early hour on June 16, was, all 
 but certainly, assured of important success. A few 
 remarks must be made on the subject. It may be that 
 the Emperor was still suffering from the effects of the 
 fatigue of the 15th — he was no longer the man he once 
 had been — and required a somewhat protracted rest before 
 he could send out his orders. It may be, too, he thought 
 he should have his whole army in hand, and across the 
 Sambre, before he attacked enemies, divided indeed, but 
 
 * This, which is important, has been conclusively established by 
 H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 130, 199. 
 
 t Jomini ('Precis de la Campagne de 18115,' 157) remarks: ' Mal- 
 heureusement pour Napoleon elle ne se fit pas avec I'activitd inouie 
 qui le distinguait ordinairement. On est forcd de I'avouer, I'emploi 
 qu'il fit de cette matinee du 16 restera toujours un problemepour ceux 
 qui le connaissent bien.' Jomini's authority is, of course, of the very 
 highest ; he perfectly well knew what could be done by Napoleon and 
 a French army. Lord Wolseley (' Decline and F'all of Napoleon,' 
 158) says: 'No movement or advance was made until near 11 a.m. 
 Between seven and eight hours was thus lost.' See also Clausewitz, 
 cited by Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 163, and Charras, i. 114, 
 118, 149. Charras is very bitter, but he is a libeller of Napoleon.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 105 
 
 formidable in numbers, even though apart ; and Welling- 
 ton has sagaciously observed that, after the exertions they 
 had made the day before, the French may have been 
 unable on the i6th to march until comparatively late.* 
 The delay of Napoleon, however, such as it was, was, it 
 would appear, mainly due to quite different reasons. The 
 retreat of the Prussians from Marchiennes and Charleroy 
 on Fleurus seemed to point to a movement towards the 
 north-east and Liege — that is, far away from their British 
 allies; not a British regiment had been seen on the 15th. 
 It seemed improbable, as affairs now stood, that Blucher 
 and Wellington would attempt to assemble their forces 
 around Sombreffe and Quatre Bras, within reach of a 
 concentrated enemy. Napoleon, therefore, appears to 
 have inferred that his adversaries were falling back before 
 him, according to true strategic principles, perhaps retiring 
 in the direction of their respective bases. His orders for 
 the i6th confirm this view, and on this supposition there 
 was no necessity for his army making a very early move- 
 ment. Besides, his inaction, if inaction there was, was 
 much less than has commonly been supposed. He sent 
 an aide-de-camp to Ney soon after daybreak ; he had let 
 the Marshal know, by half-past six in the morning, that 
 Kellermann's horsemen would soon reach Gosselies ; he 
 desired to learn exactly where D'Erlon was, and by seven 
 at least he had made his arrangements for his operations 
 on the i6th.t 
 
 These arrangements were set forth in two pairs of 
 despatches, one pair directed to Ney, the other to Grouchy, 
 one letter in each pair being from the pen of Soult, the 
 other, written somewhat later, by the Emperor himself. 
 
 * Ellesmere, 296, 297. 
 
 t See H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 133, 136, 187. The letter sent 
 to Ney at 5.30 in the morning, or thereabouts, is No. 7 of ' Docu- 
 ments inedits,' and will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 
 94, 95-
 
 io6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 As regards Ney first — he had been placed in command, 
 we must recollect, of the entire French left — the orders of 
 Napoleon were of no doubtful import. The Emperor 
 assumed, as he had reason to expect, that his lieutenant 
 had, or ere long would have, the whole of the 2nd and 
 ist corps in hand, and in addition Kellermann's corps of 
 cavalry ; he explained in detail how these forces were to 
 be disposed. One division, should no difficulty arise, was 
 to be placed four or five miles beyond Quatre Bras, on the 
 great main-road from Charleroy to Brussels ; another was 
 to be directed on Marbais, a village to the south-east of 
 Quatre Bras, and not quite five miles from that place, but 
 close to the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, the 
 natural link between Blucher and Wellington ; the whole 
 of the rest of the 2nd and the ist corps — Girard at 
 Wangenies was still under Ney's orders — was to be 
 assembled in force around Ouatre Bras. As for Keller- 
 mann's cavalry, this was to stand on an ancient Roman 
 road called the Chaussee of Brunehaut, which crosses the 
 great main road from Charleroy to Brussels, and thence 
 reaches the road from Nivelles to Namur. In this position 
 it would be near Frasnes and Quatre Bras, and yet could 
 easily attain Fleurus should the Emperor be in need of it. 
 The light cavalry of the Guard was to remain with Ney ; 
 the prohibition to employ it was not continued, but it 
 was to be * spared ' should there be an ' affair ' with the 
 English, and to be * covered ' by the horsemen of Reille 
 and D'Erlon. Napoleon proceeded to inform the Marshal 
 as to the disposition of the remaining parts of the army, 
 and as to the intentions of its chief for the day. Grouchy 
 was to march on Sombreffe with the corps of Vandamme 
 and Gerard ; Napoleon was to advance with the Guard on 
 Fleurus ; no reference was made to the corps of Lobau ; 
 and the Emperor announced that it was his purpose to 
 attack the enemy should ' he happen to meet him,' and to 
 send a detachment as far as Gembloux, a small town six
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 107 
 
 or seven miles beyond Sombreffe. Napoleon then made 
 his lieutenant aware that he hoped to be able * to be at 
 Brussels on the 17th,' and that Ney ought to have his 
 whole army in hand in order to second this great forward 
 movement. 
 
 Turning to the other side of the theatre of events, 
 Napoleon gave Grouchy the command of the whole 
 French right — that is, of the corps of Vandamme and 
 Gerard, with the cavalry of Pajol, Excelmans and Milhaud 
 — and directed him to advance on Sombreffe according 
 to what had been written to Ney. The Emperor added 
 that he would march to Fleurus with the Guard, and 
 that he would attack the enemy should he be on the spot 
 at Sombreffe or Gembloux ; he distinctly wrote that from 
 all that he had heard * the Prussians could not oppose to 
 him more than 40,000 men.'* 
 
 The despatches of Soult corresponded, of course, in 
 nearly all respects with those of his master, except that 
 he placed Kellermann's cavalry entirely at the disposal of 
 Ney, and he expressed an opinion that the enemy had 
 probably retired from the great main-road from Charleroy 
 to Brussels, and even from the country around Nivelles.t 
 From these important papers we can collect, with 
 certainty, what were Napoleon's views on the i6th, and 
 what objects he hoped to accomplish. He evidently 
 believed that Ney could not encounter much opposition 
 on the part of Wellington, and that he — that is, the 
 Emperor — would be able to defeat or to thrust aside 
 Blucher. He was convinced that he could easily master 
 the two strategic points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, 
 which he had expected to master the day before. He 
 
 * These most important despatches will be found in Napoleon 
 Correspondence, xxviii. 289, 292. They require close study. 
 
 t The corresponding despatches of Soult are in ' Documents 
 inddits,' No. 8, and La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 99, 102, and in 
 a work by a son of Grouchy.
 
 io8 rilE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 hoped that probabl}' he would enter Brussels on the 
 17th. He was plainly, therefore, convinced that the 
 allies would not be in force at Quatrc Bras and Sombreffe ; 
 that they were not moving their armies to these places, 
 their centre having been broken through, and their enemy 
 being in strength, within easy reach ; and that they were 
 falling back, possibly behind Brussels, no doubt at a 
 distance, perhaps increasing. The Emperor's calculations 
 for the day were accordingly based on false assumptions ; 
 his anticipations were quite incorrect, though in con- 
 formity with the true principles of the art of war. 
 
 But it deserves special notice, and this is of the first 
 importance, that the arrangements he made for the 
 1 6th were perfectly combined to meet all that might 
 happen ; and, in the events that actually occurred, they 
 secured him success that ought to have been decisive. 
 Ney, on the left, should he do his duty — nay, should he 
 simply obey his orders — would be easily able to hold 
 Quatre Bras against any forces Wellington could bring 
 up ; would probably crush Perponcher's weak division, 
 perhaps defeat reinforcements sent to his aid ; would 
 certainly keep Wellington far away from Blucher should 
 the allied chiefs endeavour to unite. Nor was this all, or 
 even nearly all. The division Ney was to send to Marbais 
 would help to separate Blucher from Wellington ; it 
 would be on the flank and rear of Blucher, should Blucher 
 offer battle between Sombreffe and Fleurus, and, if it 
 was even slightly reinforced, might involve the Prussian 
 chief in a great disaster ; and Kellermann's cavalry would 
 be admirably placed to second, as the case might be, 
 either Ney or Napoleon. On the opposite side of the 
 operations to take place. Napoleon and Grouchy would, 
 in any event, be more than able to make head against 
 Blucher, who could not have his four corps in hand, that 
 of Bulow having been stationed at Liege ; and very 
 probably, with the assistance of Ney, a few miles only
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 109 
 
 away at Quatre Bras, they would be the means of in- 
 flicting on Blucher a great defeat. Whatever might take 
 place, it was thus made certain that Blucher and Welling- 
 ton could not join hands, should they attempt to meet on 
 Sombreffe or Quatre Bras ; and all the chances were that 
 either or both, if they made the attempt, would heavily 
 suffer.* 
 
 The Emperor's orders, carried by one of his best aide- 
 de-camps — all commentators agree as regards the time — 
 left Charleroy between eight and nine in the morning, and 
 reached Ney at Frasnes between ten and eleven. The 
 movements of the Marshal since the brush with Saxe- 
 Weimar have not even now been fully explained ; but 
 there is ample evidence that they gave proof of the 
 indecision shown on the evening of the 15th, and that 
 with considerably less excuse. His single aide-de-camp 
 has told us that Ney left Frasnes late on the 15th, passed 
 through Gosselies, and had an interview with his master 
 at Charleroy. The Emperor received him well, though 
 Quatre Bras had not been seized, gave him his orders, 
 and sent him back to Gosselies. But the aide-de-camp 
 alone has made this statement ; he is in no sense a 
 trustworthy witness ; there is much reason to believe that 
 Ney remained at Gosselies during the night of the 15th, 
 and until the early morning of the next day, and only 
 sent a report to Napoleon, without having exchanged a 
 word with him.t 
 
 Be this as it may, the course to be taken by Ney, after 
 the first hours of the i6th, ought to have been evident to 
 him. The Marshal had been directed on the previous 
 
 * The arrangements of Napoleon for June 16 should be carefully 
 studied upon a good map. Though founded on a false hypothesis, 
 they showed characteristic strategic insight, and, in fact, met all the 
 circumstances of the situation. 
 
 t H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 186, very able on this point.
 
 no THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 afternoon to press forward and occupy Quatre Bras ;* he 
 had not succeeded in accomphshing this ; but the order 
 of Napoleon remained in full force ; he should have carried 
 it into effect as quickly as possible. In addition Ney 
 knew that he was to have Kellermann's horsemen, and 
 that orders had long been given to accelerate the march 
 of D'Erlon ; all this pointed to a forward movement early 
 on the i6th. What he ought to have done cannot be, 
 therefore, doubtful. He should have taken care that 
 Rcille's three divisions should be ready to advance on 
 Quatre Bras in the morning of the i6th ; that D'Erlon 
 and Kellermann should be close at hand ; in short, that 
 the French left should be easily in his power, and near 
 him. Had he done this, and it was not the least difficult, 
 the fortunes of Europe might have been changed for a 
 time. Ney, however, simply did nothing of the kind ; 
 he left Gosselies for Frasnes at an early hour ; he did not 
 make the slightest attempt to assemble the corps of 
 Reille, D'Erlon, and Kellermann, or even to call D'Erlon 
 and Kellermann up ; he merely told Reille to send the 
 Emperor's orders to Frasnes. This remissness and negli- 
 gence, inexcusable in themselves, were to be followed by 
 disregard of positive orders — conduct which was to 
 frustrate, to a great extent, the fine combinations made 
 by Napoleon, and to be attended with most untoward 
 results. t 
 
 * See a«/^, Monitciir of June 18, 1815, and Napoleon Correspon- 
 dence, xxviii. 288. The present writer is perhaps the first, certainly 
 the first English, writer who has furnished this conclusive proof of 
 Napoleon's orders to Ney to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th (' Great 
 Commanders of Modern Times,' 327, and ' Disputed Passages of 
 the Campaign of 181 5,' English Historical Review, January, 1895, 
 
 59). 
 t General Maurice {United Service Magazine, September, 1890) 
 
 and Mr. Ropes (' Campaign of Waterloo,' 55, and elsewhere) have 
 
 very properly dwelt on the difficulties which beset Ney from the want 
 
 of a staff. Ney, too, required some hours at least to make himself 
 
 master of the whole situation ; and Napoleon was not just to him in
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 in 
 
 Grouchy received the orders of Napoleon and Soult, 
 transmitted by the unfortunate Labedoyere, at between 
 nine and ten in the morning. It is due to an ill-fated 
 soldier — the chief cause of a tremendous disaster for 
 France — to point out that in the first hours of June 16 
 he had acted very differently from Ney, and had shown 
 the energy and the attention to be expected from him. 
 He had, perhaps, received the command of the French 
 right by word of mouth, like Ney, on the previous evening. 
 Be that as it may, he sent a message to Vandamme to 
 push forward and to draw near Sombreffe, and possibly 
 another message to Gerard to second the movement ; and 
 he advanced with his cavalry to Fleurus soon after day- 
 break. He met at this place the outposts of Zieten, and 
 he had reported to the Emperor by five in the morning 
 that large Prussian columns were round St. Amand and 
 Ligny — that is, we have seen, the corps of Zieten — a report 
 confirmed by Girard from Wangenies on his left.* 
 Grouchy, accordingly, made a halt at Fleurus, awaiting 
 the orders of Napoleon. The Emperor appears to have 
 attached little credence to the information obtained from 
 the Marshal ; he persisted in believing that Blucher 
 could not be near in force, and certainly would be unable 
 to make a stand against him, so he gave Grouchy the 
 orders before referred to, and continued the movement on 
 Sombreffe he had thus directed.t 
 
 withholding his command until the last moment. Nevertheless, this 
 again is confusing lesser with greater causes, and giving too much 
 weight to the first. Something may be said for Ney as regards the 
 15th, very little indeed as regards the i6th. The mistakes and 
 worse that were committed were emphatically his own, and can only 
 be ascribed to the agitation and disorder of his mind. 
 
 * These operations of Grouchy on the French right are much 
 better described by H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 138, 139, than by any 
 other historian. They deserve attention, and are in marked contrast 
 with Ney's conduct. 
 
 t As for Napoleon's disbelief that Blucher could be at hand in 
 force, see H, Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' 139, 140, and Charras, i. 117, 118.
 
 112 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 With the single exception of the corps of Lobau, left in 
 reserve just outside Charleroy, in order to assist cither 
 Ney or Napoleon, the whole right and centre of the 
 French army was in motion between nine and ten in the 
 forenoon, the point of assembly being Fleurus, rather 
 more than four, or even five, miles from Sombreffe. Van- 
 damme and his corps were at the head of the movement, 
 preceded by Pajol's and Excelmans' squadrons. The 
 Guard advanced from Charleroy and Gilly, followed by 
 Milhaud and his heavy cavalry. Gerard, on the right, 
 marched from before Chatelet, part of his troops, how- 
 ever, being still beyond the Sambre. Napoleon was at 
 Fleurus soon after eleven ; he received at that place the 
 latest report of Grouchy ; the whole corps of Zieten, its 
 outposts falling back, lay in dark masses around St. 
 Amand and Ligny, some two miles from Fleurus, and 
 two or three from Sombreffe. The Emperor at first 
 would hardly believe his eyes, but the situation was plainly 
 before him ; he gradually drew from it the correct in- 
 ference. The forward — nay, threatening — position of 
 Zieten made Napoleon suspect, and rightly suspect, that 
 Blucher must be at hand in great force. His previsions 
 for the day were therefore, in fact, vain ; he could not 
 easily dispose of the Prussian chief; he had to make 
 preparations for a great, perhaps a decisive, battle. His 
 army was not yet fully in line ; it was not assembled, 
 indeed, until about one, the corps of Gerard having been 
 much retarded by the passage of his soldiers in the rear 
 across the Sambre. Napoleon, therefore, avoided a 
 premature movement ; he called up the division of Girard 
 from Wangenies, detaching it from the command of Ney, 
 and he marshalled his whole army around Fleurus, wait- 
 ing the development of his enemy's movements. Mean- 
 while he ascended a windmill near the town, and from its 
 top carefully reconnoitred the scene. At first he only 
 perceived the corps of Zieten, but by noon the corps
 
 
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 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 113 
 
 of Pirch and Thielmann had gathered, on a long line, 
 around Sombreffe, at a considerable distance, however, we 
 have seen, from Fleurus. 
 
 Blucher was by this time arraying his army on the 
 positions he had chosen some weeks before as the probable 
 scene of a great battle. We must glance for a moment at 
 the tract of land about to become the theatre of one of the 
 most desperate conflicts of that age. The ground from 
 Fleurus slopes, by a gentle incline, until it sinks into a 
 rather broad valley ; from this it rises again, forming a 
 low range of hills spreading west and east from the village 
 of Sombreffe, on a distance of from five to seven miles. 
 The Ligny, an affluent of the Sambre, a stream of little 
 width, but deep, and with high banks, runs in a tortuous 
 course through the valley referred to, gathering into its 
 waters several lesser feeders, and meeting or approaching 
 from west to east the hamlets of Wagnelee, Le Hameau, 
 La Haye, St. Amand, the town of Ligny, and the hamlets 
 of Tongrinnes, Tongrinelles, Boignee, and Balatre. Be- 
 yond the Ligny the range of hills extends from the village 
 of Brye, perhaps the highest point, to Sombreffe, and 
 thence southwards, above the Ligny, to Tongrinnes, 
 Tongrinelles, Boignee, and Balatre. But the range is 
 nowhere of difficult ascent ; it encloses in an amphitheatre 
 of great extent the undulating lands of the valley beneath. 
 The lateral road from Namur to Nivelles, the proper line 
 of junction of the allied armies, runs through Sombreffe, 
 near or along the hills, and thence runs onwards to Quatre 
 Bras, where it meets the great main-road from Charleroy 
 to Brussels ; but before reaching Quatre Bras it traverses 
 the ancient Roman road, and approaches the village of 
 Marbais before mentioned. At Fleurus the main-road 
 from Charleroy to Namur stretches through the valley 
 until it joins the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, at 
 a little distance only from Sombreffe ; it thus forms a 
 broad avenue in that direction, available for the advance 
 
 8
 
 114 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 of an army. The Roman road, practicable for all arms, 
 extends about five or six miles to the west of Fleurus, 
 and thence cuts the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, 
 at a point about four miles from Sombreffe. Good country 
 roads, in addition to the main Chaussde, connect the 
 points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe about, we have said, 
 seven miles from each other, and Quatre Bras is only 
 some five miles from Brye and Marbais. The villages 
 along the course of the Ligny are strongly constructed, 
 and afford good positions of defence ; and this was espe- 
 cially the case with the town of Ligny, then a mass of 
 narrow streets, and lofty and solid buildings, crowned by 
 an old chateau, which has since disappeared. In June, 
 1 81 5, the expanses of the open ground were covered with 
 thick and high crops of rye where they were not broken 
 by copses and woodland. 
 
 The summer sun was high in the heavens, lighting up 
 a scene still of smiling peace, but soon to be ravaged by 
 the devastation of war, when Blucher had placed his army 
 on the ground. The main object of the veteran Marshal 
 was twofold : at once to extend his army towards Quatre 
 Bras, in order to attract support from his colleague, and 
 also to shield his own communications with Namur, and 
 especially to guard the road from Charleroy to Fleurus, 
 and thence to near Sombreffe, a line open to the enemy's 
 advance. Blucher believed that Napoleon's army was 
 almost wholly before him ; he had no idea that Ney was 
 only a few miles off, near Quatre Bras — that is, directly 
 upon his flank and rear — with forces which ought by this 
 time to have formed a united mass of nearly 46,000 men. 
 But he was confident in himself and his troops ; ' they 
 could conquer Algiers,' he had written, 'could they but 
 cross the sea.' His one thought was of the coming 
 battle. He marshalled his army upon a far-spreading 
 front, extending from Wagnelee on his extreme right to 
 Boignee and Balatre on his extreme left, Ligny and
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 115 
 
 Sombreffe almost marking his centre. The distance 
 formed a long line of not less than from six to seven miles 
 and upwards. Zieten's corps, composed of the four 
 divisions of Steinmetz, Pirch II., Jagow, and Henkel, 
 and of a division of cavalry under Roder, and supported 
 by near 100 guns, held the right and right centre of the 
 Prussian position from Wagnelee to beyond Ligny. It 
 occupied the villages of La Hameau, La Haye, and St. 
 Amand, hastily fortified since the evening before. It was 
 collected in Ligny in great force, the town, too, having 
 been placed in a state of good defence, the bridges across 
 the Ligny, however, not having been broken. Behind 
 the corps of Zieten stood the corps of Pirch, its four 
 divisions of Tippelskirchen, Krafft, Brause, and Langen, 
 with the cavalry of Jurgass and some eighty guns being 
 assembled as a reserve of Zieten along the low range 
 of eminences before noticed; it filled the ground nearly 
 between Brye and Sombreffe, and looked down on the 
 masses of troops in its front. To the eastwards was 
 stationed the corps of Thielmann, forming the left centre 
 and the left of Blucher. It was also made up of four 
 divisions, those of Borcke, Kemphen, Liick, and Stulp- 
 nagel, with the horsemen of Prince William of Prussia 
 and eighty-eight guns ; it was extended upon a very wide 
 tract from near Sombreffe to Tongrinnes and thence to 
 Balatre, a distance not far from three miles. It hardly 
 occupied Sombreffe at all, and did not occupy the other 
 villages to Balatre in force ; but it held strongly the road 
 from Charleroy, by Fleurus, towards Sombreffe, in order 
 to repel the enemy's attack. The whole Prussian army 
 numbered about 87,000 men, including 8,000 cavalry and 
 some 220 guns.* 
 
 The proximity of Ney to the flank and rear of Blucher, 
 especially were Ney in force around Quatre Bras, as his 
 
 * We have adopted the estimate of Charras (i. 125, 126) as regards 
 the strength of the two armies at Ligny. 
 
 8—2
 
 ii6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 master had every right to expect, obviously made this 
 position utterly false ; it might expose the Prussian army 
 to an immense disaster. Apart, however, from this 
 circumstance, the position was in itself open to the 
 gravest objections. The extreme right of Blucher was 
 completely * in the air ' ; his right and right centre, though 
 well protected in front, were liable to be turned, and even 
 pierced through ; his left centre and left, especially his 
 extreme left, were employed in covering his communica- 
 tions with Namur, and were far too extended. The brunt 
 of the battle at hand would fall on the corps of Zieten 
 and Pirch ; but the troops of Pirch drawn up along the 
 low hills in the rear presented an easy mark to the 
 French artillery, and could be ravaged and half destroyed 
 before they could fire a shot. 
 
 Wellington had joined Blucher a little after noon ; he 
 had left Brussels at about six in the morning, had reached 
 Quatre Bras within a few hours, had written the letter to 
 Blucher referred to before, and, seeing that there was only 
 a small French detachment at Frasnes — the few hundred 
 men on the spot the evening before — he had hastened to 
 consult his Prussian ally, having first, as was but just, 
 highly praised Perponcher for having moved his division 
 to Quatre Bras, though in contravention to his own orders, 
 and having left the command at Quatre Bras to the 
 Prince of Orange. What exactly passed between the 
 Duke and Blucher is not fully known. German writers, 
 who have asserted that the concentration of Blucher 
 around Sombreffe was upon the condition that he would 
 have the aid of Wellington — a statement, we have seen, 
 clearly untrue — have also insisted that the old Marshal 
 accepted battle on June 16 on the positive assurance of 
 his colleague that he would come to his assistance in force 
 on the spot ; but this is inconsistent with all the known 
 evidence. It is likely enough that Wellington, misled 
 by the errors of his staff before mentioned, and believing
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 117 
 
 that he would have a much larger part of his army at 
 Quatre Bras than was possible as affairs really stood, may 
 have held out hopes to Blucher of support, but certainly 
 nothing like a pledge was given. There is no reason to 
 doubt the statement of Muffling that the only expression 
 in this sense that fell from the lips of the Duke was, 
 'Well, I will come provided I am not attacked myself';* 
 and it is perfectly plain that Blucher had his preparations 
 made for a great battle before he even met his colleague.t 
 It is more to the purpose, and it deserves notice, that 
 Wellington, with his fine tactical judgment, disapproved 
 of the arrangement of the Prussian army on the ground, 
 and especially objected to the exposure of the corps of 
 Pirch to the enemy's batteries. But he remonstrated 
 in vain with the aged and stubborn warrior. He left 
 Blucher's headquarters at Brye between one and two, 
 and characteristically dropped these words to his staff, 
 * If they fight here they will be damnably mauled,' a 
 prediction verified in every respect. J 
 
 Napoleon's forecast for the day had, we have said, 
 proved false ; Blucher was offering him battle with three- 
 fourths of the Prussian army. The situation was wholly 
 different from what he thought it would be, but he saw in 
 it the prospect of decisive success. The faults of his 
 adversary's dispositions were apparent ; the Emperor 
 made ready to turn them to the best advantage. The 
 enormously extended line of Blucher, especially on his 
 left, the accumulation of the troops of Pirch in positions 
 where they were fatally exposed, and the weakness of the 
 Prussian extreme right, did not escape the eye of the 
 
 * Muffling, ' Passages of my Life,' 237. For the whole conversation 
 between Wellington, Gneisenau and Muffling, see pp. 233, 238. 
 
 t This subject is very exhaustively and fairly treated by Mr. Ropes, 
 ' Campaign of Waterloo,' 145-147. The matter hardly admits of a 
 doubt. 
 
 % Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 152. The Duke's moi was long 
 remembered.
 
 ii8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 great master, supreme in the art of the higher tactics. 
 Napoleon would paralyse the whole corps of Thielmann 
 with a force comparatively small, but easily moved, by 
 menacing Blucher's communications with Namur ; he 
 would fall on the Prussian right and right centre, drawing 
 as large a force as possible to these points, and threaten- 
 ing at the same time the extreme Prussian right ; and 
 when Zieten and Pirch had become exhausted, and his 
 guns had done their work on Pirch in the rear, he would 
 launch his reserve against the Prussian centre, and force 
 the hostile army to abandon the field. This would secure 
 a victory, but not a decisive victory ; the means of obtain- 
 ing this consummation were not wanting. 
 
 Ney by this time would surely be master of Quatre 
 Bras; he would have sent a division to Marbais as had 
 been directed ; he would have not far from 46,000 men in 
 his hands ; he would be on the flank and rear of the 
 enemy, and at a short distance. The Emperor sent a 
 despatch to the Marshal at two in the afternoon, ordering 
 him to drive away any hostile force in his front, and then 
 to attack and surround ' a body of troops, assembled 
 between Sombreffe and Brye '— that is, to descend on 
 Blucher's flank and rear, and so to complete the defeat of 
 the Prussian army. Meanwhile Napoleon kept his army 
 around Fleurus, masking as long as possible his projected 
 movements, and giving time to Ney to carry out his 
 orders; but he had his preparations made for the great 
 intended attack.* 
 
 Grouchy, on the French right, was to keep Thielmann 
 
 * The terms of the despatch of 2 p.m., referring mainly to ' a body 
 of troops,' are certainly perplexing. It has been inferred that Napoleon 
 did not sufficiently reconnoitre the ground, and even at 2 p.m. had not 
 descried the corps of Pirch and Thielmann. This, however, is in- 
 credible. It appears more probable that the ambiguous words were a 
 mistake of the staff, badly directed throughout the campaign. The 
 point is not very important, as we shall see a subsequent despatch 
 written within an hour and a quarter, was quite plain.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 119 
 
 on the spot, with the cavalry of Excelmans and Pajol, 
 making demonstrations towards the road to Namur ; he 
 was to be supported by Hulot's division of the corps of 
 Gerard — Hulot had replaced the deserter Bourmont — and 
 by the cavalry of Maurin from the same corps, holding 
 the road from Charleroy to Fleurus, and thence towards 
 Sombreffe. Vandamme, with the divisions of Lefol, 
 Berthezene, and Habert, Gerard with the divisions of 
 Pecheux and Vichery, were to attack the Prussian right 
 and right centre, assailing Zieten and Pirch from Le 
 Hameau, La Haye, and St. Amand to Ligny. Girard 
 and Domon's horsemen were to second the movement, 
 and to menace Blucher's extreme right at Wagnelee. The 
 Imperial Guard and Milhaud's heavy cavalry were to be 
 held in reserve to deal the final stroke when Zieten and 
 Pirch had spent their strength, and, as was inevitable, 
 had suffered much, and when Ney should appear on the 
 flank and rear of the enemy. The French army, in- 
 cluding the corps of Lobau, was in number rather more 
 than 78,000 men, comprising some 13,000 horsemen and 
 240 guns, and Lobau was about to be summoned on the 
 field. Napoleon believed, and rightly believed, that the 
 Prussian army* was in his grasp, and could not escape 
 destruction. He remarked to Gerard, his best and 
 most trusted lieutenant : ' The issue of the campaign 
 may be decided within three hours. If Ney executes his 
 orders properly, not a gun of the Prussian army will 
 escape ; it is caught in a fatal position. 't 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 140, 141. 
 
 t Nearly all historians and commentators have agreed that Napo- 
 leon's plan of attack was perfect. The double movement of Napoleon 
 in front, and of Ney on Blucher's flank and rear, was the best possible ; 
 and had Ney done his duty, Ligny would have been a second Jena, 
 and very probably the campaign would have come to an end. It is 
 scarcely necessary to notice the carping criticism of Davout, Rogniat, 
 and Charras, that Napoleon should have turned Blucher's right, and 
 not made his principal attack on Blucher's centre, this being combined
 
 I20 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 The French army remained motionless, the purpose of 
 its chief for the moment concealed, until a little after two 
 o'clock. Within a short time, however, making a change 
 of front by the right, it reached the positions it was to 
 take. The fierce Battle of Ligny had begun at three in 
 the afternoon. The division of Lefol, supported by that 
 of Berthezene, advanced boldly against St. Amand; the 
 soldiery ardent and eager for the fray ; but the division of 
 Steinmetz within the fortified village, turning its buildings 
 and enclosures to account, held the enemy at bay for a 
 time and repelled his efforts. At last the proverbial 
 * French fury ' and numbers prevailed ; St. Amand was 
 stormed and occupied after a desperate struggle, but 
 Vandamme was unable to advance further, kept back by 
 the fire of Zieten's batteries. Meanwhile Girard,* after 
 a similar onslaught and a like resistance, had made 
 himself master of Le Hameau and La Haye, and was 
 approaching Blucher's extreme right at Wagnelee. His 
 position and that of Vandamme had become most threaten- 
 ing, for a bold movement might bring them to the heights 
 of Brye. Blucher sent Pirch II. and a large part of the 
 corps of Pirch, to endeavour to retake the captured 
 villages and to dislodge the enemy from the vantage- 
 ground he had won. 
 
 It was now considerably after four ; while the French 
 had been making progress in this direction, Ligny had 
 been the scene of a murderous conflict, almost without a 
 parallel in the annals of war. The town, the key of the 
 Prussian right centre, was held by the divisions of Jagow 
 and Henkel ; the approaches on the southern bank of the 
 
 with the attack of Ney. Napoleon has triumphantly refuted such 
 remarks (' Comment.,' vi. 146, 147). In fact, one attack would have 
 led to a defeat of the Prussian army ; the other should have anni- 
 hilated it. 
 
 * Girard, the leader of this division, must not be confounded with 
 Gerard, the chief of the 4th French corps. He was a distinguished 
 veteran.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 I2i 
 
 Ligny were attacked in force by Vichery and P^cheux, 
 Gerard from the rear directing the movement. As at St. 
 Amand, the Prussians made a determined stand ; houses, 
 gardens, and buildings placed in a state of defence enabled 
 them to offer a stern resistance ; but at last the French, 
 pressing forward with savage energy, drove them fiercely 
 across the bridges of the stream, which had not, we have 
 seen, been broken. Gerard's troops in exultation swarmed 
 into the town ; a terrible scene of carnage took place in 
 the streets, each side fighting with desperate courage, * no 
 quarter being given or asked,' every man being animated, 
 as it were, with mortal hatred, and half maddened by the 
 consuming thirst for revenge. After a time Blucher 
 reinforced his troops, sending another detachment from 
 the corps of Pirch. Gerard was gradually compelled to 
 recross the Ligny, but he held his ground firmly and 
 continued the battle. Meantime on Napoleon's right, as 
 he had expected. Grouchy had succeeded in keeping 
 Thielmann in check. In this direction feeble demonstra- 
 tions only were seen. 
 
 The Battle of Ligny had only just begun, when Napoleon, 
 in observation before Fleurus, sent another and pressing 
 message to Ney at a quarter past three.* Whatever may 
 be thought of the previous despatch, this letter, sent 
 through Soult, was in the plainest terms : Ney was in- 
 formed that * the engagement was already hot,' and was 
 ordered to fall on the right of the Prussian army, and so 
 to * envelop ' its flank and rear ; * the fate of France,' it 
 was added, * is in your hands.' A short time afterwards, 
 probably about half-past three, Napoleon received a 
 message from Lobau, to the effect that Ney was engaged 
 with a part of Wellington's army, and that this was about 
 20,000 strong.t He reflected that Ney might not be 
 
 * This despatch, as well as the despatch of 2 p.m., will be found in 
 Charras (i. 122, 134) and in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 113, 114. 
 
 f See the evidence on this important point furnished by H. Hous- 
 saye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 161, 162.
 
 124 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ing advanced that Thielmann abandoned his timid atti- 
 tude, soHcitous for his chief Hne of retreat on Namur. 
 Meantime, as Wellington had foreseen, the French 
 artillery wrought frightful havoc among the divisions of 
 Pirch still in position on the heights in the rear ; * every 
 discharge,' Napoleon has informed us, ' told ';* the ground 
 was strewn with masses of the dead who had perished 
 where they stood. The Prussian army, in a word, was 
 being wasted away, while the Emperor had husbanded 
 his great reserve, and had it in hand. Let Ney or D'Erlon 
 but appear, and the corps of Zieten and Pirch would be 
 cut to pieces or compelled to lay down their arms, and 
 the corps of Thielmann could hardly escape. 
 
 It was now about half-past five o'clock ; Napoleon had 
 begun to marshal his reserve— the Guard and Milhaud to 
 fall on Zieten and Pirch in front ; the time had come for 
 his lieutenants to deal the mortal stroke, to fall on the 
 flank or the rear of Blucher's army, and to make the 
 results of the fight decisive. At this moment a message 
 came from Vandamme to the effect that an enemy's 
 column ' more than 20,000 strong ' was ' issuing from the 
 woodland in his rear, and was evidently moving upon 
 Fleurus.' Vandamme, not oblivious of his disaster in 
 1813, hastily informed his master that, if not strongly 
 reinforced, he would be compelled to abandon Le Hameau 
 and St. Amand, to lose the ground that had so hardly 
 been won, and to retreat, if he would avoid a fatal reverse. 
 Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to reconnoitre the mys- 
 terious column. t This was, no doubt, not advancing in 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 144: 'Tous les boulets de I'armde fran^aise qui 
 manquaient les premieres lignes frappaient dans les reserves ; pas un 
 coup n'^tait perdu.' Wellington said afterwards, doubtless from a 
 report, 'The Prussians were dotted in this way — all their bodies 
 along the slope of the hill, so that no cannon-ball missed its effect 
 upon them' (Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 155). Napoleon and 
 Wellington exactly concurred. 
 
 t According to Napoleon ('Comment.,' v. 142) the aide-de-camp 
 was Uejean, a general officer of great experience. We may say here,
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1 6, 1815 125 
 
 the direction which Ney or D'Erlon should properly take, 
 for it was not approaching Blucher's flank or rear, but 
 apparently threatening the flank of the French army ; yet 
 the Emperor, either convinced from what he had heard, or 
 losing his wonted presence of mind, did not take the pre- 
 caution, it may be affirmed, to order the aide-de-camp to 
 summon this body of troops to the field, should it turn out 
 to be a part of his own army. 
 
 After rather more than an hour had elapsed — that is, 
 between six and seven o'clock — the aide-de-camp returned 
 with the intelligence that the strange apparition was the 
 corps of D'Erlon, which, as had been ordered, had drawn 
 near the scene of the conflict, but had gone considerably 
 out of its way. Napoleon again missed the occasion, 
 whatever the reason, and did not call upon his subordinate 
 to take part in the battle, though D'Erlon could still have 
 done important service ; and in a short time the column 
 which might have completely turned the scales of fortune 
 was seen to disappear. While this misadventure was 
 taking place Napoleon suspended the movement of his 
 reserve. The divisions of Vandamme and Girard, already 
 hard pressed, and hearing that a great hostile force was 
 upon their flank, became stricken with panic, and in part 
 gave way ; some battalions of Lefol fled in such terror and 
 dismay that their chief actually turned his guns against 
 them. Blucher caught at the opportunity presented to 
 him. Rallying the soldiery of Tippelskirchen and Jurgass, 
 and supporting them with cavalry drawn from the corps 
 of Thielmann, he made a desperate onslaught on the 
 French left ; his heroic ardour inspired his troops ; Le 
 
 at once, that Napoleon's account of what may be called the D'Erlon 
 incident, one of the greatest importance, is very unsatisfactory. A 
 great mistake, the Emperor felt, was made, and he concealed the 
 facts. See ' Great Commanders,' 329, and ' Disputed Passages of the 
 Campaign of 1815,' 68. This, also, is the view of M. H. Houssaye 
 (' Waterloo,' ii. 203).
 
 126 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Hameau was retaken after a terrible struggle ; the whole 
 line of Vandamme seemed about to yield. Napoleon had 
 already sent Vandamme part of Grouchy's horsemen ; he 
 was reluctantly compelled to employ his reserve ; the 
 Young Guard, and even a part of the Old — the veterans 
 of a hundred battles — were pushed forward to restore the 
 fight ; but the issue remained for a time uncertain. 
 
 Blucher still believed that he had in his front by far the 
 greatest part of the French army, though the roar of 
 cannon towards Quatre Bras, in his rear, announced that 
 a battle was raging at a little distance. He had received 
 a message from Wellington not to expect assistance ; he 
 must have beheld the great reserve of Napoleon, now 
 moving from before Fleurus towards Ligny ; he knew that 
 Zieten and Pirch had suffered enormous losses, and that 
 only Thielmann's corps remained intact. The contest, in 
 a word, was going against him ; but the heroic though 
 very thoughtless chief saw only what was before his eyes, 
 and, elated by his late partial success, he resolved to make 
 a desperate effort to secure victory. He had ordered 
 Thielmann some time before to take a more active part in 
 the strife ; Thielmann had attacked Grouchy, but had 
 been repulsed ; he was directed to send his divisions of 
 Stulpnagel and Borcke towards Ligny, and so to cover the 
 Prussian centre. 
 
 Meanwhile Blucher had collected every available man 
 from the exhausted corps of Zieten and Pirch, employing, 
 in addition to the divisions already engaged, parts of the 
 divisions of Brause and Langen, and had launched them 
 against the French left, which, reinforced by the Young 
 Guard, had again taken Le Hameau and driven the enemy 
 back. The old Marshal, conspicuous on a white charger, 
 a gift of the Prince Regent of England, places himself at 
 the head of the masses he leads. His purpose is, by an 
 attack pressed home, to outflank and crush Vandamme 
 and his supports, and to force'-Napoleon from his line of
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 127 
 
 retreat by Fleurus to Charleroy, perhaps to precipitate 
 him into the defiles of the Sambre. His hoarse voice is 
 heard amidst the din and yell of the fight, telling 'his 
 children not to let the Grande nation lord it over them 
 again ; to have at the enemy, in God's name, with the 
 cold steel.' The shout of ' Vorwarts !' echoes from rank 
 to rank ; once more a tremendous conflict rages along 
 the whole line from Wagnelee to St. Amand. For a 
 moment it seems that the attack will succeed ; the Young 
 Guard is borne back by superior numbers ; the troops of 
 Vandamme hesitate, even fall back ; sounds of victory are 
 heard among the exulting Prussians. But their efforts 
 fail against the warriors of the Old Guard ; these oppose 
 a barrier to the enemy that nothing can break ; the French 
 rally behind * the column of granite ' ; once more the line 
 of fire extending beyond St. Amand marks the repulse of 
 Blucher and his baffled troops, while the superior French 
 artillery mows them down in hundreds. 
 
 While this terrible conflict was in progress, Thielmann 
 had again vigorously attacked Grouchy, but had failed, 
 for the second time, with the loss of some guns. He was 
 now so deeply engaged with the enemy that Stulpnagel 
 and Borcke could not reach Ligny. Meantime the flames 
 had consumed whole quarters of the town. Gerard had 
 recrossed the river and gained ground ; the soldiery of 
 the defence had shown signs of yielding. Napoleon, after 
 receiving the report of the aide-de-camp, had long before 
 made ready to deal a final stroke ; the combination that 
 should have annihilated Blucher had been frustrated, but 
 he could not the less reckon on more than a partial 
 triumph. The corps of Lobau was now at hand. Soon 
 after seven the greater part of the Imperial Guard and 
 Milhaud's cavalry were advancing on Ligny and the 
 enemy's centre. The Emperor understood perfectly the 
 state of the battle. * They have no reserve,' he quietly 
 said, as his glass swept the field. At about eight the
 
 128 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 great body of magnificent troops, which he had kept in 
 hand to deal a decisive blow, had joined Gerard and his 
 well-tried divisions. Under the fire of their batteries, 
 powerful and well placed, the Guard and Milhaud got 
 over the stream. Shouts of ' No quarter !' were heard 
 among the fierce soldiery. Vichery and Pecheux forced 
 their way through the streets of Ligny, reckless of blazing 
 buildings and of the scene of carnage. The victorious 
 columns, bursting through the ranges of guns, which 
 endeavoured in vain to check their advance, were seen 
 approaching the low hills which, on the left, stretch to 
 Brye and the adjoining heights. The Prussian centre, 
 in a word, denuded of support, and presenting only a few 
 exhausted bodies of troops to the formidable reserve, 
 carrying all before it, was broken through at once by the 
 overwhelming shock ; the effect, Soult wrote, ' was a 
 transformation scene at a theatre,' 
 
 Blucher, hurrying to the spot on hearing the fatal news, 
 flung the squadrons of Roder and some battalions of foot- 
 men against the exulting enemy ; but the horsemen re- 
 coiled before the serried squares of the Guard; Milhaud's 
 mailed troopers completed the defeat. In one of these 
 encounters the aged chief was thrown from his charger, 
 and only saved by the presence of mind of a devoted 
 aide-de-camp. What might have been the result of the 
 campaign had he been slain by some unknown French 
 soldier ? The victors had soon mastered the heights ; 
 along the extended line from west to east their foot and 
 horse bore the still fighting and stubborn beaten army 
 back. The corps of Lobau had by this time reached the 
 field, but it was half-past nine, and darkness gathered on 
 the scene. Napoleon rightly desisted from a pursuit by 
 night, but the mere delay caused by the mischance of 
 D'Erlon very probably saved the defeated host. Its retreat 
 was orderly and well conducted. Zieten and Pirch steadily 
 rallying their men, fell back only a few miles northwards ;
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 129 
 
 Thielmann held Sombreffe for a considerable time. The 
 French bivouacked on the ground they had won, but 
 they made no attempt to follow the enemy. Napoleon 
 returned to Fleurus, now his headquarters. The losses of 
 Blucher were about 18,000 men on the field, so frightful 
 had been the effects of the French artillery ; but from 
 8,000 to 12,000 flying men disbanded. The losses of the 
 Emperor were about 11,000 men ; few prisoners and only 
 some thirty guns were taken.* 
 
 June 16 witnessed another passage of arms, well con- 
 tested and bloody, but unlike Ligny. We left Ney at 
 Frasnes, between ten and eleven o'clock, having just 
 received the orders of Napoleon and Soult to assemble 
 the mass of his forces around Quatre Bras, and to make 
 the other dispositions set forth before. The Marshal, we 
 have seen, had let the precious hours slip ; he had done 
 nothing to draw together the army, nearly 46,000 strong, 
 placed under his command ; he had made no attempt to 
 occupy Quatre Bras, which he had been directed to seize 
 on the afternoon of the 15th. Even now he did not 
 thoroughly and loyally carry out the orders he ought to 
 have instantly obeyed; his conduct still gave proof of 
 irresolution — nay, of distrust of his master. He, indeed, 
 directed Reille and D'Erlon to advance, but Reille alone 
 was to hold Quatre Bras, and to proceed further ; D'Erlon 
 was to remain two miles in the rear, at Frasnes ; one of 
 his divisions was to occupy Marbais, a position which 
 Reille, being before him, ought to have been told to 
 seize, for this was of supreme importance ; and while he 
 ordered a single brigade of Kellermann to move on 
 
 * There are many excellent accounts of the Battle of Ligny. The 
 reader may consult Alison, Siborne, Hooper, Thiers, the Commen- 
 taries of Napoleon, Charras, La Tour d'Auvergne, H. Houssaye, 
 Damitz and Clausewitz. The rdsumd of Clausewitz, cited by Mr. Ropes 
 (' Campaign of Waterloo,' 171), is in parts very able and comprehen- 
 sive ; but Clausewitz is far from candid in several most important 
 passages of his narrative. 
 
 9
 
 I30 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Frasnes, he placed the three remaining brigades at 
 Liberchies — that is, at some distance from the old Roman 
 road, where Napoleon had written that they should be 
 placed.* This was neglect, delay, and even disobedience ; 
 yet Ney had received an order about noon, which ought 
 to have fixed his purpose at once, and compelled him to 
 act with prompt energy. At about nine Reille had been 
 apprised by Girard — then in observation around Wan- 
 genies — that ' large Prussian masses ' were seen in the 
 direction of Ouatre Bras. These were the divisions of 
 Zieten at St. Amand and Ligny. Reille sent an officer of 
 lancers to make a report to Napoleon. The Emperor, 
 about to leave Charleroy, wrote sharply to Ney, whose 
 indecision was being made manifest, commanding him 
 ' to unite the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, and the corps 
 of Kellermann,' adding that ' with these forces you should 
 defeat and destroy any enemies in your front.' ' Blucher 
 was yesterday still at Namur ; it is most improbable that 
 he could have troops near Quatre Bras ; you have to deal 
 onl}' with those on the way from Brussels. 't This order 
 was peremptory and distinct ; yet Ney still would not 
 fully comply with it ; he remained in his hesitating, halt- 
 ing mood ; he had no mind really to obey the Emperor. | 
 Napoleon's aide-de-camp, when on his way to Frasnes, 
 had communicated the orders sent to Ney, to Reille and 
 D'Erlon, at Gosselies and Jumet, and had directed these 
 
 * This order will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 
 146, 147. Ney clearly was not disposed to do what Napoleon had 
 told him to do. 
 
 + This most important order will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 
 ' Waterloo,' 105, and is No. 9 of ' Documents inddits.' 
 
 X Mr. Ropes has examined more thoroughly and impartially than 
 any other commentator the conduct, or rather the misconduct, of Ney 
 on the morning of June 16. See 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 116, 128. 
 We have only space for a single sentence (p. 187) : ' The whole manage- 
 ment of Marshal Ney on this day shows distrust of the Emperor's 
 judgment, unwillingness to take the most obvious steps, finally dis- 
 obedience of orders.'
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 131 
 
 Generals to have their troops under arms. Ney trans- 
 mitted, probably to Reille, the instructions he had received, 
 but sent nothing, it would appear, to D'Erlon and Keller- 
 mann, except his own orders, referred to already. This 
 was rather careless if excusable conduct ; but at this 
 conjuncture another delay took place, not to be laid, 
 however, to the charge of the Marshal. Reille, after 
 receiving Girard's report, became alarmed at the sup- 
 posed approach of the enemy. He sent a despatch to 
 Ney describing his fears ; he told him that he would not 
 advance towards Quatre Bras until he had obtained his 
 superior's orders.* Nej^ to do him justice, directed Reille 
 to march at once ; but Reille did not receive the message 
 until after noon ; nearly two hours were thus unfortunately 
 lost. Reille set off from Gosselies without further delay ; 
 but no additional orders, it seems, were sent to D'Erlon 
 and Kellermann in the rear ; D'Erlon remained for some 
 time motionless. It was after one when the chief part of 
 Bachelu's division, joining the fraction detached the even- 
 ing before, appeared at Frasnes, and drew near Quatre 
 Bras. It was followed by the division of Foy at a little 
 distance, and by that of Jerome, still some three miles 
 behind ; but D'Erlon was even now considerably in the 
 rear. The light cavalry of the Guard had remained 
 around Frasnes ; but Ney at this moment had not more 
 than some 9,000 infantry and 1,800 horsemen, including 
 the troops of Foy, but not taking into account the squadrons 
 of Lefebvre-Desnoettes and the brigade of Kellermann, 
 this last only a short way from Frasnes, to oppose to the 
 enemy immediately in his front. 
 
 Had the Marshal acted with insight and vigour — had 
 he been, as Napoleon had written, the man he once was 
 — he might have assembled before Quatre Bras by ten in 
 the morning the whole corps of Reille at least, with the 
 
 * 'Documents inedits,' No. 11 ; La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 
 149, 150- 
 
 9—2
 
 132 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 single exception of Girard's men, in addition to the light 
 cavalry of the Guard — that is, about 22,000 sabres and 
 bayonets, with more than forty guns, and with D'Erlon 
 and Kellermann at a short distance. Had he effectually 
 carried out Soult's and Napoleon's orders, he might have 
 had almost his whole army in hand — in other words, nearly 
 46,000 men, with not far from 100 guns — even allowing 
 for the hesitations of Reille, at four in the afternoon at 
 latest. In either case he would have destroyed Per- 
 poncher's division, the only hostile force in his path, or 
 compelled it to make a disastrous retreat. He could 
 almost certainly have defeated and driven back the 
 reinforcements coming to Perponcher's aid ; he could 
 have easily made himself master of Quatre Bras, and, 
 above all, he would have had ample means to send to 
 Napoleon the body of troops, which, falling on the flank 
 and rear of Blucher, would have annihilated the Prussian 
 army at Ligny.* 
 
 Apart from the cavalry of the Guard and Kellermann, 
 Ney, we have said, disposed of nearly g,ooo foot and 
 1,800 horsemen at this moment, the two divisions of 
 Bachelu and Foy, the squadrons of Pire, and from twenty 
 to thirty guns. Perponcher had some 7,000 infantry, 
 soon to be reinforced by a single battalion, the brigades 
 of Saxe-Weimar and Bylandt, perhaps fifty sabres, and 
 not more than sixteen pieces. t The disproportion of 
 force was therefore great, and the Nassauers and Dutch 
 Belgians were young and raw troops, not to be compared 
 with the well-trained French, though they manfully stood 
 this day to their colours,]; Nevertheless Reille, who had 
 
 * The reader may be referred again to the admirable comments of 
 Mr. Ropes. See especially pp. 177, 178, 186. 
 
 t For these figures compare Charras (i. 153, 154) and Siborne ('The 
 Waterloo Campaign,' 143, 1895 edition), both careful writers. Siborne, 
 however, is not correct in giving Ney 16,189 foot at 2 p.m. Jerome's 
 division was still in the rear. 
 
 J A fruitless attempt was made by the French to appeal to these 
 troops as old comrades : Charras, i. 157, 158.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 1 6, 1815 133 
 
 joined Ney, like Vandamme, full of evil memories of the 
 past, entreated the Marshal not to fall on ; Wellington's 
 army, he insisted, might be at hand in the immediate 
 rear of Perponcher. Ney, however, rejected these counsels 
 of fear ; he was the * bravest of the brave ' in the face of 
 an enemy ; he fired his first shot at two in the afternoon. 
 The ground was favourable to the defensive ; the great 
 main-road from Charleroy to Brussels, an avenue for an 
 army, ran, indeed, from Frasnes directly to Quatre Bras 
 — a collection of four or five buildings only, at the point 
 where the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur joins ; but 
 the Bois de Bossu, a dense piece of woodland, covered 
 the battalions of Perponcher to his right ; the large farm 
 of Gemioncourt and its walled enclosures were close to 
 the main-road in his front ; on either side, and at no great 
 distance, were the farms and enclosures of Pierrepont 
 and Pireaumont ; the adjoining lands were thick with 
 hedges and crops of rye ; the whole formed a good posi- 
 tion to hold — at least for a time. 
 
 Perponcher and the Prince of Orange, now in chief 
 command, had placed their troops with much skill on 
 the ground, concealing their weakness in numbers as far 
 as possible. They had occupied Gemioncourt and the 
 Bois de Bossu with eight battalions, had kept two in 
 reserve at Quatre Bras, and had placed their scanty 
 artillery, for the most part, on the great main-road. It 
 is unnecessary to dwell in detail on the combat that 
 followed, of which the result could be hardly doubtful. 
 Ney endeavoured to turn the position of the farm of 
 Pireaumont which Bachelu occupied after a brief struggle. 
 Foy drove the enemy out of the farm of Gemioncourt ; 
 the approaches to Quatre Bras were nearly won ; the 
 horsemen of Pir^ and the well-served French guns did 
 much execution on infantry having but little support. 
 Saxe- Weimar still clung to the Bois de Bossu, but a 
 charge led by the Prince of Orange, in person, to disable
 
 134 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the hostile artillery, failed ; the Prince was very nearly 
 made a prisoner. The defence, in a word, was unsuccess- 
 ful ; Quatre Bras was almost in Ney's grasp. But the 
 French had been held in check for more than an hour, a 
 service of the very greatest value ; time was secured for 
 reinforcements to appear on the scene. *^ 
 
 The battle was thus going against the allies, when 
 Wellington, after his interview with Blucher, returned to 
 Quatre Bras. Meanwhile the division of Jerome, nearly 
 8,000 strong, had reached the field and reinforced the 
 French. Ney now disposed of between 18,000 and 
 19,000 men, with from thirty to forty guns. The position 
 of affairs had become very critical, but the British Com- 
 mander, an eye-witness wrote, * remained impassive and 
 cold as ice, as though the French were a hundred miles 
 off.' He congratulated Perponcher and the Prince of 
 Orange, and curtly told them they had done very well. 
 His coolness and presence of mind were rewarded. At 
 about half-past three he received a large addition of 
 strength ; a brigade of Dutch-Belgian cavalry, under 
 Van Merlen, from 1,000 to 1,100 sabres, and the 5th 
 British division, led by Picton, with a brigade of 
 Hanoverians, ere long followed by a part of the Bruns- 
 wick contingent, with its Duke as chief, appeared on 
 the scene at the very nick of time.t Picton and the 
 Hanoverians might have been on the field much sooner, 
 but Wellington, always apprehensive for his right, had 
 
 * Justice has not been done by English writers to the importance 
 of Perponcher's defence. No doubt his troops were not very good ; 
 but they gained what was greatly wanted — time. See, for the conduct 
 of the Dutch-Belgian contingent in the campaign, Van Loben Sels, 
 ' Prdcis de la Campagne de 1815,' an excellent work. 
 
 + Siborne and other English writers make Picton's division and the 
 Hanoverians reach Quatre Bras at about half-past two or a quarter to 
 three (' The Waterloo Campaign,' 145, 1895 edition). But they were not 
 up until half-past three at the earliest. See Chesney, ' Waterloo Lectures,' 
 113; Charras, i. 157; H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 193; and Van 
 Loben Sels, 196, 197, There are other authorities to the same effect.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 135 
 
 made them halt at Waterloo, near the road to Nivelles ; 
 they had not begun their march thence until after noon. 
 The Duke had now a force about equal in numbers to 
 that of Ney, but this was largely composed of beaten 
 and inferior troops ; he had fewer guns than the French, 
 and these not as effective ; he was, therefore, not yet a 
 match for his enemy. He made ready, nevertheless, for 
 a stout resistance ; he perceived that Ney was preparing 
 a grand attack ; he placed Picton and the Hanoverians 
 on his left, beyond and near the lateral road from Nivelles 
 to Namur, with detachments towards Quatre Bras and 
 Pireaumont. The Brunswick contingent was arrayed 
 from the Bois de Bossu, and thence to Ouatre Bras : 
 Perponcher and the Prince of Orange were drawn back in 
 second line. 
 
 It was now past four. Ney had received the message 
 from the Emperor despatched at two from Fleurus ; he 
 addressed himself to carry out his master's orders — that is, 
 to seize Quatre Bras, and to send a detachment in force 
 to fall on the flank and rear of Blucher at Ligny. He 
 must have felt how ill he had seconded his great chief; 
 how Reille and himself had been gravely to blame ; espe- 
 cially how unfortunate it had been not to have sent a 
 division long before to Marbais, where this would be on 
 the Prussian rear ; but even now he did not summon 
 D'Erlon to the field and the cavalry of Kellermann left 
 behind ; he would not engage the light cavalry of the 
 Guard. He resolved to make the decisive effort with 
 troops already contending against an enemy, weaker, no 
 doubt, but equal in numbers to himself. Bachelu was to 
 attack the left of Wellington ; Foy was to advance on 
 Quatre Bras by the great main-road ; Jerome to carry 
 the Bois de Bossu ; Pire and the artillery were to support 
 the movement. 
 
 A fierce conflict ensued with varying fortunes, and 
 continued about an hour and a half. Bachelu, under the
 
 136 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 protection of powerful batteries, advanced boldly against 
 Picton ; his soldiers had to make their way through close 
 hedges and crops of rye ; but, as usual, the column failed 
 against the line, as the Carthaginian phalanx failed against 
 the Roman legion. At the word, it is said, of Wellington 
 on the spot, Picton's men fell on the French in disorder, 
 and forced them back to the position they had held. 
 The victors, however, pressed forward too far ; they were 
 dexterously assailed in flank by a battalion kept in re- 
 serve, and were charged, when blown and exhausted, by 
 Pire's squadrons ; they, too, in turn were compelled to 
 fall back. Bachelu, however, made no further attempt to 
 attack his formidable enemy in front ; he made little 
 more than demonstrations for a time, and contented him- 
 self with menacing Wellington's extreme left. 
 
 Meanwhile the course of the battle had turned against 
 the Duke on other parts of the scene of events. Van 
 Merlen had bravely charged the infantry of Foy, but he 
 had been routed by Pire's troopers ; the beaten squadrons 
 were driven beyond Quatre Bras, and suffered heavily 
 from the fire of an English battalion, which, deceived by 
 their uniform, mistook them for French. Ere long the 
 Brunswick contingent was engaged, and met a not 
 dissimilar fate. The Duke's infantry yielded to Foy and 
 Jerome ; his artillery was dismounted in part by the 
 guns of Ney, which kept up a destructive fire along the 
 whole line ; his cavalry was completely defeated ; he fell 
 when leading a fruitless charge. This marked success on 
 their centre and left inspired the French with enthusiastic 
 ardour ; Foy advances along the great main-road ; Jer6me 
 expels part of the enemy out of the Bois de Bossu ; Saxe- 
 Weimar's men are compelled to leave the field ; Pirn's 
 cavalry, elated by its brilliant success, and conspicuous 
 for its daring and courage on this day, bore right down 
 on Picton and the Hanoverians of Best, now almost the 
 only unbroken troops of Wellington. A sanguinary and
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 137 
 
 well-sustained struggle followed ; the horsemen fell on the 
 British 42nd and 44th before these were able to complete 
 their squares ; but after a desperate contest they were just 
 driven back. Every other effort of the brave troopers 
 failed against Picton's steady and silent squares, whose 
 murderous fire wrought great havoc. * Remember Egypt !' 
 the warrior shouted to the 28th. The British, in a word, 
 showed on the i6th what, in a few hours, they were to do 
 at Waterloo. One Hanoverian battalion, however, was, 
 it is related, caught and cut to pieces ; and some of 
 Pire's men rushed into Quatre Bras, and but for a chance 
 might have laid hands on Wellington. Meanwhile Jerome 
 and Foy had advanced further ; a step more, and they 
 would reach Quatre Bras. 
 
 The situation for Wellington had again become * ex- 
 tremely critical,'* when, fortunately, he was again rein- 
 forced. This fresh support was composed of part of 
 Alten's third British division, comprising a Hanoverian 
 brigade, about 5,400 infantry and twelve guns. The 
 Duke's army was now much superior in numbers to that 
 of Ney — some 26,000 men against 18,000 or ig,ooo ; but 
 the Brunswickers and Dutch Belgians had been defeated ; 
 it was certainly not superior in effective force. t It was 
 now about half-past five o'clock. Delcambre, the chief 
 of the staff of D'Erlon, reached the field and reported to 
 the Marshal that the Emperor had summoned D'Erlon to 
 Ligny. Nearly at the same moment the despatch of a 
 quarter-past three arrived, informing Ney, for the second 
 time, that he was to fall on Blucher's flank and rear, and 
 
 * Siborne, 'The Waterloo Campaign,' 173, 1895 edition. 
 
 + Charras (i. 161) seems to be in error in stating that a Nassau 
 contingent under Kruse came to Wellington's assistance at this time. 
 See Siborne, 'The Waterloo Campaign,' 173, 1895 edition. On the 
 other hand, Siborne is certainly wrong in making Ney bring up the 
 whole of Kellermann's cavalry on the arrival of Alten. Of four brigades, 
 only one reached Quatre Bras. All the authorities are now agreed 
 on this point.
 
 138 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 telling him that the fortunes of France were in his hands. 
 This despatch, addressed to Gosselics — another of Soult's 
 mistakes — reached Quatre Bras at least an hour late ; it 
 ought to have been directed to Frasnes or Quatre Bras ; 
 the officer — there is much controversy as to who he was — 
 had made a circuit of six or seven miles. Ney lost his 
 temper and presence of mind on receiving this news ; he 
 forgot that his master had ordered D'Erlon to march to 
 Ligny ; he forgot, too, that D'Erlon was by this time, in 
 all probability, at too great a distance to come to his aid 
 in any event ; he peremptorily told Delcambre to recall 
 his chief to Quatre Bras, exclaiming, with an imprecation : 
 * Would that those English cannon-balls would make me 
 a corpse!' an act of grave disobedience and of thought- 
 less haste, attended with the worst results for Napoleon 
 and France. We must turn for a moment to follow the 
 movements of D'Erlon, of the first importance among the 
 incidents of June 16. That General, habitually, we have 
 said, backward, had only received a single order from 
 Ney. He did not reach Gosselies from Jumet until near 
 two, and having made a long halt at Gosselies, he was not 
 on the old Roman road until after four, still at a distance 
 of some four miles from Quatre Bras, where he ought to 
 have been several hours before.* 
 
 At this point D'Erlon met Forbin-Janson, the officer 
 charged with Napoleon's message, we have said, to come 
 directly to Ligny, without regard to Ney. Forbin-Janson 
 had taken the straight road by Mellet, unlike the other 
 officer, who had gone round by Gosselies, with the order 
 of a quarter-past three to Ney. He gave the Emperor's 
 orders probably at half -past four in the afternoon. 
 D'Erlon at once turned his whole corps towards Ligny, 
 marching rapidly, it would seem, for the country was 
 open ; but Forbin-Janson was a dull and puzzle-headed 
 
 * Compare on this point H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 200, and La 
 Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 173-176.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 139 
 
 man ; he could not interpret an obscure despatch in 
 pencil — here once more we find the shortcomings of Soult 
 — and D'Erlon directed his men towards Fleurus — that is, 
 we have seen, on the flank of Napoleon, not on St. Amand 
 or Brye, on the flank or rear of Blucher. The Emperor, 
 we have said, accepted the report of Vandamme, that 
 D'Erlon's corps was an enemy's column,* and despatched 
 an aide-de-camp to ascertain the fact ; and he did not, 
 as we have taken care to point out, direct his messenger 
 to summon D'Erlon to the field either before or after he 
 discovered that D'Erlon's troops were French. 
 
 At about half-past six Delcambre rejoined D'Erlon with 
 Ney's imperative command to march on Quatre Bras. 
 D'Erlon, improperly, and very unwisely, complied, to the 
 intense indignation of his own soldiery, who rightly felt 
 they ought to fall on the enemy at hand, and showed 
 signs of unsteadiness and want of discipline. t D'Erlon, 
 however, adopted a half- measure — a characteristic of 
 inferior men — and returned to Ney with three of his 
 divisions only ; he detached a single division, under 
 Durutte, with orders to act ' with extreme caution.' 
 Durutte reached Wagnelee on the far right of Blucher, in 
 time to see the closing scenes of the battle ; but he had 
 moved slowly in obedience to the orders of his chief; he 
 only exchanged a few cannon-shot with the enemy in 
 retreat. But had D'Erlon's corps, 20,000 strong, been 
 launched, even as late as seven in the evening, or half- 
 past seven, on the flank of Blucher at Wagnelee and 
 St. Amand, it could practically have accomplished 
 
 * The staff officer who informed Vandamme that D'Erlon's corps 
 was part of an enemy's army was, it is said, afraid to reconnoitre 
 sufficiently clearly : H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 172. Here is another 
 proof how bad the French staff service was in this campaign. 
 
 t In this account of the movements of D'Erlon we have followed 
 H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 200-205. This learned and masterly 
 narrative nearly corresponds with that of Thiers, and seems to the 
 present writer conclusive as to the true facts.
 
 I40 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Napoleon's purpose, and effected the destruction of the 
 Prussian army.* In any event, had it reached the scene 
 of action, the Emperor would have had a fresh corps in 
 his hands ; very possibly, with the additional fresh corps 
 of Lobau, he would have ventured on a pursuit at night ; 
 certainly he could have made the retreat of his enemy a 
 complete rout.f 
 
 * Clausewitz, cited by Mr. Ropes ('Campaign of Waterloo,' 167), is 
 here uncandid. He asks whether Blucher must have been ' com- 
 pletely overthrown' had 10,000 men been thrown on his rear. 
 D'Erlon's corps was 20,000 strong ; and no impartial student of the 
 battle can doubt that, had 15,000 or 20,000 men been directed by Ney 
 or D'Erlon on Blucher's flank or rear, while the Emperor attacked 
 his centre in front, the Prussian army must have been destroyed. 
 Clausewitz, cited by H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 177), is also 
 disingenuous on another important point. He says that D'Erlon 
 would have been too late had he been directed on Brye — that is, on 
 Blucher's rear — at half-past six or seven. That is true ; but he might 
 have been directed on Wagnelde and St. Amand — that is, on Blucher's 
 flank — and had this happened he would have achieved decisive 
 success. Durutte, we must recollect, reached Wagnelde, and might 
 have struck the enemy hard had he chose. See H. Houssaye, 
 'Waterloo,' 215. 
 
 t H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 202, 203) has brought together a 
 great amount of evidence to confirm the statement of Colonel Baudus, 
 and to prove that D'Erlon received a direct order from Napoleon to 
 march on Ligny. The present writer has long ago been satisfied with 
 the proof afforded by the well-known letter of Soult of June 17, 
 shamefully garbled by Charras : ' Si le Comte d'Erlon avait execute 
 le mouvement sur Saint Amand que I'empereur a prescrit, I'armde 
 prussienne ^tait entierement perdu '; and by the well-known letter of 
 Ney to Fouchd of June 29 : ' J'allais faire avancer le i" corps, quand 
 j'appris que I'empereur en avait disposd.' But this additional evidence 
 is very valuable, and is quite conclusive. The story told by D'Erlon 
 himself (' Documents inddits,' No. 22), and accepted by some French 
 and by most English writers, is, at best, unsatisfactory, and may now 
 be finally dismissed as untrue. That story is briefly this — that there 
 was no direct order to D'Erlon, but that Labddoycre was the bearer of 
 the note of 3.15 p.m. to Ney (so often referred to), or of a duplicate of 
 it ; and that, while D'Erlon had gone forward to Frasnes, Labt-doycl-re 
 took on himself to turn aside the ist corps to Ligny. But (i) Labd- 
 doycre was with the Emperor near Fleurus at this very time (Petit, 
 ' Souvenirs Militaires,' 98), and (2) D'Erlon (in his 'Vie Militaire,' 95) 
 contradicts the whole story, and tells one altogether different. It is
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 141 
 
 While D'Erlon had thus been wandering between two 
 fields of battle, without making his presence felt on either, 
 Ney had made another determined attack on Wellington. 
 The Marshal had felt the effects of his master's appeal, 
 that the destinies of his country depended on him ; he 
 had nerved himself to attempt a supreme effort. But, as 
 Napoleon has truly written, Ney, thinking only of the 
 forces within his immediate ken,* and distracted by vexa- 
 tion and passion, still would not avail himself of the 
 cavalry of the Guard, or of Kellermann's three brigades 
 in the rear ; he engaged only the wearied troops he had 
 on his hands, with the addition of the single brigade of 
 Kellermann — 800 or goo cuirassiers of the first quality — 
 which had been near the scene, for some time, at Frasnes. 
 Had he employed the fresh troops he might have employed, 
 he could not have achieved decisive success ; he could not 
 now overwhelm Wellington ; the issue of the operations 
 of the day hung on the movements of D'Erlon and his 
 corps, and this had been recalled by Ney from the essential 
 point Ligny, in contravention of the Emperor's positive 
 orders ! 
 
 The Marshal's attack nevertheless was vigorously 
 pressed home, and for a time seemed to be of brilliant 
 promise. Wellington had distributed the reinforcements 
 he had lately received along his front from his left to his 
 right, from where Bachelu menaced him to Quatre Bras 
 and the Bois de Bossu ; he had placed his worn-out and 
 
 idle to accept such statements in face of the clear and consistent 
 statement of Baudus, confirmed as it is by irresistible evidence. See 
 'Disputed Passages of the Campaign of 181 5,' 68, 69. Besides, 
 D'Erlon, in all that he has written on the subject, evidently is trying 
 to exculpate himself, in respect of the enormous mistake that was 
 committed on June 16. 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 200 : ' Toujours le premier dans le feu, Ney oubliait 
 les troupes qui n'etaient pas sous ses yeux. La bravoure que doit 
 montrer un gendral-en-chef, est differente de celle que doit avoir un 
 g^ndral de division.'
 
 142 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 beaten troops in his rear ; but Picton's division and his 
 Hanoverian supports stood in squares ; his chief calmly 
 awaited the enemy's onset. The assault of Kellermann's 
 horsemen, sustained by a heavy fire of guns, had for a 
 moment a very marked effect. The 6gth was caught 
 before it could form square, lost a colour, and a great 
 number of men ; the 33rd was driven into the Bois de 
 Bossu ; the 30th was for a time in peril, but ere long had 
 beaten the bold squadrons off. Meanwhile Pire's cavalry 
 had renewed its brilliant efforts, sweeping along in the 
 rear of the mailed troops before it. A combined attack 
 was made by the French infantry from the Bois de Bossu, 
 now in part mastered, towards Quatre Bras, and thence 
 towards the road from Nivelles to Namur. The struggle 
 raged terribly for more than an hour, but Kellermann's 
 cuirassiers had ere long recoiled from before Picton's 
 indomitable squares ; they were assailed by the destruc- 
 tive fire of the British infantry, and of fresh batteries 
 which had just reached Wellington. They were suddenly 
 carried away by a panic ; this became a signal for the 
 whole French line to fall back by degrees, defeated in- 
 deed, but still threatening in defeat.* 
 
 Long before this Baudus, the bearer of the despatch of 
 which Forbin-Janson had had the duplicate, had reached 
 the field of Quatre Bras and held an interview with Ney. 
 He found the Marshal vigorously directing the fight ; he 
 had lost two of his chargers, and had not spared himself; 
 but he flamed out when he saw Napoleon's messenger, 
 refused to countermand the recall of D'Erlon, and, ' with 
 a face purple with passion,' turned furiously away. It 
 was by this time more than seven o'clock ; Cooke's 
 first division of British Guards and two battalions of 
 
 * Siborne's account of this episode of the battle is very good : 'The 
 Waterloo Campaign,' 174-188, 1875 edition. All the flench writers 
 make too much of the cavalry attacks ; they were very brilliant, but 
 proved completely fruitless against the British foot in squares.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 143 
 
 Brunswickers arrived on the scene, with two batteries 
 of sixteen guns ; Wellington had now more than 31,000 
 men, with some seventy guns, against the 18,000 or 19,000 
 of Ney, the remains of Kcllermann's brigade, and about 
 forty-five pieces. The scales of fortune had been turned ; 
 the contest was now altogether unequal. 
 
 The Duke took the offensive without delay ; the Guards 
 drove Jerome out of the Bois de Bossu ; Foy was com- 
 pelled to retreat along the great main-road ; Bachelu fell 
 back from the road from Nivelles to Namur, which at one 
 time he had nearly attained ; Gemioncourt and the other 
 two points of vantage were captured. Ney, regaining his 
 energy and presence of mind — the great qualities he had 
 exhibited splendidly in his career — by degrees drew his 
 army out of fire ; he gave proof of the fine tactical skill of 
 which he had given proof when before Wellington, at 
 Redinha among the hills of Portugal ; he retired upon 
 Frasnes with comparatively little loss. In one respect 
 the Marshal had done good service : he had prevented 
 WeUington from sending a man to Blucher; to that 
 extent he had given his master support. But so large a 
 force had been entrusted to him, that he really deserves 
 little credit for this ; and his conduct in other respects 
 must be severely censured. Had he acted with even 
 ordinary vigour and insight, he might, as we have pointed 
 out before, have had 22,000 men before Quatre Bras by 
 the early forenoon ; he might have had 46,000 or so by 
 four in the afternoon ; in either case he could have 
 defeated every enemy in his front, and he would have 
 been able to carry into effect Napoleon's grand combina- 
 tion, and to destroy Blucher. Nay, had he not most 
 improperly recalled D'Erlon in defiance of the Emperor's 
 commands, he could have secured the same results ; 
 Ligny would have been a disaster, fatal to Prussia. 
 From first to last, his conduct on June 16 showed inde- 
 cision, neglect, delay, and disregard of his master's orders.
 
 144 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 His losses at Quatre Bras were some 4,300 men ; those of 
 Wellington were 300 or 400 more. D'Erlon did not reach 
 Quatre Bras until after the end of the contest, his whole 
 corps having been, so to speak, paralysed.* 
 
 These briefly were the operations of June 16, marked 
 by the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. The superiority 
 of Napoleon on this day must be apparent to the real 
 student of war ; it was seldom more distinctly displayed. 
 Passing by the charge of inaction in the morning, which 
 seems to us far from well founded, unquestionably he 
 misinterpreted at first the intentions of his foes, reasoning 
 on assumptions false in themselves, but in accord with 
 well-conceived strategy ; he thought he could easily dis- 
 pose of Blucher, and reach Brussels on the 17th. But 
 his arrangements for the i6th were in the highest degree 
 excellent ; they not only fell in with his own ideas, but 
 perfectly met the situation that actually occurred ; this 
 is what impartial history ought to dwell on. Had the 
 commander of his left simply done his duty, had he con- 
 formed to positive and plain orders, f Blucher must have 
 been annihilated on the field of Ligny ; Wellington could 
 hardly have escaped a disaster next day. The Emperor 
 at St. Helena justly repeated the remark he had made to 
 Gerard on the i6th : " Had my left done what it ought to 
 have done, I would have crushed the enemy."| His plan 
 of attack at Ligny was also perfect ; the movement against 
 the centre of Blucher, combined with the intended move- 
 ment against the flank and rear, must have secured for 
 
 * The reader may be referred to the authorities before mentioned 
 as regards Ligny, for an account of Quatre Bras. Siborne, if not 
 always accurate, has taken great pains with details. 
 
 t The reader must again be referred to Mr. Ropes' admirable 
 commentary on Ney's conduct. Soult, years after Waterloo, remarked 
 to Sir William Napier : ' Ney neglected his orders at Quatre Bras' 
 (' Life of Sir William Napier,' i. 505). 
 
 I Napoleon Correspondence, xxxii. 275: 'Je les ^crasais a Ligny 
 si ma gauche eut fait son devoir.'
 
 

 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 145 
 
 the French an overwhelming triumph. Soult wrote, 
 without exaggeration, on the 17th that " the Prussian 
 army would have been destroyed, and perhaps 30,000 
 prisoners made."* Napoleon, too, conducted the battle 
 with conspicuous skill ; he made the most of his adver- 
 sary's mistakes ; he encouraged Blucher idly to waste his 
 strength, and then, husbanding a great reserve until the 
 moment came, he defeated the old Marshal and won a 
 battle, which but for the merest accidents must have 
 been decisive. t 
 
 Yet amidst these splendid illustrations of the art of war 
 Napoleon made, we believe, one signal mistake. He 
 always expected a great deal from his lieutenants ; he not 
 unreasonably gave credit to the report of Vandamme that 
 D'Erlon's corps was an enemy's column, and as it was 
 approaching his flank, near Fleurus, not moving against 
 the flank or the rear of Blucher, the inference was natural 
 and not strained. But the Emperor ought to have 
 ordered the aide-de-camp sent to find out the facts to 
 summon D'Erlon to the field, if D'Erlon was at hand ; 
 he omitted to do this, not once, but twice, and the result 
 was in the highest degree unfortunate, for D'Erlon could 
 have overwhelmed the Prussian army even at the eleventh 
 hour. Napoleon, in a word, missed a great occasion ; he 
 had not the nimbleness of mind he once had ; this may 
 have been the cause of a real error ; it is undoubtedly the 
 cause that, from first to last, his account of this memor- 
 able incident is obscure and untrue. 
 
 June 16, it must be said once more, ought to have 
 witnessed the ruin of the Prussian army, followed prob- 
 ably by a great defeat of Wellington. The heroism 
 
 * 'Documents inddits,' No, 17 ; La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 
 184. 
 
 t Mr. Ropes has described, better than any other commentator, 
 how admirably Napoleon conducted the Battle of Ligny (' Campaign 
 of Waterloo,' 171, 175). 
 
 10
 
 146 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 shown by Ney in this campaign, and his tragical fate 
 a few months afterwards, ought not to bhnd us to 
 the evident fact that it was mainly due to his faults 
 and misconduct that this consummation was not accom- 
 plished; on the i6th he was worse than a failure. Twice 
 at least on that day, in Napoleon's words, the ' fortunes 
 of France ' were left in his hands ; twice at least he most 
 wrongly threw them away, through indecision, neglect, 
 and positive disregard of his duty. Had he assembled 
 his army early on the i6th, had he had it together even 
 by four in the afternoon — nay, had he not recalled D'Erlon 
 in contempt of his master — he would probably have crushed 
 Perponcher, defeated Wellington, and made the move- 
 ment which would have destroyed Blucher. 
 
 He did not achieve what he might have achieved ; the 
 excuses made for him are those of mere partisans, or of 
 detractors of Napoleon scarcely worthy of notice. Reille, 
 too, was gravely to blame for his delays ; D'Erlon most 
 improperly set at naught an order of the Emperor which 
 he should have obeyed. The operations of the French 
 left, in a word, were misconducted throughout the day ; 
 this, we believe, was for them perhaps the worst mis- 
 chance of the campaign.* The irresolution, however, the 
 want of daring, the timidity exhibited by the French 
 commanders — nay, the disobedience and insubordination 
 
 * Napoleon has thus described, with very little exaggeration, what 
 Ney might have accomplished on June 16 (' Comment.,' v. 199, 200) : 
 * Le mardchal se porta sur les Quatre Bras, mais seulement avec la 
 moitid de son monde. II laissa I'autre moitid pour appuyer sa retraite 
 k deux lieux derri^re ; il I'oublia jusqu'k six heures du soir, oil il en 
 sentit le besoin pour sa propre ddfense. Dans les autres campagnes 
 ce gdndral eut occupd b. six heures du matin la position en avant des 
 Quatre Bras eut ddfait et pris toute la division Beige, et eut on tournd 
 I'armde prussienne, en faisant par la chaussde de Namur, un ddtache- 
 ment qui fut tombd sur les derri<ires de la lignes de bataille, ou en se 
 portant avec rapiditd sur la chaussde de Genappe, il eut surpris en 
 marche et ddtruit la division de Brunswick et la 5""= division Anglaise 
 qui venaient de Bruxelles, et de la marchd h la rencontre des i'° et 
 3""-' divisions Anglaises, qui arrivaient par la chaussde de Nivelles.'
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 147 
 
 of Ney — point to a general cause operating to affect tlieir 
 conduct. These men had lost the confidence of the 
 victorious past ; they knew that Napoleon had a world 
 in arms against him ; they felt at least that his ultimate 
 triumph was almost hopeless. Hence it was that Ney 
 would not act with vigour, and make the forward move- 
 ments he was bound to make ; that Vandamme was 
 ready to see an enemy at hand in D'Erlon ; that Reille 
 hesitated when he should have advanced; that D'Erlon 
 avoided a responsibility he should have taken on himself, 
 and returned to his immediate superior, probably to save 
 himself from blame. Napoleon's lieutenants, in short, 
 were more or less demoralised ; a kind of paralysis had 
 fallen on their arms.* 
 
 Turning from Napoleon to the allied chiefs, little is 
 to be said for their strategy on June 16. Their original 
 errors still had their effects ; the excessive dissemination 
 of their forces ; the extreme apprehension of Wellington 
 for his right ; his distance at Brussels from his colleague 
 at Namur, and the immobility of both at the outset of 
 the campaign — all this had consequences that had not 
 disappeared. Apart, however, from considerations of this 
 kind, their operations on the i6th were marked by one 
 great strategic mistake. Had Wellington strengthened 
 
 * Napoleon (' Comment.,' v. 198, 199) thus describes his subordinates 
 in 181 5 : ' Le caractere de plusieurs gdndraux avait 6\.6 detremp^ par 
 les ^venements de 1814 ; ils avaient perdu quelque chose de cette 
 audace, de cette resolution, et de cette confiance qui leur avaient valu 
 tant de gloire et avaient tant contribue aux succ^s des campagnes 
 passdes.' Charras (i. 59) wrote in the same sense : ' Ouelques uns 
 avaient ^prouv^ de rudes ddfaites dans des commandements isoles et 
 en gardaient la mdmoire. D'autres, dbranlds par les cruels souvenirs 
 de 181 3 et 1 8 14, d^sespdraient de Tissue de la guerre, k la vue des 
 masses armdes de la coalition et de la faiblesse des moyens de 
 defense. Tous dtaient restds braves intrdpides ; mais tous n'avaient 
 pas garde I'activite, la resolution, I'audace des premiers jours, II en 
 etait dont le moral n'etait plus a I'dpreuve d'un revers.' The author 
 of this striking passage, we must recollect, was one of Napoleon's 
 most determined libellers. 
 
 10 — 2
 
 148 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 his left as he ought to have done, he might have been 
 at Quatre Bras in sufficient force to give his colleague 
 powerful support at Sombreffe ; in these circumstances 
 both might have given battle to Napoleon with a good 
 prospect of success. When Blucher had rashly marched 
 on Sombreffe, leaving Bulow behind, Wellington evidently 
 felt that he was bound to assist the veteran warrior as 
 well as he could ; but his orders to collect his army at 
 Quatre Bras were many hours too late. Under these 
 conditions the allied leaders ought not to have risked all 
 in a conflict at Sombreffe and Quatre Bras ; they might 
 have guessed that Napoleon probably would be superior 
 in force ; they escaped a disaster, Blucher especially, by 
 the merest freak of fortune. In fact, they set at naught a 
 principle of the first importance, seldom violated, it has 
 truly been said, with impunity. They tried to concen- 
 trate in the face of a foe concentrated already for some 
 time, and Blucher at least ought to have been destroyed. 
 Napoleon has pointed out with convincing truth that, 
 being as they were ' under the guns of their enemy,' 
 Blucher ought to have fallen back at least to Wavre, 
 and Wellington to have fallen back at least to Waterloo ; 
 in that case they would have avoided extreme peril ; they 
 might have been able to draw together their superior 
 forces. Their mistake is now recognised even by fair 
 English critics.* The measure, indeed, of Napoleon's 
 strategy and that of the allies on the i6th may be fairly 
 
 * For the admirable and unanswerable remarks of Napoleon on 
 this point, see 'Comment.,' v. 205-207. General Shaw Kennedy 
 ('The Battle of Waterloo,' 172) candidly says: 'The determination 
 of Blucher and Wellington to meet Napoleon's advance at Fleurus 
 and Quatre Bras was totally inconsistent with the widely-scattered 
 positions in which they had placed their armies. Their determination 
 in this respect amounted, in the fullest extent, to that error which has 
 so often been committed in war by even great commanders — of en- 
 deavouring to assemble on a point which could only be reached by a 
 portion of the troops intended to occupy it, while the enemy had the 
 power of concentrating upon it his whole force.'
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 149 
 
 taken by a simple comparison of the armies on the scene 
 of events. But for the misconduct of Ney the Emperor 
 would have had his whole forces together at Quatre Bras 
 and Ligny. Blucher had only three-fourths of his own, 
 Wellington not a third, and that brought up piecemeal. 
 Enormously superior as they were in numbers, they were 
 distinctly inferior on the decisive points, or, rather, would 
 have been but for a mere mischance ; and Blucher, to 
 say nothing of the Duke, ought to have met his ruin. 
 
 A few remarks must, likewise, be made on the tactics 
 of the allies in these battles. Blucher exhibited in the 
 highest degree his best and most characteristic qualities — 
 daring, perseverance, and the heroic spirit ; he nerved his 
 soldiers to make the most desperate efforts. But his 
 arrangements at Ligny, we have seen, were faulty; he 
 aimed at too much in endeavouring to draw near Welling- 
 ton, and at the same time to guard his communications 
 with Namur ; his front was extended on too broad a 
 space ; his reserve was frightfully exposed to his enemy's 
 guns. In the battle, too, he wasted his strength with 
 little reflection ; he left Thielmann out of action until it 
 was too late ; he made fruitless attempts to overwhelm 
 Napoleon's left ; his centre, when the crisis came, was 
 not nearly enough occupied, though this was not wholly 
 his own fault. He was, in short, in his adversary's 
 language, ' always the old hussar ' ; strategically and 
 tactically he was bold but imprudent. 
 
 As for Wellington, his conduct at Quatre Bras was 
 marked by his wonted constancy, coolness, and tactical 
 skill. He fought admirably a losing battle for hours ; 
 arranged his troops with habitual insight and judgment 
 on the ground ; made the most of auxiliaries not of the 
 best quality ; turned his British infantry to the fullest 
 advantage. His tenacity was, as always, conspicuous ; 
 he held his army together by his own endurance and 
 courage ; he assumed the offensive at the right moment.
 
 I50 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 He made, however, two evident mistakes, though these 
 were mistakes of strategy, hardly of tactics. He made 
 Picton's division and the Hanoverians halt at Waterloo 
 until it was all but too late ; he might have had at least 
 10,000 more troops at Quatre Bras than he had, had he 
 not continued to fear for his right, a misconception 
 retained to the last.* A word, too, should be said on the 
 fine conduct of Perponcher on June 16. He did ad- 
 mirable service, we have seen, on the 15th ; had he not 
 marched his division to Quatre Bras, Ney would have 
 seized this important point unopposed ; the result of the 
 day might have been very different. Perponcher, too, 
 and his chief did excellently on the i6th ; they disposed 
 their forces very skilfully on the ground ; though their 
 soldiers were little more than a forlorn hope, they were a 
 forlorn hope that accomplished a great deal. 
 
 Passing from the chiefs to the belligerent armies, these, 
 too, require a brief notice. The French gave full proof 
 of the martial virtues of the race ; they were daring, 
 devoted, terrible in success ; Pire's horsemen are entitled 
 to high praise ; the Imperial Guard was worthy of its 
 great renown ; Napoleon's and Ney's artillery were effec- 
 tive in the extreme. Nevertheless, the army exhibited 
 the defects to be expected in an instrument of war 
 hastily put together, and abounding in dangerous, and 
 even weak, elements. Want of discipline was more than 
 once apparent ; Lefol turned his guns against his own 
 infantry, smitten with terror when they beheld the 
 approach of what was said to be a hostile column ; 
 Kellermann's noble cuirassiers gave way to panic ; 
 D'Erlon's men broke out into murmurs when turned 
 away from Ligny. Worse than all, profound distrust 
 largely existed between officers and men ; an old soldier 
 stepped out of the ranks and bade Napoleon beware of 
 Soult ; more than one General was charged by his troops 
 
 * See Charras, i. 168, a remarkable passage.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i6, 1815 151 
 
 with treachery ; several officers followed the shameful 
 example of Boiirmont. 
 
 As for the Prussian army, it was badly directed, exposed 
 to trials it ought not to have endured, thrown away on 
 parts of the scene of the conflict, and it had no corps 
 equal to the Imperial Guard. It gave proof, however, 
 of heroic qualities — ardour, energy, constancy, fierce and 
 stubborn courage, and especially devotion to Blucher and 
 all its chiefs ; it was soon to show that it could disregard 
 a most severe defeat, and baffle the calculations of the 
 great master of war, who indisputably rated it below its 
 real worth. The forces commanded by Wellington at 
 Quatre Bras were a specimen of his motley army of many 
 nations and tongues. His Dutch-Belgian levies and Bruns- 
 wickers were for the most part raw troops, and, though 
 not wanting in boldness and true courage, were no match 
 for the French infantry and the brilliant French horse- 
 men. But the British foot and the Hanoverians, in a 
 somewhat less degree, proved themselves to be all but 
 indomitable in the field. Once or twice, indeed, they 
 were successfully attacked before they resumed the forma- 
 tion required to repel cavalry ; but the furious charges 
 of Pirn's and Kellermann's troopers ' foamed themselves 
 away ' against squares as solid as rocks.* 
 
 June 16, like the day before, was ' incomplete ' as 
 regards Napoleon's objects. He had not shattered 
 Blucher's army to atoms ; Wellington had, if with 
 difficulty, held his own against Ney. But the Emperor's 
 prospects were still full of promise, so superior had been 
 his masterly strategy. The allied chiefs could no longer 
 hope to unite on the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, 
 the line on which they would naturally join ; they had 
 lost Sombreffe, which involved the loss of Quatre Bras ; 
 they would be compelled to fall back into an intricate 
 
 * See Siborne, 'The Waterloo Campaign,' 170, 1895 edition, and 
 ' Waterloo Letters.'
 
 152 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 country of marsh, woodland, and hill, with inferior roads, 
 forming the upper part of the valley of the Dyle. It 
 would be difficult in the extreme to bring their armies 
 together, on any field of battle, in front of Brussels ; it 
 was in their adversary's power to make this impossible ; 
 in fact, they were nearly in the position of Beaulieu and 
 Colli when these Generals fell back on Acqui and Ceva 
 after Montenotte. 
 
 Napoleon had thus gained an immense strategic advan- 
 tage, though his success had fallen short of what it ought 
 to have been ; nor was this the measure of the advantages 
 he could secure. Blucher's army had been scotched if 
 not slain ; it could not, great as was the energy of its 
 chief — and he was for the moment disabled — be made 
 ready to fight again for at least a whole day, even if Bulow 
 should come to its aid. Wellington's forces at Quatre 
 Bras were most perilously exposed should Napoleon and 
 Ney fall suddenly on them ; and Wellington could not 
 assemble 60,000 troops round or near Quatre Bras on 
 June 17. The situation was one of the many of those 
 in which the General of 1796 had shown what he could 
 do in the presence of enemies thus placed, and in which 
 he effected marvels of war. A large part of his army had 
 not been engaged at all ; would he, leaving Blucher for 
 the present alone, attack Wellington with the great mass 
 of his forces, and endeavour to overwhelm him before he 
 could escape ? Would he, acting more in conformity 
 with true strategy, follow Blucher with a detachment 
 comparatively small, taking care that this should observe 
 him, and hold him in check, and then turn against 
 Wellington in still largely preponderating strength ? 
 Would he renew the glories of Castiglione and Rivoli, or 
 the still recent glories of Montmirail and Montereau ? Or 
 would malignant influences intercept the rays of the sun 
 of Austerlitz that seemed about to rise, and cause it to set 
 in a night of disaster ?
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17 
 
 Retrospect of the operations since the beginning of the campaign — 
 Advantages obtained by Napoleon — Great opportunities pre- 
 sented to him on the morning of June 17 — The two alternative 
 movements he might have made, of which either should have 
 secured him decisive success — Authorities cited on the subject — 
 Napoleon at Fleurus the night of the i6th — Exultation of the 
 French army after the victory of Ligny — Overconfidence and 
 negligence — The retreat of the Prussians not followed or ob- 
 served — Conduct of Nay and of Soult — No communication 
 between them — Letter of Soult to Ney on the morning of the 
 17th — Intention that the French army was to halt for that day — 
 The state of his health the real cause of the inaction of Napoleon 
 — He proceeds to Ligny — Review of his army — He resolves to 
 pursue Blucher with Grouchy, and to attack Wellington — This 
 combination correct, but very late — Orders to Grouchy — The 
 Bertrand despatch — Its great importance — Retreat of the Prus- 
 sian army to Wavre — Napoleon reaches Ouatre Bras and follows 
 Wellington — Character of the pursuit — Napoleon halts before 
 Waterloo — Movements of Grouchy — He reaches Gembloux— His 
 letter of 10 p.m. to Napoleon — His faulty dispositions — Napoleon 
 on the night of the 17th — His dispositions and confidence — Dis- 
 positions of Blucher and Wellington — The prospect for June 18. 
 
 We may now glance back at the memorable events attend- 
 ing Napoleon's invasion of Belgium. The operations of 
 the great master had not had the decisive success he had 
 reason to expect ; but they had, nevertheless, been very 
 successful. His previsions had been, in the main, realised; 
 he had found the allied centre at its inner flanks weak.
 
 154 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 had broken through it, and held it in force. Blucher had 
 rushed to battle inconsiderately, as had been foreseen ; 
 Wellington, in this instance certainly behind the time, 
 and hesitating until it ought to have been too late, had 
 failed to give his colleague adequate support. As the 
 result, the Emperor had been able, with an army in 
 numbers very inferior, to encounter adversaries numeri- 
 cally almost twice as strong, in a position of vantage 
 before they could unite ; he had only just missed a victory 
 that might well have been final — as regards the contest, 
 at least — in Belgium. But if he had not destroyed the 
 Prussian army at Ligny, and if Ney had done no more, 
 so grave were his faults, than hold Wellington at Quatre 
 Bras in check, the complete success which had eluded 
 him, so to speak, hitherto appeared to await him on 
 June 17. 
 
 To understand this thoroughly, we must recur to the 
 situation at the close of the preceding day, though we 
 have given it already a passing notice. The defeat of 
 Ligny having forced Blucher away from Sombreffe, 
 Wellington would be compelled to retreat from Quatre 
 Bras. The allied chiefs, therefore, had virtually lost their 
 natural and proper Hne of junction — the lateral road from 
 Nivelles to Namur; if they did not fall back on their 
 respective bases, they would be obliged to retire into a 
 most intricate country, where in any case it would be 
 difficult in the extreme to bring their divided armies 
 together, and where Napoleon had it in his power all but 
 certainly to prevent this movement. Their separation, 
 therefore, might be considered assured — a capital object 
 of their antagonist. In all human probability it would 
 become wider, and this, were the campaign prolonged, 
 would necessarily be of the greatest advantage to him — 
 would multiply largely his chances of reaching his enemies 
 when apart, and of defeating them in detail. 
 
 More than this, however, was attainable on June 17 ;
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 155 
 
 the decisive success which Napoleon had not yet won was 
 now, it may be affirmed, within his grasp. Blucher's army 
 had been severely worsted ; it had lost not far from 30,000 
 men, including stragglers and fugitives beyond recall ; it 
 was short of munitions and supplies of all kinds ; its heroic 
 chief was for the moment broken down. If, taken as a 
 whole, it had not lost its energy, and though Bulow was 
 at hand with his corps, it could not give battle on the 17th 
 to an enemy in anything like powerful force. Wellington, 
 on the other hand, after the results of Ligny, was at 
 Quatre Bras — so to speak, * in the air ' ; he could not, we 
 have said, assemble 60,000 men on that point. As we 
 shall see, he had assembled 45,000 only, part of these 
 being inferior troops ; he was confronted by Ney, who, 
 having been joined by D'Erlon, was at the head of a force 
 nearly equal in numbers — allowing for the losses he had 
 sustained — and to a considerable extent of superior quality ; 
 and he had Napoleon on his flank, seven or eight miles 
 distant, with an army still at least 65,000 strong, and 
 flushed with a splendid if a dearly-bought victory. It 
 should be observed, too, that a very considerable part of 
 the forces of Ney and his master had not been engaged ; 
 the corps of D'Erlon had hardly fired a shot ; Lobau had 
 not taken part in the struggle at Ligny ; the Imperial 
 Guard had not suffered much ; the light cavalry of the 
 Guard and three-fourths of the corps of Kellermann had 
 literally done nothing at Quatre Bras ; the mailed squadrons 
 of Milhaud were almost intact ; in short, Napoleon had 
 nearly 60,000 fresh troops, who could be directed at once 
 against the enemy without subjecting them to any exces- 
 sive effort. 
 
 In these circumstances the Emperor had the choice of 
 two great alternative movements at least, of which either, 
 as affairs stood, ought now to secure him a complete 
 triumph. Should he ascertain by daybreak, as was to be 
 assumed, what the real position of his enemies was, he
 
 156 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 might detach an insignificant force only to observe Blucher, 
 and hang on his retreat ; and then, drawing together the 
 great mass of his forces, he might, in conjunction with 
 Ney, fall upon Wellington, and launch 100,000 men at least 
 against a General who had only 45,000 in hand, and that 
 in a position in which it was almost impossible to escape.* 
 This movement would probably overwhelm the Duke — 
 certainly force him to make a disastrous retreat ; yet a 
 better and more judicious movement could be made, 
 and would have, perhaps, even more important results. 
 Blucher's army, though beaten, was still numerous ; 
 
 * Apologists of Napoleon and of the allies have concurred in con- 
 cealing, as much as possible, the enormous advantages which the 
 Emperor could have secured on June 17. The truth, however, has 
 come out by degrees. As regards the first alternative, above men- 
 tioned, General Shaw Kennedy ('Battle of Waterloo,' 153) says: 
 'Napoleon's operations, up to the evening of the i6th, had, in their 
 general result, been successful by Blucher's being defeated and sepa- 
 rated from Wellington ; but, to reap the fruits of his combinations and 
 success over Blucher, it became necessary to strike against Welling- 
 ton with the utmost rapidity and vigour ; and it was impossible that 
 circumstances could have been more favourable for his doing so than 
 those which actually existed on the morning of the 17th. The Prussian 
 army was in full retreat. W^ellington's army, not yet fully collected, 
 stood only seven or eight miles from Napoleon's, and Ney was in 
 contact with Wellington's front. Wellington's left was completely 
 exposed, and stood on the great chauss^e, by which chauss^e Napoleon 
 had the immense advantage of being able to advance perpendicularly 
 to the line of the Anglo-allied army, and thus to attack it to the 
 greatest advantage before it was by any means fully injunction, and 
 on its left flank at right angles to its line of battle ; while simul- 
 taneously with Napoleon's attack on the left Ney would have assailed 
 Wellington's front. . . . Napoleon should have led his last man and 
 horse against the Anglo-allied army, even had the risk been great in 
 the highest degree, which, as has been seen, it clearly was not. Had 
 Napoleon attacked the Anglo-allied army with his whole force, and 
 succeeded in defeating it, there could be little question of his being 
 able to defeat afterwards the Prussian army when separated from 
 Wellington.' See also Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 197, 198- 
 This alternative seemed the best to Soult, who knew better than 
 Napoleon what British soldiers were : H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' 
 ii. 240.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 157 
 
 Bulow could reach it with 30,000 men. Napoleon was 
 therefore bound to be on his guard against it, while he 
 turned against his British antagonist. Following the 
 precedents he had so often and so grandly made, he might 
 pursue Blucher, and keep him in check with a restraining 
 wing of considerable strength — from 30,000 to 40,000 men. 
 This would at once prevent Blucher from drawing near 
 his colleague, would possibly still further shatter the 
 Prussian army, and would secure the communications of 
 the Emperor from attack ; and, having taken this pre- 
 caution. Napoleon might still assail Wellington with from 
 70,000 to 80,000 men — that is, in immensely superior 
 numbers — and equally gain a victory that should be 
 decisive.* There was no reason that Napoleon should 
 
 * This was the second alternative ; the history of war from the 
 days of Turenne to those of Napoleon proves that it was by many 
 degrees the best. See ' Comment.,' v. 201, 202. It was that which 
 Napoleon adopted, but it was adopted many hours too late ; it was 
 miserably executed by a most incompetent lieutenant. Charras 
 (i. 203 and ii. 128) sums up what Napoleon could have accomplished 
 on the 17th ; it will be observed he suggests a third alternative — fall- 
 ing on Blucher instead of Wellington. This is also suggested by 
 Clausewitz ; but obviously, as Jomini has pointed out, it was the least 
 judicious course : ' Si Napoleon eut galopd jusqu'au plateau de Ligny, 
 il aurait su immddiatement, vu, pour ainsi dire, de ses propres yeux, 
 oil dtait I'arm^e prussienne, et reconnu qu'il avait deux partis a prendre, 
 cL prendre sur le champ ; ou, se mettre avec toutes ses forces k la 
 poursuite des Prussiens, ou lancer sur eux sa cavalerie Idgere appuyde 
 de deux ou trois divisions d'infanterie, et avec le gros de ses troupes, 
 se porter aux Quatre Bras. Dans le premier cas, surpris au moment 
 ou son armee dtait encore assez mal en ordre, avec caissons et gibernes 
 vides, Blucher n'aurait pas echappe a la destruction ; dans le second 
 il aurait subi des pertes, sensibles ; et Wellington, prive de son appui, 
 aurait 6t6 accabld sous les efforts rdunis de Ney et de Napoldon. . . . 
 Le 17, d^s I'aube du jour, il aurait du se precipiter h la poursuite de 
 Blucher avec tous les combattants de Ligny, ou lancer une quinzaine 
 de mille hommes seulement sur les traces du vaincu, et avec le reste 
 de ses forces, courrir aux Quatre Bras s'y reunir a Ney, y attaquer 
 Wellington et, dans un cas comme dans I'autre, il aurait andanti I'une 
 des armdes allides, et mis en suite I'autre hors d'etat de rien entre- 
 prendre de serieux avant longtemps.'
 
 158 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 not give directions for either operation by four in the 
 morning ; in either case part of his forces, whether small 
 or large, could be on the track of the Prussians by five or 
 six, following the lines of their retreat, which the simplest 
 diligence ought to have discovered several hours before ; 
 and the great body of his forces and those of Ney could 
 be in front of Wellington and on his flank by eight or 
 nine. In one event or the other the Emperor must have 
 triumphed, and it deserves notice that nothing more was 
 required than the insight, the energy, and the decision he 
 had exhibited over and over again, and that in not an 
 extraordinary degree. 
 
 Napoleon could have obtained these results ; it is not 
 difficult, after the event, to see what he might have achieved 
 at this conjuncture. Had he been seconded as he ought to 
 have been — above all, had he been the Napoleon of 1796 
 to i8og — it is probable in the extreme that he would have 
 secured them. We proceed to consider how the immense 
 success that was within his reach on June 17 was all but 
 lost to him, and Fortune became adverse. Napoleon, we 
 have said, had returned to Fleurus, his headquarters, 
 after Ligny ; he reached that place at about eleven at 
 night ; he gave orders to Grouchy, in command of the 
 French right, to pursue in a general way the Prussian 
 army, with the cavalry of Excelmans and Pajol. It is 
 said, indeed, that he indicated the probable lines of 
 retreat — that is, northwards by the villages of Tilly 
 and Gentinnes, the direction being taken by the corps 
 of Zieten and Pirch, and eastwards along the roads from 
 Sombreffe to Namur — that is, towards the communications 
 which Thielmann had so jealously guarded.* 
 
 * Jomini ('Precis de la Campagne de 1815,' 188) says that Napo- 
 leon ordered General Monthyon, an officer in the highest place on 
 the staff of Soult, to follow the Prussians in the direction of Tilly and 
 Gentinnes ; but he gives no authority. The order, if given, was not 
 carried into effect.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1 815 I59 
 
 The Emperor then retired to rest, utterly exhausted, 
 as he had been on the night of the 15th ; it appears 
 certain that he saw no one, and had no conversation on 
 the position of affairs until between six and seven in the 
 morning. Meanwhile exultation ran riot in the camp of 
 the French, round Ligny; the most ordinary outpost 
 duty was hardly performed. The Prussians, who had left 
 rearguards, even at Brye and Sombreffe, on the very 
 ground held, it may be said, by the enemy, were not 
 followed, or even observed; there was a general feeling 
 that Blucher had been disposed of, and that no more 
 would be heard of him for several days at soonest. The 
 same sentiment, unfortunately, pervaded the chiefs ; they 
 were like the princely noblesse of France before the day 
 of Agincourt, described by the magical hand of Shake- 
 speare ; they were convinced the defeated army was 
 routed, and were in disorderly retreat upon Namur, even 
 Liege. Not a squadron was sent to reconnoitre the tract 
 around Tilly and Gentinnes ; Pajol and Excelmans did 
 no more than advance along the roads leading from Ligny 
 to Namur. This was bad enough, but it was not the 
 worst ; Ney, furious at what he deemed his ill-treatment 
 as regards the diversion of D'Erlon and his corps, sent 
 no report of what had occurred at Quatre Bras ; Soult, 
 characteristically indolent and remiss, disliking the Marshal, 
 and disliked by him, wrote nothing to Ney about the 
 results of Ligny ; the French army was thus, so to speak, 
 left in the dark, and in a position of false confidence, at 
 the very moment when vigilance and activity were needed 
 to reap the fruits of success — nay, even to avert danger, 
 always possible in war.* 
 
 * For the operations of the belligerent armies on June 17, of 
 supreme importance, and still not thoroughly ascertained, the original 
 and contemporaneous documents, as far as they are forthcoming, 
 should, of course, be studied in the first instance. The narrative of 
 H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 218-280) is thoroughly well informed
 
 i6o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 It was, we have seen, between six and seven in the 
 morning when Napoleon received, for the first time, any 
 intelligence respectmg his own army. This was brought 
 by General Flahault, the aide-de-camp despatched with 
 the first orders to Ney, on June 16; that officer described 
 the engagement at Quatre Bras and the results, and, it 
 is said, severely condemned the Marshal for his procras- 
 tination, indecision, and delays. A short time afterwards 
 a report came in from Pajol to the effect that the Prus- 
 sians were in full retreat along the roads to Namur and 
 Liege — that is, towards their communications with the 
 Rhine ; Pajol added that he had already made many 
 prisoners. The Emperor did not think fit to act on these 
 statements ; it was not until an hour at least had elapsed 
 that he sent a detachment of some force to ascertain what 
 was going on at Quatre Bras, and that he despatched the 
 division of Teste, of the corps of Lobau, to support Pajol 
 in his pursuit of the enemy. He appears to have made 
 no other inquiries, especially as to the lines of the Prus- 
 sian retreat ; he certainly for the present assumed, in 
 common with Soult and all his lieutenants on the spot, 
 that Blucher had been routed, and was recoiling on his 
 base. Meanwhile, at between seven and eight, and 
 probably near the later hour, Napoleon dictated a letter, 
 through Soult to Ney, setting forth his views as to the 
 existing state of affairs, and as to the operations to be 
 undertaken on June 17.* 
 
 In this despatch, every letter of which should be studied, 
 Soult, with very little candour, pretends that he had made 
 Ney aware of what had taken place at Ligny ; and he 
 
 and masterly. The commentary of Mr. Ropes ('The Campaign of 
 Waterloo,' 197-244) is excellent. Siborne ('The Waterloo Campaign,' 
 259, 323, 1895 edition) contains useful details, f'or the Prussian side 
 reference may be made to Clausewitz, Damitz and Ollech. 
 
 * This most important despatch is No. 7 in the ' Documents in- 
 ddits,' and will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 211-213.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 181 5 161 
 
 proceeds to point out to the Marshal how serious had 
 been his mistakes and shortcomings on the previous day. 
 Ney had not assembled his divisions as he ought to have 
 done ; they had acted separately, and he had, therefore, 
 suffered loss. Had the corps of Reille and D'Erlon been 
 together at Quatre Bras, not a man of the English corps 
 would have escaped ; had D'Erlon executed the move- 
 ment upon St. Amand to be made by the Emperor's 
 positive orders, there would have been an end of the 
 Prussian army ; 30,000 prisoners would probably have 
 been taken.* Soult then informs Ney, who, it would 
 appear, was thought to be apprehensive about his own 
 position, that the British army could not possibly act 
 against him, that if it made the attempt the Emperor 
 would strike it in flank, in force, and that in that event 
 it would be * destroyed in a moment ' ; and the Marshal 
 was finally directed to keep his army together, to take 
 a position at Quatre Bras, and to attack Wellington should 
 there be only a rearguard at that place. Turning to the 
 Prussians, the Chief of the French Staff shows next what 
 the situation seemed to be in his own eyes and those of 
 his master, and what was to be done on the present day. 
 He asserts twice that Blucher was in complete rout, and 
 was being pursued by Pajol on the way to Namur and 
 Liege ; he adds that a prisoner of distinction had dropped 
 the words that ' Blucher had destroyed the Prussian 
 monarchy for the second time.' Most important of all, 
 he closes the despatch by announcing that the French 
 
 * We transcribe the following passages from this despatch ; they 
 tell the simple truth, and, in our judgment, are conclusive as regards 
 the D'Erlon incident : ' L'empereur a vu avec peine que vous n'avez 
 pas r6um hier les divisions ; elles ont agi isoldment ; ainsi vous avez 
 eprouv^ des pertes. Si les corps des Comtes Reille et d'Erlon avaient 
 ^te ensemble, il ne r&happait pas un Anglais du corps qui venait 
 vous attaquer. Si le Comte D'Erlon avait execute le mouvement sur 
 Saint Amand qui l'empereur a ordonn^, I'armee prussienne etait totale- 
 ment ddtruit, et nous aurions fait peut etre trente mille prisonniers.' 
 
 II
 
 l62 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 army was to make a halt for the day ; this was * necessary 
 to obtain munitions, to rally scattered men, and to call 
 in detachments.' Not a word is said about a general 
 pursuit, or even about following the line of Blucher's 
 retreat. 
 
 Napoleon's lieutenants had served him ill. At Ligny 
 they had neglected their obvious duty ; they had not 
 ascertained where the Prussians had gone ; they had 
 assumed too lightly that Blucher was out of the case for 
 a time, and that he was falling back upon his base towards 
 Germany. No communication, too — an unpardonable 
 fault — had taken place between Ney and Soult ; the 
 French army had been, so to speak, brought to a stand ; 
 undoubtedly it had suffered a great deal. The Emperor 
 had been culpably left in the dark ; he believed that 
 Blucher was in retreat on Namur and Liege with a 
 discomfited and demoralised army. Yet these considera- 
 tions will not explain the apparent remissness and want 
 of energy of which he gave such proof at this critical 
 juncture. We almost wholly reject the charge of in- 
 activity made against him for the morning of the i6th ; 
 we fully acknowledge it as regards the morning of the 
 17th, and no candid inquirer has sought to deny it.* It 
 
 * Jomini (' Precis de la Campagne de 1815/ 185) significantly says : 
 
 * Pour ceux qui se rappellent I'dtonnante activity qui prdsida aux 
 ^v^nements de Ratisbonne en 1809, de Dresde 1813, de Champ 
 Aubert et de Montmirail en 18 14, ce nouveau temps perdu sera 
 toujours une chose inexplicable de la part de Napoldon.' This 
 inactivity produced murmurs in the French camp. Charras (i. 186) 
 tells us that Vandamme exclaimed on the morning of the 17th : 
 ' " Le Napoldon que nous avons connu n'existe plus ; notre succ6s d'hier 
 restera sans rdsultat." Vandamme dtait devenu frondeur. Mais 
 G(^rard, tout devoud au chef, exprimait la meme pensde en d'autres 
 termes. " II deplorait d'incomprehensible, irremddiable lenteurs." ' 
 Clausewitz, seeing the facts, but ignorant of the real cause, has 
 written that ' Napoleon was affected by a kind of lethargy.' See 
 also Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 200. Siborne ('The Waterloo 
 Campaign,' 268, 1895 edition) adds his testimony in these words : 
 
 * A glorious opportunity had presented itself for the attainment of his
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 163 
 
 is idle to throw the blame on French Generals alone ; 
 there must have been some more potent if less manifest 
 cause for the strange immobility of the French army, and 
 for the state of ignorance and disunion in which its chiefs 
 were left. If we bear in mind that Napoleon has never 
 had an equal in following up a defeated enemy — that, in 
 Napier's words, ' his battle was the wave that effaces the 
 landscape ' — we can judge what, but for some disturbing 
 influence, he would have done on the night of the i6th 
 and during the next few hours. He would not have gone 
 to sleep without finding out the real direction of the 
 retreat of the Prussian army, and that without the possi- 
 bility of a doubt ; he would have taken care to have 
 reports from Ney and Soult, and seen that his orders 
 were carried out by both ; he would have had his restrain- 
 ing wing ready soon after daybreak to hang on the 
 Prussians, perhaps to bring them to bay ; he would have 
 had everything prepared to attack Wellington, in front 
 and flank, three or four hours at least before noon. 
 
 The real if the unsuspected cause of this inactivity and 
 delay was, we believe, the state of Napoleon's health. 
 This, we have seen, had been long declining ; he was 
 affected by two local disorders occasionally giving him 
 the acutest pain ; he was subject to a malady which, 
 though compatible with bodily strength and the force of 
 his splendid intellect, when the fit, so to speak, was not 
 on him, made him drowsy, lethargic, good for nothing, 
 when the fit came. Two distinguished officers have 
 recorded that he was extremely ill throughout the night 
 of the i6th, so ill that he could not issue a single order.* 
 
 original design of defeating both armies in detail, but which was com- 
 pletely lost by a most extraordinary and fatal want of energy and 
 vigour in seizing upon the advantages which the victory of Ligny had 
 placed within Napoleon's reach.' Charras (i. 186) truly remarks : 
 ' La victoire etait suivie des long retards. ... Et avec les retards 
 revenaient les ^tonnements, les murmures de tons.' 
 
 * H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 482 ; Dorsey Gardner, ' Quatre Bras, 
 Ligny and Waterloo,' 35-37, a very valuable note. 
 
 II — 2
 
 l64 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 We have no doubt this was the true cause of the kind of 
 paralysis that fell on the French army and its chief, and 
 that produced the strange inaction which has appeared so 
 unaccountable to a host of critics.* 
 
 * There was nothing ' mysterious,' as has been alleged, about the 
 state of Napoleon's health in 181 5. He was suffering from a disease 
 of the lower bowel and of the bladder, which made riding exercise 
 very painful, and also from strangury. The malady, however, which 
 caused most mischief was an occasional suspension of the proper 
 functions of the skin, which stopped perspiration, reacted on the 
 brain and nervous system, and produced lethargy for the time. When 
 relieved from this affection, his energy and the powers of his intellect 
 were quickly restored. This accounts for the intermitting vigour and 
 slackness we see in his conduct in the campaign of 181 5. The pre- 
 scriptions of Corvisart for the Emperor are, we believe, still in exist- 
 ence. 
 
 M. H. Houssaye (' 1815,' i. 613) has accurately and minutely de- 
 scribed the physical, and, indeed, the mental and moral, condition 
 of Napoleon as he was leaving Paris for Waterloo : ' L'empereur ne 
 supporta pas trois mois ce supplice sans en etre affaibli moralement et 
 physiquement. A la fin de mai, il n'dtait plus I'homme du 20 mars. 
 II avait gardd intactes les qualitds maitresses de son vaste genie, mais 
 les qualitds complementaires, la volontd, la ddcision, la confiance 
 avaient ddclind en lui. La nature dminemment nerveuse de Napoldon 
 dtait soumise aux influences morales. Les contraridtes trcs vives, les 
 grandes inquidtudes, tous les tourments d'esprit, comme aussi parfois 
 I'exces des fatigues et I'dtat atmosphdrique lui donnaient simultand- 
 ment de douloureuses crises d'ischurie, et mcme de strangurie, des 
 contractions de I'estomac et une toux spasmodique, dpuisante. Ces 
 accidents, qu'il avait ddjk dprouvds en Russie, se reproduisirent 
 plusieurs fois durant les Cent Jours, h la suite de son rude voyage ii 
 travers les Alpes, dans la neige et dans la rafale, et sous Taction 
 ddsdpreuves et des amertumes qui I'accabl^rent il Paris. L'esprit 
 influait sur le corps qui reagissait alors sur l'esprit. Pendant ces 
 crises, d'une duree assez longue, l'empereur tombait dans un profond 
 abattement. II perdait tout espoir et toute energie. II avait des 
 heures d'angoisse ou d'horrible visions lui montraient la France 
 vaincue et ddmembrde. En plein jour, il cherchait dans le sommeil 
 I'oubli momentaire de ses souffrances et de ses pensdes. Lorsqu'il 
 dtait seul, il lui arrivait de pleurer ; Carnot le surpriten larmes devant 
 un portrait de son fils. L'empereur n'avait plus en lui le sentiment du 
 succes il ne croyait plus h. son etoile. II dit h. Mollien, " Le destin est 
 changd pour moi. J'ai perdu Ik un auxiliaire qui rien ne remplace." 
 II hochait la tete quand on le fdlicitait sur le rdsultat d'une election ou
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 165 
 
 The Emperor left Fleurus at about nine o'clock, accom- 
 panied by Grouchy, who for some time had been await- 
 ing his orders in vain. Grouchy has remarked that his 
 master was ' extremely fatigued.' Napoleon, unable to 
 bear the jolting of his carriage, mounted a horse, and 
 drove at rather a slow pace to Ligny. He was in an 
 irritable and unsettled mood ; he sharply told Grouchy he 
 would give him his commands as soon as the fitting 
 moment had come. The field of battle presented an 
 
 sur quelque manifestation populaire. " C'est le temps," rdpondait il, 
 "qui nous apprendra, si la France veut me conserver mieux qu'elle 
 n'a conserve les Bourbons." ' 
 
 Thidbault (' M^moires,' v. 341) has left this striking description of 
 the appearance of the Emperor at this time: 'Je ne cessai de le 
 consid^rer, et mes regards s'attacherent sur lui avec d'autant plus 
 d'aviditd, je pouvais ajouter de souffrance, que plus je I'examinais, 
 moins je parvenais a le retrouver tel qu'au temps de sa force et de sa 
 grandeur. Jamais I'impression que sa vue me fit ^prouver, k ce 
 moment ou le destin allait prononcer entre le monde et lui, jamais 
 cette impression n'"a cess^ de m'etre pr^sente. Son regard, jadis si 
 formidable k force d'etre scrutateur, avait perdu la puissance et meme 
 la fixite ; sa figure, que si souvent j'avais vue comme rayonnante de 
 grace ou model^e dans I'airain, avait perdu toute expression et tout 
 caractere de force ; sa bouche contractde ne gardait rien de son 
 ancienne magie ; sa tete elle meme n'avait plus ce port qui carac- 
 t^risait le dominateur du monde, et sa d-marche ^tait aussi em- 
 barrassde que sa contenance et ses gestes ^taient incertains. Tout 
 semblait d^natur^, decompose en lui ; la paleur ordinaire de sa peau 
 etait remplacee par un teint verdatre fortement prononc^ qui me 
 frappa.' This vivid and suggestive portrait may be overcharged ; but 
 the physical decline of Napoleon was accompanied, as is so often the 
 case, with a decline in moral force and strength of character, as we 
 have said ; and it is not surprising, considering his position, that he 
 had begun to lose his old self-confidence long before Waterloo. 
 
 Charras (i. 79, 80) gives us, not unfairly, this account of Napoleon 
 at this conjuncture : ' Napoleon dtait vieux avant I'age. Le long exercice 
 du pouvoir absolu, les efforts prolong^s d'une ambition sans limites, 
 le travail excessif du cabinet et de la guerre, les Amotions, les angoisses 
 de trois anndes de desastres inouis, la chute soudaine de cet empire 
 qu'il avait cru fondd h. jamais, I'odieuse oisivete de I'exil, une double 
 maladie, dont les crises se multipliaient en s'aggravant, avaient pro- 
 fonddment a.h6r6 sa vigoureuse organisation. Son ceil brillait du meme 
 eclat ; son regard avait la meme puissance ; mais son corps alourdi,
 
 1 66 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 appalling spectacle ; the villages in which the conflict had 
 raged were choked with the dead and untended wounded ; 
 Ligny was a heap of ruins, and of mutilated and charred 
 corpses. The French army, however, was in the joyous 
 mood of the Gaul ; the sounds of the multitudinous 
 cheers which greeted its chief were heard three or four 
 miles off by a Prussian rearguard, covering cautiously 
 the retreat of Pirch and Zieten. The Emperor passed 
 his victorious troops in review, thanking officers and men 
 
 presque ob^se, ses joues gonfldes et pendantes indiquaient la venue de 
 cette ^poque de la vie ou la decadence physique de I'homme a com- 
 mence. 11 subissait maintenant les exigences du sommeil, que 
 nagu^re il maitrisait a son grd. Les fatigues des longues journdes 
 h. cheval, des courses rapides lui dtaient devenues insupportables. II 
 avail garde la meme facilite, la meme abondance, la mcme force de 
 conception ; mais il avail perdu la persdvdrance de I'dlaboration de 
 la pensde et, ce qui ctail pis, la promptitude, la fixitd de la resolu- 
 tion. Comme certains hommes au ddclin de I'age, il aimait k 
 parler, ii discourir, et perdait de longues heures en stdriles paroles. 
 A prendre un parti, il hdsitait longtemps ; I'ayant pris, il hdsitait 
 k agir, et dans Taction meme il hdsitait encore. De sa precddente 
 tdnacitd, il ne lui restait que cette obstination frdquente, et ddjk 
 bien funeste, h voir les fails non tels qu'ils dtaient, mais comme il 
 aurait convenu h. son inldrct qu'ils fussent. Sous les coups repdtds de 
 la ddfaite, son caract^re s'dtait brisd. 11 n'avait plus cette confiance 
 en soi, dldment presque indispensable a la rdussile des grandes entre- 
 prises ; il doutait maintenant de la fortune qui pendant quinze anndes 
 avail prodigud de si prodigieuses preuves au gdndral, au consul, k 
 I'empereur. II sentail mcme, c'est lui qui Tavoue, un abatlement 
 d'espril, il avail "I'instincl d'une issue malheureuse." ' This mass of 
 testimony may be, and we think is, exaggerated ; but it is sufificienl 
 to confute the statement of Thiers — itself contradictory (* Histoire du 
 Consulal et de I'Empire,' vi. 440) — thai Napoleon's activity had not 
 diminished in 181 5. At all events, it fully explains, and, we believe, 
 can alone explain, Napoleon's conduct in the early morning of June 17, 
 and, indeed, in a few other passages of the campaign. Il is curious 
 to read in Chesney's ' Waterloo Lectures ' (72) that there was no 
 falling off in the powers of the Emperor in 1815 ; but disregard of 
 plain fact is a characteristic of this petty detractor of supreme genius. 
 Lord Wolseley ('Decline and Fall of Napoleon') is the only English 
 commentator who gives due, perhaps more than due, weight to the 
 condition of Napoleon's health as an important factor in the campaign.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1 815 167 
 
 and distributing rewards ; he properly gave orders for the 
 relief of the wounded, attending especially to the Prussians, 
 ill treated by the Belgian peasants, in return for many 
 acts of oppression ; he spent some time in talking about 
 the state of France, and the Jacobinism and folly of 
 Parisian politics. 
 
 It was now between ten and eleven o'clock ; the de- 
 tachment sent to observe Quatre Bras came back with the 
 news that a considerable part of Wellington's army was 
 still around that place. About the same time messages 
 arrived from Excelmans and Pajol, despatched, we have 
 seen, some hours before, on the track of the Prussians, 
 but only on the roads to Namur and Liege. Pajol re- 
 ported that he had seized a battery and some trains, and 
 had picked up stragglers near Mazy on the way to Namur. 
 Excelmans announced that he was marching on Gem- 
 bloux, 'where the enemy was massed in great force.' On 
 receiving this intelligence Napoleon made up his mind 
 at once ; his energies appear to have returned to him ; he 
 would, conforming to the true principles of his art, send a 
 strong restraining wing to pursue Blucher, and to make 
 it impossible for him to assist his colleague, or to threaten 
 the line of the operations of the French ; he would attack 
 Wellington, with the mass of his forces, joining hands 
 with Ney in the neighbourhood of Quatre Bras. Beyond 
 question this was the true course to adopt ; strategy of 
 this very kind had repeatedly given Napoleon splendid 
 and decisive success, but it was a course that ought to 
 have been adopted five or six hours before. Might not a 
 grand opportunity have passed away ? might not the 
 promise of the morning have become doubtful ?* 
 
 * It has been rightly said that the campaign of 181 5 should be 
 studied, watch in hand, hours — nay, half-hours — are of such import- 
 ance. This is especially true as regards the operations of June 17, 
 and notably as regards those of Grouchy. M. H. Houssaye has 
 traced them out with admirable accuracy and precision, and has
 
 i68 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 The lame and impotent conclusion that the victorious 
 French should make a halt for the day was thus 
 abandoned ; but it was abandoned, we repeat, extremely 
 late. The army was now divided into two groups, the 
 first more than 33,000 strong with g6 guns, the second 
 more than 72,000 with 240 guns,* the division of Girard, 
 which had greatly suffered, having been left at Ligny to 
 care for the wounded, and * to form in any event a 
 reserve.' The first group was composed of the corps of 
 Vandamme, without Demon's horsemen ; of the corps 
 of Gerard and the division of Teste ; and of the cavalry 
 of Excelmans, and part of that of Pajol, his division of 
 Subervie having been detached at Ligny ; it was placed 
 under the command of Grouchy ; its mission was to act 
 against Blucher. The second group was to be in the 
 Emperor's hands ; it comprised the corps of Lobau, 
 without Teste ; the Imperial Guard and Milhaud's 
 cuirassiers ; the cavalry of Subervie and Domon, and the 
 army of Ney, at and around Frasnes — that is, the two 
 corps of Reille and D'Erlon, the light cavalry of the 
 Guard and Kellermann's squadrons ; this combined force 
 was to assail Wellington. It was now about eleven in 
 • the forenoon. t Napoleon gave Grouchy his long-ex- 
 pected orders ; he still believed that Blucher was retreat- 
 ing towards his base, still probably unable to take the 
 field, though Excelmans' report had turned his attention 
 to Gembloux, a place north of the roads to Namur and 
 Liege. There have been many discussions as to the 
 exact terms of these orders, but their plain and general 
 
 brought fully out the truth. Grouchy, it may be said at once, is not 
 a faithworthy witness ; he has shamefully misrepresented time and 
 garbled documents. 
 
 * We again adopt the figures of Charras (i. 189, 190). Charras has 
 taken infinite pains to be correct. 
 
 t M. H, Houssaye has fixed this time, and, indeed, the time of all 
 the operations of the 17th, as we have said, conclusively.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 169 
 
 import is not doubtful. According to the version given 
 by Grouchy, the Marshal was to pursue the Prussians, to 
 attack them and to complete their defeat, and not to lose 
 sight of them in any event. The Emperor added that he 
 was about to join Ney, to attack the English army should 
 it make a stand on the southern verge of the Forest of 
 Soignies — a great wood between Quatre Bras and Brussels. 
 He closed his remarks by directing Grouchy to corre- 
 spond with him by the lateral road from Nivelles to 
 Namur, running at Quatre Bras, we have seen, into the 
 great main-road from Charleroy to Brussels often referred 
 to.* So far all the different accounts coincide, but 
 Napoleon has subjoined an important statement : Grouchy 
 was always to hold a position between the Prussian army 
 and the great main-road on which the Emperor was to 
 advance ; he was thus to be in constant communication 
 with his chief, and to be able to come into line with him. 
 Gerard has positively said that this last order was given ; 
 that Napoleon pointedly remarked to Grouchy : ' Press 
 the enemy hardly, and, above all, be always in contact 
 with me by your left.'t 
 
 It is possible to argue about the Emperor's words ; but 
 Grouchy's force was a restraining wing ; his duty, there- 
 
 * It is fair to give the ipsissima verba of Grouchy's version 
 ('Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815 '), cited by 
 Charras (i. 190, 191) and by H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 225): 
 ' Mettez-vous k la poursuite des Prussiens. Completez leur ddfaite en 
 les attaquant des que vous les aurez joints, et ne les perdez jamais de 
 vue. Je vais me reunir au Mar^chal Ney pour attaquer les Anglais, 
 s'ils tiennent de ce c6td-ci de la foret de Soignes. Vous corre- 
 spondrez avec moi par la route pavde (route de Namur aux Quatre- 
 Bras).' 
 
 t Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 470. Thiers 
 says he had the very words from the lips of Gerard — no friend of 
 Grouchy, but an honourable man. Napoleon's version of this order 
 will be found in 'Comment,' v. 149: ' Grouchy avait I'ordre positif de 
 se tenir toujours entre la chaussde de Charleroi a Bruxelles et Bliicher ; 
 afin d'etre constamment en communication, et en mesure de se reunir 
 sur I'armde.'
 
 170 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 fore, was not only to attack the Prussians, to defeat them 
 if he could, to hold Blucher in check, but also to inter- 
 pose between the allied chiefs; and this is exactly what 
 the passage in dispute implies.* There is a presumption, 
 accordingly, all but equal to proof, that Napoleon gave 
 the order in question. Grouchy accepted it, we shall see, 
 in this very sense, though he has dishonestly endeavoured 
 to conceal the truth. The responsibility of a weighty 
 charge alarmed Grouchy ; nor was his anxiety without 
 sufficient cause. He may have remembered how, years 
 before, he had failed to seize Cork, in the absence of 
 Hoche, this being certainly within his power, and how 
 completely he had miscarried at Bantry ; he had never 
 had a great independent command ; he was a good 
 cavalry officer, but unfit to be a General-in-Chief. Be- 
 sides, he had already quarrelled with Vandamme, a 
 malevolent and wrong-headed man ; and he was well 
 aware that Vandamme and Gdrard considered themselves, 
 as they were, very superior to him, and chafed at being 
 placed under the Marshal's command. Grouchy, he tells 
 us,t remonstrated with his master ; pointed out that the 
 Prussians were far off in retreat ; that they had gained 
 * fourteen hours ' upon their pursuers ; that the French 
 troops at Ligny had not expected to march that day, and 
 that they would be unable to march for a considerable 
 time. The Marshal added that he feared he could not 
 hold Blucher in check ; that he had not sufficient force 
 with 33,000 men to restrain an army still 90,000 strong ; 
 
 * Jomini ('Precis de la Campagne de 181 5,' 188, 189) has no real 
 doubt but that Napoleon's version of his orders to Grouchy is sub- 
 stantially correct. ' II est de mon devoir d'observer que I'ordre 
 mentionnd dans la relation de Ste. Hdl6ne, dtait tellement conforme 
 au systcme des lignes intdrieurs au quel Napoldon avait du le plus 
 grand nombre de ses victoires, qu'en ne saurait rdvoquer en doutc qu'il 
 I'ait effectivement donnd.' 
 
 t Grouchy, ' Observations sur la Campagne de 1815,' 12, 13, quoted 
 at length by La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 217, 218.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1 815 171 
 
 that the Prussians appeared to be falling back on Namur ; 
 and that, if this were the case, he would be at a great 
 distance from the main army and widely divided from it 
 Napoleon, Grouchy has alleged, was not pleased with 
 these remarks ; asked him angrily, it has been said, * was 
 he to give him lessons ?' and repeated, as was the fact, 
 * that it was Grouchy's business to ascertain the line of 
 the enemy's retreat.'* 
 
 A short time after this interview, such as it was — that is, 
 at about half-past eleven o'clock — Napoleon sent another 
 order to Grouchy, expressed in positive and unambiguous 
 terms. t Soult had lingered at Fleurus and had not yet 
 reached Ligny ; the Emperor dictated the letter to 
 Bertrand, the most trusted, perhaps, of his surviving 
 officers ; Grouchy certainly received it before noon. This 
 order is one of the highest importance ; it was most dis- 
 creditably suppressed by Grouchy, who even denied that 
 it had an existence ; it was not unearthed until 1842. It 
 has been slurred over by the worshippers of success, by 
 apologists for the allies, by Napoleon's detractors ; to this 
 hour it has hardly received the close attention it de- 
 serves, but it sets forth clearly the ideas of the Emperor 
 at the time, and throws a flood of light on the subsequent 
 conduct of Grouchy. J 
 
 * M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' 227) has given us good reasons 
 for suspecting that this alleged conversation between Grouchy and 
 Napoleon was either imaginary or has been misrepresented. Grouchy 
 is, we repeat, not to be trusted in his statements. He hardly could 
 have told the Emperor that the Prussians had gained ' fourteen hours ' 
 on him, when the time was not more than ten or twelve, and when 
 Excelmans was in touch with them at Gembloux. He hardly could 
 have said that the retreat of the Prussians was on Namur, when it 
 was known that Gembloux was largely occupied by them. There are 
 many other inconsistencies. 
 
 t It is questionable whether the new order was made upon the 
 information already given by Excelmans, or upon fresh information 
 supplied by General Berton : H, Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 229 ; 
 Charras, i. 192. 
 
 X This despatch was first published in a work called ' Notice
 
 172 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 In this remarkable paper the Emperor orders Grouchy 
 to march on Gembloux with the mass of his forces — that 
 is, to turn away from the roads towards Namur and 
 Liege, supposed hitherto to be the only line of Blucher's 
 retreat, and to occupy a place leading northwards on the 
 roads to Brussels — that is, in a direction completely 
 different. Napoleon then desires his lieutenant to recon- 
 noitre the * roads to Namur and Maastricht,' to * pursue 
 the enemy,' and to correspond with headquarters by the 
 lateral road from Nivelles to Namur, joining the great 
 main-road from Charleroy to Brussels, observing again 
 that he was going in person to Quatre Bras. The de- 
 spatch nearly ends with these most significant words : 
 ' It is important to ascertain what are the enemy's designs ; 
 he is either separating from the English, or both are 
 seeking to unite in order to cover Brussels or Liege, and 
 to try the chances of another battle ;' and it concludes 
 with an injunction to Grouchy to keep all his troops well 
 in hand. 
 
 From this pregnant testimony we can fully gather what 
 was passing in Napoleon's mind at this moment. He 
 probably still suspects that Blucher is falling back on 
 his base — at least, with the chief part of his forces ; he 
 therefore directs Grouchy to observe the roads to Namur 
 and Maastricht, and to dog the enemy's movements in 
 that direction. But evidently he is greatly struck by the 
 reports he has just received, that the Prussians are in 
 large numbers at Gembloux, so he commands Grouchy to 
 repair to that place, where he would at once all but 
 certainly come in touch with the enemy, and where, too, 
 
 Biographique sur le Mar(5chal Grouchy,' Paris, 1842. It will be 
 found at length in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 220, 221. Grouchy 
 repeatedly denied that it existed (' Observations sur la Campagne de 
 1815,' 13, 30; cited by M. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 231), and, when 
 confronted by the fact, changed the hour of its reception from the 
 forenoon to three o'clock, a scandalous misrepresentation : H. Hous- 
 saye, an/e.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 173 
 
 he would be on the way to Brussels ; and he then plainly 
 points out that it was quite possible that Wellington and 
 Blucher would endeavour to join hands in order to de- 
 fend Brussels, and to run the risk of a battle. The order 
 accordingly proves that Napoleon, if perhaps still sceptical, 
 was nevertheless alive to the contingency that the allies 
 would try to unite ; and it indicates distinctly that it was 
 Grouchy's mission to keep Wellington and Blucher 
 apart.* 
 
 While Napoleon, suspecting the truth, but still un- 
 convinced, and ignorant of the operations of Blucher's 
 army, was thus maturing his arrangements, many hours 
 late, the Prussians were safely effecting their retreat. As 
 we have seen, they fell back after Ligny, only a short 
 
 * Mr. Ropes ('Campaign of Waterloo,' 210, 211) is one of the very 
 few commentators who have seen the full significance of this despatch. 
 We quote these just and discriminating observations : ' There is in 
 this letter no trace of that certainty as to the position of affairs so 
 plainly exhibited in the verbal orders. The news that a Prussian 
 corps has been seen at Gembloux has evidently made a strong im- 
 pression on the Emperor. It may very possibly indicate that Blucher 
 is not falling back to Namur. The statement is twice made in the 
 letter that the Emperor is in doubt as to the intentions of the 
 Prussians, and the chief task now imposed upon Grouchy is to 
 ascertain those intentions. The precise danger to be anticipated is 
 stated explicitly. Grouchy is warned in so many words that the 
 Prussians may be intending to unite with the English, to try the fate 
 of another battle for the defence of Brussels, which was exactly what 
 they were intending to do, and what they succeeded in doing. 
 Whether they are or are not intending to do this is the principal 
 thing for Grouchy to find out.' Mr. Ropes (219-223) is also properly 
 severe on those commentators, for the most part English, who either 
 ignore or give no weight to a documeut of supreme importance. But 
 the object of these writers is obvious : they seek (i) to show that 
 Napoleon never had any inkling of the designs of Blucher and 
 Wellington to unite after Ligny and Quatre Bras ; (2) to justify the 
 essentially faulty, in point of strategy, operations of the allies on 
 the 17th, which, indeed, gained Waterloo, but ought to have lost it ; 
 and (3) to exculpate or excuse Grouchy, and to throw on Napoleon 
 the whole blame of the disaster of June 18. It is the duty of history 
 to overthrow the superstructure of misrepresentation and sophistry 
 which has been raised in consequence.
 
 174 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 way ; Thielmann held Sombreffe during the night of the 
 i6th ; Brye was even occupied by a Prussian rearguard. 
 Bluchcr had been borne to Mellery, a village a few miles 
 from the field ; the veteran had been cruelly shaken, and 
 was still almost unconscious ; his lieutenants for a time 
 did not know what to do. His command, however, de- 
 volved on Gneisenau, the Chief of his Staff; and Gneisenau, 
 apparently about midnight, directed that the whole army 
 should make for Wavre, a small town on the Dyle, nearly 
 twenty miles from Sombreffe, about ten miles from the 
 great main-road to the west, and some seventeen or 
 eighteen from Brussels. 
 
 Pirch and Zieten decamped towards break of day, a 
 part of their forces having already moved. As we have 
 said, the French outposts gave no sign ; the retreat was 
 not molested, or even observed. This, the right column 
 of the defeated army, marched steadily along the country 
 roads leading by Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St. Guibert 
 to Wavre. It left a detachment not far from Tilly to 
 watch the enemy; it was around Wavre about noon, having 
 not seen even a trace of the French ; it was encamped 
 at Bierges, St. Anne, and Aisemont on either bank of the 
 Dyle, many hours before the evening had closed. Thiel- 
 mann was in command of the left column ; he also, soon 
 after sunrise, broke up from Sombreffe ; but he was in 
 charge of the artillery parks of Ligny ; he made for 
 Gembloux, but his march was slow ; he halted at Gem- 
 bloux until near two, a delay that enabled Excelmans, we 
 have seen, to come up with his troops, and that might 
 have been in the highest degree disastrous. He was not, 
 however, attacked or pursued. He reached Wavre 
 between ten and twelve at night, and took a position at 
 La Bavette, near Wavre, on the western bank of the 
 Dyle. As for Bulow, he had been informed of the defeat 
 of Ligny by midnight ; he had advanced from Hannut 
 along the old Roman road to Basse Baudeset on the 17th,
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 181 5 175 
 
 nearly reaching Thielmann ; he then diverged to his right, 
 moving by Walhain and Corry and the adjoining country. 
 He established his bivouacs at Dion le Mont, not far from 
 Wavre, on the eastern bank of the Dyle, but very late. 
 He had left a detachment behind at Mont St. Guibert, 
 relieving the detachment placed near Tilly, to observe the 
 enemy should he appear. The march of the Prussians 
 had been made difficult by torrents of rain and bad roads ; 
 but the troops had not been cowed by defeat ; they moved 
 to Wavre with remarkable speed and energy, burning to 
 have the revenge for which they thirsted. An army still 
 of 90,000 men, of whom 30,000 were quite fresh, with 
 from 270 to 280 guns, had thus been assembled around 
 Wavre by the end of the night of June 17 ; it had re- 
 ceived supplies and munitions in part from Maastricht ; 
 it was ready to march and to fight on the morrow. A 
 beaten enemy had, perhaps, never escaped so easily ; and 
 yet the retreat was made in the face of the warrior who 
 had chased Wurmser through the defiles of the Brenta, 
 and after Jena had annihilated his foes.* 
 
 The march of the Prussian army to Wavre had immense 
 results in the events that happened ; it has been ascribed 
 to an implied design to co-operate with Wellington on the 
 field of Waterloo. The object, no doubt, of the allied 
 leaders had been to join hands from the outset of the 
 campaign ; and probably Gneisenau was aware that 
 Wellington had many months before chosen Waterloo as 
 a good defensive position, f and had a general idea that a 
 
 * No wonder that Siborne (' Waterloo Campaign,' 294), in ignorance 
 of the state of Napoleon's health, and of the real cause of his inaction 
 on the morning of June 17, has exclaimed: 'Whither had fled the 
 mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy in 
 former wars ?' 
 
 t Wellington Despatches, xii. 129 ; letter to Lord Bathurst, cited 
 by Charras, i. 201. The position of Waterloo had been surveyed by 
 engineers of the Duke a short time before the campaign began : 
 Ropes, ' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 290.
 
 176 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 retreat on Wavre, about ten or eleven miles from Water- 
 loo, would be in accord with the Duke's projects. But it 
 is wholly untrue that, in falling back on Wavre, Gneisenau 
 contemplated a movement on Waterloo to join Welling- 
 ton ; he could not know when he gave his orders what the 
 plans of Wellington were at the time, or even the position 
 of the British army ; his correspondence proves that he 
 had no such idea ;* he had a grudge against the Duke for 
 the delays of the 15th and the i6th ; and, as we shall see, 
 he was unwilling at the decisive moment to break up from 
 Wavre and to risk a march on Waterloo. 
 
 It is equally untrue that the retreat on Wavre, if there 
 was an intention to approach Wellington, was the in- 
 spiration of genius it has appeared to be in the eyes of the 
 mere idolaters of success. As Napoleon has pointed out 
 with conclusive logic, Wavre is at a much greater distance 
 from W^aterloo than Sombreffe is from Quatre Bras, and, 
 what is much more important, is only connected with 
 Waterloo by bad country roads, running through a tract 
 of defiles and woodland, not by any main-road like that 
 between Quatre Bras and Sombreffe ; if Gneisenau, there- 
 fore, wished to draw near Wellington, he ought not to 
 have retired on Wavre : he should have endeavoured to 
 reach his ally by a more direct march from Ligny. The 
 means were not wanting; the operation, as a whole, 
 would have been as easy, as affairs stood, and as safe, as 
 the retreat to Wavre. t The Prussian army might have 
 
 * H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 234. 
 
 + We quote these admirable remarks of Napoleon, ' Comment.,' 
 V. 205 ; English and German writers avoid them, for they cannot be 
 answered : ' Apres avoir perdu la bataille de Ligny, le general prussien 
 au lieu de faire sa r^traite sur Wavre, eut du I'operer sur I'armde du 
 Due de Wellington, soit sur les Quatre Bras, puisque celui-ci s'y ctait 
 maintenu, soit sur Waterloo. Toute la rdtraite du Mardchal Bliicher 
 dans la matinee du 17, fut h. contresens, puisque les deux armdes, qui 
 n'ctaient qu'a 3,000 toises Tune de I'autre, pendant la soirde du 16, 
 ayant pour communication une belle chaussee, ce qui les pouvait faire
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 177 
 
 been directed north-westwards, and not northwards ; it 
 might have reached the Dyle, not lower down at Wavre, 
 but higher up the stream at Moustier and Ottignies ; the 
 roads either way were of much the same character ; and 
 having crossed the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, it 
 could without difficulty have come into line with Welling- 
 ton. Thielmann and Bulow could have made the move- 
 ment securely in the rear of Zieten and Pirch, and in the 
 events that took place they would not have been molested. 
 The allies, therefore, might have united on the night of 
 June 17 ; and if so, history would rightly assert that they 
 had outmanoeuvred their great antagonist, for they would 
 be in his front in overwhelming force, not separated from 
 each other by a wide and dangerous interval of space. It 
 is true that neither the movement on Wavre nor the sug- 
 gested movement could have been successful had the 
 French army been properly directed, and in sufficient 
 time ; but the second was as feasible as the first, and 
 infinitely better, in the position of affairs at this conjunc- 
 ture. The retreat to Wavre, in fact, was a bad half- 
 measure ; for the allies it ought to have been the harbinger, 
 not of victory, but of disastrous defeat. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon had begun to make the great 
 offensive movement against Wellington, rightly con- 
 ceived, we have said, but much too late. The corps of 
 Lobau, the Imperial Guard, and other supports, had been 
 directed to Marbais, at between ten and eleven o'clock,* 
 on their way to join Ney, still before Quatre Bras. The 
 two armies, we have seen, were to fall on the Duke, and 
 to attack him in front and flank, should he try to make 
 a stand. At about noon Soult, who had now joined 
 
 considerer comme rdunies, se trouv^rent, le soir du 17, dloign^es de 
 plus 10,000 toises et separdes par des defiles et des chemins im- 
 praticables.' 
 
 * For the time, see H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 225. 
 
 12
 
 178 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Napoleon, wrote to Ney, commanding him to attack.* 
 This despatch, it will be observed, was more peremptory 
 than the despatch of a few hours before, which referred 
 to an attack in the event only of the enemy having a rear- 
 guard at Quatre Bras. Ney did not receive the earlier 
 despatch — the first intelligence he had obtained of Ligny 
 — until about nine in the morning, or even later. He 
 could not have received the second despatch until one 
 o'clock, but neither had the slightest effect on him ; he 
 made no movement, and did not even assemble his troops, 
 acts of gross misconduct and contempt of orders, even 
 though probably, as affairs now were, the Marshal could 
 not have attacked in sufficient time ; a most precious 
 opportunity had been almost lost. 
 
 We turn to the operations of Wellington on the morn- 
 ing of the 17th, big with important results in the future. 
 By the night of the i6th nearly the whole of the Duke's 
 cavalry and part of the rest of his reserve had joined the 
 troops which had fought at Quatre Bras ; he had 
 assembled some 45,000 men at that place, the other parts 
 of his army being at Nivelles, at Braine le Comte, 
 Enghien, and even more westwards; 45,000 men, it is 
 unnecessary to say, would have been unable to resist 
 Napoleon and Ney united, and Wellington must have 
 been in extreme peril, had his enemy fallen upon him, 
 as was possible, in the early forenoon. His position, too, 
 was made all the more critical because he had heard 
 nothing about the events of Ligny, an officer who had 
 carried a report having been severely wounded. In fact, 
 Wellington, we have said, was * in the air ' ; his position 
 might have been made fatal. 
 
 The Duke slept at Genappe on the night of the i6th, 
 but he was in the saddle at two in the morning, a con- 
 trast to his great adversary in this respect. His first act 
 
 * 'Documents inddits,' No. 16; La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 
 214, 215.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 179 
 
 was to send an aide-de-camp with a small escort to 
 ascertain what had become of the Prussian army. The 
 aide-de-camp fortunately met Zieten, conducting the 
 retreat not far from Tilly. He returned with a message 
 that, though defeated, the Prussians were falling back on 
 Wavre. Soon afterwards — that is, at about eight o'clock 
 — this news was confirmed by an officer despatched by 
 Gneisenau. The Duke, who had had an account of the 
 defeat of Blucher,* and must have known how critical 
 his position had become, replied, with characteristic 
 presence of mind and decision, that his purpose now was 
 to retreat on Waterloo ;t he would accept battle at that 
 place could he be assured of the support of two, or 
 even of one,l Prussian corps d'armee. The retreat began 
 about ten in the forenoon ; it was conducted, all military 
 critics have said, with no ordinary precision and skill ; 
 the cavalry of Uxbridge masked the movement; the 
 infantry marched on well-chosen lines in excellent order. 
 By one in the afternoon the great mass of the army was 
 far from Quatre Bras; Uxbridge and the cavalry alone 
 remained ; Wellington and his lieutenant continued to be 
 on the spot.§ 
 
 The retreat was wellnigh over before Napoleon had 
 passed Marbais on his way to Quatre Bras. He had 
 expected to hear the guns of Ney, but all was silent in 
 
 * For a very characteristic description of Wellington's reception of 
 the news of Ligny, see Lord Malmesbury's Letters, ii. 447. 
 
 t Muffling (' Passages from my Life,' 240) hints that he suggested 
 the retreat on Waterloo, but this is most improbable. 
 
 X Muffling (' Passages from my Life,' 241) says one corps, other 
 writers two. 
 
 § It has been argued that Wellington was not in real danger at 
 Quatre Bras, on the morning of the 17th ; he would have retreated at 
 once had Ney and Napoleon attacked even at a very early hour. But 
 the Duke would hardly have retreated before he had heard about the 
 movements of the Prussians — that is, until eight a.m. He did not 
 begin his retreat until ten ; he might have been attacked in overwhelm- 
 ing force at eight or nine. 
 
 12 — 2
 
 i8o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the direction of Frasnes ; the Emperor arrayed his army 
 in order of battle and advanced. Uxbridge had placed 
 some light squadrons on the road from Nivelles to Namur, 
 in order to watch the enemy's movements ; these fell 
 back when Napoleon's forces were seen to be at hand ; 
 the general retreat of the British cavalry began. Napoleon 
 reached Quatre Bras at about two o'clock. Indignant at the 
 conduct of Ney, he had ordered D'Erlon to press forward 
 with his corps ; the uniting armies met at Quatre Bras, 
 evacuated by the allies for several hours. Ney had 
 hitherto given no sign of life ; he had simply let his troops 
 move forward from Frasnes ; the Marshal and D'Erlon 
 were both rebuked for the failure and disobedience of the 
 preceding day. Napoleon said, with emphasis, * The 
 cause of France has been lost.' 
 
 Complaining, however, was worse than useless.* 
 Napoleon, without the delay of a moment, addressed 
 himself to pursue the retreating army. By this time 
 his powers seem to have been revived ; Richard, in a 
 word, was himself again ; but he must have bitterly felt 
 how, whatever the reason, he had let a great opportunity 
 slip, and how long before he might have brought an army 
 to bay, which now he could only expect to annoy.t He 
 placed himself at the head of his troops, followed by 
 D'Erlon, Lobau, the Guard, and Reille, his masses of 
 cavalry being for the most part in front. He urged 
 vehemently, it is said, the pursuit in person. J Little, 
 
 * For the remarks made by Napoleon to Ney and D'Erlon see 
 H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 259. 
 
 t M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 260) has very fairly stated what 
 Napoleon might have accomplished on the morning of the 17th : 
 ' II avait laisse ^chapper I'occasion d'exterminer I'armde anglaise. 
 Wellington, presque toutes ses troupes encore en position, sa ligne de 
 r^traite sur Genappe compromise, sa gauche debord^e par Napoleon, 
 son front attaqud par Ney, eut ^t^ forc^ d'accepter une bataille virtuelle- 
 ment perdue.' 
 
 \ The evidence on this point is very conflicting. Compare 'Waterloo 
 Letters,' 6-96, 133, with H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 261-263.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1 815 181 
 
 however, really was accomplished. The squadrons of 
 Uxbridge retired in perfect order, crossing the Dyle on 
 their way at points selected before ; a body of French 
 lancers defeated a body of British hussars in a sharp 
 skirmish in the streets of Genappe, but in turn was ridden 
 down and routed by the British Life Guards ; thence- 
 forward the enemy became very cautious. The losses on 
 either side were, in fact, trifling — only from 200 to 300 
 men — a sure sign of the inefficiency of the pursuit ; indeed, 
 the storm of rain which had broken on the country for 
 leagues had made even the great main-road not easy for 
 a march, had flooded all the adjoining tract, and had 
 made military operations wellnigh impossible. At about 
 half-past six o'clock the Emperor reached the heights of 
 La Belle Alliance, in front of Waterloo, but at some 
 distance ; he perceived bodies of foot and horse in the 
 mist ; and he ordered Milhaud to open fire and to pre- 
 tend to charge. The thunder of many batteries answered 
 the challenge ; a large army, with Wellington, was on 
 the spot. * What would I have given,' Napoleon ex- 
 claimed, * to have the power of Joshua, and to arrest the 
 march of the sun !'* But the march of the sun in the 
 morning had not been turned to account. 
 
 We pass on to the movements of Grouchy, of supreme 
 importance for the results of the contest, but misrepresented 
 or ill-explained for years, and even now not completely 
 explained. The Marshal lost no time in assembling his 
 army when he had received the despatch of his master 
 written by Bertrand ; he was one of those men who 
 blindly depend on superior orders, but who, without 
 initiative and clear insight, are often unable to compre- 
 hend their full import, and, catching at a shadow, drop 
 the real substance. At about noon his 33,000 men were 
 under arms,t and ready to begin the march to Gembloux, 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 200. 
 
 t The time is fixed by M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 292) by 
 absolutely conclusive evidence.
 
 1 82 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the direction their chief had been enjoined to take. We 
 must bear in mind what his position was at this moment. 
 Pajol, we have seen, had come up with the enemy on 
 the way to Namur ; but he soon discovered that he was 
 in contact with stragglers only, and that the Prussians 
 were not, on that line, in force ; he returned to Mazy 
 and halted there for some hours, having heard from 
 peasants that a large part of the hostile army was in 
 retreat by St. Denis and Leuze towards Louvain, that it 
 was moving away from its communications with Namur 
 and Li^ge, was marching northwards, and drawing to- 
 wards Brussels. It would appear that Pajol did not send 
 this report to Grouchy for a considerable time, but 
 Grouchy, like Napoleon, had been made aware that the 
 Prussians were around Gembloux ' in great force,' and 
 that Excelmans was on his way to reach them, and 
 Gembloux was the point Grouchy was himself to attain. 
 
 This intelligence ought to have made the Marshal 
 reflect that, in all probability, the Prussian army was 
 abandoning the direction of Namur and Liege, and was 
 not falling back on its base at all ; it certainly ought to 
 have induced him to advance on Gembloux and to find 
 out the enemy without the loss of an instant ; and it is 
 fair to remark that Grouchy seems at first to have had 
 the latter object distinctly in view. He had assembled 
 his forces with praiseworthy haste, but the march to 
 Gembloux was made extraordinarily slow, and was re- 
 tarded by a series of delays, largely to be ascribed to 
 Grouchy himself. The corps of Gerard around Ligny 
 was the nearest to Gembloux, and should have been the 
 first to move ; but Grouchy, afraid to annoy Vandamme, 
 whose corps was at St. Amand, some distance to the left, 
 placed Vandamme and his troops at the head of the 
 columns on their march ; nearly two hours were thus 
 unnecessarily lost. In addition Gembloux might have 
 been reached by at least two roads ; but Grouchy crowded
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1 815 183 
 
 his army into one column on a single road, and this 
 again greatly retarded his march. The result was that 
 Vandamme did not reach Gembloux until seven o'clock, 
 and Gerard not until nine in the evening ; and yet 
 Gembloux is only eight miles from Ligny, and not more 
 than ten from St. Amand. Unquestionably the storm 
 and bad roads had impeded the march ; but these 
 obstacles had been overcome by the Prussians, who had 
 moved at a very different rate of speed; and Napoleon 
 had made a march of twenty miles at least, and that in 
 the presence of an enemy in his front, even if he had the 
 advantage of the great main-road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels. Meanwhile Thielmann, whose corps had been 
 reached by Excelmans, and who, we have seen, had 
 halted at Gembloux a great deal too long, had been 
 allowed to escape almost unobserved ; and Excelmans, 
 who on this eventful day seems to have been as over- 
 confident and careless as most of his fellows, had advanced 
 only to Sauveniere, a village two or three miles beyond 
 Gembloux, and did not hang with his horsemen on the 
 retreat of the enemy. 
 
 This was an inauspicious beginning of a pursuit which 
 ought to have been pressed with all the more celerity 
 because it had been undertaken very late. By the night 
 of the 17th the whole Prussian army was being gathered 
 together around Wavre — that is, ten or eleven miles from 
 Waterloo — while Grouchy's army, scarcely more than a 
 third in numbers, was at or near Gembloux — that is, at 
 least sixteen miles from Napoleon's camp. These dis- 
 tances were already not of happy omen. Nevertheless, 
 whatever has been said, there was still no reason that 
 Grouchy should not be able successfully to perform his 
 task, should not be able to reach and to attack the enemy 
 — above all, should not hold Blucher fast, and keep him 
 away from Wellington, fulfilling the true part of a restrain- 
 ing wing, if he had the capacity of anything like a real chief.
 
 i84 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 In the course of the night Grouchy received numerous 
 reports, all indicating that the Prussians were in retreat 
 northwards ; had abandoned their communications with 
 Namur and Liege ; and were either making for Wavre, as 
 the fact was, or for Perwez, in the direction of Louvain, 
 the evidence preponderating that Wavre was the object of 
 their march. Excelmans pushed forward some squadrons 
 to Nil St. Vincent and Sart les Walhain, villages only 
 seven or eight miles from Wavre, and heard that the 
 enemy was on his way to that place ; a detachment sent 
 to Perwez gave the same intelligence. The inhabitants of 
 Gembloux and the peasantry of the adjoining tract — in 
 sympathy with the French, and hating the Prussians — 
 spoke of Prussian movements on Perwez or Wavre ; there 
 was even a rumour that Blucher was trying to join Wel- 
 lington — that is, was near Wavre — with the intention 
 of reaching Waterloo.* Upon this information, surely 
 significant enough, Grouchy wrote to Napoleon at ten at 
 night. This despatch should also be studied with care. 
 In this communication the Marshal tells his master that 
 he is at Gembloux and his cavalry at Sauveniere ; that 
 the enemy, * 35,000 strong,' is retreating ; that the 
 Prussians were divided into two main columns, one 
 moving on Wavre, the other on Perwez ; that a third 
 column was falling back on Namur ; that a part of these 
 forces, ' it might be inferred,' was * on the way ' to join 
 hands with Wellington, and that another part was perhaps 
 making ultimately for Li6ge. The Marshal adds that he 
 was sending his cavalry forward, and that, according to 
 the intelligence it should bring in, he would march either 
 on Wavre or Perwez. The despatch ends with these 
 most important words, showing plainly that Grouchy 
 understood his mission : ' If the great body of the Prus- 
 sians is retiring upon Wavre, I will follow them in that 
 
 * H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 247.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 185 
 
 direction, so that they shall not be able to reach Brussels, 
 and that I may separate them from Wellington.'* 
 
 The information Grouchy had already obtained should 
 have led him to conclude that the Prussian army was, for 
 the most part, at least, assembling at Wavre. But con- 
 sidering it even from his own point of view, the course he 
 ought to adopt should have been plain to his mind. He 
 might disregard any hostile force on its way to Perwez — 
 that is, to Louvain — for this was in far eccentric retreat, 
 and could neither molest Napoleon nor assist Wellington. 
 But he was bound to follow without delay, and carefully 
 to attack and hold in check, any hostile force making for 
 Wavre ; for this obviously was drawing near Wellington 
 — nay, might be seeking to come to his aid ; and this was 
 the more necessary because the Emperor had told Grouchy 
 that it was his intention to attack the English in front of 
 the Forest of Soignies, distant only ten or eleven miles 
 from Wavre. 
 
 The means of securing the Marshal's object and of 
 enabling him to fulfil his duty were not difficult, and ought 
 to have been apparent. He ought to advance on Wavre 
 as quickly as possibly, and so to direct his march as to 
 have the power to strike Blucher in flank were he trying 
 to join Wellington ; and this operation was possible — nay, 
 quite feasible. Gembloux is some fifteen miles from 
 Wavre, and from the roads on which the Prussians would 
 march in case they were on their way to Waterloo ; it is 
 about ten miles from the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, 
 whence there were roads to Wavre, to the line of the 
 enemy's possible movement, and to the positions now 
 held by Napoleon. The course for Grouchy to take was, 
 
 * This despatch will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo ' 
 230, 231. Grouchy shamefully garbled it afterwards, feeling the full 
 significance, regard being had to his subsequent conduct, of the ex- 
 pression that he would 'separate' the Prussians from Wellington : 
 Ropes, ' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 360, 361.
 
 1 86 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 therefore, as it were, marked out ; he should make for 
 Wavre by daybreak on June 18 ; but he should direct his 
 movement to the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, crossing 
 the river at these points by the bridges, which, like those 
 on the Sambre, remained intact ; it would be then within 
 his power either to advance on Wavre, should the Prus- 
 sians be remaining at that place, or to attack Blucher, to 
 hold him in check for a space of time, sufficiently long, at 
 least, to prevent him giving support to his colleague — and 
 the attack, we must bear in mind, would be on Blucher's 
 flank, and about as perilous as could be conceived — and 
 especially to co-operate with the main French army 
 should the Emperor be in need of his aid. Had Grouchy 
 formed this resolution on the night of June 17, and carried 
 it out intelligently on the following morning, he would 
 have atoned for the faults even now to be laid to his 
 charge ; Blucher, humanly speaking, could never have 
 joined Wellington ; Waterloo could never have been a 
 victory for the allies. 
 
 The lines taken by the Prussians in their retreat from 
 Ligny ought to have been ascertained by the dawn of 
 June 17. For this Soult was responsible, in the first 
 instance ; but Napoleon, too, must be held responsible — 
 they would have been discovered had he been the Napoleon 
 of old. Grouchy was sent to find them out, but many 
 hours too late ; and his march on Gembloux had been so 
 retarded, and Excelmans had given proof of so little zeal 
 and skill, that the direction taken by the enemy remained 
 uncertain. But the evidence obtained by Grouchy on the 
 night of the 17th pointed in the main to a retreat on 
 Wavre. It did not really point to a retreat on Perwez ; 
 the movement on Wavre was the one most probable, and 
 the only one that could endanger Napoleon ; Grouchy, 
 therefore, we repeat, ought to have provided against it by 
 adopting the measures before referred to ; had he done 
 this he would have redressed the many shortcomings and
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 187 
 
 mistakes of the day ; he would have stopped Blucher on 
 his way to Waterloo ; he would have averted from France 
 a frightful disaster. No remarkable insight or energy 
 were required ; besides, independently of the reports 
 before him, he ought to have acted in the spirit of his 
 orders — and these he understood — and to have so con- 
 ducted his operations as in any event to interpose between 
 the allied commanders. He ought, in a word, to have 
 borne in mind that in war, should a doubt exist, a General 
 should assume that his enemy would do what is best for 
 his interests, and that the military art is one of a fine 
 calculation of chances, and of making the most of the 
 opportunities these may present.* 
 
 Unfortunately Grouchy was one of those chiefs who 
 cling to the letter and miss the real import, and are 
 incapable of bold and original movements. He never 
 even thought of directing his army on Moustier and 
 Ottignies ; he did not move a division on the night of the 
 17th towards these points ; he did not contemplate an 
 early or rapid march on Wavre — nay, even a march on 
 Wavre at all — though he had indicated Wavre as the place 
 on which he would move should he learn that the enemy 
 was there in force. On the contrary, his orders show that 
 he was chiefly thinking of making his way towards Perwez 
 — that is, to his right, far away from Napoleon, and not 
 toward Wavre, where the Prussian army was ; Vandamme 
 and Excelmans were to advance to Sart les Walhain ; 
 Gerard was to follow the movement, and to send his 
 horse to Grand Leez, * for the enemy was falling back on 
 
 * This is well put by Charras (ii. no) : 'Grouchy devait tirer sa 
 resolution des circonstances. En pareil cas, I'hdsitation n'est pas 
 permis : il faut baser ses operations sur la supposition qui son adver- 
 saire a agit et agira pour atteindre le resultat le plus favorable k ses 
 interets et conformement au caract^re qu'on lui connait. II n'y a pas 
 d'autre rfegle de conduite rationnelle. L'art du general serait bien 
 vulgaire, si on n'avait jamais k operer que sur des ordres parfaits, sur 
 des donndes certaines,'
 
 i88 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Perwez ' ; Pajol was to march to Grand Leez from Mazy. 
 The truth seems to be that he had taken it into his head 
 that the Prussians were retreating on Perwez — that is, in 
 the last event, on Louvain — and that his only duty was to 
 follow and attack Blucher ; he did not reflect that his 
 paramount duty — and yet he was fully aware of this — was 
 to play the part of a commander of a restraining wing, 
 and to interpose between Blucher and Wellington. 
 
 Leaving Grouchy blindly following a fatal course, we 
 turn to Napoleon, now before Waterloo. There was no 
 sign in him on the night of the 17th of the sluggish 
 lethargy clearly seen in the morning. He superintended 
 in person the positions occupied by his troops, placed 
 D'Erlon, Milhaud, Domon, Subervie, Lefebvre - Des- 
 noettes — in fact, the parts of his army at present on 
 the spot — in a line extending from Plancenoit to Mon- 
 plaisir, and sent pressing orders that Lobau, the Imperial 
 Guard and Reille should come into line from the rear as 
 quickly as possible. A farmhouse called Caillou was made 
 his headquarters, but he took little rest on this memorable 
 night. Wellington and his army were now in his front, 
 but Napoleon feared that his adversary would not offer 
 him battle ; he believed that the Duke and Blucher, con- 
 forming to judicious strategy, would retire behind Brussels, 
 combine their forces, and then make ready to meet him 
 in overwhelming numbers ; he would not be given again, 
 he supposed, the opportunities given at Ligny and Quatre 
 Bras. His leading idea — and this almost engrossed his 
 mind — was to bring the British commander to bay before 
 he could decamp and join his colleague ; he did not 
 seriously think that Blucher, wherever he might be, 
 would venture to make a flank march of the most 
 perilous kind on the chance of being able to reach 
 Wellington ; in his heart of hearts he was convinced, with 
 all his lieutenants, that the Prussian army was not yet in 
 a condition to fight. Above all, had he not despatched
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 189 
 
 Grouchy many hours before to pursue it, to attack it, to 
 make it impossible that it should come to the assistance 
 of the Duke's army, should it even have the power of 
 giving battle ? 
 
 A report from Milhaud that an enemy's column was 
 making for Wavre — this was the detachment called in 
 from Tilly — did not affect the Emperor's fixed belief; he 
 refused to suppose that Blucher could march from Wavre 
 on Waterloo ; besides, this might be only a stray column 
 endeavouring to approach Brussels, whither we had seen 
 Blucher, he thought, might march. It appears to be 
 probable, nevertheless, that on receiving this news 
 Napoleon sent a message to Grouchy;* but if this was 
 the case, it never reached the Marshal; and certainly 
 Blucher and the Prussian army were not uppermost at 
 this moment in the Emperor's mind. Napoleon left his 
 headquarters after midnight to observe the positions of 
 the hostile army ; he contemplated, he has informed us, 
 a night attack should the Duke be showing signs of 
 retreat ; his orders prove this statement to be correct. 
 But all was silence in the enemy's camps ; ' the Forest 
 of Soignies looked like a conflagration ; the horizon shone 
 with bivouac fires ';t the only sounds were the faint rumble 
 of guns, and the dash of the torrents of rain that had not 
 ceased to fall. Napoleon returned to his farmhouse, 
 hopeful, but not satisfied; his adversary was evidently 
 making a stand; but would the state of the weather 
 permit an attack to be made ? 
 
 At about two in the morning the message arrived, 
 sent by Grouchy at ten on the night of the 17th. This 
 despatch, it should be borne in mind, was calculated to 
 inspire Napoleon with complete confidence as to the 
 possible operations of Blucher on June 18. The Prussian 
 army was represented as not being in great force, and as 
 divided into two, or even three, columns, falling back on 
 
 * H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 270. t /^I'd., 279.
 
 I90 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Wavre, Perwez, and Namur; and the Marshal had 
 pledged himself that were it moving on Wavre, in con- 
 siderable strength, he would take care ' to separate 
 Blucher from Wellington.' The Emperor felt that he 
 need have no fears as to his veteran enemy ; his 
 lieutenant understood his duty, and would hold him in 
 check ; he had only to direct his whole forces against 
 Wellington, the opinion he had already held for some 
 time. 
 
 It is probable, however, that, before he had heard from 
 Gembloux, he had formed a design of attracting part of 
 the forces of Grouchy, and in certain circumstances the 
 principal part, to the scene of the great battle obviously 
 now at hand, and that he adhered to the design after 
 Grouchy's message. We have reached one of the most 
 perplexing episodes of the campaign, which has not 
 received sufficient attention, and on which just enough 
 light has been thrown to make the darkness, so to speak, 
 more visible. Napoleon has positively asserted that he 
 sent two messages on the night of the 17th, directing 
 Grouchy to send a detachment of 7,000 men and sixteen 
 guns to St. Lambert, a little village near the Lasne, about 
 four miles from the French lines, and to fall at an early 
 hour on the left flank of Wellington ; the Marshal was to 
 support the movement, with the mass of his army, when 
 he had ascertained the whereabouts of Blucher.* This 
 statement has been summarily rejected by most critics, 
 but their arguments seem to us of no great weight ; the 
 reasons to the contrary are so cogent and so increasing in 
 force. There is literally nothing in the circumstance that 
 no such orders can be found on the records of the Chief 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 154, 155. An attentive student of war will observe 
 how these alleged orders conformed to Napoleon's statement that 
 when he detached Grouchy, on the morning of the 17th, he directed 
 the Marshal to keep between Blucher and the great main-road from 
 Charleroy to Brussels.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 191 
 
 of the French Staff; the same remark appHes to the all- 
 important order written by Bertrand in the absence of 
 Soult. Nor is there much in the circumstance that the 
 orders in question seem to be inconsistent with a well- 
 known despatch of Soult, written in the forenoon of 
 June 18, to which we shall advert afterwards. Napoleon 
 may not have consulted Soult, with whom he was by no 
 means satisfied ; he may have thought it advisable to keep 
 his counsel to himself. There are solid grounds, on the 
 other hand, for accepting the Emperor's distinct assertion. 
 The movement on St. Lambert was exactly in Napoleon's 
 manner ; it was the counterpart of the movement on 
 Marbais, which Ney was ordered to make on the i6th ; 
 it was in accord with the plan of attack at Waterloo. 
 Again there is clear evidence from independent sources 
 that Napoleon expected Grouchy to be in line with him 
 at an early hour on June 18 ; this most pregnant fact has 
 only been lately disclosed, but it is of extreme significance, 
 and we shall recur to it. Finally, it is not to be assumed 
 that, in a matter of this kind, the Emperor deliberately 
 wrote a downright falsehood ; this is very different from 
 the inaccurate and partial statements to be found in his 
 narratives of the campaign, and recent investigation, it 
 should be added, has tended to confirm, in the main, 
 these writings. On the whole, we incline to think these 
 orders were given ; this would account for much that is 
 now obscure ; but unquestionably they never reached 
 Grouchy ; he would have been too eager, if they had, to 
 comply with them. The bearers of the despatches may 
 have been killed or made prisoners ; and unhappily there 
 were traitors and deserters in the French army.* 
 
 Meanwhile Wellington had been preparing himself to 
 encounter Napoleon in front of Waterloo. In addition to 
 the forces which had fallen back from Quatre Bras, he 
 had drawn to the scene of action at hand from 23,000 to 
 
 * See Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 475, 476.
 
 192 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 26,000 men, comprising a part of the 2nd corps of Hill. 
 These moved from Nivelles and other points; he was at 
 the head of an army about 70,000 strong. He might 
 have assembled many more troops ; but he still persisted 
 in fearing for his right, an extraordinary conviction in the 
 existing state of things. He placed from 17,000 to 
 18,000 men, including a part of Colville's British division, 
 at Hal and Tubize, far away on his extreme right, in the 
 belief that * the enemy might turn him in that direction.'* 
 This admittedly was a grave strategic error ; the excuses 
 made for it maybe dismissed ; it exposed him to immense 
 danger in the great strife that ensued, danger that he 
 might wellnigh have averted. t 
 
 Meantime the aged but heroic Blucher, superior to 
 defeat and illness and pain, had resolved to lead his 
 army to the aid of his colleague — a magnificent instance 
 of energetic daring ; on the return of the messenger sent 
 to Quatre Bras in the morning, he had made answer to 
 the Duke, on the evening of the 17th : ' I shall not come 
 with two corps only, but with my whole army — upon the 
 understanding, however, that, should the French not 
 attack us on the i8th, we shall attack them on the 19th. 'I 
 This, however, seems to have been only a verbal message 
 expressing the determination of the old warrior ; it was 
 
 * Wellington to the Due de Berry : Despatches, xii. 476. 
 
 t It is scarcely necessary to refer to Napoleon (' Comment.,' vi. 179) : 
 ' II faut tenir I'arm^e r^unie, concentrer le plus de forces possibles sur 
 le champ de bataille, profiter de toutes les occasions ; car la fortune 
 est femme ; si vous la manquez aujourdhui, ne vous attendez pas k la 
 retrouver demain.' 
 
 J General Maurice {United Service Maj^azine^ September, 1890) has 
 contended that these emphatic words were not uttered on the evening 
 of the 17th, but are contained in a letter written to Muffling on the 
 morning of the iSth. But Muffling ('History of the Campaign of 
 1815') fixes the lime as the evening of the 17th ; and it is improbable, 
 in the highest degree, that Wellington would have made a stand at 
 Waterloo, if he had not had some assurance of the kind, before the 
 night of the 17th.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 I93 
 
 not, we have seen, until late on the night of the 17th that 
 the whole Prussian army was around Wavre ; up to that 
 time it was impossible to know whether it would be able 
 to march on Waterloo ; munitions, and supplies, too, 
 had to be delivered to the troops. It appears to be 
 certain that the official statement, that the march was to 
 be positively made, was not written until near midnight 
 on the 17th, and did not reach Wellington until about 
 two in the morning.* The credit of the project, too, 
 belongs wholly to Blucher ;t he insisted on the movement 
 being made with persevering ardour. Gneisenau hesi- 
 tated and made strategic objections, undoubtedly not 
 without the greatest weight ; this is sufficient proof that, 
 in ordering the retreat on Wavre, he had had no im- 
 mediate purpose of joining Wellington. 
 
 The plan of the allied commanders, therefore, was this : 
 Wellington, with an army of about 70,000 men, of whom 
 scarcely 40,000 were really good troops, was to resist the 
 attack of Napoleon in immensely superior force, regard 
 being had to the quality of his army. Blucher was to 
 march from Wavre to the aid of his colleague, each being 
 divided from the other by ten or eleven miles of a very 
 impracticable and intricate country. It should be re- 
 marked, too, and this is important, that Wellington and 
 Blucher both thought that all Napoleon's army was before 
 Waterloo, with the single exception of the corps of 
 
 * We altogether dismiss a story — first heard of many years after 
 Waterloo — that Wellington rode to Wavre and had an interview with 
 Blucher on the night of the 17th. (i) The story is almost incredible ; 
 no Commander-in-Chief ever did a thing of the kind. (2) There 
 was never a whisper about it in the Prussian or the British army. 
 (3) There is abundant evidence that Wellington flatly contradicted it 
 when he heard of it. (4) The story is really inconsistent with the 
 only known documents in existence. Mr. Ropes has properly rejected 
 it, as a myth, in the last edition of his work. 
 
 + Some writers have referred these discussions to June 16, but the 
 evidence greatly preponderates that they took place at Wavre on 
 the night of the 17th. 
 
 13
 
 194 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Vandamme ; they had no conception that Grouchy was 
 approaching Wavre with an army fully 33,000 strong.* 
 
 These dispositions secured a great and decisive triumph ; 
 they have been extolled by the courtiers of fortune ; but 
 they cannot mislead an impartial student of war ; they 
 were essentially ill-designed, and hazardous in the ex- 
 treme. They implied, from the allied point of view, that 
 Wellington was to withstand Napoleon at the head of 
 nearly 100,000 men, with an army really not half as 
 strong, for a space of certainly five or six hours, in all 
 probability of many more. Was this combination likely 
 to succeed ? was it not rather big with the promise of a 
 French victory ?t They implied, too, in the actual 
 situation of affairs, that Blucher would surely be able to 
 reach Waterloo, though Grouchy, with a powerful re- 
 straining wing, was gathering on his flank. The history 
 of many a campaign has shown that the chances were that 
 this movement would be arrested, and that Wellington 
 would be left without support from his colleague. This 
 strategy, therefore, was in principle bad ; it ought to 
 have proved in the highest degree disastrous ; but it was 
 the natural result of the faulty arrangement, which directed 
 the Prussian army to Wavre, divided from Waterloo by 
 practically a great interval of space, and which prompted 
 the resolve to march from Wavre on Wellington. But it 
 was the great object of the allies, it may be urged, to 
 unite; how otherwise were they to effect their junction? 
 Napoleon was shown how this was to be done, without 
 incurring immense unnecessary risk, and in conformity to 
 the true rules of the military art. As Blucher ought not 
 to have rushed to Sombreffe, and have dragged Welling- 
 
 * Wellington Despatches, xii. 478 ef seq. 
 
 t Napoleon (' Comment.,' v. 208, 209) has put this view of the case 
 forward with admirable clearness and force. Clausewitz, cited by 
 Mr. Ropes ('The Waterloo Campaign,' 243), has in vain attempted a 
 reply. Mr. Ropes easily disposes of his very disingenuous and untrue 
 remarks in a few sentences.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 195 
 
 ton, as it were, to Quatre Bras ; as, in the position of 
 affairs existing on June 15, they ought to have fallen 
 back on Wavre and Waterloo ; so, in the position of 
 affairs on the night of the 17th, they ought to have fallen 
 back behind Brussels ; in that event they would be 
 perfectly safe ; and they would be able to oppose nearly 
 200,000 men to an adversary who could assemble hardly 
 110,000.* In that case certainly they would not have 
 gained Waterloo ; but they would really have out- 
 generalled their mighty foe ; and instead of exposing 
 themselves, and even their cause, to peril, they would have 
 assured the ultimate success of the allies. 
 
 Napoleon and Wellington had now met, for the first 
 time ; each drew his lot from the urn with a steady hand ; 
 
 * Napoleon has proved this with characteristic force of logic (' Com- 
 ment.,' v. 210, 21 1). This is another of the passages German and English 
 commentators avoid, because it is unanswerable. ' On demandera : 
 Que devait done faire le general anglais apres la bataille de Ligny, et 
 le combat de Quatre Bras ? La postdrit^ n'aura pas deux opinions. 
 II devait traverser, la nuit du 17 au 18, la foret de Soigne sur la 
 chauss^e de Charleroi ; I'armde prussienne la devait ^galement 
 traverser sur la chaussde de Wavre : les deux armies devaient se 
 reunir, k la pointe du jour, sur Bruxelles, laisser des arri^res gardes 
 pour d^fendre la foret, gagner quelques jours pour donner le temps 
 aux Prussiens disperses par la bataille de Ligny de rejoindre 
 leur armee, se renforcer de quatorze regiments anglais qui etaient en 
 garnison dans les places fortes de la Bdlgique, ou venaient de d^- 
 barquer k Ostende de retour d'Am^rique et laisser manoeuvrer 
 I'empereur des Frangais comme il aurait voulu. Aurait-il avec une 
 armee de 100,000 hommes traverse la foret de Soigne, pour attaquer, 
 au d^bouch^ les deux armies r^unies, fortes de plus de 200,000 hommes, 
 et en position ? C'dtait certainement tout ce qui pouvait arriver de 
 plus avantageux aux allies.' Mr. Ropes (' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 
 235, 243, 244) has also made some very judicious observations on the 
 subject in the same sense as Napoleon. Perhaps the best commentary 
 on the retreat from Ligny to Wavre, and on the project of a march 
 from Wavre to Waterloo, with the results that ought to have followed, 
 will be found in Prince La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 204, 205. 
 It is remarkable that almost every eulogist of the allied operations has 
 admitted that they involved the greatest danger. As for Blucher's 
 march on Waterloo, it occupied more than the time we have allowed. 
 
 13—2
 
 196 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 each was confident as to the issue of the impending 
 struggle. Yet there was much in the situation as it 
 existed, and as it appeared to both, that might have 
 caused apprehension as to coming events. For aught 
 the Emperor knew, his adversary had his whole army 
 assembled ; if so, it would largely exceed the French army 
 in numbers. He had had no experience of the qualities 
 of British troops; but Salamanca, Vittoria, and many 
 other fields were ominous signs of what they could do in 
 battle ; he had a General before him who had never known 
 defeat ; had baffled and beaten his best lieutenants ; had 
 overthrown his gigantic power in Spain, And Blucher, 
 wherever he was, could not be far off; and Blucher had, 
 over and over again, confounded his calculations by his 
 heroic energy. Could Napoleon rely on Grouchy with 
 complete trust? might not the old warrior, threefold 
 Grouchy in strength, appear at Waterloo and turn de- 
 cisively the scales of fortune ? And Napoleon must have 
 felt that this was his last chance ; were he to fail in this 
 hazard, Europe in arms — nay, an exasperated France 
 — would make him their victim. Nevertheless these 
 thoughts had no fears for that soaring spirit, exulting 
 within its proper sphere — war; the sun about to rise 
 would see the ruin of the British army; and were the 
 British army out of the way, ' of what use would be the 
 other armies about to cross the Rhine, the Alps, and the 
 Pyrenees ?'* 
 
 Wellington, on the other hand, as things appeared to 
 him, might well have felt the gravest misgivings. He 
 believed that Napoleon was before him with 100,000 men, 
 all French troops of excellent quality. Could he resist 
 these with an army of many races and tongues, not to be 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 208 : ' Si I'armde anglo-hollandaise eiit dttf ddtruite 
 k Waterloo, a quoi eut servi aux allids ce grand nombre d'armdes qui 
 se disposient k franchir le Rhin, les Alps, et les Pyrdndes ?' No prouder 
 testimony could be given to the value of a British army, and to the 
 power of England.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 17, 1815 197 
 
 compared in strength to that of his enemy, during the 
 long hours that must pass before Blucher could join him ? 
 What if his adversary should attack in the early morning 
 — and this, we shall see, was Napoleon's purpose — could 
 Blucher, separated by miles of forest, bad roads, and 
 intricate defiles, be on the field in time to avert a disaster ? 
 And Napoleon, Wellington knew well, was very different 
 from Mass^na, Marmont, and Soult — mere satellites of 
 that mighty sun. His presence in the field, the Duke 
 has written, was equal to 40,000 men ; he had never been 
 defeated except at immense odds against him. Never- 
 theless, the British commander was in high heart ; his 
 calm constancy was not disturbed ; he said simply and 
 curtly, * All will go well.'* 
 
 Sciolists and partisans have asserted that at this junc- 
 ture Napoleon had been ' outgeneralled ' by the allies, 
 and that their success on June 18 had been rendered 
 certain. Nothing can be more untrue — nay, absurd ; 
 strategically the advantage was still on the Emperor's 
 side ; if only his lieutenants would be worthy of him, 
 the chances were still that he would gain Waterloo. 
 The junction of Blucher and Wellington would in any 
 event be difficult in the extreme, and could only take 
 place late ; even now, had Grouchy been a capable 
 chief — nay, had Gerard been at the head of his army — that 
 junction could have been made impossible. And what 
 Napoleon were to fall on Wellington at nine in the 
 morning, as would have happened but for the state of 
 the weather, and perhaps a grave mistake ; and what if 
 Grouchy should appear at St. Lambert in obedience to 
 orders he might have received ? Under all these condi- 
 tions the probabilities were that Wellington would be 
 defeated, and Blucher would fail.f Napoleon, therefore, 
 
 * Letter to the Due de Berry, 3 a.m., June 18 : Wellington De- 
 spatches, xii. 476. 
 
 t See Charras, ii. 77, 78, and Lord Wolseley, ' Decline and Fall of 
 Napoleon,' 188, 189.
 
 198 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 was not ' outgeneralled ' ; his efforts against the British 
 commander, especially if they were made at an early 
 hour, would, it is likely, be attended with success. But 
 we venture to think — and we hope we set prejudice aside 
 — that in no event could Napoleon's success on June 18 
 have been complete and decisive. He would have over- 
 whelmed Blucher on the i6th at Ligny had Ney and 
 D'Erlon been equal to their tasks ; in that case the 
 campaign might have closed in Belgium. He had it in 
 his power to inflict a crushing defeat on the allies upon 
 the following day, but owing, we believe, to a kind of 
 suspension of his great faculties by disease, he missed the 
 occasion as he had never missed it before ; Achilles had 
 been in a state of lethargy in his tent. If still favourable, 
 the chances for the battle of the i8th were much less 
 favourable than they had previously been ; and many 
 chances were becoming adverse. We cannot accept his 
 statement, true as to June 16 and 17, that ' but for the 
 faults of his lieutenant he would have made an end of his 
 foes at Waterloo.'* 
 
 * Napoleon Correspondence, xxxii. 275 : ' Je les dcrasais encore h. 
 Waterloo, si ma droite ne m'eut pas manqu^.'
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE l8 — THE PRELUDE TO 
 
 WATERLOO 
 
 The night of June 17 — The condition of the two armies — Confidence 
 of the French — Ominous symptoms — Feelings that prevailed in 
 the allied army — Wellington prepares for battle at an early hour 
 — Overconfidence of Napoleon — He postpones the attack — This 
 unfortunate for him — The position of Waterloo — Its great natural 
 strength — Disposition of Wellington's forces to resist Napoleon's 
 attack — Blucher at Wavre — Hesitation of Gneisenau — The Prus- 
 sian army begins its march on Waterloo — It is dangerously and 
 unnecessarily delayed — Blucher sets off to join Wellington — 
 Grouchy — He misdirects his army — He marches towards Wavre, 
 very late, and slowly — Magnificent appearance of Napoleon's 
 army before the attack — The Emperor — Soult — Grouchy. 
 
 The tempestuous night of June 17 severely tried the 
 endurance of the two armies, brought at last face to face 
 for a tremendous conflict. The rain continued to fall in 
 torrents for hours ; the roll of thunder sounded in the 
 far distance ; lightning flashed, in tongues of flame, from 
 between the clouds ; superstition had its tales, for many 
 years afterwards, of dread forms of death and terror 
 appearing in the skies. Scarcely more than half of the 
 French army had as yet reached the field ; the soldiery, 
 in their hastily formed encampments, stretched themselves 
 on the sodden and miry ground, amidst crops of rye 
 trodden under foot, and drenched with wet ; the bivouac 
 fires, dense with smoke, and yielding little warmth, only
 
 20O THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15 
 
 illuminated faintly the darkness around. Many divisions, 
 we have seen, were still in the rear ; the corps of Lobau 
 and Reille, and Kellermann's horsemen, spread around 
 Genappe four miles from headquarters. The men of the 
 Imperial Guard toiled painfully through the storm, and 
 reached the front in the morning only, in an angry mood 
 and a sorry plight. Hunger and privation, too, made the 
 ordeal worse ; the store of food for four days, which, as 
 their wont was, the legions of Napoleon carried with 
 them, had been by this time wellnigh exhausted ; it was 
 long after daybreak before a fresh distribution was 
 made. 
 
 Nevertheless, amidst passing murmurs and discontent, 
 there was no sign of despondency or weakness in the 
 slowly gathering host ; the French had the conqueror of 
 many years at their head ; they were elated by their 
 triumph over the detested Prussians ; they looked forward 
 with eager hope to the morrow, and to the victory they 
 would wrest from the English in retreat before them. 
 Still, apart from material distress and hardship, many 
 things concurred to impair the moral power and essential 
 strength of that high-hearted army. The country, for 
 miles around, was covered with stragglers, irregularly 
 hastening to join their colours ; hamlets, villages, and 
 farms had been ravaged by widespread pillage ; the bonds 
 of discipline had been dangerously relaxed. The worst 
 symptom, however, was the deep distrust of many officers 
 and chiefs prevailing among the troops. Ney, it was 
 rumoured, had been sharply rebuked ; Soult and his staff 
 were angrily censured ; the Old Guard mingled its com- 
 plaints with talk of treason ; the crime of Bourmont and 
 others was laid to the charge of leaders in high and 
 inferior place. Napoleon, in fact, and Napoleon alone, 
 held that formidable but ill-compacted array together ; 
 should his eagles fail in their swoop, what would be the 
 result ? would they ever soar to the sun again ?
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 201 
 
 Some provision had been made in the opposite camp to 
 mitigate the sufferings the dreary night brought with it. 
 The greater part of Welhngton's army had reached its 
 positions before the storm had burst ; the men had 
 accumulated the masses of wood which had fed the fires 
 seen from afar by Napoleon ; these had diminished the 
 discomfort caused by rain and cold. The troops, too, 
 had been well supplied with food, regularly paid for, as 
 was the rule of their service ; and they were all assembled 
 within a space comparatively small, straggling and in- 
 discipline being unknown among them. The night, how- 
 ever, was difficult to bear ; the bivouacs, like those of the 
 enemy, were on the rain-drenched ground, and amidst rye 
 ' dripping on you, as if from a bath ' ; the soldiery, of 
 whom thousands had marched twenty, thirty, and even 
 forty, miles, from the valleys of the Senne, the Dender and 
 the Scheldt, sank wearily to sleep, overcome by fatigue. 
 This was especially the case of the cavalry, which had 
 covered the retreat from Quatre Bras ; and some of the 
 divisions, which had arrived late, were almost as severely 
 tried as the French. 
 
 The feelings that pervaded that armed assemblage of many 
 peoples and tongues, as might have been expected, were very 
 different. Perponcher had suffered heavy loss at Quatre 
 Bras ; thousands of the Dutch-Belgians had been brothers 
 in arms of the French ; Napoleon for these men was a very 
 God of War, the Duke a commander almost unknown ; no 
 wonder^that the courage of part of these troops was shaken. 
 The Brunswickers, too, had been beaten on the i6th ; but 
 they were eager to avenge the fall of their Duke ; they 
 were animated by the stern Teutonic spirit ; many were 
 ere long to show they could fight to the death. As for 
 the Hanoverian and other German levies, these were 
 young troops to a very great extent ; but they were in- 
 spired by the patriotism of 1813 ; they were longing to 
 measure themselves with the enemy. The men of the
 
 202 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 German Legion and the British soldiery were, it is un- 
 necessary to say, the backbone of the army, the power on 
 which WelHngton must chiefly rely ; they were in the 
 mood that had made them terrible on many a hard- 
 fought field. Even the young and raw battalions had 
 acquired the steadiness and strong sense of duty charac- 
 teristic of troops under the Duke's command ; they were 
 to do great things in a fierce and protracted trial. As 
 for the veterans of the Peninsular War — and many regi- 
 ments of these were happily present — they looked forward 
 to the coming struggle with the most complete confidence, 
 and quietly laughed at the fears and misgivings of weaker 
 comrades. They had met and beaten the French before ; 
 they were about to meet and beat them again ; they knew 
 nothing of Napoleon, they knew Wellington ; they had 
 absolute trust in their chiefs and their officers ; Busaco, 
 Salamanca, Vittoria, and a march of victory from the 
 Tagus, across the Pyrenees to the Garonne, were the 
 signs in which they had been taught to conquer. 
 
 During the night the sounds, in places, were heard of 
 the tools of the sappers employed in strengthening the 
 outworks in advance of the allied line, which were being 
 made formidable points of defence. Wellington seems to 
 have thought that his adversary would attack at an early 
 hour ; he was on horseback soon after five in the morning ; 
 he rode to the field unaccompanied, it has been said, by 
 his staff, many of these gallant but ill-trained youths.* 
 At about six the assembly rang along the army's front ; 
 the men rose, ' cold and blue, dirty and unshaven,' from 
 the dying watchfires ; but they had soon addressed them- 
 selves to their manifold tasks, the * note of preparation,' 
 an eye - witness wrote, ' reminding me forcibly of the 
 distant murmur of the sea beating against an iron-bound 
 coast.' The leaguers, held by the armed masses, seemed 
 stirring with life ; here the guns, ' their deep voices still 
 
 * A survivor of Waterloo told this to the present writer.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 203 
 
 silent,' were being moved in batteries to selected points ; 
 there horsemen were tending their battle-steeds for the 
 fight ; here, again, footmen were despatching their morn- 
 ing meal — the last many a brave man was ever to taste ; 
 squadrons and regiments were taking the positions they 
 were to defend. The echoes of martial music spread far 
 and wide ; the Highland pibroch, with its shrill notes, 
 blending with the thunder of the drum and the blare of 
 trumpets ; staff officers were descried pointing out every- 
 where the stations the different corps were to occupy. 
 The most curious feature of the marshalling of the host 
 was, perhaps, the rapid crackling of musketry along the 
 whole line ; the soldiery discharged their pieces in the 
 air, in order to load them again for the conflict at hand. 
 The French army, though in the near distance, as yet 
 remained motionless and made no sign ; the outposts 
 only watched the enemy's doings ; mist and rain half 
 enshrouded the imperial arrays. In truth, large parts of 
 the army were still far off, and Napoleon had no notion 
 of an attack made piecemeal by day, though he had 
 certainly contemplated a night attack, should his antago- 
 nist have tried to retreat in the darkness. 
 
 The Emperor had been engaged during part of the 
 night in reading and dictating despatches referring to 
 the state of opinion in Paris, and to the questionable 
 attitude of the Houses he had lately convened. Sinister 
 rumours reached him, too, of missives disseminated far 
 and wide, presaging his fall and his army's ruin ; the 
 Belgian plains would witness an immense disaster; they 
 would be the sepulchre of the last host of the Empire. 
 His confidence, nevertheless, was absolute — nay, over- 
 weening — when at eight in the morning he called his 
 lieutenants together to partake in the last meal they 
 were to share with him. Napoleon estimated the Duke's 
 army at its full normal strength,* go, 000 men, for he was 
 
 * Allowing for the losses at Quatre Bras and in the retreat.
 
 204 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 not aware that a large body of troops had been left round 
 Hal ; he was undertaking an operation which, he has told 
 us himself, should be avoided if possible, and must be 
 hazardous, attacking a great master of defence in a 
 position chosen by himself; yet he felt convinced that, 
 with a force he calculated as 6g,ooo Frenchmen, he could 
 certainly defeat — nay, destroy — a force largely superior, he 
 thought, in number. ' The chances,' he said, * are nine to 
 one in our favour '; in this we see his too sanguine and 
 sometimes presumptuous temper. 
 
 He gave little attention to the remarks or the warnings 
 of the companions in arms seated at his board, many of 
 these in a mood wholly different from his own. His 
 brother Jerome informed him that he had heard a report 
 at Genappe that Blucher was about to march from Wavre 
 to join Wellington. Napoleon rejected the idea as almost 
 extravagant ; should the enemies unite, it would be behind 
 Brussels ; in any case Grouchy would dispose of Blucher. 
 Ney declared that Wellington was about to retreat, and that 
 his columns were making for the Forest of Soignies ; the 
 Emperor replied, and in 'part truly : ' It is now too late ; 
 Wellington would expose himself to certain destruction ; 
 he has thrown the dice ; they have turned up for us.' 
 Napoleon even seems not to have taken much heed of the 
 advice of lieutenants well acquainted with the British 
 army, and taught by bitter experience in Portugal and 
 Spain. Reille told him that British troops in position 
 were formidable in the very highest degree, and that he 
 ought to try to manoeuvre them out of the ground they 
 held. D'Erlon, it is believed, said much the same ; but 
 neither seem to have deeply impressed their master. Of 
 all Napoleon's subordinates, Soult was the least hopeful ; 
 even now his mind was not without forebodings. The 
 Chief of the Staff knew, as the Emperor did not, what 
 the qualities of a British army were ; he had wished, we 
 have seen, that Grouchy's restraining wing should be
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 205 
 
 composed of a smaller force, so that the force to attack 
 Wellington should be more powerful. * There are men 
 on that hill,' he observed, ' will die where they stand 
 sooner than retreat.' Napoleon's angry retort, it is said, 
 was : * You think Wellington a great General because he 
 beat you ; I tell you he is a bad General, and the English 
 are bad troops; we will make a mouthful of them.'* Alas 
 for genius when foredoomed by Providence ! it was with 
 Napoleon before Waterloo as it was before Moscow. 
 
 Napoleon had given positive orders that the attack 
 should begin at nine in the morning; he had seen his 
 opportunity, and had resolved to seize it.t His army, 
 however, was not nearly assembled on the field where it 
 was to give battle at that early hour; some regiments 
 were not in line until ten and afterwards. It is probable, 
 however, that, without making much effort, it might have 
 been collected on the ground by about ten ; had a deter- 
 mined and general attack been then made, it is not easy 
 to deny, as we review the incidents of the day, that it must 
 have gained a real if not a decisive victory ; the chances, 
 at least, in its favour would have been very great. But 
 unpropitious Fate interfered at this juncture ; Napoleon 
 formed a purpose, perhaps to be justified in a military 
 sense as he thought the situation was, and supported by 
 the highest authority on the spot, but most unfortunate 
 for him in events that followed. The position to be 
 assailed was obviously strong ; the approaches to it were 
 beset by obstacles; the ground, broken in hollows in 
 places, and thick with crops of rye, had been rendered 
 difficult in the extreme by the torrents of rain, which had 
 made fields, enclosures, woods, sodden, heavy, and hard 
 to traverse. The wind was now brisk ; the sun was begin- 
 
 * These and other interesting details, many collected for the first 
 time, will be found in H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 309, 315. 
 
 t This order will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 251. 
 Charras has most discreditably suppressed it.
 
 2o6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ning to shine ; it certainly would be of no small impor- 
 tance that Napoleon's cavalry and artillery, his best arms, 
 should have the means of manceuvring with some kind of 
 freedom. At the instance of Drouot,* one of his most 
 skilful officers, the commander of the artillery of the 
 Guard, the Emperor consented to postpone the attack, 
 in order that the ground should dry and harden. 
 
 It has been surmised that in coming to this resolve 
 Napoleon had it in contemplation to gain time for 
 Grouchy, as he expected, to reach the field in com- 
 pliance with orders probably sent ; t it has been surmised, 
 too, that he had an intention of displaying leisurely his 
 army in complete array before the Dutch-Belgian troops 
 of Wellington, and so to impress them with a sense of its 
 power ; and, of course, delay made his preparations more 
 mature, and secured time for his soldiers to rest, and to 
 make more ready for battle. His paramount object, how- 
 ever, it is all but certain, was to obtain two or three hours 
 to make the ground easier for his movements in attack. 
 Opinions from then to now have differed as to whether this 
 was a supremely important — nay, an attainable — object ; t 
 
 * In the Afoniteur, ]\i\y 24, 1815, Drouot said in the Chamber of 
 Peers : ' Au jour il faisait un temps si elTroyable qu'il ^tait impossible 
 de manceuvrer avec I'artillerie. Vers 9 heures le temps si leva, le vent 
 secha un peu la campagne.' 
 
 t Writers differing so widely as Thiers and Siborne agree in think- 
 ing that Napoleon was waiting for Grouchy to come up, but there is 
 no trace of this in Napoleon's writings. 
 
 X Jomini ('Pr<?cis de la Campagne de 1S15,' 199) says: 'Quatre 
 heures n'auraient pas suffi pour secher un terrain comme celui la. . . , 
 Dans la situation des affaires, ce retard de quatre heures fut una faute.' 
 Charras (ii. 76, 77) is of the same opinion, and severely condemns 
 Napoleon for the delay. On the other hand, M. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' 
 309) cites authorities of weight in a contrary sense. From the point 
 of view held by Napoleon, that Blucher would not venture to march 
 from Wavre on Waterloo, or that if he made the attempt Grouchy 
 would stop him, or that Grouchy would appear on the field himself, it 
 was evidently important to let the ground become consolidated, in 
 order to facilitate the movements of guns and horsemen. Drouot,
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 207 
 
 all that can be affirmed positively is that on June 18 the 
 sun in its courses fought against Napoleon. Had the 
 battlefield been in its ordinary state, he would have fallen 
 on his enemies much sooner than he did ; and in that 
 event, despite Blucher's energy, and the remissness and 
 shortcomings of Grouchy, Waterloo, humanly speaking, 
 would have been a victory for France. 
 
 Wellington's army had taken its order of battle before 
 Napoleon put off the attack. We must briefly describe 
 the famous position, known to history by the name of 
 Waterloo, and fiercely assailed and defended on this 
 memorable day. The hilly ridge of La Belle Alliance, 
 with a ridge towards the north-east, and the adjoining 
 tract, extending in a semicircular sweep from near Fris- 
 chermont, by Plancenoit and Rossomme, to Mon Plaisir, 
 marked generally the ground held by the French army ; 
 the allied army spread along the ridge of Mont St. Jean, 
 and thence to a considerable distance westwards, occupying 
 different points of vantage in its front, and the reverse 
 slope of the ridge to the village of Mont St. Jean. The 
 interval of space between the two ridges is less than a 
 mile. 
 
 It is composed of two valleys stretching east and west, 
 which form the watershed of feeders of the Dyle and the 
 Senne, and sink into flats, or rise into eminences of little 
 height. The great main-road from Charleroy to Brussels 
 traverses the valleys where they part at their topmost 
 levels, and runs across the ridge into the village of Mont 
 St. Jean ; it meets at this point the road from Nivelles to 
 Brussels, uniting with the great main -road, the two 
 making a long acute angle. The eastern valley narrows 
 
 eminently a conscientious man, was inconsolable at having given 
 advice which proved so unfortunate in the event. See a most in- 
 teresting conversation set forth in Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de 
 I'Empire,' vi. 513, 514. The remarks of Drouot, that but for the delay 
 a decisive victory would have been assured, are exaggerated, but con- 
 tain a great deal of truth. ^
 
 2o8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 into a ravine from which the Ohain, a streamlet, descends 
 hard by the hamlet of the same name ; the western trends 
 into a wider space, separating the villages of Merbe-Braine 
 and Braine I'Alleud from the ridge of Mont St. Jean. This 
 ridge rises from the valleys by a gentle ascent ; before it 
 spreads a series of advanced posts, so to speak, the chateau 
 of Hougoumont, with its wooded and walled enclosures ; 
 the large and solid farm of La Haye Sainte, with its 
 buildings, gardens, and a gravel-pit at hand ; and east- 
 wards the petty hamlets of Papelotte, La Haye, and 
 Smohain, little more than mere clusters of peasant 
 dwellings. 
 
 Along the crest of the ridge, extending from Ohain and 
 thence far away to Wavre, ran a cross-road connecting 
 Ohain with Braine I'Alleud ; this formed in itself a strong 
 obstacle, for it was bounded in parts by thick double 
 hedges, and in parts sank into hollows between high 
 banks ; it nearly marked the front of Wellington's chief 
 line of battle. The slope behind the ridge, up to the 
 village of Mont St. Jean, formed, as it were, a great place 
 of arms very favourable to the assemblage of reserves out 
 of the sight of an enemy, and sheltered from his fire ; it 
 proved to be of immense importance in the coming battle. 
 The tract formed by the two valleys in front of the ridge 
 was in places intersected by country roads, and it was 
 largely covered by thick masses of rye, rising from 
 enclosures here and there, not easy of access. To the 
 north of the ridge, at a distance of about two miles, rose 
 the Forest of Soignies, with its dark verdure ; the village 
 of Waterloo was half hidden within its southern verge ; 
 and to the east, especially, spread a succession of woods 
 around the ravines and defiles through which the stream 
 of the Lasne flows, and stretching from St. Lambert 
 almost to Plancenoit.* 
 
 * This description, of course, applies to the position as it existed in 
 181 5. The whole ground has been much changed since that time.
 
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 COUNTRY ROUND LIGNY, WAVRE, AND WATERLOO, 1815.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 209 
 
 The allied position has been compared to a vast natural 
 fortress, protected in front by a well-defined glacis, and by 
 outworks admirably fashioned for defence ; with a parapet 
 and a way behind the curtain to screen the garrison, and 
 to give it freedom of action, and with huge courts in the 
 rear in which the supports of the garrison could collect 
 unobserved and in safety. It had also this immense and 
 special advantage : The ground was favourable not only 
 for defence, but for counter-attack ; the three arms — 
 artillery, cavalry, and infantry — could manoeuvre upon it, 
 and easily assume the offensive should the occasion arise. 
 
 Wellington arrayed his army — 70,000 strong as a whole, 
 including 13,500 horsemen and 159 guns* — upon a front 
 about three and a half miles in extent, from Smohain 
 towards his extreme left, to Braine I'Alleud on his extreme 
 right, but scarcely half that distance for his main battle. 
 He expected the Prussians from Wavre in the forenoon ; 
 this, probably, was the chief reason that his line in that 
 direction was comparatively weak — very much weaker 
 than his centre and right. His extreme left was formed 
 of the light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur, and of the 
 Hanoverians of Wincke ; these troops had no reinforce- 
 ments from the rear. His left centre was composed of 
 Picton's division, and of the Hanoverians of Best, all 
 tried at Quatre Bras ; in front was Bylandt's brigade of 
 Perponcher's division ; in the rear was Ponsonby's heavy 
 British cavalry, the Dutch-Belgian horse of Ghigny, and 
 Lambert's brigade of British infantry, which had reached 
 the field by forced marches from Ghent. This part of the 
 army filled the space between the extreme left and the 
 great main-road ; at this last point it joined the right 
 centre and right of Wellington. All these parts, taken 
 
 * As usual, we have adopted the figures of Charras (ii. 11), who has 
 taken infinite pains. Siborne ('The Waterloo Campaign') makes the 
 numbers 67,661, and 156 guns; but this probably does not include 
 British commissioned and non-commissioned officers. 
 
 14
 
 2IO THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 together, formed what we have called the main battle of 
 the British commander. The Duke's right centre was 
 composed of Alten's third division — this also, for the most 
 part, proved at Quatre Bras ; the right, extending to the 
 road from Nivelles to Brussels, comprised the British 
 Guards of Cooke — the martial flower of the infantry — its 
 brigades directed by Byng and Maitland. Behind these 
 two divisions a powerful reserve was assembled — the 
 Household Cavalry of Somerset and a regiment of British 
 dragoons in line with that of Ponsonby, but with the great 
 main-road between ; the Dutch-Belgian horsemen of Van 
 Merlen and Trip ; the fine squadrons of Arentschild, of 
 the German Legion ; the Nassauers of Kruse, a large body 
 of Brunswickers, and the British and German Legionary 
 cavalry of Grant and Dornberg. This large reserve, care- 
 fully arrayed behind the line in its front, almost filled the 
 angle between the great main-road and that from Nivelles 
 and Brussels, of which the apex reached Mont St. Jean. 
 
 Apart from the troops forming his extreme left, the main 
 battle of Wellington, Bylandt's brigade excepted, was 
 arrayed on a front, rather more than a mile and a half in 
 breadth, just behind the cross-road from Wavre, by Ohain, 
 to Braine I'Alleud, the powerful reserves behind in the 
 rear on the reverse slope of the ridge. This disposition 
 of the British General's forces concealed even his first line 
 from the enemy to some extent, and kept its reinforce- 
 ments almost wholly out of sight ; the very opposite of 
 Blucher's arrangements at Ligny, it sheltered the defenders 
 of the position from fire, presented many difficulties to 
 the attack, and masked the real strength of the Duke's 
 army. The events of the day proved that it deceived 
 Napoleon more than once. 
 
 The main battle of Wellington, nevertheless, did not 
 comprise the whole of the troops he commanded. West 
 of the ridge of Mont St. Jean, where the village on that 
 side extends, the extreme right of the allied army was
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 211 
 
 placed. It was divided into two distinct parts ; one of 
 these was at a considerable distance from its supports. 
 The first part contained Mitchell's brigade of Colville's 
 division, the chief part of which had been left at Hal and 
 Tubize, and the main body of Clinton's second British 
 division — the brigades of Adam, Duplat, and W. Halkett 
 — English, German Legionary, and Hanoverian soldiers ; 
 it held the village of Merbe-Braine, and thence extended 
 to the right centre of the Duke's army, just west of the 
 road from Nivelles to Brussels. The second part, almost 
 isolated, was stationed around the village of Braine 
 I'Alleud, about a mile from Merbe-Braine ; it was formed 
 of the Dutch-Belgian division of Chass^, an able soldier 
 trained in the school of Napoleon ; it was greatly to 
 distinguish itself in a most fiery trial. 
 
 It remains to notice the troops who were placed to 
 defend the approaches to the main position — the outworks 
 of the great natural fortress. On Wellington's left and 
 extreme left, Saxe- Weimar's brigade held the little hamlets 
 of Papelotte and La Haye, and had detachments as far as 
 the hamlet of Smohain. La Haye Sainte, in advance of 
 the Duke's left centre, was occupied by some 400 men 
 of the German Legion ; the adjoining gravel-pit by part 
 of the British 95th Rifles, a regiment celebrated in the 
 Peninsular War. To the right Hougoumont, with its 
 buildings and large enclosures, was held by a detachment 
 of the British Guards, by one battalion of Perponcher's 
 men, and by a few Hanoverian troops — in all, from 1,200 
 to 1,400 strong ; and Hougoumont, like the other advanced 
 posts, had been hastily prepared for defence. As for the 
 artillery of the army, it was distributed, in rather even 
 proportions of guns, along the front ; not many batteries 
 were in reserve. Under Wellington, the real soul of the 
 defence, Picton commanded the left, the Prince of Orange 
 the centre, and Hill the right of the army as a whole. 
 
 This, briefly, was the position on which the British chief, 
 
 14 — 2
 
 212 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 with an army far inferior in essential force, made ready to 
 resist the attack of Napoleon at the head of an army much 
 more powerful ; and the ground had been occupied in the 
 manner referred to. The position itself, we have seen, 
 was of great natural strength ; its approaches formed ex- 
 cellent points of vantage ; its front, for the most part, gave 
 facilities for a plunging and very destructive fire. It was 
 partly protected along its crest by an obstacle ; it supplied 
 ample room for assemblmg large reserves out of the 
 enemy's sight, and screened from his guns ; it afforded 
 good opportunities for counter-attacks. The Duke had 
 generally turned to the best advantage the favourable 
 situation he had chosen for a great defensive battle. He 
 is not to be blamed because his extreme left was weak, for 
 he expected the Prussians many hours before they reached 
 the field ; and, as it was, this part of his line was never 
 forced or turned. He occupied admirably the ridge of 
 Mont St. Jean, placing his troops with perfect judgment 
 on the ground, whether for the defence or for offensive 
 movements ; he availed himself most skilfully of the feature 
 of the position most, perhaps, in his favour, and so arrayed 
 even his first line and nearly all his reserves that they 
 should be exposed as little as possible, and should present 
 a comparatively small mark to the enemy — should, espe- 
 cially the reserves, be largely beyond his reach. Welling- 
 ton, too, as a rule, occupied his advanced posts ably ; that 
 of Hougoumont made a most stubborn and successful 
 resistance ; this greatly impeded and weakened the attack. 
 The British commander, nevertheless, made two mis- 
 takes in these fine defensive arrangements. La Haye 
 Sainte was much the most important of the allied out- 
 posts ; it was on the great main-road from Charleroy to 
 Brussels, and though this and the road from Brussels to 
 Nivelles had been obstructed by strong stockades, this 
 point was the key of Wellington's left centre, and covered 
 a vulnerable part of his whole position. La Haye Sainte,
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 18, 1815 213 
 
 too, was commanded by the French ridge to the north- 
 east ; it was made an object of incessant and very 
 formidable attacks. Its loss, we shall see, proved most 
 unfortunate ; for these reasons it ought to have been held 
 by a force much more powerful than that which held it.* 
 It is difficult, besides, altogether to justify the detachment 
 of Chasse so far as Braine I'Alleud, or even the immense 
 accumulation of troops on Wellington's right — these, too, 
 for the most part, the best of his army. We see here 
 the apprehension for his right which beset him from the 
 beginning of the campaign, and which had caused him to 
 make the great strategic error of leaving a large force far 
 off around Hal and Tubize.t 
 
 While Napoleon's attack was being retarded, Blucher 
 was on the march to Waterloo from Wavre. To under- 
 stand this operation and all that it involved, we must look 
 back at the state of the Prussian army and at the positions 
 it held. It had been all assembled, we have seen, around 
 Wavre towards midnight on June 17 ; it still numbered 
 about go,ooo men, and nearly 300 guns. Of its four corps, 
 that of Bulow lay around Dion le Mont, having sent a 
 detachment to Mont St. Guibert, about six or seven miles 
 from Wavre, in order to observe the enemy's movements ; 
 that of Pirch was encamped at St. Anne and Aisemont, 
 both corps on the eastern bank of the Dyle, that of Pirch 
 being the most forward ; the corps of Thielmann was at 
 La Bavette, and that of Zieten at Bierges, each on the 
 western bank of the river. Faithful to the pledge he had 
 given a few hours before, Blucher had ordered Bulow and 
 Pirch to break up at the peep of day on the i8th, and to 
 advance as quickly as they could to St. Lambert, four 
 
 * See on this point the judicious remarks of General Shaw Kennedy, 
 'Battle of Waterloo,' 174-176. 
 
 t Napoleon is unjust in his comments on Wellington's conduct at 
 Waterloo, but there is truth in the following (' Comment.,' v. 210) : ' Le 
 general anglais ne jugea pas qu'il devait etre et serait attaqud par sa 
 gauche ; il crut qu'il le serait par sa droite.'
 
 214 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 miles, we have said, from Napoleon's camp; they were to 
 conceal from the enemy, as much as possible, their troops; 
 they were not to attack the French right until it was fully 
 engaged.* But Zieten and Thielmann were to remain 
 where they were for the present ; they were to watch the 
 operations of a French corps supposed to be on the march 
 from Gembloux, and believed to be that of Vandamme — 
 14,000 or 15,000 strong. Blucher, like Wellington, was 
 under the false impression that nearly all the French army 
 was before Waterloo ; he had not the slightest idea that 
 Grouchy was on his way to Wavre with at least 33,000 
 men.-f- 
 
 The veteran wrote to his colleague early on the i8th 
 that, suffering as he was, he would be at the head of his 
 men, would join Wellington, and fall on Napoleon's right. 
 * I would rather,' the heroic warrior exclaimed, ' be tied to 
 my horse than fail to take part in the fight.' Blucher set 
 off from Wavre at about eleven o'clock, Bulow and Pirch 
 having been for many hours in movement. He thought 
 of nothing but of the struggle at hand. He urged on the 
 troops he met with characteristic energy. With Gneisenau, 
 however, it was quite otherwise ; he had hesitated before, 
 and now hesitated again. He felt all that was risked in a 
 very hazardous march. His distrust of Wellington had 
 become intense. ' Wellington was as false as an Indian 
 Nabob.' He saw that should the British commander 
 retreat, the Prussian army would be in the lion's mouth, 
 and in all probability would be destroyed. He directed 
 the aide-de-camp who had saved Blucher at Ligny to 
 inform Muffling that he must ascertain — this was a few 
 hours only before Waterloo — whether Wellington had 
 determined on giving battle, t He saw Bulow and Pirch 
 on their way not without grave misgivings. Had he 
 known the real strength of Grouchy's army, Gneisenau 
 
 * Ollech, 188-191. t Ibid., 188. 
 
 ■\ Ibid., 189.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 215 
 
 would not improbably have found means to prevent a 
 movement being made from Wavre at all. 
 
 The troops of Bulow and Pirch, in accordance with 
 Blucher's orders, were under arms at five in the morning, 
 those of Zieten and Thielmann staying in their camps. 
 Here, however, a capital mistake was made,* which 
 greatly retarded the Prussian army, and might have led 
 to the most disastrous results. Zieten and Thielmann 
 were on the western bank of the Dyle ; they were at least 
 two or three miles nearer St. Lambert than Pirch and 
 Bulow, and, besides, had not a river and a town to pass ; 
 they ought, therefore, to have been the first to advance 
 towards Waterloo. But Zieten's men had suffered greatly 
 at Ligny ; Thielmann had hitherto been rather slow and 
 remiss ; they were detained at Wavre, this causing the 
 loss of some hours. Another grave error was also made 
 in the disposition of the corps of Pirch and Bulow. Both 
 were on the eastern bank of the Dyle, in the rear, there- 
 fore, of Zieten and Thielmann ; but Pirch was nearly two 
 miles in advance of Bulow, and, of course, ought to have 
 moved before him. The losses of Pirch at Ligny had, 
 however, been heavy; the troops of Bulow were intact 
 and fresh. It was arranged, accordingly, that Bulow 
 should begin the march, and should be the first to show 
 himself to the enemy. 
 
 As the inevitable result, the columns of Bulow had to 
 defile more or less past those of Pirch. Confusion and 
 intermingling followed. It was seven in the morning 
 before Bulow's first troops appeared in the narrow streets 
 of Wavre. Some time was required to get through the 
 town. A fire, too, which broke out caused much delay, 
 and the crossing of the Dyle was, besides, tedious. The 
 
 * M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 280,282) has explained this most 
 important passage of the campaign, and has accounted for the extreme 
 slowness of the Prussian operations better than any other historian. 
 His research and insight are admirable.
 
 2i6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 march from Wavre to St. Lambert, moreover, was im- 
 peded by all kinds of obstacles, and it was not until after 
 ten in the forenoon that the advanced guard of Bulow 
 reached St. Lambert, the mass of his forces being hours 
 in the rear. The march of Pirch was even more retarded ; 
 his troops were not in full movement until noon. Half 
 were not over the Dyle until one; the remainder were 
 still on the eastern bank.* Half of the whole Prussian 
 army was thus extended in disunited and straggling 
 columns, far from each other, on a perilous flank march. 
 Had the commander of Napoleon's restraining wing, 
 charged to interpose between Blucher and Wellington, 
 taken on this morning the course he ought to have taken 
 — and this was indicated by the true principles of war — 
 he would not only — as we shall point out — have been able 
 completely to stop the enemy, but very possibly would 
 have wrought Bulow's ruin. 
 
 We turn to Grouchy, the evil genius of France and of 
 Napoleon, on the great day of Waterloo. The Marshal, 
 we have seen, had followed the Prussians with extreme 
 slowness on June 17 ; had only reached Gembloux in the 
 evening, part of his cavalry being beyond at Sauveniere ; 
 and was thus fully fourteen miles from Blucher. This 
 delay was certainly to be deplored ; but had Grouchy 
 fulfilled his mission, and done what his master had a right 
 to expect, subsequent events proved that there was as yet 
 no danger. At ten at night, we have said, he had informed 
 the Emperor that the Prussians were in retreat not in 
 great force either towards Wavre or towards Perwez — that 
 is, Louvain. He had promised that, were they for the 
 most part falling back on Wavre, he would pursue them 
 in that direction, in order to keep Blucher apart from 
 Wellington. The intelligence he had already received 
 ought, we have pointed out, to have induced him to move 
 at daybreak on the i8th to Moustier and Ottignies, and 
 
 * Ollech, 193.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 217 
 
 to get over the Dyle at these places ; for a march towards 
 Perwez would be a false movement, but a march on 
 Moustier and Ottignies would be in the true direction. 
 It would bring him to Wavre should Blucher be halting 
 there, would enable him to stop Blucher if on the way to 
 Waterloo, and would draw him within easy reach of the 
 main French army, should the Emperor be in need of his 
 support. 
 
 Grouchy, however, had formed no such resolve, and had 
 lingered at Gembloux ; but, as the night advanced, reports 
 came in to him which ought irrevocably to have fixed his 
 purpose had he had a ray of the inspiration of a true 
 soldier. He learned that the enemy was assembled around 
 Wavre, and that without the possibility of a doubt ; and 
 at three in the morning of the i8th he wrote to the 
 Emperor that Blucher was falling back towards Brussels 
 in order to effect his junction with Wellington; that he 
 was in retreat by Corbaix and Chaumont — the first a 
 village on a line with Moustier and Ottignies, the second 
 a village between Wavre and Perwez, and both being on 
 the roads to Wavre — so that the Marshal's army would 
 march at once, by Sart les Walhain, on Corbaix and 
 Wavre.* The information that the Prussians were at 
 Wavre ought now, we repeat, to have caused Grouchy to 
 make for Moustier and Ottignies without the delay of a 
 moment, for the reasons we have before referred to ; but 
 the Marshal remained blind to his true mission, and 
 turned aside from the path of success and safety, in an 
 evil hour for his country and himself. He thought only 
 of reaching his enemy, not of standing between him and 
 his allies. The false news that Blucher had fallen back in 
 
 * The genuineness of this despatch has been questioned, but it 
 seems to us to have been certainly genuine. Soult clearly refers to it 
 in a despatch we shall notice afterwards. M. H. Houssaye contends 
 that Grouchy wrote, not at 3 a.m., but at 6 a.m. (' Waterloo,' ii. 287), 
 but the text seems to be 3 a.m. Soult refers to it as written at 2 a.m. 
 The despatch is in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 318.
 
 2i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 part, by Chaumont, made Grouchy still cast his eyes 
 towards Perwez. Instead of directing his army towards 
 Moustier and Ottignies at break of day, he directed it 
 towards Wavre by a rather shorter road — that is, by 
 Sart les Walhain and the adjoining country. This was an 
 enormous, if not a fatal, mistake. In addition, his orders 
 were that the march was to be at a late hour ; Vandamme 
 was not to leave his camps until six in the morning, 
 Gerard not until eight o'clock. Pajol, supported, we have 
 said, by the division of Teste, was to march early, but by 
 the eccentric road of Grand Leez.* 
 
 Grouchy did not leave Gembloux even at the time, 
 late as this was, he had originally designed. Vandamme 
 and Gerard were not on the march until between eight 
 and nine in the morning ; as on the 17th, the troops 
 followed each other in one huge column. The movement 
 towards Wavre was made at the rate of little more than a 
 mile and a half an hour. Even worse. Grouchy sent no 
 reconnoitring-parties towards Moustier and Ottignies to 
 bring him news of the position of the imperial army ; had 
 he taken this obvious and simple precaution, the conse- 
 sequences, we shall see, might have been momentous.t 
 
 We pass on to the tent of Napoleon contemplating, we 
 have seen, a decisive attack on Wellington ; he had re- 
 solved to make his principal effort at about one ; the 
 delay, therefore, was one of three hours at least ; he gave 
 his final orders at about nine; I he then retired to take 
 a short rest. The evidence respecting the state of his 
 health at Waterloo is extremely conflicting.§ He gave 
 
 * These orders will all be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 
 
 313,317- 
 
 t Mr. Ropes' narrative in treating this part of Grouchy's conduct. 
 or, rather, misconduct, is specially good ('The Campaign of Waterloo,' 
 254,255). 
 
 X M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 501, 502) has examined the 
 evidence with great care and research. See 313. 
 
 § This order will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 258.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 219 
 
 proof of occasional vigour and energy, but he seems to 
 have suffered from his peculiar illness at times, though 
 not to the same extent as during the night of the 17th. 
 One incident was not of auspicious omen. He had 
 directed his chief engineer, Haxo, to reconnoitre the 
 enemy's left, and to find out if there were any field works. 
 Soult, years afterwards, remarked that the Napoleon of 
 Jena and Austerlitz would have performed this important 
 task himself. 
 
 The insight and capacity of the great master fully 
 appear, however, in the plan he had formed for the 
 attack ; this was at once comprehensive, simple, and 
 grand. The Emperor had quickly perceived that his 
 adversary's left was, by many degrees, the weakest part 
 of his line. He had perceived, too, that one of the ridges 
 he held commanded La Haye Sainte and Wellington's 
 left centre ; so he resolved to turn his enemy's left, and 
 at the same time to make a determined effort against his 
 left centre ; and with this last object he collected a great 
 battery of nearly eighty guns along the ridge.* This 
 grand attack was to be carried out by the corps of 
 D'Erlon, sustained by Lobau and the Imperial Guard, 
 and by masses of cavalry in support ; should it prove 
 successful, it would cut Wellington off from Brussels, and 
 from his immediate line of retreat ; and it would force 
 him into a difficult country where he could hardly escape 
 defeat — nay, perhaps destruction. This attack was to be 
 combined with a feint made by Reille against the enemy's 
 right, at an earlier moment, in order to distract him and 
 to make him detach troops from the positions really 
 assailed in force.t 
 
 * We cannot agree with M. H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 324), that 
 apoleon contemplated a real attack on Wellington's left centre and 
 :ntre only. 
 
 t All commentators agree that the plan of Napoleon's attack was 
 Imirable. See Jomini, Charras, Siborne, Thiers, z'n loco.
 
 220 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15 
 
 The legions of Napoleon had, meanwhile, been proudly 
 taking their ground upon their last field. The spectacle 
 was remembered for years as the most imposing that had 
 ever been seen in that age of incessant war ; it was the 
 flicker shooting up before all was darkness. The valleys 
 in front of the ridge of Mont St. Jean seemed alive with 
 the magnificently stern array of battle descending from 
 the adjoining heights ; the eye rested far and near on 
 masses of footmen, on long lines of cannon, on thousands 
 of horsemen being gathered together for the great im- 
 pending conflict. Admirable order pervaded that seeming 
 chaos of war ; eleven columns unwound themselves from 
 the multitudinous host, and moved, with perfect regu- 
 larity, to their appointed stations. On Napoleon's right, 
 from near Frischermont to the great main-road, spread 
 in foremost line the corps of D'Erlon which had missed 
 its mark at Ligny ; the light cavalry of Jacquinot was on 
 its right flank ; this body of men, eager to retrieve their 
 late mischance, were to make the first effort against the 
 hostile left and left centre. Behind D'Erlon were ranged 
 the mailed squadrons of Milhaud and Lefebvre — Desnoette's 
 light cavalry of the Guard. These horsemen were to 
 support the infantry in their front, and to second the 
 grand attack when the opportunity arose. On Napoleon's 
 left was the corps of Reille, extending from the great main- 
 road to that from Nivelles to Brussels; it was to make 
 the feint against Wellington's right ; on its left flank 
 were the horsemen of Pire, with the heavy cavalry of 
 Kellermann, and the heavy cavalry of the Guard in its 
 rear. In the centre, on either side of the great main-road, 
 stood the corps of Lobau and the cavalry of Subervie 
 and Domon. Behind, at a short distance, appeared, in 
 the silence of strength, the deep and massive columns of 
 the Imperial Guard — the Triarii of the Emperor's battles ; 
 these bodies of troops were to join at the fitting time 
 in the attack of D'Erlon, and to deal, as their chief hoped.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 221 
 
 the final and the mortal stroke. The artillery was for 
 the most part in front of the line ; but, as was Napoleon's 
 wont, there were ample reserves of guns to be employed 
 at the master's bidding; a great battery, we have said, 
 had been formed on the ridge opposite La Haye Sainte. 
 The army numbered about 72,000 men, including 15,000 
 cavalry and 240 guns.* It had been so arrayed on the 
 field that all parts of the hostile position seemed equally 
 threatened. But its vast masses, unlike those of Welling- 
 ton, were completely in view to the last man ; this doubt- 
 less impressed many of the Duke's auxiliaries, but it had 
 no effect on the British and German Legionary troops. 
 
 * We will show Boney to-day how to defend a position,' 
 was a remark made, it has been said, by Wellington him- 
 self. 
 
 While the French army was being thus assembled, 
 Napoleon turned his attention again towards Grouchy, 
 the lieutenant entrusted with a powerful restraining wing, 
 and charged to see that Blucher and Wellington should 
 not effect their junction. We have come to another of 
 the difficult passages of the campaign, with respect to 
 which our knowledge remains imperfect, and the evidence 
 we possess is hard to interpret. Marbot, the author of 
 the well-known and delightful ' Memoirs,' was one of the 
 Emperor's trusted officers ; he had been made a General 
 of Brigade after the skirmish at Genappe ; he was in 
 command on June 18 of a regiment of Jacquinot's cavalry 
 on the extreme French right. At about eleven o'clock he 
 received a message from Napoleon, sent through La 
 Bedoyere, and ordering him to detach reconnoitring-parties 
 to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, upon the Dyle. 
 
 * Grouchy was certainly marching towards the main army 
 from that direction.' Marbot did what he was told to 
 do, but found no French troops at Moustier and Ottignies ; 
 he reported the fact to the Emperor without loss of time ; 
 
 * Charras, ii. 15.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 he was then ordered to make search for Grouchy again. 
 ' The Marshal must be coming by the bridges of Limale 
 and Limelette,' lower down the Dyle, and three or four 
 miles from Wavre.* 
 
 This most important evidence proves that Napoleon 
 believed that his lieutenant was approaching his camp ; 
 it is significant, in the very highest degree, that Marbot's 
 official report on the subject was discreditably suppressed 
 by the Bourbon Government, eager to throw the blame 
 for Waterloo on its great fallen enemy .f Marbot's state- 
 ment, however, unequivocal as it is, is not the only proof 
 which distinctly points to the conclusion we have just 
 referred to. A Polish officer, of the name of Zenowicz, 
 made a deposition, soon after the battle, that the Emperor 
 at about ten in the morning took him aside, and, walking 
 up a low eminence, said, indicating the horizon to his 
 right : * I am awaiting Grouchy, I am awaiting him with 
 impatience ; go and join him, and do not quit his side 
 until he debouches upon the line of my battle. 't It is 
 also significant in the extreme that Zenowicz was the 
 bearer of the despatch from Soult to Grouchy, on which 
 we shall briefly comment at once. 
 
 This remarkable and, be it observed, independent 
 evidence shows, as the fact was, that Napoleon had as yet 
 no notion that Blucher was drawing near him at this 
 conjuncture. But it shows also, what is more important, 
 that the Emperor was convinced that Grouchy was 
 approaching the imperial army from the Dyle ; and it 
 corroborates, with almost conclusive force. Napoleon's 
 statement, that on the night of the 17th he twice ordered 
 
 * Marbot, 'Memoirs,' iii. 405, 406. 
 
 + This report should, if possible, be discovered. The present 
 writer received some time ago a courteous intimation from an authori- 
 tative source that it was not forthcoming. 
 
 I M. H. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' ii. 447), and especially Thiers 
 (' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 483), who has transcribed 
 the very words of Zenowicz.
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE i8, 1815 223 
 
 Grouchy to come to his support, with a detachment, or 
 with the mass of his forces. 
 
 The proof could hardly admit of question, were it not 
 confronted with the despatch written by Soult to Grouchy, 
 to which we have just above referred. This despatch was 
 written by Soult at ten in the morning of the i8th ; it 
 apparently is at odds with the statements of Marbot and 
 Zenowicz ; assuredly it requires to be closely studied. It 
 was a reply to Grouchy's letter of ten on the night of 
 the 17th, in which Grouchy, it is to be borne in mind, 
 let his master know, among many other things, that he 
 had not as yet made up his mind whether he would follow 
 the Prussians by marching on Wavre or Perwez. Soult, 
 doubtless with this letter before his eyes, informed 
 Grouchy that the Emperor had received this report from 
 Gembloux, but informed him further, that whereas he had 
 referred only to two Prussian columns, marching by 
 Sauveniere and Sart les Walhain — that is, in the direction 
 of Wavre and Perwez — intelligence had been received — 
 and this we know was the case — that a third column was 
 moving on Wavre by Gery and Gentinnes — that is, on a 
 line between Gembloux and the main French army. Soult 
 then tells Grouchy that Napoleon was about to attack 
 the English army at Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignies, 
 and proceeds to direct Grouchy to march on Wavre — he 
 was to reach that place as quickly as possible — and to 
 drive away any part of the Prussian army which might be 
 coming in that direction. The despatch next emphati- 
 cally desires the Marshal ' to come near us, to connect his 
 operations with our own, and to be in close communication 
 with us.' This last phrase is repeated twice.* 
 
 Napoleon probably never saw this despatch ; but, as a 
 matter of course, he is responsible for it. It is idle, too, 
 
 * This despatch has been noticed by all historians and com- 
 mentators. It is set forth at length in Prince La Tour d'Auvergne's 
 ' Waterloo,' 260, 261.
 
 224 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 to contend that it does not contain an order to Grouchy 
 to advance on Wavre, or that it is consistent, in its seem- 
 ing purport, with the allegations made by Zenowicz and 
 Marbot. But in this, as in all instances of the kind, we 
 should endeavour to reconcile the evidence as a whole, 
 and, gathering it together, to arrive at the real truth. 
 This is not impossible, even not difficult, if we carefully 
 examine and peruse the despatch, though assuredly this 
 is most obscure — nay, misleading. Soult urges Grouchy 
 to march on Wavre, because Grouchy was doubting 
 whether his movement ought not to be on Perwez rather 
 than Wavre; and Wavre, as contra -distinguished from 
 Perwez, indisputedly was the right direction to take. 
 But Soult's despatch does not end at this point ; it warns 
 Grouchy that an enemy's column is moving on Wavre by 
 Gery and Gentinnes — that is, between the restraining wing 
 and the main army ; it intimates that he is to attack or to 
 intercept this ; and it orders the Marshal, with marked 
 stress of language, to come into communication with the 
 Emperor, about to fight a decisive battle in front of 
 Waterloo. 
 
 Now, how, in addition to a march on Wavre, was 
 Grouchy to accomplish the two last objects, in them- 
 selves infinitely the most important, and plainly, accord- 
 ing to the despatch, held to be the most important ? The 
 one and the only means was to take the course which he 
 ought to have taken of his own purpose — that is, to cross 
 the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, or even lower down 
 at Limale and Limelette, and to reach Wavre by this 
 line of march, for by this operation he would at once 
 get to Wavre, would fall on any hostile force near or 
 around that place, and would be coming into closer 
 relations with the imperial army. The despatch, there- 
 fore, if intelligently read, falls in with what Marbot and 
 Zenowicz relate — and Zenowicz, we must not forget, was 
 the bearer ; it is in accord with Napoleon's belief, and
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 18, 1815 225 
 
 probably direct orders ; by implication, though not 
 expressly, it orders Grouchy to cross the Dyle in his 
 advance on Wavre, and on his way to draw near 
 Napoleon, striking at the same time any enemy found 
 in his path.* The despatch, however, is ill -worded, 
 vague, and perplexing. It ought to have stated in 
 precise language that Grouchy should pass the Dyle 
 before he moved on Wavre, and should send recon- 
 noitring parties, at least, at once towards Waterloo. 
 But Soult in this, as in other instances, proved himself 
 to be a sorry Chief of a Staff. For the rest, writers whose 
 object it is to charge Napoleon with an immense disaster, 
 and to exonerate Grouchy from all blame, have found in 
 this despatch and in another from Soult, to which we 
 shall ere long refer, a kind of godsend in behalf of their 
 views ; but their arguments, we shall see, are mere 
 sophistry. 
 
 It was now after eleven in the forenoon. The French 
 army was in its positions on the field. It bore the 
 appearance of a gigantic fan spreading out from its end 
 in the master's hand. It was resplendent with the pomp 
 and circumstance of war. From Frischermont to Plance- 
 noit, to La Belle Alliance, and thence to Mon Plaisir, 
 the lowlands were dense with an armed multitude of men, 
 of battle steeds, and of grim tiers of cannon. The sun 
 shone on cuirass and pennon, on eagles gathering for 
 their deadly flight, on uniforms radiant with many brilliant 
 colours — the garb of a proud and exulting host. The 
 Emperor, accompanied by a gorgeous staff, had ridden 
 slowly before the long-drawn lines, bowing to the 
 standards inscribed with a noble roll of glory. The air 
 
 * For this or nearly this view of the real meaning of Soult's 
 despatch, see Gerard, ' Dernieres Observations,' 19 e^ seq.j Ropes, 
 'The Campaign of Waterloo,' 266-269 ; Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat 
 et de I'Empire,' vi. 508, 509; and Prince La Tour d'Auvergne, 
 ' Waterloo,' 373, 374. 
 
 15
 
 226 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 rang with the acclaim of the proud and confident legions, 
 and with the swell of the sonorous music of war ; the 
 echoes were borne, a mighty rush of sound, to the ridge 
 of Mont St. Jean. But all was silence in the positions 
 of the hostile arrays ;* a great part of Wellington's troops 
 was not even visible ; but they sternly awaited the enemy's 
 onslaught, though he appeared to be an irresistible force. 
 Before he had dictated his final orders, Napoleon had re- 
 connoitred the ground from the low eminence of La Belle 
 Alliance. He found a point from which he could survey 
 the whole scene of action, on a little hillock not far from 
 Rossomme. He took his seat before a table on which his 
 maps had been laid. At half-past eleven o'clock he gave 
 the signal for attack. The fire of three guns from the 
 batteries of the Imperial Guard rang through the summer 
 air; the troops of Reille formed into columns and moved; 
 the tremendous drama of Waterloo had begun. 
 
 * So Homer (' Iliad,' iii. 2 el seq.) described, thousands of years 
 ago, the bearing before battle of two great different races : 
 
 ' IpQies fJ^v KXayyi] r' fvoiTT) r taav, 6pvide^ tiis, 
 Ot 5' ap icrav (nyrj fiivea ■TrvelovTes 'Axatoi.'
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO TO THE DEFEAT OF 
 D'ERLON'S CORPS 
 
 Napoleon's reliance on his lieutenants — This very marked on the day 
 of Waterloo — Description of Hougoumont and its enclosures — 
 The feint converted into a real attack — Advance of the division of 
 Jerome — Bold and persistent attacks — Stubborn and successful 
 defence — Waste of the strength of the French — The apparition of 
 the advanced guard of Bulow — Soult's letter of i p.m. — His post- 
 script — Grouchy directed to march to the field of Waterloo — His 
 movement on Walhain — His despatch of ii a.m. — With other 
 officers he hears the cannon of Waterloo — Admirable advice of 
 Gerard to march and join the main army — This rejected by 
 Grouchy, who continues to march directly on Wavre— Napoleon's 
 first grand attack — Advance of D'Erlon's corps — Vicious forma- 
 tion of its columns — Attack on La Haye Sainte — Stubborn 
 defence — The charge of Somerset and Ponsonby — Defeat of 
 cuirassiers — Complete defeat of D'Erlon — State of the battle at 
 3 p.m. 
 
 It was an inevitable result of the far-spreading operations 
 in war, conducted by him for a series of years, that Napo- 
 leon should place much reliance on his lieutenants ; we 
 have seen this already in the campaign of 1815 ; it was to 
 be made very manifest on the day of Waterloo, owing 
 largely, perhaps, to the state of the Emperor's health, 
 which had deprived him of the energy of his prime, and 
 had greatly lessened his old activity in the field. The 
 attack on Hougoumont was a notable instance how his 
 trust in subordinates proved vain, with most untoward 
 
 15—2
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 results. Napoleon, we have seen, had intended that this 
 effort was to be a mere feint against Wellington's right, in 
 the hope that it would cause him to weaken his left and 
 embarrass his dispositions on the field ; this diversion is 
 not even referred to in Napoleon's first orders for the 
 fight. But, from whatever reason — Reille, of course, the 
 commander of the 2nd corps, must bear the blame* — the 
 feint was converted into a real attack, in great force, and 
 was, besides, very ill directed. This was the first error in 
 the tactics of the French on this day. 
 
 Hougoumont was the very part of the Duke's position 
 which ought not to have been selected for an onslaught 
 pressed home. It was in front of the allied right and 
 right centre, much the strongest division of the allied line ; 
 it was commanded, at a distance of a few hundred yards, 
 by the artillery of the defence, along the ridge, and had it 
 been taken, it could not have been held by the enemy ; it 
 was in itself a position of formidable strength. Hougou- 
 mont may be briefly described as a large Flemish chateau, 
 surrounded by its chapel and solid farm buildings, and 
 rising from an enclosure of difficult access, forming a 
 quadrangle of some 600 yards on each side, and encom- 
 passed by a thick hedge and a ditch. The southern end 
 of this little park, that next to the French, was composed 
 of a wood of copse and grown trees, of two open fields, 
 and of a small orchard on its western bounds ; beyond, 
 separated by another thick hedge and its ditch, and running 
 up to the northern end, extended a little and a greater 
 orchard ; in nearly the midst of these a large garden stood, 
 walled on two of its sides, and on the other two parted off 
 by a dividing ditch and fence ; and west of the garden, 
 near the main enclosure, its avenue leading to the road 
 from Nivelles to Brussels, was the chateau with its appur- 
 tenances, a natural fortress in themselves. The whole 
 position presented a series of strong obstacles, exceedingly 
 
 * Reille, .\rch. Guerre ; cited by H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' 327, 328.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 229 
 
 hard to assail and master ; and it had, we have said, been 
 hastily fortified in the night. The walls of the chateau 
 and its buildings had been pierced with loopholes, and 
 platforms had been raised along the walls of the garden to 
 give musketry its deadly play ; the hedges had been 
 thickened in some places ; and the entrances to the 
 chateau had been closed by barricades, save where the 
 northern entrance led to the allied line, and enabled 
 supports to be sent to the defence. The garrison, we 
 have said, was made up of from 1,200 to 1,400 men, 
 British Guards, Dutch-Belgian and Hanoverian troops.* 
 
 At half- past eleven o'clock, we have seen, Reille's 
 soldiery began the attack on Hougoumont. A brigade of 
 Jerome's division, sustained by the fire of its own corps, 
 and of batteries of Fk6 and Kellermann, and throwing out 
 swarms of skirmishers along its front, advanced boldly down 
 the low ridge to the east of Mon Plaisir, and made rapidly 
 across the plain for the allied position. The columns 
 suffered heavily from the fire of hostile guns, which opened 
 at orders given by Wellington — he had ridden to the spot 
 with part of his staff, and, very different from his great 
 antagonist, showed extraordinary activity on this, as on 
 the day before — they were even checked for a few moments ; 
 but they pressed forward with headlong dash, and had 
 soon reached the southern edge of the main enclosure. 
 They were driven by shells — this was also by the Duke's 
 direction — out of the open fields which they first entered ; 
 then they broke into the adjoining wood, forcing the 
 passage of the hedge and ditch after a sharp struggle. 
 
 A fierce conflict now raged for rather less than an hour, 
 the assailants endeavouring to make their way through 
 the copse and the higher trees above it, the defenders, 
 very inferior in numbers, stubbornly contesting every inch 
 
 * An excellent and elaborate description of Hougoumont and its 
 defences will be found in Shaw Kennedy, ' Battle of Waterloo,' 89-92. 
 The accounts of Siborne and Charras are also good.
 
 230 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 of the ground, and making repeated charges, broken as 
 these were by the obstacles in their path. WclHngton, 
 who had carefully watched the progress of the fight, had 
 sent a battalion of Brunswickers to support the defence ; 
 but this reinforcement came rather late ; the soldiery of 
 Jerome, after protracted efforts, at last made themselves 
 masters of the wood, and compelled the opposing troops 
 to fall back. The French, exulting at this first success, 
 and bravely led by devoted officers, rushed with loud 
 shouts across the ditch and hedge dividing the wood from 
 the two orchards ; another effort, and they fondly hoped 
 the position would be stormed and won. In a short time, 
 however, they were cruelly undeceived ; the murderous 
 fire of the British Guards, one of the best characteristics 
 of the British Infantry — the sons of the bowmen of Crecy 
 and Agincourt — burst out from the platforms along the 
 walls of the garden, and from the crenellated apertures 
 made in the chateau ; it was sustained by the fire of the 
 auxiliaries ; the onset of the assailants came to a stand. 
 The French, however, refused to give way ; they retaliated 
 by a dropping fire from the wood ; but this was desultory 
 and feeble compared to that made from sheltered defences 
 with deadly aim. Three of their men probably fell for one 
 of their enemy. 
 
 The wood in front of Hougoumont had been won ; 
 Napoleon's object had been in part attained ; the Duke 
 had not, indeed, detached from his left ; but his attention 
 had been directed to his right and right centre, and turned 
 aside from the grand attack being prepared against him. 
 Guilleminot, the chief of Jerome's staff, a very skilful and 
 experienced soldier, urged his chief to desist from further 
 efforts, involving certain loss and probable defeat ;* but 
 the Prince, carried away by the impetuous ardour which 
 
 * 'Waterloo Letters,' 262 — General Sir Alexander Woodford: 'I 
 had much conversation with General Guilleminot. The first attack 
 he advised ; the others, he said, he did not agree in.'
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 231 
 
 marked the conduct of many French officers on this day, 
 engaged, with Httle reflection, his second brigade.* These 
 troops also spent their strength in vain against enemies 
 who had them at an immense advantage ; they tried, with 
 fruitless daring, to climb the walls of the garden, and to 
 force their way into the thickly-hedged orchard ; they fell 
 in scores, stricken down by destructive missiles. 
 
 Meanwhile the survivors of the first brigade made a 
 determined effort to carry the chateau itself; they pushed 
 forward along its western front, and tried to penetrate 
 into the northern entrance, not barricaded like the southern 
 gate. A few succeeded in forcing a door open, but instantly 
 met the death they had recklessly courted. The chateau, 
 in fact, was not to be thus taken ; artillery ought to have 
 been brought nearer in order to shatter the walls and 
 buildings ; but Reille and his subordinates never thought 
 of this ; not a petard, not even a few bags of gunpowder, 
 were employed to break down the defences of the place. 
 Wellington, meantime, had reinforced the garrison with 
 some 300 men of the British Guards. These fresh and 
 choice troops, assisted by their supports, drove Jerome's 
 second brigade far back into the wood. Foy's division 
 was then moved to sustain the attack, by this time a 
 regular and fiercely - contested combat ; this powerful 
 reserve occupied the wood again, and even took possession 
 of the double orchard ; but the chateau and the garden 
 continued to resist ; the defenders were never dislodged 
 from these points by the enemy. The efforts of the 
 assailants by degrees slackened ; the scene presented a 
 confused spectacle of partial attacks baffled by a persistent 
 defence, the French being continuously smitten by an 
 overmastering fire. The advantage already remained on 
 the side of ^the allies ; they successfully opposed about 
 
 * Napoleon recalled Jerome from Hougoumont, perhaps to show 
 his disapprobation of his brother's recklessness.
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 3,000 men to nearly 10,000,* and these were mowed down 
 in heaps, and foredoomed to failure. 
 
 It was now nearly an hour after mid-day. Ncy had been 
 entrusted with the conduct of the grand attack to be made 
 by D'Erlon's corps against Wellington's left and left 
 centre. The Marshal sent a message to the Emperor 
 that all was ready. Napoleon had listlessly watched the 
 progress of the fight round Hougoumont ; he had, it has 
 been said, fallen asleep before his maps and his tablet 
 He mounted a charger, and now took a survey with his 
 field-glass of the whole scene of action before masses of 
 smoke should screen the prospect from his view. After a 
 few moments a kind of cloud seemed gathering not far 
 from the heights of St. Lambert at a distance ; the 
 Emperor thought he perceived a body of troops. In reply 
 to a question, Soult remarked this was ' probably a detach- 
 ment from Grouchy, from 5,000 to 6,000 strong'! — most 
 significant words that have been little noticed, but that 
 clearly show that Soult, as well as his master, believed 
 that Grouchy was marching on Waterloo from across the 
 Dyle. The opinions of the imperial staff were divided. 
 Some officers thought the apparition a wreath of mist ; 
 but Soult persisted he could descry soldiers piling their 
 arms;§ and Napoleon adhered to the conclusion he had 
 already formed. 
 
 The Emperor sent at once a reconnoitring party to 
 discover what the assemblage of armed men was ; he 
 detached the light cavalry of Subervie and Domon, with 
 orders to march in the direction of St. Lambert, and 
 either to join Grouchy or to keep back the enemy, accord- 
 
 * See the figures, Charras, ii. 35. 
 
 t Dorsey Gardner, 36 ; Baudus, cited by H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' 
 ii. 501. 
 
 J ' Comment.,' V. 169. Careful attention should be given to these 
 words. 
 
 § Baudus, cited by H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo," ii. 332.
 
 THE BATTLE OE WATERLOO 233 
 
 ing as the facts should be ascertained. In a short time 
 he obtained intelHgencc which dissipated any doubts he 
 may have had on the subject. The cavalry scouts of 
 Marbot, already despatched for some time towards Mous- 
 tier and Ottignies, had taken an inferior Prussian officer 
 prisoner; he carried a letter from Bulow to Wellington 
 announcing the arrival of Bulow's corps at St. Lambert. 
 He was brought before Napoleon, and freely answered his 
 questions. The troops in the distance were the advanced 
 guard of Bulow ; the rest of his corps was on the march 
 to join him. The three other corps of the Prussian army 
 had been in bivouac around Wavre the night before, and 
 had not had a glimpse of an enemy. The force under 
 Grouchy, it was supposed, was on its way to Plancenoit, 
 to come into line with the main enemy.* 
 
 These tidings were obviously extremely grave, but they 
 did not greatly disconcert Napoleon. His army before 
 Waterloo, he believed, was not yet in danger. He had 
 received, but at a very late hour, the despatch written by 
 Grouchy at three in the morning, and this, though less 
 reassuring than the despatch of five hours before, was 
 nevertheless still calculated to inspire confidence. In this 
 letter the Marshal had informed his master that Blucher 
 was in retreat on Brussels, in the expectation of joining 
 Wellington ; that he was falling back by Corbaix and 
 Chaumont ; and that Grouchy was on the point of moving 
 on Sart les Walhain, whence he would proceed to Corbaix 
 and Wavre. This indicated that Grouchy was on the 
 track of the enemy; that whether he should march on 
 Wavre by Moustier and Ottignies — indisputably, we have 
 seen, his proper course — or whether he should march by 
 Sart les Walhain and Corbaix — that is, beyond the 
 eastern bank of the Dyle — he could not fail to hear of and 
 to reach Blucher — Corbaix is only about six miles from 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 169, 170, Napoleon's account is much the best, 
 and there is no reason to question its accuracy.
 
 234 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Wavre — and if Blucher should be at Wavre, or making 
 an attempt to move on Waterloo, the commander of the 
 restraining wing, whose letters prove he understood his 
 task, would be able to prevent Blucher from joining his 
 ally. The main French army, therefore, if menaced was 
 not imperilled. Besides, the whole corps of Bulow was 
 still distant; its advanced guard only was at St. Lambert; 
 the remaining Prussian corps were probably far off. The 
 battle might be won, and Wellington beaten, before 
 Blucher could reach the field in force, should he even 
 venture to make a most hazardous march. 
 
 Napoleon at this moment was most impressed by the 
 fact that Grouchy 's advance from Gembloux must be very 
 slow, or otherwise he must have heard long before from 
 the Marshal ; and he was apprehensive that the detachment 
 of 7,000 men, which he had most probably directed 
 Grouchy to make, might be caught and destroyed by 
 Bulow as it was approaching Waterloo. To ward off the 
 danger as far as possible, he now ordered Lobau to follow 
 Subervie and Domon ; to choose a strong position towards 
 St. Lambert ; and to fall on the Prussians when he should 
 hear Grouchy's guns. Bulow would then be placed 
 between two fires ; his corps, about 29,000 strong — a 
 detachment, we have seen, had been left at Mont St. 
 Guibert — would be in grave straits should it be assailed in 
 front and rear by the 17,000 or 18,000 men of Lobau and 
 by part of the troops of Grouchy. The Emperor therefore 
 remained confident that Grouchy was at hand with a 
 detachment of the mass of his forces, and probably by the 
 way of Moustier and Ottignies. If this were the case, 
 Lobau and Grouchy would destroy Bulow, and Waterloo 
 would be a more complete triumph for France.* 
 
 * Napoleon's narrative of these incidents ('Comment.,' v. 170-172) 
 has not been sufficiently studied. It bears all the marks of truth, and 
 proves (i) that Napoleon expected Grouchy to reach the field with the 
 detachment at least of 7,000 men, which he had most probably ordered
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 235 
 
 A short time before Bulow's troops were seen, Soult 
 had written another despatch to Grouchy. This bears 
 the date of one o'clock on June 18. Unquestionably it 
 was a reply to Grouchy's message sent at three in the 
 morning of the same day, but it alludes to Grouchy as 
 having written an hour before.* This letter is as vaguely 
 and badly worded as the previous letter of ten in the 
 morning, but, if rightly interpreted, it bears nearly the 
 same meaning. Soult informs Grouchy that his master 
 generally approves of the advance on Sart les Walhain, 
 and thence on Corbaix and Wavre. ' This conforms to 
 the dispositions made by His Majesty.' But while Soult 
 sanctions the march on Wavre, he repeats the injunction 
 to Grouchy he had made before : ' The Marshal was to 
 manoeuvre in our direction, to come into close contact 
 with us'; and he positively orders Grouchy to march on 
 Waterloo, where the battle was being waged, and to ' come 
 into line without delay with our right.' This, again, in- 
 dicates a march on Wavre, no doubt by Corbaix ; but this 
 village is on a line with Moustier and Ottignies. The 
 despatch summons Grouchy to the field of Waterloo, and 
 the way to accomplish this was to approach Wavre indeed, 
 but by Moustier and Ottignies and the western bank of 
 the Dyle. Soult then added a postscript, probably under 
 Napoleon's eye ; Grouchy was apprised that Bulow was 
 threatening the right flank of the main army ; he was 
 emphatically commanded to 'approach and join us,' and 
 
 him to make ; (2) that he did not think the main French army in 
 danger through the apparition of Bulow ; (3) that Lobau was sent 
 towards St. Lambert, not merely to keep Bulow back, but to co-operate 
 with Grouchy in attacking Bulow ; (4) that the Emperor thought, and 
 rightly thought, that he had little or nothing to fear from the mass of 
 the Prussian army. 
 
 * This letter will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 270, 
 271. It was written in pencil, and almost illegible, like much of 
 Soult's work. The date 2 a.m., instead of 3 a.m., is palpably a 
 mistake.
 
 236 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 to crush Bulow, * who would be caught in a fatal position.' 
 This is a strong corroboration of proof, already nearly 
 conclusive, that the Emperor had directed Grouchy on 
 the night of the 17th to draw near him with a detachment 
 or the mass of his army, and that he believed Grouchy to 
 be at a short distance, and able with Lobau to deal Bulow 
 a mortal stroke.* 
 
 We pass on to the operations of Grouchy, destined 
 fatally to deceive his master, while on his way from 
 Gembloux to Sart les Walhain. His march, we have 
 seen, had been very late and very slow, faults for which 
 he must bear the whole blame. And he had not recon- 
 noitred in the direction of Moustier and Ottignies — that is, 
 of the imperial army — unpardonable remissness attended 
 with disastrous results : for had he taken this obvious step 
 he would have ascertained how affairs stood, and soon 
 after noon would have been in communication with 
 Marbot's horsemen, despatched by the Emperor to bring 
 him to the field of Waterloo. A little before eleven o'clock 
 the Marshal had reached Walhain, a village about a mile 
 west of Sart les Walhain, and therefore a mile nearer 
 Napoleon's lines. He wrote another despatch at this 
 place to his master, which gives proof of great want of 
 intelligence, and shows how little he had done to ascertain 
 the facts.t 
 
 In this letter Grouchy informs the Emperor that Blucher 
 was still in retreat on Brussels, but that a considerable 
 
 * If any candid inquirer will put together the positive statements of 
 Napoleon, as regards the detachment from Grouchy, the evidence of 
 Marbot and Zenowicz, the two letters of Soult on the i8th at 10 a.m. 
 and I p.m., and this postscript, the inference to be drawn seems to us 
 almost irresistible. The evidence, it will be observed, is independent 
 and cumulative. 
 
 t Mr. Ropes ('The Campaign of Waterloo,' 286-288) is the first 
 historian who has proved that it was not at Sart les Walhain, but 
 Walhain, that Grouchy halted. M. H. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' ii. 289) 
 has added a good deal to the evidence on the subject.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 237 
 
 part of the Prussian army was being assembled in the 
 plains of the Chyse, a stream flowing towards Louvain 
 from the north-east of Wavre. The mass of the army 
 was probably taking this direction, perhaps in order to 
 join Wellington at or near Brussels. The restraining 
 wing and its chief would on the present evening be round 
 Wavre, and so would interpose between Blucher and 
 Wellington, the last presumed to be falling back upon 
 Brussels.* It is unnecessary to point out how false this 
 information was. So far from being in retreat on Brussels, 
 still less from diverging into the plains of the Chyse and 
 towards Louvain, Blucher was on the march from Wavre 
 to Waterloo — that is, against Napoleon, not away from 
 him. So far from Wellington being on his way to 
 Brussels, he was awaiting his antagonist's attack at 
 Mont St. Jean. And from this, of course, it follows 
 that Grouchy's purpose to advance on Wavre by the 
 evening of the i8th, in order to be in a position between 
 the two hostile armies, was utterly vain, being in contra- 
 diction to the facts, and was leading him most disastrously 
 astray. It had also this further evil effect: it induced 
 Grouchy to imagine that there was no need that he 
 should turn his attention towards the main French army, 
 or that he should accelerate his tardy march on Wavre. 
 On this very evening he would stand between Blucher 
 and Wellington. t He was not called upon to move with 
 increased celerity. 
 
 At this time — that is, not long after eleven o'clock — the 
 positions held by Grouchy's army were these : The cavalry 
 of Excelmans had pushed forward, and had reached La 
 Baraque and the Bois d'Huzelles, points between three 
 
 * This despatch will be found in La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 
 
 324- 
 
 t It deserves notice how in this, as in other despatches, Grouchy 
 
 shows that he understood the real purport of the letter he received 
 
 from Napoleon through Bertrand. This he discreditably suppressed. 
 
 The fact speaks for itself, and should silence his apologists.
 
 238 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 and four miles from Wavre ; the heads of Vandamme's 
 columns had passed Nil St. Vincent, a village some 
 seven miles from Wavre and near Corbaix ; the corps 
 of Gerard was around Walhain and Sart les Walhain ; 
 the horsemen of Pajol and the infantry of Teste were on 
 the march from Grand Leez to Tourinnes, and were 
 perhaps two or three miles from Nil St. Vincent. It 
 should be observed, too — and this is very important — the 
 movements of Grouchy had completely escaped the notice 
 of the Prussian detachment at Mont St. Guibert, com- 
 manded by an officer of the name of Ledebur ; in fact, 
 Excclmans and Vandamme were at this moment almost 
 between Ledebur and the Prussian corps at Wavre. 
 
 This was the situation when Grouchy, with Gerard and 
 other officers, who had met at Walhain — the dwelling has 
 at last been ascertained — heard a rumbling sound towards 
 the west at a distance. This rapidly swelled into a con- 
 tinuous roar. It was the thunder of the cannon of 
 Waterloo, loud, Grouchy exclaimed, as that of Wagram. 
 Gerard, a soldier of real insight and resource, urged his 
 chief at once to march towards the scene of the battle, 
 in which the Emperor was evidently engaged. Gerard's 
 reasoning did not admit of an answer. By moving in 
 the direction of Wellington, the restraining wing would 
 exactly perform its task. Grouchy would stop Blucher 
 were he halting at Wavre, or would intercept him were 
 he on his way to Waterloo, or would come into line with 
 the imperial army, should the hostile commanders have 
 joined hands. This was palpably the true — nay, the 
 obvious — course. Nor could Grouchy conceal from him- 
 self that Blucher had gained nearly a march on him, and 
 that Bluchcr's movements were not distinctly and com- 
 pletely known. The means, too, to make the proposed 
 movement were easy and at hand. The cavalry in 
 advance should seize the bridges of Moustier and 
 Ottignies, and cross the Dyle, a march from La Baraque
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 239 
 
 of about three miles ; the corps of Vandamme and Gerard 
 should follow as quickly as possible ; the horsemen of 
 Pajol and the division of Teste should push on towards 
 Wavre, in order to mask the operations to the left, and 
 to make demonstrations against the enemy. Within two 
 or three hours the position of affairs would be made plain ; 
 within five or six Grouchy would have been within reach 
 of the Prussian or of the main French army. 
 
 The attempts made by Grouchy to answer Gerard show 
 how disastrous it may be in war, as in other spheres of 
 the conduct of man, to stick at the letter and to miss the 
 essential spirit. The Marshal said that his orders were to 
 follow the Prussians, and that this object could be best 
 attained by marching on Wavre by the line he was taking ; 
 that the Emperor had told him that he would attack 
 Wellington should that General make a stand before the 
 Forest of Soignies, but that he, that is, Grouchy — and this 
 we believe to be true — had received no command to draw 
 near the main army ; and that even were he to advance 
 towards Waterloo, the distance was so great he could not 
 be on the field in time. The unfortunate chief could not, 
 or would not, understand that Wavre could be reached 
 by the western bank of the Dyle and by the bridges of 
 Moustier and Ottignies almost as quickly as by any other 
 way, if it was necessary to proceed to Wavre at all ; that 
 his paramount duty — and this he knew — was to interpose 
 between Blucher and Wellington ; that he could not 
 possibly accomplish this should Blucher endeavour to 
 march from Wavre on Waterloo, unless he should cross 
 the Dyle by Moustier and Ottignies, or conceivably by 
 Limale and Limelette ; that were he to move towards 
 the Emperor without delay, he would effectually make 
 his presence felt hours before he should even approach 
 Waterloo ; and that in any event, in his perplexing 
 position — due to his own remissness, inactivity, and 
 mistakes — his only course was to press forward towards 
 the sound of the cannon.
 
 240 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Grouchy, however, it is beHeved, would have yielded, 
 had not Gerard's language been peremptory and his 
 bearing stiff. The jealousy of each other, so charac- 
 teristic of the warriors of France from the day of Ronces- 
 valles to the day of Spicheren may have closed his ears to 
 the counsel of manifest wisdom.* The Marshal insisted 
 on making for Wavre along the eastern bank of the Dyle 
 — that is, keeping completely away from Waterloo. He 
 angrily rejected the prayer of Gerard to allow him to 
 march with his single corps towards Napoleon, Dis- 
 regarding the advice of almost all his officers — a General 
 of Artillery was the only exception, and he did not urge 
 his objections long — and despite the angry murmurs of 
 his own soldiery, more intelligent than their purblind 
 leader, Grouchy directed his army to march on Wavre 
 by the roads he had marked out for himself in the morn- 
 ing. Had he listened to his colleague and taken the true 
 course, he might perhaps have gained a triumph for his 
 own arms, certainly have saved France from an immense 
 catastrophe. 
 
 While Grouchy was proceeding on his ill-starred march. 
 Napoleon had been making the grand attack on Welling- 
 ton's left and left centre. The intention of the Emperor 
 had at first been to sustain this effort with twenty-four 
 guns only ; but perceiving the advantage the ground gave 
 him, he had resolved to support it with nearly eighty. 
 Soon after one o'clock, while Jerome and Foy were 
 squandering their forces around Hougoumont, a tre- 
 mendous fire opened from this great battery, and was 
 continued to its right by batteries of inferior force. From 
 La Haye Sainte to Papelotte and La Haye, the valley 
 and the ridge of Mont St. Jean were shrouded in volumes 
 of dense smoke broken by the quick flashes of the red 
 artillery. The guns of the assailants searched the allied 
 position at distances of from 500 to 800 yards, carrying 
 
 * See La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 328.
 
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 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 241 
 
 devastation and death in their tempest of missiles.* The 
 allies replied, but with much fewer pieces ; their batteries, 
 in fact, were rather dispersed. The position of the great 
 French battery enabled it to throw a concentrated, and 
 even a raking, fire on a considerable part of the enemy's 
 forces. t The troops of Bylandt, who, from whatever 
 cause, stood, we have said, in front of Wellington's line, 
 and, accordingly, were very much exposed, suffered 
 terribly from the destructive storm of shot ; and though 
 the soldiery of Picton and Wincke, the main stay of the 
 defence in this direction, were ordered to lie down, and to 
 withdraw behind the crest of the ridge to seek shelter, 
 they also lost a large number of men, and even the 
 reserves in the rear were not unscathed. After about half 
 an hour of this weighty cannonade, Ney gave D'Erlon the 
 signal to begin the attack. This was to be conducted by 
 the whole infantry of the ist corps, from 17,000 to 18,000 
 men, seconded by Bachelu's division of the 2nd corps, the 
 only one not engaged at Hougoumont, this advancing to 
 the western edge of the great main-road, and sustaining 
 D'Erlon in that direction. 
 
 The ist corps was composed of four divisions, those of 
 Allix,! Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte. It was to 
 storm the enemy's position, from La Haye Sainte to 
 Papelotte and La Haye. The French columns presented 
 an aspect of most imposing force, as, preceded by a 
 multitudinous swarm of skirmishers, and supported by 
 
 * Charras describes the great artillery attack as beginning at noon. 
 He relies on this hour, because it was then Grouchy heard the in- 
 tensity of the cannonade. But Charras is contradicted by all other 
 authorities. 
 
 t This was because part of the French ridge, on which the great 
 battery was placed, curved towards the allied line. The effect of the 
 fire is noticed by most writers. 
 
 { Nearly all the English accounts transpose the positions of Allix 
 and Donzelot, and are in this respect misleading. AUix was not 
 present on the field. 
 
 16
 
 242 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the artillery thundering over their heads, they advanced 
 through the low and broken ground which divided them 
 from La Haye Sainte and the ridge of Mont St. Jean. 
 The war cry of ' Vive I'Empereur!' rose over the din of 
 the fight ; brave officers, detaching themselves from the 
 ranks, urged on their men with impassioned gestures ; 
 the soldiery, though making their way slowly through 
 thick masses of rye and miry ground, were eager to close 
 with the foe in their front. These great waves of onset 
 seemed of irresistible might ; but there was no cavalry on 
 the flanks of the columns to the left,* and the columns of 
 Allix, Donzelot and Marcognet were arrayed in forma- 
 tions so vicious and ill-conceived that they were infinitely 
 less formidable than they appeared to be. Unlike what 
 had usually been the tactics of the French, they were 
 not composed of battalions in separate columns, or of 
 battalions deployed with columns on their flanks : they 
 were made up of a succession of deployed battalions, each 
 following the other, at short distances between. They 
 were thus literally phalanxes of great but varying depth, 
 and with comparatively narrow fronts, heavy masses diffi- 
 cult to handle, and terribly exposed to horsemen and to 
 infantry in line.t 
 
 The three divisions were each about 400 yards from the 
 other, three wide intervals of space before ; they advanced 
 in echelon, the leading echelon on the left. This, formed 
 
 * Napoleon ('Comment.,' vi. 150) notices this mistake. 
 
 + Mr. Ropes (' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 305) and Charras (ii. 25, 
 26) have described clearly and well the nature of the vicious formation 
 of these columns, and have pointed out the resulting dangers and mis- 
 chiefs. Charras says, 'Ces dtranges colonnes presentaient done ici 
 douze, la vingt-quatre et vingt-sept rangs dcpaisseur, el un front 
 variant de cent cinquante a deux cent hommes, suivant la force des 
 bataillons . . . sur un terrain favourable, cette formation, compl6te- 
 ment, et a juste titre inusitde, aurait 6\.6 bien dangcreuse ; sur le sol 
 accidentd, bourbeux, qu'il fallait parcourir, c'dtait une folie. On se 
 mettait .\ la merci d'une charge de cavalerie.' Napoleon at St. Helena 
 laid the blame to the charge of D'Erlon.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 243 
 
 of the brigade of Quiot, of the troops of Allix, reached 
 La Haye Sainte at about two o'clock, and swarmed round 
 the place in furious attack. La Haye Sainte was a solid 
 Belgian farmhouse, with an orchard towards the south, 
 and a kitchen-garden northwards, and with the ordinary 
 farm buildings on two of its sides ; and, as we have seen, 
 it was only defended by some 400 men of the German 
 Legion, commanded by a fine English soldier. Baring. 
 Though greatly exposed to the enemy's guns, it had not 
 been destroyed by their fire, or even much injured. It 
 deserves notice that it had not been ravaged by shells, and 
 that the assailants, as had been the case at Hougoumont, 
 were not provided with the means of breaking down the 
 enclosures and the walls. Quiot's men, surrounding the 
 place in overwhelming numbers, had ere long mastered 
 the orchard and the kitchen-garden ; but their efforts 
 failed against buildings they could not escalade or enter. 
 They suffered heavily from the fire of the little garrison, 
 and of the enemy's guns that commanded the place. As 
 had happened at Hougoumont, their valour remained for 
 the time fruitless. 
 
 Meanwhile, the brigade of Bourgeois, the second of 
 Allix, with the divisions of Donzelot and Marcognet on 
 its right, had reached the ground at the foot of the ridge 
 of Mont St. Jean, and, though smitten severely by a 
 heavy fire, advanced resolutely against the allied line. 
 The troops of Bourgeois, greatly superior in force, dis- 
 lodged the g5th from the gravel-pit they held, but the 
 riflemen fell back a few hundred yards only, and kept 
 plying the assailants with the fire of their deadly weapons. 
 Donzelot, supported by Bourgeois on his left, now pressed 
 forward up the slope of the ridge. The Dutch-Belgians 
 of Bylandt, already shattered by the cannonade to which 
 they had been exposed, and attacked by Marcognet's men 
 in flank, began to waver, and almost at once gave way ; 
 they fled in precipitate rout upon the reserves, pursued by 
 
 16 — 2
 
 244 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the execrations of Picton's troops, who were prevented 
 with difficulty from firing on them.* Loud shouts of 
 victory burst from the French columns ; they swept 
 through the hedges on the cross-road from Ohain to 
 Braine I'AlIeud, which formed an obstacle to attack in 
 this part of the line ; they reached at several points the 
 crest of the ridge. t It seemed as if they would master 
 the position by another effort. Wellington's left centre 
 was for a moment in grave danger. Napoleon and his 
 staff, watching the scene from a distance, believed that 
 the battle was even now half won. 
 
 But here the assailants met foemen worthy of their 
 steel. They were suddenly brought to a stand amidst 
 their seeming triumph. The troops of Picton had lain 
 down and were behind the ridge. At the voice of their 
 commander they rose, formed line, fired a murderous 
 volley, and charged with the bayonet. The battalions of 
 Kempt and the battalions of Pack, although outnumbered 
 nearly three to one, fell on their enemies, entangled and 
 intermingled as these were by the very confusion caused 
 by their partial success. The superiority was then, as 
 always, seen of the British line over the French column, 
 especially over columns such as D'Erlon's were. The 
 fire from the contracted fronts was feeble, the dense 
 masses were unable to deploy ; they were soon weltering 
 in increasing disorder, smitten by a destructive fire, and 
 
 * Siborne ('The Waterloo Campaign,' 396) is just to the troops of 
 Bylandt, contemptuously called ' les braves Beiges' by more than one 
 English writer. He points out that they had suffered greatly on the 
 i6th at Quatre Bras, and had not unnaturally been demoralised in 
 their forward position by the crushing fire of the French artillery on 
 June 18. 
 
 t It has been denied that the columns of Donzelot and Marcognet 
 reached the crest of the ridge, but chey certainly did. See ' Waterloo 
 Letters ' in many places. One sentence must suffice (72) : ' The French 
 columns forced their way through our line ; the heads of the columns 
 were on the Brussels side of the double hedge.'
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 245 
 
 assailed in front and flank. Nevertheless, they were kept 
 together by their very weight ; they made a stubborn 
 resistance and struggled hard ; Picton and many of his 
 best officers and soldiers fell.*' 
 
 At this crisis of the fight an avalanche of war fell 
 suddenly on the French columns, already disorganised, 
 staggering, giving way. The horsemen of Ponsonby, we 
 have said, were behind Picton's line ; they were drawn up 
 along the reverse slope of the ridge, concealed from the 
 enemy, and comparatively out of fire. Uxbridge seized 
 the occasion with skill and resource, and gave the signal 
 for a charge pressed home. The squadrons, known 
 afterwards as the Union Brigade, and composed of the 
 ist Royal and Enniskillen Dragoons, and of the Scots Greys, 
 famous since the day of Blenheim, swept over the ridge, 
 and through openings in the hedges on the cross-road, 
 and, making their way through the intervals between the 
 hostile columns, Picton's infantry cheering them as they 
 rushed on like a torrent, burst in terrific force on the 
 astounded enemy, as little expecting them as an apparition 
 springing out of the earth. 
 
 The effects of this magnificent charge were instantaneous, 
 complete, and decisive. While the soldiery of Kempt and 
 Pack continued their attack, the horsemen fell on the 
 flanks of the dissolving masses, broke into them as they 
 began to yield, made immense havoc among men who 
 could hardly use their weapons — in a word, turned defeat 
 into a frightful rout. Within less than twenty minutes 
 two or three thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands 
 of the victors, the eagles of two regiments had been 
 captured, the troops of Bourgeois, of Donzelot, and of 
 Marcognet, huddled together, paralysed, and, in their 
 closely packed bodies, unable to make a prolonged re- 
 
 * Picton was well known as a warrior of the Peninsula in the French 
 army. On the morning of Waterloo Napoleon had asked, ' Ou est la 
 division Picton?'
 
 246 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 sistance, were hurled in confusion down the slopes of the 
 ridge which they had but just ascended in the confidence 
 of a coming- triumph. From 10,000 to 12,000 excellent 
 troops — and no one will deny their fine qualities — had, in 
 short, been utterly beaten and scattered by about 3,000 or 
 4,000 British infantry and 1,200 horsemen; cavalry has 
 never achieved more splendid success ; this was certainly 
 in a great measure due to the strange and bad formation 
 of D'Erlon's columns — the second great fault in the tactics 
 of the French at Waterloo. 
 
 It would have been well had Ponsonby's great charge 
 been checked and stopped when he had gained his object. 
 His horsemen, however, carried away and getting out of 
 hand — too common a characteristic of British cavalry — 
 rushed impetuously up the opposite ridge, drew actually 
 near the great French battery, and overturned a small 
 battery in the valley below, cutting down the gunners, 
 who bravely fell by their pieces. Here, however, their 
 headlong onset was stayed ; they were attacked, when 
 disordered and in confusion, by bodies of lancers and 
 cuirassiers in front and flank ; they paid dearly for their 
 bold temerity. They were, in fact, nearly cut to pieces ; 
 not half their number returned to their posts ; their gallant 
 leader, Ponsonby, was slain.* 
 
 * It is idle to disparage the French army at Waterloo ; it gave 
 proof of heroic courage, too often made fruitless by the inconsiderate 
 conduct of its chiefs. J5ut it is well to point out the peculiar effects 
 and characteristics of Ponsonby's charge, seconded as it was by 
 Picton's men ; it took the enemy by surprise, and they could offer a 
 feeble resistance only. ' Waterloo Letters,' 72 : ' I came in contact 
 with the head of the column ... no preparation had been made to 
 resist cavalry ; nor do I think there could have been, as there was not 
 above a hundred yards to go over after we saw each other. . . .' 
 61 : 'The enemy's column (near which I was), on arriving at the crest 
 of the position, seemed very helpless, had very little fire to give from its 
 front or flanks, was incapable of deploying, must have already lost 
 many of its officers in coming up, was fired into close with impunity 
 by stragglers of our infantry who remained behind. As we approached,
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 247 
 
 Another disaster befell the French arms not far from 
 this scene, and at the same time. Wellington had hastened 
 from near Hougoumont when his left centre was attacked; 
 he had taken his stand by an elm-tree, not far from the 
 point where the great main-road meets the cross-road 
 from Ohain to Braine I'Alleud ; here, surrounded by his 
 staff and distinguished foreign officers, he watched the 
 vicissitudes of the battle, ever active, ever ready to 
 sustain the defence. The partial success of the enemy 
 at La Haye Sainte, and the danger that threatened this 
 part of his line, should this advanced post be stormed and 
 held, made him resolve to reinforce the garrison of the 
 farm ; he sent a Hanoverian battalion, detached from 
 Alten's division, to join the hard-pressed and worn-out 
 troops of Baring. Meanwhile, Napoleon, who from the 
 first had shown that he had perceived the immense im- 
 portance of La Haye Sainte on the verge of the Duke's 
 centre, and who had been vexed that D'Erlon's attack had 
 not been supported by cavalry on its left, had despatched 
 a brigade of Milhaud's cuirassiers to second Quiot's men 
 should an opportunity arise ; this was placed in a fold of 
 the ground just south of La Haye Sainte. As the Hano- 
 verians advanced, the mailed squadrons, bursting out on 
 their enemies, took them by surprise and drove them back, 
 routed, upon Alten's line ; they boldly pressed forward, 
 and seemed about to charge. 
 
 Turning to account the occasion again, Uxbridge 
 directed Somerset's heavy cavalry against the cuirassiers 
 just at the time when he launched Ponsonby's horsemen. 
 Putting himself at the head of the ist and 2nd Life 
 Guards, of the Blues, and of the ist Dragoon Guards, he 
 gallantly led the charge in person. Milhaud's men, the 
 
 the front and flanks began to turn their backs inwards ; the rear of 
 the columns had already begun to run away.' Napoleon ('Comment., 
 vi. 150) especially praises Ponsonby's charge. The mel^e is admirably 
 and fairly described by M. H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' 346-348.
 
 248 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 veterans of many a day of renown, met their adversaries 
 boldly and with confident hearts ; the hostile squadrons 
 * came to the shock like two walls in perfect lines ' ; the 
 struggle for some moments was fierce and terrific* The 
 cuirassiers were better armed and better swordsmen than 
 their foes, but the superior strength and weight of the British 
 trooper and of his horse prevailed, and after a fiery trial of 
 force the French horsemen recoiled, were ridden down in 
 scores, and were driven back beaten. It is but just, however, 
 to remark that they apparently were inferior in numbers, 
 and several squadrons were caught in the hollows between 
 the banks on the cross-roads from Ohain to Braine 
 I'Alleud, and were borne down into the gravel-pit near 
 La Haye Sainte, where some of these unfortunate horse- 
 men perished.f The cavalry of Somerset, like that of 
 Ponsonby, was also carried away, and urged the pursuit 
 much too far ; its squadrons suffered besides from the fire 
 of Bachelu's footmen before it regained the positions it 
 had held. I 
 
 The defeat of the cuirassiers and of the greatest part of 
 the corps of D'Erlon compelled Quiot to abandon his hold 
 on La Haye Sainte. The fortune of D'Erlon's fourth 
 division had been less disastrous than that of its fellows, 
 but this had likewise been forced to retreat. Durutte had 
 taken on himself not to form his columns in the strange 
 and ruinous fashion that had been ordered ; he had 
 judiciously kept two battalions in reserve. He came in 
 conflict with the Hanoverians of Best and Wincke, and 
 
 * A spirited description of this cavalry mclde, one of the hardest 
 fought of the day, will be found in Siborne, ' The Waterloo Campaign,' 
 408, 409. 
 
 t This incident is the subject of one of Victor Hugo's finest pieces 
 of narrative. But he has enormously exaggerated the facts. 
 
 X Uxbridge, afterwards Lord Anglesey (' Waterloo Letters,' 9), says 
 that the French were completely surprised and taken aback by the 
 charges of Ponsonby and Somerset, whose troops had been kept in 
 reserve behind the ridge.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 249 
 
 reached the crest of the position on the allied extreme 
 left ; but he was more or less involved in the defeat of 
 the rest of his corps. He was charged by Vivian's and 
 Vandeleur's horsemen as he fell back, but he was disen- 
 gaged by the light cavalry on D'Erlon's right. He 
 effected his retreat without much loss. Meanwhile 
 Napoleon's attention had at last been turned to the 
 waste of his forces around Hougoumont. He directed 
 a battery of howitzers against the place ; large parts of 
 the buildings were set on fire and destroyed by shells. 
 Many wounded men perished, and many brave men fell ; 
 but the garrison clung to the orchard, the garden, and the 
 remains of the chateau. The position was surrounded, 
 but not taken. 
 
 It was now three in the afternoon. The grand attack 
 of the Emperor had completely failed ; the feint on 
 Hougoumont, changed into a real attack, had only led 
 to disastrous results. The losses of the French had been 
 already very great ; from Hougoumont to La Haye the 
 ground was strewn with the carnage and the wrecks of a 
 desperately contested battle. But Wellington also had 
 cruelly suffered : hundreds of his best troops had fallen 
 at Hougoumont ; his finest cavalry had been almost 
 destroyed ; Picton's infantry had been severely stricken ; 
 the Dutch-Belgians of Bylandt had fled ; the weak points 
 of the position had been discovered ; the Duke's left and 
 left centre had been in grave peril. Had Napoleon at 
 this conjuncture been able to attack with the corps of 
 Lobau and the Imperial Guard, and with his superb and 
 almost intact cavalry, he would probably have turned and 
 forced this part of the allied line, if a decisive victory was 
 already beyond his reach. But Bulow was beginning to 
 make his presence felt. Lobau had been detached to 
 throw him back and hold him in check. Grouchy was 
 on what might be called a fool's errand, were this not 
 to lead to an appalling catastrophe for France, and was
 
 250 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 simply marching away from his master. The battle was 
 soon to enter upon a new phase ; its character was, in a 
 great measure, to change ; it was still to rage for hours 
 with varying fortunes. Ijut Napoleon felt himself con- 
 strained to abandon his original plan of attack ; thence- 
 forward the efforts his army made against its enemies 
 were to be often disconnected, ill-combined, wanting in 
 judgment and insight. 
 
 The Emperor in the next phase of the contest was to 
 have greatly to complain of Ney, who gave proof of the 
 faults he had committed at Quatre Bras. He was himself 
 placed in most difficult straits. It is almost impossible to 
 pronounce a decided judgment ; but signs were not to be 
 wanting that the overconfidence shown by Napoleon 
 in the early morning was being replaced by very different 
 feelings, and that more than once, perhaps, he was deficient 
 in the perfect self-reliance, in the readiness, in the daring 
 of old, which he said himself he no longer possessed in 
 1815.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO TO THE REPULSE OF 
 BULOW AND HIS CORPS 
 
 Napoleon receives the news of Grouchy's tardy and false movement, 
 and of Bulow's advance from St. Lambert towards the Bois de 
 Paris — The Emperor's plan of attack profoundly modified — His 
 orders to Ney — Intense cannonade — Ney masters La Haye Sainte 
 probably about 4 p.m. — Disregarding Napoleon's orders, he 
 projects a grand cavalry attack against the allied right centre — 
 Extreme imprudence of this conduct — The attacks of Milhaud 
 and Lefebvre-Desnoettes — The French cavalry fail — Napoleon 
 not aware of the attacks until it was too late — Renewal of the 
 cavalry attacks by Milhaud, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, Kellermann, 
 and Guyot — Why the Emperor gave his sanction to them — Attack 
 of Bulow on the French right — It becomes very dangerous — 
 Napoleon compelled to strengthen Lobau by the Young Guard 
 — Magnificent resistance made to the cavalry attacks — They 
 ultimately fail — Ney and Wellington — Part of the Old Guard 
 sent to retake Plancenoit — Bulow repulsed — Fresh attacks made 
 on the allied line — The position of Wellington still critical — State 
 of the battle ; this is still undecided. 
 
 While Ney and D'Erlon had been making the grand 
 attack, ending, we have seen, in a complete reverse, 
 disastrous intelhgence had reached Napoleon. He had 
 received the letter written by Grouchy from Walhain at 
 eleven in the morning, which informed his master that 
 Blucher was falling back on Brussels ; that the mass of 
 the Prussian army was being probably concentrated in 
 the plains of the Chyse, to the north-east of Wavre and
 
 252 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 towards Louvain ; and that the restraining wing would 
 attack Wavre, but not until late in the afternoon, and 
 would stand at that place between Blucher and Wellington, 
 supposed to be in retreat on Brussels. This despatch, 
 utterly opposed to the facts, proved that Grouchy had 
 marched with extraordinary slowness from Gembloux, 
 and was not nearly in contact with the enemy, now 
 known to be in part at Wavre, in part at St. Lambert ;* 
 that Blucher had gained several miles on Grouchy ; and 
 that the chances were faint that, even if Grouchy should 
 draw near the main army by Moustier and Ottignies, he 
 could be in a position to fall on Bulow's flank and rear, as 
 both Napoleon and Soult thought would be the case when 
 the postscript to the letter of one in the afternoon was 
 written. It seemed probable, on the contrary, from 
 Grouchy's language, that the Marshal would march to 
 Wavre as slowly as he had marched to Walhain ; that he 
 would not be at Wavre until the evening of the day ; and 
 that he might even diverge towards the plains of the Chyse, 
 hoping still to interpose between the allied commanders, 
 who in his view were making for Brussels. 
 
 It had become evident, therefore, to Napoleon that his 
 lieutenant was on a wrong, possibly a fatal, course ; that 
 he must now expect that Bulow would be free to march 
 against the right flank of the main French army, while 
 this was attacking Wellington in front ; that this diversion 
 must be grave, and might become most perilous, and 
 that it must be resisted, and if possible baffled. Simul- 
 taneously the Emperor was made aware by Marbot's 
 
 * 'Comment.,' v. 174: ' L'Empereur re^ut de Gembloux des 
 nouvelles bien facheuses. Le Mar^chal Grouchy, au lieu d'etre parti 
 de Gembloux a la pointe du jour, comme il I'avait annoncd par sa 
 ddpcche de deux heures aprcs minuit, n'avait pas encore quittd ce 
 camp h. dix heures du matin. L'officier I'attribuait a I'horrible temps 
 qu'il faisait ; motif ridicule.' Gembloux is a mistake for Sart les 
 Walhain, and two in the morning should be three; but Napoleon's 
 disappointment appears plainly.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 253 
 
 horsemen and those of Domon that Bulow was moving 
 from St. Lambert, and was making his way towards the 
 Bois de Paris, a piece of woodland about a mile from the 
 extreme French right, and about two from Plancenoit, near 
 the French rear, and that an attack from this direction 
 might be ere long expected. 
 
 Napoleon has told us that, when he first heard that 
 Bulow's advanced guard was at St. Lambert, he had con- 
 sidered whether he should not change the course of the 
 battle, and direct his main attacks against Wellington's 
 right, and not against the allied left and left centre. On 
 reflection, however, he gave up this idea, for reasons 
 weighty, and indeed conclusive. It was now after three 
 in the afternoon, and he did not recur to the project, though 
 he knew that Bulow was free to march against his right 
 flank. He resolved to continue the attack on Welling- 
 ton, and at the same time to keep Bulow away. In his 
 present situation he could do nothing better, unless, indeed, 
 he were to retreat, a movement, Clausewitz has remarked, 
 which Turenne would have made, but which for Napoleon 
 was out of the question : for, apart from his characteristic 
 aversion to tactics of this kind, in the existing condition 
 of affairs in France he could not temporise ; victory was 
 his only chance of safety. The Emperor, however, pro- 
 foundly modified the plan of attack he had formed in the 
 morning, and adopted a plan in many respects different. 
 He felt that while Bulow was menacing his right he would 
 be gravely endangering this part of his line should he 
 endeavour to turn Wellington's extreme left. This might 
 bring disaster on the whole French right. He therefore 
 abandoned the effort against that part of the Duke's 
 position, which was certainly the weakest and the most 
 easy to master.* The corps of D'Erlon, besides, had 
 
 * Charras (ii. 80) blames Napoleon for this modification of his 
 original plan ; but Charras is a partisan, and most commentators are 
 against him. The immense importance of the approach of Bulow at 
 this juncture should be carefully noted.
 
 254 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 suffered immense loss. Napoleon had made himself aware 
 of this, for, soon after it had been driven back to its lines, 
 he had ridden in person to see how affairs stood, had 
 addressed encouraging words to the defeated soldiery, and 
 had spoken to the officers in command ; he had doubtless 
 learned that, for some time at least, this part of his army 
 was not equal to another grand attack. 
 
 The Emperor therefore resolved to make his next great 
 effort against Wellington's centre and left centre. The 
 means to be employed were admirably designed, and had 
 his orders been duly carried out, the result would certainly 
 have been different from what it was to be. He had long 
 perceived the importance of La Haye Sainte, an outwork 
 in front of Wellington's centre ; were this seized and 
 occupied, the French would possess an avenue into the 
 midst of the allied position. Napoleon accordingly 
 directed Ney to make himself master of this point of 
 vantage, to estabHsh himself firmly within the buildings, 
 and to wait until the opportunity had come to make an 
 attack in force on Wellington's centre — this also to be 
 conducted under Ney's command.* This great attack 
 was to be sustained by a large part of the Imperial Guard, 
 and by the mass of the still intact cavalry ; and it was to 
 be seconded on the left and the right by Keille and D'Erlon, 
 who, likewise, were for the present only to threaten the 
 enemy, and not to make a decisive movement. Meantime 
 Lobau was to hold Bulow in check ; the grand attack was 
 to be deferred until Bulow had been encountered and his 
 corps repulsed. 
 
 To sustain, and at the same time to mask, the on- 
 
 * The import of Napoleon's orders to Ney has never been ques- 
 tioned. Jerome, who had been wounded at Hougoumont, and had 
 returned to his brother, emphatically wrote to his wife (' M^moires,' 
 vii. 22) : ' L'Empereur avait ordonnd au Mardchal Ney de se maintenir 
 dans La Haye Sainte en la crdndlant, et en y etablissant plusieurs 
 bataillons, mais de ne faire aucun mouvement.' See also Gourgaud, 
 • Campagne de 1815.'
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 255 
 
 slaught to be made on Wellington's centre, several 
 batteries were withdrawn from Napoleon's right ; their 
 fire was directed on La Haye Sainte, and on other parts 
 of the enemy's line, while renewed demonstrations were 
 made against Hougoumont, and against Papelotte, La 
 Haye and Smohain, for the present, however, mere attacks 
 of skirmishers. The cannonade became most intense 
 and destructive ; the French guns, very superior in 
 numbers, and placed for the most part in positions of 
 vantage, carried havoc and death into the allied ranks ; 
 these were, certainly, to some extent shaken. Had 
 Wellington's army been as exposed as that of Blucher 
 had been at Ligny, its losses by this time might have 
 been fatal to it ; but the troops even in front, and espe- 
 cially the reserves, were kept as much as possible behind 
 the ridge of Mont St. Jean, and though they suffered 
 greatly they were able to bear the ordeal. 
 
 Under the protection of this terrific fire the soldiers 
 of Quiot advanced against La Haye Sainte again ; they 
 were reinforced by two of Donzelot's battalions ; the 
 place was once more encompassed by a swarm of furious 
 assailants. The little garrison had been to some extent 
 strengthened, but the defenders were never in sufficient 
 numbers ; they were now very inferior in force. A 
 desperate struggle, however, raged for a while, the French 
 endeavouring in vain to master the buildings — these, as 
 before, had not been attacked by shells, and appliances 
 for breaking in had, as before, been wanting — Baring and 
 his brave men stubbornly maintaining their hold. The 
 result was for a time uncertain. At last, probably at about 
 four o'clock, reiterated attempts to set the farm offices 
 on fire, spite of determined efforts to quench the flames, 
 proved to a considerable extent successful ; and the 
 ammunition of the defence began to fail : the supply, for 
 some unknown reason, had been inadequate from the 
 first. The French burst in by the entrance of a large
 
 256 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 barn on the west side of the house ; a bloody fight of a 
 few minutes ensued ; but Baring and his followers were 
 compelled to abandon the place ; few of the garrison and 
 its supporters lived to tell the tale. Two battalions were 
 sent from Alten's division to make an effort to regain a 
 position of vantage, the importance of which the allies 
 had perceived too late — the Duke nobly took the blame 
 on himself — but one of these was suddenly attacked and 
 almost destroyed by a body of cuirassiers who skilfully 
 seized the occasion, and the other was with difficulty 
 disengaged by Somerset's horsemen.* 
 
 The fall of La Haye Sainte was welcomed by the 
 French soldiery, impressionable, but intelligent, with 
 enthusiastic acclaim. The left centre and centre of 
 Wellington were now greatly exposed ; his enemy had a 
 path opened into the midst of his line, along the great 
 
 * The importance of the capture of La Haye Sainte is obvious ; 
 the left centre and centre of WeUington became very much exposed. 
 For some valuable remarks on the imperfect preparations made for 
 the defence of the post, see Shaw Kennedy, ' Battle of Waterloo.' 
 122, 123, 174. It would be most desirable to ascertain the time when 
 La Haye Sainte fell, especially in order to form a just estimate of the 
 subsequent tactics of the French ; but the accounts are conflicting, 
 and cannot be reconciled. Wellington (Despatches, xii. 619) says 
 2 p.m. ; but this is clearly a mistake. From Napoleon's narrative 
 ('Comment.,' v. 174), it may be inferred that the time was about 4 p.m. 
 This agrees with Jomini, who wrote soon after the event (* Precis de 
 la Campagne de 181 5 '). Charras (ii. 36, 37) fixes the time at a little 
 before 4 p.m. from the testimony of an eye-witness. On the other 
 hand, Shaw Kennedy, who was on the spot ('Battle of Waterloo,' 122), 
 positively states that the hour was about 6 p.m. ; and Sibome (' The 
 Waterloo Campaign,' 476, 478) concurs. The probabilities indicate 
 that the time was about 4 p.m.: for otherwise (i) the great cavalry 
 attacks, ill-conceived as they were, could hardly have been attempted 
 if La Haye Sainte were still in the hands of the enemy ; and 
 (2) Bachelu's division would hardly have been withdrawn from La 
 Haye Sainte, as it was, at about 4 p.m. had not the place been in the 
 power of the French. On the whole, the evidence preponderates that 
 La Haye .Sainte was stormed and occupied at about 4 p.m. ; but this 
 is not certain. Mr. Ropes ('The Campaign of 181 5 ') makes the time 
 near four; M. H. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' ii. 378) makes it about six.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 257 
 
 main-road from Charleroy to Brussels ; the allies must 
 have been placed in grave peril had a grand and deter- 
 mined attack been pressed home. But Bulow was already 
 striking Napoleon's right flank. The Emperor, we have 
 said, had resolved to repel this effort before falling in full 
 force on Wellington. It was the plain duty of Ney to 
 obey his orders, to occupy La Haye Sainte in adequate 
 strength, and to bide his time, until he should receive a 
 signal from his master to make the decisive onslaught, 
 which, it should be recollected, he was himself to lead. 
 But the unfortunate Marshal had been stung to the quick 
 by the reproaches addressed to him for his delays on 
 June 16. In his case, too, as in that of warriors of his 
 type, the hot fit often succeeded the cold ; he believed 
 that victory, won by his own exertions, was within his 
 grasp. Wellington had, we have seen, withdrawn a con- 
 siderable part of his army behind the ridge to escape the 
 effects of the tremendous cannonade ; there were move- 
 ments of the impedimenta in his rear ; some of his 
 auxiliaries were already flying from the field. Ney 
 thought he saw the signs of retreat at hand. On the 
 spur of the moment, without reflection, and in contraven- 
 tion of Napoleon's commands, he resolved to attack the 
 enemy with a mass of cavalry, and to change a retrograde 
 movement into defeat — nay, rout. 
 
 A more inconsiderate and reckless purpose has seldom 
 been formed in the annals of war ; it was, we repeat, a 
 violation of positive orders ; it was the third great error 
 of the tactics of the French at Waterloo. The attack, as 
 it was to be conducted, was to be made by horsemen, 
 exposed on a considerable space to the destructive fire of 
 the allied guns ; it was to be made without the support of 
 infantry in force. It was to be made, too, against Welling- 
 ton's right centre, exactly where his line was strong, and 
 could be easily reinforced; for at this point the cross- 
 road from Ohain to Braine I'Alleud did not present the 
 
 17
 
 258 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 obstacles which had proved so fatal to the luckless 
 cuirassiers a few hours before ; and it was to be made 
 against masses of infantry still unbroken, capable of being 
 greatly increased in numbers, and in a large part, at least, 
 composed of men of proved constancy and worth. No 
 wonder that experienced British officers, as they saw the 
 preparations being made for this waste of military strength, 
 felt that the effort was premature, and was doomed to 
 failure. ' We had no idea that the attack would be made 
 upon our line standing in its regular order of battle, and 
 that line as yet unshaken by any previous attack of infantry. 
 . . . Our surprise at being so soon attacked by this great 
 and magnificent force of cavalry was accompanied by the 
 opinion that the attack was premature, and that we were 
 perfectly prepared and secure against its effects, so far as 
 any military operation can be depended upon.'* 
 
 * Shaw Kennedy, 'Battle of Waterloo,' 115, 116. That the first 
 great attack of the French cavalry was made in opposition to Napoleon's 
 express orders, and was due to Nay alone, has been established by 
 incontrovertible evidence, and has been only questioned by partisan 
 writers like Charras. Napoleon (' Comment.,' v. 203) says, and with 
 evident truth : ' Le mouvement de la cavalerie sur le plateau, pendant 
 que lattaque du Gdndral Bulow n'dtait pas rdpoussee, fut un accident 
 facheux ; I'intention du chef dtait d'ordonner ce mouvement, mais una 
 heure plus tard, et de le faire soutenir par les seize bataillons d'infanterie 
 de la Garde et cent pieces de canon.' Gourgaud (' Campagne de 1815,' 
 96) pointedly remarked: ' Le Mardchal Ney, emportd par trop d'ardeur, 
 et oubliant I'ordre qu'il avait regu (de se maintenir dans La Haye 
 Sainte sans faire aucun mouvement) ddboucha sur le plateau avec les 
 cuirassiers de Milhaud et la cavalerie Idgcre de la Garde.' Jerome is 
 not less explicit ; the attack by cavalry alone was never contemplated 
 by Napoleon, and was distinctly premature. ' Mdmoires,' vii. 23: 
 ' L'Empereur ordonna au Mardchal Ney de se porter avec une grande 
 partie de la cavalerie, deux corps d'infanterie et la Garde, sur le centre 
 de I'ennemi pour donner le coup de massue et certes e'en dtait fait de 
 I'armde anglaise si le Mardchal eut exdcutd les ordres de I'Empereur, 
 mais. emportd par son ardeur, il attaqua trois quarts d'heure trop tot.' 
 Rogniat, a detractor of Napoleon, declared ('Considerations sur I'Art 
 de la Guerre,' 235) : ' Lorsque la cavalerie s'engagea sur les lignes 
 anglaises Napoldon parut siirpris et douta un moment que les masses 
 de cavalerie qu'il voyait au milieu des anglais, lui appartinssent, et
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 259 
 
 Ney had told Drouot in the morning that the French 
 cavalry, under his leading, could do great things; he 
 hurried to Delort, one of Milhaud's lieutenants, and de- 
 manded that a body of cuirassiers should be placed in his 
 hands. Delort referred the Marshal to his superior officer ; 
 Milhaud protested against an attack to be made in difficult 
 ground, under the worst conditions ; Ney angrily replied 
 that the whole cavalry had been entrusted to him, but did 
 not add that he was not to stir until Napoleon bade him. 
 Milhaud reluctantly obeyed what seemed an imperative 
 command ; his splendid division of mailed horsemen was 
 given to Ney to be at his disposal ; it was followed, as it 
 began its movement, by the light cavalry of the Guard, 
 perhaps because, chafing at its inaction at Quatre Bras, 
 it broke away from its experienced chief, perhaps because 
 Milhaud called on Lefebvre-Desnoettes to support him. 
 
 This mass of superb horsemen, about 5,000 sabres, had, 
 as it advanced, to cross the great main-road. It was 
 compelled to defile for fully 1,200 yards, exposing its 
 flank to the fire of the allied guns ; but though hundreds 
 of saddles were emptied, it kept together, and boldly 
 pressed forward, protected by a storm of shot from the 
 French batteries, and by Bachelu's division in skirmishing 
 order, this having been sent from La Haye Sainte to 
 Hougoumont. The squadrons ere long had reached the 
 low ground between these two places, from whence they 
 were to ascend the ridge. This formed a front of only a 
 few hundred yards, far too contracted for such a body of 
 men ; the assailants were frightfully ravaged by grape and 
 
 lorsque qu'il en eu la certitude il sembia mdcontent de cette charge 
 pr^maturde. ... Si done I'Empereur avait vu partir la cavalerie, il 
 eut vraisemblement donnd des ordres pour I'arreter.' To the last hour 
 of his life Napoleon charged Ney with this capital mistake, and insisted 
 it was a main cause of the disaster of Waterloo. It is important to 
 bear in mind the truth on this subject in considering the conduct of 
 Ney and of Napoleon during this passage of Waterloo. 
 
 17—2
 
 26o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 round shot, as they struggled up the miry and rain- 
 drenched slope. But they retained their formations, and 
 exulted in proud confidence ; the ' bravest of the brave ' 
 was at their head, accompanied by many a brilliant 
 officer ; the cuirassiers were the men of Borodino and 
 Eylau, whose weighty and dauntless onset had achieved 
 wonders ; the troopers of Lefebvre-Desnoettes were choice 
 soldiers, selected from the flower of the cavalry of France. 
 The multitudinous shouts of * Vive I'Empereur !' swelled 
 in tumultuous roar towards the enemy's line ; sabres 
 flashed out in thousands in the summer air ; the sun 
 shone on a still ordered array rushing up the low eminence 
 it had all but mastered, in the pomp of war, and in 
 strength that appeared invincible. Its rays lit up the 
 glittering armour and the dark helmets of a serried 
 succession of mailed squadrons ; they fell on the gay 
 pennons of a forest of lances, and on the martial forms of 
 masses of light horsemen clad in brilliant and many- 
 coloured garb, like the ' cohorts gleaming in purple and 
 gold ' of the great Assyrian ruler. The spectacle ' was 
 magnificent, but was not war,' words spoken of a grand 
 effort of British cavalry by a gallant Frenchman, before 
 Sebastopol, in another age. 
 
 The allied artillerymen had plied their deadly work 
 until the enemy had reached the edge of the ascent ; they 
 suddenly disappeared at Wellington's command. The 
 rushing tempest of horsemen swept over the ridge, finding 
 little to arrest its course for a moment ; the abandoned 
 guns were seized by the elated troopers, who saw in the 
 feat a presage of quickly-coming victory. But Wellington, 
 as always, full of resource in the field, had his preparations 
 made to resist the storm ; he had already moved part of 
 Chass^'s division at Braine I'Alleud from his extreme 
 right ; he had directed Mitchell and Clinton to the scene 
 of action, and considerable bodies of these fresh troops 
 had marched from Merbe-Braine to reinforce the main
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 261 
 
 order of battle ; behind was collected a great array of 
 cavalry ; his menaced front, in a word, was extremely 
 strong. The allied infantry was drawn up in squares, 
 forming a double line of defence ; the squares were arrayed 
 checkerwise, so that the intervals between the first line 
 were covered by the second at a short distance in the 
 rear. The two lines gave each other powerful support ; 
 a most formidable front of fire was presented. 
 
 The French cavalry did not flinch ; they charged boldly 
 down the reverse slope of the ridge, where the British 
 masses were assembled. Their onslaught fell first on the 
 Guards of Maitland, and on the right of Alten's division, 
 commanded by an excellent chief, Halkett. The horse- 
 men dashed furiously against the first line of squares, 
 striking at the angles, the most vulnerable points, en- 
 deavouring to break them up by the impulse of the assault, 
 attacking the defenders with sword and lance, here and 
 there annoying them with the fire of musketoons and 
 pistols. They did not, however, attempt to crush any 
 square by bearing down in concentrated force against it, 
 as unfortunate Murat said afterwards they might have 
 done. Their attacks were desultory and ill-connected, 
 imposing as they were ; and as they recoiled from the 
 faces of the first line of squares — living citadels, so to 
 speak, of fire edged with bayonets — they vainly wasted 
 their efforts against the second. Meanwhile the murderous 
 volleys of the infantry of the defence had told with frightful 
 effect upon the assailants ; the British and German soldiery 
 stood firm — ' rooted, as it were, in the earth.' Though 
 some of the auxiliaries wavered and showed signs of yield- 
 ing, no part of the allied front gave way ; all withstood a 
 shock, terrible for its moral effect, but, if steadfastly resisted, 
 wanting in real material power. 
 
 By degrees the French squadrons became commingled, 
 their order confused, their ranks broken ; a mass of fresh 
 cavalry was then launched against them — the horsemen
 
 262 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 of Arentschild, Van Merlen, Trip, and Dornberg — sup- 
 ported by the survivors of Somerset's troopers. Baffled, 
 but indignant, and still fighting hard, the assailants were 
 unable to resist this attack ; they were forced back over 
 the crest of the ridge, which they had just won in the 
 sure hope of a triumph at hand. As they fell back, the 
 artillerymen, who had taken refuge in the squares, returned 
 to the guns they had lost for a moment. No precaution 
 had been taken to provide means to spike them — another 
 proof of the reckless want of forethought characteristic 
 of nearly all the attacks at Waterloo ; they had not even 
 been overturned, as they might have been. Their destruc- 
 tive discharges at a short distance wrought havoc among 
 the retiring squadrons. 
 
 Ney was a dauntless hero in the stress of battle. This 
 reverse might well have made him pause ; it only nerved 
 him to make redoubled efforts. The French cavalry, too, 
 greatly as they had suffered, had not lost heart, and were 
 eager to come to blows again ; they were re-formed in the 
 low ground beneath the ridge, sheltered in some measure 
 from the artillery of the defence. Ere long the proud 
 squadrons began the attack anew ; but this was conducted 
 with more caution than before ; Lefebvre-Desnoettes kept 
 his men in reserve, while Milhaud and his cuirassiers 
 advanced towards the ascent. The narrow space where 
 the onset was made presented once more the same splendid 
 sight ; the waves of horsemen rolled grandly forward ; 
 they had broken against impenetrable masses of rock ; 
 they flowed on again in the majesty and force of the 
 storm. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon had reached the scene. It has 
 been said that, from his station near La Belle Alliance, 
 he was unable to descry the first advance of Ney ; but it 
 is more probable that he had been some time on horse- 
 back, and that he had failed to notice the Marshal's move- 
 ment, because he was far away to the right engaged in
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 263 
 
 making preparation to resist Bulow, whose attack was 
 rapidly becoming more and more threatening.* When 
 the Emperor and his staff arrived before Welhngton's 
 front, the second great cavalry attack had just begun. As 
 the still well-ordered squadrons drew near the ridge, and 
 the eye rested on those formidable masses of war, the 
 hopes of the troops at hand and of their officers rose 
 high ; nothing, it was thought, could stop that over- 
 whelming onset. It was otherwise, however, with the 
 experienced leaders on the spot. Soult exclaimed : * That 
 man is endangering us as he did at Jena.' Napoleon, 
 indignant that his orders had been set at nought, remarked: 
 * The madman ! he is ruining France for the second time. 
 This is a premature movement, of which the results may 
 be fatal. 't But half of the great reserve of cavalry had 
 been engaged ; it was now impossible to recur to his late 
 plan. Napoleon said : * All this is an hour too soon ; but 
 it has become necessary to support what has already been 
 done.' J He directed Kellermann to go to the aid of Ney 
 with his horsemen ; it is doubtful whether he did not give 
 a similar order to Guyot, the chief of the heavy cavalry 
 of the Guard, though he denied this to the latest hour of 
 his life.§ The Emperor's purpose was largely determined 
 by two facts — Bulow was thundering in force on his flank, 
 and it was essential to avoid a retrograde movement ; and 
 the French infantry between La Haye Sainte and Hougou- 
 mont had been greatly thinned, and were becoming ex- 
 posed should WeUington venture on a counter-attack. 
 Napoleon entrusted once more the conduct of the battle 
 
 * Compare H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' 358, and Ropes, 'The Cam- 
 paign of Waterloo,' 308, 309. 
 
 t ' Comment.,' v. 177, vi. 150, and authorities cited by H. Houssaye, 
 ' Waterloo,' ii. 349. 
 
 X 'Comment.,' v. 177, vi. 150, and H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' 
 ii. 364. 
 
 § Compare 'Comment.,' v. 178, and vi. 150, 151, with the evidence 
 to the contrary in H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' 365.
 
 264 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 to Ney ; he seems to have ridden off again to make head 
 against Bulow. It appears to be certain that, as was his 
 wont, he gave Ney no precise orders as to the methods 
 by which he was to direct the attacks. 
 
 It was now between five and six o'clock ; the attack of 
 r>ulow had become formidable in the extreme. Half of 
 that General's corps had not come into line at St. Lambert 
 until near one ; the other half not until after three. It 
 was well that Grouchy was far distant. Blucher had 
 joined his lieutenant long before this time. The veteran, 
 impatient as he was to take part in the great fight raging, 
 with many vicissitudes, within his view, had sent recon- 
 noitring parties to ascertain that his flank and rear were 
 safe ; he did not advance until they had returned. He 
 pushed forward, but with two of his four divisions only. 
 The way from St. Lambert through the narrow valley of 
 the Lasne, a mere ravine closed by defiles and woodlands, 
 was wellnigh impassable for troops in order ; it has been 
 said that had it been occupied by the French the Prussians 
 could never have reached the scene of action. Lobau, 
 however, remained behind the Bois de Paris ; Bulow's 
 men, though not opposed in their march, toiled with the 
 greatest difficulty through a maze of obstacles; but Blucher 
 followed the edge of the columns, breathing his heroic 
 spirit into his devoted soldiery. ' Drag the guns through 
 the mire, my lads!' he exclaimed. ' Have at the enemy! 
 You would not see me break my word.' They emerged 
 at last from the intricate valley, burning to avenge the 
 defeat of Ligny. 
 
 The old Marshal had at first resolved not to engage 
 this part of his troops until his two rearward divisions 
 had come up ; but urgent messages had arrived from 
 Wellington, entreating him to attack without a moment's 
 delay. The sight of the cavalry charging up the ridge of 
 the Mont St. Jean, and of the serried masses of the Imperial 
 Guard — ready, apparently, to deal a decisive stroke — made
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 265 
 
 the aged warrior, so to speak, throw away the scabbard. 
 At about half-past four his leading divisions, under Losthin 
 and Hiller, issued from the Bois de Paris ; they announced 
 their presence by a rolling fire from all their guns. It 
 was this that perhaps chiefly caused Napoleon to support 
 Ney, lest the French army should lose its attitude of 
 offence.* Lobau, Subervie, and Domon had only some 
 10,000 men — Lobau had, we have said, been deprived of 
 the division of Teste — to oppose to an enemy already 
 superior in numbers ; but they held Losthin and Hiller 
 successfully in check until the divisions of Ryssel and 
 Hacke had reached the field. Lobau, unable to resist an 
 enemy nearly threefold in force, fell back fighting in good 
 order, and gradually approaching the main army. The 
 Prussian line now extended from near Frischermont, 
 close to Wellington's extreme left, towards Plancenoit on 
 Napoleon's right rear ; it was at Plancenoit not many 
 hundred yards from the French army's flank. Bulow's 
 troops, fully 29,000 strong, were now masters of a part of 
 the field; his divisions on the left made a determined 
 effort to storm Plancenoit, and to hold the village as a 
 preliminary to a more decisive attack. The Prussian guns 
 already swept the Emperor's line of retreat ; the pressure 
 on the French became so great that he was compelled to 
 detach the Young Guard, about 4,000 strong, to defend 
 Plancenoit, and to throw the assailants back. A desperate 
 conflict raged for a time, but Bulow's columns were for 
 the present repulsed. 
 
 * Bulow wrote that ' he attacked to let the British army get breath,' 
 Blucherthus describes the position of affairs at this crisis of the battle 
 (Prussian official report ; see La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 407) : 
 ' La superiority de I'ennemi dtait trop grande ; Napoldon envoyait 
 continuellement en avant des masses dnormes, et quelque fermetd que 
 les troupes anglaises missent pour se maintenir dans leur position, il 
 ^tait impossible que de si heroiques efforts n'eussent enfin des bornes.' 
 The great majority of English commentators altogether underrate the 
 capital importance of Bulow's diversion.
 
 266 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Meanwhile a struggle, perhaps the most fiercely con- 
 tested, certainly the most extraordinary in its tragic but 
 grand incidents, that was witnessed during the long period 
 of the wars of the French Revolution and the French 
 Empire, had been going on for more than an hour between 
 Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, in front of Welling- 
 ton's right centre. The second cavalry attack of Ney had 
 failed like the first, though conducted with rather more 
 judgment and skill; but when the squadrons of Keller- 
 mann, and perhaps of Guyot, had been placed by Napo- 
 leon in the Marshal's hands, his confidence rose to the 
 highest point of daring, and he made preparations for 
 another decisive onslaught. It was in vain that Keller- 
 mann, of Marengo renown, who, like all the French 
 cavalry chiefs on this day, disapproved of the course on 
 which Ney was bent, entreated him to pause in his head- 
 long movement — at least, to keep a reserve of troopers 
 out of the reach of the enemy ; Ney insisted on employing 
 the whole of the great array of horsemen entrusted to him. 
 Provision, however, was made, though this was far from 
 adequate, for seconding the great efforts about to be made 
 by the masses of squadrons soon to be launched on their 
 course. Pire, on the left, was ordered to menace the 
 enemy's right, and to endeavour to search the squares of 
 the defence by an enfilading fire from batteries on the 
 road from Nivelles to Brussels; clouds of skirmishers 
 were directed to support the attack where this was prac- 
 ticable by a dropping but continuous discharge of mus- 
 ketry ; horse artillery was moved to points towards the 
 bottom of the ridge, to take part in the conflict should an 
 occasion offer itself. 
 
 But the Duke had his arrangements likewise made ; 
 they were perfectly conceived, and admirably carried out. 
 The whole of Chass^'s division, at first too distant, was 
 now drawn from Braine I'Alleud, and placed in reserve, 
 in order to strengthen the main front of battle; the
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 267 
 
 allied extreme right was thus ranged behind the right 
 centre. This was a reinforcement of fully 6,000 men. At 
 the same time, Mitchell's brigade and Clinton's division, 
 the brigades of Adam, Duplat, and W. Halkett, were 
 moved forward to defend the space between the western 
 verge of Hougoumont and the Guards of Maitland, and 
 to strengthen the line, greatly weakened at these points ; 
 and cavalry was detached to hold Pire in check, and, if 
 possible, to drive him away, a large body of cavalry, as 
 before, being kept in reserve. On his left, where D'Erlon 
 maintained an incessant fire of skirmishers, the Duke 
 withdrew the hard-pressed troops of Wincke, and brought 
 Lambert's brigade into line, Picton's infantry still making 
 good their positions, and Vivian and Vandeleur's squadrons 
 still covering the extreme left. The allied front was thus 
 greatly contracted, and presented a formidable line of 
 resistance ; it nearly held the ground originally held by 
 what we have called Wellington's main order of battle. 
 
 Seventy-seven squadrons, from 10,000 to 11,000 horse- 
 men, all splendid troops of the best quality, had ere long 
 begun the third great cavalry attack. These imposing 
 masses were once more assembled within the narrow space 
 in the low land between La Haye Sainte and Hougou- 
 mont ; they were literally packed together in their dense 
 ranks. Once more, and in a greater degree than before, 
 they presented an easy mark to the allied batteries, which 
 played on them with destructive effect. Men and horses 
 were quickly struck down in hundreds ; but the shouts of 
 ' Vive I'Empereur !' rent the troubled air ; and once more, 
 covered by a tremendous fire from their own guns, the 
 surging torrent of horsemen struggled up the ridge, and 
 became masters of the enemy's cannon in their front. 
 Once more they rushed down on the squares before them, 
 assailing them fruitlessly indeed, but with dauntless 
 courage ; once more they recoiled from the volleys they 
 could not reply to ; once more they were driven back by
 
 268 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the allied cavalry, and were compelled to re-form, baffled, 
 but still ardent, in the valley below. 
 
 These furious charges were repeated over and over 
 again. Wellington said to Jomini afterwards that * nothing 
 finer was ever seen in war ' ; but the results obtained were 
 very far from commensurate with the enormous havoc 
 wrought among these noble but doomed horsemen.* It 
 was in vain that the twofold line of squares was pene- 
 trated and attacked on every side ; that, in the Duke's 
 language, * the French cavalry rode around our squares as 
 if they had been their own.' It was in vain that Pire 
 plied his guns from a distance ; that little bodies of 
 infantry crept up to the ridge, and endeavoured to search 
 the enemy with their iire ; that light artillery, moved 
 up the slope, made deadly discharges ; that, when the 
 assailants were forced back, the French batteries far away 
 opened with fatal results upon the infantry of the defence. 
 In these reiterated, and even heroic, charges, not a single 
 square was borne down by an attack pressed home ; and 
 if perhaps two or three auxiliary squares gave way — and 
 even this is extremely doubtful — not a British or German 
 Legionary square was broken. t No doubt the losses of 
 the allies were great, especially from the fire directed 
 against them ; no doubt the moral effect of the attacks 
 was immense in the case, we shall see, of Wellington's 
 inferior troops. But the meteor flag of England still 
 continued to wave on that death-strewn ground ; like the 
 * deep Scottish circle ' at Flodden, the invincible squares — 
 it appears these were sixteen in number — withstood the 
 
 * ' Prdcis de la Campagne de 181 5,' 210: 'Le Due de Wellington 
 m'a assure lui-meme qu'il n'avait jamais rien vu de plus admirable, k 
 la guerre, que les dix ou douze charges reitdrdes des cuirassiers Fran^ais 
 sur les troupes de toutes armes.' 
 
 t Most French writers insist that several British squares were 
 broken and several British colours taken. The contrary is certainly 
 the fact ; there is no real evidence that even an auxiliary square was 
 broken.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 269 
 
 desperate efforts made to break them up, and by degrees 
 every charge became weaker and weaker ; the French horse- 
 men, their battle steeds exhausted, their officers having 
 fallen in scores, slowly losing heart, brave men as they 
 were, began to feel they could not overcome their enemy.* 
 It deserves notice that, though some of the allied guns, 
 when in the hands of the French for a moment, were 
 overturned and made useless, not one was spiked. 
 
 The allied right and right centre had thus withstood 
 the succession of attacks directed against it, as the left 
 and left centre had defeated the attack of D'Erlon. At 
 one point only, in Wellington's front, had anything like a 
 real impression been made ; the capture and occupation 
 of La Haye Sainte by the French had made a dangerous 
 gap in the Duke's centre, which might have given a great 
 opportunity to Ney, had the Marshal known how to turn 
 it to account ; but Ney, disobeying his master's orders, 
 had neglected, we have seen, to hold this post, and to 
 make it a base for future attacks, which possibly might 
 have given France a victory, and he had recklessly 
 * massacred my cavalry,' in Napoleon's bitter phrase, in 
 repeated efforts inevitably without decisive results. 
 
 * It would be most unjust to question the splendid courage of the 
 French cavalry at Waterloo ; but these charges were badly conducted 
 even as cavalry charges. Uxbridge, an impartial judge and a noble- 
 hearted soldier, wrote afterwards ('Waterloo Letters,' 10) : 'The French 
 very frequently attacked our squares, but never in overwhelming 
 masses, and with that vigour and speed which would have given them 
 some chance of penetrating. No heavy mass, having a well-formed 
 front, actually came collectively against our bayonets. Constantly a 
 few devoted fellows did clash with them, and some pierced between 
 the squares, and when I had not cavalry at hand I frequently entered 
 the squares for protection. In the afternoon a very heavy attack was 
 made upon the whole of our line on the right of the road, and connect- 
 ing itself with the troops attacking Hougoumont. It was chiefly made 
 and frequently repeated by masses of cuirassiers, but never in one 
 connected line, and after the first grand attack of the morning they 
 never came on with the degree of vigour which could give them a hope 
 of penetrating into our immovable squares of infantry.'
 
 270 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 But though the great cavalry attacks had comparatively 
 failed, it is not to be supposed they had been fruitless. 
 Many guns of the allies had been dismounted ; the sabre, 
 the lance, the musketoon, the pistol, in the hands of 
 determined and trained soldiers had not been useless. 
 The French squadrons trampled down in their repeated 
 charges hundreds of men caught in the act of forming 
 square. The enfilading fire of Pire, too, had done much 
 mischief, though not so great as it ought to have done ; 
 the skirmishing footmen had wrought a great deal of 
 havoc ; above all, the concentrated fire of the distant 
 French batteries had laid thousands of brave men in the 
 dust. Nearly all the squares had been fearfully straitened ; 
 some were mere skeletons of fine bodies that had been 
 wasted away ; the men in all were weary, exhausted, well- 
 nigh worn out. The principal effect, however, of the 
 cavalry onslaughts had, as always, been of a moral kind ; 
 this had been in no ordinary degree disastrous. The 
 very best troops in the squares felt it difficult to endure 
 * the frightful sameness,' as it had been called, of a defence 
 against charges made ten, or even twelve, times ; they 
 became impatient, angry, eager for their revenge. * When 
 shall we get at them ?' was a cry often bursting from the 
 ranks, and yet such a movement might have been fatal. 
 The inferior troops were sometimes too terrified or too 
 ill-disciplined to fall into the formations that alone could 
 give safety ; in this situation they were either cut to 
 pieces or swelled an ever-increasing crowd of fugitives 
 making away from the field by the great main-road to 
 Brussels.* 
 
 * Major Mercer ('Waterloo Letters,' 218) thus describes an attempt 
 made by a raw body of Brunswickers to form a square : ' Their ranks, 
 loose and disjointed, presented gaps of several files in breadth, which 
 the officers and sergeants were busily employed filling up by pushing, 
 and even thumping, their men together ; while these, standing like so 
 many logs, with their arms at the recover, were apparently completely
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 271 
 
 The worst effects, however, were seen in the auxiliary 
 cavalry ; the squadrons of Van Merlen and Trip were 
 unable to withstand the shock of the mailed horsemen of 
 Milhaud and Kellermann. One Hanoverian regiment of 
 hussars, damned to everlasting fame, rode away with its 
 commander by the Duke's orders ; the poltroon had re- 
 fused to cross swords with cuirassiers. The cavalry of 
 Arentschild and Dornberg, and the remains of Somerset's 
 and Ponsonby's brigades, had to do the work of these 
 men ; the two brigades had dwindled down to a mere 
 handful of troopers. Wellington, in fact, had been nearly 
 left without cavalry, if we except the brigades of Vivian 
 and Vandeleur on his left. 
 
 In these great attacks Ney had justified his proud title ; 
 he had been the ' bravest of the brave ' in a brave army. 
 Repeatedly he led the charges in person, harangued his 
 men with impassioned words and gestures; more than 
 once stood boldly by a captured gun, defying the enemy 
 with the sword he boldly waved. But this was the con- 
 duct of a soldier, not of a General-in-Chief;* he directed 
 recklessly and badly this part of the battle. Apart from 
 his disobedience of his master's orders, and from his 
 turning away from La Haye Sainte, and not waiting 
 until a decisive movement had been made from that point 
 against the Duke's centre — a movement that might have 
 had immense results — Ney had neglected to employ the 
 only means that might have gained for his noble cavalry 
 real success. 
 
 The enfilading fire of Pire on the French left was much 
 less effective than it might have been, and it ought to 
 have been supported by an enfilading fire from La Haye 
 
 stupefied and bewildered, I should add that they were all perfect 
 children. None of the privates, perhaps, were above eighteen years 
 of age.' 
 
 * So Livy says of one of Hannibal's opponents, a mere fighting man 
 (xxv. 19) : ' Tanquam eadem militares et imperatori^ artes essent.'
 
 272 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Sainte on the right, which must have told severely upon 
 the infantry of the defence. Had this twofold artillery 
 attack been made, the squares would have been raked, 
 and must have frightfully suffered ; some probably could 
 not have stood their ground ; this would have perhaps 
 trebled the power of the cavalry of the attack. But 
 where Ney was most wanting, and was even very remiss — 
 his mind, as on the i6th, had not its true balance — was 
 seen in his neglect to make any effective use of the masses 
 of infantry on the ground. The whole of Bachelu's 
 division and part of that of Foy might have been safely 
 withdrawn from the fruitless assaults on Hougoumont.* 
 This post, which had cost such a vain waste of life, might 
 even have been masked for a time ;t they might have 
 been moved to the crest of the ridge to support the horse- 
 men ; the squares would have been compelled to deploy 
 to resist the footmen. This would certainly have greatly 
 added to the power of the attack, even if the result had 
 remained uncertain, when we recollect how the Duke's 
 right centre had been reinforced. Ney, in short, as had 
 been the case at Quatre Bras, did not employ the force 
 which he might have employed ; he did not make, or 
 even attempt to make, a proper use of the three arms, 
 which if possible ought always to act in concert ; without 
 artillery and infantry in sufficient force on the spot, he 
 almost threw away the superb cavalry .J 
 
 * See H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 376, where this is well pointed 
 out. See also Foy, cited by H. Houssaye /n loco, and 'Waterloo 
 Letters,' 256, 305. 
 
 t Marbot (' Mdmoires,' ii. 476) significantly says : * Nous nous 
 obstinames a attaquer les fermes de La Haye Sainte et de Hougou- 
 mont, au lieu de les masquer par une division et de marcher sur les 
 lignes anglaises dej.\ fortement dbranlees. Nous arrivons en le temps 
 de les ddtruire avant I'arrivcc des Prussiens ce qui nous aurait assurd 
 la victoire.' 
 
 \ Mr. Ropes ('The Campaign of Waterloo,' 309, 310) has made 
 excellent comments on the faulty tactics of Ney in this part of the 
 battle: ' Marshal Ney determined to carry the allied centre by charges
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 273 
 
 It is difficult, too, to acquit Napoleon altogether from 
 blame in this most important matter. No doubt, as was 
 his wont, he had entrusted the direction of the attack to a 
 well-tried lieutenant ; no doubt he was engaged at this 
 very time with Bulow, and really was fighting two battles ; 
 and he was endeavouring to resist a most dangerous 
 offensive movement. But the Emperor appears to have 
 given no orders to the Marshal, during this phase of 
 the conflict, to turn to account the infantry at hand ; 
 assuredly such orders might have been given. And for 
 a short time Napoleon had an opportunity, it would seem, 
 to employ a part at least of the Imperial Guard. Bulow 
 had been repulsed by the Young Guard ; his attack was for 
 the present suspended. Had even* 6,000 or 7,000 men 
 of the Old Guard, supported by artillery, been directed, at 
 this crisis of the battle, along the great main-road beyond 
 
 of cavalry. He seems to have made no effort to support this attack 
 by the infantry of the 2nd corps, although it would certainly have 
 been quite possible to have withdrawn at least Bachelu's division from 
 the wood of Hougoumont, and to have used it with good effect. . . . 
 No use whatever was made of the very great advantage afforded by 
 the position of La Haye Sainte for the posting of batteries which 
 should sweep the whole line of the allies, dismount their guns, riddle 
 their squares, and render their infantry unable to resist the shock of 
 cavalry.' 
 
 * Charras is a systematic libeller of Napoleon ; his gross injustice 
 mars the value of a very able work, and his criticisms of Napoleon 
 are always to be received with suspicion. But we believe there is 
 truth in the following passage (ii. 84), though the danger of Bulow's 
 attack must be borne in mind, and it is easy to be wise after the event : 
 ' Du moment ou, abandonnant bien a tort son projet de forcer I'aile 
 gauche des Anglo-Hollandais, Napoleon s'etait decide a dinger I'effort 
 principal contre leur centre, il fallait qu'il I'y portat rapidement. Sans 
 hesiter, il devait alors faire appuyer les escadrons de Ney par toute 
 I'infanterie de la Vieille Garde, par cinquante bouches a feu, et laisser 
 a Lobau, et a la division de la Jeune Garde, le soin de contenir les 
 Prussiens de Bulow le plus long temps possible. C'eut dte, sans doute, 
 una determination bien grave, bien p^rilleuse ; mais c'dtait la seule 
 qui pr^sentat quelque chances de succes ; et plus elle dtait d\ff6r6e, 
 plus ces chances d^jk bien faibles, diminuaient.' 
 
 18
 
 274 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 La Haye Sainte against Wellington's centre, the conse- 
 quence might have been momentous in the extreme. 
 Napoleon did not employ this splendid reserve ; perhaps — 
 for he did not know what British infantry was — he 
 believed that Ney would succeed with cavalry alone, as 
 had often happened in the case of the weaker Austrian 
 footmen; perhaps he judged that it was impossible to 
 move a man of the Guard until Bulow had been driven 
 back completely — and the Prussian attack on his flank 
 was of the most formidable kind ; perhaps he thought 
 Wellington's forces almost exhausted. But he did not 
 take a decisive step at this moment — we may probably 
 see in this conduct the want of readiness, of sudden in- 
 spiration, of perfect self-confidence, we sometimes see in 
 the Napoleon of the campaign of 1815. 
 
 The conduct of Wellington during this phase of 
 Waterloo stands in striking contrast with that of Ney. 
 Unquestionably he had overlooked the importance of La 
 Haye Sainte. It may have been well for him that this 
 important post was not attacked as Napoleon had in- 
 tended. But his tactics were admirable in every other 
 respect. He reinforced his right centre at the proper 
 moment ; he distributed his forces with great skill at most 
 points on the field ; he husbanded his resources with re- 
 markable judgment. Years after Waterloo he said that 
 Napoleon had won most of his victories by the power of 
 artillery ; he did not add that the Emperor failed at 
 Waterloo partly because the Duke had taken care that his 
 army should be exposed as little as possible to its fire. 
 His calm constancy, too, in this desperate conflict com- 
 pared well with the impetuous recklessness of the French 
 Marshal. 
 
 Very probably, as he looked at his fast-diminishing line, 
 he felt that he had done wrong in leaving a great detach- 
 ment at Hal and Tubize : assuredly he had expected 
 Blucher to be on the field in force many hours before.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 275 
 
 But his stern confidence never gave way for an instant ; 
 as, vigilant, active, watching every turn in the fight, he 
 rode from point to point along his imperilled front, he 
 never lost his self-reliance and steadfast presence of mind. 
 'Hard pounding this, gentlemen,' he said to his staff; 
 * but let us see who can pound hardest.' * Stand firm, 
 men,' he exclaimed, as he threw himself more than once 
 into a square. ' What would they say of us in England 
 if we were beaten ?' He, in short, multiplied himself like 
 Richmond over the field, and was the master spirit of a 
 magnificent defence. He no doubt felt he was in grave 
 danger ; the words * Night or Blucher ' fell from his lips ; 
 but he never flinched or thought of retreat. To anxious 
 lieutenants seeking his orders he held the same laconic 
 but noble language : ' Hold out to the last man ; go on 
 with the fight. If there is nothing else to be done, stand 
 and die at your posts.' 
 
 Had the Archduke Charles been in Wellington's place, 
 he would probably have fallen back at this juncture, as he 
 did at Wagram ; but Wellington was made of sterner 
 stuff. Napoleon more than once believed he was drawing 
 off the field, but the strong-hearted Englishman had no 
 such idea in his mind ; and this tenacity and determina- 
 tion were at last rewarded. The diversion made by 
 Bulow gave him immense relief. He had learned by this 
 time that other Prussian supports were not distant, and at 
 about six, or some time after, Ney's attack had altogether 
 slackened ; the Marshal, in fact, had sent word to his 
 master that he must have fresh infantry to continue the 
 struggle. 
 
 ' Infantry ! Where am I to find them ? Do you wish 
 me to make them ?' was Napoleon's angry reply to Ney's 
 aide-de-camp, Heymes. At this moment the attack of 
 Bulow had become formidable in the highest degree, and 
 almost successful.* The Prussians, as usual, inspired by 
 
 * The reader should again notice the immense importance of 
 Bulow's attack. Justice has not been done to it by most English 
 
 18—2
 
 276 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 their old chief, had returned in force, and furiously 
 assailed Plancenoit. The Young Guard had recoiled after 
 a murderous struggle ; the village had been seized and at 
 last occupied ; the Prussian guns were again directed 
 against the Emperor's right flank ; their projectiles occa- 
 sionally reached the great main-road, the only line of 
 retreat of the French army. Napoleon had no choice but 
 to ward off this most dangerous attack. We do not agree 
 with those critics who contend that at this grave con- 
 juncture he could have weakened the Guard and detached 
 a part of it to fall on Wellington's centre ; the occasion, 
 if it existed, had by this time been lost. He had already 
 three or four battalions of this noble array guarding his 
 rear from between Rossomme and Caillou; eight battalions, 
 the Young Guard, had been engaged ; he had only twelve 
 or thirteen remaining in hand. 
 
 He now sent off two battalions of the Old Guard to 
 reinforce the troops driven out of Plancenoit, and held 
 the others in reserve to await events. He really had 
 nothing he could safely despatch to Ney, and he was 
 indignant with his lieutenant when made aware how his 
 magnificent cavalry had been wasted. He told the aide- 
 de-camp that the Marshal must bide his time, must renew 
 the attack with infantry and horsemen combined, but 
 must be less reckless and incautious than he had been. 
 He added that if the Prussians were repulsed he would 
 support Ney with the Imperial Guard, and fall on 
 Wellington with all that he could spare of that mighty 
 force. The effect of the attack of the handful of the Old 
 Guard was extraordinary, and for a time decisive. They 
 marched against the enemy in their disciplined strength, 
 sustained by the other French troops on the spot. 
 Nothing withstood that terrible and weighty effort. 
 
 writers, though the legend that the Prussians only reached Waterloo 
 to complete a victory has been long exploded even in England.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 277 
 
 After a struggle not lasting half an hour, Plancenoit was 
 retaken, and the defeated men of Bulowwere driven back- 
 ward nearly into the defiles of the Lasne. Bulow seemed 
 to be completely — nay, irretrievably — repulsed; Napoleon's 
 flank was for the present secure ; Lobau, Subervie, and 
 Domon distinctly gained ground, and even approached 
 the Bois de Paris. 
 
 Ney angrily chafed at his master's message, but set 
 himself at last to conform to his orders. A pause took 
 place after the great cavalry attacks ; the main French 
 batteries continued their work of destruction. Ere long 
 masses of infantry and cavalry issued from around 
 Hougoumont, and made several efforts against the allied 
 right centre. These attacks were made too late, and 
 proved vain.* The French squadrons had become a 
 wreck ; the French footmen had cruelly suffered ; the 
 battalions of Duplat and W. Halkett, comparatively 
 fresh and admirably placed along the front assailed, were 
 able to drive the enemy back in defeat. At two im- 
 portant points, however, of Wellington's line distinct 
 advantages were gained by the French, which show how 
 much might have, perhaps, been achieved, had well-com- 
 bined attacks been made three hours before, with cavalry 
 still unbroken, and with infantry not exhausted. 
 
 On Napoleon's extreme right Papelotte was mastered 
 by Durutte. The attack was made by the Emperor's 
 positive orders. The occupation of this post cut the Duke 
 off from Bulow, and greatly strengthened the menaced 
 French wing ; and D'Erlon's troops by this time, re-formed 
 and rested, made formidable onsets on the allied left and 
 left centre. The most important success, however, was 
 attained at La Haye Sainte, comparatively neglected for 
 some time, since Ney had turned away to begin the great 
 cavalry attacks. Guns were brought up to this point, 
 
 * See authorities collected in H. Houssaye ('Waterloo,' ii. 377), 
 especially the notes of Foy and the ' Waterloo Letters.'
 
 278 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 which, though soon silenced, wrought havoc in Alten's 
 dwindling division. French infantry advanced beyond it, 
 and kept up a destructive fire from the great main-road 
 on the Duke's weakened and now imperilled centre. The 
 consequences were grave in the highest degree. They 
 have been faithfully described by an impartial and able 
 eye-witness, who beheld them from the ground held by 
 Alten's men with dismay. ' La Haye Sainte was in the 
 hands of the enemy, also the knoll on the opposite side of 
 the road, also the garden and ground on the Anglo-allied 
 side of it. Ompteda's brigade was nearly annihilated, and 
 Kilmansegge's so thinned that these two brigades could 
 not hold their position. That part of the field of battle, 
 therefore, which was between Halkett's* left and Kempt's 
 right was unprotected, and, being the very centre of the 
 Duke's line of battle, was consequently that point above 
 all others which the enemy wished to gain. The danger 
 was imminent, and at no other period of the action was 
 the result so precarious as at this moment. 't 
 
 It was now near seven o'clock in the evening ; the 
 battle was in no sense decided. Fortune cast on Napoleon 
 a cruel smile. The attack of Bulow seemed completely 
 spent ; his columns had almost disappeared from the 
 scene ; the cannon of Grouchy at a distance was distinctly 
 heard ; the Marshal would surely hold the rest of the 
 Prussian army in check. Blucher, as the Emperor con- 
 tinued to believe, with the obstinate conviction that 
 sometimes possessed his mind, would not dare to advance 
 from Wavre in force. In front Wellington's line had 
 been greatly thinned and weakened ; the reserves of the 
 Duke could be hardly descried ; the great main-road to 
 Brussels was choked with terror-stricken fugitives. 
 
 Napoleon resolved to make a decisive attack on the 
 
 ■* C. Halkett, not to be confounded with W. Halkett, of Clinton's 
 division. 
 
 t Shaw Kennedy, 'Battle of Waterloo,' 124.
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 279 
 
 allied centre, combined with an attack on the whole line. 
 The Imperial Guard was to make the principal attack ; 
 but the Emperor had not the great and intact force with 
 which he had easily broken the Prussian centre at Ligny. 
 To outward seeming he retained the look of serene con- 
 fidence he usually wore in the shock of battle. He still 
 believed that victory was within his power ; but it is 
 difticult to suppose that he had not some misgivings in 
 offering this last challenge to Fate. The aspect and 
 feelings of his lieutenants were very different. Soult had 
 had gloomy forebodings from the first ; Ney, still ready 
 to fight, was in a savage mood ; Reille and D'Erlon had 
 wellnigh lost heart ; the chiefs of the cavalry did not 
 conceal their anger. The soldiery, too, were not in a 
 trustworthy state ; several officers had deserted in the 
 face of the enemy ; signs of indiscipline and demoralisa- 
 tion abounded ; loud murmurs were heard that the Guard 
 had been spared ; distrust, suspicion, discontent prevailed. 
 In the opposite camp Wellington had also cause for doubt 
 and anxiety. His army, it has been said, was reduced by 
 20,000 men, so many auxiliaries had left the ranks ; his 
 centre had been opened by the fall of La Haye Sainte. 
 But he had still a considerable and good reserve, of which 
 his adversary knew little or nothing ; he could still rely 
 on his British and German soldiery ; above all, he had 
 learned that a great Prussian force was near. As con- 
 fident as Napoleon, and with better reason, he girded up 
 his loins for the final struggle, made preparations to 
 resist the impending attack, and sternly awaited the issue 
 of events.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 
 
 IRRUPTION OF ZIETEN AND PIRCH ROUT AND 
 
 FLIGHT OF THE FRENCH ARMY — GROUCHY AT 
 WAV RE 
 
 State of the battle before the final attack — Views of Napoleon 
 and Wellington — Pirch approaches to support Bulow, and 
 Zieten to assist Wellington's left — Dangerous position of the 
 allied army at about 7 p.m. — Advance of part of the Imperial 
 Guard — Brilliant efforts made by D'Erlon — Reille and the cavalry 
 backward — Ney conducts the attack — He again makes mistakes — 
 Struggle between the Imperial Guard and the troops defending 
 the allied right centre — Defeat of the Imperial Guard — Advance 
 of Wellington's army — Irruption of Zieten on Napoleon's extreme 
 right — Irruption of Pirch and Bulow on Napoleon's right flank 
 and rear — Flight and rout of the French arm) — Pursuit by part 
 of the Prussian army — Hideous scenes of terror and despair — The 
 operations of Grouchy on June 18, after he had rejected the 
 counsels of Gdrard. 
 
 We may glance for a moment at the state of the battle 
 while Napoleon was preparing his final attack. The 
 carnage in both armies had been immense. Except at 
 Borodino, and perhaps at Eylau, nothing like it had 
 been seen on any stricken field in the wars that grew 
 out of the French Revolution ; and the conflict had 
 extended over a comparatively narrow space. The 
 French had lost the greater number of killed and 
 wounded ; but the allies had been even more weakened
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 281 
 
 by the flight of thousands of bad auxiliary troops and 
 desertion. From Napoleon's point of view there was 
 still a prospect of a victory that might have a real moral 
 effect, though he must have felt for hours that this could 
 not be decisive. His right flank and rear, lately so gravely 
 imperilled, appeared for the present secure from the enemy; 
 Bulow's attack had been completely repulsed ; a large 
 part of the Guard held Plancenoit in force ; Lobau, 
 Subervie, and Domon had advanced towards the Bois 
 de Paris ; Durutte had captured and occupied Papelotte. 
 On his left the assailants of Hougoumont had reached the 
 enemy's main front. The chateau was a mass of burning 
 ruins. Though the garden and the enclosures had not 
 been taken, the defence had for some time slackened, 
 and hundreds of Wellington's best troops had perished 
 on the spot. Before his centre La Haye Sainte had 
 fallen. His troops had access nearly to the midst of the 
 allied position. In the attacks they had made on this 
 vital point they had achieved success that was full of 
 promise. The Duke's line was in grave danger along a 
 considerable space. No doubt thousands of brave men 
 had been sacrificed, with little result, in the wasteful 
 attacks on Hougoumont ; no doubt Ney had thrown away 
 the noble French cavalry, and this was now unequal to 
 any great efforts. But the corps of D'Erlon had recovered 
 from its defeat ; the soldiery had become active and daring 
 again; and the Emperor had still nearly half of the Guard, 
 fresh and full of heart, to make the decisive onslaught. 
 And, we repeat. Napoleon at this crisis believed that 
 Bulow had not the means to attack again. The cannon 
 of Grouchy seemed approaching with increasing roar. 
 Napoleon was convinced that his lieutenant would 
 assuredly prevent the rest of the Prussian army from 
 reaching the field. And, we repeat, he thought that 
 Wellington had exhausted the reserves, which the Duke 
 had husbanded and kept out of sight ; and he saw that
 
 282 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 flying masses were crowding the great main -road to 
 Brussels. Napoleon, therefore, had still hopes of victory, 
 if his calculations were opposed to the facts ; and, besides, 
 as he had shown throughout his career, he would never 
 hear of a retreat on a field of battle ; a daring offensive, 
 even in difficult straits, was always in his judgment the 
 true course to follow.* It is utterly unjust, as partisans 
 have done, to represent his last attack at Waterloo as 
 the desperate venture of a merely reckless gambler. 
 
 Wellington, on the other hand, had, from his point of 
 view, good hopes of victory at this conjuncture ; and as 
 he knew much better than his antagonist could know what 
 the real position of affairs on the scene was, his point of 
 view was more complete and accurate. Unquestionably 
 his whole line — especiall}' at La Haye Sainte, where his 
 centre had been weakened almost to breaking-point — was 
 in more than one place in very grave danger. Unquestion- 
 ably his losses had been enormous : the flower of his 
 cavalry, even of his choicest footmen, had perished ; his 
 auxiliaries had largely disappeared from the field ; his 
 army had been reduced, we have seen, to an appalling 
 
 * So, after severely blaming the Grand Condi's strategy and 
 tactics at Nordlingen, Napoleon praises Conde for having risked 
 everything on a final attack ('Comment.,' vi. 203). The Emperor was 
 probably thinking of Waterloo : ' Conde a mcritd la victoire par cetle 
 opiniatret^, cette rare intrdpidite, qui le distinguait, car, si elle ne lui a 
 servi de rien dans I'attaque d'AUerheim, c'est elle qui lui a conseilld, 
 apres avoir perdu son centre et sa droite, de recommencer le combat 
 avec sa gauche, la seule troupe qui lui restat. . . . Des observateurs 
 d'un esprit ordinaire diront qu'il cut du se servir de I'aile, qui dtait 
 encore intacte, pour opdrer sa retraite, et ne pas hasarder son reste ; 
 mais avec de tels principes, un gdncral est certain de manquer toutes 
 Ics occasions de succ6s, et d'etre constammcnt battu. ... La gloire 
 et I'honncur des armes est le premier devoir qu'un g6u6ra.\ qui livre 
 bataille doit considdrer ; la salut et la conservation des hommes n'est 
 que secondaire. Mais c'est aussi dans cette audace, dans cette opinia- 
 trete, que se trouvent le salut et la conservation des hommes ; car 
 quand bien mCme le Prince de Condd se fut mis en retraite . . . il eut 
 presque tout perdu.'
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 283 
 
 extent. But, partly owing to mistakes made by Ney and 
 others, partly to his own admirable skill and energy, and 
 to the heroic constancy of his British and German soldiery, 
 he had successfully resisted every attack ; and he had just 
 strengthened, for the moment, the defence of La Haye 
 Sainte by sending a detachment of Brunswickers to the 
 spot. In Chasse's division, too, he had a reserve still 
 intact ; though the brigades of Adam, of Duplat, and of 
 W. Halkett had suffered heavily, and had been engaged 
 for hours, and all these troops, with Mitchell's brigade, 
 now formed part of the front of the allied right centre, 
 they were still able to make a formidable stand ; while on 
 the allied left Picton's division and the troops of Lambert 
 and Best, though harassed by the efforts of D'Erlon's 
 swarms of skirmishers, were still manfully holding their 
 ground, and the horsemen of Vivian and Vandeleur were 
 wellnigh fresh. 
 
 The Duke, besides, had for fully two hours received 
 most important support from Bulow ; indeed, but for this 
 powerful and opportune diversion, which exposed the 
 right, and even the rear, of Napoleon, to attacks that 
 might have become fatal, and arrested the movement of 
 the Imperial Guard, the allies, despite the errors and the 
 shortcomings of the French, would most probably have 
 been driven off the field. At this moment Bulow had 
 been repulsed ; but Wellington had for some time been in 
 communication with his loyal and aged colleague, and he 
 had been informed that the attack would be soon renewed 
 by the reinforcements already at hand. These reinforce- 
 ments were part of the corps of Pirch. This body of men, we 
 have seen, had been greatly delayed, having been entangled 
 as they advanced with the corps of Bulow ; half, we have 
 said, had not crossed the Dyle until two in the afternoon ; 
 the other half had, in some degree, been held in check by 
 a detachment of Grouchy's army ; and the march to 
 St. Lambert and the Lasne had been very slow and
 
 284 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 difficult. But two of its divisions and its cavalry were 
 now close to Bulow, and these, with the whole of Bulow's 
 remaining forces, were about to make once more the attack 
 on Napoleon's flank and rear, which had not only paralysed 
 the French army, but had placed it for a time in no 
 doubtful peril. An armed host, concealed from the 
 Emperor's sight, was soon to issue from the woods and 
 defiles of the Lasne to give assistance to Wellington that 
 might prove decisive, and that must be of extreme im- 
 portance. 
 
 This was not, however, the only, or even the most 
 necessary, support which Wellington at this critical 
 moment knew was to be afforded him by the Prussian 
 army. Zieten, we have seen, had been encamped around 
 Bierges — that is, on the western bank of the Dyle ; he had 
 been kept, with Thielmann, near Wavre, to defend the 
 place, and to observe the movements of Grouchy ; he had 
 been sent off to take part in the great fight at Waterloo, 
 Grouchy not having appeared on the scene by mid-day ; 
 he had advanced by roads north of those followed by 
 Bulow and Pirch, but in a parallel line, by Rixensart and 
 Genval. His troops, however, had been confused with 
 those of Pirch, as those of Pirch had been confused with 
 those of Bulow ; his march, accordingly, had been greatly 
 delayed. It was not far from six o'clock when his advanced 
 guard reached Chain, nearly two miles from Wellington's 
 lines, and divided from them by a far from easy country.* 
 
 The Duke had despatched an aide-de-camp to urge 
 Zieten to come to his aid, ' were it only with some 3,000 
 men ' ;t but Zieten hesitated, and even refused, for a 
 time : * he would not advance until he had all his troops 
 in hand.' In truth, with the one exception of Blucher, 
 every Prussian General was very cautious — nay, timid — 
 on this memorable day. Zieten sent a staff officer to 
 
 * Ollech, 193, 194 ; H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 389. 
 
 t Letter of Major-General Freemantle, 'Waterloo Letters,' 21, 22.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 285 
 
 observe the course of the battle ; his messenger was on 
 the scene just at the moment when the attacks around 
 La Haye Sainte had become most dangerous. He reported 
 to his superior that Welhngton's centre was giving way, 
 and that the alHed army was about to retreat in a disastrous 
 flight, preceded by a horde of terrified fugitives. The 
 Prussian commander, afraid of being involved in a rout 
 that might be fatal, turned his men towards Frischermont 
 and the Bois de Paris, in order to get into line with Bulow. 
 The movement would have drawn him away from Welling- 
 ton, and might have left the Duke and his hard-pressed 
 army in the gravest straits. Most fortunately, however, 
 for the allied cause. Muffling, the Prussian Commissioner, 
 was on the spot. He told Zieten that Wellington was 
 still holding his ground, but adjured him to march at 
 once to support the Duke's left. The battle was in a 
 most critical state ; a moment's delay, and it might be 
 lost. Zieten, persuaded by this wise and most timely 
 counsel, pushed forward with one division and a part of 
 his cavalry from Ohain towards Papelotte and Smohain. 
 Not long after seven his foremost horsemen had just 
 attained this part of the field. Muffling, too, as he had 
 hastened to join the Duke, had informed Vivian and 
 Vandeleur, on the allied left, that Zieten was at hand, 
 and that they were free to march to the assistance of 
 their chief.* They made ready to give him support now 
 most surely needed. Wellington, therefore, grave as his 
 danger was, felt that certain and speedy relief was at 
 hand. 
 
 It was now not far from half-past seven o'clock. All 
 had been made ready for the decisive attack on Welling- 
 
 * For this important episode of Waterloo, see Muffling, ' Passages 
 of my Life,' 246, 249. Muffling is rather given to boasting, but his 
 statements, no doubt, are essentially correct. See also OUech, 243, 
 244; H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 388. The reader will observe that 
 the diversion made by Zieten was as important as that wrought by 
 Bulow, if not more so.
 
 286 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ton's line, along his whole front. As before, the conduct 
 of this was entrusted to Ney, supported by D'Erlon and 
 Reille, on the French right and left, and by the surviving 
 cavalry chiefs ; not a few of these had been slain or 
 disabled. The Marshal, as before, was given the fullest 
 freedom of action, and received no directions from his 
 master. But Napoleon kept the Imperial Guard in his 
 own hands, and formed it in person, to sustain and com- 
 plete the great final movement. As usual, the attack was 
 heralded by a fierce, continuous cannonade. The French 
 batteries — their fire had never ceased — redoubled their 
 deadly discharges with fatal effect along the points of 
 vantage on which they were placed. Under their protec- 
 tion, as usual, the French columns advanced. But the 
 onset of Reille's troops was feeble and slow ; they had 
 been wasted in the vain attacks on Hougoumont. They 
 still gathered around the fatal spot ; they did not press 
 forward boldly against the enemy on the ridge.* The 
 ruined French cavalry, too, could not do much. It had 
 been partly re-formed in the low ground, from which it 
 had swept onward confident of assured victory ; it was 
 now only able to menace and to hold in check the infantry 
 in its front, and to occupy the space it filled to prevent a 
 counter-attack. 
 
 It seems probable, however, that a large part of Reille's 
 corps could have been detached — as it might have been 
 detached before in the case of the great cavalry charges — 
 to second the supreme effort now being made ; and Pire's 
 horsemen, who had been but slightly engaged, could have 
 been moved from the road from Nivelles to Brussels, and 
 been employed in supporting the attack on the left.t 
 Here again we see the want of forethought and judgment 
 
 * See H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 393, and the authorities in loco 
 carefully collected. 
 
 t This is well pointed out by Mr. Ropes, 'Campaign of Waterloo,' 
 337 ; and see pp. 317, 318.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 287 
 
 so conspicuous in Ney at Quatre Bras and Waterloo ; 
 this, and another false movement we shall soon notice, 
 was the fourth great error in the tactics of the French on 
 June 18. On Napoleon's right, however, and on his right 
 centre, the attack was vigorously and very ably directed ; 
 for a short time it was all but successful. While Durutte 
 and Marcognet assailed and held fast the infantry of 
 Lambert, of Picton, of Best, and even attained the summit 
 of the ridge, D'Erlon moved the divisions of Allix and 
 Donzelot close to the great main-road, on either side of it. 
 A most determined attack was made from La Haye Sainte 
 on this already shattered and weakened part of the allied 
 line. Once more a wide and yawning gap was made in 
 Wellington's centre; the Brunswickers, who had filled it, 
 suddenly gave way. A large part of Alten's division, 
 which had already suffered enormous loss, was wellnigh 
 destroyed.* Indeed, the Duke's centre would probably 
 have been stormed and forced at this poiut — with what 
 results it is impossible to say — had not Vivian, followed 
 ere long by Vandeleur, and set free by the approach of 
 Zieten, most opportunely come up to support the defence. 
 Vivian's horsemen were exposed for a time to a destructive 
 fire, to which they had little or nothing to oppose. The 
 scales of Fortune hung for a moment in suspense.^ 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon had been arraying the Imperial 
 Guard for the great effort which, he believed, would bring 
 victory with it. Of the twenty-four battalions J com- 
 prising this superb force, eight, the Young Guard, we 
 have seen, had been detached to Plancenoit, to make 
 head against the first attacks of Bulow ; two, followed 
 
 * The best and most circumstantial account of this remarkable 
 attack will be found in Siborne, 'The Waterloo Campaign,' 51 1-5 16. 
 
 t See ' Waterloo Letters,' under the head of ' Vivian's Cavalry 
 Brigade'; and see especially pp. 158, 159, 178, 179. 
 
 X Thiers ('Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 499) says that 
 after Ligny the twenty-four battalions of the Guard were reduced to 
 twenty-three ; but he gives no authority for the statement.
 
 i88 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 by a third, had repulsed the subsequent attacks; three 
 guarded the Hne of the army's retreat at Rossomme, 
 Caillou, and, further to the right, at Chantelet. Even if 
 there had been no necessity still to observe the Prussians, 
 all these troops were distant from the immediate scene of 
 action ; the Emperor had therefore only ten battalions in 
 hand,* to be engaged in any event in the final attack. 
 
 N apoleon, who, at this crisis of his fate, showed himself to 
 be equal to his former self, and gave proof of great energy 
 and presence of mind, harangued this splendid soldiery as 
 they defiled before him between La Belle Alliance and 
 La Haye Sainte ; he cheerfully told them they 'were to 
 sup at Brussels ;' ' they had but to deal a last blow on an 
 exhausted enemy.' It was certainly his purpose that the 
 whole of this force, from 5,000 to 6,000 veterans of 
 proved renown, should be launched in one great attack 
 against Wellington's line ; but an interval of a few 
 hundred yards divided six battalions at the front from 
 four battalions following in the rear; an untoward 
 incident, sudden and unforeseen, caused him to change 
 the dispositions he had made. On his extreme right the 
 troops of Durutte appeared to be in confusion, even giving 
 way ; a movement of disorder was seen in his re-formed 
 squadrons, some of which were approaching the slopes 
 of the ridge; sinister rumours reached him that fresh 
 Prussian columns were on the march, and drawing near 
 Smohain. 
 
 The Emperor saw the peril impending, and did not 
 hesitate ; it was of supreme importance that at this 
 
 * From Napoleon's narrative ('Comment,' v. 182, 183), it may be 
 inferred that the Emperor had twelve battalions of the Guard at his 
 disposal, but this seems to be an error. Charras, who has taken 
 great pains to ascertain the truth, has proved (ii. 51) that the number 
 was ten, and M. H. Houssaye substantially agrees. Of these ten 
 battalions, six were given to Ney, and the remaining four kept in hand 
 by Napoleon. English writers are quite wrong in maintaining that 
 ten or twelve battalions of the Guard joined m the final attack.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 289 
 
 moment discouragement should not fall on his army, 
 and that the attack should be pressed at once ; he 
 addressed a few confident words to his officers at hand, 
 sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to reassure the 
 troops of Durutte, and caused the intelligence to be spread 
 far and wide, that Grouchy and his whole army were 
 close to the field, and that a last effort of endurance would 
 secure victory.* At the same time, for not a minute was 
 to be lost, he placed the six foremost battalions at the 
 disposal of Ney, who was to conduct the attack of the 
 Guard ; he again gave the Marshal no express order, but 
 he added that he would support Ney with the four rear- 
 ward battalions, which it was his purpose to lead in 
 person against the enemy, as in the days of Areola, 
 Castiglione, and other scenes of his youth. Napoleon, 
 of course, believed that the second attack would be made 
 in immediate succession to the first ; but this expectation 
 was to prove vain. The second attack was never to take 
 place ; the result, as we follow the course of events, could 
 hardly have affected the final issue; but the incident 
 certainly was unfortunate. t 
 
 The six battalions were part of the Middle Guard, not such 
 veterans as the renowned Old Guard, but soldiers of equally 
 high quality ; they were rather more than 3,000 men in 
 number. They seem to have been arrayed in columns of 
 battalions, probably by Napoleon's orders ; for the mistake 
 of the morning in the case of the corps of D'Erlon had 
 taught a terrible lesson, and was not made again ; the four 
 battalions in the rear were formed by the Emperor him- 
 self, on a front of two battalions deployed, with one on 
 
 * Napoleon has been severely condemned for having circulated 
 this false information. Exactly the same thing was done by 
 Gneisenau at Ligny, and not a word of censure has been uttered. 
 See H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 174. 
 
 t We have adopted in substance Napoleon's account of these 
 incidents ('Comment.,' v. 183, 184). It records his own personal 
 experience, and bears all the marks of truth. 
 
 19
 
 290 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 either flank.* The six battalions composed four distinct 
 massest — in all probability, close columns ; they advanced 
 in echelons, divided by rather wide intervals of space ; 
 they extended over a front of more than a thousand 
 yards in width ; they were supported by artillery in the 
 distances between the columns. But on the left they 
 were not sustained by the troops of Reille, and there was 
 no cavalry to cover their flanks ; as the great cavalry 
 attacks had not had the help of infantry, this and the 
 other infantry attacks were now without the help of 
 cavalry ; the three arms in both instances did not act in 
 concert ; the result in both instances was, of course, 
 disastrous. 
 
 The Guard, nevertheless, presented a most imposing 
 aspect as, amidst the din and roar and confusion of the 
 strife, this noble soldiery steadily made their way onward. 
 It was in vain that the enemy's guns rent gaps in their 
 masses ; the ranks were quickly re-formed, and retained 
 their order ; the display of dauntless courage and discipline 
 was above all praise. But here a grave, perhaps a capital, 
 mistake was made : the Guard ought to have been moved 
 along the great main-road, and launched from beyond La 
 Haye Sainte against Wellington's almost broken centre ;J 
 it would have been in comparative shelter had this been 
 
 * 'Comment.,' v. 184. 
 
 •)• The French accounts of the attack of the Guard at Waterloo 
 represent it as having been made in one large column ; the English, 
 in two. M. H. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' ii. 392, 393) has studied the 
 subject with great care and research, and has, we think, proved that 
 both accounts are incorrect, and that the attack was made in four 
 distinct columns, or perhaps squares, advancing in four echelons, the 
 right the foremost. There has always been a difficulty, as the point 
 assailed was more than a thousand yards in extent, to understand 
 how one, or even two columns, could have spread over this space. 
 We have followed M. Houssaye's narrative as by far the most trust- 
 worthy. 
 
 X This is well pointed out by General Shaw Kennedy: 'Battle of 
 Waterloo,' 130.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 291 
 
 done, and, with the troops of D'Erlon, it might have gained 
 important success. From some unknown cause, however 
 — perhaps because the ridge was most accessible at this 
 point — Ney directed the Guard against that part of the 
 alhed front which had repelled the great cavalry attacks — 
 that is, against the allied right centre ; and this was at 
 present, as it had always been, the strongest division of 
 Wellington's line. At this moment, indeed, Vandeleur 
 had come up to support the reserve of Chass^ ; and this, 
 we have seen, was a large body of men. This false direc- 
 tion given to the Guard, and the absence of Reille's men, 
 with the want of the aid of cavalry, was, we repeat, the 
 fourth great tactical error of the French at Waterloo. 
 
 In spite of the tempest of shot directed against it, which 
 made ' its ranks move at times hke corn in a wind,' the 
 Guard gradually approached the edge of the ridge in the 
 space between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont. The 
 masses of bearskins overtopping the tall martial figures 
 presented an easy mark to the enemy's guns ; but there 
 was still no sign of disorder or thought of retreat, and the 
 artillery of the Guard wrought no little havoc on the allied 
 line arrayed to resist the attack. The first echelon on the 
 right assailed a body of Brunswickers, and put it to flight ; 
 it took possession of a British battery; it then turned 
 fiercely against the left of Halkett's brigade, supported by 
 a biting fire from the troops of Allix on its right, com- 
 manded, as in the forenoon, by Quiot. This part of 
 Halkett's men was composed of the British 30th and 
 73rd, which had been greatly exposed and had suffered 
 heavy loss ; whether from a mere accident, as some of its 
 officers have declared, or from the effect of the onset of 
 fresh troops, it recoiled, and for a moment was in more or 
 less confusion.* The Guard, passing the summit of the 
 
 * French writers naturally attribute this incident to the efforts of 
 the Guard, and possibly may be correct. On the other hand, British 
 officers have represented it as due to the sudden interference ol 
 
 19 — 2
 
 292 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 ridge, seemed about to pierce through the enemy's line ; 
 Friant, a veteran chief of great distinction, who had been 
 at its head, and had just been wounded, returned to the 
 Emperor, and reported that there was not a doubt of 
 victory. 
 
 But at this critical moment relief was at hand from the 
 reserve, so carefully husbanded and placed by Wellington 
 on the spot. Chasse, a very able and determined soldier 
 — he had made his mark under Napoleon in 1814, and 
 especially on the bloody day of Arcis-sur-Aube — turned a 
 battery against the French as they advanced, and charged 
 home with half his division at once. Three thousand men 
 easily overthrew little more than 600 ; the Guard was 
 driven down the slope of the ridge defeated, but still 
 fighting with desperate valour to the last.* Meantime 
 the second echelon of the Guard had fallen upon the right 
 of Halkett's brigade — the 33rd and 69th British, already 
 sorely tried at Quatre Bras, and stricken severely on the 
 i8th for hours ; for a moment the assailants had a slight 
 advantage. The Guard, however, was left without support ; 
 a fierce struggle, hand-to-hand, followed. But the fire of 
 the British musket and the formidable power of the British 
 bayonet ere long prevailed ; the second echelon yielded 
 by degrees, and was, like the first, beaten off and com- 
 
 another regiment. But that the 30th and 73rd were in trouble for a 
 few minutes is clear from the following (' Waterloo Letters,' 330) : 
 'That there was great giving way near this point, about this period, is 
 certain enough.' 
 
 * The honour of being the first to repel the Imperial Guard 
 certainly belongs to Chassd and his troops. He claimed it in a letter 
 addressed to Lord Hill, and it was substantially acknowledged. See 
 'Relation Beige de la Bataille de Waterloo,' 9-1 1. English writers 
 have, not very creditably, omitted all reference to this most important 
 incident. Siborne ('The Waterloo Campaign,' 525) notices the attack 
 of Chassd's battery, but not the charge of his troops. Charras (ii. 55) 
 is quite accurate in this matter. Sir H. Maxwell, in his ' Biography 
 of Wellington,' published after this note was written (ii. 81), has done 
 justice to Chass^.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 293 
 
 pelled to fall back. The men endeavoured to rally in the 
 hollows at the foot of the ridge, but they did not attempt 
 to renew the attack. 
 
 The third echelon was composed of two battalions ; it 
 formed the principal unit in the attack ; it was probably 
 about 1,200 strong.* It advanced in imposing order up 
 the slope of the ridge, throwing out skirmishers along its 
 front like the other columns ; Ney and many distinguished 
 officers were at its head. It had apparently suffered less 
 than the two beaten echelons — its artillery had ravaged 
 the hostile line it attacked ; it reached the summit of the 
 ridge well-nigh unopposed. Suddenly a wall of scarlet 
 seemed to rise before it : Maitland's Guards, who had 
 been ordered to lie down to avoid the effect of the enemy's 
 fire, leaped up at a word from Wellington's lips ; one of 
 those murderous volleys characteristic of British infantry 
 burst on the astounded Guard, which stopped as if 
 paralysed. Three hundred men were stricken down in a 
 moment ;t the fifth charger Ney rode on this day fell. 
 The Guard, however, would not confess defeat ; but in 
 this, as in all instances, the British line was superior to 
 the French column. The mass, comparatively unwieldy, 
 was unable to deploy, and in the attempt masked its own 
 guns, its only support ; the rearward ranks wavered ; all 
 became confused. At an opportune moment Maitland's 
 men charged home, and, assisted by part of Halkett's 
 
 * This was the principal attack of the Guard. This may be the reason 
 that it has been represented as the only one, and made in one column. 
 
 t As to the effects of the fire of British infantry, see Jomini, * Precis 
 de la Campagne de 1815,' 229, See, too, Marbot, ii. 291. Bugeaud 
 also has written strongly in the same sense. The destruction 
 wrought by Maitland's Guards is thus described (' Waterloo Letters,' 
 257) : ' The effect of our volley was evidently most deadly. The French 
 column appeared staggered and, if I may use the expression, con- 
 vulsed. ... In less than a minute above 300 went down. . . .' 
 P. 255 : ' Part seemed inclined to advance, part halted and fired, 
 others seemed to be turning round.'
 
 >94 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 troops, drove the shattered column, still resisting, down 
 the fatal slope, their fire and their bayonets completing 
 the defeat. 
 
 The fortunes of the fourth echelon were somewhat 
 different. This was not at a great distance from the 
 third.* It advanced to the ridge a little to the east of 
 Hougoumont, unprotected, as it might have been, by 
 Reille's men, and by cavalry, if we except one feeble 
 effort ; it found itself exposed on its left flank to Adam's 
 brigade, which smote it as it marched forward with a 
 destructive fire. The Guard tried to form a front to 
 oppose to the enemy. A bloody conflict of a few minutes 
 followed ; but Colborne, the chief of the British 52nd, 
 renowned in the Peninsular War, an officer of remarkable 
 powers, fell suddenly on the flank of the column, and, 
 supported by the fire of Adam's troops, drove it headlong 
 to the bottom of the slope. ' Well done, Colborne !' 
 Wellington exclaimed ; the Duke had hastened to the 
 spot just in time to see this splendid effort. 
 
 The Guard had done all that brave men could do ; but 
 it had made the attack under the worst conditions, un- 
 protected, except by D'Erlon, on both its flanks. It had 
 been directed exactly to the wrong point ; it had to en- 
 counter an enemy, in position, in largely superior numbers, 
 owing to the admirable arrangements made by Wellington; 
 it had been completely and finally beaten. Very probably 
 the result would have been the same had the four battalions 
 in the rear given the first six their support. The defeat 
 of the Guard — that ' Medusa's head ' which had stricken 
 enemies with terror on many a field — sent a thrill of panic 
 through the whole French army. The cry went forth from 
 
 * The fourth echelon was so near the third that British writers have 
 described the attack of the Imperial Guard as made in two columns. 
 For the conduct of Maitland's Guards, and of the 52nd, see ' Waterloo 
 Letters,' 241-257, and 271-307. These writings are, of course, not 
 quite accurate, but their object is to tell the truth, and they are very 
 valuable.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 295 
 
 Hougoumont to Papelotte, * The Guard recoils !' The 
 French soldiery felt that all had been staked and lost. 
 
 Napoleon's line of battle suddenly gave way ; a move- 
 ment of retreat, becoming more and more disordered, set 
 in from every point on the scene of action ; Reille and 
 Pir6, to the left, fell back with the defeated Guard, and 
 the mass of the cavalry; Donzelot and Allix abandoned 
 La Haye Sainte ; Marcognet, on the right, drew off with 
 his men from the field. It was now a little after eight 
 o'clock. Wellington seized the occasion with charac- 
 teristic skill ; he directed his army, worn out as it was, 
 against an enemy he knew it need no longer fear; he 
 let the horsemen of Vivian and Vandeleur loose ; their 
 squadrons swept the field as they hastened in pursuit, 
 and carried dismay and terror in their almost unresisted 
 progress.* 
 
 The beaten host was already beginning to break up, 
 when its dissolution was precipitated by the apparition of 
 a new enemy on the field. Zieten, with the infantry of 
 Steinmetz and the horsemen of Roder, followed by other 
 divisions in the rear — from 10,000 to 12,000 bayonets and 
 sabres — burst on the weak and exhausted body of Durutte's 
 troops. The Prussians had at first been mistaken for the 
 army of Grouchy ; but when the appalling truth became 
 known, the French soldiery, deceived by false intelligence, 
 and frantically exclaiming they had been betrayed, fled from 
 Papelotte, and became a mere scattered horde, spreading 
 consternation and despair far and wide. The victorious 
 men of Zieten now passed through the wide gap made in 
 Napoleon's extreme right ; they found nothing in their way 
 to arrest their onset ; their artillery opened on the fugitives 
 with terrible effect ; their cavalry ravaged and swept away 
 any enemies they met ; they had soon joined their allies, 
 and both advanced in the flush of triumph against the 
 
 * Napoleon especially dwells on the results produced by the cavalry 
 of Vivian and Vandeleur (' Comment.,' v. 184).
 
 296 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 main French positions. Within less than half an hour the 
 army, which had all but broken Wellington's centre, and 
 had made such formidable attacks on his line, was hasten- 
 ing from the field in rapidly increasing rout. 
 
 Napoleon, like his army, felt that all was over when 
 his Guard had been driven down the slope of the ridge. 
 'They are all mingled together!' he hurriedly exclaimed. 
 In defeat, however, as in victory, he retained his com- 
 posure ; he showed remarkable activity and resource in 
 this his last struggle with Fate in war. He formed the 
 four battalions of the Guard into as many squares, and 
 ordered them slowly to fall back ; he hoped to rally his 
 army upon these living citadels ; he charged the squadrons 
 of Vivian and Vandeleur with the squadrons of his escort 
 in vain. The squares of the Guard, islanded in a tumultuous 
 flood of enemies around, and of waves of fugitives, made 
 steadily their way towards La Belle Alliance ; they re- 
 pulsed more than one fierce attack of cavalry. Rapidly 
 dwindling, as they were, under a fire converging on every 
 side, they sternly maintained their ground against over- 
 whelming numbers. 
 
 They might possibly, in some measure, have covered 
 the retreat ; but at this moment another tempest of war 
 broke suddenly on the doomed French host. Pirch had 
 come into hne with Bulow, with the horsemen of Jurgass 
 and with the divisions of Tippelskirchen and Krafft ; the 
 attack on Plancenoit and its defenders was renewed ; from 
 40,000 to 45,000 men fell on an enemy now about 17,000 
 strong, and, striking at the right flank and rear of 
 Napoleon, endeavoured to seize his only line of retreat 
 and to annihilate his whole army on the spot. A terrible 
 conflict raged for a time ; the French, conscious that 
 everything depended on the stand they could make, 
 fought with an energy and determination worthy of all 
 honour; the veterans of the Old Guard perished, but 
 sold their lives dearly ; the Young Guard repulsed several
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 297 
 
 furious assaults ; Lobau and his troops made an heroic 
 resistance. At last, after a savage hand-to-hand fight, 
 amidst houses in flames, and a street choked with the 
 dead, in which quarter was not sought or given, Plance- 
 noit was stormed, and the remains of the gallant troops 
 which had held it were pressed back, fighting, on the 
 great main-road and confused with the wrecks of the rest 
 of the army. Their noble efforts, however, had not been 
 fruitless ; they had kept the avenue of escape open ; they 
 had gained time for the ruined host to fly from the fatal 
 field. 
 
 It was now nine o'clock ; the shadows of night were 
 closing over the scene of the late tremendous conflict. 
 The French army had broken up in multitudinous rout ; 
 the four squares of the Guard, alone, maintained at a 
 distance a hopeless struggle ; like fierce beasts of pre}', 
 hemmed in by the forest hunters, they stood savagely at 
 bay against a host of enemies. It was in vain that more 
 than one British officer called on them to yield and to 
 save their lives ; they refused to surrender in words that 
 have gone down to history ; they were charged over and 
 over again, but made many of their assailants bite the 
 dust. At last, attacked on all sides, and completely over- 
 powered, they were destroyed, and perished almost to a 
 man. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon, still hoping against hope, and 
 challenging adverse Fortune to the last, had ridden off 
 to Rossomme and Caillou, and tried to rally the feeble 
 reserve on the spot to make head against the triumphant 
 enemy; but the remains of his army were in headlong 
 flight ; he left the scene with three battalions of the Old 
 Guard still in perfect order, and steady as on a parade- 
 ground amidst terrible sights of widespread confusion and 
 despair. The French soldier, formidable, like his fore- 
 father, the Gaul, in success,* has seldom been great and 
 
 * Polybius noticed this 2,000 years ago ('Hist.,' ii. 33).
 
 298 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Stubborn in defeat ; and few beaten armies have been 
 placed in such terrible straits as that of Napoleon was 
 when darkness fell on Waterloo. But the inherent vices 
 in the French army of 1815 can alone explain the frightful 
 spectacle of demoralisation and panic presented in that 
 appalling rout. The want of coherence in an organisa- 
 tion new and untried; the distrust prevailing among 
 officers and men ; the shameless desertions that had 
 taken place ; the widespread belief that the catastrophe 
 had been caused by treason — all this told wath terrible 
 effect on the perishing host and paralysed soldiers who a 
 few hours before had given proof of heroic courage. Not 
 an effort was made to form a rearguard, to make a 
 show of resistance, and to keep back the enemy ; broken 
 battalions and squadrons trampled down each other with- 
 out a thought save of precipitate flight ; the great main- 
 road was strewn with abandoned guns and trains, with 
 weapons and armour thrown recklessly away ; the fugitives 
 took no heed of the commands of their chiefs, and often 
 broke out against them in angry curses ; the chiefs them- 
 selves had lost heart and had given up hope. Such 
 scenes of terror, consternation, and despair had not 
 been witnessed even in the retreat from Moscow. 
 
 Wellington and Bluchcr met at La Belle Alliance ; each 
 congratulated the other on an immense victory, the most 
 decisive of that age, if we except Trafalgar. The stern 
 nature of the Englishman melted, it is said, into tears 
 at the thought of the many companions in arms he had 
 lost ; Blucher's whole soul was bent on revenge for Ligny. 
 Parts of their two armies had been for some time in 
 contact ; English and Prussian bands broke out in 
 exulting music ; the deafening cheers of the victors rent 
 the air far and near. It was now about half-past nine at 
 night ; the exhausted allied army was ' dying of fatigue,' and 
 took its bivouacs on the death-strewn ground; Gneisenau 
 was given the charge of pursuing the enemy in his rout.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 299 
 
 By this time the troops of D'Erlon and Lobau, and of 
 the Guard at Plancenoit, caught, as it were, in a vice 
 between two armies, had fallen in great numbers, and 
 had largely been made prisoners ; the right wing of the 
 French army had been all but destroyed. But a consider- 
 able part of the centre had escaped, and the corps of Reille 
 and the remains of the beaten cavalry had made their 
 way from the field with comparatively little loss. No 
 attempt, however, was made to rally these men ; the 
 armed multitude rolled, like an affrighted herd, onwards, 
 the Prussian sabre and bayonet making havoc among 
 many victims. The pursuit of Gneisenau, however, was 
 not fierce or rapid ; the troops of Pirch and Zieten, com- 
 pletely worn out, halted only one or two miles from the 
 field; those of Bulow advanced only four or five; the 
 fugitive host was literally hunted down by a few thousand 
 horsemen, a significant proof of the completeness of the 
 rout. A stand might have been easily made at Genappe ; 
 but a few barricades that had been hastily thrown up 
 were abandoned when the enemy's trumpets were heard ; 
 the terror-stricken masses crowded into the narrow streets 
 of the town, forgetting the fords of the Dyle hard by ; 
 pent up and huddled together, they fought savagely to 
 get through, and time was lost before they continued 
 their flight. Many were captured, and many wounded or 
 slain ; but though the Prussians showed little mercy, the 
 tales of butchery and massacre laid to their charge are 
 probably the exaggerations of hatred and fear. The 
 legend that Duhesme, the commander of the Young 
 Guard, a veteran, with the scars of more than twenty 
 years, was immolated in cold blood is happily untrue ; he 
 died of his wounds tended by Blucher's own physician. 
 Larrey, too, the well-known Surgeon-General of Napoleon's 
 armies, was saved by the intercession of a brother surgeon ; 
 he had been mistaken for his master, and was about being
 
 300 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 shot by a Prussian officer furious that he had missed the 
 great prize.* 
 
 These sights of humihation and dismay were, however, 
 relieved, and made more conspicuous, by noble instances 
 of constancy and real military worth. The three battalions 
 of the Guard never lost their order; they steadily made 
 their way through the flying masses ; the Prussian cavalry 
 attacked them in vain ; they had the presence of mind to 
 cross the Dyle near Genappe, and leisurely effected their 
 retreat in safety. The squadrons of the light cavalry of 
 the Guard, and one regiment of the heavy cavalry — this had 
 not suffered so much as the others — appear to have joined 
 this noble body of men ; the remains of the defeated six 
 battalions of the Guard, and some of the survivors of the 
 horsemen of Milhaud, Kellermann, and Guyot, made at 
 least attempts to re-form their ranks and to restore dis- 
 cipline. No eagles, too, were taken in the flight — a sure 
 sign that the pursuit was really feeble ; a faithful few 
 guarded these honoured emblems ; in fact, the only two 
 eagles lost at Waterloo were captured by the British 
 cavalry in their great charge against the troops of 
 D'Erlon. 
 
 Individual examples of heroism were also not wanting ; 
 after the failure of the last attack of the Guard, Ney rode 
 across the field, braving a thousand deaths, and tried to 
 rally the soldiers of Durutte ; he fought desperately in 
 their ranks to the last — he was, indeed, always a soldier 
 rather than a leader in war — and hundreds of the officers 
 of the routed army endeavoured to do their duty in vain. 
 Nevertheless, even after the pursuit had ceased — Gneisenau 
 recalled his infantry at Genappe, and his horsemen at 
 Frasnes — the aspect of the flight was not changed; the 
 French army, now all but completely dissolved, sped 
 onwards to the Sambre, which it had crossed but three 
 days before in all the magnificence of war, and in the sure 
 
 * H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 421-423.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 301 
 
 hope of victory. The hideous appearance of the field at 
 Quatre Bras, thick strewn with naked corpses, ghastly 
 white in the moon, quickened the terrors of the unnerved 
 soldiery ; they fled, it was said, as if they had had a 
 glimpse of hell. The fugitives, scattered in little knots 
 and bands, reached the Sambre, only to desert in hundreds, 
 and to carry the news of the disaster through the northern 
 provinces of France. A considerable mass assembled at 
 Charleroy ; the scenes of demoralisation became even 
 worse than before. The famished soldiery, as they rushed 
 into the town, seized the provisions, which had been in 
 store for the army, and pillaged the treasure-chest, in 
 their reckless passion ; all signs of discipline and order 
 disappeared ; many even perished, squeezed to death or 
 thrown over the bridge on the river, by the pressure of 
 the mob of their frantic comrades. * It was the horrors 
 of Vilna,' it has been said, * at the very gates of France.' 
 
 Napoleon, accompanied by a few of his chief officers, 
 left the field finally with three battalions of the Guard. 
 His attempts to rally his flying army had failed ; but his 
 stoical demeanour amidst the ruin around him remained 
 unchanged. It is a tradition that he dropped the words, 
 * It has been ever thus since Crecy '; it is certain that in 
 remarks on the battle, made long afterwards, he attri- 
 buted his defeat to the conduct of the British soldiery, 
 the troops he had slighted almost with contempt in the 
 morning.* At Genappe he quitted the Guard and entered 
 his carriage, having, it would seem, endeavoured to no 
 purpose to form a kind of rearguard ; he narrowly escaped 
 falling into the hands of the Prussians, as he made his 
 way through the town amidst the crowds of fugitives. At 
 
 * Napoleon Correspondence, xxxi. 240 : ' Les Frangais, quoique si 
 inf^rieurs en nombre, auraient remport^ la victoire, et ce ne fut que la 
 bravoure obstinee et indomptable des troupes anglaises qui les en k 
 empeche.' A prouder testimonial has never been made to the quali- 
 ties of the British army.
 
 302 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Quatre Bras he made a short halt, expecting to meet the 
 division of Girard left behind at Ligny, and ordered by 
 Soult to Quatre Bras before ; but its commander had 
 apparently lost his head, and had marched to Charleroy, 
 involved in the universal rout. The Emperor then sent 
 two bearers of the fatal news to Grouchy, announcing 
 that the battle had been fought and lost, and directing 
 the Marshal to retreat towards Philippeville or Givet ; 
 and several officers carried messages to the commandants 
 of the fortresses upon the northern frontier to effect a 
 general rallying of the defeated army, and as far as was 
 possible to provide for its wants, to restore its artillery, 
 and to supply it with other requirements of war. 
 
 Napoleon having given these orders — all that could be 
 given at the present conjuncture — set off for Charleroy, 
 and, passing the Sambre, reached Philippeville in the 
 forenoon of June ig. From that place h^e wrote to his 
 brother Joseph, informing him of the disaster of the day 
 before, and expressing a hope that he would receive the 
 support of the nation ; in a short time he had set off for 
 Paris. He has been blamed severely for this conduct ; 
 detractors have said that ' he was a deserter, as he had 
 been in Egypt and in 1812.' But the Emperor had, for 
 the moment, nothing to do on the frontier ; he literally 
 was without an army ; he had to think of the Chambers 
 of Paris, of a terrified France, too willing, perhaps, to 
 make him a victim. During the agony of the hours he 
 had just gone through, his self-contained composure had 
 once given way. It has been recorded by an eye-witness, 
 that at Quatre Bras Napoleon turned his eyes towards 
 Waterloo ; silent tears trickled down cheeks almost life- 
 less, and pallid as if with the look of death. 
 
 We pass on to the operations of Grouchy, the para- 
 mount cause of this immense disaster for France. We 
 left the ill-fated Marshal at Walhain, having set at nought 
 the admirable counsels of Gerard, to cross the Dyle as
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 303 
 
 quickly as possible by Moustier and Ottignies, and to 
 march to the sound of the great fight at Waterloo. He 
 had resolved to continue the movement on Wavre by the 
 direct roads on the eastern bank of the river — that is, many 
 miles away from his master. By this time, Excelmans, 
 we have seen, had been for some time at La Baraque ; 
 Vandamme and most of his corps had reached Nil 
 St. Vincent ; they were, therefore, at a short distance 
 from Wavre; the corps of Gerard was round Walhain 
 and Sart les Walhain ; Pajol and Teste were between 
 Grand Leez and Tourinnes — that is, a few miles eastward. 
 The march of the army remained slow; and Grouchy, 
 fixed as his purpose was, was affected by the thunder of 
 the distant battle, and by the evident disapprobation of 
 his own soldiery. He approached the Dyle more than 
 once in person ; but he still persisted in his fatal course ; 
 he actually withdrew squadrons of Excelmans from a 
 place called La Plaquerie, only a few hundred yards from 
 the bridge on the Dyle at Ottignies, Excelmans having 
 assumed that Grouchy was about to cross the river and to 
 push on to Waterloo and join his master. 
 
 By this time Ledebur, charged to observe Grouchy 
 at Mont St. Guibert, and who, we have said, had not 
 perceived the advance of the French, was almost sur- 
 rounded by the Marshal's army ; but he succeeded in 
 effecting his escape to Wavre, after a short skirmish with 
 the troops of Excelmans and Vandamme ; he had received 
 some assistance from part of the corps of Pirch, which 
 soon afterwards resumed its march towards Waterloo, but 
 was too late to take part in the battle. Between three 
 and four. Grouchy, now near Wavre, received the despatch 
 written by Soult at ten in the forenoon, which directed 
 the Marshal, indeed, to march on Wavre, but emphatically 
 told him he was to draw near the Emperor, about to 
 engage in a great battle — that is, impliedly,if very obscurely, 
 intimated that he ought to get over the Dyle, to move 
 towards Wavre by the western bank, and, above all, to
 
 304 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 come in contact with the main army. Shallow, obstinate, 
 and not discerning the real import of the words. Grouchy 
 exclaimed with glee that he had done perfectly right in 
 disregarding the advice of Gerard, and took credit to him- 
 self for his skilful strategy. But Gerard, if we are to 
 believe Zenowicz, the bearer of the despatch, with true 
 insight, caught Soult's meaning, and, breaking out into 
 passion, vehemently said to Grouchy : ' If we are lost, the 
 guilt will lie at your door !'* 
 
 Grouchy, satisfied with himself, and blind in his conceit, 
 now ordered Vandamme to press on to Wavre, and to 
 make a vigorous attack on the town ; the corps of Gerard 
 was to second the movement. His fixed idea was to fall 
 on the enemy at hand. He did not wholly neglect the 
 injunctions of Soult — to approach the Emperor and the 
 main French army; but he committed this charge to Pajol 
 and Teste — that is, to the very body of men which was 
 farthest from the Dyle — and could not be over the river 
 for a considerable time. 
 
 Vandamme and Excelmans, with Gerard not far in the 
 rear, were around Wavre at about half-past four. By this 
 time Bulow was thundering on Napoleon's right flank ; 
 Pirch, with half of his corps, was on his way to join him, 
 between Wavre and St. Lambert ; Zieten was at a short 
 distance from Ohain, making for Waterloo. Grouchy had 
 let the mass of the Prussian army elude his grasp ; it was 
 in full march to join hands with Wellington. The re- 
 straining wing had failed to fulfil its task. Grouchy was 
 merely striking at the tail, so to speak, of the enemy, not 
 falling on his side, not assailing his head, not even standing 
 between the hostile armies. Thielmann had for some 
 hours been left at Wavre with not more than 21,000 men.t 
 
 * See Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de TEmpire,' vi. 508, 509. 
 Thiers knew Gerard well, and probably had this from Gerard himself. 
 
 t Thiemann's corps, after Ligny, was about 18,000 strong ; but he 
 had the support at Wavre of some troops of Zieten, and perhaps of 
 Pirch, left behind.
 
 ATTACK AND DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD 305 
 
 He had been informed, probably between one and two, 
 that Grouchy was marching towards him in largely superior 
 force, and had sent to St. Lambert to seek orders ; he was 
 curtly told by Gneisenau, or perhaps by Blucher, that 
 everything depended on what was being done at Waterloo, 
 and that he must shift for himself as well as he could. 
 He gave up all idea of moving towards his chief, and 
 hastily placed Wavre in a state of defence, barricading 
 the bridges of the town on the Dyle, throwing obstacles 
 of all kinds across the streets, crenellating houses and 
 other buildings to secure points of vantage. In this posi- 
 tion, one of considerable strength, he steadily awaited his 
 enemy's attack. 
 
 Vandamme was not slow in falling on. He assailed 
 Wavre from the eastern bank of the Dyle, and mastered 
 the suburbs on that side ; but the single division he engaged 
 was unable to cross the stream, and was decimated by a 
 heavy fire from the town. Meanwhile, a little after five 
 o'clock, Grouchy had received the message from Soult, 
 written at one, directing him once more to move towards 
 the main army, and also the postscript ordering him to 
 attack Bulow, as Soult and Napoleon believed he could 
 do.* What must have been the thoughts of the conscience- 
 stricken chief when the bandage had fallen at last from 
 his eyes ? 
 
 Yet Grouchy, even at this supreme moment — not that 
 any effort of his could now have had real effect — conducted 
 his operations with remarkable want of judgment. He, 
 indeed, sent Pajol and Teste, by this time at hand, to 
 seize the bridge on the Dyle at Limale, and to hasten to 
 the western bank of the river; but he permitted Vandamme 
 still to waste his forces in attacks on Wavre that could 
 have no object ; he did not order Vandamme to support 
 Teste or Pajol. At the same time, he directed a single 
 
 * This momentous despatch, like much of Soult's work, was 
 scribbled in pencil, and could hardly be deciphered. 
 
 20
 
 3o6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 division of Gerard to assail Wavre near Bi^rges higher up 
 the Dyle, and so to support the efforts of Vandamme, as 
 if Wavre was still his main object. Gerard fell severely 
 wounded in a fruitless attack, and it was not until Pajol 
 and Teste had got over the Dyle that Grouchy ordered 
 the two other divisions of Gerard to follow, and to pass 
 over to the western bank. The Marshal now made towards 
 Napoleon's army ; but it was past nine, and the attempt 
 could have come to nothing — Napoleon and his army had 
 succumbed. Thielmann, too, held Grouchy in check for 
 a time ; and though he was compelled to retreat some 
 distance, the French were detained in positions almost 
 around Wavre. It was eleven at night before all fighting 
 ceased. The attacks of Vandamme had meanwhile failed ; 
 the Prussians continued masters of the town ; Grouchy 
 and Thielmann had their bivouacs between Wavre and 
 Rixensart. 
 
 The cannon of Waterloo had long been voiceless. The 
 unfortunate Marshal clung to a hope that his master — the 
 rumour had so run — was a victor ; but Gerard, wounded, 
 it was feared, to death, was convinced that the result had 
 been very different. Ten miles away the truth was revealed 
 in an appalling spectacle of wide-spread carnage, on which 
 night spread a funereal pall. Wellington had lost more 
 than 15,000 men, Blucher very nearly 7,000. Each had 
 dearly paid for their great triumph. But the French army 
 had been virtually blotted out : from 30,000 to 40,000 men 
 had been killed, wounded, or made prisoners ; from 8,000 
 to 10,000 v^ere deserting ; more than 200 guns had been 
 abandoned in the rout ; in all probability 30,000 men of 
 the ruined host were never under arms again.* 
 
 * For the losses of the belligerent armies at Waterloo, see Charras, 
 ii. 67, 68; H, Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 415, 440. The figures as 
 regards the French army are, of course, mere conjecture ; enough to 
 say it was destroyed.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO, AND ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 1815 
 
 Faulty tactics of the French at Waterloo — Four distinct mistakes were 
 made — How far Napoleon is to be held responsible — Excellence 
 of Wellington's tactics — His strength of character was con- 
 spicuously seen — The result of Waterloo was due to the junction 
 of Blucher and Wellington — Consideration of the question whether 
 Grouchy could have prevented this — Position of the Prussian 
 army on the morning of June 18 — Position of Grouchy and his 
 army — Grouchy could have arrested the march of the Prussians, 
 and interposed between the allied armies, had he marched to the 
 Dyle and crossed at Moustier and Ottignies by the early forenoon 
 — He could have attained the same end had he followed the 
 advice of Gerard and marched towards Napoleon at noon — Ex- 
 amination of reasoning to the contrary — Grouchy the main cause 
 of the defeat of Waterloo — Napoleon not wholly free from blame 
 — The strategy of the allied Generals on June 17 and 18 essentially 
 faulty — They ought, having regard to the chances, to have lost the 
 Battle of Waterloo — Review of the campaign of 181 5 generally — 
 Napoleon and his lieutenants — Wellington and Blucher — The 
 belligerent armies. 
 
 The original plan of attack at Waterloo, in the opinion 
 of all competent judges, was the best possible that could 
 have been designed.* When, owing to the apparition of 
 
 * Jomini (' Precis de la Campagne de 181 5,' 198) says : ' Napoldon 
 peut laisser ce plan sans crainte k I'dxamen des maitres de I'art. II 
 ne pouvait rien faire de mieux.' Even the partisan detractor, Charras, 
 admits (ii.88) : 'La plan de la bataille est tresbeau, tr^ssolide. Ilrevele 
 le chef habitud h combiner les plus grandes actions de guerre ; il ddfie 
 la critique.' 
 
 20 — 2
 
 3o8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Billow on his right, and in some degree to the defeat of 
 D'Erlon, Napoleon was compelled to abandon this, his 
 second plan was also admirably conceived. But in this, 
 as in other passages of the campaign, fine projects were 
 marred by execution, not only faulty in itself, but some- 
 times directly opposed to the Emperor's purpose. In the 
 conduct of the French chiefs at Waterloo, the timidity 
 and indecision we see before Quatre Bras were succeeded 
 by impatient daring and hasty want of caution. Ney, 
 especially, was rash and injudicious in the extreme, and, 
 as on June 16, he disobeyed his orders. Four distinct 
 mistakes in tactics, we have said, were made ; these had 
 marked effects during the course of the battle, and were 
 not without influence on the ultimate issue. The attack 
 on Hougoumont, intended to be a mere feint, was turned 
 into a real and a determined attack ; it was conducted 
 also without skill or prudence. The consequences were 
 in many respects disastrous ; hundreds of brave men were 
 sacrificed in making efforts soon proved to be fruitless. 
 The corps of Reille was paralysed by an enemy very 
 inferior in force ; its leaders were unable, perhaps un- 
 willing, to furnish the support to the great cavalry attacks, 
 and to the last attack of the Imperial Guard, which their 
 infantry assuredly might have furnished had it not been 
 wasted to very little purpose. The vicious formation of 
 D'Erlon's columns was fatal to the success of the great 
 first attack ; this, too, was not sufficiently sustained by 
 cavalry. The result was a complete defeat, which deprived 
 the French army of fully 5,000 men, and reduced D'Erlon's 
 troops for a time to impotence. 
 
 The third error was even much worse. Ney, disregard- 
 ing his master's commands, was too impatient to remain 
 at La Haye Sainte when that most important post had 
 been won, and to wait until he could obtain the support 
 of the Guard engaged in resisting Bulow ; he prematurely 
 directed the splendid French cavalry, and that without
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 309 
 
 the necessary aid of infantry, against the right centre of 
 the allied line exactly where this was in greatest strength, 
 and where the infantry of the defence were not in the least 
 shaken. A terrible conflict raged for a considerable time. 
 The efforts of the devoted horsemen were brilliant in the 
 extreme; but, being inadequately sustained in every respect, 
 they failed against the British and German squares, and 
 this magnificent force, the greatest part of which the 
 Marshal was certainly allowed to engage, was so beaten, 
 so weakened, so worn out, that it was rendered useless, or 
 nearly so, during the rest of the day. Finally, the fourth, 
 and this a capital, mistake : the part of the Imperial 
 Guard that made the last attack was moved, not against 
 Wellington's centre at La Haye Sainte, at this moment 
 in grave peril, but against his right centre, still compara- 
 tively strong ; and the attack, made with a very insufficient 
 force, was left without the support of horse and foot, 
 which to some extent at least might still have been given. 
 In addition to these palpable mistakes, it is doubtful if 
 Napoleon did not miss an opportunity to sustain the great 
 cavalry attacks by a part at least of the Imperial Guard 
 when Bulow had been repulsed by the Young Guard ; had 
 this effort been made, it might have had great results. 
 Good judges have thought it might have been made, and 
 the Emperor certainly did not prevent Ney from throwing 
 away five-sixths of the noble French cavalry. On the 
 whole, the attacks made at Waterloo were often ill-com- 
 bined, ill-directed, desultory, and especially faulty, owing 
 to the want of concert in the use of the three arms. 
 Napoleon himself has acknowledged this ; the day, he has 
 said with emphasis, was a day of ' most false manoeuvres.' 
 And these errors of tactics were independent of what 
 possibly was the greatest error of all — that Napoleon 
 delayed the attack for three or four hours, for reasons that 
 have been largely disapproved, and so gave time to the 
 Prussians to reach the field. It is difficult, however, to
 
 3IO THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 pronounce a decided opinion on this. The delay in the 
 events that followed was, doubtless, in the highest degree 
 disastrous ; but the authority of Drouot is of great weight, 
 and the delay brought advantages with it that cannot be 
 denied. 
 
 Napoleon is, of course, parti}' responsible for all these 
 mistakes ; he was in supreme command of the French 
 army ; yet considerations must be taken into account 
 which in a great degree relieve him from blame. It may 
 be said at once that he did not give proof at Waterloo, 
 until it had become too late, of the activity and the 
 presence of mind of Wellington ; here he was inferior to 
 his antagonist and to his former self. But in the earlier 
 hours of June 18 he seems to have suffered from the 
 lethargy of the preceding day; he was dozing, we are told, 
 long after Hougoumont was attacked ; he gave no atten- 
 tion to what was going on, until he ordered the chateau 
 to be fired with shells.* Throughout the later period of 
 the day he was in a position of extreme difficulty ; he 
 had to maintain a fierce and still doubtful struggle with 
 Wellington, and to make head against the onslaught of 
 Bulow ; .he was fighting two battles, in truth, under very 
 bad conditions. He could not, therefore, superintend the 
 whole scene of action, or control and direct events as the 
 occasion required. This, probably, is the principal reason 
 that he permitted Ney to do almost as he pleased, even 
 though Ney had set his orders at nought, and was plainly 
 committing the gravest mistakes ; the Emperor had not 
 the situation fully before him, and felt that, as things 
 stood, he had better not cross the Marshal. But the chief 
 excuse that is to be made for Napoleon is that at Waterloo, 
 as in all his battles, he looked to his subordinates to do 
 almost everything ; he reserved to himself only the general 
 direction of affairs. This was a distinctive feature of his 
 military system, caused by the great extent of his opera- 
 
 * Dorsey Gardner, anie, 36 ; H. Houssaye, ' Waterloo,' ii. 501.
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 311 
 
 tions in war. From this point of view, much is to be said 
 for him : he committed to Reille the attack on Hougou- 
 mont ; he committed to D'Erlon the attack on WelHngton's 
 left and left centre ; he gave Ney generally the conduct of 
 the fight. He could not suppose that Reille, D'Erlon, 
 and Ney would make the faulty dispositions they did ; in 
 this sense he is infinitely less responsible than his lieu- 
 tenants. We have indicated, indeed, the chief faults which 
 alone, perhaps, should be laid to the charge of Napoleon ; 
 he should not have sanctioned in any way the reckless 
 use Ney made of his cavalry;* he may have lost a favour- 
 able chance of attacking with the Guard. For the rest, 
 in the last scenes of Waterloo, he rose to the level of the 
 Napoleon of old. 
 
 In spite, however, of this series of mistakes, the attacks 
 at Waterloo would have proved successful before the 
 Prussians made their presence felt, had not Wellington 
 been at the head of the allied army, and but for the heroic 
 conduct of his British and German Legionary troops. 
 The formidable advance of D'Erlon would have hardly 
 failed against a Continental army of 1800-1812; the 
 great cavalry attacks would almost certainly have broken 
 Austrian squares, and given Ney a triumph ; the Arch- 
 duke Charles, we believe, in Wellington's place, would 
 have retreated when La Haye Sainte was captured ; the 
 allied centre would have been probably pierced but for 
 the energy and resource of the British General. Unques- 
 tionably, as we have endeavoured to prove, Wellington 
 ought not to have offered battle at all ; unquestionably he 
 made a grave strategic mistake in leaving a large part of 
 his army at Hal and Tubize ; unquestionably he did not 
 fully perceive the importance of La Haye Sainte, and 
 did not occupy that post in sufficient strength ; probably 
 
 * Napoleon, we have seen, certainly allowed Ney to employ the 
 cavalry of Kellermann when Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoettes had 
 been repulsed. He always denied that he gave the same permission 
 as regards the cavalry of Guyot, his last cavalry reserve.
 
 312 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 he placed at first too large a force on his extreme right. 
 But when this has been said, his conduct on the field of 
 Waterloo is a grand specimen of skill, energy, resource, 
 and firmness of purpose. Let it not be forgotten that he 
 expected the Prussians to reach him at least three or four 
 hours before they appeared, and that from half-past eleven 
 to half-past four he was exposed to all the efforts of an 
 army greatly superior in real strength, his army being 
 largely composed of very inferior troops. Yet he suc- 
 ceeded, during this fiery trial, in repelling every attack 
 directed against him ; and this was largely because he 
 conducted the defence with conspicuous skill, turning the 
 advantages of his position to the best account, keeping 
 his men as much as possible out of a tremendous fire, 
 making admirably judicious use of his reserves, so finely 
 calculating his resources that he was nearly always able 
 to confront his enemy with an adequate force. Wellington, 
 in a word, proved himself to be at Waterloo, what he 
 always was, a great master of tactics, especially in defence ; 
 this is his real title to renown in the campaign of 1815 — 
 it is a legitimate set-off against no doubtful strategic errors. 
 His activity and vigour were also above praise ; but what 
 was most conspicuous in him was his best quality, tenacity, 
 and grand strength of character. In this respect he was 
 really a great chief; no other General of the coalition 
 was here his equal — not even Blucher, hero as he was. 
 Napoleon certainly underrated this stern power of en- 
 durance. Still, Wellington could not have held out at 
 Waterloo but for the steadfastness of his British and 
 German Legionary troops ; they maintained their ground 
 against furious attacks, while auxiliaries in thousands fled 
 from the field ; they were worthy of their illustrious leader. 
 The issue of Waterloo, however, was not determined 
 by differences of tactics, or by the conduct of the armies 
 engaged in the first part of the battle ; it is to be ascribed 
 to a deeper cause. No impartial student of war can deny
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 313 
 
 that, many as were the mistakes made in the attack, and 
 admirable as was WeUington's defence, the victory would 
 have remained with Napoleon had he been able, even after 
 three in the afternoon, to direct his whole forces against 
 his enemy. The attack on Hougoumont had been ill- 
 conducted; that of D'Erlon had completely failed. But 
 the allied army had been greatly weakened ; it could not 
 have resisted a combined effort made by Lobau, the French 
 cavalry, and the Imperial Guard. In this event Welling- 
 ton's left would probably have been turned and his centre 
 forced, according to the Emperor's design ; in a word, 
 the Duke would have suffered a real defeat, but not, as 
 we think, the overwhelming reverse which might have 
 happened at Ligny or on June 17.* This peril was averted 
 by the intervention of Bulow ; his onset on Napoleon's 
 right flank prevented the decisive movement, and in a 
 great measure paralysed the French army. The course 
 of the battle was completely changed, and the apparition 
 of Zieten and Pirch on the field made Waterloo an immense 
 victory and an immense disaster. The result of the conflict 
 was therefore determined by the junction of Wellington's 
 and Blucher's forces on the same point. Wellington fought 
 the battle on an assurance that this would take place ; 
 Blucher had pledged himself to support his ally. The 
 
 * On this subject we agree, in substance, with Mr. Ropes, 'The 
 Campaign of Waterloo,' 327 : ' Let us suppose, then, that Napoleon 
 could have combined his whole force against the army of Wellington 
 during the whole afternoon ; that he could have given his personal 
 direction to the conduct of the action ; that he could have followed up 
 the repulse of the ist corps with a new attack, in which Lobau should 
 support D'Erlon, and in which the cavalry should take its proper part; 
 that he had been on the spot when La Haye Sainte fell, and had im- 
 proved that advantage as he well knew how to do ; that he had had 
 the whole of the Imperial Guard — infantry, cavalry, and artillery— at 
 his disposal for the carrying of Wellington's position : ic seems to us 
 there can be no reasonable question as to the result ; the Duke would 
 have been badly beaten, and the action would, in all probability, have 
 been over, or substantially so, by six o'clock. This question is not 
 asked to gratify the imagination.'
 
 314 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 principal reason, accordingly, of the event at Waterloo 
 was the union of the two armies in furtherance of a pre- 
 concerted plan, which crushed Napoleon by their over- 
 whelming strength. But Napoleon had employed Grouchy 
 to prevent this junction ; he had given the Marshal a 
 powerful restraining wing to keep Blucher away from 
 Wellington. The question therefore arises, in considering 
 what occurred at Waterloo : Could Grouchy, who, we 
 know, miserably failed, have been reasonably expected to 
 fulfil his master's purpose ? Was it the more hkely, having 
 regard to the situation and the probabilities of war, that 
 Blucher would be able to come into line with Wellington, 
 or that Grouchy would be able to stop the veteran warrior, 
 or even to come to Napoleon's assistance ? The subject 
 has been placed in a false light, or has been slurred over 
 by many writers ; the facts should be presented in their 
 true aspect, and proper conclusions be drawn from them. 
 
 Undoubtedly, in the position of affairs that was witnessed 
 on June 18, the conduct of Grouchy having been what it 
 was, the main part of the Prussian army might have 
 reached Waterloo at a comparatively early hour, as 
 Wellington was convinced would be the case. Zieten 
 and Thielmann, on the western bank of the Dyle, were 
 considerably nearer the allied lines than Pirch and Bulow 
 on the eastern bank. Had they been unmolested, and 
 marched soon after daybreak, they might have been at 
 St. Lambert, with about 25,000 men, in all probability at 
 about ten or eleven, and have fallen on Napoleon's right 
 flank at about twelve or one. Under similar conditions, 
 had Pirch moved before Bulow, as his advanced position 
 made the natural course, he could have been at St. Lam- 
 bert, with perhaps 20,000 men, an hour or two probably 
 after his colleagues ; and Bulow need not have been greatly 
 behind, assuming that he had not been kept back at Wavre 
 with a large part of his corps, at least, to guard Blucher's 
 communications and rear.
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 31S 
 
 But in examining this question, we must consider, with 
 reference to the matter in hand, not what the Prussian 
 operations might have been, but what they actually were 
 in the events that happened. Zieten and Thielmann were 
 detained many hours at Wavre ; Zieten was directed to 
 Waterloo by the northern road through Ohain ; Thielmann 
 was kept back ultimately at Wavre the whole day in order 
 to resist the attack of Grouchy ; Bulow was moved forward 
 before Pirch ; Pirch was retarded a considerable time by 
 the intermingling of his columns with those of Bulow. 
 As the general result, great and unnecessary delay, apart 
 from the obstacles that stood in its path, occurred in the 
 movements of the Prussian army. Zieten did not break 
 up from Wavre until about noon ; he was not at Ohain 
 until near six ; he did not reach the field of battle in any- 
 thing like force, and then with some 10,000 men only, 
 until after the defeat of the Imperial Guard — that is, a 
 short time after eight o'clock. As for Bulow, his advanced 
 guard was not at St. Lambert until after ten in the fore- 
 noon ; his whole corps, about 29,000 strong,* had not 
 reached that place until after three ; he did not begin his 
 attack until half-past four, and then with only a part of 
 his forces. The march of Pirch was even more delayed ; 
 he did not leave Wavre until noon ; two of his divisions 
 waited for a time to observe Grouchy; he was not at 
 Plancenoit until after eight, and then with only 12,000 or 
 15,000 men ; his forces and those of Bulow at Waterloo 
 were not more than from 40,000 to 45,000 men ; and in 
 the march from Wavre they were divided by long dis- 
 tances, and spread out into disunited columns, on a flank 
 march of the most hazardous kind should they come 
 within the reach of an enemy. It should be observed, 
 too, that, if we except Blucher, every Prussian commander 
 gave proof of caution — nay, of timidity— in these move- 
 ments. Gneisenau hesitated at the critical moment ; 
 
 * Excluding the detachment of Ledebur.
 
 3i6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Zieten was most reluctant to march to Papelotte, though 
 informed that WelHngton was in great danger ; Bulow 
 waited for hours before he made his attack ; nay, even 
 Blucher would not commit himself to a real effort against 
 Napoleon until he had ascertained that his flank and rear 
 were not threatened. The Prussian march, in a word, 
 from Wavre to Waterloo, let the courtiers of Fortune say 
 what they please, was ill-directed, irresolute, and danger- 
 ously delayed. 
 
 These being the uncontested facts, and the elements 
 from which we must form our judgment, let us see whether 
 Grouchy, giving him credit for ordinary capacity, insight, 
 and skill, ought to have prevented the junction of Blucher 
 and Wellington. We have indicated the operations which, 
 beyond question, he ought to have resolved to carry out 
 when, on the night of the 17th, he was at Gembloux with 
 his army of 33,000 men. He had been placed at the head 
 of a strong restraining wing ; his companions in arms, and 
 he himself likewise, must have been aware that his duty 
 was to hold Blucher in check, while the Emperor should 
 fall in full force on Wellington. Napoleon, when giving 
 him his command, had all but certainly told him not only 
 to pursue Blucher and to keep him in sight, but also to be 
 in constant communication with the main French army ; 
 he undoubtedly added that he meant to attack Wellington, 
 should Wellington make a stand before the Forest of 
 Soignies. A short time afterwards the Marshal received 
 positive orders, through the important message despatched 
 by Bertrand, to march on Gembloux, to follow the enemy, 
 and to correspond with his master at headquarters ; and 
 he was distinctly warned that the allied Generals might 
 be seeking to effect their junction, and even to fight 
 another battle. Grouchy reached Gembloux, though very 
 late, on the evening of the 17th. At that place he learned, 
 in the course of a few hours, that the Prussian army was 
 assembled around Wavre ; he wrote twice to the Emperor
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 317 
 
 that he would march to that place — probably in the first 
 letter ; in the second, certainly — adding that he would 
 try to keep the Prussians away from Wellington, a proof 
 that he understood his mission. In the existing situation, 
 what Grouchy ought to do was plain — he should break up 
 from Gembloux at the earliest dawn ; should march rapidly 
 by the two available roads ; should cross the Dyle by the 
 bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, a distance of some ten 
 miles from Gembloux ; and should place his army on the 
 western bank of the river : for by this movement, and by 
 this alone, could he adequately perform his allotted task. 
 Were Blucher halting at Wavre, he could attack him — 
 perhaps most readily from the position he would have 
 gained ; were Blucher, as might be expected and feared, 
 attempting to march from Wavre to join Wellington, 
 Grouchy would be able to reach the Prussian army's flank, 
 to attack it when placed in the worst conditions, and all 
 but certainly to bring it to a stand — to defeat it in detail ; 
 above all, he would draw near Napoleon, and be soon in 
 contact with the imperial army.* 
 
 Instead of making the movement the occasion required. 
 Grouchy, we know, left Gembloux at a very late hour ; 
 marched extremely slowly to Walhain and Sart les 
 Walhain ; advanced along the eastern bank of the Dyle ; 
 persisted in this, spite of the entreaties of Gerard to cross 
 the stream and to make for Waterloo ; allowed Blucher 
 to give him the slip, and to join Wellington with more 
 than half his army ; and, keeping many miles away from 
 Napoleon, merely reached at Wavre the corps of Thiel- 
 mann. But had he operated as he ought to have done, 
 and as any true soldier would have done in his place, 
 what he might have accomplished is hardly doubtful. On 
 
 * All commentators, Jomini, Charras, Thiers, La Tour d'Auvergne, 
 Clausewitz, H. Houssaye, Ropes, and many others, agree that this was 
 what Grouchy should have done. See authorities collected by Mr. 
 Ropes, ' The Campaign of Waterloo,' 252-254.
 
 3i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 the night of the 17th Excelmans and his horsemen were 
 between Sauveniere and Nil St. Vincent ; Vandamme was 
 a little beyond Gembloux, Gerard a little behind the 
 town ; Pajol and Teste were some miles in the rear round 
 Mazy. Had Grouchy formed an energetic purpose to 
 march as quickly as possible across the Dylc, he might 
 have had the corps of Vandamme and Gerard under arms 
 by four in the morning of June 18 ; he might have directed 
 Excelmans to cover the intended movement, and Pajol 
 and Teste to follow Excelmans without delay. Had he 
 taken these steps — and they were almost obvious — he might 
 have marched to the Dyle with Vandamme and Gerard 
 by the roads passing through Villeroux and Cortel ; and 
 if his march had been at the rate of about two miles an 
 hour, his columns having been divided to ensure celerity, 
 he would have reached the river between nine and ten in 
 the forenoon at the two bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, 
 having possibly surprised and cut to pieces the detachment 
 of Ledebur at Mont St. Guibert — Ledebur, we have seen, 
 was surprised in the afternoon — having certainly swept it 
 out of his path. The bridges were of stone, and, like 
 those on the Sambre, had, whatever the reason, been left 
 intact. With the exception of the weak divisions of Pajol 
 and Teste — and these would not have been far in the rear 
 — Grouchy would have been across the Dyle and on the 
 western bank before noon, as has been acknowledged even 
 by the most bitter of Napoleon's detractors.* 
 
 Grouchy and the mass of his forces, being now over the 
 Dyle, had two alternative courses to take; either would have 
 given him an opportunity grand and decisive. At Moustier 
 and Ottignies he was about six miles from Maransart, a 
 village near Plancenoit, on the other bank of the Lasne, 
 and some two miles from the main French army. At 
 
 * Jomini ('Prdcis de la Campagne de 1815/222) says that Grouchy 
 woulci have reached Moustier at about ten. Charras (ii. 115) admits 
 that he could have been over the Dyle ' before noon.'
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 319 
 
 Moustier and Ottignies, too, he was only some three miles 
 farther from Napoleon than Bulow at St. Lambert was ; 
 he was not more than four or five miles from the flank of the 
 corps of Bulow, now on its march from Wavre in disunited 
 masses, and not expecting an enemy at hand. Had 
 Grouchy, as no doubt he would have done, pushed his 
 cavalry forward in both directions, he would have come 
 in contact almost at once with the horsemen of Marbot 
 sent to the two bridges, and he would have ascertained 
 how affairs stood with Bulow. In this situation Grouchy, 
 we are convinced, would have marched directly on Maran- 
 sart in conformity with the message given by Marbot ; he 
 would have reached that place between two and three, 
 long before Bulow had begun his attack ; he would have 
 received the Emperor's commands ; in all human prob- 
 ability, he would have been placed either before or behind 
 the Bois de Paris in order to cover Napoleon's right flank, 
 and to protect it from any effort to be made by Bulow. 
 In that event Grouchy would have interposed with com- 
 plete effect between Blucher and Welhngton ; Bulow 
 certainly would not have attempted to attack — at least, 
 until he had been reinforced by Pirch, then on a march 
 many miles in the rear ; Zieten assuredly would not have 
 stirred from Chain ; in the meantime Napoleon, left free 
 to act with all his forces, including the Guard, would 
 beyond question have overpowered Wellington. 
 
 Grouchy, on the march from Moustier and Ottignies, 
 could hardly have received the despatch from Soult, sent 
 off, we have seen, at half-past one, and directing him to 
 fall on the flank and rear of Bulow. Conceivably, how- 
 ever, though not probabl}^ he might have decided on 
 marching against that General; in that event he would 
 have reached the lines of Bulow's march between two and 
 three, but his influence would have been felt long before ; 
 the Prussians would have been surprised and caught in a 
 perilous flank march by an enemy superior in force at the
 
 320 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 decisive point. In this position they must have hesitated 
 and paused for a time; his was inevitable, from the 
 nature of the case ; if so, Bulow's attack would have been 
 delayed some hours. We must bear in mind that even 
 Blucher would not run the risk until he had ascertained 
 that his flank and rear were safe. The attack might not 
 have been made at all, and Pirch, in all probability, would 
 not have moved towards Bulow with the two divisions — 
 all he had in hand. He would, it is all but certain, have 
 waited for his two divisions in the rear. Bulow and Pirch, 
 in a word, would have been paralysed by the apparition 
 on their flank of an unexpected enemy — at least not less 
 than 30,000 strong. They could not have acted with 
 effect for some hours. Zieten, of course, would not have 
 stirred a step. Grouchy would have prevented Blucher 
 from joining Wellington, and secured for Napoleon time 
 to gain the day at Waterloo. It should be added that, 
 had Grouchy marched against Bulow in the position in 
 which the Prussians were, he might very possibly have 
 annihilated part of their forces, scattered as these were, 
 and most dangerously exposed. 
 
 These conclusions, however, as sound, we believe, as 
 is possible in a case of the kind, have been assailed by 
 specious, but, we think, false sophistry. The movement 
 of Grouchy to Moustier and Ottignies would, it has 
 been said, have been perceived by Ledebur at Mont 
 St. Guibcrt ; and that officer would have carried the 
 news to Wavre, and have reached the town perhaps b}- 
 eight in the morning. In that event Gneisenau and 
 Blucher would at once have made a complete change in 
 the dispositions of the Prussian army, and in the arrange- 
 ments which had been prepared for its advance on 
 Waterloo. Zieten, who had been directed to stay around 
 Wavre, would have been moved to the Dyle and the 
 bridges of Moustier and Ottignies ; Pirch, who was to 
 second the march of Bulow, would have been turned
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 321 
 
 aside from the road to St. Lambert, and ordered to hold 
 the bridges of Limale and Limelette on the Dyle. In 
 that case Grouchy could not have got over the river ; he 
 would have found a large army in his path ; he would 
 have at least been compelled to fight a battle, which 
 necessarily would have detained him for hours. Under 
 these conditions Thielmann would have been sent to sup- 
 port Bulow, and both would have overwhelmed Napoleon 
 with the aid of Wellington. Nay, even if, as was not 
 probable, Grouchy had succeeded in crossing the Dyle, 
 the whole Prussian army would have made for Waterloo ; 
 Pirch and Zieten would have followed in the track of 
 Grouchy ; Bulow and Thielmann would have joined 
 Wellington ; Napoleon would not the less have been 
 destroyed.* 
 
 This reasoning disregards important facts of the case, 
 and is opposed to the natural inferences to be drawn in 
 war. We may grant that Ledebur would have reached 
 Wavre at about eight, and given news of Grouchy ; if, as 
 was most likely, he could not have had time to estimate 
 the numbers of the Marshal's army, Blucher and Gneisenau, 
 who, we must bear in mind, thought that Grouchy had not 
 more than 15,000 men, and were making preparations to 
 join Wellington, would assuredly have made no changes in 
 these, and would not have sent Zieten and Pirch to the 
 Dyle : for this, from their point of view, would have been 
 a false movement. If, on the contrary, Ledebur had 
 ascertained that Grouchy was at the head of some 30,000 
 men, and was making for the Dyle by Moustier and 
 Ottignies, it is equally certain that not one of the move- 
 ments that have been suggested would have been made. 
 Eager as Blucher was to push on to Waterloo, Gneisenau, 
 his strategic Mentor and master, was at this very time in 
 hesitation as to whether the march should be made. He 
 was craning, so to speak, like a hunter at a fence. If 
 
 * Charras, ii. 114, 116. 
 
 21
 
 322 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 he had learned, to his surprise and amazement, how 
 formidable was the power of Grouchy's force, he would 
 very probably have detained the whole Prussian army 
 around Wavre — the foremost column of Bulow was still 
 at hand — and not moved for two or three hours at least, 
 until the situation had developed itself. In that event 
 Grouchy would have had ample time to advance across 
 the Dyle, and to join Napoleon ; not a single division of 
 the Prussian army would have reached Waterloo until 
 it was far too late to give the slightest support to 
 Wellington ; the defeat of Wellington would have been 
 assured. 
 
 It may be admitted, however, having regard to Blucher's 
 heroic nature and high sense of honour, that the old chief 
 would have insisted that no change should be made in 
 the arrangements for the march on Waterloo, and that, 
 though made aware of the real strength of Grouchy, he 
 would have ordered Bulow, Pirch, and Zieten to continue 
 their projected movements. But in that case Grouchy, 
 as we have seen, would have been able to reach Maransart, 
 or to arrest the advance of Bulow and Pirch, and there- 
 fore of Zieten ; in other words, he would have prevented 
 Blucher from joining Wellington ; Waterloo would have 
 been a victory for France. As to the supposition that, 
 when it had become known that Grouchy was close to 
 the Dyle with a real and large army, Zieten and Pirch 
 would have been sent to stop him upon the river, and, 
 still more, that the whole Prussian army would have 
 been directed to follow the Marshal, and to press on to 
 Waterloo, it may confidently be said that such an opera- 
 tion was never conducted in war. Were there no other 
 reason, the Prussian commanders would never have left 
 Wavre without a considerable force to protect their com- 
 munications and rear.* 
 
 * For an able refutation of the arguments of Charras on this subject, 
 see Ropes, 'The Campaign of Waterloo,' 281, 283.
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 323 
 
 Had Grouchy, therefore, got over the Dyle at Moustier 
 and Ottignies by the forenoon, he would have accom- 
 phshed his master's purpose, and kept Blucher away 
 from WelHngton. Let us next consider what he might 
 have achieved had he, giving ear to the counsels of 
 Gerard, marched from Walhain on Waterloo on hearing 
 the roar of the battle. At this moment — that is, not far 
 from noon — the cavalry of Excelmans had reached La 
 Baraque, a point about three miles from the Dyle ; part 
 of the corps of Vandamme was at Nil St. Vincent, the 
 remaining part being not far behind. Gerard and his 
 corps were at Walhain and Sart les Walhain ; Pajol and 
 Teste were approaching Tourinnes. These distances 
 were between six and eight miles from the rievr. Had 
 Grouchy, therefore, marched to the Dyle, and crossed it at 
 the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, sending Excelmans 
 and Vandamme to the nearest bridges at Limale and 
 Limelette — these, like the others, were of stone, and not 
 broken — he would have been over the river about four, 
 the divisions of Pajol and Teste remaining on the eastern 
 bank, and covering, as Gerard had proposed, the move- 
 ment. At this time Bulow had not fired a shot ; two of 
 his divisions were in the defiles of the Lasne. Only half 
 of the corps of Pirch was much beyond Wavre ; it did 
 not reach Plancenoit until long after eight. Zieten was 
 still a march of two hours from Chain, Thielmann was 
 encamped in and around Wavre. In these circumstances 
 Grouchy, of course, would have pushed forward, his march 
 accelerated by the sound of the cannon ; and he would 
 have made his influence felt at once on Bulow and Pirch, 
 for he would be on their flank only three or four miles 
 distant, just as Bulow made his influence felt with effect 
 on Napoleon from St. Lambert, about as far from the 
 French army. Bulow and Pirch must have paused and 
 made preparations to resist an attack ; both, especially 
 the first, were in a position that might become most 
 
 21 — 2
 
 324 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 critical. It may be confidently said that Bulow's attack 
 on Napoleon would have been long postponed ; and had it 
 then been made, it would have been too late ; Napoleon 
 would have been master of the field at Waterloo. The 
 march of Bulow, in a word, must have been arrested ; that 
 of Pirch and Zieten would have equally come to a stand. 
 No doubt, possibly, but not probably, Thiclmann would 
 have advanced from Wavre to support Pirch ; but the 
 result would practically have been the same. Grouchy, 
 though outnumbered, would have been able to detain the 
 Prussians on their march sufficiently long to give the 
 Emperor the means of defeating Wellington. It ought 
 to be added that, as Gerard has maintained, Grouchy not 
 improbably would have succeeded in destroying parts of 
 the corps of Pirch and Bulow, surprised and caught in a 
 position of no little peril. 
 
 The kind of argument, however, which has been employed 
 to prove that Grouchy could not have kept Blucher and 
 Wellington apart, had he crossed the Dyle by the early 
 forenoon, has been urged to show that had Grouchy, at 
 Walhain, followed the advice of Gerard to march on 
 Waterloo, the result would, even more certainly, have 
 been the same. Ledebur, it is said, would have reported 
 to Wavre the movement of the French army to the Dyle, 
 which he would have seen long before it reached the 
 stream ; the corps of Thielmann, and part of the corps 
 of Pirch — these, it will be recollected, still near Wavre — 
 would have been directed to the bridges to stop the march 
 of the enemy. Grouchy would, therefore, be compelled 
 to fight a battle; this must have detained him until night- 
 fall. He could not even have drawn near Napoleon, still 
 less have prevented the junction of Blucher and Wellington. 
 Besides, time and distance, though no Prussians had stood 
 in the Marshal's path, would have made it impossible for 
 him to do anything to assist his master or to molest the 
 allies ; he could not have crossed the Dyle until about six,
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 325 
 
 or have reached the field of battle until nine or ten. At 
 that hour the French army was in complete rout ; he 
 probably would have been involved in the general ruin.* 
 
 These arguments, we think, are even more unsound 
 than those we have already dealt with. Ledebur com- 
 pletely failed to perceive the movement of the French on 
 La Baraque and Nil St. Vincent ; he did not stir from 
 Mont St. Guibert until after one. He was surprised and 
 all but cut off; he could not have reached Wavre until 
 between three and four. There is no reason to suppose that 
 he would have been more vigilant, have acted differently, 
 and have done better, had Grouchy marched to the bridges 
 on the Dyle ; if so, any report he could have made at Wavre 
 would have been much too late to enable a large Prussian 
 force to move to the bridges in order to stop Grouchy. 
 Besides, Thielmann, who by this time must have ascer- 
 tained that Grouchy was at the head of an army more 
 than twice as numerous as had been supposed, and who 
 had been just ordered to defend the town, would never 
 have attempted to leave Wavre ; and the half of the corps 
 of Pirch, which had remained in the rear, and was even 
 now marching to join the other half, would not have been 
 diverted from its movement on St. Lambert to make an 
 attempt to hold Grouchy in check on the Dyle. As to 
 time and distance, the arguments are either false in fact 
 or point to conclusions plainly erroneous. Grouchy would 
 have been over the Dyle long before six; once he was 
 across, the question would not have been at what hour 
 his army would have reached Waterloo, but when it would 
 have made its power so felt by the Prussians as to arrest 
 and prevent their attack on Napoleon. That influence 
 would have told, and told with effect, almost as soon as 
 the Marshal had crossed the Dyle. An army threatening 
 another upon a hazardous flank march, especially as affairs 
 stood with Bulow and Pirch, would paralyse it long before 
 
 * Charras, ii. 1 17, 124.
 
 326 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 it could strike it ; and that being so, Grouchy could have 
 stopped his enemy. We fully acknowledge, however, that 
 Grouchy's movement in the afternoon could not have had 
 the decisive effect his movement in the morning would 
 have had ; it might have enabled Napoleon to employ the 
 whole Imperial Guard, but could not have prevented the 
 wasteful and unsuccessful cavalry attacks.* 
 
 It is unnecessary to notice the idle remark that, as 
 Grouchy was ordered to march to Wavre, he is not to 
 be blamed for not making a different movement, however 
 better this might have been. Napoleon and perhaps Soult 
 are alone to blame. t Writers who take this position are 
 blind to the facts, or worse. Apart from the interpretation 
 to be put on Soult's letters, Grouchy did not receive these 
 until the afternoon of the i8th ; his instructions were 
 those given by Napoleon on the 17th, either in person or 
 through the message of Bertrand. He was perfectly free 
 to march to Moustier and Ottignies from four in the 
 morning of the i8th to four in the evening ; he is solely 
 responsible for not having taken this course. Another 
 criticism on Grouchy of very different value is of real 
 importance, and deserves close attention. Since the 
 publication of Marbot's * Memoirs,' Napoleon, we know, 
 expected Grouchy to cross the Dyle at Moustier and 
 Ottignies, and to be on the field of Waterloo at an early 
 hour, whether in compliance or not with orders received 
 
 * As to the operations of Grouchy and to what he might have 
 accomplished, the reader may be referred to Jomini, 'Precis de la 
 Campagne de 1815,' 219, 224; Thiers, ' Histoire du Consulat et de 
 I'Empire,' vi. 504, 510, 515, 517 ; Van Loben Sels, 322, 323, 340; La 
 Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 315, 343; Ropes, 'The Waterloo 
 Campaign,' 243, 262, 281, 288 ; H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 245, 248, 
 284, 297, 441, 451, 484, 495. The only writer who takes a contrary 
 view, and has dealt with the subject seriously, is Charras (ii. 91, 121). 
 He is able and plausible, but inaccurate and sophistical. No English 
 writer has gone really into the question. 
 
 t Mr. Ropes ('The Campaign of Waterloo,' 249, 250) has treated 
 this criticism as it deserves.
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 327 
 
 on the night of the 17th, which were given, we beheve, 
 but never reached the Marshal. Apart, however, from 
 considerations of this kind. Napoleon, in his narrative of 
 the campaign, has pronounced a judgment on Grouchy's 
 conduct, and on what he might have done on June 17 
 and 18, which cannot be lightly passed over. Grouchy, 
 we have seen, had marched extremely slowly to Gem- 
 bloux ; had halted around the town on the night of 
 the 17th ; had left his camp very late on the following 
 day, and had only reached Wavre about half-past four, 
 soon before he began his attack on Thielmann. The 
 Emperor has insisted that had his lieutenant advanced 
 beyond Gembloux to Wavre on the 17th, or had marched 
 rapidly and early on the i8th, and had been before Wavre 
 in the forenoon, he would either have kept the whole of 
 Blucher's army on the spot, or three-fourths of it — that 
 is, excepting the corps of Bulow ; and in either event 
 the French would have gained Waterloo.* We may 
 think that, in coming to this conclusion. Napoleon under- 
 rated Blucher's energy, and that the Prussian army, 
 go,ooo strong, or three-fourths of it, would not have been 
 completely held in check by Grouchy, appearing with only 
 33,000 men, at Wavre ; the movement could not have 
 been as effective as that across the Dyle by Moustier and 
 Ottignies, which would have brought Grouchy on the 
 flank of Bulow and Pirch, far from each other and in 
 divided masses. But if we bear in mind that Blucher 
 and Gneisenau thought that Grouchy had only 15,000 
 
 * ' Comment.,' v. 182 : 'Si le Mardchal Grouchy eut couchd devant 
 Wavre, comme il le devait et eu re^ut Tordre le soir du 17, le Mardchal 
 Blucher y fut reste en observation, avec toutes ses forces; se croyant 
 poursuivi par toute I'armee frangaise. Si le Mardchal Grouchy comme 
 il I'avait ^crit k deux heures apres minuit de son camp k Gembloux, 
 eut pris les armes a la pointe du jour, c'est k dire k quatre heures du 
 matin, il ne fut pas arrivd k Wavre k temps pour empecher le detache- 
 ment du Gdn^ral Bulow, mais il eut arrets les trois autres corps du 
 G^ndral Bliicher ; la victoire ^tait encore certaine.'
 
 328 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 men, it is very difficult to say that, when they had ascer- 
 tained he had a force before Wavre of more than two- 
 fold strength, they would not have kept the greatest part 
 of the Prussian army around the town for hours, and thus 
 given time to Napoleon to defeat Wellington. 
 
 Had Grouchy, therefore, been worthy of his trust, the 
 facts and the probabilities of the case show that he could 
 have prevented the junction of Blucher and Wellington, 
 and secured a victory for his master on June 18.* The 
 question was not, as has been untruly said, of the 
 superiority in numbers of the Prussian army ; it was 
 whether, as affairs stood on the scene of events, the 
 French restraining wing had the means to stop it, and 
 this can be answered in the affirmative with but little 
 room for doubt. It follows that Grouchy was the real 
 and the main author of the disaster that befell the arms 
 of France ; the Marshal's conduct, Napoleon has justly 
 remarked, was no more to be anticipated than that an 
 earthquake would swallow up his whole army on his 
 march. t But it does not follow that the Emperor was 
 altogether free from blame, though this is infinitely less 
 than has been commonly supposed. The lethargy which 
 made him prostrate on the morning of the 17th explains, 
 and can alone explain, how it came to pass that the line 
 of Blucher's retreat was not ascertained at an early hour, 
 and Grouchy not detached with the restraining wing to 
 hold the Prussian army so completely in check that it 
 could not by any possibility reach that of Wellington. 
 But for this Napoleon would deserve the severest censure; 
 as the facts are, he is more to be pitied than condemned. 
 
 * Jomini (' Precis de la Campagne de 181 5,' 261) pointedly says : 
 ' Le plan d'opdrations adoptd 6\.ait si bien le plus convenable, que . . . 
 il eut complctement reussi ... si I'aile droite avail pris la direction de 
 Moustier.' 
 
 t ' Comment.,' v. 209 : ' La conduite du Mardchal Grouchy dtait aussi 
 impr<^voyable que si, sur sa route, son armee eut dprouve un tremble- 
 ment dc terre qui I'eut engloutie.'
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 329 
 
 We believe, too, that the Emperor, on the night of the 
 17th, did communicate with Grouchy more frequently than 
 has been acknowledged by most of his critics; it seems most 
 probable that he ordered the Marshal to move on Waterloo 
 with a detachment or with his whole army, though 
 Grouchy never received the message. But Napoleon 
 underrated Blucher, and was too obstinately convinced 
 that the veteran at Wavre could not draw near Wellington 
 — though even here we must recollect the Bertrand letter ; 
 he turned a deaf ear to the warnings of Jerome, perhaps 
 of Milhaud ; he placed too implicit a faith in Grouchy, 
 and refused to see that an army of 90,000 men might 
 elude an army of 33,000 if this was not directed by an 
 able chief. Napoleon, too, ought to have been more 
 observant of the despatches of Soult — ambiguous, ill- 
 worded, sent often by a single officer too late ; but here 
 again he deserves rather compassion than blame. Perhaps 
 his chief fault was that he gave Grouchy a command, 
 which he ought to have seen that Grouchy was not fit for, 
 from the Marshal's own expressions on the 17th ; had 
 Gerard had the command of the restraining wing, the 
 catastrophe that was witnessed would not have occurred. 
 
 As it was most probable that Grouchy would possess 
 the means of separating Blucher from Wellington on 
 June 18, it follows, too, that the movement of Blucher to 
 join Wellington was perilous and essentially bad strategy, 
 and of this Gneisenau appears to have been conscious. 
 Had the Prussian Generals been aware that Grouchy was 
 at hand with 33,000 men, very possibly they would not 
 have stirred from Wavre — for some time, at least ; but, 
 with Wellington, they believed he had only 15,000. Yet 
 it is astonishing they entertained this idea ; they ought 
 to have been convinced, from a study of Napoleon's 
 campaigns, that he would detach a powerful restraining 
 wing to keep them away from Wellington while the 
 Emperor should fall on the army at Waterloo. Never-
 
 330 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 theless, they made the movement, being in ignorance of 
 the real facts. This secured a decisive and grand triumph, 
 but it ought to have been rendered vain by Grouchy ; and 
 then the errors of this combination would have become 
 apparent, the Prussian army would have been placed in 
 the gravest danger, and Wellington would have certainly 
 lost the battle. It has been truly said, besides, that the 
 projects of the allied leaders were such as ought to have 
 ensured their defeat. Had Grouchy had only 15,000 men 
 with him, Napoleon would have been able to attack the 
 Duke with not much less than 100,000 ; his army could 
 not have escaped a disaster at Waterloo. And this brings 
 us back to what we have said before — Wellington, as 
 affairs stood, ought not to have fought on the i8th ; the 
 probabilities were far too distinctly against him. No 
 doubt he expected the Prussians to be on the field much 
 sooner than they were; but he believed that Napoleon 
 was before him with nearly 100,000 men, all excellent 
 troops of one nation. He had not more than 70,000 of 
 many races — a third, at least, not good. What chances 
 would he have had without the support of Blucher, on 
 which he could not reckon with reasonable hope ? Nay, 
 what chances would he have had, spite of Grouchy's faults 
 had the Emperor attacked him in the early morning ? 
 Beyond question, as Napoleon has proved, he ought to 
 have retreated beyond Brussels, and effected there his 
 junction with Blucher; both would then have been assured 
 of ultimate success, neither would have well-nigh courted 
 defeat. That Wellington did not adopt this obvious course 
 was probably because he thought the retention of Brussels 
 of the highest importance to the allied cause ; he sacrificed 
 military to political ends, very seldom judicious conduct 
 in war. 
 
 To extol the strategy of the allies on June 17 and 18 
 is simply to set the plainest evidence at naught. But 
 national prejudice is of enormous power ; the idolaters of
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 331 
 
 success, the detractors of genius, were to act according 
 to their ignoble kind. Hence the operations of Grouchy 
 have been misdescribed — nay, falsified — or, what is worse, 
 have been httle noticed, though obviously of supreme 
 importance. It was necessary to justify the ill-designed 
 movement from Ligny to Wavre, a half-measure that 
 ought to have been disastrous. Attempts have therefore 
 been made to prove that, whatever Grouchy could do, 
 this made the movement of Blucher on Waterloo certain. 
 It was necessary to maintain the absurd position that the 
 allies outmanoeuvred Napoleon on the 17th and the i8th. 
 It has been contended, accordingly, that the great master 
 never even suspected the plans of his enemies ; that he 
 sent Grouchy in the wrong direction ; that he did not 
 conceive it was Grouchy's duty to keep Blucher away 
 from Wellington at any point in the space between Wavre 
 and Waterloo — nay, to be in close relations with the main 
 French army. It was necessary, in order to support these 
 views, to make charges against Napoleon which cannot 
 be sustained, and to make apologies for Grouchy that are 
 utterly untrue ; to insist that the Emperor scarcely gave 
 a thought to the position of his lieutenant, and that it 
 was for him to do what Grouchy was bound to do — to 
 ascertain accurately where the Prussians were ; to show 
 that Grouchy could not on June 18 have stopped — nay, 
 even delayed — Blucher ; to make the Emperor alone 
 responsible for the defeat of Waterloo ; to exonerate the 
 Marshal wholly from blame. Especially it was necessary 
 to hurry over the facts ; to avoid a thorough investigation 
 of them ; to jump to the conclusion that, because Blucher 
 was largely superior in force, it was impossible that 
 Grouchy could act with effect against him ; to deal in 
 plausible generalities ; to avoid sound criticism. This 
 sophistry and mystification, however, are being dispelled ; 
 few capable writers will now deny that, but for Grouchy, 
 Napoleon would have gained Waterloo, and that the allies,
 
 332 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 many and great as their merits were, ought not to have 
 been victorious on June 18.* 
 
 Passing from Waterloo to the campaign as a whole, we 
 shall try to pronounce an impartial judgment, if our know- 
 ledge is in some particulars incomplete. The supremacy 
 of Napoleon's strategic genius has seldom, if ever, been 
 more distinctly displayed than in this memorable passage 
 of arms. The outlaw of Europe, the ruler of a divided 
 France, he seizes the initiative as he seized it in 1800 and 
 1805. With military forces not a third of those of the 
 allies, he sees in the wide distance between the hosts of 
 the coalition in the north and east an opportunity of 
 brilliant, perhaps decisive, success. The dissemination 
 of the armies of Blucher and Wellington along a broad 
 and deep front in Belgium ; the weakness of their centre 
 where their inner flanks met ; the faulty arrangements of 
 the allied chiefs, especially the great interval between their 
 headquarters — all this induces him to spring on them 
 from across the frontier of France, in the hope of dividing 
 and defeating them in detail ; and the opposite natures of 
 the hostile commanders, correctly appreciated in a great 
 measure, form other elements on which to found a hope of 
 victory. At the outset the rising in La Vendee deprived 
 the Emperor of a considerable part of his forces, which 
 might have made his triumph assured. His calculatious 
 are baffled, but he had made his choice ; it is now too 
 late to give up the venture. The operations leading to 
 the invasion of Belgium were as masterly as any in that 
 
 * For a general review and criticism of the combinations of the 
 allies on June 17 and 18, see the unanswerable remarks of Napoleon, 
 ' Comment.,' v. 209, 210. The Emperor's figures are far from correct, 
 but his reasoning and the conclusions he draws are irresistible. No 
 real attempt has been made to refute them. Mr. Ropes ('The 
 Campaign of Waterloo,' 235, 236, 258, 262, 280, 288) substantially 
 accepts them. Wc have accepted them also, but with some reserva- 
 tions. German and English writers as a rule avoid a thorough ex- 
 amination of the subject.
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 333 
 
 extraordinary career. Four corps of the French army, 
 their movements admirably concealed, are moved from 
 between Lille and Metz along the northern borders of 
 France, under the beard, so to speak, of an unsuspecting 
 enemy ; two corps arc moved from Paris and Soissons to 
 join these. On the night of June 14 the whole army, 
 128,000 strong, is concentrated upon a narrow front, near 
 the Sambre and the town of Charleroy, ready in the 
 course of a single march to pounce upon and seize the 
 weak allied centre. Meanwhile the two hostile armies, 
 about 220,000 strong, have scarcely stirred, and remain 
 for the most part spread over an immense space, their 
 centre and one of their fractions being dangerously ex- 
 posed. 
 
 Napoleon's object for the following day, the 15th, is to 
 close on and destroy the corps of Zieten, extended along 
 and near the Sambre, to occupy the strategic points of 
 Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the lateral road from 
 Nivelles to Namur, the main line of communication of the 
 allies, and at the same time to command at Quatre Bras 
 the great main - road from Charleroy to Brussels, an 
 avenue into the midst of Belgium, and the line very 
 weakly held by the allied centre. This operation was 
 quite feasible ; its success would have annihilated part of 
 Blucher's army, and would have placed the Emperor in 
 a position in which he could hope to strike the hostile 
 army with effect should they move against him, and then 
 to separate and beat them one after another, as he had 
 done in his immortal campaign of Italy. Napoleon's 
 march was perfectly designed, but the accident that 
 delayed Vandamme, the desertion of Bourmont, and the 
 mischance that kept Gerard back — this retarded the 
 advance to Charleroy. The corps of Zieten, ably handled, 
 escaped, and a large part of the French army, which 
 ought to have been over the Sambre by noon, was as 
 night fell on the southern bank of the river. Meanwhile,
 
 334 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 owing mainly to the hesitations of Ney, Quatre Bras was 
 not seized as it might have easily been, and partly owing 
 to the skill of Zieten, and partly to disputes between 
 Grouchy and Vandamme, the same incident occurred as 
 regards Sombreffe. The day, it has truly been said, was 
 incomplete, but it was not the less full of most auspicious 
 promise. The allies were still far apart from each other, 
 and unable to resist Napoleon with nearly their united 
 forces ; he was within easy reach of their weak centre, 
 and might expect important success on the morrow. 
 
 The Emperor on the night of the 15th was suffering 
 from the physical decline which affected his conduct in 
 the campaign, but we differ from the critics who impute 
 inactivity to him on the morning of the i6th. He 
 thought his enemies were falling back before him, accord- 
 ing to true strategic principles ; there was no necessity, in 
 that case, for a rapid forward movement. He expected 
 easily to master Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, and even to 
 reach Brussels on June 17. But his dispositions were so 
 ably made that they assured him success in almost any 
 event, and ought to Have secured him decisive success in 
 the events that happened. Ney was directed to occupy 
 Quatre Bras, and to send a detachment to his right to 
 support the main army ; Grouchy was ordered to advance 
 to Sombreffe, and even to Gembloux. But meanwhile 
 Blucher had pressed forward to Sombreffe and Ligny with 
 three -fourths of his army only, eager to give battle, 
 hoping for aid from Wellington, who, however, was in 
 no position to give it. Napoleon admirably seized the 
 occasion, and made arrangements that ought to have 
 destroyed the Prussian army — nay, probably brought the 
 campaign to an end. While the Emperor should attack 
 Blucher in front, the detachment of Ney was to fall on 
 his rear ; D'Erlon was ordered afterwards to make a 
 similar movement. Had either attack been made, Ligny 
 would have been another Jena. But Ney had been most
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 335 
 
 remiss and irresolute on this day ; he had even disobeyed 
 his master's orders. He had not assembled his army at 
 an early hour, as was his simple and obvious duty ; as the 
 general result, he had no body of troops to descend on the 
 rear of the Prussians. D'Erlon failed also to make his 
 attack, partly owing to the misconduct of Ney, partly to 
 his own thoughtlessness and want of insight, in some 
 degree to a mistake made by Napoleon himself. Blucher 
 thus escaped the annihilation that had been prepared for 
 him, but after a desperate conflict his centre was pierced 
 through, and his army was driven, beaten, from the field. 
 In the meantime Ney at Quatre Bras had fought an in- 
 decisive combat with Wellington, whose forces had come 
 up in driblets and piecemeal. The Marshal ought not 
 only to have been able to make the detachment, which 
 would have wrought the ruin of Blucher, but ought to 
 have severely beaten the Duke, who largely owed his 
 safety for a time to the Belgian Perponcher. Ney, how- 
 ever, would not collect his forces in time ; he set express 
 orders at naught, whatever his motive. He held Welling- 
 ton, indeed, in check, but this was a trifle to what he 
 should have achieved. The i6th, hke the 15th, was in- 
 complete, but Napoleon had gained already most impor- 
 tant success, and the future was big with magnificent 
 promise. 
 
 Ligny had not blotted out the Prussian army, as the 
 Emperor had had reason to expect, but superior strategy 
 had wrought its effects. The French had mastered the 
 weak alhed centre ; Blucher, defeated on the i6th, had 
 been forced away from his colleague ; it was impossible, 
 had due precautions been taken, that the two chiefs could 
 join hands in front of Brussels. An opportunity now 
 presented itself, such as has seldom presented itself in 
 war, to attack Wellington and to beat the enemy in detail, 
 the great end of Napoleon's aims. The British General 
 was isolated at Quatre Bras ; Napoleon and Ney could
 
 336 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 fall upon him early on the 17th with forces far superior 
 in numbers and strength. He could hardly have escaped 
 a great disaster. The examples of many campaigns since 
 the days of Turenne prove what the Napoleon of 1796 to 
 i8og would assuredly have done at this conjuncture. He 
 would have made himself certain of the situation on the 
 night of the i6th, have detached from his army a strong 
 restraining wing to pursue and to hold Blucher in check, 
 and then assailed Wellington quickly in overwhelming 
 force. But all went wrong with the French army on that 
 eventful night ; the retreat of the Prussians was not even 
 observed. Napoleon fell ill, and was overcome by the 
 lethargy that for a time paralysed his commanding 
 powers. He gave no orders until late on the morning of 
 the 17th ; he even contemplated a halt for a day. As the 
 forenoon was advancing, he changed his purpose ; he gave 
 Grouchy a large restraining wing, directing him to follow 
 Blucher and to complete his defeat, warning him that the 
 allied leaders might try to unite, practically ordering the 
 Marshal to stand between them. He then marched to 
 Quatre Bras with the mass of his forces, in the hope of 
 reaching and overpowering Wellington. This was his 
 characteristic and perfectly correct strategy, but it was 
 too late ; the opportunity had been lost. Napoleon had 
 again to complain of Ney at Quatre Bras, but the chance 
 of completely defeating Wellington had passed away ; the 
 Duke had skilfully effected his retreat. Napoleon pursued 
 his adversary, but to little purpose ; military movements 
 were almost prevented by torrents of rain. Tl^ French 
 army on the evening of the 17th halted in front of 
 Wellington's army before Waterloo. 
 
 The Prussian army retreated from Ligny to Wavre, 
 defeated but not pursued, or even observed. This move- 
 ment was made by the direction of Gneisenau, Blucher 
 having been disabled for a time ; it has been extolled by 
 the idolaters of success, but it was essentially an ill-
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 3S7 
 
 designed and feeble movement. As affairs stood on 
 June 17, the Prussians could have made for Waterloo, 
 and joined Wellington — the operations of the French had 
 been so tardy and careless ; this would really have been 
 fine strategy. The retreat to Wavre left them far from 
 their supports, and ought to have proved disastrous on 
 June 18. Nevertheless, if we except Thielmann, who 
 halted for several hours and much too long, the Prussian 
 leaders showed activity and resource ; the troops, beaten 
 as they had been, were not cowed, and gave proof of 
 remarkable energy. By the night of the 17th the four 
 corps of Blucher's army — Bulow had come into line from 
 Liege and Hannut — were assembled around Wavre, on 
 both banks of the Dyle ; they were about go,ooo strong. 
 The object of their chiefs was now to join Wellington ; 
 but they were some ten or eleven miles from Waterloo, 
 a most difficult country between, not, as at Ligny, 
 about six or seven, with an excellent communication 
 by the lateral road from Nivelles to Namur. Meanwhile 
 Grouchy, in command of the restraining wing, had reached 
 Gembloux, where he had been sent by Napoleon ; but his 
 movement had been extraordinarily slow. On the night 
 of the 17th he was hardly beyond Gembloux — that is, 
 from ten to fourteen miles from Wavre. This was a bad 
 beginning ; but nothing was yet endangered had Grouchy 
 taken his measures for the next day with judgment and 
 insight. He had ascertained long before daybreak on the 
 1 8th that the Prussian army was around Wavre; had he 
 broken up from Gembloux at an early hour, and marched 
 across the Dyle by Moustier and Ottignies, he would have 
 prevented Blucher from joining Wellington, and France 
 would not have lost Waterloo. 
 
 The morning of June 18 has come ; the decisive success 
 which might have been won on the i6th and the 17th is 
 now hardly possible. Napoleon, indeed, might have been 
 checkmated. Had the allied commanders fallen back 
 
 22
 
 338 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 beyond Brussels, they could have joined hands without 
 running risks ; in that case their armies would have been 
 greatly superior to the French in numbers. Napoleon 
 would have been fortunate had he repassed the frontier — 
 discomfited, baffled, his plans frustrated. But Wellington 
 chose to make a stand at Waterloo with an army weaker 
 than it need have been, and very much weaker than that 
 of his enemy, on the assumption that Blucher would come 
 to his support, about mid-day or a little after. The Duke 
 believed that Napoleon had more than go, 000 men in his 
 front, the whole French army, in fact, except 15,000 ; he 
 could not have withstood the Emperor's attack, in that 
 case, for any length of time with his motley army of 70,000. 
 Nay, though Napoleon had only 72,000 men, the Duke 
 would have been defeated before his colleague could reach 
 him, had the attack been made in the early forenoon, as 
 it would have certainly been made but for the state of 
 the weather. On the other hand, neither Blucher nor 
 Wellington had a right to suppose that a powerful 
 restraining wing would not be employed to prevent their 
 junction ; in that position of aff"airs they had no right to 
 assume that their armies would come together on the 
 field of the battle at hand. 
 
 These calculations were in principle false ; it was the 
 insolent play of fortune that they proved successful. The 
 great fight of Waterloo, however, begins ; the tactics of 
 the French show impatience and want of caution ; the 
 attacks are ill-conducted and ill-designed. Ney is as 
 reckless as he was remiss at Ouatre Bras ; the strength 
 of Napoleon's army is wasted. The defence of Wellington 
 is most admirably sustained ; the constancy of his British 
 and German Legionary troops is above praise. Mean- 
 while Grouchy, the commander of the restraining wing, 
 does exactly what he ought not to do ; he leaves Gembloux 
 late ; his movements are slow. He does not make for the 
 Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies ; he sets at naught the
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 339 
 
 counsels of Gdrard, and will not march on Waterloo when 
 he hears its thunder. He does not try to place himself 
 between Blucher and Wellington ; he advances to Wavre, 
 keeping aloof from his master ; he allows Blucher, scarcely 
 molested, to reach the decisive scene of action. The re- 
 straining wing, in a word, is almost worse than useless. 
 Meantime Bulow begins his attack. Napoleon is compelled 
 to fight two battles ; the French army is placed in terrible 
 straits ; and, after the defeat of part of the Imperial Guard, 
 the irruption of Zieten and Pirch completes a disaster 
 almost as frightful as ever was seen in war. But had 
 Grouchy been equal to his task, the catastrophe could 
 not have occurred; nay, Waterloo would have been a 
 victory for the arms of France. 
 
 The splendour of the triumph achieved at Waterloo 
 cannot hide from the sight of the true student of war 
 the strategic errors which, so to speak, were its prelude. 
 The superiority of Napoleon in the great combinations of 
 his art, and the complete inferiority of his opponents, are, 
 indeed, the salient features of the campaign of 1815 ; these 
 give it its chief historical interest. With an army not 
 much more than half in numbers that of his enemy, the 
 Emperor outmanoeuvres the allied commanders at once ; 
 but for accidents he would have routed Blucher on the i6th, 
 and probably routed Wellington on the next day. His 
 chances on the i8th were less ; but he would have gained 
 Waterloo had he attacked in the morning, or had Gerard 
 had the command of Grouchy. The strategy of his 
 adversaries, on the other hand, was essentially faulty from 
 first to last ; strategically they were not fit to cope with 
 Napoleon. Their arrangements before the contest were 
 ill-conceived ; the dispersion of their forces, the weakness 
 of their centre, the great distance between their head- 
 quarters, their immobility when they first heard of 
 Napoleon's advance — all this subjected them from the 
 outset to the gravest peril. Other and even more palpable 
 
 22 — 2
 
 340 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 mistakes followed. Blucher rushed into the lion's mouth 
 at Ligny, and only escaped being swallowed up by a 
 chance. The delays of Wellington on the 15th may be 
 yet explained ; but they were unfortunate in a very high 
 degree. The campaign might have been brought to an 
 end at Ligny. Gneisenau's march to Wavre was a bad 
 half-measure, which increased the distance between the 
 allied armies ; the Duke ought not to have left a great 
 detachment at Hal and Tubizc, and weakened his army 
 at the decisive point. He ought not to have offered battle 
 on the 1 8th ; the iiank march from Wavre ought to have 
 failed — nay, proved disastrous. Blucher and Wellington, 
 instead of running enormous and unnecessary risks, ought 
 to have fallen behind Brussels, and thus have baffled their 
 enemy, and made their ultimate success certain. 
 
 It would be unfair, however, to judge either Blucher 
 or Wellington as strategists by their operations in 1815. 
 They, indeed, gave each other cordial support, and acted 
 as true companions in arms ; but their movements give 
 proof of the divided counsels so often fatal in the case 
 of the chiefs of a League, and, in this very instance, not 
 without untoward results. Wellington would probably 
 not have advanced to Quatre Bras, with portions of his 
 army hurried up piecemeal, had not Blucher advanced to 
 Ligny. He would not have challenged Napoleon with all 
 the chances against him ; he probably would have fallen 
 back on Waterloo, marked out by him as a position for 
 a great defensive battle. Had he had the command of 
 the two armies, they might have been assembled at that 
 place on June 17, and had Napoleon attacked he must 
 have been defeated. In leaving the detachment at Hal 
 and Tubizc, the Duke perhaps revealed a lurking suspicion 
 that Blucher could not reach the field of Waterloo ; in 
 that case the detachment would have been of the greatest 
 use to him had he been compelled to retreat behind the 
 Forest of Soignies ; it would probably have joined his
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 341 
 
 army and made up for its losses. And Wellington, it 
 seems likely, would not have fought at Waterloo had he 
 not thought the possession of Brussels of supreme im- 
 portance. Here he made strategy subordinate to the 
 needs of politics ; it may account for his conduct in this 
 respect that the general gave way to the statesman. 
 
 But if the strategy of the allied chiefs cannot commend 
 itself to impartial judges, high praise, though in different 
 degrees, is certainly due to both as soldiers. Blucher 
 ought not to have advanced to Ligny ; he arrayed his 
 army in the field with little judgment ; he made grave 
 mistakes in the battle. But his heroism almost redeemed 
 his faults. The spirit he breathed into his devoted troops 
 enabled them to rise superior to defeat, and gave them 
 the energy we see in their retreat on the 17th. That the 
 Prussian army, too, ever reached Waterloo, and that 
 Bulow fell on Napoleon's flank in time, was owing to 
 Blucher, and Blucher alone ; Gneisenau and his subordi- 
 nates would not have made these movements with success. 
 Here we see Blucher in his best aspect, rash and heady, 
 no doubt, but indomitable in adverse fortune. The con- 
 duct of Wellington was even more to be admired in many 
 respects, and the burden and heat of the day on the i8th 
 fell, we must recollect, on the British General. He 
 effected his retreat most skilfully on the i6th ; the dis- 
 position of his army at Waterloo, and the masterly 
 defence he made on the field, have justly deserved the 
 greatest eulogy. Had Blucher been in command, the old 
 Marshal would probably have been defeated in four or 
 five hours. But what, as always, was apparent in Wel- 
 lington was his calm, stern, and invincible constancy, the 
 grand strength of character which was his most distinc- 
 tive excellence. Undoubtedly, as we survey the course 
 of the campaign, we see that Napoleon underrated the 
 best qualities of his antagonists on more than one occa- 
 sion.
 
 342 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Superior strategy, nevertheless, usually prevails in war. 
 The superiority of Napoleon's strategy in the campaign 
 of 1815 is not doubtful. Why, then, was the result the 
 disaster of Waterloo ? We may glance at the minor 
 causes of Napoleon's defeat, though these did not deter- 
 mine the final issue. The Emperor's army was too small; 
 128,000 men could with difficulty be pitted against 
 220,000 ; sufficient allowance could not be made for 
 mere mischances. The 20,000 men sent off to La 
 Vendue might very probably have redressed the balance 
 of fortune. Napoleon, too, made some positive mistakes. 
 He did not summon D'Erlon to the field of Ligny when 
 D'Erlon appeared ; he refused to listen to Jerome, and 
 perhaps to Milhaud, as regards the chances of a Prussian 
 advance from Wavre ; he would not believe the move- 
 ment possible ; he allowed Ney at Waterloo to waste the 
 greatest part of his cavalry ; he may have missed an 
 opportunity to attack with the Guard after the first 
 repulse of Bulow. And unquestionably he undervalued 
 Blucher and Wellington, and formed too low an estimate 
 of both the allied armies. He ridiculed the Prussian chief 
 as ' an old hussar '; he thought Wellington essentially a 
 bad General. These false calculations more than once 
 deceived him. And so it was with the forces opposed to 
 him. He declared that a French soldier was worth two 
 Prussians ; he would not believe until it was too late that 
 British troops were what they have always been from 
 Blenheim and Ramillics to Busaco and Waterloo. All 
 this certainly told against him, and distinctly affected the 
 course of events. These, however, were not the main 
 causes of the catastrophe that was seen at Waterloo. 
 Had Ney been equal to himself — nay, had he obeyed his 
 orders — Ligny would have beheld the destruction of 
 Blucher's army, the Duke could hardly have effected his 
 escape, the campaign in Belgium probably would have 
 come to an end. The same result would have followed
 
 REFLECTIONS ON WATERLOO 343 
 
 had Ney not recalled D'Erlon, or had D'Erlon acted with 
 vigour and insight ; and Reille also is to blame for the 
 delays before Quatrc Bras. On the 17th, again, Napoleon 
 must have gained decisive success had he been the 
 General of Areola and Rivoli. We can only ascribe the 
 extraordinary failure of that day, when the issue of the 
 contest was virtually in his hands, to the lethargy which 
 occasionally made him prostrate, and simply good for 
 nothing. He would have gained Waterloo but for the 
 strange misconduct of Grouchy, an aberration of judg- 
 ment most difficult to account for. He could even have 
 won but for the state of the weather. The paramount 
 causes of the result of the campaign were that Napoleon 
 was not the Napoleon of old, and that the lieutenants in 
 whom he trusted failed him. Soult, too, the Chief of his 
 Staff, deserves severe censure for his inactivity, his remiss- 
 ness, and bad despatches. Very possibly he had much to 
 do with the tissue of mistakes that kept Grouchy away 
 from his master.* Except Gerard, too, the subordinate 
 chiefs of the French army were inferior to their former 
 'selves, and this was especially the case with the chiefs in 
 the highest command. Nor can this surprise anyone 
 acquainted with the facts. The memory of past misfor- 
 tunes weighed heavily on all these men. They were 
 unnerved by the prospect of a struggle with Europe ; they 
 had been demoralised by the events of 1814-15 ; they were 
 divided by jealousies and angry discords ; they knew their 
 officers and their troops had little confidence in them. 
 The contest may be described in a figure of speech : the 
 eagle was suffering, even when it made its swoop. This, 
 at the outset, was terrible and swift ; but it could not use 
 its wings to close on its quarry ; it had to fight with beak 
 and talons only ; and yet it was with difficulty over- 
 
 * Thidbault, we have said, disliked Soult, but says of the Marshal 
 (' Mdnioires,' v. 355) : ' Bourmont major-gendral n'eut pas mieux fait 
 que Soult.'
 
 344 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 powered by the birds of prey that gathered around it at 
 last. 
 
 The brave men who fought in 1815 have passed away ; 
 no evil phantoms should rise over their honoured graves ; 
 enough to say they nearly all did their duty. A very few 
 words, however, may be said on the qualities displayed by 
 the contending armies. The French soldiery gave proof 
 of the high courage of the race ; but the French army 
 was deficient in discipline, organisation, and the power of 
 endurance. The old Grand Army would not have been 
 annihilated on the day of Waterloo. Many of the auxili- 
 aries of Wellington did not stand the strain of a tre- 
 mendous conflict, but many did service of real value ; the 
 British and German Legionary troops were worthy of 
 themselves. As for the Prussian army, it was ill-directed 
 at Ligny ; but it exhibited great tenacity and stubborn 
 valour, and its conduct in the retreat of the 17th deserves 
 the highest praise. As regards Napoleon, it was well, 
 perhaps, for his renown that he succumbed on his last 
 fatal field of Waterloo. The campaign in Belgium might 
 have ended on June 16, but the war would assuredly not 
 have ended. The Emperor made a complete mistake in 
 calculating that England would change her policy after 
 a single defeat. The League of Europe was bent on 
 destroying its still-feared enemy. Napoleon must have 
 fallen at last, with less glory on his arms, perhaps, than 
 that which shone on them in the campaign of 1815. For 
 the rest, that grand passage of arms remains a model on 
 his part of splendid conceptions marred by faulty execu- 
 tion from first to last, as on the part of his adversaries the 
 reverse was the case. They carried out admirably, as a 
 rule, conceptions essentially faulty in themselves. But 
 Waterloo has not dimmed the fame of Napoleon any more 
 than Zama has dimmed the fame of Hannibal. Each is 
 supreme in modern and in ancient war.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY — THE SECOND FALL OF 
 
 NAPOLEON 
 
 Grouchy, as yet ignorant of the result of Waterloo, makes preparation 
 to attack Thielmann and march on Brussels — Thielmann, who 
 had heard of the victory, attacks Grouchy, but is repulsed — 
 Grouchy receives the news of the complete defeat of Napoleon 
 — He retreats to Namur, and thence to Givet — This movement 
 was rapid and judicious, but has been unduly extolled — Partial 
 success of the French armies on the frontier and in La Vendee — 
 The intelligence of the rout of Waterloo reaches Paris — Unwise 
 attitude of the Chambers and their foolish expectations — Per- 
 fidious conduct of Fouch^ — He schemes for the restoration of 
 Louis XVni. — Napoleon returns to Paris and proposes to defend 
 France if assisted by the Chambers — These, under the influence 
 of Fouche and Lafayette, usurp power — Napoleon abdicates — 
 Fouch^ at the head of a Provisional Government — He goes on 
 with his treacherous policy, and prevents any real efforts to 
 make a national defence — His negotiations with Wellington, 
 who seconds him and indicates the conditions of peace — Fouche 
 exposed to danger — Proposal of Napoleon to attack Blucher 
 rejected by Fouch^ — Indignation of the army and the popula- 
 tion of Paris — Imprudence of Blucher — Wise and statesmanlike 
 conduct of Wellington — The capitulation of Paris and the re- 
 storation of Louis XVIII. — Fouch^'s policy triumphs, but only 
 for a short time — Great position of WeUington — The service he 
 does to France — Reflections — Conclusion. 
 
 The rout of Waterloo left the army of Grouchy the only 
 organised force remaining to France in Belgium. The 
 Marshal, ignorant of the catastrophe, cherished, we have 
 seen, the illusion that his master had won the battle ; he
 
 346 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 resolved during the night of June 18 to make good his 
 way from Wavre to Brussels, where he expected to find 
 and join the main French army. He ordered Vandamme 
 to cross the Dyle and to come into line with him, and 
 made preparations for a determined attack on the enemy 
 in his front between Rixensart and Wavre. By daybreak 
 on the igth Thielmann received the news that the allies 
 had gained a decisive victory ; he detached a considerable 
 part of his troops to the support of Zieten, who, we have 
 said, had not reached Waterloo in force — it is difficult to 
 understand this movement ; he fell on Grouchy at an early 
 hour in the morning, assuming that the Marshal was 
 thinking only of his escape. Grouchy, however, had as 
 yet heard nothing of the tragical events which had just 
 taken place ; he made a vigorous resistance, but was com- 
 pelled to give way, Vandamme having disobeyed his orders, 
 and not having come to his superior's aid. The Prussians 
 pressed forward, Thielmann having been informed of the 
 results of Waterloo by a despatch from Blucher himself, 
 and having been apprised that Pirch had been sent off 
 from the field to intercept Grouchy and to bar his retreat. 
 But the French successfully opposed the enemy ; and part 
 of Vandamme's corps having reached the scene, Thielmann 
 was obliged to execute a change of front, this, however, 
 enabling him still to keep Grouchy in check, and to retain 
 his hold on the roads from Wavre to Brussels. But 
 Grouchy, seconded by this time by Vandamme in force, 
 resumed the offensive and advanced. Thielmann, assailed 
 in front, and threatened in flank by one of the divisions 
 of Vandamme which had crossed the Dyle, with somewhat 
 precipitate haste retreated, and, losing all contact with the 
 allied army, fell back fully half a march towards Louvain. 
 It was now near eleven in the forenoon. Grouchy, 
 still in command of more than 30,000 men — his losses at 
 Wavre were not 3,000 — pushed forward to Rosieren and 
 La Bavette, elated with his recent success, fully expecting
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 347 
 
 that he would soon meet the Emperor. At this moment 
 a haggard spectre, so to speak, came across him. This 
 was one of the two messengers* sent off to inform the 
 unfortunate Marshal of the late catastrophe ; broken down 
 and terror-stricken, he could hardly utter a word or report 
 his orders, which appear not to have been in writing.t 
 Grouchy, doubtless stung by conscience to the quick, 
 and shedding, it has been said, bitter tears to no purpose, 
 instantly assembled a kind of council of war. His first 
 and, we must add his natural, impulse was to try to 
 justify his conduct on the preceding day, and especially 
 to explain why he had not followed the counsels of Gerard 
 to march on Waterloo. His excuses were the lame and 
 utterly false apologies which he afterwards endeavoured 
 to palm off on history ; he was listened to in cold and 
 significant silence. The time, however, for complaining 
 of what had happened was passed ; the terrible question 
 was before the French chiefs how to extricate themselves 
 from the midst of their victorious enemies, and if possible 
 to effect their retreat into France. Grouchy thought for 
 a moment of making an attempt to close on the rear of 
 the hostile armies, and thus to attract them towards his 
 own ; Vandamme boldly proposed to advance on Brussels, 
 and then, making a long circuit southwards, to reach the 
 frontier between Lille and Valenciennes. These vain pro- 
 jects, however, were soon abandoned ; Grouchy properly 
 resolved to adopt the only course that promised a reason- 
 able hope of safety — to fall back on Namur, and thence 
 to make his way along the Meuse to Givet. It is still 
 uncertain whether, in taking this step, he was acting in 
 conformity to his master's orders, which seem to have 
 indicated a movement in this direction.! 
 
 * Charras (ii. 160) says there was but a single messenger. H. Hous- 
 saye ('Waterloo,' ii. 427-433) says there were two — one a spy. 
 + Another of the innumerable proofs of the negligence of Soult. 
 I Thiers (' Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 552) relates that
 
 348 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 The retreat began before noon on the 19th ; it was 
 conducted with praiseworthy celerity, and on this day 
 with judgment. Pajol, a very skilful and experienced 
 soldier, was despatched to observe Thielmann, and to 
 feign pursuit ; Excelmans pressed onwards to Namur with 
 his cavalry, and reached the fortress before nightfall, a 
 march from Wavre of more than twenty miles. Mean- 
 while the rest of the army retreated in two columns — 
 Grouchy, with the corps of Gerard, by Mont St. Guibert 
 and Gentinnes ; Vandamme and his corps by Dion le 
 Mont, Tourinnes, and Grand Leez. The movement was 
 not molested ; it was about twice as rapid as that from 
 Gembloux to Wavre on June 18. By the close of the day 
 Grouchy had attained the main lateral road from Nivelles 
 to Namur, and had his bivouacs round Mazy and Temploux ; 
 Vandamme had advanced beyond Gembloux, and was but 
 a few miles from the Marshal on his right. The double 
 march was one of about twenty miles ; it contrasts most 
 strikingly with that of the day before.* Had Grouchy 
 pushed forward to Moustier and Ottignies on the morning 
 of the i8th, even nearly as quickly as he had fallen back 
 from Wavre — nay, had he marched from Walhain to 
 Waterloo at an equal rate of speed — he would have turned 
 the scales of fortune in favour of the arms of France. 
 
 Meantime Thielmann, deceived by Pajol — he masked 
 the retreat with remarkable skill, and successfully rejoined 
 the mass of the army — had continued to fall back for some 
 hours, and did not turn to pursue Grouchy until it was 
 too late. Pirch, too, at the head of troops worn out by 
 
 Napoleon ordered Grouchy to retreat on Namur, but he gives no 
 authority. Charras (ii. 160) asserts that Napoleon j;ave no such 
 orders. H. Houssaye (' Waterloo,' ii. 433) says the retreat, by Napo- 
 leon's directions, was to be either on Philippevillc or on Givet. This 
 seems probable. 
 
 * Grouchy, too, had to carry his sick and wounded men with him 
 in his retreat. This must have hampered him to some extent, and 
 there was no such impediment on June 18.
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 349 
 
 the harassing marches of two days, only reached Mellery 
 by the night of the igth, still some miles from the road 
 from Nivelles to Namiir ; Thielmann was as yet far away 
 and backward. Besides, the united forces of the Prussian 
 chiefs were not superior to those of Grouchy in numbers ; 
 they were converging, at wide distances, against a concen- 
 trated enemy ; their movements were necessarily, there- 
 fore, cautious ; they had hardly a chance of defeating 
 Grouchy. On the 20th the French army resumed its 
 movement, but this was imperilled for a time by an 
 untoward accident. Grouchy, in command of the corps 
 of Gerard, and encumbered by the charge of many sick 
 and wounded men, had ordered Vandamme to cover the 
 retreat ; but Vandamme, always a bad companion in arms, 
 had left his troops and gone off to Namur, conduct for 
 which no kind of excuse can be made ; his corps was 
 attacked by Thielmann's horsemen on the morning of the 
 20th, and for a time was in some danger. Simultaneously 
 the advanced guard of Pirch, moving from Mellery, had 
 approached Grouchy ; but the Marshal, a really good 
 cavalry officer, succeeded in baffling Thielmann's efforts. 
 Vandamme, hastening back from Namur, kept the enemy 
 at bay ; Grouchy and the men of Gerard reached the town 
 in safety ; Vandamme followed at a short distance. The 
 population of Namur detested the Prussians, and felt 
 generous sympathies with the French in their distress. 
 They gave Grouchy every assistance in their power ; his 
 army before long was across the Sambre. Teste, another 
 skilful and bold officer, repelled the attack made by the 
 Prussians on the place, and beat them back with not an 
 inconsiderable loss. Meanwhile Grouchy had continued 
 his movement ; his army, almost intact, had come under 
 the guns of Givet by the evening of June 21.* The 
 
 * For the retreat of Grouchy, see Grouchy, * Relation Succinate,' 
 46, 47; Ollech, 263-269; Wagner, iv. 99; Charras, ii. 157-165; 
 H. Houssaye, 'Waterloo,' ii. 453-488. Chesney, a detractor of Napo-
 
 350 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 intelligence and the resource he had shown in the retreat 
 would have saved Napoleon three days before. 
 
 By this time a revolution, marked with sinister features 
 and humiliating in the extreme to a great nation, was 
 again changing the destinies of France. For some days 
 after Napoleon had left Paris the intelligence that reached 
 the capital was of auspicious promise. The forces on the 
 eastern frontier were keeping the enemy in check ; the 
 rising in La Vendee had collapsed ; the victory of Ligny 
 was welcomed with noisy rejoicings while Waterloo was 
 being fought and decided. There were no tidings of the 
 war on June ig, but on the 20th a sudden and terrible 
 rumour, disseminated, no doubt, by a traitor's hand, 
 spread far and near that a great battle had been lost in 
 Belgium, and that the French army was dissolving in 
 complete rout. A thrill of alarm and dismay ran through 
 the mass of the citizens, and, save amidst the populace in 
 its lower orders — and these were unorganised and without 
 leaders — few symptoms appeared of a patriotic impulse to 
 rally around the Emperor and to resist the invader. In 
 the presence of a disaster declared to be fatal, faction, 
 selfish fears, and the divisions and hatreds of party began 
 to exhibit themselves in their worst aspects ; and the 
 attitude of the Chambers, the depositories of power, was 
 from the first moment unworthy of the representatives of 
 the State. The deputies and the peers had, as it were, 
 but yesterday bowed before the Emperor and sworn 
 allegiance to him. Had real statesmen been among their 
 
 leon, and an apologist of Grouchy ('Waterloo Lectures,' 235, 236), 
 extols the retreat as a grand operation of war. It really was a well- 
 combined movement of a very ordinary kind. Thielmann lost fifteen 
 hours ; Pirch's troops were unable to press a pursuit ; and, besides, 
 Thielmann and Pirch had not the means of overpowering or inter- 
 cepting Grouchy. What is striking in the retreat was the celerity of 
 the march, the very opposite of the hesitations, the delays, and the 
 negligence of June 17 and 18. This makes Grouchy's conduct all the 
 more inexcusable.
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 351 
 
 ranks, they would have resolved, desperate as it might 
 now appear, to support his cause, at least for the present. 
 But the profound distrust they had always shown of 
 Napoleon exhibited itself in vain and angry complaints, 
 and in their inexperienced self-conceit they began to 
 imagine that they could dispense with the great master 
 of war, and save France and secure peace by their own 
 efforts. Two sentiments at this moment possessed their 
 minds and impelled the immense majority to break with 
 Napoleon. They persuaded themselves that on his return 
 from his late defeat he would lay hands on every part of 
 the Government, and effect a second i8th Brumaire ; the 
 reign of Liberalism and of the new ideas would thus come 
 to an end. And at the same time they cherished the 
 idle belief that the armed League of Europe would instantly 
 sheathe the sword should they offer Napoleon up as a 
 sacrifice ; that should they throw Jonah over the tempest 
 would cease ; as if France had not been his accomplice in 
 recent events, and had not given him the means of 
 challenging the world to arms. 
 
 The base intriguer, who at this conjuncture acquired a 
 bad ascendancy in the State in France, left nothing 
 undone to promote these opinions and to increase their 
 force. During the brief period of the second reign of 
 Napoleon, Fouche had been trafficking with the allied 
 Powers ; he had betrayed many most important secrets ; 
 he had even disclosed the strength of the French army, 
 though he had ingeniously counterplotted his own plots, 
 and had withheld the plan of operations he had promised 
 to furnish. He had hated and feared Napoleon for 
 months ; and had the Emperor been victorious in 
 Belgium, he would not improbably have made an example 
 of his traitorous Minister. Fouche's object at this crisis 
 was to overthrow his master, and to compass his ruin, 
 whatever the means. He poured the leprous distilment 
 of his evil counsels into the willing ears of members of
 
 352 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 both Houses, and quickened their animosities and suspi- 
 cious terrors. ' He had urged the Emperor to abdicate 
 at the Champ de Mai ; but the great gambler would throw 
 the dice of war, and had even forgotten his old game. 
 His army had disappeared ; France was in the extreme of 
 peril. Napoleon was within a few miles of the capital ; 
 he would proclaim himself a dictator, dissolve the 
 Chambers, fight desperately to the last, and, sooner than 
 yield, destroy Paris and let the forces of anarchy loose. 
 He must, therefore, be compelled to abdicate, or be driven 
 from the throne.' Fouche at the same time dropped 
 significant hints that, the great disturber of the world 
 having been removed from the scene, the allies might 
 accept the infant King of Rome as the Sovereign of France. 
 They had no wish to impose on the nation a Government 
 not of its choice ; the arrangement would secure the 
 permanent repose of Europe. It is certain, however, that 
 while he made these professions he was already intriguing 
 for the restoration of Louis XVHI,, in the expectation 
 that this would raise him, perhaps, to the highest place in 
 the State. He was too sagacious not to see that, after 
 Waterloo, there was scarcely a hope for the cause of 
 Napoleon or his son, and that the allies would place the 
 Bourbons on the throne again. He had resolved to follow 
 and direct the set of an irresistible current. His services 
 to the coalition and to Louis XVHL would enable him, 
 he hoped, to play in 1815 the part played by Talleyrand 
 the year before ; he would be the master of the situation 
 — nay, of the restored monarchy. Treachery and decep- 
 tion were the elements in which Fouche lived ; but here 
 he stifled any scruples he may have felt by the reflection 
 that, when he had gained his ends, it would be in his 
 power to mitigate the White Terror which he foresaw 
 might become the policy of the new Government of 
 France. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon had arrived in Paris in the early
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 353 
 
 morning of June 21. On his way from Philippeville he 
 had passed through Laon, where he had given some 
 orders, and drawn up an account of the campaign. He 
 had scarcely uttered a word during the long journey. 
 When he reached the palace of the Elys^e, he rebuked 
 one of his affrighted followers by the remark that honour 
 at least was not lost. After giving a few hours to much- 
 needed repose, he met his ministers in Council ; explained 
 what, in his view, had been the cause of the great reverse 
 for his arms ; set forth, at some length, the resources that 
 still remained to France ; and insisted that if the nation 
 would earnestly second his efforts — ' would be the Rome 
 of Cannae, not the Carthage of Zama ' — the war might be 
 prolonged and an honourable peace secured. Whatever 
 may be thought of the soundness of this judgment — and 
 we cannot forget the marvels of 1814, though the result, 
 we are convinced, must have been the same — it deserves 
 notice that Napoleon did not entertain the designs at- 
 tributed to him by the Chambers and Fouche. He saw, 
 indeed, that the only prospect of safety for France was to 
 concentrate in his hands all the powers of the State for 
 the moment ; he expressed a hope that the Houses, of 
 their own accord, would make him a dictator during the 
 existing contest. But he knew that the days of the 
 i8th Brumaire had passed away ; he never contemplated 
 a coup d'etat. He felt that the representatives of France 
 must rally around him, and give him loyal and undivided 
 support, if he was to steer the vessel of the State through 
 an appalling sea of troubles. ' In the close union between 
 the Chambers and myself,' he emphatically said, 'is our 
 only chance of success.' 
 
 These true and noble words made a profound impression 
 on men already trembling for themselves and their master, 
 but still yielding to the spell of the genius of a great ruler. 
 Carnot, simple-minded, but a sincere patriot, was con- 
 vinced that the Chambers would comply with Napoleon's 
 
 23
 
 354 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 request, and would make him the absolute head of the 
 State for the time. But Lucien Bonaparte, the abettor 
 of the i8th Brumaire, and Davout, a soldier who not 
 wrongly dreaded what a popular assembly might attempt, 
 pronounced for a dissolution of the Chambers at the 
 present crisis ; this was within the Emperor's constitu- 
 tional rights, as these had been declared by the Acta 
 Additionnel. One minister, however, more sagacious or 
 better informed, denied that the proposed dictatorship 
 would be ever conceded ; he hinted, not obscurely, that 
 the Houses wished to get rid of Napoleon, and to negotiate 
 with the allies on behalf of the infant King of Rome. 
 Fouche, who had stammered out a few ambiguous phrases, 
 perfidiously let the deputies and the Peers know that the 
 dissolution of the Chambers was being prepared ; he 
 added that measures would be taken to put down resist- 
 ance by force. The assembly of the representatives broke 
 out into frenzied passion, and was ready to declare 
 Napoleon an enemy of the State. Lafayette, a stiff- 
 necked constitutional pedant, blind to the real situation 
 of affairs, carried by an almost unanimous vote a solemn 
 resolution to the effect that it would be a crime of high 
 treason to dissolve or to prorogue the Chambers, and 
 that the ministers of the Emperor must appear at their 
 bar. This stickler for forms and legality did not perceive 
 that what he was doing was a violation of the Acte 
 Additionnel, and was really in itself a flagrant coup d'etat. 
 The Chamber of Peers acted after its kind ; composed as 
 it was for the most part of Napoleon's creatures, it 
 followed simply in the wake of the lower House. 
 
 Had Napoleon at this crisis dissolved the Chambers 
 and appealed to Frenchmen to rally round his throne, he 
 would have been justified by the letter of the Constitution 
 and the law. But of what avail were considerations such 
 as these, when armed Europe was upon the frontier ; 
 when an immense disaster had already occurred ; when
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 355 
 
 the Acte Additionnel had no real hold on the nation ; 
 when the Legislature and the Government were in con- 
 flict ; when revolution was plainly already at hand ? 
 Detractors of Napoleon have charged him with culpable 
 weakness — nay, with pusillanimity at this conjuncture. 
 He ought, they have said, to have braved everything, 
 seized supreme power and involved the nation in a 
 desperate struggle. It is no doubt true that, as was 
 seen, even on the i8th Brumaire he dreaded a contest 
 with the representatives of France. Like most soldiers, 
 familiar chiefly with material force, he felt embarrassed 
 in the presence of moral power, and he had not in- 
 domitable constancy in the extreme of misfortune. As had 
 been manifest, too, in the campaign in Belgium, he had 
 lost much of the energy and decision of his prime ; and 
 certainly few great men have been placed in the terrible 
 situation he had now to confront. Yet these were not 
 the paramount causes that prevented him from defying 
 the Chambers and insisting on a dissolution that must 
 have been worse than useless. In the expressive language 
 he used on another occasion, he felt that he had become a 
 mark for the animosities of faction in France, and that he 
 had been placed under the ban of the great powers of 
 Europe. To have broken up the Legislature under these 
 conditions, to have grasped at a dictatorship, and made an 
 appeal to the sword, would have only led to civil war and 
 anarchy, and caused universal national ruin. He would 
 have, perhaps, had the support of millions of Frenchmen, 
 of the remains of the armies, of part of the peasantry, of 
 the populace of the towns ; but he would have been 
 resisted by the great bodies of the State, by a majority 
 of the upper classes, by the intellect and the good sense 
 of the nation. What would have been his chances, in 
 these circumstances, in a struggle with Europe ? Once 
 France refused to support him as a united people, 
 Napoleon rightly judged that his occupation was gone, 
 
 23—2
 
 356 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 and that he could not turn aside the coining strokes of 
 Destiny, 
 
 The dissolution of the Chambers, therefore, was not to 
 be thought of, though they had really usurped supreme 
 power in the State. Napoleon, after hearing what had 
 taken place, declared that he was ready to abdicate — 
 Fouche circulated the remark with malignant delight — 
 but he endeavoured for a few hours to avert and retard 
 fate, and to see if a compromise was not possible. He 
 proposed that two Commissions, partly selected by himself 
 and partly by the Houses, should be formed, and should 
 report on the existing condition of affairs, and on the 
 measures required for the public safety. The Com- 
 missions agreed that a great national effort should be 
 made, and that, if necessary, France should defend her- 
 self; but the representatives of the Chambers — their 
 leader was Lafayette — insisted that negotiations should 
 be set on foot to obtain peace ; and that this would be 
 impossible were Napoleon to remain at the head of the 
 State, as the Coalition would have no dealings with him. 
 This was virtually a declaration that the Emperor must 
 abdicate, or be deprived of his crown. After some hesita- 
 tion and angry complaints in the Chambers, Napoleon 
 reluctantly consented that commissioners should repair to 
 the camp of the allies to treat, not in his own name, but 
 in that of the two Houses. It was time that equivocation 
 and deception should end. The Emperor, seeing that he 
 had been practically deposed, announced his abdication 
 in the dignified words he knew how to make use of on 
 great occasions. He implored the nation and its repre- 
 sentatives to unite with the noble object of preserving 
 France ; while he declared that his political existence had 
 come to an end, he proclaimed his son his successor to 
 the imperial throne. This was a last tribute, perhaps to 
 pride, perhaps to paternal feeling, but he had no illusions 
 as to what was about to happen. * I abdicate in favour
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 357 
 
 of the Bourbons,' he bitterly said ; ' not of a child kept at 
 Vienna an imprisoned hostage.' 
 
 The Chambers, with a sentiment of respect for fallen 
 greatness, passed a vote of thanks to Napoleon for the 
 abdication they had, in fact, extorted. It was otherwise 
 with many of the followers of the discrowned Emperor. 
 The Scenes of 1814 were witnessed again. Ncy, deeply 
 responsible for the issue of the late campaign, but reck- 
 lessly lending an ear to the counsels of Fouch6, spoke 
 against his great master in the House of Peers ; courtiers 
 and servitors fell away from the benefactor to whom they 
 owed everything. Napoleon, really by the orders of 
 Fouche, was removed to Malmaison from the Elysee, for 
 there were fears that he might attempt a coup d'etat. 
 Davout, with singular want of feeling, urged him to quit 
 the soil of France.* History compassionately throws a 
 veil over the great victim, as he remained for a few days 
 in almost deserted loneliness. Napoleon was alive, but 
 within the Inferno of Dante ; there could be no hope for 
 him, whatever might happen ; he was the proscribed out- 
 law of Europe and France ; Marius sitting amidst the 
 ruins of Carthage, Hannibal after the catastrophe of Zama, 
 might look forward to a change of fortune he could not 
 contemplate. He had been unjustly treated by the alHes ; 
 France had abandoned him, in defeat, with weak and 
 unwise levity. But if we calmly look back at what he 
 had been in the past, we can hardly feel surprise that he 
 was made a sacrifice to the animosities and fears of the 
 civilised world. The blood of Danton had choked 
 Robespierre ; the tyranny of the Emperor, who had 
 bestrode the Continent, the violence of a despot who 
 had exhausted France, not unnaturally brought about the 
 second fall of Napoleon. It was as nothing that he had 
 protested, when he had regained his throne, that he was a 
 
 * Thidbault (' Mdmoires,' v. 369, 370) describes this scene, probably 
 with exaggeration.
 
 358 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 changed being, and had no thought but of peace ; he had 
 ruled for years by the sword ; he was struck down by it. 
 
 The question of the succession of the young King of 
 Rome was adroitly eluded by the Chambers. A Pro- 
 visional Government was appointed ; Fouche contrived 
 with cynical audacity to have himself named President. 
 He had got rid of the master he dreaded and had be- 
 trayed, but the obstacles to his policy were great and 
 might be fatal to him. The Chambers were opposed, 
 almost to a man, to the return of the Bourbons ; one of 
 their first acts was to vote supplies for continuing the 
 war, and to issue Decrees, parodies of those of the Con- 
 vention of 1793, though it is questionable if they thought 
 resistance possible, for they sent envoys to the allies with- 
 out delay. The Provisional Government, too, was largely 
 composed of regicides ; their interests and feelings forbade 
 them to seek for a restoration of Louis XVIII. But 
 Fouche had his arrangements made, and though events 
 seconded him in almost every way, he played his un- 
 principled part with characteristic skill. One of his first 
 expedients was to release from Vincennes, where he had 
 been imprisoned, the royalist agent Vitrolles, who, we 
 had seen, had tried to stir up the South against Napoleon ; 
 through him, and other obscure messengers, he entered 
 into fresh relations with the exiled Court in Belgium. At 
 the same time, while he made great professions of 
 strengthening the defences of Paris, and calling the nation 
 to arms, and while he still talked about a regency, and 
 the Duke of Orleans, he steadily went on with his work 
 of intrigue, and manoeuvred to place the King again on 
 his throne. He laboured dexterously to paralyse every 
 attempt to resist, or even to check the invacfer ; he kept 
 down the population of the capital, passionately eager to 
 take up arms, and enlisted against them the timid fears 
 of the upper classes and the bourgeoisie. The selections 
 he made for the highest commands were significant, and
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 359 
 
 showed his sagacious cunning. He placed a great name, 
 Mass^na, at the head of the National Guard of Paris; but 
 Mass^na was the shadow of the Chief of Zurich, and was 
 thinking only of self-enjoyment and repose ; he made 
 Davout the commander of all the forces around the 
 capital ; and Davout had declared that, after Waterloo, 
 the coalition would not be opposed with success. As 
 events progressed, and no doubt could remain that Paris 
 was in a state of formidable defence, Fouche assembled a 
 great Council of War, composed of Marshals and Generals 
 of high degree. Such a Council proverbially never fights ; 
 and it offered irresistible reasons that Paris could not keep 
 out the enemy with any assurance of permanent success ; 
 and that, in any event, the allies were at hand, and would 
 soon have the fortunes of France in their power. 
 
 Meanwhile Blucher and Welhngton with their victorious 
 forces had crossed the northern borders of France, and 
 were marching on Paris by the western bank of the Oise. 
 They had employed themselves for a few days in capturing 
 strong places upon the frontier, but at the intelligence of 
 the fall of Napoleon they advanced rapidly, hoping to 
 bring the war to an end, Blucher, as was his wont, press- 
 ing forward with imprudent want of caution. The 
 negotiators despatched by the Chambers had reached the 
 camp of the old Marshal, and giving too easy credence to 
 vague expressions dropped by Prussian officers had sought 
 an interview with the allied Sovereigns on the Rhine, in 
 the hope that they would not insist on a return of the 
 Bourbons. Fouche sent a second set of envoys to treat 
 with Wellington, the real master of the situation at this 
 moment. The victory of Waterloo had immensely in- 
 creased the influence in the Councils of Europe the Duke 
 had already acquired by his calm-minded wisdom, and he 
 was almost supreme in the little Court of Louis XVIII., 
 while through Fouche he controlled the Chambers. The 
 conduct of Wellington at this juncture was worthy of his
 
 56o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 statesman-like and well-balanced judgment. He sincerely 
 thought that the restoration of the House of Bourbon 
 would be in the interest of Europe and of France herself; 
 but, above all, he was desirous of securing peace without 
 further effusion of blood, of avoiding a desperate struggle 
 round the walls of Paris, the consequences of which he 
 could not foresee with certainty, and of establishing 
 Louis XVHI. on his throne with as little delay as 
 possible. With these objects in view he had advised the 
 King to make his entry into France, and to issue a pro- 
 clamation pledging himself to maintain the Charter, and 
 the rights and interests created by the Revolution and 
 what had flowed from it, and even holding forth a 
 prospect of future reforms, and he spoke freely to 
 Fouche's envoys, knowing perfectly well they would serve 
 his purpose. He said very plainly that in his judgment 
 the Bourbons ought to be restored to the throne, though 
 he admitted the claim of France to choose a Sovereiirn 
 for herself; but he insisted that the immediate and most 
 urgent question was to avert a conflict, which the negotia- 
 tors must know would inevitably be in the long-run hope- 
 less, and could only lead to further woes for their country. 
 He gradually obtained their assent to the conditions he 
 laid down as the necessary preliminaries to a suspension 
 of arms : the military forces employed in the defence of 
 Paris must evacuate their positions and retreat to a 
 distance; the allied armies should occupy certain points 
 in the capital, but the police of the city should be 
 entrusted to the National Guard. It was understood 
 that the restoration of the Bourbons would follow as a 
 matter of course. 
 
 It was the strange irony of fate that one of the greatest 
 men of his time was associated with one of the very 
 basest at this moment for a common object, although 
 with completely different motives. The countenance of 
 Wellington gave immense support to Fouch6— in fact,
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 361 
 
 almost placed in his hands the immediate future of 
 France. Yet the position of the arch-intriguer, dexterous 
 as he was, was not without real danger, and his Machia- 
 vellian policy was more than once not far from failing. 
 By the last days of June Grouchy, who had been made 
 the commander of all the military forces which had in- 
 vaded Belgium, had brought his own corps and the 
 remains of the Waterloo army with little loss under the 
 walls of Paris ; a considerable number of troops were 
 within the city, and Paris was in a good state of defence 
 along its northern front. At this moment the Prussian 
 army, diminished by the corps of Pirch detached in the 
 rear, and now not more than 60,000 strong, was around 
 Gonesse, a few miles from the capital ; the army of 
 Wellington was near Gournay, at least two marches 
 distant. This separation of the hostile forces gave an 
 opportunity to Napoleon's genius. From his retreat at 
 Malmaison he proposed to fall on Blucher with 70,000 or 
 80,000 men, who could have been assembled ; he pledged 
 himself to gain a signal victory ; he promised that when 
 this had been won he would instantly lay down his com- 
 mand. The project was certainly attractive in a military 
 sense ; it could not ultimately have changed the course of 
 events, but it might have revived the glories of Mont- 
 mirail and Vauchamps. Blucher would, not improbably, 
 have been defeated. Fouche, however, curtly rejected 
 proposals which ran counter to his treacherous schemes. 
 From his point of view he was consistent and in the 
 right. The slightest temporary success of Napoleon 
 might have blown into air the intriguer's web of duplicity, 
 and might, it is not unlikely, have cost Fouche his head. 
 
 This, nevertheless, was not the last of the troubles 
 which beset the head of the Provisional Government. 
 Blucher, setting Wellington's counsels at nought, marched 
 across the Seine to the southern front of Paris, in the 
 hope, perhaps, of storming the city on its unprotected
 
 362 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 side. He gave out that he would take the life of Napoleon 
 should the fallen Emperor come into his hands, and that 
 he would occupy, not impossibly sack, the capital of 
 France. This insolence and arrogance stirred Paris to 
 wrath, made even the half-hearted Chambers indignant, 
 provoked the population to assume an attitude as vehe- 
 ment as that of 1792-93, and turned against Fouche the 
 colleagues he had hitherto mastered and deceived. An 
 insurrectionary movement seemed impending, and the 
 army in and around the capital clamoured for a last 
 appeal to the sword and for a last effort against the 
 detested invader. Meanwhile the military situation had 
 become hazardous for the allies ; part of Blucher's cavalry 
 had fallen into a snare and had been destroyed. The 
 army of Wellington had, indeed, reached the northern 
 front of Paris, but it was divided from that of Blucher by 
 the Seine and the great city ; and the French army, from 
 80,000 to 90,000 strong, not to speak of irregular levies 
 not to be despised, stood in a kind of vast fortified camp 
 between the two hostile masses. At this grave con- 
 juncture the wisdom of the Duke was conspicuously made 
 manifest ; it averted events that must have been calami- 
 tous. He persuaded Blucher to adopt more moderate 
 language ; he candidly wrote to him that he thought their 
 two armies were by no means certain of success should 
 they attack Paris, or even be involved in a great battle. 
 He pointed out that it was only common prudence to 
 wait until the other armies of the coalition should appear 
 on the scene. At the same time he continued in close 
 relations with Fouche, and through him with his still 
 numerous partisans, and he reiterated to the negotiators, 
 who had returned to his camp, the arguments he had 
 employed with a view to put an end to the war. These 
 appeals, which as affairs now stood were irresistible to 
 reflecting and sound-thinking men, and were supported 
 by accomplished facts with overpowering force, proved
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 363 
 
 successful, and gained for Wellington his end. The pride 
 of Blucher was judiciously soothed by making him appear 
 the arbiter of the proposed arrangements ; but Wellington 
 was their real author, and the conditions he had laid 
 down from the first were, in the main, accepted. Within 
 a few days the French army was retiring beyond the Loire, 
 the capitulation of Paris was signed, and Louis XVIIL 
 was on his way to the Tuileries. The policy of Fouch6, 
 seconded as it had been by a succession of overmastering 
 events and by the wisdom of the Duke, had triumphed ; 
 but Fouche had risked his life in a dangerous game. As 
 for the army and the population of Paris, they expressed 
 their indignation in angry and widespread complaints ; 
 but the army found no leaders to make its power felt. 
 The population was almost unarmed ; both had no option 
 but to submit with reluctance. 
 
 After Waterloo France played an ignoble part, and 
 appeared to be unworthy of her great place in history. It 
 was a sorry spectacle, but this must be mainly ascribed to 
 the condition to which she had been brought by events, 
 and to the peculiar circumstances of the time. Had the 
 nation rallied around Napoleon, and put forth its still 
 immense strength, it would have ultimately succumbed to 
 the hosts of Europe ; but it might have made a resistance 
 as grand and heroic as it made after the disasters of 1870, 
 and this effaced the ignominy of Metz and Sedan, and 
 restored France to her true position as a leading State in 
 the world. But France was enervated by revolution and 
 despotic rule ; she was exhausted and worn out by long 
 years of war ; above all, she was a house divided against 
 itself. Such an effort at this juncture was not possible, 
 and no one knew this better than Napoleon himself. The 
 nation, on the other hand, might have openly deposed 
 Napoleon, taking care that his safety should be assured, 
 and have frankly invited Louis XVIIL to return to the 
 throne under conditions he would, no doubt, have
 
 364 THE CAMPAIGN OF 181 5 
 
 accepted. This compromise would have made it very 
 difficult for the allies to insist on the spoils of conquest ; 
 they might have been satisfied with an indemnity for the 
 losses caused by the war ; the dignity of France would 
 have been preserved. But a policy of this kind required 
 real statesmen, and a Parliament versed in political 
 affairs ; above all, a determined and united people ; and 
 France at this crisis had none of these elements of power. 
 The result was humiliating and to be deplored ; a base 
 intriguer, thinking almost wholly of his low ambition, 
 cajoled the weak and inexperienced Chambers ; com- 
 pelled Napoleon to abdicate by making false pretences ; 
 laid his hands on the resources of the State ; made an 
 attempt at a national defence well-nigh impossible; 
 dragged a feeble Government artfully in his wake ; and 
 then trafficked with the chiefs of the coalition for a re- 
 storation which virtually placed France at the mercy of 
 the allies, and obtained peace indeed, but peace under 
 evil conditions. It is significant of what revolution and 
 despotism can effect, that the France which in 1794 de- 
 feated Europe, and from 1800 to 1812 was the Queen of 
 the Continent, should in 1815, after a single reverse for 
 her arms, have bowed under the disgraceful yoke of 
 Fouche. 
 
 The end of this episode in the histor}' of Europe was at 
 hand ; it was calamitous for France, but what might have 
 been expected, Fouche, like Judas, obtained his reward ; 
 he was placed high in the councils of Louis XVIII. ; but 
 he was soon disgraced and relegated to obscurity for the 
 rest of his life. The Chambers verified the bitter words 
 of Napoleon ; they were the Greeks of the Lower Empire 
 discussing abstract theories while the battering-ram of 
 the invader was at their gates. They were summarily 
 suppressed in the midst of debatings about, forsooth, a 
 new Constitution for France. The King accepted the 
 Charter, and promised reforms, but he was swept away by
 
 THE RETREAT OF GROUCHY 365 
 
 a royalist reaction of extreme violence ; his Government 
 was stained by deeds of proscription and blood. A 
 White Terror rioted for many months in France. Mean- 
 while the coalition held the vanquished country in its 
 grasp ; it cannot be truly said that it was unnecessarily 
 exacting and severe, but its armies occupied the territory 
 of France for years. It made the nation pay heavily for 
 the results of the venture of 1815. It was well for France 
 that Wellington at this crisis held a commanding posi- 
 tion in the allied councils, and that the great Army of 
 Occupation was entrusted to his hands. He did not 
 indeed try to control the Government of Louis XVIII., 
 though he disapproved, we know, of many of its acts ; he 
 did not interfere to save Ney and Labedoyere, for his was 
 a stern and not a sympathetic nature ; but if he may have 
 committed mistakes in this matter, they were mistakes 
 due to an excellent quality, a dislike to meddle with 
 affairs not within his province, and his position besides 
 was difficult and delicate in the extreme. On the other 
 hand, within the limits of his military rule he maintained 
 order, and kept lawlessness down ; his treatment of the 
 country was a model of humanity and well - directed 
 discipline. And he did France an inestimable service 
 she did not forget at the time ; his far-sighted prudence 
 saved her from a dismemberment he rightly thought 
 unwise ; it was due to Wellington, and to Wellington 
 alone, that she was not deprived of Alsace and Lorraine, 
 torn from her in 187 1 by conquerors of a very different 
 type.* 
 
 The world was soon to enter into a new phase of exist- 
 ence — a phase of little apparent promise for the estate of 
 
 * Thiers is not an admirer of Wellington, and, like a patriotic 
 Frenchman, naturally feels bitter regret for the events of 1815. But 
 he is an historian and a statesman, and he has done full justice to the 
 great qualities exhibited by Wellington at this time (' Histoire du 
 Consulat et de I'Empire,' vi. 567 et seq.).
 
 366 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 man. Napoleon, like Prometheus, was to appeal in vain 
 to humanity from a barren rock ; he was to offer to 
 mankind a spectacle mournful indeed, but not without a 
 profound moral lesson. The Holy Alliance was to deceive 
 and keep down the Continent ; the sceptre of Metternich 
 with its deadening weight of oppression was to be supreme 
 for a series of years. The whole period of 1815 is one in 
 which history finds much to deplore and condemn, and 
 but little on which it can bestow praise. That period 
 and its results have long passed away ; its grand military 
 events alone give it permanent interest. We have en- 
 deavoured to describe these with an impartial hand, and 
 to present them in their true historical aspect.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. 
 
 Napoleon's Address to his Army. 
 
 A VArniee. 
 
 AVESNES, 
 
 i/^juin, 1815. 
 
 SOLDATS ! 
 
 C'est aujourd'hui I'anniversaire de Marengo et de 
 Friedland, qui decid^rent deux fois du destin de 1' Europe. 
 Alors, comme apr^s Austerlitz, comnie apr&s Wagram, nous 
 ftimes trop genereux ; nous crumes aux protestations et aux 
 serments des princes que nous laissames sur le trone ! 
 Aujourd'hui, cependant, coalises contre nous, ils en veulent 
 a I'independance et aux droits les plus sacres de la France, 
 lis ont commence la plus injuste des agressions. Marchons 
 done a leur rencontre : eux et nous ne sommes-nous plus les 
 niemes hommes ? 
 
 Soldats ! a Jena, contre ces memes Prussiens aujourd'hui si 
 arrogants, vous etiez un contre trois ; a Montmirail, un contre 
 six. 
 
 Que ceux d'entre vous qui ont ete prisonniers des Anglais 
 vous fassent le recit de leur pontons et des maux afFreux qu'ils 
 ont soufFerts ! 
 
 Les Saxons, les Beiges, les Hanovriens, les soldats de la 
 Confederation du Rhin, gemissent d'etre obliges de preter leurs 
 bras a la cause des princes ennemis de la justice et des droits 
 de tous les peuples. Ils savent que cette coalition est insatiable.
 
 368 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Aprfes avoir devore douze millions de Polonais, douze millions 
 d'ltaliens, un million de Saxons, six millions de Beiges, elle 
 devra devorer les Etats de deuxi^me ordre de I'Allemagne. Les 
 insenses ! Un moment de prosperite les aveugle. L'oppression 
 et I'humiliation du peuple fran9ais sont hors de leur pouvoir. 
 S'ils entrent en France, ils y trouveront leur tombeau. 
 
 Soldats ! nous avons des marches forcees a faire, des batailles 
 a livrer, des perils a courir : mais, avec de la Constance, la 
 victoire sera a nous : les droits, I'honneur et le bonheur de la 
 patrie seront reconquis. 
 
 Pour tout Fran9ais qui a du coeur, le moment est arrive de 
 vaincre ou deperir ! 
 
 Napoleon.* 
 
 (D'apr^s la copie. Depot de la Guerre.) 
 
 II. 
 
 SOULT TO D'ErLON. 
 
 A Monsieur le Comte d'Erlon. 
 (Extrait du registre du Major-General.) 
 
 En avant de Charleroi, 
 
 i^juin, 1815, d trots heuresdu soir. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte d'Erlon, 
 
 L'Empereur ordonne a M. le comte Reille de marcher 
 sur Gosselies, et d'y attaquer un corps ennemi qui paraissait 
 s'y arreter. L'intention de I'Empereur est que vous marchiez 
 aussi sur Gosselies, pour appuyer le comte Reille et le seconder 
 dans ses operations. Cependant, vous devez toujours faire 
 garder Marchienne, et vous enverrez une brigade sur les routes 
 de Mons, lui recommandant de se garder tr^s-militairement.f 
 
 • Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 281. 
 t ' Documents incdits,' No. 5, Paris, 1840.
 
 APPENDIX 369 
 
 III. 
 
 SOULT TO D'ErLON. 
 (jfune 15.) 
 
 (Cet ordre fut reitere apr^s le passage du Marechal Ney, 
 c'est-a-dire, vers quatre heures et demie.) 
 
 A Monsieur le Comte d'Erlon, Commandant de i"" Corps. 
 
 Charleroi, 
 
 iSJuin, 1815. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 L'intention de TEmpereur est que vous ralliez votre 
 
 corps sur la rive gauche de la Sambre, pour joindre le 2« corps 
 
 a Gosselies, d'aprfes les ordres que vous donnera a ce sujet 
 
 M. le Marechal Prince de la Moskova. 
 
 Ainsi, vous rappellerez les troupes que vous avez laissees a 
 
 Thuin, Solre et environs ; vous devrez cependant avoir toujours 
 
 de nombreux partis sur votre gauche pour eclairer la route de 
 
 Mons. 
 
 Le Marechal d'Empire, Major-Geni^ral 
 
 Due DE Dalmatie.* 
 
 IV. 
 
 Napoleon to Ney. 
 (June 16.) 
 
 Au Marechal Ney, Prince de la Moskowa, Commandant I'Aile 
 Gauche de I'Armee du Nord. 
 
 Charleroi, 
 MoN Cousin, 16 juin, 1815. 
 
 Je vous envole mon aide de camp le General Flahault, 
 qui vous porte la presente lettre. Le major-general a du 
 vous donner des ordres, mais vous recevrez les miens plus tot, 
 parce que mes ofificiers vont plus vite que les siens. Vous 
 recevrez I'ordre de mouvement du jour, mais je veux vous en 
 ecrire en detail, parce que c'est de la plus haute importance. 
 
 * 'Documents inedits,' No. 6, Paris, 1840. 
 
 24
 
 370 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Je porte le Marechal Grouchy avec les 3^ et 4' corps 
 d'infanterie sur SombrefFe : je porte ma Garde a Fleurus, et j'y 
 serai de ma personne avant midi. J'y attaquerai I'ennemi si 
 je le rencontre, et j'eclairerai la route jusqu'a a Gembloux. La, 
 d'apr^s ce qui se passera, je prendrai mon parti ; peut-ctre a 
 trois heures apres midi, peut-etre ce soir. Mon intention est 
 que, immediatement apr^s que j'aurai pris mon parti, vous 
 soyez pret a marcher sur Bruxelles, Je vous appuierai avec la 
 Garde, qui sera a Fleurus ou a Sombreffe, et je desirerais 
 arriver a Bruxelles demain matin. Vous vous mettriez en 
 Tiarche ce soir meme, si je prends mon parti d'assez bonne 
 neure pour que vous puissiez en etre informe de jour et faire 
 ce soir trois ou quatre lieues et etre demain a sept heures du 
 matin a Bruxelles. 
 
 Vous pouvez done disposer vos troupes de la maniere 
 suivante : 
 
 Premiere division, a deux lieues en avant des Quatre- 
 Chemins, s'il n'y a pas d'inconvenient : six divisions d'infanterie 
 autour des Quatre-Chemins, et une division a Marbais, afin 
 que je puisse I'attirer a moi a Sombreffe, si j'en avals besoin ; 
 elle ne retarderait d'ailleurs pas votre marche. 
 
 Le corps du Comte de Valmy, qui a 3,000 cuirassiers 
 d'elite, a I'intersection du Chemin des Romains et de celui de 
 Bruxelles, afin que je puisse I'attirer a moi si j'en avals besoin. 
 Aussitot que mon parti sera pris vous lui enverrez I'ordre 
 de venir vous rejoindre. Je desirerais d'avoir avec moi la 
 division de la Garde que commande le General Lefebvre- 
 Desnoettes, et je vous envoie les deux divisions du corps 
 du Comte de Valmy pour la remplacer. Mais, dans mon 
 projet actuel, je pref^re placer le Comte de Valmy de maniere 
 a le rappeler si j'en avals besoin, et ne point faire de fausses 
 marches au General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, puisqu'il est probable 
 que je me deciderai ce soir a marcher sur Bruxelles avec la 
 Garde. Cependant couvrez la division Lefebvre par les divisions 
 de cavalerie d'Erlon et de Reille, alin de menager la Garde : 
 s'il y avait quelque echauffouree avec les Anglais, il est 
 preferable que ce soit sur la ligne que sur la Garde. 
 
 J'ai adopte comme principe general, pendant cette campagne,
 
 APPENDIX 371 
 
 de diviser mon armee en deux ailes et une reserve. Votre aile 
 sera composee des quatres divisions du i" corps, des quatres 
 divisions du 2^ corps, de deux divisions de cavalerie ieg^re et 
 de deux divisions du corps de Comte de Valmy. Cela ne doit 
 pas etre loin de 45 a 50,000 hommes. 
 
 Le Marechal Grouchy aura a peu pvhs la meme force et 
 commandera I'aile droite. 
 
 La Garde formera la reserve, et je me porterai sur I'une ou 
 I'autre aile selon les circonstances. 
 
 Le major-general donne les ordres les plus precis pour 
 qu'il n'y ait aucune difficulte sur I'obeissance a vos ordres 
 lorsque vous serez detache, les commandants de corps devant 
 prendre mes ordres directement quand je me trouve present. 
 
 Selon les circonstances, j'affaiblirai I'une au I'autre aile, en 
 augmentant ma reserve. 
 
 Vous sentez assez I'importance attachee a la prise de 
 Bruxelles. Cela pourra d'ailleurs donner lieu a des incidents, 
 car un mouvement aussi prompte et aussi brusque isolera 
 I'armee anglaise de Mons, Ostende, etc. Je desire que vos 
 dispositions soient bien faites, pour qu'au premier ordre vos 
 huits divisions puissent marcher rapidement et sans obstacles 
 sur Bruxelles. 
 
 Napol:^on.* 
 
 V. 
 
 Napoleon to Grouchy. 
 
 {jfmie 16.) 
 
 Au Marechal Comte Grouchy, Commandant I' Aile Droite de V Armee 
 
 du Nord. 
 
 Charleroi, 
 
 iQjuin, 1815. 
 MoN Cousin, 
 
 Je vous envoie Labedoyere, mon aide de camp, pour vous 
 
 porter la presente lettre. Le major-general a du vous faire 
 
 connaitre mes intentions ; mais, comme il a des officiers mal 
 
 * Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 289-291. 
 
 24 — 2
 
 372 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 montes, mon aide de camp arrivera peut-etre avant. Mon 
 intention est que, comme commandant I'aile droite, vous 
 preniez le commandement du 3"^ corps que commando le 
 General Vandamme, du 4^ corps que commande le G6neral 
 Gerard, des corps de cavalerie que commandent les Generaux 
 Pajol, Milhaud, et Exelmans ; ce qui ne doit pas faire loin de 
 50,000 hommes. Rendez vous avec cette aile droite a Sombreffe. 
 Faites partir en consequence, de suite, les corps des Generaux 
 Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans, et Vandamme, et sans vous arreter, 
 continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe. Le 4*= corps, qui 
 est a Chatelet, re9oit directement I'ordre de se rendre a Som- 
 breffe sans passer pas Fleurus. Cette observation est im- 
 portante, parce que je porte mon quartier-general a Fleurus 
 et qu'il faut eviter les encombrements. Envoyez de suite un 
 officier au General Gerard pour lui faire connaitre votre mouve- 
 ment, et qu'il execute le sien de suite. 
 
 Mon intention est que tous les generaux prennent directe- 
 ment vos ordres ; ils ne prendront les miens que lorsque je 
 serai present. Je serai entre dix et onze heures a Fleurus : 
 je me rendrai a Sombreffe laissant ma Garde,' infanterie et 
 cavalerie, a Fleurus ; je ne la conduirais a Sombreffe qu'en 
 cas qu'elle fut necessaire. Si I'ennemi est a Sombreffe, je 
 veux I'attaquer ; je veux meme I'attaquer a Gembloux et 
 m'emparer aussi de cette position, mon intention etant apr^s 
 avoir connu ces deux positions, de partir cette nuit, et d'operer 
 avec mon aile gauche, que commande le Marechal Ney, sur 
 les Anglais. Ne perdez done point un moment, parce que 
 plus vite je prendrai mon parti, mieux cela vaudra pour la 
 suite de mes operations. Je suppose que vous etes a Fleurus. 
 Communiquez constamment avec le General Gerard, afin qu'il 
 puisse vous aider pour attaquer Sombreffe, s'il etait necessaire. 
 La division Girard est a portee de Fleurus ; n'en disposez 
 point a moins de necessite absolue, parce qu'elle doit marcher 
 toute la nuit. Laissez aussi ma jeune Garde et toute son 
 artillerie a Fleurus. 
 
 Le Comte de Valmy, avec ses deux divisions de cuirassiers, 
 marche sur la route de Bruxelles : il se lie avec le Marechal 
 Ney, pour contribuer a I'operation de ce soir, a I'aile gauche.
 
 APPENDIX 373 
 
 Comme je vous I'ai dit, je serai de dix a onze heures a 
 Fleurus, Envoyez-moi des rapports sur tout ce que vous 
 apprendrez. Veillez a ce que la route de Fleurus soit libre. 
 Toutes les donnees que j'ai sont que les Prussiens ne peuvent 
 point nous opposer plus de 40,000 hommes. 
 
 Napoleon.* 
 
 VI. 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 (June 16.) 
 
 A Monsieur le Mavechal Prince de la Moskowa. 
 
 Monsieur le Mar]£chal, 
 
 L'Empereur ordonne que vous mettiez en marche les 
 2« et I*"" corps d'armee, ainsi que le 3'' corps de cavalerie, qui a 
 ete mis a votre disposition, pour les diriger sur I'intersection 
 des chemins dits les Trois-Bras (route de Bruxelles), oil vous 
 leur ferez prendre position, et vous porterez en meme temps 
 des reconnaisances, aussi avant que possible, sur la route de 
 Bruxelles et sur Nivelles, d'oia probablement I'ennemi s'est 
 retire. 
 
 Sa Majeste desire que, s'il n'y a pas d'inconvenient, vous 
 etablissiez une division avec de la cavalerie a Genappe, et elle 
 ordonne que vous portiez une autre division du cote de Mar- 
 bais, pour couvrir I'espace entre Sombreffe et les Trois-Bras. 
 Vous placerez pres de ces divisions la division de cavalerie de 
 la Garde Imperiale commandee par le General Lefebvre- 
 Desnoettes, ainsi que le i®"^ regiment de hussards, qui a ete 
 detache hier vers Gosselies. 
 
 Le corps qui sera a Marbais aura aussi pour objet d'appuyer 
 les mouvements de Monsieur le Marechal Grouchy sur Som- 
 breffe, et de vous soutenir a la position des Trois-Bras, si cela 
 devenait necessaire. Vous recommanderez au general qui sera 
 a Marbais de bien s'eclairer sur toutes les directions, particu- 
 li&rement sur celles de Gembloux et de Wavre. 
 
 Si cependant la division du General Lefebvre-Desnoettes 
 
 * Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 271-292.
 
 374 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 etait trop engagee sur la route de Bruxelles vous la laisseriez 
 et vous la remplaceriez au corps qui sera a Marbais par le 
 3« corps de cavalerie aux ordres de Monsieur le Comte de 
 Valmy et par le i" regiment de hussards. J'ai I'honneur de 
 vous prevenir que I'Empereur va se porter sur Sombreffe, oij, 
 d'apr^s les ordres de Sa Majeste, Monsieur le Marechal 
 Grouchy doit se diriger avec les 3^ et 4*^ corps d'infanterie et 
 les i*"", 2<= et 4^ corps de cavalerie. Monsieur le Marechal 
 Grouchy fera occuper Gembloux. 
 
 Je vous prie de me mettre de suite a meme de rendre compte 
 a I'Empereur de vos dispositions, pour executer I'ordre que je 
 vous envoie, ainsi que de tout ce que vous aurez appris sur 
 I'ennemi. 
 
 Sa Majeste me charge de vous recommander de prescrire 
 aux generaux commandant les corps d'armee, de faire reunir 
 leur monde et rentrer les hommes isoles, de maintenir I'ordre le 
 plus parfait dans la troupe, et de rallier toutes les voitures 
 d'artillerie et les ambulances qu'ils auraient pu laisser en 
 
 arri^re. 
 
 Le Marechal d'Empire, Major-G^n^ral 
 
 Due DE Dalmatie."* 
 
 VII. 
 
 SouLT TO Grouchy. 
 
 {June 16.) 
 
 Au Marechal Grouchy. 
 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 L'Empereur ordonne que vous vous mettiez en marche 
 avec les i", 2^ et 4^ corps de cavalerie et que vous les dirigiez 
 sur Sombreffe, ou vous prendrez position. Je donne pareil 
 ordre a Monsieur le Lieutenant-General Vandamme pour le 
 3« corps d'infanterie, et a Monsieur le Lieutenant-General 
 Gerard pour le 4^ corps, et je previens ces deux generaux qu'ils 
 sont sous vos ordres, et qu'ils doivent vous envoyer immediate- 
 ment des officiers pour vous instruire de leur marche et prendre 
 des instructions. Je leur dis cependant que lorsque Sa Majeste 
 
 * ' Documents in^dits,' No. 8, Paris, 1840.
 
 APPENDIX 375 
 
 sera presente, ils pourront recevoir d'elle des ordres directs, et 
 qu'ils devront continuer de m'envoyer des rapports de service 
 et les etats qu'ils ont I'habitude de me fournir. 
 
 Je previens aussi Monsieur le General Gerard que dans ses 
 mouvements sur Sombreffe il doit laisser la ville de Fleurus a 
 gauche, afin d'eviter rencombrement. Ainsi, vous lui donnerez 
 une direction pour qu'il marche, d'ailleurs bien reuni, a portee 
 du 3^ corps, et soit en mesure de concourir a. I'attaque de Som- 
 breffe, si I'ennemi fait resistance. 
 
 Vous donnerez aussi des instructions en consequence a 
 Monsieur le Lieutenant-General Comte Vandamme. 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous prevenir que Monsieur le Comte de 
 Valmy a re9u ordre de se rendre a Gosselies, ou, avec le 
 3* corps de cavalerie, il sera a la disposition de Monsieur le 
 Prince de Moskova. 
 
 Le i*^"" regiment de hussards rentrera au i" corps de cavalerie 
 dans la journee. Je prendrai a ce sujet les ordres de I'Empereur. 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous prevenir que Monsieur le Marechal 
 Prince de la Moskova re9oit ordre de se porter avec le i" et 
 le 2^ corps d'infanterie et le 3^ de cavalerie a I'intersection des 
 chemins dits des Trois-Bras, sur la route de Bruxelles, et qu'il 
 detachera un fort corps a Marbais pour se lier avec vous sur 
 Sombreffe et seconder au besoin vos operations. 
 
 Aussitot que vous vous serez rendu maitre de Sombreffe, il 
 faudra envoyer une avant-garde a Gembloux, et faire recon- 
 naitre toutes les directions qui aboutissent a Sombreffe, particu- 
 li^rement la grande route de Namur, en meme temps que vous 
 etablirez vos communications avec Monsieur le Marechal Ney. 
 
 La Garde Imperiale se dirige sur Fleurus. 
 
 Le Marechal Due de Dalmatie.'* 
 
 VIIL 
 
 SouLT TO Ney. 
 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 Un officier de lanciers vient de dire a I'Empereur que 
 I'ennemi presentait des masses du cote des Quatre - Bras. 
 
 * • Brochure du General Marquis de Grouchy,' Paris, 1864.
 
 376 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Reunissez les corps des Comtes Reille et d'Erlon, et celui du 
 Comte de Valmy, qui se met a I'instant en route pour vous 
 rejoindre ; avec ces forces, vous devrez battre et detruire tous 
 les corps ennemis qui peuvent se presenter ; Bliicher etait 
 hier a Namur, et il n'est pas vraisemblable, qu'il ait porte des 
 troupes vers les Quatre-Bras ; aussi, vous n'avez affaire qu'a 
 ce qui vient de Bruxelles. 
 
 Le Marechal Grouchy va faire le mouvement sur Sombreffe, 
 que je vous ai annonce, et I'Empereur va se rendre a Fleurus ; 
 c'est la ou vous adresserez vos nouveaux rapports a Sa 
 Majeste.* 
 
 IX. 
 
 Wellington's First Memorandum of Orders. 
 
 (jfu)ie 15, 1815.) 
 
 Memorandum for the Deputy-Quartermaster-General — Movements of 
 
 the Army. 
 
 Bruxelles, 
 
 June 15, 1815. 
 
 General Dornberg's brigade of cavalry and the Cumberland 
 Hussars to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on 
 the high-road near to that town. 
 
 The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry 
 this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2nd Hussars looking out 
 between the Scheldt and the Lys. 
 
 The first division of infantry to collect this night at Ath 
 and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's 
 notice. 
 
 The third division to collect this night at Braine le Comte, 
 and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. 
 
 The fourth division to be collected this night at Grammont, 
 with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which 
 are to be moved to Audenarde. 
 
 The fifth division, the 8ist Regiment, and the Hanoverian 
 brigade of the sixth division, to be in readiness to march from 
 Bruxelles at a moment's notice. 
 
 • ' Documents inedits,' No. 9, Paris, 1840.
 
 APPENDIX 377 
 
 The Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect this night on the 
 high-road between Bruxelles and Vilvorde. 
 
 The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning 
 on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a 
 moment's notice. 
 
 The Hanoverian brigade of the fifth division to collect this 
 night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow 
 morning to move towards Bruxelles, and to halt on the high- 
 road between Alost and Assche for further orders. 
 
 The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 
 second and third divisions of the army of the Low Countries ; 
 and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move 
 the third division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as 
 collected. 
 
 This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain 
 that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, 
 and the left of the British army. 
 
 Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of 
 Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect the 
 first division of the army of the Low Countries and the Indian 
 brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning 
 at daylight. 
 
 The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight. 
 
 Wellington.* 
 
 X. 
 
 Wellington's ' After Orders.' 
 (10 p.m., jfutie 15, 1815.) 
 
 Movement of the Army — After Orders, 10 o'clock, p.m. 
 
 Bruxelles, 
 
 yune 15, 1815. 
 
 The third division of infantry to continue its movement from 
 
 Braine le Comte upon Nivelles. 
 
 The first division to move from Enghien upon Braine le 
 
 Comte. 
 
 * Despatches, xii. 472.
 
 378 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 The second and fourth divisions of infantry to move from 
 Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue 
 their movements upon Enghien. 
 
 The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon 
 Enghien. 
 
 The above movements to take place with as little delay as 
 possible. 
 
 Wellington.* 
 
 XL 
 
 Wellington's Conversation with the Duke of 
 
 Richmond. 
 {yuiu 16, 1815.) 
 
 Captain Bowles to Lord Fitzhayvis — Original Memorandum hy the 
 
 Writer. 
 
 At the Duchess of Richmond's ball at Brussels the Prince 
 of Orange, who commanded the first division of the army, 
 came back suddenly, just as the Duke of Wellington had taken 
 his place at the supper-table, and whispered some minutes to 
 his Grace, who only said he had no fresh orders to give, and 
 recommended the Prince to go back to his quarters and go 
 to bed. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington remained nearly twenty minutes 
 after this, and then said to the Duke of Richmond, ' I think it 
 is time for me to go to bed likewise'; and then, whilst wishing 
 him good-night, whispered to ask him if he had a good map 
 in his house. The Duke of Richmond said he had, and took 
 him into his dressing-room, which opened into the supper-room. 
 The Duke of Wellington shut the door and said, ' Napoleon 
 
 has hnmbtigged me, by G ! He has gained twenty-four 
 
 hours' march on me !' The Duke of Richmond said, ' What 
 do you intend doing ?' The Duke of Wellington replied, ' I 
 have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras ; but we 
 shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him here ' — at 
 the same time passing his thumb-nail over the position of 
 
 * Despatches, xii. 474.
 
 APPENDIX 379 
 
 Waterloo, He then said adieu, and left the house by another 
 way out. He went to his quarters, slept six hours and break- 
 fasted, and rode at speed to Quatre Bras, where he met 
 Hardinge, and went with him to Blucher, who took him over 
 the position at Ligny. The Duke of Wellington suggested 
 many alterations, but Blucher would not consent to move a 
 man. 
 
 The conversation in the Duke of Richmond's dressing-room 
 was repeated to me, two minutes after it occurred, by the 
 Duke of Richmond, who was to have had the command of 
 the reserve, if formed, and to whom I was to have been aide- 
 de-camp. He marked the Duke of Wellington's thumb-nail 
 with his pencil on the map, and we often looked at it together 
 some months afterwards.* 
 
 xn. 
 
 Wellington's Letter to Blucher. 
 (10.30 a.m. June 16, 1815.) 
 
 SUR LES HAUTERS DERRlfeRE FrASNE, 
 
 16 yuiii, 1815, a 10 heures et demi. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 Mon armee est situe comme il suit : 
 Le Corps d' Armee du Prince d' Orange a une division ici et 
 a Quatre Bras ; et le reste a Nivelles. 
 
 La Reserve est en marche de Waterloo sur Genappe ; ou 
 elle arrivera a midi. 
 
 La Cavalerie Anglaise sera a la meme heure a Nivelles. 
 Le Corps de Lord Hill est a Braine le Comte. 
 Je ne vois pas beaucoup de I'ennemi en avant de nous ; et 
 j 'attends les nouvelles de votre Altesse, et I'arrivee des troupes 
 pour decider mes operations pour la journee. 
 
 Rien n'a paru du cote de Binche, ni sur notre droite. 
 Votre tres obeissant serviteur, 
 
 Wellington. + 
 
 * ' Letters of First Earl of Malmesbury,' ii. 445. 
 + Ollech, opposite p. 124 in his work.
 
 38o THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 XIII. 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 (yune 16.) 
 
 En avant de Fleoros, 
 
 16 jui It, a deux hemes. 
 
 Monsieur le MARifecHAL, 
 
 L'Empereur me charge de vous prevenir que I'ennemi a 
 reuni un corps de troupes entve Somhreffe et Bry, et qu'a deux 
 heures et demie Monsieur le Marechal Grouchy, avec les 3^ et 
 4« corps, I'attaquera : 
 
 L'intention de Sa Majeste est que vous attaquiez aussi ce 
 qui est devant vous, et qu'apr^s I'avoir vigoureusement pousse, 
 vous rabattiez sur nous, pour concourir a envelopper le corps 
 dont je viens de vous parler. 
 
 Si ce corps etait enfonce auparavant, alors Sa Majeste ferait 
 manoeuvrer dans votre direction pour hater egalement vos 
 operations. 
 
 Instruisez de suite I'Empereur de vos dispositions, et de ce 
 que passe sur votre front.* 
 
 XIV. 
 
 SoULT TO NeY. 
 (June 16.) 
 
 En avant de Fleurus, 
 
 16 Jiiin, 1815, trois heures un quart. 
 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 Je vous ai ecrit, il y a une heure, que TEmpereur ferait 
 attaquer I'ennemi a deux heures et demie dans la position qu'il 
 a prise entre le village de Saint-Amand et de Bry ; en ce 
 moment I'engagement est tr^s-prononce. 
 
 Sa Majeste me charge de vous dire que vous devez 
 manceuvrer sur-le-champ, de mani^re a envelopper la droite 
 
 * ' Documents inedits,' No. 13, Paris, 1840.
 
 APPENDIX 381 
 
 de I'ennenii et tomber a bras raccourcis sur ses derri^res ; cette 
 armee est perdue si vous agissez vigoureusement, le sort de 
 la France est entre vos mains. 
 
 Ainsi n'hesitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que 
 I'Empereur vous ordonne, et dirigez-vous ' sur les hauteurs de 
 Bry et de Saint-Amand, pour concourir a une victoire peut- 
 etre decisive. L'ennemi est pris en flagrant delit au moment 
 oij il cherche a se reunir aux Anglais.'* 
 
 XV. 
 
 Captain Bowles' Story of Wellington at Quatre Bras. 
 
 (yune 17, 1815.) 
 
 Captain Bowles in Lord Malmesbury's Letters, vol. ii., 
 p. 447 : 
 
 On the morning of the 17th, my company being nearly in 
 front of the farmhouse at Quatre- Bras, soon after daybreak 
 the Duke of Wellington came to me, and being personally 
 known to him, he remained in conversation for an hour or 
 more, during which time he repeatedly said he was surprised 
 to have heard nothing of Blucher. At length a staff officer 
 arrived, his horse covered with foam, and whispered to the 
 Duke, who, without the least change of countenance, gave 
 him some orders and dismissed him. He then turned round 
 
 to me and said, ' Old Blucher has had a d d good licking 
 
 and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone 
 back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say 
 we have been licked. I can't help it ; as they are gone back, 
 we must go too.' 
 
 He made all the arrangements for retiring without moving 
 from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did 
 not occupy him five minutes, t 
 
 * ' Documents inedits,' No. 14, Paris, 1840. 
 
 f ' Letters of First Earl of Malmesbury,' ii. 447.
 
 382 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 XVI. 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 (yuite 17.) 
 
 A Monsieur le Marechal Prince de la Moskowa. 
 
 Fleurds, 
 i-j juiii, 1815, entre sept et huit hcures du matin. 
 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 Le General de Flahault, qui arrive a I'instant, fait 
 connaitre que vous etes dans I'incertitude sur les resuitats de 
 la journee d'hier. Je crois cependant vous avoir prevenu de 
 la victoire que I'Empereur a remportee. L'armee prussienne a 
 ete mise en deroute ; le General Pajol est a sa poursuite sur 
 les routes de Namur et de Liege. Nous avons deja plusieurs 
 milliers de prisonniers et trente pieces de canon. Nos troupes 
 se sont bien conduites : une charge de six bataillons de la 
 garde, des escadrons de service et de la division de cavalerie 
 du General Delort, a perce la ligne ennemie, porte le plus 
 grand desordre dans les rangs et enleve la position. 
 
 L'Empereur se rend au moulin de Bry, ou passe la grande 
 route qui conduit de Namur, aux Quatre-Bras ; il n'est done 
 pas possible que Tarmee anglaise puisse agir devant vous ; si 
 cela etait, I'Empereur marcherait directement sur elle par la 
 route des Quatre-Bras, tandis que vous I'attaqueriez de front 
 avec vos divisions, qui, a present, doivent etre reunies, et cette 
 armee serait dans un instant detruite. Ainsi, instruisez Sa 
 Majeste de la position exacte des divisions, et de tout ce qui 
 se passe devant vous. 
 
 L'Empereur a vn avec peine que vous rCayez pas reuni hier les 
 divisions : elles ont agi isolement : ainsi vous avez cprouve des pcrtes. 
 
 Si les corps des Comtes d'Erlon et Reille avaient ete ensemble, il nc 
 rechappait pas un A nglais du corps qui venait vous attaqucr. 
 
 Si le Comte d'Erlon avail execute le mouvement sur Saint- A mand, 
 que I'Empereur a ordonne, I' armee prussienne etait totalement detruite, 
 et nous aurions fait peutetre trente mille prisonniers. 
 
 Les corps des Generaux Gerard, Vandamme, et la garde
 
 APPENDIX 383 
 
 iinperiale, ont toujours ete reunis ; Ton s'expose a des revers, 
 lorsque des detachements sont compromis. 
 
 L'Empereur esp^re et desire que vos sept divisions d'in- 
 fanterie et la cavalerie soient bien reunies et formees, et 
 qu'ensemble elles n'occupent pas une lieue de terrain, pour les 
 avoir bien dans votre main et les employer au besoin. 
 
 L'intention de Sa Majeste est que vous preniez position aux 
 Quatre-Bras, ainsi que I'ordre vous en a ete donne ; mais si, 
 par impossible, cela ne peut avoir lieu, rendez-en compte sur- 
 le-champ avec detail, et I'Empereur s'y portera ainsi que je 
 vous I'ai dit ; si, au contraire, il n'y a qu'une arriere-garde, 
 attaquez-la, et prenez position. 
 
 La journee d'aujourd'hui est necessaire pour terminer cette 
 operation, et pour completer les munitions, rallier les militaires 
 isoles et faire rentrer les detachements. Donnez des ordres 
 en consequence, et assurez-vous que tous les blesses sont 
 panses et transportes sur les derrieres : Ton s'est plaint que 
 les ambulances n'avaient pas fait leur devoir. 
 
 Le fameux partisan Lutzow, qui a ete pris, disait que 
 I'armee prussienne etait perdue, et que Blucher avait expose 
 une seconde fois la monarchie prussienne. 
 
 Le Marechal d'Empire, Major-General 
 Due DE Dalmatie.* 
 
 XVIL 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 (June 17.) 
 
 En avant de Ligny, 
 
 lyjvin, 1815, midi. 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 L'Empereur vient de faire prendre position, en avant 
 de Marbais, a un corps d' infanterie et a la garde imperiale : 
 Sa Majeste me charge de vous dire que son intention est que 
 vous attaquiez les ennemis aux Quatre-Bras pour les chasser 
 de leur position, et que le corps qui est a Marbais secondera 
 
 * • Documents inedits,' No. 7, p. 45, Paris, 1840.
 
 3S4 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 vos operations ; Sa Majeste va se rendre a Marbais, et elle 
 attend vos rapports avec impatience. 
 
 Le Mar^chal d'Empire, Major-G^n^ral 
 Due DE Dalmatie/" 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 Wellington to Lord Hill. 
 
 To General Lord Hill. 
 
 June 17, 1815. 
 
 The second division of British infantry to march from 
 Nivelles on Waterloo at ten o'clock. 
 
 The brigades of the fourth division, now at Nivelles, to 
 march from that place on Waterloo at ten o'clock. Those 
 brigades of the fourth division at Braine le Comte, and on the 
 road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at 
 Braine le Comte this day. 
 
 All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to 
 Nivelles to return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to 
 proceed immediately from thence to Hal and Bruxelles. 
 
 The spare musket ammunition to be immediately packed 
 behind Genappe. 
 
 The corps under the command of Prince Frederick of Orange 
 will move from Enghien this evening and take up a position 
 in front of Hal, occupying Braine le Chateau with two 
 battalions. 
 
 Colonel Estorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, and 
 place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick. 
 
 Wellington.! 
 
 XIX. 
 
 Wellington's Orders. 
 
 June 17, 1815. 
 
 The army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras 
 to its present position in front of Waterloo. 
 
 • ' Documents inedits,' publics par le due d'Elchingen, No. iG, p. 44, 
 Paris, 1840. 
 f Despatches, xii. 476, quoted by Siborne, 263, et seq. Ed. 1895.
 
 APPENDIX 385 
 
 The brigades of the fourth division at Braine le Comte are 
 to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. 
 
 Major-General Colville must be guided by the intelligence 
 he receives of the enemy's movements in his march to Hal, 
 whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien. 
 
 Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the 
 position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long 
 as possible. 
 
 The army will probably continue in its position in front of 
 Waterloo to-morrow. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens will inform Lieutenant-General 
 Sir Charles Colville of the position and situation of the 
 armies. 
 
 Wellington.* 
 
 XX. 
 
 Napoleon to Grouchy. 
 {June 17.) 
 
 Monsieur le Mar^chal, 
 
 Rendez vous a Gembloux avec le corps de cavalerie 
 
 du General Pajol, la cavalerie legere du 4^ corps, et le corps de 
 
 cavalerie du General Exelmans, la division du General Teste 
 
 dont vous aurez un soin particulier, etant detachee de son 
 
 corps d'armee, et les 3^ et 4^ corps d'infanterie. Vous vous 
 
 ferez eclairer sur la direction de Namur et de Maastricht, 
 
 et vous poursuivrez I'ennemi. Eclairez sa marche et in- 
 
 struisez-moi de ses mouvements, de maniere que je puisse 
 
 penetrer ce qu'il veut faire. Je porte mon quartier general 
 
 aux Quatre - Chemins, oia ce matin etaient encore les 
 
 Anglais. Notre communication sera done directe par la 
 
 route pavee de Namur. Si I'ennemi a evacue Namur, ecrivez 
 
 au general commandant la deuxieme division militaire, a 
 
 Charlemont, de faire occuper Namur par quelques bataillons 
 
 de garde nationale et quelques batteries de canon qu'il formera 
 
 a Charlemont. II donnera ce commandement a un marechal 
 
 de camp. 
 
 * Despatches, xii. 476. 
 
 25
 
 386 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 // est important de pittetrer ce que Vennemi vent faire : ou il se 
 stpare des Anglais, ou ils veident se reunty encore pour couvrir 
 Brnxelles et Liege, en tentant le sort d'une nouvelle bataille. Dans 
 tous les cas, tenez constamment vos deux corps d'infanterie 
 reunis dans une lieue de terrain, et occupez tous les soirs une 
 bonne position militaire, ayant plusieurs debouches de retraite. 
 Placez des detachements de cavalerie intermediaire, pour 
 communiquer avec le quartier general. 
 
 Dicte par I'Empercur, en rahsence du Major-General. 
 
 Le Grand Marechal Bertrand.-*' 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Grouchy to Napoleon. 
 
 {Written at 10 p.m. on June ij.) 
 
 Sire, 
 
 J'ai I'honneur de vous rendre compte que j'occupe 
 Gembloux et que ma cavalerie est a Sauveni^re. L'ennemi 
 fort d'environ trente-cinq mille hommes continue son mouve- 
 ment de retraite ; on lui a saisi ici un pare de quatre cents 
 betes a comes, des magasins et des bagages. 
 
 II parait, d'apr^s tous les rapports, qu'arrives a Sauvenifere, 
 les Prussiens se sont divises en deux colonnes ; I'une a du 
 prendre la route de Wavre en passant par Sart-les-Walhain ; 
 1 'autre colonne parait s'etre dirigee sur Perwez. 
 
 On pent peut-etre en infcrer qu une portion vajoindre Wellington, 
 et que le centre, qui est I'armee de Bliicher, se retire sur 
 Lie'ge ; une autre colonne avec de I'artillerie ayant fait son 
 mouvement de retraite par Namur, le General Exelmans a 
 ordre de pousser, ce soir, six escadrons, sur Sart-les-Walhain, 
 et trois escadrons sur Perwez. D'apres leur rapport, si la masse 
 des Prussiens se retire sur Wavre, je la suivrai dans cette direction, 
 afin quils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxdles, et de les s'eparer de 
 Wellington. Si, au contraire, mes renseignements prouvent 
 que la principale force prussienne a marche sur Perwez, je 
 me dirigerai par cette ville a la poursuite de l'ennemi. 
 
 Les Generaux Thielmann et Borstell faisaient partie de 
 
 • Cette depeche a ete publiee pour la premiere fois dans une biographie 
 du Marechal Grouchy, par Pascallet. Paris : Octobre, 1842.
 
 APPENDIX 387 
 
 I'armee que Votre Majeste a battue hier ; ils ^aient encore ce 
 matin a dix heures ici, et ont annonce que vingt mille hommes 
 des leurs avaient ete mis hors de combat. lis ont demande en 
 partant las distances de Wavre, Perwez et Hannut. Bliicher 
 a ete blesse leg^rement au bras, ce qui ne I'a pas empeche de 
 continuer a commander apr^s s'etre fait panser. 
 II n'a point passe par Gembloux. 
 
 Je suis avec respect, 
 Sire, 
 
 de Votre Majeste 
 
 le fiddle sujet, 
 Signe : Le Mar^chal Comte De Grouchy.* 
 
 XXII. 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 {June 18.) 
 
 A Monsieur le Marechal Prince de la Moskowa. 
 
 L'Empereur ordonne que I'armee soit disposee a attaquer 
 I'ennemi a neuf heures du matin : Messieurs les commandants 
 des corps d'armee rallieront leurs troupes, feront mettre les 
 armes en etat, et permettront que les soldats fassent la soupe ; 
 ils feront aussi manger les soldats, afin qu'a neuf heures 
 precises chacun soit pret et puisse etre en bataille que 
 I'Empereur a indiquee par son ordre d'hier soir. Messieurs 
 les lieutenants generaux commandant les corps d'armee d'in- 
 fanterie et de cavalerie enverront sur-le-champ des officiers au 
 major-general pour faire connaitre leur position et porter des 
 ordres. 
 
 Au quartier general imperial, le 18 Juin, 181 5. 
 
 Le Marechal d'Empire, Major-General 
 
 Dug de Dalmatie.I 
 Expedie : 
 
 Monsieur le Lieutenant-General Comte Drouot, commandant 
 
 la Garde Imperiale. 
 
 * La Tour d'Auvergne, 'Waterloo,' 232: ' Certifie conforme a roriginal 
 qui nous a ete remis par I'Empereur Napoleon, et qui est entre nos mains.' 
 — Signe, le General Gourgaud. 
 
 f 'Documents inedits,' No. 18, p. 52; Paris. 
 
 25—2
 
 388 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 SOULT TO NeY. 
 
 {June 18.) 
 
 Paris, 
 
 21 juin, 1S15. 
 
 Une fois que toute I'armee sera rangee en bataille, a peu 
 pr^s a une heure apres midi, au moment ou I'Empereur en 
 donnera I'ordre au Marechal Ney, I'attaque commencera pour 
 s'emparer du village de Mont-Saint-Jean ou est I'intersection 
 des routes. A cet effet, les batteries de douze du 2^ corps et 
 du 6"^ se reuniront a celle du i*^"" corps. Ces vingt - quatre 
 bouches a feu tireront sur les troupes du Mont-Saint-Jean, et 
 le Comte d'Erlon commencera I'attaque, en portant en avant 
 sa division de gauche et la soutenant, suivant les circonstances, 
 par les divisions du i" corps. 
 
 Le 2*^ corps s'avancera a mesure pour garder la hauteur du 
 Comte d'Erlon. 
 
 Les compagnies de sapeurs du i^"" corps seront pretes pour se 
 barricader sur-le-champ a Mont-Saint-Jean. 
 
 Au crayon et de I'ecriture du Marechal Ney, aj'oute par le Marechal 
 
 Ney. 
 
 ' Le Comte d'Erlon comprendra que c'est par la gauche que 
 I'attaque commencera au lieu de la droite. Communitjuer 
 cette nouvelle disposition au General en Chef Reille. 
 
 Au dos. — ' Ordre dicte par I'Empereur sur le champ de bataille 
 de Mont-Saint-Jean, le 18 vers onze heures de matin, et ecrit 
 par le Marechal Due de Dalmatie, Major-General. 
 
 ' Le Marechal Prince de la Moskova."'' 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 SouLT TO Grouchy. 
 
 (June 18.) 
 
 En avant de la ferme do Caillou, 
 
 Le 18 juin, u dix heures du matin. 
 
 Monsieur le Marechal, I'Empereur a re9U votre dernier 
 rapport, date de Gembloux : vous ne parlez a Sa Majeste que 
 
 ' ' Documents inedits,' No. 19.
 
 APPENDIX 389 
 
 de deux colonnes prussiennes qui ont passe a Sauveniere et a Sart- 
 les-W alhain ; cependant des rapports disent qu'une troisi^me 
 colonne, qui etait assez forte, a passe a Gery et a Gentinnes, 
 se dirigeant sur Wavre. L'Empereur me charge de vous 
 prevenir qu'en ce moment Sa Majeste va faire attaquer I'armee 
 anglaise, qui a pris position a Waterloo, pres de la foret de 
 Soignes ; ainsi Sa Majeste desire que vous dirigiez vos mouve- 
 ments sur Wavre, afin de vous rapprocher de nous, votis mettre 
 en rapport d' ope rations, et Her les comnnmications ; poussant devant 
 vous les corps de I'armee prussienne qui ont pris cette direction 
 et qui ont pu s'arreter a Wavre, ou vous devez arriver le plus 
 tot possible. 
 
 Vous ferez suivre les colonnes ennemis, qui ont pris sur 
 votre droite, par quelques corps legers, afin d'observer leurs 
 mouvements et ramasser leurs trainards. Instruisez-moi 
 immediatement de vos dispositions et de votre marche, ainsi 
 que des nouvelles que vous avez sur les ennemis, et ne negligez 
 pas de Her vos communications avec nous. L'Empereur desire 
 avoir tr^s-souvent de vos nouvelles. 
 
 Le Dug de Dalmatie.''' 
 
 XXV. 
 
 Grouchy to Napoleon. 
 
 {June 18.) 
 
 Gemblodx, 
 18 juin, 1815, trots heures du matin. 
 Sire, ' 
 
 Tous mes rapports et renseignements confirment que 
 
 I'ennemi se retire sur Bruxelles, pour s'y concentrer ou livrer 
 
 bataille apr^s s'etre reuni a Wellington. Namur est evacue, a 
 
 ce que me marque le General Pajol. 
 
 Les !"■ et 2^ corps de I'armee de Bliicher paraissent se diriger, 
 
 le i^'" sur Corbais et le 2« sur Chaumont. lis doivent etre 
 
 partis hier au soir, a huit heures et demie, de Tourinnes et 
 
 avoir marche pendant toute la nuit ; heureusement qu'elle a 
 
 ete si mauvaise qu'ils n'auront pu faire beaucoup de cherain. 
 
 * ' Le Marechal Grouchy, du 16 au 19 juin, 1815,' par le General de 
 Division Senateur Marquis de Grouchy ; Paris, 1864.
 
 390 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Je pars a I'instant pour Sart-les-Walhain, d'ouje me porterai 
 a Corbais et a Wavre. J'aurai I'honneur de vous ecrire de 
 I'une et I'autre de ces villes. 
 
 Je suis, etc., 
 
 Le Marechal Grouchy.* 
 
 Dans sa brochure de 1864, le General de Grouchy fait figurer 
 cette depeche, comme etant celle que son p^re aurait adresse a 
 TEmpereur. 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 SouLT TO Grouchy. 
 {June 18.) 
 
 Alt Marechal Grouchy. 
 
 DU CHAMP DE BATAILLE DE WATERLOO, 
 
 Le iSjuin, d une heure apres midi. 
 Monsieur le Marechal, 
 
 Vous avez ecrit, ce matin a deux heures, a I'Empereur, 
 que vous marcheriez sur Sart-les-Walhain ; done votre projet 
 etait de vous porter a Corbais ou a Wavre. Ce mouvement 
 est conforme aux dispositions de Sa Majeste, qui vous ont ete 
 communiquees. Cependant, I'ErnpereiiY viordoniie de vous dire 
 que vous devez tonjouvs manceuvrer dans notre direction. C'est 
 a vous de voir le point oil nous sovtmes pour vous regler en con- 
 sequence et pour Her nos communications, ainsi que pour etre 
 toujours en mesure de tomher sur les troupes ennemis qui chercheraient 
 a inquieter notre droite et de les ecraser. Dans ce moment, 
 la bataille est engagee sur la ligne de Waterloo ; le centre ennemi 
 est a Mont-Saint-Jean: ainsi manoeuvrez pour joindre notre 
 droite. 
 
 , P.S. — Une lettre qui vient d'etre interceptee porte que le 
 General Bulow doit attaquer notre flanc. Nous croyons 
 apercevoir ce corps sur les hauteurs de Saint-Lambert ; ainsi, 
 ne perdez pas un instant pour vous rapprocher de nous et nous 
 joindre, et pour ecraser Bulow, que vous prendrez en flagrant 
 delit. 
 
 Le Marechal Due de Dalmatie. 
 Lf. Marechal Grodchy. 
 
 • La Tour d'Auvergne, ' Waterloo,' 318.
 
 APPENDIX 391 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 Grouchy to Napoleon. 
 
 (yune 18.) 
 
 Sart-les-Walhain, 
 iSjicin, 1815, ottze hcitns du matin. 
 Sire, 
 
 Je ne perds pas un moment a vous transmettre les 
 
 renseignements que je recueille ici ; je les regarde comme 
 
 positifs, et afin que votre Majeste les re9oive le plus prompte- 
 
 ment possible, je les lui expedie par le Major de la Fresnaye, 
 
 son ancien page ; il est bien monte et bon ecuyer. 
 
 Les I", 2^ et 3= corps de Bliicher marchent dans la direction 
 de Bruxelles. Deux de ces corps ont passe a Sart-les-Walhain, 
 ou a peu de distance, sur la droite ; ils ont defile en trois colonnes, 
 marchant a peu prfes en meme hauteur. Leur passage a dure 
 six heures sans interruption. Ce qui a defile en vue de Sart- 
 les-Walhain pent etre evalue a trente mille hommes au moins, 
 et avait un materiel de cinquante a soixante bouches a feu. 
 
 Un corps venant de Liege a effectue sa jonction avec ceux 
 qui ont combattu a Fleurus (ci-joint une requisition qui le 
 prouve). Quelques-uns des Prussiens, que j'ai devant moi, se 
 dirigent vers la plaine de la Chyse, situee pr&s de la route de 
 Louvain, et a deux lieues et demie de cette ville. 
 
 II semblerait que ce serait a dessein de s'y masser, ou de 
 combattre les troupes qui les y poursuiveraient, ou enfin de se 
 reunir a Wellington, projet annonce par leurs officiers, qui, 
 avec leur jactance ordinaire, pretendent n'avoir quitte le champ 
 de bataille, le 16, qu'afin d'operer leur reunion avec I'armee 
 anglaise sur Bruxelles. 
 
 Ce soir, je vais etre masse a Wavre, et me trouver ainsi 
 entre Wellington, que je presume en retraite devant votre 
 Majeste, et I'armee prussienne. J'ai besoin d'instructions 
 ulterieures sur ce que votre Majeste ordonne que je fasse. Le 
 pays entre Wavre et la plaine de la Chyse est difficile, coupe 
 et marecageux. 
 
 Par la route de Wilvorde, j'arriverai facilement a Bruxelles
 
 392 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 avant tout ce qui sera arrete a la Chyse, si tant il y a que les 
 Prussiens y fasse une halte. 
 
 Daignez, Sire, me transmettre vos ordres : je puis les recevoir 
 avant de commencer mon mouvement de demain.'*' 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 Wellington's Report or Waterloo. 
 
 To Earl Baihurst. 
 
 Waterloo, 
 
 June ig, 1815. 
 
 Buonaparte, having collected the ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 
 6th corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards and 
 nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river 
 and the Meuse, between the loth and 14th of the month, 
 advanced on the 15th, and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin 
 and Lobbes on the Sambre at daylight in the morning. 
 
 I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th; 
 and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march to 
 their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to 
 prove that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real 
 attack. 
 
 The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on 
 that day, and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps 
 which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus, and Marshal 
 Prince Blucher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, 
 holding the villages in front of his position of St. Amand and 
 Ligny. 
 
 The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi 
 towards Bruxelles, and on the same evening, the 15th, attacked 
 a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince 
 de Weimar, posted at Frasne, and forced it back to the farm- 
 house on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras. 
 
 The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade 
 with another of the same division under General Perponcher, 
 and in the morning early regained part of the ground which 
 had been lost, so as to have the command of the communica- 
 
 * Brochure du General de Grouchy, p. 54 ; Paris, 1864.
 
 APPENDIX 393 
 
 tion leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal Blucher's 
 position. 
 
 In the meantime I had directed the whole army to march 
 upon Les Quatre Bras; and the fifth division, under Lieutenant- 
 General Sir T. Picton, arrived at about half-past two in the 
 day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau. 
 
 At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince 
 Blucher with his whole force, excepting the ist and 2nd corps, 
 and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, with which 
 he attacked our post at Les Quatre Bras. 
 
 The Prussian army maintained their position with their 
 usual gallantry and perseverance against a great disparity of 
 numbers, as the 4th corps of their army, under General Bulow, 
 had not joined ; and I was not able to assist them as I wished, 
 as I was attacked myself, and the troops, the cavalry in par- 
 ticular, which had a long distance to march, had not arrived. 
 
 We maintained our position also, and completely defeated 
 and repulsed all the enemy's attempts to get possession of it. 
 The enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large body of infantry 
 and cavalry, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. 
 He made several charges with the cavalry upon our infantry, 
 but all were repulsed in the steadiest manner. 
 
 In this affair H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, the Duke of 
 Brunswick, and Lieutenant-General Sir T. Picton, and Major- 
 Generals Sir J. Kempt and Sir Denis Pack, who were engaged 
 from the commencement of the enemy's attack, highly dis- 
 tinguished themselves, as well as Lieutenant-General C. Baron 
 Alten, Major -General Sir C. Halkett, Lieutenant-General 
 Cooke, and Major-Generals Maitland and Byng, as they succes- 
 sively arrived. The troops of the fifth division, and those of 
 the Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and 
 conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must par- 
 ticularly mention the 28th, 42nd, 79th, and 92nd Regiments, 
 and the battalion of Hanoverians. Our loss was great, as your 
 Lordship will perceive by the enclosed return ; and I have 
 particularly to regret H.S.H. the Duke of Brunswick, who 
 fell fighting gallantly at the head of his troops.
 
 394 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Although Marshal Blucher had maintained his position at 
 Sombref, he still found himself much weakened by the severity 
 of the contest in which he had been engaged, and, as the 
 4th corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back and to 
 concentrate his army upon Wavre ; and he marched in the 
 night, after the action was over. 
 
 This movement of the Marshal rendered necessary a corre- 
 sponding one upon my part, and I retired from the farm of 
 Quatre Bras upon Genappe, and thence upon Waterloo, the 
 next morning — the 17th — at ten o'clock. 
 
 The enemy made no eflfort to pursue Marshal Blucher. On 
 the contrary, a patrole which I sent to Sombref in the morning 
 found all quiet, and the enemy's vedettes fell back as the 
 patrole advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our 
 march to the rear, although made in the middle of the day, 
 excepting by following, with a large body of cavalry brought 
 from his right, the cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge. 
 
 This gave Lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging them 
 with the I St Life Guards upon their debouche from the village 
 of Genappe, upon which occasion his lordship has declared 
 himself to be well satisfied Avith that regiment. 
 
 The position which I took up in front of Waterloo crossed 
 the highroads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had its right 
 thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which was 
 occupied, and its left extended to a height above the hamlet 
 Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. 
 
 In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, we 
 occupied the house and gardens of Hougoumont, which covered 
 the return of that flank ; and in front of the left centre we 
 occupied the farm of La Haye Sainte. By our left we communi- 
 cated with Marshal Prince Blucher at Wavre, through Ohain ; 
 and the Marshal had promised me that, in case we should be 
 attacked, he would support me with one or more corps, as 
 might be necessary. 
 
 The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the 
 3rd corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blucher, 
 on a range of heights in our front in the course of the night of 
 the 17th and yesterday morning, and at about ten o'clock he
 
 APPENDIX 395 
 
 commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont. I 
 had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng's 
 Brigade of Guards, which was in position in its rear, and it 
 was for some time under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Macdonnell, and afterwards of Colonel Home ; and I am 
 happy to add that it was maintained throughout the day with 
 the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding 
 the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain 
 possession of it. 
 
 This attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied 
 by a very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was 
 destined to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and infantry 
 — occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate — which were 
 made upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the farm- 
 house of La Haye Sainte, as the detachment of the light 
 battalion of the German Legion, which occupied it, had 
 expended all its ammunition, and the enemy occupied the 
 only communication there was with them. 
 
 The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his cavalry, 
 but these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful ; and they 
 afforded opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one of 
 which Lord E. Somerset's brigade, consisting of the Life 
 Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and ist Dragoon Guards, 
 highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major-General 
 Sir W. Ponsonby, having taken many prisoners and an eagle. 
 
 These attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening, 
 when the enemy made a desperate effort with cavalry and 
 infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, to force our left 
 centre, near the farm of La Haye Sainte, which, after a severe 
 contest, was defeated ; and, having observed that the troops 
 retired from this attack in great confusion, and that the march 
 of General Bulow's corps, by Frischermont, upon Planchenois 
 and La Belle Alliance, had begun to take effect, and as I 
 could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Prince 
 Blucher had joined in person with a corps of his army to the 
 left of our line by Ohain, I determined to attack the enemy, 
 and immediately advanced the whole line of infantry, supported 
 by the cavalry and artillery. The attack succeeded in every
 
 396 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 point. The enemy was forced from his positions on the 
 heights, and fled in the utmost confusion, leaving behind him, 
 as far as I could judge, 150 pieces of cannon, with their am- 
 munition, which fell into our hands. 
 
 I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then dis- 
 continued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops, who 
 had been engaged during twelve hours, and because I found 
 myself on the same road with Marshal Blucher, who assured 
 me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night. 
 He has sent me word this morning that he had taken sixty 
 pieces of cannon belonging to the Imperial Guard, and several 
 carriages, baggage, etc., belonging to Buonaparte, in Genappe. 
 
 I propose to move this morning upon Nivelles, and not to 
 discontinue my operations. 
 
 Your Lordship will observe that such a desperate action 
 could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, 
 without great loss, and I am sorry to add that ours has been 
 immense. In Lieutenant-General Sir T. Picton, His Majesty 
 has sustained the loss of an officer who has frequently distin- 
 guished himself in his service, and he fell gloriously leading 
 his division to a charge with bayonets, by which one of the 
 most serious attacks made by the enemy on our position was 
 repulsed. The Earl of Uxbridge, after having successfully 
 got through this arduous day, received a wound by almost the 
 last shot fired, which will, I am afraid, deprive His Majesty 
 for some time of his services. 
 
 H.R.H. the Prince of Orange distinguished himself by his 
 gallantry and conduct, till he received a wound from a musket- 
 ball through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the 
 field. 
 
 It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lord- 
 ship that the army never upon any occasion conducted itself 
 better. The division of Guards, under Lieutenant-General 
 Cooke — who is severely wounded — Major-General Maitland, 
 and Major-General Byng, set an example which was followed 
 by all, and there is no officer nor description of troops that did 
 not behave well. 
 
 I must, however, particularly mention, for His Royal High-
 
 APPENDIX 397 
 
 ness's approbation, Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton, Major- 
 General Adam, Lieutenant-General C. Baron Alten (severely 
 wounded), Major-General Sir C. Halkett (severely wounded), 
 Colonel Ompteda, Colonel Mitchell (commandinj:^ a brigade of 
 the 4th division), Major-Generals Sir J. Kempt and Sir D. 
 Pack, Major-General Lambert, Major-General Lord E. Somer- 
 set, Major-General Sir W. Ponsonby, Major-General Sir C. 
 Grant, and Major-General Sir H. Vivian, Major-General Sir 
 J. O. Vandeleur, and Major-General Count Dornberg, 
 
 I am also particularly indebted to General Lord Hill for his 
 assistance and conduct upon this as upon all former occasions. 
 
 The artillery and engineer departments were conducted 
 much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir G. Wood and Colonel 
 Smyth, and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct 
 of the Adjutant-General, Major-General Barnes, who was 
 wounded, and of the Quartermaster -General, Colonel De 
 Lancey, who was killed by a cannon-shot in the middle of the 
 action. This officer is a serious loss to His Majesty's service 
 and to me at this moment. 
 
 I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was severely wounded, 
 and of the officers composing my personal staff, who have 
 suffered severely in this action. Lieutenant- Colonel the Hon. 
 Sir A. Gordon, who has died of his wounds, was a most 
 promising officer, and is a serious loss to His Majesty's 
 service. 
 
 General Kriise, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted 
 himself much to my satisfaction, as did General Trip, com- 
 manding the heavy brigade of cavalry, and General Vanhope, 
 commanding a brigade of infantry in the service of the King of 
 the Netherlands. 
 
 General Pozzo di Borgo, General Baron Vincent, General 
 Muffling, and General Alava were in the field during the 
 action, and rendered me every assistance in their power. 
 Baron Vincent is wounded, but I hope not severely, and 
 General Pozzo di Borgo received a contusion. 
 
 I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal 
 Blucher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the
 
 398 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely 
 assistance I received from them. The operation of General 
 Bulow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one, and, 
 even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the 
 attack which produced the final result, it would have forced 
 the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would 
 have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they 
 should have unfortunately succeeded. 
 
 Since writing the above, I have received a report that 
 Major-General Sir W. Ponsonby is killed, and in announcing 
 this intelligence to your lordship I have to add the expression 
 of my grief for the fate of an officer who had already rendered 
 very brilliant and important services, and was an ornament to 
 his profession. 
 
 I send with this despatch three eagles taken by the troops 
 in this action, which Major Percy will have the honour of lay- 
 ing at the feet of His Royal Highness. I beg leave to recom- 
 mend him to your Lordship's protection.* 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 The Prussian Report of Waterloo. 
 
 Bataille du 18. 
 
 Au point du jour I'armee prussienne se mit en mouvement ; 
 les quatri&me et deuxitime corps march^rent vers Saint-Lam- 
 bert, oij ils devaient rester en position, couverts par une foret 
 pr^s de Frichermont, pour prendre I'ennemi par derri^re quand 
 le moment paraitrait favorable. Le premier corps devait 
 operer par Ohain sur le flanc droit de I'ennemi ; le troisi&me 
 corps devait suivre lentement, afin de porter du secours en 
 cas de besoin. La bataille commen9a environ a dix heures du 
 matin : I'armee anglaise occupait les hauteurs de Mont-Saint- 
 Jean, celle des Fran^ais etait sur les hauteurs en avant de 
 Planchenoit. La premiere etait forte d'environ quatre-vingt 
 mille hommes, I'ennemi en avait a peu pr^s cent trente mille. 
 En peu d'instants Taction devint generale sur toute la ligne. 
 
 * Despatches, xii. 478 ei seq.
 
 APPENDIX 399 
 
 II parait que Napoleon avait le dessein de rejeter I'aile gauche 
 sur le centre, afin d'effectuer enti^rement la separation des 
 Anglais de I'armee prussienne, qu'il croyait en retraite sur 
 Maestricht. 
 
 Dans cette intention, il avait place la plus grande partie de 
 la reserve au centre, pr6s de son aile droite, et il attaqua avec 
 fureur sur ce point. L'armee anglaise combattit avec une 
 valeur qu'il est impossible de surpasser. Les charges repetees 
 de lavielle Garde echou^rent devant I'intrepidite des regiments 
 ecossais, et chacune des charges de la cavalerie fran^aise fut 
 repoussee par la cavalerie anglaise. Mais la superiorite de 
 I'ennemi etait trop grande ; Napoleon envoyait continuelle- 
 ment en avant des masses enormes, et quelque fermete que les 
 troupes anglaises missent pour se maintenir dans leur position, 
 il etait impossible que de si heroiques efforts n'eussent enfin 
 des bornes. 
 
 II ^tait quatre heures et demie. L'extreme difficulte du 
 passage du defile de Saint- Lambert avait considerablement 
 retarde la marche des colonnes prussiennes, en sorte que deux 
 brigades seulement du quatrifeme corps etaient arrivees a la 
 position couverte qui leur etait assignee. Le moment decisif 
 etait venu, il n'y avait pas un instant a perdre. Les generaux 
 ne le laiss^rent point echapper. lis resolurent aussitot de com- 
 mencer I'attaque avec les troupes qu'ils avaient sous la main. 
 Le General Bulow, avec deux brigades et un corps de cavalerie, 
 avan9a done rapidement sur le derrifere de I'aile droite ennemie. 
 L'ennemi ne perdit pas sa presence d'esprit il dirigea de suite 
 sa reserve contre nous, et un engagement des plus meurtriers 
 commen9a de ce cote. Le succ^s resta longtemps incertain. 
 Pendant ce temps-la le combat avec les Anglais continuait 
 avec la meme violence. 
 
 Vers six heures, nous re9umes la nouvelle que le General 
 Thielmann, qui commandait le troisieme corps, etait attaque a 
 Wavre par un corps ennemi trfes-considerable, et que deja on 
 se disputait la possession de la ville. Le Feld-Marechal ne 
 s'inquieta pas de ce rapport ; c'etait ou il etait, et non ailleurs, 
 que I'affaire devait etre decisive. Un combat continue avec 
 tenacite et soutenu continuellement par des troupes fraiches
 
 400 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 pouvait seul assurer la victoire, et si on I'obtenait ici, un revers 
 ^prouvd a Wavre etait de peu de consequence. Les colonnes 
 continu^rent leurs mouvements. A sept heures et demie, 
 Tissue de la bataille etait encore incertaine. Tout le quatri^me 
 corps et une partie du deuxi&me, sous le General Pirch, 
 s'etaient successivement engages. Les troupes fran9aises se 
 battaient avec une rage desesp(5r^e ; cependant on apercevait 
 quelque incertitude dans leurs mouvements, et on observa que 
 quelques pieces de canon battaient en retraite. 
 
 A ce moment, la premiere colonne du General Ziethen arriva 
 sur les points d'attaque, pr&s du village de Smohain, et chargea 
 aussitot le flanc gauche de I'ennemi. Ce moment decida de sa 
 defaite. L'aile droite fut enfoncee en trois endroits et aban- 
 donna ses positions. Nos troupes march^rent en avant au pas 
 de charge, et attaqu^rent les Fran9ais de tous cotds, tandis 
 qu'au meme moment toute la ligne anglaise avan9ait. 
 
 Les circonstances furent enti&rement favorables a I'attaque 
 de I'armee prussienne. Le terrain s'elevait en amphitheatre, 
 de sorte que notre artillerie pouvait librement diriger ses feux 
 du sommet de plusieurs hauteurs qui s'elevaient graduellement 
 au-dessus les unes des autres, et dans les intervalles desquelles 
 les troupes descendaient dans la plaine, formees en brigades et 
 dans le plus grand ordre, pendant que des troupes fraiches se 
 d^veloppaient sans cesse en sortant de la foret, qui etait derri^re 
 nous sur la hauteur. Cependant I'ennemi conserva quelques 
 moyens de retraite jusqu'au moment oij le village de Planche- 
 noit, qui etait sur ses derri^res, et qui etait dt>fendu par la 
 Garde, fut, apr^s plusieurs attafjues sanglantes, emporte 
 d'assaut. Dhs ce moment la retraite devint une deroute qui 
 se r^pandit bientot dans toute I'armee fran^aise, qui dans son 
 affreuse confusion entrainait tout ce qui tentait de I'arreter, et 
 finit par presenter I'aspect de la fuite d'une arm(^e de barbares. 
 
 II etait neuf heures et demie ; le Feld-Marechal fit assembler 
 tous les officiers superieurs et donna ordre qu'on envoyat a la 
 poursuite de I'ennemi jusqu'au dernier homme et au dernier 
 cheval. L'avant garde de I'armee precipita sa marche. 
 L'armee fran9aise, poursuivie sans interruption, fut entifere- 
 ment desorganisee. La chaussee offrait le tableau d'un immense
 
 APPENDIX 401 
 
 naufrage ; elle etait couverte d'une quantite innombrable de 
 canons, de caissons, de chariots, de baggages, d'armes et de 
 debris de toute esp&ce. 
 
 Ceux des ennemis qui avaient essaye de prendre quelque 
 repos et ne s'attendaient pas a etre poursuivis si vivemei^t, 
 furent chasses de plus de neuf bivacs. Dans quelques villages 
 ils tent^rent de se maintenir, mais aussit6t qu'ils entendaient 
 le battement de nos tambours et le son de nos trompettes, ils 
 se precipitaient dans les maisons, oii ils etaient tallies en pieces 
 ou faits prisonniers. Ce fut la clarte de la lune qui favorisa 
 grandement la poursuite ; car toute cette marche n'etait qu'une 
 chasse continuelle dans les champs et dans les maisons. 
 
 A Genappe, I'ennemi s'etait retranche avec des canons et 
 des voitures renversees ; a notre approche, nous entendimes 
 tout a coup dans la ville un grand bruit de mouvement de 
 voitures ; en y entrant, nous fumes exposes a un feu de mous- 
 queterie fort vif auquel nous ripostames par quelques coups de 
 canon, suivis d'un hurrah, et dans un instant toute la ville fut 
 a nous. Ce fut la que, parmi d'autre equipages, la voiture de 
 Napoleon fut prise ; il I'avait quittee pour monter a cheval, et 
 cela avec tant de precipitation, qu'il avait oublie dedans son 
 epee et son chapeau. L'affaire se continua ainsi jusqu'au 
 point du jour. Environ quarante mille hommes, restes de 
 tout I'armee, et dans le desordre le plus complet, se sont sauves 
 en operant leur retraite par Charleroi, une grande partie sans 
 armes, n'emmenant avec eux que vingt-sept pieces de leur 
 nombreuse artillerie. Dans sa fuite, I'ennemi a passe toutes 
 ses forteresses, seules defenses de ses frontieres qui maintenant 
 sont depassees par nos armees. 
 
 X trois heures, Napoleon depecha de dessus le champ de 
 bataille un courrier a Paris, avec la nouvelle que la victoire 
 n'etait pas douteuse ; peu d'heures aprfes, il n'eut plus que son 
 aile gauche. Nous n'avons pas encore un etat exacte des 
 pertes de I'ennemi ; il suffit de savoir que les deux tiers de son 
 armee sont tues, blesses ou prisonniers ; parmi ces derniers se 
 trouvent les Generaux Du Hesme et Compans. Jusqu'a ce 
 moment, environ trois cents pieces de canon et cinq cents 
 caissons sont tombes entre nos mains. 
 
 26
 
 402 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15 
 
 Peu de victoires ont ^t^ si completes, et il n'y a certainement 
 pas d'exemple qu'une armee se soit, deux jours apr^s la perte 
 d'une bataille, engagtfe dans une telle action, et s'y soit 
 soutenue aussi glorieusement. II faut rendre honneur aux 
 troupes capables d'autant de fermetc et de valeur. Dans le 
 milieu de la position occup^e par les Frangais, et tout a fait 
 sur la hauteur, se trouve une ferme appelee la Belle-Alliance. 
 La marche de toutes les colonnes prussiennes fut dirig^e vers 
 cette ferme, qui se voyait de tous les cotds ; ce fut la aussi que 
 Napoleon se tint pendant la bataille ; ce fut la aussi qu'il 
 donnait ses ordres, qu'il se flattait de I'espoir de la victoire, et 
 que sa ruine fut decidee. Ce fut encore la que, par un hasard 
 heureux, le Marechal Bliicher et le Lord Wellington se rencon- 
 tr^rent dans I'obscurit^ et se salu^rent mutuellement comma 
 vainqueurs. 
 
 En memoire de I'alliance qui regne maintenant entre les 
 nations anglaise et prussienne, de I'union des deux armees, et 
 de leur confiance reciproque, le marechal desire que cette 
 bataille porte le nom de la Belle- Alliance. 
 
 Par un ordre du Feld-Marechal Bliicher, 
 
 Le G^n^ral Gneisenau.* 
 
 XXX. 
 
 Napoleon's Report of Waterloo. 
 
 Bataille de Mont -Saint -Jean. 
 
 A neuf heures du matin, la pluie ayant un peu diminue, le 
 I" corps se mit en mouvement, et se plaga, la gauche a la 
 route de Bruxelles et vis-a-vis le village de Mont-Saint-Jean, 
 qui paraissait le centre de la position de I'ennemi. Le second 
 corps appuya sa droite a la route de Bruxelles, et sa gauche 
 a un petit bois a portee de canon de I'armee anglaise. Les 
 cuirassiers se port^rent en reserve derri^re, et la Garde en 
 reserve sur les hauteurs. Le 6^ corps, avec la cavalerie du 
 General Domon, sous les ordres du Comte Lobau, fut destine 
 
 * La Tour d'Auvergne, • Waterloo,' 401-41 1.
 
 APPENDIX 403 
 
 a se porter en arri^re de notre droite, pour s'opposer a un corps 
 prussien qui paraissait avoir echappi^ au Marechal Grouchy, 
 et etre dans I'intention de tomber sur notre flanc droit, inten- 
 tion qui nous avait ^t^ connue par nos rapports et par une 
 lettre du g^n^ral prussien que portait une ordonnance prise 
 par nos coureurs. 
 
 Les troupes etaient pleines d'ardeur. On estimait les forces 
 de Tarm^e anglaise a quatre-vingt mille hommes. On sup- 
 posait que le corps prussien, qui pouvait etre en mesure vers 
 le soir, pouvait etre de quinze mille hommes. Les forces 
 ennemis etaient done de plus de quatre-vingt mille hommes ; 
 les notres etaient moins nombreuses, 
 
 A midi, tous les preparatifs etant termines, le Prince Jerome, 
 commandant une division du 2« corps, destinee a en former 
 I'extreme gauche, se porta sur le bois dont I'ennemi occupait 
 une partie. La cannonade s'engagea ; I'ennemi soutint par 
 trente pieces de canon les troupes qu'il avait envoyees pour 
 garder le bois. Nous times aussi de notre cote des dispositions 
 d'artillerie. A une heure, le Prince Jerome fut maitre de tout 
 le bois, et toute I'armee anglaise se replia derri^re un rideau. 
 Le Comte d'Erlon attaqua alors le village de Mont-Saint-Jean, 
 et fit appuyer son attaque par quatre-vingts pieces de canon. 
 II s'engagea la une epouvantable cannonade, qui dut beaucoup 
 faire souffrir I'armee anglaise. Tous les coups portaient sur 
 le plateau. Une brigade de la i''^ division du Comte d'Erlon 
 s'empara du village de Mont-Saint-Jean ; une seconde brigade 
 fut chargee par un corps de cavalerie anglaise, qui lui fit 
 eprouver beaucoup de pertes. Au meme moment, une divi- 
 sion de cavalerie anglaise chargea la batterie du Comte d'Erlon 
 par sa droite, et desorganisa plusieurs pieces ; mais les cuiras- 
 siers du General Milhaud chargerent cette division, dont trois 
 regiments furent rompus et echarpes. 
 
 II etait trois heures apr^s midi, I'Empereur fit avancer la 
 Garde pour la placer dans la plaine, sur le terrain qu'avait 
 occupe le i^"" corps au commencement de Taction, ce corps 
 se trouvant deja en avant. La division prussienne, dont on 
 avait prevu le mouvement, commenga alors a s'engager avec 
 les tirailleurs du Comte Lobau, en plongeant son feu sur tout 
 
 26 — 3
 
 404 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 notre flanc droit. II etait convenable, avant de rien entre- 
 prendre ailleurs, d'attendre Tissue qu'aurait cette attaque. 
 A cet effet, tous les moyens de la reserve etaient prets a se 
 porter au secours du Comte Lobau et a ^eraser le corps prus- 
 sien lorsqu'il se serait avance. Cela fait, I'Empereur avait 
 le projet de mener une attaque par le village de Mont-Saint- 
 Jean, dont on esperait un succ^s decisif ; mais, par un mouve- 
 ment d'impatience si frequent dans nos annales militaires et 
 qui nous a ete si souvent funeste, la cavalerie de reserve, 
 s'etant aper9ue d'un mouvement retrograde que faisaient les 
 Anglais pour se mettre a I'abri de nos batteries dont ils avaient 
 d^ja tant souffert, couronna les hauteurs de Mont-Saint-Jean 
 et chargea I'infanterie. Ce mouvement, qui, fait a temps et 
 soutenu par les reserves, devait decider de la journee, fait 
 isolement et avant que les affaires de la droite fussent terminees, 
 devint funeste. 
 
 N'ayant aucun moyen de le contremander, I'ennemi montrant 
 beaucoup de masses d'infanterie et de cavalerie, et les deux 
 divisions de cuirassiers etant engagees, toute notre cavalerie 
 courut au meme moment pour soutenir ses camarades. La, 
 pendant trois heures, se firent de nombreuses charges qui nous 
 valurent I'enfoncement de plusieurs carres et six drapeaux de 
 I'infanterie anglaise, avantage hors de proportion avec les pertes 
 qu'eprouvait notre cavalerie par la mitraille et les fusillades. 
 II etait impossible de disposer de nos reserves d'infanterie 
 jusqu'a ce qu'on eut repousse I'attaque de flanc du corps 
 prussien. Cette attaque se prolongeait toujours et perpendicu- 
 lairement sur notre flanc droit. L'Empereur y envoya le 
 General Du Hesme avec la Jeune Garde et plusieurs batteries 
 de reserve. L'ennemi fut contenu, fut repousse et recula ; il 
 avait epuise ses forces et Ton n'en avait plus rien a craindre. 
 C'est ce moment qui etait celui indique pour une attaque sur 
 le centre de l'ennemi. 
 
 Comme les cuirassiers soufFraient par la mitraille, on envoya 
 quatre bataillons de la moyenne Garde pour proteger les 
 cuirassiers, soutenir la position, et, si cela etait possible, 
 degager et faire reculer dans la plaine une partie de notre 
 cavalerie.
 
 APPENDIX 405 
 
 On envoya deux autres bataillons pour se tenir en potence 
 sur I'extreme gauche de la division qui avait manoeuvre sur 
 nos flancs, afin de n'avoir de ce cote aucune inquietude ; le 
 reste fut dispose en reserve, partie pour occuper la potence en 
 arri^re de Mont-Saint-Jean, partie sur le plateau, en arri^re du 
 champ de bataille qui formait notre position de retraite. 
 
 Dans cet etat de choses, la bataille etait gagnee ; nous 
 occupions toutes les positions que I'ennemi occupait au com- 
 mencement de Taction, notre cavalerie ayant ete trop tot et 
 mal employee, nous ne pouvions plus esperer de succ^s de- 
 cisifs. Mais le Marechal Grouchy, ayant appris le mouve- 
 ment du corps prussien, marchait sur le derriere de ce 
 corps, ce qui nous assurait un succ^s eclatant pour la journee 
 de lendemain. Apr^s huit heures de feu et de charges 
 d'infanterie et de cavalerie, toute I'armee voyait avec satis- 
 faction la bataille gagnee et le champ de bataille en notre 
 pouvoir. 
 
 Sur les huit heures et demie, le? quatre bataillons de la 
 moyenne Garde qui avaient ete envoyes sur le plateau au dela 
 de Mont-Saint-Jean pour soutenir les cuirassiers, etant genes 
 par la mitraille de I'ennemi, marcherent a la baionnette pour 
 enlever ses batteries. Le jour finissait ; une charge faite sur 
 leur flanc par plusieurs escadrons anglais les mit en desordre ; 
 les fuyards repasserent le ravin ; les regiments voisins, qui 
 virent quelques troupes appartenant a la Garde a la debandade, 
 crurent que c'etait de la Vieille Garde et s'ebranlerent ; les oris : 
 ' Tout est pevdii ! la Garde est vepoiissee /' se firent entendre. Les 
 soldats pretendent meme que sur plusieurs points des mal- 
 veillants apostes ont crie : ' Sauve qui pent !' Quoi qu'il en soit, 
 une terreur panique se repandit tout a la fois sur tout le champ 
 de bataille ; on se precipita dans le plus grand desordre sur la 
 ligne de communication ; les soldats, les canonniers, les caissons 
 se pressaient pour y arriver ; la Vieille Garde, qui etait en 
 reserve, en fut assaillie et fut elle-meme entramee. 
 
 Dans un instant, I'armee ne fut plus qu'une masse confuse, 
 toutes les armes etaient melees, et il etait impossible de 
 reformer un corps. L'ennemi, qui s'aper9ut de cette etonnante 
 confusion, fit deboucher des colonnes de cavalerie ; le desordre
 
 4o6 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 au»menta; la confusion de la nuit empecha de rallier les 
 troupes et de leur montrer leur erreur. 
 
 Ainsi une bataille terminee, una journee finie, de fausses 
 mesures rt^parees, de plus grands succ^s assures pour le lende- 
 main, tout fut perdu par un moment de terreur panique. Les 
 escadrons de service meme, ranges a cote de I'Empereur, 
 furent culbutes et desorganises par ces flots tumultueux, et il 
 n'y eut plus d'autre chose a faire que de suivre le torrent. Les 
 pares de reserve, les bagages qui n'avaient pas repass^ la 
 Sambre et tout ce qui etait sur le champ de bataille sont restds 
 aux pouvoir de I'ennemi. II n'y a eu meme aucun moyen 
 d'attendre les troupes de notre droite ; on salt ce que c'est que 
 la plus brave armee du monde lorsqu'elle est melee et que son 
 organisation n'existe plus/'' 
 
 * Napoleon Correspondence, xxviii. 295-298.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abdication, The, of Napoleon, 356 
 Acta Additionnel, The, 41, 42 
 Adam, British General at Waterloo, 
 
 211 
 Allies, The : they proscribe Napo- 
 leon as an outlaw, 23, 24 ; gigantic 
 preparations of, to overthrow him, 
 
 36, 37 
 
 Allix, French General : his division 
 commanded by Bourgeois and 
 Quiot at Waterloo, 243 ; their 
 attack fails, 243, 244 ; they take 
 part in the final attack, 287 
 
 Alten, General, commander of Wel- 
 lington's third division, 92-94; at 
 Quatre Bras, 137 ; at Waterloo, 
 210 ; his division suffers terribly, 
 287 
 
 Angouleme, The Due de, at the 
 Restoration, 5 ; he endeavours to 
 raise a part of the South of 
 France in favour of the Bourbons, 
 22 ; is made prisoner and released 
 by Napoleon, 22 
 
 Angouleme, The Duchesse de : she 
 endeavours to retain Bordeaux for 
 Louis XVIII., 21 
 
 Arentschild, General of the German 
 Legion at Waterloo, 210 
 
 Army, The French, at the Restora- 
 tion of Louis XVIII., 4; discon- 
 tent in, 4 ; unwise policy of the 
 Bourbons to, 7 ; the army turns 
 its eyes to Napoleon at Elba, 11 ; 
 it declares for Napoleon soon after 
 he had landed in France, 15, 17; 
 it is reorganised by Napoleon, 29- 
 35 ; distribution of the army on 
 
 the northern frontier of France, 
 55 ; concentration of, 128,000 men 
 near Charleroy on the night of 
 June 14, 1815, 56; admirable skill 
 shown in this operation, 56; 
 numbers and characteristics of 
 the army, 57-60 ; its march on 
 June 15 retarded, and the causes 
 of this, 79, 80 ; the positions it 
 holds on the night of June 15, 87 ; 
 the army does not move at an 
 early hour on June 16, 103 ; move- 
 ment of the right and centre of 
 the army, excepting the corps of 
 Lobau, in the forenoon of June 16, 
 112; the army is victorious at 
 Ligny, 128, 129 ; its conduct in 
 the battle, 150 ; exultation of the 
 army after Ligny, and want of 
 proper precautions, 159 ; the 
 whole French army is divided 
 into two groups on June 17, one 
 group to hold Blucher in check, 
 the other to pursue Wellington, 
 168 ; part of the army reaches 
 Waterloo on the night of June 17, 
 188; feelings of the army on the 
 morning of June 18, 199, 200 ; 
 magnificent appearance of the 
 army before the attack at Water- 
 loo, 220-225 ■ ^ts probable num- 
 bers, 221 ; its exultation and con- 
 fidence, 226 ; defeat and rout of 
 the French army, and its flight, 
 295 ; its supposed losses, 306 
 Army, The Prussian, in Belgium : it 
 is divided into four corps d'armee 
 under Zieten, Pirch, Thielmann, 
 and Bulow, 50 ; like that of Wei-
 
 4o8 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 lington, it is widely disseminated, 
 50; the positions it holds in June, 
 1815, 50, 51 ; numbers and charac- 
 teristics of the I'russian army, C3, 
 64 ; positions of the army on the 
 night of June 15, 99 ; positions of 
 the corps of Zieten, Pirch, and 
 Thielmann at the Battle of Ligny 
 on June 16, 114, 116; the army is 
 defeated at Ligny, 128, 129; its 
 conduct on June 16, 151 ; its 
 position critical in the night, 152 ; 
 retreat of the army after Ligny, 
 173 - 175 ; its positions around 
 Wavre on the night of June 17, 
 and its numbers, 174, 175 ; delays 
 in the advance of the Prussian 
 army from Wavre on June 18, 215, 
 216; losses of the Prussian army 
 at Waterloo, 306 
 Army, The, of Wellington in Bel- 
 gium, 49 ; it is divided into three 
 corps d'armee under Hill, the 
 Prince of Orange, and Welling- 
 ton, 49 ; like Blucher's army, it is 
 widely disseminated, 49, 50; the 
 positions it holds in June, 1815, 
 49, 50 ; numbers and character- 
 istics of Wellington's army, 60- 
 62 ; its positions on the night of 
 June 15, 99; its conduct at Quatre 
 Bras on June 16, 151 ; its position 
 critical, 152 ; feelings of the army 
 before Waterloo, 201, 202; its 
 order of battle, 207-212 ; its prob- 
 able numbers, 209 ; its appear- 
 ance before the attack on June 18, 
 226 ; it is moved forward by Wel- 
 lington after the defeat of the 
 French army, 295 ; its losses at 
 Waterloo, 306 
 Artois, The Comte de, at the Restor- 
 ation, 5 ; his fruitless efforts at 
 Lyons, 15 
 
 B 
 
 Bachelu, French General at Quatre 
 Bras, 133, 135, 13G; at Waterloo. 
 272 
 
 Baudus, ofificer of Soult, carries 
 Napoleon's message to D'Erlon 
 on June 16, 122; remonstrates 
 with Ney, 142 
 
 Belgium, Topography of, 47, 49; 
 positions of the armies of Blucher 
 and Wellington in June, 1S15, 49, 
 51 
 
 Belle Alliance, Heights of, iSi, 226; 
 meeting of Blucher and Welling- 
 ton at, 298 
 
 Berri, Due de, 5 
 
 Bertrand, one of Napoleon's most 
 trusted officers, conveys a very 
 important despatch of Napoleon 
 to Grouchy on June 17, 171 
 
 Best, Hanoverian General at Water- 
 loo, 209 
 
 Blucher, Marshal, colleague of Wel- 
 lington in 1815 : he arrives in 
 Belgium, 36; his faulty disposi- 
 tions and those of Wellington 
 before hostilities begin, 51-53 ; 
 characteristics of Blucher in war, 
 70, and of his lieutenants, 71 ; 
 Blucher on June 14 directs that 
 his army is to move on Sombreffe, 
 88,89; imprudence of this strategy, 
 90 ; he had not received a promise 
 of assistance from W'ellington on 
 June 16, 90; his operations and 
 those of Wellington up to this 
 time faulty, 100-102; Blucher 
 assembles the corps of Zieten, 
 Pirch, and Thielmann around 
 Sombreffe on June 16, and arrays 
 his army for a great battle, 113 ; 
 his conversation with Wellington 
 before Ligny, 117; his conduct 
 during the battle, 120-127; he is 
 thrown from his charger at the 
 end of the day, 12S ; his strategy 
 and tactics on June 16, 147-150 ; 
 Blucher resolves to lead his army 
 to join Wellington on June 18, 
 192 ; he is entitled to the whole 
 credit, 193 ; his messages to Wel- 
 lington, 192, 193 ; his plans and 
 those of Wellington for June 18 
 bad strategy, 194 ; Blucher on the 
 march from Wavre to Waterloo, 
 213 ; his orders to his army for 
 June 18, 214 ; he presses on the 
 march of his columns, 214; his 
 energy in urging the attack of 
 Bulow from St. Lambert, 264 ; 
 he promises to assist Wellington 
 with part of the corps of Pirch, 
 283 ; he meets his colleague at La 
 Belle Alliance, 29.S ; he advances 
 on Paris with Wellington, 359 ; 
 his march imprudent, 359 ; he 
 crosses the Seine, and places him- 
 self in a dangerous position, 361 ; 
 his violent threats, 362 ; he is
 
 INDEX 
 
 409 
 
 persuaded by Wellington to 
 become more moderate, and is 
 soothed by being made to appear 
 the arbiter of events, 363 
 
 Bordeaux holds out for the Bour- 
 bons under the Duchesse d'Angou- 
 leme, 21 
 
 Bourmont, French General : his 
 desertion of the army, 78 
 
 Braine I'Alleud, Village of, 208 
 
 Brussels, Wellington's headquarters 
 in, 1815, 52 ; he attaches great 
 importance to it, 50, 52 
 
 Bulow commands the 4th corps of 
 the Prussian army, 64 ; he is 
 directed on the night of June 14 
 to move towards Sombreffe, 88, 
 89 ; he is prevented by distance 
 from doing this, 89 ; he joins the 
 Prussian army after Ligny, 175 ; 
 Bulow is delayed on June 18 when 
 on the march from Wavre, 215, 
 216 ; he reaches St. Lambert with 
 half of his forces only, 264 ; the 
 other half comes up at three in 
 the afternoon of June 18, 264 ; his 
 first attack repulsed, 265 ; his 
 attack renewed and again re- 
 pulsed, 277 ; with the support of 
 Pirch he storms Plancenoit, 297 
 
 Bylandt, Dutch-Belgian General at 
 Waterloo, 209 ; defeat of his 
 troops, 243, 244 
 
 Byng, British General at Waterloo, 
 210 
 
 C 
 
 Cambaceres, Minister of Napoleon 
 in 1815, 19 
 
 Carnot, Minister of Napoleon in 
 1815, 19 ; his advice to Napoleon 
 after Waterloo, 353 
 
 Caulaincourt, Minister of Napoleon 
 in 1815, 19 
 
 Chambers, The French, of 1815 : 
 their composition and qualities, 
 43, 44 ; they declare themselves 
 the sole representatives of the 
 State after Waterloo, 350 ; their 
 illusions, 351 ; they pronounce 
 against being dissolved by Napo- 
 leon, 354 ; they vote thanks to 
 Napoleon when he abdicates, 357 ; 
 they are strongly opposed to the 
 restoration of the Bourbons, but 
 are made the dupes of Fouche, 
 358 ; they are suppressed on the 
 return of the King, 364 
 
 Champ de Mai, The, 44, 45 
 
 Charleroy : the French army enters 
 the town on June 15, 79; passes 
 through it after the rout of Water- 
 loo, 301 
 
 Chasse, Dutch General, gives Wel- 
 lington valuable assistance, 69 ; 
 at Waterloo, 211 ; he breaks the 
 first column of the Imperial 
 Guard, 292 
 
 Church, The French, at the Restor- 
 ation, 5 
 
 Clinton, British General at Water- 
 loo, commands the second division, 
 
 2TI 
 
 Colville, British General : the 
 greatest part of his division left 
 at Hal and Tubize, 211 
 
 Constant, Benjamin, consulted by 
 Napoleon, and the author of the 
 Acte Additionnel, 41 
 
 Cooke, British General, commands 
 the first division British Guards, 
 94 ; at Quatre Bras, 142 ; at Water- 
 loo, 210 
 
 D 
 
 Davout, Minister of Napoleon in 
 1815, 19; his advice after Water- 
 loo, 354 ; his unfeeling conduct 
 to Napoleon, 357 ; is made com- 
 mander of the French army 
 around Paris, and declares that 
 resistance is hopeless, 359 
 
 Delcambre, chief of D'Erlon's staff, 
 informs Ney that D'Erlon has 
 been summoned to Ligny, 137 ; 
 Ney orders him to recall D'Erlon, 
 138 
 
 D'Erlon, commander of the ist 
 corps of the French army in 1815, 
 57; his operations on June 15, 
 77-80; D'Erlon moves his corps 
 to Jumet early on June 16, 104 ; 
 he is remiss and backward on 
 June 16, but receives only one 
 order from Ney, 138 ; he turns 
 aside with his corps towards 
 Ligny, but in the wrong direction, 
 139; he is recalled by Ney, and 
 joins the Marshal, 139 ; this was 
 grave misconduct, 139 ; he de- 
 taches Durutte to observe the 
 Prussians at Ligny, 139 ; what he 
 might have accomplished, 139, 
 140 ; his conduct on June 16 de- 
 serves censure, 146 ; at Waterloo, 
 220; he conducts the first great
 
 4IO 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 attack, 241 ; vicious formation of 
 his columns, 241, 242; he takes 
 part in the final attack, 2S7. 
 
 Desnoettes, Lefebvre-, commands 
 the light cavalry of the Imperial 
 Guard : his operations on June 15, 
 80, 84 ; at Waterloo, 220 ; he 
 takes part in the great cavalry 
 attacks, 259 
 
 Domon, French cavalry General at 
 Waterloo, 220 ; detached with 
 Subervie and Lobau to hold 
 Bulow in check, 232 
 
 Donzelot, French General at Water- 
 loo, 241, 242, 245; his attack 
 fails, 245 ; he takes part in the 
 final attack, 287 
 
 Dornberg, General of the German 
 Legion at Waterloo, 210 
 
 Duhesme, commander of the Young 
 Guard, not slain by the Prussians 
 in cold blood, 299 
 
 Duplat,oneof Wellington's Generals 
 at Waterloo, 211 
 
 Dupont, General, made Minister of 
 War at the Restoration, 8 
 
 Durutte, French General detached 
 by D'Erlon on June 16, 139; his 
 attack at Waterloo fails, 248 ; his 
 conduct in the final attack. 287 
 
 Emigre party, The extreme, at the 
 Restoration of Louis XVIIL, 3 
 
 Emperor. See Napoleon 
 
 Empire of Napoleon quickly re- 
 stored in 1815, 21 
 
 Excelmans, French cavalry General : 
 his operations on June 17, 159; 
 he is remiss and overconfident, 
 183 ; he reaches Sauveniere, 183 ; 
 his conduct on June 18, 303, 304, 
 and on June 19, 348 
 
 Forbin-Janson carries Napoleon's 
 message to D'Erlon on June 16, 
 122 
 
 Fouche : his objects at the Restora- 
 tion ; he sets a military conspiracy 
 on foot, II ; is made Minister of 
 the Police by Napoleon in 1815, 
 20; at the Champ de Mai, 45; his 
 intrigues during the second reign 
 of Napoleon, 351 ; his perfidy, 
 354 ; he persuades the Chambers 
 that Napoleon is about to dis- 
 
 solve them , 354 ; he is made head 
 of the Provisional Government 
 of France, 358 ; his subsequent 
 intrigues, 358, 359 ; he paralyses 
 every effort to resist or to check 
 the invaders, 358 ; he sends en- 
 voys to Wellington, 359 ; he 
 releases VitroUes, and negotiates 
 with the exiled Court of Louis 
 XVIIL, 35S, 359 ; he acquires 
 great influence from the support 
 of Wellington, 3G0, but is placed 
 in a position of real danger, 360 ; 
 his crooked policy succeeds, 363 ; 
 he obtains a high place in the 
 councils of Louis XVIIL, but is 
 disgraced, 364 
 
 Foy, French General at Quatre 
 Bras, 132, 134, 136; joins in the 
 attack on Hougoumont, 231 
 
 France, State of, at the Restoration 
 of Louis XVIIL, i-ii ; accepts 
 the Empire after Napoleon's re- 
 turn from Elba, 19, 22 ; parts of, 
 gradually fall away from Napo- 
 leon, 24, 25 ; attitude of, after 
 Waterloo, 363 
 
 Frischermont, 207 
 
 Gaudin, Minister of Napoleon in 
 1815, 19 
 
 Gembloux, Grouchy at, 183 
 
 Generals, Feelings of the French, at 
 the Restoration, 9 
 
 Gerard commands the 4th corps 
 of the French army, 17; his 
 operations on June 15, 78, 81, 85 ; 
 his conduct at the Battle of Ligny, 
 121, 123 ; remark of Napoleon to, 
 at Fleurus, iig ; Gerard's opera- 
 tions on June 17, 182, 183 ; at 
 Walhain he urges Grouchy to 
 march on Waterloo, 238 ; the 
 means he proposes to effect this, 
 238 ; Grouchy rejects his wise 
 counsel, 240 ; indignation of 
 Gerard at Grouchy's conduct. 
 304 ; he takes part in the attack 
 on Wavre, and is severely 
 wounded, 306 
 
 Ghigny, Dutch-Belgian General at 
 Waterloo, 209 
 
 Girard, Conduct of, at Ligny, and 
 death of, 120, 123 
 
 Gneisenau, chief of Blucher's staff, 
 directs the Prussian army after
 
 INDEX 
 
 411 
 
 Ligny to Wavre, 174 ; this move- 
 ment a bad half-measure, 177; 
 what might have been accom- 
 pHshed, 177 ; Gneisenau hesitates 
 on the night of June 17 and the 
 morning of June 18, 214 ; his dis- 
 trust of Wellington 214; he 
 presses the pursuit after Waterloo, 
 but not energetically, 298, 299 
 
 Government of Louis XVIII. at the 
 Restoration : its bad policy and 
 many errors, 5-7 ; it breaks faith 
 with Napoleon when at Elba, 13 ; 
 Government of Napoleon in 1815 
 inevitably feeble, 26, 27 
 
 Grant, British cavalry General at 
 Waterloo, 210 
 
 Grouchy made a Marshal of France, 
 22 ; at first commands the cavalry 
 reserve of the French army, 
 with Pajol, Kellermann, and Mil- 
 haud as subordinates, 57 ; he in- 
 forms Napoleon of the retreat 
 being made by Pirch II. on Gilly, 
 86 ; Vandamme refuses to comply 
 with his request to march on 
 Sombreffe, 86 ; Grouchy receives 
 Napoleon's orders for June 16, 
 HI ; he shows energy and atten- 
 tion, III ; his report to Napoleon, 
 III ; his conduct at Ligny, 121, 
 123, 127 ; Grouchy accompanies 
 Napoleon to Ligny on June 17, 
 165 ; he receives Napoleon's 
 orders, 169 ; their true purport, 
 169, 170; he remonstrates with 
 Napoleon, and is rebuked, 171 ; 
 he receives another order of the 
 first importance through Ber- 
 trand, 171 ; Grouchy denied for 
 many years the existence of this 
 order, 171 ; his operations on 
 June 17, 181 ; his march to Gem- 
 bloux extraordinarily slow, 182 ; 
 
 183 ; positions of his army around 
 Gemblouxon the night of June 17, 
 
 184 ; his despatch to Napoleon at 
 ten at night, 184; what he ought 
 to have done on June 18, 186 ; he 
 does not even think of this opera- 
 tion on the night of June 17, 187 ; 
 his despatch to Napoleon at three 
 in the morning of June 18, 217 ; 
 he does not make for Moustier 
 and Ottignies on June 18, and 
 does not try to interpose between 
 Blucher and Wellington, 217 ; he 
 
 marches on Sart les Walhain, 
 218 ; he moves at a late hour and 
 slowly towards Wavre, 218, and 
 sends out no reconnoitring-parties, 
 218 ; he reaches Walhain near 
 eleven in the morning of June 18, 
 236 ; his despatch to Napoleon 
 from Walhain, 236, 237; positions 
 of his army at this moment, 237, 
 238 ; he hears the thunder of 
 Waterloo, and is urged by Gerard 
 to march to the scene of the 
 battle, 238 ; he rejects this advice, 
 239 ; marches on Wavre by the 
 eastern bank of the Dyle, and 
 keeps far away from Waterloo, 
 240 ; positions of his army, 303 ; 
 he receives Soult's despatch of 
 ten in the morning of June 18, 
 304 ; he is indignantly censured 
 by Gerard, 304 ; he reaches 
 Wavre at about half-past four, 
 304 ; he attacks Wavre, 304 ; he 
 receives Soult's letter of one in 
 the afternoon, and the postcript 
 to it, 305 ; he sends Pajol and 
 Teste to the Dyle, and continues 
 the attack on Wavre, 305, 306 ; 
 Grouchy resolves to march on 
 Brussels on June ig, 346 ; he re- 
 ceives the news of the rout of 
 Waterloo, 347 ; his excuses to his 
 lieutenants, 347 ; he retreats on 
 Namur, 348 ; celerity of this 
 movement in marked contrast 
 with his operations on June 18, 
 348 ; Grouchy reaches Namur on 
 June 20, and Givet on June 21, 
 349. 350 ; he is given the com- 
 mand of the French army that 
 had fought in Belgium, and leads 
 its remains to Paris, 361 
 Guard, The Imperial : conduct of 
 at Ligny, 127, 128 ; it is at Water- 
 loo, 220 ; the Young Guard and 
 part of the Old detached to oppose 
 Bulow on June 18, 265, 276; part 
 of the Guard attacks Wellington's 
 line, 289 ; it is wrongly directed, 
 291 ; attack of the Guard in four 
 echelons, 291, 204 ; it is com- 
 pletely defeated, 294 ; the part 
 of the Guard left in Napoleon's 
 hands makes a fine resistance, but 
 is overwhelmed, 297 ; retreat of 
 another part of the Guard from 
 Waterloo, 297, 300
 
 412 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 Guilleminot, chief of Ter6me's staff, 
 disapproves of the reiterated 
 attacks on Hougoumont, 230 
 
 Guyot commands the heavy cavalry 
 of the Imperial Guard at Water- 
 loo ; Napoleon always denied that 
 he allowed him to take part in 
 the great cavalry charges, 263 
 
 H 
 
 Halkett, C, British General at 
 Waterloo, 278, 291 
 
 Halkett, W., one of Wellington's 
 Generals at Waterloo, 211 
 
 Heyraes, aide-de-camp of Ney, 82 ; 
 not a faith worthy witness, 83 ; 
 sent by Ney at Waterloo to ask 
 Napoleon for infantry, 275 
 
 Hill commands the 2nd corps of 
 Wellington's army, 49 ; com- 
 mands the right wing at Water- 
 loo, 211 
 
 Hougoumont, important outpost 
 of Wellington at Waterloo, 211 ; 
 description of, 224 
 
 J 
 
 Jacquinot, French cavalry General 
 
 at Waterloo, 220 
 Jerome Bonaparte at Quatre Bras, 
 
 134, 136 ; takes part in the attack 
 
 on Hougoumont, 229 
 
 K 
 
 Kellermann, French cavalry 
 General, 143 ; conduct at Quatre 
 Bras, 141, 142 ; at Waterloo, 220 ; 
 his conduct in the battle, 266 ; 
 he disapproves of the great 
 cavalry attacks, 266 
 
 Kempt, British General at Water- 
 loo : he repulses D'Erlon's attack, 
 244 
 
 Kilmansegge, one of Wellington's 
 Generals at Waterloo, 278 
 
 Kruse commands the Nassau con- 
 tingent at Waterloo, 210 
 
 Labedoyere : his defection to Napo- 
 leon, 15 
 
 Lafayette, 43 ; he persuades the 
 Chambers to resist any attempts 
 at a dissolution, 359 
 
 La Haye Sainte, important outpost 
 of Wellington at Waterloo, 211 ; 
 
 first attack on, 243 ; fall of, at 
 about four in the afternoon, 256 ; 
 fierce attacks of the French from, 
 278, 287 
 
 Lambert, British General at Water- 
 loo, 209 
 
 Ledebur, Prussian officer at Mont 
 St. Guibert, charged to observe 
 Grouchy, 238 ; he is surprised 
 and nearly surrounded, 303 
 
 Liberal party in France at the 
 Restoration, 4, 9 
 
 Ligny : description of the battle- 
 field, 113, 114 ; the battle of, 114- 
 129 ; the attack of the corps of 
 Vandamme, 120; the attack of 
 the corps of Gerard, 121 ; Blucher 
 reinforces the point assailed, 120, 
 121 ; continuation of the battle, 
 123, 126; furious counter-attack 
 of Blucher, 126, 127 ; defeat of 
 the Prussian army, 128, 129 
 
 Lobau commands the 6th corps of 
 the French army, 57 ; his opera- 
 tions on June 15, 78; he reaches 
 the field of Ligny at the close of 
 the battle, 128 ; at Waterloo, 220 ; 
 he is detached with Subervie and 
 Domon to hold Bulow in check, 
 234 ; rout of his troops at Plance- 
 noit after an heroic resistance, 
 
 297 
 
 M 
 
 Macdonald, Marshal : his fruitless 
 efforts at Lyons to oppose Napo- 
 leon, 15 
 
 Maitland, British General at Water- 
 loo, 210 
 
 Marbot sent by Napoleon on the 
 morning of June 18 to communi- 
 cate with Grouchy, 221, 222 ; finds 
 no trace of him, 222 
 
 Marie Louise, The Empress: Fouche 
 conspires in her behalf, 11 ; she 
 is separated by the allies from 
 Napoleon, 13 
 
 Marmont, Marshal, known as Mar- 
 shal Judas, 8 
 
 Marshals, the French, Feelings of, 
 at the Restoration, 9, 10 
 
 Massena, Marshal : he sends a 
 column from Marseilles to stop 
 Napoleon, 14 ; he is made Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the National 
 Guard in Paris, and declares re- 
 sistance impossible, 359 
 
 Merbe-Braine, Village of, 208
 
 INDEX 
 
 413 
 
 Milhaud, French cavalry General : 
 conduct of at Ligny, 128 ; at 
 Waterloo, 220 ; his conduct on 
 June 18,259; part of his cuirassiers 
 defeated near La Haye Sainte, 
 247, 248 ; he disapproves of the 
 great cavalry attacks, but takes 
 part in them, 259 
 
 Mollien, Minister of Napoleon in 
 1815, 19 
 
 Mont St. Jean, Village and ridge of, 
 207, 208 
 
 Murat, Fall of, disastrous to Napo- 
 leon, 39, 40 
 
 N 
 
 Namur : headquarters of Blucher in 
 1815,52; Grouchy's army retreats 
 through the town after Waterloo, 
 
 349 
 Napoleon at Elba : his attitude 
 during the first months of his 
 exile, 12 ; he resolves to leave 
 the island and to regain his 
 throne, 12 ; unjust policy of the 
 allies to him, 13 ; projects of 
 assassinating Napoleon, 13 ; his 
 departure from Elba, 13 ; he 
 lands near Cannes, 13 ; his march 
 through Dauphine, 14, 15 ; a 
 regiment declares for him, 15 ; 
 he reaches Grenoble and Lyons, 
 15, 16; he is welcomed with 
 enthusiasm by the peasantry, the 
 population of the towns, and 
 the army, 15, 16 ; Ney declares 
 for him, 16; vain efforts of the 
 Bourbon Government, 17 ; Louis 
 XVIIL flies to Lille and Ghent, 
 18 ; Napoleon enters the Tuileries 
 March 20, 1S15, 18 ; exultation of 
 his partisans, 18; he re-estab- 
 lishes the Empire, 18, 22 ; he is 
 proscribed by the allies, 23 ; he 
 ought to have been made a dic- 
 tator, 25 ; he must have failed 
 had he played the part of a 
 Jacobin dictator, 27, 28 ; he re- 
 organises the army, 29, 35 ; he 
 fortifies Paris, 36 ; his plans of 
 operations against the allies, 37, 
 39 ; he resolves to attack Blucher 
 and Wellington in Belgium, 39; 
 he tries to conciliate Liberal 
 France, 41 ; the policy and 
 measures he adopts, 41, 43; he 
 presides at the Champ de Mai, 
 44 ; he leaves Paris to join his 
 
 army in Belgium, 46; he resolves 
 to attack the centre of the armies 
 of Blucher and Wellington, 53, 
 55 ; he concentrates his army on 
 the frontier near Charleroy with 
 extraordinary skill, 56 ; character- 
 istics of Napoleon in war, 66, 
 and of his lieutenants, 66, 68 ; 
 Napoleon's address to his army, 
 72, 73 ; his orders for the advance 
 on June 15, 73, 75 ; his objects in 
 making this march, 75, 76; he 
 enters Charleroy on June 15, and 
 gives his orders, 79, 80 ; his orders 
 to Ney to seize Quatre Bras on 
 June 15, 82 ; Napoleon directs 
 the combat at Gilly, 86 ; his 
 excessive fatigue on the night 
 of June 15, 86, 87 ; he had not 
 accomplished all that he ex- 
 pected, but had gained important 
 strategic success, 87, 88 ; Napo- 
 leon charged with inactivity on 
 the morning of June 16, 104 ; ex- 
 amination of this charge — the 
 true reasons of his delay, 105 ; 
 Napoleon's orders to Ney for 
 June 16, 105, 107; his orders to 
 Grouchy for the same day, 107 ; 
 his anticipations for June 16 ill- 
 founded, but his arrangements 
 perfectly combined to meet all 
 that might happen, 108 ; Napo- 
 leon assembles the right and 
 centre of his army, apart from the 
 corps of Lobau, around Fleurus 
 at about one in the afternoon of 
 June 16, 112; his message to Ney 
 at two to fall on the flank and rear 
 of Blucher, 118; the message re- 
 peated at a quarter past three, 
 121 ; Napoleon's direct orders 
 to D'Erlon to march against 
 Blucher, 122 ; he sends an aide- 
 de-camp to reconnoitre when in- 
 formed that an enemy's column 
 is moving on Fleurus, 124 ; the 
 aide-de-camp reports that the 
 column is that of D'Erlon, 125 ; 
 Napoleon, whatever the reason, 
 does not summon D'Erlon to the 
 field, 125 ; he breaks Blucher's 
 centre, and gains the Battle of 
 Ligny, 144 ; his operations very 
 able, but he made one signal mis- 
 take, 145 ; he had not obtained 
 all the results he might have ob-
 
 414 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 tained on June 16, but his pro- 
 spects are still full of promise, 
 151, 152 ; Napoleon could have 
 gained decisive success on June 17, 
 155 ; he retires to rest at Fleurus 
 on the night of June 16 com- 
 pletely exhausted, 159 ; he saw no 
 one, and had no conversation on 
 the position of affairs until the 
 morning of June 17, 159; he be- 
 lieves that Blucher had been 
 routed, and was recoiling upon 
 his base, 159 ; his first orders to 
 pursue the Prussians, 160; his 
 despatch sent through Soult to 
 Ney, 161 ; the French army, 
 among other things, was to halt 
 for the day, 162 ; the state of 
 Napoleon's health was the true 
 cause of his apparent remissness, 
 162-165 ■ Napoleon leaves Fleurus 
 at about nine in the forenoon of 
 June 17, accompanied by Grouchy, 
 165 ; he reviews his army at 
 Ligny, 166, 167; he receives 
 messages from Quatre Bras and 
 from the lines of the retreat of 
 the Prussians, 167; he resolves to 
 send a restraining wing to pursue 
 Blucher, and with Ney to attack 
 Wellington, 167; this was the 
 true course to adopt, but it was 
 adopted very late, 167 ; his orders 
 to Grouchy, and their real import, 
 169, 170 ; Napoleon dissatisfied 
 with Grouchy's remarks, 171 ; he 
 sends a second order to Grouchy 
 through Bertrand, 171 ; its real 
 purport, 172, 173 ; it clearly 
 directs Grouchy to keep Blucher 
 and Wellington apart, 173 ; 
 Napoleon begins his offensive 
 movement against Wellington, 
 177; he reaches Marbais on his 
 way to Quatre Bras, 179; indig- 
 nant at the inactivity of Ney, he 
 orders D'Erlon to advance, 180; 
 he rebukes Ney and D'Erlon, 
 180 ; he conducts in person the 
 pursuit of Wellington's army, 
 180; he reaches the position of 
 Waterloo, 180 ; he makes a sig- 
 nificant remark, 181 ; Napoleon 
 before Waterloo on the night of 
 June 17, 188 ; his leading idea is 
 to bring Wellington to bay, 188 ; 
 he does not believe that Blucher 
 
 could reach Waterloo, 189 ; he 
 reconnoitres Wellington's position 
 in the night, 1S9; he receives 
 Grouchy's despatch written at ten 
 at night, 189 ; this is calculated 
 to give him complete confidence, 
 190 ; his communications with 
 Grouchy in the night of June 17, 
 190 ; examination of the question 
 whether Napoleon ordered 
 Grouchy to send a detachment of 
 7,000 men to St. Lambert, and to 
 second the movement with the 
 main part of his army, 191 ; 
 Napoleon has now met Wellington 
 for the first time, 195 ; his confi- 
 dence as to the result, 196 ; he 
 had not been outgeneralled by 
 the allies, 197, 198 ; Napoleon on 
 the morning of June 18, 203 ; his 
 overconfidence, 203, 204 ; his con- 
 versations with his lieutenants, 
 204, 205 ; he had given orders for 
 the attack to begin at nine in the 
 morning, but countermands these 
 in order to gain time for the 
 ground to harden, 206 ; the sun 
 in its courses fights against him, 
 207 : the evidence as to the state 
 of his health on June 18 con- 
 flicting, 2ig ; Napoleon's plan of 
 attack at Waterloo, 219 ; he turns 
 his attention to Grouchy, and 
 directs Marbot to send recon- 
 noitring-parties to Moustier and 
 Ottignies in order to meet 
 Grouchy, 221 ; on being informed 
 that French troops are not at 
 Moustier and Ottignies, he directs 
 Marbot to search for Grouchy at 
 the bridges of Limale and Lime- 
 lette, 222 ; his significant conver- 
 sation with Zenowicz, 222 ; Napo- 
 leon learns that Bulow is ap- 
 proaching the French army, 233 ; 
 he had received Grouchy's letter 
 written from Gembloux at three 
 in the morning, 233 ; he detaches 
 Subervie and Domon with Lobau 
 to hold Bulow in check and to 
 join Grouchy, 233 ; he does not 
 think his army in real danger, 
 234. 235 ; Napoleon receives 
 ominous intelligence from 
 Grouchy at Walhain, 251, 252; 
 he is compelled to modify his 
 plan of attack, 254 ; he resolves
 
 INDEX 
 
 415 
 
 to attack Wellington's centre and 
 left centre only, 254 ; his orders 
 to Ney, 254 ; Nay disobeys these, 
 257 ; Napoleon severely con- 
 demns Ney, and disapproves of 
 the great cavalry attacks, but feels 
 obliged to support them, 263 ; he 
 detaches the Young Guard to re- 
 pulse Bulow, 265 ; whether he 
 made a mistake at this crisis of 
 the battle, 273 ; his angry remark 
 to Heymes, 275 ; he detaches part 
 of the Old Guard to oppose 
 Bulow, 276 ; fresh orders to Ney, 
 276 ; he makes preparations for 
 the final attack, 27S ; he is still 
 hopeful of victory, 279, 281 ; he 
 forms the Imperial Guard for 
 the final attack, 286-288 ; his 
 energy at this crisis, 288 ; he 
 sends a message to Durutte an- 
 nouncing the approach of 
 Grouchy, 289 ; he forms four 
 battalions of the Guard to resist 
 the advance of the enemy, 296 ; 
 he leaves the field with three 
 battalions of the Old Guard, 297, 
 301 ; he is nearly made prisoner 
 by the Prussians, 301 ; his orders 
 to Grouchy, 302 ; he reaches 
 Charleroy and Philippeville, 302 ; 
 Napoleon arrives in Paris on 
 June 21, 353 ; he expresses a hope 
 to his Ministers that the Chambers 
 will make him a dictator during 
 the war, 353 ; he feels that a dis- 
 solution of the Chambers would 
 only lead to civil war and national 
 ruin, 355 ; after some hesitation, 
 he abdicates, 356 ; he retires to 
 Malmaison, 357 ; his proposal to 
 fall on the allied armies, when 
 apart, as they approached Paris, 
 361 ; this is rejected by Fouche, 
 361 ; Napoleon is exiled to St. 
 Helena, 366 
 Ney, Marshal : his defection to 
 Napoleon, 16; he joins Napoleon 
 on June 15, 82 ; he receives the 
 command of the left of the French 
 army, 82 ; his operations on 
 June 15, 83 ; he is quite inferior 
 to himself, 83 ; he advances to 
 Frasnes with a small body of 
 troops, having neglected to rally 
 the corps in his rear, and, after 
 a mere demonstration, places his 
 
 men in camp, 85 ; he does not 
 seize Quatre Bras, as he might 
 have done, 85 ; Ney receives 
 Napoleon's orders for June 16, 
 109; he gives proof of irresolution 
 and negligence, and disobeys his 
 orders, 1 1 1 ; what he might have 
 done. III ; he does not assemble 
 his army and occupy Quatre 
 Bras at an early hf)ur on July 16, 
 129 ; his orders to Reille, D'Erlon 
 and Kellermann late and inade- 
 quate, 129, 130; fresh proofs of 
 hesitation and disobedience, 130 ; 
 sharp reproof of Napoleon to Ney 
 on the morning of June 16, 130 ; 
 what Ney could have accom- 
 plished, 132 ; he attacks at Quatre 
 Bras at two in the afternoon, 133 ; 
 he receives Napoleon's message 
 sent from Fleurus at two, 135 ; 
 and the subsequent message sent 
 at a quarter-past three, 137 ; Ney 
 is informed that D'Erlon has been 
 summoned to Ligny, and peremp- 
 torily orders his recall, 138; his 
 indignation and want of reflection, 
 
 142 ; his retreat to Frasnes skilful, 
 
 143 ; examination of Ney's con- 
 duct on June 16, 143, 144, 146; it 
 deserves severe censure, 146; Ney, 
 furious at what he deemed ill- 
 treatment, sends no account to 
 Soult of the results of Quatre Bras, 
 159 ; he is rebuked by Napoleon 
 on June 17, 180 ; his remarks to 
 Napoleon on the morning of 
 June 18, 204 ; he is entrusted 
 with the first great attack to be 
 made by D'Erlon's corps, 232 ; 
 Ney is ordered by Napoleon to 
 seize La Haye Sainte, to establish 
 himself there, and to await a de- 
 cisive attack pressed home, 254 ; 
 he disobeys his orders, and re- 
 solves to make the great cavalry 
 attacks, 257 ; this most unwise 
 and premature, 258 ; his conduct 
 in the cavalry attacks reckless and 
 precipitate, 271, 272 ; he sends to 
 Napoleon to ask for infantry, 275; 
 he conducts the final attack of 
 part of the Imperial Guard, sup- 
 ported by D'Erlon and Reille, 
 286 ; he gives a false direction to 
 the attack, 291 ; he fights desper- 
 ately at the close of the battle,
 
 4i6 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 300 ; his injudicious conduct after 
 Waterloo, 357 
 Noblesse, The French, at the Re- 
 storation, 3, 9 
 
 O 
 
 Ompteda, one of Wellington's 
 Generals at Waterloo, 278 
 
 Orange, The Prince of, commands 
 the ist corps of Wellington's 
 army, 49 ; his skilful arrangements 
 on June 16, 133 ; he is repulsed 
 with Perponcher, but gains time, 
 134 ; is thanked by Wellington, 
 134 ; he commands the centre of 
 Wellington's army at Waterloo, 
 
 211 
 
 Orleans, The Duke of: plots of 
 Fouche in his favour, 1 1 ; his 
 fruitless attempts in behalf of the 
 Bourbon Government at Lyons, 
 
 15 
 
 P 
 
 Pack, British General at Waterloo, 
 repulses D'Erlon's attack, 244 
 
 Pajol, French cavalry General : his 
 operations on June 15, 78-80 ; and 
 on June 17, 159, 160, 182 ; his 
 conduct on June 18, 238, 305 ; he 
 skilfully masks the retreat of 
 Grouchy, 348 
 
 Paris, State of opinion in, at the 
 Restoration, 8 ; and after Water- 
 loo, 350 
 
 Peasantry, Feelings of the French, 
 in 1814, 2, II 
 
 Perponcher, Dutch-Belgian Gene- 
 ral, gives Wellington valuable 
 assistance, 69 ; his admirable con- 
 duct on June 15, 95 ; his skilful 
 arrangements at Quatre Bras, 133 ; 
 is thanked by Wellington, 139 
 
 Picton, one of Wellington's best 
 lieutenants, 69 ; he reaches Quatre 
 Bras rather late, 135 ; his conduct 
 in the battle, 135-137 ; he com- 
 mands Wellington's left at Water- 
 loo, 211 ; is killed in the battle, 
 
 244, 245 ^ ^ ^ 
 
 Pirch commands the 2nd corps 01 
 Blucher's army, 64 ; is directed 
 on the night of June 14 to march 
 on Sombreffe, 88 ; his corps is 
 assembled round that place on 
 June iG, 113; his conduct at 
 Ligny, 120, 121, 123, 126; and 
 during the retreat to Wavre, 174 ; 
 
 he is delayed, on June 18, in 
 marching from Wavre on Water- 
 loo, 216 ; part of his corps reaches 
 Bulow at the close of the battle, 
 2S4 ; with Bulow storms Plance- 
 noit, 297 ; he pursues Grouchy 
 on June 19, but fails to come up 
 with him, 34S, 349 
 
 Pirch II., one of Zieten's subordi- 
 nates : his operations on June 15. 
 77, 79 ; he makes a successful 
 stand at Gilly, 85 
 
 Pire, French cavalry General : his 
 conduct at Quatre Bras, 135, 136; 
 at Waterloo, 220 ; his conduct in 
 the battle, 266, 271, 286, 287 
 
 Plancenoit stormed by the Prussians 
 at the close of Waterloo, 297 
 
 Ponsonby, cavalry General of Wel- 
 lington at Waterloo, 209 ; his 
 magnificent charge, 245 ; his 
 cavalry get out of hand, and he 
 is slain, 246 
 
 Q 
 Quatre Bras : important strategic 
 point not seized by Ney on 
 June 15, 85; battle of, 132, 144; 
 description of the field, 133 ; 
 attack of Bachelu, Foy, and Pire, 
 133 : Perponcher and the Prince 
 of Orange are driven back, but 
 have gained time for the arrival 
 of reinforcements, 134, 135 ; Wel- 
 lington arrives at Quatre Bras, 
 and is reinforced, 134, 135 ; 
 Jerome's division reaches the 
 field ; attack of Bachelu, Foy, Pire, 
 and Jerome, 136, 137 ; the situa- 
 tion for Wellington critical, 137 ; 
 he receives fresh reinforcements, 
 137 ; Ney attacks again with the 
 forces in his hands, and with one 
 brigade of Kellermann's cavalry, 
 141; the attack fails, 141, 142; 
 Wellington, largely reinforced, 
 assumes the offensive, and com- 
 pels Ney to retreat to Frasnes, 
 
 143 
 
 R 
 Reflections on Waterloo : Napoleon's 
 original plan of attack the best 
 possible, 307 ; his second plan of 
 attack admirably conceived, 308 ; 
 four distinct mistakes were made 
 in the tactics of the French, 308, 
 309 ; question as to the delay 
 in making the attack, 309 ; how
 
 INDEX 
 
 417 
 
 far Napoleon is responsible for 
 these errors, 310, 311 ; the attacks 
 would have succeeded before the 
 Prussians made their presence 
 felt but for the conduct of Wel- 
 lington and of part of his army, 
 311; admirable tactics of Wel- 
 lington, 312; steadfastness of his 
 British and German Legionary 
 troops, 312 ; the result of Water- 
 loo not due to mere differences of 
 tactics, 312; it was determined 
 by the junction of Wellington's 
 and Blucher's forces on the field, 
 313 ; ought Grouchy to have pre- 
 vented this junction ? 313 ; ex- 
 amination of the question in detail, 
 314, 323 ; Grouchy could have 
 kept Blucher away from Welling- 
 ton had he got over the Dyle at 
 Moustier and Ottignies by noon 
 on June 18, 323 ; he could nearly 
 have attained the same result had 
 he followed Gerard's advice and 
 marched from Walhain on Water- 
 loo, 323 ; review of arguments to 
 the contrary, 320, 326 ; remarks 
 of Napoleon on the subject, 327 ; 
 Grouchy the main cause of the 
 disaster at Waterloo, 328 ; Napo- 
 leon not wholly free from blame, 
 and why, 328, 329 ; the combina- 
 tions of the allied Generals essen- 
 tially faulty, 329 ; why Grouchy's 
 conduct has been misdescribed 
 and slurred over, 331 
 
 Reille commands the 2nd corps of 
 Napoleon's army, 57 ; his opera- 
 tions on June 15, 77, 80, 83; his 
 hesitation and delay on June 16, 
 131 ; he urges Ney not to attack 
 at Quatre Bras, 133 ; his conduct 
 on June 16 deserves blame, 146 ; 
 at Waterloo he is charged with 
 the attack on Hougoumont, 22S ; 
 his conduct of the attack faulty, 
 228, 232 ; he takes part in the 
 final attack, but the onset of his 
 troops is feeble and slow, 286 ; he 
 might have done more, 286 
 
 Restoration of Louis XVIIL : state 
 of France under the Bourbon 
 Government, i-ii 
 
 Resume of the campaign of 1815, 
 332, 344 ; the supremacy of Napo- 
 leon's strategic genius fully seen, 
 332 ; his objects for June 15 only 
 
 partly attained, but his position 
 full of promise, 334 ; ability of his 
 dispositions for June 16, 334, 335; 
 the result is incomplete, but his 
 prospects brilliant, 335 ; Napo- 
 leon's delays on June 17 caused by 
 the state of his heal th, 336 ; he gives 
 Grouchy a powerful restraining 
 wing to pursue Blucher, but very 
 late, 336 ; retreat of the Prussian 
 army to Wavre, 337 ; slowness of 
 Grouchy's march, but notliing as 
 yet is endangered, 337 ; prospects 
 of Napoleon for June 18, 338 ; the 
 calculations of Wellington and 
 Blucher not well-founded, 338 ; 
 misconduct of Grouchy — he does 
 exactly what he ought not to do, 
 338,339; the strategy of the allied 
 Generals faulty from first to last, 
 339; but they are not to be judged 
 as strategists by their conduct in 
 1S15, and why, 340, 341 ; high 
 praise is due to both as soldiers, 
 341 ; the paramount causes of the 
 result of the campaign of 18 15, 
 343 ; the conduct of the belligerent 
 armies, 344 ; Napoleon must have 
 succumbed at last, 344 ; but his 
 fame has not been dimmed, 344 
 
 Retrospect of the operations up to 
 June 17, 153, 154 
 
 Rossomme, 207 
 
 St. Lambert, village near Waterloo, 
 and Napoleon's lines, 208, 232, 
 
 233 
 Savary, Minister of Napoleon in 
 
 1815, 19 
 
 Saxe- Weimar, Bernard of, judici- 
 ously moves forward a detach- 
 ment from Genappe on June 15, 
 84 ; occupies the hamlets of 
 Papelotte and La Haye at Water- 
 loo, 211 
 
 Sombreffe, important strategic point 
 not seized by the French on June 
 
 15.85 
 
 Somerset, British cavalry General 
 at Waterloo, 211 ; his fine charge 
 in the battle, 247 
 
 Soult, Marshal, succeeds Dupont as 
 Minister of War, and becomes 
 detested in the army, 8 ; he as- 
 sembles 30,000 men to support 
 the claims of France at Vienna, 
 
 27
 
 4i8 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 14 ; he is deprived of his office as 
 War Minister, 17 ; he is made 
 Chief of the Staff of the French 
 army in Belgium, 69 ; the appoint- 
 ment unfortunate, 69 ; Souk's 
 letters to Ney and Grouchy on 
 June 16, 107; his staff work had 
 and his despatches obscure, 139 ; 
 Soult does not inform Ney of the 
 results of Ligny on the night of 
 June 16, and until late in the 
 morning of June 17, 159 ; his im- 
 portant letter to Ney, 161 ; Soult 
 not hopeful on the morning of 
 June 18,223; his letter to Grouchy 
 written at ten on the morning of 
 Waterloo, 204 ; it is obscure and 
 misleading, 224 ; its real but ill- 
 explained purport, 224 ; it is not 
 contradictory to the evidence of 
 Marbot and Zenowicz, 224, 225 ; 
 Soult's despatch to Grouchy, and 
 the postscript written at one and 
 a quarter past one, after the 
 news of the apparition of Bulow, 
 235 ; this is also vague and ill- 
 worded, 235 ; its true meaning, 
 235 ; Soult condemns Ney for 
 making the great cavalry attacks, 
 263 
 
 Steinmetz, one of Zieten's subordi- 
 nates : his operations on June 15 ; 
 his retreat, 84 
 
 Subervie, French cavalry General 
 at Waterloo, 220 ; is detached 
 with Domon and Lobau to hold 
 Bulow in check, 232 
 
 Suchet, Marshal, entrusted by Napo- 
 leon with the defence of Lyons, 
 38 
 
 T 
 
 Talleyrand is privy to plots against 
 Napoleon, 13 
 
 Teste, French General, commands 
 a division of Lobau's corps, 168 ; 
 with Pajol on June 18, 238, 323; 
 he repulses the I'russians at 
 Namur, 349 
 
 Thielmann commands the 3rd corps 
 of Blucher's army, 65 ; is directed 
 on the night of June 14 to march 
 to Sombreffe, 88, 89 ; his corps 
 assembled around Sombreffe on 
 June 16, 113; his conduct at 
 Ligny, 121, 123, 127; he halts too 
 long at Gembloux, 179 ; he is kept 
 back at Wavre on June 18, 215 ; 
 
 he defends Wavre from the attacks 
 of Grouchy, 305, 306; he hears 
 the result of Waterloo on June 
 19,346: he is repulsed by Grouchy, 
 and falls back towards Louvain, 
 346 ; he fails to intercept Grouchy, 
 348. 349 
 Trip, Dutch-Belgian General at 
 Waterloo, 210 
 
 U 
 
 Uxbridge, Lord, commands the 
 corps of the British cavalry in 
 1815, 50 ; his skilful retreat from 
 Quatre Bras, 179; his conduct at 
 Waterloo, 245, 247 
 
 V 
 
 Vandamme commands the 3rd corps 
 of the French army, 57 ; his 
 operations on June 15, 78 et scq. ; he 
 is delayed through an accident, 78 ; 
 he refuses to march on Fleurus 
 and Sombreffe, 86 ; his conduct 
 at Ligny, 120, 123, 124 ; his mes- 
 sage to Napoleon as to a supposed 
 enemy's column, 124 ; his opera- 
 tions on June 17, 182, 183; on 
 June 18 he takes part in the attack 
 on Wavre, 305, 306; his opera- 
 tions on June 19 and June 20, 
 
 348. 349 
 Vandeleur, British cavalry General 
 at Waterloo, 209 ; he charges 
 Durutte's division, 249 ; he sup- 
 ports the defence at La Haye 
 Sainte, 287 ; his charge at the 
 close of Waterloo very efTective, 
 
 295 
 
 Van Merlen, Dutch-Belgian General 
 at Quatre Bras, 134 ; at Waterloo, 
 210 
 
 Vendee, La, The Due de Bourbon 
 tries to raise, 21 ; the rising in 
 1815 disastrous to Napoleon, 40 
 
 Vienna, Congress of: the policy of 
 the Powers at resented in France, 
 10 ; policy of the allies at against 
 Napoleon, 13 
 
 Vitrolles, partisan of the Bourbons, 
 in the South of France, 21 ; re- 
 leased by Fouche after Waterloo, 
 
 358 
 Vivian, British cavalry General at 
 Waterloo, 209 ; co-operates with 
 Vandeleur, 249, 287, 295
 
 INDEX 
 
 419 
 
 W 
 
 Waterloo, Battle of: description of 
 thepositions of Wellington'sarmy, 
 207, 208 ; these may be compared 
 to a natural fortress, 209 ; how 
 the army was arrayed in its order 
 of battle, 209, 213 ; the attack on 
 Hougoumont, intended to be a 
 feint, is made a real attack, 228 ; 
 progress of the attack, 229, 232, 
 233 ; success of the defence, 232 ; 
 the attack made by D'Erlon's 
 corps, 240, 249 ; it is completely 
 defeated, 249 ; state of the battle 
 at three in the afternoon, 249, 
 250 ; renewed attack of the French 
 army, tremendous cannonade, 
 255 ; fall of La Haye Sainte, 257 ; 
 the great cavalry attacks, 259, 
 269 ; they are ill-sustained and 
 defeated, 268, 269 ; but the losses 
 of Wellington are very great, 270 ; 
 the attack of Bulow, 264, 276 ; it 
 is repulsed for a time, 265 ; the 
 Young Guard repulsed, 276 ; part 
 of the Old Guard detached to 
 resist Bulow, 265, 276 ; Bulow's 
 attack apparently completely de- 
 feated, 277 ; renewed attacks on 
 Wellington'sarmy, 277; Papelotte 
 taken by the French, and impor- 
 tant success gained at La Haye 
 Sainte, 277, 278 ; the battle still 
 undecided at about seven in the 
 evening, 278 ; state of the battle 
 before the final attack, 280, 281 ; 
 the crisis and the end of Water- 
 loo, 285, 297 
 
 Wavre, Prussian army assembled 
 around, on the night of June 17, 
 175 ; positions of the Prussian 
 army around Wavre on the morn- 
 ing of June 18, 213 ; Grouchy 
 attacks Wavre, 304-306 
 
 Wellington, Field - Marshal the 
 Duke of: he arrives in Belgium 
 in April, 1815, 36 ; he proposes to 
 invade France, 37 ; his faulty dis- 
 positions before the campaign 
 began, and the reasons, 51-53; 
 characteristics of Wellington in 
 war, and of his lieutenants, 68, 
 69 ; Wellington had received in- 
 telligence early in June that an 
 attack was impending, 91 ; he 
 makes no movement, 91 ; he 
 
 learns from Zieten, probably in 
 the afternoon of June 15, that 
 Zieten's outposts have been driven 
 in, 91 ; he still makes no move- 
 ment, and the reasons, 91, 92 ; his 
 first orders despatched between 
 five and seven, 92, 93 ; these 
 directed a movement essentially 
 false, 93 ; his second orders, 94 ; 
 these are also ill-conceived and 
 dangerous, 95 ; the dispositions of 
 Wellington up to this time un- 
 worthy of him, 9G ; his last orders 
 directing a movement on Quatre 
 Bras, 96 ; conversation of Wel- 
 lington at the ball with the Duke 
 of Richmond, 97 ; his letter to 
 Blucher on the morning of 
 June 16, 98 ; Wellington's strategy 
 and that of Blucher faulty, 100, 
 loi ; the allied commanders in 
 peril, loi, 102; Wellington's con- 
 versation with Blucher before 
 Ligny, 117; he arrives at Quatre 
 Bras in the afternoon of June 16, 
 134 ; his skilful direction of the 
 battle, 134, 143 ; his strategy and 
 tactics on June 16, 147, 150; con- 
 duct of Wellington on the morn- 
 ing of June 17, 179 ; his message 
 to Blucher that, if supported, he 
 would accept battle at Waterloo, 
 179; his skilful retreat from 
 Quatre Bras, 179; he concentrates 
 part of his army at Waterloo, 191, 
 192 ; he places a large detach- 
 ment at Hal and Tubize, a grave 
 strategic error, 192 ; his confi- 
 dence as to the result on June 18, 
 196, 197 ; the plans of Blucher 
 and Wellington for the Battle of 
 Waterloo essentially bad strategy, 
 193, 194; what the allied com- 
 manders ought to have done, 194, 
 195 ; Wellington arrays his army 
 on June 18, 209 ; his front extends 
 from Smohain to Braine I'Alleud, 
 209 ; positions of his extreme left, 
 his left centre, his right centre, 
 and his right, 209, 210 ; his main 
 battle, 210 ; his extreme right 
 at Merbe-Braine and Braine 
 I'Alleud, 211 ; his advanced posts, 
 Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte, 
 Papelotte, and La Haye, 211 ; 
 Wellington the soul of the defence, 
 
 27 — 2
 
 420 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 
 
 211; he occupies the ground ad- 
 mirably, 212 ; but there are two 
 mistakes in his arranfjements, 213 ; 
 he superintends the defence bf 
 Hougoumont and the defence of 
 La Have Sainte, 229, 231, 247; 
 he draws his right in on his centre 
 to resist the great cavalry attacks, 
 267 ; his conduct in striking con- 
 trast to that of Ney, 274, 275 ; 
 Wellington's hopes of victory 
 towards the close of the battle, 
 2S1, 2S4 ; he orders Maitland's 
 Guards to attack the Imperial 
 Guard, 293 ; he makes his whole 
 army advance after the defeat of 
 the Guard, 295 ; he meets Blucher 
 at La Belle Alliance, 298 ; he ad- 
 vances with Blucher into France 
 after Waterloo, 359 ; his negotia- 
 tions with Fouche, 360 ; his wis- 
 dom conspicuously manifest, 362: 
 he moderates Blucher, 363 ; he 
 is made commander of the Army 
 of Occupation, 365 ; his great 
 position in the councils of the 
 allies, and his services to France, 
 365 
 
 Wincke, Hanoverian General at 
 Waterloo, 209 
 
 Zenowicz, a Polish officer : Napo- 
 leon's conversation with him on 
 the morning of Waterloo, 222 ; he 
 is the bearer of Soult's despatch 
 to Grouchy written at ten in the 
 morning of June 18, 224 ; he 
 reaches Grouchy 's army, 304 
 
 Zieten commands the first corps of 
 Blucher's army, 64 ; his skilful 
 retreat on June 15, 81 ; he directs 
 Pirch n. to make a stand near 
 Gilly, 85 ; he retreats to Fleurus 
 and then to Sombreffe, 89 ; his 
 corps assembled around St. Amand 
 and Ligny on June 16, 112; his 
 conduct at Ligny, 120, 123, 126 ; 
 and during the retreat to Wavre, 
 174 ; Zieten detained on the 
 morning of June 18, 215 ; he 
 reaches Ohain at six in the after- 
 noon, 284 ; he hesitates to support 
 Wellington, 284, 285 ; his irrup- 
 tion on the right flank of the 
 French army and its effects, 295
 
 INDEX TO APPENDIX 
 
 LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
 
 I. Napoleon's address to his army, June 14, 367 
 II. Soult to D'Erlon, June 15, 368 
 
 III. Soult to D'Erlon, June 15, 369 
 
 IV. Napoleon to Ney, June 16, 369, 370 
 
 V. Napoleon to Grouchy, June 16, 371-373 
 VI. Soult to Ney, June 16, 373, 374 
 VII. Soult to Grouchy, June 16, 374, 375 
 VIII. Soult to Ney, June 16, 375, 376 
 IX. Wellington's first memorandum of orders, June 15, 376, 377. 
 X. Wellington's 'after orders,' June 15, 377, 378 
 XI. Wellington's conversation with the Duke of Richmond, June 15, 
 
 378. 379 
 XII. WeUington's letter to Blucher, June 16, 379, 380 
 
 XIII. Soult to Ney, June 16. 380 
 
 XIV. Soult to Ney, June 16, 380. 381 
 
 XV. Captain Bowles' story of Wellington at Quatre Bras, June 17, 
 
 381 
 XVI. Soult to Ney, June 17, 382, 383 
 XVII. Soult to Ney, June 17, 383, 384 
 XVIII, Wellington to Lord Hill, June 17, 384 
 XIX. Wellington's orders, June 17, 384, 385 
 XX. Napoleon to Grouchy, June 17, 385, 386 
 XXI. Grouchy to Napoleon, June 17, 3S6, 387 
 XXII. Soult to Ney, June 18, 387 
 
 XXIII. Soult to Ney, June 18, 388 
 
 XXIV. Soult to Grouchy, June 18. 388, 389 
 XXV. Grouchy to Napoleon, June 18, 389, 390 
 
 XXVI. Soult to Grouchy, June 18, 390 
 XXVII. Grouchy to Napoleon, June 18, 391, 392 
 XXVIII. Wellington's report of Waterloo, June 19, 392-398 
 
 XXIX. The Prussian report of Waterloo, 398-403 
 XXX. Napoleon's report of Waterloo, 403-406 
 
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