UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES

 
 t fet E 
 
 PRESENT STATE 
 
 O'F THE 
 
 BRITISH INTEREST 
 
 I N 
 
 INDIA: 
 WITH A 
 
 PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING 
 
 A 
 
 REGULAR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 IN THAT 
 
 COUNTRY. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for J, ALMON, oppofite Burlington Houfe^ 
 in Piccadilly. 
 
 M DCC LXXIIL 
 
 17X45 -- * 4 f price Three Shillin s s 'J
 
 Vikil
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 J . rTTt H E prefent State of the Britifli In- 
 JL tereft in India, &c. page f] 
 
 II. The Nature and Effe&s of the Compa- 
 ny's Government in Bengal, v if 
 
 III. The true Caufes of Evil and Abufe 
 in the Government of Bengal, and the 
 Means to remedy them, 46 
 
 IV. A Plan, for eftablifhing a regular 
 Syftem of political Government in India, 106 
 
 y. A Plan, for eftablifhing a regular 
 Syftem of military Government, and of 
 fecure Defence, in India, - 156 
 
 THE
 
 - 
 
 .
 
 THE 
 PRESENT STATE 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 BRITISH INTEREST 
 
 I N 
 
 INDIA, &c/ 
 
 NO nation nor ftate ever acquired an 
 acceffion of dominion fo truly va- 
 luable and beneficial, as are the acquifi- 
 tions lately made by Britain in India. But 
 the particular fituation of her circumftan- 
 ces at the time when thefe acquifitions fell 
 into her hands, enhanced the real and in- 
 trinfic value of them to Britain. Oppref- 
 fed by a grievous debt, the annual intereft 
 of which, exceeding four millions and a 
 half filling, was levied by taxes, which 
 raifed the price of each manufacture, her 
 commerce labouring under fuch difadvan* 
 tages was daiiy/fmking into decay , whilft 
 a conudetable part of this annual intereft 
 being paid to foreigners, created fuch a 
 dram of ipecie, as the balance of her trade 
 could not fupply , fo that, in proportion 
 as her expence increafed, the means of 
 defraying it diminifhed ; and he was eve- 
 B ry
 
 I 6 ] 
 
 ry year approaching towards a flate of na- 
 tional poverty and bankruptcy. 
 
 In fuch circumftances did Britain ac- 
 quire the fovereign dominion of Bengal, 
 and of other rich manufadluring and trad- 
 ing countries in India ; which, at the time 
 they fell to her, were capable of not only 
 defraying every charge of their own go- 
 vernment and defence, but over and above 1 
 that, of yielding annually to the fovereign 
 a fum equal to 1,300,000!. flerling, as 
 can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we 
 include in this fum the benefit which Bri- 
 tain had been accuftomed to receive, in 
 her commercial capacity, by her trade 
 with thofe countries r the fum here fpe- 
 cified would have arifen purely in confe- 
 quence of dominion : and, whether tranl* 
 mitted from thofe countries in merchan- 
 dize or in money, would at laft have ar- 
 rived at the public treafury in fpecie : and 
 would thus have ferved to alleviate the 
 burden of thofe taxes, that are preff- 
 ing every branch of herdomeftic commerce 
 to ruin. And, if Britain had beffcwed 
 the fmalleft attention on the political go- 
 vernment of thofe countries, (he might 
 have continued to draw from them the 
 
 above-
 
 f 7 1 
 
 abovementioned tribute fum in perpetuum, 
 without any danger of draining or impo- 
 veriming them : nay it is certain, that 
 under a juft, equitable and well ordered 
 government, their commerce and agricul- 
 ture might have been extended to a de- 
 gree, that would have enabled them to 
 afford a ftill larger annual tribute to the 
 fovereign. The poffeflion of this Indian 
 dominion is likewife fo particularly fecu- 
 red from domeftic and foreign danger, by 
 the extraordinary fubmiffive difpofition of 
 the natives, the fingularly defenfible fitu- 
 ation of the country, and the naval fupe- 
 riority of Britain, that, by a very trifling 
 expence of men, 'and no pecuniary charge, 
 fhe might have maintained it againft all 
 enemies. So that Britain might have de- 
 rived from this dependent dominion re- 
 fources fufficient to relieve her from all 
 her difficulties and diftrefles. 
 
 This is what Britain might have done : 
 and this was not fimply poilible, it was 
 eafy of execution. But if we enquire 
 what Britain hath done, we (hall find that, 
 inftead of applying thefe refources by a 
 proper care and attention to the purpofe, 
 for which it would feem the all- wife dif- 
 B 2 penfation
 
 f 8 1 
 
 penfation of Providence had at this criti- 
 cal conjuncture beftowed them upon her, 
 flie hath indolently and defperately thrown 
 them from her, and left them to the wi'l of 
 blind chance. For furely it may with pro- 
 priety be faid, that the government of Bri- 
 tain configned all thefe rtfources to the 
 guidance of blind chance, or rather to 
 certain deftruction, when it fcrupuloufly 
 withheld its own care, and implicitly con- 
 fided the fovereign charge of governing 
 and defending this foreign dominion to a 
 Company of Merchants, fo evident'v un- 
 equal to fuch a charge, that, inftead of 
 being furprized that thefe coun tries fhouid 
 now at laft be impoverifhed and ruined, 
 we have reafon to be aftonimed, that they 
 have fupported, for fuch a length of time, 
 the complicated evils of tyranny and a* 
 narchy. 
 
 The confequenccs of committing this 
 fovereign charge to the Company have 
 been long forefeen, and likewife foretold, 
 by fome who were acquainted with the 
 nature of their government : but the 
 power and influence of thofe who were 
 iharing amongft them the plunder of thofe 
 wretched countries, blafted the credit of 
 
 their
 
 t 9 ] 
 
 their reprefentations : until at laft, the 
 effects being felt at home, it hath become 
 impoffible to totally fupprefs the truth. 
 Nay even now, that thefe men are forced 
 to partly acknowledge the ruinous fitua- 
 tion of this foreign dominion, yet have 
 they ftill the affurance tomiflead the pub- 
 lic judgment, by reprefenting the Com- 
 pany as the only party concerned in the 
 confequence : though it is certain, that 
 this Indian concern, which hath been 
 leafed or farmed out by Government to the 
 Company, is of the very higheft impor- 
 tance to the public intereil j as haying 
 been for many years the principal fupport 
 of national opulence and credit, as well 
 as of commerce and revenue. For, in the 
 article of opulence, the private fortunes 
 acquired in thofe countries by the fervants 
 of the Company, ever fince the time that 
 their power prevailed over the native go- 
 vernment, that is ever fince 1757, hath 
 created an annual influx of fpecie to Bri- 
 tain of about 700,000 1. and the dedo- 
 magt.nent paid to Government by the 
 Company, fince the aflumption of the de- 
 wanny in 1765, is a farther influx of 
 
 400,000 1.
 
 [ 1 ] 
 
 400,000 1. the drawback on teas is reck- 
 oned about 200,000 1. and the Company 
 hath increafed her dividend fmce the laft 
 mentioned period 200,000 1. though only 
 one half of this laft fum may be reckon- 
 ed to remain in the country, the other half 
 being paid to foreign proprietors. Thefe 
 four fums, making together 1,400,000!. 
 have been yearly drawn from India in con- 
 fequence of dominion : and, whether fent 
 from thence in merchandize, in bills, or 
 in fpecie, have produced fo much money 
 to Britain : and notwithstanding the pri- 
 vate fortunes have been acquired by means 
 that have exhaufted thefe fources of wealth, 
 that might otherwife have flowed perpe- 
 tually into Britain ; and the dedomage- 
 ment may be confidered as a bafe compo- 
 lition, received for alienating the fpvereign 
 rights of the Britim crov/n and nation^ 
 and for furniming a force to fupport the 
 moft deteftable tyranny of a few indivi- 
 duals over fifteen millions of men, wha 
 are to all intents and purpofes Britim fub-* 
 jeds ; yet did the opportune importation 
 of fo much wealth, ferve to fupport the 
 credit of the nation under the grievous ac- 
 cumulation of debt contracted in the laft
 
 t "1 
 
 war ; and to prevent her feeling the dram 
 of fpecie made by her foreign creditors, 
 which otherwife would by this time have 
 completely exhaufted her. By her com- 
 merce with thofe countries, Britain hath 
 exported yearly 5 or 600,000 1. worth of 
 her own manufactures and merchandize, 
 and for thefe me received the commodi- 
 ties of India ; which commodities, being; 
 re-exported, formed the moft efTential ar- 
 ticle of her traffic with Africa, on which 
 her Weft India colonies do entirely de- 
 pend ; they are likewife the moft valua- 
 ble article of her trade with America. 
 And the duties levied by Government, on 
 fuch part of thefe Indian commodities as 
 is expended at home, create a very confi- 
 derable, and by far the moft equitable and 
 convenient branch of revenue. 
 
 But the value and importance of this 
 Indian concern will appear in a ftill 
 ftronger light, if we (hall look forward to 
 the confequences that muft naturally and 
 unavoidably .enfue to the public intereft 
 from the lofs of it. The firft and moft 
 immediate of thefe confequences will be 
 national bankruptcy ; or, which is the 
 fame thing, a ftop to the payment of in- 
 
 tereft
 
 terefl on the national debt > for a depri- 
 vation of that annual influx of fpecie from 
 India will quickly produce national po- 
 verty; and an incapacity of paying in 
 fpecie the intereft of the foreign credi- 
 tors. But the lofs of our Indian com- 
 merce will operate this efFeft ftill more 
 fpeedily; for, on the fuppofition that the 
 nation mail be deprived of this branch of 
 commerce, it muft neceffarily follow, that 
 Government will lofe that branch of reve- 
 nue which arifes from the home confump- 
 tion of Indian commodities ; and it is 
 plain, that Government cannot then con- 
 tinue to pay the ufual expence, without 
 making good this deficiency of revenue 
 by additional taxes on land, and the ne- 
 ceflaries of life : but as this additional 
 load, falling on our little remaining com- 
 merce, would by one year's experience be 
 found infupportable, Government would 
 be forced to retrench its expence, in that 
 only article that can be difpenfed with, 
 the payment of intereft on the national 
 debt; and when this happens, what advan- 
 tage will the public creditor hold above 
 the India proprietor ? The only difference 
 will be, that the latter will have felt his 
 
 lofs
 
 1 13 1 
 
 lots Ji little earlier than the former. But 
 national bankruptcy* though it may be the 
 firft, is not the only* nor even the great* 
 eft, public damage, accruing from a de- 
 privation of this Indian concern : lofs of 
 future credit, of trade and navigation, and 
 confequently of naval power and defence^ 
 will foon fallow ; and, in this general ca- 
 lamity, everyone individual of thecommu-* 
 nity will come in for his {hare, in pro- 
 portion to his rank or fituation. 
 
 Such are the confequences that muft 
 enfue to the public intereft from a depriva- 
 tion of the benefit hitherto derived from 
 this Indian concern t and if the nation is 
 to fuffer fo grievoufly by the lofs of this 
 object, can {he allow herfelf to be perfua- 
 ded,thatme hath no intereft in its preferva- 
 tion. Now this objecl: ftands in danger of 
 being loft to the nation by two different 
 caufes j the firft being, the neglect or in- 
 capacity of the Company to maintain and 
 defend it from the aflault of enemies : and * 
 the other danger arifes from the oppreffion, 
 and mifconducT: of this Company's poli- 
 tical government ; tending to defpoil thofe 
 countries of their circulating fpecie, their 
 arts, manufactures, commerce, and inha- 
 C bitants,
 
 ['4] 
 
 bitants, which were the only means that 
 enabled them to afford this benefit to Bri- 
 tain. The firft of thefe dangers is fcafce* 
 ly dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps imme- 
 diately imminent $ at prefent however we 
 are treating of the danger to be appre- 
 hended ffom the political caufe. 
 
 How far the intereft of this foreign do- 
 minion hath been injured by the Com- 
 pany's political mifgovernment ; or how 
 near it may be reduced to a ftate of utter 
 inability to afford any farther benefit to 
 Britain, is but little known by the public. 
 For though people have heard in the grofs, 
 that affairs in thofe countries are rather 
 in a bad fituation, yet do not they either 
 underftand or believe it to be fo very bad 
 as it really is ; or rather they do not com* 
 prehend how it mould be fo bad $ as not 
 being acquainted with the full power of 
 the caufe that hath produced the evil^ 
 and every one will form his notion of ef- 
 feds that he neither feels nor fees, from 
 his knowledge or opinion of the nature and 
 power of the caufes that produced them* 
 In the cafe before us, people have been 
 taught to confider the oppreflion and ex- 
 tortion of its government, (of which cer- 
 tain
 
 f 15] 
 
 tain inftances are quoted) as the fole caufe 
 of evil to Bengal : of confequence it is 
 fuppofed that Bengal hath fuftered no far- 
 ther damage from its government, than 
 what may have been caufed by fome pri- 
 vate ads of extortion, exercifed by the 
 few perfons vefted with the powers of 
 governing : and, befides that the authen- 
 ticity of thefe ads is denied or difputed, 
 and men who are to judge only from re- 
 port are apt to make allowance for the 
 prejudice or paflion of the accufer who 
 brings a charge againft individuals ; ftill 
 if all thefe acts of oppreffion that have 
 been narrated mould be fully credited ; 
 nay, if the hearer fhould fuppofe ftill 
 more than is reprefented, yet cannot he 
 conceive or allow himfelf to believe that 
 fuch ads of extortion, exercifed by a fmall 
 number of individuals, could fuffice to re- 
 duce the lately rich commercial kingdom 
 of Bengal to fuch a deplorable ftate of 
 mifery, poverty, and diftrefs : the caufe 
 afligned will appear too trivial for the ef- 
 fed ; and of courfe the efFed, at leaft the 
 degree of it, will be difcredited. 
 
 But he who means to acquire a juft no- 
 tion of the prefent ftate of thofe countries, 
 C a and
 
 and the extent of damage they have fuf 
 tained from their prefent Government, 
 muft fully inform himfelf of the true na 
 ture and condition of that Government, 
 and the manner of its operation on the 
 general jnterefl of the people governed > 
 he muft learn, not only that which it hath 
 done, but likewife that which it hath not 
 done ; for the interefl of a community may 
 fufrer far more detriment from the non- 
 ac~tion, than from the oppreffion, of its 
 government. To the end, therefore, that 
 every one may be enabled to form a proper 
 judgment on thefe matters, we mean to 
 prefent a general view of the nature, and 
 effects, of fhe Company's Government i# 
 Bengal, 
 
 The
 
 THE 
 NATURE AND EFFECTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT 
 
 I N 
 
 BENGAL. 
 
 THE Englifh Eaft India company is, 
 under the title of Dewan, the real 
 and actual fovereign of Bengal, Behar, 
 and Orixa : a dominion equal to almoft any 
 one ftate in Europe, in refpeft of either 
 extent and fertility of country, or num- 
 bers of ingenious and induftrious fubje&s ; 
 and exceeding moft of them in the inter- 
 nal materials of commerce, or refources of 
 wealth. The Company executes the go- 
 vernment of this dominion by a deputa- 
 tion, confifling of a Governor and Coun- 
 cil j who refide at Calcutta, the Com- 
 pany's original prefidency, or chief factory 
 in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as 
 pofTeffing the executive authority of the 
 Company, may be termed the fupreme 
 fovereigns of this Indian dominion, have 
 preferved to themfelves the fole power of 
 immediately ordering, directing and con- 
 
 trouling
 
 trouling the government 5 for this de- 
 puted government communicates its pur- 
 pofes, receives its orders, and accounts 
 for its conduct to none but the Directors. 
 
 But it is evident, that the diftance of 
 fituation muft render the immediate con- 
 troul of the Directors perfectly impotent, 
 ineffectual, and nugatory ; for it would 
 be abfurd to fuppofe, that the government 
 ef Bengal mould defer the execution of 
 any one purpofe until it fhall have com- 
 municated with, and received the opinion 
 of the i irectors, which cannot be effe&ed 
 in the fpacc of a whole year ; confequently 
 the directors cannot interfere in the direc- 
 tion, or ordering of this government, far- 
 ther than in fume few cafes of the moft 
 general or invariable nature : but the 
 execution o f even thcfe general orders de- 
 pends upon the will and difcretion of the 
 deputed government j feeing the Directors 
 cannot, at that diftance, enforce it them- 
 felves : and the lame caufe puts it out of 
 their power to prevent or reftrain abufe ; 
 fo that they hold neither potitive nor ne- 
 gative authority in the immediate execu- 
 tion of this government. And the con- 
 dition or fituation of thefe directorial fo- 
 
 vereigns
 
 vereigns at home, renders their retrof r 
 pedtive controul equally impotent and in- 
 effectual ; for they have no power in them- 
 felves to inflict other punifhment on their 
 deputies, for the mod audacious difobe-* 
 dience, or for maladminiftration, than dif- 
 minion from their fervice j and this be- 
 comes no punifhment, becaufe the delin- 
 quents are previoufly prepared for it, being 
 ready to fet out of their own accord with 
 a princely fortune for the mother country j 
 where they fet the authority of the Di- 
 rectors at defiance ; for there thefe fo ve- 
 reigns of India are themfelves fubjedts, and 
 cannot call their quondam minifters to ac- 
 count, except in an ordinary court of juf- 
 tice ; and the difficulty of obtaining evi- 
 dence requifite to convict in thefe courts, 
 the dread of bringing to light, in the 
 courfe of a legal procefs, foms abftrufe 
 myfteries of government; and the ap- 
 prehenfion of danger arifing to the intereft 
 of the prefent direction from a powerful 
 combination at the next election, will ever 
 deter the Directors from ferioufly profe- 
 cuting a lawfuit againft their deputies, 
 even in cafes of peculation from the fo- 
 vereign $ but if it refpedts only the intereil 
 
 of
 
 [20] 
 
 of the fubjeft, they will Be more apt to 
 palliate and defend the offence. We muft 
 therefore perceive, that this deputed go- 
 vernment ads perfectly independent of 
 either the immediate controul, or future 
 awe of the fovereign : whilft the foVereign, 
 is compelled to blindly fupport, with its 
 whole power, the authority of this go- 
 vernment ; and, without choice, to en- 
 force all its meafures ; feeing that to op* 
 pofe the will of the deputy, is oppofmg 
 the authority of the fovereign. 
 
 And, as to the native fubjecls, the power 
 of this deputed government over them is 
 perfectly abfolute and complete. For the 
 inhabitants of thofe countries, being dif- 
 pofed by nature or climate to paflive obe* 
 dience, and by long cuftom habituated to 
 defpotic authority, and being farther im- 
 prefled with a particular awe of Europeans, 
 from a notion of their natural fuperiority, 
 implicitly fubmit to the will of their pre- 
 fcnt government, without once daring to 
 either examine its right, difpute its au- 
 thority, or queftion its conduct. The 
 fubjedt therefore holds not the fmalleft 
 voice in the adminiflration of govern- 
 ment; the jurifdiction, the police, the 
 
 finances,
 
 [21 ] 
 
 finances, the military * government and 
 defence, are all incontroulably directed 
 by the Company's deputation : and the 
 entire interefts of thofe countries, the % 
 lives and property of the inhabitants, are 
 fubjected to its difcretiori, and depend oil 
 its will. 
 
 So that this deputation of the Company- 
 executes the government of Bengal with 
 a power perfectly unlimited by any exte- 
 rior controul ; and if we confider that ifc 
 is at the fame time foreign to the country 
 governed, mutable, and of very mort du- 
 ration, we mall find that it is equally un- 
 reftrained by any internal check. It is 
 therefore the rriolt unlimited government 
 on earth j or rather it is the only govern* 
 ment that can, with propriety, be termed 
 arbitrary and defpotic. 
 
 For all other deputed governments arc 
 fufficiently reftrained by the' authority of 
 the fovereign j and we have no idea of def* 
 potifm, except in governments that are 
 fupreme or fovereign. But the idea of 
 actual defpotifm in a fupreme government 
 is merely imaginary ; feeing that, in one 
 and all of thefe governments, the power 
 of governing is conditional, limited By 
 D rule,
 
 , t 22 J 
 
 rule, and fubjected to controul both ex- 
 ternal and internal. For it is evident, 
 that, in all fupreme governments, the 
 power of governing, and the means that 
 fupport this power, muft needs be derived 
 from the people governed 5 and there- 
 fore cannot exift in defpight of their con- 
 fent; and though, in fome of thefe go- 
 vernments, the condition, upon which 
 this power and thefe means are granted, is 
 not fpecially exprefled, yet is it perfectly 
 understood," and invariably enforced in all 
 of them ; inafmuch as there are examples 
 in each, of fovereigns who have fufrered 
 the utmoft punifhment, for attempting to 
 tranfgrefs the limits of this condition; 
 nay, there is fcarce one inftance where 
 the prince, thus tranfgreffing, efcaped the 
 refentment of the people ; and examples 
 of this nature are moft frequent in thefe 
 governments that are falfely termed def- 
 potic. Thefe examples muft therefore 
 convince all fovereigns, that there is a 
 power in the people, fuperior to, and 
 capable of controuling them ; and the 
 fenfe' of this muft ever prove an effeclual 
 external controul on the conduft of a fu- 
 preme government. - But felf-intereft, 
 
 that
 
 [23 ] 
 
 d perpetuum mobile of human 
 adion, which we may term an internal 
 check, operates flill more forcibly, con- 
 ftantly, and immediately on the will of a 
 fupreme government -, not limply reftrain- 
 ing it from doing or permitting injury, but 
 impelling it to promote the good of the 
 people governed. For a government that 
 is fovereign, and perpetual (or durante 
 vita and hereditary) cannot poflibly fepa- 
 rate its own private intereft from that of 
 the community which it governs; being 
 indeed itfelf a part of that community : 
 and this is fo evident, that no prince ever 
 attempted to advance a diftincl: intereft of 
 his own, at the expence of the general 
 weal, who was not a fool, before he became 
 a tyrant. But a wife fovereignpenfiders 
 his people as the channel through which 
 alone he can receive fubftantial good or 
 evil 5 and, adling upon this principle, he 
 will, however abfolute and difpofed by 
 nature to tyranny, abflain from injuring 
 the general intereft, becaufe he is len- 
 fible that fuch injury will recoil upon him- 
 felf ; and he will exert himfelf to pro- 
 mote the profperity of his people, as the 
 only means of advancing his own power, 
 D 2 gran-
 
 grandeur, or wealth. So that a fovereign 
 prince, who underftands his own real 
 intereft, though otherwife void of virtue, 
 will ever ftudy to govern well ; nay, the 
 private vices of fuch a prince do often ope- 
 rate public good -, a ftriking inftance of 
 which we meet with in our Henry the 
 Seventh ; whofe extreme and fordid ava-s- 
 rice was the fource of Englifh commerce 
 and wealth ; and his mean felf-love, and 
 jealoufy of power, eflablimed univerfal 
 liberty. 
 
 But the nature of this Bengal govern- 
 ment differs, in every circumflance, from 
 that of a fupreme government 5 being de- 
 puted, foreign, mutable, and temporary, 
 it is no way interested in the lafting prof- 
 perity of the community which it governs^ 
 on the contrary, this 'government holds 
 an interefl which is not only diftin<3 from, 
 but diametrically oppofite to that of the 
 futyeft. For thefe Governors return to 
 Europe immediately on the expiration of 
 their office, which feldom dures above 
 three years, often lefs } therefore their 
 fole aim is to amafs all the wealth they 
 can, during the fhort term of their power, 
 ^n order to tranfport it along with their 
 
 perfons
 
 [25] 
 
 perfons to their own country. But the 
 wealth which a government amafles, muft 
 needs be extorted from the people govern- 
 ed ; confeqnently felf-intereft leads this 
 government to pillage and plunder the 
 fubjeft : and we have feen that it is not 
 reftrained, by any external controul, front 
 advancing its own diftindl intereft at the 
 expence of the community which it go- 
 verns, feeing it is perfectly exempted from 
 all awe of either the fovereign or the fub- 
 je<fl$ and it cannot be reftrained by any 
 internal check, becaufe it holds no con- 
 cern in the lading welfare of the people. 
 Such then is the ruling principle of this 
 government : nor are the means which it 
 employs to promote its own intereft lefs 
 extraordinary than is its power to enforce 
 them. For this government, which ar- 
 bitrarily directs the jurifdidion and police, 
 together with the impofition and collec- 
 tion of taxes, doth at fame time aft in 
 the capacity of a merchant. And this 
 commercial defpotifm, or defpotic power 
 Jodged in the hands of a few foreign mer- 
 chants, hath, in its nature and confe- 
 quences, proved infinitely more deftruc* 
 ttive to the intereft of that commercial 
 
 country,
 
 country, than all the operations of poli- 
 tical tyranny have been : for from it fprung 
 thefe cruel monopolies, which firuck at 
 the very root of manufacture, commerce, 
 and even population. 
 
 To attempt defcribing the particular 
 methods which this government hath prac- 
 tifed to promote its own intereil -at the 
 expence of the people, in its double ca- 
 pacity, of an abfolute fovereign and a def- 
 potic merchant, would be a tedious, in- 
 vidious, and even an unpro6table under- 
 taking ; for it is almoft impoffible to pro- 
 perly delineate the conduct of a tyranny 
 fo various and irregular in its operations ; 
 and, to thofe who are unacquainted with 
 the modes, cufloms, and interefts of the 
 country in queilion, the recital of a few 
 particular inftances would only ferve to 
 miflead their judgment, and darken or di- 
 minim the truth. By attending to the 
 general defcription given of the nature 
 views and interefts of this government, 
 we mall form a more complete and juft 
 notion of its conduct and deportment, than 
 can be acquired from any disjointed ac- 
 count of particulars. Let us fuppofe a 
 few foreigners fent into a rich commercial 
 
 country,
 
 country, with abfolute and unlimited 
 power over the lives and property of the 
 inhabitants; actuated hy no other principle 
 than that of acquiring riches, and flimu- 
 lated thereto not only by avarice but am- 
 bition, or the defire of excelling ; tinre- 
 flrained by any fpecies of prefent awe or 
 future apprehenfion ; but on the contrary, 
 encouraged by precedent to expect in their 
 own country, titles, dignity, refpect, and 
 confequence, each in proportion to the 
 fum he imports; and whatever methods - 
 we can fuppofe would be practifed by fuch 
 foreigners, to accomplish their purpofe, 
 within a fhort limited term, we may fup- 
 pofe to have been actually employed by 
 this Bengal government. The enormous 
 amount of numerous fortunes, imported 
 by the perfons employed in this govern^ 
 ment, together with the rapidity of ac- 
 quifition,are circumstances feen and known 
 in this country ; and thefe will thoroughly 
 warrant our fuppofing, ihat tljie acquirers 
 have availed themfelves to the utrnoft of 
 their powers, as well as their opportuni- 
 ties. However, we fhall err greatly in 
 our eftimate of the damage caufed to thofe 
 conntries, by their government's proie- 
 
 cuting
 
 t 28] 
 
 CUting its own diftincT: intereft, if we fliall 
 confine the reckoning to only the lofi of 
 fo much fpecie, as hath been extorted and 
 exported by thefe foreigners : for this, 
 though in itfelf a ruinous grievance, is 
 merely trivial, when compared with the 
 havoc and wafte committed on the manu- 
 facture, the commerce, agriculture, and 
 population, by the methods employed to 
 acquire thefe fums. A herd of hogs, 
 broke into a well dreffed vineyard, will 
 gorge their voracious maws ; but that 
 which they eat and devour doth not de- 
 flroy the vineyard ; it is their manner of 
 eating, their rutting up, their tearing 
 down, and trarripling under foot. 
 
 Hitherto we have regarded this govern- 
 ment in only one point of view : we have 
 (een it acting for itfelf -, but we have not 
 fcen the part it acts for the people, in its 
 capacity of a fovereign ruler, adminiftring 
 the government of a mighty ftate in all 
 its different offices or departments ; and 
 entrufted with the care of the whole and 
 entire interefts of a numerous commercial 
 cation. But, in the difcharge of this fo- 
 vereign truft, we (hall find the govern- 
 ment of Bengal a mere Vis inertia* void 
 
 of
 
 of the two efficient principles of adtion* 
 ability or power of acting, and will or 
 inclination. For how can we expert to 
 find the ability, of governing well, in the 
 men employed by the Company to exe- 
 cute the government of thofe countries ? 
 to attain the knowledge of any one fci- 
 ence or myftery, demands an effort of the 
 mind ; but it is impoffible for the bright* 
 eft natural genius to arrive at even a mo- 
 derate degree of fkill in the art of govern- 
 ing, which, as it is the moft elevated, fo 
 is it the moft difficult, abflrufe, various 
 and complicated of all human fciences, 
 without long and intenfe application, ftudy, 
 and reflection ; and, we may add, a feries 
 of practice ; and all thefe gradations to 
 fkill, in governing, are wanting to our 
 Bengal governors. Their fcholaftic edu- 
 cation extends no farther than to qualify 
 them for merchants clerks ; and, imme- 
 diately on being taken from fchool, they are 
 difpatched to India ; where the manner 
 of life is confonant to the climate, volup- 
 tuous to a degree of diflblutenefs, vain, 
 idle, diffipated, and an enemy to ftudy 
 or reflection : the juvenile part of their 
 life being fpent in this mariner, they ar- 
 E rive
 
 f 3] 
 
 rive at the charge of government with 
 minds perfectly uninformed, and fo very 
 averfe to application, that they commit 
 and implicitly confide the charge of their 
 own private concerns to fervants. If fuch 
 men mould poffefs the fkill or addrefs of 
 governing well, it muft certainly be ac- 
 quired inftaritaneoufly and fupernaturally ; 
 infufcd into them by miracle, like the 
 gift of fpecch into the afs of Balaam. 
 
 But the want of will or inclination is 
 an obftacle to their governing well, ftill 
 more prevalent than is the want of ability. 
 Labour, fatigue, and difficulty are evils, 
 to which the human mind is fo naturally 
 averfe, that, unlefs it is urged by fome 
 ftrong impulfe of paflion, fuch as the fear 
 of fome fuperior evil, or the hope and 
 defire of fome mighty good, it will de- 
 cline and evade them : what flimulurn 
 then can be fufficiently powerful to urge 
 the habitually indolent minds of our Ben- 
 gal governors to encounter the difficulties, 
 the labour, and fatigue attending a due 
 difcharge of the duties of government ; 
 which, of all human undertakings, is the 
 moft replete with thefe mental evils ? Yet 
 this government, which demands a ftron- 
 
 ger
 
 f 31 ] 
 
 ger ftimulum than any other government 
 that ever yet exifted, is in effed urged by 
 no one motive or confideration to difcharge 
 the duties of its office j for, as it holds 
 no intereft in the lafting welfare of the 
 people governed, neither its hopes nor 
 its fears are at all interefled in the good or 
 evil confequences that may be cauied by 
 its own vigilance or neglect : being alto- 
 gether fuperior to the refentment of the 
 fubjed, and independent of the fovereign's 
 authority, it is not impelled, by the fear 
 of immediate danger, nor the apprehen- 
 fion of future punifhment : and as to the 
 profped of glory, applaufe, or refped, 
 which pufli the generous and ambitious 
 mind to adion, our governors aim to at- 
 tain them, not by governing well, but 
 by acquiring and bringing home a mighty 
 fortune to their own country. 
 
 Men thus actuated, or rather unadua- 
 ted, muft, in the difcharge of their fove- 
 reign office, be perfedly torpid aud lift- 
 lefs -, the machine of political government 
 flops in their hands, and ftands Hock ftill : 
 their minds being incapable of applica- 
 tion, they withdraw themiclves as much as 
 poffible from attention, and leave the trouble 
 2 of
 
 [32] 
 
 of governing to others, ftill lefs qualified 
 than themfel ves j thefe inferior agents being 
 chofen, not for their abilities or virtue, but 
 for their fitnefs to ferve the private purpofe 
 of the governors, otherwife by chance ; but 
 they give themlelves no trouble to infpecl: 
 the conduct of thefe agents, who in ge- 
 neral are unprincipled miicreants ; on the 
 contrary, they promifcuoufly approve and 
 fupport every action ; fo that, wherever 
 the power of this government afts, it is 
 only to opprefs; and all beftde is left to 
 chance. However, the power of govern- 
 ing, or rather of oppr-rffing, is not con- 
 fined to the perfons vefted with the charge 
 of government : the numerous fervants 
 \vhom this Company difperfes over the 
 face of the country, for the purpofe of 
 carrying on her trade, do each of them, 
 in his own diflricT:, affume the authority 
 of a defpotj and communicates a like 
 authority to all his fervants and depen- 
 dants, who, it muft be allowed, are far 
 more unrelenting than their mailers ; and 
 thus tyranny is extended into every corner; 
 oppreffion becomes general ; and the op- 
 prefled are excluded from the very prof- 
 peel of redrefs; for, on appeal to the 
 
 fuperior,
 
 [331 
 
 fuperior, the plaintiff is ever remanded 
 to the very oppreffor, who punifhes him 
 for having dared to complain. And thus 
 juftice and protection are no where to be 
 found ; vice goes unpunimed, and inno- 
 cence unsupported ; therefore every man 
 becomes a villain in his own defence - y and 
 faith, confidence, truth, and honefty are 
 banimed the land. In (hoit, it may with 
 find: propriety be faid by thefe wretched 
 peorle, 1 err as ajlr<z<.i reliquit -> and tyranny 
 and anarchy have here fet up their throne. 
 
 And to this inaction or non-exertion of 
 the powers of government we are to im- 
 pute the ruin of thofe countries, rather 
 than to the avarice or rapine of the per- 
 fons deputed by the Company to execute 
 that government. For the power of go- 
 verning being vefled in only a few, the 
 extortion of thefc few might have been 
 long lupported by a rich commercial coun- 
 try, provided they had exerted themfelves 
 to reftrain and -prevent all others from 
 plundering and oppreffing. The avarice, 
 profufion and bloody tyranny of even 
 Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only 
 a few of their fubjc&s at Rome; every 
 where elfe the empire flourished ; be- 
 
 caufe
 
 [34] 
 
 caufe thefe imperial monopolizers of vice 
 would fuffer none in power to be wicked 
 but themfelves; they narrowly infpected 
 the conduct of their governors and offi- 
 cers, and feverely punifhed their injuftice 
 or oppreffion. But where the govern- 
 ment doth not only plunder itfelf, but 
 fuffers every one under it to plunder, that 
 country muft in time be completely 
 ruined. 
 
 Now Bengal hath been fubjected to a 
 government of this nature for thefe fifteen 
 years paft ; for though we commonly date 
 the commencement of the Company's fo- 
 vereignty from the aflumption of the De- 
 wanny, (as it is termed,) yet hath this 
 Company (at leaft her deputies) poflefTed 
 a really abfolute authority in thofe coun- 
 tries ever fmce the battle of PlaiTey in 
 1757. That action rendered them maf- 
 ters of Bengal ; and it was equally within 
 t their power to aflume the fovereign go- 
 vernment at that time, as afterwards in 
 1765 ; their own will was the only ob- 
 ftacle : but notwithstanding they beftowed 
 it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain 
 an abfolute fuperiority over him, and he 
 governed in a ftate of perfect fubordina- 
 
 tion
 
 [35) 
 
 don to their authority ; for he well knew 
 and experienced, that the duration of 
 his office, and even of his exiftence, de- 
 pended upon their will ; confequently 
 this deoendent native government could 
 but little reftrain the conduct of the Com- 
 pany's deputies, or protect the fubjecl: from 
 their rapacity ; and when they, in 1765, 
 fet afide this native government, they 
 only removed a fcreen which they them- 
 felves had fet up, and till then preferved 
 for their own purpofe. 
 
 How far thefe countries may have ad- 
 vanced towards the period of final ruin, 
 under the fifteen or fixteen years domina- 
 tion of fuch a government, we mall not 
 pretend to determine, becaufe the terra 
 ruin is variously underflood. This much 
 is certain, that the unbounded remittance 
 *>f fpecie made, for fome years, by the 
 Englim Company, for fundry purpofes 
 as fovereign ; and for a much greater 
 number of years, and in much larger fums 
 by the other European Companies, who 
 received it from the fervants of the Eng- 
 lifli Company for bills on Europe, at a 
 very low exchange, and employed it for 
 every purpofe in the other parts of India 
 
 and
 
 [36] 
 
 ;md China, hath compleatly drained Ben- 
 gal of its wealth, and reduced it to a 
 flate of the moil abjed: poverty. And 
 the grievous opprcffion and rapine exer- 
 cifed by the Company's fervants, and their 
 numerous dependants ; together with the 
 moil cruel monopolies ufurped by them 
 over every fpecies of merchandize, and 
 even the neceiTaries of life, hath in a great .. 
 meafure fuppreiTed commerce, and abo- 
 liflied trade. Whilil the infatiable ava- 
 rice and unreilrained extortion of thofe 
 employed in the cclle&ion of taxes and re- 
 venue having ruined the farmer, the lands 
 lay uncultivated and waile 5 infomuch 
 that, not to mention the immenie decreafe 
 of revenue, that naturally moil fertile of 
 ail countries, .Bengal, hath fuffered a more 
 fevere famine than perhaps was ever heard 
 of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the 
 inhabitants have died of want, andnumbers 
 have fled from flarving and oppreflion. 
 
 But it is not difficult to determine how 
 near the intereil of Britain in thofe coun- 
 tries hath approached to ruin : for Britain 
 is to confider them as ruined to her pur- 
 pofe, fo foon as they mall become inca- 
 pable of fupporting a commerce benefi- 
 cial
 
 t 37 1 
 
 cial to her ; and at fame time of yielding 
 her a confideration, in the nature of tri-^ 
 bute, equivalent to the expenc? of fub- 
 jedts which (he fends out annually to main-* 
 tain her dominion there. And that they 
 are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her, 
 in both thefe relpe<fts, we begin already 
 to feel, in fpite of all the art or influence 
 ufed to conceal the truth. 
 
 For, in the article of tribute, we find 
 that, inflead of receiving fuch a furplus 
 of revenue as fufficed, at the commence-* 
 ment of the Dewanny, to not only pay 
 for the fpecie part of the Company's in- 
 veflment in Bengal itfelf, but to pufchafe 
 her cargoes, and defray all her charges in 
 the other parts of India, and in China, 
 the government of Bengal was, two yearsi 
 ago, reduced to the neceflity of borrow- 
 ing near a million fterling on bills, which 
 have been tranfmitted and acceoted by the 
 Company : in like manner hath this go- 
 vernment teen obliged to borrow laft yeaf ; 
 though the bills have been prevented, by 
 an arbitrary ftroke of deceit, from appear- 
 ing againft them ( in Europe. Thefe bor- 
 rowed fums have all been expended in Ben- 
 gal itfelf: and if we allow that the whole 
 F hath
 
 hath been employed to pay for the Com- 
 pany's inveftment, ^though- by the by the 
 fpecie part of the Company's inveftment 
 cannot, at lead it ought not, if me ex- 
 ports the proper quantity of European; 
 commodities, exceed half a million,) it 
 inuft even then be admitted, that the 
 revenue of Bengal hath barely fufficed 
 to defray the ordinary expence of go- 
 vernment. And, if fo, from whence is 
 the tribute of Bengal, (whether we term- 
 it dedomagement, drawback, or encreafed 
 dividend) to arife ? not from the mighty 
 cargoes imported; for they are purchaied, 
 not with fur plus revenue, but with bor- 
 rowed money, which muil be repaid ci- 
 ther in Inclia or in Europe : and as to ther 
 profits on thefe cargoes, they will be more 
 than eat up by the charges of freight, and a 
 long reckoning of India intereft at eight 
 per cent. I am feniible, that this account 
 is itrangelj perplexed and embarrafled by 
 intricate calculations of flock in hand, 
 annual importations, and future fales, &c. 
 but when diverted of all thele ftudied in- 
 tricacies it will ftand limply thus As is 
 the clear furplus of revenue received in 
 Bengal, fo will be the amount of tribute 
 
 received
 
 f 39 1 
 
 received in Britain j the former will ever 
 -exactly balance the latter. But this fur- 
 plus we find to have ben, for the two paft 
 years, equal to nothing ; and the amount 
 of tribute received in Britain muft amount 
 to exactly as much ; confequently the de- 
 domagement, drawback, and increafed 
 'dividend for the two laft years is ftill in Nu- 
 bibits ; where the national part, confiding 
 of the two firft articles, is like to remain ; 
 unlefs it mall be paid out of the Company's 
 capital flock, as the encreafed dividend 
 hath been. But this revenue, which for 
 the* two years paft hath barely fufficed to 
 defray the expence of gove-rnment, hath 
 not been kept up even to that extent with- 
 out the aid of violence : but violence it- 
 felf muft yield to necjffity, and cannot 
 extort that which doth not exift ; moreover 
 the Company had, in thefe two years, de- 
 creafed her military expence, by dif- 
 banding fome thoufand fipahis, and other- 
 wife diminishing the chargeof her remain- 
 ing force; and the attack made by Shaw 
 Allum in conjunction with the Mharrattors 
 will, this year, compel her to re-augment 
 iier military expence in every refpecl: . 
 whilft the predatory incurfions of thefe 
 F 2 Mhar-
 
 [4 ] 
 
 Mharrbattors will prevent the collection of 
 revenue^ how then will (he fupport the 
 augmented charge of this year, with a 
 revenue decreased by a variety of caufes fo 
 rpuch below the degree of laft year ? Ano* 
 ther loan upon the ftrength of the capital 
 is the only refource ; but poffibly borrow- 
 ing may, for ieveral reafons, have become 
 impracticable by this time $ and it is cer- 
 tain that troops will not, nay cannot, ferve 
 without pay-rHere is a blefled profpect 
 indeed, 
 
 But, leaving this to the proof of time, 
 we perceive that, at any rate, we have loft 
 the pr>fp< <Ct of future tribute from Bengal, 
 through the channel of the Company ; we 
 have not fo much as the promife of de- 
 domagemeut, drawback, or encreafed di- 
 vidend for this current year j and if we 
 can truft to our own reafon, preferably to 
 bar krupt promiies, we may give it up for 
 good and all. Nay, there is mighty rea- 
 fon to apprehend, that even the private for- 
 tunes will foon ceafe to exift; and then 
 Britain will ceafe to receive the fum of 
 1,400,000!. (lerling, which for a number 
 cf years paft hath been annually flowing 
 in to her from India, in confequence of 
 ii .. domi-
 
 [4i 3 
 
 dominion. And if (he could barely fup- 
 port her burden, when aided by this influx, 
 how will me, when deprived of it, an- 
 fwer the annual drain of fpecie made by her 
 foreign creditors ? 
 
 With refpecl to the prefent ftate of our 
 commerce with thofe countries, it is not 
 enquired, and therefore not known, whe- 
 ther the Company exports the ftipulated 
 fum of Britifh commodities or not ; and it 
 is ftill lefs known, whether the fmall 
 quantity (he hath exported of late is dif- 
 pofed of; or whether it remains in her 
 warehoufes abroad, to fwell up the ao* 
 count of her flock ; thus much however 
 reafon teHs us, that the inhabitants of 
 Bengal, who cannot procure the necefla- 
 ries of life, millions having died of 
 want, can but little afford to purchafe fo- 
 reign fopperies or fuperfluities. Never- 
 theleis we have feen large cargoes of In- 
 dian manufactures imported this very year; 
 but we are not to fuppofe, that thefe car- 
 goes are the produce of willing induitry ; 
 they are procured by force and compul- 
 fion ; the artifan being held to work under 
 the difcipline of tafk matters, who de- 
 prive him of his labour jsefore it is com- 
 pleted,
 
 [ 4* ] 
 
 dieted, at a price that will not afford him 
 the means of living. Of the many mar- 
 kets that forages had taken off the manu- 
 factures of Bengal, Europe is now the 
 only one remaining ; and this one market 
 cannot be Supplied without the application 
 of force. How long force might fupply 
 the place of willing induftry, we mall 
 not pretend to determine; but one year 
 more will difcover the united effects of 
 want of artifans, want of money, and 
 Mharrattor incurfions. 
 
 And thus have we demonftrated the na- 
 ture and condition of this Bengal govern- 
 ment, together with the evils it hath 
 cauied to the country governed, not from 
 a recital of difputed facts, but from prin- 
 ciples univerfaily underftood and admitted. 
 For every one, the leaft acquainted with 
 the Company's affairs, muft know and will 
 allow that the views, the interefts, the 
 powers and opportunities of her deputed 
 government in Bengal are exactly fuch as 
 we have defcribed them; and upon this 
 one undifputed datum we have bulk our 
 whole demonftration j the truth and juft- 
 nefs of which- every m;m is capable of 
 trying and proving, by the touchftone of 
 
 his
 
 [43 I 
 
 his own reafon. For reafon, without the* 
 aid of circumftantial proof, can judge- 
 whether the line of conduct which we 
 have affigned to the government of Ben- 
 gal, is fairly inferred and deduced front 
 its evident and allowed principle of aflion ; 
 and common fenfe, unafllfted by demon- 
 flration, will point out the effe&s that 
 fuch condudl muft operate on the intereft 
 of the country governed ; and, if we far- 
 ther advert to the length of time that this 
 country hath been fubje&ed to fnch opera- 
 tion, we ill all nearly guefs at its prelent 
 {late and condition. 
 
 And we doubt not, that what hath been 
 faid will enable every one,, who makes ufe 
 of his own reafon and reflection, to form a 
 proper judgment for himfelf on certain 
 .points of this Eaft India bufinefs, which 
 have been mod grofsly mifreprefertted. 
 For he will theieby difcover, that the ob- 
 jeft, for which the nation hath to appre- 
 hend at prefent, is not the " credit of 
 the Company ;" which, had (he been re- 
 ftrained within her natural fpheT, and her 
 conduct properly infpe&ed by government, 
 could never have been injured; or, if it 
 had, the breach could (in fuch cafe) have 
 
 little
 
 [ 44} 
 
 little more affedted the general weal, than 
 the failure of any large trading houfe; 
 which, fo long as the trade remained en- 
 tire, would have been immediately re- 
 placed by another ; but he will perceive, 
 that the prefent bad (rate of the Company's 
 credit is only an efFecl;, or confequence, 
 of the ruinous (inuation of affairs in In- 
 dia ', and, of courfe, that the object of 
 national apprehenfion is the ruin or lofs of 
 that mighty and important branch of na- 
 tional intereft, which hath been committed 
 to the charge of the Company, in a man- 
 ner fo complete and implicit, that the 
 name, as well as the intereft of the na- 
 tion, nay the very name of the object it- 
 felf, hath been funk and loft in that of 
 the Company : this Company, which is 
 but the temporary farmer, having been, 
 to all intents and purpofes, fubflituted in 
 the ftead of not only the fovereign pro- 
 prietor, but even of the farm itfelf. And 
 it will farther appear, that the danger 
 which threatens this objed: is not to be 
 averted by blindly fupporting the credit 
 of the Company : but, on the contiary, ' 
 that the nation will, by affording this 
 blind fupport, only furnilli the means of 
 
 com-
 
 [4Sl 
 
 completing that ruin, which is already fo 
 far advanced. To prevent this danger de- 
 mands meafures of a very different nature : 
 and we mail proceed to point out thefe 
 meafures ; which, had they been applied 
 in time, would, we humbly conceive, 
 have fufficed to prevent the ruin or lofs of 
 this important concern : and which, if 
 matters are not pail remedy, may yet ferve 
 to reftore them, 
 
 . . : U-fli noOH , ? Thl j I;3 i V li3l 2? 
 
 T H E
 
 THE T*US CiUSES OF 
 
 ^xfe V I L AND A B U S E 
 
 , juts :.&.Y- X - 
 
 I N THE 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, 
 
 AND THE 
 MEANS TO REMEDY THEM.; 
 
 IT is a common faying that, the caufc 
 of an evil being known, the remedy 
 is readily difcovercd* and, upon the ftrength 
 of this maxim, feveral, who think they 
 have hit upon fome one caufe of evil in 
 the political government of Bengal, have 
 taken upon them to prefcribe a remedy ; 
 which is pronounced an univerfal panacea, 
 a falve for every fore : but no fooner 
 have they produced their ware, titan the 
 eye hath difcovered it to be mere powder 
 of poft ; or fomething equally unavailing. 
 Few of thefe prefcriptions have at all 
 attracted notice ; the propofal for pro- 
 ted ing the liberty of the fubjedl from the 
 defpotifm of government, by the inftitu- 
 tion of native juries, was indeed extreme- 
 ly well calculated to pleafe Britifh fpecula- 
 tionj and therefore, like the device of hang- 
 ing the bell about the cat's neck, it was 
 
 highly
 
 [471 
 
 highly applauded by thofe who never ad- 
 verted to the difference betwixt Britain 
 and Bengal, in point of general conftitu- 
 tion of government; and difpofition of the 
 natives. But, for practice, it muft ap- 
 pear a mere chimera ta fuch as confider, 
 on the one hand, that men, who are 
 Haves to their government and its officers 
 in every other capacity, cannot poflibly be 
 free in that of jurymen ; and that juries, 
 if they are not free and impartial, avail 
 nothing : and, on the other hand, that if 
 the natives (hould be actually endowed 
 with the real cap of liberty in the jury 
 room^there is danger, nay, there is a cer- 
 tainty, that they would make bold to wear 
 it elfewhere $ and then, adieu to the Eng~ 
 lirn dominion in Bengal. In few words, 
 the power of the English government, and 
 the freedom of native juries, are two 
 things that cannot poflibly exift together 
 in Bengal ; the life of the one muft un- 
 avoidably caufe the death of the other : 
 and, however haifh this doctrine may 
 found in a freeborn Englifli ear, the force 
 and truth of it will immediately /Irike the 
 politician. 
 
 G 2 Equally
 
 [48 ] 
 
 Equally unavailing is that propofal for 
 fecuring the liberty and property of the 
 fubject, from the oppreflion : and extortion 
 of government, by granting to the native 
 a perpetual property in land ; without pro- 
 viding him the Imalleft lecurity for the 
 free poneifion of its produce ; which, fo 
 long as government ftands on its pre- 
 fent footing, is liable to be wrefted from 
 him ib foon as acquired. 
 
 But it would feem, that the reafon why 
 thefe political phyficians have been fo un- 
 lucky in their prefcriptions is, that they 
 have proceeded upon falfe principles ; as 
 having miftaken the nature of the malady. 
 For they have either affigned no one certain 
 caufe of evil ; or elfe they have traced it 
 no farther than to the perfons who have 
 executed the government of thole coun- 
 tries, otherwife to the Directors : as if all 
 the evil had proceeded from fome particu- 
 lar vicioufnefs in their difpolition, as if 
 they had been fmners above ail men, or 
 as if no men would have done the wicked 
 deed but they : whereas he who is the 
 leaft acquainted with human nature will 
 allow, that few, if any men, wou-d have 
 made any better ufe of their powers and 
 
 oppor-
 
 (49l 
 
 opportunities 5 nay he will add, that every 
 other government on earth, would aft the 
 very part that this Bengal government 
 hath done, provided it held the fame views 
 and intereits, together with the fame pow- 
 ers and opportunities. And, if fo, what 
 can be more abfurd, than the propofal to 
 remedy the evils and abufes of this go- 
 .vernment, by fending out Supervifors, 
 with the fame or greater powers, and con- 
 fequently pofleffing greater opportunities 
 of promoting their own views and inte- 
 refts ; which are exadtly the fame as thefe 
 of the perions complained of ; teeing that* 
 as the fame caufe of evil which exifted in 
 the Governors, would have exifted in the 
 Sdpervifors, thefe fimilar caufes muft have 
 operated fimiiar effects. 
 
 Indeed we (hall err widely, if we look 
 for the original caufe of evil in thefe Go- 
 vernors : for, on in -peeing the preceding 
 defcription of this Bengal government, we 
 perceive, that their maladminiftration is 
 itfelf but an effect, or confequence, na- 
 turally flowing from the total want of cer- 
 tain fundamental principles or powers ; 
 which, in every other government, ferve 
 to reftrain the party governing from do* 
 
 ing
 
 ing or permitting injury, and impel it ta 
 promote the good of the party governed : 
 and as the want of thefe retraining and 
 impelling powers hath unavoidably pro- 
 duced, the nrft tyranny, and the latter 
 anarchy, it is plain, that all the evils and 
 abuies in the government of Bengal have 
 fprung from this deficiency. It farther 
 appears, from the fame defcription, that 
 the want of thefe reftraining and impel- 
 ling powers arifes fiom two different 
 caufes - y the firft being the particular con- 
 dition and conflitution of the fovereign : 
 and the fecond is there termed the dif- 
 tance of iuuation, betwixt the fovereign 
 refidence and the country governed ; tho* 
 the fequel will evince this latter to be ra- 
 ther a radical defect in the nature of that 
 fyftem, which the Directors have adopted 
 for the government of this diflant domi- 
 nion. That thefe have been the two ori- 
 ginal caufes of the tyranny and anarchy* 
 and confequently of all the evils and a-, 
 bufes in this Bengal government, includ-* 
 ing thefe of the commercial defpotifm, is 
 fufficiently evident. We fhall therefore 
 proceed to point out the means of remov- 
 ing thefe caufes, as the only effectual me- 
 thod
 
 thod of remedying the evils. And as 
 each of the two caufes hath contributed 
 its proper fhare of the evil, and each de- 
 mands a diftincl: remedy, we ihall confi- 
 der them feparately. 
 
 With regard to the condition and con- 
 ftitution of the Company, we have already 
 mentioned the feveral circumstances that 
 difqualify her for the office of a fupreme 
 fovereignj here therefore we (hall only 
 recapitulate, or coiled them into one point 
 of view. The firft defect is, her impo- 
 tence, or want of power to promote good 
 government in her dominion: and this 
 proceeds from her being, with refpeft to 
 her deputed government, a meer fellow 
 fubjeft, totally void of fupreme legifla- 
 live and judicial powers ; and confequently 
 incapable of inforcing obedience; or of 
 punishing difobedience : and this want of 
 authority and power in the fovereiVn, we 
 have mown to be a principal caufe^of def- 
 potifm in the deputed government, A 
 fecond defed in the conftitution of the 
 Company is her want of inclination, or 
 rather of intereft, to difcharge the duty 
 of a good fovereign; and this arifes from 
 the fluctuating and hourly mutable tfate 
 
 of
 
 of thd proprietary, the temporary arid 
 fhort duration of her corporate exifteftce* 
 the flill fhorter tenor of this fovereignty> 
 and the annual rotation of her executive 
 government ; for, in confequence of thefe 
 feveral circumftances in her fituation, her 
 views are narrow, contracted, and rapa- 
 cious ; the fole aim of all her meafures 
 being to make the moft of the prefent 
 moment. The third defect is the mer* 
 cantile capacity of this fovereign Com* 
 pany; and from this defect alone flow 
 evils fufficient to ruin the intereft of th6 
 country fubjected to her government : 
 for, in confequence of her mercantile ca- 
 pacity, her deputed government a<5ls as a 
 merchant ; and, in confequence of het 
 fovereign capacity, all her mercantile fer* 
 vants affume the authority of fovereigns* 
 Thefe are the principal defects in the 
 being and constitution of this fovereign 
 Company ; and it is evident, that iuch 
 defects in the fovereign, muft have con- 
 tributed largely towards the exiftence of 
 abufe, in the deputed government. But 
 thefe defects might have been, in a great 
 meafure, remedied, and their confequen- 
 ces prevented, by a fimple act of parlia- 
 ment,
 
 f S3J 
 
 iiient, paft by the national government, 
 at the time it thought proper to commit 
 the charge of this important branch of 
 national intereft, to the care of the Com- 
 pany. This act might have been entitled, 
 " An aft for better enabling the Eaft 
 India Company to adminifter the political 
 government, and to protect, maintain and 
 defend certain ftates and countries in In- 
 dia, which have become fubjected to the 
 dominion of Britain, and which, for fun- 
 dry weighty confiderations, it hath been 
 judged proper to commit to her charge." 
 And it might have been conceived in the 
 following, or fuch like terms. 
 
 " Whereas it appears, that the want of 
 a proper legiflative authority over the mi- 
 nifters and fervants, employed by the 
 Company to execute the fovereign govern- 
 ment of thefe fubjedted dominions, muft 
 be productive of many abufes, detrimen- 
 tal as well to the intereft of the Company, 
 as to the honour and intereft of the Britifh 
 nation. Be it enacted by 5cc. that, from 
 the time of paifing this aft, the Company 
 fhall poflefs the power of legiflation, or 
 making laws, for the government of this 
 foreign dominion : and the laws thus 
 H enacted
 
 tS4l 
 
 enabled by the Company, mall be equally 
 binding on all her minifters, fervants, and 
 fubjects, in that dominion, as are thea&s 
 of parliament on the fubje&s of Bri f ain. 
 And being farther fenfible of the many 
 inconveniences, that muft arife from the 
 Company's incapacity of punifhing the 
 offences committed by her minifters, and 
 fervants abroad, otherwife than by ap- 
 plying to courts of juftice that are foreign 
 to her government ; where me cannot 
 convict, through the difficulty of obtain- 
 ing the evidence required by the forms of 
 thefe courts; and where (he is deterred 
 from profecuting, by the fear of divul- 
 ging the fecretsof her government ; info- 
 much that, rather than apply to thefe 
 courts, (he muft fubmit to the moil auda- 
 cious ads of difobedience, and maladmi- 
 niftration ; and confidering that fucli inca- 
 pacity in the Company muft difcourage all 
 good government, and produce tyranny 
 and anarchy in this dominion ; be it 
 ena&ed, that the Company mail have au- 
 thority to erect courts of juftice, and ap- 
 point judges; with the like powers, as 
 are vefted in his majefty's judges, and 
 court? of judicature, for trying and judg- 
 ing
 
 f553 
 
 ing all fuits and caufes, or offences com- 
 mitted within the limits of this Indian 
 dominion 5 and for punifhing the fame, 
 either capitally, or by fine, imprifonment, 
 and banimment, though to Europe only. 
 And whereas it is probable, that fome of 
 the minifters or fervants of the Company 
 may, by various methods, elude thejuf- 
 tice of her courts abroad, and efcape to 
 Europe ; in order therefore to prevent fuch 
 dangerous illufion of juftice, it is enacted, 
 that the Company's court of directors 
 fhall, on due information being made to 
 them, have power at all times to call be- 
 fore them fuch efcaping delinquents, and 
 to try and punifh them, for the offences 
 they may have committed within the li- 
 mits of this Indian dominion, in like 
 manner as they could have been tried or 
 punimed by the Company's courts abroad. 
 And becaufe the liberty of appealing from 
 the Company's courts of juftice, to the 
 judgment of any other courts, mufl be 
 productive of the fame inconveniences to 
 the Company, as a trial of the fame caufe 
 in the firft inftance would have been, and 
 muft therefore deter the Company from 
 ever availing herfelf of the judicial powers 
 H 2 granted
 
 granted by this act} it is enacted, that 
 delinquents (hall have no liberty of ap* 
 pealing from the Company's courts abroad, 
 excepting to the Court of Directors at 
 home, or to a general court of Proprie- 
 tors ; whofe judgment in all fuch cafes 
 {hall be final. Ana as the Court of Di-? 
 rectors have, and may be, difcouraged, 
 from profecuting or punifhing the crimes 
 of their rich fervants, by the fear of dan- 
 ger to their own private intereft, from a 
 combination of the friends and abettors, 
 of fuch rich delinquents at a futureannual 
 election, be it enacted, that the 24 Direc- 
 tors, being iuch at the time of paffing this 
 act, mall continue in office, durante vita" 
 *s And whereas it appears, that the 
 liberty of daily felling, transferring, and 
 alienating the (hares in the Company's 
 ftock, ot which this iovereign dominion 
 forms a part, tends to infufe into the pro* 
 piietors a fpirit of rapacity, that may be 
 productive of much damage to the feveral 
 intereds concerned ; and hath many other 
 very pernicious confequences ; whilft it 
 reflects djfgrace on the dignity of all other 
 fovereignsj; be it enacted, that no pro- 
 prietor in thjs Company's (lock, of which 
 
 the
 
 fS7l 
 
 the fovereignty forms a part, (hall have 
 power to fend his (hare in the faid fove- 
 reignty to market, like as it were a hog or 
 bullock, and to fell, transfer, and alienate 
 the fame ; but that the feveral proprietors 
 of this ftock and fovereignty, being fuch 
 at the time of paffing this act, fhall remain 
 and continue proprietors, without the 
 power of alienation, except in the cafes 
 that mall be hereafter fpecified. 
 
 And whereas it hath been reprefented 
 that the Company 's holding this fove- 
 reignty by leafe, and for a mort term, 
 may not only alienate her care and prevent 
 her from ftudying and promoting the 
 lading welfare of the country, but may 
 induce her to pillage, plunder and wafte 
 it ; be it enafted, that the Company fhall 
 hold the fovereignty of this dominion, 
 tpamdiu fe bene ge/erit 5 to the end, that 
 the may confider and treat it, not as the, 
 property of another, but as her own in- 
 heritance. 
 
 And whereas the Company exercifes 
 traffic in this dominion j and, in confe- 
 quence thereof, her minifters do likewife 
 traffic ; and whereas the exercife of traf- 
 fic is evidently repugnant to a due dif. 
 
 charge
 
 charge of the duties of government, as 
 being unavoidably productive of deftruo 
 tive monopolies and oppreffion ; all which 
 it is impoffible to prevent, fo long as the 
 Company herfelf (hall continue a mer- 
 chant ; be it enafted, that this Company's 
 commercial charter (hall be diffolved j and 
 {he, and her minifters, (hall be retrained 
 from trading or trafficking, diredly or in- 
 diredliy, within the limits of this Indian 
 dominion, under certain penalties to be 
 mentioned in a new charter, which mall 
 be granted to this Company, confuting 
 her the United Company of Englifh Eaft 
 India Sovereigns." 
 
 Thefe powers, grants, limitations, and 
 reHridions, would have qualified the Com- 
 pany, fo far as the nature of things could 
 admit, for adminitfring the political go- 
 vernment ; but, in her military capacity, 
 as the fovereign protedor, maintainer and 
 defender of this Indian dominion, (he hath 
 been flill kfs qualified, and would there- 
 fore have required ftill more extraordinary 
 powers. Thcfe however we (ha.ll not fpe^ 
 cify, as apprehending, that what hath been 
 already demanded will (hock. The grant 
 pf fupreme legislative and judicial powers 
 
 to
 
 [59 ] 
 
 to fubjefts, over their fellow fubjecls, 
 muft feem an abfurd communication of 
 tbat which is incommunicable : the pro- 
 hibition of felling and tranferring the 
 fhares of ilock, would be termed a tyran- 
 nical reftraint on private property : the 
 perpetual grant of this fovereignty to the 
 Company, muft be deemed an unjuft alie- 
 nation of the Crown's and Nation's rights ; 
 and the difTolution of the Company's com- - 
 mercial charter, would alter her very be- 
 ing and nature. In fhort, if we regard 
 the propofed aft (imply, it will appear a 
 collection of abfurd inconfiftencies, and 
 ridiculous nonfenfe : but if we confider 
 it conjundly with the caufe or purpofe for 
 which it is required, then every abfurdity 
 vanimes from the adt, and centers in the 
 caufe that renders it neceifary. For we 
 appeal to common fenfe, whether every 
 circumflance, fpecified in this propcfed 
 aft, is not indifpenfably neceiTary, to qua- 
 lify the Company for the fovereign office 
 of adminiftring the political government of 
 this Indian dominion : and, if that neccf- 
 fity is admitted, then doth the acl become 
 a rational and neceffary confequence, of 
 government's having previoufly commit- 
 ted
 
 [6o] 
 
 ted that fovereign charge to the Compa- 
 ny. Nay, we muft take the liberty to 
 add, that government, by committing 
 iuch a charge to the Company, and at 
 fame time totally neglecting to capacitate 
 her for fupporting it, is in a great mea- 
 fure acceflbry to all the ruinous confe- 
 quences that have enfued from her inca- 
 pacity. 
 
 1 am fenfible it will be urged, that we 
 proceed upon falfe premifes ; , for that go- 
 vernment never confidered thefe countries 
 as fubjected to the dominion of Britain . 
 that it never granted the fovereignty of 
 them to the Company j nor fuppoied her 
 to be the fbvereign ; but that it only ac- 
 quiefced in her holding the Dewanny, on 
 condition of her paying a part of the re- 
 venues to the nation ; and, of confequence, 
 that government never confidered the in- 
 habitants of thofe countries as fubjects to 
 the government of Britain. But this is a 
 moft flimfy evafion, like that of fhutting 
 our eyes to the fun, that we may deny it 
 is day : government granted to the Com- 
 pany a right or permiflion to hold the De- 
 wanny 5 which is explained to be, the 
 power of collecting and appropriating the 
 
 reve-
 
 t i 1 
 
 revenues of Bengal ; and, in confidera- 
 tion of this grant, government demanded 
 and received a mare of thefe revenues ; 
 government therefore, in its legiflative ca- 
 pacity, admits a knowledge, that the 
 Company did poflefs the power of colleft- 
 ing, and alfo of applying the revenues of 
 Bengal, ad libitum ; and, amongft other 
 purpofes, to that of defraying the charges 
 of the military, as well as the civil, go- 
 vernment : and government well knows, 
 that the power which defrays the charges 
 of the military and civil government, muft 
 hold the abfolute direction of both : and 
 what conftitutes fovereign power, but the 
 abfolute direction of the military and civil 
 government, together with the difpofal-of 
 the revenues ? But, exclufive of the De- 
 wanny contract, the Company hath ap- 
 plied, in every other characterise of a 
 fovereign, to government, in its legiflative 
 capacity : me hath brought a bill into 
 parliament, for the grant of certain mili- 
 tary powers and indulgences, for the bet- 
 ter enabling her to defend, what (he there 
 modeftly, though vaguely, terms her ter- 
 ritorial acquifitions, (but which, by re- 
 ferring to the Dewanny contract, is ex- 
 I plained
 
 [62] 
 
 plained to include Bengal :) and {he hath 
 applied for certain juridical powers and 
 grants, for the better adminiflration of the 
 jurifdiction, not in her commercial facto- 
 ries, but over the whole country of Ben- 
 gal : therefore government hath been in- 
 formed, in its legiflative capacity, by the 
 Company herfelf, that me adminiftred the 
 military and civil government, and appro- 
 priated the revenues of Bengal; confe- 
 quently that (he was, in every fenfe and 
 refpedt, the adtual fovereign of that coun- 
 try. 
 
 Now government could not be ignorant 
 that the Company is a fubject to the na- 
 tional government of Britain ; and that, 
 as fuch, me could have neither right, pow- 
 er, nor force to fubject this dominion, or 
 afterwards to hold it in fubjeftion, faving 
 what (he derived from the national govern- 
 ment; confequently government, as it 
 underftood that thefe countries were iub- 
 jedted to the Company, mud have known 
 that they were fubjected to the dominion 
 of Britain. And as government did per- 
 mit the Company to retain this dominion ; 
 and furnimed her with a military force, 
 knowing it to be for the purpofe of main- 
 taining
 
 taining dominion, it is plain, that the 
 Company hath held this dominion, no 
 otherwife than by the grant and fupport of 
 government. 
 
 But if the Company be the fovereign 
 of Bengal, the inhabitants muft, per force, 
 be her fubjefts ; and if the Company 
 holds this fovereignty as a fubjeft to the 
 government of Britain, by virtue of the 
 grant or permiffion of that government* 
 and by means of a force furnimed by the 
 fame government, in what relation can 
 this government regard the inhabitants of 
 Bengal ? In that of fubjedts furely ; the/ 
 the degree hath, by the deed of govern- 
 ment, been fomewhat implicated ; like" 
 that of a child begot by the father upon 
 his own daughter. And fubjects they have 
 been to the government of Britain, in 
 every fenfe and meaning ; they have yield- 
 ed obedience to thofe fubjecfts of tjiis go- 
 vernment whom it appointed to rule over 
 them 5 and they have yielded the fruits, 
 as well as the duties of obedience. 
 
 But the government of Britain, which 
 hath thus by force fubje&ed the inhabi- 
 tants of Bengal to its dominion j which 
 hath, for a feries of years, held them in 
 I 2 fub-
 
 164] 
 
 fubjedion j and hath, all along, exa&cd 
 from them the tribute of fubjection ; hath 
 >vithheld from them the protection due to 
 fubjed:s. For it hath fcrupuloufly with-' 
 drawn itfelf from all regard or attention to 
 their government ; and hath left it im- 
 plicitly to the guidance of a few mer-? 
 chants ; whorn it knew to be perfectly un- 
 qualified for admmiftring any fort of go- 
 vernment ; in confequeuce of which . thefe 
 wretched people have, for many years, 
 been ruled, without law, jufttce, or go- 
 vernment. Unhappy fubjefts, wrio are 
 forced to obey a fovereign. that refules 
 them protection, and leaves them expofed 
 to all the h^rors of tyranny and anarchy. 
 It will neverthelefs be itill infifted that 
 government could not, without commit-- 
 ting a number of irregularities and abfur-r 
 dities, endow the Company in the man- 
 ner fpeciried -, as alfo that the Company, 
 \yhen thus endowed, would ft ill have been 
 altogether unequal to the charge of regur 
 larly adminiftring a fpvereign government. 
 But furely government, if it would not or 
 could not capacitate the Company to re- 
 gularly govern thofe countries, ought not 
 to have furnifhed her the means of oppref- 
 
 fing.
 
 [6 S ] 
 
 fing, ravaging, pillaging, and ruining 
 them ; to the difgrace of humanity, and 
 the indelible reproach of the Britifh name. 
 Government would have adled a part far 
 more continent with the rules of honour 
 and humanity, if, inttead of furnifhing 
 to the Company this military power, it 
 had relt rained her from availing herfelf of 
 the advantage, gained by force and chance, 
 over that mild, unwarlike, but induftri- 
 ous peoole ; and obliged her to leave them 
 to their own government. 
 
 But then the fituation of affairs in thofc 
 countries, where the nation and Company 
 held fuch a valuable commercial intereft, 
 rendered it highly improper anjl dangerous 
 to leave the native government to itfelf : 
 moreover the nation and Company could 
 not, in fuch cafe, have acquired the migh- 
 ty wealth and other benefits that have been 
 derived from the conqueft, or afTumed do- 
 minion, of thofe countries. Oh wealth, 
 bafely acquired, and foolimly applied ! 
 Was there then no medium, no middle 
 channel, thro* which government might 
 have fteered the Nation and Company to 
 this fame wealth and benefits, clear of all 
 theie irregularities, incongruities, inhu- 
 manities,
 
 
 [(6 ] 
 
 inanities, and reproaches ? Yes furely $ 
 and one fo obvious and confpicuous, that 
 it is irppoffible to conceive how govern- 
 ment could be fo induftrious as to (hun or 
 mils it. Had the national government 
 taken upon itfelf the charge of fuperin- 
 tending the government of thofe countries, 
 as reafon and the nature of things direct- 
 ed, then would it have furniihed them a 
 fovereign, naturally free from all the de- 
 feds of the Company, and completely 
 endued with all the qualifications cf pow- 
 er, ability, and inclination from intereft, 
 to proted and regularly govern them. 
 
 For it is plain, that the national go- 
 vernment, ^fTeffing fupreme legiflative, 
 and judicial power, muft have been ca- 
 pable of enforcing obedience to the laws 
 which it might have enacfted for the good 
 government of thofe countries; and of 
 puniming difobedience, not only in the 
 natives, but in the minifters whom it 
 would have e nployed to execute that go- 
 vernment; as thefe muft have been its' 
 own fubjefts. And, on the other hand, 
 the natkn being an immutable body, and 
 holding this lovereignty in her own right, 
 and by perpetual tenor ; her government 
 
 muft
 
 muft have been actuated, by the ftrong 
 motive of felf intereft, to exert itfelf in 
 promoting the real and lafting welfare of 
 thofe countries. And as to the commer- 
 cial defpotifm, it could never have exifled 
 under the national government. 
 
 It therefore follows, that the national 
 government, being perfectly free from all 
 the defeds of the Company, would, by 
 the fimple, natural, and rational aft of 
 affuming the adminiftration of government 
 in thofe countries, have prevented or re- 
 formed all the feveral abufes or evils that 
 have fprung from the defe<ftive conftitu- 
 tion of the Company, as fovereign. But 
 befides the mighty reform of abufes, that 
 muft have been immediately caufed by thus 
 changing the perfon of the fovereign ; 
 there is another advantage, which, though 
 it cannot be faid to fpring direftly from 
 that change, yet would it have enfued as 
 a natural confequence of the national go- 
 vernment's taking upon itfelf this fove- 
 reign charge ; and that is, the creation or 
 institution of a new intereft in that coun- 
 try j a fort of middle ftate, betwixt the 
 native fubje&s and their foreign govern- 
 ment.
 
 [68] 
 
 The middle ftate here meant is thd 
 Eaft India Company, (or which is the 
 fame, her fervants in Bengal ;) which, be- 
 ing now reduced to the condition of a fab* 
 ject, tho' ftill retaining all her commercial 
 privileges and interefts in that country^ 
 would have formed an intermediate link in 
 the political chain, ferving to conned: the 
 natives with their government, and go- 
 vernment with the natives. For, in every 
 one circumftance that refpedted the liberty 
 of the fubjefr, this middle ftate mud: have 
 held precifely the fame intereft as the na- 
 lives -, and, in confequence, the fame in- 
 clination to oppofe all oppreffion of govern- 
 ment : and, in every thing that refpecfted 
 the real intereft, the power, or honour of 
 the fovereign, the community of Natale 
 So/urn muft have led it to fupport the mea- 
 fures of government. Therefore, this mid- 
 dle ftate, holding a great weight in that 
 dependent dominion, (not indeed from its 
 numbers, but from the powerful fupport 
 and influence of the Company, which 
 would have been ftill very refpeclable in 
 the fovereign country,) muft have carried 
 a mighty poife into the fcale of liberty, in 
 oppofition to the defpotifm of govern- 
 ment;
 
 ment; whilft, at fame time, it would 
 have created no danger to the power of the 
 fovereign. And a middle ftateof this na- 
 ture muft have been of inexprefiible utili- 
 ty ; facilitating, in many refpects, the efta* 
 blimment of a regular political oeconomy 
 in the government of thefe countries. For, 
 in fuch cafe, the fovereign could, with 
 propriety, efficacy, and fafety, have con- 
 ferred every reafonable privilege on the 
 whole body of fubjects in this foreign do- 
 minion : feeing that the exertion of thefe 
 privileges might have been artfully confin- 
 ed to this middle ftate : and, as on the one 
 hand, this finefle would not have, in any 
 fhape, withheld the benefit of thefe privi- 
 leges from the natives ; but, on the con- 
 trary, would have rendered them more 
 effectually ufeful to the whole body of fub- 
 jecls, than if they had been committed 
 either entirely or in common to the na- 
 tives j becaufe the Company's fervants 
 would, from intereft, have had the fame 
 inclination as the natives,, to exert thefe 
 privileges for the common good ; and they 
 would have had infinitely greater power, 
 from their fuperior activity, intrepidity, 
 and firmnefs, as alfo from iheir fuperior 
 K oppor-
 
 opportunities of obtaining redrefs elfewhcre 
 againft any infringement made by govern- 
 ment : lo, on the other hand, the autho- 
 rity of the fovereign could have incurred 
 no rifk from thefe privileges in the hands 
 of Europeans 3 whereas there is great dan- 
 ger in attempting to confer on the natives 
 a power to controul even the defpotifm of 
 government. With this middle flate the 
 power of juries would have been effectual 
 to the fubject, and harmlefs to the fove- 
 reign : however, we (hall have occafion to 
 be more particular on this head in the 
 fequel. 
 
 But if the national government could, 
 by taking this fovereign charge upon it- 
 felf, have prevented or reformed thefe ma- 
 ny evils and abufes that have arifen from 
 the defers of the Company ; and could 
 have likewife created other fuch advan- 
 tages, facilitating the eftablimment of a 
 regular government in thofe countries; 
 what reafon can be affigned for govern- 
 ment's declining this charge, and devolv- 
 ing it on the Company ? Government 
 could not furely fuppofe that this impor- 
 tant concern would be managed to greater 
 national advantage by the Company, than 
 
 by
 
 by itfelf : feeing that common fenfe might 
 have forefeen, what experience hath fmce 
 proved, that, under the management of 
 the Company, the intereft of Britain in 
 thofe countries would, in the fpace of a 
 very few years, be completely annihilated j 
 that the countries themfelves would either 
 be completely ruined, or otherwife loft to 
 enemies -, and that the wealth, which was 
 extorted from them by rapine and general 
 havoc, being imported into Britain in the 
 hands of a few indifcrcet individuals, would 
 create a torrent of profufion, extravagance, 
 luxury, and prodigality, that would fweep 
 all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy, 
 perdition, and defpair. Whereas, under 
 the regular adminiftration of national go- 
 vernment, thofe countries might have been 
 flill preferved in a flourishing condition ; 
 and, in confequence, ftill capable of yield- 
 ing to Britain a tribute little inferior to the 
 furplus revenue which the Company re- 
 ceived in the firft year of the Dewanny : 
 which tribute, arriving immediately at the 
 public treafury of Britain, and being there 
 applied to the diminution of taxes, and 
 confequent reduction of the price of ne- 
 ceflaries and labour, would have proved a 
 K 2 gentle
 
 [72] 
 
 gentle univerfal fhower, reviving our de- 
 cayed and drooping manufactures and 
 commerce. 
 
 But neither could government be indu- 
 ced to confer this fovereignty on the Com- 
 pany, by any motive of regard to the true 
 intereft of the proprietors : feeing it was 
 palpably evident that this charge, being fo 
 unmeafurablyfuperior to her powers of lup- 
 porting it, muft unavoidably crufli her to 
 ruin j and, along with her, the countries 
 iubjeded to her rule; and, it is to be 
 feared, even that community of which me 
 forms a part. Whereas, if the national 
 government had taken into its own hands* 
 and carefully adminidered the government 
 of thole countries, whilfl it continued the 
 Company in pofleflion of her commerciaj. 
 privileges, fhe would have continued to di- 
 vide, in the firft place, the fix per cent, 
 which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) 
 afforded ; even when burdened with the 
 necefiary expence of a fmall military force 
 maintained for the guard of that commerce 
 in thofe foreign countries, and which muft 
 have been equal to four per cent, on her ca- 
 pital : but this commercial military expence 
 being rendered in a great meafure unnecef- 
 
 fary>
 
 I 73 1 
 
 fary, by the immediate proteftion of na- 
 tional government, the faving thereof 
 would have added two per cent, to her di- 
 vidend : and the equivalent, which govern- 
 ment would havepaid for her fortreffes, mu- 
 nition, &c. being added to her capital 
 flock, would have encreafed her dividend 
 nearly one per cent, more ; whilft her ftock 
 itfelf would, at this day, have been really, 
 and intrinfically worth 220!. inftead of 
 
 its prefent real and intrinfic 
 
 value. 
 
 It would be infulting the undemanding 
 of miniftry, to fuppofe that it had been 
 reftrained from afliiming this fovereign 
 charge, by any delicacy of regard to the 
 ideal right of the Company ; derived from 
 either conquefts, as fubjedts ; or from the 
 fham grant of a man, who had not power 
 to difpofe of a fmgle bega of land, nay, 
 not of a cocoa- nut- tree in that country ; 
 and confequently whofe grant of the fove- 
 reignty of Bengal could contribute nothing 
 more to inveftiture or poffeffion, than hi* 
 grant of the crown of Britain could. 
 Though if we mould (for the fake of ar- 
 gument) fuppofe, that miniftry had real- 
 ly admitted fome fuch right, we muft Hill 
 
 efleem
 
 ''-''':., 174] 
 
 cfteem its acquiefcence in that right a mofl 
 abfurd and wildly miftaken indulgence ; 
 feeing it evidently tended to the ruin of 
 the party whom it meant to favour. 
 
 There hath heen, however, one weigh- 
 ty argument againft government's afTuming 
 this Indian charge, which is, the danger 
 arilirig to national liberty from govern- 
 ment's, (or, in other words, the crown or 
 miniftry's) acquiring fuch an acceflion of 
 influence, as muft arife from the poflefllon 
 of the many emoluments, places, pofts, 
 &c. annexed to this Indian charge : where- 
 as liberty is completely fecured from fuch 
 danger, whilft the Company poffefTes it. 
 And the certainty of this double maxirr^ 
 viz. the danger from government's poflef- 
 ling this charge, and the fecurity whilft it 
 is in the hands of the Company, is as ge- 
 nerally eftablifhed as almoft any one hu- 
 man principle : for, being violently en- 
 forced by thofe whofe perlbnal views lead 
 them to oppofe adminiftration, and at fame 
 time not fimply allowed, but even inculcat- 
 ed by miniilry itfelf, it hath been readily 
 credited by thofj who, their perfonal inter- 
 eft not being fo deeply concerned, were 
 lefs curious to inveftigate the truth, 
 
 It
 
 [75] 
 
 It may be deemed prefumptuous in an 
 individual, to queftion the orthodoxy of 
 a maxim fo powerfully enforced by one 
 party, readily allowed by the other, and 
 almofl univerially credited : tho' the ex- 
 traordinary circumftance, of two violent 
 rival parties concurring fo exadly on a 
 point, where their perfonal intereft feems 
 to be fo materially and fo oppofitely en- 
 gaged, would lead a byftandcr to fuppofe, 
 that either one of the two parties muft be 
 miflaken ; or otherwife, that one or both 
 muft mifreprefent : at any rate, that un- 
 common inftance of candour, in ministry's 
 preaching up a doftrine fo repugnant to 
 that which it pretends to be its own per- 
 fonal intereft, would induce fuch byflander 
 to fufpeft its fmcerity. However, as a 
 right undemanding of this point may con* 
 fiderably import the public, at this critical 
 juncture, I fhall venture difclofing my fen- 
 timents, at the rifk of cenfure for prolixi- 
 ty, as well as impertinence. 
 
 With regard to the firft part of thp max- 
 im, I conceive that the danger to liberty 
 from government's holding this charge in 
 its own hands, is fuppofed to arife from 
 the influence which the minirter would 
 
 acquire,
 
 acquire, over the two fubjeft branches of 
 legiflature, (thofe bulwarks of liberty) by 
 means of the many emoluments, places* 
 ports, &c. annexed to the pofleflion of that 
 charge. But before we admit that the mi- 
 nifters holding this charge would be crea- 
 tive of that dangerous influence, we ought 
 to be fatisfied that he doth not already pof- 
 fefs it, by other means ; for, if he doth 
 already poflefs fuch influence by other; 
 means, it is plain that the Indian charge 
 cannot confer it j nor will it avail to fhut 
 one door, whilft there are others open to 
 admit nim. And that the minirter hath 
 long been in full and plenary pofleflion of 
 fuch influence, we have ever heard aflerted 
 by thefe very men who fo loudly enforce 
 the danger of his acquiring it, by means 
 of this Indian charge : nay, we have much 
 better authority than their contradictory 
 aflertions, (even that of fact and daily ex- 
 perience,) for believing that the minifter 
 hath and doth poflefs ports and places, and 
 that, on any emergency, he hath in his 
 power other means equaUy effectual, to- 
 wards creating and holding fuch influ- 
 ence, in a degree as plenary and com- 
 plete as his own heart can defire. And, 
 
 if
 
 And, if the minifler doth already pofiefs 
 fuch influence by other means, it is plain, 
 that the Indian charge cannot confer it j 
 nor will it avail to mut one door, whilfl 
 there are others open to admit him. And 
 that the minifter hath been long in full 
 and plenary pofleffion of fuch influence, 
 we have ever heard afierted by thofe very 
 men, who fo loudly enforce the danger of 
 his acquiring it, by means of this Indian 
 charge : nay, we have much better au- 
 thority than their contradictory afTertions, 
 (even that of fact and daily experience,) 
 for believing that the minifter hath and 
 doth poflefs pofts and places, and that on 
 any emergency he hath in his power o- 
 ther means equally effectual, towards 
 creating and holding fuch influence, in a 
 degree as plenary and complete as his own 
 heart can deiire./ And, if the minifter 
 doth already poflefs an influence fo fully 
 fufficient, it muft be allowed that, in fo 
 much as refpects parliamentary influence, 
 this Indian charge would be a thing fu. 
 perfluous and ufelefs to him ; like meat to 
 a man that hath already filled his, belly; 
 the abfence of it can withhold nothing 
 that he wants, and the acquifition cannot 
 L confer
 
 [73] 
 
 confer more than he already poffeffes. I 
 may venture to add, that we certainly 
 hold our liberty by fome latent fecurity, 
 more powerful than that of parliament 
 itfelf, which neither the minifter's in- 
 fluence over parliament, nor pofts and 
 places, will ever induce him to attack, or 
 enable him to fubdue ; for that, otherwife, 
 we mould have been divefted of our pri- 
 vileges and liberty long ago. And, upon 
 confidering thefe feveral circumftances, I 
 conclude, that if this Indian charge was 
 in the hands of government to-morrow, it 
 would neither enable, nor induce the mi- 
 nifter, to attempt a jot more againft our 
 liberty, than he hath done, can do, and 
 will do, without it. However, by way 
 of reinforcing my argument, I mall add 
 that, if the plan which I mean to pro- 
 pole mould be carried into execution, it 
 would leave but few of thefe emolu- 
 ments, &c. to the immediate difpofal of 
 theminifter; and, poflibly, this declara- 
 tion may but little recommend it to his 
 favour. 
 
 But ftill, if we were to admit a real 
 .danger to liberty from the minifter's pof- 
 feffing thefe emoluments, &c. it remains 
 
 te
 
 [79] 
 
 to be proved that liberty hath been, is> 
 and will be fecured from fuch danger, by 
 the Company's holding that Indian charge. 
 And, when the nature of this fecurity 
 comes to be examined, I apprehend it will 
 be found more difficult to prove this lat- 
 ter part of the maxim, than the former. 
 For it is notorious that,, ever until the late 
 diftraction in the Company's affairs, the 
 arbitrary application of thefe emoluments, 
 pofts, &c. was vefted in the Directors ; 
 and indeed the entire powers and interefts 
 of the Company ; infomuch that the Di- 
 rectors might, with propriety, be termed 
 the Company. So that the whole fecu- 
 rity of national liberty, and, of courfe, 
 the fole obftruction to the minifter's dan- 
 gerous views, depended on the integrity 
 and independent fpirit of 24 Directors $ 
 of whom, again, one or two. generally 
 leads all the reft. Confequently, to come 
 at the fingering of thefe dangerous emo- 
 luments, &c. the minifler had only to 
 fubvert the integrity, or fubdue the inde- 
 pendance, of thefe Directors. And, to 
 effect this, a minifter poiTeffed more than 
 one infallible recipe. By artfully joining 
 the mighty influence which he held in the 
 
 L 2 Company's.
 
 1 80] 
 
 
 
 Company's ftock thro' his numerous de- 
 pendants, to one or other of two parties 
 contending violently for the direction, he 
 could reduce both to a perfect dependance 
 on himfelf : by the fame means he could 
 hold them in iubiection : but ftill more, 
 by the awe of wrefting from them the 
 fweet management of this Indian fove- 
 reignty, which they were fenlible he could 
 do by a word. And thus he could work 
 upon their fears. But inclination would 
 naturally and powerfully lead the Direc- 
 tors to throw themfelves into the arms of 
 a rninifler; not fo much ior his immedi- 
 ate afliftanee j tho' even that might be of 
 great ufe, for rendering matters eafy with 
 the proprietors, as well as parliament and 
 the nation 5 but becaufe, on thefe terms, 
 they fecured, in him, an omnipotent fup- 
 porter and all powerful advocate, againft 
 the day of diftrefs, which they well knew 
 rnuft come, and that foon : whereas, o- 
 therwile, they muft lay their account 
 with finding him a fevere judge, and bit- 
 ter proiecutor. 
 
 By thefe feveral operations on the hopes 
 and fears of the Directors, it was extreme- 
 ly eafy fpr a minifter to render them as 
 
 pliant
 
 [ i 1 V 
 
 pliant as a glove ; as obedient as a fpaniel, 
 to fetch and carry at bidding, And the 
 Directors being once reduced to this ftate 
 of dependance, it is evident, that the mi- 
 nifter muft poffefs a full and arbitrary 
 power over all the emoluments, pofts, 
 places, &c. appertaining to this Indian 
 charge. But the difpofal of the prefent 
 emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter, 
 compared with other advantage?, which 
 this Indian bufinefs, whiift in the hands 
 of the Company, presented to an artful 
 and enterprifing minifter. For, under 
 the plaufible and indeed undeniable pre- 
 text of qualifying the Company for ad- 
 miniftring this fovereign charge, he might 
 have drawn from the legiflature certain 
 military as well as political powers; which, 
 being gradually augmented as occafion 
 offered, might have at laft eftablifhed a 
 fort of power, in this government, diftinct 
 from and independent of the legiflature : 
 the exertion of which power, being con- 
 fided to the Directors, would in fact have 
 retted with the minifter. Here indeed was 
 a real danger to liberty j provided it had 
 been poffible to hold up this Indian bufi- 
 jiefs, in the ha_nds of the Company, for 
 
 any
 
 t Ba] 
 
 any length of time -, for, notwithftanding 
 I confider national liberty as inexpugnable 
 to the open aflaults of a minifter, yet, 
 from fuch a fecret convenient and com- 
 manding poft as this mentioned, he might 
 have made frequent fly and fuccefsful in* 
 curfions on the confines of liberty ; which 
 would have greatly ftraitened her quarters, 
 and wafted her ftrength. 
 
 On the other hand, if that Indian charge 
 had been vetted in the national govern- 
 ment, liberty muft have been perfectly 
 fecured from this laft mentioned danger ; 
 for, in fuch cafe, there could have been 
 no pretext for demanding thefe extraordi- 
 nary diftinft powers j and, confequently, 
 no opportunity of eftablifhing that truly 
 dangerous impcrium in imperio. And even 
 in the application of the ordinary pow- 
 ers, emoluments, 6cc. a minifter muft 
 have been fubje<fted to many troublefome 
 checks, and reftraints. His Majefty, who 
 cao have no views diftinct from the gene- 
 ral intereft of his people, muft have held 
 a principal voice in every meafure ; as 
 Hkewiie muft fome others his counfellors. 
 Parliament too muft have proved an in- 
 convenient reltraint on a minifter 5 parti- 
 cularly
 
 cularly in the article of eflimates and ac- 
 counts of revenue, which muft have been 
 fubmitted to its infpection ; and notwith- 
 flanding the certainty of carrying points 
 by a majority of voices, yet, as there will 
 ever be fome refractory members, thefe 
 might have carried tales to the public ; 
 which, provided this charge had been in 
 the hands of national government, would 
 have judged itfelf interefted in the affair ; 
 and would therefore have taken the li- 
 berty to criticifs his meafures, or cenfure 
 his mifconduct. Whereas, this bufinefs 
 being fecured, as private property, in the 
 hands of the Company, king, parlia- 
 ment, and nation were all excluded from 
 participation : the proprietors alone had a 
 right to examine meafures or accounts ; 
 and, the majority of them upon all quef- 
 tions being mercenary retainers to mini- 
 flry and the direction, they muft have ever 
 been a mere /crvile pecus. So that the 
 bufinefs might have been fnugly confined 
 to three or four minifterial aflbciates, 
 with their faithful dependants in Leaden- 
 hall Street ; whilft the miniiler needed 
 never appear in the affair $ free from care, 
 charge, or trouble ; and irrefponfible for 
 
 either
 
 [84] 
 
 cither meafures, or confequences ; he 
 might enjoy all the fweets, without the 
 leaft alloy of bitter. 
 
 Sure I am if I had b^en minifter, and 
 minded to make a job of this Indian bu- 
 finefs, J would certainly have exerted my- 
 felf moft feduloufly to preferve it in the 
 hands of the Company. And, to divert 
 the nation from ever turning her eye to- 
 wards it, I would have ftrenuoufly inculca- 
 tedthe rights of the Company, national faith, 
 the impossibility of conducing this bull- 
 nefs otherwife than through the Company; 
 and, above all things, I would, by my 
 cmifTaries, have alarmed the public, with 
 fears of danger to their liberty, mould 
 this bufmefs ever come into the hands of 
 government ; whilfl, by the fame canal, 
 I would have trumpeted forth my own 
 candour, difmtereftednefs as a minifter, 
 indifference to power, and delicate regard 
 to national liberty and private property, in 
 thus difclaiming an objeft fo replete with 
 minifterial advantages, which was within 
 my power. And thus would I have con- 
 tinued the game, until it was up : and 
 then I would have directed the enquiries, 
 which decency and regard to appearances 
 
 extorted
 
 extorted from me, in fdch a manner as to 
 iupprefs, infleadof invefligating: though, 
 at fame time, I would have boldly ex- 
 prefTed my indignation at the Company's 
 mifcondifdj and loudly denounced ven- 
 geance againft the individuals that had 
 ftared in the plunder; not a foul that 
 was guilty mould efcape. And, to wind 
 up the whole affair dextroufly, I would 
 have tafked my own powers, and thofe of 
 my myrmidons, to reprefent all thefe In- 
 dian acquifitions as a tranfitory, cafual, 
 and accidental piece of bufinefs; which 
 was altogether out of our tract ; and 
 which, if the nation had ever engaged 
 in maintaining them, would have ruined 
 and exhaufted her : and fo the nation was 
 to thank me, for withholding her from, 
 ruin, 
 
 In this manner, I fay, would I, who 
 am a reptile, have adted, had I been mi- 
 nifter, and minded to make a job of this 
 bufinefs : but I am far from intimating 
 or infmuating that our minifters, who 
 are men of high birth and ftridt honour, 
 could be capable of admitting even a 
 thought of taking fuch bafe advantages. 
 M All
 
 [86] 
 
 All that I have faid Is only meant to {how, 
 that a minifter, if he had the inclination, 
 poffefTed an infinitely fairer opportunity, 
 of converting this bufmefs to fmifter pur- 
 pofes, whilft it was in the hands of the 
 Company ; than he poffibly could have 
 had, from the fame bufmefs, under the 
 condud of national government. And, 
 from thence, I would infer that, had this 
 bufmefs been in the hands of government, 
 our liberty, nay and our property too, 
 would have been fecured from many dan- 
 gers, to which they have been expofed, 
 whilft this bufinefs hath been in the hands 
 of the Company, 
 
 I cannot then conceive what other ob- 
 jections could be flarted againft govern- 
 ment's taking upon itfelf the charge of 
 this Indian dominion : unlefs it be the old 
 trite arguments of timid fluggifli indo- 
 lence, want of enterprize, 6cc. That, the 
 diftance of lituation rendering it impofli- 
 ble for Britain to properly maintain and 
 govern this dominion, it would become 
 an object of no true value or importance, 
 but rather a heavy load exhauiting her 
 ftrength. But it is now more than time 
 for the nation to recal her faith from men 
 
 whom
 
 [8 7 ] 
 
 whom fhe hath fufficient ground to fufpect 
 of deceit ; and, roufing her fenfes, to take 
 the liberty of trying thefe matters by the 
 ftandard of her own reafon ; which we 
 fhall endeavour to aid by the following 
 hints. 
 
 To properly demonftrate the true value 
 and importance of this Indian dominion to 
 Britain, would demand a volume -, we 
 have, in the firft part, prefented a flight 
 fketch of it -, here therefore we fhall offer 
 only one or two remarks refpecting its im- 
 portance to our finances ; and though we 
 do not ofter thefe remarks as the refult of 
 exact calculation, yet will they ferve to 
 throw a light on this fubject. Ever fince 
 the laft war Britain hath paid annually 
 to foreign creditors, in intereft, about 
 1,500,000!. and this is paid, not in 
 paper, but all in hard money ; or, 
 otherwife, in what is equivalent, the flop- 
 page of fo much hard money as is reck- 
 oned to come into Britain by the balance 
 of her trade. On the other hand, the 
 net fpecie balance of trade with all the 
 world, (exclufive of that part which 
 flrictly and properly may be termed th 
 produce of Indian dominion,) after de- 
 M 2 ducting
 
 183] 
 
 du&ing the imperceptible and enormous 
 drain of fpecie made by fmuggliug, doth 
 not at this day perhapsamount to Soo,oopl. 
 The difference then betwixt her numerical 
 fpecie difburfement and receipt in balance 
 of trade, muft needs have been made good 
 from fome other fund than the circulating 
 flock of fpecie, otherwife circulation mufl 
 in that number of years have totally ceafed. 
 And this fund we need not mention to 
 have been the dominion in India, Ever 
 fince 1757, the private fortunes acquired 
 there in confequence of dominion or con- 
 queft, having been remitted either in bills 
 on foreign Indian companies, or in dia* 
 monds, have created an annual influx of 
 fpecie, (or what is equivalent,) to the a- 
 mount of at leafl 700,000 1. * ^ he Com- 
 pany 
 
 * As it is impoflible to exa&ly afcertain the annual 
 amount of this private remittance made through va- 
 rious channels, it will no doubt be alledged, that we 
 have exaggerated this article ; and yet we have certain 
 ground to affirm, that it is greatly underrated. 
 Sure I am, if we can fuppofe that the amount of 
 fuch remittance made from 1757 to 17/0 hath been in 
 any degree equal to that of the two following years, 
 (v/hich is afcertained,) and we have no reafon to fup- 
 pofe that there hath been any confiderable difference, 
 
 the
 
 [893 
 
 pany too received fmce that period, and 
 previous to the Dewanny, though by vir- 
 tue of dominion or conqueft, fundry large 
 fums of money; which {he inverted in 
 merchandize j and, thereby, faved to -Bri- 
 tain fo much fpecie as /he would, other- 
 wife, have tranfmitted for the purchafe 
 of fuch merchandize 3 and it doth not re- 
 quire demonftration to prove, that all fuch 
 faving is, in every refpecl, the fame as the 
 
 influx 
 
 * v t v ' 
 the fum afligned by us will be greyly under mark. For 
 
 no fooner did the Englifh Company, in 1770, open 
 her treafury, to receive money for remittance to Bri- 
 tain, than there was poured in at her three capital fet- 
 tlements above 1,400,000!. for which bills were grant- 
 ed, prefented, and accepted by the Company, ant} 
 nearly two thirds of this fum was borrowed in Bengal, 
 And in 1771 fhe hath borrowed in Bengal alone, under 
 thepromife of remittance, a fum perhaps exceeding the 
 whole loan of the former year ; though the bills have 
 been poftponed by her agents in Bengal, on account 
 of the Company's inability to anfwer them. Such 
 was the remittance of Britifh private fortunes for thefe 
 two years, through the channel of the Englifh Com_ 
 pany alone : and we have good reafon to fuppofc, that 
 there may have been fome made through other channels. 
 And thefe enormous fums, borrowed by the Company, 
 as fovereign, for the expence of Bengal, in thefe two 
 years, will ferve to mow the mighty alteration of af- 
 faifis in that country fince 1765.
 
 influx of an equal fum. And ever from 
 1765, till fome time in 1770, the Com- 
 pany paid for all her cargoes, not only in 
 India but in China, with the furplus re- 
 venue of Bengal : and of courfe this fur- 
 plus revenue hath, for that fpace, faved, 
 (which is the fame as gained) annually to 
 Britain, the whole fums which the Com- 
 pany ufed to tranfmit for the purchafe of 
 her cargoes in India and China ; and 
 which, on an average, may be reckoned 
 500,000 1. per annum : but thefe cargoes 
 were, from 1765, encreafed to an enor- 
 mous degree; and if we add only 200,000!. 
 for fuch encreafe, we (hall find that the 
 furplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the 
 return of trade, created an annual influx 
 to Britain of at leaft 700,000 1. in fpecie : 
 and this, added to the private fortunes, 
 makes 1,400,000 1. received yearly by 
 Britain, from Indian dominion. 
 
 But, for thefe two years paft, the ruin- 
 ous fituation of thofe countries, and the 
 confequent deficiency of revenue, hath 
 obliged the Company to either tranfmit 
 money from Europe, or otherwife to bor- 
 row money abroad, on bill or bond, for 
 the purchafe of all her cargoes in India as 
 
 well
 
 well as China : and the Company, by thus 
 borrowing^ for the purchafe of cargoes, 
 and even the expence of her government, 
 hath abforbed the private fortunes, which, 
 till then, had been tranfmitted to Britain, 
 by bills on foreign companies. We muft 
 therefore perceive, without defcending to 
 tedious inveftigation, that the ruined ftate 
 of thofe countries, having cut off furplus 
 revenue, hath, for thefe two years paft, 
 diminiflied the annual influx to Britain 
 from Indian dominion, at leaft one half, 
 or 700,000 1. And this diminution of 
 influx, whilft our drain continues the 
 fame, we already begin to feel in our cir- 
 culation : though this felt effect is not yet 
 traced up to its caufe. Of what mighty 
 importance then muft this Indian domi- 
 nion have been, to the circulation of Bri- 
 tain : when this circulation feels feverely, 
 from only two years partial deprivation of 
 the benefit formerly derived from that 
 dominion ? And what effecT: muft a total 
 deprivation of that benefit operate, in a 
 few years, on this circulation j whilft, 
 we are continuing to pay to our foreign 
 creditors about 1,500,000!.^" annum in 
 numerical fpecie -, exclufive of other lefs 
 
 noted
 
 [ 9O 
 
 noted drains, which, it is moft probable 
 mount it up much higher ? And yet it is 
 evident, that Britain muft, unavoidably, 
 be deprived of this whole benefit, Ib foon 
 as (he (hall lofe her dominion in India ; 
 whether that lofs mall be caufed by ene- 
 mies, or by the ruin of the countries fub- 
 jecled. Nay, by lofing the dominion of 
 Bengal fingly, me mufl 'not only incur 
 a deprivation of almoft the whole dominion 
 benefit > but me muft likewife iofe by far 
 the mod valuable part of that commerce, 
 which was carried on by the Company with 
 thofe countries, previous to dominion. 
 For the commerce^ with Bengal, alone, is 
 of much greater value, than that with all 
 the reft of India: and, -as to the trade 
 with China, it is the moft pernicious and 
 iofing trade to the nation ; however con- 
 venient it may be to government. 
 
 And if we mall then advert to the 
 benefit and fupport which the finances of 
 Britain have received from this Indian do- 
 minion, for fo many years paft, though 
 under the moft prepofterous management ; 
 but, ftill more, if we (hall advert to the 
 nature and degree of benefit that, under 
 proper management, might have been de- 
 rived
 
 [931 
 
 derived in perpetuum from this Indian do- 
 minion, in not only the article of finance, 
 but in other weighty refpe&s : and, if we 
 {hall, yet farther, look forward to the 
 difmal confequences that muft unavoida- 
 bly enfue to Britain* in thefe feveral ref- 
 pe&s, from a deprivation of this Indian 
 dominion and its benefits ; can we tamely 
 furrender our reafon to the ipfe dixit of men 
 who are hardy enough to tell us, that In- 
 dian dominion is of no value nor utility 
 to Britain; 
 
 Nor do thefe men lefs abufe our under- 
 ftanding, by holding forth the difficulty of 
 maintaining and defending this dominion : 
 feeing that, of all nations in the world, 
 Britain is, by a variety of circum Ranees, 
 the beft qualified to maintain and defend 
 maritime or commercial dominion in In- 
 dia. For, as (he exceeds all the world in 
 naval force, me is^ through that circum- 
 ftance alone, the mofl capable of defend- 
 ing fuch dominion, againft the affault of 
 European enemies : and had Britain availed 
 herfeif of evident advantages, had (he 
 eftablimed her naval and land defence upon 
 the plan that (hall be explained, Britilh 
 dominion in India might, at this day, have 
 been fecured from even the attempt of 
 N European
 
 t 94') 
 
 European rivals : they might have admired 
 and envied, but they would not have dared 
 to attack. And thefe European rivals are 
 the only dangerous enemies to Britim do- 
 minion in India : for as to the neighbour- 
 ing native powers, they would, from fear 
 as well as inclination, have been amicable 
 to Britain ; provided her government ia 
 thofe countries had acted with common 
 honefty, and common decorum, or pru- 
 dence; and not as common robbers. And, 
 as to the unhappy native fubjects them- 
 felves, their loyalty hath been fufficiently 
 proved, by fo many years patient fub- 
 miffion to the moft intolerable of all pof- 
 fible governments. Wherein then confifts 
 the difficulty of maintaining and defend- 
 ing Eritifh dominion in India ? 
 
 And with regard to the fo much talked 
 of expence or drain of native flrength, 
 we may furely, with good reafon, fay 
 that this objection militated much ftronger 
 againft maintaining that dominion under 
 the Company, than under national govern- 
 ment: tho' the natureandextentofeven that 
 drain under the Company, is moft grofsly 
 mifreprefented. For I am well informed 
 that the Company's annual recruit, fince 
 the time me completed her dominion force, 
 
 hath
 
 f 95 1 
 
 hath never exceeded 1200 men ; and I am 
 afraid it hath in general fallen fhort of 
 1000 ; notwithstanding {he laboured under 
 many difadvantages, from which national 
 government would be exempted : fuch as 
 being obliged to put up with very indif- 
 ferent and unhealthy recruits, for want of 
 better; too little attention paid to the 
 manner of tranfporting them ; and ftill 
 lefs to their health and manner of living 
 in the country : whilft her governors ex- 
 pended numbers of them on unnecefTary 
 predatory wars. And even this reciuit 
 we are not to reckon a drain of real ftrength 
 from Britain : feeing that, the Company's 
 recruits have been moftly fellows of the 
 tnoft defperate circumftances, who had no 
 means of fubiifting at home ; and who 
 therefore would, if the Company had not 
 taken them off, have been taken off by 
 the gallows, or otherwife would have emi- 
 grated to America or fome other country, 
 in fearch of bread ; and would thus have 
 been equally loft to Britain. So that, 
 upon rationally confidering this matter, 
 we (hall find that, for the maintenance of 
 dominion in India, the Company hath not 
 drained this country, of" 100 men an- 
 N 2 nually,
 
 f 96] 
 
 nually, that could, in any fenfe, be term-i 
 ed ufeful, or a real ftyrength to it. But, 
 fetting fciide the precedent of the Com- 
 pany, it is certain that, to maintain and 
 defend the mighty dominion of Bengal, 
 demands an European force very little fu- 
 perior in number to the garrifon of that 
 barren fortrefs Gibraltar : and to maintain 
 and defend the whole territorial poffemons, 
 ^ogether with the commerce of Britain in 
 Ipdia, requires a force very little exceed-? 
 ing the aforefaid garrifon with that of its 
 filler fortrefs in Minorca. And the annual 
 recruit, neceilary to keep up this force, 
 after allowing largely for climate, and 
 every other circumftance, would, on a 
 complete plan of defence, not exceed 900 
 or at moft 1000 m^n : and, of this recruit, 
 at leaft 200, would be wanted annually 
 to maintain commerce, if there was no, 
 dominion. Nay, if this is judged top 
 great a drain for Britain, one fourth part 
 of that number may be reduced, by re- 
 cruiting that proportion of foreign pro- 
 teftants : fuch being eafily procured j and^ 
 in fuch a low proportion, they can in no 
 refpect be dangerous. And can Britain 
 f ?|ard 6 or 700 men annually as too great 
 
 a drain
 
 [971 
 
 drain, for the maintenance of that im 
 portant dominion and commerce, which 
 is as one of the capital limbs of her bodyj 
 and at fame time beftow a nearly equal 
 {hare of her ftrength on maintaining thefe 
 two barren, and I had almoft faid ufelefs, 
 fortrefles ; the pecuniary charge of which 
 fhe pays out of her proper finance, never 
 to return ; whilft Indian dominion defrays 
 J,ts own charge. 
 
 The only remaining objection then to 
 Indian dominion is, the difficulty of pro- 
 perly governing it. But this difficulty 
 doth not arife, like that in America, from 
 the indomitably obftinate fpirit of the fub- 
 jects ; on the contrary, it arifes from their 
 over paffive or fubmiffive difpofition, and 
 incapacity of refitting the power of go- 
 vernment : and this, inftead of being an 
 pbjection, is the mofl valuable qualifica- 
 tion of a dependent dominion. To re- 
 move this difficulty demands no exterior 
 aids, no exertion of powers or force , it 
 depends entirely on the will of the fove- 
 reign; and a very little art, a very little 
 care, with a little honefty, would ferve 
 to completely remedy it j as we doubt not 
 (p evince. 
 
 la
 
 In fine, Bengal, being one of the rich- 
 eft commercial countries is, to Britain as 
 a commercial nation, the nobleft and rhoft 
 truly valuable acquifition that providence 
 could poffibly beftow on her : by the mild 
 r.ifrcfition of its inhabitants it is the moft 
 jfacily governed and maintained j and, by 
 the nature of its fituation, it is the moft 
 defenuble foreign dominion on this globe; 
 particularly to Britain which excels in 
 naval force. And one may almoft ven- 
 ture to fay that providence, by throwing 
 Bengal into the arms of Britain, feems to 
 have intended that this, the richeft com- 
 mercial ftate in Afia, which, through the 
 effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable 
 of maintaining its own independance, 
 mould be fubjected to Britain, as being 
 the fitteft, through fimilarity of com- 
 mercial difpofition, intereft, and modes, 
 to properly govern it j and, through her 
 luperiari y in naval force, the beft quali- 
 fied to defend and protect it from all 
 enemies. 
 
 In what light then mail pofterity 
 
 regard the policy of Britain, during 
 
 the third quarter of the eighteenth cen- 
 
 1 tury : when it mall find her, in the Eaft, 
 
 flighting
 
 [99] 
 
 flighting and giving up that glorious field, 
 which annually yielded a golden crop, to 
 be rutted up and trodden down by hogs 
 and viler beads : whilft, in the Weft, {he 
 was tugging with all her might, exerting 
 her utmoft ftudy, care and attention, much 
 ftrength, and more money, on cultivating 
 the fea fands 5 draining to fubdue nature; 
 and forcing the horfe to drink in fpite of 
 inclination ? Will it not be faid, that me 
 would have acled a far wifer part,if me had 
 Jeft nature and time to flowly operate in 
 America, the effects which they will un- 
 avoidably produce, in fpite of all her ef- 
 forts ; and had converted her care and at- 
 tention, to properly govern, and maintain, 
 that noble, rich, and grateful dependent 
 dominion in India ; which, upon fuch 
 terms, would have poured, into her pub- 
 lick treafury, refources, that would have 
 ferved to alleviate her burden of taxes ; 
 and, confequently, to reduce the price of 
 necefTaries, of labour, and of manufac- 
 tures ; which, again, would have preferv- 
 ed her commerce, not only with Ame- 
 rica, but with other countries ; and would 
 at fame time have preferved to her thou- 
 f?. n/1 .r- of induftrious and ufeful fubjecls, 
 
 who*,
 
 Who, through want of employment, were 
 forced to emigrate from her to America. 
 And, by the fame care and attention to 
 the government and revenue of that In- 
 dian dominion, flic would have prevented 
 the inundation of eaftern profufion and 
 extravagance $ which chiefly contributed 
 to convert this formerly grariiferous ifland, 
 into a pafture for horfes of parade and 
 ftately pride; infomuch that, inftead of 
 fupplying her neighbours as formerly, with 
 fome hundred thoufand pounds worth of 
 rain annually, me could not feed the great- 
 ly reduced number of her own inhabitants; 
 nor fiirnim the means of living totheiriduf- 
 trious agricultor, and peafant ; who, iri 
 fearch of livelihood, fled from her to Ame- 
 rica; thereby debilitating her own beft 
 fource of ftrength, and prematurely acce- 
 lerating the manhood of thofe otherwife 
 infant colonies. 
 
 Neverthelefs there flill remains a pofii* 
 bility of retrieving this error in policy ; 
 or at leaft of preventing a farther encreafe 
 of the evils that have afifeii from it ; pro- 
 vided that, in the firft place, this Indian 
 dominion {hall Hill be in our pofleflion : 
 and, in the fecond place, that national 
 
 govern*
 
 government fhall, by taking upon itfelf 
 the charge of adminiftring the govern- 
 ment thereof, remedy that firfl and radi- 
 cal caufe of evil arid abufe which hath 
 exifted under the Company's government : 
 and mall, at fame time, with honeft and 
 lincere intention, fpirit and activity, ap- 
 ply a proper remedy to that which hath 
 been affigned as the fecond caufe of evil, 
 and the nature of which remedy mall be 
 explained in the fequel. For, upon fuch 
 terms, there is no doubt that a regular 
 fyftem of government may be eftablifhed 
 in that dependent dominion ; under which 
 it may be reflored to its priftine profperi- 
 ty, nay, it may be elevated to a fiate ftill 
 more flouriming than it ever knew; and, 
 in confequence, to a capacity of yielding 
 a ftill fuperior degree of benefit to Britain ; 
 and in a manner widely different, and truc- 
 ly falutary to her. 
 
 But I muft again repeat, that it is vain 
 to expect this reform of evils from the 
 management of the Company ; loaded as 
 fhe is with fo many natural defedls, which 
 it is out of the power of art to remedy, 
 otherwife than by conferring upon her the 
 fovereign government of Britain, along 
 O with
 
 with that of this dependent dominion. 
 For the execution of thefe two fovereign 
 governments is, by the nature of things, 
 infeparable : it being morally impoflible, 
 that any power can execute the fovereign 
 government of thof~ Indian countries, as 
 a dominion dependent upon Britain, un- 
 lefs that power fhall pofTefs the fovereign 
 execution of government in Britain. 
 
 However, it would be flill more vain to 
 look for any good from that extravagant 
 fancy of joining the Company, with go- 
 vernment, in this fovereign charge. What 
 quota of powers, proper to her and want- 
 ing to government, can the Company con- 
 tribute,- to render her a necefiary or ufeful 
 aflcciate with government, in this fove- 
 reign charge ? I doubt not that the pro- 
 pofer's intentions were good and honeft: 
 but hisfcheme would be fo far from promot- 
 ing his or any one good purpofe,that it would 
 produce the very oppofite effects. For,inftead 
 of checking and contrafling,it would ferve, 
 in the firft place, to furhilh, in the Di- 
 rectors and their governors, a convenient 
 cloke of excufe to miniftry and its go- 
 vernors, with the nation ; whilft miniftry 
 and its governors would ferve the Direc- 
 tor*
 
 *Si [ ' 3 ] 
 
 ' i -'j 
 
 tors and their governors a like good turn 
 with the proprietors : they would mutual- 
 ly voucfTfor and fcreen each other j nei- 
 ther would be refponfible, and neither 
 would at ; and thus, between ftools, &c. 
 in the fecond place, commercial def- 
 potifm which, by feparating the Company 
 from the powers of government and the 
 confequent jealoufy of privilege, muft have 
 been completely fupprefled, would, under 
 this double-headed monfter, flourim with 
 redoubled vigour : the national governors 
 would, by their connection with the Com- 
 pany's, become merchants as well as ty- 
 rants ; and the Company's governors 
 would, by their power in the government, 
 continue tyrants as well as merchants : and 
 thus the candle would burn at both ends- 
 In* the third place, the Company which, 
 by being excluded from the powers of go- 
 vernment, would have contributed fo ef- 
 fentially in the nature of a middle flate to 
 the eftablimment of a regular political fyf- 
 tem in thofe countries, muft, by being 
 joined in the execution of government, en- 
 tirely lofe that virtue : inftead of fupport- 
 ing liberty, me would join in promoting 
 tyranny ; and would ftiil continue a ruin- 
 
 O 2 OUS
 
 1 104 1 
 
 ous pefl to thofe countries. Indeed that; 
 flrange partnership of Nation and Co. in 
 this fovereignty bufinefs, is a cure infinite- 
 ly worfe than the difeafe. 
 
 In fhort, there is no alternative : if 
 Britain means to preferve the pofTeffion of 
 that mighty benefit derived from dominion 
 and commerce in India ; if fhe means tq 
 prevent the abfolute ruiri of the Compa- 
 ny, and her creditors j if fhe hath any re- 
 gard to the loud cry of opprefTion fen$ 
 forth to her for a feries of years, by her 
 numerous wretched fubjefts in thofe coun- 
 tries ; and means to fave them from final 
 deftrudion, (he muilfurnim their govern- 
 ment with a fovereign, or head, properly 
 qualified to adminifter it : for this is the 
 foundation, as well as the crowning of all 
 good government j it is the center upon 
 which the machine revolves, from which 
 every line iffues, and in which every line 
 terminates 3 it is ihejine qua non t for with- 
 out it no regular government can exift. 
 And what proper fovereign can Britain 
 furnim to that dependent dominion, un- 
 Jefs it be her own fovereign gpvernment ? 
 
 We have fhown that the nation and her 
 fupreme government are perfectly equal to 
 
 the
 
 r 105 j 
 
 the charge : to them there is not th? 
 fmalleft difficulty in fupporting it, Nei- 
 t}ier is there the fmalleft difficulty to her 
 
 (executive government or miniftry, provide 
 ed it (hall poflefs an ordinary fhare of fpi- 
 rit, activity, or enterprize 5 and {hall pro- 
 ceed with (incere and upright intention. 
 For, a regular form of government being 
 once eftablimed abroad, and a properly 
 digefted office or department formed at 
 home, the bufinefs would go on with great 
 fmoothnefs and facility to miniftry. 
 
 Neverthelefs, as I have affumed the li- 
 berty of prefcribing in this important an4 
 almoft defperate cafe,I am forry, that a fin- 
 cere regard to the welfare of the patient 
 ihould compel me to add, (by way of con- 
 cluding on this head,) that, unlefs mini- 
 ftry mall act upon a principle, and with a 
 fpirit, extremely different from that which 
 it hath hitherto difcovered in this bufinefs, 
 it would be much more advifeable to conti- 
 nue the charge in the hands of the Com- 
 pany : for it can be but ruined under her. 
 However, in ftrong hopes of a melioration 
 in thefe refpedts, which depends altogether 
 on the will of government, I {hall proceed 
 
 t
 
 KiM tlo6] 
 
 to difclofe that plan, which, in the hands 
 of a properly qualified fovereign, would, I 
 doubt not, ferve to eftablim a regular fyftem 
 of government in India. 
 
 A P L A N, 
 
 FOR 
 ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM 
 
 F ,,vx 
 
 POLITICAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 1 N 
 
 INDIA. 
 
 WE have before obferved, that the 
 fecond caufe why thefe reftraining 
 and impelling powers, which alone can 
 prevent tyranny and anarchy, have been al- 
 together wanting in the Company's fyftem 
 of government, appears to be the diftance 
 of fituation, betwixt the fovereign refi- 
 dence and the country governed. And we 
 fhall here add that, if national govern- 
 ment (hould adopt the fame fyftem, this 
 
 diftancc
 
 diftance would operate, under it, effects 
 the fame in nature as thefe under the Com- 
 pany j and nothing but the difference in 
 other circumftanceS, betwixt the national 
 government and Company, could prevent 
 thefe effects from being likewife equal in 
 degree. For it is evident that, if the execu- 
 tive government of the nation mould, ai 
 the Directors have done, preferve to itfelf 
 the charge and power of immediately fu- 
 perintendihg and controuling the execution, 
 of government in that Indian dominion, 
 the diftance of fituation would create to 
 that government an equal impoffibility of 
 advifing and directing meafures, of en- 
 forcing the execution or obfervance of or- 
 ders, and of preventing or retraining abufe : 
 confequently, in the immediate execution 
 of all meafures, the national governors 
 would poffefs the fame unlimited power, as 
 the Company's governors have done. And 
 the only advantage to that Indian govern- 
 ment, from national governments affuming 
 from the Company the charge of admini- 
 ftring it, would arife from the following 
 eircumftances. Firft, the fuperior retrofpec- 
 tive or ex poft fafto authority of national 
 government, enabling it to judge and pu- 
 
 nul*
 
 t i8 } 
 
 him the maladminiftration, or difobedl-* 
 ence of its minifters. Second, Thefupe-f 
 rior inclination or difpofition of national 
 government (anting from its perpetual in- 
 tereft in the property) to exert itfelf in 
 promoting proper meafures. Third, The 
 fuppreffion of commercial defpotifm. And 
 fourth, The exigence of the Company as 
 a middle ftate betwixt the natives and their 
 foreign government. All which innova- 
 tions, ariiing from national government's 
 taking upon itfelf the adminiftration of 
 this Indian government, though they are 
 indifpenfably necefTary and highly condu- 
 cive to the eflablimment of a regular poli- 
 tical fyftem, yet do we perceive that they, 
 fingly and unfupported, cannot fuffice to 
 Create that due proportion of reftraint on 
 the power, or of impulfe on the will of the 
 deputed executive government, which is 
 abfolutely neceflary to the perfecl: fuppref- 
 fion of tyranny, anarchy, and abufe. Nor 
 is it poflible to complete this reftraint and 
 impulfe, to that fufficing degree, unlefs by 
 a proper exertion of the fovereign's own 
 fupreme influence. 
 
 But we find that, upon the Company's 
 fyftem, the diftance of fituation renders 
 
 thr
 
 the influence of the fovereign altogether 
 impotent to this effect : and if we mould 
 take it for granted that her fyftem hath 
 been juft or complete, then muft we con- 
 clude, that this fovereign impotence is a 
 confequence naturally and unavoidably a- 
 rifing from the diftance; and, therefore, 
 above the remedy of art. But, if we 
 confult our own reafon, we mail perceive 
 that the Company's impotence, in that 
 particular refpect, proceeded from a radi- 
 cal defect or error in her fyftem ; which 
 might have been remedied by art. For, 
 it is evident, that the diftance of fituation 
 was in every circumftance fimilarly and 
 equally obftructive to the Company's im- 
 mediately or perfonally executing the go- 
 vernment of that Indian dominion, as it 
 was to her immediately reftraining or en- 
 forcing the manner of execution : and yet 
 we find that the Directors could difcover 
 a remedy for the firft of thefe obftruc- 
 tions, by the fuccedaneum of appointing 
 . a deputed executive government, And, as 
 the fecond fprung from the fame caufe, 
 and was exactly fimilar in its nature, com- 
 mon fen fe muft furely have inftructed her, 
 that it was to be removed by a fimilar re- 
 P medy,
 
 rnedy : it being certain that, if the Di- 
 rectors had thought proper to inftitute in 
 India a deputation properly qualified to 
 controul their executive deputation, the 
 meafures of thofe Indian governments' 
 might have been enforced or retrained by 
 the fovereign refiding in Europe, as ef- 
 fectually as they have been executed by 
 the fame fovereign : that is to fay, as ef- 
 fectually, as the defective conftitution of 
 the Company, (which equally difqualified 
 her for controuling as for executing,) 
 could admit. 
 
 But it could not be ignorance, or want 
 of common fenfe, that prevented the Di- 
 rectors from inflituting a controuling de- 
 putation of this nature : feeing they had 
 before them the precedent of thefe other 
 European nations, who hold any poflef- 
 iions in India : all of whom have provided 
 fomething of this kind : for inftance, the 
 Dutch government at Batavia. Sound 
 policy quickly pointed out to the Dutch, 
 the abfurdity of committing the charge of 
 their difperfed concerns in India, to a mul- 
 tiplicity of diftinct heads, all acting under 
 no other conftraint, or reftraint, than that 
 of the Company's Directors refiding in 
 
 Europe.
 
 f III ] 
 
 Europe. Therefore, fo foon as the Dutch 
 Company began to extend her poffeffions 
 in India, (he inftituted one fupreme go- 
 vernment at Batavia, with full powers, 
 and authority, to diredt and controul the 
 executive government of all her other fet- 
 tlements. And this government afts in 
 India as an intermediate power, betwixt 
 the Company refiding in Europe, and her 
 various polTeflions in that diftant country; 
 and as the perpetual refidentiary fuper- 
 vifor of all her interefts there. The Di- 
 rectors communicate all -their purpofes 
 immediately to it ; and it difperfes orders 
 and inftru&ions to all the fubordinate go- 
 vernments ; which again tranfmit to it a 
 regular accouat of their fituation, wants, 
 or tranfaftions. All governors, chiefs, 6cc. 
 are immediately refponfible to it : all ap- 
 pointments to, and removals from, office 
 in the fuborninates, are made immediately 
 by it : and all complaints or appeals, againft 
 the mifconducl; or injultice of thefe go- 
 vernors, are immediately addrefled to it. 
 In fine, it may be termed the center of the 
 Dutch government in India. And though 
 this government can in no mape be termed 
 the complete model of a deputation, fit 
 
 P 2 tO
 
 I '2] 
 
 to controul or enforce the execution of 
 fovereign government, in various territorial 
 dominions j yet, to this institution, de- 
 fective as it is, the Dutch owe it, that 
 the government of their numerous fubor- 
 dinate pofleflions in India hath been con- 
 ducted, for about two hundred years, 
 clear of any enormous abufe. 
 
 But if the Dutch ar\d other European 
 nations, which hold little other concern, 
 in India than a few fettlements eftablime4 
 there for the purpofe of commerce, found 
 it neceflary, for. the regular management 
 of thefe commercial concerns, to infti- 
 tute a fort of intermediate fupreme power, 
 as a local check on the reft of their fet- 
 tlements : how much more incumbent 
 was it on the Englifli Company, to con- 
 ftitute an immediate directing and controul- 
 ing power, over the conduct of her depu- 
 ties, who were entrufted with the charge 
 of executing the fovereign government, 
 of fundry mighty flates ; a charge of fuch 
 fuperior intricacy, weight, importance, 
 and delicacy 5 and fo very liable to be 
 abufed. 
 
 What may have been the motive of the 
 Dire&ors for thus wilfully omitting an in- 
 
 ftitution
 
 ["Si 
 
 Aitution fo evidently ufeful and necefTary, 
 I fhall not pretend to determine. Poffi- 
 bly they might apprehend that if, upon 
 their acquiring this mighty fovereign do- 
 minion, they fhould alter that which had 
 been all along their commercial iyftem, 
 fuch alteration might induce the nation 
 to enquire into the caufe of it, and fo dif- 
 cover the nature of their dominion, which 
 they have ever carefully hid from the pub- 
 lic. Though, it is more probable, they 
 might perceive, that the inftitution of fuch 
 an intermediate power would greatly in- 
 terfere with their own perfonal influence, 
 power, and emoluments ; feeing it mufl 
 have poffefTed the immediate difpofai of 
 places and ports, as well as a confiderable 
 fliare in the direction of affairs : and, in 
 order to prevent this, they preferved to 
 themfelves the power, of immediately fu- 
 perintending, and directing, the execu- 
 tion of government in thofe Indian do-~ 
 minions. 
 
 .But whatever the motive of the Di- 
 rectors may have been, it is certain, that 
 the want of a deputed controuling power 
 in India, hath been a radical and grievous 
 .defect in their fyltem : which hath pro- 
 duced
 
 ["4] 
 
 duced a number of thofe evils that have 
 been falfely'afcribed to the diftance of fi- 
 tuation. And though-we are far from al- 
 ledging, that it was poffible for the Com- 
 pany to eftablifh in thofe countries a go- 
 vernment in any degree regular, feeing that 
 the numerous natural defects in her con- 
 flitution, unavoidably producing many 
 deftrudtive abufes, muft have ever pro- 
 ved an infuperable obftacle to that 5 yet 
 do we affirm that, the inftitution of a 
 duly qualified intermediate controuling 
 power, v/ould have totally prevented feme* 
 and would have greatly diminimed moft, 
 of thefe enormous abufes which, upon 
 the fyflem of the Directors, have ferved 
 to ruin thofe countries. 
 
 Now we have feen that the national go- 
 vernment would, by taking upon itfelf 
 the charge of adminiftring that Indian 
 government, remedy or fupprefs all the 
 abufes that have fp rung from the defective 
 conftitution of the Company, (befides 
 creating other circumftances of high uti- 
 lity, that could not exifl under the Com- 
 pany's government.) And as the diftance 
 of fituation, preventing the fovereign from 
 immediately exerting his fupreme influence 
 
 over
 
 over the deputed executive government, 
 is the only remaining caufe of evil or 
 abufe; it is plain that, if it is poffible to 
 conftrud: in India, a deputed power, upon 
 fuch principles, as that it mall effectually 
 and completely fupply the place of the 
 Ibvereign, in immediately directing, en* 
 forcing, and controuling the meafures of 
 the deputed executive government, then 
 muft the only obftruction to the eftablim- 
 ment of a regular political fyftem, be re- 
 medied and removed. Confequently the 
 grand de/ideratiim, the only thing that is 
 wanting, to enable the national govern- 
 ment of Britain to regularly adminifter 
 the government of thofe Indian dominions, 
 is the inftitution of a deputed controuling 
 power in India, properly qualified to ful- 
 fil the purpofes that have been here fpe- 
 cified. 
 
 And that it is poffible, to conftitute an 
 intermediate power in India, that mall 
 ^ftectually and faithfully direct, enforce, 
 and controul the meafures of the deputed 
 executive government in thofe Indian do- 
 minions, I doubt not to evince : though, 
 at fame time, I am fully fenfible. of the 
 many real difficulties, arifing from natuce 
 
 and
 
 r 
 
 and circumftance, to obftruft it ; as like- 
 wife of the many artificial difficulties pro- 
 ceeding from the endeavours of thofe 
 who have an intereft to obftrucT: fuch a 
 meafure ; and who have influence to en- 
 force their objections, however futile, on 
 the underftanding of others. 
 
 But before we proceed to defcribe the 
 plan upon which we mean to conftruct 
 this controuling deputation, it will be ne- 
 cefTary to explain the extent of its charge, 
 or number of the government's compo- 
 iing that dominion which it is meant to 
 controul. For tho', in our defcription of 
 the Company's government in India, we 
 confined our account to that of Bengal 
 alone, as being the moft important and 
 beft known part of her dominion ; yet 
 doth the Company pofTefs, befides Ben- 
 gal, certain other territorial governments, 
 of no fmall value and importance, in re- 
 fpeft of either revenue or commerce. All 
 which governments being formed upoa 
 the fame fyftem as that of Bengal, do not 
 lefs demand reform, fupervifion, and con- 
 troul. 
 
 For, in the firft place, the government 
 of Madrafs poffeffes a very conliderable 
 
 and
 
 arid valuable territorial dominion, avow- 
 edly in the name and right of the Com- 
 pany. This fame government doth like- 
 wife, in every thing befide the name, pof- 
 fefs the abfolute fovereignty of that rich 
 commercial province of Arcot, or ih 
 Carnatic, in which it is fituated : for, not- 
 withftanding it tolerates a nominal Nabob, 
 whofe name it ufes in moft a<fls of govern- 
 ment ; and who, confequently> for the 
 Company's convenience, poffefles the (ha- 
 dow of fovereignty ; yet, as the govern- 
 ment of Madrafs holds the charge of de- 
 fending the country, and maintains the 
 military force requifite thereto, it is the 
 actual fovereign : feeing that, in all In- 
 dian or Afiatic governments, he who holds 
 the fword muft be the abfolute lord and 
 mafter. And, notwithftanding all the 
 Company's parade of appearances, this 
 Nabob of Arcot is, in refpect of fovereign 
 power, as much a pageant as he of Ben- 
 gal : a mere fcreen or blind, placed before 
 the Company's fovereignty. 
 
 Bombay is likewife embarked in dorrii* 
 nion, fince it feized on the rich commer- ' 
 cial city of Surat, with its diftrift, 6cc. 
 Though found policy mud direct Britain 
 
 to
 
 t 118 J 
 
 to reprobate all territorial dominion on 
 that fide of the peninfulaj as caufing a 
 dangerous divifion and weakening of her 
 force and defence. 
 
 But the fame policy will inftruct Britain 
 to regard dominion on the eaft fide of that 
 peninfula in an oppofite light; becaufe 
 on that fide lay all the truly valuable do- 
 minions which fhc already pofTefTes. 
 
 To fully explain what is the trueintereft 
 of Britain, refpecting territorial dominion 
 in India, would be, here, foreign and te- 
 dious j and, to flightly touch on that fub- 
 ject, might afford ground for ccnfure and 
 criticifm : we mail only obferve, in the 
 general, that Britain ought to value only 
 fuch dominion in India as is maritime: 
 becaufe, in the firft place, thefe are ever 
 trading and manufacturing countries \ and, 
 as fuch, are highly ufeful to her proper 
 commerce ; they are likewife capacitated, 
 by their own active foreign trade, ta 
 richly reimburfe her for her expence of 
 native flrength in defending them, as well 
 as for her trouble in governing them : and, 
 in the fecond place, being acceflible to her 
 naval force, they are eafily maintained 
 and defended by her. Therefore, fo much 
 
 of
 
 [ "9] 
 
 of this maritime dominion as me can 
 maintain and defend, without creating any 
 additional expence of native ftrength j and, 
 upon a footing fo connected with that 
 truly valuable dominion which me already 
 poflefles, as not to caufe any dangerous di- 
 vifion of that original ftrength, fo much 
 of this maritime dominion in India may 
 be truly ufeful and advantageous to her ; 
 on any other terms it may be detrimental. 
 Such is the prefent ftate of Britim do- 
 minion in India : and fuch is the intereft 
 of Britain, with refpect to future aug- 
 mentation of dominion in that country. 
 And we have undertaken to plan the con- 
 ftruction of an intermediate power or de- 
 putation, which, under the national go- 
 vernment of Britain, (hall effectually and 
 faithfully fuperintend, enforce, and con- 
 troul the meafures of thefe feveral govern- 
 ments that, at prefent are,, or in future 
 may be, fubjected to Britain : and which 
 deputation (hall of courfe, in the firft 
 place, enable the national government of 
 Britain to eftablim a regular fyitem of po* 
 litical government over this whole prefent 
 or future dominion : t and, in the fecond 
 place, fhall conftitute a complete fyftem of 
 
 military
 
 [120] 
 
 military government, and fecurc defence, 
 for all the feveral branches of this domi- 
 nion. At prefent we are on the fuhjedt of 
 political government. 
 
 The properties requifite to qualify this 
 intermediate power, or deputation, for ef- 
 fectually fuperintending, enforcing, and 
 controuling the political government of 
 dominion in India, are, firft, virtue and 
 integrity, to faithfully and honeftly dif- 
 charge the duties of its office : and, fe- 
 cond, power or ability, to effedually ful- 
 fil the purpofe of its inftitution. The lat- 
 ter is more eaiily conferred 5 but the for- 
 mer is rendered difficult, by fundry ob- 
 ftrucYions, anting from the nature or dif- 
 pofition of the perfons who mult necef- 
 farily be employed to compofe this deputa- 
 tion. For it is needlefs to obferve, that 
 this controuling power cannot be lodged 
 in the fubj eels native of the dependent do- 
 minion ; the nature of the government, as 
 well as the nature of their difpofitiqn, renr 
 dering that impracticable ; (as hath been 
 mewn) : otherwife this difficulty might 
 be more eafily furmounted. But, the In- 
 dian fubjects being fet afide, there remains 
 po choice - 3 this controuling deputation rnufl;* 
 
 fer
 
 ptr force, be compofed of Britifh bom 
 fubjedts : whilft the feveraj governments, 
 which it is meant to controul, are at fame 
 time executed by Britim born fubje&s. 
 And, from this circumftance, it follows, that 
 the perfonal intereft of the party controul- 
 ing muft naturally be the very fame, with 
 that of the party controuled : and, of 
 courfe, the views of both muft likewife 
 be the fame. 
 
 This fimilarity or famenefs of perfonal 
 intereft and views it is that creates the 
 difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity, 
 honour, and fidelity, on the controuling 
 deputation. For it is morally certain, that 
 the fimilarity of intereft and views will, 
 naturally and invariably, draw the party 
 controuling, to concur and join, inftead 
 of qontrouling or oppofing, the meafures 
 of the party executing, (feeing fuch mea- 
 fures tend to promote that which is their 
 common intereft) provided that this party 
 controuling (hall poffefs the power, and 
 opportunity of fo joining intereft, with 
 the party executing. And it is no lefs 
 certain, that this controuling deputation 
 muft, unavoidably, pofTefs the opportuni- 
 ty of thusjoining interefts, unlefs it can, 
 
 by
 
 [ 122 ] 
 
 by fome means, be prevented and retrain- 
 ed from joining and uniting the adtion of 
 its own proper powers, with the aftion of 
 thefe powers that are proper to the exe- 
 cutive office. Whereas, if it (hall be 
 found poffible to divide and feparate the 
 action of thefe two different powers, the 
 pne from the other, in a manner fo dif- 
 tinct, that each {hall act, in the fphere af- 
 figned to it, with freedom and liberty -, and 
 neither mall have the opportunity of tranf- 
 greffing the limits prefcribed, to its own 
 proper department, by the fovereign; 
 then, and in fuch cafe, it is not only pof- 
 fible, but certain, that this controuling 
 deputation may, and will be, prevented 
 from joining interefls, with the executivp 
 deputation j >and, confequently, from pro- 
 moting the very meafures which it was 
 meant to reftrain. And, from thence I 
 concludejthat the only poffible and certain 
 means of conferring, on this controuling 
 deputation, virtue and integrity to faithfully 
 and honeftly difcharge the duties of its 
 office, is to cut it off from all opportuni- 
 ty of joining the powers of its office, 
 with thofe of the executive ; or of affii- 
 ming any (hare in the executive govern- 
 ment :
 
 [ "3 ] 
 
 ment : in other words, it muft be reftrain* 
 ed from interfering, either diredly or in- 
 directly, personally or by proxy, in the 
 immediate execution of meafures, in any 
 one of thefe governments which it is meant 
 to controul. 
 
 But it is evident that, if this controul- 
 ing deputation mall exift or refide within 
 any one of thofe dominions whofe go- 
 vernment it is meant to controul, it will 
 be morally jmpofiible to prevent it from 
 joining its powers, and, confequently, its 
 interefts, views, and meafures, with the 
 deputed executive power of that govern- 
 ment where it refides. For, by virtue of 
 its authority, which from the nature of 
 its office muft needs be fupreme over the 
 executive deputation, it will ufurp at lead 
 a part if not the whole power of execu- 
 tion : or otherwife it will, by confent, join 
 and unite its powers with thofe of the ex 
 ecutive, in order to promote their mutual 
 intereft, by meafures diametrically repug- 
 nant to the purpofe of its inftitution. Nor 
 is it poffible, in this cafe, by any art, de- 
 vice or feparation into parts, to prevent 
 this ufurpation or union : let the controul- 
 ing power be termed judges, fupervifors, 
 
 officers
 
 [ 
 
 officers of the revenue, or what elfe; and 
 let the office of controuling be divided^ 
 into as many parts as can be conceived; 
 ilill, the difference of term, will not 
 alter the nature of the men employ* 
 edj nor will the divifion of parts fepa- 
 rate their intereft. All the various per- 
 fons, compofing this office, will ftill be Eu- 
 ropeans ; the fame as thefe who compofe 
 the executive office ; and fo, all the per- 
 fons in both offices will be foreign to the 
 country governed, acting by an authority 
 which is deputed mutable and temporary ; 
 confequently they will all hold the fame 
 view ; which is, to amafs all the money 
 they can during the fhort term of their 
 office, in order to tranfport it to theif 
 own country : and as all of them would, 
 by virtue of their refiding within the fame 
 government, pofTsfs the fame powers, and 
 the fame opportunities of exerting them, 
 they would all be irrefiftably attracted, by 
 the omnipotent fympathy of felf-intereft, 
 to join their feveral powers, in promoting 
 that which is the common view of one 
 and all of them. In fine, if thefe controul- 
 ing and executive deputations, which 
 thus, from the community of the natale 
 
 Jolitm >
 
 J 
 
 folum, hold one and the fame intered, (hall 
 both refide together in one and the fame 
 government, and thereby poiTefs the fame 
 opportunities, it will be equally impoffi- 
 ble to prevent thefe two deputations, how- 
 ever artfully feparated into parts, from 
 joining and uniting their different powers, 
 &c. as it is to preferve feparate the guttas 
 of quickfilverj which, however gently 
 and carefully they are dropt upon the 
 fame confined and frnooth furface, will 
 meet, join, and conglobate into one u- 
 nited mafs. But if the controuling 
 deputation fhall be thus permitted to join 
 its powers with thefe of the executive, 
 and confequently forfeit its virtue and in- 
 tegrity, with refpedt to that one territo- 
 rial government where it refides, it thereby 
 becomes difqualified and unfit to controui 
 the meafures of any one other govern- 
 ment : for the judge" who is himfelf cor- 
 rupt, is but little qualified to judge or 
 punilh corruption in others. I therefore 
 conclude that, in order to preferve the 
 virtue and integrity of this controuling 
 deputation, it is indifpenfably neceffary 
 that it mould not refide withhi the limits 
 of any one of thefe territorial govern- 
 R ments j
 
 [ 1*6] 
 
 ; thefe being the governments 
 which it is meant to controul. 
 
 On the other hand, it is equally certain, 
 that this controuling deputation cannot exe- 
 cute in perfon,cr affume any perfonal mare 
 jn the execution of meafures, in any one of 
 thole governments where it doth not ac- 
 tually refide ; it being impoffible that it 
 can acT: perionally where it is not perfonal- 
 ly prefent. It therefore follows that, by 
 fituating or placing this controuling depu- 
 tation at a fufficiently proper diilance from 
 all thefe feveral territorial governments, i( 
 may be prevented from afTurning a perfo- 
 nal (hare in the immediate execution of 
 meafures in any one of them. And being 
 thus, by the lltuation of its refidence* 
 cut off from all opportunity of acting 
 perfonally, it may likewife be precluded 
 from acting ifecondarjly, or usurping by 
 proxy any influence, in the immediate ex- 
 ecution of thefe governments, if it mall, 
 after the manner of the Dutch govern- 
 ment at Batavia, be ftric*lly prohibited 
 from exercifing its fuperviiing authority 
 any where without the limits of its own 
 fixed refidence ; and from delegating or 
 deputing its powers to any perfon or per- 
 
 fons 4
 
 { 1*7 1 
 
 fons, its own members or others, who 1 
 (hall refide, or may be beyond thefe pre- 
 fcribed bounds. For though the fyftem 
 of the Dutch government at Batavia is, 
 in many refpe&s, far too rude and unpo- 
 limed 5 yet is it, in this particular, moft 
 nicely circumfcribed : that government 
 being retrained, in the moil precife man- 
 lier, from delegating and transferring its 
 authority ; or from deputing any power 
 to examine into cafes, of even the mod 
 dubious nature, within the fubordinates : 
 but to obviate any inconvenience, that 
 might otherwife arife from fuph restraint, 
 it hath a power to call before it, from the 
 fubordinates, all perfpns or records necef- 
 fary to information. For the Dutch were 
 well aware, that the fupreme government, 
 if it mould be permitted to carry its fu- 
 pervifing authority on any pretext into the 
 fubordinates, would gain an occafion of 
 interfering in the execution pf thofe mea- 
 fures which it was intended to controul. 
 
 We muft then perceive, that this con- 
 trouling deputation being feated at a pro- 
 perly fufficient diftance from all thefe ter- 
 ritorial governments, and the exercife of 
 its powers being exprefsly confined to that 
 R 2 par-
 
 [ 
 
 particular feat of refidence, it will, by fuch 
 means, be effectually retrained from in- 
 terfering, in any fhape, either directly or 
 indirectly, in the execution of any one of 
 thofe governments which it iff intended to 
 controul. And we ' muft farther perceive 
 that, by virtue of fuch effectual reftraint, 
 that clear feparation of office, which alone 
 can prevent the junction or union of the 
 powers, interefts, and views of this con- 
 trouling deputation with thofe of the ex- 
 ecutive, will be completely accomplifhed. 
 Seeing that, the action of the controuling 
 power being fhictiy confined within the 
 limits of its own proper fphere, the exe- 
 cutive power muft remain at full liberty 
 to act diflinctiy and freely in the office 
 affigned to it by the fovereign. 
 
 The principal fource of corruption, and 
 grand {tumbling block of virtue, being 
 thus removed, the integrity of this con- 
 trouling deputation may be eftablifhed on 
 a firm and folid bafis, by ikilfully dividing 
 the parts which go to compofe it: and, 
 in particular, by clearly Separating the po- 
 litical and judicial powers : which, if they 
 {hall be judicioufly divided into two diftinct 
 departments, mutually independent and 
 
 unin-
 
 fjjp [ 129 ] 
 
 uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as 
 an effe&ual check, and powerful impulfe, 
 on the other : fo as to prevent either from 
 abufing its authority, or neglecting its 
 duty. Whereas, if the political power 
 fhould, at fame time, pofTefs the power of 
 judging, trying and determining, or mould 
 even poflefs any influence over the judica- 
 ture, there is danger that it might, on 
 fome occafions, facrifice its duty to its in- 
 tereft. And this is the very capital error 
 of the Dutch fyftem at Batavia, inafmuch 
 as that government, pofleffing the judicial 
 power, hath thereby the opportunity of 
 perverting juftice, fometimes to the preju- 
 dice of its conftituent, and often to the 
 detriment of its fubordinates. 
 
 Nor would we be here underftood to 
 fignify, by judicial power, a fimple court 
 of judicature, eftablifhed for the purpofc 
 of deciding litigated cafes . of property ; 
 the judicial power here meant, muft extend 
 o every thing that refpects a due execution 
 of the jurifdidion and police, in thefub- 
 ordinate governments. Therefore its au- 
 thority muft not be paffive, and confined 
 to fuch matter as fhall come before it by 
 complaint; but it muft be active, aflum- 
 
 ing 
 
 -
 
 1 130] 
 
 ing cognizance of all public huifance, 
 trefpafs, or delinquency, that may be 
 brought before it by information. For, 
 here, juries may exift with great pro- 
 priety and efficacy, feeing that the Com- 
 pany will, on account of her commerce, 
 keep a number of fervants at this fupremc 
 fettiement; there will likewife be, no 
 doubt, many free merchants (as they are 
 termed) : and, confequently, there will 
 never be wanting a choice of perfons un- 
 connected with, and uninfluenced by the 
 political government -, and therefore fit to 
 form a grand inqueft j as well as petit or 
 fpecial juries, to decide in either criminal 
 cafes, or difputes of property. And this 
 judicial power mufr. farther be endued with 
 all proper and necefTary officers ; particu- 
 larly an attorney general : it mull like- 
 wife be divided into diftincl courts; re- 
 fembling, as nearly as circumftances will 
 admit, or occafion requires, the courts 
 of juftice in the fovereign country. 
 
 Neverthelefs, we do not prefume to dic- 
 tate or prefcribe the exact or complete form 
 of this judicial power : we would only 
 hint at the main purpofes of its inftitution ; 
 a due confideration of which will readily 
 
 fuggeft
 
 fuggeft the particular form, to thole 
 whofe province it may be to conftrucl: k. 
 We ihall only obferve that, in order to 
 confer a due weight on the judicial power, 
 it is not fufficient that it fhould be inde- 
 pendent, in its corporate capacity ; the 
 judges and officers competing it muft, in 
 their perfonal capacity, be placed as far as 
 poffible beyond the influence of the poli- 
 tical power. The falaries annexed to their 
 offices muft be fuch as will afford dignity, 
 as well as independence : whilft, on the 
 other hand, they hall be debarred, under 
 the ievereft penalties, from holding, either 
 directly or indirectly, any place, poft, emo- 
 lument, or employment, of any nature, 
 diftincl: from that of its own proper de- 
 partment. Moreover, the political power 
 {hould hold no voice in conferring the de- 
 grees of this department : that fhould be 
 vefted in the judicial power itfelf, with 
 reference to the confirmation of the fo- 
 vereign. 
 
 This judicial power may be termed the 
 
 fupreme Court of Judicature, for the 
 
 whole Britim dominion in India : to which 
 
 .all the fubjects, under the feveral govern- 
 
 jrients, whether natives or Europeans, mav 
 
 readily
 
 readily appeal, againft the oppreffion of 
 their governors, .or the perverfion of juf- 
 tice : and, on which they may fecurely 
 depend for redrefs ; provided it (hall be 
 placed above the influence of the political 
 power. This fupreme court of judica- 
 ture would likewife be of inexpreflible 
 utility, as a check on the power, and an 
 impulfe on the will, of the political 
 branch. 
 
 We may add, that a judicious fubdivi- 
 fion of the political power, into different 
 departments, might contribute confidera- 
 bly to its virtue. 
 
 Thefe are the outlines of that meafure, 
 by which we propofe to preferve this con- 
 trouling deputation free from corruption : 
 and we doubt not but, upon this plan, 
 when meliorated and improved by the fu- 
 perior undemanding of others, a controul- 
 ing power may be conftruded, which 
 fhall be completely qualified, in point of 
 virtue and integrity, to faithfully and ho- 
 nourably fuperintend, enforce, and con- 
 trpul the execution of political govern- 
 ment in thofe Indian dominions. And 
 this is, by far, the moft difficult, delicate, 
 and important part of the undertaking. 
 
 For,
 
 [ '33 ] 
 
 for, as to the power and ability, requi- 
 fite to qualify this deputation for effe&u- 
 ally fulfilling the purpofe of its inftitu- 
 tion, that is readily beftowed. The de- 
 gree of power is altogether in the difpo- 
 fal of the fovereign. And, its efficacy or 
 ability depends, principally, upon the 
 choice of fuch a fituation for the feat of 
 its refidence, as fhall enable it to keep up f 
 at all feafons, a ready and fpeedy corre- 
 fpondence with the feveral fubordinate go- 
 vernments, 
 
 With regard to the choice of fituation 
 proper for the refidence of this controul- 
 ing power 5 (which is indeed a point of 
 high importance,) we fhall readily con- 
 ceive, from adverting to its nature and 
 the purpofes of its inftitution, that this 
 refidence ought to be fome convenient fea 
 port ; fituated at a confiderable diftance 
 from the limits of all thefe territorial go- 
 vernments ; but, at fame time, fo centri- 
 cally near to each, that the communica- 
 tion, to and from it, fhall, in either mon- 
 foon, be not only practicable, but certain 
 and fpeedy. I (hall referve the farther 
 explanation of this intended feat of refi- 
 dence, till I come to treat of the military 
 S fyftem 5
 
 [ '34] 
 
 fyilem ; becaufe there are fome properties, 
 particularly requifite to a proper centre of 
 military defence : and it is propofed that 
 the fame power, and confequently the 
 fame refidence, that fuperintends the 
 political government, fhou-ld iikevvife di- 
 rect the military government and defence, 
 of this dominion. 
 
 But this fupreme controlling power be- 
 ing thus centrically fituated, with refpect 
 to the feveral fubordinates, as that it {hall 
 at all times hold a ready and fpeedy cor- 
 refpondence with each, will be thereby 
 ' enabled toe ffe&ually fuperintend, enforce, 
 and controul the execution of political 
 government in that whole dominion. For, 
 in the firll phce, the ready and fpeedy 
 communication with all the fubordinates, 
 affording to the lupreme power an oppor- . 
 tunity of .obtaining, from each, the mod 
 early intelligence of every tranfadion, in- 
 cident, or occurrence ; as likewife of im- 
 mediately tranfmitting the orders and in- 
 ftrudions, that may be fuitable to the oc- 
 cafion; will cut off from the feveral go- 
 vernors of the territorial dominions all 
 pretext for ading difcretionally. And, 
 in confequence, that defpotic and arbitrary 
 
 power,
 
 1 135 1 
 
 power, which hath fubfifted under the 
 Company's fyftem, will be completely fup- 
 prefTed. And, from adverting to this cir- 
 cumitance, we (hall perceive the import- 
 ance of a proper choice of fituation, for 
 this fupreme center of government. 
 
 In the fecond place, this ready corref- 
 pondence with all the fubordinate govern- 
 ments, enabling the fupreme power to 
 acquire a minute and complete knowledge 
 of every circumftance, refpeding the ftate 
 and nature of the general police, in this 
 whole dominion, will qualify it for ori- 
 ginally planning, and for afterwards im- 
 proving, all fuch defigns and meafures as 
 can contribute to the inftitution of regu- 
 larity and good order. It will likewife 
 attain an intimate knowledge of the whole 
 manoeuvre of finance, refpeding the mode 
 of collevfling as well as appropriating the 
 revenue and taxes : and it will be thereby 
 enabled to project judicious forms, with 
 different offices, as mutual checks upon 
 each other, in that branch: which will 
 ferve to remedy that incredible extortion* 
 rapine, and peculation : which, by ruin- 
 ing the farmer of the lands, hath almoft 
 totally fupprefled agriculture, and greatly 
 S 2 depo-
 
 F 136] 
 
 depopulated thole miferable countries $ 
 whilft it hath grievoufly defrauded the fo- 
 vereign of his right. And all thefe plan- 
 ned modes, being approved and confirmed 
 by the fovereign, would be continued in 
 vigorous and perpetual action, by the vi- 
 cinity of the fupreme political power : and 
 all thefe feveral meafures, being enacted 
 into laws, the Uriel: obfervance of them 
 would be effectually enforced by the fame 
 vicinity. And thus, that fupreme power 
 will, not only eftablim, but perpetually 
 conferve a juft regularity in police, and an 
 exact oeconomy in finance. 
 
 In the third place, the fupreme judicial 
 power will, by its neighbourhood to thefe 
 dependent dominions, acquire a juftknow- 
 ledge of the modes, cuftoms, and difpofi- 
 tions of the inhabitants ; and, by that, it 
 will be enabled to devife the befl forms or 
 offices, together withikilful rules for admi- 
 niftring the jurifdiction, in a manner tru- 
 ly effectual, and at fame time confonant 
 and agreeable to the humour of the fub^ 
 ject. It will likewife be capable of after- 
 wards improving and adding to thefe forms 
 and rules, as future occafion may require, 
 ^r better information may fuggeft. All 
 
 which
 
 t 
 
 which forms or offices may, by the appro- 
 bation of the fovereign, be eftabliftied in- 
 to {landing courts 5 and the rules enacted 
 into laws. And a punctual obfervance of 
 all thefe laws enacted, either for the regu- 
 lar adminiftration of juftice, or confer- 
 vance of the police, will be completely 
 enforced, by the awe of this fupreme 
 tribunal : the communication with which, 
 from all parts of that dependent domi- 
 nion, being eafy and fpeedy, will afford a 
 ready accefs and opportunity to all the 
 fubjeds, of prefenting their complaints, 
 againft any oppreflion of their govern- 
 ment, or denial, or perveriion of juftice : 
 whilft the fame ready communication will 
 render the trial of all litigated cafes, fpee- 
 dy and eafy. A moghty innovation this, 
 from the former mode of juftice in thofc 
 dominions; when it was impoflible for even 
 Europeans to obtain redrefs, in our dif- 
 tant precife European courts, againft the 
 moft glaring oppreflion of government : 
 and the natives were excluded from even, 
 that diftant and deceitful profped of re- 
 m.edy. 
 
 And in order that the courfe of juftice 
 may be rendered thoroughly complete, it 
 
 may
 
 [ 138] 
 
 may be ena&ed, after the manner of the 
 Dutch, that no perfon, who hath held 
 any office of power or truft within the 
 fubordinates, fhall depart immediately 
 from thence for Europe ; but fhall be 
 obliged to repair to the fupreme refidence ; 
 there to remain for three months ; to the 
 end that any perfon or perfons who may, 
 by any means, have been retrained, du- 
 ring the exiftence of his office, from pre- 
 ferring their complaint againft him, on 
 the fcore of either public or private tref- 
 pafs, may there have the free opportuni- 
 ty of profecuting him. 
 
 The fupreme political power fhall im- 
 mediately appoint to all offices, as well 
 political as military, within the fubordi- 
 nate governments -, whh reference held to 
 the future approbation, and confirmation, 
 of the fovereign : and it fhall preferve re- 
 gular minutes of all fuch appointments, 
 orders, and other tran factions made in its 
 fupreme capacity ; which minutes, toge- 
 ther with regular and properly vouched 
 accounts of the collection, as well as the 
 appropriation of the revenue, fhall be 
 punctually tranfmitted, by etfery occafion, 
 to the fovereign. The judicial power 
 
 (hall
 
 mall likewife keep an exacl: regifter of all 
 trials, caufes, and proceedings ; more par-* 
 ticularly thofe of the grand inqueft and 
 affizes : this latter to be figned by all the , 
 judges and officers of the court, and at- 
 tefled by the foremen, with a majority of 
 the juries : two copies of which mall be 
 regularly tranfmitted to Britain -, one to 
 the fovereign j and the other to the Com- 
 pany ; which, as holding a material inte- 
 reft and mare in thefe law proceedings, 
 hath a claim to fuch participation of . 
 * knowledge. All which minutes, accounts, 
 and proceedings, being communicated to 
 the fovereign, will enable him to aft as 
 an ultimate check on the political go- 
 vernment, the finance, and the jurifdic- 
 tion of that Indian dominion. 
 
 Such is the form of this intermediate^ 
 power, through which I propofe to convey* 
 into the execution of government in thofe 
 diftant Indian dominions, that plenary ex- 
 ertion of the fovereign's reftraining and 
 compelling power, which, alone, can fuf- 
 fice to prevent tyranny and anarchy. And 
 notwithstanding the materials are, through 
 hurry and want of time, rude, unpolifhed 
 and coarfely arranged, yet do I flatter my- 
 
 felf,
 
 [140] 
 
 felf, that candour will allow them to be: 
 folidly good, proper, and fully fufficing to 
 conftrucl, at leaft, the groundplot, or 
 bafis, of a regular political fyftem. Sure 
 I am, the high propriety, nay the in- 
 difpenfable necefiity of fuch a mea- 
 fure, muft immediately ftrike every per- 
 fon who employs his own judgment, 
 however flightly, to conlider, firft, the 
 nature, interefts, and views of the exe- 
 cutive government in thofe Indian do- 
 minions ', as being foreign, deputed, 
 mutable, and temporary. Second the 
 timid, paflive, and ilavimly fubmiffive dif- 
 pofition of the native fubjeds. And third, 
 the diftance of fituation, betwixt the fo- 
 vereign refidence, and the fcene of go- 
 vernment ; which, rendering the immedi- 
 ate reftraint and conftraint of the fove- 
 reign perfectly impotent, confers on this 
 foreign executive deputation an unlimited 
 and arbitrary power, of promoting its own 
 pcrfonal views and interefl, by meafures* 
 which tend to the intolerable oppreilion 
 of the wretched inhabitants, and the utter 
 ruin of thofe fubjected countries ; as well 
 as to the mighty detriment of Britain's 
 deareft interefl:, and the blackeft reproach 
 
 to
 
 t *4 J 
 
 to her reputation. Nor can all this bfc 
 remedied or prevented, but by fuch a mea*- 
 jfure as is here propofed. 
 
 And now we (hall take a flight glance 
 fct the operation of this meafure, on the 
 jurifdiclion,- and police, of the fubordinate 
 dominions. And though^ for the fake of 
 perfpicuity, we confine the view to Ben- 
 gal alone, as being the mod eminent part, 
 yet will the effects be equally felt through 
 the whole. 
 
 As to the fundamental eftablifhments of 
 Governors, Councils, &c. thefe are fuffi- 
 ciently obvious 5 as li'kewife are the pro- 
 per chambers of revenue : and thefe, with 
 the minutiae appointments of inferior offi* 
 ces, will be more properly provided and 
 improved, by the better judgment, true 
 information > and future experience of the 
 fupreme controuling power. Here we 
 mean to offer only one or two hints on the 
 mode of jurifdiction and police* 
 
 And firft, with regard to the courts of 
 juftice, I fhould propofe that the mayor's 
 court at Calcutta mould ftill fubfift, as $ 
 court of equity for the whole country : 
 and a moil equitable court it is, if properly 
 .regulated : for the truth of which affer- 
 T ticn,
 
 I '4*1 
 
 tion, I appeal to all thofe who knew it 
 previous to that alteration of the Com* 
 pany's charter of juftice, which rendered 
 it dependent on, and fubfervient to, the 
 Governor and Council : never was juftice 
 more exactly or more expeditioufly admi- 
 niftered, than it was by this court, pre- 
 vious to that alteration. In order there- 
 fore to reflore it to its primitive utility, it 
 ought to be reftored to its original ftate. 
 Let thejudges or aldermen, who at prefent 
 compofe it, continue fuch : being fervants 
 to the Company, or free merchants, they 
 muft be unconnected with, and uninfluen- 
 ced by the national government. And, in 
 the cafe of death, or removal, the vacuum 
 to be fupplied by the court itfelf, from 
 amongft the Company's fervants, or free 
 merchants only : and if any alderman 
 lhall, fubfequent to entering on his office, 
 accept of any poft or place under govern- 
 ment, let that be an exprefs difqualifica- 
 tion and vacation of his office ; which is 
 to be immediately made good, by the 
 choice of another perfon, properly quali- 
 fied. The newly elected aldermen to be 
 prefented, for acceptance, to the fupremc 
 
 court
 
 - : t -43 i 
 
 court of judicature only. And the officers 
 of this court to be chofen by itfelf. . 
 
 But as it would be impoffible for the 
 mayor's court to difpatch all the bufmefs 
 that might be brought before it, there 
 ought like wife to be a court of law -, con- 
 lifting of a chief juftice, with three judges; 
 to be appointed by the fovereign. And 
 this court fhould guide itfelf, by fuch laws 
 as may be ena&ed for the jurifdi&ion of 
 thofe countries ; otherwife by equity. 
 
 Appeals from this court of law, as well 
 as that of equity, to be made immediately 
 to the fupreme court of judicature ; and 
 from thence to his Majeftyin council. 
 
 If it is thought proper, there might be 
 another mayor's court, of the fame na- 
 ture, eftablimed at Coflitnbuzar, in the 
 neighbourhood of the old capital, Maxa- 
 davad. 
 
 And as to the forms, for the more uni- 
 verfal diftribution of juflice to the natives, 
 thefe will be adjufled by the fupreme fu- 
 pervifing power ; as before mentioned. 
 We fhall only obferve, that their courts of 
 Zemindary and Cutchery are, as they ftand 
 at prefent, a grievous nuifance. 
 
 T 2 Bat
 
 f 144 1 
 
 JBut the nobleil inftitutioo for protecting 
 the liberty and property of the lubjcd:, 
 from the extortion and oppreffipn of their 
 foreign government, and of its inferioc 
 train of native harpies, who are infinitely 
 more rapacious than the Europeans, would 
 be that of juries, properly conftrud:ed^ 
 I^et the grand inqueit of the country be 
 held at Culcutta, four times in the year : 
 and let thejurie?, both grand and petit t 
 be exprefly compofed of Company's fer-r 
 v^nts, or free merchants, Europeans, and 
 none others : the judges of law, or af; 
 leaft two of them, to fit on the affizes : 
 the fheriff to be chofen annually, from 
 amongft the Company's fervants. 
 
 The powers of this grand inqueft, if 
 adapted to the iituation qf things, muft 
 be enlarged beyond thefe of our juries in 
 Britain ; where there are judicial and po-? 
 litical aids, that muft'be wanting in thofe 
 countries: for inftancc, the enquiry mufl 
 not be confined to place, but mud extend 
 every where through the country : it muft 
 likewife have authority to bring before it 
 all manner of nuifance or trefpafs com- 
 mitted againft the liberty or proptffty of 
 the fu,bjet, natives as well as Europeans. 
 
 And
 
 r 145 1 
 
 And the ju.tjes, fhould have no power to 
 reject or poftpone the bills, found by the 
 grand jury : but fhould bring them on to 
 decifion, in turn, as prefented. Moreover, 
 as the extent of enquiry may render it im- 
 poffible for the more diflant defendant to 
 appear with his evidences, during the fit- 
 ting of that aflize to which the bill hath 
 been prefented againft him -, let fummons 
 fee iflued, upon the bill's being prefented, 
 for fuch diftant defendant to appear at next 
 affixes ; or let fome other method be found, 
 either by means of the grand jury's meet- 
 ing a fufficient time before the com- 
 mencement of trials, or by fome extraor- 
 dinary power vefted in the judges or flierifF 
 to produce fuch diftant defendant with his 
 evidences in due time. And as this fame 
 extent of enquiry may, on the other hand, 
 produce inconvenience to the fubjecl:, by 
 affording occafion to litigious perfons of 
 diftrefling others, by bringing them from a 
 great diftance to thefe affizes, on frivolous 
 or ill grounded complaints, it may be or- 
 dered that, where the caufe fhall appear to 
 the court truly litigious, the plaintiff fliall 
 t>e bound over to ftand fuit at law, for da- 
 to the defendant : and, one or two 
 examples,
 
 examples, of this nature, will prove a 
 barr to frivolous litigation. 
 
 And leaft the judges mould, by any 
 means, be influenced to act that part which 
 the Company's governor and council com- 
 monly act, when they abfurdly prefide at 
 thefe afiizes, as his Majsfty's judges in their 
 own caufc ; namely, to difmifs the Court, 
 fo foon as the grand jury mall find a bill 
 that may be difagreeable to them ; it may 
 be ordered that neither the judges, nor 
 any officer of the Court, mall have power 
 to adjourn the affizes, until all the trials 
 fhall be decided ; or, otherwife, by the 
 confent of a majority in both juries. 
 
 The principal check however upon the 
 conduct of thefe affizes, would be that of 
 obliging the Court to keep exact regifters, 
 of all trials, and proceedings ; figned and 
 attefted, as before mentioned. And if any 
 part of either jury mall except to the au- 
 thenticity of fuch regifler, which mail be 
 publickly expofed in the Court, then, 
 fuch difienting part (hall have a right to 
 proteft, and affiga its reafons. Three co- 
 pies of which regifter, with proteft, (if 
 any,) mail be difpatched, by the earlieft 
 ^cca^on, after each affize. One copy to 
 
 the
 
 [ '47 1 
 
 the fupreme Court of Judicature $ which 
 will, thereby, have the earlieft notice of 
 any abufe ; and, with the concurrence of 
 the fupreme political power, (hall have the 
 opportunity of immediately correcting it. 
 A fecond copy (hall be tranfmitted to the 
 fovereign ; who will aft as an ulterior 
 check on the fupreme controuling power. 
 And a third copy to the Company for the 
 reafons before fpecified. 
 
 But, as this fmgle inqueft at Calcutta 
 cannot poffibly carry juftice to the ex- 
 tremes of that extenfive country, circu- 
 lating affizes may be held, at leaft once, 
 or if poffible twice a year, at Muxadavad 
 as the center, and at Patnah as the nor- 
 thern extreme $ two judges to go this nor- 
 thern circuit : and the other two judges 
 to go on an eaftsrn circuit, at Dacca. 
 And, as there may not be a fufficient num- 
 ber of Company's fervants, properly qua- 
 lified, to form complete juries at thefe 
 northern and eaftern aflizes : I would pro- 
 pofe that, to make up any fuch deficien- 
 cy, natives mould be mixed with the Eu- 
 ropeans. Which mixture, if it (hall be 
 artfully tempered, in the following man- 
 ner, would produce all the efficacy of en- 
 tirely 

 
 f 148 ] 
 
 tlrely European juries ; and, at fame tirhej 
 .none of the bad effects, that might be ap- 
 prehended, from an attempt to confer 
 freedom and impartiality on juries entirely 
 native. 
 
 Let, at leaft, one half of both the grand 
 and petit juries be Europeans ; and the 
 remaining part natives : and if it ftiould 
 happen, that there cannot be collected, 
 at the aflize factory, and from the neigh* 
 bouring inferior factories, fo many Com- 
 pany's fervants as mall make up half the 
 ulual number of jurymen ; then, let the 
 whole number be diminished, to the fuf- 
 ficing half of Europeans. Let the una- 
 nimity of verdict, in fuch mixt juries, be 
 difpenfed with ; and let the majority of 
 voices, in either jury, find the bill or ver- 
 dict ; as is the cuftom in Scotland. And 
 let an additional provifion be made to the 
 oath of the juryman, purporting that he 
 ihall not, on any account, difclofe the 
 opinion given by any individual, in the 
 jury room. 
 
 By ,thi9 artful mixture, and thefe pre- 
 cautions, the native jurymen would be li- 
 berated from that ilavim dread, of future 
 revenge from their own countrymen em- 
 ployed 

 
 ployed under government; feeing it would 
 be impoflible, for thefe native officers of 
 government, to difcover the particular opi- 
 nion of each individual -, which, if the 
 juries were entirely native, they would 
 infallibly do, to the utter ruin of the poof 
 native jurymen. So that the native Jury* 
 men, acting thus with freedom, under the 
 cloke and protection of the Europeans, 
 would anfvver all the effectual purpofes of 
 Europeans. Whilft, being fenfible that 
 they owed their freedom and impartiality, 
 together with all the other benefits arifing 
 from juries, to their connection with the 
 Europeans ; this freedom conferred on 
 them in the jury room, would not in the 
 lead diminish their awe and deference to 
 government. The proceedings at thefe 
 circuit affizes to be regiftered and tranf- 
 mitted in like manner as at Calcutta. 
 
 Thefe juries would prove the Magna 
 Charta, the palladium, and true fecurity 
 of Indian liberty and property, againft the 
 defpotifm and extortion of their foreign 
 government. And it evidently appears* 
 that the virtue of thefe juries, (a's being, 
 at one and the fame time, truly effectual 
 to the fubject, and perfectly fafe to the 
 U fove-
 
 fovereign,) entirely depends upon the cir* 
 cumftance, of completely excluding the 
 Company and her fervants, from the fmall^ 
 eft participation in the executive powers 
 of government. But the efficacy of thefe 
 juries, and of other inferior jnftitutions 
 jnade through the fupreme controuling 
 power, being once felt and known, would 
 Ipeedily induce the natives to purchafe 
 perpetual property in lands ; feeing they 
 would perceive themfelves thoroughly fe-p 
 cured in the produce of thofe lands. And 
 this, being divulged abroad, would draw 
 the inhabitants of the neighbouring coun- 
 tries to the ftandard of Britain; together 
 with their wealth, and induftry. By 
 which means the Britifh dominion in In- 
 (lia, which, at prefent is, through op- 
 preffion and confequent famine, in a great 
 meafure deferted and depopulated, woulc} 
 again be completely peopled and cultivated: 
 arts, manufactures, and commerce would 
 foon be reflored to their former flate $ nay, 
 they would be extended to a degree far 
 fuperior: and thefe countries would, of 
 pourfe, be enabled to richly repay Britain 
 for the bleflings conferred by her, of per-.
 
 t *St 1 
 
 feet fecurity in liberty arid property ; btef- 
 lings, never before known in India. 
 
 And all this may be efTecled by meanS 
 of that intermediate fuprerrie cdntrduling 
 power : which would, ribt only create! 
 but preferve, the full arid vigdrdus efficacy 
 of all thefe institutions, in the fubordinate 
 dominionSi Whereas, if it was even pof- 
 fible, (though indeed it is morally impof- 
 fible,) to inftitute, by any temporary 
 means* all thefe powers, forms, rules, 
 and regulations in thofe dominions, yet 
 is it evidently certain that, fo fooh as thefe 
 temporary means were withdrawn, the 
 virtue and efficacy of all thefe inftitutions 
 Would immediately vantth, arid be fup* 
 preffed by the power of the executive gd- 
 vernment; which, from the nature of 
 things, muft unavoidably be, either def- 
 potic over the native fubjects> or cannot 
 cxifl at all. 
 
 But this fame coritrouling power, as it 
 would, on the one hand, by its fixed re- 
 fidence in the immediate neighbourhood, 
 perpetually preferve the adtiori and motiori 
 of all thefe inftitutions, like to a power 
 ever prefent to wind up the fprings of the 
 machine; and, fo, would check all thd 
 U 2 bad
 
 bad eftcds of that naturally necefiary def- 
 potifm in executive government : fo would 
 it, on the other hand, effectually fupport 
 the power and authority of that executive 
 government ; and prevent its being en- 
 croached on, by an over exertion of the 
 privileges conferred on the fubjeft. For, 
 on this fide too, there is a danger; which 
 will be readily comprehended, by thofe 
 who confider the nature of government ; 
 and, at fame time, the difpofition of hu- 
 man nature. But all danger, of prepon- 
 derating either fcale, would be prevented, 
 by the vicinity of the controuling power: 
 which, holding the balance in its hands, 
 and nicely diminishing from one, OF 
 adding to the other fcale, would ever pre- 
 ierve a juft equilibrium, betwixt the li 
 berty of the fubject, and the power of 
 government. 
 
 Nor would the inftitution of new regu- 
 lations be the only means, in the hands 
 of the controuling power, of preventing 
 the dangerous over exertion of privilege : 
 it would likewife poflefs the inftantaneouc 
 power of feizing, or otherwife of ordering 
 to its own refidence, all fuch perfons as 
 
 ihould prove over troublefome, or dangerous 
 
 to
 
 [ >53] 
 
 to the due authority of executive govern- 
 ment. For, though it would be extremely 
 abfurd to truft a power of this nature, im- 
 mediately in the hands of executive go- 
 vernment ; which would, infallibly, em- 
 ploy it to its own word purpofes : yet 
 might fuch power be fafely trufted to this 
 controuling government ; which could not 
 have the fame motives to abufe it. 
 
 Neverthelefs,we do not mean that this,, 
 and all thefe other powers, mould be un- 
 limitedly confided to this controuling de- 
 putation : we Hill preferve a check over 
 it, in the national government. And a 
 mod effectual check too -, by means of the 
 beforementioned copies of regifters, im- 
 mediately tranfmitted to Britain, from the 
 fubordinates j as likewife by its own mi- 
 nutes, accounts, and regifters. 
 
 So that here would be a regular grada- 
 tion of effectual political checks. The 
 privilege of juries, and other inftitutions 
 in the fubordinate dominions, being pre- 
 ferved in vigorous adtion, by the influence 
 of the intermediate controuling power, 
 would prove an effectual check on the def- 
 potifrn or extortion of executive govern* 
 tnent ; and would thus completely fecure 
 
 the
 
 r 154 3 
 
 the liberty and property of the fubje<5h 
 And the fame influence of the controuling 
 power would fufficiently check the luxu- 
 riancy of privilege j and fupport the power 
 of government j thus preferving an exact 
 poife betwixt both. Whilft the fovereign, 
 at a diftance, could deliberately and effec- 
 tually watch the hand that> trimmed the 
 fcales. 
 
 And thus the inftitution of this inter- 
 mediate controuling and impelling power* 
 would completely remove every obftruc- 
 tion arifing from the diftance of fituation 5 
 it would ferve as an intermediate link of 
 the political chain : or, as a bridge of 
 communication, joining this dependent 
 Indian dominion to the fovereign coun* 
 try. But, all obftru&ion anting from the 
 diftance of fituation being thus removed, 
 what difficulty can the national govern- 
 ment of Britain find, in adminiftring the 
 political government of that Indian domi- 
 nion ? Upon this plan, that tafk appears 
 to me more facil, lefs pregnant with dif- 
 ficulty, charge, or care, than it is to govern 
 any one, the moft pretty, of our foreign 
 Colonies : nay it appears equally eafy, as 
 it is tp govern the neighbouring Ifte of 
 
 Man;
 
 [ 155 1 
 
 Man : feeing that the oppofition of the 
 fubjeds, to the authority of government 
 in this Indian dominion, though they be fo 
 infinitely more numerous, is not greater 
 than is the oppofition of the few fub- 
 jeds in Man. The only difficulty, that 
 could exifl to national government, was 
 that of duly tempering, or abating, the 
 power of the deputed executive govern- 
 ment : and it appears, that this may he 
 completely effected by means of this 
 intermediate controuling power; which* 
 in the hands of the fovereign, would ac~t 
 upon the government of this Indian domi- 
 nion as the pegs or keys upon the firings of 
 a ^mufical inftrument; of which one 
 being gently {trained, and another proper- 
 ly relaxed, would create, and perpetually 
 preferve, a perfect harmony, or concord, 
 In this political fyflem.
 
 A PLAN, 
 
 FOR 
 
 ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM 
 O F 
 
 MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 
 
 AND OF 
 
 SECURE DEFENCE, 
 
 I N 
 
 I N D I A. 
 
 THE Company's fyftem of military 
 government and defence in India is, 
 at leaft, equally defective, faulty, and ab- 
 furd -, and, therefore, doth equally demand 
 reformation, as doth her political fyftem. 
 For the fame caufe that renders the power 
 of the Company's feveral deputed gover- 
 nors perfectly arbitrary and difcretional, 
 in civil matters ; namely, the Directors 
 having preferved to themfelves the charge 
 of immediately directing and fuperintend- 
 ing thofe governments ; confers, upon 
 thefe deputed governors, a like arbitrary 
 and difcretional power, in military mat- 
 ters. And furely it is impoffible to con- 
 ceive any thing more ridiculoufly extra- 
 vagant
 
 r '57 1 
 
 vagant, than is this military fyftem of the 
 Company ; which affords to each gover- 
 nor,, of four different capital fettlements, 
 the abfolute, independent, and difcreti- 
 onal power, of applying the military force 
 of his own government j and likewife of 
 directing the meafures of defence : whilil, 
 each, of thefe four governors, holds a par- 
 ticular intereft of his own -, which is, not 
 only diflindt from, but oppofite to that of 
 all the others. 
 
 Can it be fuppofed that four men, thus 
 oppofite in their perfonal views and inter- 
 efts, and thus independent of each other, 
 fhould heartily concur in general meafures ; 
 or mould cordially unite in a fyftem of 
 common defence ? Common fenfe informs 
 us that they will not; and experience con- 
 vinces us that they do not. For it hath 
 been known that one, of thefe fettlements, 
 hath furnifhed arms and ammunition j 
 and hath otherwife befriended a power, 
 at open war with one of the others. And, 
 in the cafe of any one of thefe fettle - 
 inents being attacked, the others are ex- 
 tremely backward in fupporting itj be- 
 caufe each, of the four governors, giving 
 the preference to his own particular 
 X oharge,
 
 1 158] 
 
 charge, in which his own perfonal intereft 
 is more immediately concerned, confiders 
 all communication of his force, to any 
 of the other fettlements, as a diminution 
 of his own fecurity, and even of his im-t 
 portance. So that, upon fuch terms, the 
 union betwixt thefe four diftind, and mu- 
 tually independent, governments, can 
 fcarcely be termed federal. 
 
 Moreover, each of thefe four governors 
 poflefles, within the limits of his own go- 
 vernment, the difcretionary power of 
 making war and peace. And, fo, hath 
 the opportunity, whenever it (hall fuit the 
 purpofe of his own perfonal in tereft, to 
 pick a quarrel, and engage his government 
 in war, with fome one of the neighbour- 
 ing native flates. Nor is this an imaginary 
 evil ;. or a fimple fuppofition of what may 
 poflibly happen -, it is a real cafe ; an abufe 
 that hath adually exifted, For, We can 
 produce feveral inftances where thefe go- 
 vernors, more particularly on the coaft of 
 Cormondel, have commenced, and induf- 
 trioufly protracted, wars with the neigh- 
 bouring iiates, exprefsly for the purpofe of 
 
 plunder and peculation, 
 
 And,
 
 And, from this difcretionary power of 
 jpeace and war lodged in the hands of thefe 
 feveral governors, and the confequent abufe 
 thereof, flow the following evils to the 
 fovereign. Firft, the governor, thus 
 warring, exhaufts and confumes the trea- 
 fureof his conftituentj to the end that he 
 and his affociates, may gain occafion to 
 pocket a part. Second, by thefe offen- 
 five wars, he waftes and deftroys that force, 
 which was intended by the fovereign for 
 defence : and, thereby, expofes his own 
 charge, naked and dcfencelefs, to the at- 
 tack of other enemies. And third, by 
 thefe wanton unneceflary and unjuft wars, 
 he provokes the hatred and jealoufy of all 
 the neighbouring flates -, -and, thus, con- 
 verts into enemies, thofe native powers, 
 who would, otherwife, be amicable and 
 friendly to the fovereign. 
 
 To correct thefe, and many other abufes 
 of a like nature, which flow from this ab- 
 furd military fyftem of the Company, it 
 is evidently and indifpenfably neceffary, 
 that there mould be inftituted, one fu- 
 preme head of military government. 
 Which, being veiled with the fupreme 
 power of making peace and war in India, 
 X 2 (hall
 
 r 160 1 
 
 {hall reftrain thefe feveral territorial go- 
 vernors, from engaging in unneceffary wars 
 with their neighbours. And which, pof- 
 fefiing the fupreme direction of the com- 
 mon force, {hall, in the cafe of particu- 
 lar or general danger, apply that force to 
 the moft proper and neceffary purpofes. 
 
 Now it is naturally proper, that the 
 
 fame intermediate fupreme power, which 
 
 fuperintends the political government, 
 
 fhould likewife fupremely fuperintend the 
 
 military government, and defence, of 
 
 thofe Indian dominions. And, for this 
 
 latter purpofe, the choice of a proper fi- 
 
 tuation, for the refidence of that fupreme 
 
 power, becomes likewife a point of moil 
 
 efTential confequenc.e. For it is evident, on 
 
 the one hand, that this military fuperin- 
 
 tending power ought not to exifl in any 
 
 one of thefe territorial governments ; nay 
 
 it ought not to refide in the immediate 
 
 neighbourhood of any one rich native 
 
 ftate ; becaufe, in either of thefe two fi- 
 
 tuations, it is liable to be tempted, by 
 
 views of avarice or ambition, to apply the 
 
 general force, to its own perfonal purpofes ; 
 
 and, if fo, the cure would be worfe than 
 
 the difeafe : and, on the other hand, it is 
 
 no
 
 t i6i-J 
 
 no lefs evident, (from the reafons alugned 
 on the fxmilar head in the political fyftern) 
 that this fupreme military power ought toi 
 be fituated fo centricaJly near, to all the 
 leveral territorial governments, as that it 
 may, at all times and feafons, be capable 
 of keeping up a ready and fpeedy cor re- 
 fpondence with each. 
 
 The diftant and unconnected fituation, 
 of thefe four capital governments, is like- 
 wife a migh ty obftrudion to a fecure fyf* 
 tern of defence. For, the wind, blow- 
 ing in thofe feas for fix months from one 
 quarter of the compafs, and for the other 
 fix months from the oppofite quarter, doth, 
 alternately, cut off in a great meafure all 
 naval communication betwixt thefe four 
 governments. For inftance, during the 
 violence of the fouth weft monfoan, that 
 is, from the middle of April till the mid- 
 dle of July, it is almoft impracticable for 
 ihips to pafs from Bengal to Madrafs : and, 
 curing the three more moderate months 
 of that monfoon, this pafTage is difficult 
 and tedious. And during the north eaft 
 monfoon, the paflage is much the fame 
 from Madrafs to Bengal. But the com- 
 munication betwixt Bombay, and thefe 
 
 two
 
 [162 ] 
 
 two fettlements, is ftill more obftructed. 
 For Bombay, being fituated in lat. 19 deg. 
 north, on the weft fide of the peninfula 
 of India, it is almoft impoffible, from thel 
 latter end of November till the middle of 
 February, for (hips from Bombay, bound 
 for the Bay of Bengal, to round the ifland 
 of Ceyloan : and, for the other three 
 months of the north eaft monfoon, they 
 are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan^ 
 to fland over to the eaftward almoft as far 
 as Atchen head, and back again to the 
 ifland j a run of about 20 degrees. From 
 the end of April till Auguft, it is almoft 
 impracticable for mips from the Bay and 
 bound for Bombay, to round Ceyloan 5 
 and in the other three months of the fouth 
 weft monfoon, that paffage is difficult and 
 tedious. And, even in the fair paflage, 
 the run betwixt Bengal and Bombay is 
 feldom made in lefs than a month. More- 
 over, during the force of the fouth weft 
 monfoon on the weft fide of the penin- 
 fula, that is, from the middle of May till 
 the middle of Auguft, it is extremely dan- 
 gerous for mips to attempt running in for 
 Bombay : the weather being then fo ex- 
 tremely thick, that fometimes a folar ob- 
 
 fervation
 
 fervation cannot be obtained for fcveral 
 days together : and if a fhip fhould, in 
 fuch circumftances, run in for the land, 
 which in fuch weather is not diftinguifh- 
 able at three leagues diftance, and fhould 
 mifs the opening of the harbour, which 
 is but fmall, it is more than probable that 
 fhe would not be able to clear the more, 
 with the wind blowing fiercely right on, 
 and rolling before it a heavy fea. As to 
 Bencolen, circumftances are nearly the 
 fame with it, as betwixt Bengal and Ma- 
 drafs. 
 
 Now it is evident, that this obftrucled 
 naval communication, betwixt the four 
 <?hief governments muft, in many refpefts, 
 greatly \veaken the common defence : 
 and muft greatly augment, to the fore- 
 reign, the charge, in both men and mo- 
 ney, of maintaining and defending thofe 
 dominions and pofieffions. Seeing it muft 
 neceffitate him to keep up, in each of 
 thofe governments, a force fufficient to 
 defend it againft the whole united ftrength 
 of an orTenfive enemy, without trufting 
 to any aid from the others : becaufe, other- 
 wife, he runs the rifk of lofing them all 
 
 fingly.
 
 1 164] 
 
 iingly, to a force that can overpower but 
 one of them. 
 
 But all the danger, inconveniences, and 
 extraordinary expence, arifing from this 
 obftru&ed naval communication, may be 
 obviated and removed, by eftabliming one 
 iupreme center of military defence; fo 
 tftuated, with refpedt to theTeveral parts 
 of thofe truly valuable territorial domi- 
 nions, as that the communication be- 
 twixt it and them (hall, in either monfoon, 
 be not only practicable but fpeedy and 
 eafy. For it is evident that, in fuch a fi- 
 tuation, this fupreme center of defence 
 could, at all time's, receive fpeedy notice 
 of any impending danger, or adtual attack ; 
 and that, upon fuch notice, it could im- 
 mediately tranfport its own garrifon, by fea 
 as well as coiled: aid from the other fettle- 
 ments. So that the garrifon of this fu- 
 preme center of defence would acl: as an 
 army of obfervation ; ever ready to pour 
 in, at any quarter, on the back of an ag- 
 greffive enemy. And, of courfe, fuch a 
 center of defence mult connect, and u- 
 nite, the flrength of all the feveral parts 
 of Britifh dominion in India. 
 
 No*
 
 1 16$ .] 
 
 Now it appears that, the fituation of 
 reiidence, becomes a circumftance, highly 
 effential to the efficacy of each purpofe,, 
 propofed from this fupreme intermediate 
 power. And it farther appears that one, 
 and the fame, fituation is required, for all 
 thcfe feveral purpofes : feeing that, from 
 a convenient naval port, fituated at a pro- 
 per diftance from the limits of all the ter- 
 ritorial governments j and, at fame time, 
 fo centrically near to each, that the com- 
 munication with all the feveral parts of 
 dominion will be fpeedy and eafy ; this 
 fupreme power would, in the firffc place, 
 completely and effectually, faithfully and 
 honourably fuperintend, enforce, and 
 controul the meafures of political govern- 
 ment, as well as the conduct of military 
 government: and, in the fecond place, it 
 would uniteand connect thegeneral ftrength 
 of thofe dominions, and completely fecure 
 the defence of the whole. 
 
 But, of the feveral fettlements poflefTed 
 by the Company in India, Bengal and Ma- 
 drafs are evidently difqualified for this feat 
 of refidencei not only becaufe the commu- 
 nication betwixt them and the other fettle- 
 ments is, at certain feafons, altogether cut 
 Y - off* 
 
 V
 
 1 166] 
 
 off; but becaufc they are, themfelves, territo- 
 rial governments $ and therein, the very ob- 
 jedl to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every 
 refpect, out of the queftion. And, there 
 then remains only Bombay ; which is fo 
 far poffefTed of the properties requifite to 
 this refidence, in that it is, at prefent, not 
 greatly embarked in territorial dominion ; 
 and is, likewife, a fea port. But in ref- 
 pe& of communication, with the truly 
 valuable poffeffions of Britain in India, 
 Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the 
 refidence of the fupreme controuling pow- 
 er, or yet the center of defence ; as mufl 
 appear from the preceding defcription ; 
 which was more particularly enlarged, 
 for the exprefs purpofe of evincing this. 
 Far from being a proper center of de- 
 fence, all the force that is lodged at Bom- 
 bay becomes detached, and completely 
 loft to the defence of Britain's truly valua- 
 ble pofleffions ; at leaft on any fudden e- 
 mergency. Indeed Bombay is, in every 
 thing, refpecting either dominion or com- 
 merce, a dead load, and uielefs fettlement ; 
 faving it be for the fole purpofe of a naval 
 port, or a place for refitting our fquadrons. 
 
 But
 
 But the choice of Bombay for a naval 
 port, is the moft dangerous and fatal error, 
 in the whole abfurd fyftem of the Com- 
 pany's defence : feeing that, by this abfurd 
 choice, Britain lofes the ufe of her naval 
 force ; which is her capital ftrength of de- 
 fence, againft the attack of France, her 
 only dangerous enemy in India As will 
 appear It is impoffible that (hips, the beft 
 fitted from Europe, can fubfift, in thofe 
 feas, for two years, without a thorough 
 repair : and more particularly in time of 
 jvar j when action hath happened, and is 
 again expected. And this thorough ,re r 
 pair they cannot obtain but in a 
 naval port, properly filled with docks, or 
 careening platforms. Bombay is the only 
 naval port, thus fitted by Britain, in In- 
 dia ; confequently the fquadron of Britain 
 muft retire, at leaft every fecond year, to 
 Bombay, for repair. But the British 
 fquadron being once retired to Bombay, 
 (as is common, in O&oberj) which is fitua- 
 ted in lat. 19 degrees north, on the weft fide 
 of the peninfula > it is as effectually ex- 
 cluded, for five months, from the bay of 
 Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal 
 itfelf, as if it was flill in Europe. 'And, 
 Y 2 during
 
 during thefc five months, the enemy may 
 ehher fcour that Bay with fingle cruizers, 
 or fhe may tranfport, and, without oppo- 
 fition, land a force in Bengal j and thefe 
 faid five months are the very fitted in the 
 whole year for land operations. This muft 
 be thoroughly underftood by all thofe who 
 are acquainted with the navigation of thofe 
 feas : and could be here readily demon - 
 ftrated ; was it not that, by publickly 
 pointing out our own weaknefs, we mould 
 point out to the enemy her ftrength. 
 It is moft certain that, if France under- 
 ftands her own advantage, (and it is to be 
 apprehended me is but too well acquainted 
 with it; flie may either wafte and confume 
 theBritim fquadron,]through preventing its 
 repair ; or otherwife me may efFeft every 
 purpofe, againfl Bengal, nay again ft Ma-*- 
 4rafs, with as great fecurity, as if there 
 was no Britim iquadron in India : ever fo 
 long as Britain mail continue her only na- 
 val port at Bombay. Nor is there any al- 
 ternative. For as to that ridiculous no- 
 tion, of carrying a fquadron of large mips 
 up the river of Bengal to repair, no com- 
 mander in his fenfes would, in the time of 
 war, when he expected to be equally 
 
 matched
 
 1 169] 
 
 matched by the enemy, fo foon as the fea- 
 ibn arrived, incur the riik of lofing fome 
 of his fhips, in the paflage up and down 
 that incredibly dangero'us river -, and ftill 
 lefs would he fubject himfelf to the cer- 
 tainty of lofing half his hands, by that 
 putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. 
 Neither would he be mad enough, in the 
 while of a hot war, to ufe that dangerous 
 expedient, of half repairing at Trinca- 
 malay ; where he is liable to be furprized 
 by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In 
 fine, fo long as Bombay continues to be 
 our only naval port, our commanders 
 muft, of neceffity, either wafte and lofe 
 their fquadron ; or elfe they muft retire to 
 Bombay, at the leaft, once in two years ; 
 and, thereby leave the feas, with all our 
 valuable poffeffions in the Bay of Bengal, 
 freely expofed to the attack of an enemy, 
 for five months. 
 
 It therefore follows that, if Britain 
 means to avail herfelf of her naval force^ 
 which is the principal defence of her do- 
 minion and commerce in India, ihe muft 
 eftablifh a proper naval port, on the eaft 
 fide of the peninfula ; becaufe, on that 
 fide lay all her truly valuable pofleflions, 
 
 and
 
 [I 7 o] 
 
 and commerce. And that port, which I 
 mean to propofe, is in every refpect com- 
 pletely qualified for this purpofe : though 
 I cannot, in this publication, fpecify the 
 place; left the enemy mould anticipate, 
 and take the advantage of our fliameful 
 neglect. 
 
 I am fenfible it will be immediately ex- 
 claimed that we have already too many 
 pofleffions in India ; and that this is no 
 time to increafe our fettlements there ; and 
 thereby to increafe the drain of our native 
 itrength, as well as the expence of trea- 
 fure. 
 
 But* to- this, I anfwer, that this new 
 eftabliihment would not encreafe the num- 
 ber of our capital fettlements in India : on 
 the contrary, it would diminim it, from 
 four to three : for it would fupprefs, in 
 the firfl place, Bombay ; which is in every 
 refpect a truly ufelefs fettlement; and would 
 therefore be exchanged for this new fettle- 
 ment ; which would ferve to connect the 
 whole ftrength of this dominion j as well 
 as to promote a variety of other very im- 
 portant purpofes. In the fecond place, 
 Bencolen would be reduced to the degree 
 of a fubordinate, immediately under the 
 
 direction
 
 I '7 3 
 
 direction of the refident at this new fet- 
 tlcment ; and completely fecure under its 
 protection.-/ i.S 
 
 As to the drain of native ftrength, this 
 eftablimment would, inftead of adding, 
 confiderably decreafe it : for the garrifon, 
 together with the artillery, &c. of Bombay, 
 would be tranfported thither; as likewife 
 would the better part of the garrifon at 
 Bencolen : and thefe two garrifons, being 
 placed there, would form an army of ob- 
 fervation, for all our valuable pofleflions, 
 as hath been defcribed ; confequently the 
 territorial governments would not demand 
 that degree of force, which is requifite at 
 prefent, when each ftands on its own 
 bottom. 
 
 And with regard to the expence of 
 treafure, I fhall only obferve that, it is 
 mod unaccountably abfurd in Britain to 
 fend out to India, a fquadron of 17 mips 
 of the line, befides frigates, (as me did in 
 laft war,) for the protection of her domi- 
 nion and commerce in that country ; which 
 fquadrons become evidently unprofitable 
 to that purpofe, through the circumftancc 
 of wanting a properly fituated naval port; 
 when lefs than a (ingle year's charge, of
 
 [ '7*] 
 
 fuch fquadron, would fuffice to complete- 
 ly fit up a naval port, fo fituated as that, 
 from thence, her naval force would com- 
 pletely effect its intended purpofe. For I 
 affirm, that the port which I propofe would 
 be completely fitted up, in every refpect, 
 as a naval port, for lefs expence than one 
 year's charge of fuch fquadron ; feeing 
 that I do not propofe docks, but platforms 
 for careening, as at Batavia ; and thefe are 
 prepared, in infinitely lefs time, and at 
 much lefs charge than docks ; whilft they 
 are far more convenient and expeditious 
 for repairing large mips, than thefe docks 
 at Bombay. And, as to the fortification 
 immediately requifite, it would be but lit- 
 tle expenfive, and would demand but lit- 
 tle time to rear it: becaufe it would be 
 perfectly accefiible to the fhips ; and fo, 
 whilil it protected them, would be pro- 
 tected by them. 
 
 Moreover no part of the treafure, ex- 
 pended on originally fitting this naval port, 
 would come immediately out of Britain's 
 proper treafury ; for the whole would be 
 defrayed by the dependent dominion in 
 India. And this new eflabliihment would, 
 in a very little time, not only fupport its 
 
 own
 
 t *73 1 
 
 own charge, but would richly reimburfe 
 Britain for her original coft. Seeing it 
 would, in the firft place, as a colony or 
 fettlement, yield her immediate treafure, 
 together with fundry commodities peculiar 
 to itfelf ; and*, in a little time, it would, 
 under proper conduct, produce rich ma- 
 nufactures. In the fecond place, it would, 
 as an Emporium, (for which purpofe it is 
 perfectly adapted by its fituation,) greatly 
 improve the commerce of Britain in In- 
 dia : and as a centrical magazine or ware- 
 houfe, for the commodities of China as 
 well as India, it would reduce the term 
 of the Company's voyages to one year ; 
 and, thereby, reducing the expence of her 
 carnage nearly one third, it would enable 
 her to fell cheaper 5 and confequently ad- 
 vance her commerce in Europe. Like* 
 wife the Company's {hips rendezvoufing 
 and departing from this port for Europe, 
 under proper convoy, this would fecure 
 her trade from that imminent danger to 
 which it is expofed, from her {hips ren- 
 dezvouQng iingly, at that button of an 
 ifland, St. Helena : a circumftance that 
 may, in the very firft year of a French 
 war, completeJy ruin this Company ; as 
 Z that
 
 1 174 1 
 
 that enemy is now perfectly acquainted 
 with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly 
 ufelefs to all thefe, and indeed to every 
 other purpofe; as can be readily demon- 
 ftrated : and the whole benefit derived from 
 it, as acolony or fettlement, in the year, doth 
 not fuffice to defray one month's expence. 
 But this new eftablifhment, being once 
 fitted up as a naval port, from whence the 
 fquadrons of Britain can, in either mon- 
 foon, command all her valuable polfeffions; 
 this fame eflablifhment would, at fame 
 time, completely fuit for the refidence of 
 that fupreme intermediately fuperintending 
 power. For this port is fituated, at fuch 
 a diftance from all the territorial govern- 
 ments, as would fuffice to effectually pre- 
 vent the controuling power, from inter- 
 fering in the immediate execution of go- 
 vernment. And, having faid that it is 
 perfectly well lituated for a naval port, it 
 follows that the communication, betwixt 
 it and all the parts of the British dominion 
 in India, muft be fpeedy and eafy, in 
 either monfoon : and confequently that, 
 from this refidence, this fupreme power can 
 effectually fuperin tend, enforce, and con- 
 troul the meafures of political, as well 
 
 as
 
 f '75 J 
 
 as of military, government, in this wholfi 
 dominion. And, being the center of 
 naval defence, it muft be the only pro- 
 per center of land defence : feeing the 
 iquadron will be ever at hand, to tranf- 
 port its land force, to any part of this 
 dominion, that may be in danger. 
 
 And thus have I accompliQied that 
 which I propofed : having planned the defign 
 of an intermediate power which, in fuch 
 a fituation as hath been defcribed, would 
 eftablifh a completely regular fyftem of go- 
 vernment, civil as well as military, in 
 the whole prefent or future dominion of 
 Britain in India : nay which would, in 
 the hands of national government, ren- 
 der the tafk of governing this Indian do- 
 minion, as facil and eafy, as it is to go- 
 vern the fmall Ifle of Man. And, the 
 feat of its refidence beiag at fame time 
 the center of naval and land defence, it 
 would completely conned the, other wife, 
 divided ftrength of the feveral govern- 
 ments : and would eftahlifh the general 
 defence, upon a footing fo fecure, that no 
 enemy, either European or native, would 
 dare to attack Britidi dominion in India. 
 It likewife appears that the drain of native 
 Z 2 flrength,
 
 1 176 ] 
 
 flrength, requifiteto maintain this whole 
 dominion, would but little exceed that 
 which Britain expends on maintaining the 
 two barren fortrefles, of Gibraltar and 
 St. Philips'?. Whilft no part of the pecu- 
 niary charge, of either eftabliihing or 
 afterwards fupporting this fyftem of go- 
 vernment, nor yet of the land and even 
 naval defence, would corne out of the 
 treafury of Britain j but would all be 
 defrayed by the dependent dominion. 
 
 I have farther demonftrated the moral 
 impoffibility of governing and maintaining 
 this Indian dominion, by means of the 
 Company j upon any other terms, than 
 thefe, of continuing her fovereign at home 
 as well as abroad ; and of conferring, up- 
 on her Directors, the fovereign execution 
 of government in Britain, as well as in 
 that dependent dominion. 
 
 And I have endeavoured to rouze and 
 awake the nation, to fome fenfe of, and re- 
 gard to, the intereft me holds in this In- 
 dian dominion; by a flight dcfcriptive 
 fketch of the nature, and degree, of be- 
 nefit received by her from it, for fome years 
 pad. And, as the fenfation received from 
 fact and experience makes ever a ftronger 
 
 impref-
 
 [ 177 1 
 
 imprcffion on the mind, than that which 
 is conveyed by fpeculative argument, I mall 
 here again apply to the experience of the 
 public, on this topic; which cannot be 
 too much inculcated, nor prefented in too 
 many different points of view ; at this 
 truly critical jun<fture, when nothing lefs 
 than the rnoft fpeedy application, of the 
 moft vigorous meafures, can prevent the 
 total lofs, of this moft important object to 
 Britain ; either through the final ruin of 
 the countries themfelves 5 or, otherwife, 
 by the aflault of enemies. 
 
 Britain feels a general failure of credit* 
 not only in the Eaft India Company, but 
 in individuals : and this failure of credit 
 flie can afcribe to no other caufe, than to 
 fome extraordinary defect of numerical 
 circulation, or a deficiency of numerical 
 fpecie, fufficient to fupport the wonted 
 credit of paper. How happens this want 
 of numerical fpecie to be fo feverely felt, 
 all of a fudden ; or from whence fliould 
 fuch defect arife ? Afluredly frbm a de- 
 creafe of her wonted influx of numerical 
 fpecie ; whilft her drain of that fpecie 
 continues to be at leaft the fame as for- 
 merly. But what channel or fource, of 
 
 Britain's
 
 Britain's influx, hath been dried up fo fud- 
 denly, as to create this furprizing failure 
 of numerical circulation ? We have fhown 
 it to originate in Indian dominion ; which 
 being, through mifgovernment, reduced 
 to a ruinous (late, the confequent wonder- 
 ful decreafe of revenue, hath obliged the 
 Company, to abforb and dry up that chan- 
 nel of Indian private fortunes ; which, till 
 within thefe two years, ufed to convey into 
 Britain, by foreign Company's bills, &c. 
 at leaft 700,000 l./?r annum, in numeri- 
 cal fpecie, or what is equivalent. And as 
 Britain hath, during the two years that 
 this channel was dried up, been continuing 
 that drain, which (he could barely fup- 
 port, when aided by that private fortune 
 influx, it is plain that, within thefe two 
 years, (he muft have diminished the (land- 
 ing (lock of her numerical circulation, 
 at leaft, 1,400,000!. And one year, more 
 of only an equally decreafed degree of 
 influx, will diminim her circulating (lock 
 2, 100,000 1. and fo on. But a total depri- 
 vation of the influx received, for fomc 
 years paft, from Indian dominion, will* 
 annually, double the diminution of cir 
 culating ftock. 
 
 And*
 
 t '79] 
 
 And, from this view, the nation may 
 draw the following juft inferences : firft, 
 the mighty value and importance, of this 
 Indian dominion, to Britain ; in point of 
 financial aid j as well as in other weighty 
 refpecls. Second, the mighty alteration 
 of circumftances, in thefe Indian coun- 
 tries, fmce the time they became fubjefted 
 to the dominion of the Company ; as alfo, 
 the prefent ruinous ftate of that domi- 
 nion. And from thefe two inferences fhe 
 may deduce, that conelufion which hath 
 been juft mentioned, that nothing lefs thaa 
 the moft fpeedy application of the moil 
 vigorous and effectual meafures, can pof- 
 fibly fave thofe countries from final ruin; 
 and Britain from confequent bankruptcy, 
 poverty, lofs of credit, of commerce, na- 
 vigation, naval power, &c. 
 
 I have, in this haily production, iltetch- 
 ed out the nature of the necefTary meafures; 
 but the application of thefe meafures de- 
 pends entirely upon the nation's exerting 
 her own attention. I am far from mean- 
 ing to work upon the paflions, I apply on* 
 ly to the reafon and underftanding of men ; 
 for had not refpccT: to decorum, and to the 
 dignity of government, retrained rne, I 
 
 might,
 
 t 180] 
 
 might, on this fubjeft, have thrown out 
 many things, that muft have excited dif- 
 content and indignation. Neverthelefs the 
 importance and urgency of the cafe obli- 
 ges me to add, (and, without this, all I 
 have faid can avail nothing,) that unlefs the 
 nation {hall exert herfelf moft vigoroufly 
 in this her own deareft concern, me muft 
 not look for any fuch effectual meafures, as 
 will fuffice to prevent thefe difafters. 
 
 For the nation muft confider, that her 
 prefent adminiftration confifts of the very 
 men who tranfacled, and (by their truly 
 reverberating eccho) confirmed, to the 
 Company, the fecond * grant of the De- 
 wanny : knowing that this Dewanny was 
 nothing other than the fovereignty of a 
 
 * .We muft make a wide difference betwixt the firft 
 and fecond grants of this Dewanny, (as it is termed.) 
 The firft grant was made for only two years, at a time 
 \vhen the then miniftry were in a great meafure unac- 
 quainted with the nature of the thing which they 
 granted : having been deceived by bafe art : nor did this 
 miniftry, in the courfe of their adminiftration, exert 
 any manner of minifterial influence over the Directors. 
 But far different were the lights, as well as the conduct 
 of that miniftry which, on the expiration of the fir It 
 two years, renewed that grant for the long term of 
 five years. 
 
 mighty
 
 mighty dominion, dependent upon the 
 Crown, and Nation, of Britain : and, con- 
 fequently that, by fubjecting the numerous, 
 inhabitants of thofe countries to the domi- 
 nion of a few merchants, incapable of ad- 
 miniftring any fort of government, they 
 were conilgning over to tyranny and anar- 
 chy, intolerable oppreffion and ruin, many 
 millions of men, who were, to all intents 
 and purpofes,. fubjects of Britain. And 
 they are the men who, during the four 
 years that elapfed fince that grant, have 
 furnifhed the force to.fupport this tyranny 
 
 and anarchy : and, in fpite of "* . 
 
 , ~.. , u 'enacting a farce, 
 
 wherein the Directors were compelled to 
 perform the fame part in Europe, that the 
 native Nabobs have exhibited in In- 
 dia. It cannot, therefore, be expected that 
 they will, willingly, change their plan of 
 conduct : feeing that, befides their former 
 motives, they have the additional one of 
 obflinacy ; or mame of Handing felf-con- 
 demned, for paft mifmanagement, mould 
 they now alter their meafures. It is ra- 
 ther to be fuppofed that they will continue 
 the cloke of the Company ; together with 
 the Directorial farce : and that/to fupport 
 A a the
 
 the broken credit of the Company, (bro* 
 ken by collufive management,) they will, 
 through eccho, grant her a power, to force 
 her paper upon the public, for its money. 
 As alfo that, under the pretext of honour- 
 ing the nation with fome mare in the charge 
 of this fovcreignty, (under the Company 
 but no fhare in the profits,) they will gra- 
 dually thruft her moulders under that whole 
 load, which, as the Company muft ma- 
 nage it, will foon become intolerable. And, 
 by the aid of thefe frefh reinforcements, 
 they will juggle it and bungle it, and bun- 
 gle it and juggle it on, for one, or poffibly 
 two, years longer : and then Nation and 
 Company will both tumble together, into 
 the pit of bankruptcy, perdition, and def- 
 pair. 
 
 But mall the nation, with eyes open, 
 fuffer the pilot to crowd ftemlings on the 
 rocks, which have already grazed the 
 fhip's bottom ? No, we muft about fhip, 
 and call another hand to the helm. Mat- 
 ters, it is to be hoped, are not yet paft re- 
 medy ; the channel is obvious ; if the na- 
 tion will but put to her hand. His Ma- 
 jefty can have no real intereft but what is 
 common with that of his people : and, 
 
 how-
 
 t 
 
 however the views of the Crown may, m 
 fome cafes, differ a little from thefe of the 
 people ; in this particular cafe they muft 
 both exadly concur. He will, here, 
 hearken to the voice of his people : and 
 a little popular heat will force into admi-* 
 niftration fomething of that patriotic am- 
 bition, fire, fpirit, and enterprize, which 
 alone can fave this nation from dreadful 
 impending misfortunes. 
 
 But if the nation, funk in the bed of 
 flavifh floth, inebriated with the tranf- 
 forming Circean cap, enervated and emaf- 
 culatcd by the lewd embraces of fenfuai 
 pleafure, ihall flight and difregard her own 
 deareft concerns : like the prodigal debau- 
 chee, who chides from him the faithful 
 friend that attempts recalling him to fober 
 reflection ; and implicitly confides in the 
 management of a fteward, who hath al- 
 ready wafted the better part of his fair 
 patrimony : then let the nation, fome two 
 or three years hence, recollect, that flic 
 was advifed of her danger, by a hafty pro- 
 duction, iflued about the middle of Janu- 
 ary, 1773 : though not thought of, until 
 that moft difmterefted of all poflible mi- 
 nifters had, by way of remedying ail evils, 
 
 A
 
 t 
 
 ctffpatched kis Secret Committee to the In*. 
 dia Houfe : there to infpect the Company's 
 private ceconomy : a thing, with which, 
 neither law, jaftice, government, nor na- 
 tion hath any thing to do j and which, 
 unlefs in cafes of bankruptcy^ is facred to 
 the meaneft individual.. As if, from the 
 Company's hooks of accounts, it was pof* 
 fible to difcover the caufe of abufe in the 
 government of thofe Indian dominions :- 
 or, as if fchemcs of faving to the Com- 
 pany, one Shilling per ton, freight of her 
 cargoes : or, three pence per pound, irv 
 warehoufe room, would retrieve the, ah- 
 moft ruined, Jntereil of Britain in India. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below 
 
 25 1944 
 
 1973
 
 A 000000133 9