UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES t fet E PRESENT STATE O'F THE BRITISH INTEREST I N INDIA: WITH A PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THAT COUNTRY. LONDON: Printed for J, ALMON, oppofite Burlington Houfe^ in Piccadilly. M DCC LXXIIL 17X45 -- * 4 f price Three Shillin s s 'J Vikil CONTENTS. J . rTTt H E prefent State of the Britifli In- JL tereft in India, &c. page f] II. The Nature and Effe&s of the Compa- ny's Government in Bengal, v if III. The true Caufes of Evil and Abufe in the Government of Bengal, and the Means to remedy them, 46 IV. A Plan, for eftablifhing a regular Syftem of political Government in India, 106 y. A Plan, for eftablifhing a regular Syftem of military Government, and of fecure Defence, in India, - 156 THE - . THE PRESENT STATE O F T H E BRITISH INTEREST I N INDIA, &c/ NO nation nor ftate ever acquired an acceffion of dominion fo truly va- luable and beneficial, as are the acquifi- tions lately made by Britain in India. But the particular fituation of her circumftan- ces at the time when thefe acquifitions fell into her hands, enhanced the real and in- trinfic value of them to Britain. Oppref- fed by a grievous debt, the annual intereft of which, exceeding four millions and a half filling, was levied by taxes, which raifed the price of each manufacture, her commerce labouring under fuch difadvan* tages was daiiy/fmking into decay , whilft a conudetable part of this annual intereft being paid to foreigners, created fuch a dram of ipecie, as the balance of her trade could not fupply , fo that, in proportion as her expence increafed, the means of defraying it diminifhed ; and he was eve- B ry I 6 ] ry year approaching towards a flate of na- tional poverty and bankruptcy. In fuch circumftances did Britain ac- quire the fovereign dominion of Bengal, and of other rich manufadluring and trad- ing countries in India ; which, at the time they fell to her, were capable of not only defraying every charge of their own go- vernment and defence, but over and above 1 that, of yielding annually to the fovereign a fum equal to 1,300,000!. flerling, as can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we include in this fum the benefit which Bri- tain had been accuftomed to receive, in her commercial capacity, by her trade with thofe countries r the fum here fpe- cified would have arifen purely in confe- quence of dominion : and, whether tranl* mitted from thofe countries in merchan- dize or in money, would at laft have ar- rived at the public treafury in fpecie : and would thus have ferved to alleviate the burden of thofe taxes, that are preff- ing every branch of herdomeftic commerce to ruin. And, if Britain had beffcwed the fmalleft attention on the political go- vernment of thofe countries, (he might have continued to draw from them the above- f 7 1 abovementioned tribute fum in perpetuum, without any danger of draining or impo- veriming them : nay it is certain, that under a juft, equitable and well ordered government, their commerce and agricul- ture might have been extended to a de- gree, that would have enabled them to afford a ftill larger annual tribute to the fovereign. The poffeflion of this Indian dominion is likewife fo particularly fecu- red from domeftic and foreign danger, by the extraordinary fubmiffive difpofition of the natives, the fingularly defenfible fitu- ation of the country, and the naval fupe- riority of Britain, that, by a very trifling expence of men, 'and no pecuniary charge, fhe might have maintained it againft all enemies. So that Britain might have de- rived from this dependent dominion re- fources fufficient to relieve her from all her difficulties and diftrefles. This is what Britain might have done : and this was not fimply poilible, it was eafy of execution. But if we enquire what Britain hath done, we (hall find that, inftead of applying thefe refources by a proper care and attention to the purpofe, for which it would feem the all- wife dif- B 2 penfation f 8 1 penfation of Providence had at this criti- cal conjuncture beftowed them upon her, flie hath indolently and defperately thrown them from her, and left them to the wi'l of blind chance. For furely it may with pro- priety be faid, that the government of Bri- tain configned all thefe rtfources to the guidance of blind chance, or rather to certain deftruction, when it fcrupuloufly withheld its own care, and implicitly con- fided the fovereign charge of governing and defending this foreign dominion to a Company of Merchants, fo evident'v un- equal to fuch a charge, that, inftead of being furprized that thefe coun tries fhouid now at laft be impoverifhed and ruined, we have reafon to be aftonimed, that they have fupported, for fuch a length of time, the complicated evils of tyranny and a* narchy. The confequenccs of committing this fovereign charge to the Company have been long forefeen, and likewife foretold, by fome who were acquainted with the nature of their government : but the power and influence of thofe who were iharing amongft them the plunder of thofe wretched countries, blafted the credit of their t 9 ] their reprefentations : until at laft, the effects being felt at home, it hath become impoffible to totally fupprefs the truth. Nay even now, that thefe men are forced to partly acknowledge the ruinous fitua- tion of this foreign dominion, yet have they ftill the affurance tomiflead the pub- lic judgment, by reprefenting the Com- pany as the only party concerned in the confequence : though it is certain, that this Indian concern, which hath been leafed or farmed out by Government to the Company, is of the very higheft impor- tance to the public intereil j as haying been for many years the principal fupport of national opulence and credit, as well as of commerce and revenue. For, in the article of opulence, the private fortunes acquired in thofe countries by the fervants of the Company, ever fince the time that their power prevailed over the native go- vernment, that is ever fince 1757, hath created an annual influx of fpecie to Bri- tain of about 700,000 1. and the dedo- magt.nent paid to Government by the Company, fince the aflumption of the de- wanny in 1765, is a farther influx of 400,000 1. [ 1 ] 400,000 1. the drawback on teas is reck- oned about 200,000 1. and the Company hath increafed her dividend fmce the laft mentioned period 200,000 1. though only one half of this laft fum may be reckon- ed to remain in the country, the other half being paid to foreign proprietors. Thefe four fums, making together 1,400,000!. have been yearly drawn from India in con- fequence of dominion : and, whether fent from thence in merchandize, in bills, or in fpecie, have produced fo much money to Britain : and notwithstanding the pri- vate fortunes have been acquired by means that have exhaufted thefe fources of wealth, that might otherwife have flowed perpe- tually into Britain ; and the dedomage- ment may be confidered as a bafe compo- lition, received for alienating the fpvereign rights of the Britim crov/n and nation^ and for furniming a force to fupport the moft deteftable tyranny of a few indivi- duals over fifteen millions of men, wha are to all intents and purpofes Britim fub-* jeds ; yet did the opportune importation of fo much wealth, ferve to fupport the credit of the nation under the grievous ac- cumulation of debt contracted in the laft t "1 war ; and to prevent her feeling the dram of fpecie made by her foreign creditors, which otherwife would by this time have completely exhaufted her. By her com- merce with thofe countries, Britain hath exported yearly 5 or 600,000 1. worth of her own manufactures and merchandize, and for thefe me received the commodi- ties of India ; which commodities, being; re-exported, formed the moft efTential ar- ticle of her traffic with Africa, on which her Weft India colonies do entirely de- pend ; they are likewife the moft valua- ble article of her trade with America. And the duties levied by Government, on fuch part of thefe Indian commodities as is expended at home, create a very confi- derable, and by far the moft equitable and convenient branch of revenue. But the value and importance of this Indian concern will appear in a ftill ftronger light, if we (hall look forward to the confequences that muft naturally and unavoidably .enfue to the public intereft from the lofs of it. The firft and moft immediate of thefe confequences will be national bankruptcy ; or, which is the fame thing, a ftop to the payment of in- tereft terefl on the national debt > for a depri- vation of that annual influx of fpecie from India will quickly produce national po- verty; and an incapacity of paying in fpecie the intereft of the foreign credi- tors. But the lofs of our Indian com- merce will operate this efFeft ftill more fpeedily; for, on the fuppofition that the nation mail be deprived of this branch of commerce, it muft neceffarily follow, that Government will lofe that branch of reve- nue which arifes from the home confump- tion of Indian commodities ; and it is plain, that Government cannot then con- tinue to pay the ufual expence, without making good this deficiency of revenue by additional taxes on land, and the ne- ceflaries of life : but as this additional load, falling on our little remaining com- merce, would by one year's experience be found infupportable, Government would be forced to retrench its expence, in that only article that can be difpenfed with, the payment of intereft on the national debt; and when this happens, what advan- tage will the public creditor hold above the India proprietor ? The only difference will be, that the latter will have felt his lofs 1 13 1 lots Ji little earlier than the former. But national bankruptcy* though it may be the firft, is not the only* nor even the great* eft, public damage, accruing from a de- privation of this Indian concern : lofs of future credit, of trade and navigation, and confequently of naval power and defence^ will foon fallow ; and, in this general ca- lamity, everyone individual of thecommu-* nity will come in for his {hare, in pro- portion to his rank or fituation. Such are the confequences that muft enfue to the public intereft from a depriva- tion of the benefit hitherto derived from this Indian concern t and if the nation is to fuffer fo grievoufly by the lofs of this object, can {he allow herfelf to be perfua- ded,thatme hath no intereft in its preferva- tion. Now this objecl: ftands in danger of being loft to the nation by two different caufes j the firft being, the neglect or in- capacity of the Company to maintain and defend it from the aflault of enemies : and * the other danger arifes from the oppreffion, and mifconducT: of this Company's poli- tical government ; tending to defpoil thofe countries of their circulating fpecie, their arts, manufactures, commerce, and inha- C bitants, ['4] bitants, which were the only means that enabled them to afford this benefit to Bri- tain. The firft of thefe dangers is fcafce* ly dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps imme- diately imminent $ at prefent however we are treating of the danger to be appre- hended ffom the political caufe. How far the intereft of this foreign do- minion hath been injured by the Com- pany's political mifgovernment ; or how near it may be reduced to a ftate of utter inability to afford any farther benefit to Britain, is but little known by the public. For though people have heard in the grofs, that affairs in thofe countries are rather in a bad fituation, yet do not they either underftand or believe it to be fo very bad as it really is ; or rather they do not com* prehend how it mould be fo bad $ as not being acquainted with the full power of the caufe that hath produced the evil^ and every one will form his notion of ef- feds that he neither feels nor fees, from his knowledge or opinion of the nature and power of the caufes that produced them* In the cafe before us, people have been taught to confider the oppreflion and ex- tortion of its government, (of which cer- tain f 15] tain inftances are quoted) as the fole caufe of evil to Bengal : of confequence it is fuppofed that Bengal hath fuftered no far- ther damage from its government, than what may have been caufed by fome pri- vate ads of extortion, exercifed by the few perfons vefted with the powers of governing : and, befides that the authen- ticity of thefe ads is denied or difputed, and men who are to judge only from re- port are apt to make allowance for the prejudice or paflion of the accufer who brings a charge againft individuals ; ftill if all thefe acts of oppreffion that have been narrated mould be fully credited ; nay, if the hearer fhould fuppofe ftill more than is reprefented, yet cannot he conceive or allow himfelf to believe that fuch ads of extortion, exercifed by a fmall number of individuals, could fuffice to re- duce the lately rich commercial kingdom of Bengal to fuch a deplorable ftate of mifery, poverty, and diftrefs : the caufe afligned will appear too trivial for the ef- fed ; and of courfe the efFed, at leaft the degree of it, will be difcredited. But he who means to acquire a juft no- tion of the prefent ftate of thofe countries, C a and and the extent of damage they have fuf tained from their prefent Government, muft fully inform himfelf of the true na ture and condition of that Government, and the manner of its operation on the general jnterefl of the people governed > he muft learn, not only that which it hath done, but likewife that which it hath not done ; for the interefl of a community may fufrer far more detriment from the non- ac~tion, than from the oppreffion, of its government. To the end, therefore, that every one may be enabled to form a proper judgment on thefe matters, we mean to prefent a general view of the nature, and effects, of fhe Company's Government i# Bengal, The THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT I N BENGAL. THE Englifh Eaft India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real and actual fovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa : a dominion equal to almoft any one ftate in Europe, in refpeft of either extent and fertility of country, or num- bers of ingenious and induftrious fubje&s ; and exceeding moft of them in the inter- nal materials of commerce, or refources of wealth. The Company executes the go- vernment of this dominion by a deputa- tion, confifling of a Governor and Coun- cil j who refide at Calcutta, the Com- pany's original prefidency, or chief factory in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as pofTeffing the executive authority of the Company, may be termed the fupreme fovereigns of this Indian dominion, have preferved to themfelves the fole power of immediately ordering, directing and con- trouling trouling the government 5 for this de- puted government communicates its pur- pofes, receives its orders, and accounts for its conduct to none but the Directors. But it is evident, that the diftance of fituation muft render the immediate con- troul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and nugatory ; for it would be abfurd to fuppofe, that the government ef Bengal mould defer the execution of any one purpofe until it fhall have com- municated with, and received the opinion of the i irectors, which cannot be effe&ed in the fpacc of a whole year ; confequently the directors cannot interfere in the direc- tion, or ordering of this government, far- ther than in fume few cafes of the moft general or invariable nature : but the execution o f even thcfe general orders de- pends upon the will and difcretion of the deputed government j feeing the Directors cannot, at that diftance, enforce it them- felves : and the lame caufe puts it out of their power to prevent or reftrain abufe ; fo that they hold neither potitive nor ne- gative authority in the immediate execu- tion of this government. And the con- dition or fituation of thefe directorial fo- vereigns vereigns at home, renders their retrof r pedtive controul equally impotent and in- effectual ; for they have no power in them- felves to inflict other punifhment on their deputies, for the mod audacious difobe-* dience, or for maladminiftration, than dif- minion from their fervice j and this be- comes no punifhment, becaufe the delin- quents are previoufly prepared for it, being ready to fet out of their own accord with a princely fortune for the mother country j where they fet the authority of the Di- rectors at defiance ; for there thefe fo ve- reigns of India are themfelves fubjedts, and cannot call their quondam minifters to ac- count, except in an ordinary court of juf- tice ; and the difficulty of obtaining evi- dence requifite to convict in thefe courts, the dread of bringing to light, in the courfe of a legal procefs, foms abftrufe myfteries of government; and the ap- prehenfion of danger arifing to the intereft of the prefent direction from a powerful combination at the next election, will ever deter the Directors from ferioufly profe- cuting a lawfuit againft their deputies, even in cafes of peculation from the fo- vereign $ but if it refpedts only the intereil of [20] of the fubjeft, they will Be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We muft therefore perceive, that this deputed go- vernment ads perfectly independent of either the immediate controul, or future awe of the fovereign : whilft the foVereign, is compelled to blindly fupport, with its whole power, the authority of this go- vernment ; and, without choice, to en- force all its meafures ; feeing that to op* pofe the will of the deputy, is oppofmg the authority of the fovereign. And, as to the native fubjecls, the power of this deputed government over them is perfectly abfolute and complete. For the inhabitants of thofe countries, being dif- pofed by nature or climate to paflive obe* dience, and by long cuftom habituated to defpotic authority, and being farther im- prefled with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of their natural fuperiority, implicitly fubmit to the will of their pre- fcnt government, without once daring to either examine its right, difpute its au- thority, or queftion its conduct. The fubjedt therefore holds not the fmalleft voice in the adminiflration of govern- ment; the jurifdiction, the police, the finances, [21 ] finances, the military * government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company's deputation : and the entire interefts of thofe countries, the % lives and property of the inhabitants, are fubjected to its difcretiori, and depend oil its will. So that this deputation of the Company- executes the government of Bengal with a power perfectly unlimited by any exte- rior controul ; and if we confider that ifc is at the fame time foreign to the country governed, mutable, and of very mort du- ration, we mall find that it is equally un- reftrained by any internal check. It is therefore the rriolt unlimited government on earth j or rather it is the only govern* ment that can, with propriety, be termed arbitrary and defpotic. For all other deputed governments arc fufficiently reftrained by the' authority of the fovereign j and we have no idea of def* potifm, except in governments that are fupreme or fovereign. But the idea of actual defpotifm in a fupreme government is merely imaginary ; feeing that, in one and all of thefe governments, the power of governing is conditional, limited By D rule, , t 22 J rule, and fubjected to controul both ex- ternal and internal. For it is evident, that, in all fupreme governments, the power of governing, and the means that fupport this power, muft needs be derived from the people governed 5 and there- fore cannot exift in defpight of their con- fent; and though, in fome of thefe go- vernments, the condition, upon which this power and thefe means are granted, is not fpecially exprefled, yet is it perfectly understood," and invariably enforced in all of them ; inafmuch as there are examples in each, of fovereigns who have fufrered the utmoft punifhment, for attempting to tranfgrefs the limits of this condition; nay, there is fcarce one inftance where the prince, thus tranfgreffing, efcaped the refentment of the people ; and examples of this nature are moft frequent in thefe governments that are falfely termed def- potic. Thefe examples muft therefore convince all fovereigns, that there is a power in the people, fuperior to, and capable of controuling them ; and the fenfe' of this muft ever prove an effeclual external controul on the conduft of a fu- preme government. - But felf-intereft, that [23 ] d perpetuum mobile of human adion, which we may term an internal check, operates flill more forcibly, con- ftantly, and immediately on the will of a fupreme government -, not limply reftrain- ing it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is fovereign, and perpetual (or durante vita and hereditary) cannot poflibly fepa- rate its own private intereft from that of the community which it governs; being indeed itfelf a part of that community : and this is fo evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a diftincl: intereft of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wife fovereignpenfiders his people as the channel through which alone he can receive fubftantial good or evil 5 and, adling upon this principle, he will, however abfolute and difpofed by nature to tyranny, abflain from injuring the general intereft, becaufe he is len- fible that fuch injury will recoil upon him- felf ; and he will exert himfelf to pro- mote the profperity of his people, as the only means of advancing his own power, D 2 gran- grandeur, or wealth. So that a fovereign prince, who underftands his own real intereft, though otherwife void of virtue, will ever ftudy to govern well ; nay, the private vices of fuch a prince do often ope- rate public good -, a ftriking inftance of which we meet with in our Henry the Seventh ; whofe extreme and fordid ava-s- rice was the fource of Englifh commerce and wealth ; and his mean felf-love, and jealoufy of power, eflablimed univerfal liberty. But the nature of this Bengal govern- ment differs, in every circumflance, from that of a fupreme government 5 being de- puted, foreign, mutable, and temporary, it is no way interested in the lafting prof- perity of the community which it governs^ on the contrary, this 'government holds an interefl which is not only diftin<3 from, but diametrically oppofite to that of the futyeft. For thefe Governors return to Europe immediately on the expiration of their office, which feldom dures above three years, often lefs } therefore their fole aim is to amafs all the wealth they can, during the fhort term of their power, ^n order to tranfport it along with their perfons [25] perfons to their own country. But the wealth which a government amafles, muft needs be extorted from the people govern- ed ; confeqnently felf-intereft leads this government to pillage and plunder the fubjeft : and we have feen that it is not reftrained, by any external controul, front advancing its own diftindl intereft at the expence of the community which it go- verns, feeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe of either the fovereign or the fub- je and tyranny and anarchy have here fet up their throne. And to this inaction or non-exertion of the powers of government we are to im- pute the ruin of thofe countries, rather than to the avarice or rapine of the per- fons deputed by the Company to execute that government. For the power of go- verning being vefled in only a few, the extortion of thefc few might have been long lupported by a rich commercial coun- try, provided they had exerted themfelves to reftrain and -prevent all others from plundering and oppreffing. The avarice, profufion and bloody tyranny of even Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only a few of their fubjc&s at Rome; every where elfe the empire flourished ; be- caufe [34] caufe thefe imperial monopolizers of vice would fuffer none in power to be wicked but themfelves; they narrowly infpected the conduct of their governors and offi- cers, and feverely punifhed their injuftice or oppreffion. But where the govern- ment doth not only plunder itfelf, but fuffers every one under it to plunder, that country muft in time be completely ruined. Now Bengal hath been fubjected to a government of this nature for thefe fifteen years paft ; for though we commonly date the commencement of the Company's fo- vereignty from the aflumption of the De- wanny, (as it is termed,) yet hath this Company (at leaft her deputies) poflefTed a really abfolute authority in thofe coun- tries ever fmce the battle of PlaiTey in 1757. That action rendered them maf- ters of Bengal ; and it was equally within t their power to aflume the fovereign go- vernment at that time, as afterwards in 1765 ; their own will was the only ob- ftacle : but notwithstanding they beftowed it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain an abfolute fuperiority over him, and he governed in a ftate of perfect fubordina- tion [35) don to their authority ; for he well knew and experienced, that the duration of his office, and even of his exiftence, de- pended upon their will ; confequently this deoendent native government could but little reftrain the conduct of the Com- pany's deputies, or protect the fubjecl: from their rapacity ; and when they, in 1765, fet afide this native government, they only removed a fcreen which they them- felves had fet up, and till then preferved for their own purpofe. How far thefe countries may have ad- vanced towards the period of final ruin, under the fifteen or fixteen years domina- tion of fuch a government, we mall not pretend to determine, becaufe the terra ruin is variously underflood. This much is certain, that the unbounded remittance *>f fpecie made, for fome years, by the Englim Company, for fundry purpofes as fovereign ; and for a much greater number of years, and in much larger fums by the other European Companies, who received it from the fervants of the Eng- lifli Company for bills on Europe, at a very low exchange, and employed it for every purpofe in the other parts of India and [36] ;md China, hath compleatly drained Ben- gal of its wealth, and reduced it to a flate of the moil abjed: poverty. And the grievous opprcffion and rapine exer- cifed by the Company's fervants, and their numerous dependants ; together with the moil cruel monopolies ufurped by them over every fpecies of merchandize, and even the neceiTaries of life, hath in a great .. meafure fuppreiTed commerce, and abo- liflied trade. Whilil the infatiable ava- rice and unreilrained extortion of thofe employed in the cclle&ion of taxes and re- venue having ruined the farmer, the lands lay uncultivated and waile 5 infomuch that, not to mention the immenie decreafe of revenue, that naturally moil fertile of ail countries, .Bengal, hath fuffered a more fevere famine than perhaps was ever heard of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the inhabitants have died of want, andnumbers have fled from flarving and oppreflion. But it is not difficult to determine how near the intereil of Britain in thofe coun- tries hath approached to ruin : for Britain is to confider them as ruined to her pur- pofe, fo foon as they mall become inca- pable of fupporting a commerce benefi- cial t 37 1 cial to her ; and at fame time of yielding her a confideration, in the nature of tri-^ bute, equivalent to the expenc? of fub- jedts which (he fends out annually to main-* tain her dominion there. And that they are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her, in both thefe relpefp< and the annual rotation of her executive government ; for, in confequence of thefe feveral circumftances in her fituation, her views are narrow, contracted, and rapa- cious ; the fole aim of all her meafures being to make the moft of the prefent moment. The third defect is the mer* cantile capacity of this fovereign Com* pany; and from this defect alone flow evils fufficient to ruin the intereft of th6 country fubjected to her government : for, in confequence of her mercantile ca- pacity, her deputed government a<5ls as a merchant ; and, in confequence of het fovereign capacity, all her mercantile fer* vants affume the authority of fovereigns* Thefe are the principal defects in the being and constitution of this fovereign Company ; and it is evident, that iuch defects in the fovereign, muft have con- tributed largely towards the exiftence of abufe, in the deputed government. But thefe defects might have been, in a great meafure, remedied, and their confequen- ces prevented, by a fimple act of parlia- ment, f S3J iiient, paft by the national government, at the time it thought proper to commit the charge of this important branch of national intereft, to the care of the Com- pany. This act might have been entitled, " An aft for better enabling the Eaft India Company to adminifter the political government, and to protect, maintain and defend certain ftates and countries in In- dia, which have become fubjected to the dominion of Britain, and which, for fun- dry weighty confiderations, it hath been judged proper to commit to her charge." And it might have been conceived in the following, or fuch like terms. " Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legiflative authority over the mi- nifters and fervants, employed by the Company to execute the fovereign govern- ment of thefe fubjedted dominions, muft be productive of many abufes, detrimen- tal as well to the intereft of the Company, as to the honour and intereft of the Britifh nation. Be it enacted by 5cc. that, from the time of paifing this aft, the Company fhall poflefs the power of legiflation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign dominion : and the laws thus H enacted tS4l enabled by the Company, mall be equally binding on all her minifters, fervants, and fubjects, in that dominion, as are thea&s of parliament on the fubje&s of Bri f ain. And being farther fenfible of the many inconveniences, that muft arife from the Company's incapacity of punifhing the offences committed by her minifters, and fervants abroad, otherwife than by ap- plying to courts of juftice that are foreign to her government ; where me cannot convict, through the difficulty of obtain- ing the evidence required by the forms of thefe courts; and where (he is deterred from profecuting, by the fear of divul- ging the fecretsof her government ; info- much that, rather than apply to thefe courts, (he muft fubmit to the moil auda- cious ads of difobedience, and maladmi- niftration ; and confidering that fucli inca- pacity in the Company muft difcourage all good government, and produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion ; be it ena&ed, that the Company mail have au- thority to erect courts of juftice, and ap- point judges; with the like powers, as are vefted in his majefty's judges, and court? of judicature, for trying and judg- ing f553 ing all fuits and caufes, or offences com- mitted within the limits of this Indian dominion 5 and for punifhing the fame, either capitally, or by fine, imprifonment, and banimment, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that fome of the minifters or fervants of the Company may, by various methods, elude thejuf- tice of her courts abroad, and efcape to Europe ; in order therefore to prevent fuch dangerous illufion of juftice, it is enacted, that the Company's court of directors fhall, on due information being made to them, have power at all times to call be- fore them fuch efcaping delinquents, and to try and punifh them, for the offences they may have committed within the li- mits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as they could have been tried or punimed by the Company's courts abroad. And becaufe the liberty of appealing from the Company's courts of juftice, to the judgment of any other courts, mufl be productive of the fame inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the fame caufe in the firft inftance would have been, and muft therefore deter the Company from ever availing herfelf of the judicial powers H 2 granted granted by this act} it is enacted, that delinquents (hall have no liberty of ap* pealing from the Company's courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at home, or to a general court of Proprie- tors ; whofe judgment in all fuch cafes {hall be final. Ana as the Court of Di-? rectors have, and may be, difcouraged, from profecuting or punifhing the crimes of their rich fervants, by the fear of dan- ger to their own private intereft, from a combination of the friends and abettors, of fuch rich delinquents at a futureannual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Direc- tors, being iuch at the time of paffing this act, mall continue in office, durante vita" *s And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily felling, transferring, and alienating the (hares in the Company's ftock, ot which this iovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infufe into the pro* piietors a fpirit of rapacity, that may be productive of much damage to the feveral intereds concerned ; and hath many other very pernicious confequences ; whilft it reflects djfgrace on the dignity of all other fovereignsj; be it enacted, that no pro- prietor in thjs Company's (lock, of which the fS7l the fovereignty forms a part, (hall have power to fend his (hare in the faid fove- reignty to market, like as it were a hog or bullock, and to fell, transfer, and alienate the fame ; but that the feveral proprietors of this ftock and fovereignty, being fuch at the time of paffing this act, fhall remain and continue proprietors, without the power of alienation, except in the cafes that mall be hereafter fpecified. And whereas it hath been reprefented that the Company 's holding this fove- reignty by leafe, and for a mort term, may not only alienate her care and prevent her from ftudying and promoting the lading welfare of the country, but may induce her to pillage, plunder and wafte it ; be it enafted, that the Company fhall hold the fovereignty of this dominion, tpamdiu fe bene ge/erit 5 to the end, that the may confider and treat it, not as the, property of another, but as her own in- heritance. And whereas the Company exercifes traffic in this dominion j and, in confe- quence thereof, her minifters do likewife traffic ; and whereas the exercife of traf- fic is evidently repugnant to a due dif. charge charge of the duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of deftruo tive monopolies and oppreffion ; all which it is impoffible to prevent, fo long as the Company herfelf (hall continue a mer- chant ; be it enafted, that this Company's commercial charter (hall be diffolved j and {he, and her minifters, (hall be retrained from trading or trafficking, diredly or in- diredliy, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which mall be granted to this Company, confuting her the United Company of Englifh Eaft India Sovereigns." Thefe powers, grants, limitations, and reHridions, would have qualified the Com- pany, fo far as the nature of things could admit, for adminitfring the political go- vernment ; but, in her military capacity, as the fovereign protedor, maintainer and defender of this Indian dominion, (he hath been flill kfs qualified, and would there- fore have required ftill more extraordinary powers. Thcfe however we (ha.ll not fpe^ cify, as apprehending, that what hath been already demanded will (hock. The grant pf fupreme legislative and judicial powers to [59 ] to fubjefts, over their fellow fubjecls, muft feem an abfurd communication of tbat which is incommunicable : the pro- hibition of felling and tranferring the fhares of ilock, would be termed a tyran- nical reftraint on private property : the perpetual grant of this fovereignty to the Company, muft be deemed an unjuft alie- nation of the Crown's and Nation's rights ; and the difTolution of the Company's com- - mercial charter, would alter her very be- ing and nature. In fhort, if we regard the propofed aft (imply, it will appear a collection of abfurd inconfiftencies, and ridiculous nonfenfe : but if we confider it conjundly with the caufe or purpofe for which it is required, then every abfurdity vanimes from the adt, and centers in the caufe that renders it neceifary. For we appeal to common fenfe, whether every circumflance, fpecified in this propcfed aft, is not indifpenfably neceiTary, to qua- lify the Company for the fovereign office of adminiftring the political government of this Indian dominion : and, if that neccf- fity is admitted, then doth the acl become a rational and neceffary confequence, of government's having previoufly commit- ted [6o] ted that fovereign charge to the Compa- ny. Nay, we muft take the liberty to add, that government, by committing iuch a charge to the Company, and at fame time totally neglecting to capacitate her for fupporting it, is in a great mea- fure acceflbry to all the ruinous confe- quences that have enfued from her inca- pacity. 1 am fenfible it will be urged, that we proceed upon falfe premifes ; , for that go- vernment never confidered thefe countries as fubjected to the dominion of Britain . that it never granted the fovereignty of them to the Company j nor fuppoied her to be the fbvereign ; but that it only ac- quiefced in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part of the re- venues to the nation ; and, of confequence, that government never confidered the in- habitants of thofe countries as fubjects to the government of Britain. But this is a moft flimfy evafion, like that of fhutting our eyes to the fun, that we may deny it is day : government granted to the Com- pany a right or permiflion to hold the De- wanny 5 which is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the reve- t i 1 revenues of Bengal ; and, in confidera- tion of this grant, government demanded and received a mare of thefe revenues ; government therefore, in its legiflative ca- pacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did poflefs the power of colleft- ing, and alfo of applying the revenues of Bengal, ad libitum ; and, amongft other purpofes, to that of defraying the charges of the military, as well as the civil, go- vernment : and government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the military and civil government, muft hold the abfolute direction of both : and what conftitutes fovereign power, but the abfolute direction of the military and civil government, together with the difpofal-of the revenues ? But, exclufive of the De- wanny contract, the Company hath ap- plied, in every other characterise of a fovereign, to government, in its legiflative capacity : me hath brought a bill into parliament, for the grant of certain mili- tary powers and indulgences, for the bet- ter enabling her to defend, what (he there modeftly, though vaguely, terms her ter- ritorial acquifitions, (but which, by re- ferring to the Dewanny contract, is ex- I plained [62] plained to include Bengal :) and {he hath applied for certain juridical powers and grants, for the better adminiflration of the jurifdiction, not in her commercial facto- ries, but over the whole country of Ben- gal : therefore government hath been in- formed, in its legiflative capacity, by the Company herfelf, that me adminiftred the military and civil government, and appro- priated the revenues of Bengal; confe- quently that (he was, in every fenfe and refpedt, the adtual fovereign of that coun- try. Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a fubject to the na- tional government of Britain ; and that, as fuch, me could have neither right, pow- er, nor force to fubject this dominion, or afterwards to hold it in fubjeftion, faving what (he derived from the national govern- ment; confequently government, as it underftood that thefe countries were iub- jedted to the Company, mud have known that they were fubjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did per- mit the Company to retain this dominion ; and furnimed her with a military force, knowing it to be for the purpofe of main- taining taining dominion, it is plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwife than by the grant and fupport of government. But if the Company be the fovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants muft, per force, be her fubjefts ; and if the Company holds this fovereignty as a fubjeft to the government of Britain, by virtue of the grant or permiffion of that government* and by means of a force furnimed by the fame government, in what relation can this government regard the inhabitants of Bengal ? In that of fubjedts furely ; the/ the degree hath, by the deed of govern- ment, been fomewhat implicated ; like" that of a child begot by the father upon his own daughter. And fubjects they have been to the government of Britain, in every fenfe and meaning ; they have yield- ed obedience to thofe fubjecfts of tjiis go- vernment whom it appointed to rule over them 5 and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the duties of obedience. But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force fubje&ed the inhabi- tants of Bengal to its dominion j which hath, for a feries of years, held them in I 2 fub- 164] fubjedion j and hath, all along, exa&cd from them the tribute of fubjection ; hath >vithheld from them the protection due to fubjed:s. For it hath fcrupuloufly with-' drawn itfelf from all regard or attention to their government ; and hath left it im- plicitly to the guidance of a few mer-? chants ; whorn it knew to be perfectly un- qualified for admmiftring any fort of go- vernment ; in confequeuce of which . thefe wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, jufttce, or go- vernment. Unhappy fubjefts, wrio are forced to obey a fovereign. that refules them protection, and leaves them expofed to all the h^rors of tyranny and anarchy. It will neverthelefs be itill infifted that government could not, without commit-- ting a number of irregularities and abfur-r dities, endow the Company in the man- ner fpeciried -, as alfo that the Company, \yhen thus endowed, would ft ill have been altogether unequal to the charge of regur larly adminiftring a fpvereign government. But furely government, if it would not or could not capacitate the Company to re- gularly govern thofe countries, ought not to have furnifhed her the means of oppref- fing. [6 S ] fing, ravaging, pillaging, and ruining them ; to the difgrace of humanity, and the indelible reproach of the Britifh name. Government would have adled a part far more continent with the rules of honour and humanity, if, inttead of furnifhing to the Company this military power, it had relt rained her from availing herfelf of the advantage, gained by force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but induftri- ous peoole ; and obliged her to leave them to their own government. But then the fituation of affairs in thofc countries, where the nation and Company held fuch a valuable commercial intereft, rendered it highly improper anjl dangerous to leave the native government to itfelf : moreover the nation and Company could not, in fuch cafe, have acquired the migh- ty wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the conqueft, or afTumed do- minion, of thofe countries. Oh wealth, bafely acquired, and foolimly applied ! Was there then no medium, no middle channel, thro* which government might have fteered the Nation and Company to this fame wealth and benefits, clear of all theie irregularities, incongruities, inhu- manities, [(6 ] inanities, and reproaches ? Yes furely $ and one fo obvious and confpicuous, that it is irppoffible to conceive how govern- ment could be fo induftrious as to (hun or mils it. Had the national government taken upon itfelf the charge of fuperin- tending the government of thofe countries, as reafon and the nature of things direct- ed, then would it have furniihed them a fovereign, naturally free from all the de- feds of the Company, and completely endued with all the qualifications cf pow- er, ability, and inclination from intereft, to proted and regularly govern them. For it is plain, that the national go- vernment, ^fTeffing fupreme legiflative, and judicial power, muft have been ca- pable of enforcing obedience to the laws which it might have enacfted for the good government of thofe countries; and of puniming difobedience, not only in the natives, but in the minifters whom it would have e nployed to execute that go- vernment; as thefe muft have been its' own fubjefts. And, on the other hand, the natkn being an immutable body, and holding this lovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor ; her government muft muft have been actuated, by the ftrong motive of felf intereft, to exert itfelf in promoting the real and lafting welfare of thofe countries. And as to the commer- cial defpotifm, it could never have exifled under the national government. It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free from all the defeds of the Company, would, by the fimple, natural, and rational aft of affuming the adminiftration of government in thofe countries, have prevented or re- formed all the feveral abufes or evils that have fprung from the defe I 73 1 fary, by the immediate proteftion of na- tional government, the faving thereof would have added two per cent, to her di- vidend : and the equivalent, which govern- ment would havepaid for her fortreffes, mu- nition, &c. being added to her capital flock, would have encreafed her dividend nearly one per cent, more ; whilft her ftock itfelf would, at this day, have been really, and intrinfically worth 220!. inftead of its prefent real and intrinfic value. It would be infulting the undemanding of miniftry, to fuppofe that it had been reftrained from afliiming this fovereign charge, by any delicacy of regard to the ideal right of the Company ; derived from either conquefts, as fubjedts ; or from the fham grant of a man, who had not power to difpofe of a fmgle bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa- nut- tree in that country ; and confequently whofe grant of the fove- reignty of Bengal could contribute nothing more to inveftiture or poffeffion, than hi* grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we mould (for the fake of ar- gument) fuppofe, that miniftry had real- ly admitted fome fuch right, we muft Hill efleem ''-''':., 174] cfteem its acquiefcence in that right a mofl abfurd and wildly miftaken indulgence ; feeing it evidently tended to the ruin of the party whom it meant to favour. There hath heen, however, one weigh- ty argument againft government's afTuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arilirig to national liberty from govern- ment's, (or, in other words, the crown or miniftry's) acquiring fuch an acceflion of influence, as muft arife from the poflefllon of the many emoluments, places, pofts, &c. annexed to this Indian charge : where- as liberty is completely fecured from fuch danger, whilft the Company poffefTes it. And the certainty of this double maxirr^ viz. the danger from government's poflef- ling this charge, and the fecurity whilft it is in the hands of the Company, is as ge- nerally eftablifhed as almoft any one hu- man principle : for, being violently en- forced by thofe whofe perlbnal views lead them to oppofe adminiftration, and at fame time not fimply allowed, but even inculcat- ed by miniilry itfelf, it hath been readily credited by thofj who, their perfonal inter- eft not being fo deeply concerned, were lefs curious to inveftigate the truth, It [75] It may be deemed prefumptuous in an individual, to queftion the orthodoxy of a maxim fo powerfully enforced by one party, readily allowed by the other, and almofl univerially credited : tho' the ex- traordinary circumftance, of two violent rival parties concurring fo exadly on a point, where their perfonal intereft feems to be fo materially and fo oppofitely en- gaged, would lead a byftandcr to fuppofe, that either one of the two parties muft be miflaken ; or otherwife, that one or both muft mifreprefent : at any rate, that un- common inftance of candour, in ministry's preaching up a doftrine fo repugnant to that which it pretends to be its own per- fonal intereft, would induce fuch byflander to fufpeft its fmcerity. However, as a right undemanding of this point may con* fiderably import the public, at this critical juncture, I fhall venture difclofing my fen- timents, at the rifk of cenfure for prolixi- ty, as well as impertinence. With regard to the firft part of thp max- im, I conceive that the danger to liberty from government's holding this charge in its own hands, is fuppofed to arife from the influence which the minirter would acquire, acquire, over the two fubjeft branches of legiflature, (thofe bulwarks of liberty) by means of the many emoluments, places* ports, &c. annexed to the pofleflion of that charge. But before we admit that the mi- nifters holding this charge would be crea- tive of that dangerous influence, we ought to be fatisfied that he doth not already pof- fefs it, by other means ; for, if he doth already poflefs fuch influence by other; means, it is plain that the Indian charge cannot confer it j nor will it avail to fhut one door, whilft there are others open to admit nim. And that the minirter hath long been in full and plenary pofleflion of fuch influence, we have ever heard aflerted by thefe very men who fo loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge : nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory aflertions, (even that of fact and daily ex- perience,) for believing that the minifter hath and doth poflefs ports and places, and that, on any emergency, he hath in his power other means equaUy effectual, to- wards creating and holding fuch influ- ence, in a degree as plenary and com- plete as his own heart can defire. And, if And, if the minifler doth already pofiefs fuch influence by other means, it is plain, that the Indian charge cannot confer it j nor will it avail to mut one door, whilfl there are others open to admit him. And that the minifter hath been long in full and plenary pofleffion of fuch influence, we have ever heard afierted by thofe very men, who fo loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge : nay, we have much better au- thority than their contradictory afTertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the minifter hath and doth poflefs pofts and places, and that on any emergency he hath in his power o- ther means equally effectual, towards creating and holding fuch influence, in a degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can deiire./ And, if the minifter doth already poflefs an influence fo fully fufficient, it muft be allowed that, in fo much as refpects parliamentary influence, this Indian charge would be a thing fu. perfluous and ufelefs to him ; like meat to a man that hath already filled his, belly; the abfence of it can withhold nothing that he wants, and the acquifition cannot L confer [73] confer more than he already poffeffes. I may venture to add, that we certainly hold our liberty by fome latent fecurity, more powerful than that of parliament itfelf, which neither the minifter's in- fluence over parliament, nor pofts and places, will ever induce him to attack, or enable him to fubdue ; for that, otherwife, we mould have been divefted of our pri- vileges and liberty long ago. And, upon confidering thefe feveral circumftances, I conclude, that if this Indian charge was in the hands of government to-morrow, it would neither enable, nor induce the mi- nifter, to attempt a jot more againft our liberty, than he hath done, can do, and will do, without it. However, by way of reinforcing my argument, I mall add that, if the plan which I mean to pro- pole mould be carried into execution, it would leave but few of thefe emolu- ments, &c. to the immediate difpofal of theminifter; and, poflibly, this declara- tion may but little recommend it to his favour. But ftill, if we were to admit a real .danger to liberty from the minifter's pof- feffing thefe emoluments, &c. it remains te [79] to be proved that liberty hath been, is> and will be fecured from fuch danger, by the Company's holding that Indian charge. And, when the nature of this fecurity comes to be examined, I apprehend it will be found more difficult to prove this lat- ter part of the maxim, than the former. For it is notorious that,, ever until the late diftraction in the Company's affairs, the arbitrary application of thefe emoluments, pofts, &c. was vefted in the Directors ; and indeed the entire powers and interefts of the Company ; infomuch that the Di- rectors might, with propriety, be termed the Company. So that the whole fecu- rity of national liberty, and, of courfe, the fole obftruction to the minifter's dan- gerous views, depended on the integrity and independent fpirit of 24 Directors $ of whom, again, one or two. generally leads all the reft. Confequently, to come at the fingering of thefe dangerous emo- luments, &c. the minifler had only to fubvert the integrity, or fubdue the inde- pendance, of thefe Directors. And, to effect this, a minifter poiTeffed more than one infallible recipe. By artfully joining the mighty influence which he held in the L 2 Company's. 1 80] Company's ftock thro' his numerous de- pendants, to one or other of two parties contending violently for the direction, he could reduce both to a perfect dependance on himfelf : by the fame means he could hold them in iubiection : but ftill more, by the awe of wrefting from them the fweet management of this Indian fove- reignty, which they were fenlible he could do by a word. And thus he could work upon their fears. But inclination would naturally and powerfully lead the Direc- tors to throw themfelves into the arms of a rninifler; not fo much ior his immedi- ate afliftanee j tho' even that might be of great ufe, for rendering matters eafy with the proprietors, as well as parliament and the nation 5 but becaufe, on thefe terms, they fecured, in him, an omnipotent fup- porter and all powerful advocate, againft the day of diftrefs, which they well knew rnuft come, and that foon : whereas, o- therwile, they muft lay their account with finding him a fevere judge, and bit- ter proiecutor. By thefe feveral operations on the hopes and fears of the Directors, it was extreme- ly eafy fpr a minifter to render them as pliant [ i 1 V pliant as a glove ; as obedient as a fpaniel, to fetch and carry at bidding, And the Directors being once reduced to this ftate of dependance, it is evident, that the mi- nifter muft poffefs a full and arbitrary power over all the emoluments, pofts, places, &c. appertaining to this Indian charge. But the difpofal of the prefent emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter, compared with other advantage?, which this Indian bufinefs, whiift in the hands of the Company, presented to an artful and enterprifing minifter. For, under the plaufible and indeed undeniable pre- text of qualifying the Company for ad- miniftring this fovereign charge, he might have drawn from the legiflature certain military as well as political powers; which, being gradually augmented as occafion offered, might have at laft eftablifhed a fort of power, in this government, diftinct from and independent of the legiflature : the exertion of which power, being con- fided to the Directors, would in fact have retted with the minifter. Here indeed was a real danger to liberty j provided it had been poffible to hold up this Indian bufi- jiefs, in the ha_nds of the Company, for any t Ba] any length of time -, for, notwithftanding I confider national liberty as inexpugnable to the open aflaults of a minifter, yet, from fuch a fecret convenient and com- manding poft as this mentioned, he might have made frequent fly and fuccefsful in* curfions on the confines of liberty ; which would have greatly ftraitened her quarters, and wafted her ftrength. On the other hand, if that Indian charge had been vetted in the national govern- ment, liberty muft have been perfectly fecured from this laft mentioned danger ; for, in fuch cafe, there could have been no pretext for demanding thefe extraordi- nary diftinft powers j and, confequently, no opportunity of eftablifhing that truly dangerous impcrium in imperio. And even in the application of the ordinary pow- ers, emoluments, 6cc. a minifter muft have been fubje but me muft likewife iofe by far the mod valuable part of that commerce, which was carried on by the Company with thofe countries, previous to dominion. For the commerce^ with Bengal, alone, is of much greater value, than that with all the reft of India: and, -as to the trade with China, it is the moft pernicious and iofing trade to the nation ; however con- venient it may be to government. And if we mall then advert to the benefit and fupport which the finances of Britain have received from this Indian do- minion, for fo many years paft, though under the moft prepofterous management ; but, ftill more, if we (hall advert to the nature and degree of benefit that, under proper management, might have been de- rived [931 derived in perpetuum from this Indian do- minion, in not only the article of finance, but in other weighty refpe&s : and, if we {hall, yet farther, look forward to the difmal confequences that muft unavoida- bly enfue to Britain* in thefe feveral ref- pe&s, from a deprivation of this Indian dominion and its benefits ; can we tamely furrender our reafon to the ipfe dixit of men who are hardy enough to tell us, that In- dian dominion is of no value nor utility to Britain; Nor do thefe men lefs abufe our under- ftanding, by holding forth the difficulty of maintaining and defending this dominion : feeing that, of all nations in the world, Britain is, by a variety of circum Ranees, the beft qualified to maintain and defend maritime or commercial dominion in In- dia. For, as (he exceeds all the world in naval force, me is^ through that circum- ftance alone, the mofl capable of defend- ing fuch dominion, againft the affault of European enemies : and had Britain availed herfeif of evident advantages, had (he eftablimed her naval and land defence upon the plan that (hall be explained, Britilh dominion in India might, at this day, have been fecured from even the attempt of N European t 94') European rivals : they might have admired and envied, but they would not have dared to attack. And thefe European rivals are the only dangerous enemies to Britim do- minion in India : for as to the neighbour- ing native powers, they would, from fear as well as inclination, have been amicable to Britain ; provided her government ia thofe countries had acted with common honefty, and common decorum, or pru- dence; and not as common robbers. And, as to the unhappy native fubjects them- felves, their loyalty hath been fufficiently proved, by fo many years patient fub- miffion to the moft intolerable of all pof- fible governments. Wherein then confifts the difficulty of maintaining and defend- ing Eritifh dominion in India ? And with regard to the fo much talked of expence or drain of native flrength, we may furely, with good reafon, fay that this objection militated much ftronger againft maintaining that dominion under the Company, than under national govern- ment: tho' the natureandextentofeven that drain under the Company, is moft grofsly mifreprefented. For I am well informed that the Company's annual recruit, fince the time me completed her dominion force, hath f 95 1 hath never exceeded 1200 men ; and I am afraid it hath in general fallen fhort of 1000 ; notwithstanding {he laboured under many difadvantages, from which national government would be exempted : fuch as being obliged to put up with very indif- ferent and unhealthy recruits, for want of better; too little attention paid to the manner of tranfporting them ; and ftill lefs to their health and manner of living in the country : whilft her governors ex- pended numbers of them on unnecefTary predatory wars. And even this reciuit we are not to reckon a drain of real ftrength from Britain : feeing that, the Company's recruits have been moftly fellows of the tnoft defperate circumftances, who had no means of fubiifting at home ; and who therefore would, if the Company had not taken them off, have been taken off by the gallows, or otherwife would have emi- grated to America or fome other country, in fearch of bread ; and would thus have been equally loft to Britain. So that, upon rationally confidering this matter, we (hall find that, for the maintenance of dominion in India, the Company hath not drained this country, of" 100 men an- N 2 nually, f 96] nually, that could, in any fenfe, be term-i ed ufeful, or a real ftyrength to it. But, fetting fciide the precedent of the Com- pany, it is certain that, to maintain and defend the mighty dominion of Bengal, demands an European force very little fu- perior in number to the garrifon of that barren fortrefs Gibraltar : and to maintain and defend the whole territorial poffemons, ^ogether with the commerce of Britain in Ipdia, requires a force very little exceed-? ing the aforefaid garrifon with that of its filler fortrefs in Minorca. And the annual recruit, neceilary to keep up this force, after allowing largely for climate, and every other circumftance, would, on a complete plan of defence, not exceed 900 or at moft 1000 m^n : and, of this recruit, at leaft 200, would be wanted annually to maintain commerce, if there was no, dominion. Nay, if this is judged top great a drain for Britain, one fourth part of that number may be reduced, by re- cruiting that proportion of foreign pro- teftants : fuch being eafily procured j and^ in fuch a low proportion, they can in no refpect be dangerous. And can Britain f ?|ard 6 or 700 men annually as too great a drain [971 drain, for the maintenance of that im portant dominion and commerce, which is as one of the capital limbs of her bodyj and at fame time beftow a nearly equal {hare of her ftrength on maintaining thefe two barren, and I had almoft faid ufelefs, fortrefles ; the pecuniary charge of which fhe pays out of her proper finance, never to return ; whilft Indian dominion defrays J,ts own charge. The only remaining objection then to Indian dominion is, the difficulty of pro- perly governing it. But this difficulty doth not arife, like that in America, from the indomitably obftinate fpirit of the fub- jects ; on the contrary, it arifes from their over paffive or fubmiffive difpofition, and incapacity of refitting the power of go- vernment : and this, inftead of being an pbjection, is the mofl valuable qualifica- tion of a dependent dominion. To re- move this difficulty demands no exterior aids, no exertion of powers or force , it depends entirely on the will of the fove- reign; and a very little art, a very little care, with a little honefty, would ferve to completely remedy it j as we doubt not (p evince. la In fine, Bengal, being one of the rich- eft commercial countries is, to Britain as a commercial nation, the nobleft and rhoft truly valuable acquifition that providence could poffibly beftow on her : by the mild r.ifrcfition of its inhabitants it is the moft jfacily governed and maintained j and, by the nature of its fituation, it is the moft defenuble foreign dominion on this globe; particularly to Britain which excels in naval force. And one may almoft ven- ture to fay that providence, by throwing Bengal into the arms of Britain, feems to have intended that this, the richeft com- mercial ftate in Afia, which, through the effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable of maintaining its own independance, mould be fubjected to Britain, as being the fitteft, through fimilarity of com- mercial difpofition, intereft, and modes, to properly govern it j and, through her luperiari y in naval force, the beft quali- fied to defend and protect it from all enemies. In what light then mail pofterity regard the policy of Britain, during the third quarter of the eighteenth cen- 1 tury : when it mall find her, in the Eaft, flighting [99] flighting and giving up that glorious field, which annually yielded a golden crop, to be rutted up and trodden down by hogs and viler beads : whilft, in the Weft, {he was tugging with all her might, exerting her utmoft ftudy, care and attention, much ftrength, and more money, on cultivating the fea fands 5 draining to fubdue nature; and forcing the horfe to drink in fpite of inclination ? Will it not be faid, that me would have acled a far wifer part,if me had Jeft nature and time to flowly operate in America, the effects which they will un- avoidably produce, in fpite of all her ef- forts ; and had converted her care and at- tention, to properly govern, and maintain, that noble, rich, and grateful dependent dominion in India ; which, upon fuch terms, would have poured, into her pub- lick treafury, refources, that would have ferved to alleviate her burden of taxes ; and, confequently, to reduce the price of necefTaries, of labour, and of manufac- tures ; which, again, would have preferv- ed her commerce, not only with Ame- rica, but with other countries ; and would at fame time have preferved to her thou- f?. n/1 .r- of induftrious and ufeful fubjecls, who*, Who, through want of employment, were forced to emigrate from her to America. And, by the fame care and attention to the government and revenue of that In- dian dominion, flic would have prevented the inundation of eaftern profufion and extravagance $ which chiefly contributed to convert this formerly grariiferous ifland, into a pafture for horfes of parade and ftately pride; infomuch that, inftead of fupplying her neighbours as formerly, with fome hundred thoufand pounds worth of rain annually, me could not feed the great- ly reduced number of her own inhabitants; nor fiirnim the means of living totheiriduf- trious agricultor, and peafant ; who, iri fearch of livelihood, fled from her to Ame- rica; thereby debilitating her own beft fource of ftrength, and prematurely acce- lerating the manhood of thofe otherwife infant colonies. Neverthelefs there flill remains a pofii* bility of retrieving this error in policy ; or at leaft of preventing a farther encreafe of the evils that have afifeii from it ; pro- vided that, in the firft place, this Indian dominion {hall Hill be in our pofleflion : and, in the fecond place, that national govern* government fhall, by taking upon itfelf the charge of adminiftring the govern- ment thereof, remedy that firfl and radi- cal caufe of evil arid abufe which hath exifted under the Company's government : and mall, at fame time, with honeft and lincere intention, fpirit and activity, ap- ply a proper remedy to that which hath been affigned as the fecond caufe of evil, and the nature of which remedy mall be explained in the fequel. For, upon fuch terms, there is no doubt that a regular fyftem of government may be eftablifhed in that dependent dominion ; under which it may be reflored to its priftine profperi- ty, nay, it may be elevated to a fiate ftill more flouriming than it ever knew; and, in confequence, to a capacity of yielding a ftill fuperior degree of benefit to Britain ; and in a manner widely different, and truc- ly falutary to her. But I muft again repeat, that it is vain to expect this reform of evils from the management of the Company ; loaded as fhe is with fo many natural defedls, which it is out of the power of art to remedy, otherwife than by conferring upon her the fovereign government of Britain, along O with with that of this dependent dominion. For the execution of thefe two fovereign governments is, by the nature of things, infeparable : it being morally impoflible, that any power can execute the fovereign government of thof~ Indian countries, as a dominion dependent upon Britain, un- lefs that power fhall pofTefs the fovereign execution of government in Britain. However, it would be flill more vain to look for any good from that extravagant fancy of joining the Company, with go- vernment, in this fovereign charge. What quota of powers, proper to her and want- ing to government, can the Company con- tribute,- to render her a necefiary or ufeful aflcciate with government, in this fove- reign charge ? I doubt not that the pro- pofer's intentions were good and honeft: but hisfcheme would be fo far from promot- ing his or any one good purpofe,that it would produce the very oppofite effects. For,inftead of checking and contrafling,it would ferve, in the firft place, to furhilh, in the Di- rectors and their governors, a convenient cloke of excufe to miniftry and its go- vernors, with the nation ; whilft miniftry and its governors would ferve the Direc- tor* *Si [ ' 3 ] ' i -'j tors and their governors a like good turn with the proprietors : they would mutual- ly voucfTfor and fcreen each other j nei- ther would be refponfible, and neither would at ; and thus, between ftools, &c. in the fecond place, commercial def- potifm which, by feparating the Company from the powers of government and the confequent jealoufy of privilege, muft have been completely fupprefled, would, under this double-headed monfter, flourim with redoubled vigour : the national governors would, by their connection with the Com- pany's, become merchants as well as ty- rants ; and the Company's governors would, by their power in the government, continue tyrants as well as merchants : and thus the candle would burn at both ends- In* the third place, the Company which, by being excluded from the powers of go- vernment, would have contributed fo ef- fentially in the nature of a middle flate to the eftablimment of a regular political fyf- tem in thofe countries, muft, by being joined in the execution of government, en- tirely lofe that virtue : inftead of fupport- ing liberty, me would join in promoting tyranny ; and would ftiil continue a ruin- O 2 OUS 1 104 1 ous pefl to thofe countries. Indeed that; flrange partnership of Nation and Co. in this fovereignty bufinefs, is a cure infinite- ly worfe than the difeafe. In fhort, there is no alternative : if Britain means to preferve the pofTeffion of that mighty benefit derived from dominion and commerce in India ; if fhe means tq prevent the abfolute ruiri of the Compa- ny, and her creditors j if fhe hath any re- gard to the loud cry of opprefTion fen$ forth to her for a feries of years, by her numerous wretched fubjefts in thofe coun- tries ; and means to fave them from final deftrudion, (he muilfurnim their govern- ment with a fovereign, or head, properly qualified to adminifter it : for this is the foundation, as well as the crowning of all good government j it is the center upon which the machine revolves, from which every line iffues, and in which every line terminates 3 it is ihejine qua non t for with- out it no regular government can exift. And what proper fovereign can Britain furnim to that dependent dominion, un- Jefs it be her own fovereign gpvernment ? We have fhown that the nation and her fupreme government are perfectly equal to the r 105 j the charge : to them there is not th? fmalleft difficulty in fupporting it, Nei- t}ier is there the fmalleft difficulty to her (executive government or miniftry, provide ed it (hall poflefs an ordinary fhare of fpi- rit, activity, or enterprize 5 and {hall pro- ceed with (incere and upright intention. For, a regular form of government being once eftablimed abroad, and a properly digefted office or department formed at home, the bufinefs would go on with great fmoothnefs and facility to miniftry. Neverthelefs, as I have affumed the li- berty of prefcribing in this important an4 almoft defperate cafe,I am forry, that a fin- cere regard to the welfare of the patient ihould compel me to add, (by way of con- cluding on this head,) that, unlefs mini- ftry mall act upon a principle, and with a fpirit, extremely different from that which it hath hitherto difcovered in this bufinefs, it would be much more advifeable to conti- nue the charge in the hands of the Com- pany : for it can be but ruined under her. However, in ftrong hopes of a melioration in thefe refpedts, which depends altogether on the will of government, I {hall proceed t KiM tlo6] to difclofe that plan, which, in the hands of a properly qualified fovereign, would, I doubt not, ferve to eftablim a regular fyftem of government in India. A P L A N, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM F ,,vx POLITICAL GOVERNMENT 1 N INDIA. WE have before obferved, that the fecond caufe why thefe reftraining and impelling powers, which alone can prevent tyranny and anarchy, have been al- together wanting in the Company's fyftem of government, appears to be the diftance of fituation, betwixt the fovereign refi- dence and the country governed. And we fhall here add that, if national govern- ment (hould adopt the fame fyftem, this diftancc diftance would operate, under it, effects the fame in nature as thefe under the Com- pany j and nothing but the difference in other circumftanceS, betwixt the national government and Company, could prevent thefe effects from being likewife equal in degree. For it is evident that, if the execu- tive government of the nation mould, ai the Directors have done, preferve to itfelf the charge and power of immediately fu- perintendihg and controuling the execution, of government in that Indian dominion, the diftance of fituation would create to that government an equal impoffibility of advifing and directing meafures, of en- forcing the execution or obfervance of or- ders, and of preventing or retraining abufe : confequently, in the immediate execution of all meafures, the national governors would poffefs the fame unlimited power, as the Company's governors have done. And the only advantage to that Indian govern- ment, from national governments affuming from the Company the charge of admini- ftring it, would arife from the following eircumftances. Firft, the fuperior retrofpec- tive or ex poft fafto authority of national government, enabling it to judge and pu- nul* t i8 } him the maladminiftration, or difobedl-* ence of its minifters. Second, Thefupe-f rior inclination or difpofition of national government (anting from its perpetual in- tereft in the property) to exert itfelf in promoting proper meafures. Third, The fuppreffion of commercial defpotifm. And fourth, The exigence of the Company as a middle ftate betwixt the natives and their foreign government. All which innova- tions, ariiing from national government's taking upon itfelf the adminiftration of this Indian government, though they are indifpenfably necefTary and highly condu- cive to the eflablimment of a regular poli- tical fyftem, yet do we perceive that they, fingly and unfupported, cannot fuffice to Create that due proportion of reftraint on the power, or of impulfe on the will of the deputed executive government, which is abfolutely neceflary to the perfecl: fuppref- fion of tyranny, anarchy, and abufe. Nor is it poflible to complete this reftraint and impulfe, to that fufficing degree, unlefs by a proper exertion of the fovereign's own fupreme influence. But we find that, upon the Company's fyftem, the diftance of fituation renders thr the influence of the fovereign altogether impotent to this effect : and if we mould take it for granted that her fyftem hath been juft or complete, then muft we con- clude, that this fovereign impotence is a confequence naturally and unavoidably a- rifing from the diftance; and, therefore, above the remedy of art. But, if we confult our own reafon, we mail perceive that the Company's impotence, in that particular refpect, proceeded from a radi- cal defect or error in her fyftem ; which might have been remedied by art. For, it is evident, that the diftance of fituation was in every circumftance fimilarly and equally obftructive to the Company's im- mediately or perfonally executing the go- vernment of that Indian dominion, as it was to her immediately reftraining or en- forcing the manner of execution : and yet we find that the Directors could difcover a remedy for the firft of thefe obftruc- tions, by the fuccedaneum of appointing . a deputed executive government, And, as the fecond fprung from the fame caufe, and was exactly fimilar in its nature, com- mon fen fe muft furely have inftructed her, that it was to be removed by a fimilar re- P medy, rnedy : it being certain that, if the Di- rectors had thought proper to inftitute in India a deputation properly qualified to controul their executive deputation, the meafures of thofe Indian governments' might have been enforced or retrained by the fovereign refiding in Europe, as ef- fectually as they have been executed by the fame fovereign : that is to fay, as ef- fectually, as the defective conftitution of the Company, (which equally difqualified her for controuling as for executing,) could admit. But it could not be ignorance, or want of common fenfe, that prevented the Di- rectors from inflituting a controuling de- putation of this nature : feeing they had before them the precedent of thefe other European nations, who hold any poflef- iions in India : all of whom have provided fomething of this kind : for inftance, the Dutch government at Batavia. Sound policy quickly pointed out to the Dutch, the abfurdity of committing the charge of their difperfed concerns in India, to a mul- tiplicity of diftinct heads, all acting under no other conftraint, or reftraint, than that of the Company's Directors refiding in Europe. f III ] Europe. Therefore, fo foon as the Dutch Company began to extend her poffeffions in India, (he inftituted one fupreme go- vernment at Batavia, with full powers, and authority, to diredt and controul the executive government of all her other fet- tlements. And this government afts in India as an intermediate power, betwixt the Company refiding in Europe, and her various polTeflions in that diftant country; and as the perpetual refidentiary fuper- vifor of all her interefts there. The Di- rectors communicate all -their purpofes immediately to it ; and it difperfes orders and inftru&ions to all the fubordinate go- vernments ; which again tranfmit to it a regular accouat of their fituation, wants, or tranfaftions. All governors, chiefs, 6cc. are immediately refponfible to it : all ap- pointments to, and removals from, office in the fuborninates, are made immediately by it : and all complaints or appeals, againft the mifconducl; or injultice of thefe go- vernors, are immediately addrefled to it. In fine, it may be termed the center of the Dutch government in India. And though this government can in no mape be termed the complete model of a deputation, fit P 2 tO I '2] to controul or enforce the execution of fovereign government, in various territorial dominions j yet, to this institution, de- fective as it is, the Dutch owe it, that the government of their numerous fubor- dinate pofleflions in India hath been con- ducted, for about two hundred years, clear of any enormous abufe. But if the Dutch ar\d other European nations, which hold little other concern, in India than a few fettlements eftablime4 there for the purpofe of commerce, found it neceflary, for. the regular management of thefe commercial concerns, to infti- tute a fort of intermediate fupreme power, as a local check on the reft of their fet- tlements : how much more incumbent was it on the Englifli Company, to con- ftitute an immediate directing and controul- ing power, over the conduct of her depu- ties, who were entrufted with the charge of executing the fovereign government, of fundry mighty flates ; a charge of fuch fuperior intricacy, weight, importance, and delicacy 5 and fo very liable to be abufed. What may have been the motive of the Dire&ors for thus wilfully omitting an in- ftitution ["Si Aitution fo evidently ufeful and necefTary, I fhall not pretend to determine. Poffi- bly they might apprehend that if, upon their acquiring this mighty fovereign do- minion, they fhould alter that which had been all along their commercial iyftem, fuch alteration might induce the nation to enquire into the caufe of it, and fo dif- cover the nature of their dominion, which they have ever carefully hid from the pub- lic. Though, it is more probable, they might perceive, that the inftitution of fuch an intermediate power would greatly in- terfere with their own perfonal influence, power, and emoluments ; feeing it mufl have poffefTed the immediate difpofai of places and ports, as well as a confiderable fliare in the direction of affairs : and, in order to prevent this, they preferved to themfelves the power, of immediately fu- perintending, and directing, the execu- tion of government in thofe Indian do-~ minions. .But whatever the motive of the Di- rectors may have been, it is certain, that the want of a deputed controuling power in India, hath been a radical and grievous .defect in their fyltem : which hath pro- duced ["4] duced a number of thofe evils that have been falfely'afcribed to the diftance of fi- tuation. And though-we are far from al- ledging, that it was poffible for the Com- pany to eftablifh in thofe countries a go- vernment in any degree regular, feeing that the numerous natural defects in her con- flitution, unavoidably producing many deftrudtive abufes, muft have ever pro- ved an infuperable obftacle to that 5 yet do we affirm that, the inftitution of a duly qualified intermediate controuling power, v/ould have totally prevented feme* and would have greatly diminimed moft, of thefe enormous abufes which, upon the fyflem of the Directors, have ferved to ruin thofe countries. Now we have feen that the national go- vernment would, by taking upon itfelf the charge of adminiftring that Indian government, remedy or fupprefs all the abufes that have fp rung from the defective conftitution of the Company, (befides creating other circumftances of high uti- lity, that could not exifl under the Com- pany's government.) And as the diftance of fituation, preventing the fovereign from immediately exerting his fupreme influence over over the deputed executive government, is the only remaining caufe of evil or abufe; it is plain that, if it is poffible to conftrud: in India, a deputed power, upon fuch principles, as that it mall effectually and completely fupply the place of the Ibvereign, in immediately directing, en* forcing, and controuling the meafures of the deputed executive government, then muft the only obftruction to the eftablim- ment of a regular political fyftem, be re- medied and removed. Confequently the grand de/ideratiim, the only thing that is wanting, to enable the national govern- ment of Britain to regularly adminifter the government of thofe Indian dominions, is the inftitution of a deputed controuling power in India, properly qualified to ful- fil the purpofes that have been here fpe- cified. And that it is poffible, to conftitute an intermediate power in India, that mall ^ftectually and faithfully direct, enforce, and controul the meafures of the deputed executive government in thofe Indian do- minions, I doubt not to evince : though, at fame time, I am fully fenfible. of the many real difficulties, arifing from natuce and r and circumftance, to obftruft it ; as like- wife of the many artificial difficulties pro- ceeding from the endeavours of thofe who have an intereft to obftrucT: fuch a meafure ; and who have influence to en- force their objections, however futile, on the underftanding of others. But before we proceed to defcribe the plan upon which we mean to conftruct this controuling deputation, it will be ne- cefTary to explain the extent of its charge, or number of the government's compo- iing that dominion which it is meant to controul. For tho', in our defcription of the Company's government in India, we confined our account to that of Bengal alone, as being the moft important and beft known part of her dominion ; yet doth the Company pofTefs, befides Ben- gal, certain other territorial governments, of no fmall value and importance, in re- fpeft of either revenue or commerce. All which governments being formed upoa the fame fyftem as that of Bengal, do not lefs demand reform, fupervifion, and con- troul. For, in the firft place, the government of Madrafs poffeffes a very conliderable and arid valuable territorial dominion, avow- edly in the name and right of the Com- pany. This fame government doth like- wife, in every thing befide the name, pof- fefs the abfolute fovereignty of that rich commercial province of Arcot, or ih Carnatic, in which it is fituated : for, not- withftanding it tolerates a nominal Nabob, whofe name it ufes in moft a for the Company's convenience, poffefles the (ha- dow of fovereignty ; yet, as the govern- ment of Madrafs holds the charge of de- fending the country, and maintains the military force requifite thereto, it is the actual fovereign : feeing that, in all In- dian or Afiatic governments, he who holds the fword muft be the abfolute lord and mafter. And, notwithftanding all the Company's parade of appearances, this Nabob of Arcot is, in refpect of fovereign power, as much a pageant as he of Ben- gal : a mere fcreen or blind, placed before the Company's fovereignty. Bombay is likewife embarked in dorrii* nion, fince it feized on the rich commer- ' cial city of Surat, with its diftrift, 6cc. Though found policy mud direct Britain to t 118 J to reprobate all territorial dominion on that fide of the peninfulaj as caufing a dangerous divifion and weakening of her force and defence. But the fame policy will inftruct Britain to regard dominion on the eaft fide of that peninfula in an oppofite light; becaufe on that fide lay all the truly valuable do- minions which fhc already pofTefTes. To fully explain what is the trueintereft of Britain, refpecting territorial dominion in India, would be, here, foreign and te- dious j and, to flightly touch on that fub- ject, might afford ground for ccnfure and criticifm : we mail only obferve, in the general, that Britain ought to value only fuch dominion in India as is maritime: becaufe, in the firft place, thefe are ever trading and manufacturing countries \ and, as fuch, are highly ufeful to her proper commerce ; they are likewife capacitated, by their own active foreign trade, ta richly reimburfe her for her expence of native flrength in defending them, as well as for her trouble in governing them : and, in the fecond place, being acceflible to her naval force, they are eafily maintained and defended by her. Therefore, fo much of [ "9] of this maritime dominion as me can maintain and defend, without creating any additional expence of native ftrength j and, upon a footing fo connected with that truly valuable dominion which me already poflefles, as not to caufe any dangerous di- vifion of that original ftrength, fo much of this maritime dominion in India may be truly ufeful and advantageous to her ; on any other terms it may be detrimental. Such is the prefent ftate of Britim do- minion in India : and fuch is the intereft of Britain, with refpect to future aug- mentation of dominion in that country. And we have undertaken to plan the con- ftruction of an intermediate power or de- putation, which, under the national go- vernment of Britain, (hall effectually and faithfully fuperintend, enforce, and con- troul the meafures of thefe feveral govern- ments that, at prefent are,, or in future may be, fubjected to Britain : and which deputation (hall of courfe, in the firft place, enable the national government of Britain to eftablim a regular fyitem of po* litical government over this whole prefent or future dominion : t and, in the fecond place, fhall conftitute a complete fyftem of military [120] military government, and fecurc defence, for all the feveral branches of this domi- nion. At prefent we are on the fuhjedt of political government. The properties requifite to qualify this intermediate power, or deputation, for ef- fectually fuperintending, enforcing, and controuling the political government of dominion in India, are, firft, virtue and integrity, to faithfully and honeftly dif- charge the duties of its office : and, fe- cond, power or ability, to effedually ful- fil the purpofe of its inftitution. The lat- ter is more eaiily conferred 5 but the for- mer is rendered difficult, by fundry ob- ftrucYions, anting from the nature or dif- pofition of the perfons who mult necef- farily be employed to compofe this deputa- tion. For it is needlefs to obferve, that this controuling power cannot be lodged in the fubj eels native of the dependent do- minion ; the nature of the government, as well as the nature of their difpofitiqn, renr dering that impracticable ; (as hath been mewn) : otherwife this difficulty might be more eafily furmounted. But, the In- dian fubjects being fet afide, there remains po choice - 3 this controuling deputation rnufl;* fer ptr force, be compofed of Britifh bom fubjedts : whilft the feveraj governments, which it is meant to controul, are at fame time executed by Britim born fubje&s. And, from this circumftance, it follows, that the perfonal intereft of the party controul- ing muft naturally be the very fame, with that of the party controuled : and, of courfe, the views of both muft likewife be the fame. This fimilarity or famenefs of perfonal intereft and views it is that creates the difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity, honour, and fidelity, on the controuling deputation. For it is morally certain, that the fimilarity of intereft and views will, naturally and invariably, draw the party controuling, to concur and join, inftead of qontrouling or oppofing, the meafures of the party executing, (feeing fuch mea- fures tend to promote that which is their common intereft) provided that this party controuling (hall poffefs the power, and opportunity of fo joining intereft, with the party executing. And it is no lefs certain, that this controuling deputation muft, unavoidably, pofTefs the opportuni- ty of thusjoining interefts, unlefs it can, by [ 122 ] by fome means, be prevented and retrain- ed from joining and uniting the adtion of its own proper powers, with the aftion of thefe powers that are proper to the exe- cutive office. Whereas, if it (hall be found poffible to divide and feparate the action of thefe two different powers, the pne from the other, in a manner fo dif- tinct, that each {hall act, in the fphere af- figned to it, with freedom and liberty -, and neither mall have the opportunity of tranf- greffing the limits prefcribed, to its own proper department, by the fovereign; then, and in fuch cafe, it is not only pof- fible, but certain, that this controuling deputation may, and will be, prevented from joining interefls, with the executivp deputation j >and, confequently, from pro- moting the very meafures which it was meant to reftrain. And, from thence I concludejthat the only poffible and certain means of conferring, on this controuling deputation, virtue and integrity to faithfully and honeftly difcharge the duties of its office, is to cut it off from all opportuni- ty of joining the powers of its office, with thofe of the executive ; or of affii- ming any (hare in the executive govern- ment : [ "3 ] ment : in other words, it muft be reftrain* ed from interfering, either diredly or in- directly, personally or by proxy, in the immediate execution of meafures, in any one of thefe governments which it is meant to controul. But it is evident that, if this controul- ing deputation mall exift or refide within any one of thofe dominions whofe go- vernment it is meant to controul, it will be morally jmpofiible to prevent it from joining its powers, and, confequently, its interefts, views, and meafures, with the deputed executive power of that govern- ment where it refides. For, by virtue of its authority, which from the nature of its office muft needs be fupreme over the executive deputation, it will ufurp at lead a part if not the whole power of execu- tion : or otherwife it will, by confent, join and unite its powers with thofe of the ex ecutive, in order to promote their mutual intereft, by meafures diametrically repug- nant to the purpofe of its inftitution. Nor is it poffible, in this cafe, by any art, de- vice or feparation into parts, to prevent this ufurpation or union : let the controul- ing power be termed judges, fupervifors, officers [ officers of the revenue, or what elfe; and let the office of controuling be divided^ into as many parts as can be conceived; ilill, the difference of term, will not alter the nature of the men employ* edj nor will the divifion of parts fepa- rate their intereft. All the various per- fons, compofing this office, will ftill be Eu- ropeans ; the fame as thefe who compofe the executive office ; and fo, all the per- fons in both offices will be foreign to the country governed, acting by an authority which is deputed mutable and temporary ; confequently they will all hold the fame view ; which is, to amafs all the money they can during the fhort term of their office, in order to tranfport it to theif own country : and as all of them would, by virtue of their refiding within the fame government, pofTsfs the fame powers, and the fame opportunities of exerting them, they would all be irrefiftably attracted, by the omnipotent fympathy of felf-intereft, to join their feveral powers, in promoting that which is the common view of one and all of them. In fine, if thefe controul- ing and executive deputations, which thus, from the community of the natale Jolitm > J folum, hold one and the fame intered, (hall both refide together in one and the fame government, and thereby poiTefs the fame opportunities, it will be equally impoffi- ble to prevent thefe two deputations, how- ever artfully feparated into parts, from joining and uniting their different powers, &c. as it is to preferve feparate the guttas of quickfilverj which, however gently and carefully they are dropt upon the fame confined and frnooth furface, will meet, join, and conglobate into one u- nited mafs. But if the controuling deputation fhall be thus permitted to join its powers with thefe of the executive, and confequently forfeit its virtue and in- tegrity, with refpedt to that one territo- rial government where it refides, it thereby becomes difqualified and unfit to controui the meafures of any one other govern- ment : for the judge" who is himfelf cor- rupt, is but little qualified to judge or punilh corruption in others. I therefore conclude that, in order to preferve the virtue and integrity of this controuling deputation, it is indifpenfably neceffary that it mould not refide withhi the limits of any one of thefe territorial govern- R ments j [ 1*6] ; thefe being the governments which it is meant to controul. On the other hand, it is equally certain, that this controuling deputation cannot exe- cute in perfon,cr affume any perfonal mare jn the execution of meafures, in any one of thole governments where it doth not ac- tually refide ; it being impoffible that it can acT: perionally where it is not perfonal- ly prefent. It therefore follows that, by fituating or placing this controuling depu- tation at a fufficiently proper diilance from all thefe feveral territorial governments, i( may be prevented from afTurning a perfo- nal (hare in the immediate execution of meafures in any one of them. And being thus, by the lltuation of its refidence* cut off from all opportunity of acting perfonally, it may likewife be precluded from acting ifecondarjly, or usurping by proxy any influence, in the immediate ex- ecution of thefe governments, if it mall, after the manner of the Dutch govern- ment at Batavia, be ftric*lly prohibited from exercifing its fuperviiing authority any where without the limits of its own fixed refidence ; and from delegating or deputing its powers to any perfon or per- fons 4 { 1*7 1 fons, its own members or others, who 1 (hall refide, or may be beyond thefe pre- fcribed bounds. For though the fyftem of the Dutch government at Batavia is, in many refpe&s, far too rude and unpo- limed 5 yet is it, in this particular, moft nicely circumfcribed : that government being retrained, in the moil precife man- lier, from delegating and transferring its authority ; or from deputing any power to examine into cafes, of even the mod dubious nature, within the fubordinates : but to obviate any inconvenience, that might otherwife arife from fuph restraint, it hath a power to call before it, from the fubordinates, all perfpns or records necef- fary to information. For the Dutch were well aware, that the fupreme government, if it mould be permitted to carry its fu- pervifing authority on any pretext into the fubordinates, would gain an occafion of interfering in the execution pf thofe mea- fures which it was intended to controul. We muft then perceive, that this con- trouling deputation being feated at a pro- perly fufficient diftance from all thefe ter- ritorial governments, and the exercife of its powers being exprefsly confined to that R 2 par- [ particular feat of refidence, it will, by fuch means, be effectually retrained from in- terfering, in any fhape, either directly or indirectly, in the execution of any one of thofe governments which it iff intended to controul. And we ' muft farther perceive that, by virtue of fuch effectual reftraint, that clear feparation of office, which alone can prevent the junction or union of the powers, interefts, and views of this con- trouling deputation with thofe of the ex- ecutive, will be completely accomplifhed. Seeing that, the action of the controuling power being fhictiy confined within the limits of its own proper fphere, the exe- cutive power muft remain at full liberty to act diflinctiy and freely in the office affigned to it by the fovereign. The principal fource of corruption, and grand {tumbling block of virtue, being thus removed, the integrity of this con- trouling deputation may be eftablifhed on a firm and folid bafis, by ikilfully dividing the parts which go to compofe it: and, in particular, by clearly Separating the po- litical and judicial powers : which, if they {hall be judicioufly divided into two diftinct departments, mutually independent and unin- fjjp [ 129 ] uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as an effe&ual check, and powerful impulfe, on the other : fo as to prevent either from abufing its authority, or neglecting its duty. Whereas, if the political power fhould, at fame time, pofTefs the power of judging, trying and determining, or mould even poflefs any influence over the judica- ture, there is danger that it might, on fome occafions, facrifice its duty to its in- tereft. And this is the very capital error of the Dutch fyftem at Batavia, inafmuch as that government, pofleffing the judicial power, hath thereby the opportunity of perverting juftice, fometimes to the preju- dice of its conftituent, and often to the detriment of its fubordinates. Nor would we be here underftood to fignify, by judicial power, a fimple court of judicature, eftablifhed for the purpofc of deciding litigated cafes . of property ; the judicial power here meant, muft extend o every thing that refpects a due execution of the jurifdidion and police, in thefub- ordinate governments. Therefore its au- thority muft not be paffive, and confined to fuch matter as fhall come before it by complaint; but it muft be active, aflum- ing - 1 130] ing cognizance of all public huifance, trefpafs, or delinquency, that may be brought before it by information. For, here, juries may exift with great pro- priety and efficacy, feeing that the Com- pany will, on account of her commerce, keep a number of fervants at this fupremc fettiement; there will likewife be, no doubt, many free merchants (as they are termed) : and, confequently, there will never be wanting a choice of perfons un- connected with, and uninfluenced by the political government -, and therefore fit to form a grand inqueft j as well as petit or fpecial juries, to decide in either criminal cafes, or difputes of property. And this judicial power mufr. farther be endued with all proper and necefTary officers ; particu- larly an attorney general : it mull like- wife be divided into diftincl courts; re- fembling, as nearly as circumftances will admit, or occafion requires, the courts of juftice in the fovereign country. Neverthelefs, we do not prefume to dic- tate or prefcribe the exact or complete form of this judicial power : we would only hint at the main purpofes of its inftitution ; a due confideration of which will readily fuggeft fuggeft the particular form, to thole whofe province it may be to conftrucl: k. We ihall only obferve that, in order to confer a due weight on the judicial power, it is not fufficient that it fhould be inde- pendent, in its corporate capacity ; the judges and officers competing it muft, in their perfonal capacity, be placed as far as poffible beyond the influence of the poli- tical power. The falaries annexed to their offices muft be fuch as will afford dignity, as well as independence : whilft, on the other hand, they hall be debarred, under the ievereft penalties, from holding, either directly or indirectly, any place, poft, emo- lument, or employment, of any nature, diftincl: from that of its own proper de- partment. Moreover, the political power {hould hold no voice in conferring the de- grees of this department : that fhould be vefted in the judicial power itfelf, with reference to the confirmation of the fo- vereign. This judicial power may be termed the fupreme Court of Judicature, for the whole Britim dominion in India : to which .all the fubjects, under the feveral govern- jrients, whether natives or Europeans, mav readily readily appeal, againft the oppreffion of their governors, .or the perverfion of juf- tice : and, on which they may fecurely depend for redrefs ; provided it (hall be placed above the influence of the political power. This fupreme court of judica- ture would likewife be of inexpreflible utility, as a check on the power, and an impulfe on the will, of the political branch. We may add, that a judicious fubdivi- fion of the political power, into different departments, might contribute confidera- bly to its virtue. Thefe are the outlines of that meafure, by which we propofe to preferve this con- trouling deputation free from corruption : and we doubt not but, upon this plan, when meliorated and improved by the fu- perior undemanding of others, a controul- ing power may be conftruded, which fhall be completely qualified, in point of virtue and integrity, to faithfully and ho- nourably fuperintend, enforce, and con- trpul the execution of political govern- ment in thofe Indian dominions. And this is, by far, the moft difficult, delicate, and important part of the undertaking. For, [ '33 ] for, as to the power and ability, requi- fite to qualify this deputation for effe&u- ally fulfilling the purpofe of its inftitu- tion, that is readily beftowed. The de- gree of power is altogether in the difpo- fal of the fovereign. And, its efficacy or ability depends, principally, upon the choice of fuch a fituation for the feat of its refidence, as fhall enable it to keep up f at all feafons, a ready and fpeedy corre- fpondence with the feveral fubordinate go- vernments, With regard to the choice of fituation proper for the refidence of this controul- ing power 5 (which is indeed a point of high importance,) we fhall readily con- ceive, from adverting to its nature and the purpofes of its inftitution, that this refidence ought to be fome convenient fea port ; fituated at a confiderable diftance from the limits of all thefe territorial go- vernments ; but, at fame time, fo centri- cally near to each, that the communica- tion, to and from it, fhall, in either mon- foon, be not only practicable, but certain and fpeedy. I (hall referve the farther explanation of this intended feat of refi- dence, till I come to treat of the military S fyftem 5 [ '34] fyilem ; becaufe there are fome properties, particularly requifite to a proper centre of military defence : and it is propofed that the fame power, and confequently the fame refidence, that fuperintends the political government, fhou-ld iikevvife di- rect the military government and defence, of this dominion. But this fupreme controlling power be- ing thus centrically fituated, with refpect to the feveral fubordinates, as that it {hall at all times hold a ready and fpeedy cor- refpondence with each, will be thereby ' enabled toe ffe&ually fuperintend, enforce, and controul the execution of political government in that whole dominion. For, in the firll phce, the ready and fpeedy communication with all the fubordinates, affording to the lupreme power an oppor- . tunity of .obtaining, from each, the mod early intelligence of every tranfadion, in- cident, or occurrence ; as likewife of im- mediately tranfmitting the orders and in- ftrudions, that may be fuitable to the oc- cafion; will cut off from the feveral go- vernors of the territorial dominions all pretext for ading difcretionally. And, in confequence, that defpotic and arbitrary power, 1 135 1 power, which hath fubfifted under the Company's fyftem, will be completely fup- prefTed. And, from adverting to this cir- cumitance, we (hall perceive the import- ance of a proper choice of fituation, for this fupreme center of government. In the fecond place, this ready corref- pondence with all the fubordinate govern- ments, enabling the fupreme power to acquire a minute and complete knowledge of every circumftance, refpeding the ftate and nature of the general police, in this whole dominion, will qualify it for ori- ginally planning, and for afterwards im- proving, all fuch defigns and meafures as can contribute to the inftitution of regu- larity and good order. It will likewife attain an intimate knowledge of the whole manoeuvre of finance, refpeding the mode of collevfling as well as appropriating the revenue and taxes : and it will be thereby enabled to project judicious forms, with different offices, as mutual checks upon each other, in that branch: which will ferve to remedy that incredible extortion* rapine, and peculation : which, by ruin- ing the farmer of the lands, hath almoft totally fupprefled agriculture, and greatly S 2 depo- F 136] depopulated thole miferable countries $ whilft it hath grievoufly defrauded the fo- vereign of his right. And all thefe plan- ned modes, being approved and confirmed by the fovereign, would be continued in vigorous and perpetual action, by the vi- cinity of the fupreme political power : and all thefe feveral meafures, being enacted into laws, the Uriel: obfervance of them would be effectually enforced by the fame vicinity. And thus, that fupreme power will, not only eftablim, but perpetually conferve a juft regularity in police, and an exact oeconomy in finance. In the third place, the fupreme judicial power will, by its neighbourhood to thefe dependent dominions, acquire a juftknow- ledge of the modes, cuftoms, and difpofi- tions of the inhabitants ; and, by that, it will be enabled to devife the befl forms or offices, together withikilful rules for admi- niftring the jurifdiction, in a manner tru- ly effectual, and at fame time confonant and agreeable to the humour of the fub^ ject. It will likewife be capable of after- wards improving and adding to thefe forms and rules, as future occafion may require, ^r better information may fuggeft. All which t which forms or offices may, by the appro- bation of the fovereign, be eftabliftied in- to {landing courts 5 and the rules enacted into laws. And a punctual obfervance of all thefe laws enacted, either for the regu- lar adminiftration of juftice, or confer- vance of the police, will be completely enforced, by the awe of this fupreme tribunal : the communication with which, from all parts of that dependent domi- nion, being eafy and fpeedy, will afford a ready accefs and opportunity to all the fubjeds, of prefenting their complaints, againft any oppreflion of their govern- ment, or denial, or perveriion of juftice : whilft the fame ready communication will render the trial of all litigated cafes, fpee- dy and eafy. A moghty innovation this, from the former mode of juftice in thofc dominions; when it was impoflible for even Europeans to obtain redrefs, in our dif- tant precife European courts, againft the moft glaring oppreflion of government : and the natives were excluded from even, that diftant and deceitful profped of re- m.edy. And in order that the courfe of juftice may be rendered thoroughly complete, it may [ 138] may be ena&ed, after the manner of the Dutch, that no perfon, who hath held any office of power or truft within the fubordinates, fhall depart immediately from thence for Europe ; but fhall be obliged to repair to the fupreme refidence ; there to remain for three months ; to the end that any perfon or perfons who may, by any means, have been retrained, du- ring the exiftence of his office, from pre- ferring their complaint againft him, on the fcore of either public or private tref- pafs, may there have the free opportuni- ty of profecuting him. The fupreme political power fhall im- mediately appoint to all offices, as well political as military, within the fubordi- nate governments -, whh reference held to the future approbation, and confirmation, of the fovereign : and it fhall preferve re- gular minutes of all fuch appointments, orders, and other tran factions made in its fupreme capacity ; which minutes, toge- ther with regular and properly vouched accounts of the collection, as well as the appropriation of the revenue, fhall be punctually tranfmitted, by etfery occafion, to the fovereign. The judicial power (hall mall likewife keep an exacl: regifter of all trials, caufes, and proceedings ; more par-* ticularly thofe of the grand inqueft and affizes : this latter to be figned by all the , judges and officers of the court, and at- tefled by the foremen, with a majority of the juries : two copies of which mall be regularly tranfmitted to Britain -, one to the fovereign j and the other to the Com- pany ; which, as holding a material inte- reft and mare in thefe law proceedings, hath a claim to fuch participation of . * knowledge. All which minutes, accounts, and proceedings, being communicated to the fovereign, will enable him to aft as an ultimate check on the political go- vernment, the finance, and the jurifdic- tion of that Indian dominion. Such is the form of this intermediate^ power, through which I propofe to convey* into the execution of government in thofe diftant Indian dominions, that plenary ex- ertion of the fovereign's reftraining and compelling power, which, alone, can fuf- fice to prevent tyranny and anarchy. And notwithstanding the materials are, through hurry and want of time, rude, unpolifhed and coarfely arranged, yet do I flatter my- felf, [140] felf, that candour will allow them to be: folidly good, proper, and fully fufficing to conftrucl, at leaft, the groundplot, or bafis, of a regular political fyftem. Sure I am, the high propriety, nay the in- difpenfable necefiity of fuch a mea- fure, muft immediately ftrike every per- fon who employs his own judgment, however flightly, to conlider, firft, the nature, interefts, and views of the exe- cutive government in thofe Indian do- minions ', as being foreign, deputed, mutable, and temporary. Second the timid, paflive, and ilavimly fubmiffive dif- pofition of the native fubjeds. And third, the diftance of fituation, betwixt the fo- vereign refidence, and the fcene of go- vernment ; which, rendering the immedi- ate reftraint and conftraint of the fove- reign perfectly impotent, confers on this foreign executive deputation an unlimited and arbitrary power, of promoting its own pcrfonal views and interefl, by meafures* which tend to the intolerable oppreilion of the wretched inhabitants, and the utter ruin of thofe fubjected countries ; as well as to the mighty detriment of Britain's deareft interefl:, and the blackeft reproach to t *4 J to her reputation. Nor can all this bfc remedied or prevented, but by fuch a mea*- jfure as is here propofed. And now we (hall take a flight glance fct the operation of this meafure, on the jurifdiclion,- and police, of the fubordinate dominions. And though^ for the fake of perfpicuity, we confine the view to Ben- gal alone, as being the mod eminent part, yet will the effects be equally felt through the whole. As to the fundamental eftablifhments of Governors, Councils, &c. thefe are fuffi- ciently obvious 5 as li'kewife are the pro- per chambers of revenue : and thefe, with the minutiae appointments of inferior offi* ces, will be more properly provided and improved, by the better judgment, true information > and future experience of the fupreme controuling power. Here we mean to offer only one or two hints on the mode of jurifdiction and police* And firft, with regard to the courts of juftice, I fhould propofe that the mayor's court at Calcutta mould ftill fubfift, as $ court of equity for the whole country : and a moil equitable court it is, if properly .regulated : for the truth of which affer- T ticn, I '4*1 tion, I appeal to all thofe who knew it previous to that alteration of the Com* pany's charter of juftice, which rendered it dependent on, and fubfervient to, the Governor and Council : never was juftice more exactly or more expeditioufly admi- niftered, than it was by this court, pre- vious to that alteration. In order there- fore to reflore it to its primitive utility, it ought to be reftored to its original ftate. Let thejudges or aldermen, who at prefent compofe it, continue fuch : being fervants to the Company, or free merchants, they muft be unconnected with, and uninfluen- ced by the national government. And, in the cafe of death, or removal, the vacuum to be fupplied by the court itfelf, from amongft the Company's fervants, or free merchants only : and if any alderman lhall, fubfequent to entering on his office, accept of any poft or place under govern- ment, let that be an exprefs difqualifica- tion and vacation of his office ; which is to be immediately made good, by the choice of another perfon, properly quali- fied. The newly elected aldermen to be prefented, for acceptance, to the fupremc court - : t -43 i court of judicature only. And the officers of this court to be chofen by itfelf. . But as it would be impoffible for the mayor's court to difpatch all the bufmefs that might be brought before it, there ought like wife to be a court of law -, con- lifting of a chief juftice, with three judges; to be appointed by the fovereign. And this court fhould guide itfelf, by fuch laws as may be ena&ed for the jurifdi&ion of thofe countries ; otherwife by equity. Appeals from this court of law, as well as that of equity, to be made immediately to the fupreme court of judicature ; and from thence to his Majeftyin council. If it is thought proper, there might be another mayor's court, of the fame na- ture, eftablimed at Coflitnbuzar, in the neighbourhood of the old capital, Maxa- davad. And as to the forms, for the more uni- verfal diftribution of juflice to the natives, thefe will be adjufled by the fupreme fu- pervifing power ; as before mentioned. We fhall only obferve, that their courts of Zemindary and Cutchery are, as they ftand at prefent, a grievous nuifance. T 2 Bat f 144 1 JBut the nobleil inftitutioo for protecting the liberty and property of the lubjcd:, from the extortion and oppreffipn of their foreign government, and of its inferioc train of native harpies, who are infinitely more rapacious than the Europeans, would be that of juries, properly conftrud:ed^ I^et the grand inqueit of the country be held at Culcutta, four times in the year : and let thejurie?, both grand and petit t be exprefly compofed of Company's fer-r v^nts, or free merchants, Europeans, and none others : the judges of law, or af; leaft two of them, to fit on the affizes : the fheriff to be chofen annually, from amongft the Company's fervants. The powers of this grand inqueft, if adapted to the iituation qf things, muft be enlarged beyond thefe of our juries in Britain ; where there are judicial and po-? litical aids, that muft'be wanting in thofe countries: for inftancc, the enquiry mufl not be confined to place, but mud extend every where through the country : it muft likewife have authority to bring before it all manner of nuifance or trefpafs com- mitted againft the liberty or proptffty of the fu,bjet, natives as well as Europeans. And r 145 1 And the ju.tjes, fhould have no power to reject or poftpone the bills, found by the grand jury : but fhould bring them on to decifion, in turn, as prefented. Moreover, as the extent of enquiry may render it im- poffible for the more diflant defendant to appear with his evidences, during the fit- ting of that aflize to which the bill hath been prefented againft him -, let fummons fee iflued, upon the bill's being prefented, for fuch diftant defendant to appear at next affixes ; or let fome other method be found, either by means of the grand jury's meet- ing a fufficient time before the com- mencement of trials, or by fome extraor- dinary power vefted in the judges or flierifF to produce fuch diftant defendant with his evidences in due time. And as this fame extent of enquiry may, on the other hand, produce inconvenience to the fubjecl:, by affording occafion to litigious perfons of diftrefling others, by bringing them from a great diftance to thefe affizes, on frivolous or ill grounded complaints, it may be or- dered that, where the caufe fhall appear to the court truly litigious, the plaintiff fliall t>e bound over to ftand fuit at law, for da- to the defendant : and, one or two examples, examples, of this nature, will prove a barr to frivolous litigation. And leaft the judges mould, by any means, be influenced to act that part which the Company's governor and council com- monly act, when they abfurdly prefide at thefe afiizes, as his Majsfty's judges in their own caufc ; namely, to difmifs the Court, fo foon as the grand jury mall find a bill that may be difagreeable to them ; it may be ordered that neither the judges, nor any officer of the Court, mall have power to adjourn the affizes, until all the trials fhall be decided ; or, otherwife, by the confent of a majority in both juries. The principal check however upon the conduct of thefe affizes, would be that of obliging the Court to keep exact regifters, of all trials, and proceedings ; figned and attefted, as before mentioned. And if any part of either jury mall except to the au- thenticity of fuch regifler, which mail be publickly expofed in the Court, then, fuch difienting part (hall have a right to proteft, and affiga its reafons. Three co- pies of which regifter, with proteft, (if any,) mail be difpatched, by the earlieft ^cca^on, after each affize. One copy to the [ '47 1 the fupreme Court of Judicature $ which will, thereby, have the earlieft notice of any abufe ; and, with the concurrence of the fupreme political power, (hall have the opportunity of immediately correcting it. A fecond copy (hall be tranfmitted to the fovereign ; who will aft as an ulterior check on the fupreme controuling power. And a third copy to the Company for the reafons before fpecified. But, as this fmgle inqueft at Calcutta cannot poffibly carry juftice to the ex- tremes of that extenfive country, circu- lating affizes may be held, at leaft once, or if poffible twice a year, at Muxadavad as the center, and at Patnah as the nor- thern extreme $ two judges to go this nor- thern circuit : and the other two judges to go on an eaftsrn circuit, at Dacca. And, as there may not be a fufficient num- ber of Company's fervants, properly qua- lified, to form complete juries at thefe northern and eaftern aflizes : I would pro- pofe that, to make up any fuch deficien- cy, natives mould be mixed with the Eu- ropeans. Which mixture, if it (hall be artfully tempered, in the following man- ner, would produce all the efficacy of en- tirely f 148 ] tlrely European juries ; and, at fame tirhej .none of the bad effects, that might be ap- prehended, from an attempt to confer freedom and impartiality on juries entirely native. Let, at leaft, one half of both the grand and petit juries be Europeans ; and the remaining part natives : and if it ftiould happen, that there cannot be collected, at the aflize factory, and from the neigh* bouring inferior factories, fo many Com- pany's fervants as mall make up half the ulual number of jurymen ; then, let the whole number be diminished, to the fuf- ficing half of Europeans. Let the una- nimity of verdict, in fuch mixt juries, be difpenfed with ; and let the majority of voices, in either jury, find the bill or ver- dict ; as is the cuftom in Scotland. And let an additional provifion be made to the oath of the juryman, purporting that he ihall not, on any account, difclofe the opinion given by any individual, in the jury room. By ,thi9 artful mixture, and thefe pre- cautions, the native jurymen would be li- berated from that ilavim dread, of future revenge from their own countrymen em- ployed ployed under government; feeing it would be impoflible, for thefe native officers of government, to difcover the particular opi- nion of each individual -, which, if the juries were entirely native, they would infallibly do, to the utter ruin of the poof native jurymen. So that the native Jury* men, acting thus with freedom, under the cloke and protection of the Europeans, would anfvver all the effectual purpofes of Europeans. Whilft, being fenfible that they owed their freedom and impartiality, together with all the other benefits arifing from juries, to their connection with the Europeans ; this freedom conferred on them in the jury room, would not in the lead diminish their awe and deference to government. The proceedings at thefe circuit affizes to be regiftered and tranf- mitted in like manner as at Calcutta. Thefe juries would prove the Magna Charta, the palladium, and true fecurity of Indian liberty and property, againft the defpotifm and extortion of their foreign government. And it evidently appears* that the virtue of thefe juries, (a's being, at one and the fame time, truly effectual to the fubject, and perfectly fafe to the U fove- fovereign,) entirely depends upon the cir* cumftance, of completely excluding the Company and her fervants, from the fmall^ eft participation in the executive powers of government. But the efficacy of thefe juries, and of other inferior jnftitutions jnade through the fupreme controuling power, being once felt and known, would Ipeedily induce the natives to purchafe perpetual property in lands ; feeing they would perceive themfelves thoroughly fe-p cured in the produce of thofe lands. And this, being divulged abroad, would draw the inhabitants of the neighbouring coun- tries to the ftandard of Britain; together with their wealth, and induftry. By which means the Britifh dominion in In- (lia, which, at prefent is, through op- preffion and confequent famine, in a great meafure deferted and depopulated, woulc} again be completely peopled and cultivated: arts, manufactures, and commerce would foon be reflored to their former flate $ nay, they would be extended to a degree far fuperior: and thefe countries would, of pourfe, be enabled to richly repay Britain for the bleflings conferred by her, of per-. t *St 1 feet fecurity in liberty arid property ; btef- lings, never before known in India. And all this may be efTecled by meanS of that intermediate fuprerrie cdntrduling power : which would, ribt only create! but preferve, the full arid vigdrdus efficacy of all thefe institutions, in the fubordinate dominionSi Whereas, if it was even pof- fible, (though indeed it is morally impof- fible,) to inftitute, by any temporary means* all thefe powers, forms, rules, and regulations in thofe dominions, yet is it evidently certain that, fo fooh as thefe temporary means were withdrawn, the virtue and efficacy of all thefe inftitutions Would immediately vantth, arid be fup* preffed by the power of the executive gd- vernment; which, from the nature of things, muft unavoidably be, either def- potic over the native fubjects> or cannot cxifl at all. But this fame coritrouling power, as it would, on the one hand, by its fixed re- fidence in the immediate neighbourhood, perpetually preferve the adtiori and motiori of all thefe inftitutions, like to a power ever prefent to wind up the fprings of the machine; and, fo, would check all thd U 2 bad bad eftcds of that naturally necefiary def- potifm in executive government : fo would it, on the other hand, effectually fupport the power and authority of that executive government ; and prevent its being en- croached on, by an over exertion of the privileges conferred on the fubjeft. For, on this fide too, there is a danger; which will be readily comprehended, by thofe who confider the nature of government ; and, at fame time, the difpofition of hu- man nature. But all danger, of prepon- derating either fcale, would be prevented, by the vicinity of the controuling power: which, holding the balance in its hands, and nicely diminishing from one, OF adding to the other fcale, would ever pre- ierve a juft equilibrium, betwixt the li berty of the fubject, and the power of government. Nor would the inftitution of new regu- lations be the only means, in the hands of the controuling power, of preventing the dangerous over exertion of privilege : it would likewife poflefs the inftantaneouc power of feizing, or otherwife of ordering to its own refidence, all fuch perfons as ihould prove over troublefome, or dangerous to [ >53] to the due authority of executive govern- ment. For, though it would be extremely abfurd to truft a power of this nature, im- mediately in the hands of executive go- vernment ; which would, infallibly, em- ploy it to its own word purpofes : yet might fuch power be fafely trufted to this controuling government ; which could not have the fame motives to abufe it. Neverthelefs,we do not mean that this,, and all thefe other powers, mould be un- limitedly confided to this controuling de- putation : we Hill preferve a check over it, in the national government. And a mod effectual check too -, by means of the beforementioned copies of regifters, im- mediately tranfmitted to Britain, from the fubordinates j as likewife by its own mi- nutes, accounts, and regifters. So that here would be a regular grada- tion of effectual political checks. The privilege of juries, and other inftitutions in the fubordinate dominions, being pre- ferved in vigorous adtion, by the influence of the intermediate controuling power, would prove an effectual check on the def- potifrn or extortion of executive govern* tnent ; and would thus completely fecure the r 154 3 the liberty and property of the fubje<5h And the fame influence of the controuling power would fufficiently check the luxu- riancy of privilege j and fupport the power of government j thus preferving an exact poife betwixt both. Whilft the fovereign, at a diftance, could deliberately and effec- tually watch the hand that> trimmed the fcales. And thus the inftitution of this inter- mediate controuling and impelling power* would completely remove every obftruc- tion arifing from the diftance of fituation 5 it would ferve as an intermediate link of the political chain : or, as a bridge of communication, joining this dependent Indian dominion to the fovereign coun* try. But, all obftru&ion anting from the diftance of fituation being thus removed, what difficulty can the national govern- ment of Britain find, in adminiftring the political government of that Indian domi- nion ? Upon this plan, that tafk appears to me more facil, lefs pregnant with dif- ficulty, charge, or care, than it is to govern any one, the moft pretty, of our foreign Colonies : nay it appears equally eafy, as it is tp govern the neighbouring Ifte of Man; [ 155 1 Man : feeing that the oppofition of the fubjeds, to the authority of government in this Indian dominion, though they be fo infinitely more numerous, is not greater than is the oppofition of the few fub- jeds in Man. The only difficulty, that could exifl to national government, was that of duly tempering, or abating, the power of the deputed executive govern- ment : and it appears, that this may he completely effected by means of this intermediate controuling power; which* in the hands of the fovereign, would ac~t upon the government of this Indian domi- nion as the pegs or keys upon the firings of a ^mufical inftrument; of which one being gently {trained, and another proper- ly relaxed, would create, and perpetually preferve, a perfect harmony, or concord, In this political fyflem. A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM O F MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND OF SECURE DEFENCE, I N I N D I A. THE Company's fyftem of military government and defence in India is, at leaft, equally defective, faulty, and ab- furd -, and, therefore, doth equally demand reformation, as doth her political fyftem. For the fame caufe that renders the power of the Company's feveral deputed gover- nors perfectly arbitrary and difcretional, in civil matters ; namely, the Directors having preferved to themfelves the charge of immediately directing and fuperintend- ing thofe governments ; confers, upon thefe deputed governors, a like arbitrary and difcretional power, in military mat- ters. And furely it is impoffible to con- ceive any thing more ridiculoufly extra- vagant r '57 1 vagant, than is this military fyftem of the Company ; which affords to each gover- nor,, of four different capital fettlements, the abfolute, independent, and difcreti- onal power, of applying the military force of his own government j and likewife of directing the meafures of defence : whilil, each, of thefe four governors, holds a par- ticular intereft of his own -, which is, not only diflindt from, but oppofite to that of all the others. Can it be fuppofed that four men, thus oppofite in their perfonal views and inter- efts, and thus independent of each other, fhould heartily concur in general meafures ; or mould cordially unite in a fyftem of common defence ? Common fenfe informs us that they will not; and experience con- vinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that one, of thefe fettlements, hath furnifhed arms and ammunition j and hath otherwife befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And, in the cafe of any one of thefe fettle - inents being attacked, the others are ex- tremely backward in fupporting itj be- caufe each, of the four governors, giving the preference to his own particular X oharge, 1 158] charge, in which his own perfonal intereft is more immediately concerned, confiders all communication of his force, to any of the other fettlements, as a diminution of his own fecurity, and even of his im-t portance. So that, upon fuch terms, the union betwixt thefe four diftind, and mu- tually independent, governments, can fcarcely be termed federal. Moreover, each of thefe four governors poflefles, within the limits of his own go- vernment, the difcretionary power of making war and peace. And, fo, hath the opportunity, whenever it (hall fuit the purpofe of his own perfonal in tereft, to pick a quarrel, and engage his government in war, with fome one of the neighbour- ing native flates. Nor is this an imaginary evil ;. or a fimple fuppofition of what may poflibly happen -, it is a real cafe ; an abufe that hath adually exifted, For, We can produce feveral inftances where thefe go- vernors, more particularly on the coaft of Cormondel, have commenced, and induf- trioufly protracted, wars with the neigh- bouring iiates, exprefsly for the purpofe of plunder and peculation, And, And, from this difcretionary power of jpeace and war lodged in the hands of thefe feveral governors, and the confequent abufe thereof, flow the following evils to the fovereign. Firft, the governor, thus warring, exhaufts and confumes the trea- fureof his conftituentj to the end that he and his affociates, may gain occafion to pocket a part. Second, by thefe offen- five wars, he waftes and deftroys that force, which was intended by the fovereign for defence : and, thereby, expofes his own charge, naked and dcfencelefs, to the at- tack of other enemies. And third, by thefe wanton unneceflary and unjuft wars, he provokes the hatred and jealoufy of all the neighbouring flates -, -and, thus, con- verts into enemies, thofe native powers, who would, otherwife, be amicable and friendly to the fovereign. To correct thefe, and many other abufes of a like nature, which flow from this ab- furd military fyftem of the Company, it is evidently and indifpenfably neceffary, that there mould be inftituted, one fu- preme head of military government. Which, being veiled with the fupreme power of making peace and war in India, X 2 (hall r 160 1 {hall reftrain thefe feveral territorial go- vernors, from engaging in unneceffary wars with their neighbours. And which, pof- fefiing the fupreme direction of the com- mon force, {hall, in the cafe of particu- lar or general danger, apply that force to the moft proper and neceffary purpofes. Now it is naturally proper, that the fame intermediate fupreme power, which fuperintends the political government, fhould likewife fupremely fuperintend the military government, and defence, of thofe Indian dominions. And, for this latter purpofe, the choice of a proper fi- tuation, for the refidence of that fupreme power, becomes likewife a point of moil efTential confequenc.e. For it is evident, on the one hand, that this military fuperin- tending power ought not to exifl in any one of thefe territorial governments ; nay it ought not to refide in the immediate neighbourhood of any one rich native ftate ; becaufe, in either of thefe two fi- tuations, it is liable to be tempted, by views of avarice or ambition, to apply the general force, to its own perfonal purpofes ; and, if fo, the cure would be worfe than the difeafe : and, on the other hand, it is no t i6i-J no lefs evident, (from the reafons alugned on the fxmilar head in the political fyftern) that this fupreme military power ought toi be fituated fo centricaJly near, to all the leveral territorial governments, as that it may, at all times and feafons, be capable of keeping up a ready and fpeedy cor re- fpondence with each. The diftant and unconnected fituation, of thefe four capital governments, is like- wife a migh ty obftrudion to a fecure fyf* tern of defence. For, the wind, blow- ing in thofe feas for fix months from one quarter of the compafs, and for the other fix months from the oppofite quarter, doth, alternately, cut off in a great meafure all naval communication betwixt thefe four governments. For inftance, during the violence of the fouth weft monfoan, that is, from the middle of April till the mid- dle of July, it is almoft impracticable for ihips to pafs from Bengal to Madrafs : and, curing the three more moderate months of that monfoon, this pafTage is difficult and tedious. And during the north eaft monfoon, the paflage is much the fame from Madrafs to Bengal. But the com- munication betwixt Bombay, and thefe two [162 ] two fettlements, is ftill more obftructed. For Bombay, being fituated in lat. 19 deg. north, on the weft fide of the peninfula of India, it is almoft impoffible, from thel latter end of November till the middle of February, for (hips from Bombay, bound for the Bay of Bengal, to round the ifland of Ceyloan : and, for the other three months of the north eaft monfoon, they are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan^ to fland over to the eaftward almoft as far as Atchen head, and back again to the ifland j a run of about 20 degrees. From the end of April till Auguft, it is almoft impracticable for mips from the Bay and bound for Bombay, to round Ceyloan 5 and in the other three months of the fouth weft monfoon, that paffage is difficult and tedious. And, even in the fair paflage, the run betwixt Bengal and Bombay is feldom made in lefs than a month. More- over, during the force of the fouth weft monfoon on the weft fide of the penin- fula, that is, from the middle of May till the middle of Auguft, it is extremely dan- gerous for mips to attempt running in for Bombay : the weather being then fo ex- tremely thick, that fometimes a folar ob- fervation fervation cannot be obtained for fcveral days together : and if a fhip fhould, in fuch circumftances, run in for the land, which in fuch weather is not diftinguifh- able at three leagues diftance, and fhould mifs the opening of the harbour, which is but fmall, it is more than probable that fhe would not be able to clear the more, with the wind blowing fiercely right on, and rolling before it a heavy fea. As to Bencolen, circumftances are nearly the fame with it, as betwixt Bengal and Ma- drafs. Now it is evident, that this obftrucled naval communication, betwixt the four it is as effectually ex- cluded, for five months, from the bay of Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal itfelf, as if it was flill in Europe. 'And, Y 2 during during thefc five months, the enemy may ehher fcour that Bay with fingle cruizers, or fhe may tranfport, and, without oppo- fition, land a force in Bengal j and thefe faid five months are the very fitted in the whole year for land operations. This muft be thoroughly underftood by all thofe who are acquainted with the navigation of thofe feas : and could be here readily demon - ftrated ; was it not that, by publickly pointing out our own weaknefs, we mould point out to the enemy her ftrength. It is moft certain that, if France under- ftands her own advantage, (and it is to be apprehended me is but too well acquainted with it; flie may either wafte and confume theBritim fquadron,]through preventing its repair ; or otherwife me may efFeft every purpofe, againfl Bengal, nay again ft Ma-*- 4rafs, with as great fecurity, as if there was no Britim iquadron in India : ever fo long as Britain mail continue her only na- val port at Bombay. Nor is there any al- ternative. For as to that ridiculous no- tion, of carrying a fquadron of large mips up the river of Bengal to repair, no com- mander in his fenfes would, in the time of war, when he expected to be equally matched 1 169] matched by the enemy, fo foon as the fea- ibn arrived, incur the riik of lofing fome of his fhips, in the paflage up and down that incredibly dangero'us river -, and ftill lefs would he fubject himfelf to the cer- tainty of lofing half his hands, by that putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. Neither would he be mad enough, in the while of a hot war, to ufe that dangerous expedient, of half repairing at Trinca- malay ; where he is liable to be furprized by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In fine, fo long as Bombay continues to be our only naval port, our commanders muft, of neceffity, either wafte and lofe their fquadron ; or elfe they muft retire to Bombay, at the leaft, once in two years ; and, thereby leave the feas, with all our valuable poffeffions in the Bay of Bengal, freely expofed to the attack of an enemy, for five months. It therefore follows that, if Britain means to avail herfelf of her naval force^ which is the principal defence of her do- minion and commerce in India, ihe muft eftablifh a proper naval port, on the eaft fide of the peninfula ; becaufe, on that fide lay all her truly valuable pofleflions, and [I 7 o] and commerce. And that port, which I mean to propofe, is in every refpect com- pletely qualified for this purpofe : though I cannot, in this publication, fpecify the place; left the enemy mould anticipate, and take the advantage of our fliameful neglect. I am fenfible it will be immediately ex- claimed that we have already too many pofleffions in India ; and that this is no time to increafe our fettlements there ; and thereby to increafe the drain of our native itrength, as well as the expence of trea- fure. But* to- this, I anfwer, that this new eftabliihment would not encreafe the num- ber of our capital fettlements in India : on the contrary, it would diminim it, from four to three : for it would fupprefs, in the firfl place, Bombay ; which is in every refpect a truly ufelefs fettlement; and would therefore be exchanged for this new fettle- ment ; which would ferve to connect the whole ftrength of this dominion j as well as to promote a variety of other very im- portant purpofes. In the fecond place, Bencolen would be reduced to the degree of a fubordinate, immediately under the direction I '7 3 direction of the refident at this new fet- tlcment ; and completely fecure under its protection.-/ i.S As to the drain of native ftrength, this eftablimment would, inftead of adding, confiderably decreafe it : for the garrifon, together with the artillery, &c. of Bombay, would be tranfported thither; as likewife would the better part of the garrifon at Bencolen : and thefe two garrifons, being placed there, would form an army of ob- fervation, for all our valuable pofleflions, as hath been defcribed ; confequently the territorial governments would not demand that degree of force, which is requifite at prefent, when each ftands on its own bottom. And with regard to the expence of treafure, I fhall only obferve that, it is mod unaccountably abfurd in Britain to fend out to India, a fquadron of 17 mips of the line, befides frigates, (as me did in laft war,) for the protection of her domi- nion and commerce in that country ; which fquadrons become evidently unprofitable to that purpofe, through the circumftancc of wanting a properly fituated naval port; when lefs than a (ingle year's charge, of [ '7*] fuch fquadron, would fuffice to complete- ly fit up a naval port, fo fituated as that, from thence, her naval force would com- pletely effect its intended purpofe. For I affirm, that the port which I propofe would be completely fitted up, in every refpect, as a naval port, for lefs expence than one year's charge of fuch fquadron ; feeing that I do not propofe docks, but platforms for careening, as at Batavia ; and thefe are prepared, in infinitely lefs time, and at much lefs charge than docks ; whilft they are far more convenient and expeditious for repairing large mips, than thefe docks at Bombay. And, as to the fortification immediately requifite, it would be but lit- tle expenfive, and would demand but lit- tle time to rear it: becaufe it would be perfectly accefiible to the fhips ; and fo, whilil it protected them, would be pro- tected by them. Moreover no part of the treafure, ex- pended on originally fitting this naval port, would come immediately out of Britain's proper treafury ; for the whole would be defrayed by the dependent dominion in India. And this new eflabliihment would, in a very little time, not only fupport its own t *73 1 own charge, but would richly reimburfe Britain for her original coft. Seeing it would, in the firft place, as a colony or fettlement, yield her immediate treafure, together with fundry commodities peculiar to itfelf ; and*, in a little time, it would, under proper conduct, produce rich ma- nufactures. In the fecond place, it would, as an Emporium, (for which purpofe it is perfectly adapted by its fituation,) greatly improve the commerce of Britain in In- dia : and as a centrical magazine or ware- houfe, for the commodities of China as well as India, it would reduce the term of the Company's voyages to one year ; and, thereby, reducing the expence of her carnage nearly one third, it would enable her to fell cheaper 5 and confequently ad- vance her commerce in Europe. Like* wife the Company's {hips rendezvoufing and departing from this port for Europe, under proper convoy, this would fecure her trade from that imminent danger to which it is expofed, from her {hips ren- dezvouQng iingly, at that button of an ifland, St. Helena : a circumftance that may, in the very firft year of a French war, completeJy ruin this Company ; as Z that 1 174 1 that enemy is now perfectly acquainted with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly ufelefs to all thefe, and indeed to every other purpofe; as can be readily demon- ftrated : and the whole benefit derived from it, as acolony or fettlement, in the year, doth not fuffice to defray one month's expence. But this new eftablifhment, being once fitted up as a naval port, from whence the fquadrons of Britain can, in either mon- foon, command all her valuable polfeffions; this fame eflablifhment would, at fame time, completely fuit for the refidence of that fupreme intermediately fuperintending power. For this port is fituated, at fuch a diftance from all the territorial govern- ments, as would fuffice to effectually pre- vent the controuling power, from inter- fering in the immediate execution of go- vernment. And, having faid that it is perfectly well lituated for a naval port, it follows that the communication, betwixt it and all the parts of the British dominion in India, muft be fpeedy and eafy, in either monfoon : and confequently that, from this refidence, this fupreme power can effectually fuperin tend, enforce, and con- troul the meafures of political, as well as f '75 J as of military, government, in this wholfi dominion. And, being the center of naval defence, it muft be the only pro- per center of land defence : feeing the iquadron will be ever at hand, to tranf- port its land force, to any part of this dominion, that may be in danger. And thus have I accompliQied that which I propofed : having planned the defign of an intermediate power which, in fuch a fituation as hath been defcribed, would eftablifh a completely regular fyftem of go- vernment, civil as well as military, in the whole prefent or future dominion of Britain in India : nay which would, in the hands of national government, ren- der the tafk of governing this Indian do- minion, as facil and eafy, as it is to go- vern the fmall Ifle of Man. And, the feat of its refidence beiag at fame time the center of naval and land defence, it would completely conned the, other wife, divided ftrength of the feveral govern- ments : and would eftahlifh the general defence, upon a footing fo fecure, that no enemy, either European or native, would dare to attack Britidi dominion in India. It likewife appears that the drain of native Z 2 flrength, 1 176 ] flrength, requifiteto maintain this whole dominion, would but little exceed that which Britain expends on maintaining the two barren fortrefles, of Gibraltar and St. Philips'?. Whilft no part of the pecu- niary charge, of either eftabliihing or afterwards fupporting this fyftem of go- vernment, nor yet of the land and even naval defence, would corne out of the treafury of Britain j but would all be defrayed by the dependent dominion. I have farther demonftrated the moral impoffibility of governing and maintaining this Indian dominion, by means of the Company j upon any other terms, than thefe, of continuing her fovereign at home as well as abroad ; and of conferring, up- on her Directors, the fovereign execution of government in Britain, as well as in that dependent dominion. And I have endeavoured to rouze and awake the nation, to fome fenfe of, and re- gard to, the intereft me holds in this In- dian dominion; by a flight dcfcriptive fketch of the nature, and degree, of be- nefit received by her from it, for fome years pad. And, as the fenfation received from fact and experience makes ever a ftronger impref- [ 177 1 imprcffion on the mind, than that which is conveyed by fpeculative argument, I mall here again apply to the experience of the public, on this topic; which cannot be too much inculcated, nor prefented in too many different points of view ; at this truly critical jun