LOGIC 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 T. SHARPER 
 K.NOWLSON
 
 Ex Libris 
 C. K. OGDEN
 
 LOGIC 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 MILLION
 
 The Origins of Popular 
 Superstitions, Customs 
 and Ceremonies. 
 
 By T. SHARPER KNOWLSON. 
 
 Ctown 8vo, 6s. net. 
 
 We meet people every day who are super- 
 stitious, but who can give no intelligent account 
 of the origin of those beliefs that it is dangerous, 
 for instance, to sit thirteen at table, or to break a 
 looking-glass. To trace a habit of thinking and 
 of action to its source is frequently to dispel an 
 illusion ; at any rate, the interest of the search 
 for origin has a charm all its own, and Mr. 
 Sharper Knowlson, working on the basis of old 
 authorities, has brought forth a mass of attractive 
 exposition respecting popular beliefs and customs 
 which cannot fail to secure ihe reader's attention, 
 
 By the same Author, 
 
 The Education of the Will. 
 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. net. 
 
 Can Will-power be trained ? If so, how ? 
 These are the two main questions before Mr. 
 Sharper Knowlson in " The Education of the 
 Will." As a book it covers the middle ground 
 between the erudite studies of professors of 
 medicine and psychology on the one hand, and 
 the extravagant literature of many " New 
 Thought " writers on the other hand. The 
 author's aim is to popularise the results of re- 
 search, apd set forth in a strictly practical 
 manner the best known methods of developing 
 Will-power, The volume is a vigorous attempt 
 to combine theory with practical wisdom, 
 
 T. Werner Laurie, Clifford's Inn, London.
 
 LOGIC 
 FOR THE MILLION 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 T. SHARPER KNOWLSON 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 "The Art of Thinking," 
 "The Education of the Will," etc. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 T. WERNER LAURIE 
 CLIFFORD'S INN
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 THE object of the following pages is to supply the 
 general reader with a simple text-book on logic. 
 There are, it is true, several elementary manuals 
 already, but the speciality of the present one lies 
 in its illustrations of logical principles from old 
 and new writers, and from the political and social 
 discussions of the period. Examples in logic are 
 usually very uninteresting in themselves, and too 
 brief to be attractive. In Logic for the Million 
 these faults have been remedied, and following the 
 lead of J. W. Gilbart, F.R.S., I have endeavoured 
 to bring the science of reasoning out of the atmo- 
 sphere of the class-room into the arena of daily life. 
 
 20G05G8
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 I 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. 
 
 THE SPHERE OF REASONING - 
 
 9 
 
 II. 
 
 THE UTILITY OF THE LOGICAL MIND 
 
 15 
 
 III. 
 
 MENTAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
 20 
 
 IV. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE AND REASONING - 
 
 28 
 
 V. 
 
 THE RELATION OF A SUBJECT AND ITS 
 
 
 
 ATTRIBUTES 
 
 34 
 
 VI. 
 
 THE RELATION OF A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS - 
 
 5 
 
 VII. 
 
 THE RELATION OF GENUS AND SPECIES - 
 
 57 
 
 VIII. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT 
 
 
 
 PHYSICAL CAUSES 
 
 75 
 
 IX. 
 
 MORAL CAUSES 
 
 85 
 
 X. 
 
 CONDITIONAL CAUSES 
 
 101 
 
 XI. FINAL CAUSES 1 15 
 
 XII. THE USE OF WORDS IN REASONING - - 133 
 
 XIII. ON SOCRATIC DISPUTATION - - - - 142 
 
 XIV. REASONING FROM EXAMPLES - - - - 152 
 XV. REASONING FROM ANALOGY - - - - l6l 
 
 XVI. REASONING FROM STATISTICS - - - - 171 
 
 XVII. REASONING FROM HISTORY - - - - 178 
 
 XVIII. REASONING FROM AUTHORITIES - - - 187 
 
 XIX. A STUDY IN FALLACIES igi 
 
 xx. BAILEY'S RULES FOR ANALYSING ARGUMENTS - 209 
 
 XXI. CONVERSATIONAL REASONING - - - - 213 
 
 XXII. REASONING BY SIMPLE SYLLOGISM - - 22$ 
 
 XXIII. REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM - - 234 
 
 XXIV. ARGUMENTS FOR ANALYSIS - - - - 238
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 MEPHISTOPHELES indulges in some merciless criti- 
 cism of University studies, and in regard to logic 
 thus advises a friend : " First of all attend a course 
 of logic. There your mind will be properly drilled 
 and laced up in the tightest of boots, so that it 
 may henceforth slink more circumspectly along the 
 path of thought, and not perchance will-o'-the-wisp 
 it hither and thither through thick and thin. Then 
 you'll be taught for many a day that what you've 
 been in the habit of doing in a moment, as easy as 
 eating and drinking, must have its One, Two, 
 Three. To be sure, the manufacture of. thought 
 is like a masterpiece of weaving where one treadle 
 moves a thousand threads. The shuttles fly hither 
 and thither ; the threads flow unseen ; a single 
 stroke strikes a . thousand combinations. Your 
 philosopher comes up and proves to you that it 
 can't help being so. The first was;so, the second 
 so, and hence the third and fourth were so; and 
 if the first and second had not been there, the third 
 and fourth would never have come to pass. The 
 students go into ecstasies over his explanation 
 but none of them have become weavers." Thus
 
 2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Goethe. Is he right or wrong? And what have 
 others to say in the matter ? 
 
 Take the latter question first. Herbert Spencer, 
 in a letter to Professor Brough, said: "I have 
 at no time paid the least attention to formal logic, 
 and hold for all practical purposes it is useless." 
 Spencer and Mephistopheles are then of the same 
 opinion ; and to these names could be added many 
 others. It would indeed be no difficult thing to 
 get up a respectable case against logic as a factor 
 in mental education ; a case with apparent reason- 
 ableness in all its arguments, and supported by the 
 authority of some of the greatest names in philo- 
 sophy and literature. Such a task is naturally 
 outside the scope of this book, but we may do well 
 to enquire into some of the reasons which have 
 prompted men of weight to criticise the place of 
 logic in modern education. The chief reason lies 
 in its seeming inutility. This is a feature specially 
 selected for notice by Spencer in the remark just 
 quoted. Its short-sightedness is not a little surpris- 
 ing, for it is as if he had said, " I have found 
 formal logic useless ; therefore other men will find 
 it useless " an arguing from the particular to the 
 universal. And yet when such an opinion is bol- 
 stered up by the testimony of others, it suggests 
 a weakness somewhere ; and that weakness we shall 
 find in the worship of the figures of Aristotle, a 
 worship that reduces logic to the mere analysis of 
 other men's arguments. Logic should teach the 
 art of reasoning; too often it is content with argu- 
 mentative criticism. That is why expert logicians 
 are sometimes unable to form public opinion or to
 
 INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 lead it in logical paths. It was with a view to the 
 correction of this error that the original author of 
 Logic for the Million wrote his book on popular 
 argumentation. He set his face against mere 
 formal analysis of syllogisms; and although quite 
 willing to admit the result was good, by reason of 
 the critical power it engendered, he preferred to 
 give more attention to the illustration of simple 
 rules. His position, stated in his own words, is 
 as follows : 
 
 " A knowledge of the art of reasoning is essential 
 to the study of the science ; but an acquaintance with 
 the science is not necessary to the practice of the 
 art. Indeed it is only by the use of the art that the 
 science can be studied. We meddle not with the 
 science. We profess not to analyse any of the 
 powers of the mind, nor to lay down any new rules 
 for conducting the process of reasoning. We shall 
 attempt only to describe those rules tfiat are already 
 known, and to apply them correctly. And we shall 
 consider their application chiefly with reference to 
 those things with which people are most familiar. 
 
 " If a man who understands grammar hear a per- 
 son say, ' I speaks,' he will know, from general prac- 
 tice, that the language is improper; but he will, 
 moreover, quote the rule, that ' a verb should agree 
 with its nominative case in number and person.' 
 Now, a collection of such rules form grammar, or 
 the art of speaking correctly. So, if a man hear 
 a person say ' All men are liars, for a man has 
 just told me a lie,' he will know from his own 
 common sense that this is not sound reasoning; 
 but if he has studied logic, he will also cite the
 
 4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 rule, ' Universals cannot be inferred from particu- 
 lars.' Now, a collection of all these rules form 
 logic, or the art of reasoning correctly ; and the 
 man who has a knowledge of these rules, and is 
 correct and ready in applying them in practice, is 
 called a logician. A man may reason accurately 
 without rules. But if he can give the rules, he will 
 have more confidence in the truth of his reason- 
 ings. He will also be better able to perceive the 
 incorrect reasonings of others, and to show the 
 soundness or unsoundness of any opinions pro- 
 pounded for his consideration. 
 
 " These practical rules of reasoning collected to- 
 gether form the art of reasoning, in the same way 
 as a collection of rules for speaking and writing 
 with propriety form the art of speaking and writing 
 with propriety. The one art is called logic the 
 other art is called grammar. These two arts are 
 useful to each other. Thoughts are expressed in 
 words. If we think clearly we shall speak clearly, 
 and when we are learning to arrange our words 
 with accuracy and order, we are leaning to think 
 with accuracy and order. 
 
 " A man who has acquired a knowledge of gram- 
 mar will afterwards speak and write grammatically, 
 without ever thinking of the rules of grammar. So 
 a man who has acquired a knowledge of logic, will 
 afterwards reason logically, without ever thinking 
 of the rules of logic. The rules will have become 
 so deeply fixed in his mind that he will habitually 
 reason accurately ; and by practice he will come to 
 reason promptly and forcibly. It is the chief 
 business both of grammar and logic to teach us
 
 INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 how to avoid errors. Grammar teaches us how to 
 avoid the use of words and sentences that are con- 
 trary to its rules. But as beautiful or powerful style 
 of writing must arise from the constitution of our 
 own minds, or the peculiar direction of our studies, 
 and is not to be acquired merely by an observance 
 of grammatical construction. So logic teaches 
 how to know and to discard bad arguments." 
 
 A second objection to formal logic arises from 
 its supposed difficulty. This, of course, is a very 
 flimsy objection, but nevertheless it exists, and is 
 referred to by Lord Morley in his essay, On 
 Culture, who no doubt had in mind the attitude 
 of the young man anxious to learn, but afraid of, 
 the mysteries of Barbara Celarent. One must 
 admit that a page from a text-book on formal logic 
 is not prepossessing : it has the appearance of being 
 very dry and uninteresting, with its circles within 
 circles and its endless repetition of terms. Still, 
 it is not untrue to affirm, with Mill, that logic can 
 be learned in a few weeks; what is not true is to 
 affirm that logic has ever been made as attractive 
 as it can be made not even by Lewis Carroll. 
 Readers and private students who are unaccus- 
 tomed to scientific figures and mathematical for- 
 mulae seem to have an instinctive dislike for logic 
 taught by squares and circles. Put the idea into a 
 little explanatory prose and they will study it 
 closely. That was one of the notions of Mr. J. W. 
 Gilbart, F.R.S., and his success certainly lends 
 some support to his pleas for reasoning without 
 diagrams. 
 
 The third objection to formal logic has more
 
 6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 human nature in it than sound sense : it is that 
 professors of logic get no nearer the truth in some 
 things than the untrained man. A body of social- 
 ists who listen to the arguments of a professor of 
 logic in favour of individualism reject those argu- 
 ments with great scorn, both for the man and his 
 science. The popular mind argues that if twenty 
 expert logicians entertain seriously twenty different 
 policies for social amelioration, there cannot be 
 much good in logic as a study ; otherwise it would 
 inevitably bring a greater unanimity of opinion. 
 This contention is not so absurd as some people 
 have affirmed ; for however wrong-headed it may 
 be, it does emphasise a real fact, namely, that we 
 are guided in our actions more by feeling than by 
 thought : our temperaments are more than a match 
 for our reasoning powers. That explains why 
 Newman's logic carried him into the Roman 
 Church; why John Stuart Mill's logic kept him 
 an unbeliever; why Romanes' logic caused him 
 to turn to the Anglican Church ; why Joseph 
 McCabe's logic compelled a journey from the 
 Roman Catholic College to the Rationalist 
 platform ; it explains why highly intelligent men 
 are to be found individually supporting different 
 kinds of political policy, thoroughly convinced 
 theirs is the only true solution of national 
 problems. One of the greatest of all mental arts 
 is to be able to kill prejudices and adjust emotions; 
 and formal logic has taken little account of this 
 fact, mainly because it is formal and unable to help 
 itself. Here, then, comes the opportunity for a 
 style of text-book which shall, in addition to formal
 
 INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 rules, give some attention to other features of 
 reasoning processes; and instead of studying 
 abstract propositions, shall devote its attention to 
 concrete cases, reviewing them in the light of facts 
 as we know them, particularly the facts of human 
 life.
 
 LOGIC 
 FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE SPHERE OF REASONING. 
 
 IN order to show the true sphere of logic, we shall, 
 in this chapter, briefly consider the truths with 
 which we become acquainted by other means than 
 reasoning. They may be classed as the truths of 
 the senses, of consciousness, of the intellect, and 
 of testimony. 
 
 (i) Truths of the senses: 
 
 The evidence of sense consists in framing a proposi- 
 tion according to the dictates of the senses; thus we 
 judge that grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a pleasant 
 sound ; that fire burns wood ; water is soft ; and iron is 
 hard ; for we have seen, heard, or felt all these. It is 
 upon this evidence of sense that we know and believe 
 the daily occurrences in human life ; and almost all the 
 histories of mankind, that are written by eye or ear- 
 witnesses, are built upon this principle. Under the 
 evidence of sense we do not only include that knowledge 
 which is derived to us by our outward senses of hearing, 
 seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling; but that also 
 which is derived from the inward sensations and appe- 
 tites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, weariness, 
 B
 
 io LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 rest, etc., and all those things which belong to the body ', 
 as, "hunger is a painful appetite; light is pleasant; 
 rest is sweet to weary limbs." 
 
 (2) Truths of consciousness : 
 
 As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence 
 of the senses, so we learn what belongs to the mind by 
 an inward consciousness, which may be called a sort of 
 internal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes 
 in the mind; as, "I think before I speak; I desire large 
 knowledge ; I suspect my own practice ; I studied hard 
 to-day ; my conscience bears witness to my sincerity ; 
 fear is an uneasy passion ; long meditation on one thing 
 is tiresome." 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a 
 multitude of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by 
 those two principles which Locke calls sensation and 
 reflection ; one of them is a sort of consciousness of 
 what affects the body, and the other is a consciousness 
 of what passes in the mind. 
 
 (3) Truths of the intellect : 
 
 Intellect relates chiefly to those abstract propositions 
 which carry their own evidence with them, and admit 
 no doubt about them. Our perception of this self- 
 evidence in any proposition is called intelligence. It is 
 our knowledge of those first principles of truth which 
 are, as it were, wrought into the very nature of our 
 minds ; they are so evident in themselves to every man 
 who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is the 
 prerogative and peculiar excellence of these proposi- 
 tions, that they can scarce ever be proved or denied : 
 they cannot easily be proved, because there is nothing 
 supposed to be more clear or certain, from which an 
 argument may be drawn to prove them. They cannot 
 well be denied, because their own evidence is so con- 
 vincing, that, as soon as the terms are understood, the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION n 
 
 mind necessarily assents ; such are these, " whatsoever 
 acted hath a being ; nothing has no properties ; a part 
 is less than the whole; nothing can be the cause of 
 itself." These propositions are called axioms or 
 maxims, or first principles; these are the very founda- 
 tions of all improved knowledge and reasonings, and 
 on that account these have been thought to be innate 
 propositions, or truths born with us. 
 
 (4) Truths of testimony : 
 
 When we derive the evidence of any proposition from 
 the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith; 
 and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten thou- 
 sand things there are which we believe merely upon the 
 authority or credit of those who have spoken or written 
 of them. It is by this evidence that we know there is 
 such a country as China, and there was such a man as 
 Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most 
 of the transactions in human life are managed : we 
 know our parents and our kindred by this means, we 
 know the persons and laws of our present governors, 
 as well as things that are at a vast distance from us in 
 fpreign nations, or in ancient ages. According as the 
 persons that inform us of anything are many or few, or 
 more or less wise, and faithful, and credible, so our 
 faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the proposi- 
 tion believed is either certain or doubtful ; but in matters 
 of faith, an exceeding great probability is called a moral 
 certainty.* 
 
 * Mr. Bailey observes: "In philosophical strictness, we 
 can be said to know only these things which we perceive, 
 or have perceived, through our organs of sense, and those 
 states of mind or mental events of which we are or have been 
 conscious. Other things we believe on evidence more or 
 less cogent; that is to say, they are matters of inference." 
 If so, the truths of testimony will have to be classed under 
 truths of inference. But the word know is often used in a 
 more extended sense.
 
 12 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 The truths of reasoning are distinct from all 
 these. They are derived from these truths, or 
 similar truths, by natural and just methods of 
 argumentation. As logic is the art of reasoning, 
 it has nothing to do with those truths that are 
 self-evident, or which are known to be true without 
 reasoning. The positive tendency of the senses 
 supercedes the necessity for reasoning.* If you 
 have toothache, or gout, you want no logic to prove 
 to you that you suffer pain. And as we know what 
 passes without us, by the organs of hearing and 
 seeing and what passes in our bodies, by means 
 of our sensations so we know what passes in our 
 minds, by means of consciousness. We know that 
 we think that we judge that we remember. We 
 know that we hope and we fear we love and we 
 hate. All these, and a variety of other operations 
 and feelings, pass within our minds; and we want 
 no logic to convince us of their existence. There 
 are also many other truths that are self-evident. 
 We know that two and two make four that a part 
 of anything is less than the whole that a cause 
 must precede the effect and that a proposition 
 cannot be both true and not true at the same time, 
 and in the same respect. These are called first 
 truths, or truths of intuition. They are wrought 
 into our very nature, and we cannot disbelieve 
 them if we would. If we meet a man who denies 
 them, we do not reason with him. We conclude 
 either that he does not understand the meaning of 
 
 * Such a statement needs guarding from misapprehension, 
 for in scientific experiments observation must be more than 
 the mere seeing: it is observation with inference. [ED.]
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 13 
 
 the words, or that he has lost his reasoning facul- 
 ties. 
 
 As logic is merely the art of reasoning, it follows 
 that it has nothing to do with those mental 
 operations in which we do not reason. The mere 
 giving or receiving of information is not reasoning. 
 If you say to a friend, " It is a cold day," there is 
 no logic in that. But if you say, " I think we shall 
 have rain in the course of the day," that is a logical 
 conclusion ; and if asked to do, you should be pre- 
 pared to give reasons for your opinion. So the 
 acquisition of knowledge by reading or hearing is 
 not reasoning. You may possibly read history or 
 biography, learn several languages, and become 
 acquainted with botany, natural history, and several 
 sciences, without reasoning. All this requires 
 nothing more than a good memory. And hence it 
 is possible to become a very learned man and yet 
 not be a logician. But if you begin to reason about 
 anything you learn, you immediately become a 
 logician. Take, for illustration, a case in history. 
 You have read the life of Napoleon Bonaparte, and 
 you remember all the events recorded, and also the 
 opinions of the historian. You are no logician 
 here. But if you stop to ask if any particular event 
 be true if you inquire whether in certain actions 
 he evinced sagacity or courage and consider what 
 were the effects of his course on the state of Europe 
 as soon as you commence to discuss these or any 
 similar questions, you become a logician. 
 
 Logic has no province of its own. If you reason 
 at all you must reason about something, and that 
 something may belong to any one of the arts or
 
 14 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 sciences. There is no object in nature, nor any 
 fact in history, but what may become a subject of 
 argument. Thus, while logic as an art has no 
 domain of its own, it has a province in every other 
 domain or rather, it is called in whenever necessary 
 to settle disputes and exercise supremacy in all the 
 other departments of human knowledge. A judge 
 on circuit has no property in the county in which 
 he administers justice, nor any authority over its 
 population. But should any estates in the county 
 become the subject of litigation, or any person 
 become a party in a civil or criminal proceeding, 
 then are they immediately brought under his juris- 
 diction. So whenever any difference in opinion 
 arises either in the arts and sciences or in ordinary 
 life, it is the province of logic to adjust the dispute. 
 Thus every object in nature, every feeling of the 
 mind, and every event in history, may become 
 connected with a logical process.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE UTILITY OF THE LOGICAL MIND. 
 
 WHEN men reason about things they understand, 
 they generally reason well. But sometimes they 
 reason ill ; and it is the business of the art of reason- 
 ing to show them why, and to teach them how to 
 reason well. Such an art cannot be otherwise than 
 useful. And when we recollect that much of our 
 health, our success in business, our happiness, our 
 reputation in the world, and our usefulness to 
 others, will depend upon the soundness of our 
 reasonings, the art will appear to us to be of very 
 high importance. We shall point out a few respects 
 in which it is useful 1 . 
 
 (i) It assists in the formation of intelligent opinion. 
 
 You talk, of course, about a great many things. 
 You talk about yourself; about your friends and 
 relations, and acquaintances; about your trade and 
 profession ; about the accidents and offences you 
 read of in the newspaper; about public measures 
 and public men ; about France, and Russia, and 
 America, and other nations ; about right and wrong ; 
 justice and injustice ; wealth and poverty ; slavery 
 and liberty ; and on Sundays, if not on other days, 
 you will talk about religion, or at least about the
 
 16 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 church and the parson, and about people who are 
 supposed to be religious. Now, upon all these 
 subjects, and a variety of others, you will probably 
 give opinions, and most likely very correct opinions, 
 provided you talk only of what you understand. But 
 to guard against giving incorrect or unguarded 
 opinions, you may as well take a lesson or two upon 
 the right way of reasoning. 
 
 You will say that you can do all this without 
 the aid of logic. So you can. But logic will teach 
 you how to do it better. Logic will teach you that 
 you must form your opinions by reason alone, 
 without any bias from your passions or feelings. 
 Logic will teach you that you must be able to give 
 a reason for all the opinions you entertain. Logic 
 will teach you that you must look at both sides of 
 the question, and examine the arguments that can 
 be advanced against any opinion, as well as those 
 that may be advanced in its favour; and that you 
 must weigh these arguments, and see which side 
 preponderates. Logic will teach you that after 
 having done this, you must be ready to admit any 
 new facts or arguments that may appear on either 
 side of the question. In these various ways a 
 knowledge of the art of reasoning will be useful 
 to yourself. 
 
 By thus examining the reasons for your opinions 
 you will soon learn to distinguish between good 
 reasons and bad ones. You will get into the prac- 
 tice of using good reasons and discarding bad ones. 
 You will acquire the habit of reasoning well, 
 and when assailed with bad reasons you will know 
 how to refute them.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 17 
 
 (2) The second benefit lies in the aid it renders to 
 
 the powers of debate. 
 
 You may have to defend your opinions against the 
 attacks of those who hold contrary opinions. You 
 must not hesitate to do this when the cause of truth 
 or of justice requires it. When your own charac- 
 ter or that of your friends, or your political or 
 religious principles are assailed, you are bound to 
 make resistance, and it will be useful to be able 
 to do it well. The political and religious differences 
 that exist among mankind are by no means to be 
 deplored as unmingled evils. They serve to awaken 
 the nobler feelings of the mind, and to maintain 
 attention to principles that might otherwise be for- 
 gotten. They stimulate the intellectual powers, 
 and impart an energy to all the faculties and to all 
 the operations of the mind. To engage in contro- 
 versy does not imply that you are to vituperate the 
 person, misrepresent the opinions, or calumniate 
 the character of your opponents. You will be less 
 liable to fall into these practices if you understand 
 the art of reasoning. You will then have no occa- 
 sion for these ignoble weapons. You will be con- 
 scious that the force of truth and the power of 
 logic will have much greater effect in defeating 
 your antagonists. 
 
 (3) The third benefit is also individual : it lies in 
 
 the ability to control passion and prevent it 
 from warping the judgment. In a curious 
 but learned book on " Man's Power over 
 Himself to prevent or control Insanity," I 
 find the following:
 
 i8 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 " The registers of the Bicetre, for a series of 
 years, show that even when madness affects those 
 who belong to the educated classes, it is chiefly seen 
 in those whose education has been imperfect or 
 irregular, and very rarely indeed in those whose 
 minds have been fully, equally, and systematically 
 exercised. Priests, artists, painters, sculptors, 
 poets, and musicians, whose professions so often 
 appear marked in that register, are often persons 
 of very limited or exclusive education ; their faculties 
 have been unequally exercised ; they have com- 
 monly given themselves up too much to imagina- 
 tion, and have neglected comparison, and have not 
 habitually exercised the judgment. Even of this 
 class it is to be remembered that it is commonly 
 those of the lowest order of the class, in point of 
 talent, who become thus affected; whilst of natu- 
 ralists, physicians, chemists, and geometricians, it 
 is said not one instance occurs in these registers. 
 If one go from individual to individual in any 
 lunatic establishment, and investigate the character 
 and origin of the madness of each, we shall find 
 for every one who has become insane from the 
 exercise of his mind, at least a hundred have become 
 insane from the undue indulgence of their feelings. 
 Those men who really most exercise the faculties 
 of their minds, meaning thereby all their faculties, 
 their attention, reflection, or comparison, as well 
 as their imagination and memory, are least liable 
 to insanity. An irregular and injudicious cultiva- 
 tion of poetry and painting has often concurred to 
 produce madness, but nothing is rarer than to find 
 a mad mathematician ; for, as no study demands
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 19 
 
 more attenion than mathematics, so it secures the 
 student, during a great part of his time, from the 
 recurrence of feelings which are always the most 
 imperious in those who are the least occupied." 
 
 But there is a sense in which the benefit of a 
 study of reasoning is not merely individual : it is 
 social. Truth is always attainable to an approxi- 
 mate degree not truth for the one alone, but for 
 the many. Ought we not therefore to consider a 
 knowledge of logic to be an acquisition, the pos- 
 session of which we owe to the community ? If a 
 slovenly personal appearance is a sign that we have 
 no self-respect as well as no respect for others, 
 surely a slovenly mental habit is alike an insult to 
 ourselves and to society.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MENTAL INDEPENDENCE. 
 
 To reason well we must avoid prejudices or p re- 
 judgments judgments formed before we begin to 
 reason. Watts divides prejudices into four classes 
 prejudices arising from things, from words, from 
 ourselves, and from others. We shall follow his 
 observations on two dispositions, which those who 
 wish to reason well ought to cultivate. We mean 
 the love of truth, and a spirit of mental indepen- 
 dence. 
 
 (i) The love of truth: 
 
 Search for evidence of truth with diligence and 
 honesty, and be heartily ready to receive evidence, 
 whether for agreement or disagreement of ideas. Search 
 with diligence; spare no labour in searching for the 
 truth in due proportion to the importance of the proposi- 
 tion. Read the best authors who have written on that 
 subject ; debate the matter with your friends ; and be not 
 unwilling to borrow hints from the meanest person, nor 
 to receive any glimpse of light from the most illiterate. 
 Search carefully for the evidence of truth, and dig for 
 wisdom as for hid treasure. Above all be honest, and 
 develop a sincere impartiality to find the truth. Watch 
 against every temptation that might bribe your judg- 
 ment or warp It aside. Do not indulge yourself to wish 
 any unexamined proposition were true or false. A wish 
 
 20
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 21 
 
 often perverts the judgment, and tempts the mind 
 strangely to believe upon slight evidence whatsoever we 
 wish to be true or false. . . . 
 
 Be ready always to hear what may be objected even 
 against your favourite opinions, and those which have 
 had longer possession of your assent. And if there 
 should be any new and incontrovertible evidence brought 
 against these old or beloved sentiments, part with any- 
 thing for the sake of truth : remember when you over- 
 come an error you gain truth; the victory is on your 
 side, and the advantage is all your own. . . . Let not 
 a party spirit, nor any passion or prejudice whatsoever, 
 stop or avert the current of your reasoning in quest of 
 true knowledge. When you are inquiring therefore into 
 any subject, maintain a due regard to the arguments 
 and objections on both sides of a question. Consider, 
 compare, and balance them well, before you determine 
 for one side. It is a frequent, but a very faulty prac- 
 tice, to hunt after arguments only to make good one 
 side of a question, and entirely to neglect and refuse 
 those which favour the other side. If we have not given 
 a due weight to arguments on both sides, we do but 
 wilfully misguide our judgment and abuse our reason, 
 by forbidding its search after truth. When we espouse 
 opinions by a secret bias on the mind, through the in- 
 fluences of fear, hope, honour, credit, interest, or any 
 other prejudice, and then seek arguments only to support 
 those opinions, we have neither done our duty to God 
 nor to ourselves; and it is a matter of mere chance if 
 we stumble upon truth in our way to ease and prefer- 
 ment. 
 
 (2) The spirit of mental independence. 
 
 (a) Independence of mind implies a right use 
 of the principle of authority, neither rely- 
 ing on it blindly nor discrediting it as un- 
 worthy of consideration.
 
 22 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 " To believe in all things as our predecessors did, is 
 the ready way to keep mankind in an everlasting state 
 of infancy, and to lay an eternal bar against all the im- 
 provements of our reason and our happiness. Had the 
 present age of philosophers satisfied themselves with 
 the substantial forms and occult qualities of Aristotle, 
 with the solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of Pto- 
 n lemy, and the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord^ 
 ' Bacon, Copernicus, and Descartes, with the greater Sir 
 
 i ^r> Isaac N e wton , Locke, and Boyle, had risen in our world 
 ' in vain. We must have blundered on still in successive 
 Jf^ene rations, among absurdities and thick darkness, and 
 - x a hundred useful inventions for the happiness of human 
 life had never been known." So Dr. Watts : and he is 
 right for the most part. But there is another side to 
 the question. We have dealt with it in another place. 
 
 (b) Independence of mind implies exemption 
 from the influence of the passions : 
 
 The various passions or affections of the mind are 
 numerous and endless springs of prejudice. They dis- 
 guise every object they converse with, and put their own 
 colours upon it, and thus lead the judgment astray from 
 truth. It is love that makes the mother think her own 
 child the fairest, and will sometimes persuade us that a 
 blemish is beauty. Hope and desire make an hour of 
 delay seem as long as two or three hours ; hope inclines 
 us to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempted ; 
 despair tells us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, 
 and that every difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes 
 us imagine that a bush shaken with the wind has some 
 savage beast in it, and multiplies the dangers that attend 
 our path. . . . Sorrow and melancholy tempt us to 
 think our circumstances much more dismal than they 
 are, that we may have some excuse for mourning ; and 
 envy represents the condition of our neighbour better 
 than it is, that there may be some pretence for her own
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 23 
 
 vexation and uneasiness. Anger, and wrath, and re- 
 venge, and all those hateful passions, excite in us far 
 worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us 
 to believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil in- 
 fluence of the affections of the mind upon our judgment, 
 would make a large volume. 
 
 (c) Independence of mind implies exemption 
 from the influence of constitutional infirmi- 
 ties : 
 
 The credulous man is ready to receive everything for 
 truth that has but a shadow of evidence; every new 
 book that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom 
 he converses, has power enough to draw him into the 
 sentiments of the speaker or writer. He has so much 
 complaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that he is 
 ready to resign his own opinion to the first objection 
 which he hears, and to receive any sentiments of another 
 that are asserted with a positive air and much assurance. 
 
 The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour, 
 for he stands ready to oppose everything that is said : 
 he gives a slight attention to the reasons of other men, 
 from an inward scornful presumption that they have no 
 strength in them. When he reads or hears a discourse 
 different from his own sentiments, he does not give him- 
 self leave to consider whether that discourse may be 
 true ; but employs all his powers immediately to confute 
 it. Your great disputers and your men of controversy, 
 are in continual danger of this sort of prejudice : they 
 contend often for victory, and will maintain whatsoever 
 they have asserted, while truth is lost in the noise and 
 tumult of reciprocal contradictions; and it frequently 
 happens, that a debate about opinions is turned into a 
 mutual reproach of persons. . . . 
 
 Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a right 
 judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changeable 
 spirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When such
 
 24 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 persons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of 
 things agreeable to it ; when their humour changes, they 
 reverse their first judgment, and embrace a new opinion. 
 They have no steadiness of soul; they want firmness 
 of mind sufficient to establish themselves in any truth, 
 and are ready to change it for the next alluring false- 
 hood that is agreeable to their change of humour. This 
 fickleness is sometimes so mingled with their very con- 
 stitution by nature, or by distemper of body, that a 
 cloudy day and lowering sky shall strongly incline them 
 to form an opinion both of themselves, and of persons 
 and things round about them, quite different from what 
 they believe when the sun shines, and the heavens are 
 serene. 
 
 This sort of people ought to judge of things and per- 
 sons in their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours 
 of life, and reserve these judgments for their conduct 
 at more unhappy seasons. 
 
 (d) Independence of mind implies exemption 
 from the influence of manner: 
 
 There is another tribe of prejudices which is near 
 akin to those of authority, and that is, when we receive 
 a doctrine because of the manner in which it is proposed 
 to us by others. I have already mentioned the power- 
 ful influence that oratory and fine words have to in- 
 sinuate a false opinion, and sometimes truth is refused, 
 and suffers contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want 
 of the charms of language : but there are several other 
 manners of proposals, whereby mistaken sentiments are 
 powerfully conveyed into the mind. 
 
 Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what 
 another dictates with a positive air, and a great degree 
 of assurance : they feel the overbearing force of a confi- 
 dent dictator, especially if he be of a superior rank or 
 character to themselves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doc-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 25 
 
 trine, when he that proposes it puts on all the airs of 
 piety, and makes solemn appeals to heaven, and protes- 
 tations of the truth of it : the pious mind of a weaker 
 Christian is ready to receive anything that is pronounced 
 with such an awful solemnity. It is a prejudice near 
 akin to this, when a humble man is frighted into any 
 particular sentiments of religion, because a man of great 
 name or character pronounces heresy upon the contrary 
 sentiments, casts the disbeliever out of the church, and 
 forbids him the gates of heaven. Others are allured 
 into particular opinions by gentler practices on the 
 understanding; not only the soft tempers of mankind, 
 but even hardy and rugged souls, are sometimes led 
 away captives to error by the soft air of address, and 
 the sweet and engaging methods of persuasion and kind- 
 ness. There is another manner of proposing our own 
 opinion, or rather opposing the opinions of others, which 
 demands a mention here, and that is when persons make 
 a jest serve instead of an argument; when they refute 
 what they call error by a turn of wit, and answer every 
 objection against their own sentiments, by casting a 
 sneer upon the objector. These scoffers practise with 
 success upon weak and cowardly spirits : such as have 
 not been well established in religion or morality, have 
 been laughed out of the best principles by a confident 
 buffoon ; they have yielded up their opinions to a witty 
 banter. There is no way to cure these evils in such a 
 degenerate world as we live in, but by learning to dis- 
 tinguish well between the substance of any doctrine, and 
 the manner of address, either in proposing, attacking, 
 or defending it ; and then by setting a just and severe 
 guard of reason and conscience over all the exercises of 
 our judgment, resolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
 vincing evidence of truth. 
 
 (e) Independence of mind implies exemption 
 
 from the influence of association : 
 A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and 
 c
 
 26 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 equipage, and the vain notions of birth and quality, con- 
 stantly joins and mixes all these with the idea of her- 
 self, and she imagines these to be essential to her nature, 
 and as it were necessary to her being : thence she is 
 tempted to look upon menial servants, and the lowest 
 rank of mankind, as another species of beings, quite dis- 
 tinct from herself. A ploughboy, who has never tra- 
 velled beyond his own village, and has seen nothing but 
 thatched houses and his parish church, is naturally led 
 to imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature of a 
 house, and that that must be a church which is built of 
 stone, and especially if it has a spire upon it. A child 
 whose uncle has been excessively kind, and his school- 
 master very severe, easily believes that kindness always 
 belongs to uncles, and that severity is essential to mas- 
 ters or instructors. He has seen also soldiers with red 
 coats, or ministers with long black gowns, and there- 
 fore he persuades himself that these garbs are essential 
 to the characters, and that he is not a minister who has 
 not a long black gown, nor can he be a soldier who is 
 not dressed in red. It would be well if all such mistakes 
 ended with childhood. . . . When we have just reason 
 to admire a man for his virtues, we are sometimes in- 
 clined not only to neglect his weaknesses, but even to 
 put a good colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a book that has many excellent truths in 
 it, we are tempted to approve not only that whole book, 
 but even all the writings of that author. When a poet, 
 an orator, or a painter, has performed admirably in 
 several illustrious pieces, we sometimes also admire his 
 very errors, we mistake his blunders for beauties, and 
 are so ignorant as to copy them. . . . 
 
 This sort of prejudice is relieved by learning to distin- 
 guish things well, and not to judge in the lump. There 
 is scarce anything in the world of nature or art, In the 
 world of morality or religion, that is perfectly uniform. 
 There is a mixture of wisdom and folly, vice and virtue, 
 good and evil, both in men and things. We should re-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 27 
 
 member that some persons have great wit and little judg- 
 ment; others are judicious, but not witty. Some are 
 good-humoured without compliment ; others have all the 
 formalities of complaisance, but no good-humour. We 
 ought to know that one man may be vicious and learned, 
 while another has virtue without learning. That many 
 a man thinks admirably well, who has a poor utterance; 
 while others have a charming manner of speech, but 
 their thoughts are trifling and impertinent. Some are 
 good neighbours, and courteous and charitable toward 
 men, who have no religion ; others are truly religious, 
 but of morose natural tempers. Some excellent sayings 
 are found in very silly books, and some silly thoughts 
 appear in books of value. We should neither praise nor 
 dispraise by wholesale, but separate the good from the 
 evil, and judge of them apart ; the accuracy of a good 
 judgment consists much in making such distinctions.
 
 .CHAPTER IV. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE AND REASONING. 
 
 (i) To reason well, you must understand the sub- 
 jects that you reason about. 
 
 Go to the market-place, and listen to the con- 
 versation between the buyers and sellers. How 
 readily the sellers advance arguments to show that 
 their goods are very cheap, and how promptly the 
 buyers answer these arguments, and strongly argue 
 on the other side. Now how is it that these unedu- 
 cated people are enabled to argue so forcibly and 
 so fluently? It is that they understand what they 
 are talking about. And this must be the first step 
 in all our reasonings. 
 
 We begin, therefore, by stating clearly what is 
 the subject of discussion, and this is called giving 
 a definition of it : 
 
 In order to form a definition of anything, we must 
 put forth these three acts of the mind. First, Compare 
 the thing to be defined with other things that are most 
 like itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees 
 with them : and this is called the general nature or genus 
 in a definition : so if you would define what wine is, first 
 compare it with other things like itself, as cider, perry, 
 etc., and you will find it agrees essentially with them in 
 this, that it is a sort of juice. Secondly, Consider the 
 
 28
 
 29 
 
 most remarkable and primary attribute, property, or idea 
 wherein this thing differs from those other things that 
 are most like it ; and that is its essential or specific differ- 
 ence : so wine differs from cider and perry, and all other 
 juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may be 
 called its special nature, which distinguishes it from 
 other juices. Thirdly, Join the general and special 
 nature together, or (which is all one) the genus and the 
 difference, and these make up a definition. So the juice 
 of a grape, or juice pressed from grapes, is the defini- 
 tion of wine. 
 
 So if I would define what winter is, I consider first 
 wherein it agrees with other things which are most like 
 it, namely, summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are 
 all seasons of the year; therefore a season of the year 
 is the genus. Then I observe wherein it differs from 
 these, and that is in the shortness of the days ; for it is 
 this which does primarily distinguish it from other sea- 
 sons ; therefore this may be called its special nature, 
 or its difference. Then by joining these together, 1 make 
 a definition. Winter is that season of the year wherein 
 the days are shortest. 
 
 But everything cannot be defined in this formal 
 manner, and we may adopt any mode of expression 
 we please, provided it will convey to others a correct 
 description of what we mean. Thus we may say 
 
 Motion is a change of place. Swiftness is the passing 
 over a long space in a short time. A natural day is the 
 time of one alternate revolution of light and darkness, 
 or it is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eclipse 
 of the sun is a defect in the sun's transmission of light 
 to us by the moon interposing. Snow is congealed 
 vapour. Hail is congealed rain. An island is a piece 
 of land rising above the surrounding water. A hill is 
 an elevated part of the earth, and a grove is a piece of 
 ground thick set with trees. A triangle is a figure com-
 
 30 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 posed of three sides. A king is the chief ruler in a king- 
 dom. Veracity is the conformity of our words to our 
 thoughts. Murder is the unlawful killing of a man. 
 Natural philosophy is the knowledge of the properties of 
 bodies, and the various effects of them, or it is the know- 
 ledge of the various appearances in nature, and their 
 causes. 
 
 (2) To reason well, you must clearly understand 
 what is asserted about the subject. 
 
 A proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas 
 or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or 
 negation; as, " Plato was a philosopher: every angle 
 is formed by two lines meeting : no man living on earth 
 can be completely happy." When there are two or 
 more ideas or terms in the sentence, and they are 
 joined or disjoined merely by one single affirmation or 
 negation, they are properly called but one proposition, 
 though they may be resolved into several propositions 
 which are implied therein, as will appear hereafter. 
 
 There are three things which go to the nature and con- 
 stitution of a proposition ; namely, the subject, the pre- 
 dicate, and the copula. 
 
 The subject of a proposition is that concerning which 
 anything is affirmed or denied : So " Plato, angle, man 
 living on earth," are the subjects of the foregoing pro- 
 positions. 
 
 The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of 
 the subject : so " philosopher " is the predicate of the 
 first proposition; " formed by two lines meeting," is the 
 predicate of the second; " capable of being completely 
 happy," the proper predicate of the third. 
 
 The subject and predicate of a proposition taken to- 
 gether, are called the matter of it; for these are the 
 materials of which it is made. 
 
 The copula is the form of a proposition ; it represents 
 the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is ex-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 31 
 
 pressed by the words, am, art, is, are, etc. ; or am not, 
 art not, is not, are not, etc. 
 
 The subject and predicate of a proposition, are not 
 always to be known and distinguished by the placing of 
 the words in the sentence, but by reflecting duly on the 
 sense of the words, and on the mind or design of the 
 speaker or writer : as if I say, " In Africa there are 
 many lions," I mean many lions are existent in Africa : 
 " many lions " is the subject, and " existent in Africa " 
 is the predicate. "It is proper for a philosopher to 
 understand geometry " : here the word " proper " is the 
 predicate, and all the rest is the subject, except " is," 
 the copula. But there are some propositions, wherein 
 the terms of the subject and predicate seem to be the 
 same ; yet the ideas are not the same ; nor can these be 
 called pure, identical, or trifling propositions ; such as, 
 Home is home ; that is, home is a convenient or delight- 
 ful place ; Socrates is Socrates still : that is, the man 
 Socrates is still a philosopher; The hero was not a 
 hero ; that is, the hero did not show his courage ; What 
 I have written, I have written ; that is, what I wrote I 
 still approve and will not alter it : What is done, is 
 done ; that is, it cannot be undone. It may be easily 
 observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, for 
 in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has 
 in the subject. 
 
 (3) To reason well, you must know the meanings 
 of words and their relation to habits of thought. 
 
 A separate section having been devoted to this 
 topic (see p. 133), there is no need to deal with 
 it here. 
 
 (4) Practice is the secret of success. 
 
 Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct ideas, to 
 evident propositions, to strong and convincing argu- 
 ments. Converse much with those friends, and those
 
 32 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 books, and those parts of learning, where you meet with 
 the greatest clearness of thought and force of reasoning. 
 The mathematical sciences, and particularly arithmetic, 
 geometry, and mechanics, abound with these advan- 
 tages : and if there were nothing valuable in them for the 
 uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts of this 
 sort of learning are well worth our study ; for by per- 
 petual examples they teach us to conceive with clear- 
 ness, to connect our ideas and propositions in a train of 
 dependence, to reason with strength and demonstration, 
 and to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Some- 
 thing of these sciences should be studied by every man 
 who pretends to learning, and that, as Locke expresses 
 it, not so much to make us mathematicians, as to make 
 us reasonable creatures. We should gain such a fami- 
 liarity with evidence of perception and force of reason- 
 ing, and get such a habit of discerning clear truths, that 
 the mind may be soon offended with obscurity and con- 
 fusion : then we shall, as it were, naturally and with ease 
 restrain our minds from rash judgment, before we attain 
 just evidence of the proposition which is offered to us : 
 and we shall with the same ease, and, as it were, natu- 
 rally seize and embrace every truth that is proposed with 
 just evidence. 
 
 This habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, 
 and of reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by 
 the happiness of constitution, the brightness of genius, 
 the best natural parts, or the best collection of logical 
 precepts. It is custom and practice that must form and 
 establish this habit. We must apply ourselves to it till 
 we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on 
 rules. A coherent thinker, and a strict reasoner, is not 
 to be made at once by a set of rules, any more than a 
 good painter or musician may be formed extempore, by 
 an excellent lecture on music or painting. It is of in- 
 finite importance, therefore, in our younger years, to be 
 taught both the value and the practice of conceiving 
 clearly and reasoning right ; for when we are grown up
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 33 
 
 lo the middle of life, or past it, it Is no wonder that we 
 should not learn good reasoning any more than that 
 an ignorant clown should not be able to learn fine lan- 
 guage, dancing, or a courtly behaviour, when his rustic 
 airs have grown up with him till the age of forty.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE RELATION OF A SUBJECT AND ITS ATTRIBUTES. 
 
 BY attribute we mean a quality or property that 
 can be ascribed to some person or thing; by subject 
 we mean that to which the attribute is ascribed. 
 Take an illustration from English grammar. A 
 substantive or noun is the name of any person, 
 place, or thing; and an adjective is a word added 
 to the substantive or noun to denote its quality. 
 Now, instead of using the words substantive and 
 adjective, use subject and attribute, and you will 
 get a good idea of what we have to talk about in 
 this section. Of course, attribute has a more exten- 
 sive meaning than adjective: every adjective 
 denotes an attribute, but sometimes an attribute is 
 expressed by a verb, a particle, or by several words 
 put together. Often, too, an adjective united to a 
 substantive will become a subject. When you say 
 "a wily man," the word man denotes the subject, 
 and wiliness is the attribute. But when you say 
 "a wily man is frequently unscrupulous," the 
 words, "wily man," become the subject, and the 
 remaining phrase is the attribute. Whatever you 
 talk about is a subject, and what you say about it 
 is an attribute, real or affirmed. Some attributes 
 are called specific. They belong to the subject, 
 
 34
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 35 
 
 and to no other subject. These are attributes 
 chiefly that distinguish one class or species from 
 others. Thus man is called a rational animal. 
 Rationality is the specific attribute that dis- 
 tinguishes him from other animals. The specific 
 attribute is called by logicians a specific difference. 
 Other attributes are called common. They are 
 essential to the subject, but they belong also to 
 other subjects. Thus, it is an attribute of gold to 
 be yellow. If a metal is not yellow, it is not gold. 
 But other things are yellow besides gold. 
 The colour yellow is an attribute common to many 
 subjects. These common attributes are called 
 properties. Other attributes are accidental. What- 
 ever attribute can be removed from the subject 
 without destroying the subject, is considered to be 
 accidental. A hat may be white, or black, or made 
 of beaver, silk, or straw ; these are accidental attri- 
 butes, for they all might be changed, and yet the 
 subject remain a hat. These attributes are called 
 accidents. This relation of subject and attribute 
 is a very extensive one. Almost everything we see, 
 or hear, or know, is a subject, and has some kind 
 of attributes. The usual way in which we define 
 or describe anything is by an enumeration of its 
 attributes. We shall here adduce a few proposi- 
 tions expressing this relation, and then we shall 
 show how this relation is employed in reasoning. 
 
 (a) Newman's definition of a Gentleman. 
 
 Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentle- 
 man to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This de- 
 scription is both refined, and, as far as it goes, accurate. 
 He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles
 
 36 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those 
 about him ; and he concurs with their movements rather 
 than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be 
 considered as parallel to what are called comforts or 
 conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature : like 
 an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in ex- 
 pelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both 
 means of rest and animal heat without them. The true 
 gentleman, in like manner, carefully avoids whatever 
 may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom 
 he is cast all clashing of opinion, or collision of feel- 
 ing, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment ; 
 his great concern being to make everyone at their ease 
 and at home. He has his eyes on all his company, he is 
 tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, 
 and merciful towards the absurd. 
 
 (b) Herbert Spencer on " Style." 
 
 The ideal is "to so present ideas that they may be 
 apprehended with the least possible mental effort." Re- 
 garding language as an apparatus of symbols for the 
 conveyance of thought, we may say that as in a mechani- 
 cal apparatus, the more simple and the better arranged 
 its parts, the greater will be the effect produced. In 
 either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine 
 is deducted from the result. A reader or listener has at 
 each moment but a limited amount of mental power avail- 
 able. To recognise and interpret the symbols presented 
 to him requires part of this power : to arrange and com- 
 bine the images suggested requires a further part : and 
 only that part which remains can be used for realising 
 the thought conveyed. Hence, the more time and atten- 
 tion it takes to receive and understand each sentence, 
 the less time and attention can be given to the central 
 idea; and the less vividly will that idea be conceived. 
 
 Turning our attention to a different class of sub-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 37 
 
 ject, we find the sum total of attributes more exact, 
 in the sense of being capable of proof. 
 
 (c) Biology. 
 
 Biology is that branch of knowledge which treats of 
 organised beings, or animals and plants, including their 
 morphology, physiology, origin or development, and dis- 
 tribution. 
 
 (d) Blackstone on " Law." 
 
 Every law may be said to consist of several parts ; 
 one, declaratory whereby the rights to be observed and 
 the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly denned and laid 
 down; another, directory whereby the subject is in- 
 structed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to 
 abstain from the commission of those wrongs; a third, 
 remedial whereby a method is pointed out to recover a 
 man's private rights, or redress his private wrongs : to 
 which may be added a fourth, usually termed the sanc- 
 tion or vindicatory part of the law, whereby it is signi- 
 fied what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as 
 commit any public wrongs and transgress or neglect 
 their duty. 
 
 These examples will serve to show how it is 
 impossible to carry on even an ordinary conversa- 
 tion without the use of attributive phrases; whilst 
 to conduct an argument means the close and rea- 
 soned use of such phrases. When Disraeli, in a 
 humorous vein, desired to set out the attributes of 
 a good novel, he said : " Take a pair of pistols and 
 a pack of cards, a cookery book and a set of new 
 quadrilles; mix them up with half an intrigue and 
 a whole marriage, and divide into three equal 
 portions."* The university professor, on the other 
 
 * Referring, of course, to the three-volume novel.
 
 38 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 hand, in true academical style, would argue the 
 question from the broad basis of art, the function 
 of literature, the qualities of good narrative, and 
 a host of other items. 
 
 But the capacity to deal with attributes in relation 
 to subject is one of the first that should be 
 developed. 
 
 (1) From the presence of the subject we infer the 
 
 presence of the attribute. 
 
 It was said by a wise man that " a fool uttereth 
 all his mind : but a wise man keepeth it in till 
 afterwards." If, then, the man who rides to town 
 with you every morning be a fool, he will utter all 
 his mind. Generally he does, and having loqua- 
 ciously turned his brain inside out, dropping all 
 its secrets on the floor of the compartment for every- 
 body to inspect, he invites you to do likewise; and 
 when you decline, he calls you a snob, for to him 
 no thoughts should be private property : he is an 
 out-and-out socialist. 
 
 Arguments of this kind are often expressed in a 
 conditional form. Thus we say : If this be a 
 magnet, it will attract iron ; if he be an honest man, 
 he will pay his debts; if the current is on the 
 " live " wire, it will be dangerous; if we sow wheat, 
 we reap wheat. 
 
 (2) From the presence of the specific attribute, or 
 
 of all the common attributes, we infer the 
 presence of the subject. 
 
 You will observe that this rule is the reverse of 
 the former. In the former case we said : This is
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 39 
 
 a good tree; therefore it will bear good fruit. In 
 the present case we say : This tree bears good 
 fruit ; therefore it is a good tree. So, if we should 
 find a metal having all the common attributes of 
 gold, we should know that it is gold. This prin- 
 ciple is of great use in chemical experiments. 
 Thus, we know that certain bodies have certain 
 affinities for other bodies. To ascertain, therefore, 
 whether this body be present in any compound 
 substance, we add some body, for which the body, 
 whose presence we wish to detect, has an affinity, 
 or upon which it produces a known effect. There 
 are certain chemical tests which are in constant 
 use in such cases. Thus, the presence of the 
 specific attribute shows the presence of the subject. 
 So, if an auctioneer had to sell a house, he would 
 enumerate all its attributes, in order to show that 
 it is a most agreeable residence. The projector of 
 a new company enumerates all its attributes, in 
 order to show that its shares would turn out a most 
 profitable investment. A candidate for a seat in 
 the House of Commons states all his attributes, in 
 order to prove that he would be a most valuable 
 member. To enable you to infer from a single 
 attribute the presence of the subject, that attribute 
 must be a specific attribute; that is, it must belong 
 to no other subject. (See p. 41.) Thus, if it be 
 an attribute of an express train on any railway, that 
 it does not stop at the intermediate stations, you 
 may say: "This train does not stop at the inter- 
 mediate stations;" therefore, "this train is an 
 express train." Here, from the presence of the 
 attribute, we infer the presence of the subject. But!
 
 40 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 mind, if there are other trains besides the express 
 trains that do not stop at the intermediate stations, 
 this conclusion may not be correct. For then the 
 attribute is no longer a specific attribute, but a 
 common attribute. And from the presence of an 
 attribute that is common to several subjects you 
 cannot infer the presence of any particular subject. 
 All you can do is to infer the presence of either 
 one or other of the subjects. Thus, " The express 
 trains and the mail trains are the only trains that 
 do not stop at this station. The train which has 
 just passed has not stopped at this station ; there- 
 fore, the train which has just passed is either an 
 express train or a mail train." 
 
 But in conformity with the first rule you may 
 always, from the presence of the subject, infer the 
 presence of the attributes, even though the same 
 attributes may belong to other subjects. Thus you 
 may say : None of the express trains stops at the 
 intermediate stations. The train that leaves at 
 three o'clock is an express train ; therefore, it will 
 not stop at the intermediate stations. 
 
 (3) From the absence of the subject we infer the 
 absence of its specific attribute. 
 
 Here are some instances : This animal is not 
 a human being ; therefore he is not endowed with 
 rational intelligence. This man is not an educated 
 man ; therefore he is not qualified to be a teacher. 
 This man has had no military training ; therefore 
 he is unfit to lead a large army. Jones has an 
 impediment in his speech; therefore he is unfitted 
 for public speaking.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 41 
 
 But although the absence of a subject shows the 
 absence of its specific attribute, it does not prove 
 the absence of any of its common attributes or 
 properties. For these attributes belong also to 
 other subjects. Thus, honesty is an item in the 
 code of religion; but we cannot say that if a man 
 is not a religious man he is not an honest man, 
 for a man may be honest and yet be destitute of 
 religion. 
 
 (4) From the absence of an essential attribute we 
 
 infer the absence of the subject. 
 
 This rule is the reverse of the last, where the 
 process was to say : This is not a good tree ; there- 
 fore it will not bear good fruit. By the present 
 rule we should say : This tree does not bear good 
 fruit; therefore it is not a good tree. So thought 
 is an attribute of mind; and since matter cannot 
 think, we infer that matter is not mind. Again, 
 it is an attribute of matter to be divisible; but mind 
 is not divisible; hence we infer that mind is not 
 matter. 
 
 (5) If any two attributes may be ascribed to the 
 
 same subject, then we may infer that these 
 two attributes are not inconsistent with each 
 other. 
 
 Sir Isaac Newton was a great philosopher, and 
 also a man of strong religious principle; hence 
 we infer that philosophy is not incompatible with 
 religion. Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine 
 arts, he was also a good man of business; hence 
 we infer that a taste for the fine arts is not incom-
 
 42 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 patible with habits of business. Sir Thomas Powell 
 Buxton was a very benevolent man, and yet a great 
 sportsman ; and hence we infer that benevolent 
 feelings are not incompatible with a fondness for 
 field-sports. 
 
 Writers on scholastic logic repeat the subject in 
 this kind of argument so as to form two proposi- 
 tions, which they usually place under one another, 
 and the conclusion under them ; and these three 
 propositions taken together they call a syllogism ; 
 thus 
 
 Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine arts. 
 Sir Robert Peel was a good man of business. 
 Therefore, a taste for the fine arts is not incom- 
 patible with habits of business. 
 
 Here are three more examples. 
 
 (a) All who assist in the progress of true science 
 
 deserve the respect of mankind. 
 All who assist in the progress of true science 
 
 have to contend with difficulties. 
 Some who have to contend with difficulties 
 
 deserve the respect of mankind. 
 
 (b) Some distinguished poets have not escaped 
 
 poverty. 
 All distinguished poets do honour to their 
 
 country. 
 Some who do honour to their country have not 
 
 escaped poverty. 
 
 (c) No bombastic writers are worthy of imitation. 
 Some bombastic writers are amusing.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 43 
 
 Some things amusing are not worthy of imita- 
 tion.* 
 
 This mode of reasoning may also be expressed 
 in the form of example, thus: "A taste for the 
 fine arts is not incompatible with habits of business. 
 In proof of this we may cite the example of Sir 
 Robert Peel." "Some who do honour to their 
 country have not escaped poverty, which is proved 
 by the history of some of our distinguished poets." 
 "A very interesting book may consist chiefly of 
 quotations. Witness DTsraeli's ' Curiosities of 
 Literature' ' The following are instances of the 
 same kind of argument expressed in a different 
 form : " The example of Virgil shows that a great 
 poet may be seduced into some faults by the prac- 
 tice of imitation." " A man remarkable for his 
 knowledge and policy, the wisdom of his maxims, 
 the justness of his reasoning, and the variety, dis- 
 tinctness, and strength of his characters, may want 
 exactness in his diction, and be careless in the art 
 of writing, for we find all these qualities united in 
 Lord Clarendon." You will observe that this 
 argument must not be pushed too far. It does not 
 prove that either of the two attributes is the cause 
 of the other; or that they always, or even often, 
 accompany one another; but merely that they are 
 not incompatible. 
 
 * These examples illustrate the third figure of syllogistic 
 reasoning: the maxim is, " When the whole of a class pos- 
 sess a certain attribute, and the whole or part of the class 
 possess another attribute, then some things that possess one 
 of these attributes possess the other also." See Bailey, 
 p. 72.
 
 44 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (6) If the same attribute cannot be ascribed to two 
 
 specified subjects, then we may infer that 
 those subjects are different from each other. 
 
 Thus, if the soul of man can reason, and the soul 
 of a brute cannot reason, we infer that the soul 
 of a man is different from the soul of a brute. If 
 all fever produces thirst, and the patient does not 
 suffer thirst, we infer that the patient has no fever. 
 The following examples are taken from the Port 
 Royal Logic: 
 
 No virtue is contrary to the love of truth ; 
 There is a love of peace which is opposed to a 
 
 love of truth ; 
 Therefore there is a love of peace which is not 
 
 a virtue. 
 
 Every virtue is accompanied with discretion ; 
 There is a zeal without discretion ; 
 Therefore there is a zeal which is not a virtue.* 
 
 You will observe that these conclusions are 
 negative. We deny that one thing is another, 
 because the attribute can be ascribed to one of 
 these things and not to the other. 
 
 (7) If a subject have certain attributes, we infer 
 
 that it is adapted for the use to which those 
 attributes are applicable. 
 
 * These examples are adduced as illustrations of the 
 second figure of syllogistic reasoning. The maxims of this 
 figure are, " When the whole of a class possess a certain 
 attribute, whatever does not possess the attribute does not 
 belong to the class; " and, "When the whole of a class is 
 excluded from the possession of an attribute, whatever pos- 
 sesses the attribute does not belong to the class." Bailey, 
 p. 71.
 
 45 
 
 From the attributes of the Isle of Wight, Tor- 
 quay, and Penzance, we infer that those places are 
 suitable residences for people in danger of con- 
 sumption. From the attributes of wool, we infer 
 that a woollen garment worn next the skin is some- 
 times good for rheumatism. From the attributes 
 of certain medicines, w r e endeavour to learn what 
 are the respective complaints for which they are 
 adapted. From the attributes of bones, lime, sea- 
 weed, and fish, we infer that they may be usefully 
 applied as manure to certain kinds of land. So if 
 a man have the attributes of honesty, industry, 
 prudence, and perseverence, we infer that he will 
 thrive in his pursuits. If a man offers himself 
 as a Member of Parliament, excise officer, banker's 
 clerk, or policeman, he must show that he has 
 those attributes which will qualify him for the 
 discharge of his official duties. The attributes 
 of a joint-stock bank are, that it has more than six 
 partners, that it has an amount of paid-up capital, 
 and that on the death or retirement of any of its 
 partners their portion of the capital is not with- 
 drawn, but is transferred to other parties; and hence 
 we infer that it is a safer system of banking for 
 the public than if the partners were no more than 
 six, and the death or retirement of any partner 
 would cause the withdrawal of his portion of the 
 capital. So from the attributes of the precious 
 metals, it was inferred that they were adapted for 
 the purposes of coin. 
 
 That medium of exchange must be best which unites 
 in itself the largest amount of the following qualities : 
 sameness of value both as to time and place, divisibility,
 
 46 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 durability, and facility of transportation. The metals 
 especially gold and silver possess all these qualities in 
 a great degree. We may have them in tons or in grains : 
 wear is slow; fire will not destroy them; when divided, 
 they can be fused again and re-blended ; and, except 
 where large values are concerned, they are easily con- 
 veyed from place to place. Because metals possess these 
 qualities, they were early and (in civilized countries) uni- 
 versally adopted as a medium of exchange. 
 
 (8) The presence of similar attributes in two 
 or more subjects shows the probability 
 of their corresponding in other attributes. 
 This is called " reasoning by analogy," 
 which we shall discuss more at length later 
 on. We will here give an example. 
 
 It is natural to mankind to judge of things less known 
 by some similitude, real or imaginary, between them and 
 things more familiar or better known. And where the 
 things compared have really a great similitude in their 
 nature, when there is reason to think that they are sub- 
 ject to the same laws, there may be a considerable degree 
 of probability in conclusions drawn from analogy. Thus 
 we may observe a very great similitude between this 
 earth which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, 
 Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury. They all revolve 
 round the sun, as the earth does, although at different 
 distances and in different periods. They borrow all 
 their light from the sun, as the earth does. Several of 
 them are known to revolve round their axis, like the 
 earth ; and by that means must have a like succession of 
 day and night. Some of them have moons that serve 
 to give them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon 
 does to us. They are all in their motions subject to the 
 same law of gravitation as the earth is. From all this 
 similitude, it is not unreasonable to think that those
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 47 
 
 planets may, like our earth, be the habitation of various 
 orders of living creatures. 
 
 (9) The presence of any attribute shows the absence 
 of a contrary attribute. This, of course, 
 refers only to accidental attributes, for an 
 essential attribute cannot be absent from its 
 subject. Thus, if the weather be hot, it is 
 not cold ; if a man be humble he is not proud ; 
 if avaricious, he is not liberal ; if he is gouty, 
 he is not in good health. 
 
 The presence of an accidental attribute in one 
 instance, proves the possibility of such a subject 
 becoming united to such an attribute in any similar 
 case. Wisdom is the accidental attribute of a man, 
 and therefore we are justified in inferring that a 
 man may become wise. In the same way, wealth, 
 learning, virtue, happiness, are attributes of man, 
 and though not essential attributes, but only acci- 
 dental, yet they may all be acquired- Sometimes, 
 as we have already observed, an accidental attri- 
 bute may be united to a subject, and form a new 
 subject, which may have other attributes. Thus 
 we may say " A wise man will receive instruc- 
 tion." Here the word "wise" is not viewed as 
 an attribute, but as with " man " forming a sub- 
 ject, and a readiness to receive instruction is an 
 essential attribute of a wise man. 
 
 In reasoning upon the relation subsisting between 
 subject and attribute, it is always necessary to dis- 
 tinguish between those attributes which are essen- 
 tial, and those which are accidental. For, if we 
 take accidental attributes, and argue upon them
 
 48 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 as though they were essential, our reasonings will 
 be erroneous. Thus, the poet Ovid had a large 
 nose. This was a mere accidental circumstance, 
 and was by no means essential to him as a poet. 
 If, therefore, we were to meet a man in the street 
 with a large nose, we should not be justified in 
 inferring that he was a poet. Some men of great 
 minds have had feeble bodies, but it does not follow 
 that a feeble body tends to invigorate the mind. 
 Some men of great intellectual powers have been 
 addicted to great vices, but it does not follow that 
 great vices are a mark of intellect. Erroneous 
 reasonings under this head sometimes arise from 
 our omission to take into account some one or more 
 of the essential attributes. A tradesman may have 
 all the attributes of a good man of business, except 
 that he is fond of speculation. A young woman 
 may have all the attributes of a good wife, except 
 sweetness of temper. A house may have all the 
 attributes of an agreeable residence, except that 
 the chimney smokes. A man may have all the 
 attributes of an excellent friend, except that he 
 cannot keep' a secret. Now, in these cases, if you 
 had from a review of the other attributes, come to 
 the conclusion, " That tradesman is worthy of high 
 credit"; "That young woman would make an 
 excellent wife "; " That house is a most agreeable 
 residence"; "That man is a most judicious 
 friend," you would have formed erroneous conclu- 
 sions. The tradesman may let you in for a heavy 
 account; the young woman may bring misery upon 
 herself and her man for the space of fifty years; 
 your house may cost you more than if you had
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 49 
 
 rented it; and the man who was a friend turned out 
 to be a devil in disguise. 
 
 (10) It may also happen that when we have 
 noticed all the attributes, our judgment may be 
 kept in suspense from the conflicting character of 
 those attributes. If we have to hire servants, those 
 who are most skilled may be deficient in sobriety, 
 or, if not deficient in sobriety, they may be deficient 
 in industry, or in cleanliness. If we want a house, 
 we cannot find one that has all the attributes we 
 require. If we wish to emigrate, we can discover 
 no colony exactly suited to our circumstances. In 
 these cases we must balance the attributes one 
 against the other. Here, a full knowledge of the 
 subject, and plenty of common sense, are the best 
 guides. The rules of logic, however, will teach 
 us to decide coolly and systematically. The best 
 way is that of Franklin. Write down on paper 
 first, all the reasons for the affirmative, and then, 
 all the reasons for the negative. Having all the 
 reasons thus before your eyes, weigh them deliber- 
 ately, and see which preponderate.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE RELATION OF A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 
 
 (i) The things that have parts are subjects pos- 
 sessing attributes, but attributes themselves, or most 
 of them, have no parts. The colours green, red, 
 and blue; the sounds loud, sharp, and shrill; the 
 smells pleasant and unpleasant, have no parts. But 
 all material objects can be divided into parts : we 
 divide an animal into head, trunk, and limbs; a 
 tree into root, stem, branches, bark, leaves, and 
 fruit; a day into hours, minutes and seconds; a 
 book into pages, chapters, and lines; a mile into 
 furlongs and furlongs into yards. Watts has some 
 interesting remarks shewing the importance of what 
 otherwise appears an elementary feature of all 
 knowledge. 
 
 Each part taken singly must contain less than the 
 whole, but all the parts taken collectively must contain 
 neither more nor less than the whole. Therefore, if in 
 discoursing of a tree you divide it into the trunk and 
 leaves, it is an imperfect division, because the root and 
 the branches are needful to make up the whole. In all 
 divisions we should first consider the larger and more 
 immediate parts of the subject, and not divide it at once 
 into the more minute and remote parts. It would by no 
 means be proper to divide a kingdom first into streets, 
 and lanes, and fields ; but it must be first divided into 
 
 50
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 51 
 
 provinces or counties, then those counties may be divided 
 into towns, villages, fields, etc. ; and towns into streets 
 and lanes. The several parts of a division ought to be 
 opposite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. 
 It would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, 
 limbs, body, and brains, for the brains are contained in 
 the head. Let not subdivisions be too numerous with- 
 out necessity : for it is better many times to distinguish 
 more parts at once, if the subject will bear it, than to 
 mince the discourse by excessive dividing and subdivid- 
 ing. It is preferable, therefore, in a treatise of geo- 
 graphy, to say, that in a city we will consider its walls, 
 its gates, its buildings, its streets, and lanes, than to 
 divide it formally first into the encompassing and the 
 encompassed parts; the encompassing parts are the 
 walls and gates ; the encompassed parts include the ways 
 and the buildings; the ways are the streets and the 
 lanes ; buildings consist of the foundations, and the 
 superstructure, etc. 
 
 Divide every subject according to the special design 
 you have in view. One and the same idea or subject 
 may be divided in very different manners, according to 
 the different purposes we have in discoursing of it. So 
 if a printer were to consider the several parts of a book, 
 he must divide it into sheets, the sheets into pages, the 
 pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a 
 grammarian divides a book into periods, sentences, and 
 words, or parts of speech, as noun, pronoun, verb, etc. 
 A logician considers a book as divided into chapters, 
 sections, arguments, propositions, ideas; and, with the 
 help of ontology, he divides the propositions into sub- 
 ject, object, property, relation, action, passion, cause, 
 and effect. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician 
 to divide a book into sheets, pages, and lines; or for a 
 printer to divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into pro- 
 positions, ideas, properties, or causes. In all your divi- 
 sions observe with greatest exactness the nature of 
 things.
 
 52 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 By way of illustration one may refer to the relics 
 of the cross of Christ found in many Continental 
 churches. If the wood so regarded were gathered 
 together and weighed, it would be found to total an 
 avoirdupois far in excess of that carried by the 
 Cyrenian. Hence we infer that some of these relics 
 cannot be genuine, in spite of the testimony of 
 tradition and the veneration of the faithful. 
 
 (2) We shall now consider this principle of the 
 whole and its parts with reference to physical 
 objects. 
 
 By physical objects we mean objects known to the 
 senses, such as relate to what we call science. By 
 chemistry we ascertain what are the parts of which 
 these objects are composed. And hence we infer 
 the purposes to which they may be applied. Thus, 
 we learn that certain substances may be employed 
 as medicines; and we discover the effects of par- 
 ticular kinds of food : 
 
 (a) Of what is water composed ? Of two gases oxygen 
 and hydrogen. In nine pounds of water, eight are oxy- 
 gen, and one is hydrogen. Of what is atmospheric air 
 composed ? Principally of two gases, oxygen and nitro- 
 gen, mixed together in the proportion of one gallon of 
 oxygen to four of nitrogen. 
 
 (b) Fruits consist principally of gum, sugar, starch, 
 and vegetable jelly, combined with different acids. They 
 contain but little nutritious matter, though, on account 
 of their flavour and coolness, they are very agreeable 
 to the palate, and, therefore, much prized as an article 
 of diet. Their use is particularly beneficial to the health. 
 
 Here from a knowledge of the constituent parts
 
 53 
 
 of these substances we infer what would be the 
 effect of the whole. 
 
 The relation between a part and a whole has 
 sometimes furnished important evidence in cases of 
 judicial proceedings. In a case of house-breaking, 
 the thief had gained admission into the house by 
 means of a penknife, which was broken in the 
 attempt, and part left in the window-frame. The 
 broken knife was found in the pocket of the 
 prisoner, and perfectly corresponded with the frag- 
 ment left. In the case of a man who had been shot 
 by a ball, the wadding of the pistol, which stuck in 
 the wound, was found to be part of a ballad which 
 corresponded with another part found in the pocket 
 of the prisoner. 
 
 The relation of a whole and its parts has some- 
 times a reference to questions in political economy. 
 
 Let us now observe how the value of a commodity re- 
 solves itself into three component parts. Take, for in- 
 stance, a load of hay ; its price pays first the wages of 
 the labourer who cut down the grass and made it into 
 hay then the profits of the farmer who sells it and 
 lastly, the rent of the field in which it grew. This, there- 
 fore, constitutes the whole cost of production of the 
 load of hay, and may be called its natural value. 
 
 (3) We shall now consider the application of this 
 principle to moral ideas. 
 
 The word moral is not used here in its ethical 
 sense as opposed to immoral, but as opposed to 
 physical. We cannot divide these ideas into parts 
 so readily as we can divide arithmetical numbers, 
 or as we may carve a fowl. Hence we often use the
 
 54 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 words imply or include, in order to denote the 
 simple ideas of which they are composed. Thus 
 we may consider independence of mind as implying 
 or including several things. Possibly it includes 
 several other things besides those I have mentioned. 
 But we are able to argue from these. For if it be 
 a duty to cherish independence of mind, then it is 
 a duty to cherish every one of the parts or principles 
 of which it is composed. So gratitude includes a 
 consciousness of favours received a disposition to 
 acknowledge them on proper occasions and a 
 resolution to return them when an opportunity 
 occurs. Honour includes a regard to truth in 
 words humanity and generosity in actions can- 
 dour and forgiveness in thought, and resentment of 
 insult or affront. 
 
 Lender this relation we may class the points of 
 belief, or practice adopted by any public body. 
 The following were the points of the charter con- 
 tended for by the Chartists : i . Equal Electoral Dis- 
 tricts. 2. Universal Suffrage. 3. Vote by Ballot. 
 4. Triennial Parliaments. 5. No Property Quali- 
 fications for Members. 6. Payment of Representa- 
 tives. 
 
 The settlement of a public question will some- 
 times turn upon this relation of a whole and its 
 parts. The first Baron Rothschild took all the oath 
 required from Members of Parliament, except the 
 words, " Upon the true faith of a Christian." His 
 friends contended that these words were not part of 
 the oath, and that the Baron, having now taken the 
 oath, should be allowed to take his seat. The 
 House of Commons decided that these words
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 55 
 
 formed a part of the oath. The Baron, therefore, 
 could not take his seat. 
 
 (4) It is curious to note how false reasonings arise 
 out of a misuse of the relation between a 
 whole and its parts. 
 
 When a public body or society, governed jointly 
 by a number of managers, is prosperous, each 
 manager will take to himself a high degree of credit 
 for having caused that prosperity. Quite naturally, 
 too. On the other hand when the society or 
 limited company becomes involved in difficulties, 
 each manager is anxious to show that no part of 
 the blame belongs to him ; thus the totals of the 
 praise or blame which each manager is willing to 
 take to himself are more or less than the total that 
 belongs to the whole body. It should not be for- 
 gotten in such cases that, whether of applause or 
 censure, the total of all the parts cannot be either 
 more or less than the whole. 
 
 In the Curtain Lectures, it will be remembered 
 that Mr. Caudle having lent a friend five pounds, 
 Mrs. Caudle enumerates four or five ways in which 
 this amount might have been employed, and then 
 concludes that the lending of this one sum of five 
 pounds has subjected her to all those privations. 
 
 You ought to be very rich, Mr. Caudle. I wonder 
 who'd lend you five pounds? But so it is : a wife may 
 work and may slave ! Ha, dear ! the many things that 
 might have been done with five pounds. As if people 
 picked up money in the street ! But you always were a 
 fool, Mr. Caudle ! I've wanted a black satin gown these 
 three years, and that five pounds would have pretty well
 
 56 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 bought it. All the girls want bonnets, and where they're 
 to come from I can't tell. Half five pounds would have 
 bought 'em but now they must go without. Next 
 Tuesday the fire insurance is due. I should like to know 
 how it's to be paid. Why, it can't be paid at all. That 
 five pounds would have just done it and now, insurance 
 is out of the question. I did think we might go to Mar- 
 gate this summer. There's poor little Caroline, I'm sure 
 she wants the sea. But no, dear creature ! she must 
 stop at home all of us must stop at home she'll go 
 into a consumption, there's no doubt of that; yes, sweet 
 little angel ! I've made up my mind to lose her, now. 
 The child might have been saved ; but people can't save 
 their children and throw away their five pounds too. 
 
 Dean Swift, in his sarcastic " Advice to Ser- 
 vants," counsels them to act on the same fallacy. 
 
 The cook, the butler, the groom, the market-man, and 
 every other servant who is concerned in the expenses of 
 the family, should act as if his master's whole estate 
 ought to be applied to that servant's particular business. 
 For instance, if the cook computes his master's estate 
 to be a thousand pounds a year, he reasonably con- 
 cludes, that a thousand pounds a year will afford meat 
 enough, and therefore he need not be sparing ; the butler 
 makes the same judgment, so may the groom and the 
 coachman ; and thus every branch of expense will be filled 
 to vour master's honour.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE RELATION OF GENUS AND SPECIES. 
 
 THIS relation is founded upon the act of classifica- 
 tion. Let us take a tree. There are many kinds of 
 trees, e.g., the oak and the elm ; and there is a great 
 number of oaks and elms. Here, then, a tree is 
 the GENUS ; oak and elm are the species, and a par- 
 ticular oak or elm that we may happen to see, is 
 an individual. In all the branches of natural his- 
 tory, classification is very generally introduced. It 
 is a rule, that the GENUS can always be asserted of 
 each species. Thus we can say, an oak is a tree, 
 an elm is a tree, a vine is a tree. This shows 
 that tree is a genus, and that oak, elm, and vine, 
 are species under that particular genus. We may 
 say a horse is an animal, an ox is an animal, a 
 dog is an animal. This proves that animal is a 
 genus, and that dog, horse, and ox, are species of 
 that genus. Each species may again be divided 
 into inferior species, as there are various kinds of 
 dogs, horses, and oxen. Genus and species have 
 a reference to moral ideas, as well as to physical 
 ones. Thus we may say, industry is a virtue, 
 frugality is a virtue, temperance is a virtue. This 
 shows that virtue is a genus, and that frugality, 
 industry, and temperance are three of its species. 
 E 57
 
 58 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 You will observe that, although I call this, for 
 brevity's sake, the relation of genus and species, 
 you must always remember that, while a genus 
 may be divided into species, each species may 
 again be subdivided into individuals. I use these 
 words, genus and species, being words in common 
 use, to express the general idea of classification. 
 The^ word genus denotes a large class the word 
 species a small class included in the large class. 
 This small class may sometimes be again sub- 
 divided into smaller classes, and an individual is 
 a single thing forming a part of the smallest class. 
 It is clear that any single thing included in a 
 smaller class must be included in a larger class. 
 This is the foundation of all our reasonings from 
 the relation of genus and species. 
 
 (i) The following are examples of classification : 
 
 (a) Mountain water, as it is pure and cold to the taste, 
 is also beneficial to the health for drinking. If it cannot 
 be obtained, river water may be resorted to. Well water 
 I put in the last place, although everywhere it is agree- 
 able for its coldness. It is almost always hard, unsuit- 
 able for dissolving soap and for cooking vegetables. 
 The water of lakes, even although they may contain the 
 purest waters, and appear pellucid, nevertheless become 
 tepid from their isolation, and are flat and vapid. 
 
 (b) The capital of a manufacturer is of two kinds, 
 fixed and circulating. The fixed capital remains always 
 in his possession, as the mills, warehouses, etc. The 
 circulating capital is always going out of his possession, 
 as the materials of the manufacture, the wages of the 
 workmen, etc. So the horses that draw the plough are 
 part of the farmer's fixed capital, the sheep and oxen he
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 59 
 
 sends to market for sale are part of his circulating 
 capital. 
 
 (c) A library of books might be arranged (i) accord- 
 ing to their size (2) according to the language in which 
 they are written, (3) according to the alphabetic order 
 of their author's names, (4) according to their subjects 
 and in various other ways.* 
 
 (d) The primary distinction of rights is of Natural 
 and Positive rights. Rights are natural, as laid in the 
 nature of man; rights are positive, as defined in the 
 nation. Rights are natural as immanent in the nature 
 of man : rights are positive as immanent in the nation, f 
 
 The great purpose of classification, which reduces 
 multiplicity to unity, is that it enables us to infer 
 of all other members of a class what we know of 
 any one member; consequently every classification 
 should allow the greatest possible number of general 
 assertions to be made, and it should be appropriate 
 to the purpose in hand. 
 
 (2) The rules for dividing a genus into its species, 
 are similar to those for dividing a whole 
 into its parts. A species is part of a 
 genus. 
 
 Each part singly taken must contain less than the 
 whole, but all the parts taken collectively, or together, 
 must contain neither more nor less than the whole ; or, 
 as logicians sometimes express it, the parts of the divi- 
 sion ought to exhaust the whole thing which is divided. 
 In all distributions we should first consider the larger 
 and more immediate kinds or species, or ranks of being, 
 and not divide a thing at once into the more minute and 
 
 *Jevons' Logic, p. 278. tMulford's The Nation,
 
 60 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 remote. The several parts of a distribution ought to be 
 opposite; that is, one species or class of beings in the 
 same rank of division ought not to contain or include 
 another; so men ought not to be divided into the rich, 
 the poor, the learned, and the tall ; for poor men may be 
 both learned and tall, and so may the rich. Let not sub- 
 divisions be too numerous, without necessity ; therefore 
 I think quantity is better distinguished~at once into a 
 line, a surface, and a solid ; than to say, as Ramus does, 
 that quantity is either a line or a thing lined; and a 
 thing lined is either a surface or a solid. 
 
 It is to this doctrine of distribution of a genus into 
 its several species, we must also refer the distribution 
 of a cause according to its several effects, as some medi- 
 cines are heating, some are cooling : or an effect, when it 
 is distinguished by its causes; as faith is either built 
 upon divine testimony or human. It is to this head we 
 refer particular artificial bodies, when they are distin- 
 guished according to the matter they are made of, as a 
 statue is either of brass, of marble, or wood, etc. ; and 
 any other beings, when they are distinguished accord- 
 ing to their end and design, as the furniture of body or 
 mind is either for ornament or use. To this head also 
 we refer subjects, when they are divided according to 
 their modes or accidents; as men are either merry, or 
 grave, or sad; and modes, when they are divided by 
 their subjects, as distempers belong to the fluid, or to 
 the solid parts of the animal.* 
 
 (3) The mode of reasoning from genus and species 
 is merely to show that a certain species is 
 properly classed under a certain genus, and 
 then to affirm or deny of the species what 
 you may affirm or deny of the genus. f 
 
 * Watts' Logic. 
 
 t This is the principle of the first figure of syllogistic 
 ifasoning; or, as Mr. Bailey calls it, "class reasoning."
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 61 
 
 Thus you may say, All fruit is useful to health : 
 the apple is a kind of fruit; therefore the apple is 
 useful to health. I may observe that this principle 
 of reasoning from genus to species is the only kind 
 of reasoning in which you gain anything by placing 
 it in the form of a syllogism. And here, mind, 
 the argument gains nothing in point of strength, 
 but sometimes it gains a little in point of clearness; 
 or, at least, it gives a clearer statement of the mean- 
 ing of the reasoner. 
 
 Here are two further specimens of syllo- 
 gisms : 
 
 He that's always in fear is not happy; 
 Covetous men are always in fear; 
 Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
 
 Nothing that must be repented of is truly desir- 
 able; 
 
 Some pleasures must be repented of; 
 
 Therefore there are some pleasures which are not 
 truly desirable. 
 
 In the first syllogism, " He that's always in fear " 
 is the genus, and "covetous man " is the species 
 under that genius. At least, he is, or was, with 
 Dr. Watts; with other people he would have a 
 more happy classification, despite his ambitions. 
 In the second syllogism, " Nothing that must be 
 repented of " is the genus, and " Some pleasures " 
 
 The maxim is, " Whatever is predicated universally of any 
 class of thing's, may be predicated in like manner of anything 
 comprehended in that class." See Bailey's Theory of Rea- 
 soning, p. 64.
 
 62 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 is the species. In natural, everyday reasoning we 
 should not use these syllogisms. We should 
 say : 
 
 Covetous men are not happy because they are 
 always in fear. 
 
 Some pleasures are not truly desirable because 
 they must be repented of. 
 
 (4) The application of a general principle to a par- 
 ticular case is another mode of reasoning 
 from the relation of genus and species. 
 Take the principle of justice by way of illustra- 
 tion. Gilbart thus applies it to the question of the 
 rights of employees : 
 
 Be just in your appointments, and select those who 
 are the most worthy and the best qualified for the duties 
 they will have to discharge. Be just in the amount of 
 your remuneration; recollect that many of the servants 
 of public companies have greater trusts and heavier re- 
 sponsibilities than the servants of individuals; and in 
 this case, it is just and equal that they be rewarded 
 accordingly. Be just in your promotions, and let not 
 merit be supplanted by patronage or favouritism. Be 
 just in the quantity of labour you exact. Appoint a suffi- 
 cient number of servants to do the work easily. Do not 
 compel them to keep late hours ; nor refuse reasonable 
 holidays, for the purposes of health and recreation. Be 
 just in your pensions, and let your aged and worn-out 
 servants be treated with respect and liberality. Be just 
 in your reproofs. Let not your censures or your punish- 
 ments be more than proportionate to the offence ; and be 
 as ready at all times to acknowledge the merits of your 
 servants as to notice their defects. All complaints, and 
 all applications for increased remuneration or privileges,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 63 
 
 from the servants of public companies, should receive 
 mature consideration; and all refusals should be given 
 with kindness and courtesy.* 
 
 (5) In the application of general proverbs we reason 
 
 from the relation of genus and species. 
 
 Thus, " Honesty is the best policy." Therefore, 
 when a public company has sustained losses, it is 
 the best policy to announce them in its annual 
 report to the shareholders, as that is the most 
 honest procedure. This is one of the numerous 
 cases to which this maxim may be applied. Frank- 
 lin describes several specific characters under the 
 genus that they " paid too dear for their whistle." 
 And in daily life we meet with people to whom is 
 applied the maxim, that " they have too many irons 
 in the fire " ; or that " they carry too many eggs 
 in one basket " ; or that " they are penny wise and 
 pound foolish." In these cases the proverb is 
 regarded as the genus, and the particular case to 
 which it is applied is the species. This will appear 
 the more evident if placed in the form of a syllo- 
 gism. 
 
 It is unwise to have too many irons in the fire. 
 The man who carries on more trades than he can 
 
 attend to, has too many irons in the fire. 
 Therefore, the man who carries on more trades 
 
 than he can attend to acts unwisely. 
 
 (6) Rules and examples in any art or science sus- 
 
 tain the relation to each other of genus and 
 species. 
 
 * Practical Treatise on Banking.
 
 64 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 Take the following general rule in grammar: 
 
 " Two or more nouns in the singular number joined 
 together by a copulative conjunction, expressed or 
 understood, must have verbs, nouns, and pronouns 
 agreeing with them in the plural number." That 
 is the general rule. Now, when we meet with two 
 or more nouns, joined together in the manner 
 stated, we apply the rule, and if we find that the 
 verbs, nouns, and pronouns agreeing with them 
 are put in the plural number, we infer that the 
 sentence is grammatical; but, if otherwise, we say 
 the sentence is ungrammatical. Now then, try by 
 this rule the following sentences: "Socrates and 
 Plato were wise, they were the most eminent 
 philosophers of Greece." Here the rule is observed. 
 " And so ivas also James and John, the sons of 
 Zebedee, who were partners with Simon." Here 
 the rule is violated. 
 
 You perceive then that the application of any 
 general rule to a particular case, is a logical process, 
 and forms an argument on the principle of genus 
 and species. I may also observe, that although 
 in teaching an art systematically, we lay down our 
 rules first, and then give the examples, yet, in the 
 practical operations of teaching, especially in con- 
 versation, it is usually best to state the example 
 first, and then state the rule as a deduction from 
 the example. Indeed, most general rules were 
 probably in the first instance deduced from 
 examples. Men did not invent grammar first, and 
 then learn to speak, but speech existed before 
 grammar. The same remark may be applied very
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 65 
 
 extensively. Poets existed before critics, and the 
 practical arts before the sciences. 
 
 (7) Arguments from enumeration may justly be 
 classed under genus and species, as the 
 enumeration is either of the individuals of 
 a species, or of the species of a genus. 
 
 Sometimes we enumerate the several arguments 
 by which an opinion may be supported. Public 
 speakers at the close of their address often do this. 
 And judges on the bench enumerate, or sum up, 
 as it is called, the arguments that have been used 
 by the advocates. 
 
 Sometimes, to prove the advantages or disadvan- 
 tages of any engagement or pursuit, we enumerate 
 them. In order to show that there is a pleasure 
 in science, Lord Brougham thus enumerates the 
 pleasures that it tends to produce: 
 
 It is easy to show that there is a positive gratification 
 resulting from the study of the sciences. If it be a 
 pleasure to gratify curiosity to know what we are ig- 
 norant of to have our feelings of wonder called forth ; 
 how pure a delight of this very kind does natural science 
 hold out to its students ! Recollect some of the extra- 
 ordinary discoveries of mechanical philosophy. Observe 
 the extraordinary truths which optical science discloses. 
 Chemistry is not behind in its wonders; and yet these 
 are trifling when compared to the prodigies which astro- 
 nomy opens to our view : the enormous masses of the 
 heavenly bodies ; their immense distances ; their count- 
 less numbers ; and their motions, whose swiftness mocks 
 the uttermost efforts of the imagination. Then, if we 
 raise our view to the structure of the heavens, we are 
 again gratified by tracing accurate, but most unexpected
 
 66 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 resemblances. Is it not in the highest degree interest- 
 ing to find that the power which keeps the earth in its 
 shape, and in its path wheeling round the sun, extends 
 over all the other worlds that compose the universe, and 
 gives to each its proper place and motion ; that the same 
 power keeps the moon in her path round the earth ; that 
 the same power causes the tides upon our earth, and the 
 peculiar form of the earth itself; and that, after all, it is 
 the same power which makes a stone fall to the ground ? 
 To learn these things, and to reflect upon them, pro- 
 duces certain, as well as pure, gratification. 
 
 (8) Under this head of genus and species we may 
 place reasoning from the definition. 
 
 The genus and the specific difference, as we have 
 already stated, are joined together to make a formal 
 definition.* We cannot always obtain a definition 
 of this kind, but when we can do so, we may reason 
 from it in various ways. Commence your definition 
 by stating the genus or general nature. Thus, in 
 dealing with justice you would describe it as 
 "merited reward or punishment"; therefore be- 
 longing to the sphere of ethics. This is the genus. 
 And then you may state wherein it differs from 
 other branches of ethics, e.g., temperance, obedi- 
 ence, patience, and self-love. But you must not 
 be too precise about this matter of definition. If 
 your opponent is disposed to cavil, he may easily 
 find fault with any definition you can give. Even 
 men of great talent and learning cannot agree 
 among themselves upon this subject. The most 
 eminent political economists give different defini- 
 
 * See p. 28.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 67 
 
 tions of such plain words as capital, profit, rent, 
 wages, words that we use in our ordinary con- 
 versation, without fancying that there is any diffi- 
 culty or mystery about them. Sydney Smith, the 
 most witty man of his time, was at a loss to find 
 a definition for wit, and at the same time is very 
 witty upon the definitions he quotes from other 
 writers. Dryden's definition of wit, he says, will 
 apply to Blair's Sermons, and Pope's to the Funeral 
 Orations of Bossuet. 
 
 (9) We reason erroneously from the relation of 
 genus and species, when we place under the 
 genus several species that do not belong to 
 it, and then assert of each species what may 
 be truly asserted of the genus. 
 
 Mrs. Opie, who had previously become a member 
 of the Society of Friends, published a book en- 
 titled, " Illustrations of Lying in all its Branches." 
 Under the class of " practical lies," she places the 
 practice of wearing false hair. This we think is 
 an erroneous classification ; for if we use the word 
 liar in the sense in which it is usually employed, 
 the wearer of false hair is not a species of that 
 genus. A lie implies something immoral, but we 
 do not think it is immoral to conceal defects that 
 are inconvenient to the party himself, or that would 
 be unpleasant to the beholders. Mrs. Opie's argu- 
 ment stands thus: 
 
 A liar is one who wishes to deceive. 
 
 She who wears false hair wishes to deceive. 
 
 Therefore she who wears false hair is a liar. 
 
 We may refute this argument in the following
 
 68 
 
 ways: We may say that the words, "wishes to 
 deceive," have not the same meaning in the first or 
 major proposition which they have in the second 
 or minor proposition, and hence the two proposi- 
 tions are independent of each other, and they have 
 no relation that can be a foundation for any reason- 
 ing respecting them. Or, we may admit that in 
 both propositions the words, "wishes to deceive," 
 have the same meaning. But then they merely 
 denote a common property not a specific difference 
 and hence they do not prove that the two subjects 
 are the same. Gold is yellow, and saffron is yellow, 
 but it does not follow that saffron is gold. So in 
 the present case, the common attribute does not 
 prove that the two subjects are the same. Or we 
 may reduce the conclusion to an absurdity, thus : 
 
 All liars shall have their portion in the lake that 
 
 burns with fire and brimstone. 
 She who wears false hair is a liar. 
 
 Therefore she who wears false hair shall have 
 her portion in the lake that burns with fire and 
 brimstone. 
 
 Such a conclusion shows the absurdity of the 
 classification. 
 
 In actual life we often meet with erroneous classi- 
 fications of this kind. The words, " want of 
 courtesy," is a general term often unjustly applied 
 to individual actions. A person goes to transact 
 some business at a public office, and is detained 
 much longer than he expected. He becomes irri- 
 tated, and declares he is treated with want of 
 courtesy; whereas the delay may have been occa-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 69 
 
 sioned by the necessary forms of the office, or by 
 his own ignorance of those forms. When a servant 
 for some trifling oversight is charged with " neglect 
 of duty," it is a fallacy of the same kind. The 
 words, " neglect of duty," is a generic phrase that 
 is applied only to cases of wilful or serious omis- 
 sions. To apply it in trfling cases is to use it 
 illogically. Whenever we wish to represent any 
 act in its worst colours, we use generic terms of 
 so wide a meaning as to include several species 
 of offences of a deeper dye than that we are called 
 upon to censure ; and, on the other hand, when 
 we wish to extenuate, we employ generic terms that 
 shall include only offences of a lighter hue. All 
 these are fallacies arising from erroneous classifica- 
 tion similar to that we have exemplified from Mrs. 
 Opie. 
 
 (10) We must also avoid the error of confounding 
 two or more species because they belong to 
 the same genus. 
 
 Thus when we find that two species resemble 
 each other in some respects (which of course they 
 always must do), we should not infer that they 
 resemble each other in all respects. For example 
 
 He who says you are an animal, says what is true. 
 He who says you are a goose says you are an 
 
 animal. 
 Therefore he that says you are a goose, says what 
 
 is true. 
 
 Here the two premises are true, and yet the con- 
 clusion is absurd. It is true that you are an animal, 
 and that a goose is an anjmal, and yet it is not
 
 70 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 true (of course I mean literally) that you are a 
 goose : For you and the goose belong to different 
 species, and although you resemble each other so 
 far as to be properly classed under the same genus 
 (animal), yet you cannot be asserted to be each 
 other. So, dog, horse, camel, elephant, are species 
 of animal, but a dog is not a horse, nor is a camel 
 an elephant. In the case of genus "animal " we 
 are not in much danger of falling into error. But 
 we meet with similar errors elsewhere. I have read 
 a debate in the House of Commons in which 
 Unitarians were called Mahometans. Both these 
 bodies agree in disbelieving the doctrine of the 
 Trinity. But under this generic description, they 
 form two widely different species, and one cannot 
 logically be confounded with the other. You will 
 often observe this practice in party writers. They 
 will class the party against whom they write with 
 some other party that has a disreputable name, 
 and confound them both together under some 
 generic description. 
 
 (11) In reasoning on this principle we should 
 always be on our guard against mere mental 
 classifications. I mean such as exist only 
 in the mind, and not in the nature of the 
 things themselves. The following para- 
 graph explains the point fully. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose 
 almost out of every garden, which contains a variety of 
 plants in it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they 
 have a root, a stalk, leaves, buds, blossoms, and seeds : 
 but the gardener ranges them under very different names,
 
 as though they were really different kinds of beings, 
 merely because of the different use and service to which 
 they are applied by men : as for instance, those plants 
 whose roots are eaten, shall appropriate the name of 
 roots to themselves; such are carrots, turnips, radishes, 
 etc. If the leaves are of chief use to us, then we call 
 them herbs, as sage, mint, thyme; if the leaves are 
 eaten raw, they are termed salad, as lettuce, purslain; 
 if boiled, they become pot-herbs, as spinach, coleworts ; 
 and some of those plants which are pot-herbs in one 
 family are salad in another. If the buds are made our 
 food, they are called heads or tops ; so cabbage heads, 
 heads of asparagus, and artichokes. If the blossom be 
 of most importance, we call it a flower; such are daisies, 
 tulips, and carnations, which are the mere blossoms of 
 those plants. If the husk or seeds are eaten, they are 
 called the fruits of the ground ; as peas, beans, straw- 
 berries, etc. If any part of the plant be of known and 
 common use to us in medicine, we call it a physical herb; 
 as carduus, scurvy-grass ; but if we count no part useful, 
 we call it a weed, and throw it out of the garden ; and 
 yet, perhaps, our next neighbour knows some valuable 
 property and use of it ; he plants it in his garden, and 
 gives it the title of a herb, or a flower. Now, when 
 things are set in this clear light, it appears how ridicu- 
 lous it would be for two persons to contend, whether 
 dandelion be an herb or a weed ; whether it be a pot-herb 
 or a salad; when, by the custom or fancy of different 
 families, this one plant obtains all these names, accord- 
 ing to the several uses of it, and the value that is put 
 upon it. 
 
 A dispute somewhat similar to what is here inti- 
 mated took place between M'Culloch and Malthus 
 upon the classification of labourers into productive 
 and unproductive. Malthus, following Adam 
 Smith, applied the word productive to such
 
 72 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 labourers only whose exertions directly produced 
 material wealth. M'Culloch extended the word so 
 as to include those also whose labour indirectly 
 produced wealth. Hence arose the important ques- 
 tion, whether a dancer at the opera should be styled 
 a productive or an unproductive labourer? Some 
 good paper and printing were expended in this 
 wordy warfare. And, after all, it was only a dis- 
 pute about classification, for in other respects the 
 antagonists did not differ in opinion. This example 
 may teach us to use caution in the choice of the 
 words we employ to denote our classifications. 
 The words productive and unproductive seem to 
 convey praise and censure. Had other words been 
 employed, Adam Smith's distinction would not 
 probably have been thought worthy of so much 
 reproach.* 
 
 (12) In reasoning from this relation of genus and 
 species we should carefully notice the kind of 
 universality which is attributable to the 
 genus ; for if the general proposition be taken 
 in too extensive a sense, the conclusion will 
 be erroneous. One authority thus argues 
 the case : 
 
 Universal terms may either denote a mathematical, a 
 physical, or a moral universality. 
 
 A mathematical universality, is when all the particu- 
 lars contained under any general idea have the same 
 
 * We fear Mr. Bailey has committed an error of this kind 
 in dividing reasoning into demonstrative and contingent. 
 In defiance of all explanation the mind will associate some 
 degree of uncertainty with the word "contingent."
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 73 
 
 predicate belonging to them without any exception what- 
 soever ; or when the predicate is so essential to the uni- 
 versal subject, that it destroys the very nature of the 
 subject to be without it ; as, All circles have a centre and 
 circumference. A physical or natural universality, is 
 when, according to the order and common course of 
 nature, a predicate agrees to all the subjects of that 
 kind, though there may be some accidental and preter- 
 natural exceptions; as, All men use words to express 
 their thoughts, yet dumb persons are excepted, for they 
 cannot speak. All beasts have four feet, yet there may 
 be some monsters with five; or maimed, who have but 
 three. A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees 
 to the greatest part of the particulars which are con- 
 tained under the universal subject ; as, All men are gov- 
 erned by affection rather than by reason : All the old 
 Romans loved their country : and the scripture uses this 
 language when St. Paul tells us, " The Cretes are always 
 liars." Now it is evident, that a special or singular 
 conclusion cannot be inferred from a moral universality, 
 nor always and infallibly from a physical one, though it 
 may be always inferred from a universality which is 
 mathematical, without any danger or possibility of a mis- 
 take. 
 
 Let it be observed also, that usually we make little or 
 no distinction in common language, between a subject 
 that is physically or mathematically universal. 
 
 You will find that some political economists lay 
 down general propositions, and reason from them 
 as though they possessed a mathematical univer- 
 sality. But, from the nature of the science, this 
 cannot be the case. It is a moral science, and its 
 general propositions have only a moral universality. 
 I mean that these rules have a good many excep- 
 tions. For example; one of its principles is, that 
 the Government should not interfere with matters 
 F
 
 74 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 of trade a very good rule, as a general rule; but 
 when we are told that this rule is so inflexible that 
 the Government must not interfere even in behalf 
 of humanity and religion, then we contend that its 
 advocates claim for this rule a universality to which 
 it is not entitled In this sense we deny the sound- 
 ness of the rule. Nay, even those political econo- 
 mists who maintain most strongly this principle, 
 maintain at the same time that the Government 
 ought to pass laws for the regulation of the currency 
 a subject with which trade has a very close 
 affinity. 
 
 It is rarely that a mathematical universality can 
 be obtained with regard to those propositions that 
 we usually act upon in ordinary life. We believe 
 that all noblemen have honourable and patriotic 
 feelings that all judges are impartial in their deci- 
 sions that all London merchants are honest in 
 their dealings that our friends, whose constancy 
 we have tried, will never desert us that a man who 
 has maintained a high reputation for thirty years 
 will maintain it as long as he lives. But we have 
 only moral evidence for all these propositions, and 
 we can get no more. He who, in these and similar 
 instances, would refuse to act until he should obtain 
 mathematical evidence, would show a want of that 
 wisdom and decision which are essential to the good 
 administration of the affairs either of a family, a 
 commercial establishment, or a political com- 
 munity.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT PHYSICAL 
 CAUSES. 
 
 THE Relation of Cause and Effect is a principle of 
 extensive use in the art of reasoning. But as causes 
 are of various kinds, \ve must consider them sepa- 
 rately in different sections; and in this section we 
 shall confine our attention to those causes that refer 
 to material substances, and are consequently styled 
 physical. We shall, in the subsequent sections, 
 consider those causes that are moral, conditional, 
 and final. We may observe, with regard to these 
 four kinds of causes physical, moral, conditional, 
 and final the first has reference to the physical 
 sciences, as botany, physiology, geography, 
 chemistry, etc. ; the second has reference to the 
 sciences of politics and political economy ; the third 
 has reference to jurisprudence and the affairs of 
 ordinary life; the fourth has reference to ethics 
 and theology. We do not mean an exclusive refer- 
 ence, but a general reference. 
 
 (i) The first class of causes we call physical 
 causes. To this class of causes we refer all those 
 effects which are produced by the uniform and 
 necessary operations of nature. Thus, it is an 
 established law of nature that the earth should move 
 
 75
 
 76 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 round the sun, and that the moon should move 
 round the earth. All the phenomena which result 
 from the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are the 
 result of natural causes. It is a law of nature that 
 all bodies on the earth should tend towards the 
 centre; and that different kinds of matter, whether 
 fluid or solid, should have certain properties, and 
 that some of them should Have an affinity for each 
 other. Hence, all reasonings connected with 
 astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, and the other 
 branches of experimental philosophy, are founded 
 on natural causes. The reasonings founded on 
 this class of causes amount to demonstration. The 
 cause necessarily and invariably produces the effect. 
 
 The following are examples: 
 
 (a) Almost universally in nature causes are manifold 
 and complex and none of the complex elements can be 
 overlooked without falling into error. For example, 
 about 1854, some excavators brought up some burnt 
 brick and pottery from the depth of 60 and 72 feet in the 
 valley of the Nile. Assuming that they were found where 
 they were made, and that the alluvium had been de- 
 posited upon them at the rate at which the Nile now 
 makes its deposit, and that this was the only cause at 
 work, it was calculated mathematically that the relics 
 must be from 12,000 to 60,000 years old. One causal 
 element omitted was the weight of the brick bats in con- 
 nection with the fact (also causal) that all the region is 
 a vast quagmire during the inundation which covers it 
 with water during a large part of the year. Sir Robert 
 Stephenson afterwards found in the delta, near Damietta, 
 at a far greater depth, a brick, bearing the stamp of 
 Mohammed Ali (1808). Someone said, satirically, that 
 the main question in the first case should have been :
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 77 
 
 How long will it take a brick to sink 72 feet in a quag- 
 mire? But, although this might be the main question, 
 all causes should be given their due weight in reaching 
 the correct result.* 
 
 (b) It is perfectly certain that, at a comparatively 
 recent period of the world's history the cretaceous 
 epoch none of the great physical features which at 
 present mark the surface of the globe existed. It is cer- 
 tain that the Rocky Mountains were not. It is certain 
 that the Himalaya Mountains were not. It is certain 
 that the Alps and Pyrenees had no existence. The evi- 
 dence is of the plainest possible character, and is simply 
 this : We find raised up on the flanks of these moun- 
 tains, elevated by the forces of upheaval which have 
 given rise to them, masses of cretaceous rock which 
 formed the bottom of the sea before these mountains ex- 
 isted. It is, therefore, clear that the elevatory forces 
 which gave rise to the mountains operated subsequently 
 to the cretaceous epoch ; and that the mountains them- 
 selves are largely made up of the materials deposited in 
 the sea which once occupied their place, t 
 
 (c) The annual overflowing of the Nile is caused by 
 the periodical rains in Ethiopia. The river begins to 
 rise in the latter end of June, and attains its utmost 
 height about the middle of August, when Egypt presents 
 the appearance of a vast sea, while the cities and towns 
 appear like so many islands ; after this the waters 
 gradually subside, and about the end of November the 
 river has returned to its ordinary limits. During this 
 period the earth, or mud, which the waters held in solu- 
 tion, has fallen on the soil; and on the retiring of the 
 
 * Practical Logic. D. S. Gregory. 
 t Three Lectures on "Evolution. By T. H. Huxley.
 
 78 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 waters, the whole land is covered with a rich manure; 
 and, according to Herodotus, required so little cultiva- 
 tion, that, in some cases, it was only necessary that the 
 seed should be thrown upon the surface, and trodden 
 down by pigs.* 
 
 (2) There are four ways of reasoning in regard 
 to these physical causes. First, from the existence 
 of the cause, we may infer the existence of the 
 effect; if the sun has arisen, we know it must be 
 day; if the earth comes between the sun and the 
 moon, the moon will be eclipsed : if a body, of less 
 specific gravity than water, be thrown into water, 
 we know it will float. If fire be applied to gun- 
 powder, an explosion will take place ; if the colours 
 blue and yellow be mixed together, they will pro- 
 duce a green ; if a man has had his head cut off, \ve 
 may infer that he is dead. The second mode of 
 reasoning is, from the existence of the effect to 
 infer the existence of the cause. All theories or 
 systems are founded upon this mode of reasoning. 
 We observe the appearances of nature, and we 
 endeavour to ascertain the causes which have pro- 
 duced them : if we see an abundant harvest, we 
 may infer that the land is good. The third mode 
 of reasoning is, from the non-existence of the cause 
 to infer the non-existence of the effect : in the deserts 
 of Arabia there is no rain, consequently there can 
 be no vegetation. The fourth mode of reasoning 
 is, from the non-existence of the effect to infer the 
 non-existence of the cause : the streets are not wet, 
 therefore it cannot have rained recently. 
 
 *Ltctures on Ancient Commerce. By J. W. Gilbart.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 79 
 
 Watts thus expounds the principle: 
 
 There is a system of beings round about us, of which 
 we ourselves are a part, which we call the world, and in 
 this world there is a course of nature, or a settled order 
 of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, and con- 
 sequents. 
 
 Where antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, 
 causes and effects, signs and things signified, subjects 
 and adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, 
 we may infer the causes from the effects, and effects 
 from causes, the antecedents from the consequents, as 
 well as consequents from antecedents, etc., and thereby 
 be pretty certain of many things both past, present, and 
 to come. It is by this principle that astronomers can 
 tell what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed 
 five hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipses as 
 long as the world shall stand. They can tell precisely 
 at what minute the sun rises or sets this day at Pekin, in 
 China, or what altitudes the dog-star had at midnight or 
 midnoon in Rome on the day when Julius Caesar was 
 slain. Gardeners upon the same principle, can foretell 
 the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the 
 ploughman knows the weeks of harvest : we are sure, if 
 there be a chicken, there was an egg; if there be a rain- 
 bow, we are certain it rains not far off ; if we behold a 
 tree growing on the earth, we know it has naturally a 
 root under ground. 
 
 Where there is a necessary connexion between causes 
 and effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and 
 things signified, we know also that like causes will have 
 like effects, and proportionable causes will have propor- 
 tionable effects, contrary causes will have contrary 
 effects ; and observing men may form many judgments 
 by the rules of similitude and proportion, where the 
 causes, effects, etc., are not entirely the same. Where 
 there is but a probable and uncertain connexion between 
 antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, we can give 
 but a conjecture, or a probable determination. If the
 
 8o LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 clouds gather, or the weatherglass sinks, we suppose it 
 will rain : if a man spit blood frequently, with coughing, 
 we suppose his lungs are diseased : if very dangerous 
 symptoms appear, we expect his death. 
 
 (3) We reason falsely when we ascribe effects 
 to wrong causes. 
 
 Thus, for many ages the appearances of the celes- 
 tial bodies were ascribed to their motion round the 
 earth; whereas it has since been demonstrated that 
 these effects could not be produced by such a cause. 
 The French philosopher, Descartes, imagined 
 certain whirlpools in the atmosphere, by which he 
 attempted to account for the appearances of nature. 
 Thunder and lightning, earthquakes and volcanoes, 
 are effects which have been ascribed to a variety 
 of causes, according to the hypotheses of different 
 philosophers : the flux and reflux of the tide, the 
 origin of rivers, and the phenomena of electricity, 
 have furnished curious specimens of false reasoning 
 in assigning causes. 
 
 I would make this matter a little plainer still by in- 
 stances borrowed from the peripatetic philosophy, which 
 was once taught in all the schools. The professor fancies 
 he has assigned the true reason why all heavy bodies 
 tend downward, why amber will draw feathers or straws, 
 and the loadstone draw iron, when he tells you that this 
 is done by certain gravitating and attractive qualities, 
 which proceed from the substantial forms of those 
 various bodies. He imagines that he has explained why 
 the loadstone's north pole shall repel the north end of a 
 magnetic needle, and attract the south, when he affirms 
 that this is done by its sympathy with one end of it, and 
 its antipathy against the other end. Whereas, in truth, 
 all these names of sympathy, antipathy, substantial
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 81 
 
 forms, and qualities, when they are put for the causes of 
 these effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only 
 express a learned and pompous ignorance of the true 
 cause of natural appearances. 
 
 Writers on metaphysics have also adopted 
 theories calculated to weaken our confidence in the 
 relation of physical causes and effects. The most 
 remarkable of these writers is Bishop Berkeley 
 "Since," he asks, "the mind does not perceive 
 physical objects, but merely the images of those 
 objects formed in the eye, how do you know that 
 any such objects exist ?" To this we may reply, that 
 the representation formed in the eye, is the effect of 
 the external objects, and is in itself a proof of their 
 existence. When we look at an object through a 
 telescope, we know that the object exists, though 
 we see only the image formed by the speculum. 
 
 Mill observes in his system of " Logic " : 
 
 I affirm that I saw my brother at a certain hour this 
 morning. If any proposition concerning a matter of fact 
 would commonly be said to be known by the direct testi- 
 mony of the senses, this surely would be so. The truth, 
 however, is far otherwise. I only saw a certain coloured 
 surface, or rather I had the kind of visual sensations 
 which are usually produced by a coloured surface, and 
 from these, as marks known to be such by previous ex- 
 perience, I concluded that I saw my brother.* 
 
 Upon this theory we should suppose, that as soon 
 as an infant can recognise its mother, it has begun 
 to draw conclusions, and has also had sufficient 
 
 * Mill's Logic, vol. ii., p. 208.
 
 82 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 experience in the arts to know that a human body 
 may be represented on a coloured surface.* 
 
 (4) To prove the connection between a physical 
 cause and its effects, is not directly the province 
 of reasoning, but of observation and experiment. 
 
 Bacon said: " Alan, the Servant and Interpreter 
 of Nature can do and understand as much as he 
 has observed concerning the order of Nature in 
 outward things or in the mind : more he can neither 
 know nor do." In other words, the truth about 
 nature and man can only be discovered by analys- 
 ing both, using such faculties as we possess and 
 following a strict logical method for the avoidance 
 of error. Observations carefully and systematic- 
 ally carried out and recorded tell us what happens 
 in the world of Nature when we do nothing to affect 
 the results of natural forces; experiments conducted 
 in the same way tell us new truths, which, mere 
 observation could not possibly yield. We do not 
 mean that new truths do not come by observation, 
 else we should not have Newton discovering the 
 law of gravitation ; but no observation pure and 
 simple, without the aid of experiment, would have 
 put us in possession of radium. The function of 
 reasoning in these cases is, as Mill said, to enable 
 us "to discriminate accurately between what we 
 
 * I have thought it best to let this argument stand as 
 Gilbart wrote it. The attitude of psychologists to-day would 
 seem to make an intellectually double life necessary, denying 
 objective reality in one breath and affirming it the next. 
 Christian Scientists deny the existence of matter, including 
 dollars, but they know when they have received the wrong 
 change. [Ed.]
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 83 
 
 really do observe and what we only infer from the 
 facts observed. 
 
 " Observation, even where supported by exact 
 measurement, in many cases, will go very little 
 way towards establishing the cause of a phenome- 
 non, unless we are able to vary the concomitant 
 circumstances, and view the cause, generate the 
 effect, or vary in exact proportion along with it. 
 Though there was every reason to attribute light- 
 ning to electric agency, the fact was never con- 
 sidered definitely made out until Franklin threw 
 up his kite in the air at the approach of a thunder- 
 storm, and obtained the same sparks from his cord 
 as invariably accompanied its connection with an 
 electric machine. As Nature is constructed for a 
 widely different object than that of facilitating our 
 studies, it frequently happens, indeed, that she 
 refuses to afford the precise kind of variation needed 
 to establish the law we are in search of, and leaves 
 us to rack our invention, to institute a case in point, 
 by direct experiment. Thus were it required to 
 ascertain the principle in the atmosphere which 
 enables it to sustain life, we should find no instance 
 in which Nature produces either oxygen or nitrogen 
 in a separate state, to enable us, by immersing a 
 living animal alternately in both gases, to decide 
 the question. We are exclusively indebted to ex- 
 periment for the fact that respiration is supported 
 by oxygen, and also for our knowledge of the ingre- 
 dients of which the atmosphere is composed."* 
 
 In all reasoning about physical causes it is well 
 
 *Devey's Logic, p. 215.
 
 84 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 to bear in mind Mill's canons of inductive enquiry. 
 
 I. If two or more instances of the phenomenon 
 under investigation have any one circumstance in 
 common, the circumstance in which alone all the 
 instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given 
 phenomenon. 
 
 II. If an instance in which the phenomenon 
 under investigation occurs, and an instance in 
 which it does not occur, have every circumstance 
 in common save one, that one occurring only in 
 the former; the circumstance in which alone the 
 two instances differ is the effect or the cause or an 
 indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon. 
 
 u. If two or more instances in which the phe- 
 nomenon occurs have only one circumstance in 
 common, while two or more instances in which it 
 does not occur have nothing in common, save the 
 absence of that circumstance : the circumstance in 
 which alone the two sets of instances (always or 
 invariably) differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an 
 indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT MORAL CAUSES. 
 
 THE existence of moral causes can best be under- 
 stood from examples, and some of these we hope 
 to give as early as possible ; but it will not be amiss 
 to occupy the opening paragraph of this chapter 
 with a few words of explanation as to the term 
 itself. Moral causes deal with ethical problems 
 only as part of that great sphere of life where forces 
 work that are not purely physical. In sciences 
 like chemistry and physics we have to do with 
 physical causes alone; we add nothing to them, and 
 we take nothing from them ; they would exist and 
 operate even if we ourselves did not exist. But in 
 dealing with problems arising out of actions of 
 human beings, we are face to face with a new 
 element : and although sociology and political 
 economy, to take two instances, cannot be said to 
 be free from all connection or association with phy- 
 sical causes, there is sufficient freedom from them to 
 justify the use of another term, i.e., moral; not in 
 the strictly ethical sense, but as opposed to physical. 
 The reader is warned against the expectation of 
 finding the same demonstration in the world of 
 moral causes as he finds in the other, where in most 
 instances no two opinions are possible. The 
 science of physics, as far as we know it, is almost 
 
 85
 
 86 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 as exact as mathematics; but in reasoning about 
 human relationships of all kinds allowance must 
 be made for the fact that it is not possible to get 
 the same exactitude as in other spheres of investiga- 
 tion. True, tae moral probability arising out of 
 a study of events is frequently of a demonstrative 
 character; but in some matters the experts have 
 been, and always will be, at variance. In this sec- 
 tion we shall try to reproduce those laws of moral 
 argumentation which have proved themselves to 
 be of the greatest worth. First, however, we give 
 some examples of moral cases: 
 
 (a) Influence. 
 
 Certainly the two human beings who have had the 
 greatest influence upon the understandings of mankind 
 have been Aristotle and "baked. Bacon. To*bwd Bacon 
 are indebted for an almost daily extension of our 
 knowledge of the laws of nature in the outward world ; 
 and the same modest and cautious spirit of inquiry, ex- 
 tended to moral philosophy, will probably at last give us 
 clear, intelligible ideas of our spiritual nature. Every 
 succeeding year is an additional confirmation to us that 
 we are travelling in the true path of knowledge ; and as it 
 brings in fresh tributes of science for the increase of 
 human happiness, it extorts from us fresh tributes of 
 praise to the guide and father of true philosophy. To 
 the understanding of Aristotle, equally vast, perhaps, 
 and equally original, we are indebted for fifteen hundred 
 years of quibbling and ignorance, in which the earth 
 fell under the tyranny of words, and philosophers quar- 
 relled with one another, like drunken men in dark rooms, 
 who hate peace without knowing why they fight, or see- 
 ing how to take aim.* 
 
 * Sydney Smith's Moral Philosophy.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 87 
 
 (b) Political Economy. 
 
 It is a doctrine of Hume, in his " Essay on Money," 
 that an influx of the precious metals gives great en- 
 couragement to industry, during the interval which 
 elapses before the prices of commodities are adjusted to 
 the increased quantity of specie. " We find," says he, 
 " that in every kingdom into which money begins to flow 
 in greater abundance than formerly, everything takes a 
 new face : labour and industry gain life ; the merchant 
 becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more dili- 
 gent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough 
 with greater alacrity and attention. In my opinion," 
 he continues, " it is only in this interval, or intermediate 
 situation, between the acquisition of money and rise of 
 prices, that the increased quantity of gold and silver is 
 favourable to industry."* 
 
 (c) Ecclesiastical Affairs. 
 
 We hold that a Church Establishment is the most 
 effective of all machines for the moral instruction of the 
 people, and that, if once taken down, there is no other 
 instrumentality by which it can be adequately replaced. 
 We are aware, that it may be feebly and even corruptly 
 administered ; but the way to rectify this, is not to demo- 
 lish the apparatus, but to direct its movements. It is 
 the means of turning so much unproductive into produc- 
 tive consumption. Without a church the whole of our 
 ecclesiastical wealth would have been in the hands of 
 those who give no return for it. With a church, we 
 have the return of all its usefulness its theological learn- 
 ing the protection which it affords against a desolat- 
 ing infidelity the service which it renders to the morality 
 of the commonwealth and, above all, to the eternal 
 well-being of the individual members who compose it. t 
 
 * Questions on Political Economy. t Dr. Chalmers.
 
 88 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (2) With regard to moral causes, we may adopt 
 
 the following modes of reasoning : 
 
 First. From the existence of the cause we may 
 infer the existence of the effect. Thus, if a man 
 be industrious, we may infer that he will probably 
 become rich. If a man be given to intoxication, 
 we may infer that he will reduce himself to beggary. 
 If a man exercise his intellectual faculties, we know 
 he will improve them. 
 
 Secondly. From the existence of the effect we 
 may infer the existence of the cause. Thus, if a 
 servant enjoy in a high degree the confidence of 
 his master, we may infer that he has served him 
 well. If a man be involved in debts which he is 
 unable to pay, we may infer that he has been either 
 imprudent or unfortunate. 
 
 Thirdly. From the non-existence of the cause, 
 we may infer the non-existence of the effect. Thus, 
 if a man has not been unfortunate nor improvident, 
 we may argue that he cannot be poor. 
 
 Fourthly. From the non-existence of the effect 
 we may infer the non-existence of the cause. Thus, 
 we may say, such a person is not poor; he cannot 
 then have been extravagant. Such a person is not 
 an intelligent man ; he cannot, then, have spent 
 much time in reading and study. He does not 
 speak correctly; therefore he cannot have learned 
 grammar. 
 
 (3) In the relation of moral causes and effects, we 
 
 have, generally, in the first instance, to prove 
 by reasoning that such a relation exist. 
 
 If, for instance, I contend that education produces
 
 8 9 
 
 good morals, and hence, ask my neighbours to 
 assists me in establishing a school for the poor, 
 I may be asked to prove, in the first instance, that 
 education does produce good morals; for, unless 
 I can prove the relation of cause and effect in this 
 case, my efforts will be unavailing. So in many 
 of the acts of ordinary life, and in nearly all our 
 public proceedings, whether a certain cause will 
 produce a certain effect, is in fact the whole question 
 in dispute. 
 
 In reasoning upon moral causes, we are exposed 
 to much difficulty from the circumstance, that one 
 effect is often produced by a variety of causes. The 
 greatest sophistry arises from imputing to one 
 particular cause an effect which results from the 
 joint operation of many causes. Thus, the ruin 
 of an individual may be the consequence of the 
 accidental burning of his house; of imprudent 
 conduct ; of the treachery of friends, and of robbery 
 by thieves. The fall of a state may be the effect 
 of the united operation of a tyrannical government, 
 a seditious people, the encroachments of a foreign 
 enemy, and pestilence and famine. Now, should 
 a person take the effect, and argue that it was pro- 
 duced solely by one cause, he would be in error. 
 
 We shall fall into error if we deny the existence 
 of any one cause, because other causes contributed 
 to produce the effect. Thus, it has been contended 
 that Sir Robert Peel's Act for Regulating the 
 Currency, passed in the year 1844, was a cause of 
 the commercial distress that occurred in the year 
 1847. In reply, it was contended, that the distress 
 of 1847 was produced by the famine in Ireland and 
 
 G
 
 90 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the speculations in railways. Now this is no refu- 
 tation of the former opinion ; for all the three causes 
 may have united in producing the same effect. 
 
 We should also fall into error were we to infer, 
 that of two events one is the cause of the other, 
 merely because it occurred first in the order of time. 
 This fallacy is often ridiculed by a reference to the 
 building of Tenterden steeple being the cause of 
 the Goodwin sands. The story is told, I believe, 
 by Bishop Latimer. There was a time when the 
 Goodwin sands, which lie in the neighbourhood of 
 Dover, did not exist. Some time after they had 
 collected, Government commissioners were ap- 
 pointed to ascertain the cause. They accordingly 
 proceeded to the spot to examine witnesses. Among 
 others, an old man assured them that the cause 
 of the Goodwin sands was the building of the 
 Tenterden steeple. They asked him how this 
 could be. He stated, he could not tell how, but 
 he knew it was so; for he recollected that when 
 there was no steeple there were no sands, but soon 
 after the building of the steeple, in came the sands. 
 He, therefore, inferred that the building of the 
 steeple was the cause of the sands. 
 
 We shall give an example of the way in which 
 this allusion is applied. The following argument 
 is taken from the " Sophisms of Free Trade," by 
 " A Barrister " : 
 
 All great manufactures had their origin in the protec- 
 tive system. Take our own, the greatest and least 
 sickly of any. All our own manufactures took their 
 rise in a system of protective duties, so high as to 
 amount to prohibitions. In addition to this, owing to
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 91 
 
 the fearful hostilities that raged in Europe for nearly a 
 quarter of a century before 1815, we enjoyed a further 
 accidental monopoly of the manufacturing industry of 
 the world. And this stringent protection has not only 
 created manufactures, but created them where they 
 would not naturally have existed, in spite of great 
 natural disadvantages. Other nations have coal and iron 
 ore as well as we. The United States are even richer in 
 this respect. But other nations have, also, what we 
 have not, they have native raw materials. It has been 
 justly observed, that Great Britain is singularly poor in 
 the raw materials which constitute the basis of the 
 greater portion of her manufacturing industry. We have 
 no cotton, no silk, no fine wool. Even our best iron for 
 the manufacture of hardware, comes from Sweden ; our 
 oils, gums, colours, woods, from the ends of the earth. 
 Next to us in manufacturing industry, is France. Her 
 manufacturing industry, though still inferior to ours, has 
 nevertheless, since the peace, augmented in an even 
 greater ratio, but under strict and jealous protection. 
 
 The following reply is taken from " Free Trade 
 and its so-called Sophisms " : 
 
 There is no doubt that, until recently, the govern- 
 ments of almost all countries considered that the way 
 to establish an industry, and make it prosper, was to 
 " protect " it; and, consequently, whenever an industry 
 flourishes simultaneously with the existence of protec- 
 tion, a great shout of triumph is raised, as if the former 
 were dependent on the latter the old fallacy of post hoc, 
 ergo propter hoc. It is only necessary to refer to the 
 well-known case of Tenterden steeple and the Goodwin 
 sands for an illustration. 
 
 The reader will observe, that the Barrister's 
 argument with regard to manufactures is that in 
 several countries protection preceded prosperity;
 
 92 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 and he infers that protection was the cause of 
 prosperity. His opponent replies, that though 
 protection preceded prosperity, it was not the cause 
 of prosperity ; the two facts having no more relation 
 to each other than Tenterden steeple and the Good- 
 win sands. 
 
 In order to prove that two events sustain the 
 relation to each other of cause and effect, it is 
 necessary to show, first, that the two events did 
 actually occur; secondly, that the event which we 
 call the cause, occurred in the order of time before 
 the effect; and, thirdly, that there was an adaptation 
 in the cause to produce the effect. In refutation 
 we may state, that one or both of the two events 
 did not occur or that they did not occur in the 
 order of time or that there was no adaptation in 
 the one to produce the other. We may go further, 
 and maintain that the alleged cause, so far from 
 being the cause, was an obstruction to the effect. 
 The words, " in spite of," are sometimes used on 
 such occasions. " Gentlemen, I contend that trade 
 did not prosper in consequence of protection, but 
 that it prospered in spite of protection." 
 
 (4) Public measures are usually approved or con- 
 demned on account of the effects they are 
 alleged to produce. 
 
 Here is a wide field for controversy. The affairs 
 of a nation are so multifarious, so many causes are 
 perpetually at work, that it is difficult to trace with 
 certainty the precise effects of any one cause. Even 
 after measures have become law, and we have had 
 some experience of their operation, the same differ-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 93 
 
 ence of opinion is still maintained. If a measure 
 already adopted is applauded on account of the 
 good effect it "has produced, we may contend in 
 opposition to this, that the event, called the effect, 
 has not taken place or admit that the event has 
 taken place, but was not the effect of that cause. 
 Or, we may go further, and admit that the event 
 was the effect of the cause, but that the effect was 
 a bad effect. Or, we may go still further, and 
 admit that the effect was a good effect, and then 
 contend that the same cause produced other effects 
 of a different character, so that the bad conse- 
 quences more than counterbalanced the good ones. 
 Sometimes it is a matter of dispute, when two 
 circumstances sustain the relation of cause and 
 effect, which is the cause and which is the effect. 
 Heretofore the landlords have been accused of 
 keeping up the price of corn by demanding high 
 rents; but Chalmers observes that there is no 
 sounder principle in political economy than that the 
 high prices of corn are not the effect, but the cause 
 of high rents. The country bankers were accused 
 of causing a general rise in prices by an excessive 
 issue of their notes ; but they stated, in reply, that 
 it was not the increased issue of notes that caused 
 the high prices, but the high prices called out the 
 notes. 
 
 The error of the Ricardo system of political economy 
 on the subject of rent, has been well characterised by 
 Mr. T. Perronet Thomson as the fallacy of inversion. 
 It confounds the effect with the cause. It is not be- 
 cause of the existence of inferior soils that the superior 
 pay a rent, but it is because the superior pay a rent that
 
 94 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the inferior are taken into occupation. There does not 
 occur to us any logical term by which to denominate the 
 fallacy that is now under consideration ; but it is not less 
 a fallacy notwithstanding. 
 
 If the effect may have been produced by several 
 causes, and we can prove the absence of all causes 
 except one, this fixes the effect on that one cause. 
 Some years ago there was a serious outbreak of 
 fever in an English town, where it began in a par- 
 ticular street. The fact of the people in the first 
 street mentioned having been the first victims in 
 the great outbreak, shows that they must have been 
 highly predisposed; and as they lived in decent 
 houses, and were in comfortable circumstances two 
 of the more ordinary causes of the disease over- 
 crowding and poverty could not have operated. 
 Those considerations can leave no doubt that the 
 one main cause of the great severity of the attack, 
 was the use for domestic purposes of polluted water. 
 A series of analyses proved this to be true. In 
 investigating the relation of cause and effect, it is 
 sometimes advisable not to stop at the immediate 
 causes, but to go further back, and ascertain what 
 are the original causes of that immediate cause. 
 It has been disputed whether the price of food has 
 any influence on the rate of wages. It has been 
 answered, No; for the rate of wages is regulated 
 by the proportion between the demand for labour 
 and the supply. Admitting the latter opinion to 
 be correct, it does not refute the former; for the 
 demand and the supply of labour are influenced 
 by anterior causes, and the price of food may be 
 one of those anterior causes. So, we are told that
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 95 
 
 the rate of interest is regulated by the proportion 
 that may exist between the demand and the supply 
 of capital. This throws but little light upon the 
 matter, unless we are told at the same time what 
 are the anterior causes that regulate this demand 
 and this supply. 
 
 If it be a matter of dispute whether two events 
 sustain the relation of cause and effect, we may be 
 able to solve the difficulty, if it is found that the 
 removal of the supposed cause is followed by the 
 removal of the supposed effect. In 1844 an Act 
 was passed for regulating the currency, and in 
 1847 there was severe monetary pressure. The 
 1844 Act got all the blame; but it was found that 
 when the Act was suspended in October, 1847, the 
 pressure immediately ceased. A writer on this 
 subject observes " It has been denied that this 
 pressure was produced or increased by the Act. 
 But how stand the facts? The Act was passed, 
 and, as predicted, a pressure came the Act was 
 continued, and the pressure increased the Act was 
 suspended, and the pressure went away. These 
 are not opinions they are facts." 
 
 In reasoning upon moral causes and effects we 
 should inquire whether at all times and under all 
 circumstances the same causes will produce pre- 
 cisely the same effects. We often meet with cases 
 of this kind in the consideration of historical and 
 international questions. Thus it is said the wool- 
 len manufacture in England, and the linen manu- 
 facture in Ireland, prospered in consequence of 
 protective laws, and therefore the same laws would 
 cause increased prosperity at the present time.
 
 9 6 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 When Joint Stock Banks were first created, it was 
 contended they were adapted only for countries 
 having little capital and Scotland and Ireland 
 were freely mentioned in this connection not for 
 wealthy countries like England ! 
 
 (5) We sometimes attempt to refute a doctrine 
 by tracing the absurd consequences that must result 
 from it. This is called by scholastic logicians a 
 reductio ad absurdum you reduce it to an ab- 
 surdity. It is not necessary, however, in this mode 
 of reasoning that the deduction should be absurd 
 in the ordinary sense of the word. It is sufficient 
 if it shows the unsoundness of the sentiment from 
 which it is fairly inferred. Here is one from 
 philosophy. 
 
 If the thesis is, Man is a free agent, then the antithe- 
 sis is, Man is not a free agent. . . . The indirect proof 
 would take some such form as this : Man is either free 
 or he is not free. Let us assume he is not free. If he 
 is not free he cannot, in cases of conflicting motives, 
 choose, but must blindly follow one of the impulses. 
 But we know from consciousness that he can decide be- 
 tween conflicting motives ; therefore it is false that he is 
 not free. 
 
 In the following passage Professor Greenleaf is 
 arguing on behalf of the synoptical writers and 
 the author of the Fourth Gospel : 
 
 If, on the contrary, they are supposed to have been 
 bad men, it is incredible that such men should have 
 chosen this form of imposture : enjoining- as it does, un- 
 feigned repentance, the utter forsaking and abhorrence 
 of all falsehood and of every other sin, the practice of 
 daily self-denial, self-abasement, and self-sacrifice, the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 97 
 
 crucifixion of the flesh with all its earthly appetites and 
 desires, indifference to the honours and hearty contempt 
 of the vanities of the world, and inculcating perfect 
 purity of heart and of life, and intercourse of the soul 
 with heaven. It is incredible that bad men should in- 
 vent falsehoods to promote the religion of the God of 
 Truth. The supposition is suicidal. If they did believe 
 in a future state of retribution, a heaven and hell here- 
 after, they took the most certain course, if false wit- 
 nesses, to secure the latter for their portion. And if, 
 still being bad men, they did not believe in future punish- 
 ment, how came they to invent falsehoods, the direct and 
 certain tendency of which was to destroy all their pros- 
 pects of worldly honour and happiness, and to ensure 
 their misery in this life? From these absurdities there 
 is no escape but in the perfect conviction and admission 
 that they were good men, testifying to that which they 
 had carefully observed and considered, and well knew to 
 be true.* 
 
 Sometimes we meet with zealous advocates who 
 reduce their own principles to an absurdity by 
 deducing from them extravagant conclusions. 
 Socialist speakers very frequently fall into this 
 error. If an absurd conclusion can be legitimately 
 deduced from any alleged general principle, it is 
 sufficient proof that the principle is unsound; but 
 in cases of this kind we should carefully investigate 
 the logical accuracy of the deduction, for weak and 
 unbalanced advocates will sometimes make extrava- 
 gant deductions from even sound principles. 
 
 (6) Akin to the reduction ad absurdum is an expo- 
 sure of the fallacy called " proving too 
 much." 
 
 * From Genung's Rhetoric, p. 430.
 
 98 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 This fallacy is an argument that, if admitted to 
 prove the point in dispute, would, if carried out 
 to all its legitimate consequences, also prove other 
 points that neither of the disputants admit to be 
 true. As an example of proving too much, we 
 may adduce all the arguments that go to 
 prove the impropriety of closing the post- 
 offices throughout the country on the Sunday; 
 for if these arguments prove the point in 
 regard to provincial towns, they also prove the 
 propriety of opening the post-office on Sunday in 
 London. But if the argument fails when applied 
 to London, then, a fortiori, it must be inconclusive 
 when applied to a country town. This argument 
 can be resisted only by showing that there are 
 peculiar circumstances in the country which do not 
 apply to London. Cobden's arguments against 
 granting loans to Russia proved too much ; for if 
 it were immoral to lend money to the Czar because 
 he might employ it to carry on war against the 
 Hungarians, then by parity of reasoning it would 
 be also immoral to have any transactions with him 
 by which his finances might be improved. Hence 
 all trade with Russia would cease. 
 
 (7) Arguments founded on the advantages or dis- 
 advantages that may result from any measure 
 under consideration come under the head of 
 reasonings from the relation of cause and 
 effect. 
 
 When I state the importance of the Colonies to this 
 country, and the magnitude of danger hanging over this 
 country from the present plan of maladministration
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 99 
 
 practised against them, I desire not to be understood to 
 argue for a reciprocity of indulgence between England 
 and America. I contend not for indulgence, but justice 
 to America ; and I shall ever contend that the Americans 
 justly owe obedience to us in a limited degree they owe 
 obedience to our ordinances of trade and navigation; 
 but let the line be skilfully drawn between the objects of 
 those ordinances and their private internal property. . . 
 When I urge this measure of recalling the troops from 
 Boston, I urge it on this pressing principle, that it is 
 necessarily preparatory to the restoration of your peace 
 and the establishment of your prosperity.* 
 
 These examples will suffice to show how moral 
 causes, in the sense defined, are part and parcel 
 of our daily interests. Here is a plea against 
 early marriages, the argument being very interest- 
 ing as a specimen of the early nineteenth century 
 attitude : 
 
 Lord Harewood, to get rid of the evil of over-crowd- 
 ing in country villages, refuses to permit his cottage 
 tenantry to take lodgers, or to allow a son or daughter 
 to marry from the cottage, and continue to occupy it 
 with the wife or husband conjointly with the parents. 
 The first of these regulations is one with which 
 every landlord is familiar. The offence lies in the 
 second, which has been interpreted to mean a pro- 
 hibition to the poor to marry : and some country 
 newspaper talks about feudal laws, and we know 
 not what besides. Now the regulation means nothing of 
 the sort. It is a simple refusal on the part of Lord Hare- 
 wood to permit persons to continue his tenants who 
 marry without the power of having a house of their own. 
 
 Now we are quite satisfied that it is the bounden duty 
 of a landlord to put every check in his power upon the 
 
 * Lord Brougham, House of Lords, 1775.
 
 ioo LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 mania of the poor for headlong marriages. God forbid 
 we should attempt to restrain them from marrying at 
 all. But, in the name of morality and decency, let them 
 wait till they have a chair and bed of their own. With- 
 out question or doubt, nine-tenths of agrarian misery, 
 pauperism, and crime, arise from the extraordinary hurry 
 and recklessness of the poor in marrying early. It is 
 a madness neither more nor less. A young woman in 
 the country is never satisfied till she has got a sweet- 
 heart. As soon as she has caught her Lubin, she must 
 needs fix him, lest, as she says, " next time she should 
 get a worse." And so, in one half-year, a tidy lad and 
 decent lass become a couple of ragged, ill-looking, 
 slovenly trampers. Let them only do as all other mem- 
 bers of society do, from the top of the ladder down- 
 wards, until it reaches themselves let them be patient 
 and provident let them stay till they have bought a 
 pot to boil their potatoes in, and a sack in advance 
 many a couple begin life without either. The poor ob- 
 tain a multitude of advantages by delay ; they start fair 
 they learn carefulness they have an idea of comfort, 
 and some notion of character; and, more than all Mal- 
 thusian though the consideration be they will find four 
 children much easier to bring up than fourteen. 
 
 A landlord has an unquestioned right to keep bad 
 characters from his cottages. He owes this duty to him- 
 self and to his honester tenants. He has an equal right 
 to exclude those who, from their circumstances, are cer- 
 tain we use the word advisedly to become bad charac- 
 ters. In the last case he may prevent, not the contagion 
 alone, but the evil itself. If this right were used, cau- 
 tiously and yet firmly, throughout the country, the vil- 
 lages would not be what they are.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT CONDITIONAL 
 CAUSES. 
 
 A CONDITIONAL cause is a circumstance, or state 
 of things, which is necessary to the production of 
 an effect, but which does not actively produce that 
 effect. Thus, if a man fall from his horse, it is a 
 necessary condition that he should previously have 
 been on his horse, otherwise he could not have 
 fallen. If a man is hanged for forgery, the active 
 or efficient cause of his being hanged is the com- 
 mission of the crime; but if he had never learned 
 to write, he could not have committed a forgery; 
 hence his knowledge of writing is a necessary con- 
 dition. As the condition does not thus actively, 
 or necessarily produce the effect, we do not usually 
 use the words "conditional cause" and "effect," 
 but we say the "condition," and the "sign."* 
 Thus, a physician feels the pulse of his patient, 
 to ascertain the state of his health ; the state of 
 health is the condition, the state of the pulse is 
 the sign. Now, a man may be in a bad state of 
 health, and yet his pulse may be regular : the exist- 
 ence of the condition is no proof of the existence 
 of the sign. But if the pulse be irregular, it shows 
 
 * Or the condition and the consequent, or the antecedent 
 and the consequent. 
 
 101
 
 102 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 that the health is disturbed : the existence of the 
 sign is proof of the existence of the condition. 
 
 So it is a necessary condition to the performance 
 of any act, that the man who performs it should 
 be alive. Therefore, if a will is produced of a date 
 some years subsequent to the death of the alleged 
 testator, it proves that the will is a forgery. The 
 man might have been alive without making a will, 
 but he could not have made a will unless he had 
 been alive. The condition must have preceded the 
 consequent. 
 
 (i) This relation of condition and sign supplies us 
 with various modes of reasoning. 
 
 From the non-existence of the condition, we infer 
 the non-existence of the consequent. 
 
 Qualifications, instruments, and opportunities are 
 necessary conditions to the performance of any act. 
 If we prove the absence of these we prove the non- 
 performance of the act. If a man has committed 
 murder, it is a necessary condition, that he should 
 have been at the place when the murder was com- 
 mitted, and at the time the murder was committed. 
 Now, if he can prove an alibi (this word of course 
 means elsewhere), that is, if he can prove that he was 
 at a distant place at the time the murder was com- 
 mitted, this proves that he did not commit the 
 murder. The non-existence of the condition proves 
 the non-existence of the sign. But you cannot 
 reverse this rule. The existence of the condition 
 will not of itself prove the existence of the sign ; 
 for he might have been at the place where, and at 
 the time when, the murder was committed, and
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 103 
 
 yet might not have committed the murder. It 
 might have been committed by some of his com- 
 panions. 
 
 Again, from the existence of the sign we infer 
 the existence of the condition. 
 
 Take the same instance. If a man is proved to 
 have committed a murder, it proves the condition, 
 that he was at the place where, and at the time 
 when, the murder was committed. But if it is 
 proved that he did not commit the murder, that is 
 in itself no proof that he was not present when the 
 murder was committed. The non-existence of the 
 sign is no proof of the non-existence of the con- 
 dition. Sometimes it is contended in favour of a 
 proposed measure, that it is a necessary condition, 
 i.e., a conditional cause, to some other measure 
 of still greater importance. Thus the Earl of 
 Shaftesbury advocated in the House of Lords the 
 establishment of Lodging Houses for the poor, upon 
 the ground that domestic comfort is a necessary 
 condition to their intellectual and moral improve- 
 ment. 
 
 Could their Lordships suppose that these physical evils 
 produced no mischievous moral consequences ? He was 
 sorry to have to inform them that they produced the 
 most fatal and deadly consequences. They generated 
 habits of drinking they led to the overthrow of decency. 
 Every function of nature was performed in public there 
 was no retirement for any purpose for any purpose; 
 there was no domestic education nay education itself 
 was useless, if children returned to their homes to un- 
 learn by* example what they had learned elsewhere by 
 precept. He grieved to reflect that in these dens there 
 could be no domestic training of that description which
 
 104 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 was more valuable than any other training the train- 
 ing of the mother; and that the want of such domestic 
 training could not be compensated by any system of 
 public education which could be devised. This he saw 
 daily. He had, as many of their lordships perhaps knew, 
 been for some time connected with the ragged schools 
 recently established in the metropolis. Most of the 
 ragged children whom they saw about the streets 
 attended those schools, and not, he trusted, without 
 benefit. A young boy or girl received there useful 
 lessons, but they returned to the single room, in which 
 six families might be residing, without any regard to 
 the restraints which were necessary for a social, moral, 
 and religious life; and they lost, in one hour, all the 
 decent impressions which they had gained in the pre- 
 vious six. Until this source of evil were removed, all 
 your hopes to improve the morals of your people, all 
 your efforts to give them a useful and religious educa- 
 tion, will be vain. You must stop this welling fountain 
 of disaster, if you would carry into execution the benev- 
 olent and provident views which you, in common with 
 all who have property to protect, entertain towards the 
 lower class. 
 
 (2) You will observe that much erroneous reason- 
 ing has taken place from confounding the 
 conditional with the active cause. 
 
 In cases where a number of causes, some active, 
 and some only conditional, conspire to produce the 
 same effect, it is not always easy to distinguish 
 between the active and the conditional causes. 
 This difficulty is often experienced in the investiga- 
 tion of historical facts. Thus, it has been said that 
 the Reformation was the cause of all the wars in 
 Germany in the fifteenth century. The Reformation 
 was certainly a condition, for if there had been no
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 105 
 
 Reformation, there could have been no fighting 
 about it. But it was only the condition, the active 
 cause of those wars was the interference of those 
 hostile parties, who would not allow the people to 
 follow the convictions of their own judgments. 
 
 In the following argument the existence of the 
 condition is insisted on as essential to the conse- 
 quent. 
 
 Men of excellent intentions and full of a fervent though 
 mistaken zeal, have been, and still are, attempting to 
 propagate their own religion among the inhabitants of 
 barbarous countries. By strenuous and unremitting 
 activity, and frequently by promises, and even by actual 
 gifts, they have in many cases persuaded savage com- 
 munities to make a profession of the Christian religion. 
 But whoever will compare the triumphant reports of the 
 missionaries with the long chain of evidence supplied 
 by competent travellers will soon find that such profes- 
 sion is only nominal, and that these ignorant tribes have 
 adopted, indeed, the ceremonies of the new religion but 
 have by no means adopted the religion itself. They re- 
 ceive the externals but there they stop. They may bap- 
 tise their children ; they may take the sacrament ; they 
 may flock to the church. All this they may do and yet 
 be as far removed from the spirit of Christianity as when 
 they bowed the knee before their former idols. The rites 
 and forms of a religion lie on the surface ; they are at 
 once seen, they are quickly learned, easily copied by those 
 who are unable to penetrate to that which lies beneath. 
 It is this deeper and inward change which alone is 
 durable ; and this the savage can never experience while 
 he is sunk in an ignorance that levels him with the 
 brutes by which he is surrounded. Remove the ignor- 
 ance and then the religion may enter. This is the only 
 course by which ultimate benefit can be effected.* 
 
 * History of Civilisation, vol. i., p. 206. By H. T. Buckle. 
 H
 
 106 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (3) This principle of reasoning is used very 
 extensively in the examination of evidence adduced 
 in our Courts of Law. Sometimes men are 
 accused of crimes, to the perpetration of which 
 there were no witnesses. Their guilt is inferred 
 from the circumstances of the case. This is called 
 "circumstantial evidence," and sometimes pre- 
 sumptive evidence," as the guilt is presumed 
 from the circumstances adduced. Some lawyers 
 have maintained that circumstantial evidence is 
 more conclusive than direct evidence, as there is 
 no danger from the perjury of the witnesses. But 
 others have thought differently. No certain rules 
 can be given for circumstantial evidence. Each 
 cause must depend upon itself. The reader will 
 remember, that within recent years, several atro- 
 cious criminals have been convicted upon circum- 
 stantial evidence. 
 
 The following are some general remarks on this 
 kind of evidence: 
 
 The force and effect of circumstantial evidence 
 depend upon its incompatibility with, and incapa- 
 bility of, explanation or solution upon any other 
 supposition than that of the truth of the fact which 
 it is adduced to prove ; the mode of argument resem- 
 bling the method of demonstration by the reductio 
 ad absurdum. 
 
 These circumstances may be considered under 
 the heads of motives to crime, declarations indi- 
 cative of intention, preparations for the commis- 
 sion of crime, possession of the fruits of crime, 
 refusal to account for appearances of suspicion, or 
 unsatisfactory explanations of such appearances,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 107 
 
 evidence indirectly confessional, and the suppres- 
 sion, destruction, simulation, and fabrication of 
 evidence. 
 
 The principal facts of circumstantial evidence 
 of an external character, relate to questions of 
 identity, (i) of person; (2) of things; (3) of hand- 
 writing; and (4) of time; but there must necessarily 
 be a number of isolated facts which admit of no 
 more specific classification. 
 
 Since an action without a motive would be an 
 effect without a cause, a presumption is created in 
 favour of innocence from the absence of all apparent 
 inducement to the commission of the imputed 
 offence. But the investigation of human motives 
 is often a matter of great difficulty from their 
 latency or remoteness; and experience shows that 
 aggravated crimes are sometimes committed from 
 very slight causes, and occasionally even without 
 any apparent or discoverable motive. This par- 
 ticular presumption would therefore seem to be 
 applicable only to cases where the guilt of the indi- 
 vidual is involved in doubt; and the consideration 
 for the jury in general is rather whether upon the 
 other parts of the evidence the party accused has 
 committed the crime, than whether he had any 
 adequate motive. 
 
 Since falsehood, concealment, flight, and other 
 like acts, are generally regarded as indications of 
 conscious guilt, it naturally follows that the absence 
 of these marks of mental emotion, and still more 
 a voluntary surrender to justice, when the party 
 had the opportunity of concealment or flight, must 
 be considered as leading to the opposite presump-
 
 io8 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 tion : and these considerations are frequently urged 
 with just effect as indicative of innocence; but the 
 force of the latter circumstance may be weakened 
 by the consideration that the party has been the 
 object of diligent pursuit. It must be also remem- 
 bered, that flight and other similar indications of 
 fear may be referable to guilt of another and less 
 penal character than that involved in the particular 
 charge. 
 
 If it be proved that a party charged with crime 
 has been placed in circumstances which commonly 
 operate as inducements to commit the act in ques- 
 tion, that he has so far yielded to the operation 
 of those inducements as to have manifested the 
 disposition to commit the particular crime, that 
 he has possessed the requisite means and opportuni- 
 ties of effecting the object of his wishes, that 
 recently after the commission of the act he has 
 become possessed of the fruits or other consequen- 
 tial advantages of the crime, if he be identified 
 with the corpus delicti by any conclusive mechani- 
 cal circumstances, as by the impressions of his 
 footsteps, or the discovery of any article of his 
 apparel or property at or near the scene of the 
 crime, if there be relevant appearance of suspicion 
 connected with his conduct, person, or dress, and 
 such as he might reasonably be presumed to be 
 able to account for, but which nevertheless he can- 
 not or will not explain, if he be put upon his 
 defence recently after the crime, under strong cir- 
 cumstances of adverse presumption, and cannot 
 show where he was at the time of its commission, 
 if he attempt to evade the force of those circum-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 109 
 
 stances of presumption by false or incredible pre- 
 tences, or by endeavours to evade or pervert the 
 course of justice by conduct inconsistent with the 
 supposition of his innocence, the concurrence of 
 all or of many of these cogent circumstances, 
 unopposed by facts leading to a counter presump- 
 tion, naturally, reasonably, and satisfactorily 
 establishes the moral certainty of his guilt, if not 
 with precisely the same kind of assurance as if he 
 had been seen to commit the deed, at least with 
 all the assurance which the nature of the case and 
 the vast majority of human actions admit. In such 
 circumstances we are justly warranted in adopting, 
 without qualification or reserve, the conclusions to 
 which, "by a broad, general, and comprehensive 
 view of the facts, and not relying upon minute 
 circumstances with respect to which there may be 
 some source of terror," the mind is thus naturally 
 and inevitably conducted, and in regarding the 
 application of the sanctions of penal law as a mere 
 corollary. Nor can any practice be more absurd 
 and unjust, than that perpetuated in some modern 
 codes, which, while they admit of proof by circum- 
 stantial evidence, inconsistently deny to it its 
 logical and ordinary consequences.* 
 
 It may be observed that the conclusiveness of 
 circumstantial evidence does not depend upon the 
 force of any one circumstance, but upon the 
 strength of the whole united. If we see a man 
 coming out of a house, with blood on his clothes, 
 that is no proof that he has committed murder. 
 
 * Will's Principles of Circumstantial Evidence.
 
 i io LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 There are many other ways in which his dress may 
 have become bloody. But* if we enter the house, 
 and find there a person who has the appearance 
 of having been recently murdered, this causes the 
 former individual to become suspected. If, again, 
 you find the hat of this person in the house of the 
 murdered man ; and when this person is appre- 
 hended, he denies ever having been in the house; 
 and, moreover, you find concealed in his dress some 
 property proved to have belonged to the man who 
 was murdered; now, putting these and similar 
 circumstances together, you may have sufficient 
 proof of the prisoner's guilt; for although you 
 might easily assign other causes for any one of 
 these circumstances separately, you cannot assign 
 sufficient causes to account for them all, except on 
 the supposition that the prisoner is the man who 
 has committed the crime. In cases of this kind 
 the prisoner's counsel exercises his ingenuity in 
 assigning other causes to account for these 
 criminating appearances. And some barristers 
 think themselves justified in doing this, even after 
 the prisoner has confessed his guilt. Lawyers of 
 high standing have declared that such conduct is 
 not, in their judgment, a violation of professional 
 morality. 
 
 It must also be observed, that if the circumstances 
 brought in evidence against a prisoner can be 
 accounted for on any other supposition than his 
 guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. The evidence 
 must prove, not merely that he may be guilty, but 
 that he must be guilty. The circumstances 
 adduced must be wholly incompatible with the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION in 
 
 supposition that he is innocent, and incapable of 
 explanation upon any other hypothesis than that 
 of his guilt. It is upon this kind of evidence that 
 most criminals are convicted. As crimes are 
 usually committed in secret, witnesses can rarely 
 be obtained, and circumstantial evidence is the only 
 evidence that can be adduced; and Providence 
 seems always to have arranged that all great crimes 
 shall in this way be brought to light. Plans 
 hatched with consummate ingenuity, and in pro- 
 found secrecy, have in their execution been attended 
 with some slight oversight, which has supplied a 
 thread by which the whole plot has been unravelled. 
 True, some persons convicted upon circumstantial 
 evidence have afterwards been proved to be inno- 
 cent; so also persons convicted upon direct evidence 
 have afterwards been proved to be innocent. If, 
 on the one hand, circumstances may seem to war- 
 rant an erroneous conclusion, on the other hand 
 you may have mistaken or perjured witnesses. 
 
 (4) Circumstantial evidence is part of the armoury 
 of the Biblical critic. 
 
 Below is a specimen of the way in which a theo- 
 logian argues on behalf of the genuineness of an 
 Old Testament record. 
 
 Towards the end of the famine caused by this drought, 
 Elijah is commanded by God to " get him to Zarephath, 
 which belongeth to Zidon, and dwell there"; where a 
 widow woman was to sustain him.* He goes : finds the 
 woman gathering sticks near the gate of the city ; and 
 asks her to fetch him a little water and a morsel of 
 
 * i Kings xvii. 9.
 
 ii2 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 bread. She replies, " As the Lord thy God liveth, I 
 have not a cake, but an handful of meal in a barrel, and 
 a little oil in a cruse : and, behold, I am gathering two 
 sticks, that I may go in and dress it for me and my son, 
 that we may eat it, and die."' 
 
 This widow-woman, then, it seems, dwelt at Zare- 
 phath, or Sarepta, which belongeth to Zidon. Now, 
 from a passage in the book of Joshua,! we learn that 
 the district of Zidon, in the division of the land of 
 Canaan, fell to the lot of Asher. Let us, then, turn to 
 the thirty-third chapter of Deuteronomy, where Moses 
 blesses the tribes, and see the character he gives of this 
 part of the country : " Of Asher he said, Let Asher be 
 blessed with children ; let him be acceptable to his breth- 
 ren, and let him dip his foot in oil ";+ indicating the 
 future fertility of that region, and the nature of its prin- 
 cipal crop. It is likely, therefore, that at the end of a 
 dearth of three years and a half, oil should be found 
 there, if anywhere. Yet this symptom of truth occurs 
 once mye as an ingredient in a miraculous history for 
 the oil was made not to fail till the rain came. The inci- 
 dent itself is a very minute one ; and minute as it is, only 
 discovered to be a coincidence by the juxtaposition of 
 several texts from several books of Scripture. It would 
 require a very circumspect forger of the story to intro- 
 duce the mention of the oil ; and when he had introduced 
 it, not to be tempted to betray himself by throwing out 
 some slight hint why he had done so. 
 
 (5) Circumstantial evidence is employed too with 
 reference to the affairs of ordinary life. 
 
 Bankers, merchants, and traders judge by this 
 kind of evidence of the solvency and responsibility 
 of the parties with whom they deal. The actual 
 
 * i Kings xvii. 12. t Josh. xix. 28. J Deut. xxxiii. 24. 
 ^Undesigned Coincidences. By J. J. Blunt, B.D.
 
 amount of a man's property is probably known only 
 to himself. His standing on the exchange or in 
 the market will depend upon his personal character, 
 his business habits, his conformity to established 
 rules, and the extent to which he practises those 
 moral virtues which are known to be the surest 
 guide to wealth. We are told that "it is of great 
 importance to a banker to have an ample knowledge 
 of the means and transactions of his customers. 
 The customer, when he opens his account, will give 
 him some information on this subject. The banker 
 will afterwards get information from his own books. 
 The amount of transactions that his customer passes 
 through his current account, will show the extent 
 of his business. The amount of his daily balance 
 will show if he has much ready cash. The extent 
 and character of the bills he offers for discount, 
 will show if he trust large amounts to individual 
 houses, and if these are respectable. On the other 
 hand, the bills his customer may accept to other 
 parties, and his payments, will show the class of 
 people with whom he deals, or who are in the habit 
 of giving him credit."* Another banker observes 
 that, " Next in importance to a study of his 
 accounts, the habits and character of a client are 
 deserving of your attentive consideration. If a 
 man's style of living, for example, becomes extrava- 
 gant, and he gives himself over to excess, you 
 cannot too promptly apply the curb, however regu- 
 lar the transactions upon his account may seem."f 
 
 * Gilbart's Practical Treatise on Banking. 
 t The Internal Management of a Country Bank. By 
 Thomas Bullion.
 
 ii4 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 Now, this is judging from circumstantial evi- 
 dence. By the same kind of evidence we are guided 
 in our social adjudications. In this mode of 
 reasoning we judge of the honesty of our servants, 
 of the truthfulness of our children, and of many 
 other transactions connected with social discipline. 
 By this mode too we often judge of the sincerity 
 of our friends, and of the character of public men. 
 
 (7) Arguments are often expressed in a conditional 
 form when they have no reference to the 
 relation of conditional cause and effect. 
 
 In these cases the relation is usually denoted by 
 the words antecedent and consequent. The ante- 
 cedent denotes what goes before, and the conse- 
 quent denotes what follows after. The consequent 
 is the result of the antecedent, or is a natural infer- 
 ence from the antecedent. Thus, " If the sun is 
 fixed centre of the solar system, the planets move 
 round it." " No fire, no smoke." The truth of 
 such propositions does not depend on the truth or 
 falsehood of their two parts, but on the truth of 
 the connection of them. The sun has a proper 
 motion, and there is an appearance of smoke that 
 does not come from fire. 
 
 In many cases, indeed, we do not intend to denote 
 any kind of condition or contingency, but adopt 
 this form of reasoning merely because it is a more 
 forcible way of stating the argument. Arguments 
 from analogy, and a fortiori, as will be explained 
 hereafter, are almost always expressed in this form, 
 as well as those advanced in the way of objections.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT FINAL CAUSES. 
 
 OF late years the term " Final Cause " seems to 
 have gone out of fashion. The design argument 
 for the existence of a Supreme Being was subjected 
 to a good deal of spirited criticism in the latter part 
 of the nineteenth century, and it became almost 
 improper to assume any kind of knowledge about 
 the teleology of the universe i.e., the object or 
 purpose for which it came into being, which is 
 another way of saying what we mean by " final 
 cause." Immediate causes become known to us in 
 science, but as to the cause of all causes, we are pre- 
 sumed to be entirely ignorant. In spite of our ignor- 
 ance, however, we may still reason about the prob- 
 lem on the basis of such small knowledge as we 
 possess. But first, following a previous practice, 
 we will reproduce some specimen arguments on final 
 causes within the sphere of our more immediate 
 knowledge, afterwards dealing at greater length 
 with the larger issue. 
 
 (i) The doctrine of final causes enters largely into 
 the administration of the law. 
 
 Sometimes this mode of reasoning is employed by 
 the lawyers in fixing the meaning of an Act of
 
 Parliament. Our laws are-made by the legislature, 
 but their meaning is fixed by the judges. It some- 
 times happens that the wording is uncertain or ob- 
 scure, and that one clause appears to contradict 
 some other clause. In these cases the judges en- 
 quire into the intention of the Act ; that is the inten- 
 tion of the Legislature in passing the Act. This in- 
 tention is sometimes called the spirit of the Act, 
 and when a clause has two meanings the judges 
 will decide in favour of that meaning which is most 
 in conformity with the spirit of the Act. Take, for 
 example, the Reform Act, passed in 1831. The in- 
 tention of the act was to extend the privilege of 
 voting for Members of Parliament. In case, there- 
 fore, the meaning of any of the clauses should be 
 doubtful, that meaning which is most favourable to 
 the extension of the privilege of voting for Mem- 
 bers of Parliament is most in conformity with the 
 spirit of the act. If you watch the proceedings of 
 the Courts of Law you will observe many cases illus- 
 trative of this kind of reasoning. 
 
 (2) In judicial cases, also, this principle of final 
 causes is acknowledged. 
 
 From the effects of any motive, the law infers the 
 existence of the motive. If a man commits murder, 
 the law assumes that he intended to commit mur- 
 der. So, if a dozen persons, who never saw each 
 other before, should join in an illegal act, they may 
 be indicted for a conspiracy ; for their acting in con- 
 cert will be considered as a proof of an intention to 
 act in concert. 
 
 In the case of Dr. Webster, who was hanged at
 
 Boston for the murder of Dr. Parkman, the follow- 
 ing criticisms, in a prominent journal, aptly set 
 forth the legal principles involved: 
 
 Suppose the facts as stated in the confession had been 
 proved by a witness present on the spot, but without the 
 knowledge of the accused; and then apply the law as 
 laid down by the Chief Justice, and which we see no 
 reason to question. 
 
 " In murder, to escape the imputation of malice, the 
 prisoner must prove the provocation, the accident, or 
 any other circumstance which goes to preclude the 
 malice ; otherwise it is argued from the act itself. No 
 provocation of words, however opprobious, will mitigate 
 the motive for a mortal blow, or one intended to pro- 
 duce death, where there is an intent to kill. If there is 
 sufficient provocation, it is manslaughter; but words are 
 not a sufficient provocation. Malice is implied from any 
 deliberate, cruel act against another, however sudden. 
 When there is a blow of a deadly weapon, with intent 
 to do some great bodily harm, and death ensues, malice 
 is presumed." Amongst the interstices of this net-work 
 of distinctions, there may possibly be room to extricate 
 the killing of Dr. Parkman from the category of murder ; 
 but we confess the distinctions of the law seem framed 
 to meet this very description of sudden, unjustifiable, 
 passionate, revengeful, and reckless homicide. Were 
 the contrary the case, few of the usual forms of murder 
 would come within the definition. The confession of Dr. 
 Webster may be only another link in the chain of fatali- 
 ties which he has been forging for his own destruction. 
 
 (3) Final causes form an important part of the 
 investigation in cases of circumstantial evidence. 
 
 If we show that the prisoner had a strong motive 
 for committing the offence, such as avarice, re-
 
 ii8 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 venge, etc., or had stated beforehand a determina- 
 tion that he would commit it, this, with other cir- 
 cumstances, will be considered as tending to prove 
 that he did commit it. 
 
 Motives are, with relation to moral conduct, what phy- 
 sical power is to mechanics ; and both of these kinds of 
 impulse are equally under the influence of known laws. 
 But in reasoning upon motives and their resulting 
 actions, it is impracticable to obtain the same sure data 
 as when material phenomena only are involved, since it 
 is not possible to discover all the modifying circum- 
 stances of human conduct, or to assign with unerring 
 certainty the true character of the motives from which 
 they spring. Nevertheless, we naturally, reasonably, 
 and safely, judge of men's motives by their conduct, as 
 we conclude from the nature of the stream the qualities 
 of the fountain whence it proceeds. An evil motive con- 
 stitutes in law, as in morals, the essence of guilt ; and 
 the existence of an inducing motive for the voluntary 
 acts of a rational agent, is assumed as naturally as 
 secondary causes are concluded to exist for material phe- 
 nomena. The predominant desires of the mind are in- 
 variably followed by corresponding volitions and actions. 
 It is therefore indispensable, in the investigation of 
 moral actions, to look at all the surrounding circum- 
 stances which connect the supposed actor with 
 other persons and things, and may have influenced his 
 motives. 
 
 The usual inducements to crime, are the desire of re- 
 venging real or fancied wrongs of obtaining some ob- 
 ject of desire which rightfully belongs to another or of 
 preserving reputation, either that of general character 
 or the conventional reputation of sex or profession.* 
 
 In many things which we do, we ought not only to 
 consider the mere naked action itself, but the persons 
 
 * Will's Circumstantial Evidence.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 119 
 
 who act, the persons towards whom, the time when, the 
 place where, the manner how, the end /or which the 
 action is done, together with the effects that must, or 
 that may follow, and all other surrounding circum- 
 stances : these things must necessarily be taken into our 
 view, in order to determine whether the action, which is 
 indifferent in itself, be either lawful or unlawful, good 
 or evil, wise or foolish, decent or indecent, proper or 
 improper, as it is so circumstantiated. 
 
 Let me give a plain instance for the illustration of this 
 matter. Mario kills a dog, which, considered merely 
 in itself, seems to be an indifferent action : now the dog 
 was Timon's, and not his own : this makes it look un- 
 lawful. But Timon bid him do it ; this gives it an appear- 
 ance of lawfulness again. It was done at church, and 
 in time of divine service; these circumstances added, 
 cast on it an air of irreligion. But the dog flew at 
 Mario, and put him in danger of his life; this relieves 
 the seeming impiety of the action. Yet Mario might 
 have escaped by flying thence; therefore the action 
 appears to be improper. But the dog was known to be 
 mad ; this further circumstance makes it almost neces- 
 sary that the dog should be slain, lest he might bite 
 other people, and do much mischief. Yet again, Mario 
 killed him with a pistol, which he happened to have in 
 his pocket since yesterday's journey; now, hereby the 
 whole congregation was terrified and discomposed, and 
 divine service was broken off; this carries an appear- 
 ance of great indecency and impropriety in it : but 
 after all, when we consider a further circumstance, that 
 Mario, being thus violently assaulted by a mad dog, had 
 no way of escape, and had no other weapon about him, 
 it seems to take away all the colours of impropriety, in- 
 decency, or unlawfulness, and to allow that the preserva- 
 tion of one or many lives will justify the act as wise and 
 good. Now, all these concurrent appendices of the 
 action ought to be surveyed, in order to pronounce with 
 justice and truth concerning it.
 
 120 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (4) Under the head of final causes we may place 
 those reasonings that are founded on the presumed 
 object of the measures we advocate. 
 
 Thus, in regard to the punishment of criminals, 
 one party contends that the main object is the 
 punishment of the criminal ; another contends that 
 the main object is the reformation of the criminal ; 
 and a third contends that the main object of punish- 
 ment is the prevention of crime. The opinion any 
 one may entertain as to the final cause or main 
 object of punishment, will, of course, influence his 
 sentiments as to the nature, duration, and severity 
 of the punishments that ought to be inflicted. 
 
 The proper end of punishment is said by some to be 
 the satisfaction of justice; by others the prevention of 
 crimes ; by others the reformation of the offender. The 
 first doctrine is that which most immediately occurs to 
 a mind beginning to reflect on the subject ; and it is often 
 warmly defended, although it is now pretty nearly aban- 
 doned by systematic writers on legislation. One of the 
 last instances of a laboured defence of it, which we have 
 met with, is to be found in a dissertation by Lord Wood- 
 houselee, appended to his life of Lord Kames. The 
 second opinion is supported by the generality of writers, 
 although they by no means reject the third object, as 
 a subordinate consideration. Of late years, a few 
 philanthropists have argued, that the principal object of 
 punishment should be the reformation of the offender, 
 and that other ends are of inferior consequence. 
 
 If crimes could be more effectually prevented by any 
 one punishment than another, the tendency of that 
 punishment to satisfy the demand for justice, or to re- 
 form the offender, would be a secondary consideration. 
 If the crime of murder, for example, could be more 
 effectually prevented by the penalty of death than by a
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 121 
 
 term of imprisonment, which would give an opportunity 
 for the reformation of the criminal, that penalty ought 
 to be inflicted, and the reformation of the offender aban- 
 doned, otherwise we should be showing more regard 
 for the life of a murderer than for the lives of innocent 
 persons. 
 
 (5) Political economists sometimes argue upon 
 this principle. They assign motives to different 
 classes of society, and then infer that persons under 
 the influence of such motives, would act in a cer- 
 tain manner; and on the conduct thus assumed, 
 they construct a theory. 
 
 Thus Macculloch states that " the wish to aug- 
 ment our fortunes comes with us from the womb, 
 and never leaves us till we go into the grave." This 
 may be the case generally in Scotland, but it is not 
 so in Ireland, and it is not so universally anywhere. 
 In all classes of society, many individuals are 
 found who prefer present enjoyment to a future im- 
 provement of their condition. Another erroneous 
 assumption is, that the uninstructed classes of 
 society, when left to themselves, will always do that 
 which is most conducive to their own advantage. 
 This argument has been advanced in opposition to 
 those acts of the legislature that refer to regulating 
 the hours of labour in the manufacturies, and to the 
 working of women and children in mines. The 
 reasonings of some economists, with reference to 
 these matters, will, on examination, be found to 
 rest on erroneous assumptions. 
 
 "In tracing the progress of society, too, the econo- 
 mists assume that mankind were originally savages, 
 i
 
 122 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 then became hunters, then shepherds, then agricul- 
 turists, and at last merchants and manufacturers; 
 and they attribute to mankind in these several 
 stages precisely the same feelings and motives 
 which men entertain in the highest degree of civili- 
 sation. Such writers' theories are full of subtle 
 fallacies. In the first place, the origins of civilisa- 
 tion are more obscure than the origins of life itself; 
 and in the second place, savages have no thirst for 
 knowledge and the improvement of circumstances. 
 But the opinion that all mankind were originally 
 savages, is unsupported by either reason or history. 
 Had they been created savages, they would proba- 
 bly have remained savages for ever. They could 
 have formed no idea of a civilisation which had 
 never existed, nor have desired comforts, the want 
 of which they did not feel. History does not record 
 a single instance of a savage nation having become 
 civilised by its own unassisted exertions. Civilisa- 
 tion has never sprung up spontaneously from the 
 soil ; it has always been imported from abroad. The 
 Greeks derived their civilisation from the Egyptians ; 
 the Romans theirs from the Greeks; the nations 
 conquered by Rome became civilised from their in- 
 tercourse with the Romans. But if we attempt to 
 trace the origin of civilisation in Egypt and Baby- 
 lon, we are at a loss; for neither history, nor even 
 tradition, mentions any period at which these 
 nations were not civilised. Founded in an inscrutable 
 past, they possessed the knowledge of all the arts 
 and sciences known to the antediluvian world. The 
 fertility of their soils, and the extent of their plains, 
 furnished ample provision for their population :
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 123 
 
 hence, as population increased, their civilisation in- 
 creased. While, on the other hand, those tribes 
 or families who wandered in quest of new settle- 
 ments, became separated from the rest of mankind 
 by mountains, and forests, and rivers ; and their time 
 being wholly occupied in seeking supplies of food, 
 they lost, in the course of a few generations, the 
 knowledge they originally possessed, and fell into 
 the savage state. It would thus appear, from his- 
 tory and from reason, that the savage state was not 
 the original state of man, but a departure from that 
 state, arising from a want of communication 
 through several ages with the other branches of the 
 family of mankind." (Gilbart.) 
 
 (6) As all actions result from the feelings of the 
 mind, when we wish to induce any person to per- 
 form certain actions, we try to produce in the mind 
 those convictions and feelings which are the usual 
 cause of such actions. 
 
 It is the great object of logic to teach us how to 
 select and use those arguments that have an effect 
 upon the judgment and understanding. But some- 
 times people are influenced more by their feelings 
 than by their judgment. In this case, if we wish 
 to convince or persuade them, we must adapt our 
 arguments to their feelings. The parties who are 
 thus influenced by their passions can hardly be said 
 to reason ; but we who are trying to influence them 
 may be reasoning nevertheless. We are using a 
 means to accomplish an end ; we are selecting such 
 arguments, and placing them in such a form, as 
 are best adapted to produce an impression on the
 
 124 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 mind of the individual with whom we converse. 
 These arguments are outlined below : 
 
 There is yet another rank of arguments which have 
 Latin names; their true distinction is derived from the 
 topics or middle terms which are used in them, though 
 they are called an address to our judgment, our faith, 
 our ignorance, our profession, our modesty, and our pas- 
 sions. If an argument be taken from the nature or ex- 
 istence of things, and addressed to the reason of man- 
 kind, it is called argumentum ad judicium. When it is 
 borrowed from some convincing testimony, it is argu- 
 mentum ad fidem, an address to our faith. When it is 
 drawn from any insufficient medium whatsoever, and yet 
 the opposer has not skill to refute or answer it, this is 
 argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our ignor- 
 ance. When it is built upon the professed principles or 
 opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether the 
 opinions be true or false, it is named argumentum ad 
 hominem, an address to our professed principles. St. 
 Paul often uses this argument when he reasons with the 
 Jews, and when he says, " I speak as a man." When 
 the argument is built upon the sentiments of some 
 wise, great, or good men, whose authority we reverence 
 and hardly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad vere- 
 cundium, an address to our modesty. I add finally, 
 When an argument is borrowed from any topics which 
 are suited to engage the inclinations and passions of the 
 hearers on the side of the speaker, rather than to con- 
 vince the judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, 
 an address to the passions; or, if it be made publicly, it 
 is called ad populum, or an appeal to the people. 
 
 The argument called Argumentum ad hominem 
 requires a further illustration : 
 
 Sometimes we may make use of the very prejudices 
 under which a person labours, in order to convince him 
 of some particular truth and argue with him upon his
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 125 
 
 own professed principles as though they were true. This 
 is called argumentum ad hominem, and is another way 
 of dealing with the prejudices of men. 
 
 Suppose a Jew lies sick of a fever, and is forbidden 
 flesh by his physician ; but hearing that rabbits were 
 provided for the dinner of the family, desired earnestly 
 to eat of them; and suppose he became impatient be- 
 cause his physician did not permit him, and he insisted 
 upon it, that it could do him no hurt; surely, rather than 
 let him persist in that fancy and that desire, to the 
 danger of his life, I would tell him that these animals 
 were strangled, which sort of food was forbidden by the 
 Jewish law, though I myself may believe that law is 
 now abolished. 
 
 Encrates used the same means of conviction when he 
 saw a Mahometan drink wine to excess, and heard him 
 maintain the lawfulness and pleasure of drunkenness : 
 Encrates reminded him that his own prophet Mahomet 
 had utterly forbidden all wine to his followers : and the 
 good man restrained his vicious appetite by his super- 
 stition, when he could no otherwise convince him that 
 drunkenness was unlawful, nor withhold him from 
 excess ! 
 
 (7) The effects of circumstances upon the disposi- 
 tion of the mind may fairly be placed under this 
 head, and they enter largely into our daily reason- 
 ings. 
 
 On this ground Lord Erskine advocated his bill 
 for preventing cruelty to animals. 
 
 In what I am proposing to your lordships, disin- 
 terested virtue, as in all other cases, will have its own 
 certain reward. The humanity you shall extend to the 
 lower creation will come abundantly round in its conse- 
 quences to the whole human race. The moral sense, 
 which this law will awaken and inculcate, cannot but
 
 126 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 have a most powerful effect upon our feelings and sym- 
 pathies for one another. The violences and outrages 
 committed by the lower orders of the people, are offences 
 more owing to want of thought and reflection than to 
 any malignant principle; and whatever, therefore, sets 
 them a-thinking upon the duties of humanity, more 
 especially where they have no rivalries nor resentments, 
 and where there is a peculiar generosity in forbearance 
 and compassion, has an evident tendency to soften their 
 natures, and to moderate their passions in their deal- 
 ings with one another. The effect of laws, which pro- 
 mulgate a sound moral principle, is incalculable ; I have 
 traced it in a thousand instances, and it is impossible 
 to describe its value. 
 
 In conformity with this principle, if a man has 
 received a good education, we expect to find him 
 well informed; if he has mixed in good society, we 
 presume his manners are courteous ; if he has held 
 certain positions in society, we infer that he has 
 the excellencies, and probably the defects, con- 
 nected with that position ; and if we are wise, we 
 shall consider the peculiar temptations to which our 
 own circumstances expose us, and endeavour to 
 guard our minds against them. 
 
 Different employments, and different conditions of life, 
 beget in us a tendency to our different passions. Those 
 who are exalted above others in their daily stations, and 
 especially if they have to do with many persons under 
 them, and in many affairs, are too often tempted to the 
 haughty, the morose, the surly, and the more unfriendly 
 ruffles and disturbances of nature, unless they watch 
 against them with daily care. The commanders in 
 armies and navies, the governors of workhouses, the 
 masters of public schools, or those who have a great 
 number of servants under them, and a multitude of cares
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 127 
 
 and concerns in human life, should continually set a 
 guard upon themselves, lest they get a habit of affected 
 superiority, pride, and vanity of mind, of fretfulness, 
 impatience, and criminal anger. 
 
 Upon this ground, we avoid the dangerous social 
 element, because we instinctively prefer a suitable 
 environment. 
 
 And here I would advise you to have no dealings with 
 a man who is known to be a rogue, even though he 
 should offer a bargain that may, in that instance, be for 
 your advantage to accept. To avoid him is your duty, on 
 the ground of morality; but it is, moreover, your in- 
 terest in a pecuniary point of view : for, depend upon it, 
 although he may let you get money by him at first, he 
 will contrive to cheat you in the end. An additional 
 reason is, that your own reputation, and even your 
 moral sensibilities, may be endangered by the contact. 
 If you get money by a rogue, there is a danger that you 
 will feel disposed to apologize for his rogueries; and, 
 when you have once become an apologist for roguery, 
 you will probably, on the first temptation become a rogue 
 yourself. 
 
 (8) The doctrine of final causes also enters largely 
 into our reasonings on the nature and character of 
 the human mind, and on the circumstances by 
 which we are surrounded. 
 
 From the properties, or qualities, or faculties of 
 the mind, we infer the existence of a corresponding 
 design. Alan has a capacity for being happy we 
 infer he was designed to be happy. Man has a 
 capacity for acquiring knowledge we infer he was 
 designed to acquire knowledge. Man has feelings 
 
 4^ 
 
 L*
 
 128 
 
 and capacities adapted for society we infer he was 
 designed to live in society. 
 
 (9) In the same way, from the attributes, quali- 
 ties, and capacities of the animal creation, we infer 
 the design or final cause of their creation. 
 
 All the wonderful instincts of animals, which, in my 
 humble opinion, are proved beyond a doubt, and the 
 belief in which has not decreased with the increase of 
 science and investigation all these instincts are given 
 them only for the combination or preservation of their 
 species. If they had not these instincts, they would be 
 swept off the earth in an instant. This bee, that under- 
 stands architecture so well, is as stupid as a pebble- 
 stone, out of his own particular business of making 
 honey; and, with all his talents, he only exists that boys 
 may eat his labours, and poets sing about them. Ut 
 pueris placeas et declamatio fias. A peasant girl of ten 
 years old puts the whole republic to death with a little 
 smoke; their palaces are turned into candles, and every 
 clergyman's wife makes mead-wine of the honey; and 
 there is an end of the glory and wisdom of the bees ! 
 Whereas, man has talents that have no sort of reference 
 to his existence; and without which, his species might 
 remain upon earth in the same safety as if they had them 
 not. The bee works at that particular angle which saves 
 most time and labour ; and the boasted edifice he is con- 
 structing is only for his egg : but Somerset House, and 
 Blenheim, and the Louvre, have nothing to do with 
 breeding. Epic poems, and Apollo Belvideres, and 
 Venus de Medicis, have nothing to do with living and 
 eating. We might have discovered pig-nuts without the 
 Royal Society, and gathered acorns without reasoning 
 about curves of the ninth order. The immense super- 
 fluity of talent given to man, which has no bearing upon 
 animal life, which has nothing to do with the mere pre- 
 servation of existence, is one very distinguishing circum-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 129 
 
 stance in this comparison. There is no other animal but 
 man to whom mind appears to be given for any other 
 purpose than the preservation of body.* 
 
 The following argument, from the relation of 
 final cause and effect, has been advanced in favour 
 of sporting : 
 
 As Nature, with a liberal but not lavish hand, has 
 bestowed on her offspring those powers and propensities 
 only, which their own necessities, or the general order 
 and economy of the system require; the gifts of scent 
 to the hound, swiftness to the greyhound, and sagacity 
 to the pointer, denote the use which she intended man 
 to make of these animals ; and, therefore, the diversions 
 in question are justifiable, as fulfilling the intentions of 
 Nature herself. 
 
 (10) It is a principle of ethics that the final cause, 
 or motive, of an action decides its essentially moral 
 quality. 
 
 There can be no doubt that motive is of the 
 essence of morality, but an ethical idea, to be com- 
 plete, must eventuate in some form of expression, 
 otherwise it can only be judged as an idea. This 
 admission implies a higher tribunal of judgment 
 than that which takes note of actions and the 
 motives that caused them. For there are people 
 who intend to murder other people in the spirit of 
 revenge, and yet never have the chance of carrying 
 out their evil designs. A citizen may harbour the 
 worst thoughts in the world, and yet so long as he 
 does not act them he is regarded as a model citizen. 
 Similarly another citizen may have the best 
 thoughts and intentions and yet have no oppor- 
 
 * Sydney Smith's Sketches of Moral Philosophy.
 
 130 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 tunity of putting the most altruistic of them into 
 practice. Further, a third citizen may follow the 
 principle of doing evil that good may come. Per- 
 haps he lands himself and others in disaster. Here 
 the motive, the final cause, is weighed and the 
 result is judged accordingly. The person who 
 " means well " may be a most unpleasant and un- 
 profitable person, but occasional specimens of his 
 type do not invalidate the doctrine that motive is of 
 the essence of morality. The great question in all 
 conduct is : Why do we act as we do ? 
 
 (11) In regard to the Universe and its purpose, 
 modern thought readily confesses its inability to say 
 what that purpose is : the real question for us, how- 
 ever, is whether logic can be used to discuss the 
 existence or non-existence of a purpose. It is difficult 
 to see how such a discussion can be legitimately 
 refused, for if we ask " the reason why " of a part of 
 the Universe, such as the cause of a solar system, it 
 follows that we may ask ourselves why the Universe 
 exists at all what is its object and what is its 
 destiny. Here are some arguments for and against. 
 
 (a) That the world displays Intelligence and is 
 Intelligible. 
 
 I allow you to doubt all things if you wish till you 
 come to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is 
 an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can 
 doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does 
 to believe to deny as it does to affirm. Universal 
 doubt, therefore, is an impossibility, for doubt cannot, 
 if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to 
 doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt 
 that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 131 
 
 you doubt, and there is one thing at least you do not 
 doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelli- 
 gence that doubts would be to doubt that you doubt, for 
 without intelligence there can be no more doubt than 
 belief. Intelligence then, you must assert, for without 
 intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and denial 
 of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself and 
 affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt 
 then as much as you will, you must still affirm intelli- 
 gence as the condition of doubting or of asserting the 
 possibility of doubt, for what is not, cannot act. . . . 
 Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligence or 
 some object capable of being known. The intelligence 
 is, therefore, something which is, is being, real being 
 too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without 
 the real there is and can be no possible or abstract. The 
 intelligible must be asserted as real, not as abstract or 
 merely possible being. The real being thus asserted is 
 either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, sub- 
 sisting by and from itself or it is contingent and there- 
 fore created being. Whatever is, is either necessary 
 and eternal, or contingent and created, is either being 
 in itself, absolute being, or existence dependent on 
 another for its being and, therefore, is not without the 
 necessary and eternal on which it depends. If you say 
 it is necessary and eternal being you say it is God; if 
 you say it is contingent being, you still assert the neces- 
 sary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent 
 is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary 
 and eternal. From this it follows that in every act of 
 intelligence God is asserted.* 
 
 (b) That the morality of the Universe is not our 
 morality : and that its design, if it has one, is 
 inhuman. 
 
 When you tell me God is good you can only mean he 
 * Notes on Ingersoll. L. A. Lambert.
 
 132 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 is good as I understand goodness. Very well, then, ex- 
 amine the goodness of the universe from the human 
 sense of what is good and bad : what follows ? Simply 
 this, that from time immemorial men have condemned 
 the morality of Nature, " red in tooth and claw." Even 
 civilisation, part of Nature's development, allows the 
 evil to overcome the good. These things turned men 
 into pessimists, and Buddhism is a religion of sorrow, 
 arising out of the troubles and griefs of this mortal life. 
 So intense has become the criticism of man on his sur- 
 roundings that modern science now says Nature is un- 
 moral : it is neither good nor bad. Whatever it may be 
 essentially, from our point of view it is a strange mix- 
 ture of good and bad ; and we cannot think that God is 
 half as kind as a really kind-hearted man, or he would 
 have made a world in which virtue was easier and vice 
 more difficult, where justice would have reigned supreme, 
 and where there would be no premium on might as right. 
 It is useless to tell me the Why of the Universe will be 
 revealed in a later life. By that time this life will be 
 over. What is the good of a key to unlock a mystery 
 that no longer exists? The whole scheme is inhuman. 
 
 Teleology, the science of final causes, is still 
 where Kant left it. Probably it will remain there, 
 for the best we can do is to regard the world as in- 
 telligently and morally well based, at least in prac- 
 tical life, for otherwise action loses much of its 
 significance. On the other hand its purpose in- 
 vites our discussion, and theoretically that purpose 
 may be held to be either insoluble, or good, or 
 evil, or both.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE USE OF WORDS IN REASONING. 
 
 THE novice in the art of reasoning will not have 
 gone far ere he discovers the importance of defining 
 words; at any rate, to the extent of giving them 
 the same meaning as does his opponent. It is at 
 once humorous and annoying to find at the end of 
 an hour's argument that the two words which con- 
 stitute the real bone of contention have been used 
 with two totally different meanings; and disputants 
 with a keen sense of the value of time are not likely 
 on a second occasion to give themselves the dubious 
 pleasure of wasted breath. Watts affirms that, 
 " As we are led into the knowledge of things by 
 words, so we are oftentimes led into error, or mis- 
 take, by the use or abuse of words. And in order 
 to guard against such mistakes, as well as to pro- 
 mote our improvements in knowledge, it is neces- 
 sary to acquaint ourselves a little with words and 
 terms. Words, whether spoken or written, have 
 no natural connexion with the ideas they are 
 designed to signify, nor with the things which are 
 represented in those ideas. There is no manner 
 of affinity between the sounds white in English, or 
 blanc in French, and the colour which we call by 
 that name ; nor have the letters, of which these words 
 
 133
 
 134 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 are composed, any natural aptness to signify that 
 colour rather than red or green. Words and names 
 therefore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men 
 to communicate their thoughts or ideas to one 
 another. 
 
 Words and terms are either univocal or equi- 
 vocal. Univocal words are such as signify but one 
 idea, or at least but one sort of thing; equivocal 
 words are such as signify two or more different 
 ideas, or different sorts of objects. The words 
 book, bible, fish, house, elephant, may be called 
 univocal words; for I know not that they signify 
 anything else but those ideas to which they are 
 generally affixed ; but head is an equivocal word, 
 for it signifies the head of a nail, or of a pin, as 
 well as of an animal : nail is an equivocal word, 
 it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot, and for 
 an iron nail to fasten anything. Post is equivocal, 
 it is a piece of timber, or a swift messenger. A 
 church is a religious assembly, or the large fair 
 building where they meet; and sometimes the same 
 word means a synod of bishops, or of presbyters; 
 and in some places it is the pope and a general 
 council. 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more words 
 signify the same thing, as wave and billow, mead 
 and meadow, they are usually called synonymous 
 words ; but it seems very strange that words, which 
 are directly contrary to each other, should some- 
 times represent almost the same ideas; yet thus it 
 is in some few instances : a valuable or an invalu- 
 able blessing; a shameful, or a shameless villain; 
 a thick skull, or a thin-skulled fellow a mere paper
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 135 
 
 skull ; a man of a large conscience, little conscience, 
 or no conscience; a famous rascal, or an infamous 
 one. So uncertain a thing is human language, 
 whose foundation and support is custom. As 
 words signifying the same thing are called 
 synonymous, so equivocal words, or those which 
 signify several things, are called homonymous, or 
 ambiguous; and when persons use such ambiguous 
 words with a design to deceive, it is called equivo- 
 cation. In your own studies, as well as in the 
 communication of your thoughts to others merely 
 for their information, avoid ambiguous and equi- 
 vocal terms as much as possible. Do not use such 
 words as have two or three definitions of the name 
 belonging to them ; that is, such words as have two 
 or three senses, where there is any danger of mis- 
 take. Where your chief business is to inform the 
 judgment, and to explain a matter, rather than to 
 persuade or affect, don't express yourself in figura- 
 tive language, when there are any proper words 
 that signify the same idea in their literal sense. 
 When we communicate our notions to others, 
 merely with a design to inform and improve their 
 knowledge, let us, at the outset, take care to adjust 
 the definition of names, where necessary; that is, 
 to determine plainly what we mean by the chief 
 words; and be sure always to keep the same ideas 
 whensoever we use the same words, unless we give 
 due notice of the change. This will secure others 
 and ourselves from confusion and mistake ; for even 
 writers and speakers, for want of due watchfulness, 
 are ready to affix different ideas to their own words, 
 in different parts of their discourses, and thereby
 
 136 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 bring perplexity into their own reasonings, and 
 confound their hearers. 
 
 In communicating your notions, use every word 
 as near as possible in the same sense in which 
 mankind commonly use it; or which writers who 
 have written before you have usually affixed to it, 
 upon condition that it is free from ambiguity. 
 Though names are in their original merely arbi- 
 trary, yet we should always keep to the established 
 meaning of them, unless great necessity requires 
 the alteration ; for when any word has been used 
 to signify an idea, that old idea will recur in the 
 mind when the word is heard or read, rather than 
 any new idea which we may fasten to it. And this 
 is one reason why the received definition of names 
 should be changed as little as possible." 
 
 We will take an instance : The word " classic " 
 is generally used to denote, according as the object 
 refers to languages or books, those of the highest 
 excellence. Thus when we speak of the classical 
 languages we refer exclusively to the Greek and 
 Latin, because these tongues have always been 
 considered by Europeans as exemplars after which 
 they might approve their own. In like manner 
 we refer to the works of Milton or Dryden, Racine 
 or Boileau, as English and French classics, the 
 productions of these authors being ranked as the 
 best of their kind by the general body of their 
 countrymen. Nevertheless, the canon of what is 
 classic utterance in literature is not even yet a 
 transparent fact; and St. Beuve tried to solve the 
 problem in his essay, entitled: "What is a 
 classic? '- There are professors who are quite sure
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 137 
 
 certain books are classical performances, and other 
 professors who are equally sure they are not. 
 
 But the less important words of the language are 
 open to the same objection. " Common speech is 
 a quicksand," to use the expression of Minto. " In 
 geometry we learn the definitions of the words used 
 point, line, parallel, etc. before we proceed to 
 use them. But in common speech we learn words 
 first in their application to individual cases. No- 
 body ever defined good to us, or fair, or kind, or 
 highly educated. We hear the words applied to 
 individual objects : we utter them in the same con- 
 nexion : we extend them to other objects that strike 
 us without knowing the precise points of likeness 
 that the convention of common speech includes.* 
 
 Nowadays few words have a more extensive 
 vogue than Socialism. Everybody uses it, and yet 
 it has not the same meaning even among the 
 socialists themselves. This disadvantage it shares 
 with many other political terms, and it was to 
 provide a remedy that Sir George Cornewall Lewis 
 wrote his Use and Abuse of Political Terms and 
 Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. 
 A few examples from the former treatise will suit- 
 ably illustrate this chapter. 
 
 Take the word tyranny. To the socialist, capi- 
 talism is a great tyranny : to the capitalist there 
 could be no worse tyranny than that of strictly 
 democratic rule, with uninstructed men occupying 
 the chief places. Now, although these two men 
 may agree on one issue, namely, that an absolute 
 
 * Logic, Inductive and Deductive. 
 K
 
 138 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 monarchy is, or may be, the source of most cruel 
 oppression, they probably are not agreed as to the 
 advantage of a limited monarchy ; the socialist is 
 for a real republic, the capitalist votes for a heredi- 
 tary ruler. But both of them have an undefined 
 belief that tyranny is less associated with free 
 government than with autocratic government. 
 And yet facts do not confirm that view. Burke said 
 that "free governments have committed more 
 flagrant acts of tyranny than the most perfect 
 despotic governments which we have ever known." 
 Locke said: "It is a mistake to think this fault 
 [viz., tyranny] is proper only to monarchies; other 
 forms of government are liable to it as well as that : 
 for wherever the power is put in any hands for 
 the government of the people and the preservation 
 of their properties, is applied to other ends, and 
 made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them 
 to the arbitrary and irreguW commands of those 
 that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny 
 whether those that use it are one or many." 
 
 The fallacy underlying the common use of the 
 word is twofold : that tyranny is the oppression 
 of one man, or one class ; and that free institutions 
 can prevent it. 
 
 Take another word : Nature. The number of 
 uses to which this word is put is almost bewilder- 
 ing, and, of course, the same remark applies to 
 its cognates. " Women have a natural right to 
 the vote," we hear it said. Here are two important 
 words natural and right. On this point Lewis 
 says: "The phrase, natural right, takes its origin 
 from the doctrine of a state of nature. ... It
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 139 
 
 appears to signify a claim recommended by natural 
 law, or by those rules which were recognised by 
 common consent when mankind were in a state of 
 nature." Hence woman, whatever rights they may 
 claim politically, have no natural right to exercise 
 a vote : what they mean is an indefeasible right, 
 one that already is theirs, but which they are not 
 allowed to use. But "an indefeasible right is a 
 right which man enjoyed in a state of nature, and 
 which he only surrendered conditionally at the 
 making of the social compact." Therefore, since 
 woman, as a sex, never enjoyed the political posi- 
 tion to which they aspire, no political wrong is 
 being done to them by withholding the vote; that 
 is to say, their rights are neither natural nor inde- 
 feasible : they must be argued on other grounds 
 altogether. 
 
 Lewis devotes many pages to the analysis of this 
 word right. He quotes from Boswell, who recorded 
 a conversation by Johnson : " Every man has a 
 right to liberty of conscience, and with that the 
 magistrate cannot interfere. People confound 
 liberty of thinking with liberty of talking; nay, with 
 liberty of preaching. Every man has a physical 
 right to think as he pleases; for it cannot be dis- 
 covered how he thinks. He has not a moral right, 
 for he ought to inform himself and think justly." 
 Here physical right (argues Lewis) must mean 
 po-wer; moral right appears to mean legal right, 
 for Johnson never could have intended to say that 
 a man is in conscience bound to conceal opinions 
 which he thinks true. On another occasion he said 
 that " There seems to be in authors a stronger right
 
 140 
 
 of property than that by occupancy ; a metaphysical 
 right, a right, ac it were, of creation, which should 
 from its nature be perpetual." This expression is 
 manifestly founded on the erroneous supposition 
 that a right to a tangible is more corporeal than 
 a right to an intangible object; but elsewhere he 
 uses a more common epithet when, speaking of 
 government, he says that " if the abuse be enor- 
 mous, Nature will rise up, and, claiming her 
 original rights, overturn a corrupt political sys- 
 tem." It is, however, a contradiction to speak of 
 original rights, if by original is meant anterior to 
 government, for . . . the notion that right is ' alto- 
 gether an abstract thing which is independent of 
 human laws and institutions ' is not only not true, 
 but the direct contrary of the truth."* 
 
 The reader who may perchance have given this 
 matter but little consideration will now see that it 
 is not a mere question of abstruse philology, 
 worthy of the attention of scholars alone, but a 
 really practical issue, one that he will be called 
 upon to face when reading his lawyer's agreements, 
 when trying to decide whether to vote for free trade 
 or tariff reform, or when dealing with the affairs 
 of his business. Edward Johnson, a lively critic 
 of the last century, says: "If the legislators of 
 a country would but first settle among themselves 
 what is to be uniformly understood by such words 
 as right, wrong, good, bad, better, justice, im- 
 provement, reform, honour, dishonour, law, prin- 
 ciple, etc., I think it is clear that much sound 
 
 * Use and Abuse of Political Terms, p. 32.
 
 knowledge would take the place of much ridiculous 
 opinion, that good argument would succeed to a 
 mere noisy jargon, and confusion and much misery 
 be superseded by good order and an increase of 
 human happiness. It would no longer happen, 
 as it does now, that the morality of one man is 
 heinous in the eyes of another that the right of 
 to-day is the wrong of to-morrow that what one 
 man considers improvement another believes to be 
 deterioration that justice often becomes injustice 
 honour, dishonour principle, no principle at all 
 and law itself unlawful."* If our political quar- 
 rels are wordy, and about words (for they are 
 all aiming at the " best interests of the nation "), 
 so are our quarrels in theology, in philosophy, in 
 ethics, in practical sociology, and a host of other 
 matters. The lesson is simple, but difficult : simple 
 to understand, difficult to carry out. It is this 
 always define your terms. If more attention were 
 given to definitions at the beginning of an article 
 or a speech, there would be less trouble, fewer 
 disagreements, and a vast saving of time. 
 
 * Nuces Philosophies ; or, the Philosophy of Things as 
 developed -from the study of the Philosophy of Words.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ON SOCRATIC DISPUTATION. 
 
 WHEN Socrates argued with his friends it was not 
 after the manner of a modern disputant who defends 
 a position against all comers; it was by means of 
 cross examination. He asked his friends what they 
 meant by the words used to set forth their ideas ; he 
 tested their opinions by analysing the component 
 parts and by showing their lack of harmony with 
 other opinions expressed previously : he generally 
 proved to his friends that they did not see through 
 the veil of language to the clear idea ; or, if they did, 
 that the idea itself could not be justified. His 
 method was to put every alleged truth into the wit- 
 ness box. A good example is to be found in the dia- 
 logue called Menon. The characters are Socrates, 
 Menon, and his son Anytus. The opening question 
 is addressed to Socrates: "Can you tell me, So- 
 crates, whether virtue can or cannot be taught, or is 
 only acquired by practice, or in neither way, but 
 comes to men naturally?" Socrates begs Menon 
 to tell what virtue is. Menon declares that a man's 
 virtue is fitness for political business and causing 
 yourself or your friends to do well and your enemies 
 ill; while a woman's virtue is taking care of her 
 household, her husband, and her children. Socrates 
 
 142
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 143 
 
 considers himself in luck in having lighted on a 
 swarm of virtues, but what he wants to know is, 
 what is the essence of virtue? He asks, "Is it 
 possible to administer a state or family well, if not 
 doing it wisely or justly ? He must point out the 
 generic idea, not the concrete example of figure, 
 colour, and limit." Menexenus questions Socrates 
 and is rallied by him as not willing "to tell what 
 Georgias sa>s about virtue, and on his agreeable 
 outside, while he thinks little of Socrates' personal 
 recommendations. He is asked if he believes in the 
 effluxes and pores of Empedocles, what vision is, 
 hearing and smell, all which Menon professes to be 
 able to explain. Socrates begs him to tell about 
 virtue as a whole. Menon says it is a joying in 
 beautiful things and the being able to procure a 
 supply. Socrates asks, Do not all men desire good ? 
 Menon thinks not, but that some desire evil. Can 
 they do this knowing them to be evil. Do people 
 wish to be wretched ? 
 
 Again Socrates presses to be told what virtue is 
 as a whole. On this Menon complains that Socrates, 
 as he has before heard, is always doubting and 
 causing others to doubt; that he is befooling and 
 drugging and benumbing him like a flat fish, the 
 torpedo, and asserts he has avoided foreign travel 
 with reason. Socrates who a second time twits 
 Menon on the score of personal vanity, asserts that 
 he does not make others doubt when himself not 
 in perplexity, but because he is really in doubt and 
 does not know. "But how," asks Menon, "will 
 you know, when you light on a result, that this 
 is what you did not know?" The danger of this
 
 144 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 argument is alluded to. Socrates declares that he 
 has heard from men and women about divine 
 things, and then introduces the subject of the soul's 
 immortality and his doctrine of reminiscence ex- 
 planatory of his desire to investigate with Menon 
 what virtue is. Socrates will not be led to contra- 
 dict himself by any craft of Menon's. 
 
 Hereupon he summons one of the attendants of 
 the latter to put his doctrine to the proof. The 
 examination of the boy is continued, and the infer- 
 ences to be drawn from the latent knowledge elicited 
 are stated. It is proved that the boy has in him 
 right opinions : that if he did not gain this know- 
 ledge in this life, it was in an antecedent time. 
 This remembrance must be stirred in us; we shall 
 be the better for seeking to know what we do not 
 know. Socrates thinks that before we seek whether 
 virtue can be taught, we should strive to know 
 what it is. Here occurs a geometrical puzzle. If 
 virtue is knowledge, it can be taught. What other 
 than virtue shall we declare good to be ? What 
 are the things of use to us? Are they not health, 
 strength, beauty, and money ? And yet we talk 
 sometimes of these as beautiful ! Is it not the 
 right use of these that is profitable? Does not 
 fortitude sometimes become rashness ? It is 
 phronesis that makes virtue of advantage. This 
 being so, men cannot be good by nature. If it 
 were so, we should have had connoisseurs of virtue 
 who would have put a stamp on the genuine article. 
 If virtue is to be taught, must there not be teachers ? 
 Here Anytus drops in. Should we not go and fee 
 the sophists? But Anytus protests against this.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 145 
 
 Socrates asks if he is to believe that Protagoras, 
 who has got together what Phidias and ten of the 
 best statuaries have not earned, cannot teach virtue, 
 and declare it a sham that a man should have been 
 duping people for forty years when a cobbler or 
 old-clothes man would have been detected and 
 punished. Anytus says that it is not the sophists 
 who are mad, but the fools who give them money, 
 and is asked by Socrates whether they have ever 
 injured him that he inveigfcs so against them. 
 How is he to know if he has had no intercourse 
 with them ? Any one, Anytus declares, can make 
 a pupil good, better than the sophists. Socrates 
 on this asks whether any of the great and good 
 men referred to are such spontaneously or from 
 teaching. No doubt there have been, and still are, 
 such in the state. But have these men received it 
 from others, and can they transmit it? Take the 
 case of Themistocles : you know he taught his son 
 Cleophantus all that could be taught, but did you 
 ever hear that he was his father's equal or superior ? 
 Again, take Aristides, son of Lysimachus, or 
 Paralus and Xanthus, the two sons of Pericles- 
 That you may not think the failure was in the case 
 of inferior persons, take the case of Thucydides 
 and his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus. Surely 
 Thucydides, with all the advantages of wealth and 
 rank, would have succeeded if any one could ; but 
 no virtue is not to be taught. 
 
 Socrates again turns to Menon, and asks whether 
 in his city the nobles teach youth virtue? Menon 
 admires Georgias because he does not promise to 
 make his pupils virtuous only smart.
 
 146 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 Passing on, we get to another turn in the dis- 
 cussion on the value of right opinion as hardly 
 inferior to knowledge as a ground of action ; true 
 opinions, when chained by the runaway statues of 
 Daedalus becoming permanent, and not differing 
 from knowledge except in the matter of chain. 
 Right opinions are good as long as they last, but 
 they run from the soul like fugitive slaves. The 
 explanation of true opinion is still carried on, but 
 it is still denied that virtue can be taught. Socrates 
 asserts that Themistocles and others did not govern 
 the state as being wise, nor through perfect know- 
 ledge, but by correct opinion. They differ nothing 
 from oracle chaunters, but are divinely inspired, 
 gifted men, who, apart from knowledge, direct 
 successfully many and great affairs under a guid- 
 ance not their own. Virtue really comes to us by 
 a divine allotment, not inherited by nature, not 
 acquired by teaching. 
 
 A statesman who could make others statesmen, 
 would be among the living what Homer says 
 Tiresias was among the dead a true substance 
 among shadows. But though virtue comes by 
 divine allotment, we shall never know how it comes 
 to be present among men till we know what it is 
 absolutely in itself.* 
 
 In this much condensed outline the reader who 
 is not already familiar with Plato's dialogues will 
 obtain a fair notion of the method employed and 
 of the results obtained. It was employed largely 
 by the late St. George Mivart in his Philosophical 
 
 * Davy's Summary of Plato, p. 133.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 147 
 
 Catechism and Nature and Thotight. From the 
 former book I select the following: 
 
 Self-Evident Truths. 
 
 Can everything be proved? 
 
 Manifestly not. However long may be our argu- 
 ments, we must ultimately come to the statements 
 which must be taken for granted. 
 
 Must we then found our arguments on proposi- 
 tions which we believe blindly ? 
 
 By no means; for the truth of such propositions 
 is self-evident, and if it is not blind to believe 
 what is evident to us by means of something else, 
 it must be much less blind to believe that which 
 is directly evident in and by itself. 
 
 Give me some examples of self-evident truths. 
 
 My own existence ; that the whole is greater than 
 its part; that things which are equal to the same 
 thing are equal to one another; that nothing can 
 be and not be at the same time; and the conclusion 
 of every logically drawn deduction every valid 
 syllogism. 
 
 Is not syllogistic reasoning fallacious its con- 
 clusions being a mere repetition of part of the major 
 premiss ? 
 
 Certainly not : its conclusion imparts knowledge, 
 which is brought to the mind by the explicit recog- 
 nition of a truth implicitly contained in the minor 
 premiss. This is done by recognising the fact that 
 an object has certain characters inasmuch as it 
 belongs to a certain class. 
 
 But if any one knows a truth in which others
 
 148 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 are contained implicity, does he not know these 
 latter also ? 
 
 Not at all, otherwise a man by knowing the 
 definitions and axioms of Euclid would thereby 
 also know all the propositions relating to circles 
 and triangles which are implicitly contained in 
 those definitions and axioms. 
 
 Have you any reason to urge ? 
 
 Yes. It sometimes happens that a general prin- 
 ciple is more evident than a particular example 
 which comes under it, and our judgment as to the 
 latter may be much aided by viewing it in the light 
 of the former. 
 
 Can you explain how it is that many persons 
 think that to believe anything on its own evidence 
 is to believe it blindly? 
 
 In this way. Most of this knowledge is gained 
 by inference, and therefore persons have come to 
 associate the "inferred" with the "not blind," 
 and so think that everything we believe without 
 proof must be believed by us blindly, while that 
 which conies to us as the result of a reasoning 
 process is not believed blindly. 
 
 Are not, however, our senses what we must 
 appeal to in the last resort as the supreme tests 
 of truth? 
 
 No, for it is by our intellect that we know we 
 have and do employ our senses, and it is our intel- 
 lect which must judge when different sense impres- 
 sions conflict. Thus self-conscious reflective 
 thought, and not sense, is our ultimate and absolute 
 criterion. We may call this ultimate act of intel- 
 lectual perception "intellectual intuition."
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 149 
 
 Do you then distrust your own senses? 
 
 Not at all : I firmly believe that the certainty of 
 which I obtain through my sense. Nevertheless, 
 certainty is not in sensation, but belongs only to 
 thought. 
 
 Is our inability to conceive the negation of any- 
 thing an adequate test of the truth of that thing? 
 
 No. Such mere passive inability may be nothing 
 more than a mental impotence. Only when we 
 actively see that the negation of anything is posi- 
 tively impossible because its affirmation is unneces- 
 sarily true have we such a guarantee for truth. 
 
 How do you name things thus manifestly true ? 
 
 I call them " evident." 
 
 Do you then build merely upon what is but a 
 purely internal feeling of the individual ? 
 
 Certainly not. When I say "evident," I refer 
 to a property of things in themselves, as they exist 
 independently of us, or, as it is called, "objec- 
 tively," as well as to corresponding affections which 
 exist in us, or, as it is called, " subjectively." 
 That is to say, I refer not only to their subjective 
 evidence, but also to their corresponding external 
 condition of objective evidence. When anything 
 is evident both objectively and subjectively I call 
 it completely or simply evident. 
 
 How can we be sure we know anything external 
 or objective ? 
 
 That we must be able so to do is made clear to 
 us by our faculty of memory. This shows us that 
 we do really know existences and condftions which 
 are not ours now, and which are external and 
 objective to our present being.
 
 150 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 How does this character of the faculty of memory 
 affect the truth of this principle of evidence ? 
 
 It shows that we can know objective as well as 
 subjective conditions, and that therefore there is 
 no impossibility in our knowing that real quality 
 or objective evidence in a thing itself which is a 
 cause of its being evident to our minds, and so gives 
 it subjective evidence. 
 
 Can you give an instance of this perception of 
 ours of such concordance between objective and 
 subjective relations? 
 
 Yes, such a concordance is implied in every 
 proposition about external things known to us. 
 Thus, when I say "a negro is black," I affirm a 
 conformity between the external thing, "a negro," 
 and the external quality, blackness. I also affirm 
 a conformity between those two external entities 
 and any two corresponding internal concepts that 
 is to say, I affirm that there is really an external 
 thing corresponding to the term negro and an 
 external quality corresponding to the term black. 
 Besides these assertions, I also implicitly affirm a 
 correspondence between my mental judgments and 
 the corresponding objective co-existence. 
 
 Of course, St. George Mivart's methods are open 
 to the objection that the question and answer repre- 
 sent the work of one mind. This is true, but the 
 same criticism in some measure applies to Plato. 
 The point, however, lies in the real use of Socratic 
 disputation as distinct from an arranged argument 
 on paper. The advantages of such a system of 
 cross-examination has frequently been stated. 
 Watts thus quaintly sums up:
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 151 
 
 " Now the advantages of this method are very 
 considerable. It represents the form of a dialogue, 
 or common conversation, which is much more easy, 
 more pleasant, and a more sprightly way of in- 
 struction, and more fit to excite the attention, and 
 sharpen the penetration of the learner, than solitary 
 reading, or silent attention to a lecture. Man being 
 a sociable creature, delights more in conversation, 
 and learns better this way, if it could always be 
 wisely and happily practised. This method hath 
 something very obliging in it, and carries a very 
 humble and condescending air, when he that in- 
 structs seems to be the inquirer, and seeks informa- 
 tion from him who learns. It leads the learner 
 into the knowledge of truth as it were by his own 
 invention, which is a very pleasing thing to human 
 nature; and by questions pertinently and artificially 
 proposed, it draws him on to discover his own 
 mistakes, which he is much more easily persuaded 
 to relinquish when he seems to have discovered 
 them himself. It is managed in a great measure 
 in the form of the most easy reasoning, always 
 arising from something asserted or known in the 
 foregoing answer, and so proceeding to inquire 
 something unknown in the following question, 
 which again makes way for the next answer. Now 
 such an exercise is very alluring and entertaining 
 to the understanding, while its own reasoning 
 powers are all along employed, and that without 
 labour or difficulty, because the querist finds out 
 and proposes all the intermediate ideas or middle 
 terms."
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 
 
 IN the previous sections of this book we have 
 considered those principles of reasoning which have 
 a direct relation to the subject itself; we took the 
 subject and considered its attributes, its parts, its 
 causes, and its effects. In this section we shall 
 consider the subject in its relation to other things. 
 We will call the principles already discussed the 
 internal principles of reasoning; and those we are 
 now to discuss the external principles. 
 
 In reasoning from examples we adduce examples 
 in proof of the propositions we desire to establish. 
 Here are two specimens: 
 
 (a) It would be an extremely profitable thing to draw 
 up a short and well-authenticated account of the habits 
 of study of the most celebrated writers with whose style 
 of literary industry we happen to be most acquainted. It 
 would go very far to destroy the absurd and pernicious 
 association of genius and idleness, by showing them that 
 the greatest poets, orators, statesmen, and historians 
 men of the most brilliant and imposing talents have 
 actually laboured as hard as the makers of dictionaries 
 and the arrangers of indexes ; and that the most obvious 
 reason why they have been superior to other men is, 
 that they have taken more pains than other men. Gibbon 
 was in his study every morning, winter and summer, at 
 
 152
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 153 
 
 six o'clock; Mr. Burke was the most laborious and in- 
 defatigable of human beings; Leibnitz was never out 
 of his library; Pascal killed himself by study; Cicero 
 narrowly escaped death by the same cause ; Milton was 
 at his books with as much regularity as a merchant or 
 an attorney he had mastered all the knowledge of his 
 time; so had Homer. Raffaelle lived but thirty-seven 
 jears ; and in that short space carried the art so far 
 beyond what it had before reached, that he appears to 
 stand alone as a model to his successors. There are 
 instances to the contrary; but, generally speaking, the 
 life of all truly great men has been a life of intense and 
 incessant labour.* 
 
 (b) If then we consider the perpetual conflicts of savage 
 tribes, the frequent wars of the rival republics of Greece 
 with each other, and with their common enemies; if we 
 remember that the temple of Janus at Rome, always 
 open in the time of war, was never closed during five 
 centuries, till the end of the second Punic war, and then 
 only for a short time; if we advert to the desolation 
 caused by the Scythians, Goths, Vandals, Tartars, and 
 the destruction of about two millions of human beings 
 in the Crusades, it seems to be evident that wars were 
 anciently, and before the general use of firearms and 
 cannon, more frequent, protracted, destructive, and 
 cruel than they are noio.-f- 
 
 (2) This mode of reasoning from examples is called 
 by scholastic logicians induction, and is 
 opposed to deduction. 
 
 We will, then, illustrate the difference between 
 reasoning by induction and reasoning by deduction. 
 You have observed an individual come to poverty 
 by a dishonest course of action, and another arrive 
 
 * Sydney Smith's Moral Philosophy. 
 t Aiken's On War.
 
 154 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 at wealth by a life of rectitude ; and you remark, 
 " Honesty is the best policy." Here you reason 
 by induction. From these individual cases you 
 gather a proof of the general maxim, " Honesty 
 is the best policy." But suppose a person should 
 ask your advice how to act in a case wherein strict 
 integrity might appear to be less advantageous than 
 a more crooked procedure, and you observe to him, 
 "Honesty is the best policy"; here you reason 
 by deduction. You apply the general principle 
 to an individual case; you reason on the principle 
 of genus and species. These two kinds of reason- 
 ing are just the reverse of each other. When from 
 one or more examples you infer a general principle, 
 that is called induction, or reasoning from 
 examples. When from the general principle you 
 infer an individual case, that is called deduction, 
 or reasoning from genus and species. Induction 
 is reasoning from particulars to generals, and 
 deduction is reasoning from generals to particulars. 
 But you ask, How can I infer a general proposi- 
 tion from a small number of examples? Is it not 
 a rule, that " generals cannot be inferred from 
 particulars"? Very true. You cannot infer 
 generals from particulars, unless you have reason 
 to believe that all the particulars are alike. Our 
 reasoning here must depend upon the uniformity 
 of the laws of nature. When the law is uniform, 
 we can infer generals from particulars, because we 
 know that all particulars are in fact generals. This 
 is the case most frequently in the physical sciences. 
 All animals of the same species are alike. I see 
 that a horse has four legs : I may assert, then,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 155 
 
 that every horse in the world has four legs, though 
 I have not seen them all. I decompose a glass of 
 water, and find it is formed of oxygen and hydro- 
 gen : I therefore assert that all water, everywhere, 
 is composed of oxygen and hydrogen. But when 
 this constant uniformity does not exist, I cannot 
 reason so conclusively ; and my reasonings will be 
 weaker and weaker in proportion to this want of 
 uniformity ; and hence we shall have to descend 
 from certain reasonings, to probable reasonings, 
 and then lower, to doubtful reasonings, until at 
 last our examples may be so few or so conflicting, 
 that we may have no foundation for any reasoning 
 at all respecting the matter in dispute.* 
 
 Don't erect general theories from a few peculiar ob- 
 servations, appearances, or experiments. This is what 
 the logicians call a false induction. When general ob- 
 servations are drawn from so many particulars as to 
 become certain and indubitable, these are jewels of 
 knowledge, comprehending great treasure in a little 
 room : but they are, therefore, to be made with the 
 greater care and caution, lest errors become large and 
 diffusive, if we should mistake in these general notions. 
 
 Some writers make a distinction between reason- 
 ing from example and reasoning from induction, 
 the example is one, induction is more than one. 
 
 * " When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we 
 term the mental act or state induced, a conjecture ; when 
 they are strong, we term it an inference or conclusion. In- 
 crease the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclu- 
 sion ; diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into 
 a conjecture. The process which ends in a conclusion, and 
 the process which ends in a conjecture, are thus essentially 
 the same, and differ only in degree, or in the force of the 
 evidence." Bailey, p. 31.
 
 156 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 But there seems no ground for this distinction. 
 The mode of reasoning is the same : the only differ- 
 ence is in the degree of proof. The greater the 
 number of examples, of course, the greater is the 
 amount of evidence in proof of the general proposi- 
 tion.* 
 
 In reasoning then from genus and species, we 
 infer, you perceive, individual cases from universal 
 rules. In reasoning from examples, we reverse our 
 mode of reasoning; and from one or more examples 
 we prove the general rule. 
 
 We use the inductive method in regard to the 
 physical sciences, such as astronomy, chemistry, 
 etc. We see several instances in which fire melts 
 lead ; we infer it will always do so, and when we 
 are satisfied that this is the case, we call it a law 
 of nature. It was also by this method that philo- 
 sophers have discovered the laws of astronomy. 
 By the same rule we discover the laws of medicine : 
 if a medicine cures in a great number of cases, we 
 infer that it will always cure in similar cases. In 
 the science of morals, we also observe that certain 
 vices lead to misery ; and we infer that vice will 
 always lead to misery, and virtue to happiness. 
 In politics, we observe in the history of the world 
 what institutions and what laws have conduced to 
 the happiness of the people ; we gather together 
 these instances, and thus form maxims for the 
 
 "It is obvious that whether we can draw an inference 
 from a single fact, or whether it is needful to have a collec- 
 tion of facts, depends altogether on what is requisite for 
 establishing a similarity in the influential circumstances of 
 each case, and does not affect the character of the reason- 
 ing." Bailey, p. 10.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 157 
 
 government of nations. In political economy we 
 observe, or should observe, the same practice But 
 political economists have too often wandered into 
 other paths. Instead of deducing their principles 
 from facts, they have first formed their theories, 
 and then made facts bend to their theories. Hence 
 we have theories of population, theories of rent, 
 theories of the currency, and theories of taxation, 
 advanced and supported in a way more in accord- 
 ance with the Aristotelian than with the Baconian 
 system of philosophy. 
 
 (3) The following explanation of the nature of 
 induction is taken from Hill's Logic: 
 
 An induction in which every individual case is enu- 
 merated is a perfect demonstration. And in general, the 
 more nearly we approach to the entire enumeration, the 
 higher is the degree of probability attained by the in- 
 duction : provided, at least, that no facts of an oppo- 
 site tendency are discoverable ; or that if they occur, they 
 are satisfactorily shown r >t to be really inconsistent 
 with the principle deduced. The great error in induc- 
 tion is too great haste in drawing a conclusion without 
 having premised a sufficient number of individual cases. 
 Many, for example, if they have met with or heard of 
 one or two dishonest lawyers, or observed a comet in a 
 warm summer, think themselves authorised to draw the 
 sweeping inference, that all lawyers are dishonest, or 
 all comets occasion a warm season. 
 
 The difference between deduction and induction 
 may be illustrated by the methods of proving that 
 the interior of the earth is in a molten condition. 
 From the volcanic phenomena, i.e., from the fact 
 that the earth is in a molten condition under Mount 
 Vesuvius, Mount Hecla, Mount Etna, and others,
 
 158 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 it is inferred inductively that the whole interior is 
 in such condition. From the process of the earth's 
 formation by the condensation of intensely heated 
 material (an origin probable on astronomic 
 grounds), it is inferred deductively that the interior 
 is in a molten condition. The one process starts 
 from facts; the other from a general principle. 
 They are usually thrown into syllogistic form as 
 follows : * 
 
 INDUCTIVE PROCESS. DEDUCTIVE PROCESS. 
 
 The interior of the earth The interior of the earth is 
 
 is molten ; molten ; 
 
 For, it is molten under For the Solar system was 
 
 Vesuvius, etc. ; formed by condensation ; 
 
 And Vesuvius, etc., fairly And the earth is a part of 
 
 represents the whole. the Solar system. 
 
 In order to reason correctly on inductive lines 
 it is necessary to obey two rules, which, although 
 apparently simple in themselves, are not always 
 easy to keep. 
 
 First Rule. Observe, analyse, and classify the 
 facts to be generalised and explained, in order to 
 ascertain their reality and their various elements 
 and relations. 
 
 This rule guards against two common sources 
 of error in induction. The first is that of assuming 
 to be fact what is not fact. Charles II. propounded 
 a problem to the Royal Society. He asked : Why 
 does a live fish in water increase the weight, while 
 a dead fish does not ? The Society took the matter 
 seriously, and gravely thought out scientific 
 
 * Gregory's Practical Logic, p. 136.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 159 
 
 explanations. If they had asked, " Is it a fact? " 
 they would have saved themselves the trouble of 
 trying to solve an imaginary problem. The second 
 is the error from getting only a partial view of 
 the facts, or from failure to get them in their rela- 
 tions. This is illustrated in Stahl's method of 
 accounting for combustion by the extrication of a 
 substance supposed to be contained in all com- 
 bustible matter called phlogiston, which went up 
 in the flame. Combustion results in the visible 
 residue of ashes and the invisible phlogiston, which 
 passes off. The error was in the non-observation 
 of an important part of the actual residue the 
 gaseous products of combustion. When these were 
 at last taken into account, it was found that the 
 gases, with the ashes, weighed much more than 
 the substance burned, so that there was no room 
 for phlogiston. 
 
 Second Rule. Correctly interpret the facts, i.e., 
 seek to find the appropriate cause for the facts and 
 basis for the generalisation. 
 
 By cause, in induction, is meant operating power, 
 or more strictly "power which in operating 
 originates new forms of being." It is anything 
 which has efficiency, and exerts it in producing 
 change; and hence is often called efficient cause. 
 It should be distinguished from law, which has no 
 efficiency, but is merely an expression of an estab- 
 lished sequence of facts, or the regular order in 
 which a cause operates.* 
 
 * Gregory's Practical Logic, p. 137.
 
 160 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 To employ these rules intelligently it is necessary 
 to invent hypotheses for the provisional work of 
 interpretation. If I found that a certain plant grew 
 better in darkness than in light, I should have to 
 observe and experiment with other plants until I 
 came to some sort of conclusion as to why this 
 plant was so different from its fellow plants. The 
 conclusion may be a wrong one, but still it renders 
 good service as a working hypothesis; it enables 
 me to study the subject more methodically, and, 
 as often happens, it may ultimately lead me to the 
 real truth. The habit of hypothesis formation is 
 a sound intellectual habit, and can as easily be 
 applied to economics, politics, ethics, trade, as to 
 natural science. The danger to be guarded 
 against is the inherent attractiveness of a new 
 hypothesis. A man looks upon it as the child of 
 his imagination, and he fosters it as tenderly as 
 the child of his body with the result that hard 
 facts which refute it altogether meet with a grudg- 
 ing welcome, sometimes with unscientific hostility.
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 REASONING FROM ANALOGY COMPARISON AND 
 CONTRAST. 
 
 BY reasoning from analogy we mean reasoning 
 about one thing from its resemblance to another 
 thing; consequently any mal-observation in com- 
 parison and contrast between the two things under 
 investigation will vitiate the conclusion ; for the 
 argument in this case is not based upon an iden- 
 tity, but upon a relation. 
 
 Before discussing fully the nature, limitations, 
 and fallacies of this form of reasoning, we will 
 give a selected list of such arguments. They are 
 reproduced here not because we believe them to 
 be models and free from all error, but because they 
 are representative in quality and variety. 
 
 (i) From Sydney Smith : 
 
 It would be a very curious question to agitate, how 
 far understanding is transmitted from parent to child; 
 and within what limits it can be improved by culture : 
 whether all men are born equal with respect to their 
 understanding ; or whether there is an original diversity 
 antecedent to all imitation and instruction. The analogy 
 of animals is in favour of the transmissibility of mind. 
 Some ill-tempered horses constantly breed ill-tempered 
 colts ; and the foal never has seen the sire therefore, in 
 this, there can be no imitation. If the eggs of a wild 
 
 161
 
 1 62 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 duck are hatched under a tame duck, the young brood 
 will be much wilder than any common brood of poultry : 
 if they are kept all their lives in a farm-yard, and treated 
 kindly, and fed well, their eggs hatched under another 
 bird produce a much tamer race. 
 
 (2) From William Paley : 
 
 I suppose it will be allowed, that, to advance a direct 
 falsehood, in recommendation of our wares, by ascrib- 
 ing to them some quality which we know that they have 
 not, is dishonest. Now, compare with this the designed 
 concealment of some fault, which we know that they 
 have ; the motive in these two cases is the same, and the 
 prejudice to the buyer is also the same. The practice of 
 passing bad money is sometimes defended by a vulgar 
 excuse, that we have taken the money for good, and 
 must therefore get rid of it. Which excuse is much the 
 same as if one who had been robbed on the highway, 
 should imagine he had a right to reimburse himself out 
 of the pocket of the first traveller he met. 
 
 (3) From Edmund Burke: 
 
 I confess to you freely that the sufferings and dis- 
 tresses of the people of America in this cruel war have 
 at times affected me more deeply than I can express. 
 I felt every gazette of triumph as a blow upon my heart, 
 which has a hundred times sunk and fainted within me 
 at all the mischiefs brought upon those who bear the 
 whole brunt of war in the heart of their country. Yet 
 the Americans are utter strangers to me; a nation among 
 whom I am not sure that I have a single acquaintance. 
 Was I to suffer my mind to be so unaccountably warped, 
 was I to keep such iniquitous weights and measures of 
 temper and reason as to sympathise with those who are 
 in open rebellion against an authority which I respect, 
 at war with a country which by every title ought to be 
 and is most dear to me and yet to have no feeling at 
 all for the hardships and indignities suffered by men who
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 163 
 
 by their very vicinity are bound up in a nearer relation 
 to us, who contribute their share, and more than their 
 share, to the common prosperity, who perform the 
 common offices of social life, and who obey the laws to 
 the full, as well as I do. [Burke advocates sympathy 
 for the Irish Roman Catholics as more natural for the 
 English than sympathy with the Americans.] 
 
 (4) From Cardinal Newman : 
 
 You will see what I mean by the parallel of bodily 
 health. Health is a good thing in itself, though nothing 
 came of it, and is especially worth seeking and cherish- 
 ing; yet, after all, the blessings which attend its 
 presence are so great, while they are so close to it, and 
 so redound back upon it and encircle it, that we never 
 think of it except as useful as well as good, and praise 
 and prize it for what it does as well as for w r hat it is, 
 though, at the same time, we cannot point out any 
 definite and distinct work or production which it can be 
 said to effect. And so as regards intellectual culture, I 
 am far from denying utility in this large sense as the 
 end of Education, when I lay it down that the culture 
 of the intellect is good in itself and its own end. I do 
 not exclude from the idea of intellectual culture what it 
 cannot but be from the very nature of things; I only 
 deny that we must be able to point out before we have 
 any right to call it useful, some art or business, or pro- 
 fession, or trade, or work, as resulting from it, and as 
 its real or complete end. The parallel is exact : As 
 the body may be sacrificed to some manual or other toil, 
 whether moderate or oppressive, so may the intellect be 
 devoted to some particular profession ; and I do not call 
 this the culture of the intellect. Again, as some 
 member or organ of the body may be inordinately used 
 or developed, so may memory, or imagination, or the 
 reasoning faculty ; and this again is not intellectual cul- 
 ture. On the other hand, as the body may be tended,
 
 164 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its 
 general health, so may the intellect also be generally 
 exercised in order to its perfect state; and this is its 
 cultivation. 
 
 (5) From Professor Jevons: 
 
 We may rely upon it that indefinite and to us incon- 
 ceivable advances will be made by the human intellect, 
 in the absence of any unforeseen catastrophe to the 
 species or the globe. Almost within historical periods 
 we can trace the rise of mathematical science from its 
 simplest genus. We can prove our descent from ances- 
 tors who counted only on their fingers, but how almost 
 infinitely is a Newton or a Laplace above all simple 
 savages. Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a heca- 
 tomb when he discovered the 47th proposition of Euclid, 
 and the occasion was worthy of the sacrifice. Archimedes 
 was beside himself when he first perceived his beautiful 
 mode of determining specific gravities. Yet these great 
 discoveries are the simplest elements of our school-boy 
 knowledge. Step by step we can trace upwards the 
 acquirement of new mental powers. What could be 
 more wonderful and unexpected than Napier's discovery 
 of logarithms, a wholly new mode of calculation, which 
 has multiplied perhaps a hundredfold the working 
 powers of every computer and, indeed, has rendered easy 
 calculations which were before almost impracticable. 
 Since the time of Newton and Leibnitz whole worlds of 
 problems have been solved which before were hardly 
 conceived as matters of enquiry. In our own day ex- 
 tended methods of mathematical reasoning, such as the 
 system of quaternions, have been brought into existence. 
 What intelligent man will doubt that the recondite 
 speculations of a Cayley or a Sylvester may possibly 
 lead to some new methods, at the simplicity and power 
 of which a future age will wonder, and yet wonder more, 
 that to us they were so dark and difficult. [Argument 
 from past examples to future truths.]
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 165 
 
 These specimens are sufficiently varied to show 
 the extent of reasoning by analogy in our everyday 
 thought as well as our more serious attempts in 
 reflective moments ; for as Jevons points out in his 
 Logic, analogical reasoning is the type of all 
 reasoning: "Two things resemble each other in 
 one or more respects; a certain proposition is true 
 of the one; therefore it is true of the other. In 
 science, ethics, politics, political economy, trade 
 in no sphere is reasoning by analogy an absent 
 quantity, unless it be in the gospels of social 
 dreamers, who, having no past model to guide 
 them, draw pictures of an Elysian state from the 
 realms of imagination. Even a caricature in Punch 
 is founded on the principle of analogy. The pro- 
 rogation of Parliament in 1850 was represented by 
 " Lord John Russell shutting up shop " ; and when 
 William II. dismissed Bismarck, Sir John Tenniel's 
 cartoon represented the Emperor as " Dropping 
 the Pilot." Dean Swift's satires on the political 
 and religious disagreements of his day have a 
 similar basis in the use of analogy. 
 
 The political parties were distinguished from 
 each other by the high and low heels of their shoes. 
 The heir-apparent (afterwards George II.) wore one 
 heel higher than the other, which gave him a hobble 
 in his gait he was evidently halting between two 
 opinions. The religious parties were styled the 
 Big-endians and the Little-endians; the former 
 always broke their eggs before they ate them on 
 the big end, the latter on the little end. The words 
 of their prophet were, " Let all true believers break 
 their eggs on the most convenient end." A few
 
 166 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 statesmen thought this meant " that every true 
 believer should break his egg on that end which 
 seemed to him to be the most convenient." But 
 this construction was not generally admitted, and 
 many hundred large volumes had been published 
 on the controversy. In his " Tale of a Tub " the 
 Dean has, in the supposed adventures of three 
 brothers, Peter, Martin, and Jack, given what he 
 deems a representation of the Catholic, Lutheran, 
 and Calvinistic Churches. 
 
 But it must be admitted that in cases of this kind 
 analogy is used more by way of exposition than 
 of argument, although the latter element is never 
 absent. Exposition and the argument that lies 
 latent in it is developed by comparison and con- 
 trast, two words that young students frequently 
 confuse. Comparison takes note of similarities; 
 contrast takes note of differences. The following 
 passage from the indictment of Guy Fawkes pro- 
 ceeds on the basis of comparison, and is a good 
 specimen of what is known as argumentum a 
 fortiori. 
 
 The matter that is now to be offered to you, my Lords 
 the Commissioners, and to the trial of you the knights 
 and gentlemen of the jury, is matter of treason ; but of 
 such horror and monstrous nature, that before now the 
 tongue of man never delivered, the ear of man never 
 heard, the heart of man never conceited, nor the malice 
 of hellish or earthly devil ever practised. For if it be 
 abominable to murder the least; if to touch God's 
 anointed be to oppose themselves against God; if (by 
 blood) to subvert princes, states, and kingdoms, be hate- 
 ful to God and man, as all true Christians must acknow- 
 ledge; then how much more than too monstrous shall
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 167 
 
 all Christian hearts judge the horror of this treason, to 
 murder and subvert such a king, such a queen, such a 
 prince, such a progeny, such a state, such a govern- 
 ment, so complete and absolute ; that God approves : the 
 world admires : all true English hearts honour and 
 reverence : the Pope and his disciples only envy and 
 malign. 
 
 Here is a further specimen from the United States 
 Congress at a time when they were discussing the 
 Fugitive Slaves Bill. The Hon. J. R. Giddings 
 said : 
 
 Thus, fellow-citizens, you and I are liable at any hour 
 to be called upon to pursue the flying bondman as he 
 hastens towards a land of freedom. We have become 
 a nation of slave-hunters, and slave-catchers. The man 
 who shall seize a slave upon the African coast, is by 
 our law consigned to the gallows, and deemed unworthy 
 of an existence among civilised, and even barbarous 
 people ; but how much greater must be the guilt of him 
 who seizes the enlightened and intelligent Christian, one 
 who holds the same religion, and trusts in the same 
 salvation as himself, and riveting the cold iron upon his 
 trembling limbs, sends him back to bondage and suffer- 
 ing. We know that the benighted African is uncon- 
 scious of his rights, and incapable of appreciating his 
 degradation : yet we hang the man who arrests and con- 
 signs him to slavery. This we regard as just : but what 
 penalty can be regarded as commensurate with the 
 crime of seizing upon our fellow-man, whose mind has 
 been enlightened, who knows the rights with which God 
 has endowed him, who comprehends the crime com- 
 mitted against him, and of sending him back to a land 
 of chains, and whips, and suffering? In my opinion, 
 such crime far transcends that of the ordinary pirate. 
 Indeed, I think the thief or the pirate far more entitled 
 to our friendship, than he who under such circumstances
 
 i68 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 will lend himself to the commission of the crimes which 
 the law requires us to perpetrate. 
 
 The argument by contrast, that is, the noting 
 of differences and the inferences to be drawn there- 
 from, are well set forth in the following passage. It 
 was written many years ago, and will afford the 
 reader an opportunity of finding out what state- 
 ments no longer hold good, and how far they 
 invalidate the argument. 
 
 The United States are, singularly enough, taken by 
 both the advocates and the opponents of universal 
 suffrage as a conclusive example for and against the 
 same system ; and it is not the least curious part of the 
 paradox that the principal cause of the facts which are 
 pleaded and exaggerated by both parties lies out of the 
 sphere of politics altogether. It is to the prodigious 
 amount of fertile soil, compared with the smallness of 
 the population, and to the consequent cheapness of land 
 and dearness of labour, that North America owes, in a 
 great measure, the prosperity, morality, and content- 
 ment of her people, and the comparative security of life 
 and property. And it is to the same cause that we 
 should attribute the major part of that spirit of specula- 
 tion, that rabid thirst for wealth, that inferiority in arts 
 and literature, that absence of refinement, that selfish 
 kimboing, jostling race through life, of which brother 
 Jonathan is sometimes justly, and oftener unjustly, 
 accused : the United States are, and must long remain, 
 a country of material production, with its advantages 
 and its disadvantages. It follows, that the conditions 
 under which complete consistent democracy has been 
 tried on the other side of the Atlantic are so unlike those 
 of Europe, that we cannot infer, with any certainty, from 
 the success of the institutions of the former, that they 
 would succeed on our more crowded shores.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 169 
 
 The contrast between Protestant and Catholic 
 states is thus described by Mr. Macaulay : 
 
 From the time when the barbarians overran the 
 Western Empire, to the time of the revival of letters, 
 the influence of the Church of Rome had been generally 
 favourable to science, to civilisation, and to good 
 government. But during the last three centuries, to 
 stunt the growth of the human mind has been her chief 
 object. Throughout Christendom, whatever advance 
 has been made in knowledge, in freedom, in wealth, and 
 in the arts of life, has been made in spite of her, and 
 has everywhere been in inverse proportion to her power. 
 The loveliest and most fertile provinces of Europe have, 
 under her rule, been sunk in poverty, in political servi- 
 tude, and in intellectual torpor, while Protestant coun- 
 tries, once proverbial for sterility and barbarism, have 
 been turned by skill and industry into gardens, and can 
 boast of a long list of heroes and statesmen, philoso- 
 phers and poets. Whoever, knowing what Italy and 
 Scotland naturally are, and what four hundred years ago 
 they actually w^ere, shall now compare the country round 
 Rome with the country round Edinburgh, will be able 
 to form some judgment as to the tendency of Papal 
 domination. The descent of Spain, once the first among 
 monarchies, to the lowest depths of degradation; the 
 elevation of Holland, in spite of many natural disadvan- 
 tages, to a position such as no commonwealth so small 
 has ever reached, teach the same lesson. Whoever 
 passes in Germany from a Roman Catholic to a Protes- 
 tant principality ; in Switzerland from a Roman Catholic 
 to a Protestant canton ; in Ireland from a Roman Catho- 
 lic to a Protestant country, finds that he has passed 
 from a lower to a higher grade of civilisation. On the 
 other side of the Atlantic the same law prevails. The 
 Protestants of the United States have left far behind 
 them the Roman Catholics of Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. 
 The Roman Catholics of Canada remain inert, while the 
 M
 
 170 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 whole continent round them is in a ferment with Protes- 
 tant activity and enterprise.* 
 
 In the scientific world, indeed in almost every 
 department of knowledge, analogy and contrast are 
 great aids to discovery. The analogy of logic and 
 algebra was the basis of the discoveries made in 
 logic by Professor Boole. The detection of differ- 
 ence or likeness of things discovered by comparison 
 with things already known is essential to successful 
 research. This is as true for a business man as 
 for a man of science. Many Americans have falsely 
 reasoned that because a certain product sold well 
 in the States, it would sell well here. They made 
 the mistake of dwelling on points of analogy be- 
 tween English conditions and American conditions 
 ignoring the contrasts and differences. 
 
 * As the argument is based on material conditions, how 
 far is it invalidated by the present state of Canada and South 
 America, to say nothing of the United States?
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 REASONING FROM STATISTICS. 
 
 THE place which figures occupy in arguments that 
 relate to politics, trade, and sociology is so impor- 
 tant that it has been considered almost necessary 
 to devote a section to the study of first principles. 
 Few people know how to approach a table of figures 
 showing the state of labour, or the comparative 
 number of births, or any other facts that can be 
 put in numerical form. The truths stated are sup- 
 posed to be as evident as those in a profit and loss 
 account, needing no minute analysis, and contain- 
 ing no features that may eventuate in subtle fal- 
 lacies. 
 
 If statistics were so simple as is often imagined, 
 we should not have the accusing picture of free 
 traders and tariff reformers brewing their own 
 dogmatic conclusions from the same sets of figures ; 
 for over and over again the free trader has 
 examined a government blue-book only to find 
 astounding confirmation of his views, and the tariff 
 reformer has pondered the same tables of returns 
 without receiving a shock to his tariff convictions. 
 The necessary complexity and subtlety of statistics 
 is one of the first lessons to be learned. I mean, of 
 course, statistics referring to a huge aggregate of 
 people or commodities. There is not much room 
 for differences of opinion about a balance-sheet : 
 it is either good or bad, or, at any rate, promising 
 or unpromising ; whilst the profit or loss is revealed 
 
 171
 
 i;2 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 in the presence or absence of dividends. But the 
 state of the trade of the nation as revealed in a big 
 Return is quite a different matter, partly because 
 of the vast number of facts tabulated, and partly 
 because there are some things which can never be 
 embodied in figures. Professor Bowley says : 
 "We cannot measure health, poverty, or crime: 
 we can only measure the death-rate and count 
 the number of persons who seek public relief, and 
 the number of convictions. In such cases the 
 measurements can only be used as indications, and 
 their relation to the more important quantity must 
 be constantly criticised, while other indications 
 should be obtained wherever possible to check the 
 impressions formed."* 
 
 (i) In arguments based on statistics the first 
 enquiry should be directed towards the origin of 
 the figures. Who tabulated them ? If they are 
 the figures of a first-rate authority, they are worthy 
 of consideration ; but if he uses them to prove a 
 much-debated issue, they should be carefully com- 
 pared with figures published by authorities on the 
 other side, or, better still, use some authority quite 
 independent. In the case of the national balance- 
 sheet this is easily possible, for all government 
 returns are unprejudiced at any rate, they contain 
 as little political prejudice as any other publications 
 mostly no prejudice at all. The debater who 
 quotes statistics glibly is many a time brought up 
 abruptly by being asked his authority. Thus the 
 oft-repeated statement that there are 13,000,000 of 
 
 * Elementary Manual of Statistics, p. 4.
 
 173 
 
 people in this country on the verge of starvation 
 falls a ready prey to the questioner. Who is the 
 authority for the statement ? Those to whom it is 
 a weapon of warfare. 
 
 (2) The next item is the need to know exactly 
 what is contained in the tables before you. Sup- 
 pose those tables tell you the number of cattle in 
 Great Britain during a certain period of years. 
 That sounds very simple, but it is not so simple 
 as it looks, for, as Professor Bowley remarks, 
 What is a cow ? is a standard question in agri- 
 cultural statistics. Similarly, in an account of 
 registered births, it is not inopportune to inquire 
 what is understood by a registered birth. There 
 are many fallacies abroad which could be disposed 
 of at once by a little keen analysis of what lies 
 behind the formidable array of figures. 
 
 (3) Professor Bowley, in his section on Rules for 
 using published Statistics, has a useful suggestion 
 on what he called homogeneity : are the persons 
 or things referred to similar? do they form a homo- 
 geneous group? For instance, there has been a 
 serious decrease in the number of agricultural 
 labourers in this country during the last half cen- 
 tury. Before placing too much stress on that fact, 
 is it not wise to enquire whether fifty years ago 
 the same class of people were called agricultural 
 labourers, or whether in the later tables dairymen 
 are included who were not included previously? 
 
 (4) Statistics to be really serviceable should be 
 allowed to tell their own story. Too often men 
 form a theory, and then go out in search of figures
 
 174 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 to bolster it up. If the figures point the other way, 
 they either let them alone or doctor them to suit 
 the theory. Hence the sneer: "You can prove 
 anything from statistics." 
 
 I will now reproduce two specimen arguments 
 based on figures, not as being necessarily true 
 arguments, but as being the work of an authority, 
 and as showing some of the characteristics required 
 in such forms of reasoning. The quotations are 
 from An Enquiry into the Economic Condition of 
 the Country (1904), by R. H. Inglis Palgrave, 
 F.R.S. 
 
 The produce of the income tax and the progress of 
 the deposits in the Post Office Savings Banks are often 
 quoted as proofs of our prosperity. I will put those 
 figures also before you, and you shall judge for your- 
 selves what they mean. 
 
 TABLE II. 
 Income Tax, 1843-1901. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Produce 
 per i,'. in the 
 of the 
 Income Tax. 
 
 Proportion to 
 First Year 
 1843=100. 
 
 Produce per 
 Head of the 
 Population 
 in Pence. 
 
 Difference in 
 this + or 
 in each 
 Decade. 
 
 
 
 
 % 
 
 d. 
 
 a. 
 
 1843 
 
 772,166 
 
 100 
 
 6-93 
 
 
 
 1851 
 
 786,886 
 
 I O2 
 
 6-90 
 
 - -03 
 
 1861 
 
 1,122,258 
 
 145 
 
 9-30 
 
 + 2-40 
 
 1871 
 
 1,587,596 
 
 206 
 
 12-10 
 
 + 2-80 
 
 1881 
 
 1,915,683 
 
 248 
 
 13-17 
 
 + 1-07 
 
 1891 
 
 2,238,130 
 
 290 
 
 14-23 
 
 + 1-06 
 
 1901 
 
 2,531,462 
 
 328 
 
 14-65 
 
 + -42 
 
 These figures show the produce of a penny in the 
 of the income tax for every ten years since the tax was 
 first levied. It has been levied at very different rates 
 in different years, but the amount raised by each penny 
 of the tax supplies a very good basis of comparison from
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 175 
 
 one year to another. The years chosen are those of the 
 Census Returns, for reasons which I will shortly ex- 
 plain. A census of the population of these islands is 
 taken every ten years. The first year when the income 
 tax was levied was 1843. There was no census in that 
 year, and, therefore, the produce of the tax in 1843 is 
 compared with the numbers of the population in 1841. 
 After that date the figures referring to the income tax 
 follow the exact years of the census. We usually find 
 that people quote the figures of the yield of the penny 
 in the of the income tax exactly as they stand. You 
 will see that every penny in the yielded over three 
 times as much in 1901 as it had done in 1843. The 
 figures run from 772,000 in 1843 up to ^2,531,000 
 in 1901. Hence the yield in 1901 was over three times 
 as large as it had been when the tax was first imposed. 
 According to this computation the country would appear 
 to be more than three times as wealthy now as it was in 
 1843. But is it the right method of interpretation, to 
 take these figures singly by themselves, separate from 
 all other elements of progress in the country ? Are there 
 no other points which we ought to consider? Ought 
 not the numbers of the population also to be brought 
 into account? If those who pay the tax become twice 
 as many in number, the produce of the tax would exactly 
 be doubled, while each individual would, on average, be 
 no better off than he was before. Surely the numbers 
 of the people ought to be taken into account, and we 
 ought to divide the amount of the tax by the numbers 
 of the people at the time the tax was paid. When in- 
 vestigated thus the result is shown to be very different 
 from what it seems to be when the tax alone is con- 
 sidered. . . . There have been some considerable abate- 
 ments off the income tax in recent years, but allowing 
 for these, the general lesson to be learnt from the figures 
 remains unchanged. One main lesson is to be learnt 
 from them. This is that the yield in the tax increases 
 more slowly now than formerly. This shows in plain
 
 176 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 words that the country is not prospering as much now 
 as some years ago. 
 
 Further evidence to this effect is found in the returns 
 of the Post Office Savings Bank from 1896 onwards. 
 Now, it is never pleasant to people to show them that 
 they are not getting on so well as they had done, and 
 the point is one which may touch us all very closely. 
 But my readers must bear with me while I put the facts 
 before them. 
 
 TABLE III. 
 
 POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS, 1896-1902. 
 Details of Deposits and Investments in Public Funds. 
 
 V*arc 
 
 Excess of 
 
 Interest 
 
 
 Amount of 
 Money 
 
 
 Withdrawals. 
 
 Depositors. 
 
 
 Invested in 
 Public Funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1806 . 
 
 7,769,000 
 
 2,461,000 
 
 10,230,000 
 
 1,065,000 
 
 1897 . 
 
 5,132,000 
 
 2,666,000 
 
 7,798,000 
 
 1,079,000 
 
 1898 . 
 
 4,409,000 
 
 2,838,000 
 
 7,247,000 
 
 1,304,000 
 
 1899 . 
 
 3,951,000 
 
 3,024,000 
 
 6,973,000 
 
 1,770,000 
 
 1900 . 
 
 2,285,000 
 
 3,146,000 
 
 5,431,000 
 
 2,830,000 
 
 1901 . 
 
 1,562,000 
 
 3,281,000 
 
 4,843,000 
 
 3,065,000 
 
 1902 . 
 
 821,000 
 
 3,391,000 
 
 4,212,000 
 
 2,593,000 
 
 These figures show that the new money paid in by 
 depositors described in the table as the excess of 
 deposits over withdrawals which was nearly 
 ;8, 000,000 in 1896, diminished to little over 
 ;8oo,ooo in 1902, barely one-tenth of what it had 
 been but seven years before. I have looked through 
 the annual reports of the Postmaster-General, and 
 I find that the net amount deposited in 1902 was 
 actually the smallest recorded since the Post Office 
 Savings Bank commenced operations in 1861. It 
 is true that the investments in the public funds 
 made through the medium of the Post Office, 
 which are shown in the last column of the table, more 
 than doubled during the period 1896-1902. But these
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 177 
 
 investments had fallen off in 1902 from the amount they 
 had reached in 1901, and they by no means make up 
 for the diminution in the deposits. The figures for 1903 
 have not yet been published completely, but they appear 
 to indicate an actual decrease in the deposits of the 
 Post Office Savings Banks. A similar diminution has 
 been noticed elsewhere. Thus the Lord Provost of 
 Glasgow, speaking at the 68th annual meeting of the 
 Glasgow Savings Bank, held 24th December, 1903, 
 stated that the withdrawals of money during the year 
 exceeded the deposits by some ^50,000 at that institu- 
 tion. The Glasgow Savings Bank is a large one, with 
 deposits of nearly ten millions. It is true that the In- 
 dustrial Insurance offices, such offices as the Refuge and 
 the Prudential, and similar institutions which receive 
 weekly payments of premiums for life policies, have 
 recently been very active. I am glad that these offices 
 are active, and that they induce more people to save, 
 but the additions to the funds in the savings banks 
 ought, according to the precedents of former yearSj to 
 have been far larger than they were in the years from 
 1899 to 1902. The falling off in them indicates that the 
 working classes are not doing so well as in years past. 
 This indication of their want of means coincides with 
 the diminished occupation in several important branches 
 of our industries shown by recent returns of the Board 
 of Trade. 
 
 We have thus examined roughly into the condition 
 of two great classes in the community, those who pay 
 income tax and who are customers of the banks of the 
 country, and those who place their savings in the Post 
 Office Savings Bank. Neither appears to be prospering 
 so much as formerly. 
 
 We do not affirm this argument can be sub- 
 stantiated : it may, or it may not. Our present 
 purpose is to use it as a model of careful analysis 
 and equally careful reasoning.
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 REASONING FROM HISTORY. 
 
 THERE are two problems before the historian : he 
 has to discover what events actually took place, 
 no light task in some instances where the evidence 
 is confused and the testimony conflicting; and he 
 has then to interpret the facts, showing their true 
 inwardness in relation to the times in which they 
 occurred, and their significance for the future. His 
 qualifications require to be extensive and intensive : 
 he must not only know many things, but some of 
 them he must know intimately, in the manner of 
 an expert. A keen knowledge of the sources of 
 history, of the innate mind of races, of the influ- 
 ence of geographical position, of the method of 
 weighing evidence, and of a host of other items, go 
 to make up the capacity for writing history, and the 
 work involved demands as full a use of logic as that 
 of the geologist or chemist. But as this book is 
 addressed to general readers who never expect to 
 become historians, it is needless to pursue this 
 thought further; our object in referring to the 
 matter at all was to show that we may expect as 
 much difference in the views of the writers of history 
 as we do in the views of any other class of men 
 who have attempted to interpret fact. We will 
 
 178
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 179 
 
 therefore adduce a number of passages showing 
 the historian at work. 
 
 (i)The first pasage is from Buckle, who argues 
 that history is an exact science. 
 
 Rejecting then the metaphysical dogma of free will 
 and the theological dogma of predestined events, we are 
 driven to the conclusion that the actions of men being 
 determined solely by their antecedents, must have a 
 character of uniformity, that is to say must, under pre- 
 cisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely 
 the same results. And as all antecedents are in the 
 mind or out of it, we clearly see that all the variations 
 in the results, in other words, all the changes of which 
 history is full, all the vicissitudes of the human race, 
 their progress or their decay, their happiness or their 
 misery, must be the fruit of a double action; an action 
 of external phenomena upon the mind and another action 
 of the mind upon phenomena. These are the materials 
 out of which a philosophic history can alone be con- 
 structed. On the one hand, we have the human mind 
 obeying the laws of its own existence, and, when 
 uncontrolled by external agents, developing itself 
 according to the conditions of its organisation. On the 
 other hand we have what is called Nature, obeying like- 
 wise its laws ; but incessantly coming into contact with 
 the minds of men, exciting their passions, stimulating 
 their intellect and, therefore, giving to their actions a 
 direction which they would not have taken without such 
 disturbance. Thus we have man modifying nature and 
 nature modifying man ; while out of this reciprocal modi- 
 fication all events must necessarily spring. 
 
 (2) The second passage is from Professor 
 Heeren's Political History of Ancient Greece. It 
 is somewhat interesting by reason of the fact that 
 Heeren is a writer of nearly one hundred years
 
 i8o LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 ago, and his arguments in the light of recent demo- 
 cratic developments among Asiatic peoples offer 
 an inviting study to the reader. 
 
 To the student of the history of man there is hardly 
 a phenomenon more important in itself, or more difficult 
 of explanation, than the superiority of Europe over the 
 other parts of our earth. With whatever justice other 
 lands and nations may be estimated, it cannot be denied 
 that the noblest and best of everything which man has 
 produced, sprung up, or at least ripened, on European 
 soil. In the multitude, variety, and beauty of their 
 natural productions, Asia and Africa far surpass 
 Europe; but in everything which is the work of man, the 
 nations of Europe stand far above those of the other 
 continents. It was among them, that, by making mar- 
 riage the union of but two individuals, domestic society 
 obtained that form, without which so many parts of our 
 nature could never have been ennobled ; and if slavery 
 was once established among them, they alone abolished 
 it, because they recognised its injustice. It was chiefly 
 and almost exclusively among them that such constitu- 
 tions were framed, as are suited to nations who have 
 become conscious of their rights. While Asia, during 
 all the changes in its extensive empires, shows only the 
 continued reproduction of despotism, it was in Europe 
 that the germ of political freedom unfolded itself, and 
 under the most various forms, in so many parts of the 
 same soil, bore the noblest fruits ; which again were 
 transplanted from thence to other parts of the world. 
 The simplest inventions of the mechanical arts may 
 perhaps belong in part to the east ; but how have they 
 all been perfected by Europeans ! What an advance from 
 the hand-loom of the Hindoo to the power-loom worked 
 by steam ; from the sundial to the chronometer ; from 
 the bark of the North American savage to the British 
 man-of-war. And if we direct our attention to those 
 nobler arts, which, as it were, raise human nature above
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 181 
 
 itself, what a distance between the Jupiter of Phidias 
 and an Indian idol; between the Transfiguration of 
 Raphael and the works of a Chinese painter. The east 
 had its annalists, but never produced a Tacitus, or a 
 Gibbon; it had its poets, but never advanced to criti- 
 cism ; it had its sages, who not unfrequently produced 
 a powerful effect on their nations by means of their 
 doctrines ; but still a Plato or a Kant could never flourish 
 on the banks of the Ganges and the Hoangho. 
 
 (3) The third passage is from Carlyle's Oliver 
 Cromwell, wherein he endeavours to illustrate two 
 common errors in interpreting history, more par- 
 ticularly the leaders of men. 
 
 There are two errors, widely prevalent, which pervert 
 to the very basis our judgments formed about such men 
 as Cromwell, about their " ambition," " falsity," and 
 such like. The first is what I might call substituting 
 the goal of their career for the course and starting point 
 of it. The vulgar historian of a Cromwell fancies that 
 he Had determined on being Protector of England at the 
 time when he was plowing the marshlands of Cam- 
 bridgeshire. His career lay all mapped out : a pro- 
 gramme of the whole drama. . . . This is a radical 
 perversion ; all but universal in such cases. And think 
 for an instant how different the fact is. How much does 
 one of us foresee of his own life? Short way ahead of 
 us it is all dim. . . . But a second error refers to this 
 same ambition itself. We exaggerate the ambition of 
 great men ; we mistake what the nature of it is. Great 
 men are not ambitious in that sense ; he is a small, poor 
 man that is ambitious so. Examine the man who lives 
 in misery because he does not shine above other men. 
 Such a creature is among the wretchedest sights seen 
 under the sun. . . . Your Cromwell, what good could it 
 do him to be " noticed" by noisy crowds of people? 
 God, his maker, already noticed him.
 
 1 82 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (4) The fourth passage is from Bigland's Letters 
 on History, and is a specimen of how deductions 
 are drawn in favour of the science of politics. 
 
 Much has been said by many writers against the per- 
 nicious effects of extensive empire, but many arguments 
 may also be adduced in its favour. The union of a 
 numerous mass of people in one political system is one 
 of the surest preventives of war, as the division of coun- 
 tries into a greater number of independent states is a 
 never-failing source of predatory hostilities, of blood- 
 shed, rapine, and anarchy. Wherever a country is thus 
 divided, such a multiplicity of jarring interests arise, 
 and so many objects of ambition present themselves, as 
 cannot fail of producing continual scenes of contention, 
 originating in the ambition, the avarice, and the jarring 
 interests of the rulers or the subjects, which involve the 
 people in all sorts of calamities. Instances without 
 number might be adduced, but a glance at the state of 
 England during the time of the Heptarchy will suffice 
 to exemplify the propriety of this observation. In an 
 extensive monarchy there is only one great political 
 interest, and the objects of ambition, however splendid 
 and attractive, are fewer, and consequently within the 
 reach of a smaller number of persons ; in such a state 
 all tends to one central point, instead of deviating to 
 different centres. The vast collective mass of the people 
 is united in one political system, and in one general 
 interest, and the different provinces which compose the 
 empire enjoy the advantages of a free and uninterrupted 
 commerce ; a circumstance of incalculable benefit, both 
 to individuals and to the whole community. Supposing 
 even an extensive monarchy to be despotic, and the 
 monarch himself a sanguinary and unfeeling tyrant, yet, 
 by reason of the extent of his dominions, only a few 
 individuals, who most of them voluntarily bring them- 
 selves into contact with him, feel the effects of his 
 cruelty and despotism. Those who, from motives of
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 183 
 
 ambition or interest, approach his person, and serve him 
 as the instruments of his tyrrany, are the persons who 
 principally feel the heavy hand of the tyrant. The 
 great mass of the people feel its pressure in a much 
 lighter degree. Distance of situation, and the great 
 multitude of subjects, cause individuals to escape his 
 notice. The reverse is the case in petty states, where 
 the eye of the tyrant is always upon the individuals of his 
 contracted dominions ; and a tyrant at the distance of a 
 thousand miles, is infinitely preferable to a tyrant at 
 home, at our very doors. The history of mankind 
 affords a multiplicity of proofs, that extensive monar- 
 chies are more conducive to the tranquillity of the world, 
 and the general interests of humanity, than petty states. 
 
 (5) The fifth passage deals with the operating 
 cause of history as to whether events occur by blind 
 Chance, by Law, or by Providence. It is taken from 
 Wall's Theories of History. 
 
 The conclusion at which we have arrived is that there 
 is nothing in life and history which can justly be called 
 chance, and that however obscure may be the connec- 
 tion of events and however imperfect our knowledge of 
 their sequences they are all linked together in the indis- 
 soluble bonds of law, that is, in a mutual interdepen- 
 dence of cause and effect. Here arises a new question, 
 the precise bearing of which must be carefully discrimi- 
 nated. In the preceding sections the question was 
 between chance and law : Do events happen without 
 connection? Or, do they occur consecutively? If 
 events happen without connection, no other question 
 remains to be solved; no other question can be raised. 
 In knowing this we know all that can be known ; nothing 
 remains to be known. Let it be taken for granted that 
 chance is proved, and there is thenceforth no question 
 between chance and any other theory of the universe. 
 Science, philosophy, history, theism, are all disproved 
 by the proof of chance. But they are not disproved by
 
 184 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the proof of law. On the contrary, a foundation is laid 
 on which alone they can all be securely built. If events 
 occur consecutively, that is, according to law, then one 
 of the first questions that arise is this : Is law the highest 
 conception of the human mind, the sole bond of the 
 universe and expressing itself by law? This is the ques- 
 tion not between chance and law, which is here assumed 
 to be settled in favour of the latter, but between law and 
 theism; and it is to be carefully noted that while in the 
 former case the two theories mutually negative each 
 other, in the latter this mutual negation does not take 
 place. 
 
 It will be observed that three of these passages 
 are concerned with history as a science, one with 
 the possible errors of interpretation, and one with 
 the political lessons of history the last mentioned 
 showing that it is a form of reasoning from 
 examples. This is the use which the general reader 
 makes of the history he reads : he wishes to derive 
 instruction from it to help him in deciding a course 
 of action in reference to the problems of the present. 
 If he is persuaded that the story of civilised nations 
 shows the inimical influence of private property, 
 he will become a socialist of pronounced opinions. 
 Very possibly his next-door neighbour, who has 
 covered the same ground in the reading of history, 
 arrives at the opposite conclusion. 
 
 Now this divergence of opinion need not come 
 as a surprise : it is the natural colouring which 
 temperament gives to all our reasoning. " Josephus 
 interprets history as the theocratic Jew; Aristotle 
 as a Greek who has seen the bloom of Athens; 
 Polybius as a Greek who has seen the bloom of 
 Athens fade before the fateful power of Rome;
 
 St. Augustine living in the age of the decadence 
 of Rome and the weakness of the Church interprets 
 events in the light of another and more enduring 
 world; the mystics of the thirteenth century who 
 saw Europe emerging into a quickening life, hap- 
 pier and freer^than any the world had seen before, 
 seize upon a new view of history and see in the 
 Kingdom of the Holy Spirit a promise for the 
 earth itself of a New Jerusalem. After men broke 
 with authority in the age of the Reformation, and 
 learned to use their own eyes and their own minds 
 on many things, they applied the method to history 
 as well, and began to perceive in it some natural 
 laws. This scientific point of view has dominated 
 the leading thinkers in this field until our own day; 
 and yet these modern men have seen these laws 
 differently, according to their own point of view. 
 Thus the sceptics of the eighteenth century looked 
 to natural laws alone, and were inclined to ignore 
 the interference of incalculable human choice; the 
 biologists seize upon the struggle for existence as 
 the only key to the situation ; the socialists see in 
 history only the play of the laws of production, 
 leading to the inevitable goal of the dominion of 
 the proletariat."* 
 
 There are so many factors conspiring together 
 to make us see in history what we want to see that 
 the real truth is easily obscured. What, then, are 
 we to do ? The story of Sedan will be appreciably 
 different in a German history from a French his- 
 tory, not only in the account of the battle, but of 
 
 * Method in History. By M. S. Barnes.
 
 186 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the events leading up to it ; and the reader naturally 
 asks: Whom am I to believe? Which writer has 
 stated the facts and drawn the inferences correctly ? 
 To give what may be termed an absolute answer 
 to such questions is impossible, but one or two 
 considerations may bring us relatively nearer the 
 truth. The first is that the historical account of 
 Sedan by a third party, say an English or an 
 American writer, is likely to be more impartial than 
 an account written by a member of either of the 
 interested countries, that is, France or Germany. 
 The second is that there are certain facts which 
 all parties admit, e.g., the battle of Sedan was won 
 by Germany because of its superior military power 
 and the morale of its army. Here, then, are two 
 important rules for reasoning correctly from his- 
 tory. One is to discover the facts which every 
 historian of merit acknowledges, and the other is 
 to follow the account of that writer who by reason 
 of his position is likely to be disinterested.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII- 
 
 REASONING FROM AUTHORITIES. 
 
 IT frequently happens that when a number of men 
 are arguing the pros and cons of a subject, they 
 try to secure the verdict for themselves by quoting 
 the opinion of eminent authorities. Let the subject 
 be the origin of life. Outside the class of experts 
 there is nobody who can argue this question on the 
 basis of personal experiments. We are all of us 
 guided by what the authorities say. But there is 
 a more subtle guide at work : our temperaments, 
 our prejudices, and our previous conclusions act 
 as if they were a single entity. If we are Christians 
 and believe that a Divine Person interfered with 
 the order of nature, creating the organic out of 
 the inorganic, no experiments or inferences of 
 Bastian or Haeckel will have any weight with us : 
 the words we seek for are those of scientists who 
 believe that life never came from death. To increase 
 our confidence we draw up a comparative statement 
 of great names : we put Haeckel, Bastian, and the 
 rest in one column; Lodge, Wallace, Dallinger, 
 and the others in another column. Then we count, 
 and the addition is finished. The argument is 
 decided by a little sum in arithmetic. The rational- 
 ists perform the same mathematical manoeuvre, and 
 
 187
 
 1 88 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 there follows a quarrel about the rights and wrongs 
 of including certain names. 
 
 The basis of the argument is this: " Life had a 
 natural origin because the best equipped men of 
 science say it had." So says the rationalist. The 
 Christian says: " Life had a supernatural origin 
 because the best equipped men of science say 
 natural forces are inadequate for the production of 
 the phenomenon." Now it is certainly reasonable 
 to mass together the names of authorities in this 
 way; and it is inevitable, if unfortunate, that 
 quarrels should ensue about certain men whose 
 opinions are in doubt. But the dominant fact is 
 the effect which a natural or supernatural theory 
 will have on pre-arranged knowledge. If natural 
 forces unaided are not able to produce life, the 
 rationalists' scheme of the universe falls to the 
 ground; and if, on the other hand, life came from 
 dead matter, the Christian will have to revise one 
 of the most important items in his creed. Thus 
 we come to the power of prejudice once again ; 
 the prejudice which made Huxley want to believe 
 in spontaneous generation, and which made Bishop 
 Wilberforce want to disbelieve in the natural evolu- 
 tion of man because the Bible declared man to be 
 a special creation. 
 
 Theology, however, is only one sphere in which 
 we argue from the names of authorities. Take law 
 as another sphere. A judge will have to decide 
 a case involving, perhaps, the evidence of three 
 experts on each side. Three engineers affirm the 
 fallen bridge was properly built, and three 
 affirm the contrary. In the Thaw case there were
 
 1 89 
 
 almost as many lunacy experts who said he was 
 sane as those who said he was not. What line of 
 reasoning can bring us to an intelligent conclusion 
 in matters where we cannot form an expert opinion 
 ourselves, and where experts themselves are in 
 equally divided camps ? 
 
 First, we must decide on the relative merits of 
 the authorities themselves. In the Thaw case the 
 prosecutor, cross-examining an alleged expert, 
 asked him what he knew of a certain disease, 
 naming a disease which did not exist, but which 
 had been invented to ensnare the witness. That 
 individual fell into the trap, and at once discredited 
 himself by assuming he knew something about this 
 imaginary disease. There are experts and experts; 
 and not all of them can go successfully through 
 the small sieve. 
 
 Next, the opinions of the best authorities should 
 be carefully compared and contrasted. Very often 
 partisans who want to strengthen the case for their 
 own side do not give sufficient attention to the 
 delicate task of weighing evidence conveyed in 
 chosen words. Sometimes an authority is unable 
 to express a definite opinion on some point of great 
 importance : he prefers to suspend his judgment. 
 Occasionally even the reasons for suspended judg- 
 ment are construed by partisan speakers and writers 
 into negative or positive affirmations. There is 
 usually about conflicting expert evidence a drift in 
 one definite direction. In the case of telepathy the 
 drift seems to be, on the whole, "in favour of" 
 rather than " against " the theory. Where there 
 does not appear to be any such tendency it may
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 safely be assumed that the real truth lies in recon- 
 ciliation ; in other words, both sides have half the 
 truth, and the office of the conciliator is to bring 
 them together. 
 
 The origin of life has been referred to, and we 
 have authorities who are certain the organic came 
 out of the inorganic, the living from the dead. 
 Other authorities, in the absence of proof, prefer 
 to believe that life must have come to the planet 
 in some other way. The tendency is springing up 
 to regard the terms life and non-life as too harsh : 
 that in some sense the matter which we call dead 
 must be living. Should sound developments follow 
 from this line of investigation, it will be evident 
 that once more the meaning of words has been at 
 the bottom of centuries of acrimonious debate- 
 To recapitulate : 
 
 (1) Where authorities disagree in anything like 
 equal proportions, some attempt must be made to 
 determine the relative value of such authorities. 
 
 (2) The testimonies of such authorities should 
 be critically examined; and a note must be taken 
 of other authorities who prefer to suspend an 
 expression of opinion. 
 
 (3) Endeavour to ascertain whether there is not 
 a possibility of discovering the truth by a union of 
 the two principles which are in debate.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 A STUDY IN FALLACIES. 
 
 I. Fallacies arising from not understanding the 
 question. 
 
 (a) Proving a different question from that in 
 dispute : 
 
 The first sophism is called ignoratio elenchi, i.e., 
 " Ignoring the refutation." Watts provides an 
 illustration after telling us what this fallacy is. 
 ' When something else is proved, which has 
 neither any necessary connexion or consistency 
 with the thing inquired, and consequently gives 
 no determination to the inquiry, though it may 
 seem at first sight to determine the question : as, 
 if any should conclude that St. Paul was not a 
 native Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman ; 
 or if they should pretend to determine that he was 
 neither a Roman nor Jew, by proving that he was 
 born at Tarsus in Cilicia : these sophisms are 
 refuted by showing that all these three may be true; 
 for he was born of Jewish parents in the city of 
 Tarsus, and by some peculiar privilege granted to 
 his parents, or his native city, he was born a 
 citizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of these 
 three characters of the apostle inconsistent with each 
 other, and therefore the proving of them true does 
 not refute the others." 
 
 191
 
 192 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 This type of fallacy has several subdivisions, and 
 we proceed to enumerate them, taking as a guide 
 the sections found in Gregory's Practical Logic: 
 
 The argumentutn ad jtidicium is based upon the 
 common judgments of mankind. Its maxim is " What 
 all men everywhere and always believe, is true." . . . 
 The argument has great force when it is really based 
 on the common judgment of mankind. The danger of 
 appealing to this principle without sufficient grounds is, 
 however, very great. Under the confident assertions, 
 " Everybody says," " No one pretends to think," the 
 greatest fallacies are often covered. The argument may 
 be illustrated as follows : The material world is a 
 reality and our perception of it is immediate, because all 
 men everywhere and always have so believed. (That is 
 how Galileo's uninstructed accusers argued when he 
 said the earth revolved round the sun as against the 
 testimony of " all men everywhere.") 
 
 The argumentum ad populum is based on an appeal 
 to public opinion, or to passion or prejudice rather than 
 intelligence. It is often employed because no really good 
 arguments are to be found, or because it is easier to 
 appeal to the passions and prejudices of the masses than 
 to their intelligence. It often puts forward as its major 
 premise the false maxim, Vox populi, vox Dei, " The 
 voice of the people is the voice of God." 
 
 The argumentum ad vericundiam is an appeal to the 
 feelings of reverence for certain persons or objects, in- 
 stead of proceeding to prove the point in hand. The 
 scholastics used as a standing major premise the maxim, 
 "It is foolish to affirm Aristotle erred." 
 
 The argumentutn ad ignorantiam is addressed to the 
 ignorance of men. It sometimes consists in assuming 
 that a position is correct because an adversary cannot 
 show the contrary ; sometimes in taking advantage of 
 men's ignorance to impose upon them by some shallow 
 sophism, false statement, or confident assertion. Under
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 193 
 
 this may be included the fallacy of interrogation in 
 which a question is so put as to be equivalent to a con- 
 fident assertion of some error. The demand for " an 
 adequate conception," or description, often made by a 
 brow-beating lawyer upon a witness in court, is of the 
 same character. Only a few experts can give anything 
 more than a clear notion of the handwriting, features, 
 or dress of the most intimate friend. 
 
 The argumentum ad hominem -is an appeal to the 
 practice, principles, or professions of an opponent as 
 confirming our own position or destructive to his. An 
 opponent may thus be silenced since the argument is 
 good against him, even though it be not good against 
 the views he advocates. Christ used this method to 
 silence the cavils of the Jews. Matt, xxi., 41-45. 
 
 One of the most glaring examples of this kind 
 of irrelevant conclusion occurred in the debate on 
 the institution of a commission of enquiry into the 
 state of the universities. The principal opponent 
 of the Ministerial proposition took up the ground 
 that Government had no right to enquire into the 
 state of municipal or corporate bodies; a principle 
 of which no one can dispute the justice so long as 
 the movements of those societies do not interfere 
 with the interests of the commonwealth, or impede 
 the progress of the community matters, of course, 
 over which the Government have complete control. 
 The defender of the universities, however, neglected 
 so to restrict it, and the Minister threw ridicule 
 on his opponent by representing many cases in 
 which a wise Government could not abstain from 
 interfering with corporate societies. The onus 
 which lay on the Minister of proving that the 
 universities presented a case for public interference
 
 194 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 was lost sight of, in the feelings excited by the 
 confutation of the principle in the sense to which 
 its propounder did not intend it to apply.* 
 
 (b) Assuming as true the question in dispute. 
 
 This is called petitio principii, or " begging the 
 question," or "arguing in a circle." Thus: 
 
 John Knox and John Witherspoon were excel- 
 lent men because they belonged to an excellent 
 church, the Presbyterian Church : and the Pres- 
 byterian Church is an excellent one because it 
 has contained such good men. 
 
 The combination of the ignoratio elenchi and 
 the petitio principii is very common in Parliamen- 
 tary debates, and Canning's speeches afford several 
 instances of their employment and detection. One 
 of the most striking of the latter will be found in 
 his reply to the member who referred to the con- 
 tinuance of our triumphs in the Peninsula and our 
 conflicts with Napoleon as a reason for perpetuating 
 an exclusive paper currency. Canning said, " I 
 will not pay my right honourable friend so ill a 
 compliment as to suppose that he is not himself 
 perfectly aware that in thus shaping his argument 
 he has, in fact, rather assumed or omitted the 
 question in dispute. The question is not whether 
 we shall continue the war In the Peninsula with all 
 our heart. Who doubts, who dissuades that deter- 
 mination? That point might have been assumed 
 without hazard of contradiction. But my right 
 honourable friend argues that point as if it were 
 
 *Devey's Logic, p. 334.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 195 
 
 disputed, and assumes without argument that which 
 was necessary for him to prove, viz., that to the 
 continuance of the war and our success in the 
 Peninsula it is essential that the present system 
 of currency should remain unchanged. Just as 
 fairly might I assume without argument that a 
 change in our currency is necessary to this same 
 purpose of continuing the war, and then retort upon 
 my right honourable friend his own expostulations 
 against fettering the energies and cramping the 
 exertions of the country. In either case the point 
 which is alone in dispute remains to be decided."* 
 
 (c) Abusing the ambiguity of words a practice 
 which may be carried out in different ways, some 
 of them very amusing in character. 
 
 When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they 
 are called sophisms of equivocation; as, if we should 
 argue thus : " He that sends forth a book into the 
 light, desires it to be read ; he that throws a book into 
 the fire, sends it into the light ; therefore, he that throws 
 a book into the fire, desires it to be read." This 
 sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the like 
 nature, are solved by showing the different senses of 
 the words, terms, or phrases. Here light in the major 
 proposition signifies the public view of the world ; in the 
 minor it signifies the brightness of flame and fire; and 
 therefore, the syllogism has four terms, or rather it has 
 no middle term, and proves nothing. But where such 
 gross equivocations and ambiguities appear in argu- 
 mentSj there is little danger of imposing upon ourselves 
 or others. The greatest danger, and which we are per- 
 petually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the two 
 
 * Devey's Logic, p. 336.
 
 196 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 senses or significations of one term are near akin, and 
 not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really suffi- 
 ciently different in their sense to lead us into great mis- 
 takes, if we are not watchful. And, indeed, the greatest 
 part of controversies in political or civil life, arise 
 Irom the different senses that are put upon words, and 
 the different ideas which are included in them. 
 
 As an additional instance of this class we may 
 cite the use of the word representative, which . . . 
 " is taken not infrequently to mean, in the case of a 
 member of a legislative assembly, a person who is 
 bound to represent the exact opinions of a majority 
 of his constituents on all points, and never to act 
 on his own responsibility ; whereas law and usage 
 have defined the term to mean one who is chosen 
 to represent the interests of a certain constituency 
 according to the best dictates of his own judgment, 
 and unbiassed by any undue extraneous influence. 
 Such a person may consult the opinions of his 
 constituents before making up his mind on a ques- 
 tion that may concern them, but he is not bound 
 to be either their spokesman or resign his seat, 
 though he may pursue the latter course from 
 motives of delicacy."* 
 
 II. Fallacies connected with the relation of sub- 
 ject and object. 
 
 (a) Judging a thing by that which belongs to it 
 only accidentally. 
 
 This is called fallacia-accidentis, or a sophism wherein 
 we pronounce concerning the nature and essential pro- 
 
 * Devey's Logic, p. 310.
 
 197 
 
 perties of any subject according to something which is 
 merely accidental to it. This is akin to the former, and 
 is also very frequent in debate. So if opium or the 
 Peruvian bark has been used imprudently, or unsuc- 
 cessfully, whereby the patient has received injury, some 
 weaker people absolutely pronounce against the use of 
 the bark or opium upon all occasions whatsoever, and 
 are ready to call them poison. So wine has been the 
 accidental occasion of drunkenness and quarrels ; learn- 
 ing and printing may have been the accidental cause 
 of sedition in a state ; the reading of the Bible, by acci- 
 dent, has been abused to promote heresies or destructive 
 errors; and for these reasons they have all been pro- 
 nounced evil things. 
 
 Of a similar kind is the fallacy of the Epicureans who 
 concluded that gods must have human form because 
 among all creatures in the world men alone had the use 
 of reason. The gods, said these philosophers, are very 
 happy; none can be happy without virtue; there is no 
 virtue without reason ; and reason is found nowhere 
 except in the human form ; it must be avowed, therefore, 
 that the gods have human form. Reason, however, is 
 not essential to the human form, but only accidentally 
 connected with it ; it was, therefore, puerile to conclude 
 that because the gods were endowed with mind they 
 must also have hands, feet, and other human appur- 
 tenances. 
 
 (b) Passing from what is true in some respects 
 to what is true absolutely : 
 
 The next sophism borders upon the former : and that 
 is, when we argue from that which is true in particular 
 circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
 simply, and abstracted from all circumstances : this is 
 called in the schools a sophism, a dicto secundum quid
 
 1 98 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 ad dictum simpliciter; as, That which is bought in the 
 shambles is eaten for dinner ; raw meat is bought in the 
 shambles ; therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. Or 
 thus : Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he 
 describes prodigies and omens ; therefore Livy's Roman 
 History is never to be believed in anything. This sort 
 of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we argue from 
 that which is true simply and absolutely, to prove the 
 same thing true in all particular circumstances whatso- 
 ever; as if a traitor should argue from the sixth com- 
 mandment, " Thou shalt not kill a man," to prove that 
 Ke himself ought not to be hanged : or if a madman 
 should tell me, " I ought not to withhold his sword 
 from him, because no man ought to withhold the pro- 
 perty of another." These two last species of sophisms 
 are easily solved, by showing the difference betwixt 
 things in their absolute nature, and the same thing sur- 
 rounded with peculiar circumstances, and considered in 
 regard to special times, places, persons, and occasions ; 
 or by showing the difference between a moral and a 
 metaphysical universality, and that the proposition will 
 hold good in one case, but not in the other. 
 
 (c) The two errors in reasoning to which scholas- 
 tic logicians give the names of " Undistributed 
 Middle," and " Illicit Process," may be classed 
 under this head. The " undistributed middle " is 
 when we argue that because two things have a 
 common attribute, therefore they are the same 
 thing; as, " Gold is yellow, and saffron is yellow 
 therefore saffron is gold." The " illicit process " 
 is when, two things are not the same thing, 
 we infer they have not a common attribute; as, 
 "Gold is yellow; saffron is not gold: therefore, 
 saffron is not yellow." We sometimes meet with 
 strange fallacies of this description in the con-
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 199 
 
 troversy respecting religious education. Thus, 
 " Religion produces morality; education produces 
 morality; therefore, education is religion "; and, 
 on the other side, "Religion produces morality; 
 education is not religion ; therefore, education does 
 not produce morality." 
 
 III. Fallacies connected with the relation of a 
 whole and its parts. 
 
 The sophisms of composition and division come next 
 to be mentioned. The sophism of composition is when 
 we infer anything concerning ideas in a compounded 
 sense, which is only true in a divided sense. As if any 
 one should argue thus : Two and three are even and 
 odd ; five are two and three ; therefore five are even 
 and odd. Here that is very falsely inferred concerning 
 two and three in union, which is only true of them 
 divided. 
 
 The sophism of division is when we infer the same 
 thing concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only 
 true in a compounded sense; as, if we should pretend 
 to prove that every soldier in the Grecian army put a 
 hundred thousand Persians to flight, because the 
 Grecian soldiers did so. Or if a man should argue thus : 
 Five is one number; two and three are five; therefore 
 two and three are one number. 
 
 IV. Fallacies connected with the relation of genus 
 and species. 
 
 v a) Misapplication of general principles from 
 Mill's Logic. 
 
 A third example is the opposition sometimes made to 
 legitimate interferences of government in the economi- 
 cal affairs of society, grounded upon a misapplication of
 
 2OO 
 
 the maxim, that an individual is a better judge than the 
 government of what is for his own pecuniary interest. 
 This objection was urged to Mr. Wakefield's system 
 of colonisation, one of the greatest practical improve- 
 ments in public affairs which have been made in our 
 time. Mr. Wakefield's principle, as most people are 
 now aware, is the artificial concentration of the settlers, 
 by fixing such a price upon unoccupied land as may pre- 
 serve the most desirable proportion between the quan- 
 tity of land in culture and the labouring population. 
 Against this it was argued, that if individuals found it 
 for their advantage to occupy extensive tracts of land, 
 they, being better judges of their own interest than the 
 legislature (which can only proceed on general rules), 
 ought not to be restrained from doing so. But in this 
 argument it was forgotten that the fact of a man's 
 taking a large tract of land is evidence only that it is 
 his interest to take as much as other people, but not 
 that it might not be for his interest to content himself 
 with less, if he could be assured that other people would 
 do so too; an assurance which nothing but a govern- 
 ment regulation can give. If all other people took 
 much, and he only a little, he would reap none of the 
 advantages derived from the concentration of the popu- 
 lation and the consequent possibility of procuring labour 
 for hire, but would have placed himself, without equiva- 
 lent, in a situation of voluntary inferiority. The pro- 
 position, therefore, that the quantity of land which 
 people will take when left to themselves is that which it 
 is most for their interest to take, is true only secundum 
 quid : it is only their interest while they have no 
 guarantee for the conduct of one another. But the argu- 
 ment disregards the limitation, and takes the proposi- 
 tion for true simpliciter. Under the same head of 
 fallacy (d dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter) 
 might be placed all the errors which are vulgarly called 
 misapplications of abstract truths : that is, where a 
 principle, true (as the common expression is) in the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 201 
 
 abstract, that is, all modifying causes being supposed 
 absent, is reasoned upon as if it were true absolutely, 
 and no modifying circumstances could ever by possi- 
 bility exist. 
 
 (b) Reasoning from loose definitions: 
 
 Those who are familiar with the writings of Madame 
 de Stael, know how constantly it was the practice of 
 that acute and plausible writer, to have recourse to what 
 may be called the fallacy of definition, which consists 
 in giving an arbitrary meaning to some well-known 
 expression, sufficiently large to include, or sufficiently 
 narrow to exclude, the subject under discussion. 
 
 V. Fallacies connected with the relation of cause 
 and effect, whether the cause be physical, moral, 
 conditional, or final. Taking for a cause that which 
 is not a cause : 
 
 The next kind of sophism is called non causa pro 
 causa, or the assignation of a false cause. This the peri- 
 patetic philosophers were guilty of continually, when 
 they told us that certain beings, which they called sub- 
 stantial forms, were the springs of colour, motion, vege- 
 tation, and the various operations of natural beings in 
 the animate and inanimate world; when they inform 
 us that nature was terribly afraid of a vacuum; and 
 that this was the cause why the water would not fall 
 out of a long tube if it was turned upside down : the 
 moderns, as well as the ancients, fall often into this 
 fallacy, when they positively assign the reasons of 
 natural appearances, without sufficient experiments to 
 prove them. 
 
 When comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon, are 
 
 construed to signify the fate of princes, the revolution 
 
 of states, famine, wars, and calamities of all kinds, it 
 
 is a fallacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms. 
 
 O
 
 202 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 There is scarce anything more common in human life 
 than this sort of deceitful argument. If any two acci- 
 dental events happen to concur, one is presently made 
 the cause of the other. If Titus wronged his neighbour 
 of a guinea, and six months after he fell down and 
 broke his leg, weak men will impute it to the Divine 
 vengeance on Titus for his former injustice. 
 
 VI. Fallacies connected with reasoning from 
 examples. 
 
 Drawing a general conclusion from a defective 
 induction : 
 
 (a) There is, after all these, another sort of sophism, 
 which is wont to be called an imperfect Enumeration or 
 a False Induction, when from a few experiments or 
 observations men infer general theorems and universal 
 propositions. Nivio in his youth observed, that on three 
 Christmas days together there fell a good quantity of 
 snow, and now hath writ it down in his almanack as a 
 part of his wise remarks on the weather, that it will 
 always snow at Christmas. Huron, a young lad, took 
 notice ten times, that there was a sharp frost when the 
 wind was in the north-east; therefore, in the middle of 
 last July he almost expected it should freeze, because 
 the weathercocks showed him a north-east wind; and 
 he was still more disappointed, when he found it a very 
 sultry season. It is the same hasty judgment that hath 
 thrown scandal on a whole nation for the sake of some 
 culpable characters belonging to several particular 
 natives of that country ; whereas all the Frenchmen are 
 not gay and airy; all the Italians are not jealous and 
 revengeful ; nor all the English overrun with the 
 spleen. (Watts.) 
 
 (b) I have already said that the mode of Simple Enume- 
 ration is still the common and received method of Induc- 
 tion in whatever relates to man and society. Of this a
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 203 
 
 very few instances, more by way of memento than of 
 instruction, may suffice. What, for example, is to be 
 thought of all the " common-sense " maxims for which 
 the following may serve as the universal formula? 
 " Whatsoever has never been, will never be." As for 
 example : Negroes have never been as civilised as whites 
 sometimes are, therefore it is impossible they should be 
 so. Women, as a class, have not hitherto equalled men 
 as a class, in intellectual energy and comprehensiveness, 
 therefore they are necessarily inferior. Society cannot 
 prosper without this or the other institution; e.g. in 
 Aristotle's time, without slavery; in later times, without 
 an established priesthood, without artificial distinctions 
 of ranks, etc. One working man in a thousand, edu- 
 cated, while the nine hundred and ninety-nine remain 
 uneducated, has usually aimed at raising himself out of 
 his class, therefore education makes people dissatisfied 
 with their condition in life. Bookish men, taken from 
 speculative pursuits, and set to work on something they 
 know nothing about, have generally been found or 
 thought to do it ill ; therefore, philosophers are unfit for 
 business, etc., etc. All these are inductions by simple 
 enumeration.* 
 
 VII. Fallacies connected with the relation of 
 analogy, comparison, and contrast. 
 
 But this is only one of the modes of error in the 
 employment of arguments of analogy. There is another, 
 more properly deserving the name of fallacy; namely, 
 when resemblance in one point is inferred from resem- 
 blance in another point, although there is not only no 
 evidence to connect the two circumstances by way of 
 causation, but the evidence tends positively to discon- 
 nect them. This is properly the Fallacy of False Analo- 
 gies. As a first instance, we may cite that favourite 
 
 * Mill's Logic.
 
 204 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 argument in defence of absolute power, drawn from the 
 analogy of paternal government in a family, which 
 government is not, and by universal admission ought 
 not to be, controlled by (though it sometimes ought to 
 be controlled for) the children. Paternal government, 
 in a family, works well ; therefore, says the argument, 
 despotic government in a state will work well : implying 
 that the beneficial working of parental government 
 depends, in the family, upon the only point which it has 
 in common with political despotism, namely, irrespon- 
 sibility. Whereas it does not depend upon that, but 
 upon two other attributes of parental government, the 
 affection of the parent for the children, and the 
 superiority of the parent in wisdom and experience; 
 neither of which properties can be reckoned upon, or 
 are at all likely to exist, between a political despot and 
 his subjects; and when either of these circumstances 
 fails, even in the family, and the influence of the 
 irresponsibility is allowed to work uncorrected, the result 
 is anything but good government. This, therefore, is 
 a false analogy. 
 
 Another example is the not uncommon dictum, that 
 bodies politic have youth, maturity, old age, and death, 
 like bodies natural : that after a certain duration of 
 prosperity they tend spontaneously to decay. This also 
 is a false analogy, because the decay of the vital powers 
 in an animated body can be distinctly traced to the 
 natural progress of those very changes of structure 
 which, in their earlier stages, constitute its growth to 
 maturity ; while in the body politic, the progress of those 
 changes cannot, generally speaking, have any effect but 
 the still further continuance of growth ; it is the stoppage 
 of that progress and the commencement of retrogression 
 that alone could constitute decay. Bodies politic die, 
 but it is of disease or violent death : they have no old 
 age.* 
 
 * Mill's Logic.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 205 
 VIII. Miscellaneous fallacies. 
 
 (1) Verbal quibbles. Here is an amusing speci- 
 men : 
 
 Franklin had no taste for verbal criticism. On one 
 occasion, when the Senate of Pennsylvania were engaged 
 in a long discussion upon the wording of a resolution, 
 he retired to one of the back seats, and engaged in con- 
 versation with a friend on this subject. He said : 
 " When I was a journeyman printer, a young trades- 
 man, named John Owen, who was about to set up busi- 
 ness as a ropemaker, came into the printing-office, and 
 asked us what writing he should place over his shop 
 window. The foreman immediately wrote on a board, 
 ' John Owen, Ropemaker, makes and sells ropes ' ; with 
 a coil of rope at the end. One man objected to the 
 word ropemaker, as superfluous; for if he made ropes 
 he was certainly a ropemaker. This word was accord- 
 ingly struck out. Another objected to makes. He said, 
 4 Your workmen make the ropes, not you, and if you 
 sell good ropes, people won't care whether you make 
 them or not. ' The sentence then stood ' John Owen 
 sells ropes.' 'John Owen sells ropes!' exclaimed 
 another ; ' why, who would suppose that you intended 
 to give them away ? what do you open a shop for but to 
 sell them?' The word sells was then struck out, and 
 ropes followed of course. Nothing then remained but 
 ' John Owen,' and a coil of rope." 
 
 (2) Historical evidence. 
 
 In reproducing a long quotation from Whateley's 
 famous Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buona- 
 parte, it should be remembered that the argument 
 from history as a species of reasoning is necessarily 
 very much to the fore; and although Whateley tries 
 to prove too much, his method is that on which 
 many critics still rely.
 
 206 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 I suppose it will not be denied that the three follow- 
 ing are among the most important points to be ascer- 
 tained, in deciding on the credibility of witnesses; first, 
 whether they have the means of gaining correct informa- 
 tion; secondly, whether they have any interest in con- 
 cealing truth, or propagating falsehood; and, thirdly, 
 whether they agree in their testimony. Let us examine 
 the present witnesses upon all these points. 
 
 First, what means have the editors of newspapers for 
 gaining correct information? We know not, except 
 from their own satements. Besides what is copied 
 from other journals, foreign or British (which is usually 
 more than three-fourths of the news published), they 
 profess to refer to the authority of certain " private 
 correspondents " abroad; who these correspondents are, 
 what means they have of obtaining information, or 
 whether they exist at all, we have no way of ascertaining. 
 We find ourselves in the condition of the Hindoos, who 
 are told by their priests that the earth stands on an 
 elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise ; but are left to 
 find out for themselves what the tortoise stands on, or 
 whether it stands on anything at all. So much for our 
 clear knowledge of the means of information possessed 
 by these witnesses ; next, for the grounds on which we 
 are to cauculate on their veracity. 
 
 Have they not a manifest interest in circulating the 
 wonderful accounts of Napoleon Buonaparte and his 
 achievements, whether true or false? Few would read 
 newspapers if they did not sometimes find wonderful or 
 important news in them ; and we may safely say that no 
 subject was ever found so inexhaustibly interesting as 
 the present. Still it will be said, that unless we suppose 
 a regularly preconcerted plan, we must at least expect 
 to find great discrepancies in the accounts published. 
 Though they might adopt the general outline of facts 
 one from another, they would have to fill up the detail 
 for themselves; and in this, therefore, we should meet 
 with infinite and irreconcileable variety.
 
 207 
 
 Now this is precisely the point I am tending to; for 
 the fact exactly accords with the above supposition ; the 
 discordance and mutual contradictions of these wit- 
 nesses being such as would alone throw a considerable 
 shade of doubt over their testimony. It is not in minute 
 circumstances alone that the discrepancy appears, such 
 as might be expected to appear in a narrative substan- 
 tially true; but in very great and leading transactions, 
 and such as are very intimately connected with the sup- 
 posed hero. For instance, it is by no means agreed 
 whether Buonaparte led in person the celebrated charge 
 over the bridge of Lodi (for celebrated it certainly is, as 
 well as the siege of Troy, whether either event ever 
 really took place or no), or was safe in the rear, while 
 Augereau performed the exploit. The same doubt hangs 
 over the charge of the French cavalry at Waterloo. 
 The peasant Lacoste, who professed to have been Buona- 
 parte's guide on the day of battle, and who earned a 
 fortune by detailing over and over again to visitors all 
 the particulars of what the great man said and did up 
 to the moment of flight this same Lacoste has been sus- 
 pected by others, besides me, of having never even been 
 near the great man, and having fabricated the whole 
 story for the sake of making a gain of the credulity of 
 travellers. 
 
 It appears, then, that those on whose testimony the 
 existence and actions of Buonaparte are generally 
 believed, fail in ALL the most essential points on which 
 the credulity of witnesses depends : first, we have no 
 assurance that they have access to correct information ; 
 secondly, they have an apparent interest in propagating 
 falsehood ; and, thirdly, they palpably contradict each 
 other in the most important points. But what shall we 
 say to the testimony of those many respectable persons 
 who went to Plymouth on purpose, and saw Buonaparte 
 with their own eyes? must they not trust their senses? 
 I would not disparage either the eyesight or the vera- 
 city of these gentlemen. I am ready to allow that they
 
 208 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 went to Plymouth for the purpose of seeing Buonaparte ; 
 nay, more, that they actually rowed out into the harbour 
 in a boat, and came alongside of a man-of-war, on whose 
 deck they saw a man in a cocked hat, who, they were 
 told, was Buonaparte. This is the utmost point to 
 which their testimony goes; how they ascertained that 
 this man in the cocked hat had gone through all the 
 marvellous and romantic adventures with which we 
 have so long been amused, we are not told. There is 
 one more circumstance which I cannot forbear mention- 
 ing, because it so much adds to the air of fiction which 
 pervades every part of this marvellous tale; and that 
 is the nationality of it. 
 
 Buonaparte prevailed over all the hostile states in 
 turn except England; in the zenith of his power, his 
 fleets were swept from the sea, by England; his troops 
 always defeat an equal, and frequently even a superior 
 number of those of any other nation, except the English; 
 and with them it is just the reverse; twice, and twice 
 only, he is personally engaged against an English com- 
 mander, and both times he is totally defeated ; at Acre, 
 and at Waterloo; and to crown all, England finally 
 crushes this tremendous power, which had so long kept 
 the continent in subjection or in alarm; and to the 
 English he surrenders himself prisoner ! Thoroughly 
 national, to be sure! It may be all very true; but I 
 would only ask, if a story had been fabricated for the 
 express purpose of amusing the English nation, could 
 it have been contrived more ingeniously?"
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 BAILEY'S RULES FOR ANALYSING ARGUMENTS. 
 
 SAMUEL BAILEY, in his Theory of Reasoning, drew 
 up what may be called a list of rules for testing 
 arguments, and as they are much to the point 
 (especially in view of a popular audience), I venture 
 to reproduce them in full. Suppose, therefore, the 
 student has before him a political speech, or an 
 ethical pamphlet, which he wishes to analyse with 
 an eye to its logic. He should first 
 
 (1) Find the exact conclusion sought to be estab- 
 lished by the writer, and state it as briefly, but 
 as nearly as possible in his own language. 
 
 (2) If the conclusion is obscure or ambiguous, 
 endeavour to find out what the author meant ; and, 
 if it is doubtful which of two or more propositions 
 he intended to maintain, examine the argument, 
 as suggested in the following rules, first on the 
 assumption of one, and then on that of the other, 
 or others. 
 
 (3) Next find the reason or reasons assigned, and 
 state them as the writer has done, and as nearly as 
 possible in his own language, stripping them, how- 
 ever, of redundant expressions and irrelevant 
 matter. 
 
 209
 
 210 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 (4) Examine the nature of the argument. 
 
 (a) If it is direct contingent reasoning, consider 
 well whether the facts alleged are sufficient to war- 
 rant the general law, or, as the case may be, the 
 particular inference : if not sufficient, it is needless 
 to proceed further. 
 
 (b) If the reasoning is ostensibly demonstrative, 
 and in the form of enthymemes, it may be well to 
 make it syllogistic by supplying what is called the 
 missing or suppressed premise, since even should 
 the last turn out to be needless, you will at all 
 events have all the possible propositions before 
 you ; and although needless, it must be true if the 
 enthymeme is valid. When the argument has thus 
 been brought into a definite form, examine the 
 validity of the syllogism; and if it is fallacious, in 
 consequence of confusion or ambiguity in the 
 language or other cause, mark the fallacy, and your 
 task is ended. 
 
 (5) In both the above cases (a and b), since the 
 premises are insufficient to prove the conclusion 
 deduced from them, it will be well to consider 
 whether a modified inference may not be drawn 
 from the facts as stated. The facts do not bear 
 out the asserted conclusion, but they may bear out 
 something short of it : what conclusion do they 
 enable us to deduce ? 
 
 (6) Suppose, however, the inference to be valid, 
 the next step, whether the argument belongs to 
 direct contingent reasoning or to demonstrative 
 reasoning, is to examine the truth of the premises,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 211 
 
 or, in other words, of the facts asserted in them. 
 The conclusion is warranted by the premises : but 
 are the premises themselves to be relied upon ? 
 
 (7) In this investigation of the truth of the pre- 
 mises, you may possibly find that although the 
 propositons, as stated by the author, are inadmis- 
 sible, yet the substance of them is true, or, at least, 
 susceptible of being put into a less objectionable 
 shape. In such cases, as your object is not to 
 take advantage of mere errors in form, but to come 
 at the truth, whatever it may be, throw the argu- 
 ment into the most forcible shape in which it can 
 be exhibited, and then re-examine the whole. 
 
 (8) If you satisfy yourself that the premises are 
 erroneous, and can point out the circumstances 
 which make them so, it will be useful to trace the 
 source of the error in the mind of the writer. 
 Nothing seems to give us a greater command of 
 a subject than to be able, not only to see the mis- 
 takes which have been made regarding it, but to 
 ascend to their origin. 
 
 (9) Recollect that in many cases, although you 
 can show an argument to be fallacious, the conclu- 
 sion may still be true, and all that you have done 
 is simply to have placed it in the position of being 
 improved. 
 
 (10) In order to guard against the obscurity, 
 vagueness, confusion, and ambiguity incident to 
 language, endeavour to conceive, when practicable, 
 the actual things represented by words; and when
 
 212 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the terms are complex, decompose their meaning 
 into its constituent parts. 
 
 (11) When the definition of an important word 
 on which any of the reasoning turns has been given, 
 make it a practice, in all obscure or dubious .pas- 
 sages of the composition where it is employed, to 
 substitute the definition for the term. If the writer 
 under examination has furnished no definition of 
 such a term, form one for yourself, and use it in 
 the same manner. 
 
 (12) When abstract general terms are used in any 
 proposition, translate the proposition into concrete 
 language, and try how the argument in which the 
 proposition is employed will be affected by the 
 change.
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 
 
 BY conversational reasoning, I mean, of course, that 
 reasoning which is employed chiefly in conversa- 
 tion. I say chiefly, for there is no kind of reason- 
 ing that is employed exclusively in conversation, 
 nor is conversational reasoning confined to only 
 one kind. But all kinds of reasoning, when 
 employed in conversation, are employed in a differ- 
 ent manner as to the form or mode of expression 
 from that employed in books or in speeches. It is 
 impossible to describe all these forms. Every man 
 will express his reasons in conversation in a way 
 of his own, according to his constitutional tempera- 
 ment, his education, his temper at the time, the 
 occasion, or the manners of the society in which he 
 is accustomed to move. 
 
 (i) The language and form of conversational rea- 
 soning. 
 
 This is chiefly by enthymemes. I wish I had 
 a good English word to substitute for the Greek 
 word enthymeme it signifies, from the mind. 
 Reasoning by enthymemes, therefore, means rea- 
 soning from the mind : reasoning as you think, 
 or talk, or write, in the ordinary affairs of life. .You 
 
 213
 
 214 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 have heard of a character in a French play, who 
 was surprised to learn that he had been talking 
 prose for fifty years without knowing it. He might 
 have made the same observation respecting enthy- 
 memes. Whenever you have given a reason, you 
 have spoken an enthymeme. If you observe to a 
 friend, "It is a fine day," that is a description. 
 If you ask, "Is it going to be wet?" that is an 
 interrogation. If you say, " I shall take my um- 
 brella, for I think it will rain," that is an enthy- 
 meme. 
 
 Enthymemes are treated of largely in Aristotle's 
 Rhetoric. The following is the substance of his 
 doctrine respecting them. An enthymeme bears 
 the same relation to rhetoric as a syllogism to logic. 
 It is composed of a sentence and a reason. A 
 sentence is a general proposition concerning those 
 things which are to be desired, or avoided, and 
 it bears the same relation to an enthymeme as any 
 proposition to a syllogism. And therefore a sen- 
 tence, if a reason be rendered, becomes a conclu- 
 sion, and both together make an enthymeme. The 
 following is an example given by Aristotle: "To 
 be over-learned produces effeminacy and envy. 
 Therefore, he that is wise, will not suffer his 
 children to be over-learned." The form of this 
 enthymeme may be reversed thus : "A wise man 
 will not suffer his children to be over-learned, 
 because too much learning produces effeminacy 
 and envy." 
 
 Minto, in his Logic, Inductive and Deductive, 
 refers to Hamilton's threefold division of enthy- 
 memes.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 215 
 
 The first order has the major premiss under- 
 stood : 
 
 Caius is a coward; for Caius is a liar. 
 
 The second order has the minor premiss under- 
 stood : 
 
 Caius is a coward : for all liars are cowards. 
 
 The third order has the conclusion understood : 
 All liars are cowards, and Caius is a liar. 
 
 Huyshe quotes several examples: 
 
 The enthymeme is a defective syllogism, which con- 
 sists of one premiss and a conclusion; e.g. 
 
 Diamonds are jewels, they are therefore valuable. 
 
 God is a spirit ; therefore he is eternal. 
 
 An enthymeme may easily be reduced to a regular 
 syllogistic form ; for since the conclusion and one premiss 
 are given, the three terms may be known, and the 
 omitted premiss may be supplied : thus, in the above 
 example, the major, " All jewels are valuable," is 
 omitted, and, if supplied, the syllogism will be regular, 
 thus : 
 
 All jewels are valuable; 
 Diamonds are jewels ; 
 therefore, Diamonds are valuable. 
 
 Again : 
 
 Every spirit is eternal; 
 God is a spirit; 
 therefore, God is eternal. 
 
 In both these examples, the major premiss is sup- 
 pressed ; for, as was before observed, the major premiss 
 is, generally speaking, some universal and incontro-
 
 216 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 vertible principle, which is so evident that it is left to 
 the hearer's judgment; but the minor premiss is most 
 commonly expressed, because it has more particular 
 reference to the question which is to be proved. 
 
 In common discourse the usual mode of expressing 
 an argument is by means of the enthymeme; it being 
 unnecessary to adduce both the premises when one is so 
 evident that it may very fairly be left to the hearer's 
 judgment; e.g. 
 
 When we find a book quoted, or referred to by an 
 ancient author, we are entitled to conclude that it was 
 read and received in the age and country in which that 
 author lived. This sentence is an enthymeme, in which 
 the major premiss is suppressed, but which may easily 
 be supplied as follows : " Every book quoted, or referred 
 to by an ancient author, must have been read and 
 received in the age and country in which that author 
 lived." The sentence may thus be reduced to a regular 
 syllogism in Barbara : this may be effected in most enthy- 
 memes without much difficulty, whether their conclu- 
 sions be negative or affirmative. 
 
 Although the major premiss is generally suppressed 
 in most enthymemes, yet there are some enthymemes in 
 which the minor premiss is found to be omitted : this 
 may happen when the minor premiss is very evident, or 
 when much stress is meant to be laid upon the major; 
 e.g. "Every tyrannical king deserves to be deposed by 
 his subjects ; therefore Nero deserved to be deposed by 
 the Romans." The minor premiss, which is 
 suppressed, may be thus supplied : 
 
 Nero was a tyrannical king : 
 
 and thus the argument is reduced to the regular syllo- 
 gistic form. 
 
 An enthymeme is sometimes condensed into one sen- 
 tence, which is called an enthymematic sentence: viz.,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 217 
 
 when the premiss is united in one proposition with 
 the conclusion; e.g. " All machines, being of human 
 manufacture, are liable to imperfections." This argu- 
 ment may be thus expanded into a regular syllogism : 
 
 All things of human manufacture are liable 
 
 to imperfections ; 
 
 All machines are of human manufacture; 
 therefore, They are liable to imperfections. 
 
 The following are further examples of enthy- 
 memes : 
 
 We enjoy a greater degree of political liberty than 
 any civilised people on earth, and therefore have no 
 excuse for a seditious disposition. 
 
 The power of ridicule is a dangerous faculty, since it 
 tempts its possessor to find fault unjustly, and to dis- 
 tress some for the gratification of others. 
 
 The study of mathematics is essential to a complete 
 course of education, because it induces a habit of close 
 and regular reasoning. 
 
 Hard substances may be elastic, for ivory is both hard 
 and elastic. 
 
 The example of Virgil shows that even a great poet 
 may be seduced into some faults by the practice of 
 imitation. 
 
 The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his 
 own happiness or safety, compels us to seek from one 
 another assistance and support. 
 
 Real learning is too valuable a thing to be within the 
 grasp of the idle. 
 
 You will observe that although an enthymeme 
 is called by scholastic logicians a defective syllo- 
 gism, yet the syllogism is formed from the enthy- 
 meme, not the enthymeme from the syllogism. 
 The enthymeme is the natural mode of reasoning; 
 P
 
 218 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 the syllogism is the artificial mode. The argument 
 first occurs to our mind in the form of an enthy- 
 meme, but when we wish to make it clearer, we 
 extend it to a syllogism. 
 
 You will remember that the occurrence of " for," 
 "because," "therefore," or any similar word, 
 either in conversation or in reading, usually denotes 
 an enthymeme; in other words, denotes a reason 
 or argument expressed naturally, without the for- 
 mality of scholastic logic. 
 
 (2) The principles of reasoning most in use in con- 
 versation. 
 
 We refer not here to that communication which 
 takes place on occasion of buying and selling, or 
 in any other of the business transactions of life. 
 .We speak of that kind of conversation which takes 
 place in the hours of social intercourse. Into this 
 circle, formal logical definitions, and processes of 
 syllogistic reasoning, are never introduced. Nor 
 do we witness any pitched battles of controversy 
 nor systematic discussions of any one topic nor 
 captious objections nor triumphant boastings. 
 Every principle of reasoning may be introduced 
 into conversation, but I think those most frequently 
 employed are the relation of cause and effect, of 
 example and of analogy. You call on a friend, 
 and find he has taken cold. You inquire the cause. 
 It may be he rode in an omnibus with the windows 
 open ; he was caught in a shower without an 
 umbrella, or he got his feet wet, and did not 
 change his boots; or perhaps his female relations
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 219 
 
 will tell you that it was all his own fault, as lie 
 never takes proper care of himself. Here you will 
 have an interesting discussion upon the relation 
 of cause and effect. But you observe, you had 
 previously called on half a dozen of your friends, 
 and they all had colds. You infer it is a very 
 unhealthy season. Here you reason from example, 
 and you arrive at your conclusion by induction. 
 But you think the situation of your friend's house 
 is a very exposed one, and you make a comparison 
 between that and other situations which are more 
 sheltered. The language of conversational reason- 
 ing will be, as we have stated, enthymemical. 
 Descriptions, when introduced, will be short, unless 
 one of the party is describing an object which the 
 others may have not seen, as Klondyke, or the 
 Argentine. Interrogative reasoning is sometimes 
 employed, but chiefly in the form of inquiry : 
 "How do you account for this?" And in this 
 mode it is sometimes prefixed to an argument from 
 analogy. The form of dilemma a form to be 
 hereafter described is also often used in conversa- 
 tion. By a little observation on those conversa- 
 tions that come under your notice, you will soon 
 be able to discover the principles and forms of 
 reasoning that enter into their composition. 
 
 (3) Under the heading of " Rules usually 
 observed in Conversational Reasoning," Gilbart 
 wanders somewhat from the object he has in view; 
 instead of dealing with logic in conversation, he 
 dabbles in its ethics, quoting from a quaint old 
 book with the title, " The Art of Conversation,
 
 220 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 with Remarks on Fashion and Dress," by Captain 
 Orlando Sabertash. I reproduce a section : 
 
 As to subjects for conversation, what difficulty can 
 there be about them ? Will not books, balls, bonnets, 
 and metaphysics furnish pleasant topics of discourse? 
 Can you not speak of the 
 
 " Philosophy and science, and the springs 
 Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world?" 
 
 Are flirtation, travelling, love, and speech making at an 
 end; is St. Stephen's shut up; or is the great globe 
 itself and the weather on its surface so perfectly 
 stationary that you can find nothing to say about them ? 
 No, no, let us not deceive ourselves : we never want 
 subjects of conversation; but we often want the know- 
 ledge how to treat them; above all, how to bring them 
 forward in a graceful and pleasing manner. There is, 
 I am sorry to say, a great deal of servility in the very 
 best society : a needless meanness, seen through at once; 
 for you may be pleasant, courteous, and well-bred, 
 without cringing to the wit or opinions of others. All 
 that is expected, or can be expected from you, is, that 
 you are not to shock the unsuccessful wit by exposing 
 his stupidity, however glaring it may be, nor mark 
 dissent from opinions in which you may not coincide, 
 in such a manner as to bring on an argument or dis- 
 cussion. Any pleasant, passing, and good-humoured 
 jest will free you from noticing the wit, if particularly 
 forced upon your attention; even as an easy, playful 
 dissent from objectionable opinions will relieve you from 
 the necessity of disputing or submitting to them. 
 
 Franklin says, that you must never contradict in con- 
 versation, nor correct facts if wrongly stated. This is 
 going much too far : you must never contradict in a 
 short, direct, or positive tone : but with politeness, you 
 may easily, when necessary, express a difference of 
 opinion in a graceful and even complimentary manner.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 221 
 
 And I would almost say, that the art of conversation 
 consists in knowing how to contradict, and when to be 
 silent; for, as to constantly acting a fawning and 
 meanly deferential part in society, it is offensive to all 
 persons of good sense and good feeling. In regard to 
 facts wrongly stated, no well-bred man ever thinks of 
 correcting them, merely to show his wisdom in trifles; 
 but with politeness, it is perfectly easy to rectify an 
 error, when the nature of the conversation demands the 
 explanation. 
 
 Whenever the lady or gentleman with whom you are 
 discussing a point, whether of love, war, science, or 
 politics, begins to sophisticate, drop the subject 
 instantly. Your adversary either wants the ability to 
 maintain his opinion and then it would be uncivil to 
 press it or he wants the still more useful ability to yield 
 the point with unaffected grace and good humour; or, 
 what is also possible, his vanity is in some way engaged 
 in defending views on which he may probably have acted, 
 so that to demolish his opinions is perhaps to reprove 
 his conduct, and no well-bred man goes into society for 
 the purpose of sermonising. 
 
 (4) Some of the most interesting examples of 
 conversational reasoning are found in Boswell's 
 Johnson. 
 
 I praised the accuracy of an account-book of a lady 
 whom I mentioned. JOHNSON : " Keeping accounts, Sir, 
 is of no use when a man is spending his own money, and 
 has nobody to whom he is to account. You won't eat 
 less beef to-day because you have written down what it 
 cost yesterday." I mentioned another lady who thought 
 as he did, so that her husband could not get her to keep 
 an account of the expense of the family, as she thought 
 it enough that she never exceeded the sum allowed her. 
 JOHNSON: " Sir, it is fit she should keep an account, 
 because her husband wishes it; but I do not see its use." 
 I maintained that keeping an account has this advan-
 
 222 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 tage, that it satisfies a man that his money has not 
 been lost or stolen, which he might sometimes be apt 
 to imagine, were there no written state of his expense : 
 and, besides, a calculation of economy, so as not to 
 exceed one's income, cannot be made without a view of 
 the different articles in figures, that one may see how 
 to retrench in some particulars less necessary than 
 others. This he did not attempt to answer. 
 
 Mr. Walker, the celebrated master of elocution, came 
 in, and then we went up stairs into the study. I asked 
 him if he had taught many clergymen. JOHNSON : " I 
 hope not." WALKER : " I have taught only one, and 
 he is the best reader I ever heard, not by my teaching, 
 but by his own natural talents." JOHNSON : " Were he 
 the best reader in the world, I would not have it told 
 that he was taught." Here was one of his peculiar 
 prejudices. Could it be any disadvantage to the clergy- 
 man to have it known that he was taught an easy and 
 graceful delivery? Bos WELL : " Will you not allow, 
 Sir, that a man may be taught to read well?" JOHN- 
 SON: " Why, Sir, so far as to read better than he 
 might do without being taught, yes. Formerly it was 
 supposed that there was no difference in reading, but 
 that one read as well as another." Bos WELL : "It is 
 wonderful to see old Sheridan as enthusiastic about 
 oratory as ever." WALKER : " His enthusiasm as to 
 what oratory will do, may be too great : but he reads 
 well." JOHNSON: " He reads well, but he reads low; 
 and you know it is much easier to read low than to 
 read high; for when you read high you are much more 
 limited, your loudest note can be but one, and so the 
 variety is less in proportion to the loudness. Now some 
 people have occasion to speak to an extensive audience, 
 and must speak loud to be heard." WALKER : " The 
 art is to read strong, though low." 
 
 Talking of the origin of language : JOHNSON : " It 
 must have come by inspiration. A thousand, nay a 
 million of children could not invent a language. While
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 223 
 
 the organs are pliable, there is not understanding enough 
 to form a language; by the time that there is under- 
 standing enough the organs are become stiff. We know 
 that after a certain age we cannot learn to pronounce a 
 new language. No foreigner who comes to England 
 when advanced in life ever pronounces English tolerably 
 well; at least, such instances are very rare. When I 
 maintain that language must have come by inspiration, 
 I do not mean that inspiration is required for rhetoric, 
 and all the beauties of language; for when once man 
 has language, we can conceive that he may gradually 
 form modifications of it. I mean only that inspiration 
 seems to me to be necessary to give man the faculty of 
 speech ; to inform him that he may have speech ; which 
 I think he could no more find out without inspiration 
 than cows or hogs would think of such a faculty." 
 WALKER : " Do you think, Sir, that there are any perfect 
 synonymes in any language?" JOHXSON* : " Originally 
 there were not; but by using words negligently, or in 
 poetry, one word comes to be confounded with another." 
 
 (5) After the above examples of conversational 
 reasoning, I will conclude this section with an 
 example of a conversation without reasoning^. It 
 is taken from Miss Austen's description of "The 
 Voluble Lady": 
 
 My dear sir, you are too obliging. Is there nobody 
 you would not rather? I am not helpless. Sir, you are 
 most kind. Upon my word, Jane on one arm, and me 
 on the other ! Stop, stop, let us stand a little back, 
 Mrs. Elton is going; dear Mrs. Elton, how elegant she 
 looks beautiful lace ! Now we all follow in her train. 
 Quite the queen of the evening ! Well, here we are at 
 the passage. Two steps, Jane, take care of the two 
 steps. Oh ! no, there is but one. Well, I was per- 
 suaded there were two. How very odd ! I was con- 
 vinced there were two, and there is but one. I never
 
 224 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 saw anything equal to the comfort and style candles 
 everywhere. I was telling you of your grandmamma, 
 Jane there was a little disappointment. The baked 
 apples and biscuits, excellent in their way, you know; 
 but there was a delicate fricassee of sweetbread and 
 some asparagus brought in at first, and good Mr. 
 Woodhouse, not thinking the asaparagus boiled enough, 
 sent it all out again. Now there is nothing grand- 
 mamma loves better than sweetbread and asparagus so 
 she was rather disappointed; but we agreed we would 
 not speak of it to anybody, for fear of its getting round 
 to dear Miss Woodhouse, who would be so very much 
 concerned. Well, this is brilliant ! I am all amaze- 
 ment could not have supposed anything such ele- 
 gance and profusion ! I have seen nothing like it since 
 Well, where shall we sit? Where shall we sit? Any- 
 where, so that Jane is not in a draught. Where / sit is 
 of no consequence. Oh ! do you recommend this side? 
 Well, I am sure, Mr. Churchill only it seems too good 
 but just as you please. What you direct in this house 
 cannot be wrong. Dear Jane, how shall we ever recol- 
 lect half the dishes for grandmamma? Soup too ! Bless 
 me ! I should not be helped so soon, but it smells most 
 excellent, and I cannot help beginning.
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 IF the mere perception and comparison of two 
 ideas would always show us whether they agree or 
 disagree, then all rational propositions would be 
 matters of intelligence, or first principles, and there 
 would be no use in reasoning, or drawing any con- 
 sequences. It is the narrowness of the human 
 mind which introduces the necessity of reasoning. 
 When we are unable to judge of the truth or false- 
 hood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by 
 the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, 
 we are then constrained to use a medium, and to 
 compare each of them with some third idea, that 
 by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, 
 we may be able to judge how far they agree or 
 disagree among themselves : as if there are two 
 lines, A and B, and I know not whether they are 
 equal or no, I take a third line c, or an inch, and 
 apply it to each of them ; if it agree with them both, 
 then I infer that A and B are equal : but if it agree 
 with one and not with the other, then I conclude 
 A and B are unequal : if it agree with neither of 
 them, there can be no comparison. 
 
 If I say that some taxes ought not to be paid, a 
 friend will argue thus : 
 
 All taxes levied by Government must be paid. 
 225
 
 226 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 The tax on Incomes is levied by Government. 
 Therefore Income tax must be paid. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion 
 of a syllogism : it is a sentence or argument made 
 up of three propositions, so disposed as that the last 
 is necessarily inferred from those which go before, 
 as in the instances which have been just mentioned. 
 The three terms are named the major, the minor, 
 and the middle. The predicate of the conclusion 
 is called the major term, because it is generally of a 
 larger extension than the minor term, or the subject. 
 The major and minor terms are called the extremes. 
 The middle term is the third idea, invented and 
 disposed in two propositions, in such a manner as 
 to show the connexion between the major and minor 
 term in the conclusion ; for which reason the middle 
 term itself is sometimes called the argument. 
 
 That proposition which contains the predicate of 
 the conclusion, connected with the middle term, is 
 usually called the major proposition, whereas the 
 minor proposition connects the middle term with 
 the subject of the conclusion, and is sometimes 
 called the assumption. This exact distinction of 
 the several parts of a syllogism, and of the major 
 and minor terms connected with the middle term 
 in the major and minor propositions, does chiefly 
 belong to simple or categorical syllogisms, though 
 all syllogisms whatsoever have something ana- 
 logical to it. Single syllogisms are made up of 
 three propositions: compound syllogisms contain 
 more than three propositions, and may be formed 
 into two or more syllogisms.,
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 227 
 
 Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be 
 divided into simple, complex, and conjunctive. 
 
 I. SIMPLE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 Those are properly called simple or categorical 
 syllogisms, which are made up of three plain, 
 single, or categorical propositions, wherein the 
 middle term is evidently and regularly joined with 
 one part of the question in the major proposition, 
 and with the other in the minor, whence there flows 
 a plain single conclusion ; as " Every human virtue 
 is to be sought with diligence ; prudence is a human 
 virtue; therefore, prudence is to be sought with 
 diligence." 
 
 II. COMPLEX SYLLOGISM. 
 
 Those are properly called complex syllogisms, 
 in which the middle term is not connected with 
 the whole subject, or the whole predicate in two 
 distinct propositions, but is intermingled and com- 
 pared with them by parts, or in a more confused 
 manner, in different forms of speech ; as, 
 
 " The sun is a senseless being; 
 The Persians worshipped the sun ; 
 Therefore, the Persians worshipped a sense- 
 less being." 
 
 Here the predicate of the conclusion is, " wor- 
 shipped a senseless being," part of which is joined 
 with the middle term, " sun," in the major proposi- 
 tion, and the other part in the minor. Though this 
 sort of argument is confessed to be entangled or 
 confused, and irregular, if examined by the rules
 
 228 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 of simple syllogisms, yet there is a great variety 
 of arguments used in books of learning, and in 
 common life, whose consequence is strong and 
 evident, and which must be ranked under this head ; 
 as, 
 
 None but physicians came to the consultation ; 
 the nurse is no physician ; therefore, the nurse came 
 not to the consultation. 
 
 The fogs vanish as the sun rises; but the fogs 
 have not yet begun to vanish; therefore, the sun 
 is not yet risen. 
 
 It is necessary that a general understand the art 
 of war; but Caius does not understand the art of 
 war; therefore, it is necessary Caius should not be 
 a general. 
 
 A total eclipse of the sun would cause darkness 
 at noon ; it is possible that the moon at that time 
 may totally eclipse the sun ; therefore, it is possible 
 that the moon may cause darkness at noon. 
 
 Now the force of all these arguments is so evident 
 and conclusive, that though the form of the syl- 
 logism be never so irregular, yet we are sure the 
 inferences are just and true; for the premises, 
 according to the reason of things, do really contain 
 the conclusion that is deduced from them, which is 
 a never-failing test of a true syllogism. 
 
 III. CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 Those are called conjunctive syllogisms, wherein 
 one of the premises, namely the major, has distinct 
 parts, which are joined by a conjunction, or some
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 229 
 
 such particle of speech. Most times the major or 
 minor, or both, are explicitly compound proposi- 
 tions arid generally the major proposition is made 
 up of two distinct parts or propositions, in such a 
 manner, as that by the assertion of one in the 
 minor, the other is either asserted or denied in the 
 conclusion : or, by the denial of one in the minor, 
 the other is either asserted or denied in the con- 
 clusion. It is hardly possible indeed to fit any 
 short definition to include all the kinds of them ; 
 but the chief amongst them are conditional syllo- 
 gism, the disjunctive, the relative, and the con- 
 nexive. 
 
 (1) The conditional or hypothetical syllogism, is 
 that whose major or minor, or both, are conditional 
 propositions; e.g. 
 
 If such an administration had involved the 
 country in war it would have been a bad administra- 
 tion. 
 
 But it did not involve the country in war; 
 
 Therefore it was not a bad administration. 
 
 Take Cicero's defence of Mura?na : 
 
 " I could then only be accused with justice of 
 acting contrary to my law, if I maintained that 
 Muraena purchased the votes and was justified in 
 doing so. But I maintain that he did not buy the 
 votes, therefore I do nothing contrary to the law." 
 
 (2) A disjunctive syllogism is when the major 
 proposition is disjunctive; as, The earth moves in
 
 230 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 a circle or an ellipsis; but it does not move in a 
 circle; therefore it moves in an ellipsis. 
 
 Again : 
 
 Those who have slain Caesar are either parricides 
 
 or defenders of liberty ; 
 They are not parricides; 
 Therefore they are defenders of liberty. 
 
 All sciences are either pure, inductive, or mixed 
 
 sciences ; 
 But astronomy is not a pure or an inductive 
 
 science ; 
 It is therefore a mixed science. 
 
 Mahomet was either an enthusiast or an impostor ; 
 But he was an enthusiast; 
 Therefore he was not an impostor. 
 
 (3) A relative syllogism requires the major 
 proposition to be relative; as, "As is the captain, 
 so are his soldiers; but the captain is a coward; 
 therefore his soldiers are cowards too." 
 
 Arguments that relate to the doctrine of pro- 
 portion must be referred to this head; as, As two 
 are to four, so are three to six; but two make the 
 half of four; therefore, three make the half of six. 
 
 (4) A connexive syllogism requires that two or 
 more ideas be so connected, either in the complex 
 subject or predicate of the major, that if one of them 
 be affirmed or denied in the minor, common sense 
 will naturally show us what will be the conse- 
 quence.
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 231 
 
 For example : 
 
 A Government cannot be at the same time 
 despotic and the licenser of a free press ; 
 
 But the English Government permits a free 
 press ; 
 
 Therefore the English Government is not 
 despotic. 
 
 Reasoning by means of syllogisms has been a 
 thorny subject of debate among logicians for many 
 years past. Minto remarks that " there have been 
 heaps and mazes of discussion about the use of the 
 syllogism, much of it being profitable as a warning 
 against the neglect of formal logic. Again and 
 again it has been demonstrated that the syllogism 
 is useless for certain purposes and from this it has 
 been concluded that the syllogism is of no use at 
 all."* The truth seems to be that it is a form of 
 reasoning, but not adapted for arguments founded 
 on induction, analogy, or on mere probability. 
 The conclusion of a syllogism should be a certainty 
 and a certain deduction from the premises. Let 
 us take Mill's example: 
 
 All men are mortal : 
 
 The Duke of Wellington is a man ; 
 
 Therefore the Duke of Wellington is mortal. 
 
 Here you will observe it is essential to the validity 
 of this argument that the first proposition should be 
 universally true. Had it been said, " All men 
 (except one) are mortal ; the Duke of Wellington 
 is a man;" we could not have inferred that the 
 
 * Logic, Inductive and Deductive, p. 209.
 
 232 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 Duke of Wellington is mortal, for that excepted 
 one might, for aught we know, be the Duke of 
 Wellington. It would appear from this example, 
 that the syllogism is not adapted for probable 
 arguments, however high the degree of probability 
 may be. Hence, as in the moral sciences, and in 
 the ordinary affairs of life, we cannot always 
 have more than a high degree of probability, it 
 seems to follow that in these sciences and in these 
 affairs we cannot always employ the syllogism. 
 The chief principle of reasoning for which the 
 syllogism appears to be adapted, is that of genus 
 and species, and here chiefly when the relation of 
 genus and species is founded in nature. When we 
 try to form this relation mentally, by simply chang- 
 ing the mode of expression, we may weaken our 
 reasoning. In similar cases we can rarely form a 
 major proposition, capable of being proved to be 
 universally true. We place ourselves by syllogism 
 under the necessity of proving a universal, when 
 the argument requires us to prove only a particular. 
 And we attempt to prove by reasoning a proposi- 
 tion that cannot be proved but by observation and 
 experience. 
 
 Although an argument legitimately founded on 
 any other relation than genus and species, such as 
 the relation of subject and attribute, cause and 
 effect, can seldom be so well expressed by syllo- 
 gism, yet, when an argument is legitimately 
 founded on the relation of genus and species, and 
 that a natural, not an artificial relation, the syllo- 
 gism will sometimes afford the means of expressing 
 the argument with superior clearness. Perhaps
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 233 
 
 this is the case in the example we have noticed. 
 Were we to say, " As the Duke of Wellington is 
 a man, he must be mortal " ; or, " As all men are 
 mortal, the Duke of Wellington must be mortal, 
 for he is only a man " ; or any similar mode of 
 expression, we should not, perchance, express our 
 meaning with as much clearness as in the above 
 syllogism. While we are thus ready to admit that 
 the syllogism is sometimes a useful form of reason- 
 ing, we do not admit that an argument derives 
 greater strength from being put into this form. In 
 fact, no argument obtains increased strength by 
 being expressed in one form more than in another. 
 The advantage gained is in point of clearness, or 
 in adaptation to the party to whom the argument 
 may be addressed. The same form is not suitable 
 for all occasions. The form which gives clearness 
 and adaptation in one case may in another case be 
 attended with obscurity and unsuitableness. The 
 case in which syllogisms may be used with advan- 
 tage is, as we have said, in natural relations of 
 genus and species. In many other cases we think 
 them unsuitable, and in some, probably injurious.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 
 
 WE properly call those compound syllogisms, 
 which are made of two or more single syllogisms, 
 and may be resolved into them. The chief kinds 
 are these : epichirema, dilemma, prosyllogisms, 
 and sorites. 
 
 I. Epichirema is a syllogism which contains the 
 proof of the major or minor, or both, before it 
 draws the conclusion. 
 
 This is often used in writing, in public speeches, and 
 in common conversation; that so each part of the dis- 
 course may be confirmed and put out of doubt, as it 
 moves on toward the conclusion which was chiefly 
 designed. Take the instance in Cicero's oration in 
 defence of Milo, who had slain Clodius. His major pro- 
 position is, that " it is lawful for one man to kill another 
 who lies in wait to kill him, which he proves from the 
 custom of nations, from natural equity, examples, etc. 
 His minor is, that Clodius " laid wait for Milo " ; wJiich 
 he proves by his arms, guards, etc. ; and then infers the 
 conclusion, that " it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius." 
 
 II. A Dilemma is an argument which divides 
 the whole into all its parts or members by a dis- 
 junctive proposition, and then infers something 
 
 234
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 235 
 
 concerning each part which is finally inferred con- 
 cerning the whole. 
 
 Instances of this are frequent; as, In this life we must 
 either obey our vicious inclinations, or resist them : to 
 obey them will bring sin and sorrow; to resist them is 
 laborious and painful : therefore, we cannot be per- 
 fectly free from sorrow or pain in this life. A dilemma 
 becomes faulty or ineffectual three ways : First, when 
 the members of the division are not well opposed, or not 
 fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Secondly, 
 when what is asserted concerning each part is not just ; 
 for then the minor is not true. Thirdly, when it may 
 be retorted with equal force upon him who utters it. 
 
 There was a famous ancient instance of this case, 
 wherein a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised 
 Protagoras a reward when he had taught him the art 
 of pleading; and it was to be paid the first day that he 
 gained any cause in the court. After a considerable 
 time Protagoras goes to law with Euathlus for the 
 reward, and uses this dilemma : " Either the cause will 
 go on my side, or on yours : if the cause goes on my 
 side, you must pay me, according to the sentence of the 
 judge; if the cause goes on your side, you must pay me 
 according to your bargain ; therefore, whether the cause 
 goes for me or against me, you must pay me the 
 reward." But Euathlus retorted this dilemma thus: 
 " Either I shall gain the cause, or lose it : if I gain the 
 cause, then nothing will be due to you, according to the 
 sentence of the judge; but if I lose the cause, nothing 
 will be due to you, according to my bargain; therefore, 
 whether I lose or gain the cause, I will not pay you, 
 for nothing will be due to you." 
 
 The attempt to provide artificial dilemmas is a trick 
 of the debater. Bradlaugh is said on one occasion to 
 have asked an opponent for an answer, " Yes," or 
 " No," to a specific question. The debater said the 
 question could not be answered in the direct affirmative
 
 236 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 or negative. Bradlaugh said every question could be so 
 answered. Whereupon his opponent asked him : " Mr. 
 Bradlaugh, have you ceased beating your wife?" To 
 say " Yes," or " No," implied a serious admission, and, 
 of course, Mr. Bradlaugh did not beat his wife. 
 
 III. A Prosy llogism is when two or more syllo- 
 gisms are so connected together, that the conclusion 
 of the former is the major or the minor of the 
 following : 
 
 Example 
 
 Blood cannot think ; but the soul of man thinks ; there- 
 fore, the soul of man is not blood : but the soul of a 
 brute is his blood, according to the Scripture; therefore, 
 the soul of man is different from the soul of a brute. 
 
 Happiness is the result of certain habits; 
 Man has the power of acquiring those habits; 
 Therefore, man has the power of making himself 
 happy. 
 
 Man has the power of making himself happy; 
 Every wise man uses this power; 
 Therefore, every wise man is a happy man. 
 
 IV. A sorites is when several middle terms are 
 chosen to connect one another successively in 
 several propositions till the last proposition con- 
 nects its predicate with the first subject. 
 
 For example I may say 
 
 A is B. 
 
 C is D. 
 
 D is E. 
 
 Therefore A is E. 
 
 A good illustration is given by Lord Eldon on 
 the occasion of Laurence's injunction concerning
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 237 
 
 the pirated edition of his book on The Natural 
 History of Man. " I have a rational doubt whether 
 some portion of this book do not lean to mate- 
 rialism ; what leans to materialism is inconsistent 
 with the immortality of the soul ; what is incon- 
 sistent with the immortality of the soul is contrary 
 to Scripture; but as that which contradicts Scrip- 
 ture does not come under the protection of the law, 
 I have a rational doubt whether the injunction can 
 be maintained; therefore the injunction is dis- 
 solved."* 
 
 The sorites is, of course, much used in mathe- 
 matical demonstrations. 
 
 * Devey's Logic, p. 139.
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 ARGUMENTS FOR ANALYSIS. 
 
 THE object of the following selection is to offer 
 some facilities for examining real arguments, or 
 what pass as arguments, as distinct from the dull 
 and dry specimens found in some text-books of 
 logic. I am indebted to Lateur's Illustrations of 
 Logic for a few of the following examples : 
 
 I would encourage parents to carry their daugh- 
 ters early and much into company; for what harm 
 can be done before so many witnesses ? Solitude 
 is the surest nurse of all prurient passions; and a 
 girl in the hurry of preparation, or tumult of gaiety, 
 has neither inclination nor leisure to let tender 
 expressions soften or sink into her heart. The ball, 
 the show, are not the dangerous places : no, it is 
 the private friend, the kind consoler, the companion 
 of the easy, vacant hour, whose compliance with 
 her opinions can flatter her vanity, and whose 
 con^ejfvfetion can first soothe, without ever shielding 
 her mind that is the lover to be feared. He who 
 buzzes in her ear at Court, or at the opera, must 
 be contented to buzz in vain. Dr. Johnson. 
 
 So you object, with old Hobbes, that I do good 
 actions for the pleasure of a good conscience; and 
 
 238
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 239 
 
 so, after all, I am only a refined sensualist. 
 Heaven bless you, and men your logic ! Don't 
 you see that if conscience, which is in its nature 
 a consequence, were thus anticipated and made an 
 antecedent a party instead of a judge it would 
 dishonour your draft upon it it would not pay 
 on demand ? Don't you see that, in truth, the very 
 fact of acting with this motive properly and logic- 
 ally destroys all claims upon conscience to give 
 you any pain at all ? S. T. Coleridge. 
 
 The entire difference between enlightened politi- 
 cians and the advocates of violent measures may 
 be exemplified by the difference in the signification 
 of the singular and the plural of the word reform. 
 A man who uses this term in the singular, exclaim- 
 ing, " I am for reform," is a revolutionist, and 
 an advocate of every kind of violent change which 
 would suit his selfish ends or his vague, conceited 
 notions of things; but the term reform means the 
 sanitary removal of certain impediments to the 
 welfare of society, which powerful minds, after a 
 thorough investigation and consideration of cir- 
 cumstances, have found to be such ; therefore every 
 enlightened politician may pronounce himself to 
 be an advocate of reforms. Prince Metternich. 
 
 Education is all paint : it does not alter the 
 nature of the wood that is under it, it only improves 
 its appearance a little. Why I dislike education 
 so much is, that it makes all people alike, until 
 you have examined into them; and it is sometimes 
 so long before you get to see under the varnish !
 
 240 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 Education, beyond reading, writing, and arith- 
 metic, is of no use to persons who have shops to 
 attend to, household duties to perform, and, indeed, 
 in all the ordinary occupations of life. Lady 
 Stanhope. 
 
 No story ought to be well constructed or prob- 
 able, in the ordinary sense of the word. If you 
 relate only common events and ascribe actions to 
 such motives only as would produce them in com- 
 mon characters, what materials have you for a 
 romance? The drama is a picture of life, where 
 the objects represented are real, though the group- 
 ing is such as the ordinary business of mankind 
 does not exhibit. Byron. 
 
 What has love to do with the intellect? We 
 love a young woman for everything but her intel- 
 lect for her beauty, her youth, her seductiveness, 
 her candour, her faults, her caprices, and heaven 
 knows for what other inexpressible things but we 
 don't love her for her intellect. We may esteem 
 her for intellect, if she is clever; and a young girl 
 gains much in our sight by being clever. Intellect 
 may enslave us if we are predisposed to like it; 
 but intellect cannot warm us or inspire us with 
 passion. Goethe. 
 
 The best of us being unfit to die, what an inex- 
 pressible absurdity to put the worst to death ! 
 Hawthorne. 
 
 Capital punishment is a violation of natural 
 justice. No society has a right to deprive the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 241 
 
 individual of that which he has not obtained from 
 society. Argument of a Portuguese in defence 
 of the abolition of capital punishment in his 
 country. 
 
 We have been saying in thousands of treatises 
 on Logic, All men are mortal : Socrates is a man, 
 therefore Socrates is mortal. The elephant reasons : 
 All boys are bun-giving animals; that biped is a 
 boy; therefore I will hold out my trunk to him. 
 A philosopher says, The barometer is rising, and 
 therefore we shall have fine weather ; his dogs says, 
 My master is putting on his hat, and therefore I 
 am going to have a walk. A dog equals a detective 
 in the sharpness with which he infers general objec- 
 tionableness from ragged clothes. A clever dog 
 draws more refined inferences. If he is not up to 
 enough simple arithmetic to count seven, he can 
 at least say, Everybody is looking so gloomy, that 
 it must be Sunday morning. Leslie Stephen/. 
 
 I hold that a long poem does not exist. I main- 
 tain that the phrase, "A long poem," is simply 
 a flat contradiction in terms. I need scarcely 
 observe that a poem deserves its title only inasmuch 
 as it excites, by elevating the soul. The value of 
 the poem is in the ratio of this elevating excitement. 
 But all excitements are, through a psychal neces- 
 sity, transient. That degree of excitement which 
 would entitle a poem to be called so at all, cannot 
 be sustained throughout the composition of any 
 great length. After the lapse of half an hour at the 
 very utmost, it flags fails a revulsion ensues
 
 242 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 and then the poem is in effect, and in fact, no 
 longer such. Edgar Allan Poc. 
 
 The deductive inquirer . . . will argue thus : 
 Poetry appeals to the imagination, mathematics to 
 the understanding. To work the imagination is 
 more exciting than to work the understanding, and 
 what is habitually exciting is usually unhealthy. 
 But what is usually unhealthy will tend to shorten 
 life; therefore poetry tends more than mathematics 
 to shorten life; therefore, on the w r hole, poets will 
 die sooner than mathematicians. Henry Thomas 
 Buckle. 
 
 All living, in the first place, however common-' 
 place its aims, however accidental its ideals, in- 
 volves a deep paradox. We long to live. Very 
 well, then, we long to be active. For life means 
 activity; and activity, that again means longing, 
 striving, suffering, lack, hoping for the end of the 
 activity in which we are immediately engaged- . . . 
 Life is will ; and every will aims at its own com- 
 pletion, that is, at its own cessation. I will to be 
 wiser than I am. Well, then, I will that my 
 present foolishness shall cease. I will to get some- 
 body's love; and that means that I will the cessa- 
 tion of my unloved condition. Every will aims 
 at the attainment of its desire; and attainment is 
 the death of just this desire, and so of just this act 
 of will. And yet, on the whole, I will to live. 
 /. Royce. 
 
 Haeckel seeks to get out of a difficulty by assum- 
 ing that the principle of life has its origin in the
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 243 
 
 physical and chemical properties of albuminous 
 bodies. And how are these albuminous bodies 
 formed ? By the tendency of carbon towards mani- 
 fold combinations with other elements. And what 
 is the cause of this tendency and also of all other 
 chemical properties of bodies? " I do not know," 
 answers Haeckel. " Then," it may be replied, 
 " if your hypothesis is sound, you have done 
 nothing more than remove the mystery a little 
 farther, and if the cause of your vital principle 
 springs in its turn from an unknown cause, your 
 explanation is reduced to this : The original cause 
 of life is equal to x." Antonio Fogaszaro. 
 
 I am a finite being, God is infinite : I am im- 
 perfect and defective. God is perfect and without 
 defects. It is, therefore, impossible for me to be 
 the cause of this idea. Either I cannot have such 
 a conception at all, or its cause must be a being 
 of like reality; i.e., God Himself. But I have the 
 idea of God; and, in this case, to have it is equiva- 
 lent to having received it. Every conception, as 
 every phenomenon, has its cause. If I clearly and 
 distinctly perceive that I cannot be this cause, I 
 know just as clearly and distinctly that it must be 
 without me ; that there is, therefore, a being without 
 me. Kuno Fischer. 
 
 You know what Pericles said of his son's dog 
 Azor : Azor rules my boy, my boy rules his 
 mother, his mother rules me, I rule Athens, Athens 
 rules Greece, and Greece rules the world, where- 
 fore Azor is the ruler of the world. Same remark
 
 244 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 applies to Mdlle. Mimi Triboulette's dog, Bichon. 
 Bichon governs Mdlle. Mimi, Mimi governs the 
 Parisian public, the Parisian public governs 
 Europe, Europe governs the two hemispheres; 
 ergo, Bichon is the governor of the universe. 
 E. C. Grenville Murray. 
 
 What distinguishes one being from another is 
 its organisation. That is what distinguishes a 
 plant from a mineral, an animal in one species 
 from one in another. Every being has therefore 
 its own nature; and because of having its own 
 nature, it is predestined by that nature to a certain 
 end. If the end (purpose) of the bee, for example, 
 is not that of the lion, and that of the lion again 
 not identical with that of man, the reason of it 
 can be found nowhere but in the difference of their 
 respective natures. Every being is therefore 
 organised in view of a certain end, so that, if one 
 only knew its nature completely, one could deduce 
 therefrom its intention or end. The end of a being 
 is what we call its good. There is consequently 
 an absolute identity between the good of a being 
 and its end. Its good is to compass its end, to 
 travel to the limit of the purpose for which it has 
 been organised. Jouffroy. 
 
 Make the necessaries of life too expensive for 
 the poor to reach them, and you will save their 
 money. If they buy but few candles, they will pay 
 but little tax; and if they buy none, the tax, as to 
 them, will be annihilated. Coivper.
 
 245 
 
 People really do not know what they mean by 
 complaining that vice is happy and virtue unhappy 
 in this world. ... It is manifestly proved that ills 
 of every sort rain down on the human race like 
 bullets on an army, without any distinction of 
 persons. Now, if the good man does not suffer 
 because he is good, and if the wicked does not 
 prosper because he is wicked, the objection dis- 
 appears and common sense has triumphed. Joseph 
 De Maistre. 
 
 If no man has a right to political power, then 
 neither Jew nor Gentile has such a right. The 
 whole foundation of government is taken away. 
 But if government be taken away, the property 
 and the persons of men are insecure ; and it is 
 acknowledged that men have a right to their 
 property and to personal security. If it be right 
 that the property of men should be protected, and 
 if this can only be done by means of government, 
 then it must be right that government should exist. 
 Now there cannot be government unless some 
 person or persons possess political power. There- 
 fore, it is right that some person or persons should 
 possess political power. That is to say, some 
 person or persons must have a right to political 
 power. Macaulay. 
 
 Why does the murdered deserve death ? The 
 answer will be, because he has deliberately taken 
 human life. Then, of course, the same guilt is 
 perpetrated, and the same penalty incurred, when 
 the law deliberately takes human life in return. 
 For wherein is there a difference ? Both acts of
 
 246 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 homicide are perpetrated wilfully, and to our mind 
 the homicide of the law is worse than the homicide 
 of the assassin, inasmuch as it is committed in cold 
 blood, and in the sight of day. Eclectic Review, 
 July, 
 
 Suicide is indeed one of those acts which may 
 be condemned by moralists as a sin, but which, 
 in modern times at least, cannot be regarded as 
 within the legitimate sphere of law; for a society 
 which accords to its members perfect liberty of 
 emigration, cannot reasonably pronounce the 
 simple renunciation of life to be an offence against 
 itself. W. E. H. Lecky. 
 
 David said in his wrath, All men are liars. 
 
 Therefore, David w T as a liar. 
 
 Therefore, what David said was not true. 
 
 Therefore, David was not a liar. 
 But if David was not a liar, what he said was true 
 namely, that all men are liars. 
 
 Those men who set up Nature as a standard of 
 action do not intend a merely verbal exposition ; 
 they do not mean that the standard, whatever it 
 be, should be called Nature ; they think they are 
 giving some information as to what the standard 
 of action really is. They who say that we ought 
 to act according to Nature, do not mean the mere 
 identical proposition that we ought to do what we 
 ought to do. They think that the word Nature 
 affords some external criterion of what we should 
 do; and if they lay down as a rule for what ought
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 247 
 
 to be, a word which in its proper signification 
 denotes what is, they do so because they have a 
 notion, either clearly or confusedly, that what is, 
 constitutes the rule and standard of what ought 
 to be. y. 5. Mill. 
 
 How (it has been asked) does a child come to 
 form the very abstract and metaphysical idea 
 expressed by the pronoun I or moi? In answer 
 to this question, I have only to observe that when 
 we set about the explanation of a phenomenon, 
 we must proceed on the supposition that it is pos- 
 sible to resolve it into some more general law or 
 laws with which we are already acquainted. But in 
 the case before us, how can this be expected, by 
 those who consider that all our knowledge of mind 
 is derived from the exercise of reflection ; and that 
 every act of this power implies a conviction of our 
 own existence as reflecting and intelligent beings? 
 Every theory, therefore, which pretends to account 
 for this conviction, must necessarily involve that 
 sort of paralogism which logicians call a petitio 
 principii; inasmuch as it must resolve the thing 
 to be explained into some law or laws, the evidence 
 of which rests ultimately on the assumption in 
 question. Dugald Stewart. 
 
 It is a matter of infinite difficulty, but, for- 
 tunately, of comparative indifference, to determine 
 what a man's motive may have been for this or 
 that particular action. Rather seek to learn what 
 his objects in general are what does he habitually 
 wish, habitually pursue ? and thence deduce his 
 impulses, which are commonly the true efficient
 
 248 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 causes of men's conduct, and without which the 
 motive itself would not have become a motive. 
 S. T. Coleridge. 
 
 Men are by nature unequal. It is vain therefore 
 to treat them as if they were equal. Froude. 
 
 There is nothing strictly immortal but immor- 
 tality. Whatever hath no beginning may be con- 
 fident of no end. Sir Thomas Browne. 
 
 Good laws are for good people. It is useless 
 to offer good laws to bad people. H. R. Haweis. 
 
 Gambling with canis, or dice, or stocks, is all 
 one thing it is getting money without giving an 
 equivalent for it. H. W. Beecher. 
 
 He who bears arms at the command of the 
 magistrate does what is lawful for a Christian ; the 
 Swiss in the French service, and the British in the 
 American service, bore arms at the command of a 
 magistrate; therefore they did what was lawful for 
 a Christian. Whateley. 
 
 Improbable events happen almost every day; 
 but what happens almost every day is a very 
 probable event; therefore very improbable events 
 are very probable events. Whateley. 
 
 I boasted the other day I was in good health : 
 the next day I fell ill; therefore my boasting was 
 the cause of the illness, and I will never boast 
 again, unless I "touch wood."
 
 INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Accidental attributes ... 47 
 
 Active cause 104 
 
 Analogy, reasoning- by 46, 161 
 Analysing arguments, 
 
 rules for 209 
 
 Argumentum ad judicium 124 
 ,, ad ignorantiam 124 
 ,, hominem 124 
 ,, verecundiam 124 
 ,, ,, passiones 124 
 >, populam 124 
 Argument by contrast ... 168 
 Arguments from enumera- 
 tion ... 65 
 ,, ,, general 
 
 principles 62 
 
 ,, proverbs 63 
 
 ,, ,, definitions 66 
 
 Association, influence of 25 
 
 Attributes and Subject ... 34 
 
 Authority 21 
 
 Authorities, reasoning 
 
 from 187 
 
 B. 
 
 37 
 
 Blackstone on " Law " 
 Berkeley's theory of 
 
 matter 81 
 
 Biology 37 
 
 Bowley on Statistics ... 173 
 
 C. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 75 
 .. 115 
 
 Cause and effect 
 
 Causes, final 
 
 Circumstantial evidence 
 
 i 06, 107 
 
 Classic, what is a 136 
 
 Classification, instances of 58 
 
 Constitutional infirmities 23 
 
 Common attributes 38 
 
 Contrary attributes ... 47 
 
 Conditional causes 101 
 
 Contrast, argument by ... 168 
 
 Conversational Reasoning 213 
 
 Complex Syllogism 227 
 
 Conjunctive Syllogism ... 228 
 
 Compound Syllogism ... 234 
 
 D. 
 
 Design argument 127 
 
 Deduction 153 
 
 Dilemma 234 
 
 E. 
 
 116, 
 
 Effects of motives 
 Enthymemes 
 
 Epichirema 
 
 Equivocal terms 
 
 Essential attributes 
 Ethics and final causes ... 
 Experiment and observa- 
 tion 
 
 Evidence, circumstantial 
 
 106, 107 
 
 118 
 213 
 234 
 134 
 47 
 129 
 
 82
 
 INDEX Continued. 
 
 F. PAGE 
 
 Fallacies 191 
 
 Fallacia-accidentis 196 
 
 Final Causes ... 115, 130 
 
 G. 
 
 Genus and species 57 
 
 Goethe, on logic ... i , 2 
 Goodwin Sands and Ten- 
 
 terden Steeple go 
 
 Grammar and logic ... 3 
 
 H. 
 
 Hill on Induction 157 
 
 Historical evidence 205 
 
 I. 
 
 Ignoratio elenchi 191 
 
 Illicit process 198 
 
 Intelligence and the Intel- 
 ligible 130 
 
 Induction 153 
 
 K. 
 
 Knowledge and Reasoning 28 
 
 L. 
 
 Logic not difficult 5 
 
 Logic : its alleged inutility 6 
 
 Logic and debate 17 
 
 Logic and insanity 18 
 
 Love of truth 20 
 
 M. 
 
 Manner, influence of ... 24 
 Mathematical Universality 73 
 Mental independence 20 to 27 
 Methods of Observation 137 
 
 Moral ideas 53 
 
 Moral Universality 73 
 
 Moral causes 85 
 
 Motives, effects of 116, 118 
 Morality of the Universe 131 
 
 N. PAGE 
 
 Nature, what is? 138 
 
 Newman's " gentleman " 35 
 
 Non causa pro causa ... 201 
 
 O. 
 
 Observation and Experi- 
 ment 82 
 
 Object of punishment ... 120 
 
 Origin of civilisation ... 122 
 
 Origin of Life 187 
 
 P. 
 
 Palgrave on Statistics ... 174 
 
 Passions, influence of ... 22 
 
 Petitio Principii 194 
 
 Physical Universality ... 73 
 
 Physical causes 75 
 
 Prosyllogism 236 
 
 "Proving too much" ... 97 
 
 Punishment, object of ... 120 
 
 R. 
 
 Reductio ad absurdum ... 96 
 Reasoning from examples 153 
 Reasoning from analogy 161 
 Reasoning from Statistics 171 
 Reasoning from History 178 
 Reasoning from Authori- 
 ties 187 
 
 " Rights " explained ... 139 
 
 Rules for induction 158 
 
 Rules for analysing argu- 
 ments 2OQ 
 
 S. 
 
 Self-Evident Truths 
 Science and Logic .. 
 Single Syllogism .. 
 Spencer on Logic .. 
 Spencer on Style .. 
 Specific attributes .. 
 Species v. genus 
 Sorites
 
 INDEX Continued. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Socratic Disputation ... 142 
 
 Statistics, reasoning' from 171 
 
 Syllogisms ... 61, 227, 228 
 
 Subject and attributes ... 34 
 
 T. 
 
 Teleology 132 
 
 Tenterden Steeple and 
 
 Goodwin Sands ... 90 
 
 Truths of the senses ... 9 
 
 ,, consciousness 10 
 
 ,, ,, intellect 10 
 
 ,, testimony ... n 
 
 ,, ,, reasoning ... 12 
 
 "Tyranny" explained ... 137 
 
 U. 
 
 Univocal terms . . . 
 
 134 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Undistributed Middle ... 198 
 
 Universality, mathematical 72 
 
 physical ... 73 
 
 moral 73 
 
 Use and abuse of terms ... 137 
 Utility of logical mind ... 15 
 
 V. 
 
 Verbal quibbles 205 
 
 Virtue, what is? 142 
 
 W. 
 
 Wall's Theories of History 183 
 
 What is a classic? 136 
 
 Whole and its parts 50 
 
 Words in Reasoning ... 133 
 
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