S'iJ^pt^^B.^ €1)0 Concept ^^urpose A PHILOSOPHICAL THESIS by the REV. ORROK COLLOQUE, Ph.D. LIMITED EDITION 1 > J ' NEW YORK Fourth Ave. and Twenty-Second St. 1904 PSVCH. LIBRARV Q^cIk Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, by the Graduate School of New York University, in 190 4-. 21)6240 CONTENTS PART I THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND CHAPTER PAGE I. Purpose and the Volitional Activity .... 3 II. Definition 15 III. The Purposes of Men 20 PART II THE COSMOLOGICAL APPLICATION IV. On Method 27 V. The Purposes of Beasts 30 VI. Purpose in Inorganic Nature 36 VII. The Purpose of Organic Nature 49 Bibliography . 56 PART I THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND THE CONCEPT PURPOSE CHAPTER I PURPOSE AND THE VOLITIONAL ACTIVITY In the unity of consciousness, we find the intel- lectual side of life and the volitional side of Hfe very closely bound up together. We never find in expe- rience either the intellectual or the volitional elements independent and alone. In psychology we find neu- roses and psychoses inevitably linked together; and if we examine ideas, and try to determine their nature, we again find the intellectual and the volitional closely intertwined. Both are imited in a single conscious- ness. According to the philosophy of Locke, ideas are the objects of thought. Locke's definitions of " Idea '* are as follows: An idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks" . . . "what- ever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Ideas are the material with which the mind works. They are obtained wholly from experience. They come into the mind as the results, the effects, produced through the means of sensation. These ideas, coming from and given through sensation, are again the objects of the operations of the Mind, which, as an independent and active agent, unites and combines 3 THE CONCEPT PURPOSE these ideas from sensation, and hence there comes to be a second class of ideas — the ideas from Reflection. Knowledge arises from both these sources, which to- gether form experience. Hence all our knowledge is about ideas, and ideas only are known by the mind. But this position, inasmuch as it does not cover all the facts, is unsatisfactory. In that reflection is an active process of the mind, acting upon the ideas of perception and producing other ideas; the ideas show evidences of an activity of the mind which has not yet been taken into consideration. The activity of the mind is a fun- damental thought with Kant. The problem between Nominalism and Conceptualism does not exist for him. The mind cannot think perceptions directly, imme- diately. No sooner are percepts received than they are classed under concepts, and must be thought through concepts. But the mind can think concepts directly, without the intervention of any further idea. The reason transforms and synthesizes ideas, in accordance with the forms and categories, because it is the very nature and constitution of the mind to do this very thing. An a priori philosophy goes beyond the given, and transcends experience. There is no possibility of an idea that is purely in- tellectual, and has no other aspect. Every idea is as much a volitional process, or rather gives evidence of a distinct volitional activity, as it is an intellectual datum. As the volitional character and the intellectual character are both to be found displayed in ideas, we know them to be purposive, id est, they express or give evidence of a purpose. This is embodied in, or ex- pressed by, the idea and is a principle characteristic of 4 PURPOSE AND VOLITIONAL ACTIVITY an idea. It is in the ideas we find evidences of pur- poses which have been acting upon them or through them, altering their character, making of diverse ideas homogeneous units, and giving them the character of purposive ideas. Purposes are not the product of ideas, neither are ideas the product of pui-poses. But the sources of the purposes must be sought not in pre- cepts or concepts, but by reference to the Will. This attitude is opposed to that of Royce, when he says, " Ideas first voluntarily bind themselves to a given task — the internal purpose is selective — the idea learns to develop its internal meaning so as to assign to itself a specific purpose — the idea selects its object — the idea is selective. It seeks its own. It attends as itself has chosen. It desires in its own way — the idea's own conscious purpose or will,"^ et al. This seems to mean that each idea possesses all the charac- teristics and powers of a complete and separate human mind, possessing the ability to choose, will, plan and execute. Such ideas are hypostasized. " The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings, in so far as they are rational," says Kant.^ If a will acted without regard to an intellect, it would be blind. But in all our experience, we can never find evidence of a blind, an abstract will. "Tendency is only the empty form of the will . . . and as every empty form is only an abstraction, voHtion is ex- istential or actual only in its relation to the repre- sentation of a present or future state. No one can really will purely and simply, without willing this or ^ Royce : The World and the Individual. ^ Kant : Practical Reason. 5 THE CONCEPT PURPOSE that. A will that does not will something is nothing. It is only by the determination of its content that the will acquires the possibility of existence, and this con- tent is representation. Thus, then, there is no will without representation, as Aristotle had said before: opeKTiKov Se ovK avev (f)aPTa(Tia