1 
 
 ii: 
 
 A 
 
THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
Zbc /Iftoorbouse Xectutee, 1907 
 
 THE 
 
 SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 BY 
 
 The Rt. Rev. J. EDWARD MERCER 
 
 D.D. OxoN. 
 
 BISHOP OF TASMANIA 
 
 ■^ OF THE • 
 
 LONDON 
 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE 
 
 14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN 
 
 1907 
 

Zo 
 
 THE RIGHT REVEREND 
 
 JAMES MOORHOUSE, D.D. 
 
 SOMETIME 
 
 BISHOP OF MELBOURNE 
 
 THIS ATTEMPT TO FULFIL THE INTENTIONS 
 
 OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE 
 
 MOORHOUSE LECTURESHIP 
 
 IS DEDICATED 
 
 BY 
 
 THE FIRST LECTURER UNDER THE TRUST. 
 
 189165 
 
CONDITIONS OF THE LECTURESHIP, 
 
 Extract from the Minutes of the Chapter 
 of St Paul's Cathedra/, Me/bourne. 
 
 MOORHOUSE LECTURESHIP. 
 
 I. This lectureship shall be called the Moorhouse 
 Lectureship, in memory of the Australian episcopate of 
 the Right Rev. James Moorhouse, D.D., St John's 
 College, Cambridge, Bishop of Melbourne 1876-1886. 
 
 2. The annual income of the lectureship shall be the 
 interest upon a sum of £2000 held in trust by the 
 Trusts Corporation of the Diocese of Melbourne for this 
 purpose. 
 
 3. No lecturer shall hold the office more than twice, 
 and at least ten years shall elapse between the first and 
 second tenure. Anyone in Holy Orders in the Church 
 of England at home or abroad, or in a church in 
 communion with her, shall be eligible for election. 
 
 4. The electors shall be the bishops of the metropolitan 
 sees of Australia and Tasmania, and the Primate of New 
 
 vu 
 
viii CONDITIONS OF THE LECTURESHIP 
 
 Zealand, and the Archbishop of Melbourne shall hold the 
 office of Chairman. 
 
 5. The subjects of the lecture shall be (i) the defence 
 and confirmation of the Christian faith as declared in the 
 Apostles' and Nicene Creeds ; (2) questions bearing upon 
 the history and authority of the Holy Scriptures of the 
 Old and New Testaments ; and (3) the social aspects of 
 the Christian faith in their widest application. 
 
 6. The lectures, not less than six in number, shall be 
 delivered annually in St Paul's Cathedral, Melbourne, on 
 such days as the Archbishop of Melbourne may approve. 
 Each lecturer shall be required to publish his lectures in 
 a form approved by the electors at his charges within six 
 months of their delivery, and shall retain any copyright 
 in them. He shall present a copy to each of the electors, 
 and to every Diocesan Library in Australia, Tasmania, 
 and New Zealand. 
 
 7. It shall be lawful for a majority of the electors to 
 decide all questions arising out of the interpretation of 
 these conditions. 
 
PREFATORY. 
 
 A PREFACE should bc brief. On the whole it seems 
 best that it should not be apologetic. I content myself, 
 therefore, with giving a succinct account of the aims I 
 have had in view while writing these lectures. 
 
 In the first place, I have tried to carry out the inten- 
 tions of the founders of the Lectureship, by showing 
 that the Christian Religion can meet the deepest social 
 needs of the individual and of the race. I have ap- 
 proached the subject indirectly — first defining the needs 
 on grounds of experience, and then showing that a 
 soulless universe can never satisfy them. 
 
 I take this opportunity of congratulating the founders 
 on having chosen a peculiarly appropriate method of 
 commemorating the forceful and brilliant episcopate of 
 Bishop Moorhouse in Melbourne. The Lectureship 
 will afford to the Australasian Church continuous oppor- 
 tunity for making widely useful all that is most pro- 
 gressive in her developing life and thought. It is 
 especially happy that he whom Melbourne Churchmen 
 learnt to love, and thus delight to honour, is able, in his 
 well-earned retirement, to appreciate this proof of the 
 
 IX 
 
X PREFATORY 
 
 deep and lasting effect of his inspiring eloquence and 
 unwearied activity. 
 
 In the second place, I have tried to make the social 
 movement conscious of its soul. It is surely a matter of 
 supreme importance that the great masses of thinkers 
 and workers should recognise the spiritual character of 
 existence and of human progress. World views are 
 bound to have their moral effect on those who espouse 
 them. I am jealous that the Church should take her due 
 part in moulding and expanding those spiritual ideals on 
 which so much depends. It is time that religion should 
 realise the power of social science, and it is time that 
 social science should realise the power of religion. 
 
 As regards myself, I am a humble disciple of the 
 Neo-Darwinians, and find my most congenial philosophic 
 home among the Personal Idealists. I mention these 
 facts in order that my general attitude may be defined, 
 however much it may be reprobated. At the same time, 
 I have throughout the lectures (save in certain paragraphs 
 duly noted) adopted the working dualism of " the plain 
 man " as sufficient for my purpose. 
 
 I look to the hypothesis of evolution as a rallying 
 point. The Utilitarian can be happy in its scientific 
 conceptions — the Idealist in tracing the development of 
 conscious thought — the Theologian in striving to inter- 
 pret the manifestations of the Divine life. Isolate any 
 one of these thinkers, and he scourges the world with 
 dogmatisms which dwarf human nature and impede 
 progress. Bring these thinkers together in fruitful 
 co-operation, and we shall see many of their seeming 
 
PREFATORY xi 
 
 antagonisms merged in a higher philosophy which will 
 deal with life as a whole. 
 
 I have inserted my quotations in the body of the text. 
 Now and again (as in the first lecture) they may bulk 
 rather largely. But it is probable that the general reader 
 will like to have them presented in the places to which 
 they apply. I have only quoted where authority was 
 called for, or where there was danger of misrepresenting 
 those whom I venture to criticise. 
 
 I trust 1 may stimulate, in however small a degree, 
 that interest in the deeper aspects of our social problems 
 which is so essential to our welfare. I am only too 
 sensible of my shortcomings ; but I rely on the intrinsic 
 and practical interest of my subject. Whether I succeed 
 or no, the truth stands fast that the key to the inter- 
 pretation of history is the unfolding of the Divine 
 purpose, culminating in the manifestation of the Son 
 of God. 
 
 J. E. TASMANIA. 
 
 HOBART, %th Ap7'il 1907. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Conditions of the Lectureship 
 Prefatory ..... 
 
 PAGE 
 
 vii 
 ix 
 
 Lecture I. Fact and Meaning — 
 
 1. Introduction: Stonehenge and Salisbury 
 
 2. Materialism and Social Work 
 
 The Philosophy of Negations. 
 
 3. Apparent Indifference of Nature 
 
 4. All Things Flow 
 
 5. Feeling and Reality 
 
 6. Function of Feeling 
 
 7. Feeling and Reason 
 * 8. Value Judgments, 
 
 9. Socrates on Anaxagoras 
 
 Parallel with Modern "Studies in 
 
 10. Truth for Truth's Sake 
 
 11. Value and Purpose 
 ^ Paley's Watch. 
 Hi2i. Feeling and Progress . 
 
 Organic." 
 
 Lecture II. Ideals as Attracting Forces- 
 
 1. Why? Whence? Whither? . 
 
 2. Ideas as Forces ..... 
 
 Nature of Ideals. 
 
 3. Push and Pull ..... 
 
 Mechanism Transcended. 
 
 I 
 4 
 
 8- 
 
 II 
 
 13 
 17 
 19 
 
 22' 
 27 
 
 30 
 36 
 
 38 
 
 41 
 
 43 
 45 
 
 xin 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 4- 
 
 5. 
 
 7- 
 8. 
 
 9- 
 
 lO. 
 
 II. 
 
 12. 
 
 The Materialist View .... 
 
 Diihring's " Philosophy of the Actual." 
 
 Modern Materialistic Tendencies. 
 Objections of the Practical Man . 
 Ideals and Evolution ..... 
 Natural and Supernatural .... 
 The Beautiful ...... 
 
 Function of Art and Poetry. 
 Art and Puritans ..... 
 
 The Good ....... 
 
 The Moral Ideal and the Incarnation. 
 
 The Authority of the Moral Ideal. 
 The Ideal and Religion .... 
 Transformation of the Material . 
 
 Illustration from a Symphony. 
 
 Science — History and Form — Music. 
 
 PAGE 
 48 
 
 53 
 56 
 60 
 
 62 
 
 68 
 71 
 
 74 
 76 
 
 Lecture III. Evolution and Life^ 
 
 1. A Time of Transition 
 
 2. Darwinism 
 
 3. The True Sphere of Biology 
 
 4. Evolution and Triangles 
 
 5. History not Explanation 
 
 6. History and the Struggle for Food 
 
 Karl Pearson's View. 
 Schopenhauer's View. 
 Nietzsche. 
 
 7. Xjiie ....... 
 
 The Biologist still in Ignorance. 
 
 8. Aristotle's Theory of Life . 
 
 ,-^^Matter and Form. 
 Francis Bacon. 
 Ruskin. 
 
 9. The Will to Live .... 
 10. " Organic Selection " . 
 
 Importance of this New Development. 
 
 81 
 82 
 
 85 
 88 
 
 91 
 92 
 
 97 
 
 lOI 
 
 108 
 113 
 
CONTENTS XV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 II. Evolution nd Christianity . . . . . .117 
 
 Appeal to Christians. 
 
 Lecture IV. Evolution and Mind — 
 
 1. Materialistic View of Mind . . . . .124 
 
 Healthy Materialism. 
 
 2. Consciousness , . . . . . . .126 
 
 Transcends Categories and Methods of Physical 
 Science. 
 
 3. Personality . . . . . . . -131 
 
 4. The Self — Simple or Complex ? ..... 133 
 
 Personality and Social Work. 
 
 5. Conscience . . . . . . . -137 
 
 Attempted Reconciliation of Opponents. 
 
 6. Physical Basis of Mind . . . . . .142 
 
 7. The Chasm ........ 147 
 
 The Theory of Interaction. 
 Automatism. 
 
 8. Materialistic Dogmatism . . . . . .152 
 
 The Transmissive Theory. 
 
 9. The Soul 154 
 
 /- Defined as " Conscious Activity." 
 
 Ao. Incompleteness of Nature . . . . . .158 
 
 11. Love and the Incomplete . . . . . .161 
 
 12. Man as Incarnate Reason . . . . . .164 
 
 Lecture V. Free Will — 
 
 i. Progress and Human Initiative . . . / 167 
 
 2. Sphere of the Determined . . . . • .169 
 
 3. Indeterminism . . . . . . . • 171 
 
 4. Self-determinism . . . . . . .174 
 
 Man a Centre of Original Force. 
 
 5. Modes of Causation Differ . . . . . .178 
 
 6. Kant and Causation . . . . - . .181 
 
 7. Psychical Causation .... . . 183 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 8. Man's Will as Creative . . . . . .186 
 
 Comparison with Creation in iVrt. 
 
 9. Line of Least Resistance . . . . . .189 
 
 Incommensurables. 
 ^. Sin. 
 
 10. Moral Choice ........ 192 
 
 - w^ The Whole Man Active — 
 
 (a) Reason. 
 
 (d) Will. 
 
 (c) Feeling and Hedonism. 
 
 11. Am I Responsible? ....... 202 
 
 12. Social Aspects of Free Will . . . . .204 
 
 Law and Punishment. 
 State Interference. 
 
 13. An Eirenicon ........ 208 
 
 14. The Church the Society of Free Spirits . . .210 
 Appendix : Moral Statistics . . . . .211 
 
 Lecture VI. Man as a Social Being — 
 
 1. The Social Factor . . . . . . .214 
 
 Aristotle and Mill. 
 
 The Physical Concepts Inadequate. 
 
 2. Non-Social Theories . . . . . . . 221 
 
 Hobbes — Schopenhauer — Karl Pearson. 
 
 3. Social Impulses . . . . . . . .224 
 
 4. Sympathy . . . . . . . . .226 
 
 5. Unsocial Impulses ....... 230 
 
 6. Competition ........ 233 
 
 Enlightened Self-interest. 
 
 7. Transformation of the Struggle ..... 238 
 
 Huxley's Romanes Lecture. 
 
 8. Kidd's View of Reason Criticised .... 243 
 
 Stoic View of Social Function of Reason. 
 
 9. Religion and the Social Factor 250 
 
 Affords Social Judgments of Value. 
 Reveals Society as a Spiritual Organism. 
 
CONTENTS xvii 
 
 Lecture VII. What, then, is Progress? — page 
 
 I. The Question ........ 256 
 
 Various Problems Suggested. 
 yZ. The State of Nature ....... 258 
 
 Rousseau — The Golden Age. 
 
 3. Pessimism ......... 263 
 
 Justifiable — Unjustifiable. 
 
 4. Optimism . . . . . . . . .270 
 
 Need of Education. 
 
 Feeling to be Educated as well as Intellect. 
 
 5. Progress and Happiness . . . . . -275 
 
 Happiness a Secondary Product. 
 Function of Suffering. 
 
 6. Slow Rate of Progress . . . . . .280 
 
 Growing Complexity. 
 
 Herbert Spencer's Definition of Evolution. 
 
 7. Dyak, Arab, Hindoo, Albanian . . . . .286 
 
 8. The Alpha and Omega . . . . . .292 
 
 From God — To God. 
 
UNIVERSITV • 
 
 OF T 
 
 ■-/ 
 
 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 FIRST LECTURE. 
 FACT AND MEANING. 
 
 'Ep- 0Lp)(rj yjv 6 \6yo<s .... Trdvra 8l avrov iyivero. v 
 
 " In the beginning was the Word All things were made 
 
 by Him." — St John i. i, 3. 
 
 I. Introduction. 
 
 On Salisbury Plain stands Stonehenge, in ruined but 
 impressive grandeur, the finest of those prehistoric 
 monuments in which Britain is so rich. Its circles of 
 gigantic stones baffle hitherto the keenest research. 
 Those most competent to speak would carry back its date 
 far beyond the arrival of the Aryan and Celtic tribes in 
 England. They would assign its building to certain 
 priest-astronomers who, more than two thousand years 
 before the Christian era, brought to Cornwall some 
 portions of the lore and science of Egypt. We can 
 picture those early sages, guided by star charts even then 
 
2 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 twenty centuries old, planning their mystic circles to fit 
 the movements of the starry heavens, and watching the 
 flow of time. 
 
 Away over the breezy downs, the Salisbury spire rushes 
 up into the blue. To reach it there is but little space to 
 traverse, and yet we are some three thousand years lower 
 down the stream of time. The Cathedral raises the same 
 sense of wonder as does the older monument — compels 
 the same admiration for human skill, and endurance, and 
 creative power. And yet how overwhelming the contrast ! 
 On the one hand, the huge, rough pillar stones with their 
 ponderous, broken line of tenoned imposts. On the 
 other, the most perfect example of one of the most 
 perfect styles of Gothic, with its vistas of polished, 
 clustered shafts, and its miracles of delicate and soaring 
 structure. 
 
 Let Stonehenge and Cathedral come together in the 
 alembic of a thoughtful mind, and reflection is inevitable. 
 For they miake visible and concrete the mystery of the 
 march of human progress. But the reflections they 
 suggest would vary with the bent and training of the 
 thinker. The man of science would tend to single out 
 the concrete facts. He would determine the weight and 
 measure of the megaliths ; he would examine their 
 mineralogical structure, and so arrive at conclusions as 
 to their original site and the means of their transporta- 
 tion. He would recognise also the growth of technical 
 and mechanic skill which made possible the lifting of that 
 
FACT AND MEANING 3 
 
 glorious spire. The archaeologist would dwell rather on 
 the traces of the life of the past ; he would seek to 
 reconstruct the course of history. The artist would 
 absorb the wild and mystic spell of the one, and would 
 pass with enhanced rapture to the joyous, springing, yet 
 chastened beauty of the other. The philosopher, with 
 eager questionings of his inner self, would speculate 
 upon the meaning of it all : he would seek to probe into 
 the nature of the being who reared such temples. Man, 
 the builder, who and what is he ? Whence comes he ? 
 Whither goes he ? And what is the purport and destiny 
 of that vast temple of the universe in which these human 
 monuments fill their little time and space ? 
 
 Human life — its Whence ? and Whither ? — these are 
 the deep questions for which I would bespeak your 
 attention in this course of lectures. We talk of Progress. 
 I shall ask you to bethink yourselves what you mean by 
 this word. I shall ask you to decide what postulates 
 must be granted if progress is to be more than a delusion 
 — more than a specious name for a passing manifestation 
 of a soulless Fate. Has life a meaning — a purpose — a 
 highest good — a worthy goal ? Unless we can give some 
 answer to these questions which shall be more than 
 agnostic, why should we prate of progress ? No, if there 
 is to be any genuine hope in living, any genuine en- 
 thusiasm in social work, any genuine courage in facing 
 the evils within and without, progress must have a Sou/. 
 
 Our quest, then, is for the Soul of Progress. Let us 
 
4 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 not shirk facts where facts may be had. But let us also 
 try to see life steadily and see it whole. And let us join 
 in the prayer that the good Spirit of God, the Giver of 
 Life, will reveal to us " the well of life," and the " light " 
 in which we " shall see light." 
 
 IL Materialism and Social Work. 
 
 Throughout this course of lectures I shall be con- 
 tinuously opposed to all philosophies of negations — to 
 those which maintain the universe to be a closed system 
 in which the happenings at any particular moment are 
 purely and wholly the outcome of the happenings in the 
 preceding moment — to those which deny to man any 
 power of initiative or of spiritual freedom — to those 
 which regard the cosmic process as unconscious, blind, 
 inevitable. To all world views established upon such 
 conclusions as these I declare undying enmity. For they 
 empty life of all true value and dignity. They kill all 
 joy and hope. They dry up the fountains of enthusiasm 
 and self-devotion. They render progress meaningless 
 and hollow by robbing it of its soul. 
 
 I shall busy myself a good deal with modern material- 
 ism — partly because of its widespread influence, especially 
 among the ranks of social reformers — partly because I 
 feel that in overthrowing its fundamental principles, I 
 shall condemn those negative philosophies to which I 
 have just alluded. For what matters it how grand a 
 
FACT AND MEANING 5 
 
 name we give to the ultimate Reality — call it Substance, 
 the Absolute, or what you will — if it is to be impersonal, 
 blind, and fatalistic ? The true antithesis to materialism 
 is the philosophy of the spiritual.^ I use the word 
 " spiritual " in its older, nobler, and wider significance, ^ 
 as implying meaning, purpose, personality. Unless the 
 texture of the universe is shot through and through with 
 meaning, purpose, and personality, we are in the grip of 
 a soulless fate. Fine phrases can only make the hideous 
 reality still more hideous. The cruder forms of material- 
 ism may be waning. Negative and agnostic thinkers 
 may be driven more and more to make excursions into 
 the realms of idealism. But let these explorations of new 
 lands be never so venturesome, they cannot avail for our 
 comfort unless they yield some better results than the giving 
 of pseudo-idealistic names to the old mechanical concepts. 
 Without further preface, let me introduce you to this 
 philosophy of the soulless. And lest you should deem 
 me likely to paint it in colours too dark, I will quote for 
 you the words of certain of its recognised exponents. A 
 book of essays appeared lately in which various represen- 
 tative men discuss the ideals of science and faith. Here 
 is a passage ^ from the essay on the " Ethical Approach." 
 
 ^ Von Hartmann struggles hard to escape materialism by describ- 
 ing his philosophy as a Spiritualistic Monism — his ultimate principle 
 being an individual Spirit. But it is unconscious, impersonal, and 
 therefore fatalistic. See Phil, of the Unconscious (Coupland's trans.), 
 vol. iii. p. 194. 
 
 2 Ideals of Science and Faith, p. 303. 
 
6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 After giving the cynical story of the Creation as told by 
 Mephistopheles to Dr Faustus in his study, the author 
 continues thus : 
 
 " Such in outline, but even more purposeless, more 
 void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for 
 our beHef. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals 
 henceforward must find a home. That man is the pro- 
 duct of causes which had no prevision of the end they 
 were achieving ; that his origin, his growth, his hopes 
 and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome 
 of accidental collocations of atoms ; that no fire, no hero- 
 ism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an 
 individual life beyond the grave ; that all the labours 
 of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the 
 noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to 
 extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that 
 the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably 
 be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins — all 
 these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so 
 nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can 
 hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these 
 truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair 
 can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." 
 
 There is a picture of a soulless universe ! Well may 
 the painter of it go on to ask " how, in such an alien 
 and inhuman world," a creature so powerless as man can 
 " preserve his aspirations untarnished." That is the 
 question I want to drive home. If we are to have no 
 
FACT AND MEANING 7 
 
 background to life but this dread fatalism, how can we 
 sing songs of the days that are to be 
 
 " When the world grows fair "? ^ 
 
 How shall things ever be fair without if there be unyielding 
 despair within ? If we have no firmer or broader base on 
 which to build the soul's habitation, how shall we sound 
 the call for social service ? If we discard Christianity as 
 " a pessimistic superstition," ^ what substitute shall we 
 provide ? It is not on negations, however scientific, that 
 the heart can feed. It is not a soulless universe that can 
 feed the flame of generous enthusiasm. The irrational, 
 the impersonal, is fatal, not only to the theology which 
 many would destroy, but also to the growing social 
 sentiment from which they hope so much. 
 
 No, the questions Whence and Whither must receive 
 some deeper answer if life is to be worth living. If the 
 materialist tells us, with Spinoza, that vita est meditatio 
 vit^^ non mortis^ we can agree with him. But the life 
 must be, as Aristotle taught, a spark from the divine — it 
 must not be a passing illusion, but must have its founda- 
 tions deep down in the heart of the spiritual. It must 
 have a value, a meaning, and a purpose. It must lay 
 hold on the permanent and the eternal. Given such life 
 as that, we cannot meditate too much upon it. It is 
 the materialist's world which compels us to meditate on 
 death. 
 
 1 W. Morris. ^ Karl V^dixson, Ethic of Free Thought, p. 303. 
 
8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 III. Apparent Indifference of Nature. 
 
 A plain man, looking out on life in a plain way, sees 
 that various things around him have various values, 
 according as they serve his various purposes or supply 
 his various wants. To him, therefore, the statement that 
 the world as a whole has a purpose is only a natural 
 extension of his ordinary experience. 
 
 But there are those who see nothing in the world 
 save a ceaseless and unconscious play of forces, bound 
 by inexorable laws to go through a fated series of 
 changes — each change being a link in an unending and 
 unbreakable chain of cause and effect. And as for man 
 — toiling, hoping, suffering man — he is but a deluded 
 being, who offers up prayers in a universe which heeds 
 him not. The heavens are as brass above him ; the 
 earth is as iron beneath his feet. The eternal process 
 moving on is indifferent to his weal or woe. It recks 
 not of just or unjust, of wise or foolish, of good or 
 evil. It sweeps away into oblivion man and his works 
 ' as heedlessly as the sea levels the children's castles on the 
 sands.^ 
 
 This last simile reminds me of a desolate passage in 
 the writings of a brilliant French moralist. I quote it 
 in extenso as a pendant to the sad passage I gave a while 
 
 1 Compare the picture in the Iliad (vii. 454), but note that behind 
 Homer's sea there is a personality akin to men, though greater than 
 they. 
 
FACT AND MEANING 9 
 
 ago. I am anxious that you should realise the character 
 and conclusions of the " philosophy of negations " by a 
 sufficient presentation of them in the words of its professed 
 exponents. 
 
 " I remember (he writes ^) that once, sitting on the 
 beach, I watched the serried waves rolling towards me. 
 They came without interruption from the expanse of the 
 sea, roaring and white. Beyond the one dying at my 
 feet I noticed another ; and further behind that one, 
 another ; and further still, another and another — a 
 multitude. At last, as far as I could see, the whole 
 horizon seemed to rise and roll on towards me. There 
 was a reservoir of infinite, inexhaustible forces there. 
 How deeply I felt the impotency of man to arrest the 
 effort of that whole ocean in movement ! A dike mipfht 
 break one of these waves ; it could break hundreds and 
 thousands of them ; but would not the immense and 
 indefatigable ocean gain the victory ? And this rising 
 tide seemed to me the image of the whole of nature 
 assailing humanity, which vainly wishes to direct its 
 course, to dam it in, to master it. Man struggles bravely ; 
 he multiplies his efforts. Sometimes he believes himself 
 to be the conqueror. That is because he does not look 
 far enough ahead, and because he does not notice far out 
 on the horizon the great waves which, sooner or later, 
 must destroy his work and carry himself away." 
 
 ^ Guyau, Esquisse d^une Morale sans Ohligatioft ?ti Sa?iction, 
 chap. i. sect. 3. 
 
lo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 How infinitely sad ! The same elimination of the 
 spiritual leads to the same despairing pessimism. Vanity 
 of vanities, said the Preacher. But to a soulless universe 
 of blind, unpitying forces such a term as " vanity " will not 
 apply. For vanity gives the idea of something light and 
 vanishing ; whereas this soulless universe is a burden 
 which would grow heavier as human consciousness 
 realised its drear and blank inevitability. 
 
 Perchance some of you find it hard to accord to these 
 views any measure of respectful attention. But such 
 impatience is misplaced. For this negative philosophy 
 has played a large part in the development of human 
 thought. And in the present day, with varying shades 
 of vagueness, it forms the working creed of masses who 
 have never studied philosophy at all. Largely, no doubt, 
 it is a reaction from an unduly arbitrary theology — a 
 reaction not altogether without excuse, but one which 
 cannot last too long without working untold disaster. 
 Laissez-faire is not a Christian policy. Invective will 
 embitter. Let us have a calm appeal to reason and 
 experience. 
 ' And from the outset let us guard against the idea that 
 because we cannot endure such a philosophy, there can 
 therefore be no truth in it at all. It is but seldom that 
 any great and continuous school of thought has not had 
 some contribution to make to the common stock of 
 human knowledge. In this case we find insistence on 
 the undoubted fact that the outward frame of things does 
 
FACT AND MEANING ii 
 
 not carry its explanation on its face. Nature keeps what 
 is well called her " open secret." From the dawn of 
 conscious speculation men have been driven to seek 
 solutions for that secret, and to render to themselves 
 some account of their world and of their own relation to 
 it. Haeckel's title, the " Riddle of the Universe," links 
 him on to an untold past. 
 
 IV. All Things Flow. 
 
 One of the earliest of recorded speculations was that of 
 Heracleitus — coming to us from the far-off days of the 
 infancy of Greek philosophy, and finding strange cor- 
 roborations in the advanced theories of our own time. 
 " All things flow," said Heracleitus. And who shall 
 deny it ? Look out on the world as presented to the 
 senses ; examine it with telescope and microscope ; bring 
 to bear the most refined methods of calculation open to 
 modern science — you will discover nothing fixed or per- 
 manent. What else but this did Shakespeare conclude .'' 
 
 " The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
 The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
 Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
 And like an unsubstantial pageant faded, 
 ""^ Leave not a rack behind." 
 
 What else but this was the declaration of the Hebrew 
 prophet, endorsed by the Apostle ? " Lift up your eyes 
 to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath : for the 
 
12 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall 
 wax old like a garment, and they that dwell therein shall 
 die in like manner." So far all seem to be in harmony 
 with Guyau and his school. But here comes the parting 
 of the ways. 
 
 Heracleitus saw nothing but the ceaseless flux. At 
 best, for him, one form of being does but provide the 
 contrary for another, supplant another, or flow over into 
 another. Eyes and ears delude with a show of per- 
 manence where all is really ceaseless flux. We can grant 
 him the ceaseless flux — but we need not stop short at 
 that — refusing to see anything more. Suppose we dis- 
 cover that there are good grounds for accepting the 
 simple yet sublime language of the prologue to the 
 Fourth Gospel — suppose we can rationally arrive at the 
 conclusion that the world has proceeded from the eternal 
 Logos — what then ? Why, the ever-changing flow of 
 phenomena will then stand out upon a background of 
 the spiritually permanent. Instead of an infinitely 
 monotonous welter of aimless forces, we shall have the 
 gradual and orderly unfolding of a rational purpose. 
 Blank resignation will yield to buoyant, sunny hope. 
 
 But mark — in the world of phenomena, as it presents 
 itself to our senses, we shall look in vain for this perma- 
 nent element. We cannot even tell whether the history 
 of the world reveals a progressive purpose or is a mere 
 swing in a never-ending see-saw. For though Stonehenge 
 and Salisbury Cathedral take us through a few centuries 
 
FACT AND MEANING 13 
 
 of human history, the arc is too small to give us any 
 conception of the complete curve. There is not even 
 evidence to assure us that the forward movement may 
 not at any time be arrested, or may not give place to 
 retrogression. Nay, if we are limited to what physical 
 science can teach, we are certain that retrogression is \ 
 inevitable. The sun will lose his heat, and life upon our 
 globe will decline in quantity and in quality, until it 
 ceases altogether. This fate is physically certain, even 
 should no friendly comet come along to give us a 
 speedier and happier dispatch. 
 
 V. Feeling and Reality. 
 
 Now we are face to face with our problem. On the 
 one hand, the ceaseless flux of the world of phenomena. 
 On the other hand, the craving of the heart for some 
 assurance that the ceaseless changes lead to life, not 
 death, and that death itself may be but birth disguised. 
 Can we bring the surmises of the heart and the con- 
 clusions of the reason sufficiently into harmony to 
 warrant us in the indulgence of the larger hope ? Can 
 we honestly maintain that progress has a soul ? 
 
 Let us begin where tbe father of modern philosophy 
 began. Let us adopt his famous Cogito^ ergo sum — " I 
 think, therefore I exist." Here we are on firm ground. 
 The external world may or may not be what we imagine 
 it — it may even not exist at all. But each one of us is 
 
14 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 certain, by the immediate evidence of experience, of his 
 own existence as a thinking being. But I would have 
 you note that Descartes might have taken his spring 
 equally well from either of two other propositions. He 
 might have said, " I feel, therefore I exist." Or again, " I 
 exercise will-power, therefore I exist." If we bring these 
 three together, we get the familiar triad into which the 
 unity of the self is commonly divided — Will, Feeling, 
 and Reason. 
 
 Now, what is the nature and what are the functions of 
 these ultimate forms of experience thus discovered ? I 
 trust I shall be able to show you that, individually and 
 collectively, they carry us beyond the world of changing 
 phenomena, out into other spheres and modes of being ; 
 that though they refuse to submit themselves to physical 
 methods of investigation, they are none the less real forces 
 in determining the course of evolution. A brief pre- 
 liminary statement will serve as basis for future argument 
 and expansion. 
 
 Speaking quite generally, then, I would say that 
 science deals with forms of existence which can be pre- 
 sented to the mind as objects under the concepts of 
 matter and force. Will, feeling, and reason cannot be 
 thus presented, and remain, therefore, outside its sphere. 
 Reason, instead of being an object, is the very condition 
 by which we apprehend and examine the world of objects. 
 Will is not an object, but a subjective putting forth of 
 effort. Feeling, again, is not an object, but is sub- 
 
FACT AND MEANING 15 
 
 jective and individual in the highest degree. Thus, in 
 and for themselves, reason, will, and feeling, remain out- 
 side the range of physical science. So far, indeed, as 
 they find expression in external forms and events, they 
 may, or may not, yield objects amenable to scientific 
 treatment. But they themselves belong to the sphere of 
 what I shall call the world of the supersensible. The 
 world of science, therefore, does not embrace the whole 
 sphere of reality. 
 
 We can reach this same conclusion by another line of 
 thoup^ht. Let us ask ourselves, What is our test of 
 reality ? Many answers can be given, but there is one 
 factor which will be found to be constant, and that is — 
 " power to satisfy some want of our nature." If I am 
 hungry, I want food ; and I judge that to be real food 
 which has the power of satisfying my hunger. If I want 
 to write, I judge pen, ink, and paper to be real when 
 they enable me to effect my purpose. Now it so happens 
 that a majority of our simplest needs are satisfied by 
 objects which belong to what is known as the material 
 world. We have thus come to judge material objects as 
 being real in a special and peculiar degree. But we are 
 labouring under an illusion when we regard that which 
 we can see and touch, and perceive by any sense, as 
 being more real than feelings, ideas, and ideals. The 
 true test is, not sense, but power to satisfy. We have 
 rational, and aesthetic, and moral needs — we have higher 
 aspirations, and hopes, and cravings. And although the 
 
1 6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 things which satisfy these immaterial wants are often 
 themselves immaterial by the very fact that they can 
 satisfy the wants, we are bound to class them among the 
 " reals." The aesthetic sense, the heart, the reason, the 
 conscience, each make their claims on reality. And any 
 philosophy which would deal with life as a whole must 
 acknowledge different modes of reality corresponding to 
 different modes of satisfying different sides of our nature. 
 In other words, the world known to physical science is 
 but one world out of many. As in the world open to 
 physical science, so in each of those other worlds — ex- 
 panding knowledge and experience will enable us to 
 correct and adjust our judgments, and will bring us 
 nearer to the truth of things. 
 
 It will easily be seen how vital is the issue here defined. 
 The claim of the material world to a peculiar kind 
 and degree of reality must be discarded, not in a vague 
 and general sense, but with full consciousness of the 
 significance of the step. It must be realised that the 
 appeal to the senses is but one of many forms of appeal. 
 Not only so — we find that it is as subject to delusion and 
 error as any of the other forms. Modern science itself 
 has taught us to reduce the material world to various 
 kinds of vibration, and has convinced us that colour, 
 sound, heat, cold, taste, and the rest, are in ourselves 
 and not in the external world. Granting vibrations, these 
 various sensations are our modes of apprehending them. 
 But vibrations, in their turn, can be shown to be nothing 
 
FACT AND MEANING 17 
 
 more than another mode of apprehending the phenomena 
 presented In the form of sensations. And thus many 
 modern scientists of the first rank are led to conclude 
 that our world of material objects Is constituted of chains 
 of sensations, which we project outside of ourselves by 
 purely subjective processes. The Imagined superior 
 reality of the material world disappears. 
 
 However these things may be, the fact remains that 
 the ultimate test of the reality of a thing is power to 
 satisfy a want. And tried by this test, supersensuous 
 phenomena, such as feelings, ideas, and ideals, must be 
 placed among the " reals " of existence. 
 
 VI. Function of Feeling. 
 
 For the rest of this lecture, I shall bespeak your 
 attention more particularly for the nature and function of 
 feeling. I take it first of the three elements in the triad, 
 because it is the one which seems to be most peculiarly 
 our own. It Is Inalienable from the individual. Others 
 may sympathise : imagination and fellow-feeling may 
 arouse experiences In different individuals more or less 
 similar to those of an individual en rapport with them. 
 But feeling begins and remains to the end a purely 
 Individual experience. Or, looked at from a different 
 point of view, feeling Is that element In our nature which, 
 as Hegel expresses it, " is the Immediate, and, as it were, 
 the closest contact in which the thinking subject can stand 
 
1 8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 to a given content." ^ Or, as Wallace puts it in an 
 introductory essay to Hegel's Theory of Mind^ " Sensation 
 is the prius — or basis — of all mental life : the organisation 
 of soul in body and of body in soul." ^ An external fact, 
 whatever it may be, does not become ours by thinking it, 
 but only by feeling it. If we are unmoved by what is 
 external to us, no effort will enable us to think ourselves 
 into the experience gained by the direct result of its 
 action upon us. Or, as Lotze puts it,^ " The sensuous 
 impressions that perception yields are all equally in- 
 accessible to thought : we experience their content, but we 
 do not possess them by means of thought. What is 
 good and evil can be as little thought as what is blue or 
 sweet. It is only after immediate feeling has taught us 
 that there is worth and worthlessness in the world, and 
 taught us, too, the gravity of the distinction between 
 them, that thought can develop out of this experienced 
 content, signs which enable us to bring a particular fact 
 under these universal intuitions. Love and hate (he 
 asks), are they thinkable } Can their essence be exhausted 
 in concepts } " 
 
 Such is Lotze's view of feeling. I adopt it, but with 
 certain important reservations which I will now explain. 
 
 1 Philosophy of Mi?id {\x2cc\'&. by Wallace), p. 68. 
 
 2 Op. cit.^ p. clvi. 
 
 ^ Microcosmos^ bk. viii. chap. i. 
 
FACT AND MEANING 19 
 
 VII. Feeling and Reason. 
 
 There has been a tendency in recent times to set 
 feeling and reason over against each other as disconnected, 
 if not antagonistic, elements in our nature. Lotze held 
 feeling and reason to be mutually exclusive — neither 
 could be reduced to terms of the other. In the theo- 
 logical world, Ritschl and his followers have attempted 
 to base religion almost wholly on feeling as expressed 
 in value judgments, and have depreciated the religious 
 functions of reason. Better known among ourselves is 
 Kidd's^ onslaught upon reason. He accumulates evidence 
 to prove that it is a disintegrating, anti-religious, and 
 therefore anti-social force. Such are some among many 
 instances of this tendency. I avow myself at the outset 
 to be an uncompromising opponent of it. I cannot con- 
 sent to any " departmental " view of man's complex 
 nature. 
 
 I can much more easily sympathise with Schopenhauer 
 in his doctrine that will is the ultimate reality, and that 
 feeling and intellect are developments from it. I can 
 sympathise still more with Hegel in his doctrine that 
 feeling is one stage in the vast sweep of that evolution 
 which passes from the lowest forms of consciousness to 
 the full dignity of a reason which comprehends itself. 
 For Hegel starts with Reason ; Schopenhauer with 
 
 ^ Social Evolution, passim. 
 
20 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Unreason. But I seem to be nearer to the rich concrete 
 whole of real life when I try to combine the two 
 doctrines, and to recognise the highest mode of exist- 
 ence in acts of rational self-determination which involve 
 Feeling, Reason, and Will in an indivisible unity. 
 
 Since, however, such speculations may seem to some 
 to be too remote from the world of actual experience, 
 1 appeal to modern psychology. You will find that 
 the chief authorities agree in deprecating any artificial 
 abstractions in the analysis of mental development. The 
 three movements of the mental life, manifesting them- 
 selves as reason, feeling, and will,^ " are not three 
 currents of change which run on side by side, but rather 
 different aspects of that one current which constitutes 
 ' the flow of consciousness.' " So writes Sully in his well- 
 known text-book. And he also has this significant 
 summing up of his sections on the subject ^ : "It is thus 
 evident that, in spite of the fact that intellection, feeling, 
 and active impulse are distinct psychical forces or 
 tendencies, and that in their most energetic forms they 
 assume the aspect of hostile or incomparable tendencies, 
 they are organically implicated, so that there can be no 
 
 ^ Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 296. 
 
 2 Op. cit., p. 298. Cf. Wundt, Philosophische Siudien, x. 121 ff: 
 " From inquiry into time relations, .... I attained an insight into 
 the close union of all those psychic functions usually separated by 
 artificial abstractions and names, such as ideation, feeling, will ; and 
 I saw the indivisibility and inner homogeneity, in all its phases of the 
 inner life." 
 
FACT AND MEANING 21 
 
 normal and complete development of one without a 
 concurrent and correspondent development of the others. 
 In other words, the highest development of feeling, of 
 thought, and of volition is a phase of a complete typical 
 development of mind." I am quite prepared to rest my 
 case against Ritschl and Kidd on this passage. 
 
 May we not accept with intellectual satisfaction the 
 doctrine of the fundamental unity of the mind ? May 
 we not hold that, while feeling has its peculiar function, 
 it will become ever more interpenetrated by reason ? 
 For it is the function of reason to discipline mere 
 impulse and to co-ordinate our faculties. I shall return 
 to this aspect of the subject in a later lecture. But a 
 clear pronouncement on the problem of the relation of 
 feeling to reason is necessary to all that follows. And I 
 therefore here declare my belief that, as man's nature 
 develops, reason will tend to lose itself in the glow of 
 active love, and active love will tend to manifest itself 
 as transfigured reason. 
 
 As things are, this ideal harmony is far from being 
 realised — it is only adumbrated. Hence the necessity 
 we are under of coining phrases to define the varying 
 proportions of preponderance, according as one or other 
 element asserts itself at the expense of its companions. 
 For instance, it is generally held that women are swayed 
 rather by emotion, men by reason. In so far as this is 
 true (and the exceptions, especially on the latter count, 
 are many), it is largely the result of different training, as 
 
22 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 well as of differences in temperament. So, again, we 
 speak of " a man of feeling," " a man of strong will," or 
 " a man of intellect." So, too, with our own varying mental 
 states — at one time will is active ; at another, feeling ; at 
 another, reason. But all these differences in tempera- 
 ment or mood in no way interfere with the fact that 
 each element is a part of an indissoluble whole — is a 
 factor in an active unity. 
 
 We may further note that under the conditions of our 
 present life, it seems impossible for any one of these 
 elements to attain to any exceptional development save at 
 the expense of the others. And thus, as a thoughtful 
 writer suggests,^ " The ideal of humanity on earth — the 
 perfection we are intended to attain here — is to be sought, 
 not in the surpassing development of our highest faculties^ but 
 in the harmonious and equal development of all r 
 
 VIII. Value Judgments. 
 
 I trust I am now at liberty to discuss the more dis- 
 tinctive functions of feeling without laying myself open 
 to any suspicion of being an enemy to reason. 
 
 There is a very important distinction, now widely 
 recognised, between what are called judgments of value 
 or appreciation^ and judgments oi fact or description. The 
 former are defined as resting upon feeling ; the latter as 
 
 1 Greg works out this aspect of the problem in chap. iv. of his 
 Enigmas of Life^ from which the quotation is taken. 
 
FACT AND MEANING 23 
 
 due to the use of reason. It is essential to my argument 
 that this distinction should be clearly appreciated. 
 
 You will observe that the term "judgment" is used in 
 each case alike. Our ordinary idea of a judgment is that 
 it implies some process of reasoning. But here its 
 significance is expanded so as to cover mental determina- 
 tions which are altogether independent of reason. This 
 extended use is quite warranted by the facts of experience. 
 For suppose I taste a piece of sugar — my feeling gives 
 me the direct and immediate judgment, "this is sweet." 
 That is to say, I have passed a judgment without the 
 intervention of reason. No doubt there is implicit reason 
 — it is, indeed, on this very score that I refuse to draw a 
 line between feeling and reason. But there is no process. 
 The judgment is immediate, springing directly out of the 
 feeling itself It may stop short at feeling. Or it may, 
 while remaining itself, furnish the basis for a process of 
 explicit reasoning. We can trace the transition in more 
 fundamental cases. For example, if I feel " this is 
 myself," " that is not myself," I have arrived at the 
 judgments directly and immediately ; but I have also laid 
 the basis for the distinction, all-important for thought, 
 between the subject and the object. Or again, when I 
 say, " I like this," " I do not like that," I have the basis 
 in feeling for the logical distinction between affirmative 
 and negative propositions. So closely are the two sets of 
 judgments allied, and yet so different in their mode of 
 coming into being. 
 
24 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Note, in the second place, that the result of a value 
 judgment, arrived at as it is by an immediate perception, 
 defines a relation between percipient and thing perceived. 
 This is why it is called a judgment of value or appreciation. 
 The content of the judgment is wholly internal and sub- 
 jective.^ Hence the well-known saying, " there is no 
 accounting for tastes." However much we may subse- 
 quently analyse or elaborate a value judgment, and 
 however much, by reflection or further experience, we 
 may modify its future contents, the fact remains that, at 
 the time it was passed, it expressed the immediately exist- 
 ing attitude of the perceiving individual to the thing he 
 perceived. There was no intermediate process. 
 
 You will see the bearing of this, if you try to imagine ^ 
 a man who should not know what it is to feel, but who 
 should be pure reason. Now observe — for such a feeling- 
 less being there would be no sense of value : he could 
 pass no value judgments. All experiences would come 
 before the bar of reason, and would be judged solely by 
 rational processes. Hence they would all be of equal 
 importance : they would all simply " happen." There 
 would be no ground for preferring one to another, for 
 liking one person better than another, or desiring to do 
 one thing rather than another. He would not even eat 
 and drink to keep himself alive, since life itself would 
 
 1 This is well stated in Everett's Psychological Elements of Religion^ 
 but with too rigid an exclusion of reason from feeling. 
 
 2 Illustration suggested by the above. 
 
FACT AND MEANING 25 
 
 have no value for him, nor would any craving act as spur 
 to the will to live. No volition, inclination, or aversion 
 would trouble the placid course of his reasoning processes ; 
 until, like Archimedes tracing his diagrams in the dust, 
 he suddenly became extinct, or, like a Babbage's calcu- 
 lating machine, he wore out or rusted. 
 
 Now here is a startling thought ! The ideal man of 
 science ought to be just such a heartless thinking 
 machine as this. He should be an achromatic medium 
 for the registration of facts. He should be swayed by no 
 personal likes or dislikes, by no aiFection for any special 
 theory, by no desire to be of use nor to excel. He 
 should recognise no distinction between good and bad, 
 just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, sublime and in- 
 significant. Each fact would have to be taken as it came 
 and given a place in a gradually accumulating and 
 thoroughly impersonal system. Such would be the ideal 
 scientist. But he would not be an ideal man ! Nor 
 would his system, however perfect, represent the real 
 world ! 
 
 Do I therefore condemn the scientist ? By no manner 
 of means. In actual life we well know that men of 
 science are far from being achromatic mediums. They 
 are as full of human nature as the rest of us. But, qua 
 scientists^ they are quite justified in struggling towards the 
 ideal, and in striving for an impersonal use of reason. 
 We begin to protest, though, when they try to forget 
 that significant condition — qua scientists. We object when 
 
26 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 they want to claim the whole field of experience for their 
 methods, and declare that what they do not know is not 
 knowledge. We bid them remember that there are 
 judgments of value as well as judgments of fact and 
 description, and that judgments of value, being purely 
 subjective processes, are for ever out of their reach. 
 They may register and classify such judgments of value 
 as events. But the grounds and meanings of the 
 judgments cannot be brought within the scope of their 
 methods. In a word — that which makes life worth the 
 living cannot be a matter of scientific knowing. 
 
 The true function of science is to get at " facts," and 
 to attain this object it must spare no pains or effort. But 
 it remxains from first to last in the sphere of the objective. 
 It gives us a world of description, not of appreciation. 
 The authority for the possibilities of human life is 
 " the whole man," and not any one artificially constructed 
 department of him. Feeling must be allowed its say as 
 well as reason ; otherwise the results will be one-sided 
 and misleading. 
 
 Modern science is providing us with a wealth of new 
 facts, for which the world should be duly grateful. But 
 the facts, as facts, cannot carry us far. They must be 
 used as stimulants for fresh feelings. Only thus can they 
 bring us nearer to the heart of existence — only as appre- 
 hended in judgments of value can they yield interpreta- 
 tions and insights. Stonehenge and Salisbury will present 
 a myriad bare facts to the investigator. But their secret 
 
FACT AND MEANING 27 
 
 will never be revealed unless we can reproduce in our- 
 selves the feelinp:s of those who constructed them. Here 
 science is powerless. We have to rely on the subjective 
 force of sympathy. The builders were moved to their 
 labours by value judgments. Let us apprehend those 
 value judgments, and then (and not till then) we shall 
 understand. And this is true of the universe at large. 
 
 IX. Socrates on Anaxagoras. 
 
 This limitation of the sphere of science was seen long 
 ago by the marvellously sane subtlety of the Greek mind. 
 Do you remember that impressive passage in the Ph^edo 
 in which the dissatisfaction of a true man with the world 
 of mere fact is so dramatically expressed } Socrates is in 
 the prison awaiting the return of the ship which is to 
 date his death. He spends the intervening time in 
 converse with his friends — speculating on high themes 
 and on the life beyond. He tells how, in seeking an 
 explanation for sun and moon and stars and all that 
 inhabit them, he had felt that the secret lay in the Mind 
 which manifested itself in this world of material forms. 
 At last he hailed in Anaxagoras a teacher after his own 
 heart. " I thought (says he) that he would assign a cause 
 to each thing, and then would go on to explain to me what 
 was best for each thing and what was the common good 
 of all. I would not have sold my hopes for a good deal. 
 I seized the books very eagerly, and read them as fast 
 
28 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 as I could, in order that I might know what is best and 
 what is worse." And how great was his disappointment ! 
 — a disappointment which comes home to us when we read 
 materiahstic treatises, brilHant perchance, but leading us 
 nowhither. Let Socrates voice our discontent. " All my 
 splendid hopes (he continues) were dashed to the ground, 
 my friend ; for as I went on reading, I found that the 
 writer made no use of Mind at all, and that he assigned 
 no causes for the order of things. His causes were air, 
 and ether, and water, and many other strange things. I 
 thought that he was exactly like a man who should begin 
 by saying that Socrates does all by Mind, and who, 
 when he tried to give a reason for each of my actions, 
 should say, first, that I am sitting here now, because my 
 body is composed of bones and muscles, and that the 
 bones are hard and separated by joints, while the muscles 
 can be tightened and loosened, and, together with the 
 flesh, and the skin which holds them together, cover the 
 bones ; and that therefore, when the bones are raised in 
 their sockets, the relaxation and contraction of the muscles 
 makes it possible for me now to bend my limbs, and that 
 that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. 
 And in the same way he would go on to explain why I 
 am talking to you : he would assign voice, and air, and 
 hearing, and a thousand other things as causes ; but he 
 would quite forget to mention the real cause, which is 
 that since the Athenians thought it right to condemn 
 me, I have thought it right and just to sit here and 
 
FACT AND MEANING 29 
 
 to submit to whatever sentence they may think fit to 
 impose." 
 
 Every word of this goes home to-day. Every word 
 expresses my own feelings, as I read a book like 
 Maudsley's Life in Mind and Conduct. I follow with 
 appreciative pleasure while the author insists on the 
 " organic in human nature." I admire the exposition of 
 the processes of growth and development ; the description 
 of the exquisitely fine networks of nervous organisation 
 which are the indispensable conditions of earthly being. 
 But my soul is saddened by the almost cynical pessimism 
 which is the outcome of these " studies in organic." 
 Maudsley fails to find any rational meaning in the 
 "organic." Ground for hope and cheer there arises 
 none. The exquisite processes seem to come from the 
 bosom of night and to return thither. He tells us we 
 must not think and speak of any mental product, even 
 when raised to its brightest power, as if it had value 
 outside human limits of thought.^ " The bee (he says) 
 would do much the same which should deem its buzzing 
 to be of like transcendental import, as at heart doubtless 
 it unconsciously yet exultantly does. Let a creature buzz, 
 hiss, howl, roar, sing, crawl, fly, creep, walk, or talk, as 
 its mode of living self-expression, it must needs translate 
 the world into the terms of such mode of being, shape 
 the things thereof accordingly, and feel or find therein 
 the foundations of its beliefs." 
 
 ^ Life in Mind and Co?idtict, p. 437. 
 
30 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 True, Dr Maudsley — quite true, as far as it goes. But 
 why stop just there ? Why should feeling be deemed to 
 be worthless because it takes myriad forms ? May not 
 each of the forms accomplish some hold on the ultimately 
 real ? The buzzing of the bee is not something detached 
 from reality — it is itself part of reality. And so of the 
 bee*s exultation in its buzzing — that too is part of reality. 
 Your censure, Dr Maudsley, falls rightly on those who 
 think that all life upon the globe was made merely and 
 expressly for man's use and pleasure. But it falls 
 harmlessly on those whose creed is wider, and who have 
 the faith 
 
 " That nothing walks with aimless feet ; 
 That not one life shall be destroyed, 
 Nor cast as rubbish to the void, 
 When God has made the pile complete." 
 
 X. Truth for Truth's Sake. 
 
 At this stage of my argument, someone may interpose 
 with the question whether there is not such a thing as 
 truth for truth's sake — that is to say, a pursuit of truth 
 apart from feeling. And are we not bound, it may be 
 asked, to follow truth wherever she may lead, and what- 
 ever may be the consequences ? 
 
 Truth for truth's sake ! It seems a churlish and, 
 indeed, a wanton thing to damp or lessen enthusiasm for 
 such a phrase. But when those who deny any meaning 
 or purpose to the universe, use it as though they had a 
 
FACT AND MEANING 31 
 
 peculiar right to it, and even advance it as a substitute for 
 religion, then it becomes necessary to show its incomplete- 
 ness and its hollowness. If the universe is nothing; but 
 a closed system, containing a fixed amount of matter and 
 energy (or whatever soulless substitutes for these may be 
 provided by monistic " substances " or pseudo-idealistic 
 " absolutes ") — what possible meaning can there be for 
 such a term as truth ? All is machinery, and the truth- 
 seeker is simply part of the machinery. He cannot 
 genuinely search for anything ; he just " works " like any 
 other machine. And even supposing he could search for 
 truth, what could he effect but aimlessly amass a host of 
 bare facts ? Beyond the power to satisfy his wants, what 
 should he care for truth as truth ? The hoarding of bare 
 facts would be more foolish than the miser's hoarding 
 of gold he never means to use. No, the facts must be 
 clothed with some sort of significance if they are to 
 induce us to expend energy upon accumulating them. 
 In other words, our value judgments must find in them 
 material which can give them content. Feeling must 
 arouse the will, and the will must spur the intellect. The 
 whole man must be put into action. Truth must be no 
 cold abstraction : it must be heated in the alembic of life, 
 until it glows with the hues of meaning and of purpose. 
 
 How thoroughly is the " value " aspect of the search for 
 truth recognised by great thinkers ! Malebranche says : 
 " If I held truth captive in my hand, I should open it and 
 let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture 
 
32 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 it." Mark the zest, the warmth of feeling, here displayed. 
 Lessing says : " Did the Almighty, holding in his right 
 hand Truth and in his left Search after Truth, deign to 
 tender me the one I might prefer — in all humility, but 
 without hesitation, I should request Search after Truth." 
 And Jean Paul Richter goes to the heart of the matter 
 when he declares that " it is not the goal, but the course 
 which makes me happy." That is to say- — there is an 
 element of value for the individual in the very exercise of 
 the speculative faculties, and in the sense of having effected 
 a purpose.^ 
 
 Should the materialist grant this position, and allow 
 that we pursue knowledge with a view to decreasing our 
 pains and increasing our pleasures — then I urge that this 
 admission destroys the lofty dictum with which he started. 
 Moreover, there are undoubtedly times when ignorance 
 is bliss. Why, then, in those cases, should I seek for 
 truth ? Unless there is some real dignity and value in 
 truth founded on the nature of things, it need have no 
 magisterial authority for me. It would be nothing more 
 than one among other means to happiness, to be played 
 with, and taken up or put away as occasion might 
 require. In a soulless universe, truth for truth's sake 
 rings hollow. 
 
 But I go further than this. As I briefly suggested a 
 while ago, I deny that for the man who can discover no 
 
 1 See, for these and other similar quotations, Sir Wm. Hamilton's 
 Metaphysics^ pp. 12, 13. 
 
 ^■4 
 
FACT AND MEANING 33 
 
 meaning or purpose in the universe there can be any 
 such thing as truth. For let us keep him to his nega- 
 tions. Everything that happens is to be determined by 
 the law of causation. The materialist, Cabanis, tells us 
 that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. 
 Very good. Then take two brains — say, mine and a 
 materialist's. Each is a part in the mighty mechanically 
 determined whole. By some utterly inconceivable 
 process, the materialist's brain secretes the thought that 
 brains in general, including his own, are mere machinery. 
 My brain, by what is, if possible, a still more inconceiv- 
 able process, secretes the thought that brains in general, 
 including my own, are something more than mere 
 machinery. Now who is to decide between us ? Can 
 one of us claim to be more the exponent of truth than 
 the other ? I cannot see how this could be. For the 
 two results are on precisely the same footing. They 
 are both (by the supposition) the product of inevitable, 
 aimless, mechanical processes. This is all passing strange ! 
 One tiny bit of a vast piece of machinery makes itself 
 ridiculous by contradicting another tiny bit of the same 
 vast machinery. There is no appeal, for the system is 
 self-contained. And other tiny bits of the same 
 mechanical whole secrete a thought of the ridiculous as 
 they behold these things, and other parts of the machinery, 
 in close connection with the brains concerned, are auto- 
 matically shaken backwards and forwards in space, pro- 
 ducing a sardonic cackle. 
 
 3 
 
34 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 However, since the materialist and his kin can 
 apparently swallow all this without difficulty, we must 
 even leave them to it undisturbed. But those of us who 
 believe that there is a reason without which finds response 
 in a reason within, can at any rate frame a doctrine which 
 shall make us willing to pursue the truth for the sake of 
 the meanings and the values secured. 
 
 What a striking illustration is afforded of the function 
 of feeling in the pursuit of truth by the history of that 
 great theory on which the materialist is wont to lean so 
 heavily — I mean the theory of evolution. We find at 
 its base a goodly array of facts, tested by the methods of 
 science, and brought into connection with each other 
 from a special point of view. But are the facts sought 
 for their own sake in the abstract, or even left to stand 
 by themselves as facts } Far from it. Into those facts 
 thinker after thinker reads his own speculations as to their 
 significance for man. Hopes have risen high that new 
 light might be thrown upon the origin of terrestrial life, 
 and upon the problem of man's place in nature. Contro- 
 versy has raged hotly — sometimes too hotly. And men 
 of science have not been less heated than others. Now 
 where is the nerve of all this throbbing intellectuality ? 
 Partly in the pleasure of the search. But chiefly it is 
 where it will ever be found — not in abstract theory, 
 nor in abstract truth, but in the value judgments 
 involved ? 
 
 It is suggestive to look at this matter from the 
 
FACT AND MEANING 35 
 
 opposite point of view. Writers of popular science ^ are 
 always painting for us pictures of the glories of scientific 
 discovery and of the increased happiness they will bring 
 to the race. We are bidden to fall down in ecstasy over 
 Rontgen rays, wireless telegraphy, and radium. There are 
 few who have been more roused to wonder by these 
 marvels than I. But, with sadness I confess it, the 
 wonder has already begun to wear off. And as regards 
 the general public, Marconi's system has become a matter 
 for commercial speculation and will be valued no more 
 highly than the telegraph or the telephone. These and 
 all other discoveries have their nine days' glory, and then 
 sink into the huge mass of accepted facts. And so it 
 will always be. The value of the facts is not something 
 objective like the facts themselves — it is a personal, 
 subjective affair. Familiarity breeds indifference. The 
 glamour 
 
 " Fades into the light of common day." 
 
 Let us therefore be on our guard against a common 
 fallacy. Because scientific discoveries give us pleasure 
 at first, it is argued that they will always give us pleasure. 
 We know from experience that this is not so. Value 
 judgments are the determining factor. The true zest is in 
 the search for further discoveries — in the exercise of our 
 
 1 For example, a book with a large sale — New Conceptions in 
 Science — enthusiastic, bright, but hopelessly deficient in its ideas as 
 to what constitutes true progress. 
 
36 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 functions and faculties — and in the firmer grasp we gain 
 upon meanings and purposes which shall make life worth 
 living. 
 
 XI. Value and Purpose. 
 
 Value judgments, when occasion calls, stimulate the 
 will to action. Thus comes into existence the conception 
 of a purpose to be fulfilled — an end to be gained — a 
 design to be carried into execution. The full bearing of 
 this conception will be considered when we come to deal 
 with ideals and free will. Here I want to point out 
 that design, or purpose, reposes on value judgments, and 
 therefore belongs, like them, to the sphere of existences 
 beyond the reach of science. Science has never yet 
 managed to weigh, measure, capture, or bottle, a purpose 
 — simply because the thing is impossible. We know of 
 design or purpose solely as a subjective experience. We 
 interpret purpose where we see it by analogy from the 
 workings of our own minds. And yet there are 
 scientists, who, because by their methods they cannot 
 discover design or purpose in nature, refuse to believe 
 that it is there. It is cheering to know that the number 
 of such scientists is steadily decreasing. 
 
 Some of us belong to the generations to whom Paley*s 
 famous " watch " argument was familiar and conclusive. 
 But nowadays many tell us that this attempt to prove 
 design in nature is hopelessly old-fashioned — that Darwin- 
 ism has robbed it of all its point. Well, I suppose few 
 
FACT AND MEANING 37 
 
 will deny that the watch has received some hard knocks 
 of late. But I am bold to believe that it is going yet. 
 It may want cleaning, and a new face ; but its essential 
 virtue remains. For what is a watch ? It is a machine 
 with a design. The fact that it is a machine does not 
 take from it the element of design. It embodies and 
 fulfils a purpose. And therefore, as a matter of fact^ the 
 universe has produced a machine which does actually 
 effect a purpose. How enormously significant is this fact 
 when its implications are duly apprehended ! For how 
 can we deny purpose to a universe which has produced 
 a being capable of conceiving a design, and constructing 
 a machine in accordance with that design } It seems to 
 me that philosophers of the soulless, with the exception 
 of Schopenhauer and his school, persistently blink this 
 outcome of the cosmic process. Schopenhauer posits 
 Will, and so " purpose " follows naturally. But how 
 shall purpose emerge as a " product of causes which had 
 no prevision of the end they were achieving," or as an 
 " outcome of accidental collections of atoms " } The 
 process would seem to me to involve nothing less than an 
 absolute contradiction in terms. 
 
 I hold, then, that purpose does actually exist — that it 
 manifests itself in experience as one of the absolute 
 " reals " of life — and that it must be definitely reckoned 
 with in any philosophy which hopes to penetrate beneath 
 the surface of " facts " to the nerves and tissues of 
 " meaning." Science cannot discover purpose. That is no 
 
38 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 wonder : the wonder would be rather if it could. Feeling 
 is the interpreter of purpose. Science cannot touch it. 
 
 XII. Feeling and Progress. 
 
 The first step in my argument is now definitely taken. 
 I look to feeling as the means for establishing the prime 
 and fundamental relation between living, sentient creatures, 
 and the external realities which form their environment. 
 Historically, feeling has been developed in the animal world 
 in ever-growing degrees of quantity, quality, and inten- 
 sity. Beginning with undifferentiated sensations, sentient 
 creatures have gradually learnt to smell and taste, to hear 
 and see. The evolution has been evoked by form and 
 colour, scent and sound, and all the varied stimuli of the 
 external world. This upward striving for contact with the 
 real culminates in man. And for man, too, there has been 
 a historical development of feeling, with a corresponding 
 power of piercing to meanings and framing of rational 
 purposes. Feeling furnishes material for apprehending 
 with increasing clearness the " Reason " underlying the 
 phenomena of sense. It enables us to realise, with Lotze, 
 that the whole outer framework of the cosmos is " a tissue 
 of regularly crossing stimuli, designed to kindle at 
 innumerable points the true action of a more intelligent 
 life." Set the theory of evolution in the light of such a 
 world-view as this, and it begins to be luminous with 
 purpose and meaning. Dark masses still move through- 
 
FACT AND MEANING 39 
 
 out its immense bulk ; but shooting rays of glory flash 
 hither and thither, and cast a glow over the very darkness 
 itself. 
 
 Such a world-view enables us to understand Carlyle as, 
 looking up to the star-lit heavens, his spirit was moved 
 within him, and he exclaimed to his friend, " Man, it's 
 just dreadful." It enables us to understand another, and 
 very different philosopher, Herbert Spencer, when in 
 his last essay he writes thus ^ : "Of late years the 
 consciousness that without origin or cause infinite space 
 has ever existed and must exist, produces in me a feeling 
 from which I shrink." Such a world-view enables us to 
 understand the psalmist of old time, who, looking up at 
 those same heavens, cried, " Lord, what is man that Thou 
 art mindful of him, or the son of man that Thou so 
 regardest him ? " It enables us to understand how even 
 the unimpassioned Kant could declare, "Two things 
 strike me dumb : the infinite starry heavens without, and 
 the moral law within." For in each, and all such 
 experiences, feeling of the most exalted character is 
 wrestling with realities, and rises into self-conscious 
 acknowledgment of a mystery yet to be solved. Cosmic 
 emotion is no empty, meaningless stirring of a futile 
 wish to know : it is deep calling unto deep. Man 
 cannot rest in "a study of organic," however exquisite 
 may be the nerve tissues and processes he may dis- 
 cover. The methods of physical science cannot satisfy 
 ^ Fads and Comments : last words of the last essay. 
 
40 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 him. He reaches out, through feeling, to learn the 
 meanings of this " strange swift course run out beneath 
 the silent heavens."^ The knowledge for which he 
 yearns is more a knowledge of the heart than of the head. 
 The intellectual knowledge of absolutes must always be 
 imperfect. For intellectual knowledge implies unreal 
 abstractions. His passionate search is for realities that 
 can inspire and justify a life of action. Thus it is that 
 feeling, more and more tempered, enriched, harmonised, 
 organised, by reason, spurs on the will to realise those 
 ideals which, as we shall see, express the spiritual 
 capacities of man's nature, and constitute the Soul of 
 Progress. 
 
 ^ J. Caird, University Addresses^ p. 306. 
 
SECOND LECTURE. 
 
 IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES. 
 
 "Stretching forward to the things which are before." — Phil. 
 iii. 13. 
 
 I. Why ? Whence ? Whither ? 
 
 1 ASKED in the first lecture how men can be inspired to 
 
 work for the social good unless they believe that the 
 
 principles of progress are founded in the real ? If 
 
 nature is evil, the case is hopeless. But even if we 
 
 modify the pessimistic view into saying that nature is 
 
 indifferent, the case is not much better. For all certainty 
 
 is taken away ; the eternal flux is too strong for us. The 
 
 heart is taken out of all we would do. The part of 
 
 wisdom would be to face the hopeless future with stoical 
 
 resignation and unflinching fortitude. 
 
 We saw that such conclusions appear to be inevitable 
 
 if we have nothing but the teachings of science to guide us. I 
 
 For science cannot penetrate to meaning, or to purpose. 
 
 These belong to the sphere of the subjective ; and the 
 
 subjective remains essentially out of the scientist's reach. 
 
 41 
 
42 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Qui scientist, he has to stop short at facts and descriptions. 
 But we also saw that, qui man, he is bound to go on. 
 For through the medium of feeling he comes into touch 
 with reality in ways unknown to science. He forms 
 judgments of appreciation as well as judgments of 
 description. If he shuts his eyes to the revelations of 
 feeling, he crushes down in himself that which is not 
 only the most human in him, but also the most noble. 
 If by specialisation he is unhappy enough to atrophy 
 some of his sensibilities, and so contract his nature, as 
 did Darwin, he will, like Darwin, lament his loss, rather 
 than glory in his limitations. 
 
 I maintain, then, that if a man is a man at all, in any 
 true sense of the word, he cannot rest content to look no 
 further back nor further forward than the bounds set by 
 the limits of his natural life. The ultimate questions 
 press upon him because his nature expands beyond the 
 world of fact to expatiate freely in the unknown and the 
 unrealised. 
 
 In proof whereof, here is a touching passage from 
 Herbert Spencer. He was feeling the end to be near, 
 and he notes how nature forced upon him some of her 
 world-old, yet ever insistent questionings.^ " For years 
 past (he writes) when watching the unfolding buds in the 
 spring, there has arisen the thought — Shall I ever again 
 be awakened at dawn by the song of the thrush ? " And 
 later he adds : " It is commonly supposed that those 
 
 ^ Fac^s and Cotmnents^ last essay. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 43 
 
 who have relinquished the Creed of Christendom occupy 
 themselves exclusively with material interests and material 
 activities — thinking nothing of the How and Why, of the 
 Whence and Whither. It may be so with some of the 
 uncultured, but it is certainly not so with many of the 
 cultured." 
 
 There you have the simple, direct statement of a great 
 thinker and a good man. I take it to be typical. The 
 spirit of the writer was humane, sincere, and indefatigable. 
 It has now passed beyond the veil, and some, at any rate, 
 of these ultimate problems will have found their solution. 
 Those of us who have not felt compelled, like him, to 
 relinquish the Creed of Christendom, believe that many 
 of them, in their essentials, are solved for us already. 
 
 II. Ideas as Forces. 
 
 It is manifest that when we approach these ultimate 
 questions we pass from the sphere of objective phenomena 
 into that of mental existences — some would say, into the 
 sphere of the unsubstantial, if not the visionary. But ideas 
 are not unsubstantial, though they be immaterial. They 
 have a real existence, and exert a definite force. I need 
 not dwell upon this subject. For the tendency of much 
 modern psychology is all in this direction of recognising 
 ideas as forces. It sometimes almost materialises them. 
 
 From another point of view, ideas have won for them- 
 selves a distinct place in scientific philosophy. Science 
 
44 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 1 now is nothing if it is not a system of ideas. " Law in 
 the scientific sense " (says Karl Pearson) " is essentially a 
 product of the human mind and has no meaning apart 
 from man. It owes its existence to the creative power 
 of his intellect. There is more meaning in the statement 
 that man gives laws to Nature than in its converse that 
 Nature gives laws to man." ^ The source from which I 
 take this statement will guarantee its freedom from any 
 leaning to a spiritual interpretation of thought. And it 
 will also serve to prove how far modern science is being 
 compelled to move in the direction of idealism. 
 
 Speaking generally, we may say that ideas are now seen 
 to possess a sort of individuality of their own. They 
 can combine together in modes of varying complexity. 
 They can be " in the air," as the phrase goes. They can 
 migrate from brain to brain. They can go to form part 
 of the common stock of stored or traditional knowledge. 
 In short, though they are " immaterial," they are none 
 the less " reals," and act as definite forces in the progress 
 of the race. 
 
 Moreover, they are ever subject to the laws of develop- 
 ment, if not of evolution. For thought is living and 
 progressive. There is a continual struggle for existence 
 among ideas, analogous to that in the organic world. 
 Our arguments and controversies are but so many 
 manifestations of the continued efforts of thought to 
 bring itself into harmony with the reason implicit in its 
 
 ^ Grammar of Science J '^. 104. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 45 
 
 environment. We have to be thankful that we live in 
 times when the conflict for survival among ideas is being 
 confined more and more to the arena of peaceful debate, 
 instead of being fought out, as so often in bygone days, 
 on bloody battle-fields, or in torture chambers, or by fire 
 and stake. 
 
 But the ideas involved in the answers to these " ultimate 
 questions " are of a peculiar kind. Scientific ideas take 
 shape from the study of definite, objective facts. The 
 origin of these is quite different. While it is true that, 
 in the first instance, they are based on the facts of ex- 
 perience, it is more true to say that they owe their 
 existence to the absence of facts. They are the outcome 
 of attempts to go beyond the facts. They take form 
 round obscure tendencies in our nature, and " stretch out 
 to that which is before." We project ourselves into the 
 unknown, and trust the primal forces of our nature to 
 guide us where the light of fully reasoned process has not 
 yet penetrated. We feel the direction we should take, 
 rather than recognise it by known signs or landmarks. 
 The absolutes of nature are not yet intellectually visualised 
 by human beings. But they are known, because felt. 
 
 III. Push and Pull. 
 
 By the use of reason, man has made marvellous strides 
 in subduing his environment to his will. But with the 
 existing order of things he is never satisfied. A peculiar 
 
46 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 doubleness of his consciousness enables him to put him- 
 self outside his world, and to speculate on its why, and 
 whence, and whither. But he does not stop short with 
 asking questions. He looks round upon the vast un- 
 wieldy mass of facts, and begins to criticise it. He then 
 tries to picture to himself something better. From the 
 springboard of the present he launches out into worlds 
 which might be, though they are not. And thus he comes 
 to frame those truly astonishing products of his mental 
 activity — his ideals, 
 
 ^ Science deals with facts — but man's nature chafes 
 against facts just because it is greater than the facts. 
 As Lange well puts it, the mere stubborn fact must 
 always seem bad ; and the materialism to which it leads 
 must inevitably end in some form of pessimism. Nay, 
 as Lange further points out, pessimism itself is only 
 possible because of the shock we experience when we 
 contrast the actual with the ideal. Man feels his know- 
 ledge to be imperfect. Why ? Only because he has 
 an ideal of a more perfect knowledge. Man recognises 
 the imperfections of his environment — only because he 
 has an ideal of beauty. He grieves over the imperfec- 
 tions of his own nature — only because he has an ideal of 
 the good. Bereft of these ideals, he would be content 
 with what exists. Dowered with these ideals, he devotes 
 the energies of his nature to achieving them. 
 
 Now these ideals have one vitally significant and out- 
 standing feature which I would emphasise to the utmost 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 47 
 
 of my power. Recall for a moment the scientific con- 
 ception of nature. It is that of a closed mechanical 
 system in which the state of affairs at any given moment 
 is the exact resultant of the forces at work in the pre- 
 ceding moment. That is to say, the onward movement is 
 wholly the result of push from behind. That which exists 
 now is nothing more than the outcome of what before 
 existed. Contrast the action of the ideal. It belongs to 
 a world which does not yet exist at all. It beckons to us 
 out of an unrealised future. It pulls us on from the 
 front, and brings into existence new creations, new con- 
 ditions. It is based on past experience, but it transcends 
 that experience. It lures on by the hope of an experience 
 yet to be. It frees us from the mechanical. 
 
 I shall hope to show, when I come to consider the 
 " will to live," that there is an inner urge in our nature 
 which leads us to continuous effort in the direction of 
 modifying our environment and developing the " self." 
 So far from rigid mechanism pushing everything from 
 behind, it is just the operation of such rigid mechanism 
 that crushes the bloom and freshness of the impulses 
 to new creation. You will realise the force of my con- 
 tention if you consider the creative prompting in the 
 case of a true artist. You will find that while he obeys 
 recognised laws and traditions, he throws them off when 
 they unduly cramp and fetter the free expression of his 
 idea or ideal. He has had an intuition, a vision, of 
 something more beautiful, or more noble, or more 
 
48 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 rapturous, than anything yet attained. There wells up 
 out of his soul a creative power which goes out to meet 
 the vision or the intuition. And there comes into 
 existence "a thing of beauty" which is "a joy for ever." 
 The observation is now trite, but it needs perpetual 
 emphasis, that analysis comes after creation. Science can 
 gather facts, and classify, and describe. But the aroma 
 of the living process, the creative spirit of the artist, the 
 attractive force of the ideal, are for ever free from its 
 mechanical categories. 
 
 The soul of Monteverde moved about in a world of 
 sound not realised. He rebelled against the rigid laws 
 of harmony and counterpoint prevailing in his day. He 
 insisted on the discord of the dominant seventh, and, 
 lo ! the way was opened out for all the glories of modern 
 music. Do you say that his discovery was inevitable ? 
 I grant you there is a sense in which it was. Every 
 real work of art is, in a sense, inevitable. But the 
 " inevitable " of the ideal is the very antithesis of the 
 "inevitable" of mechanics. For it has all the spontaneity 
 of free, self-determining spirit, realising its expanding 
 nature in wedding idea to form. 
 
 IV. The Materialist View. 
 
 I need not tell you that the views I have expounded 
 have many powerful and uncompromising opponents. 
 And naturally the consistent materialist is among the 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 49 
 
 most determined of them. Such views of the nature 
 and functions of ideals are fatal to his soulless system. 
 Hence he makes a desperate effort to show that the 
 ideal is, after all, the outcome of pushes from behind. 
 If we ask him whence comes its power of modifying 
 the future, he assures us that such power is quite a 
 delusion. 
 
 How convenient, by the way, these delusions, illusions, 
 hallucinations, and the rest, are for these philosophers of 
 the negative ! The only wonder is how an unconscious 
 and aimless set of soulless forces manages to produce 
 them. Suppose that the materialist himself is under a 
 delusion ! On his own principles, this dreadful possi- 
 bility is quite as likely as the other 1 
 
 Of this anti-spiritual school I select Dilhring as an able 
 
 and brilliant representative. He is a philosopher who 
 
 has evolved what he designates a Philosophy of the 
 
 Actual. He takes the world just as it is — just as it 
 
 presents itself to our senses ; and he interprets it in 
 
 terms of that purely mechanical causation to which I have 
 
 drawn attention. For him, therefore, the future, whole 
 
 and entire, exists potentially in the present. If we could 
 
 know all the forces mechanically at work at the present 
 
 moment, and had sufficient powers of calculation, we 
 
 could calculate its exact state at any subsequent moment. 
 
 On such premisses there is of course neither place nor 
 
 need for any such spiritual forces as my doctrine of ideals 
 
 would necessitate. The ideal becomes a kind of by- 
 
 4 
 
so THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 product, of no real significance. He falls fiercely^ on 
 " everything which points to anything beyond the 
 present." And yet it is interesting to note that " what 
 really incites him to engage in philosophical speculation 
 is the feeling which impels one to search into the mean- 
 ing of existence and to seek to transform life : that is 
 to say, his speculations are throughout of a passionate 
 character." How explain this apparent contradiction ? 
 I think it arose from his intense desire to be practical. 
 He attacked " everything which leads away from active 
 work." And he started on the assumptions that the 
 ideal was unpractical, and that religion was nothing but 
 weak mysticism. He longed for the real. Hence his 
 materialism, which gave him, as he thought, a true 
 pedestal for a true philosophy. 
 
 In treating of such a world-view as this, one can have 
 every possible sympathy with its aim, while repudiating 
 its fundamental conceptions. As regards the inadequacy 
 of mechanical conceptions to grapple with the facts of 
 experience, I have already said as much as is possible 
 under present conditions. But I will point out the 
 comforting and edifying fact that Dilhring himself was 
 unable to make his own principles account for the actual 
 world. For example, when confronted by the facts of 
 evolution and progress, he has to fly to principles which 
 are not mechanical, and to bring on the scene the gibbering 
 ghost of a conscious purpose. He is forced to this by 
 ^ Erdmann, Hist, of Philosophy^ vol. iii. p. 249. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 51 
 
 his attempt to justify teleology. He also introduces types 
 or ideas after the fashion of those of Plato and Schopen- 
 hauer. Of course such types or Ideas are quite Inconsistent 
 with his materialism. But, waiving this objection, what 
 are they but a feeble resuscitation of the older, and saner, 
 and most truly human, doctrine of Ideals ? Further, he 
 has to acknowledge a mystery In spite of his hatred of 
 mysticism. But In order that he may remain faithful to 
 his materialism, he leaves the solution of this mystery to 
 future discovery. And In order to satisfy the cravings of 
 man's Immaterial nature, he deigns to acknowledge the 
 sense of cosmic emotion, uses it as a basis for judgments 
 of value, and makes it a substitute for religion. 
 
 Now, Is It not fair to ask whether, when so able and so 
 subtle a reasoner as Dtihring Is reduced to straits so dire, 
 when he would fasten himself down to the world of actual 
 fact — is It not fair to ask whether his case is not a bad 
 one ? And may we not feel justified In holding to our 
 Ideals without submitting the whole materialistic system 
 to detailed and elaborate criticism ? I have the greater 
 courage in putting these questions, because Dtihring him- 
 self allowed that materialism supplied only a small part of 
 true philosophy. He put It at one-twentieth ! 
 
 But Duhring wanted to be practical. So do I. And 
 therefore I ask you to look at this matter from the 
 practical side. Ideals do actually exist — good or bad, as 
 the case may be. Let us confine our attention to the 
 good. Now, suppose we grant that they are nothing 
 
52 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 more than empty creations of the human mind, with no 
 foundation in the real. Then, if we are to be logical 
 and consistent, we must learn to take them for what they 
 are — chimerical and arbitrary conceptions : figments of 
 the imagination : mirages projected on the mists of the 
 future by the flickering lights of vague desires. But if 
 ideals be such, why should we waste a thought or effort 
 upon them ? The sooner we emancipate ourselves from 
 their vain thraldom the better. Perchance Schopenhauer 
 and von Hartmann might seriously urge such counsel as 
 this. Duhring attempted to escape from such conclusions, 
 though in vain. But, all philosophy apart, I ask you as 
 practical men and women living in a real world under the 
 conditions of real life. What would become of progress 
 were the counsel acted upon ? Could we dare to face the 
 future stripped of our ideals ? Surely the question gives 
 us the reductio ad ahsurdum of the whole philosophy on 
 which such a counsel could be founded. 
 
 But, alas ! the true character of the materialistic system, 
 and of the soulless systems akin to it, has not yet been 
 sufliciently apprehended. The glittering tinsel of a 
 criticism that pretends to work with " facts " versus 
 " fictions " carries people away, and blinds them to the 
 fatalistic tendencies of the doctrines they would embrace. 
 And, what is still more sad, the doctrines filter down into 
 the ranks of those who seldom read, and still more seldom 
 think for themselves. There is a popular Philosophy of 
 the Actual which is one of the great dangers of the future. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 53 
 
 Among the toiling masses stirred by eager hopes of a 
 social reconstruction, there is prevalent a practical material- 
 ism which will inevitably eat out the life of the ideals in- 
 herited from a fuller faith — the ideals by which they live. 
 Their cry is for machinery — more machinery — machinery 
 political — machinery social — machinery industrial. Far be 
 it from me to deny that machinery has its place, and that 
 we want more of it. But its place is subordinate. We 
 must have such a view of the meaning and worth and 
 dignity of human life as shall keep alive in us a glowing 
 love for all that is high, and pure, and generous. We 
 must feel the pull of the ideal drawing us onward, and so 
 gain guidance and courage for the task that lies before us. 
 Nor would I forget the withering effect of this same 
 Philosophy of the Actual on many at the other end of the 
 social scale — the moneyed and privileged classes. It leads 
 them to fritter away their lives in a round of trivial, often 
 harmful, pleasures. It allows of no serious thinking nor 
 earnest purpose, nor unselfish effort. In place of these, 
 there burns a dull, fierce anger against those who appear 
 to threaten property or privilege. Oh for ideals to fire 
 their hearts and lift them to a higher plane ! 
 
 V. Objections of the Practical Man. 
 
 In defending the ideal against the negations of the 
 materialist, I appealed to the practical side of our nature. 
 But I have to bethink me of that large number of good 
 
54 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 people who somewhat pride themselves on looking at 
 life in a matter-of-fact way. An enthusiast of any kind 
 perturbs them, if he does not alarm them. And they 
 are disposed to regard the man of ideals as a visionary, 
 if not a flighty or weak-minded person. These apostles 
 of the gospel of " hard common sense " (for so they call 
 the quality they admire) point to lives wasted in senti- 
 ment ; they hold up to scorn the dreamer, the builder of 
 castles in the air, the aesthetic or social rhapsodist. And, 
 no doubt, like most people with strong opinions, they can 
 often make out a good case. 
 
 But who cannot see at once that in so far as their case 
 is good, they are dealing with the abuse of a noble thing ? 
 Here, as ever, the adage applies — corruptio optimi pessima. 
 To be animated by ideals is not to ignore the actual. 
 The well-balanced mind will avoid each extreme. It will 
 not ignore the ideal and rest content with the actual, for 
 that will mean stagnation and consequent decay. Nor 
 will it soar into the ideal oblivious of the conditions 
 under which the work has to be done, for that would 
 mean imbecility or despair. The idealist, like the 
 physicist, must have a fulcrum ; and that fulcrum must 
 be found in the definitely constituted world of fact. But, 
 given the fulcrum, the idealist will transmute the stubborn 
 fact into gold. He will " work upon it in the light of 
 the ideal." ^ Regarded thus, if the ideal is anything, it is 
 practical. It assigns tasks : it imposes burdens : it com- 
 
 1 Lange. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 55 
 
 mands action. The true poet is impelled to utter his 
 message : the artist to embody his vision : the prophet 
 to paint the glories of the good times to. come. It is 
 woe to the evangelist if he preaches not the good tidings. 
 These idealists, one and all, find relief in action. The 
 ideal fires them, and calls them to strenuous living. 
 
 One of the saddest anomalies is to see professing 
 Christians frowning upon social ideals as unpractical and 
 mischievous, and yet praying to God regularly that His 
 Kingdom may come and His Will be done on earth as it 
 is in heaven. They will read the glowing chapters in 
 which Isaiah paints an ideal future, and will be moved by 
 them into mild humanitarian emotion. But they will rise 
 from the prayer, or shut the book, and straightway con- 
 demn those who believe that it is possible for the prayer 
 to be answered or for the vision to come true. Social 
 ideals interfere with vested interests : they must therefore 
 be sternly repressed — Lord's Prayer and Prophet Isaiah 
 notwithstanding. 
 
 How easy it is to raise the old cry — " These fellows 
 would turn the world upside down " ! Sometimes the 
 world wants turning upside down to bring it right way 
 up ! I conceive that the chief cause of our social evils 
 is our grievous lack of social ideals. The social ideal, to 
 be healthy, must be founded on the ideals of the True, 
 the Good, the Beautiful ; and it must be pursued by all 
 on behalf of all. Nothing can be more practical. 
 
 If to aim at conceiving and realising a social ideal is 
 
S6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 to be visionary and Utopian, then I am content to be 
 numbered among the condemned. But I hold myself 
 free to condemn my judges. I refuse to rest content 
 with the actual. I claim that movement is the law of 
 life, and that movement should be in the direction of the 
 ideal. I refuse to accept any social programme which, 
 while boasting itself to be founded on facts and common 
 sense, proclaims in reality nothing but the dictates of 
 individual or class interest or prejudice. The only ideal 
 worth the name is one which will harmonise all interests 
 by being simply human. It must be broad and deep as 
 the river of life. It must realise the good for man, 
 individually and collectively. And my faith stands firm 
 that every brave or generous word spoken on behalf of 
 such an ideal — every social impulse finding vent in action 
 under its light and leading — will enter into the great 
 causal series of forces, spiritual and physical, which are 
 bringing in the kingdom of God. The social ideal not 
 practical ! It is all too practical for most. 
 
 VI. Ideals and Evolution. 
 
 I have dealt with two enemies of the ideal — the 
 materialistic philosopher and the man of hard common 
 sense. A formidable foeman still remains — the material- 
 istic evolutionist, qua evolutionist. He points out to us 
 that, when we examine the origin and development of our 
 ideals — even those of the True, the Beautiful, and the 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 57 
 
 Good — we find that they have not been always and every- 
 where the same. 
 
 Now here is undoubtedly a considerable difficulty. 
 The light shed upon the history of our ideals makes it 
 impossible to deny that this objection is founded on facts. 
 How does it affect our views of the validity and authority 
 of these forces which, under any theory, are prominent 
 elements in our experience ? I will indicate one or two con- 
 siderations which may help us to the right point of view. 
 
 I have already alluded to what I ventured to call the 
 evolution of ideas. Perhaps the term " development " is 
 better, because evolution is so suggestive of processes of 
 organic growth. But whichever term we use, the fact 
 remains that " knowledge grows from more to more." 
 And on the very principles of the evolution theory itself, 
 we shall expect that growth will be by the struggle of 
 variations and by the survival of the fittest. This is true^ 
 even in such sciences as Astronomy and Chemistry, which 
 deal with purely objective facts. They have passed 
 through some strange phases, such as Astrology and 
 Alchemy. And this progressive approach to truth 
 characterises our latest and most advanced scientific 
 theories. But we do not throw over Astronomy and 
 Chemistry because they exhibit evidences of growth and 
 development. Why should we mete out different treat- 
 ment to our ideals ? We cannot expect equal exactness 
 of results in all departments of human knowledge — and 
 least of all in man's efforts to grasp the realities of worlds 
 
58 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 beyond the reach of sense and scientific method. But 
 may we not assume, in the case of our ideals, that the 
 longer man is in contact with his environment, the larger 
 will be the number of his adjustments to it ? This is 
 obviously true of Astronomy and Chemistry. On what 
 ground shall anyone hold it to be untrue of our adjust- 
 ments to the verities of the supersensible world ? 
 
 We can thus see that no new difficulty is raised by the 
 discovery that there has been an evolution of ideals. 
 The difficulty would arise had this not been the case. 
 On the basis of the struggle for life rises that for 
 conscious happiness. On this basis, again, the struggle 
 for the ideal. Out of ruthless competition springs self- 
 sacrificing emulation for the higher life of the race. By 
 an infinitely wonderful reversal of the original conditions, 
 food, and happiness, and life itself, are freely and 
 consciously dedicated in the sacred cause of progress. 
 Ideal succeeds to ideal, enthusiasm to enthusiasm. And 
 under the spell of the attractive force of the ideal, toil 
 and suffering, ay, torture and martyrdom, are welcomed 
 by the noblest of our kind. 
 
 There are ideals, of course, which are positively bad — 
 which degrade instead of elevating. But the cosmic 
 process will eliminate them. The hero worship so 
 natural to lads may find unworthy objects in bushrangers, 
 highwaymen, pirates, and other undesirable celebrities. 
 The Australian ideal of a happy life centres far too much 
 in horse-racing and betting. In the industrial world at 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 59 
 
 large, commercial ideals are lamentably low. So with 
 many of our political and social ideals. These and others 
 like them are bound to go down in the struggle for 
 survival, to the damage of those individuals and nations 
 which yield to them. There is, for example, no full, 
 rich life possible for any nation or individual which gives 
 itself up to the ideal of accumulating wealth. There is no 
 future before Australia unless she can curb and reduce 
 the gambling ideal of her people. These are " varia- 
 tions " in ideals which the universe rejects. And thus it 
 comes that the application of the theory of evolution to 
 our ideals provides both warning and cheer — warning 
 against the false — cheer for the ultimate triumph of the 
 true. 
 
 There is another consideration which may help us in 
 our study of the evolution of ideals. However great 
 may have been the variations in their contents, their form 
 has been persistent. The conception of some ideal, 
 whatever that ideal might be, has always confronted the 
 actual. Wherever there is progress there is discontent 
 with the facts as they are : the progressive individual or 
 community condemns them, contradicts them, strives to 
 bring them into a better setting. There is necessary for 
 progress what Kingsley calls " a divine discontent." And 
 since the " form " is persistent, there will always be 
 variations from which Dame Nature may " select," and our 
 ideals will always be approaching nearer to harmony with 
 the underlying reality. 
 
6o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 And when for the blind selection of the materialistic 
 evolutionist we substitute the guidance of a personal, 
 loving All-Father, we may well rest assured that advance 
 means real progress, not shadowy illusion. We can 
 think of the supreme ideal as itself unchangeable — as the 
 absolutely True, and Beautiful, and Good. And we take 
 courage in the thought that our ideals, though historically 
 relative to special stages and environments, and though 
 subject to ceaseless development, are yet the means by 
 which we attain our truest and deepest hold upon the 
 meaning of existence. Man's relation to the ideal is 
 defined once and for ever in the command — " Be ye 
 therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is 
 perfect." 
 
 VII. Natural and Supernatural. 
 
 In discussing the nature and function of feeling and 
 of the ideal, I have had frequent occasion to distinguish 
 the world of sense or science from what I have hitherto 
 called the supersensuous world. It will be profitable as 
 well as wise to define this distinction somewhat more 
 closely. 
 
 I selected the term " supersensuous " because it seemed 
 to be most free from what certain scientists would deem 
 the undesirable associations connected with the terms 
 " supernatural " and " spiritual." I do not deny that the 
 widespread objection to these latter terms is not to some 
 extent justified. They have been used unfairly to belittle 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6i 
 
 and discredit the legitimate assumptions and conclusions 
 of physical research. Nevertheless, I hold that the 
 prejudice against them is largely the result of misunder- 
 standings. 
 
 Our study of value judgments in the first lecture will 
 have sufficed, I trust, to prove that we do need some 
 distinction between the facts which are open to the 
 methods of physical science, and those supersensible 
 realities revealed to us in the spheres of thought and 
 feeling and will. If we employ the term " natural " to 
 cover all the phenomena, which yield themselves to in- 
 vestigation by " natural science," the simplest correlative is 
 " supernatural." But it is clear that we must consider- 
 ably modify and expand the theological use of that term. 
 It will have to cover, not only certain theological concepts, 
 but the whole field of psychological, aesthetic, and moral 
 concepts, in so far as these carry us out of range of the 
 senses. 
 
 Now I believe it would be of considerable service, even 
 to theologians, to adopt this wider usage, provided it 
 be clearly defined and accepted by all concerned. Then 
 it would be freed from all suspicion of implying some- 
 thing " outside " nature altogether — it would not even 
 imply " above " nature. It would simply mean, " out of the 
 reach of natural science." We should thus preserve the 
 grand conception of the unity of nature — a conception 
 for which scientists and philosophers alike are very 
 jealous. And we should have a definite recognition of 
 
62 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the gap undoubtedly existing between what we may 
 broadly designate the world of facts and the world of 
 meanings. 
 
 If you press me as to why this gap should exist, or as 
 to why the world of facts should have assumed this 
 particular form, I candidly acknowledge the inability to 
 give any satisfactory answers to such problems. But an 
 impatient longing for unifying our knowledge, and for 
 elaborating " synthetic philosophies," must not blind us to 
 real differences in modes of existence. Neither absolute 
 idealism nor absolute materialism can hold the fort alone. 
 Each finds that, however perfect its system, there is an 
 unexplained residue. Hoffding's conclusion seems to be 
 the wisest, that we must be content to leave certain 
 questions open. He holds ^ that " while we cannot solve 
 definitively these great problems, still we can descry the 
 road that leads onward and forward, so that the rights of 
 both our thought and our life are safeguarded. The 
 insolubility of the problems really only means that, no 
 matter how far we may penetrate in our research and 
 thought, new horizons, new goals, and new tasks always 
 rise before us." 
 
 VIII. The Beautiful. 
 
 The great self-contained triad of the True, the 
 Beautiful, the Good, constitutes the threefold unity of 
 
 ^ The Problems of Philosophy^ p. i86. Trans, by Fisher. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6;^ 
 
 the ideal world. Concerning the True, I have already 
 spoken, and have shown that, to be worthy of pursuit, it 
 must be founded in the very nature of things, and that 
 it must have a meaning for life. Let us now turn to 
 consider the second member of the triad — the Beautiful. 
 
 What is the Beautiful ? I care not how you define it, 
 so long as you know what it is to feel it. To the 
 ordinary man, nature appears capricious and disconnected. 
 To the man of knowledge, she is the embodiment of law. 
 To the man susceptible to beauty, she reveals a soul. 
 To the poet, 
 
 " The gods talk in the breath of the woods, 
 They talk in the shaken pine, 
 And fill the long reach of the old sea shore 
 With dialogue divine : 
 And the poet who overhears 
 Some random word they say, 
 Is the fated man of men 
 Whom the ages must obey." ^ 
 
 The soul of the artist cherishes the myriad feelings that 
 can be clothed with colour, light, or form. He embodies 
 the world of values in the world of concrete objects. 
 The soul of the musician catches strains of harmony 
 issuing from the very bosom of the intangible, and 
 re-echoes them as " prophecies of the life that is to be.*' 
 We speak, and, as I have shown, we rightly speak of 
 nature's secret. But when the inspired interpreter 
 arrives, her outer frame resounds with spiritual meanings. 
 
 ^ Emerson. 
 
64 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 But now that we are mounting to the higher slopes 
 of experience, methinks I catch an icy breath from the 
 glaciers of scientific criticism. With a touch of gently 
 tolerant, but withering cynicism, we may be told that the 
 fancies and emotions of the poet belonged to the childhood 
 of the race — that art is a mere plaything — and that all 
 really enlightened people keep to facts. And there are 
 many who, with no touch of cynicism, but with honest 
 fear, confess to themselves that science is killing poetry 
 and art, emptying the universe of mystery, and dragging 
 out to " the light of common day " all that formed 
 
 ''The poet's consecration and the dream." 
 
 But need this be so ? I trow not. Granted that 
 science has well-nigh metamorphosed our world for us, is 
 the new in any essential less poetical than the old ? Are 
 these hidden meanings and subtle analogies destroyed 
 which stirred the genius of the past to utterance and ex- 
 pression ? By no means — rather the reverse. No doubt 
 many figments of uninstructed imagination will have to 
 be thrown aside. The mediaeval three-story universe is 
 expanded beyond recognition. But in its place we have 
 star beyond star, galaxy beyond galaxy, and out again the 
 frowning walls of infinitude. Assuredly we have not lost. 
 Again, we have learnt more of the laws of light than 
 David knew. But are the prismatic hues less glorious 
 when there comes " the clear shining after rain " ? Are 
 the beauties of heaven and earth reduced in number or in 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6s 
 
 quality ? So far is this from being the case, that the day 
 of the triumph of science has seen the birth of art, of 
 landscape painting — that form of art for which we can 
 claim that it is one of the most original things we moderns 
 have accomplished. And what does that development 
 imply ? There can be no dispute that it witnesses to a 
 new sense of beauty in nature. Tennyson was not robbed 
 of his " spirit in the woods " because he knew more of 
 botany than Homer. Nor was the edge of emotion 
 dulled for his In Memoriam because he was versed in 
 the lore of the nineteenth century. Depend upon it, we 
 have no need to fear that science will destroy our aesthetic 
 joys and ideals. Our most dangerous enemies are else- 
 where — in our wrong methods of education, in our love of 
 a low range of pleasures, in our Mammon worship. Let 
 us but preserve a wholesome freshness in our nature and 
 we may cease to fear for the future of poetry and of art. 
 Science will keep us closer to fact ; but it will not empty 
 fact of its meaning and living power. Matthew Arnold 
 has exhorted us to conceive worthily of poetry, and, 
 therefore, of all that feeds the feelings and emotions. 
 "More and more (he says^) mankind will discover that 
 we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to con- 
 sole us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will 
 appear incomplete." Arnold then quotes Wordsworth 
 as finely and truly calling poetry " the impassioned ex- 
 pression which is in the countenance of all science." And 
 
 ^ Preface to Essays in Criticisvi. 
 
 5 
 
66 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 on this he comments, " What is a countenance without its 
 expression ? " 
 
 We can thus claim for art, if it be true art, that it is 
 no mere means to satisfy the play-instinct in man — no 
 mere by-product of evolution — nor even a mere stimulus 
 to exalted feeling. We can claim for it a deeply spiritual 
 function. The creator of a true work of art, and he who 
 is able to appreciate it, are alike in touch with forms of 
 reality higher than can come from the study of facts as 
 facts. There is a supersensuous attraction of like to like. 
 The soul of man and the soul of nature enter into fruitful 
 communion, through the immanent idea of the Beautiful 
 which is in both. Kingsley was looking at some lovely 
 work of art in a London shop, and at his side was a 
 labouring man, attracted by the same object. Their 
 eyes happened to meet, and to the lips of each there 
 sprang at the same moment the involuntary ejaculation 
 — " Is it not beautiful ^ " — which thing is more than a 
 parable. 
 
 But we can easily foresee that such claims as these on 
 behalf of art and poetry are not suffered to go unchallenged 
 by the materialistic school. The new psychology which 
 produces " studies in organic " is sometimes terribly in 
 earnest in repudiating all idealism. Myers, in his re- 
 markable book on Human Personality^ draws a vivid 
 contrast between the views of a modern exponent of 
 " organic," and those expressed so magnificently in Plato's 
 
 ^ Vol. i. pp. 1 1 2-1 15. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 67 
 
 Symposium. He quotes a passage from a French psy- 
 chologist in which falling in love is regarded simply as 
 a sign that a man is not in good health.-^ This opinion is 
 set forth in no light spirit, but, as Myers remarks, " with 
 all the earnestness of a modern Lucretius." All effort to 
 idealise is contemptuously ruled out of court. Now I can 
 admire a man like this for his consistency. But I cannot 
 be content with his philosophy. Contrast Plato's doctrine 
 of love, with its stages mounting step by step in degree 
 and kind. The first step is the love of beautiful shapes ; 
 a higher step is the love of beautiful souls ; still higher 
 comes the love of beauty as discovered in human 
 knowledge ; and highest of all is the love of the ideal 
 Beauty, eternal and unchangeable, the parent of true 
 knowledge, of true virtue, of immortality. Love is thus 
 portrayed as the endeavour of the finite to expand itself 
 into the world of the Ideal, and so into the infinite. All 
 this, remember, where the student, resting in his " organic," 
 can find nothing more than proof that a man is out of 
 health ! 
 
 But did not Plato (some may ask) despise that world 
 of fact which affords the sole material of modern science } 
 Perchance this charge may be to some extent justified. 
 But if I have to err, I would rather err with Plato than 
 with your philosopher of the organic. Moreover, Plato's 
 doctrine is by no means necessarily inconsistent with a 
 due recognition of the world of facts. Facts, when filled 
 ^ Pierre Janet, L' Automatisme Psychologique^ p. 466. 
 
68 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 with meaning, are manifestations of the real — of that real 
 which exists in its fulness in the Ideal. 
 
 IX. Art and Puritans. 
 
 There is another, and widely different objection to the 
 claims of art — that which comes from the Puritan strain 
 in humanity. This strain is not confined to any one age, 
 or race, or country, but is well-nigh as widely spread 
 as the love of art itself. It generally appears in the 
 character of a reaction. It stands over against the 
 lamentable tendency in human nature to degrade art into 
 a medium for externalism in religion, or for sensuality 
 in morals. It regards aesthetic culture with suspicion, 
 even though it may not proceed to the length of con- 
 demning it as definitely evil. 
 
 Confining our attention to the development of 
 Puritanism in our own race, it would be difficult to 
 deny its general hostility to art. I speak of the average, 
 popular Puritanism. For that the Puritan spirit at its 
 best is not repressive of aesthetic impulse is proved by 
 the fact that it was imbibed by men so different as 
 Milton, and Wordsworth, and Ruskin. But even in its 
 popular form, who shall venture to condemn it wholly ? 
 For consider to what it is opposed. There are certain 
 enthusiasts who take as their motto. Art for art's sake. 
 They interpret this to mean that art must be free from 
 all restraint, moral or other ; and they defiantly proclaim 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 69 
 
 their own freedom to follow their artistic bent wherever it 
 may lead. Now if we have to choose between art and 
 morals, who can doubt what the issue should be ? For 
 morals mean conduct — and conduct, as Matthew Arnold 
 held, is three-fourths of life. 
 
 In dealing with those who claim this licence in art, we 
 can grant them much. We can grant them that there is 
 a sense in which art may be said to possess elements 
 peculiar to itself. But this is not to say that it may cut 
 itself loose from the rest of life. As Plato taught, it 
 must fit in with, and aid, the development of the whole 
 man. He who develops the aesthetic side of his nature 
 at the expense of other elements loses his hold on true 
 beauty. The triad, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, 
 form an indissoluble sisterhood. This is a lesson we 
 sorely need to-day. For too often do we see the whole 
 resources of art lavished to destroy, rather than foster, the 
 ideal good of life. Pictures, poetry, plays, abound with 
 immoralities disguised as art. All the charms of light, 
 and sound, and colour, and form, are employed to keep 
 us from rising to Plato's second stage. They entangle 
 us in the meshes of the sensual, and hide from us the 
 nobler wealth of beautiful souls. In place of the triad of 
 sisters. Vice flaunts her meretricious glamours, and a 
 besotted Realism glories in her shrine. Truly there is 
 need for the Puritan strain in our nature ; without it, we 
 should become rotten at the core. 
 
 So much can rightly be urged in favour of Puritanism. 
 
70 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 But if what I have advanced as to the function of the 
 ideal be sound, the apparent opposition between the 
 Beautiful and the Good is dissolved, and loses itself in a 
 deeper harmony. Ruskin tells us in a striking chapter 
 of his Pr^terita^ how his long debate with himself on 
 this subject found its termination.-^ He was in Turin, 
 and found himself one Sunday morning in a little chapel 
 by the dusty roadside. There had gathered the few 
 sheep of the old Waldensian faith, numbering " in all 
 some three or four and twenty, of whom fifteen or sixteen 
 were grey-haired women. Their solitary and clerkless 
 preacher, a somewhat stunted figure in a plain black coat, 
 with a cracked voice, after leading them through the 
 languid forms of prayer," put his utmost zeal into a con- 
 solatory discourse, which dwelt upon the wickedness of 
 the city, and on the exclusive favour with God enjoyed 
 by the handful of the elect members of his congregation. 
 Himself " neither cheered nor greatly alarmed by this 
 doctrine," Ruskin walked back into the condemned city, 
 and up into the gallery, where the full flood of sunshine 
 was lighting up the pictures, and where, through the open 
 windows, " came in with the warm air, floating swells " of 
 music from the courtyard. " And as the perfect colour 
 and sound gradually asserted their power " on him, he 
 was convinced, with final certainty, that his old Puritanism 
 was lacking, and there was fastened in him " the old 
 article of Jewish faith, that things done delightfully and 
 
 ^ Vol. iii. chap. i. p. 46. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 71 
 
 rightly were always done by the help and in the Spirit of 
 God." 
 
 X. The Good. 
 
 Judgments of value determined by the appreciation of 
 Beauty have carried us far from the realm of the purely 
 mechanical. We have come nearer to the heart of things. 
 The Ideal of the Good brings us nearer still. It is a noble 
 thing to be able to distinguish the beautiful from the 
 ugly ; it is a nobler thing to be able to distinguish the 
 good from the bad. In exercising this function we 
 become " as gods, knowing good and evil." That is to 
 say, we rise to the dignity of being moral agents in a 
 morally governed universe. 
 
 Whence comes to us the Ideal of the Good ? As in 
 the case of that of Beauty, I am content to forego 
 definition in favour of a direct appeal to experience. For 
 there are but few of us who have not a spontaneous and 
 abiding conviction that our actual selves are not our true 
 selves — that we might be better than we are. We can 
 see clearly that we fall short of a standard which we our- 
 selves frame and apply. Soiled as we are by travel-stains 
 on life's dusty road, we catch sight at intervals of a 
 purity, a moral perfection, which we feel to be our 
 natural goal, though we have so far to journey. 
 
 It is from experiences and longings such as these that 
 we construct for ourselves, with greater or less complete- 
 ness, a conception of an ideal man. We build him up, 
 
72 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 as It were, out of the various qualities of which we 
 approve in ourselves and others. The ideal so formed is 
 indefinite, indeed, but is by no means a mere abstraction. 
 And just because it is not an abstraction, Christendom 
 has recognised in the Person of its Founder, the realisa- 
 tion of its ideal. You remember John Stuart Mill's 
 virile appreciation of the moral grandeur of Jesus Christ. 
 Not " even now (he writes ^) would it be easy, even for 
 an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of 
 virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to 
 endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life." 
 If one whom we deem to have had but a partial glimpse 
 of the glory revealed in Jesus Christ could form such an 
 estimate as this of His unique position as a moral type, 
 how much more can Christians rest upon that type as 
 their ideal ^ For them, the type is perfect on the side 
 of its divinity as well as of its humanity. Their hopes 
 and possibilities can thus expatiate in a boundless range ; 
 and they do not despair even when there is laid upon 
 them the command — " Be ye therefore perfect, even as 
 your Father in Heaven is perfect." For in Jesus Christ 
 they believe that they have a revelation of the Express 
 Image of the Father's Person. They know, therefore, 
 that the moral ideal is founded deep in the very nature 
 of existence, and that it already wears the wreath of 
 victory. 
 
 Another characteristic of the moral ideal here springs 
 
 ^ Mill, Theism^ last section. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 73 
 
 to light — its absolute authority over us. Science wields 
 its " must " as a word of fate. Morality also wields its 
 " must," but it is addressed to a being who is a moral 
 agent — who can consciously obey or disobey. Dis- 
 obedience means death : obedience means fuller life. 
 But there is a choice open to us. With this aspect of 
 the ideal I shall be concerned at a later stage. Here I 
 would only ask you to remark that the judgments of 
 the moral sense, so far from being identical in kind with 
 those of physical science, are often at the opposite pole. 
 The height of scientific certainty may also be the height 
 of moral wrong. The passion for gambling, for example, 
 is a scientific certainty as a psychological fact, and can 
 be studied as such. But the passion is judged to be 
 wrong by the moral sense, and the fact is thus condemned. 
 It " is," but it " ought not to be." The ideal, in condemn- 
 ing the passion, commands us to repress and conquer it. 
 
 The Ideal of the Good thus stands above all other 
 forms of existence, and authoritatively demands that they 
 shall be brought into its service. And it thereby proves 
 itself to be, not a shadowy abstraction, or illusion, but 
 one of the highest forms of reality. 
 
 In the first lecture I quoted from Guyau the desolate 
 picture of the ever-devouring sea. The blank fatalism of 
 that picture is relieved by a ray of light from the moral 
 ideal. " If (writes he) the unknown activity that lies at 
 the basis of the natural world has produced in the human 
 race a consciousness of goodness and a deliberate desire 
 
74 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 for it, there is reason and hope to believe that the last 
 word of ethics and metaphysics is not a negative." 'Tis 
 but a wintry gleam, striking across the grey expanse of 
 his heaving ocean ; but, such as it is, mark you, it comes 
 from the inspiration of the Ideal of the Good. 
 
 Lotze sees more clearly the orb from which Guyau's 
 ray emanates. Hence these noble words ^ : " All being, 
 all that we call mode and form, thing and event, the 
 whole sum of nature, can be nothing else than the 
 condition for the realisation of the Good ; can be as it is, 
 only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good 
 manifests itself." 
 
 XL The Ideal and Religion. 
 
 Religion is the outcome of man's stretching out to the 
 things which are before. It is that activity of his nature 
 whereby he relates himself to forms of existence which 
 satisfy his ideals. It belongs, therefore, to the sphere of 
 the " supernatural " in the wide significance which I have 
 attached to that term. Hence it follows that religion will 
 progress in purity and reasonableness step by step with 
 the evolution of our ideals. And since we have seen how 
 natural and, indeed, inevitable is the evolution of the 
 contents of ideals, we also see how natural and inevitable 
 it is that religion shall have a historical development. 
 
 A cursory study of the science of comparative religion 
 
 ^ MicrocosmoSy bk. iii., conclusion. 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 75 
 
 will afford ample proof and illustration of such develop- 
 ment. In the typical polytheistic religions we find that 
 the gods are ideals and patterns for men to copy. They 
 are greater than human, and yet they are conceived on 
 human lines. They also belong to the supersensible 
 world and embody the moral ideas of their worshippers. 
 
 ^ The Greek conceptions of the divinities, for example, 
 embodied the Greek ideals. They were gradually purged 
 of their coarseness and their more degraded features as 
 
 ) the contents of the True, the Beautiful, the Good, were 
 more clearly apprehended, until there came the almost 
 exaggerated spirituality of Plato. 
 
 And this is just as true of the Christian conception 
 of God. The characteristics of the divine goodness are 
 founded on our apprehension of the characteristics of 
 human goodness — but all carried on to the highest 
 plane of the ideal. Take the very names given to 
 the Persons of the ever Blessed Trinity — Father, Son, 
 and Holy Spirit — every one of these names is founded 
 on human relationships and analogies. This truth was 
 grasped by Pestalozzi. " This I soon saw (he says) 
 that the feelings of love, trust, thankfulness, and the 
 habit of obedience must be developed in me, before I 
 can entertain them towards God. I must love men, I 
 must trust men, I must obey men, before I can raise my- 
 self to the level of loving God, thanking Him, trusting 
 Him, and obeying Him." And is not Pestalozzi in line 
 here with the Apostle who asked : " He that loveth not 
 
76 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God 
 whom he hath not seen ? " And is not Pestalozzi in line 
 with the central truth of the Christian Religion, the truth 
 of the Incarnation ? The conception of God, from its 
 very vastness, is hopelessly beyond our finite endeavour. 
 But in the humanity of the Saviour, God's perfections 
 are brought within the comprehension of human faculty, 
 while still retaining the unimpaired beauty which the 
 ideal demands. While, on the one hand, we are left to 
 work out the philosophical and metaphysical problems 
 involved in the Absolute and the Infinite, on the other 
 hand we apprehend God, through the Incarnation, as the 
 Father of Spirits, the moral Governor of the Universe, 
 and the loving " Giver of every good and perfect gift." 
 And all this is possible for us, just because He is "the 
 Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." 
 
 XII. Transformation of the Material. 
 
 We have risen from the " material " to the " ideal," 
 and from the " natural " to the " supernatural." And 
 progress means the gradual transformation of the lower 
 into the higher — the increasing power of pressing the 
 material into the service of the spiritual. 
 
 It has always appeared to me that a musical instrument 
 affords as perfect an example of this process as we can 
 well have. There is the material of which it is formed : 
 there is the science expended in its construction : and 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 77 
 
 there is the use we make of it to express the most 
 dematerialised of our emotions. 
 
 Carlyle says of music that it is " a kind of inarticulate 
 speech, which leads us to the edge of the infinite, and lets 
 us for moments gaze into that." Let us suppose our- 
 selves present at a rendering of the Choral Symphony. 
 One of the greatest orchestras of the world, supported by 
 a worthy choir of banded voices, shall labour on our be- 
 half to interpret the greatest work of the greatest master. 
 Let us revel in the sea of harmony. But let us detach 
 ourselves at times to watch the faces of those around us. 
 
 Near to us sits a well-known scientist whose scientific 
 interests overpower his emotions. His attention is fixed 
 on the acoustic phenomena brought into existence. He 
 pictures to himself the air carved and fretted into resultant 
 waves of almost inconceivable intricacy — waves combining 
 in ordered proportions the trembling of the strings, the 
 pure tones of the wood instruments, the more piercing 
 pungency of the wind and brass, the reverberation of the 
 drums, and the volume of human voices floating on an ever- 
 varying body of rhythmic sound. He thinks also of the 
 miraculous delicacy of the sense of hearing which is able 
 to take up and to decompose those intricate waves, and to 
 distinguish the various timbres and notes without dis- 
 turbing that sense of unity in diversity which orchestral 
 music demands from those who would enjoy it. In short, 
 he tends to fix his mind on the material aspect of the 
 phenomena. 
 
78 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Next to him is a musical theorist on theory bent, who 
 takes a wholly different view of the phenomena. He 
 marks the character of the melodies, the harmonic pro- 
 gressions, the daring innovations on set rules of form, 
 the orchestral and vocal combinations, the balancing of 
 the divisions of the symphony, the contrasts which give 
 variety and charm, and the welding of the whole into a 
 perfect work of art. There pass through his mind also 
 thoughts of the wonderful development of musical science 
 and resource, and of the expansion of musical form. He 
 recalls the monks with their barbarous " modes " and 
 counter-point, the troubadours with their freer strains, 
 the Italian awakening to natural beauty and dramatic 
 power, and the resistless wave of German genius moving 
 onward, and bearing on its crest the mighty Beethoven. 
 
 And next to him again there is a man whose soul is 
 evidently lost to science, theory, and history. It is on 
 fire. He is drinking in the music and is in mystic 
 communion with the soul of the master. Shaking air 
 and trembling nerve, for him, are non-existent. He is 
 in the supernatural world. The choir to which he 
 listens is invisible. He is brought " to the edge of the 
 infinite " and is " for a moment gazing into that." 
 
 Now who shall, of these three, be the interpreter of 
 the symphony ? The man of science has his place, 
 and an honoured place. But can he tell us by his com- 
 putations what was in the soul of Beethoven when, deaf 
 to natural sound, the master soared into the world of 
 
IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 79 
 
 the ideal ? He cannot even pretend to tell us. One 
 who has a right to speak of the power of music has said : 
 " It seems a gratuitous depreciation of the spirit of man 
 to suppose it stirred to such rapture by forces finding an 
 absolute equivalent in heat and motion." 
 
 Or shall it be the student of form and theory and 
 development ? He can go much further than the 
 scientist. He does know something more than can be 
 calculated or examined by the methods of physical science. 
 He has traced the stages by which the human spirit has 
 expanded its emotions in and through musical expression. 
 But if he stops short at theory and history, he has not 
 gained the grand secret. He has travelled beyond " the 
 furthest horizon of science " — but he is still only on the 
 threshold of the realm of the living ideal. 
 
 We must come to the man who is snatched away out 
 
 of the body, whose knowledge is absorbed into his mode 
 
 of direct feeling. And he will tell us (to continue the 
 
 words of him from whom I have already quoted) that 
 
 " we feel in such music the touch of God upon our 
 
 souls. Surely (he exclaims) we need not hesitate to 
 
 believe with all our hearts that in such experiences the 
 
 oneness of the finite and the infinite is realised in a flash 
 
 of emotion. Or, as Tennyson has it — 
 
 ' The glory of the sum of things 
 Will flash along the chords and go.'" 
 
 The application of these three types is self-evident. 
 The ideal shows forth the meaning and goal of the 
 
8o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 natural. The material is to be exalted until it reaches 
 its destined perfection. In working out His purposes in 
 nature, God has bound Himself by certain fixed laws. 
 These laws it is the function of science to discover by- 
 tabulation and systematising of facts. Man conquers 
 his environment by rendering obedience to these laws. 
 Just as he fashions the violin to become an instrument 
 of spiritual expression, so is he working together with 
 God to fashion the material framework of His world to 
 make it yield the music of the spheres. The laws of the 
 trembling string link on to the laws of the trembling soul. 
 So do the laws of progress — whether of material environ- 
 ment, or of social institution, or of artistic creation — link 
 on to the laws of that city, perfect in form as in life, the 
 pattern of which is stored in heaven. 
 
THIRD LECTURE. 
 
 EVOLUTION AND LIFE. 
 
 eyw TjiXOov Iva ^oirjv e;(wo-t, /cat Trcpicrcrov e)(Oi(TLV. 
 " I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly." 
 — St John x. io. 
 
 I. A Time of Transition. 
 
 Whether they accept its conclusions or not, there are 
 
 few thinkers who would not agree that since the theory of 
 
 evolution came on the scene, it has imparted a very 
 
 special character and colour to almost every department of 
 
 our intellectual activities. We cannot avoid its influence 
 
 even if we would. Evolution is in the air. Nearly all the 
 
 old fierce opposition has died down ; and in its place has 
 
 come a general spirit of acquiescence which errs rather by 
 
 being too easily tolerant of anything bearing the name of 
 
 evolution. The very utterance of the word has gained 
 
 a power of lulling our critical faculties to sleep. 
 
 The fact is that this theory throws upon the familiar 
 
 landscape a blaze of light which renders all clear seeing 
 
 for a time impossible. The ancient landmarks seem to 
 
 8i 6 
 
82 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 be removed, if not cast into the sea. We have none of 
 us as yet learnt how to accommodate our eyes to the new 
 conditions. The first impression, on the part of friends 
 and foes alike, was that the new theory would destroy 
 religious belief, and establish a militant materialism. 
 But the hour of panic has passed, and most of us are 
 calmly awaiting the return of clearer vision. Already we 
 discover that the old landmarks are pretty much where 
 they were. We find, too, that new ones have come into 
 sight, and that our horizons are indefinitely extended. 
 
 Lest my attempts to limit or modify the application of 
 the theory should be misunderstood, I at once avow 
 myself a humble disciple of the Neo-Darwinian school. 
 I therefore approach this branch of the " new learning," 
 not as a foe, but as a friend. 
 
 IL Darwinism. 
 
 The term " evolution " is sometimes used in a sense so 
 extended and universalised, that it covers the whole of 
 the cosmic process. Herbert Spencer, for example, in 
 his First Principles^ has developed a philosophy which 
 looks upon the " unceasing redistribution of matter and 
 motion " as constituting evolution, working throughout 
 the entire universe, and leading everywhere to " a trans- 
 formation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." 
 Each period of evolution is followed by one of dissolution, 
 in a mighty rhythm, like unto that fabled by the Indian 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 83 
 
 sages. With this extended conception of evolution I 
 shall be concerned indirectly only. I propose to confine 
 myself here to the stricter use of the term, taking it as 
 equivalent to what is generally known as Darwinism. 
 This latter term is convenient but misleading. For 
 Darwin's original hypothesis has been extended and 
 modified in so many ways, that, save for the honour due 
 to his name, it is safer to avoid any terminology which 
 would unfairly define the views of many of his successors. 
 By way of rough definition, I shall take evolution to 
 mean the history and theory of the development of 
 organic life upon our planet. From this point of view, it 
 falls wholly within the boundaries of what is known as 
 " natural science " — that is to say, it confines itself to such 
 facts as can be observed and classified within the field of 
 natural processes. Huxley stated the essential feature of 
 this view of evolution ^ when he said that in the process 
 of development there would be no breach of continuity, no 
 point at which we could say, " This is a natural process,'* 
 and " This is not a natural process." He compared it to the 
 development of a tree from its seed, or of a fowl from 
 its egg. By such definition of its sphere, Huxley intended 
 to exclude from evolution all reference to creation, or to 
 any kind of supernatural intervention. Each stage in 
 the process is to be regarded as the exact effect of the 
 causes at work in a closed and self-contained system. 
 j And he was absolutely warranted, as a scientist, in taking 
 ^ See Prolegomena io'^EvoluHon and Ethics. 
 
84 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 this restricted view. For if science is to obtain satisfactory 
 results, it must limit its field of operations, and must 
 concentrate its attention on particular aspects of its 
 problems. 
 
 I suppose the necessity for such limitations is now 
 generally recognised in every science. Each abstracts its 
 own special material from the total mass presented in 
 experience. The mischief comes in when any particular 
 science forgets that it is dealing with parts and abstractions, 
 not with the concrete or living wholes, and then claims 
 for its conclusions an unreserved and universal application. 
 Huxley did not make this mistake in regard to the theory 
 of evolution as a scientific hypothesis. With his usual 
 lucidity and candour he tells us,^ " It is very desirable to 
 remember that evolution is not an explanation, but merely 
 a generalised statement of the method and results " of 
 evolution. And he further remarks ^ that " if there is 
 proof that the cosmic process was set going by any agent, 
 then that agent will be the creator of it and of all its 
 products, although supernatural intervention may remain 
 strictly excluded from its further course.'* 
 
 Huxley, then, played the game fairly and philosophically. 
 He left the way open for taking into account factors other 
 than those included in the categories of natural science. 
 And this was all the more praiseworthy because some 
 of his theological contemporaries were by no means alive 
 to the necessity for giving fair play to scientific inquiry 
 
 1 Op. Cit 2 Qp cit 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 85 
 
 and speculation. O si sic omnes I Alas ! there are 
 evolutionists who, while confining themselves to the 
 methods and data of natural science, demand for their 
 conclusions completeness and finality. There are to be 
 no modes of existence other than those which fall within 
 their ken ; there are to be no modes of causation other 
 than physical or mechanical ; there are to be no forces 
 at work other than those which lend themselves to 
 scientific treatment. I trust we have already realised how 
 false and blind are such arrogant negations as these. The 
 facts of life are wider than the mind of man when acting 
 with its widest sweep. Natural science affords material 
 for the exercise of part only of the human mind. How 
 small, then, is the fraction of reality to which the scientist, 
 qua scientist, can hope to penetrate ! 
 
 III. The True Sphere of Biology. 
 
 Bearing in mind the fact that the evolution theory is a 
 department of natural science, let us try to mark out its 
 province. I have taken it to mean the history and theory 
 of organic life upon our planet. The main principles 
 involved are now familiar to all. The " laws " of the 
 universe, as we call them, apply to organic life, and con- 
 dition its development. The germs of life, once started 
 on their career, tend to multiply without limit. And, 
 since the food supply is always limited, there results a 
 universal struggle for existence. Each individual organ- 
 
86 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 ism is subject to variation from the central type ; and 
 such of the variations as happen to be in harmony with 
 the environment give an advantage in the struggle, and 
 tend to be perpetuated. Thus, through a continuously 
 differentiating series of survivals, have come into ex- 
 istence the varied forms of life as we have them now. 
 The whole process has been governed by the factors 
 included in the strict use of the term — " natural 
 selection." 
 
 This theory refers for its existence to the marvellous 
 discoveries of modern Biology, in its departments of 
 Palaeontology, Embryology, and Natural History. It 
 relies, with pardonable pride, on the wide inductions 
 which have brought into scientific clearness the results 
 of the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, 
 and hereditary transmission. Now here comes the first 
 limitation. Let us realise that all I have hitherto men- 
 tioned falls within the sphere of Biology. Biological 
 methods are applicable throughout. Biological " laws " 
 and conceptions are brought to bear on material which 
 lends itself naturally to their use. Beyond Biology, 
 therefore, the theory has no right to travel. 
 
 But just because Biology has made such wonderful 
 strides of late, its professors are in danger of losing their 
 intellectual balance. In this they are but like the rest of 
 mortals. It is hard for any of us in the full tide of success 
 to keep a due sense of the proportion of things. When 
 mathematical activity was at its height, the world was 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 87 
 
 straightway to be reduced to mathematical formulae. 
 And now that Biology is having its turn of inflation, 
 all existence is to yield to biological method, and to be 
 reduced to terms of organic development. So the 
 pendulum swings ! 
 
 We may readily allow that Biology has a better chance 
 of succeeding than Mathematics, for it deals with higher 
 and fuller categories of being ; but when the biologist 
 would have us accept him as an interpreter and final 
 authority for every possible problem of existence, we 
 declare that he, like the mathematician before him, is a 
 victim of distorted vision. We can forgive him because 
 we can explain him. He is an enthusiastic specialist who 
 knows a good many things which other people do not 
 know. But he is not therefore omniscient, either 
 positively as possessing formulae of universal application, 
 or negatively as a dogmatic agnostic. Of course it is not 
 every competent biologist who advances such claims. I 
 speak only of those who do. 
 
 Let us try to define the limits of Biology. When we 
 study the phenomena of life upon this planet, we find an 
 outstanding characteristic which seems sufficient in itself 
 to serve as differentia — I refer to the fact of transmission. 
 There is no form of life known to us which is not con- 
 ditioned by reproductive processes. Generation succeeds 
 generation in an unbroken descent. And in this fact we 
 meet at once with a well-marked limitation of biological 
 methods. Any factors of life and of human experience 
 
88 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 which do not lend themselves to reproductive processes 
 are not within the legitimate sphere of the biologist — and 
 therefore not within the legitimate sphere of the theory 
 of organic evolution by natural selection. 
 
 For example, there has been a parallel development of 
 brain and mind. We shall consider the connection of 
 the two later. Here I merely want to show that the 
 biologist cannot pass from one to the other. The brain, 
 said Cabanis, secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. 
 Well, take a thought — such as that the three angles of a 
 triangle are equal to two right angles. To say that this 
 thought is secreted is an absurdity excusable only because 
 it is the outcome of enthusiasm. A brain structure may 
 develop so as to be able to compass this thought. But 
 the thought itself is something apprehended, not secreted. 
 It is and remains eternally valid. It is not a causal link 
 in a time series, but stands outside the time series as a 
 truth in its own right. To say this thought is manu- 
 factured, instead of saying it is apprehended, is to commit 
 in glaring form the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. The laws 
 of organic chemistry are not the laws of thought. 
 
 IV. Evolution and Triangles. 
 
 Let us follow up our " triangles *' a little further. Some 
 may suspect that I am bringing an idealistic philosophy to 
 bear without due warning or warrant. Let me therefore 
 call your attention to this passage from Herbert Spencer. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 89 
 
 He tells us ^ that he was exercised more and more as life 
 went on by the problems of space. He remarks that 
 little study had been devoted to that subject, and then 
 continues thus : " Concerning the multitude of remark- 
 able relations among lines and among spaces, very few 
 ever ask — Why are they so ? Perhaps the question may 
 in later years be raised, as it has been in myself, by some 
 of the more conspicuously marvellous truths now grouped 
 under the title of ' the Geometry of Position.' Many of 
 them are so astounding that but for the presence of 
 ocular proof they would be incredible ; and by their 
 marvellousness, as well as by their beauty, they serve, in 
 some minds at least, to raise the unanswerable question 
 — How came there to exist among the parts of this 
 seemingly structureless vacancy we call space, these 
 strange relations ? How does it happen that the blank 
 form of things presents us with truths so incomprehensible 
 as do the things it contains ? " And a little later he 
 concluded that " Theist and Agnostic alike must agree in 
 recognising the properties of space as inherent, eternal, 
 uncreated — as anteceding all creation, if creation has 
 taken place, and all evolution, if evolution has taken 
 place. Hence could we penetrate the mysteries of 
 existence, there would remain still more transcendent 
 mysteries. That which can be thought of neither as 
 made nor evolved presents us with facts the origin of 
 which is even more remote from conceivability than is 
 ^ J^acts and Comments^ pp. 211, 212. 
 
90 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the origin of the facts presented by visible and tangible 
 things." 
 
 As an idealist I should put this differently, and should 
 argue that these space relations imply a perceiving mind, 
 even if they are not the subjective condition of sense 
 perception. But Herbert Spencer's statement of the case 
 quite serves my purpose. He shows that these relations 
 are not evolved, but exist. They do not, therefore, 
 come within the sphere of Biology. And we have left 
 far behind us the conception that the brain can secrete 
 them as the liver secretes bile ! 
 
 I am warranted, then, in pressing firmly home the 
 difference in kind here revealed. Chemical and organic 
 processes cannot explain thought, though they may be 
 concerned with the conditions under which thought is 
 apprehended by human brains. Not that the conception 
 of evolution, in the widest sense of the term, may not be 
 applied to thought. Hegel's daring and colossal system 
 is proof to the contrary, in which he attempts to explain 
 existence by the logical unfolding of the categories. But 
 Hegel's system is not biological ! And however much 
 or however little of it we may accept or reject, at any 
 rate we must confess that it moved in the right direction. 
 Nature, for Hegel, was not the cause of spirit, but its 
 manifestation. He was not foolish enough to seek for the 
 greater in the less. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 91 
 
 V. History not Explanation. 
 
 Look at the matter in another way. The enthusiastic 
 biologist is tempted often to think that, because he has 
 traced the history of a development, he has therefore 
 explained it. More especially, because he begins low 
 down in the scale of life, he conceives too often the idea 
 that the higher orders of phenomena are explained away : 
 their very existence may practically be denied. For 
 example, because man's physical origin is traced down- 
 wards into the animal world, therefore man is to be 
 nothing more than an animal. Now while we thankfully 
 receive the teachings of the biologist within his own 
 sphere, we must quietly but distinctly assure him that 
 description and history are not explanation. He brings 
 to our notice certain interesting phenomena, say, in regard 
 to the development of brain structure. But he cannot 
 tell us anything of the underlying causes at work. He 
 describes and tabulates a series of happenings on the 
 stage of space and time. But he cannot penetrate to the 
 why and the wherefore of these happenings. Nor will 
 any possible increase in his biological knowledge ever place 
 him in a better position for reaching to the modes of 
 being manifested in the phenomena of organic develop- 
 ment. It will not even reveal to him the secret of his 
 favourite evolutionary process. Problems of beginnings, 
 endings, tendencies, purposes, and meanings, stretch out 
 beyond him on every side. His facts are full of value. 
 
92 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 But when we come to higher problems than his, these 
 facts are neither adequate nor relevant. 
 
 VI. History and the Struggle for Food. 
 
 It will help us to appreciate the biologist's helplessness 
 in these matters if we spend a short time in studying a 
 recent statement as to the ultimate forces behind the 
 evolutionary process. Karl Pearson, in his widely-read 
 Grammar of Science^ finds three such forces — the struggle 
 for food, the rate of productivity, and geographical dis- 
 tribution. These, for him, are the supreme arbiters of 
 the course of life, animal and human. Their action is 
 most easily followed in the lower stages of the process. 
 But all the complexities and refinements of civilisation 
 only serve to disguise their continued operation. It is 
 on such premisses as these that he bases the following 
 remarkable statement ^ : " Only when history is interpreted 
 in this sense of natural history does it pass from the 
 sphere of narrative and become science." 
 
 Think of it ! The ultimate reason for our being: alive 
 is that we happen to have outlived others. And history's 
 greatest task is to describe how we managed to do it ! 
 It is true we had got wrong with our history — deeming 
 it to be a record of plots, and battles, and wars, and 
 dynasties. But we have been trying of late to correct 
 this mistake, and to get at the soul of the nations and 
 1 Chap. ix. p. 13. 2 £0^ cn 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 93 
 
 peoples. Even under the old conception, be it noted, we 
 had risen to think of history as a drama full of meaning. 
 We talked of progress and of man's destiny, and of the 
 mystery of life. Now Karl Pearson takes us in hand, 
 shows us how foolish we are, and throws us further back 
 into a more brutal, meaningless theory of life than 
 human mind ever before conceived. And yet the author 
 of this brutal theory is an ardent social reformer, for 
 whom, in that capacity, I have a warm regard ! 
 
 And so the increase of human knowledge has brought 
 us to this — that there can be no real history until it is 
 written in terms of food, sex, and geographical distribu- 
 tion ! All our imaginings of higher and better things are 
 but poor, meretricious devices for covering up the loath- 
 some realities of an unending struggle for food. This is 
 all strange enough ! More especially is it strange when, 
 by a most peculiar combination of circumstances, it goes 
 hand in hand with dreams of social Utopias. The rigid 
 doctrine of undying internecine competition is lovingly 
 embraced by many on whose banner is inscribed the 
 inspiring legend — The Brotherhood of Man. Truly a 
 mad world, my friends ! 
 
 Will someone object that, in thus contrasting scientific 
 theory and social creed, I am needlessly putting friends 
 at loggerheads in the interests of religion ? Well, I am 
 quite prepared to meet them on their own ground. I 
 must ask your attention for one or two quotations from 
 evolutionists of the negative agnostic type. Haeckel, I 
 
94 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 presume, will be accepted as an orthodox apostle of the 
 school. He writes thus ^ : "If this English hypothesis 
 (of Darwinism) is to be compared to any definite political 
 tendency — as is, no doubt, possible — that tendency can 
 only be aristocratic, certainly not democratic, and least of 
 all socialist. The theory of selection teaches that in 
 human life, as in animal and plant life everywhere, and 
 at all times, only a small and chosen minority can exist 
 and flourish, while the enormous majority starve and 
 perish miserably more or less prematurely." And he 
 avers that while " we may profoundly lament this 
 tragical state of things, we can neither controvert it nor 
 alter it." 
 
 Does not this justify Schopenhauer's view that human 
 beings are produced in bulk, like worthless factory wares, 
 and are thrown away in bulk, in accordance with the 
 maxim of wholesale production, as cheap and bad ? The 
 many, he says, are poverty-stricken wretches, intent only 
 on eking out their miserable existence ; their sole aim is 
 to procure food, and perhaps produce progeny for the 
 same unhappy lot. All this sounds harsh, does it not ? 
 But it is quite in accord with Karl Pearson's theory of 
 scientific history. 
 
 Once again, hear Nietzsche, whose hard, logical con- 
 sistency and unappalled frankness should surely cry 
 
 ^ "The Doctrine of Descent and Social Democracy " — being chap, 
 vi. of his Freedo7fi i?i Science and Teachings pp. 92 and 93 of the 
 Eng. trans. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 95 
 
 " Halt " to those who would make a new gospel of the 
 evolutionary hypothesis.^ " To demand of strength, that 
 it should not manifest itself as strength, that it should not 
 be a thirst for enemies, resistance and triumphs, is as 
 absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest 
 itself as strength. If the lambs say that the birds of 
 prey are wicked, and that it is good to be as little as 
 possible of a bird of prey — the birds may make rather 
 mocking eyes and say : ' We do not at all bear a grudge 
 to them, these good lambs, we even love them. Nothing 
 is more delicious than a tender lamb.* '* Again, he asks ^ : 
 " Whom do I hate most among the mob of the present 
 day ? The Socialist mob, who undermine the working 
 man's instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentedness 
 with his petty existence." He agrees with Karl Pearson 
 in condemning Christianity — but it is on the ground that 
 it favours the weak. He calls ^ Christianity " the one 
 great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity." Why } 
 Because it is the religion of sympathy. And sympathy 
 (he says *) " stands in antithesis to the tonic passions 
 which elevate the energy of the feeling of life. It 
 operates depressively. One loses force by sympathising." 
 And, following out this line of thought, he tells us ^ that 
 " the weak and ill-constituted shall perish : first principle 
 of our charity. And people shall help them to do so. 
 
 ^ A Genealogy of Morals^ trans., p. 44. 
 
 ^ The Antichrist^ trans., p. 342. 
 
 •^ Op. cit., p. 354. ■* Op. cit., p. 246. ^ Op. cit.^ p. 242. 
 
96 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 . . . . Sympathy thwarts, on the whole, the law of 
 development, which is the law of selection. It preserves 
 what is ripe for extinction ; it resists in favour of life's 
 disinherited and condemned ones ; it gives to life itself a 
 gloomy and questionable aspect by the abundance of ill- 
 constituted of all kinds whom it maintains in life." 
 
 Behold, then, the true bearing of the scientific theory 
 on which Socialism would too often rear its doctrine of 
 Brotherhood ! Can men gather grapes of thorns, or figs 
 of thistles ? But perchance such socialists may repudiate 
 Nietzsche, and may urge that, as a matter of fact, the 
 evolutionary process has produced " the social factor," 
 and has favoured social progress. With all which I 
 heartily concur, and shall myself urge directly. But this 
 is to go outside the scientific history of Karl Pearson — 
 and outside even the recognised theory of evolution. The 
 cardinal doctrine of that is " the survival of the fittest." 
 Whereas the cardinal doctrine of Socialism, or, indeed, of 
 any form of humanitarianism, is " the fitting of as many as 
 possible to survive." Nietzsche is courageous, consistent, 
 and thorough-going. The man who sees nothing in 
 history but a struggle for food and who yet asks us to 
 work for social ideals is none of these. The rigid 
 evolutionist of the " struggle " type immures us in an 
 immoral cosmos from which there is no escape. Once 
 accept his premisses as final and complete, and away with 
 ideals and aspirations, with hopes and fears, with human 
 sympathy and love. Cadunt omnes quastiones. All is 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 97 
 
 resolved into a struggle for food. So long as I can get 
 food, I am attaining the sole end of my being. All 
 higher matters are delusions connected with the one great 
 ^ reality. Give me food, and I need struggle for nothing 
 else — not even for the latest edition of the Grammar of 
 Science. 
 
 VII. Life. 
 
 Karl Pearson would account for Stonehenge and 
 Salisbury Cathedral by telling us they are disguised results 
 of the struggle for food, conditioned by rate of produc- 
 tivity and geographical distribution. The natural man, 
 unspoilt by the drear philosophy of negations, rebels. 
 But even with this meagre list we can do something if we 
 are allowed to go behind it. I will not insist on the idea 
 that the conformation of continents and islands, of oceans 
 and seas, may itself be the outcome of purposeful design 
 — though I believe it. But I will ask why we should 
 stop short with such ideas as those of productivity and 
 struggle. Productivity implies life. What is life } 
 Struggle for food implies will to live. What is will to 
 live } The answers to these questions will carry us out 
 into the free and breezy expanse of life as we actually 
 live it. 
 
 And first — What is life } Most apostles of negation 
 
 either avoid this question, or treat it superficially. No 
 
 one yet knows how or when it appeared on our planet. 
 
 There are speculations, however. And speculations have 
 
 7 
 
98 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 a knack of mixing themselves up with the facts, and of 
 imposing themselves on the imagination as though they, 
 too, were facts. Fortunately the spirit of modern science 
 is increasingly destructive of such hybrid opinions and 
 pronouncements. Personally, I do not refuse to believe 
 that life has arisen from what we call " dead matter " ; 
 though this has not yet been established, and I am 
 satisfied to await further discoveries. But suppose it is 
 ever proved that the organic arose out of the inorganic — 
 what then .? We shall be just where we were. For the 
 inorganic could not rise into the organic, unless the 
 organic was already implicitly there. The lower must be 
 interpreted in terms of the higher ; for we do not know 
 what the lower really is until we have seen it in all its 
 manifestations. And then for " lower " and " higher " we 
 should substitute " undeveloped " and " developed," or 
 " implicit " and " explicit." 
 
 Sir Oliver Lodge suggests, as a working hypothesis, a 
 different conception of life. He thinks^ it may bear 
 some analogy to the known behaviour of magnetism. 
 " If anyone (he writes) should assert that all magnetism 
 was pre-existent in some ethereal condition, that it would 
 never go out of essential existence, but that it could be 
 brought into relation with the world of matter by certain 
 acts — that, while there, it could operate in a certain way, 
 controlling the motion of bodies, interacting with forms 
 of energy, producing sundry effects for a time, and then 
 
 ^ Life and Matter, pp. 147, 148. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 99 
 
 ^ disappearing from our ken to the immaterial region 
 whence it came — he would be saying what no physicist 
 would think it worth while to object to, what many indeed 
 might agree with. Well, that is the kind of assertion 
 
 p, (says Sir Oliver) which I want to make, as a working 
 hypothesis, concerning life." 
 
 This is another legitimate way of solving one aspect of 
 the problem of Life. It is not, however, at all my 
 intention to balance opposing hypotheses of this character. 
 I want rather to emphasise the fact that the biologist does 
 not yet know anything about Life^ apart from its manifesta- 
 tions. If he waxes dogmatic about it, he is dogmatic on 
 a basis of ignorance. And if experience tells you and me 
 that life is something richer, and fuller, and worthier, 
 than a struggle for food, we can trust our value judg- 
 ments as against the scientific enthusiasm which o'erleaps 
 itself. 
 
 Haeckel, Karl Pearson, Maudsley, and others of this 
 school, discourse of" polarities," and " tensions," and such- 
 like learned terms, and then expect us to applaud them 
 for their explanation of Life. They remind me of my 
 evenings at Maskelyne and Cook's entertainments. While 
 you are engaged with patter and bounce, the trick is done. 
 
 I Allow yourself to be hypnotised by " polarities " and 
 " tensions," and, hey, presto 1 there is Life ! But it is not 
 there, after all. It is away in somebody's pocket at the 
 other end of the room. The only difference between 
 the conjurer and the materialistic biologist is this, that 
 
 ^ 
 
 y 
 
loo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the former knows himself to be deceiving, whereas the 
 latter is taken in by his own bluff. His favourite and 
 solemn formulae impose upon his own imagination, and 
 so he loses sight of the real issue. As an accomplished 
 biologist himself points out, it is very easy to suppose 
 you have had a lecture explaining life when in reality 
 you have only had an interesting discourse on organic 
 chemistry, or a clever bit of descriptive biology. 
 
 Baldwin issues to the over-bold biologist a significant 
 challenge. He points out that the problem of analysis 
 is one thing, the problem of genesis is quite another. 
 When we ask for the laws of reproduction and growth, 
 the physicist is silent. " We discover here (says Baldwin ^) 
 the fact that the development is by a long series of 
 syntheses, each chemical, but each, so far as we know, 
 producing something new — a new genetic mode. If this be 
 denied, then we have to ask the chemist to produce the 
 series, and if he claims that this might be done if he knew 
 how, we ask him to reproduce the series backward. Nothing 
 short of this last form of treatment will do for exact 
 quantitative science.*' This challenge involves a vital 
 distinction (literally " vital "). For every chemical process 
 can be reversed. But when an organism dies, " the 
 dissolution series is not at all the reverse of the com- 
 position series." And Baldwin adds in a note that " this 
 point becomes very much stronger when we cite the racial , 
 or evolution series, with the immortality of protoplasm. 
 ^ Development and Evolution^ p. 325. (The italics are his.) I 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE loi 
 
 Think of producing the phenomena of sexual reproduc- 
 tion from mature son to infant father instead of the 
 reverse ! " This insoluble difficulty, he adds, shows that 
 " the later terms have some character which the earlier 
 have not." 
 
 VIII. Aristotle's Theory of Life. 
 
 I suppose that the modern biologist seldom troubles 
 himself with Aristotle, and thereby, in my opinion, loses 
 much. For that subtle thinker was a keen naturalist. 
 " It must not be forgotten (says Pierce) that Aristotle was 
 an Asclepiad : that is, that he belonged to a family which 
 for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, 
 
 had had their attention turned to vital phenomena 
 
 He must have had prominently before his mind the fact 
 that all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very 
 much alike, while the animals that grow out of the one, 
 the plants that grow out of the other, are as different 
 as possible." Thus dowered by tradition, training, and 
 nature, he devoted some of his best thought to the 
 phenomena of life — watching its development from the 
 germ to the perfect form. And he earnestly sought 
 for some principle which should explain life from its 
 humblest form in that of the plant to its highest in 
 man, or even in the Divine Being. 
 
 Aristotle asks himself what is the widest definition of 
 life. And in answering it, he distinctly rejects material- 
 
I02 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 istic theories. He sticks to the facts of life closer perhaps 
 than any other philosopher of his rank ; and on this very 
 account is represented in RafFaelle's great picture, called 
 " The School of Athens," as looking down to earth, while 
 Plato looks up to heaven. But his love of facts did not 
 blind him, as it has blinded so many since, to the subtler 
 and nobler facts of life in favour of the mechanical and 
 materialistic. For example, he rejected the tempting 
 theory that life means " movement," because he saw that 
 the activity of the intellect cannot be described in terms 
 of moving parts. The operations of reason seemed to 
 him to be rather of an opposite character, and to resemble 
 rest, or the suspension of motion.-^ 
 
 In arriving at his own definition, he draws a distinction 
 of the highest value — one which would never have failed 
 for general recognition but for the reaction against 
 Scholasticism — I mean, the distinction between matter and 
 form. The experiences on which it is founded are simple 
 and obvious. If you have a cube of wax, you can have 
 the same form in iron, or wood, or stone, or a thousand 
 other materials. On the other hand, the cube of wax can 
 be moulded into a sphere, or a pyramid, or a thousand 
 other shapes. The material and the form thus fall apart, 
 as it were, and show themselves as independent modes of 
 existence. Plato had seized on this distinction and made 
 the world of forms to be the real world. He called them 
 
 ^ See De Amma^ i. iii., en S' rj voiycrt? toiKev rjpcfx'^crei tivI ^ 
 CTTicTTaaet fiaWov rf Kivqcrii- 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 103 
 
 Ideas, and regarded them as giving to each individual 
 thing its special characteristics. A thing is what it is by 
 virtue of the Ideas " informing " ^ that particular piece of 
 matter. He placed these Ideas in a separate world of 
 their own ; in so far as they manifested themselves in the 
 world of matter, the union was temporary only, and 
 unessential. Aristotle adopts the same theory of the 
 function of Form, or Idea, but will not allow that Form 
 can exist apart from Matter, or Matter from Form. He 
 starts with the concrete individual as actually given in 
 experience. All things in the world are thus, for 
 Aristotle, ideal compounds, consisting of these two 
 inseparable elements. Form and Matter. The Form, in 
 the mind of the percipient, is an idea ; but it is also a 
 reality in the world outside the mind of the percipient. 
 And being itself a real cause, producing all the form and 
 meaning of the actual world, the mind which perceives 
 the Form of a thing penetrates to the very core of exist- 
 ence. And further, since Form in the external world is 
 the image of a supreme creative mind, the mind of the 
 percipient, in recognising it, is in touch with that which 
 is akin to it — the mind that is in the world. Surely this 
 is a noble theory to come from the philosopher whose look 
 was bent down to earth ! The way was open for him 
 through Nature up to Nature's God. 
 
 But now to apply this to the problem of Life. Aris- 
 
 ^ Note that the Form is, of course, infinitely more than the mere 
 outward shape or figure, as apprehended by touch or sight. 
 
ro4 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 totle began his researches with the study of natural living 
 objects. He watched the oak springing from the acorn, 
 the bird from the egg. He saw how matter took form 
 under the controlling influence of inherent forces. The 
 lowest form of life seemed to be that of plants : his 
 definition therefore must include them. He accordingly 
 defines Life itself ^ as " the process of nutrition, increase, 
 and decay, from an internal principle." But life rose in 
 stages above this vegetative basis. In certain living 
 creatures sensation was developed ; in others, on a higher 
 grade, power of locomotion. Each preceding stage is the 
 necessary basis for its successor. And the soul of man is 
 the combination of these into one purposeful activity. 
 And in the "living natural object " we find the inseparable 
 combination of Form and Matter. The body is the 
 matter to which the soul acts as form. The soul is 
 dependent on the body, as the Form on the Matter. 
 But, on the other hand, the truth, the reality, the meaning 
 of the body is in its form, the soul. As Grote ^ puts it : 
 " The Matter to which (as correlate) soul stands related 
 is a natural body (i.e. a body having within it an inherent 
 principle of motion and rest), organised in a certain way, 
 or fitted out with certain capacities and preparations to 
 which soul is the active and indispensable complement. 
 These capacities would never come into actuality without 
 
 ^ Metaph. ii. i., ^w^v 8e Xiyoixev ttjv Sl ulvtov rpocfiyv re kcll av^rjaLv 
 ^ Grote's Aristotle^ p. 457. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 105 
 
 the soul ; but, on the other hand, the range of actuahtles 
 or functions in the soul depends upon, and is limited by 
 the range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body. 
 The implication of the two constitutes the living subject, 
 with all its functions, active and passive." And, as he 
 continues further on, " we thus see that the animated 
 subject is^ a form immersed or implicated in matter ; and 
 all its actions and passions are so likewise. Each of these 
 has its formal side, as concerns the soul, and its material 
 side, as concerns the body.^ When a man is angry, for 
 instance, this emotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact 
 of the body : in the first of these two characters, it may 
 be defined as an appetite for hurting someone who has 
 hurt us ; in the second of the two, it may be defined as 
 an ebullition of the blood and heat round the heart." 
 
 All this is brought into closest connection with the 
 modern conception of evolution by Aristotle's further 
 development of his doctrine of Form and Matter in his 
 significant distinction between the potential and the actual. 
 Matter is potential only, imperfect, undefined ; Form is 
 required to make it complete and determinate. Form 
 thus comes to the aid of Matter as the energising 
 principle, making that actual which might never have 
 been so. Wallace, a master of Aristotelian lore, states this 
 conception of " realisation " thus : " Without soul, Aris- 
 totle implies,^ the body is a mere potential existence, a 
 
 ^ Op. cit.^ p. 459. 2 De Anima^ I. i. 
 
 ^ Aristotle's Psychology^ Introd., p. xli. 
 
io6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 mere possible substratum for development in future : it 
 is nothing actual or real. But the whole meaning of a 
 potential capacity lies in its reference to the actual realisation 
 which expresses it} Just as the seed reaches its true 
 meaning in the tree, so the soul constitutes the real 
 significance of the body. Soul is thus not only the 
 realisation, the true meaning of the body : it is also in a 
 sense its end or termination. When an organism has 
 advanced so far as to possess a soul, it has reached, as it 
 were, its last stage in development." 
 
 Such, then, in brief, is Aristotle's theory ^ of life. The 
 materialistic biologist may turn aside in scorn from such 
 old-fashioned stuff. But I ask him what he has to 
 substitute for it. His formulae give us what Aristotle 
 would call the material cause. But whence comes the 
 element of " organisation," which he would call the formal 
 cause } It is surely unscientific to stress for ever the 
 material cause, and calmly to assume as of no significance 
 that cause which alone makes organic development 
 possible. Depend upon it, the Aristotelian conception of 
 Form has still its part to play in science and philosophy. 
 It presents to us all nature rising in an eternal graduated 
 conversion of matter into form, an eternal breaking out 
 into life in higher and higher functions.^ A particle of 
 
 ^ Italics mine. 
 
 2 Aristotle did not sufficiently carry out the idea that form and 
 matter are correlatives in a higher unity. But his whole tendency 
 was in the direction of rising above all dualism. 
 
 ^ See Schwegler's Hist, of Phil. (Stirling's Eng. edit.), p. 107. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 107 
 
 the Divine Mind appears as a factor in all existence, 
 animate and inanimate. Thus all matter tends to become 
 form, all potentiality actuality, all being knowing. The 
 full development of the universe is immanent from the 
 beginning. It came from God and it returns to God. 
 
 Our own Francis Bacon, who, as Erdmann remarks,^ 
 reveals his English origin in the entirely secular character 
 of his philosophy, has yet a place for a doctrine of 
 " Forms." He rejected all ideal ends, whether the 
 honour of God or the satisfaction of the thirst of know- 
 ledge, and put in their place prosaic industrial aims. 
 He was content to find efficient causes, and despaired of 
 grasping the " natures of things." Nevertheless he made 
 the natures of things an object of his keen pursuit. His 
 doctrine of " forms " approaches very near to that of 
 Aristotle, though it had more of a utilitarian cast.^ He 
 looked to " forms " for the interpretation of the permanent 
 qualities of things. Of what character he deemed such 
 interpretation to be is sufficiently shown by his declaration : 
 " I had rather believe all the fables in legend and the 
 Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is 
 without a mind." ^ 
 
 Or take finally the teaching of a man like Ruskin, who 
 looked at the useful chiefly through the idea of the 
 beautiful. He feels that in dealing with the problem of 
 life, we come nearest to a solution in the consideration of 
 
 ^ Hist, of Phil. ^ vol. i. p. 684. 
 
 2 Nov, Org,^ ii. 4. ^ Bacon, Essay xvi. 
 
io8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Form. " Hold fast (he says ^) to the form, and defend 
 that first, as distinguished from the mere transition of 
 forces. Discern the moulding hand of the potter com- 
 manding the clay, from his merely beating foot, as it 
 turns the wheel. If you can find incense in the vase, 
 afterwards — well." 
 
 So general, and from points of view so varied, is the 
 significance of form recognised and emphasised. 
 
 IX. The Will to Live. 
 
 Karl Pearson asks for history to be written in terms of 
 the struggle for food. We saw that the word " struggle " 
 compels us to go behind it. Why do living beings 
 struggle for food ? Evidently because they want it. 
 They are creatures, then, with desires. What is the 
 driving force behind the desire ? Evidently what 
 Schopenhauer calls the will to live — a will which manifests 
 itself in many other fiDrms than the desire for food, even 
 were we to confine ourselves to the sphere of natural 
 history. Granting that there are senses, refined and 
 unrefined, in which we may be said to live to eat, I think 
 even the rigid Darwinian will not deny that there are 
 also senses in which we eat to live. 
 
 But the materialistic or negatively idealistic evolutionist 
 may stop short of this will to live, and declare himself 
 satisfied with the operation of what is called " natural 
 
 ^ Ethics of the Dust, pp. 204-208, 2H, 212. 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 109 
 
 selection." I am myself prepared to allow enormously- 
 wide operation to this factor in the evolutionary process. 
 But I am by no means inclined to look to it for answers 
 to ultimate questions. What selects ? What is selected .'' 
 These questions spring at once to the front, and until 
 they are answered, to mutter on every occasion the mystic 
 words " natural selection " is to put ourselves into the 
 company of those dear, good folk who believe in the 
 virtue of such blessed words as Mesopotamia, 
 
 The biologist tells us that " variations " afford the 
 material for selection, and that these variations are 
 " accidental " or " fortuitous." But he will hasten to 
 assure us that by these terms " accidental " or " fortuitous " 
 he does not mean rea/ly indeterminate, but indeterminate 
 only from the point of view of our knowledge of the 
 causes. He holds them to be, like all else, inevitable 
 results of definite causation. Qua biologist, he is quite 
 warranted in thus limiting his view. Indeed, qua 
 biologist, he cannot go much further. But he cannot 
 forbid those who want to be more than biologists asking 
 whether there is any aim or purpose in this process. If 
 he tells us there is no such purpose, but that natural 
 selection works blindly on promiscuous variations blindly 
 produced, we shall quickly demand from him how he 
 knows this. Even on such a basis as is provided by the 
 abstract law of probabilities,^ we know from experience 
 that a purposeful structure can be raised. The materialist 
 ^ See Appendix to Lecture V. on Moral Statistics. 
 
no THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 will not suffer us to escape even by this pathway of 
 actual experience. He wants his universe to be blind, 
 and blind he will have it. He covers up its beggarly 
 ugliness, its brutal self-assertion, by such phrases as " the 
 iron law of causation." But I maintain that this law is 
 only Chance, or Fate, writ large. For why do such and 
 such particular conditions exist, and follow the " law " 
 which describes their sequences ? The only answer 
 possible to the materialist is that the universe happens to he 
 built that way. And what is this, I repeat, but Chance 
 or Fate } We are back, by way of " natural selection," 
 into the old weltering sea of endless and aimless 
 " becomings." 
 
 Is there no way of escape from such conclusions ? In 
 a previous case, we were rescued by judgments of value 
 and by ideals. We saw also that life has a controlling 
 and directing power. Let us now see whether " the will 
 to live " can aid us in this present emergency. 
 
 Kant had suggested that in the will of man we should 
 be most likely to find the solution to our deepest 
 problems. Schopenhauer worked out this idea, and made 
 it the basis of his philosophy. He found in it the 
 explanation of the whole visible and tangible world. He 
 treats it as covering the whole field of cosmic and psychic 
 energy. He has all manner of synonyms and sup- 
 plementary expressions by which to convey his full 
 meaning. He calls it " wish, seeking, stirring, effort, 
 impulse, force, push, inclination, passion, fearing, anger, 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE m 
 
 hate, hope, excitation, pressure ; and also compares it 
 to gravitation and attraction, and chemical force and 
 plant force." I will quote a characteristic passage, in 
 order that he may speak for himself.^ " Only those 
 changes (he writes) which have no other ground than 
 a motive — i.e. an idea — have hitherto been regarded as 
 manifestations of will. Therefore in nature a will has 
 only been attributed to man, or at the most to animals. 
 .... But that the will is also active where no knowledge 
 guides it, we see at once in the instinct and the mechanical 
 
 skill of animals In such actions of these creatures 
 
 the will is clearly operative as in their other actions, but 
 it is in blind activity, which is indeed accompanied by 
 knowledge but not guided by it. If now we have once 
 gained insight into the fact, that idea as motive is not a 
 necessary and essential condition of the activity of the 
 will, we shall more easily recognise the activity of will 
 where it is less apparent. For example, we shall see that 
 the house of the snail is no more made by a will which 
 is foreign to the snail itself, than the house which we 
 build is produced through another will than our own ; 
 but we shall recognise in both houses the work of a will 
 which objectifies itself in both the phenomena — a will 
 which works in us according to motives, but in the snail 
 still blindly as formative impulse directed outwards." 
 
 I have said, and quoted, sufficient to give a general 
 idea of Schopenhauer's theory of will. I confess that 
 ^ The World as Will and Idea^ vol. i. pp. 147-148 (Eng. trans.). 
 
112 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 it has a great fascination for me. I have studied some- 
 what in detail the marvellous phenomena of instinct, 
 and agree with Schelling in thinking that " there is no 
 better touchstone of a genuine philosophy than the 
 phenomena of animal instinct, which must be reckoned 
 among the greatest by every thoughtful being." I am 
 also in deep sympathy with Schopenhauer in his Idealism, 
 expressed so strongly and so clearly in the opening words 
 of his great work ^ : " The world is my idea — this is a 
 truth which holds good for everything that lives and 
 knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective 
 and abstract consciousness." With all this I have 
 deep sympathy. But alas ! this Will of Schopenhauer's 
 philosophy is blind, and dumb, and unconscious ! It is 
 sheer craving, sheer striving, and is continually being 
 thwarted by some mysterious check which gives rise to 
 what we call " consciousness." The world, upon this 
 theory, rests on Unreason, or on what has been well 
 called " the dark under-tow of the ever-heaving Desire." 
 Can we wonder that such a theory led to pessimism ? 
 Can we wonder that he looked on death as the means of 
 escape from the burden of insatiable desire ? The Will, 
 having somehow attained to consciousness in the brain, 
 realises its hopeless blindness and has no better end at 
 which to aim than an unconscious oblivion. There is a 
 will to live — but it must be repressed, as the source of 
 all our misery. 
 
 ^ Op. cit., p. 3. 
 
 L 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 113 
 
 X. Organic Selection. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, we are by no means 
 under the necessity of submitting to such extreme con- 
 ditions as those required by Schopenhauer. We may 
 grant the will to live ; and if we avoid the impersonal, 
 the irrational, the unconscious, as the basis, we may find 
 that life is worth living after all. Let us return to 
 investigate afresh the action of natural selection. 
 
 I ask you to observe that natural selection is a positive 
 name for what is itself purely negative. Natural selection 
 produces nothing — it merely eliminates certain individuals 
 from a total produced by forces of a positive character. 
 It cannot, therefore, explain one single fact of existence. 
 It may to some extent tell us why certain organisms do 
 not exist ; but for those which do exist, it sends us out 
 in search of adequate causes. These causes are some of 
 them found in the action of the environment on the 
 given organism ; but others are found in the organisms 
 themselves. The former have received almost more than 
 their due share of attention. The latter have been, com- 
 paratively speaking, forgotten. The environment has 
 been exalted so exclusively, that the organism has been 
 looked upon, if not quite as a passive agent, at any rate 
 as one which reacts simply in accordance with mechanical 
 laws of action and reaction. 
 
 But the turn of the organism itself has come at last. 
 
 A number of recent labourers in the field of evolution 
 
 8 
 
114 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 are convinced that the organism is by no means a passive, 
 or merely mechanical, recipient of stimuli from outside, 
 but that it has, so to speak, a will of its own. It is a 
 centre of the will to live, and strives to expand by a 
 power of self-adaptation to changes in its external con- 
 ditions. That is to say, we are beginning to see that an 
 organism is not idly swayed by external forces, like a 
 strip of lank seaweed, adrift in the wash of the waves ; 
 but that it exerts a directive force from within^ and develops 
 by virtue of a conflict with^ and a triumph over^ the difficulties 
 it encounters. 
 
 We shall better see the force of this new view of 
 development if we put the matter in another way. The 
 naturalistic school of evolutionists have recognised the 
 part played by pleasure as a factor on the side of the 
 organism itself. And this certainly marks an advance on 
 the mechanical theory ; for feeling, as being a subjective 
 experience, is clear of mechanism. But it does not release 
 us from passivity ; for pleasure simply leads its victim 
 captive. A creature goes, says Epicurus, where pleasure 
 calls him. But more accurate investigation and completer 
 reasoning show that we must go behind the pleasure to 
 the creature which feels the pleasure. The impulse to 
 live acts prior to, and independently of, the pleasure 
 which is the result of the impulse. In other words, it is 
 the exercise of the activity which creates the pleasure ; it 
 is not the pleasure which creates the activity. Of course 
 there is action and reaction. The experience of pleasure 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 115 
 
 becomes part of the total being of the organism. But 
 activity opens out the way. 
 
 Considerations of this kind have gradually forced them- 
 selves upon the attention of students of vital phenomena, 
 with the consequence that we have the new and important 
 development of the Darwinian theory ^ which now goes by 
 the name of " organic selection." Any detailed exposition 
 of this new hypothesis is not possible here. But I would 
 take advantage of this opportunity to bespeak for it 
 careful attention. I believe it to be fraught with great 
 possibilities, and I anticipate from it at no distant date 
 results of a somewhat revolutionary character. I will 
 describe its main feature, in language as untechnical 
 as the subject allows. The gist of the matter lies in 
 the use of the term " organic " as qualifying the term 
 " selection." " Natural," as applied to selection, is not 
 excluded, but it is supplemented. In the words of one 
 of its exponents,^ " The organism, so to speak, selects 
 itself: that is, it is its own accommodations which are 
 instrumental in securing its survival. It is the behaviour 
 of the organism^ therefore, which is important, and not 
 variations alone, as in simple natural selection generally — 
 and hence the adjective ' organic' It is in so far the 
 organic function — reactions, struggles, efforts, conscious 
 
 1 For full discussion, with references to authorities, etc., see 
 Baldwin's Development and Evolution. 
 
 2 Diet, of Psychology, sub. "Organic Selection." (Italics those of 
 the original.) 
 
ii6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 choices, etc. — which really count and determine what sort 
 of characters shall be saved by natural selection." This 
 brief extract will show the new importance given to what 
 I have designated the " internal " forces. Individual 
 organisms are no longer to be looked upon as wholly 
 dependent on their environment. As another exponent 
 of the theory puts it, " The creatures pilot themselves. 
 .... Selection ceases to be purely natural : it is in 
 part artificial." 
 
 This theory of organic selection has been accepted by a 
 large and representative number of leading biologists and 
 psychologists, and is full of hopeful augury for such an 
 expansion of the Darwinian hypothesis as shall make it 
 more adequate to the facts of life. The abstractions of 
 science are far removed from the complex and infinitely 
 varied nature of the " real." Actions and reactions are 
 possible in modes to which mechanism can never apply. 
 Spinoza's celebrated axiom is again declaring itself as 
 applicable to our latest biological developments. " All 
 life tends to persevere in life." Moreover, life is seen to 
 be a guiding and directing agency — to be, as I shall urge in 
 the lecture on free will, a self-determining force, expand- 
 ing from within by an inherent energy, and increasingly 
 master of its environment. It gains the victory over 
 external conditions, not by defying or breaking what are 
 known as the laws of nature, but by adapting itself to 
 them, and then directing the material forces to serve its 
 own purposes. The world is thus modified increasingly 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 117 
 
 because it is the instrument by which creatures with the 
 will to live assert that will. Stonehenge and Salisbury- 
 Cathedral are collections of matter, with resident forces, 
 which would never have taken that form, but for this 
 same will to live. And inasmuch as they are " temples," 
 they manifest a growing desire for life fuller and richer 
 than any which the " natural " order can provide. Stone- 
 henge witnesses to a yearning towards a life but dimly 
 conceived, and centred in a God but dimly revealed. 
 Salisbury Cathedral witnesses to a belief in Him Who 
 said : " / came that they may have life^ and may have it 
 abundantly'^ 
 
 XI. Evolution and Christianity. 
 
 We can breathe again. The incubus of a fatalistic 
 " natural selection" is gone. We have given one answer 
 at any rate to the questions — What selects } and What is 
 selected } The organism itself has the will and the power 
 to select ; and it tends to select such portions of its en- 
 vironment as make for fuller life. We shall obtain other 
 answers when we come to consider the relation of the 
 evolutionary process to mind, and to the higher faculties. 
 I conclude the present lecture by asking what should be 
 the attitude of Christians to this hypothesis of evolution. 
 
 Speaking broadly, there can be no doubt that the 
 general attitude of Christians has been hostile, and that 
 supporters of the hypothesis have frequently resented with 
 bitterness an opposition which they could not help re- 
 
ii8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 garding as prejudiced, if not factious. But can we wonder 
 
 that there should be a recoil from a theory which leads to 
 
 such world-views as those I have discussed, which would 
 
 make of life a fatalistic struggle for food, and would 
 
 negative every higher quality and spiritual aspiration of 
 
 human existence ? The Christian sense of the value of 
 
 life and the facts of actual experience of religion were not 
 
 to be thrown away as rubbish because a few specialists, 
 
 with a new success to intoxicate them, could not find place 
 
 in their scientific systems for phenomena which obstinately 
 
 refused to bend to their will. Better, therefore, even 
 
 perverse and extreme antagonism than a light yielding to 
 
 crude and early forms of a hypothesis which goes down to 
 
 the depths of " being '' and " becoming." Even negative 
 
 speculators themselves should be grateful for religious 
 
 opposition to their impetuosity — that is to say, if they are 
 
 genuine lovers of truth, and not mere blindly prejudiced 
 
 enemies of all spiritual views of the universe. There 
 
 is a scientific and negationist dogmatism which is as 
 
 hectoring and intolerant as the worst specimens of the 
 
 odium theologicum^ and without the excuse of the latter. 
 
 For the too dogmatic theologian has brought himself to 
 
 believe that it will undoubtedly be well for the world to 
 
 come as speedily as may be to his point of view. But 
 
 if the dogmatic materialist, or negationist, is right, what 
 
 difference can it make to him or to me what we believe, 
 
 so long as we leave each other in peace ? Of course, on 
 
 materialist premisses, this very question is meaningless — 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 119 
 
 for we can none of us help thinking just as we think. I 
 put it, however, from the point of view of the ordinary 
 man. And further, must it not be acknowledged that the 
 modifications and expansions of the evolution hypothesis, 
 since Darwin first propounded it, have been sufficiently 
 numerous and weighty to justify the drag put upon its 
 acceptance by the conservative elements in the social 
 organism ? 
 
 But now for the other side of this matter. I would ask 
 Christians in general whether the time has not arrived 
 when they should devote sympathetic and detailed study 
 to the facts accumulated in such abundance in favour of 
 evolution versus special creation ? We are not wise, nor 
 even sound in the faith, if we continue wilfully to shut 
 our eyes to new truths merely because we do not like 
 them, or because they seem to clash with some of our 
 older beliefs. Many of the dangers and difficulties an- 
 ticipated with dread have been dissipated by fuller research 
 and freer discussion. A wider and wiser criticism and 
 exegesis are showing us that much which we took to be of 
 the essence of the faith is only scaffolding. And many of 
 us have found to our joyful surprise that the more firmly 
 established results of scientific method are compatible with 
 the fundamentals of Christian theology, and sometimes 
 flood them with new light and richer content. I am 
 jealous for Christianity. I desire to see it shown to be 
 in practice what it is in essence — a living religion, able to 
 assimilate things new as well as old, and give meaning and 
 
I20 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 proportion to every phase of existence as it develops, 
 quietly confident in the knowledge that — 
 "God fulfils Himself in many ways." 
 
 Do some of us still fear that man will be lowered if he 
 is linked on to the continuous line of life ? Why should 
 we ? For, in the first place, it is God who made all 
 things ; none of them came from the hand of any other 
 God ; and He pronounced them very good. All things 
 are therefore ultimately spiritual, and proceed from the 
 fulness of the Divine Nature. And, in the second place, 
 questions of origin and genetic problems do not affect 
 present matters of fact. Man does not cease to be him- 
 self because he was once a child. He does not cease to 
 be capable of spiritual experiences because he was once a 
 helpless infant. Apply this thought on the large scale. 
 Man is not lowered if he is linked on to primordial forms 
 of life. The facts of his nature assert themselves, what- 
 ever may be the process by which God brought him into 
 his state of conscious dignity and moral selfhood. Such 
 linking on does not lower him, but flings back a light on 
 all that has preceded him — gives worth, and meaning, 
 and place, to the various ascending forerunners of his 
 higher form of life. 
 
 The great modern poets have fully grasped this thought. 
 It is time theologians should grasp it in their turn. 
 Emerson conceives that — 
 
 (( 
 
 Striving to be man, the worm 
 
 Mounts through all the spires of form." 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 121 
 
 And Browning speaks with wonted vigour and directness 
 of feeling — 
 
 *' Partake my confidence ! No creature's made so mean, 
 But that, some way, it boasts, could we investigate. 
 Its supreme worth : fulfils, by ordinance of fate, 
 Its momentary task, gets glory all its own. 
 Tastes triumph in the world, pre-eminent, alone." ^ 
 
 It has always seemed strange to me that there should 
 be so much difficulty in grasping the idea of the unity 
 and solidarity of all life. For whence comes life ? Are 
 not Christians taught that in the Divine Logos was life ? 
 Are they not taught that the life-giving Spirit brooded on 
 the face of the waters ? Whence, then, this reluctance to 
 see God in every form of life ? Is it because we speak of 
 lower and higher stages, and we would fain mark man off 
 as absolutely separate from all the rest beneath him. But 
 how about the facts of our nature ? Study the embryo 
 of man. See how each one of us begins life deep down 
 below the level of the conscious, and in a form which 
 links on in a thousand ways to various stages in the 
 evolutionary process. Watch how he rises step by step, 
 by a slow and orderly progress from unconscious insensi- 
 bility to perception, consciousness, self-consciousness, 
 moral consciousness, culminating in the full sense of 
 knowing himself to be a " son of God." There is no 
 arbitrary leap at any point. At the base of the process is 
 the material ; on that is formed the animal ; and on that 
 
 1 Fifine at the Fair, 
 
122 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 again the spiritual. And as Aristotle saw so long ago, 
 each stage in the ascending scale remains as a support 
 for that which carries on the process to a higher point. 
 Think of all these facts — and then meditate on St Paul's 
 deep saying :".... first .... that which is natural, 
 then that which is spiritual." Why should we hesitate, I 
 ask, to apply to the evolution of life as a whole, that 
 which is so plain, so undeniable, in the case of the indi- 
 vidual life ? The process in the individual is, of course, 
 infinitely more rapid than the world process. But there 
 is no difference in kind. Lapse of time constitutes no 
 difference in essence. 
 
 I appeal, then, for a bolder and firmer grasp of the 
 facts of life. At present many of us blink them in favour 
 of our narrower theories and opinions. But are we not 
 persuaded that the ways of God are " broader than the 
 measures of man's mind" ? If we really believe this, then 
 we shall be receptive of whatever fresh gleams of light 
 God may throw upon the works of His hands. Is not 
 Alfred Russell Wallace sufficiently a Darwinian ? Why, 
 he shares with Darwin the honour of formulating the 
 hypothesis. And yet how does he conclude his book on 
 Darwinism ? By nothing less than an explicit and earnest 
 statement of his belief in the spirituaHty of man's nature. 
 There cannot, then, be any serious incompatibility 
 between evolution and a spiritual view of existence. 
 
 I hold that the Christian, of all others, should be keen 
 and alert to obtain a complete history of life upon the 
 
EVOLUTION AND LIFE 123 
 
 globe ; for he is bound to see in it a revelation of God*s 
 Nature and a gradual unfolding of His purpose. A full 
 and accurate knowledge of the past will enable him to 
 read ever deeper meaning into St Paul's grand conception 
 of the groaning and travailing creation. And his hopes 
 for the future will centre in the Incarnate Logos, Who has 
 been behind the process from the beginning, and Who has 
 assured us of development yet to come — " / came^'' said 
 Hcy " that they may have life^ and may have it abundantly T 
 
FOURTH LECTURE. 
 EVOLUTION AND MIND. 
 
 <I>aj5 Kvptov irvor] dvOpwTrwv. — LXX. 
 "The spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord." — Prov. xx. 27. 
 
 I. Materialistic View of Mind. 
 
 We have examined the bearing of the evolution hypothesis 
 
 on the nature of Life. We now pass to examine its 
 
 bearing on those elements in our nature which fall under 
 
 the category of Mind. The subject is a vast one. I can 
 
 only hope to drive a few main lines through the mass of 
 
 material it presents. 
 
 Let us understand clearly what the materialistic 
 
 biologist demands. He claims universal application for 
 
 his inductions from biological premisses. Not only the 
 
 body, but the mind of man (the very mind that frames 
 
 the hypothesis !) shall confess its entire subjection to 
 
 purely naturalistic agencies. It will not satisfy him to 
 
 grant that the term " development " may be applied in 
 
 some sense to mental qualities and to reason : it must be 
 
 applied in his sense. Mind is to be evolved out of that 
 
 124 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 125 
 
 which is not mind : reason out of that which is not 
 rational : morals out of that which is not moral : religion 
 out of that which is soulless. 
 
 Before I proceed to controvert these demands, let me 
 clearly assert that I recognise to the full the claims of a 
 rational and healthy materialism. I oppose what I deem 
 to be perversions, and exaggerations, and misapplications, of 
 an undoubted truth. Maudsley tells us ^ it is only timid 
 minds and ignorant which are shocked by the very word 
 " materialism," and exhorts us " to refine, purify, and 
 develop the material being in obedience to natural laws 
 of cause and effect, instead of trying to degrade and 
 despise it continually as the enemy of an indwelling 
 entity." I most cordially concur in these incisive strictures 
 upon a maudlin spirituality, or a fevered and un- 
 natural asceticism. But these errors are not peculiar to 
 Christianity. And as I do not know of any considerable 
 body of civilised Christians who are at present committing 
 these errors, I am not quite sure whom he means to lash. 
 Asceticism is certainly not one of the crying evils of our 
 times ! And Christianity is a religion which, in its full 
 presentation, most definitely and essentially recognises the 
 dignity, and even the eternity, of the " material." 
 
 Dr Maudsley gives to one of his books the title l^ife 
 in Mind and Conduct, I wonder what he means by 
 mind, and by conduct. Are they concerned only with 
 rendering " obedience to natural laws of cause and effect } " 
 
 ^ Life in Mind and Conduct^ p. 144. 
 
126 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Or are there some other laws to obey ? This is the great 
 problem. Mind and conduct cannot mean much in a 
 world which is mindless and which pays no heed to right 
 and wrong. 
 
 II. Consciousness. 
 
 Set over against Maudsley's pronouncement a well- 
 known passage from Pascal : " Man is only a reed, the 
 feeblest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is 
 no necessity that the whole universe should arm itself to 
 crush him. A vapour, a drop of water, suffices to kill 
 him. But should the universe crush him, man would 
 still be greater than that which kills him, because he 
 knows that he dies ; whereas the universe knows nothing 
 of its advantage over him." 
 
 Now the two passages are far from being inconsistent ; 
 up to a point they can easily be harmonised by the 
 aphorism — mens sana in corpore sano. But can anyone 
 put the two on the same level. Instruction and ex- 
 hortation as to the structure, management, and develop- 
 ment of the body are most necessary ; for the body is 
 the instrument of the mind. But you will not get far 
 in developing organ music if you never rise higher in your 
 philosophy of music than the organ-builder's workshop. 
 And so you wiU never arrive at any worthy conceptions 
 of the value and dignity of human life if you remain on 
 the level of " studies of organic in human nature." ^ Do 
 
 ^ Sub- title of Life in Mind and Co?iduct. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 127 
 
 not misunderstand me. I acknowledge the need for such 
 studies to as full an extent as Maudsley himself. But I 
 regard them as means to higher ends. I never feel that 
 in prosecuting them I am coming into contact (save 
 indirectly) with man's true nature and aim. Whereas, 
 with Maudsley, they bulk so largely that they produce in 
 him a cynical form of pessimism which takes all the real 
 glow of enthusiasm out of life, and leaves one in hopeless, 
 sullen rebellion against an order of things which one 
 cannot modify or improve. Here is a passage from the 
 concluding chapter of the work I have mentioned ^ : "It 
 is because of the inevitable strong bias of judgment 
 owing to man's conceit of his position and value in the 
 universe that sin, evil, corruption, decay, disease, and 
 death are anywise anomalies or mysteries to be wondered 
 at as needing explanation. His towering egoism prompts 
 him naturally to look on disease which sickens, weakens, 
 humiliates, and ends him as a continually recurring 
 calamity which he would fain abolish. Yet from a wider 
 point of view than the anthropocentric standpoint they are 
 seen to be good, seeing that they are natural and necessary 
 events in the ordered sequence of things." Contrast this 
 passage with the joyous sense of a mode of existence 
 higher than the material, which brims over with every word 
 of Pascal's statement. Of course there is truth in what 
 Maudsley says : but it is truth of that dangerous kind 
 which, when it is left without its complementary truths^ works 
 
 ^ Op» cit., p. 438. 
 
128 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 havoc with individual lives and with the welfare of the 
 community. Let me try to bring some of these com- 
 plementary truths into their rightful relation to the 
 teachings of materialism. 
 
 And first of all, is there not something manifestly 
 absurd in referring a conscious, rational being to the 
 conscious and the irrational for his origin, and as the 
 measure of his place in nature ? For, as I have already 
 remarked, the mind which apprehends the material 
 phenomena, and judges the evidence for its very existence, 
 not to speak of its nature and qualities, cannot itself be 
 one among the phenomena thus apprehended and judged. 
 In other words, the relation of subject and object — of 
 knower and known — is primary and absolute, if there is 
 to be any knowledge at all. By whatever stages con- 
 sciousness had developed, the characteristics which it 
 presents in its form of human self-consciousness, are 
 facts, and must be reckoned with as facts. No biological 
 history of organisms, no studies in organic, can make 
 them other than they are. We may watch cells join 
 themselves to cells, and by infinitely fine and varied 
 modifications adapt themselves for the battle with their 
 environment and with each other ; we may ^admire the 
 complexity of the increasing division of labour, and the 
 formation of those larger organic unities in which (to use 
 Kant's terse and pregnant phrase) " all the parts are 
 mutually ends and means." And we may marvel yet 
 more as we discover that the end, or aim, of each cell and 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 129 
 
 organism is not to be self-contained, but to help in 
 building up some form of life higher than itself — but 
 when we have done all this, we have not come within 
 sight even of the problem of consciousness, much less 
 explained it. Its very existence, still more its mystery, 
 escape us. 
 
 As simple matter of fact, if we have to choose between 
 consciousness and the world of things and forces, it is the 
 world that must go. For whatever the world may be, 
 consciousness is an ultimate reality. For consciousness is 
 able to turn back even upon itself, and become conscious 
 of itself. That is to say, it is not a mere awareness of 
 phenomena presented to it from outside, so to speak, but it 
 is aware of itself. Wallace puts this well ^ when he says 
 that consciousness is at once " the scene, the play, and an 
 observer, who, in some strange league with author and 
 manager, is more than observer." Spinoza was too sound 
 and thorough a thinker to blink these facts. For him, 
 consciousness was one of the modes of ultimate reality. 
 Extension and thought are two aspects of the one 
 existence which he calls Substance. But the two are not 
 really in the same rank. For the ultimate unity of 
 extension and thought can never be found in the objects 
 of thought as objects, but in the mind — the subject — that 
 knows them. It is in the unity of the apprehending centre 
 of self-consciousness that we have the awareness both of 
 the consciousness that perceives and of the object per- 
 
 ^ W. Wallace, Lecitires, p. 170. (Clarendon Press.) 
 
 9 
 
I30 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 ceived. Spinoza himself realised this,^ and, almost in 
 spite of himself, gave thought the preponderance. Kant 
 saw this still more clearly and made extension to be 
 definitely a mode of thought, a construction of con- 
 sciousness. But, in any case, the fact remains that 
 the one absolute certainty is consciousness. It stands 
 out as supreme and inexplicable. Even though we 
 adopt the monistic substance of Haeckel, we can con- 
 ceive of it as nothing else than consciousness coming 
 to itself in organic nature. For twist and turn things 
 as you will, you cannot get consciousness out of the 
 unconscious. 
 
 Starting, then, with the fact of consciousness, we find 
 ourselves at once in what I have called the sphere of the 
 supernatural. We are here out of the reach of the cate- 
 gories and methods of physical science. For science is 
 itself a construction of consciousness ^ : it is not facts, but 
 knowledge of facts. It comes into being because the 
 mind turns round upon itself, and asks the what, the why, 
 the whence, and the whither. It is the creation of beings 
 such as we men know ourselves to be by direct experience 
 of ourselves. As Cousin says ^ : " We not only feel^ 
 but we know that we feel ; we not only act^ but we know 
 that we act ; we not only think^ but we know that we think. 
 To think without knowing that we think, is as if we should 
 
 ^ See Martineau, Study of Spinoza, p. i88. 
 
 ^ Cf. Karl Pearson, chap. i. of Ethic of Free Thought. 
 
 ^ Hist, of Modern Philosophy, i. ^74- 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 131 
 
 not think ; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental 
 attribute of thought, is to have a consciousness of itself." 
 
 III. Personality. 
 
 I have referred in passing to the function of conscious- 
 ness as giving, not only the possibility of experience, but 
 a sense of unity in and through the gaining of that 
 experience. Let us follow up for a time this further 
 train of thought. We are not only aware of ourselves as 
 conscious, but as " selves," as " persons," In Locke's 
 homely, but sufficient phraseology,^ " a person stands for a 
 thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
 and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in 
 different times and places T In more modern and accurate 
 terminology, fitting into the doctrine of value judgments 
 stated in the first lecture, we may define personality as the 
 irreducible element of self-value in all recognition. That is to 
 say — all values to be recognised hy me must be values for 
 me. The values change and perish, but the identity of 
 the " me " for whom they are values remains as the 
 continuous centre of value in and for itself. 
 
 We shall best enter into the meaning of such definitions 
 as those just given if we bring them into contrast with 
 others of a different, and, as I hold, insufficient character. 
 For example, John Stuart Mill admits ^ the existence of 
 
 ^ Essay ^ bk. ii. 27. (Italics mine.) 
 2 See Mill on Hamilton^ pp. 2 1 2 ff. 
 
132 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the mind in the form of " a thread of consciousness," 
 " aware of itself as past and future," and possessing a 
 conviction of the simultaneous existence of other " threads 
 of consciousness " and of numerous " permanent possi- 
 bilities of sensation." That is to say, a series of separate 
 and successive sensations is supposed to become aware, or 
 conscious, of itself as a series. But Mill himself acknow- 
 ledges-^ there is a difficulty here. I go further, and 
 maintain there is an impossibility — nay, an absurdity. 
 For how can a series become aware of itself as a series ? 
 The words may be put together, but they mean nothing. 
 One momentary stage of consciousness is succeeded by 
 another. But consciousness, of itself, can only be of the 
 present. What, then, is to join the momentary states up 
 into a consciousness of each other — what is the thread on 
 which they are to be strung ? Or, to change the metaphor, 
 who is the weaver who sits behind the loom of experience, 
 and weaves the pattern and texture of the individual 
 mind ? We can answer the question by looking within 
 ourselves. As Locke said, each of us is aware that from 
 moment to moment and place to place, he is " one and 
 the same thinking thing." Or again, each of us is aware 
 of a centre of value for which all values exist — the centre 
 which we call the " self." The atoms of my body may 
 come and go, but I feel I am not my body. My thoughts 
 may course along in a changing stream, but I feel I am 
 not my thoughts. Over and above these is what we may 
 
 ^ Op. cit.^ p. 213. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 133 
 
 call a " self-feeling," which persists through the changes, 
 and sets itself over against them, organises them, and, as 
 a self-conscious referee and arbiter of their nature and 
 their claims, uses them as material for further develop- 
 ments. Indeed it is but simple truth to say that without 
 such a persisting element there could be no change ; nor, 
 without a permanent, could there be a series. 
 
 Here we have the secret of the old and profound 
 dictum, yvijoOi creavrov — " know thyself." Look not on 
 the changing flux of things — on the ceaseless " becoming," 
 if thou wouldst have immediate knowledge of the real : 
 look into thyself — into thine own abiding self-conscious- 
 ness. There thou wilt find depths beyond depths, just 
 because God is at the bottom of it. 
 
 IV. The Self : Single or Complex } 
 
 But I may at this point be told by the up-to-date 
 psychologist that I am living in the past, and that modern 
 discoveries have made such a doctrine of personality 
 untenable. He will ask me to study the curious cases of 
 disordered personality which have aroused of late so much 
 interest and speculation. He will point out that such 
 cases exhibit every stage of disintegration and disorganisa- 
 tion in self-consciousness — that sometimes there may even 
 be alternations of personality in the same individual. 
 Arguing from these, and perchance still more recondite 
 premisses, he would deny the existence of an absolutely 
 
134 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 simple and undecomposable " self," revealed by intro- 
 spection and intuition. 
 
 I would, however, assure such an objector that I have 
 by no means lost sight of such phenomena, nor of the 
 arguments founded on them. But I hold that they do 
 not at all affect the main principle for which I am con- 
 tending. For I have never asserted that the self may not 
 be complex. I have only adduced the fact that in the 
 normal mind there is an actually established unity of 
 self-consciousness. Of course there are degrees in the 
 development of the idea of self and of personality. As 
 Sully says,^ the attainment of a full consciousness of 
 personality " evidently presupposes the highest exercise of 
 abstract thought." " Such self-knowledge (he adds) plays 
 an important part in the best logical thought about the 
 world, as also in the highest artistic and moral effort." 
 Of course, also, we know by experience that there are 
 derangements possible in this idea of self, whatever degree 
 of clearness it may have attained. But it is not the idea 
 of self that I am emphasising. // is that element in our 
 mental being which renders such an idea possible. As Stout 
 says, " The unity of self-consciousness is the crown and 
 completion of the unity of consciousness. But the unity 
 of consciousness, as expressed in the word ' I,' cannot 
 wholly consist in recognition of this unity. Otherwise we 
 should be involved in a circle. The unity must already 
 exist in some manner and degree before it can be cognised." 
 ^ Sully, The Human Mind, vol. i. pp. 480-481. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 135 
 
 As to the ultimate unity or complex character of the 
 " self," I do not venture to dogmatise. Mathematical 
 ideas of unity have often led us wrong ; the doctrine of 
 the Trinity warns us off from that. Life is more than 
 mathematics. The unity of the " self " need not be less 
 real because it is not a rigid unit, nor an atom, nor a 
 monad. The body is one though it has many members. 
 So the " self " may be a complex spiritual organism, and, 
 just because it is an organism, may possess the highest 
 kind of unity. Experimental psychology may also show 
 that the " self " is a co-ordination. But whatever may, or 
 may not, be shown, the great fact of the actual continuity 
 of self-consciousness stands firm. We can see this much, 
 at any rate, that the explanation cannot be mechanical. 
 Let us labour at the problem. But do not let us, because 
 we cannot as yet find the solution, forget or reject the 
 cardinal dictum — Cogilo, ergo sum. Disorder among our 
 ideas does not disorganise the fundamental realities. 
 Because a man believes himself to be made of glass, he 
 does not therefore cease to be a human being. The 
 doctor will check such a statement by the normal facts 
 of life. Why should not the physiological psychologist 
 be willing to treat in the same way disordered ideas in 
 " diseases of personality " ^ No doubt our conscious- 
 ness is a very much bigger and more complex thing 
 than any of us can yet imagine. But the " idea " of 
 "self" is actually evolved by the normal mind. And 
 in the highest minds it is most distinctly apprehended. 
 
136 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Here is the bed-rock of fact which must be reckoned 
 with. 
 
 A word as to the direct practical aspect of all this. 
 The ardent social reformer bids us work for our fellow- 
 men, and even sacrifice ourselves for their welfare. Will 
 it be unreasonable on our part to ask him how he proves 
 to us that they are worth such work and sacrifice. If 
 men are naught but vanishing aspects of an impersonal 
 substance, I do not quite see why 1 should trouble myself 
 about them. I will e'en choose Nietzsche as my prophet. 
 Or I will throw in my lot with Schopenhauer or von 
 Hartmann, who, in sympathy with the Eastern sages, 
 would conduct me to Nirvana — or to something even 
 worse ! Surely, of all men, the humanitarian should 
 earnestly seek for some spark of the divine in man — 
 some element which shall be of absolute value and 
 dignity. It is no " colossal egoism," as Maudsley would 
 have us think, which leads us to institute such a search. 
 For unless we find in our fellows some basis for our 
 reverence and our human enthusiasms. Progress has lost 
 its soul. Social hope is bound to regard the universe as 
 a kingdom of persons, "Be a person," said Hegel, "and 
 respect others as persons." Biology can never issue a 
 command like that, just as chemical analysis can never 
 give us the oak from the acorn. A universe that has 
 produced a reverence for persons must be interpreted in 
 terms of this, one of its highest products, and not in 
 terms of protozoa and ascidians. A recent writer must 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 137 
 
 surely carry us with him when he concludes^ that the 
 realities " found in the fully developed man, whose body, 
 mind, and feelings are at their highest, are worth more 
 to solve the mystery of existence than any conceivable 
 application of the genetic method." 
 
 V. Conscience. 
 
 There is a special kind of consciousness which will, in 
 its most general aspect, fall naturally for consideration 
 here. The word Conscience is composed of the same 
 elements as the word Consciousness. But instead of 
 keeping the wide sense we have hitherto discussed, it is 
 limited to a particular sphere, namely, that of moral 
 distinctions. None will deny that, as matter of fact, they 
 find within themselves a complex instinct, carrying with 
 its exercise a sense of self-approbation or self-disapproba- 
 tion, according as its behests are regarded or disregarded. 
 It is a force, an impulse, operating constantly during our 
 conscious life, and claiming a peculiar authority of its 
 own. Its insistence and condemning power are well seen 
 in the often quoted words of Ovid — Video meliora pro- 
 boque^ deteriora sequor ; as also in Seneca's frequent de- 
 scriptions of the struggle between the moral element in 
 man's nature, and the weak will under the sway of base 
 desires. What is the relation of this " conscience " to 
 the evolution hypothesis } 
 
 ^ Benedict, Internat, Journal of Ethics^ Oct. 1903 — "Religion as 
 an Idea." 
 
138 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 This question, like so many which come in our way, is 
 a very large one. I will suggest the lines on which I 
 myself have found an answer. I need hardly tell you 
 that there are two great schools of thought which oppose 
 one another in their views of the origin and nature of the 
 moral faculty. The one is the a priori school, who look 
 upon conscience as an original, innate activity, revealing 
 an absolute standard of duty. The other is the empirical, 
 or utilitarian school, now merged in what we may call the 
 evolutionist school, who make morals dependent on ex- 
 perience and a gradual process of development. Herbert 
 Spencer,^ for example, holds that the sentiment of duty " is 
 an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous 
 to that in which abstract ideas are generated." Its 
 " superior authority, unrecognisable by lower types of 
 creatures which cannot generalise, and little recognisable 
 by primitive men, who have but feeble powers of 
 generalisation, has become distinctly recognised as 
 civilisation and accompanying mental development have 
 gone on. Accumulated experiences have produced the 
 consciousness that guidance by feelings which refer to 
 remote and general results is usually more conducive to 
 welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately 
 gratified." 
 
 Such are the two views between which the battle rages. 
 Speaking personally, the more I study them, the less am 
 I convinced that they are fundamentally inconsistent. 
 
 ^ Data of Ethics^ § 46. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 139 
 
 For, on the one hand, even the strictest intuitionalist 
 cannot deny (if he has any respect for facts) that the 
 moral sense develops. We see it on the small scale in 
 the individual, and on the large scale in social groups 
 and communities. If you would absorb the living truth 
 of all this, watch the dawn of moral sense in the mind of 
 a child. At first there is the direct, unmoral assertion of 
 the individual impulse and will. By degrees the child 
 discovers that it has to reckon with other wills, and that 
 by entering into certain social relations with these other 
 wills, its own desires are more easily and pleasantly 
 satisfied. Then, as knowledge of the social environment 
 increases, and the social circle expands, there results a 
 self-adaptation to a system of mutual subordinations and 
 co-operations. And at last there comes a sense of right 
 and wrong, which, like all other faculties, is capable of 
 development by education and experience. And what is 
 true of the individual child, is true also of the childhood 
 of the race. There was a time when it cannot be said to 
 have existed at all. Is it not St Paul who tells us that 
 where there was no law, there was no transgression ? 
 The sense of moral responsibility took a long time to 
 develop, and is even now very unequally developed. 
 The moral standard has varied, and does vary, enormously, 
 in different stages of human progress. 
 
 How, then, is the intuitionalist going to meet this 
 alarming array of facts ? The least he can do is to admit 
 a genuine development of the practical reason, which 
 
I40 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 implies again a genuine development of the moral sense. 
 He may, indeed, affirm that the moral sense is latent 
 from the beginning, and comes into consciousness through 
 social intercourse. And I am not concerned to deny this, 
 if a sufficiently wide sense be given to the word "latent." 
 I propose to follow up the implications of the " social 
 factor " in a later lecture, arguing that since man is by 
 nature social, the development of the moral sense by 
 social intercourse is part and parcel of a larger process 
 by which the individual will is harmonised with the 
 general will. But this is a very different theory to that 
 which would regard conscience as an unerring power of 
 moral intuition, applied to a code of rigid commands, 
 fixed arbitrarily, and imposed by an external authority. 
 I look upon morality as being a relation between wills, 
 and as, therefore, relative to the development and organisa- 
 tion of those wills. In short, 1 deem morality to be social 
 through and through. 
 
 On the other hand, as against the purely empirical 
 doctrine, I would urge that the very fact of moral progress 
 proves that morality is grounded in the nature of the 
 universe. I have already laid stress upon this point in 
 treating of the moral ideal. And I would add to what I 
 there advanced, a further thought. As in the case of 
 Life, so here — to trace the history of a development is 
 not to explain the origin, nor the causes at work, nor 
 the meaning of the results. No moral precept can gain 
 any validity or authority from tracing the stages of its 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 141 
 
 manifestation. Hence a strict naturalism can never find 
 a basis for the " ought." At the best it can but trust to 
 instinct, or social impulse, or enlightened self-interest. 
 But " duty " in the full and human sense there can be 
 none. The moving and eloquent appeals of moralists 
 who wish to sever ethics from any spiritual view of 
 existence are simply so much gush. Maudsley's clever 
 exposure of the true character of such appeals from the 
 society to the individual is one of the best bits of work he 
 has accomplished. 
 
 If we are to have real morals, a genuine " ought," we 
 must rise above history and biological formulae. We 
 must decide that human life has some worthy end ; 
 and this decision must itself rest on the moral ideal. 
 The moral element is thus final and absolute. What else 
 could we expect on the basis of the evolution hypothesis 
 itself ? For can an evolutionist hold that such a faculty, 
 or power, as that of conscience, with all its complex 
 implications for the individual and the community, can 
 have no place in the world of ultimate realities ? The 
 natural again passes into the supernatural — first the 
 natural, then the spiritual. The " is " is the basis for 
 the " ought to be." Conscience becomes the subjective 
 appreciation of the moral order of the universe. 
 
 I am thus prepared to maintain that the modern 
 evolutionary view is not inconsistent with any sane form 
 of intuitionalism ; rather does it bring us into deeper 
 agreement with the supreme principle of the New Testa- 
 
142 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 ment. First, there is the reaction, well-nigh on mechanical 
 principles, of blow for blow, of eye for eye, of tooth for 
 tooth. Then there is the gradual socialisation of the 
 individual, as he learns to co-operate with others for the 
 general welfare. External law passes into spiritual law. 
 The social bond, called by Christianity ayairrj — love of 
 God, and love of neighbour — supersedes all moral precepts 
 — for "love is the fulfilling of the Law." 
 
 VL Physical Basis of Mind. 
 
 Having discussed the relation of the evolutionary 
 hypothesis to consciousness, to personality, and to 
 conscience, we are convinced, I trust, that all true 
 progress depends on our transcending the limits of 
 natural science, and on our piercing through to the 
 world of " values " and of " persons." But I feel sure 
 that the course of the discussion has over and over again 
 suggested to your minds a question, than which it would 
 be hard to find one more full of vivid interest and human 
 pathos — the question of the relation of the body to the 
 mind, or soul. Can we, or can we not, in the light of 
 modern science, continue to cherish our hope of Hfe 
 beyond the grave ? 
 
 In this field of inquiry, the physiological evolutionist 
 is wont to think that he has matters all his own way. 
 He considers he has disproved the existence of a soul 
 which is independent of the body ; and that therefore. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 143 
 
 when the body dies, the individual life is at an end. 
 You will remember the desolate words of a representative 
 modern thinker which I quoted to you at the opening 
 of this course. He declared his conclusion that man's 
 " origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his 
 beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of 
 atoms ; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought 
 and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the 
 grave," and that " the whole temple of man's achievement 
 must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe 
 in ruins." 
 
 Now, as against this, I ask you whether Burns does not 
 voice the soul of the people when he sings — 
 
 " I'll ne'er say that fortune grieves me 
 While the star of hope she leaves me." 
 
 Will the race allow the star of hope to be thus buried 
 in the dark waters of materialism ? I trow not. " Wir, 
 wir leben — und der Lebende hat Recht." Life, as I 
 have so often insisted, is wider than thought — and 
 infinitely wider than scientific categories. Let us, then, 
 approach this difficult subject with the determination that 
 we will not blink facts, but will insist on all the facts being 
 reckoned with — that we will not refuse to go where 
 reason leads, but will not allow specious arguments to 
 close avenues for speculation and for hope which still 
 open out to us a spiritual and eternal world. 
 
 There are two fallacies into which the materialist falls 
 
144 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 — fallacies sufficiently obvious when detected. The first 
 is one we have already noted, that arising from the 
 confusion of history with explanation. Psychologists 
 have learnt a wonderful amount about the development 
 of the mind — about how the mind has become what 
 it is. Dazzled by the increase of such knowledge, 
 the materialistic psychologist has waxed over-confident 
 in the possibilities of the historical method, and has 
 quietly substituted a history of the mind for an explana- 
 tion of the mind. This calm assumption is largely 
 responsible for such hopeless pessimism as is becoming 
 too common in the world. The second fallacy lies in 
 the undue prominence given to the material side of 
 existence, more particularly in the calm assumption that 
 consciousness is a function of the grey matter of the 
 brain. In tracing the stages of mental development, the 
 structure of the brain has bulked so largely, that a pseudo- 
 chemistry is actually willed into existence which provides 
 a physical basis for all mental and spiritual phenomena. 
 I hope to show that the premisses on which these views 
 are founded are illogical, and involve suppositions which 
 are inconceivable. 
 
 We find that the astonishingly acute mind of Leibnitz 
 grasped this problem of the connection of mind and body 
 in all its essential features. He saw that, even if we had 
 microscopes powerful enough to reveal to us on a large 
 scale all the intricacies of nerve cell and nerve fibre in 
 the brain, we should never get beyond " figures and 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 145 
 
 motions." ^ We could conceive the brain " so enlarged 
 that, while keeping the same proportions, one could go 
 into it as into a mill — but we should never find there 
 anything but particles jostling each other." " If in that 
 which is organic (he says) there is nothing but mechanism, 
 that is, bare matter, having differences of place, magnitude, 
 and figure ; nothing can be deduced and explained from 
 it, except mechanism. Hence (he continues) we may 
 readily conclude that in no mill or clock as such is there 
 to be found any principle which perceives what takes 
 place in it ; and it matters not whether the things con- 
 tained in the machine are solid or fluid, or made up of 
 both." Again, he insists that mechanism always means 
 partes extra partes. Thus matter can never be said to 
 think — it presupposes a thinking, or, at least, a perceiving 
 principle. 
 
 All this is delightfully direct and simple. Have recent 
 philosophers been able to go beyond it ^ The question 
 is so important that I must answer it, not in my own 
 words, but in those of a typical representative of modern 
 science. Huxley speaks ^ with no uncertain voice on this 
 matter. " Nobody, I imagine (he says), will credit me 
 with a desire to limit the empire of physical science, but 
 I really feel bound to confess that a great many very 
 familiar, and, at the same time, extremely important 
 
 ^ See Monadology, § 17, and cf. Commentatio de Anima Brutorum^ 
 E. 463a; G. vii. 328. 
 
 ^ Science a?td Morals, p. 122. 
 
 10 
 
146 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 phenomena lie quite outside its legitimate limits. I 
 cannot conceive, for example, how the phenomena of 
 consciousness, as such, and apart from the physical process 
 by which they are called into existence, are to be brought 
 within the bounds of physical science. Take the simplest 
 possible example, the feeling of redness. Physical science 
 tells us that it commonly arises as a consequence of mole- 
 cular changes propagated from the eye to a certain part 
 of the substance of the brain, when vibrations of the 
 luminiferous ether of a certain character fall upon the 
 retina. Let us suppose the process of physical analysis 
 pushed so far that one could view the last link of this 
 chain of molecules, watch their movement as if they were 
 billiard balls, weigh them, measure them, and know all 
 that is physically knowable about them. Well, even in 
 that case, we should be just as far from being able to 
 include the resulting phenomenon of consciousness, the 
 feeling of redness, within the bounds of physical science, 
 as we are at present. It would remain as unlike the 
 phenomena we know under the names of matter and 
 motion as it is now. If there is any plain truth upon 
 which I have made it my business to insist over and over 
 again, it is this.'* 
 
 Here we have perfect agreement between the pre-evolu- 
 tionist and the post-evolutionist — between the philo- 
 sophical scientist and the scientific philosopher. It will 
 surely require some very strong evidence to overthrow 
 such a concurrence of testimony as this ! 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 147 
 
 VII. The Chasm. 
 
 It may be well at this stage to avoid a possible miscon- 
 ception. To deny that mind can conceivably be resolved 
 into mechanism is not to deny that mental phenomena 
 may be invariably accompanied by changes in the material 
 of the brain. I am myself inclined to believe that such 
 material changes are an invariable accompaniment of 
 thought, though I would freely acknowledge that as yet 
 we have no proof for such a statement. I take this view 
 because of the rapid and massive accumulation of evidence 
 for such concomitance — evidence I deem it unwise, as 
 well as unscientific, to ignore. 
 
 But in spite of the growing accumulation of evidence 
 for concomitance, there is a parallel growing conviction 
 that mental and material phenomena are disparate. There 
 is no perceptible or perceivable community of nature 
 between them. A sensation of red, as Huxley showed, 
 may accompany a certain change in the nervous tissue ; 
 but to bring the two together is unthinkable. A gap 
 separates them which human faculties cannot bridge. 
 Tyndall's pronouncement on this subject is clearness 
 itself ; and Herbert Spencer in full agreement declares ^ 
 that we are " utterly incapable of seeing or even imagining 
 how the two are related .... mind remains a something 
 without any kinship with other things." He goes even 
 further and affirms ^ that " of the two it seems easier to 
 ^ Principles of Psychology^ § 56. ' '"^ Op. cit.y § 63. 
 
148 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 translate so-called matter into so-called spirit, than to 
 translate so-called spirit into so-called matter (which latter 
 is indeed wholly impossible)." 
 
 This last remark of Herbert Spencer's tempts me to 
 forsake for a moment my plan of keeping to the point of 
 view of ordinary dualism, and to suggest in faintest 
 outline the solution of the problem which satisfies me as 
 an idealist. I conceive it to be quite wrong to separate 
 body and soul as though either could exist independently 
 of the other. I hold that the body is the " form " given 
 by the mind to certain of its experiences. It is, so to 
 speak, concrete will infused by ideas. And my body, 
 thus considered, is only part of my universe as " exter- 
 nalised " — " projected " — under the conditions of space 
 and time, which themselves, again, are ideal conditions. 
 For me, therefore, the souls of all living beings are 
 indestructible, or rather, belong to the sphere of the 
 spiritual, the timeless. The particular body I possess at 
 any stage — the present stage or any other — is the special 
 lens (to use Leibnitzian phraseology) through which I 
 perceive or represent my universe at that particular stage. 
 It may be of interest to quote to you Schopenhauer's 
 statement of this view. " The body (he writes ^) is given 
 in two entirely different ways to the subject of knowledge 
 .... as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object 
 among objects and subject to the laws of objects. And 
 it is also given in quite a different way as that which is 
 ^ The World as Will and Idea (Eng, trans.), pp. 129, 130. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 149 
 
 immediately known to everyone, and is signified by the 
 word will. Every true act of his will is also at once and 
 without exception a movement of his body. The act of 
 will and the movement of body are not two different 
 things objectively known, which the bond of causality 
 unites ; they do not stand in the relation of cause and 
 effect ; they are one and the same, but they are given in 
 entirely different ways, — immediately, and again in per- 
 ception for the understanding. The action of the body is 
 nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e. passed into 
 perception." In adopting the general tenor of this state- 
 ment, I would remind you that the will which I would 
 posit at the base of existence is rational and personal. 
 Hence it is that I can believe in the possibility of true 
 progress and development. Each finite will is filled 
 increasingly with the fulness of the Divine Will. Thus 
 the " natural body " may yield place to a higher mani- 
 festation of will and become " a spiritual body." 
 
 But I must return from this degression. I permitted 
 myself to make it only because I desired to illustrate 
 Herbert Spencer's suggestion of interpreting matter in 
 terms of mind. 1 resume the point of view of popular 
 dualism. I have shown that representative modern 
 philosophers allow, with Bain,^ that the mental fact is a 
 two-sided fact, and that a chasm which cannot be crossed 
 separates mechanism and mind. We have escaped from 
 the crudities of a crass materialism. Even though we 
 
 ^ Mind and Body^ p. 1 34. 
 
I50 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 went no further, we might be thankful. But there is the 
 further problem of causation. There are materialists 
 who, while acknowledging the chasm, still hold that the 
 brain is tl)e controlling factor — that the functions of 
 thoughts are causally dependent on the functions of matter. 
 Let us turn to see how it fares with this problem of causal 
 nexus. 
 
 When we examine into the present speculations on this 
 matter, we find that three main solutions are offered. 
 The first allows interaction between mind and body. 
 The second allows interaction in one direction only, that 
 from body to mind. The third allows no interaction at 
 all.^ On the first theory, the brain is regarded as an 
 instrument used by the mind ; sensation as the action of 
 body on mind ; volition as the action of mind on body. 
 There is thus a causal nexus in both directions. We may 
 call this theory " interactionism." The second is known as 
 " automatism." On this theory, the brain processes pro- 
 duce effects upon the mind, but the mind cannot produce \ 
 effects upon the body. We are puppets — marionettes, i 
 pulled by wires seen and unseen. Consciousness is a ' 
 by-product — a mere spectator of results with which it has ■ 
 no more to do than the shadow of a passing train has to i 
 do with its motion. " We are nervous machines with a i 
 useless appendage of consciousness somehow added." ^ : 
 
 i 
 
 ^ For a careful analysis of these three theories, see a recent work, ' 
 IV/iy the Mind has a Body, by C. A. Strong. 
 2 Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 368. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 151 
 
 The third theory is that known as Parallelism. It 
 altogether disconnects the mind and the body. Each 
 goes its own way, uninfluenced by the other, giving as a 
 result two independent series of happenings, each running 
 parallel with the other. This third view is that which is 
 most widely accepted at the present day ; as an idealist, 
 I cannot myself accept it — but, at any rate, it is subversive 
 of materialism. 
 
 As you may well imagine, it is impossible for us to 
 consider these theories at any length. I have mentioned 
 them for two reasons. First, I would have you under- 
 stand how little reason materialism has to boast itself. 
 Its glory (such as it was !) is departing. Even the 
 popular press and the non-Christian socialists will come 
 to understand this ere long. Speculations on the nature 
 of mind are becoming less materialistic every day. But 
 my second reason is more important. I want to bring 
 home the fact that these three theories are each of them 
 concerned only with the causal issue. We may adopt 
 any one of the three, and be at perfect liberty to speculate 
 on the totally distinct problems as to what mind and body 
 are^ and why they are related at all. To say that each acts 
 on each, or that only one acts on the other, or that neither 
 acts on the other, is not to tell us anything of the things 
 which do, or do not, interact. The main facts of mind, 
 of consciousness, and of personality, stand out just as 
 strongly marked as ever — they refuse to be explained 
 away, or resolved into anything less than themselves. 
 
152 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 VIII. Materialistic Dogmatism. 
 
 Let us devote a brief study to the full interactionist 
 theory from the materialistic point of view. I need not 
 specify the various " proofs " adduced for such inter- 
 action — the effects of diseases of the brain, of a blow on 
 the head, of the use of narcotics and stimulants, of change 
 of scene and occupation, and so forth. It is hard for us 
 to escape from the reiteration of the familiar list. Let 
 us grant the phenomena without further discussion. The 
 view I would oppose is that above condemned — the view 
 that the working of atoms produces consciousness — or, 
 in more general terms, that mind is dependent on 
 body. 
 
 James, in his remarkable Ingersoll lecture on " Im- 
 mortality," has rebuked the dogmatism of the materialistic 
 hypothesis. He shows that to argue from the destruction 
 of a brain to the destruction of the life comes from taking 
 too superficial a view of the admitted fact of functional 
 dependence. I shall avail myself of his general line of 
 argument in so far as it bears upon this particular 
 question. 
 
 The great mistake of the materialistic physiologist lies 
 here. When he speaks of thought as a " function " of 
 the brain, he has in view the same creative, or productive 
 function as when he says that light is a function of the 
 electric current. In fact, there are scientists who would 
 have us picture to ourselves atoms at a white heat, as it 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 153 
 
 were, as the causes of consciousness ! But allowing for 
 much more subtle exercise of the scientific imagination 
 than such a crude theory as this would require, the as- 
 sumption remains that this creative, or productive function 
 is the only kind possible. 
 
 But this assumption is a piece of almost inexcusable 
 dogmatism. For there are at least two other kinds of 
 functional dependence with which we are familiar. For 
 example, if I touch a button, which fires a torpedo, which 
 sinks an ironclad, there is functional dependence. But 
 my touch does not create the sinking of the ironclad — it 
 merely releases the forces which do the work. We may 
 call this " the releasing or permissive function." And it 
 is quite possible that the dependence of thought on the 
 brain might be of this releasing or permissive character. 
 The other kind of functional dependence we may call 
 the " transmissive." In this case, the material transmits 
 another force, conditioning it in perchance a thousand 
 ways, but not creating it. For example, a prism absorbs 
 the shaft of light and resolves it into the graded band of 
 the solar spectrum. Here is a still more probable way of 
 explaining the dependence of the mind on the brain. 
 Suppose thought to be a definite and independent form 
 of existence, much as Lodge supposed life to be, and 
 suppose the brain to be the particular conformation of 
 matter which is able to transmit thought, as a telephone 
 transmits sound. Then the thinking power of any con- 
 scious being which happens to be conditioned by brain 
 
154 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 development and structure will vary according as the 
 transmitting machinery is good or bad. 
 
 Now here are two functions of dependence, both 
 absolutely removed from the creative or productive 
 function. By what right does the materialist calmly 
 assume that his supposition is the only one possible ? 
 When we reflect upon such quiet ignoring of all oppos- 
 ing hypotheses, and upon the scornful certainty of the 
 materialistic controversialist, I think we must own to a 
 tremor of fear lest the dogmatic theologian should not 
 come in first in the race. And further — these two other 
 kinds of functional dependence happen to be known to 
 us — may there not be, nay, must there not be an indefinite 
 number of others not known to us ? And when we have 
 the opinions of men like Leibnitz, Huxley, Herbert 
 Spencer, and a host of the greatest thinkers of ancient 
 and modern times, to the effect that thought and mechan- 
 ism are " incommensurables " — that they cannot conceiv- 
 ably be brought together — we may well hesitate to accept 
 the dogmatic materialist as infallible, however cynical he 
 may be. We may rather regard him as a being whose 
 brain has not yet acquired the function of transmitting 
 perceptions of modes of existence higher than the 
 mechanical. 
 
 IX. The Soul. 
 
 We thus find that the dissolution of the material 
 organism by no means necessarily closes for us the 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 155 
 
 avenues into the supernatural world. For even did 
 his own theory necessitate such a conclusion (which is 
 questionable), we are far from being limited to his theory. 
 He has, therefore, no ground, either scientific or rational, 
 for barring our perfectly free discussion of the existence 
 of the soul, and of the hope of immortality. 
 
 The existence of the soul — it is an old question, is it 
 not ? In the Fhado of Plato, to which I have before 
 referred you, Crito asks Socrates : "In what way shall 
 we bury you } " Socrates answers : " I cannot make 
 Crito believe that I am the Socrates who has been talking 
 and conducting the argument. He fancies that I am the 
 other Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body — and 
 he asks how he shall bury me." It is thus that Plato 
 raises the great question in a dramatic setting which fills 
 it with solemn human content. We must acknowledge 
 that Plato's answer to the question was imperfect — but it 
 was noble — so noble that a competent critic ^ has not 
 hesitated to call the Dialogue " the mightiest of the 
 pyramids raised by human hope beside the great river of 
 Time " — so noble that, as the same critic remarks, " when 
 we contemplate, under the pathos of its weakness, the 
 greatness of its power, the question will not fail to suggest 
 itself whether, after all, the strongest argument in the 
 Ph^do is not the Ph^edo itself, which, in its aspirations 
 and aims, is greater than all its arguments." Plato's 
 chief error was the outcome of his implicit dualism. In 
 ^ Geddes, Phado^ Introduction, p. xxx. 
 
156 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the Timaus he does indeed suggest that the body was 
 fitted to be the vehicle of the soul, but he tended more 
 and more to look upon it as a prison house, as a clogging 
 burden from which the soul must seek to be freed. We 
 may grasp his thought by comparing (with Paulsen) the 
 body and the soul to a book and its contents. The body 
 is the paper, the soul the words. The paper may be 
 burnt, but the words can be produced in another edition. 
 Still, I repeat, his error was a noble one — for it sprang 
 from his apprehension of the abiding nature of the soul, 
 and of the dignity of its functions. 
 
 As to Aristotle's theory on the subject, we gained some 
 little idea of it in reviewing his doctrine of Form. We 
 saw that he concluded the soul to be the " form " of the 
 body, and the body to be the " matter " of the soul. He 
 maintains that " this definition should make it evident 
 that we must no more ask whether the soul and the body 
 are one than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed 
 upon it are one." That is to say, the soul, with its 
 consciousness, its moral sense, its will, its emotions, is the 
 realisation of the body. Matter comes to itself in the 
 soul. The body, then, is the soul at its best estate ; and 
 the brain is the most highly developed state of matter. 
 But the meaning of the body is not in itself, but in the 
 consciousness which it renders possible. 
 
 I may say that I hold Aristotle's theory to be sound in 
 its main feature. For it is no longer possible, I think, to 
 regard the soul as a separate entity, a mystical being 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 157 
 
 separate from the body ; nor is it even possible to regard 
 it as something distinct from the content of consciousness. 
 Taken in abstraction, it disappears in a barren concept of 
 unity. 
 
 But may we not build on these ancient theories a new 
 theory which shall embody all that has since been learnt ? 
 Such a theory would seem to take the form that the soul 
 is the conscious activity itself- — the thinking self — the feeling 
 self — the acting self. Such a theory would give us the 
 facts of soul life without leading us into the dim and 
 perilous paths of abstract spirit, metaphysical unities, and 
 all the rest. It gives us all that is really valuable in the 
 old-fashioned theory of a separate soul, while avoiding all 
 the grave objections to which that theory was open. 
 Remember that no theory can alter \}cv^ facts of soul life — 
 it is simply a matter of our interpretation of the facts. 
 Those facts I have shown to centre round the concepts of 
 consciousness, personality, and conscience. If we keep 
 close to those we cannot get far wrong. The body is 
 the matter ; the soul is the form. As the form varies, so 
 will the body in which it expresses itself. 
 
 I do not for one moment pretend that such a theory 
 will solve all the mysteries of the connection between 
 body and soul. But I am confident that it will lead us 
 far on the way to reconciling conflicting claims. On the 
 side of science, it allows of such hypothesis as that framed 
 by the authors of the Unseen Universe. You will 
 remember how, in that intensely interesting speculation, 
 
158 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the vibrations generated in and emanating from our present 
 body are all taken up by the ether, and may be develop- 
 ing for us an ethereal body which will be the external 
 expression of the " self " when it shuffles off this mortal 
 coil. On the side of Christian theology, the doctrine of 
 the resurrection of the body adapts itself perfectly to the 
 continued indissolubility of matter and form. And on 
 the side of metaphysics, the active element in man — 
 conscious, personal, moral — reaches out to the Supreme 
 Person, the Father of Spirits, and " the spirit of man " is 
 seen to be " the lamp of the Lord." Hence progress is 
 not limited by material conditions, and man can gaze 
 unmoved even on the spectacle of a universe in ruins. 
 
 X. Incompleteness of Nature. 
 
 The conclusions at which I have arrived are capable of 
 being reinforced from many sides. I wish, however, 
 to keep as much as possible within the sphere of the 
 evolution hypothesis. And in this connection there is a 
 statement of HaeckeFs which eminently deserves con- 
 sideration. He tells us that, on the whole, evolution 
 appears to be a progressive improvement in historical 
 advance from the simple to the complex, from the 
 imperfect to the perfect. The advance from the im- 
 perfect to the perfect — what does he mean by this ? 
 What is the perfection to which we are moving ? He 
 tells us further that " the life of the animal and the plant 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 159 
 
 bears the same character of incompleteness as the life of 
 man." This term " incompleteness " arrests the attention 
 even more than the term " imperfection." What is 
 meant by " incomplete life " ? What place is there for 
 incompleteness in a closed system of simple " happen- 
 ings " ? Schopenhauer, who bases his universe on the 
 deep under-tow of the heaving ocean of unsatiable desire, 
 can answer this question satisfactorily. But what shall 
 a materialist say ? For him the machinery merely 
 "works," and every result is complete, definite, deter- 
 mined, in and for itself. But Haeckel's acknowledgment 
 of incompleteness goes a long way to prove that existence 
 does imply something more than " happenings " after all. 
 But can there be doubt about the matter ? " Man's 
 unhappiness (says Carlyle ^), as I construe, comes of his 
 greatness ; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which 
 with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the 
 Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers, and Up- 
 holsterers, and Confectioners of modern Europe under- 
 take, in joint stock company, to make one shoe-black 
 kappy ? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or 
 two : for the shoe-black also has a soul quite other than 
 his stomach ; and would require, if you consider it, for 
 his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this 
 allotment, no more, and no less : God's infinite Universe 
 altogether to himself^ therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill 
 every wish as fast as it rose." 
 
 ^ Sartor Resartus^ bk. ii. chap. ix. 
 
i6o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Yes, desires are boundless, and the world is incomplete. 
 Why should we argue from these facts to pessimism ? 
 For, as we saw, we could never criticise that which exists, 
 nor long for better things unless there were in us germs 
 of the ideal which have within them possibihties of 
 indefinite development. We feel instinctively that we 
 ourselves, as well as our world, are only " in the making," 
 so to speak. Or, as St Paul puts it, the whole creation 
 groans and travails, eagerly looking out into the future 
 for greater " completeness," for some higher stage of 
 perfection. Such instincts, such ideals as these cannot 
 be dissevered from their roots in the universe at large. 
 Were the sap not flowing, they would long since have 
 withered and died. We look for the unfolding of larger 
 schemes — the asserting of a wider righteousness — the 
 gain of a deeper knowledge — the attainment of a fuller 
 happiness — the building up of a nobler character. The 
 conviction is confessedly based on life, not on science ; on 
 value judgments, not on syllogisms. But it is none the 
 less significant on that account. It forces itself up from 
 the depths of our being. It represents in us that uni- 
 versally pervading spirit in nature which, having evolved 
 the various inferior forms of life, has proved to us on the 
 stage of world-history that these 
 
 '' All shaped out dimly the superior race, 
 The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false." ^ 
 
 ^ Paracelsus. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND i6i 
 
 And the unity of nature — that very unity which science 
 postulates so eagerly — gives promise that her secret 
 potencies will work out the fulfilment of hopes yet fairer 
 and more daring. The great mother speaks out in the 
 sufferings, the sadness, the aspirations of her child, as 
 Emerson ^ makes her speak — 
 
 " Who has drugged my boy's cup ? 
 Who has mixed my boy's bread ? 
 Who, with sadness and madness, 
 Has turned my child's head ? " 
 
 And the poet's answer comes — loud and cheerful — 
 
 secure in the knowledge that "love lieth under these 
 pictures of time " — 
 
 " The fiend that man harries 
 
 Is love of the Best ; 
 Yawns the pit of the Dragon, 
 
 Lit by rays from the Blest. 
 The Lethe of Nature 
 
 Can't trance him again, 
 Whose soul sees the perfect, 
 
 Which his eyes seek in vain." 
 
 XI. Love and the Incomplete. 
 
 Human desire, then, is infinite — it has the capacity for 
 infinite expansion — and it implies incompleteness. But 
 its chief incompleteness, as also its chief bloom, its glory, 
 is its capacity for Love. Love is a form of human 
 
 ^ The Sphinx. 
 
 II 
 
1 62 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 activity which does not attach itself to the changing, 
 passing qualities of its object, but fixes itself on what we 
 may call the essential being of that object — on Personality. 
 It cannot rest content with anything less than a living 
 and continuous personality. It conquers time — 
 
 " Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, 
 But bears it out even to the edge of doom." ^ 
 
 Nay, Schiller expresses better even than our own great 
 poet the peculiar timelessness and spacelessness of love. 
 When Hector is taking leave of Andromache, he makes 
 him say — 
 
 "Air mein Sehnen will ich, all' mein Denken, 
 In des Lethe stillen Strom versenken, 
 Aber meine Liebe nicht." ^ 
 
 (" My hopes, my longings, all would destined seem M 
 
 To sink in Lethe's slow and silent stream, 
 But not my love.") 
 
 
 Will the materialist point to the teaching of Epicurus 
 on this subject of love ? The picture of Epicurus in 
 his garden, surrounded by his disciples in an atmosphere 
 of friendship, is truly very delightful. The almost 
 unanimous praise bestowed by antiquity upon the gentle 
 affection which distinguished their community was doubt- 
 less well deserved. But shall we say that such friendship 
 displays love in its highest manifestations ? Does it even 
 go as deep as the average love of an average mother for \ 
 
 1 Shakespeare, Sonnet cxvi. 2 ffektors Abschied. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 163 
 
 her child ? Whatever form its actual manifestations have 
 assumed, at any rate its theoretical basis was lamentably 
 deficient ; for it avowedly based upon " utility mutually 
 enjoyed." And this is what love becomes under the 
 etherealising touch of materialism ! Nay, materialism 
 developed under the favouring conditions of modern 
 science and biological speculation, can reach, as we 
 saw, an even yet more ethereal height. It can prove 
 triumphantly, from a " study of organic," that when 
 a man falls in love it is a sign that he is out of 
 health ! 
 
 Compare such teaching as this with the deep insight, 
 the upward rush of living feeling, which glows in the 
 best work of our best poets, and dramatists, and novelists, 
 and painters. Think of Watt's pictures of " Love and 
 Death " and " Love Triumphant." Realise how that 
 the purest love seizes on the essence of its object — on 
 personality — establishes an intercommunion of souls — 
 and spurns the bounds of space and time. And then ask 
 yourselves whether such a capacity as this, constituting 
 the very core of the noblest of our race, does not, by the 
 very pathos and incompleteness of its present environ- 
 ment, lead us on to the conception of stages of existence 
 in which it shall find worthier and wider fields in which 
 to expand its deathless possibilities ? Many of the forms 
 it now assumes are unworthy ; few are altogether free 
 from connection with conditions which are what the 
 logicians would call " accidents," not " properties." As 
 
1 64 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 M'Taggart says/ " These cannot be the ultimate forms 
 under which love is manifested, since they depend on 
 determining causes outside love itself. Love for which 
 any cause can be assigned carries the marks of its own 
 
 incompleteness upon it The nearest approach to it 
 
 we can know now is the love for which no cause can be 
 given, and which is not determined by any outer rela- 
 tion, of which we can only say that two people belong 
 to each other — the love of the Vita Nuova and of In 
 Memoriamy 
 
 This same author, speaking of the frequently blind and 
 irrational character of love, explains the matter thus ^ : 
 " Nothing but perfection could really deserve love. 
 Hence when it comes in this imperfect world, it only 
 comes in cases in which one is able to disregard the other 
 as he is now — that is, as he really is not — and to care for 
 him as he really is — that is, as he will be." What a 
 pregnant sentence this is ! I commend it to your earnest 
 thought. And connect it with those three short words 
 which dive down to the centre of being — God is love. 
 
 Xn. Man as Incarnate Reason. 
 
 Let us sum up. We have seen that a sound ' 
 materialism will give its full weight of the truth that 
 
 ^ Studies in Hegelian Cosmology^ p. 290. See this work, from 
 p. 262 to end, for a most striking exposition of the cosmological 
 significance of love. 
 
 2 Op* cit., p. 262. 
 
EVOLUTION AND MIND 165 
 
 man is formed of " the dust of the ground." But we 
 have also seen that a sound materialism will place no bar 
 in the way of the complementary truth that on the dust 
 is stamped " the image of God " — that we are " partakers 
 of the Divine Nature." We see in this dual aspect of 
 man's being, not a real dualism, but an indissoluble unity 
 manifesting itself as Matter and Form. In other words, 
 man is an incarnation of reason — he is a reasonable soul 
 expressing itself in and through a body. 
 
 The body is a machine. Energy passes through it, as 
 Huxley teaches, just as it does through a steam engine. 
 The heat is kept up by the oxidising of foods. And 
 so with all the mechanical aspects of the body with which 
 we are nowadays so familiar. But all this energy, 
 passing in and out, is the means, interpreted by physical 
 concepts, of enriching and developing the abiding core of 
 personality. Each of us, as a person, can separate himself 
 from all other existences, making them objects for himself 
 as subject. Here is the individual aspect of man's being. 
 But this individuality does not exhaust that being ; it 
 cannot exist in isolation. Each of us is also a member of 
 a " kingdom of persons." Each of us, by reason, shares 
 in the experience of all rational existences. Each of us 
 is linked on by love to souls with whom we can hold 
 communion. And so by links of reason and of love each 
 one of us has part and lot in the great spiritual order 
 which emanated from God and returns to God. What 
 is there in such a view of existence which contradicts any 
 
1 66 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 known scientific fact, or can be disproved by any scientific 
 method ? 
 
 All that I have advanced finds its crown and consum- 
 mation in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Can 
 we therefore wonder that the Church, down the centuries 
 of her career, has expended unequalled energies, has 
 striven even unto blood, for the doctrine of the Incarna- 
 tion ? For in that doctrine she lays hold on, and 
 proclaims to the world, nothing less than the Divine 
 Reason taking form to itself in a human body ; revealing 
 to us the spirituality of existence ; showing Himself to be 
 not Incarnate Reason only, but Incarnate Love ; and in 
 each capacity declaring Himself as the express image of 
 the Father's Person. Such is the doctrine which is the 
 foundation of the Church's creed — the doctrine on which 
 she builds her estimate of human nature, and her hopes 
 for future progress in the power of an endless life. For 
 those who realise with any measure of fulness the 
 implications of this doctrine, the universe is transfigured. 
 They say with St Paul : " The life which I now live in the 
 flesh, I live in faith — the faith which is in the Son of God, 
 Who loved me, and gave Himself for me." 
 
FIFTH LECTURE. 
 
 FREE WILL. 
 
 ®€0v yap icrfxev avvepyoL. 
 " For we are God's fellow workers." — i Cor. iii. 9. 
 
 I. Progress and Human Initiative. 
 
 Free Will ! A subject of perennial and absorbing interest 
 
 to all earnest thinkers. Leslie Stephen tells us the 
 
 problem is already threshed out to the last grains. I 
 
 differ from him. I believe that the real issues are only 
 
 now coming into sight. We have had Schopenhauer's 
 
 philosophy. More recently we have the significant theory 
 
 of " Organic Evolution." Are not these proofs of the 
 
 vitality of the venerable controversy ? As for the future, 
 
 I conceive we are as yet but on the threshold of the 
 
 problem of causation. And until that is more nearly 
 
 solved, how shall we know what Will is ? There is an 
 
 increasing array of eminent thinkers who refuse to be 
 
 bound by the iron law of physical causation, and who 
 
 definitely recognise that there are limits to its application. 
 
 And as regards the dwindling band of " the apostles of the 
 
 167 
 
1 68 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 negative," there is the comforting reflection that while 
 they serve as spurs to further thought and research, their 
 minds are not, after all, measures of man nor of the 
 universe. 
 
 But whether the controversy be threshed out or no, in 
 discussing progress we cannot pass it by. If we are asked 
 to work for the general good, we must arrive at some 
 decision as to the nature of human initiative. Are we 
 merely conscious automata, puppets pulled by wires, seen 
 and unseen ? Or are we capable of genuine co-operation 
 with the forces that make for progress ? If we are 
 puppets, then life must be for us 
 
 " Like a tale of little meaning, though the words be strong." | 
 
 Nay, it cannot have any meaning at all. And we 
 shall but harbour illusions if we imagine that we can 
 avail aught to hasten, modify, or retard the " eternal 
 process moving on." 
 
 Let me ask you to apprehend the present issue clearly. 
 We speak of Progress. The very word has a magic and 
 inspiration all its own. What is our relation to this 
 Progress ? Are we conscious automata or are we not ? 
 If we are, then it behoves us to see that we are not 
 befooled into thinking we are not. Let us see the pitiful 
 farce of life as it is. Then our useless enthusiasm for 
 humanity will die a natural death. We shall acknowledge 
 that the fool rebuked by Solomon is every whit as wise 
 as Solomon himself — perhaps wiser, for he need not play 
 
FREE WILL 169 
 
 at being wise. We shall realise that, individually and 
 collectively, we are swept along on the stream of the fated 
 and the inevitable. 
 
 But if we can discover in man some fount of original, 
 creative, self-determined energy, which shall give him a 
 real part of his own to play, then with a sense of our 
 dignity and responsibility as moral agents, we can 
 
 " be up and doing, 
 With a heart for any fate." 
 
 n. Sphere of the Determined. 
 
 Before we enter on our search for a power of initiative 
 in man, let us make sure that we have shaken ourselves 
 loose from a popular misconception. There are many 
 who think that, when free will is claimed, almost the 
 whole of our waking lives must be brought within the 
 sphere of its operations. Now this is a lamentable error. 
 It shows that there has been no appreciation of what 
 Sidgwick calls " the formidable array of cumulative 
 evidence offered for determinism." ^ It lays the champion 
 of free will open to a multitude of needlessly harassing 
 and dangerous assaults. The Article on Predestination 
 in the Book of Common Prayer should preserve Anglicans, 
 at any rate, from too easy a dogmatism, and should 
 render them more than a little sympathetic when they see 
 scientists grappling with the same problem in another of 
 
 ^ Methods of Ethics^ p. 67. 
 
lyo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 its Protean forms. While we rebel against determinism, 
 let us not ignore the facts of life. 
 
 In the passage from which I have just quoted, Sidgwick 
 states his view that the only valid argument for free will 
 is " the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the 
 moment of deliberate action." Mark the word " de- 
 liberate." As we shall see later, it implies much — a 
 conscious effort of attention ; a putting forth of energy to 
 hold alternatives before the mind, with a resulting sense 
 of tension ; and an act of self-determined decision. Now 
 I ask you to reflect how comparatively rare in life are 
 such acts of deliberate choice. Most assuredly they do 
 not compose the warp and woof of ordinary experience. 
 The roughest analysis will reveal to us the astonishingly 
 large extent to which our nature and our actions are the 
 results of forces and circumstances over which we have 
 had no conscious control. How enormously important 
 are those facts of heredity which have determined the 
 bulk of our physical and mental capacities ! There are 
 the more general facts of organic structure and tendency ; 
 the distinction of sex ; the influences of time and clime, 
 of environment and race, of social and religious conditions ; 
 and there are the more individual facts of character, 
 disposition, and education. Where shall we stop ? Some 
 would say we cannot stop anywhere. I am bold to main- 
 tain that we can. Nevertheless, I am anxious that you 
 should realise the extent to which our lives and fortunes 
 are predetermined. 
 
FREE WILL 171 
 
 Nor must we lose sight of the fact that these pre- 
 determined elements have most of them been predeter- 
 mined in their turn — and so back and back until they are 
 lost in the general constitution of the universe. 
 
 All this has no terrors for the believer in a divinity 
 
 " that shapes our ends, 
 Rough-hew them how we will." 
 
 Rather do we learn the supreme significance of those 
 times, however rare, when we ourselves exert a conscious 
 power from within. For then we feel that we are rising 
 above the externally conditioned elements in our ex- 
 perience, and asserting our spiritual freedom in a spiritual 
 universe. As Cassius urges — 
 
 " Men at some time are masters of their fates ; 
 The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
 But in ourselves." 
 
 But I am anticipating. I hie me back to the search for 
 that which would justify these views. 
 
 in. Indeterminism. 
 
 For what, then, are we about to search ? Is it for 
 some faculty within us that shall be free from all law, 
 and that shall be able to act independently of character 
 and motive, as well as of circumstance ? Must an act of 
 free will be a willing in vacuo, so to speak ? There are 
 few or none who would claim such a power when the 
 question is put to them in this sharp relief. But I have 
 
172 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 never been convinced that the doctrine called " in- 
 determinism " can mean anything less than this. I do 
 not want to entangle myself in a metaphysical discussion 
 as to the possibility of an uncaused cause. Moreover, I 
 have every sympathy with the indeterminists in their bold 
 assertion of human freedom. But I cannot see my way 
 out of the simple dilemma — either the will is determined, 
 or it is not. If it is not, then free will becomes another 
 name for "sheer caprice," if not for "chance" ; and if 
 indetermination is necessary to a moral act, then morality 
 is impossible. L 
 
 For consider the practical bearing of the law of causa- 
 tion. Everybody appeals to it. I need not remind you 
 how the scientist relies upon it : he shrinks in positive 
 horror from the idea of an uncaused event. But I would 
 remind you that the theologian is wont to lean upon it no 
 less heavily when he would use it as the basis for belief 
 in a First Cause.^ Whatever the value of this line of 
 argument may be, at any rate the theologian cannot be 
 allowed to jettison the law of causation when he comes 
 to deal with free will. James, indeed, is prepared to 
 grant ^ an element of pure chance in the act of will : 
 but he will find few to follow his lead. For scientists 
 have rejected the conception of chance, in its older 
 sense, and now deem it to be another name for ignorance. 
 
 1 See a terse criticism of this argument in Hoffding's Philosophy of 
 Religion^ pp. 34 ff. 
 
 2 See The Will to Believe^ pp. 153-159. 
 
FREE WILL 173 
 
 And certainly the theologian cannot take refuge here ; 
 for if chance is a factor in the process of becoming, the 
 world breaks loose from God as well as from man. 
 
 But even if indeterminism were possible, it could never 
 be moral. Unless there be some determining cause, or 
 reason, why one course of conduct is pursued rather than 
 another, whence shall it gain its moral colouring ? All 
 genuine bond of connection between agent and act is 
 destroyed. Character and training have no moral 
 significance ; because, in so far as they determined an 
 action, it would not be free. And responsibility (for the 
 sake of which indeterminism was invented) is a shadow 
 of a shade. Moral conduct becomes a disconnected 
 set of motiveless acts. And the apparent paradox of 
 morality, that the better a man is, the more certain is he 
 to act in a given way on a given occasion, is hardened 
 into a contradiction in terms. 
 
 It was this moral aspect of the law of causation that 
 roused St Augustine to his indomitable championship of 
 predestination. He could not consent to any view of 
 the will which would place the world at the mercy of 
 uncaused and capricious actions. His own doctrine was 
 distinctly more moral than metaphysical. He taught 
 that a man is free when he obeys God's laws, and when 
 he accordingly conquers himself as well as his external 
 conditions. And his doctrine is, of course, profoundly 
 true. It forms an integral part of that which I shall 
 advocate. But it does not satisfy us in our present 
 
174 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 search. For we are left to ask whether a man is free to 
 be free. Can he assert his own will in determining his 
 moral choice, or does this power depend upon some 
 external influence ? For example, in the story of Doctor 
 Faustus, we would ask whether it represents a genuine bit 
 of human experience. Was the Doctor free to sell him- 
 self ? St Augustine did not face this ultimate problem. 
 
 But as against indeterminism, the Augustinian con- 
 tention holds good. Motiveless action is inconsistent 
 with divine government, as well as with reason and 
 morality. 
 
 IV. Self-Determinism. 
 
 I hold, then, that indeterminism is unsatisfactory. 
 What shall be put into its place ? I will give a succinct 
 statement of my own view, in order to make clear the 
 general bearing of the subsequent arguments and dis- 
 cussions. 
 
 I start with the experience we have of will as force, 
 agreeing with Herbert Spencer that the one thing the 
 mind is directly conscious of is just this inherent energy 
 or force which we know as will. Indeed this experience 
 of will as force is the origin of our concept of force. 
 But I go a step further than Spencer, and I agree with 
 Schopenhauer in altogether discarding the idea of force as 
 separate from will. If we can only know force by ex- 
 periencing our own efforts to produce changes, why should 
 we go behind the will itself ^ Why should we not 
 
FREE WILL 175 
 
 take " will " to be the ultimate reality ? In so doing, we 
 need by no means suffer shipwreck, as did Schopenhauer, 
 on the rock of the unconscious and the impersonal. 
 
 Instead of supposing will to be a blind striving, 
 rising into consciousness as an unhappy accident, let us 
 assume what we actually find in experience — the existence 
 of an indefinite number of centres of the will to live. 
 How such independent centres of will came into being 
 is a metaphysical problem with which we need not now 
 concern ourselves. Here they are on every side of us 
 — plants, and insects, and birds, and fish, and animals, and 
 men. Personally I am prepared to find this will to live 
 in the crystal world, and in the ultimate atoms, whatever 
 those may be. Each centre asserts itself, as we saw 
 when considering the theory of organic selection, in and 
 through its environment, selecting such materials as best 
 suit its own strivings to develop fuller life. This will to 
 live passes upward through various stages with a parallel 
 development of consciousness. Consciousness sleeps in 
 stones, stirs in plants, awakes in animals, and knows that 
 it is awake in self-conscious, purposeful man. And in 
 him the will to live, while manifested also in its lower 
 forms, rises at times far above mere striving in response 
 to unsatisfied desire. It rises stage by stage until it 
 displays itself as self-determined activity, directed by 
 reason, steadied by deliberation, and delivering itself in 
 an act of conscious choice between alternatives. It is for 
 volition of this fully developed kind that I claim the 
 
176 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 term " free will." I hold that it is free, not in a negative 
 sense, as being free from external constraint, but in a 
 positive sense, as being able to follow the law of its own 
 nature, and express itself in definite self-conscious, self- 
 determined activities. The will, thus raised to its 
 highest power, can best be described as " the glorious 
 liberty of the sons of God.'' 
 
 Such a view of the will as this afFords us an adequate 
 basis for a philosophy of the universe. We can interpret 
 the lowest by the highest. As Browning says, man flings 
 back his light on all that went before. He 
 
 " Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains 
 Each step back in the circle." 
 
 And as of the past, so of the future. We can trust to 
 
 this upward trend of will, holding with the same poet 
 
 that 
 
 " Man must pass from old to new ; 
 From vain to real, from mistake to fact ; 
 From what once seemed good, to what now proves best." 
 
 Free will, then, I hold, has its roots deep in the will to 
 live. Consciousness bears testimony to its originality as 
 a force. Let the mechanical determinist bombard the 
 citadel never so fiercely, he is himself compelled to act 
 as though he and his fellows had some measure of self- 
 determining power. His very militancy against free will 
 testifies to his power of selecting from alternatives — that 
 is to say, to his freedom. For let us adapt an old 
 illustration. If the lump of clay would turn upon the 
 
FREE WILL 177 
 
 potter and argue with him that it had, or had not, a 
 will of its own, the inference would appear inevitable 
 that the clay was really to some extent independent of 
 the potter. And this remains true, whichever side the 
 clay might take in the controversy. And so of man. If 
 he can at all put himself outside of his environment, even 
 of his own feelings and desires, so as to consider their 
 relation to himself, he must in some sense, and to some 
 degree, be independent of that environment. He asserts 
 himself as against it. That is to say, he is manifest as 
 a centre of independent energy. 
 
 But I have already stated that I do not deem such a 
 doctrine of free will to be inconsistent with a belief in 
 the universality of causation. There is, of course, an 
 apparent contradiction in affirming that the will is free, 
 and yet subject to law. But the seeming contradiction 
 disappears when we distinguish between external and 
 internal law. For I hold, with Kant, that the will is one 
 of the ultimate " reals " of the world, and that it is a law 
 to itself. In obeying itself, it is free. The will, then, is 
 an independent centre of original energy, declaring itself 
 in and through an environment, and acting in accordance 
 with laws inconceivably remote from those of the 
 mechanical type — laws which are the expression of self- 
 developing and self-determining spiritual life. 
 
 From this point of view, the problem of free will 
 assumes a new form. It becomes a problem of causation. 
 
 12 
 
1 78 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 V. Modes of Causation Differ. 
 
 1 have previously tried to show that there are spheres 
 of being in which mechanical concepts are absolutely out 
 of place. Let us test this conclusion in the particular 
 case of distinguishing a physical from a moral necessity. 
 
 That such a distinction is really needed is acknowledged 
 by Karl Pearson. He laments ^ the confusions in the use 
 of the term "law." "We sadly need (he says) separate 
 terms for the routine of sense impressions, for the brief 
 description or formula of science, and for the canon of 
 social conduct, or, in other words, for the perceptive 
 order, the descriptive order, and the prescriptive order." 
 He takes Hooker roundly to task for " stating paradoxes 
 based on a confusion between natural and moral law." 
 In all this I can agree with him. But I fail to follow him 
 when he turns from criticism to construction. He 
 bewilders me. My only explanation of him is that he 
 is determined to overthrow any spiritual view of the 
 universe ; and finding that the idealist attack upon 
 materialism waxes fast and furious, he dresses up the old 
 principles in idealistic uniforms with a view to demoralis- 
 ing the opposing forces. 
 
 Being myself an adherent of the school of Personal 
 Idealists, I can sympathise in many of his statements as 
 to the relation between the mind and its environment.^ 
 
 ^ Grammar of Science, p. 113. 
 
 2 Ethic of Free Thought, chap. i. ; Gramtnar of Science, p. 112. 
 
FREE WILL 179 
 
 So far as I can understand him, he starts with " sequences 
 of sense impressions." Man finds brief expressions to 
 describe these sequences, and calls them " natural laws." 
 Under the stress of social conditions, he frames civil and 
 moral laws to secure self-preservation or a maximum of 
 comfort. All this I can assent to so far as it goes. But 
 I demur when he, on the one hand, refuses to allow us to 
 read reason or purpose into nature, and yet, on the other 
 hand, regards man as a natural product. I can understand 
 Kant when he would separate the world of things-in- 
 themselves from the world of sense, though I cannot agree 
 with him. At any rate I get a distinct " thinker," 
 separate from the things thought. But Karl Pearson's 
 " thinking " hangs in the air. Even the law of causation, 
 he would have us believe, is purely a mental product. 
 This may be defensible if man is detached from the 
 " natural " world into which he reads law. This, speak- 
 ing roughly, would be Kant's position. But if man is 
 himself a part of, or a product of, this " natural " world, 
 then the doctrine becomes meaningless. The whole 
 confusion seems to me to lie in the phrase " natural 
 process," used so often by Karl Pearson. What is this 
 " nature " which manifests itself in these processes ? Is 
 man himself included in this " nature," or is he outside 
 of it ? Karl Pearson seems to adopt the first alternative. 
 If so. Hooker's confusion is thrice confounded. The 
 irrational and lawless gives birth to a being who is 
 rational, who constructs the universe by a vast logical 
 
i8o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 process of thought, who gives laws to his producer, and 
 who then is deluded into reading himself into his 
 producer. Such a philosophy would seem to smell con- 
 siderably of the irrational cask from which its producer 
 conceives himself to have been drawn. 
 
 My point, however, is this. Even with such a 
 philosophy, necessity is found for distinguishing various 
 groups of " laws." I mean exactly the same thing when 
 I urge the necessity for distinguishing various modes of 
 causation. 
 
 Far back in time, Aristotle had struggled with this very 
 problem ; and it is intensely interesting to note his list of 
 causes. He gathers up, as usual, the views, contemporary 
 and traditional, current in his day. As the result of his 
 labours, he enumerates ^ " nature, and necessity, and 
 chance, and reason, and all that depends upon man." 
 How full of significance that last member of the list ! j 
 Man — is he, or is he not, to be put into a special 
 category ? Aristotle said " yes." But he was at a lossi 
 for scientific or logical definition of the kind of causation, 
 exercised by man ; and he therefore had to rest satisfied 
 with the simplicity of the phrase — "all that depends upon^ 
 man." And yet how significant, 1 say, is that phrase! 
 It contains in germ all that Kant, and Fichte, and Hegel, 
 and the Personal Idealists have had to teach us. 
 
 ^ atrtat yat Sokovctlv eivat <pv(TL'S koL dvdyKrj Koi rvxf) ^tl 8k voDs /ca 
 TTOLv TO 8t' dvOp<i)7rov. — JStA. Nic. iii. 3, 7. 
 
FREE WILL i8i 
 
 VL Kant and Causation. 
 
 I have several times alluded to Kant. Let us turn to 
 a brief study of his doctrine on the relation between 
 causation and free will ; for we shall thus be brought to 
 the core of the problem.^ 
 
 On the one hand, Kant recognised that there is an 
 element in man which is independent of the law of causa- 
 tion universally prevailing in the world of sense. He 
 was also convinced that freedom could not be a matter 
 of scientific knowledge, and therefore could not be 
 demonstrated. Nevertheless the doctrine of freedom is 
 a practical necessity ; it is demanded by the facts of 
 human existence. But causation and freedom cannot 
 coexist in the same world — they are contradictories. 
 There must, then, be two worlds — a world of appearances 
 I in which causation reigns, and a world of realities in which 
 I freedom reigns. In the world of sense, everything takes 
 place according to invariable laws. But in the world of 
 realities, underlying the phenomenal world, is found "a 
 rule and order totally different from the order of nature. 
 For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, 
 ought not to have happened which, according to the course 
 of nature, has happened^ and, according to its empirical 
 grounds, was inevitable." That is to say, Kant builds 
 on the distinction I have so often emphasised between 
 i the " is " of " fact " and the " ought " of ideal or duty. 
 
 ^ See Kant's Theory of Ethics (Abbott's trans., passim). 
 
1 82 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 If we ask Kant how man is related to these two worlds, 
 he tells us that man belongs to them both. He is one 
 of the phenomena of the world of sense, and is in that 
 regard subject to the law of causation. But he is also 
 conscious within himself of a supersensuous element in 
 his nature. His knowledge of this element does not 
 come by perception through the senses, but by a higher 
 faculty which Kant calls apperception ! It is this element 
 which recognises the " ought " ; and for the " ought " 
 Kant could discover no ground in experience. It does 
 not belong to the realm of phenomena known to science. 
 But since man finds himself under the influence of this 
 " ought," he knows that he belongs to the world from 
 which the " ought " issues. That is to say, his sense of 
 duty assures him that he belongs to the world of things- 
 in-themselves. And further, since a sense of "ought" 
 can only appeal to a being who knows what "ought" is, 
 and to whom it appeals, it implies a corresponding power 
 of acting in accordance with its behests. In the world of 
 things-in-themselves, man is a free agent. 
 
 But Kant guards himself. "Although freedom (he 
 says) is not a property of the will depending upon 
 physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless ; on the 
 contrary, it must be a causality acting according to im- 
 mutable laws, but of a peculiar kind ; otherwise a free 
 will would be an absurdity.'' When we follow up this 
 lead, and ask Kant wherein this peculiarity of the moral 
 law consists, he tells us it is just this self-determining 
 
FREE WILL 183 
 
 element in man that constitutes him a thing-in-itself — 
 that is to say, one of the " reals " of the universe. Indeed, 
 he holds that the world of realities consists wholly of 
 such self-determining wills. 
 
 But we have further questions to put. We ask how 
 man's will can be free if it is subject to law ? I have 
 myself prepared you for the answer. It brings us to the 
 heart of Kant's moral theory. The moral law is the law 
 of the world of realities — that is to say, of the world of 
 self-determining wills. But this is the same thing as to 
 say that these wills are a law to themselves. And thus, 
 when they are obeying the law of their own innermost 
 being, they are free. 
 
 Such in barest outline is Kant's epoch-making theory 
 of man's moral freedom. It is hard to exaggerate its 
 importance. It asserts the true and essential dignity of 
 man as an agent in a rational universe. It draws with 
 unfaltering firmness the line between physical necessity 
 and obedience to moral law. It concentrates itself in the 
 famous sentence : " Nothing can possibly be conceived 
 in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
 without qualification, except a good will." 
 
 VII. Psychical Causation. 
 
 It is sufficiently patent how many points of agreement 
 there are between this theory and that which I am en- 
 deavouring to expound. Instead of dwelling, however. 
 
1 84 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 upon the points wherein they agree, I propose, in a spirit 
 of grateful reverence, to study some of the points wherein 
 they differ. For by taking this course, the fundamental 
 principles will be brought into clearer view. 
 
 We note in the first place that Kant was not free, 
 as Aristotle had been, from that narrow conception of 
 causality which takes physical causation as the universal 
 type. I trust that in the earlier lectures I sufBciently 
 showed the utter inadequacy of this physical type to cover 
 all the facts of experience. It is simply an intellectual 
 impossibility to apply the categories of physical constancy, 
 persistency, and conservation, to the laws of reason, to 
 the world of meanings and purposes, or to the influence 
 and creation of ideals. Do not imagine that Kant did 
 not realise this impossibility. He realised it so keenly 
 that he forsook causation altogether, and to escape the 
 difficulty, he left the world of sense to soar into an un- 
 knowable world of things-in-themselves. Is the situation 
 so desperate as all this ? To save free will, are we 
 compelled to make an absolute division between the 
 territories of reason and of faith ^ I do not think it. I 
 pass by the serious contradiction involved in the concep- 
 tion of a will which in its actual willings is a slave, and 
 which yet in itself is free. I keep simply to the point 
 that the real being of existence is not mechanical necessity. 
 I believe that we may hold to this view, and yet, with 
 Aristotle, allow the will to play its part on the theatre of 
 time and space. 
 
FREE WILL 185 
 
 Let me quote again from Sir Oliver Lodge. " Matter 
 (he writes^) possesses energy in the form of persistent 
 motion, and it is propelled by force ; but neither matter 
 nor energy possesses the power of automatic guidance 
 
 and control. Energy has no directing power 
 
 Inorganic matter is compelled by pressure from behind it ; 
 it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a 
 preconceived course nor seek a determined end." Such 
 are the limitations of physical causation as described by a 
 competent authority ; and if he is right, we have to look 
 beyond the sphere of the mechanical to explain the world 
 as we actually know it. We find directing power, the 
 influence of the future, preconceived courses, and de- 
 termined ends, here and now, without flying to another 
 and an unknowable world to escape from the grip of 
 mechanical causation. In brief, this type of causation is 
 but one of a group, and can in no way claim the pre- 
 eminence. 
 
 Of the peculiar nature of psychical causation. Sir Oliver 
 gives an admirable illustration. Even an intelligent 
 animal, when it is being pushed from behind, resents it 
 and is in an ignominious position. It is in a rightful 
 position when it is led or called. I like this illustration. 
 It expresses so clearly the difli^erence between agit and 
 agitur — between " he acts " and " he is driven." ^ But if 
 this be true of the higher animals which are almost wholly 
 
 ^ Life and Matter^ pp. 117, 118. 
 
 2 Cf. the Stoic saying, Fata volentetti ducunt, nolentem trahunt. 
 
1 86 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 under the sway of impulse and perception, how much 
 more true is it of man, who can reason, deliberate, and 
 obey a principle ? Human action in the world of sense 
 itself implies modes of causation which utterly transcend 
 the mechanical. 
 
 VIII. Man's Will as Creative. 
 
 But we can claim more for the human will than that 
 it is self-determining. In a very real sense of the word, 
 it is creative. Among the recognised leaders of modern 
 thought is Wundt. And he has pointed out^ that, while 
 the law of mechanical causes is equivalence^ that of 
 psychical development is one of increasing psychical energy. 
 And here again there is an appeal to direct experience. 
 Is it not plain to any thinker who reflects upon his 
 thinking, that psychical event gives birth to psychical 
 event in modes absolutely distinct from the laws of 
 mechanical stresses and strains } The most significant of 
 the diff^srences would seem to be that, as Wundt insists, 
 while the eff^ects of voluntary acts are always determined 
 by definite causes, they are not already contained in the causes. 
 Here we have the psychical parallel to Baldwin's similar 
 contention in regard to the processes of life. It may be 
 possible to explain after the event, but it is impossible to 
 reproduce the series backwards. The will is limited 
 by its environment, but it does not merely ring the 
 changes on given materials. Like the artist, the poet, the 
 
 ^ See the sections on The Will in his Priticiples of Morality. 
 
FREE WILL 187 
 
 sculptor, or the musician, the moral agent brings something 
 new into existence whenever he decides an issue by his 
 power of self-determination. An inherent creative force 
 wells up within him, and prompts him to new combina- 
 tions of the will with ideas — combinations which, though 
 they may be capable of subsequent analysis, cannot wholly 
 be predicted. As is natural, this creative power is most 
 plainly evidenced in the case of a moral genius ; but it is 
 present in its degree in every genuine act of choice. 
 
 There is thus a deep analogy to be traced between the 
 creation of a work of art and the creation of a character. 
 This aspect of the problem of moral action has aroused 
 much attention of late, and will well repay careful study. 
 The laws of morals are seen to correspond in function 
 with the laws of aesthetics, as regulative principles. A 
 countless series of moral decisions contribute to the 
 accumulating stock of social tradition. The great stages 
 are marked by the flashes of insight granted to some pre- 
 eminent moral genius — just as in the case of paintina^, or 
 the drama, or music. The parallel is close throughout. 
 
 It will perhaps now be sufficiently clear that free self- 
 expression is compatible with the reign of law. There is 
 no creation out of nothing, but there is the expression of 
 a self-determining centre of force striving to develop. 
 We do not yet understand physical causation, still less 
 spiritual. But the facts of experience, and of development 
 in art and morals, do not wait upon our explanations ; our 
 explanations must wait upon them. Life evolves, not by 
 
1 88 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 law, but within law. Or rather, laws are our attempts to 
 describe the modes of the development. Hence the 
 adaptability of the Christian conception of morals to all 
 climes and times. The New Testament does not lay- 
 down fixed rules ; it proclaims a new spirit — a fresh influx 
 of life. Who shall lay down rigid rules for living a noble 
 life, any more than for knowledge, truth, or beauty } 
 If the full bloom of our activities is to be attained, there 
 must be spontaneous uprushes of the indwelling, self- 
 determining power. Mere external obedience to existing 
 law is a necessary stage in evolution, but, by itself, is of 
 little worth. Each new moral situation calls for a new 
 act of choice — a new combination of the will and the idea 
 — a new definition of results in the world of concrete 
 realities. 
 
 The moral genius, then, is the man who spontaneously 
 evolves new moral combinations. He will transcend the 
 customary morality whenever it unduly trammels the 
 development of his higher self. His genius will manifest 
 itself in single acts which are thrown off^ at white heat 
 of moral power ; and it will also manifest itself in the 
 building up of the whole character. Janet adduces ^ a fine 
 example of creative power evidenced in a single act. 
 There is a general law that a man ought to sacrifice 
 himself for his country. But who could say beforehand 
 that this law would lead Mucius Scaevola to put his hand 
 into a chafing dish, and let it be burned, so that the enemy 
 
 ^ Theory of Morals. 
 
FREE WILL 189 
 
 might know the kind of men with whom they had to 
 deal ? Or take as an example of progressive insight, the 
 well-marked stages in the law of the treatment of an 
 enemy. Primitive morality said, " Kill him." Later 
 morality said, " Hate him." Chivalry said, " Forgive 
 him." Jesus Christ said, " Love him." 
 
 As we ponder on this creative power, its nature, its 
 functions, and its results, we are led to exclaim — When 
 will the materialistic scientist learn his limitations ? 
 When will he cease to trouble the unwary and the 
 ignorant with the dismal, drear, and soulless creed of 
 mechanical determinism ? The spiritual is in the midst 
 of us. Man is a true " son of God." Let us not be 
 afraid of giving to this name that richness of significance 
 which we find attached to it in the New Testament. If 
 man is a son, then he shares the Father's nature and the 
 Father's power. He has indeed to grow from childhood 
 to manhood. But as he puts " away childish things," he 
 is called upon to exercise in his degree that very creative 
 power wielded by the Father Himself. Thus it is that 
 we come to understand the rich content of the marvellous 
 title accorded to us — " God's fellow workers." 
 
 IX. Line of Least Resistance. 
 
 We are now in a position to appreciate the falsity of 
 the issues raised by the use of certain phrases constantly 
 appearing in discussions on the freedom of the will. I 
 
I90 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 refer to such phrases as " following the line of least 
 resistance," or " obeying the strongest motive." It is 
 plain that these and similar attempts to describe or define 
 the phenomena of volition are borrowed from physical 
 and mathematical formulae for determining resultants. 
 But unless it can first be shown that such formulae have 
 application in the supersensuous sphere, they delude by 
 a fictitious simplicity, and quietly beg the questions at 
 issue. 
 
 There is, however, one mathematical term which may 
 usefully and safely be allowed a wider scope — I mean the 
 term " incommensurables." It is employed in mathe- 
 matics to denote quantities which have no common 
 measure. But there are many other things which have 
 no common measure. How, for example, will you 
 compare together bravery and a triangle ? How will you 
 estimate the porosity of two o'clock ? Or connect the 
 truth that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
 right angles with the fact that I like sugar ? Or estimate 
 the morality of the statement that two and two make 
 four ? And yet it is just such incommensurables as these 
 which are brought together as material for moral judg- 
 ments. Determination of the mechanical type is thus 
 often totally impossible. The laws governing such 
 incommensurables in their connection with moral judg- 
 ments must be of a different kind altogether. The push 
 from behind is of very limited application. 
 
 Recall the distinction drawn in an earlier lecture 
 
FREE WILL 191 
 
 between quantity and quality. John Stuart Mill honestly 
 recognised it, though it destroyed the symmetry of his 
 utilitarianism. He saw and acknowledged that it was 
 better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. 
 No doubt the consequences of the distinction are serious 
 to materialism. But the facts of experience are too strong 
 to allow us to obliterate it. Quality and quantity are 
 incommensurables. And hence it is that reason and 
 moral sense often call upon us to sacrifice, not the weaker 
 for the stronger motive, following the line of least 
 resistance, but to sacrifice the less worthy for the more 
 worthy, the base for the noble, the false for the true, the 
 ugly for the beautiful, the better for the best, following 
 the line of the development of the higher self. 
 
 Moral obligation, therefore, has nothing in it which 
 resembles external constraint. It is utterly misleading to 
 look upon it as a discharge of mechanical force. If I say, 
 " I cannot help doing this," I have the idea in my mind 
 of some external controlling power or of some internal 
 impulse not under the sway of the will. But if I say, 
 " I am morally compelled to do this," I have a totally 
 distinct set of ideas in my mind. The sense of external 
 constraint is gone. I act from within in accordance with 
 laws which express my innermost self. It is insistence 
 on this fundamental truth that constitutes the glory of 
 Kant's theory. I consciously and willingly bend to the 
 authority of the law, and willingly yield my lower to my 
 higher self. As a bird escapes the snare of the fowler, 
 
192 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 and wings its way through the bright blue vault of 
 heaven, so does the soul, escaped from the snare of 
 fatalistic dynamics, wing its way into the free expanse 
 of the spiritual world. The moral agent lives and acts 
 as a son in the Father's house. 
 
 Of the mysterious subject of sin I cannot treat at 
 length. As a dread fact, the evil in human nature 
 declares itself along the whole course of human history. 
 Much of this evil comes from the fight with the lower 
 elements in our nature — the law reigning in the members. 
 Much comes, as we shall see, from the " self" constituting 
 itself as a false centre, in opposition to the social will and 
 to the moral order of the world. But from our present 
 point of view, sin, as the result of perverse moral 
 decisions, is just as directly an outcome of the power of 
 self-determination as is the thinking and doing of the 
 right. There is no sin where there is no recognised law 
 or ideal which claims moral authority. The source of 
 what Kant calls " the bad principle in human nature," 
 merges in the problem common to all systems — the 
 problem of evil. But a spiritual system alone can offer 
 deliverance from evil. 
 
 X. Moral Choice. 
 
 The mention of sin brings us to a subject demanding 
 special study — one which we cannot pass by if we would 
 at all adequately discuss the problem of free will. I have 
 said that man's self-determining power is at its highest 
 
FREE WILL 193 
 
 in the act of moral choice. Now what constitutes such 
 an act ? Is it single, or is it composite ? Let us attempt 
 to analyse it. 
 
 The answers to these questions reveal a great historical 
 cleavage. The Greek mind inclined to Reason as the 
 pre-eminent and essential moral agent. This view found 
 expression in the famous Socratic doctrine that virtue is 
 knowledge, or rational insight. On the other hand, the 
 Hebrews and the Romans claimed the pre-eminence for 
 the Will. The opposition thus revealed raised prolonged 
 debate in the mediaeval schools. Almost every famous 
 doctor espoused one side or the other, and the contention 
 frequently waxed sore and furious. Augustine had been 
 a champion for the will : Aquinas was a champion for 
 the reason. The one school held that it was the choice 
 of the will which rendered the act good or bad : the 
 other school held that it was the rational character of 
 the act. 
 
 The early leaders of modern philosophy almost without 
 
 exception laid the chief stress on reason, while endeavouring 
 
 to find a function for the will. Kant, as we have just 
 
 seen, declared for the primacy of " the good will." 
 
 " Reason (he says ^) is not competent to guide the will 
 
 with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction 
 
 of all our wants (which it even to some extent multiplies), 
 
 this being an end to which an implanted instinct would 
 
 have led with much greater certainty ; and since, never- 
 
 ^ Metaphy sic of Morals^ Abbott's trans., p. 12. 
 
 13 
 
194 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 theless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e, 
 as one which is to have influence on the will^ therefore, 
 admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her 
 capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true 
 destination must be to produce a will^ not merely good 
 as a means to something else, but good in itself^ for which 
 reason was absolutely necessary. This will, then, though 
 not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the 
 supreme good and the condition of every other, even of 
 the desire of happiness." 
 
 With the main purport of this passage from Kant I am 
 heartily in accord. But in the light of modern psychology 
 I would put the matter somewhat differently. 
 
 First of reason : What are its moral functions ? It is 
 
 obvious that reason is essential to the appreciation of the 
 
 facts of the moral life, and to the practical application of 
 
 the moral standard. A will may be instinctively good ; 
 
 but it has not come to itself until it knows that it is good. 
 
 It is also obvious that reason cannot be placed among 
 
 motives as one of their number. It stands above them — 
 
 examines, selects, arbitrates. In short, without reason, 
 
 there can be no conception of human life, nor of the 
 
 bearings and relations of its various activities and duties. 
 
 Reason, therefore, is essential to morality ; for without 
 
 it, there can be no genuine development of the " self." 
 
 But it does not follow that reason is on this account the 
 
 sole determining element in morality. It can sift : it can 
 
 weigh : but it cannot take the place of feeling : nor can 
 
FREE WILL 195 
 
 it take the place of will. The Socratic claim that virtue 
 is knowledge must then be put aside. 
 
 How, then, about the will ? There is a modern 
 version of the older doctrine which makes the essence of 
 a moral act to consist in the power of fixing the attention. 
 James, for example,^ goes so far as to say that the keeping 
 of a difficult object before the mind is " the essential 
 achievement of the will when it is most voluntary." He 
 calls this act of holding fast the true fiat. He even 
 affirms that thus " to sustain a representation, to think, 
 is the only moral act." From this point of view the 
 Socratic dictum would be altered to " virtue is the power 
 of attention." 
 
 Who shall deny the cogency of this reasoning ? Unless 
 a man is able to pull himself together, to fix the alternatives 
 in his mind, to give his motives a larger setting, and to 
 let each have a fair chance of exercising its due influence 
 — unless a man is able to make this effort, he cannot 
 become a moral being. And this effort requires clearly 
 an act of will. The will, therefore, is seen to be an 
 essential factor in an act of moral choice. But here again 
 we must deny to it the right to be the sole determining 
 factor. 
 
 But how if we combine the two — the will and the 
 reason — shall we not then have what will suffice for an 
 act of moral choice } I maintain that we shall not. The 
 
 ^ Psychology^ vol. ii., chap, on " The Will." Compare Kiilpe, 
 Psychology, p. 215, and pp. 449, 450. 
 
196 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 will and the reason in combination can give us the well- 
 known sense of " tension." They suffice to prove that, 
 as Aristotle says, there is within our single personality 
 " a power which includes opposites." Though even 
 here there must be added the element of feeling which 
 makes it worth while to keep up the struggle against a 
 premature decision — the struggle which Descartes felt to 
 be so vital to morality. But there is nothing yet to give 
 the moral colouring to the decision. Reason may secure 
 a wise decision ; but it cannot exercise moral choice. No 
 doubt the two qualities, wisdom and rightness, are 
 ultimately one. But for us with our present constitution, 
 the distinction between right and wrong is one that is felt, 
 not reasoned out. A man may have the subtlest intellect, 
 and foresee consequences most accurately ; but unless he 
 feels that a certain course is right, the rights and feelings 
 of others will meet with scant consideration. No great 
 knowledge of life is necessary to justify this statement. 
 The moral sense, therefore, is another essential factor in 
 any true act of moral choice. 
 
 In mentioning feeling as necessary to a moral act, I 
 have involved a potent spirit which threatens to dwarf, 
 if not enslave, all other factors. The giant form of 
 Pleasure, or Happiness, towers aloft — who shall with- 
 stand it ^ 
 
 Kant gave battle, and that right valiantly. Armed with 
 his " Duty for duty's sake," he altogether repudiated the 
 claims of pleasure as a moral agent. He held that, in 
 
FREE WILL 197 
 
 proportion as pleasure entered into the motives of an act, 
 duty lost her native strength and dignity. He was 
 almost compelled to take this view because of the exi- 
 gencies of his metaphysical system. Duty must belong 
 to his world of things-in-themselves — whereas sensations, 
 impulses, and desires manifestly belong to the world of 
 phenomena, and are, therefore, in the grip of the law of 
 causation. Duty and pleasure must, therefore, be divorced. 
 Such was the train of reasoning to which he was driven if 
 he would be consistent. 
 
 Kant stands out as a thorough-going representative of 
 the school of moralists who hold that fulfilment of the 
 moral law is the supreme moral aim. The opposing 
 school hold that man's chief good lies precisely in the 
 pursuit of pleasure, and that pleasure, therefore, is the 
 supreme moral criterion. This hedonist doctrine takes 
 many forms, from that of Aristotle, who based his Ethics 
 on the linking of happiness to the perfection of human 
 life, down to the modern schools of Evolutionary 
 Hedonists. They all agree, however, in maintaining 
 that happiness constitutes the end of human action. How 
 does this ancient and still vigorous controversy affect our 
 present problem ? 
 
 I answer at once that, after what I have urged as to the 
 function of feeling in passing judgments of value, I am 
 bound to accept pleasure as a factor in the act of moral 
 judgment. But I do not on this account deny the truth 
 of the intuitionalist doctrine that morality is founded on 
 
198 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the nature of things. Personally I believe that a rational 
 synthesis of the opposing views is possible, and that it is 
 even now being brought about.-^ 
 
 Few will deny that Kant's doctrine is noble ; few also, 
 I think, will deny that it is out of touch with real life. 
 As against the hedonist, experience teaches that a sense 
 of duty may frequently oppose the solicitations of sense. 
 Duty is often seen to lift its serene head above the storm, 
 and rebuke the lawless violence of the gusts of passion 
 that lash its waters into storm. Duty issues the fiat of 
 its " ought," and condemns that which is without care for 
 individual ease or pleasure. Evolution, also, has rendered 
 the old form of hedonist doctrine untenable. Nature's 
 care is not for the individual, but the type. Nevertheless 
 it is unnatural, and therefore dangerous, to thrust feeling 
 aside as void of moral value. 
 
 In the first lecture I tried to show that feeling and will 
 and reason are each and all so closely united that it is 
 difficult, if not impossible, to draw any hard and fast line 
 between them. When feeling prompts us to say, " I like 
 this " or " I do not like that," it is passing judgments of 
 value ; and these shade off into logical or discursive judg- 
 ments. Feeling is also so akin to will, that many would 
 regard what we call will as a kind of secondary product 
 
 ^ Cf. E. Cairdj Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers^ 
 vol. i. p. 371. ''Morality passes into religion, not as with Kant, by 
 the external postulate of a Deus ex machina who shall bind together 
 goodness with happiness, or the spiritual with the natural world, but 
 by the recognition that there is one principle underlying both." 
 
FREE WILL 199 
 
 of feeling. In any case we saw that the three are bound 
 together in the indissoluble unity of mental activity. 
 
 Now, since these things are so, it seems to be impossible 
 for us to accept Kant's doctrine of abstract duty.^ 
 Modern psychology forbids us to say that a man can act 
 from an abstract sense of pure duty. Even Kant himself 
 has to admit "a feeling of respect for the law of duty." 
 He could not help himself. For feeling is necessary to 
 give the sense of worth or value. And we are thus 
 encouraged to ask why pleasure and duty should not be 
 different aspects of one and the same underlying aim — 
 the realisation of fuller life for the self. If this can be 
 granted, we need not break away from a true hedonism. 
 Religion need not gather up her robes and pass by on the 
 other side. For did not the Psalmist sing, in blissful 
 ignorance of all our controversies, that at God's " right 
 hand there are pleasures for evermore " ? 
 
 Once again, however, I have to urge that because any 
 particular factor can be shown to be essential to an act of 
 free choice, it does not follow that it is to stand alone as 
 the supreme determinant and arbiter. Pleasure is an 
 essential factor ; but it is not the complete whole of which 
 we are in search. 
 
 What, then, is this whole ? I trust I have prepared 
 you for the answer. It is not reason alone — nor will 
 
 1 I deal later with the fact, now acknowledged by nearly all 
 morahsts, that pleasure can seldom be the direct object of pursuit. 
 It accompanies, rather than produces, right action. 
 
200 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 alone — nor feeling alone. But it is the living unity of 
 the three combined in the " total " man.^ Moral choice 
 is the highest function of a being who can will, and feel, 
 and think, and who cannot exercise any one of these 
 powers in isolation from the other two. As Green puts 
 it — a man's action is the result of his character acting 
 under certain circumstances. Or, as I prefer to put it, a 
 man's action is a manifestation of the will to live as it 
 exists at the moment of deliberate volition, conditioned by 
 its environment. This means determinism if you include 
 the man himself in the total of causes at work. But the 
 man is free in so far as he is self-determined. That is to 
 say, I deny that his action is determined if that is taken to 
 imply that his action is the result of mechanical determinism. 
 But it may be asked further — Must not human action 
 under such conditions be at any rate the outcome of 
 necessity ? Let Green answer this for us. " All results 
 (he writes) are necessary results. If a man's action is the 
 result of his character and circumstances, we in effect add 
 nothing by saying that it is their necessary result. If it 
 is not the result of character or circumstances, or (as we 
 prefer to say) if it is not the expression of a character in 
 contact with certain circumstances, there must be some 
 further element that contributes to its determination. 
 
 ^ Cf. Aristotle, De Anima^ i. iv. — to Se Xiyuv opyi'^co-^at rrjv xj/v^riv 
 ofxoLov Kciv €L Tt9 Xcyot TYjv if/v)(r)v v(fiaLveLV y oiKoSofMetv fdeXxLov yap tew? 
 fjLr) Aeyetv Tr]v if/v)(r)v ikcetv, r] fxavdavcLv rj Stavoetcr^ai, 'aA.A.a tov avOptnirov 
 
FREE WILL 20I 
 
 What is that further element ? ^ Free will * some one 
 may say. Very well ; but free will is either a name for 
 you know not what, or it is included, is the essential 
 
 factor in character It is simply a confusion to 
 
 suppose that, because an action is a result — and if a result, 
 a necessary result — of character and circumstance, the 
 agent is therefore a necessary agent, in the sense of being 
 an instrument of external force or a result of natural 
 events and agencies."^ I freely adopt this statement, with 
 the reservation that I would like to substitute the phrase 
 " the whole man " for the word " character." This latter 
 savours too much of " impress." I want the active 
 principle. 
 
 I maintain, then, that we do not need a kind of separate 
 will which shall be independent of motive and circumstance. 
 I am content with " the will to live." And I am convinced 
 that in the doctrine of individual will-centres, self- 
 determining, and rising stage by stage into ever higher 
 modes of freedom, we have the means of reconciling the 
 chief opposing schools of ethics, of bringing ourselves into 
 line with modern psychology, and of satisfying our desire 
 
 ^ Green, Prolegomena, p. 113. Character means "impress," and 
 denotes, properly, the resultant of past impressions. Hence my 
 preference for some expression which connects "original activity." 
 Moreover, the word character, as here used, suggests (as Green 
 himself saw) " the idea of an alien force which, together with the 
 other force called circumstances, converges upon him, moving him 
 in a direction which is the resultant of the two forces combined, and 
 in which accordingly he cannot help being carried." 
 
202 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 for a philosophy which shall " see life steadily and see it 
 whole." And for theologians there is the comforting 
 thought that such a doctrine is practically that of the 
 great Augustine. For he held that the will is primary 
 both in God and man, and that it virtually includes all the 
 rest. Hence his pregnant statement — omnes nihil aliud 
 quam voluntates sunt. 
 
 XI. Am I Responsible } 
 
 You will remember Sidgwick's statement, that the 
 only valid argument for free will is " the immediate 
 affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate 
 action." At the time, I insisted on the word " deliberate." 
 I made no remark, however, on the view that this is the 
 only valid argument. But my silence did not imply an 
 acceptance of the dictum. I do indeed believe that this 
 testimony of consciousness is equal to the burden it has 
 to bear. But I hold that there is another of nearly, if 
 not quite, as cogent a character. I refer to the sense of 
 responsibility. 
 
 Were we but automatic puppets, how grotesque would 
 be the world ! Creatures, pulled by wires, praising and 
 blaming each other for things which none of them could 
 help doing ; and, stranger still, approving or condemning 
 themselves. Of course this grotesqueness does not prove 
 or disprove anything. But it compels us (does it not ?) 
 to mistrust any theory which appears to necessitate it. 
 Further, it can escape the testimony of experience only 
 
FREE WILL 203 
 
 by telling us that in thinking ourselves responsible, we 
 are under an illusion. Oh, the grim delight some seem 
 to take in assuring poor mortals that " illusion " is the 
 last word of philosophy ! But the true man shakes him- 
 self free in scorn. You will recall the noble passage I 
 quoted in which Socrates disdains the idea that he is a 
 mechanical automaton, kept in the prison by a concurrence 
 of forces with no personal will at the back of them. Does 
 not every true heart thrill in sympathy with his ? 
 
 Yes ! Define freedom as you will, the sense of 
 responsibility lifts up its insistent voice, and assures us 
 that to be a moral agent is something quite distinct from 
 being a puppet pulled by wires, or, to use the language 
 more consecrated by " advanced " science, " a conscious 
 automaton." The distinction between actions for which 
 we are and actions for which we are not responsible 
 is ineffaceable. And if the distinction exists, there 
 must be ^ome ground for it. And the ground must 
 be such as will give some genuine significance 
 to praise and blame. Is there any ground con- 
 ceivable, short of some measure of self-determining 
 power ? Butler's contention ^ still holds good : " A 
 machine is inanimate and passive ; but we are agents. 
 Our constitution is put in our own power. We are 
 charged with it, and therefore are accountable for any 
 disorder or violation of it." Or, as Huxley puts it, we 
 are machines which can mend themselves. 
 
 ^ Pref. to Sermons, § 13. 
 
204 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 XII. Social Aspects of Free Will. 
 
 It is a weighty confirmation of the views advanced in 
 this lecture that there has been developed, and is still 
 developing, a social conception of free will. That is to 
 say, society has adopted a belief in the responsibility of 
 its members for certain of their acts. I do not refer to 
 what is known as " legal " responsibility, in its often 
 technical and artificial ramifications.^ I refer to that 
 working basis of a moral character which society feels to 
 be necessary as a justification for the administration of 
 rewards and penalties. 
 
 Mill and others have argued that since the will is 
 determined by the strongest motive, punishment is 
 justifiable as an influence to strengthen the weak will of 
 the wrong-doer. In fact. Mill would make responsibility 
 equivalent to the " knowledge that punishment will be 
 just." ^ But unless responsibility meant more than this, 
 punishment would not he just at all^ in any sense of the 
 word worth fighting for. Moreover, this connection of 
 responsibility with punishment as an invariable concomitant 
 is false to the facts of experience. A man can be re- 
 sponsible to himself, to a self-imposed law which he 
 recognises as binding — to an ideal — to an inner call — 
 quite apart from thought of punishment. 
 
 1 See this line of thought well worked out in Hadley's Freedom 
 and Responsibility^ chap, iv., "Freedom as a Legal Institution." 
 ^ See the discussion in Mill on Hamilton^ chap. xxvi. 
 
FREE WILL 205 
 
 Of course, on the principles of strict determinism, the 
 punishment is determined in exactly the same sense as 
 the fault. Responsibility, guilt, punishment, justice, are 
 all alike simply names for certain concatenated series of 
 experiences, and I do not see that there is more to be said. 
 They all alike must be, together with discussions and 
 conclusions about them. They all simply happen, and 
 could not be otherwise. But if we rebel against this 
 view of life, and if we grant some value to our sense of 
 justice. Mill's theory will not content us. If I am not 
 responsible, I ought not to be punished. To say that I 
 acted from the strongest motive does not alter my feeling 
 of injustice if I feel that I do not deserve a punishment. 
 It cannot be that a multitude of automata, deluded into 
 the idea that they are not automata, deal out penalties 
 to keep themselves from acting as though they were 
 automata. Can absurdity further go ! Society, to save 
 itself from such a nightmare, has evolved its working 
 theory of free will. True indeed that our legal 
 codes fall far short of ideal justice. True, we have 
 still much to learn about criminology and penology, as 
 well as about fair modes of distributing social rewards. 
 The complexities of life are often bewildering. Still, 
 the social sense of justice, so far from being disinte- 
 grated, is growing steadily, and is the source of our 
 progress in adjusting our methods to varying degrees 
 of responsibility. 
 
 The sense of responsibility is thus seen to be a great 
 
2o6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 social institution, of universal validity, and of growing 
 solidity. Can we ascribe it to a mere illusion ? 
 
 Having touched upon this social aspect of free will, it 
 may be interesting to note another of the ways in which 
 social institutions are brought into practical relation with 
 our problem. There is manifested on various sides a 
 fear that the State may interfere unduly with the indi- 
 vidual. As social organisation increases, the area of 
 individual liberty appears to become more circumscribed. 
 There is a tendency, say some, to mould us all after the 
 same pattern, and to repress the variations necessary for 
 progress. Mill uttered his passionate protest^ against 
 curtailments of individual liberty, and Herbert Spencer 
 followed with a powerful and detailed indictment of State 
 interference. To brush aside the serious protests of two 
 such thinkers would be folly. Nevertheless, I am con- 
 vinced that there are many misconceptions mingled with 
 their sounder arguments. 
 
 For how is progress possible ? Evolution has taught 
 us that individual variations are necessary. But so, also, 
 are social institutions. For, without social organisations 
 in which the favourable variations may be embodied and 
 conserved, little is gained. There are, of course, bad 
 institutions as well as good ; and we cannot be too care- 
 fully on our guard against the bad. The general fault is 
 a tendency to class legislation which fetters the many for 
 the benefit of the few. But this fault is not inherent in 
 ^ See Mill's Liberty^ and Herbert Spencer's Man versus the State. 
 
FREE WILL 207 
 
 legislation, or in social organisation. Restraint is not 
 an evil in itself. Rather is it true that when healthy 
 tendencies are crystallised in social forms, they are most 
 powerful aids, not only to social progress, but to the 
 development of individuals. They do not repress freedom, 
 but give it scope for exercise. In fact, they afford the 
 social parallel to habits in the individual. Habits, too, 
 may be bad as well as good. But we do not on that 
 account strive to reduce our habits to a minimum. It is 
 so clearly to our advantage to multiply our good habits 
 that their formation becomes a direct object of our moral 
 discipline. They economise time and labour, and leave 
 us free for new developments. There is no sounder in- 
 vestment than a good habit ; and a good social institution 
 is its counterpart. The adequate discussion of this 
 matter would lead us to consider the nature and the 
 function of the social factor in progress, and that I must 
 reserve for the next lecture. Here I merely deny the 
 false antithesis of " Man versus the State," as though 
 the State were the enemy of the individual. Just as 
 reason and moral sense become incarnate in nerve and 
 muscle and tissue, so do they become incarnate in social 
 tradition and organisation. And just as co-ordinated 
 muscles and nerves and tissues fit us to conquer our 
 environment, so, on the large scale, do social institutions 
 extend the area of our free action by lessening the 
 tyranny of external compulsion. Hence it comes that 
 the civilised man is more free than the savage, the 
 
2o8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 disciplined than the wayward character. Rational obedi- 
 ence flees from passion, from harmful prejudice, and 
 from hampering tradition. And on these grounds we 
 are led to anticipate that, as individual and social organi- 
 sation proceed in healthy and concurrent development, 
 so will the compulsory element in our environment — 
 that sphere of the determined which is still so large — be 
 conquered and diminish. That is to say, we have reason- 
 able ground for holding that the compulsory element in 
 our experience is contingent only, not essential. 
 
 XIII. An Eirenicon. 
 
 Am I over-sanguine in thinking that in some such 
 theory as I have outlined, there will be found the means 
 of reconciling the great opposing schools of moralists ? 
 I do not believe that any doctrine which has received 
 powerful and continuous advocacy through long periods 
 of time can be empty of value or significance. May not 
 determinists and indeterminists both be right in their 
 characteristic essentials, and yet both need modification ? 
 Cannot both armies combine without any serious lowering 
 of colours on either side ? Life is wide, and the human 
 mind is narrow. The more we know, the less we shall 
 differ. 
 
 I hold that theologians, scientists, and philosophers, 
 can all alike concentrate their forces on the fundamental 
 "will to live." All else is implicit in that, up to the 
 
FREE WILL 209 
 
 very will to love. For the fullest life means love. 
 
 Given certain centres manifesting the will to live, and 
 
 rising, in an environment, and by stages, from obscure 
 
 striving to full self-conscious personality — given these 
 
 and all else seems to find its place. The environment by 
 
 which development is conditioned is being gradually 
 
 conquered. The original energy and creative power 
 
 which characterises these centres of will asserts itself over 
 
 all that is external, and increasingly transforms it into 
 
 material for its self-expression. The goal to which the 
 
 whole process of evolution tends is thus seen to be the 
 
 attainment of ever richer and happier spiritual freedom. 
 
 And inasmuch as the will to live belongs to the sphere 
 
 of the supernatural, it escapes the sweep of the iron 
 
 law of causation, of limitations of time and space. It 
 
 develops and expands eternally in the sphere of the 
 
 ideal. 
 
 That there are degrees of freedom is obvious from 
 
 the facts of experience. There is the freedom of the 
 
 magnetic needle which swings freely on its pivot and 
 
 comes to rest without external hindrance. There is the 
 
 higher freedom of the plant which expands its latent 
 
 powers under favouring conditions of air and soil, of 
 
 sunshine and of shower. There is the still higher 
 
 freedom of the moral agent who can " be determined 
 
 in his action by a reflective choice between diflFerent 
 
 motives." ^ This is the freedom which contains the 
 
 ^ Wundt, Principles of Morality^ Eng. trans., p. 37. 
 
 14 
 
2IO THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 secret of man's greatness, and defines his rightful place 
 in the cosmos. 
 
 XIV. The Church the Society of Free Spirits. 
 
 And what of the bearing of Christianity on all this ? 
 Why, Christianity here, as ever, carries all on to the 
 highest plane. It brings to us the conception of an 
 ideal society which is to be a kingdom of free spirits, in 
 which each shall be an end in himself and yet find his 
 truest self by living in the life of all. To this society is 
 given the name of " the Church of the Living God." It 
 is founded on the Person of Him Who died for the race. 
 It is filled with the Spirit by Whom its members know 
 themselves to be the sons of God. In this society, each 
 is absolutely free, because he obeys the laws of his own 
 being ; and those laws are identical with the will of God, 
 who desires the highest happiness of every member of 
 the great spiritual family. The appeal in this kingdom 
 is ever to inner freedom, not to external force. Its 
 Founder stated the essential principle of its existence 
 when He said : " I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men 
 unto Me." The law is to be lived, not obeyed, for it is 
 to be the innermost nature of the agent himself. It is 
 thus that love becomes the fulfilling of the law. The 
 will to live is transmuted into the will to love. Each 
 learns to lose his life in the lives of others, and so each 
 finds his life for time and for eternity. 
 
 No doubt this is an ideal. No doubt the actual Church 
 
FREE WILL 211 
 
 on earth falls far, far short of her high aim and calling. 
 But still, there is the ideal as her possession, and new 
 life and effort are always possible. Why, then, should 
 not all social enthusiasts, all lovers of true freedom, join 
 in a mighty effort to come nearer to this ideal than has 
 ever yet been possible ? The Church exists and works 
 here on earth, and no form of honest human effort is 
 alien to her spirit and her aims. But she also reaches 
 out into the spiritual ; she sees all human life and labour 
 sud specie teternitatis. And thus, with a firm hold both 
 on the actual and on the ideal, she lifts high the banner 
 of progress. What might not be accomplished if all lovers 
 of their kind would but join hands and hearts in the 
 brotherhood of " God's fellow workers " ! 
 
 APPENDIX TO LECTURE V. : MORAL 
 
 STATISTICS. 
 
 Many minds are somewhat perturbed by certain results of the 
 
 taking of "moral statistics." It is found that, when the numbers 
 
 included are sufficiently large, the percentages for a group of 
 
 I common crimes remain fairly steady. It would seem to follow 
 
 that such statistics prove that moral events lend themselves to 
 
 I the same methods of calculation as are possible in the case of 
 
 • mechanical probabilities, and that therefore human conduct is 
 
 mechanically, or, at any rate, mathematically determined. 
 
 In considering the significance of these statistics, we must be 
 careful not to lay too great stress upon their accuracy. Their 
 steadiness is not so marked as a superficial examination might 
 
212 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 lead us to suppose. But even if we grant their accuracy, they 
 need not alarm us. For if we allow that self-determination is at 
 work in an environment of externally determined conditions, 
 we do not therefore assert that the constitution of things is 
 necessarily inconsistent with the prevalence of marked regularities, 
 even in the sphere of the self-determined. The externally 
 determined forces are always at work, and the will-centres 
 develop by virtue of their reactions upon the given material. 
 The average type of will-centre will react in an average way 
 while still remaining self-determined. 
 
 But we need not even concede so much as this. For we know 
 from direct experience that a general purpose may run through 
 a process of evolution without interfering with individual pro- 
 cesses. Such an idea is familiar to theologians in connection 
 with the development manifested in the Bible history. God fulfils 
 His divine purposes without interfering with human responsibility. 
 
 But since theologians may not be as clear in regard to the 
 ground of this theory as they are in regard to its truth, I would 
 draw attention to an illustration used by Baldwin in dealing with 
 this very problem.^ I adapt to my present purpose its general 
 drift. 
 
 Consider the business of a life insurance society. It is based 
 on certain calculations of the chances of Hfe, drawn up in 
 mortality tables, in accordance with the law of probabiKties. The 
 conditions of the Hves involved are indefinitely varied, and their 
 course is run quite independently of the calculations of the society 
 which insures them. Individual purpose and initiative swing 
 quite free of the existence of the society, save in so far as the 
 particular element of risk is provided for. 
 
 But further, the society which bases its operations on the law 
 of probabilities, itself serves a double purpose. It secures the 
 
 ^ Development and Evolution^ pp. 231 ff. 
 
FREE WILL 213 
 
 purpose of eliminating, to varying degrees, the risk of financial 
 risk or difficulty in the case of those who benefit by the 
 insurances. And it also fulfils a purpose which centres in itself 
 as a society, by providing dividends for stockholders and salaries 
 for officials. We thus see that a regular web of purposes can be 
 fulfilled on a basis of probabiKties. Observed regularities are 
 found not to be incompatible even with alien purposes running 
 side by side. 
 
 With such facts before him Baldwin asks : " Why is it not 
 a reasonable view that cosmic Purpose — if we may call it so — 
 works by similar, but more adequate knowledge of the whole, 
 and so secures its results — whether in conformity to^ or in contraven- 
 tion ofy our particular strivings ? " 
 
SIXTH LECTURE. 
 
 MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING. 
 
 "We are members one of another." — Eph. iv. 25. 
 
 I. The Social Factor. 
 
 More than two thousand years ago, the " Master of 
 those who know *' recognised and proclaimed that man 
 is by nature a social being.^ By this he did not mean 
 to imply merely that man seeks companionship. He had 
 something much more fundamental in his mind. To 
 adapt one of his own illustrations, he meant that the 
 isolated individual is no more a man than a hand is a 
 hand without the body. He had a clear prevision, in all 
 essentials, of what we now call " the social factor." And 
 he was thus ahead, not only of the social thinkers of his 
 own times, but of all times almost up to the present. 
 For compare two passages. The first is from the work 
 in which Aristotle develops his doctrine,^ as stated above. 
 " That the State exists by nature, and is prior to the 
 
 ^ja.v6po)7ro^ cfivcreL ttoXltlkov ^wov* ^ Politics^ i. i, 2. 
 
 214 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 215 
 
 individual, is proved by the consideration that the 
 individual is not self-sufficing ; he is therefore a part, like 
 every other part, relative to the whole, and so implying it." 
 In this profound utterance are implicit the latest develop- 
 ments of social theory. It gave a splendid lead for social 
 theory and practice. But alas ! it was never worthily 
 followed up. And even at the beginning of the latter 
 half of last century, John Stuart Mill could write as 
 follows ^ : " Men in a state of society are still men ; 
 their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of 
 individual human nature. Men are not, when brought 
 together, converted into another kind of substance, with 
 different properties ; as hydrogen and oxygen are different 
 from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and azote, 
 are different from nerves, muscles, and tendons. Human 
 beings in society have no properties but those which are 
 derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the 
 nature of individual man." 
 
 This — and from John Stuart Mill, with Comte behind 
 him — and more than two thousand years after Aristotle ! 
 One of the debts of gratitude we owe to the conception 
 of evolution is that we have learnt to study the individual 
 in his relation to his social environment with a fresh 
 realisation of the solidarity of humanity. In Mill's 
 statement we miss even that ring of social consciousness 
 which burst into applause when Terence's line was first 
 
 ^ Logic^ bk. vi. chap. vii. § i (quoted by Sidgwick, Philosophy^ its 
 Scope aftd Relations, p. 153). 
 
2i6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 declaimed : " I am a man — and nothing that pertains to 
 man do I deem to be alien from me." ^ Not that I would 
 have you think Mill lacking in his recognition of the indi- 
 vidual's debt to society. My complaint is that he altogether 
 underrates the function and nature of the social factor. 
 
 Before going into more general questions, let me cite 
 a few familiar facts which will at once prove Mill to be 
 wrong in his assertion that " human beings in society have 
 no properties but those which are derived from, and can 
 be resolved into, the laws of the nature of the individual 
 man." The psychology of crowds is a much neglected 
 field of research. But we all know this much, at any 
 rate, that the behaviour of humanity in mass is something 
 more than the sum of the behaviour of the individuals 
 composing the mass. Men will often allow themselves, 
 when associated together, a licence which would have 
 been impossible to them in their individual capacities. 
 The phenomena of panics, the contagion of enthusiasm, 
 the subtle influence of even small gatherings for a 
 common purpose, the swaying passions and emotions of 
 large gatherings — all these aflFord instances of new 
 phenomena coming into existence over and above the 
 sum of individual forces, as the result of association. 
 There is a curious speculation in a recent work on 
 abnormal psychic phenomena, by a French savant^ as to 
 
 ^ Homo sum, et huviani a me nil alienum pufo, 
 2 Maxwell, Metaphysical Phenomena (Eng. trans., with preface by 
 Prof. Lodge), p. 65. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 217 
 
 the origin of the strange personifications familiar at 
 spiritualistic seances. He is inclined to attribute them to 
 a kind of collective consciousness, emanating from the 
 circle of sitters ; and in this way only does he consider it 
 possible to explain some of the characteristic features of 
 such manifestations. Of course this is a guess, and 
 must not count for more. But it is in undesigned coinci- 
 dence with larger and more serious speculations on the 
 part of such men as Fechner, Paulsen, and Romanes — to 
 mention no others — as to the possibility of composite 
 consciousness. And it is in line with the almost in- 
 stinctive theories implicit in such expressions as esprit de 
 corps^ the Zeit Geist^ " the national character," and many 
 others, not to mention the almost universal practice of 
 personifying nations by symbols, nor such more dis- 
 tinctively theological speculations as those of Swedenborg. 
 It would seem that such considerations as these just 
 cited would suffice to overthrow Mill's doctrine of the 
 composition of social forces. But let us spend a moment 
 or two on his illustration. Even hydrogen and oxygen, 
 when combined, produce a result which could not be 
 predicted ; and still more is this the case with the other 
 elements when combined to form muscles and nerves and 
 tissues. Further, in these chemical combinations, the 
 elements involved may be separated again, recombined, 
 and again separated, as often as we like, without any 
 apparent change in their condition. But when you are 
 dealing with human beings, who can absorb emotions and 
 
2i8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 ideas and social traditions, who can learn by experience, 
 and develop a central core of personality, such combinations 
 and separations are obviously out of the question. To 
 suggest them would be absurd. As Baldwin showed, it 
 is impossible to reproduce a life series backwards. We 
 are in the sphere of vital phenomena, and chemical 
 analogies are dangerously misleading. 
 
 In chemistry we are sometimes bidden to imagine that 
 the atoms are held together by little hooks. The device 
 is clumsy, but useful. We shall err most grievously, 
 however, if we attempt thus to picture to ourselves the 
 vinculum sociale. For in the case of " social tissue " there 
 are inherent the properties of organised life. Human 
 society, on the large scale and the small, generates social 
 tendencies which sweep along on their stream individuals, 
 and groups, and nations. By far the larger number of 
 human institutions have been the outcome of the play of 
 unconscious forces. Consider the analogy of a poem. 
 Each word in a poem has an individual existence. But 
 the separate words are taken up by a spirit of which they 
 are unconscious, and form part of an intangible whole. 
 The poem is more than the sum of the words. And all 
 this is just as true of the separate parts — of the lines, 
 and sections, and larger sections — each and all are brought 
 together in a higher supernatural unity which presides 
 over their order, and endows them with new powers and 
 beauties. So with individuals, communities, nations, and 
 humanity, as a whole. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 219 
 
 Or consider the actual history of the development of 
 language itself, as a typical product of the social factor. 
 It has been developed by social forces in obedience to 
 social needs. It is handed down from generation to 
 generation, becoming part and parcel of the mental being 
 of countless individuals. I think it was Coleridge who 
 finely called the Greek language " the unconscious meta- 
 physics " of a highly gifted race. It came out of the 
 " social consciousness." It awoke in the consciousness of 
 individuals when Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle began to 
 analyse it. And it provided a medium for the expression 
 of truths enshrined in the most social and spiritual of all 
 religions. Who shall separate for us the strands of the 
 web ? Who shall assign to the individual or the social 
 factors their shares in the final result ? Or who shall 
 isolate the individual and show him to us as he would 
 have been without the use of the social traditions em- 
 bodied in language ? 
 
 Who shall isolate for us the individual ? Ah, there's 
 the rub, not in the case of language only, but in every 
 department of life ! Primitive man, for instance, built 
 his hut to protect himself ; but it was to protect others 
 also. He ate food to satisfy his hunger ; but the meal 
 was almost universally a social, and even a religious 
 ceremony. He decorated his person ; but it was that he 
 might extort admiration from his friends or strike terror 
 into his foes. And this social aspect of individualistic 
 action remains under the most complex conditions. For 
 
220 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 example, a man guards his own health in obedience to 
 self-regarding motives ; but his action has obvious social 
 results — better temper, greater efficiency, less burden on 
 others, and others too many to number. A man is a 
 good father because, primarily, he finds pleasure in caring 
 for his children ; but the results of such action benefit 
 the community at large. You cannot isolate either an 
 individual nor the action of an individual. Mill saw 
 with perfect clearness that each of us owes nearly all he 
 has and is to the social factor ; but he failed to realise 
 that the social factor had organic functions of its own, and 
 so lost himself in ideas about compositions of forces 
 analogous to chemical combinations of atoms. 
 
 To insist thus on the social factor does not by any 
 means preclude attempts to isolate the individual for 
 purposes of special study — but it does imply that the 
 artificial character of such abstractions shall not be lost 
 sight of. That wonderful invention, the economic man, 
 would have been very useful in his way had not theorists 
 forgotten his bloodlessness. Nor must we run into the 
 opposite extreme, and merge the individual in the 
 community, as though he had no specialised existence 
 at all. Here again, for certain limited purposes, it is 
 legitimate to study men in masses. But we must never 
 forget that the social forces are generated by the action of 
 the individual parts. To crush the individual would be 
 fatal to progress. 
 
\ 
 
 MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 221 
 
 II. Non-Social Theories. 
 
 In Aristotle's opinion, then, man was by nature a social 
 animal. It will aid us materially to grasp his thought 
 if we glance at one or two of those social theories which 
 start from opposite premisses. 
 
 Our English Hobbes, for example, would have us 
 believe that man is by nature unsocial, and that the State 
 is the outcome of a consciously realised necessity. He 
 draws a vivid picture of primitive man as being " a wolf 
 to his fellow man." ^ The natural state he held to be 
 one of universal war. Each individual strove with each 
 for means of subsistence and enjoyment. Hobbes had 
 taken an enormous fancy to the science of mechanical 
 physics, and he applied it to his social problems. In the 
 world of atoms, said he, the individual atoms assert 
 themselves under the sway of the law of the conservation 
 of matter. So in the social sphere, the law of self- 
 preservation rules the conduct of the individual social 
 atoms. 
 
 How, then, did men emerge from this very undesir- 
 able condition ? Hobbes tells us that they discovered 
 they were going the wrong way to work to get what they 
 wanted — namely, the preservation and perfection of their 
 individual lives. Right reason, therefore, led them to 
 organise various social institutions. But all their co- 
 
 ^ Homo homini lupus. Bellu7n omnium contra omnes. 
 
222 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 operative efforts were due to enlightened self-interest, 
 and thus the basis of the State was and remains 
 individualistic in aim and essence. 
 
 In criticising this theory of the State, it is only fair 
 to Hobbes to say that he invented history rather than 
 ignored it. But while we can make allowances for him, 
 we cannot follow his lead. For we know now, that 
 however far we push back our researches, we never 
 come across such an undesirable aggregate of solitaries 
 as he bids us summon before the bar of our historical 
 imagination. Nay, if we go back to the beginnings of 
 life of any kind, we find that in the development of even 
 the simplest organisms, love has its part to play as well 
 as hate. But though the historical element has vanished 
 from this theory, there are still many political theorists 
 who would base society on enlightened self-interest. I 
 will discuss their views later. 
 
 Or consider Schopenhauer's view. He would have 
 us believe that the antagonism between the individual 
 interest and the interests of others is final and 
 irrevocable — that the natural man is essentially and 
 absolutely selfish. He holds that men are sociable 
 from vanity, compassionate from self-love, honest from 
 fear, peace-loving from cowardice, benevolent from 
 superstition. On this estimate of human nature there 
 cannot be any such thing as a pure social impulse. And 
 the practical outcome is that so frankly and cynically 
 expressed by Maudsley. Society has to fashion the 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 223 
 
 individual to its will — its self-interest, therefore, is^ 
 " to do all the pruning and training of the individual 
 
 necessary to make him serve it best In the end 
 
 it comes to this — that the despotism of morality is the 
 self-seeking of the species and the servitude of the 
 individual, who is expected to find full compensation 
 for his self-sacrifice in the implicit belief of its inestimable 
 worth and the knowledge that he is ministering to its 
 glorious destiny." This is the line of thought which 
 has led Nietzsche to his cruel doctrine of the 
 Uebermensch. 
 
 Or recall Karl Pearson's remarkable statement that 
 only when history is interpreted in the sense of natural 
 history will it pass from the sphere of narrative and 
 become science.^ Recall also how that the forces at 
 work behind the process are reduced to the struggle 
 for food, the rate of reproduction, and geographical 
 distribution. 
 
 1 have instanced three theories of the relation of the 
 individual to the community. You will note that 
 however much they may differ in detail, they agree in 
 teaching that the mainspring of progress is internecine 
 war of individual with individual, of group with group. 
 Competition reigns supreme. Let us turn to see what 
 can be advanced in support of Aristotle's dictum that 
 
 ^ Life in Mind and Conduct^ p. 68. 
 
 2 Grammar of Science^ chap. ix. § 13. See Lecture III. of this 
 course. 
 
224 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 man is by nature a social being. My own position in 
 
 this controversy is defined by Maurice's burst of 
 
 indignation : " Competition is put forth as the law of 
 the universe. That is a lie." 
 
 III. Social Impulses. 
 
 1 begin with what we may call the " larger society" — 
 the society which includes all sentient life. In this the 
 independence of the social factor stands out clearly. We 
 find that from the beginning survival has depended on 
 union and co-operation. It is by the union of cells, and 
 their mutual subordination through an increasing com- 
 plexity in the division of labour, that progress has been 
 rendered possible. The limb of a complex organ does 
 not exist for itself alone, but serves the larger unity of 
 which it forms a part. In the higher animals we meet 
 with social feelings and impulses which are common in 
 their degree to themselves and men. We can even 
 observe certain tendencies to associated life and organisa- 
 tion which are definite anticipations of human social 
 institutions. Over and above the generic impulse to 
 produce and preserve offspring, even at the sacrifice of 
 individual life, there are social instincts which bring into 
 existence such highly elaborated politics as those of the 
 ants and bees. Birds and animals which nest, or herd, 
 or hunt, in groups or companies, and which unite for 
 common defence, attain to ends which would be impracti- 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 225 
 
 cable for Isolated individuals. True it is that such 
 associations are seldom based on conscious reflection, 
 and that it is seldom possible to trace the stages by which 
 they have been evolved — but they are facts neverthe- 
 less, and prove that the evolutionary process contains 
 tendencies to union and co-operation no less than to 
 competition. 
 
 And even on the large scale, as between race and race, 
 and group and group, the necessity for union into large 
 dependent wholes is obvious. Darwin's familiar example ^ 
 will occur to all. Certain kinds of clover are dependent 
 on the visits of humble-bees ; the number of these de- 
 pends in a great measure on the number of field mice, 
 which destroy their combs and nests ; and the number of 
 mice, again, is largely dependent on the number of cats. 
 " Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a 
 feline animal in large numbers in a district might 
 determine, through the intervention first of mice and 
 then of bees, the frequency of certain flowers in that 
 district ! " Put this into general terms, and we reach 
 the conclusion that every race depends upon its environ- 
 ment : in that environment must be reckoned all other 
 living races. And therefore, in spite of the conflict con- 
 tinually raging, there is reciprocal dependence of every 
 degree and kind. 
 
 I have said enough, without elaborating the evidence, 
 
 ^ Origin of Species^ chap. iii. p. 57. Cf. Leslie Stephen, Social 
 Duties and Rights, vol. i. pp. 231 ff. 
 
 15 
 
226 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 to prove that the aim and end of individual existence is 
 something that shall not be self-contained, but something 
 that shall be part of a higher whole. On the human side, 
 this truth is being increasingly recognised, with a conse- 
 quent stimulus to the growth of the social consciousness 
 — though this is all implicit in the deep saying found in 
 the Epistle to the Hebrews that former generations with- 
 out us could " not be made perfect." In fact, the whole 
 of the sentient universe, the totality of existences that 
 have lived, do live, and are yet to live, are bound to- 
 gether into a vast organised unity. The State, says 
 Aristotle, exists by nature, and is prior to the individual. 
 The end of life upon our globe, says the Bible, is the 
 perfect city. 
 
 IV. Sympathy. 
 
 But how shall we deal with Schopenhauer, who refuses 
 to see in our social tendencies anything more than dis- 
 guised selfishness ? Here is the pith of his argument : 
 I can be influenced by that only which affects my per- 
 sonal will. To say that I desire a thing is to say that 
 it has some bearing on my personal happiness. I cannot 
 act on feelings which I do not myself feel. Therefore 
 when I perform what is called an unselfish act, I am 
 really only pleasing myself. 
 
 As against this I put a simple case. A child falls into 
 the water. A man, standing near, without a moment's 
 hesitation, plunges in to the rescue. He has not time to 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 227 
 
 deliberate. Reflection as to the effects of his action, as 
 to whether he stands to gain or lose, is out of the 
 question. The reaction of his will is immediate. Have 
 we not here a clear case of a social impulse which is as 
 natural and spontaneous as any selfish impulse, and which 
 for the time overpowers regard for personal safety and 
 comfort ? 
 
 How can we therefore but acknowledge that the 
 individual has within him springs of action which do not 
 aim solely at his own preservation ? Intermixed with 
 the selfish impulses there are undoubtedly social impulses 
 which are pure and direct. Moreover, just as we found 
 it impossible to isolate the individual man, so do modern 
 psychologists tell us it is impossible to isolate the in- 
 dividual motive. All the elements in the character of an 
 individual act and react upon one another in endless 
 diversity of manners and degrees. And since these social 
 impulses exist side by side with the selfish, they are 
 bound to make themselves felt at every turn. Take an 
 example previously used. A man has regard for his 
 personal health. Why ? Hobbes will answer that he is 
 acting under the law of self-preservation. Granted, so 
 far as it goes. But is it possible for any of us to 
 eliminate from such action all reference to those de- 
 pendent upon us, or in close relation to us ? Is it not 
 even possible that care for others may induce the pro- 
 longation of a life which might otherwise be yielded up 
 without much effort ? Or how about an artist who 
 
228 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 paints a picture to satisfy his artistic impulse ? Can he 
 possibly eliminate from his mind all thought of those 
 who are to look at his picture ? And so with every 
 action of our lives. The social motives may be subtle — 
 they may often evade us altogether — but they have their 
 influence none the less. Man is by nature a social being, 
 and his social impulses are blended with every fibre of 
 his character. 
 
 Let us go into this matter a little more deeply. For 
 unless there is such a thing as genuine sympathy in the 
 world, there cannot be much hope for progress towards 
 greater brotherhood. 
 
 We may allow that all action must ultimately depend 
 upon individual feeling, without in the slightest degree 
 emptying sympathy of its peculiar significance. For the 
 analysis will turn on the nature of the feeling and of the 
 stimulus which brings it into existence. And it is 
 undeniable that the solidarity of associated groups of 
 men does manifest itself in peculiar and special modes of 
 feeling. For instance, a sense of danger impels an 
 individual to self-defence. But it can also impel him, as 
 we just now saw, to risk his life to save that of another. 
 We thus arrive at a distinction between our feelings 
 which goes down to bed-rock. The first class originates 
 within ourselves as the direct result of our own existence. 
 The other class originates in the feelings of others, which 
 awaken in us responsive experiences. The latter class, 
 are, of course, just as truly our own feelings ; but they 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 229 
 
 take a range outside of ourselves. We may even go so 
 far as to say that the feelings of others are transferred to 
 us by a kind of contagion. The phenomena of such 
 transference are shown most strikingly when men are 
 congregated in masses. But even at an ordinary meeting, 
 it is easy to observe that the tension of feeling is higher 
 than would be the case were the same people engaged in 
 the same matters individually. We have various phrases 
 to express such tension, some of which may be more than 
 metaphors. We speak of the atmosphere at a public 
 meeting being " electrical " ; we speak of feeling being 
 " reflected " from mind to mind ; and we speak of 
 " concentrated " feeling, as though it could be focussed 
 at certain centres. The influence, whatever it may be, 
 is preponderatingly emotional, and, as such, is often 
 blind and wayward. But as it becomes filled with in- 
 tellectual content — as sympathy lends itself to rational 
 control — it enables us to understand one another, and 
 forges the links of true brotherhood. 
 
 How utterly indefensible, then, to confuse two sets 
 of feelings so distinct in their origin, and in their objects, 
 as are the feelings for self and the feelings for others. 
 We may rightly call a man " selfish " who does not feel 
 for others as he ought and when he ought. But to call 
 that man selfish whose feeling goes out of himself, and 
 enables him to live in and for the interests of others, is 
 to empty language of all serious meaning. 
 
 From the hedonistic point of view, again, it is certain 
 
230 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 that the exercise of the sympathetic feelings is capable of 
 yielding one of the highest forms of pleasure to those 
 who are moved by them. But this fact, instead of 
 making for the individualist theory of social union, is one 
 of the most incontestable proofs of the naturalness of the 
 social side of human character. The man who is quite 
 indifferent to the happiness of others is looked upon as a 
 moral monster. The human heart in its normal condition 
 longs for sympathy and spontaneously offers it. And in 
 proportion as a man fails to feel with his kind, in that 
 proportion does he fail to develop himself. Even lack of 
 harmony with one's social environment is attended by 
 unhappiness, sometimes amounting to pain. On the 
 other hand, that character develops most freely and fully 
 which is most open to the influences of family, com- 
 munity, and nation — which absorbs elements from the 
 aims and experiences of others, and identifies their interests 
 with its own. In short, absolute egoism exists only in 
 theory, and would defeat its own object. 
 
 V. Unsocial Impulses. 
 
 While arguing thus strongly for the natural and spon- 
 taneous character of the social impulses and feelings, I 
 do not suppose that you will deem me ignorant of the 
 number and strength of the individualistic and anti- 
 social tendencies. Indeed, I fear I shall have to grant 
 that they are, of the two, the more deeply rooted, just 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 231 
 
 because they are more primitive. The earlier stages of 
 the struggle for life called for stern self-assertion. And 
 this tendency to self-assertion is always ready to reassert 
 itself. How often are we startled by the news of singular 
 cruelties perpetrated by civilised men who have lived any 
 length of time in barbarous communities ! How often a 
 man who at home would shrink from the idea of using a 
 fellow-man as a slave, will become hardened if slavery 
 will make him rich ! So even under the restraining in- 
 fluences of Christian civilisation itself, the haste to be 
 rich will cause men to use their fellows as mere instru- 
 ments to selfish ends. So, too, the anti-social tendency 
 to gambling will destroy the finer traits of character, and 
 dwarf the weaker social impulses. So, too, with struggles 
 for privileges, hereditary or acquired ; with defence of 
 the "caste" system, so well illustrated by the appropria- 
 tion of the term " society " to one small fraction of the 
 social whole ; so, too, with all the manifold forms assumed 
 by self-love, desire for pleasure or for power, the rush to 
 be rich, and the rest of the dark progeny of undue self- 
 assertion. The germ of social sympathy is latent from 
 the first ; but it calls for careful and rational develop- 
 ment. To the will is set the task of acting under the 
 guidance of the reason, and of so reducing the instincts 
 and impulses, both egoistic and social, to harmonious 
 subjection and adjustment. In brief, the will has to be 
 socialised. The process is a long and a difficult one. 
 Each class in the community has to learn its lesson. 
 
232 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 The ardent socialist must learn to sympathise with his 
 
 fellows, even though they be rich and privileged. And 
 
 (what seems to be a much harder task !) the rich and 
 
 privileged must learn to respect the rights of those whom 
 
 for so many centuries they have regarded as their 
 
 inferiors. The middle class also has to learn that the 
 
 same struggle for fuller life which in their own case they 
 
 think so glorious, is no less glorious when the toilers in 
 
 their turn demand a better place at the feast of life. Oh, 
 
 how hard it is for all of us to generalise from that which 
 
 is good for ourselves to that which is good for others ; 
 
 from that which is calculated to advance our own welfare 
 
 to that which is calculated to advance the welfare of 
 
 others ! 
 
 There are stages in socialisation — that goes without 
 saying. It is something to learn that we should seek the 
 good of others even on selfish grounds, from desire for 
 such social health and stability as will ensure our own 
 welfare and happiness. It is a higher stage when we can 
 find personal interest in social work, such as shall make 
 it worth our while on this score to throw ourselves into 
 philanthropic aims and efforts. Many of us find real 
 pleasure in gaining experience of life and in relieving 
 distress. But it will not do for us to stop short at this 
 stage. For the gentle enjoyment of such social work 
 may leave us unmoved as regards the causes which render 
 it necessary ; nay, may even leave us ready to oppose 
 measures and schemes which might do much to remove 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 233 
 
 those causes. We must go on to the highest stage — we 
 must learn to love our fellows as we love ourselves, to 
 put ourselves into their places, and to work for them 
 with that enthusiasm for the race which led Jesus Christ 
 from Bethlehem to Calvary. 
 
 VI. Competition. 
 
 As the social impulses and feelings find their centre in 
 social sympathy, so do the unsocial impulses and feelings 
 find their centre in the principle of competition. We 
 have studied some of its features in the evolutionary 
 struggle for food. It would seem to be hard, if not 
 impossible, to make competition the supreme and final 
 force behind social development ! And yet there are 
 many who do take up this position. In spite of all the 
 failures of the past, they hold that the world will advance 
 most surely and rapidly if free play be allowed to the 
 action of enlightened self-interest. They deprecate inter- 
 ference with the individual, and would leave him to work 
 out his own salvation in his own way. The action of the 
 State is to be of a negative character only — it is to protect 
 person and property, and to enforce the fulfilment of 
 contracts. It is, in fact, to be a big modern policeman. 
 Should it attempt to be more, we are solemnly warned 
 that it will do more harm than good. In the industrial 
 world, more particularly, we are urged to keep the field 
 clear for individualistic enterprise. 
 
 fY f 
 
234 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Now it would be quixotic to deny that the case for 
 enlightened self-interest can present many striking and 
 substantial examples of its success in promoting the 
 general welfare. It has stimulated invention, extended 
 commerce, increased industrial efficiency, and, perhaps 
 chiefest of all, has established a working basis for deter- 
 mining prices and wages. But these results, though 
 important, do not cover the whole of life, nor has it been 
 shown that they could not be compassed by methods 
 more rational and more in accord with our best social 
 sentiments. And the fact remains that enlightened self- 
 interest is selfish, whatever fine epithets you may use to 
 soften the unpalatable truth ; that the selfishness to be 
 of an " enlightened " character only serves to render it 
 more subtle and diplomatic. Make it as enlightened as 
 you please, selfishness will never be transmuted into the 
 spirit of brotherhood. As a matter of experience, do you 
 find many convinced philanthropists in the ranks of the 
 enlightened egoists ? Why should they be found there ? 
 So long as the masses can be kept quiet, and awkward 
 or dangerous discontent can be restrained within due 
 bounds, their motto must be " apres nous le deluge." It 
 would be inconsistent on their part if they did not 
 sedulously repress any incipient tendencies to social 
 sympathy. Self-sacrifice must only be in exact proportion 
 to benefit gained. 
 
 If you ask me how, these things being so, the competi- 
 tive principle has done any good at all, the answer is easy. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 235 
 
 Firstly, we have to grant most freely that there is a 
 legitimate sphere for the action of enlightened self- 
 interest. As I have before remarked, to emphasise the 
 social factor does not require us to ignore the individual 
 factor. We may even allow that there will always be a 
 place for the competitive principle ; but its incidence will 
 have to be vastly altered, and its character profoundly 
 modified. The good, then, wrought by the legitimate 
 working of self-interest, has been undoubtedly great both 
 in quantity and quality. Secondly, we note that the 
 universe is the scene of moral government. There is in 
 it a power that makes for righteousness by overruling 
 the evil for good. The Dragon in the Book of Revelation 
 cast forth a flood to overwhelm the woman who had fled 
 from him, but " the earth swallowed up the flood." So, 
 on the largest scale, the cosmic process transforms even 
 chaos into order. But this comforting thought cannot 
 make us regard the Dragon's overwhelming flood, or the 
 reign of chaos, as desirable things in and for themselves. 
 
 That which is selfish shall be selfish still ; that which is 
 unsocial shall be unsocial still. If you would see the 
 undisguised fruit of the tree of self-interest, read Lord 
 Shaftesbury's Life and Letters. Gain from him the true 
 horror of England's industrial condition before the State 
 stepped in to curb the action of free competition. Do 
 you say that the self-interest displayed was not en- 
 lightened } How will you show that } Many of the 
 colossal fortunes of the northern manufacturers were 
 
236 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 built up in those times — and who shall calculate the 
 privileges, social and political, that have followed in their 
 train ? 
 
 Or again — suppose we adopt this principle of en- 
 lightened self-interest as our guide, how many are there 
 who have the necessary experience and knowledge to 
 apply it ? There is need for a very considerable and 
 general development of mental and moral faculties before 
 a man can be said to be a fair judge of his own interests 
 — still more before he can recognise to any large extent 
 the parallelism of his own interests with those of the 
 community. Further, the greater the increase in the 
 experience and knowledge required among those who 
 are favourably situated, the worse, because the more 
 diplomatic and systematic, will be the exploitation of the 
 ignorant. And we thus discover that even from the 
 practical point of view the principle fails us as a guide to 
 conduct which shall be truly social. 
 
 And, to continue this " practical " line of criticism, can 
 any unprejudiced student of sociology deny that industrial 
 competition has failed to fulfil the expectations of those 
 who looked to it for social salvation ? Production has 
 been stimulated beyond the dreams of the most sanguine. 
 Machinery, steam, and electricity, have accomplished 
 marvels. And yet, as Mill sadly remarks, it is doubtful 
 if the lot of any human being has been lightened. 
 Certainly, for the great masses of the people, the Golden 
 Age is as distant as ever. The fear of want, especially 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 237 
 
 in old age ; the struggle with constant uncertainty of 
 employment ; the hurry, the excitement, the strain, of 
 modern life ; the all too common sense of weakness which 
 oppresses those who cannot rise to the surface in the 
 competitive whirlpool ; the overshadowing feeling of 
 loneliness amid surging crowds — these and countless 
 other dark features of the industrial type of civilisation 
 check the flow of glib apologies for enlightened self- 
 interest. Can we wonder that expectations so bitterly 
 dashed to the ground have given place to deep-seated 
 distrust of social conditions, and have kindled the 
 smouldering fires of discontent and rebellion ? 
 
 Hear Huxley on this subject. He had a wholesome 
 contempt for sentimental rhetoric ; and his words are 
 therefore the more worthy of our serious thought. He 
 is speaking of the condition to which the workers in 
 large cities are often reduced — the condition called by 
 the French emphatically la misere} " It is a condition 
 (he says) in which the food, warmth, and clothing, which 
 are necessary for the mere maintenance of the functions 
 of the body in their normal state cannot be obtained ; in 
 which men, women, and children, are forced to crowd 
 into dens wherein decency is abolished and the most 
 ordinary conditions of existence are impossible of attain- 
 ment ; in which the pleasures within reach are reduced 
 to bestiality and drunkenness ; in which the pains ac- 
 cumulate at compound interest in the shape of starvation, 
 1 Essays — "The Struggle for Existence." 
 
238 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 disease, stunted development and moral degradation ; in 
 which the prospect of even steady and honest industry is 
 a life of unsuccessful battling with hunger, rounded by a 
 pauper's grave." 
 
 Such is the picture which Huxley draws of some of 
 the fruits of the free competitive system. Should you 
 object that the colours are too dark for such countries as 
 Australia and New Zealand, I would reply that, first, we 
 are young as yet, and cannot gauge the trend of our 
 development. Secondly, we have by no means accepted 
 the principle of free competition ; the State has interfered 
 and intends to interfere, to an extent far in excess of 
 protection of person and property, and the safeguarding 
 of contracts. Did the principle of unrestricted self- 
 interest reign among us, our country would not be so 
 happy even as it is. And we are bound to go forward 
 still in our efforts to bring the total of our social resources 
 to bear on the social weal. The dogmatism of the 
 individualistic systems is breaking down. Ignorance, 
 prejudice, and self-interest, are yielding to the sunny 
 influences of the growing social consciousness. The 
 dawn of the era of brotherhood is perceptibly brightening. 
 
 VII. Transformation of the Struggle. 
 
 Let us consider it settled, then, that the evolutionary 
 process yields social phenomena just as naturally and 
 spontaneously as it yields egoistic phenomena, only that 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 239 
 
 the former are longer in reaching conscious maturity. 
 The materialistic evolutionist may go so far as to grant 
 this, and will yet deny that we are taken thereby out of 
 the fated circle of the struggle for life. Let us now 
 approach the subject from this point of view. 
 
 In his famous Romanes Lecture^ Huxley broke new 
 ground. He drew a line between the time before, and 
 the time after, the appearance of conscious purpose in the 
 world. He showed with his customary boldness and 
 honesty, as also with his accustomed force, that among 
 the civilised nations the struggle is being transformed. 
 Instead of being a struggle for life, it is becoming a 
 struggle for the means of enjoyment. Self-restraint is 
 taking the place of self-assertion. And the common 
 weal is being consciously adopted as an aim by an in- 
 creasing number of individuals. Man is no longer 
 wholly dependent upon his environment — he can largely 
 create it for himself. He can bring into existence, with 
 conscious purpose, conditions which modify indefinitely 
 the old war of individualistic forces. 
 
 Huxley uses as an illustration of his meaning, the 
 artificial state of affairs established in the midst of the 
 cosmic process when a man fences in and tills a plot of 
 ground to make a garden for himself. Were the cosmic 
 process to resume its sway, the garden would soon be 
 overwhelmed. But the gardener defeats the tendencies 
 of unconscious nature, and adjusts the conditions to the 
 needs of the plants he desires to cultivate. Just such. 
 
240 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 mutatis mutandis^ is man's object in founding social in- 
 stitutions. By their means he gets rid of the bare 
 struggle for existence. Of course, as Huxley himself 
 fully acknowledges, in the widest sense of the word, 
 nature includes society, as it includes art. But he main- 
 tains that a distinction is useful, if not necessary, since 
 society differs from nature in having a definite moral 
 object. Hence it comes to pass that^ " the course shaped 
 by the ethical man — the member of society or citizen — 
 necessarily runs counter to that which the non-ethical 
 man — the primitive savage, or man as a mere member of 
 the animal kingdom — tends to adopt. The latter fights 
 out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any 
 other animal ; the former devotes his best energies to the 
 object of setting limits to the struggle." 
 
 With the general drift of Huxley's argument I am in 
 cordial sympathy, though I am not sure that he does not 
 underrate the value and influence of the social element 
 with which the cosmic process was from the beginning 
 pregnant. Still there is no manner of doubt that the 
 advent of conscious purpose marks a stage in the process 
 the significance of which cannot be exaggerated. I myself 
 would venture to put the matter thus. With the develop- 
 ment of self-consciousness came the possibility of rendering 
 explicit the social tendencies which before were implicit. 
 Co-operation takes the place of competition. The number 
 of those who seek to limit the struggle is ever growing. 
 ^ Essays — "The Struggle for Existence in Human Society." 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 241 
 
 Even international warfare feels the influence of the new 
 
 spirit, and is rapidly being rendered more humane. The 
 
 social impulses and feelings are gaining the mastery, and, 
 
 guided by reason, and inspired by spiritual ideals, are 
 
 destined to usher in an era of universal brotherhood. 
 
 That is my antidote to Karl Pearson's scientific history, 
 
 written in terms of the struggle for food, of sex, and of 
 
 geographical distribution. We can witness in history the 
 
 evolution of a set of social forces which antagonises and 
 
 suppresses the evolution of the struggle for food. This 
 
 set of social forces is not less " natural " than the other ; 
 
 but with the advent of conscious purpose it gains new 
 
 powers. We can gain consolation, then, from the fact 
 
 that human history reveals something more than the 
 
 struggle for food. Man is steadily winning a victory 
 
 over his environment, training his intellect, amassing 
 
 knowledge and social tradition, developing a social 
 
 consciousness, expanding his ideals. And the outcome 
 
 is a diversion of energy from the struggle to survive to 
 
 the effort to fit as many as possible to survive. Huxley ^ 
 
 sees " no limit to the extent to which intelligence and 
 
 will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and 
 
 organised in common effort, may modify the conditions 
 
 of existence." Karl Pearson cannot say that this is a 
 
 barb tipped with theological jade. It comes home as 
 
 the ripe opinion of a veteran scientist honoured of all 
 
 men. 
 
 ^ Cf. Huxley's Romanes Lecture^ and the essay quoted above. 
 
 16 
 
242 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 But someone may argue that if the struggle ceases, 
 the chance of progress will also vanish along with it. I 
 By no means. The attraction of the ideal takes its | 
 place, and more than takes its place. Here again I have 
 Huxley with me.-^ " It is extremely important (he says) 
 to note that, the state of nature remaining the same, if 
 the produce does not satisfy the gardener, it may be | 
 made to approach his ideal more closely." Hence, 
 " although the struggle for existence may be at an end, 
 the possibility of progress remains." In other words — 
 the gardener can be attracted by an ideal. The beautiful | 
 can dominate him as well as the useful. And thus it 
 comes that by conscious selection he evolves not only 
 the cabbage from the wild kale, but the Viola Tricolor 
 is nursed and guided into the velvety texture and vivid 
 colouring of the pansy. The latter is a fact as much as 
 the former. But it is not the outcome of the mechanical 
 push from behind ; it comes into existence because it is 
 an approach to the ideal of its humbler successor. It 
 is a manifestation, not of the struggle for food, but of 
 the spirit which strives towards it — the True, the Beautiful, 
 the Good. II 
 
 We need not, therefore, shrink from facing the facts 
 of the struggle for food, nor from recognising the part 
 it still plays, and yet has to play, in moulding history. 
 For though its stern realities remain shrouded in much 
 mystery, we can see that they are features in an upward 
 ^ Prolegomena to the Romanes Lecture. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 243 
 
 process from which they will be ultimately eliminated. 
 But if we take food in its widest application, though the 
 struggle may cease, the striving will abide. Did not old 
 Homer sing that " men gape for God," like birdlings in 
 the nest for food. This is not exactly what Karl Pearson 
 meant. But we may mean it — remembering that man 
 lives " not by bread alone, but by every word that pro- 
 ceedeth out of the mouth of God." 
 
 VIII. Kidd's View of Reason. 
 
 At this stage of my argument, I have to deal with a 
 view of the social function of reason wholly opposed to 
 that which I have upheld. Kidd, in his well-known book 
 on Social Evolution^ maintains that reason is anti-social 
 and disintegrating in its agency, and needs the severe 
 restraint of the religious instincts. 
 
 The question turns on the relation of the individual 
 to the community. Even Leslie Stephen, anxious as he 
 is to establish an evolutionary ethics, cannot see his way 
 clearly as regards this problem of harmonising the interests 
 of the self and the not-self. In fact, he frankly gives it 
 up. He is sure that the individual is moralised through 
 his identification with the social organism, and that the 
 security of morality depends upon the persistence of 
 society. But he regards the attempt to estabHsh the 
 complete coincidence between virtue and happiness — 
 that is to say, between the individual and the general 
 
244 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 good — to be as hopeless as the attempt to square the 
 circle, or to discover perpetual motion.^ 
 
 Kidd has a still worse case to present. For he holds, 
 not merely that we cannot prove a coincidence, but that 
 the interests of the social organism and those of the 
 individual are inherently and essentially irreconcilable.^ 
 With such a theory as this on which to build, we cannot 
 wonder that he emphasises " the far-reaching consequences 
 which flow from the recognition of this simple fact," 
 and its " revolutionary significance." How does he 
 arrive at this truly " startling conclusion " ? He assumes 
 that all rational acts have self-satisfaction as their object ; 
 and he is so boldly consistent that he holds all disin- 
 terested actions to be inherently irrational. In brief, 
 the reason is set against the social impulses. Here is 
 one of his own statements of his case.^ " On the one side 
 (he says) we have the self-assertive reason of the individual 
 necessarily tending to be ever more and more developed 
 by the evolutionary forces at work. On the other, we 
 have the immensely wider interests of the social organ- 
 ism, and behind it those of the race in general, demanding, 
 nevertheless, the most absolute subordination of this ever- 
 increasing rational self-assertiveness in the individual." 
 
 Such is Kidd's " startling conclusion." Are we really 
 condemned to so hopeless a dualism — to so pessimistic 
 a view of the function of reason ? Let me suggest to 
 
 ^ Scieiicc of Ethics^ p. 430. ^ Social Evolution^ p. 80. 
 
 3 Op. cit., p. 83. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 245 
 
 you a few lines of thought which may lead to cheerier 
 conclusions. And let us derive encouragement from 
 such facts as these. The Homeric warrior was frankly 
 a self-regarding personage. The naivete of some of his 
 views is such as at times to give us a mild shock of 
 dismay. Nevertheless, he was always ready to help a 
 friend in danger. Why ? Partly from a social impulse 
 — but partly also, if not chiefly, from a self-regarding 
 motive — " If I do not help, 1 shall not be helped." In 
 any case, there was not much reasoning power brought 
 to bear upon his moral problems. The Greeks sub- 
 sequently developed their reasoning powers to a dazzling 
 degree. Aristotle represents that power at its critical 
 perfection ; and yet he is the one who founds his political 
 theories on the dictum that man is by nature a social 
 being, and maintains that the full and harmonious 
 development of human nature is possible only for the 
 citizen of a well-organised State. These views were the 
 outcome of rational researches into more than a hundred 
 and fifty Greek constitutions, and into the social and 
 political usages of many foreign tribes. Or think of 
 that deeply social sentiment expressed in the line of 
 Menander, " Life is not living for thyself alone." Or 
 think of the teaching of the Stoics, who felt ^ that " the 
 further man carries in himself the work of moral improve- 
 ment, the stronger he will feel the impulse to society " — 
 in spite of a strong bent to the assertion of individual 
 
 ^ See Zeller's Stoics^ p. 293. 
 
246 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 independence, in virtue of their attribution of absolute 
 worth to rational thought and will. But just because 
 this worth belonged only to rational thought and inten- 
 tion, on that very account the individual is bound to 
 recognise the community, and is required to " subordinate 
 his own ends to the ends and needs of the community." 
 They taught that " rational conduct and thought can 
 only be said to exist when the conduct of the individual 
 is in harmony with a general law ; and this is the same 
 for all rational beings. All rational beings must therefore 
 aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to 
 the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one 
 connected whole. Man must not live for himself, but 
 for society. . . . The desire for society (they held) is 
 immediately involved in reason. . . . Like (said they) | 
 has an attraction for like ; and this holds good of | 
 everything endowed with reason, since the rational soul | 
 is in all cases identical." ^ 
 
 All this, and much more that I could add, gives no 
 suspicion of the inherent and essential disintegrating 
 power of reason. Nay, the very philosophers who insisted 
 most on the isolation of the individual, and the paramount 
 claims of reason, are the very ones to emphasise the social 
 bond, and to evolve a wonderfully deep concept of the 
 solidarity of humanity. And so right down to the! 
 
 ^ See Seneca, Ep. 95, 52 : The whole world is a unit; "membra 
 sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos editit." Hence mutual] 
 love, love of society, justice, and fairness. 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 247 
 
 present day. An astonishingly small number of the 
 best thinkers of the civilised races have definitely adopted 
 any anti-social theory of society. And in such cases as 
 do appear, the decision has rested more on tone of feel- 
 ing than on use of reason. Rven evolutionists can be 
 socialists ! 
 
 Let us look at the matter from the evolutionary point 
 of view. We find that in the development of the animal 
 world, reason plays but a small part. Instinct and 
 impulse, built up into cell structure, reign well-nigh 
 supreme. As a consequence, the pace of progress has 
 been painfully slow. Animals cannot forge much ahead 
 of definite physiological change. But conscious reason, 
 once developed, enables men to be largely independent 
 of physiological change. The rifle renders the skilled 
 hunter more than a match for the strength of the elephant 
 or the speed of the antelope. The telegraph will carry a 
 message further than the most stentorian voice. But 
 what need of illustration ! The advantages gained by 
 rational processes are too obvious at every turn. And 
 the outcome is that the rate of progress is enormously 
 increased. A human group can accomplish in a genera- 
 tion changes of habit and of mode of life which the 
 action of impulse and instinct would not accomplish in a 
 thousand generations. Again, even the higher animals 
 are dependent almost wholly on their environment. 
 Whereas men, as Huxley showed, can modify and create 
 their environment. Certain animals have the germs of 
 
248 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 this power ; but the degree to which man possesses it puts 
 him into a world by himself. 
 
 Kidd is right to this extent, that all possibilities of 
 progress bring with them corresponding risks in their 
 train — and the greater the possibilities the greater the 
 risks. But this is a condition of all progress — moral 
 progress included. Further, the rate of progress in 
 forming instincts and impulses was slow, but it was sure. 
 Hence we cannot afford lightly to ignore them or crush 
 them down. And it is more especially wise to foster the 
 social instincts and impulses, because, being the latest to 
 be highly developed, they are the most easy to lose. 
 They go to form that conservative element in our nature 
 which is so necessary for the stability of society, and, 
 therefore, also for the onward march of progress. But 
 the conservative element can bulk too largely, as is 
 proved by the " arrested development " of China. That 
 the civilised nations have not suffered her fate has been 
 due to the freer use of reason. And, speaking quite : 
 generally, it is safe to say that the real danger lies in our 
 lack of reason — in our superficiality — not in our having 
 too much reason, or in our going too deeply and com- 
 prehensively into our social problems. The more we 
 know, the more rapid and solid our progress. And this 
 is only natural — for I presume that Kidd himself would 
 allow that the universe is ultimately founded on reason. 
 Is not Huxley justified in the theory that the advent of 
 conscious, rational purpose was the sign for the reversal 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 249 
 
 of the selfish struggle to live. We are a long way from 
 being socialised yet ; but one of the chief causes is that 
 we are yet a long way from being rational. 
 
 Add a consideration on which the Cairds, among others, 
 have so often and so convincingly insisted. The intelli- 
 gence of man is not wholly a disintegrating agent. It 
 analyses, it criticises ; but it does not lose itself in a 
 multiplicity of details : it gathers them into groups, 
 classifies, seeks hidden bonds, and reduces its material to 
 order. The sciences are the outcome of synthetic, as 
 well as of analytic processes, and seek to establish unity 
 in the study of nature and of human life. 
 
 Add yet again a consideration to which I made allusion 
 a while ago. No true social life is possible without the 
 use of reason. Man cannot understand his fellow man 
 until there is a common basis of intellectual life. Reason 
 interprets and guides sympathy. The social impulses 
 themselves have to be filled with intellectual content 
 before there can be any genuine brotherhood. In this 
 regard the Hegelian dialectic has its teaching for us. The 
 ego and the alter ego are necessary to one another ; and it 
 is only by self-conscious reason that their functions are 
 apprehended and developed. 
 
 As I warned you, I have but suggested lines of 
 thought ; but I trust they may suffice to prove that 
 Kidd's " startling conclusion " is much more startling 
 than the facts of the case warrant. Reason in the service 
 of enlightened self-interest may be deserving of his lash. 
 
250 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 But reason in the service of the promptings of social 
 sympathy will increasingly modify and soften the struggle 
 for existence, and will secure the triumph of the newer 
 and nobler factors in the cosmic process. 
 
 IX. Religion and the Social Factor. 
 
 It will be well for us, then, to resist attempts to 
 desocialise the reason. But I presume that many will 
 still feel that Leslie Stephen's problem is unsolved. We 
 still are left to ask whether it is possible to show the 
 individual that his highest interest and that of the com- 
 munity are identical — or whether we are to give up hope 
 of a solution as we have given up hope of squaring the 
 circle or discovering perpetual motion. It is allowed by 
 all that these interests coincide on the average. But can 
 they be shown to coincide completely and absolutely } 
 There is the question on which, as 1 believe, the very 
 existence of morality depends. 
 
 Now I think it plain that, so far at any rate as Leslie 
 Stephen is concerned, the despair of solution arises from 
 undue limitation of the field of inquiry. If the life of 
 the individual is to be compressed within the boundaries 
 of natural birth and death, the " incompleteness," of which 
 Haeckel spoke, spoils all rational discussion and argument 
 on the problem. For example, if the individual argues 
 that to incur the trouble and expense of a family is a 
 thing to be avoided, because it interferes with the enjoy- 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 251 
 
 ment of life which is otherwise possible, it is difficult 
 to give him a valid reason for changing his mind, if at 
 the same time you tell him that the present chance of 
 enjoying himself is all that he will get. You may appeal 
 to him on larger issues, but he will ask what such larger 
 issues are to him so long as he can live his own life 
 comfortably. Let the State take care of itself. So, too, 
 with the shirking of public responsibilities by those who 
 are fitted to undertake them. Why should they put 
 themselves to inconvenience for the public good ? If this 
 is their sole chance, it seems difficult to show them that 
 their selfishness is wrong. The only practicable method 
 is, as Maudsley said, for society to prune and trim the 
 individual to its liking, and compel him to subserve its 
 aims and ends. To this extent Kidd is justified — but 
 only to this extent. Give reason insufficient premisses 
 from which to argue, and it is no marvel if wrong con- 
 clusions emerge. Bui nole, the reason is not to blame^ qua 
 reason. 
 
 If the social factor, therefore, is to be rationalised, we 
 must search for some bond of union between the in- 
 dividual and the race which shall link their mutual 
 interests together beyond the limits of the individual life, 
 and be independent of the changing natural order. In 
 other words, the vinculum sociale — the social bond — must 
 not be a mere passing accident, or meaningless, perishing 
 phase of an unconscious process : it must be of the very 
 essence of things, and belong to the world of realities. 
 
252 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 If we can find such a bond as this, the problem is 
 solved. 
 
 I am intensely anxious that social reformers and lovers 
 of their kind should face the issues here raised. For our 
 world-views are bound to influence our conduct. If we 
 tell men that this life is all, then reason must set to work 
 to make the best of it. But fortunately for progress and 
 for the race, reason itself forces its way, following the 
 lead of feeling, into wider and nobler conceptions of the 
 meaning and value of existence. With Kidd, I believe 
 that the reconciliation of the interests of the community 
 and of the individual is found chiefly and permanently 
 in religion. But I appeal to my religion, not, as Kidd 
 does, because I mistrust my reason, but because my 
 reason finds an adequate basis for my social creed in 
 the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and of man's 
 spiritual sonship. 
 
 I cannot rest content with trying to keep myself in a 
 state of blind, instinctive faith. I would fain struggle on, 
 even where I cannot now understand that my highest 
 religious conceptions are in harmony with reason, just 
 because in the Father of Spirits are hidden all the 
 treasures of wisdom, as well as of love. My reason 
 is confessedly faulty and finite ; but I cannot ignore 
 or bury it under blind movements of my unconscious 
 nature. So far as it takes me I am willing to go. 
 Where it fails I will follow those feelings and impulses 
 and instincts which it tells me are highest and best — 
 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 253 
 
 and so I shall be rational in spirit even where syllogisms 
 are impossible. 
 
 The appeal lies to religion as a basis for social value 
 judgments. Belief in a supreme Person, who is at once 
 the Father and the moral Governor of the universe, lifts 
 me out of my individualism, and allows free scope for 
 developing my social impulses and feelings. For thereby 
 I reach to the true inwardness of the social factor. 
 Humanity is no longer a mechanical union of mutually 
 repellent individuals, each striving to do his best for him- 
 self. Individualistic, selfish, and artificial theories of the 
 State are dissipated. Society becomes a morally ordered 
 whole — a spiritual kingdom in which social progress is 
 not only possible, but essentially natural. Give me this 
 belief to build upon, and I shake off all the exaggerations 
 of modern individualism — I can seize on the vital truth 
 contained in the wiser social theories of ancient Greece, 
 and can enrich them with all that the intervening centuries 
 of Christianity have to teach of the dignity of personality, 
 and of the glory of religious and political freedom. St 
 Paul's words become luminous to me — " We are members 
 one of another.*' 
 
 But, further, if I am part of a spiritual whole, I can 
 even subscribe to the doctrine of enlightened self-interest 
 in the form given to it by Jesus Christ — " he that loseth 
 his life shall save it." For in preserving and developing 
 my higher self I am bound to live in the lives of others ; 
 and in responding to the calls which society makes upon 
 
254 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 me, I am responding to a whole of which my ideal self 
 forms an integral and permanent part. I can under- 
 stand why egoism is self-destructive : it cuts itself off 
 from the source of life. I can see that the question — Is 
 life worth living ? — is wrongly put : it should take the 
 form — How can I make my life worth living ? For if 
 my life is continuous and bound up with the spiritual 
 unity of humanity, I shall best advance my own welfare 
 by advancing tha*" of the social organism to which I 
 belong. But all the advantages of social action will 
 accrue to me indirectly. As was evident in tracing the 
 stages of socialisation, the highest happiness comes, not 
 from calculated, self-centred action, but from the free 
 surrender of love. Nay, until the heights of love are 
 climbed, there is no real escape from that dark cloud 
 which hangs over humanity — the cloud we know as " sin." 
 For, in its essence, sin consists in separating oneself from 
 the social whole, and acting as an independent and 
 isolated centre. To this doctrine the Stoics would have 
 subscribed on grounds of reason alone — much more 
 clearly does its truth declare itself when we look at the 
 matter in the light of love. When the individual will is 
 in antagonism to the Universal Will — that is, the Father's 
 Will — and so in antagonism to the social will, the clash 
 and discord are inevitable. And thus the head and the 
 heart alike bear witness to the spiritual, and therefore to 
 the timeless, nature of the social factor. The individual 
 losing his life in the lives of others and finding thereby 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 255 
 
 his ideal and his eternal self — there is the law of true 
 progress. And that is the law of the religion of Jesus 
 Christ. Christianity provides for the perfecting of the 
 individual character as part of a living process which 
 involves the perfection of humanity as a whole — it de- 
 velops on the stage of time a life that is to be eternal. 
 
SEFENTH LECTURE. 
 
 WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 
 
 Eyw 6tyu,i TO A KoX TO Q, XiycL Kvpto? 6 0eo9, 6 tjiv Kol o rjv Koi 
 6 ipxof^^vo^. 
 
 '^ I am the Alpha and the Omega, saith the Lord God, which is 
 and which was and which is to come." — Rev. i. 8. 
 
 1. The Question. 
 
 The average civilised man has settled down to think and 
 talk of progress as though the import of the word were 
 generally understood and accepted. But if asked to 
 define his meaning, he will either be reduced to silence, 
 or his answer will be vague, and coloured by circumstance 
 of nationality, rank, and disposition. This loose employ- 
 ment of the term was prevalent before Darwinism had 
 come on the scene ; but since men have begun to talk 
 evolution, the case is much worse. For the doctrine of 
 the upward development of forms of life has given a 
 seemingly scientific warrant to what before was rather 
 matter of instinctive faith or of humanitarian hope. And 
 yet there are powerful thinkers who, in spite of all the 
 
 race has accomplished, gravely doubt whether there really 
 
 256 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS ? 257 
 
 is any such thing as progress, and who are able to advance 
 weighty reasons for their scepticism. It behoves all 
 those who would have reasonably clear ideas on these 
 problems to submit their social theories and pious hopes 
 to a little healthy analysis and criticism. 
 
 Of course no one is so foolish as to deny that the 
 world changes. There is, for example, no doubt in any- 
 one's mind that the last century was marked by a number 
 of signal revolutions in matters scientific, social, and 
 industrial. The differences arise when we come to 
 interpret the meaning and bearing of phenomena. Various 
 alternatives present themselve^2^'The changes may be 
 rhythmical or recurrent ; developments and degenerations 
 may succeed each other. Or a movement forward in one 
 
 ^ part of the universe may be accompanied by a backward 
 movement in another, leaving the total condition un- 
 altered. Or there may be progresses and regresses, with 
 a forward movement on the whole. Various are the 
 theories which have suggested themselves in different 
 ages and in different civilisations. And we may safely 
 prophesy that Herbert Spencer's cosmological speculations 
 in his First Principles will be by no means the last of 
 their kind. In any case, the exceeding smallness of the 
 
 1 section of time open to our observation should make 
 dogmatism impossible. The unknown is so indefinitely 
 vaster than the known that it keeps us, or should keep 
 us, humble and teachable. 
 
 Limiting our attention to the human race, there are 
 
 17 
 
^** 
 
 258^1 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 many questions of intense interest which press for 
 answers with growing insistence. Does happiness in- 
 crease with civilisation ? Are we wise, or are we foolish, 
 to indulge hopes of better times to come ? What is the 
 social ideal at which we should aim ? These, and many- 
 others of like purport, are being forced upon us by the 
 social developments of our day. Our attitude towards 
 them is of extreme practical importance. Supposing 
 social progress to have a legitimate ideal and a rational 
 aim, any mistakes of ours in regard to them are so much 
 to the bad. If we are in earnest, we shall not dare to 
 trust to the accidents of temperament or prejudice. We 
 shall do our best to get at facts. And when we have 
 found them, we shall not shut our eyes to them if they 
 chance to be other than we expected. 
 
 '■ ? II. The State of Nature. 
 
 In the last lecture we glanced at the social theory of 
 Hobbes, and saw that he regarded the primitive condition 
 of man as one of universal war. The State was invented 
 to make life more endurable. Thus, for Hobbes, the 
 present was bad, but the past had been worse. 
 
 So wonderful, however, is the range of human specula- 
 tion that we find precisely the opposite view made into 
 the basis for social reconstruction. Rousseau felt the 
 present to be unendurable and looked back upon the past 
 as the time when man was free and happy in a beautiful 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 259 
 
 world. He regarded the whole process of civilisation as 
 a falling away from "the state of nature.'* The only- 
 hope lay in retracing the false steps which had brought 
 man to so great misery. 
 
 We cannot be astonished that Rousseau developed 
 such a view when we remember the hideously artificial 
 and wholly cruel form of civilisation which he saw around 
 him. Well might he look back longingly to the 
 simplicity of more primitive times ! Well might his 
 arguments be red hot with emotion and enthusiasm, and 
 the remedies he proposed be drastic ! Nor did his on- 
 slaught fail of its effect withal. Maine testifies ^ that 
 " the world has not seen more than once or twice in all 
 the course of history a literature which has exercised such 
 prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every 
 cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from 
 Rousseau between 1749 and 1762." 
 
 Nor has the condemnation of modern society passed 
 away with Rousseau's crusade. It reappears from time 
 to time, enforced with much enthusiasm and commanding 
 wide attention. There is, for example, a book with the 
 title Civilisation^ its Cause and its Cure^ ^ which has 
 reached its eighth, if not its ninth edition. Its author 
 arraigns civilisation as leading to social disease and as 
 breaking up the unity of man's nature. He would fan 
 into flame the smouldering fire of dissatisfaction with 
 modern conditions. He points out to us the road which 
 ^ Ancient Law, chap. iv. ^ gy Carpenter. See pp. 25 and 35. 
 
X 
 
 26o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 he believes will lead us " back to the lost Eden, or rather 
 forward to the new Eden, of which the old was only 
 a figure. Man has to undo his wrappings and his 
 mummydom of centuries by which he has shut himself 
 from the light of the sun." He has " to emerge from 
 houses and all his other hiding-places wherein he has 
 concealed himself. Nature must once again become his 
 home, as it is the home of the animals and the angels." 
 
 Such are the teachings which keep alive the underlying 
 spirit of the legends of the Golden Age — the legends 
 which recount the cycles of gradual but steady deteriora- 
 tion — the legends which are so widely spread, and which 
 on that account puzzle us all the more. Certain thinkers ^ 
 are inclined to regard them as witnessing to a general 
 consciousness of a lost condition of ease and contentment. 
 We can agree as to the " consciousness," but we cannot 
 allow historical truth to the legends themselves, any more 
 than to Hobbes' conceptions of the primitive state of 
 universal war. I believe them to have sprung from the 
 natural tendency of old age to look back on the glowing 
 days of youth with regret for vanished hopes and for 
 abated vigour. We can trace the working of such 
 feelings in ourselves, and we find them in concentrated 
 form in the poets. It is thus that Wordsworth lamented 
 the passing of the glory of outward nature^ — 
 
 " I know, where'er I go, 
 That there hath passed away a glory from the earth." 
 
 ^ Op. cit., p. lo. 2 Q^g 0^ Immortality. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 261 
 
 It is thus that Robert Louis Stevenson lamented the 
 passing of the glory of youth that glowed in his soul ^ — 
 
 " Sing me a song of a lad that is gone, 
 Say, could that lad be I ? 
 Merry of soul he sailed on a day 
 Over the sea to Skye. 
 
 Give me again all that was there. 
 
 Give me the sun that shone ! 
 Give me the eyes, give me the soul, 
 
 Give me the lad that's gone ! " 
 
 But however these things may be, we have surely all 
 now learnt our lesson — we no longer expect that ^ 
 
 '* Time will run back and fetch the age of gold." 
 
 The Golden Age, if it is to be a reality for us, must (as 
 St Simon said) lie before us, not behind us. I have 
 sufficiently acknowledged the evils of modern civilisation. 
 I rejoice in many of the reactions against them. I can 
 enjoy Thoreau, appreciate a good deal of Tolstoi, and 
 applaud the spirit of Wagner's proposed return to the 
 " Simple Life." But I cannot admire the primitive 
 savage. The more we know of " man in a state of 
 nature," the more do we find that he was the slave of 
 custom. Freedom is about the last thing he possesses. 
 Every detail of his life is regulated by minute and arbitrary 
 rules, the breach of which is an offence against religion, 
 and punished accordingly by the severest penalties.^ 
 
 ^ Songs of Travel^ xlii. ^ Milton, Ode on Chrisfs Nativity. 
 
 ^ See Lubbock, Origin of Civilisation., pp. 448 ff. 
 
262 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Just, however, as we found excuse for Hobbes because 
 he invented history rather than ignored it, so may we 
 find a similar excuse for Rousseau. He was not really 
 building on the data of scientific anthropology — he was 
 protesting against glaring abuses which actually flaunted 
 themselves before his eyes. He was thinking rather of 
 simplicity as opposed to a cruelly selfish artificiality. He 
 advocated a more general equality of opportunity for all 
 classes alike, both for pampered nobles and for squalid 
 poor. From his conviction of the fairness of this, there 
 flashed his brilliant denunciations of social vices and 
 abuses, and the daring paradoxes in which he concentrated 
 his wrath and pity. He insisted with amazing energy 
 that civilisation increases misery and that our vaunted 
 progress is retrogression. His mistake was that he 
 dazzled himself and his contemporaries by crediting the 
 state of nature with all the culture and refinement which 
 centuries of civilisation had made possible. But however 
 much his anthropology may be at fault, the moral of 
 his tale is sound, and is as wholesome for our times as 
 for his own. 
 
 We can amend the imperfections of his theory by 
 bringing them into connection with Aristotle's deeper 
 doctrine. Man is by nature a social being. By nature^ 
 mark. Nature must be taken in the widest sense if we 
 are to arrive at sound social theory. It must include 
 origin, process, and completed development. For the 
 nature of a thing, in Aristotle's sense, is not seen until 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 263 
 
 the development is complete. The germ of political 
 
 capacity is there from the beginning. History describes 
 
 its unfolding. Its full perfection is yet to come. The 
 
 present may reveal a mass of corruption which may lead 
 
 us to despair ; but the decay is such as will provide a 
 
 soil for richer growth. Browning has given a grand 
 
 exposition of this noble doctrine, and has set it in the 
 
 light of modern knowledge. He represents Nature as 
 
 full of quiet triumph — a triumph which can 
 
 " Fill us with regard for man, 
 With apprehension of his passing worth, 
 Desire to work his proper nature out. 
 For these things tend still upward ; progress is 
 The law of life." 
 
 III. Pessimism. 
 
 If there is to be social salvation at all, we must look 
 forward, not backward, for ideals and for inspiration. 
 But, as I said, there are some who tell us that neither 
 looking backward nor looking forward will avail. Exist- 
 ence is radically bad, and our only hope is to face the 
 inevitable with a Stoic fortitude. " Brief and powerless 
 is man's life ; on him and on all his race the slow, sure 
 doom falls, pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, 
 reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its 
 relentless way." ' Such is the latest edition of pessimism. 
 Schopenhauer definitely declared that the pains of life 
 exceed the pleasures ; that increasing sensibility brings 
 
 ^ Ideals of Scie?tce and Faith, p. 169. 
 
264 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 with it increased suffering ; that desire itself is pain. 
 Our truest wisdom, therefore, is to mortify the pride of 
 life. Our highest bliss is to sink into the bosom of the 
 unconscious. 
 
 I would not have you imagine that the arguments on 
 the side of pessimism are either few or lightly to be 
 dismissed. When we begin to reflect on the amount of 
 pain and suffering in the world, the sensitive spirit is 
 almost appalled, and administers a crushing rebuke to 
 the blind optimism of the contented conservative who 
 glibly talks about this being " the best of all possible 
 worlds," and glorifies the gospel of laissez faire. A 
 Christian can never acquiesce in so comfortable, but so 
 blind and so selfish a view of life. He will remember 
 St Paul's words that the whole creation groans and 
 travails together in pain. He will remember St Paul's 
 own personal " Iliad of woes." He will remember above 
 all that the Divine Captain of his salvation was a man of 
 sorrows and acquainted with grief, who, when burdened 
 with the thought of the sin and sorrow of the world, was 
 in an agony, and His sweat was as it were great drops of 
 blood falling to the ground. No, a Christian who has 
 in any degree absorbed the spirit of his religion, cannot 
 possibly be an easy-going optimist. At the heart of 
 human history there throbs the supreme tragedy. 
 
 With full determination, then, to keep our hand firmly 
 on the pulse of real life, let us review the pessimistic 
 position, and see whether light does not break through 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 265 
 
 the cloud full and bright enough to make us share 
 Browning's conviction that 
 
 " God's in His heaven, 
 All's right with the world." 
 
 The chief contention of the pessimist is that the balance 
 of pain in human life preponderates over that of pleasure. 
 It is obviously impossible to refute such a statement by- 
 logic, or even by statistics. For pleasure and pain are 
 not objective quantities which can be measured — they are 
 subjective phenomena — they are dependent on individual 
 temperament, and even on momentary mood. We are 
 thus compelled to forsake the direct discussion of the 
 question. But the indirect methods of discussion will 
 furnish sufficiently tangible results. 
 
 Take one of the main positions of the pessimist of the 
 Schopenhauer type — that desire itself is pain, and that to 
 increase desire is to increase pain. From this it follows 
 that pleasure itself is an evil, for pleasure kindles desire. 
 Now is it true that desire is always painful ^ If a ship- 
 wrecked crew which has taken to the boats is consumed 
 with a desire for food or water, the pain will reach a 
 terrible intensity. But if a healthy man comes in from 
 an invigorating walk, the feeling of hunger or thirst may 
 be distinctly pleasant in itself, and serve as a zest to 
 the food which satisfies the desire. And so with all our 
 desires and appetites, when not too violent. We may 
 safely generalise and maintain that there is a definite 
 pleasure attached to the healthy functioning of any part 
 
266 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 of our nature, physical, mental, or spiritual. So certain 
 
 is this conclusion that Guyau, the French moralist, whom 
 
 I have previously cited, has founded his whole system of 
 
 morals upon it. He holds that the pleasure of action 
 
 / lies at the very root of life. And he points out that 
 
 many people will even prefer the chance, or even the 
 
 actual suffering, of pain to continued inaction. The 
 
 pleasure of expending energy conquers the shrinking 
 
 from what is undoubtedly an evil. And this argument 
 
 applies, as I said, to mental and spiritual experiences, as 
 
 well as to physical. So that Tennyson could acknowledge 
 
 in the deepest depth of his sorrow — 
 
 " 'Tis better to have loved and lost, 
 Than never to have loved at all." 
 
 Follow up this line of argument into the sphere of 
 evolution. The very fact that life persists and develops 
 is proof that, on the whole, it must be worth living. 
 Were the pains in excess, the process would cease. 
 Natural selection secures the result that those who 
 survive, even though they are not optimists, must still 
 have sufficient interest to make them struggle to live. 
 And since increasing life means corresponding increase 
 of life-preserving activities, it follows that the same causes 
 which make life possible also make it enjoyable. Hence 
 there is much to be said for the view that pessimists are 
 often men of ill-balanced constitutions who incline to 
 colour the whole of existence with the sombre hues of 
 their subjective experiences. At any rate it is safe to 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 267 
 
 conclude with Ritchie ^ that " pessimism, genuine and 
 earnest pessimism, can never be the living creed of any 
 large portion of the race," for " sincere and convinced 
 pessimists would kill themselves or cease to continue 
 their accursed race." 
 
 If the pessimist takes his stand upon another set of 
 phenomena in human life — remorselessly laying bare the 
 sordid, selfish features, we have sadly to acknowledge 
 the strength of his case. Hobbes' picture of man as a 
 wolf to his fellow man is in many respects a true 
 transcript from nature. A British firm will sacrifice the 
 lives of soldiers who are risking their lives for the 
 stability of British commerce, by knowingly supplying 
 them with weapons which will fail in the hour of need. 
 And the general level of trade morality may be so low 
 as to make it impossible to punish those who have used 
 such dastardly means to satisfy their greed. For the 
 animals men often make the world a hell, not merely by 
 cruelties which arise from sheer brutality or ignorance, 
 but by scientifically calculated torture applied in large 
 and specially endowed institutions in the chief centres of 
 civilisation. Hecatombs of human lives may be offered up 
 on the ever-smoking altar of human lust and mammon- 
 worship. To all this, and to an endless series of like 
 indictments, we have to listen with bowed heads and 
 saddened hearts. Verily the pessimist has much to urge ! 
 
 Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be 
 ^ ^itchie^s Philosophical Studies^ p. 226. 
 
268 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 beguiled into taking a distorted view of human life and 
 character. Man is not an angel — but neither is he a 
 devil. Who shall estimate the amount of simple good- 
 ness of heart, of kindly feeling, of sterling honesty, that 
 go to the living of an average human life ? The social 
 instinct and feelings, as I have shown, are no less natural 
 than the selfish, and are gaining increased rationality. 
 There is an abundance of healthy sentiment, of love of 
 home and family, of generous goodwill, of rugged worth 
 half shy of allowing itself to be seen, of the spirit of 
 mutual helpfulness. The poor are proverbially kind to 
 one another — and the poor are many in number ! The 
 spirit of comradeship can work marvels even among the 
 least promising of the race. Further, consider how little 
 chance the race has yet had of developing its higher 
 possibilities — how inadequate are our methods of education 
 — how unwholesome to the whole man the environment 
 of vast multitudes of those who compose the bulk of 
 our civilised communities. Whatsoever a man sows that 
 shall he also reap. A very large number of our miseries 
 and shortcomings are remediable. Let us remedy them 
 before we feel we have earned the right to judge. I 
 have myself worked for seven years in a slum of the 
 slums, and I can affirm with Wordsworth, that while 
 
 " I've heard of hearts unkind, kind deed 
 With coldness still returning ; 
 Alas ! the gratitude of men 
 
 Has oftener left me mourning." 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 269 
 
 The mention of the slums brings me to another point. 
 One of the most dangerous features in life under slum 
 conditions is that the dwellers therein tend to be satisfied 
 with that which is, and even to love to have it so. The 
 attraction of the ideal almost ceases to be felt. There is 
 apathy — there is resentment against any effort from with- 
 out to purify or uplift. How infinitely sad if a whole 
 people should sink into this condition of passive acceptance 
 of the actual ! The sting of divine discontent is the very 
 salt of life. Unsatisfied desires, instead of being the 
 source of our misery, are the spur to progress and to 
 higher development. 
 
 And, lastly, under the head of those arguments against 
 pessimism, if the pessimist insists that unhappiness tends 
 to increase as civilisation progresses, I think we may fairly 
 ask him whether he is not largely confusing cause and 
 effect. Our knowledge of suffering is increasing, as also 
 our power of sympathising with it. May not such 
 increase of knowledge and sympathy produce in our 
 minds an exaggerated estimate of the increase of the 
 exciting causes ? I deem this to be more than probable. 
 And again, granting that there is some ground for the 
 view that the finer the nervous susceptibility, the greater 
 the capacity for pain, there is still no case for pessimism 
 until it is shown that the pains increase more rapidly than 
 the pleasures. Can this be proved ? I trow not. Look 
 around. Never before in the world's history has life been 
 so full of interest for the normal man. Never have so 
 
270 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 many experiments been open to him for expanding and 
 enriching his nature. On every hand the mental vision 
 ranges over prospects fresh and fair. Problems of intense 
 interest afford exhilarating exercise for the intellectual 
 vigour which shows no signs of flagging. New modes of 
 feeling and emotion are being evolved. And the social 
 ideals which will allow of ever greater numbers rising 
 from the level of mere living to that of living well — these 
 ideals are seizing on the hearts and imaginations of restless 
 and aspiring multitudes, and bid fair to make the world 
 a happier and a nobler home for man. Doubtless 
 Schopenhauer would warn us that this is all so much to 
 the bad. We lay on him and his disciples the burden of 
 the proof. 
 
 IV. Optimism. 
 
 I spoke a while back of the dangers of a facile optimism. 
 Now that we have repudiated the teachings of a morbid 
 and faithless pessimism, we are in a position to enforce 
 this earlier theme. I alluded then to the thoughtless, 
 heartless optimism of the laissez faire type. I dealt, by 
 anticipation, with the optimism (more excusable, but not 
 less dangerous) of the sentimental and unreasoning type, 
 when I defended the ideal against the charge of being 
 visionary and unpractical. For both types I would urge 
 the thought that the problems of life are stern and are by 
 no means easy of solution. It is dangerous to shut one's 
 eyes to facts ; it is dangerous also to indulge in rash 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 271 
 
 inductions and humanitarian dreams. We must cherish 
 an optimism that shall be hopeful, elastic, and resource- 
 ful ; but let us see to it that it be sane withal. The out- 
 come of social movements is often startlingly different 
 from that anticipated. Let us look before we leap — but 
 not look so long as to be paralysed. 
 
 In this regard I am thoroughly at one with Karl 
 Pearson when he insists ^ that " really to change human 
 nature requires long generations of educational labour. 
 y Human progress, like Nature, never leaps ; this is the 
 most certain of all laws deduced from the study of human 
 development. If this be formulated in the somewhat 
 obscure phrase : ' Social growth takes place by evolution, 
 not by revolution,' the man of the market-place declares 
 in one breath that his revolution is an evolution, and in 
 the next either sings some glorious chant, a blind appeal 
 to force, or informs you that he can shoulder a rifle, and 
 could render our present society impossible by the use 
 of dynamite, with the properties of which he is well 
 acquainted. Poor fellow ! would he were as well 
 acquainted with the properties of human nature ! " 
 With the general tenor of these remarks I am, I repeat, 
 quite in accord. Education is of paramount necessity. 
 But I should differ from Karl Pearson rather seriously 
 as to the kind of education required. He lays almost 
 exclusive stress on appeals to the reason, as opposed to 
 appeals to the emotions. But if anything I have urged 
 
 1 Ethic of Freethought^ p. no. 
 
272 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 in my first two lectures, as to the relation of feeling to 
 reason, be sound, I insist that an education of the feelings 
 is of equal, if not greater, importance. As Karl Pearson 
 is especially hard on Christian theologians, let me bring 
 Guyau to my aid. He will be free from suspicion on 
 this score of theology. Could anything be stronger than 
 this ? Speaking of instruction in aesthetics, he explains ^ 
 that the ancients saw in the poet an almost divine being, 
 because the poet is he who best perceives the relation 
 of form to emotion and thought. He enlarges thus : 
 " The moral, thinking, and feeling being has yet to be 
 created in the child ; and just as we do not profess to 
 leave the child to discover the fundamental laws of 
 science (assuming him capable of such discovery), so we 
 ought not to expect him unaided to attain to all the most 
 elevated sentiments ; he must be brought to such a level 
 little by little ; he must be taught not only the discoveries 
 and acquisitions, but also the ideal aspirations of the 
 human mind, from which, in fact, all science springs." 
 And speaking of the function of the ideal, he declares 
 with warmth^ that "the power of the ideal to realise 
 itself will become greater in proportion as the ideal is 
 placed higher in the society of the future." He warns 
 us against always teaching the ufi/iiy of the good while 
 forgetting its " beauty^ which causes what is good 
 
 1 Guyau, Education and Heredity^ trans, in Contemp, Science 
 Series, p. 207. 
 
 2 Op, cit., p. 183. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 273 
 
 spontaneously to afford immediate enjoyment." And 
 
 even of religious instruction as given in France he tells 
 
 us that " anti-religious fanaticism offers grave dangers, 
 
 just as religious fanaticism does," and that it is the duty 
 
 of the State to preserve the children from both alike. 
 
 I would ask Karl Pearson to perpend these weighty 
 
 opinions of a brother agnostic. For myself, I declare 
 
 my intense conviction that a sane and practical optimism 
 
 must establish itself on educated feeling as well as on 
 
 educated reason. We have seen that science, by itself, 
 
 leads us to fatalism and despair ; for it is bound to stop 
 
 short at unconscious mechanism. We have seen that 
 
 reason without emotion is like an engine without steam. 
 
 Does it not follow that the emotion must be sound, as 
 
 well as the reasoning ? And if we stunt emotion we 
 
 shall stunt humanity. The kind of human being 
 
 prophesised quite solemnly and in the name of science, 
 
 in a leading review,^ is a toothless, bald, toeless creature 
 
 with flaccid muscles and limbs almost incapable of 
 
 locomotion. This is the style of prophecy propounded 
 
 by those who have cultivated reason without at the same 
 
 time cultivating a saving sense of the ludicrous, not to 
 
 speak of the ideal of the beautiful. And we are urged 
 
 to throw ourselves into the arms of a hard rationalism, 
 
 which inspires with the hope of our becoming creatures 
 
 such as that above pictured, in a world where omnipotent 
 
 matter rolls on its remorseless way, and crushes us in 
 
 ^ Nineteenth Century^ May 1883, quoted by Carpenter. 
 
 18 
 
274 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 the end (flaccid muscles and all) in the immense ruin 
 of the solar system. Let us cherish no illusions, then ; 
 science by itself is not a basis for optimism. It can never 
 reveal meanings — it can never supply the soul to progress. 
 Rather is its motto that which befits the dungeon of 
 fatalistic facts — 
 
 " All hope abandon, ye who enter here." 
 
 Pray do not misunderstand me ! I am an ardent lover 
 of science. I regard it as one of the factors essential to 
 progress. It reveals to us the world of facts, and 
 furnishes material for ever higher expressions of man's 
 nature. But it cannot stand alone — to make an exclusive 
 claim on its behalf is to extinguish its very possibility. 
 I cannot even use my reason unless I go beyond my 
 reason, and trust to my whole nature. I must desire — 
 in the greatest issues of life, I must love — that which I 
 am to strive for and attain. 
 
 Thus it is that true optimism lies enshrined in the 
 ideal — an ideal which is not rational only, but aesthetic 
 and moral. The cosmic process must be recognised as 
 the gradual realisation of perfect truth, combined with 
 perfect beauty and with perfect good. Goethe goes to 
 the root of the matter ^ — 
 
 " As all Nature's myriad changes 
 
 still one changeless Power proclaim, 
 So through thought's wide kingdom ranges 
 one vast meaning, e'er the same. 
 
 ^ Carlyle's translation. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 275 
 
 This is Truth — eternal Reason — 
 
 that in Beauty takes its dress, 
 And serene thro' time and season, 
 
 stands complete in Righteousness." 
 
 V. Progress and Happiness. 
 
 What, then, is progress ? Let us come to closer 
 quarters with our question. What is the aim and out- 
 come of the process of organic evolution ? Is it happiness ? 
 The pessimist denies this absolutely. Others, without 
 subscribing to pessimism, doubt whether happiness 
 increases with civilisation. Others, again, maintain that 
 happiness should at any rate be the goal at which we aim, 
 and adopt as their motto for progress the well-worn 
 formula — the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
 
 In criticising Kant's conception of duty, I took occasion 
 to give desire for happiness a place in the complex unity 
 of the moral judgment. But I argued that it constituted 
 a part only of a greater whole, and that in an act of 
 moral choice the " total man " is concerned — feeling, will, 
 and reason. We may preserve ourselves from much 
 wearisome controversy here by applying this conclusion 
 to the wider problem. To posit happiness as the aim 
 of progress is to put the part for the whole. There can 
 be little, if any, doubt that all organisms, from the lowest 
 to the highest, seek to avoid pain and to gain pleasure. 
 And that on the whole they succeed in their efforts is 
 proved by the fact that life persists and develops. This 
 
276 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 was one of our main arguments against pessimism. But 
 to allow this is a totally different thing from allowing 
 that pleasure is the sole, or even the most direct, aim in 
 the process onward and upward through the stages of 
 development. Underlying it, as I have so often insisted, 
 is the will to live. The self-determining centre declares 
 itself, and strives to expand by using, and even opposing, 
 its environment. Regarded in this light, pleasure is seen 
 to be normally a secondary product of certain of the life- 
 seeking actions. It accompanies, rather than causes, them. 
 In other words, it is only under exceptional, and some- 
 what artificial, circumstances that pleasure is the object 
 directly sought. Impulses and cravings precede the 
 experience of pleasure, much more the consciously ap- 
 prehended idea of pleasure. Or yet again (for the point 
 is a crucial one), in the normal development of an 
 organism, pleasure is a sign^ rather than an aim — a sign 
 that an aim has been reached, namely, that some function 
 has been exercised in a healthy way. 
 
 Long ago the Greeks thought all this out for us. It 
 seems a pity we should have to go over the ground so 
 often. More especially would Plato and Aristotle have 
 condemned the too prevalent modern theory that progress 
 means increased material comfort. We are, of course, 
 bound to make the material side of life harmonise with 
 our ideal of life as a whole ; the Greeks were unique in 
 their grasp of this idea, and in the extent to which they 
 gave it effect. But Aristotle scorned the thought of 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 277 
 
 seeking money as a means to bodily pleasure, or of 
 making the accumulation of money an end in itself. 
 Wealth and material comforts were to be a means to an 
 end — they were to be used, not for living merely, but for 
 living nobly and well. Aristotle would have condemned 
 our modern State in two respects. The multitudes of 
 those who, calling themselves free citizens, live their lives 
 under conditions of filth, and squalor, and want, would 
 have appalled him. He desired a sufficiency of wealth for 
 all. He would have no extremes. He suggested that, 
 even under the simpler economic conditions of the old 
 world, accumulation should be limited. Our modern 
 worship of money would have struck him as unutterably 
 vulgar. Such was the teaching of enlightened Greeks 
 before Christianity was heard of. We have nearly two 
 thousand years of Christianity behind us — and where 
 are we ! 
 
 Still, while emphasising with all the force of which we 
 are capable the necessity for improving the material 
 conditions of the toilers and the poor, we must not lose 
 sight of Aristotle's teaching that these material conditions 
 are a means and not an end. Sensuous enjoyment must 
 never be pursued at the expense of character. It panders 
 to the animal in us ; it degrades our true humanity. 
 When Mephistopheles would destroy Faust, he plied him 
 with satisfaction for his senses. And Faust was saved 
 just because there was something in him which rebelled 
 against a life of sensuous pleasure. 
 
278 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 Hear Spinoza, also, searching for the " good " of life ^ : 
 " The ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by 
 men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may 
 be classed under the three heads — Riches, Fame, and the 
 Pleasures of Sense : with these three the mind is so 
 absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any diflrerent 
 good. By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the 
 extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually 
 attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any 
 other object." Having arrived at the conclusion that 
 external, material goods were not, as he originally 
 believed, certain, but rather very uncertain goods, he 
 reflects that "all the objects pursued by the multitude 
 not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our 
 being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not 
 seldom of those who possess them, and always of those 
 who are possessed by them." 
 
 True optimism, then, will not regard the universe as 
 a large machine for manufacturing happiness — least of all, 
 material happiness. Pleasure is not the aim or the goal, 
 but a useful means for measuring our success ^ in attain- 
 ing to the true end, namely, self-development. 
 
 But we may go further than this. The Greeks them- 
 selves saw that unbroken happiness is not good for us. 
 They would have concurred from the Greek standpoint 
 
 1 Tractatus de Litellectus Emefidafione — opening paragraphs. 
 ^ Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays (Eversley edition), vol. ii. 
 p. 158. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 279 
 
 with the Hebrew expression of the same experience — 
 " Before I was troubled, I went wrong, but now have I 
 kept Thy word." Continued material prosperity tends 
 to a certain hardness of character, a lack of sympathy, an 
 undue sense of self-satisfaction. In short, unbroken 
 happiness creates a certain attitude of mind which may 
 be described as unsocial. The Greeks called it vppL<s — 
 wantonness, or insolence. They were afraid of it, deem- 
 ing it likely to call down the jealous wrath of the gods. I 
 need not tell you how Christianity has spiritualised the 
 conception, and softened human suffering by shedding 
 on it the light of chastening love. 
 
 / But thus to argue that suffering has its uses, Is not to 
 argue that it is a good thing in itself.^ Much of it comes 
 from ignorance. Sometimes it waxes so intense or over- 
 whelming that it hardens or crushes. In any case it 
 stands condemned as an imperfection, or disorder, in 
 the universe. The ideal judges it, however much it may 
 seem to have purpose here and now. The spiritual 
 element in man refuses to acquiesce in its permanence — 
 revolts against it — demands its abolition. As Comte has 
 taught,^ we are travelling by a long and stormy road — 
 not of untroubled and peaceful growth, but of conflict, 
 division, pain. As a recompense, however, he held out 
 the hope of the reconciliation of the individual and 
 
 1 Spinoza is most suggestive here. See Ethics^ iii. 11, and Schol. 
 iv. 64, Dem. 
 
 2 See E. Caird's Social Philosophy of Comfe^ passim. 
 
28o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 society, of humanity and the world. The aim of pro- 
 gress I defined as self-realisation. My lecture on the 
 social factor will interpret this statement. If man is by 
 nature a social being — if the "self" cannot develop in 
 isolation but only as an integral part of a social whole — 
 then it follows that to aim at self-realisation is to aim at 
 nothing short of a perfect humanity. Here is the true 
 inwardness of Comte's social theory. And is it not still 
 more the inwardness of Christianity ? " Now ye are the 
 body of Christ," says St Paul, "and severally members 
 thereof." That is to say. Christians know themselves to 
 have risen yet another step in the grades of approach 
 to the perfection of God's Nature, in that they are 
 members of that portion of humanity which has con- 
 sciously realised its spiritual nature, its kinship to the 
 Divine. 
 
 VI. Slow Rate of Progress. 
 
 Here we touch on what is, to me, one of the greatest 
 of mysteries — the slow pace of development. Think of 
 the untold ages which have elapsed since life appeared 
 upon the planet. Think even of the lapse of time since 
 man appeared — and yet his date is but of yesterday as 
 compared with the epochs which preceded him. We 
 can trace him back into the latest of the Inter-glacial 
 periods, and who shall yet say how many thousand years 
 that means ? Or who shall yet say how many thousand 
 years behind that again we should have to go back to 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 281 
 
 reach his cradle ? But these and similar questions of 
 intensest interest I am compelled to leave aside. I want 
 to consider man as we know him now, and to gauge his 
 future rather than meditate upon his past. 
 
 Coming, then, to things as they now are, we realise 
 that the pace of progress is manifesting an ever-accelerat- 
 ing speed. Last century was phenomenal. The whole 
 of civilised Australasia grew up within its limits. It 
 witnessed enormous strides in the knowledge of nature's 
 laws and forces, and strides no less enormous in the 
 practical application of that knowledge. With these 
 phases of progress we are all sufficiently well acquainted. 
 But knowledge of nature and its practical applications 
 touch the surface only of our lives. I have quoted to 
 you MilFs doubt as to whether the lot of any human 
 being has been as yet thereby relieved. Let us, how- 
 ever, put a yet more fundamental question. How about 
 the development of the social organism itself} Here we 
 have a different tale to tell. Here we have to confess 
 that the pace is still slow — painfully creeping. This 
 backwardness in social evolution was keenly appreciated 
 by Haeckel.^ He quotes, to endorse them, the words 
 of Alfred Russell Wallace, how that, " as compared with 
 our astounding progress in physical science and its 
 practical applications, our system of government, of ad- 
 ministrative justice and of national education, and our 
 entire social and moral organisation, remain in a state of 
 
 ^ Riddle of i lie Universe^ p. 6. 
 
282 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 barbarism." There are few students of social questions 
 who will not agree with Haeckel and Wallace in this 
 indictment. 
 
 What are the causes of this lagging ? Many and 
 various. Most of them spring from the anti-social 
 instincts and impulses which I have already considered 
 at sufficient length. There is, however, one factor of 
 supreme importance which has not yet been touched 
 upon — I refer to the growing complexity of human 
 society. With growth in complexity there goes along 
 increasing difficulty of modification and reform — increasing 
 risk of damaging the social organism by interfering with 
 its more vital functions. 
 
 When we think of this increasing complexity, we are 
 inevitably reminded of Herbert Spencer's definition of 
 the evolutionary process. Starting with the assumption 
 that the universe is the scene of an unceasing redistribu- 
 tion of matter and motion, he defines^ as follows : — 
 " Evolution is an integration of matter and consequent 
 dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes 
 from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, 
 coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained 
 motion undergoes a parallel transformation." Such is 
 the famous formula, for the ponderosity of which 
 Spencer has been severely blamed by some, while others 
 have congratulated the universe on delivering itself of 
 such a mighty utterance ! Spencer has as warmly de- 
 
 ^ jFirs^ Principles y p. 396. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 283 
 
 fended it, urging the necessity for technical terms 
 when dealing with statements of such abstract gener- 
 ality. Personally, I should not complain were it not 
 that the pronouncing or penning of such ponderosities 
 is apt to fill one with a proud, but quite mistaken, sense 
 of knowing all about it. When we come to analyse 
 homogeneity and heterogeneity, and recognise that neither 
 could the homogeneous ever become the heterogeneous, 
 nor the heterogeneous the homogeneous, we begin to feel 
 doubtful. Unless the whole heterogeneity were potential 
 in the universe from the beginning, it could never have 
 come about. That is to say, the heterogeneity was always 
 there, though taking different forms. That is to say, 
 there never was any homogeneity. But enough of this 
 criticism ; it was not for such reasons that I quoted the 
 formula. It was because of its giving expression to an 
 undoubted truth concerning that part of the universe, 
 or of existence, which is at present taking the form of 
 human society. Civilised communities are becoming 
 every whit as complex as the most differentiated of the 
 typical physical organisms. So many and so intricate are 
 the balancings among the parts, that even smaller dis- 
 turbances will often produce unexpectedly serious results. 
 The task of moulding and modifying social tissue thus 
 demands extreme care and patience if more good than 
 harm is to come of our experiments. I have already 
 insisted on this aspect of the problem when dealing with 
 the necessity for sound education. If we cut too deeply 
 
284 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 or too rapidly, the healing processes may not be able to 
 cope with the mischief wrought. A study of the French 
 Revolution will furnish superabundant evidence of the 
 difficulties and dangers arising from hasty attempts to 
 treat the complex as though it were simple. There is a 
 clear call, therefore, to all social reformers to study widely 
 and deeply the conditions under which they are working. 
 Serious operations and amputations are often of service in 
 their way. But it is not good even for the most robust 
 constitution to indulge in them too frequently. Our 
 supreme aim must be to cast out of the social organism 
 all unsocial elements which tend to set up local suppura- 
 tions. Let the average citizen be thoroughly socialised 
 — all else will follow in due course. The soul will 
 speedily evolve a body through which to find its fitting 
 expression. 
 
 Used in this fashion, and on these lines, the application 
 of biological analogies to social evolution is most valuable. 
 But I have shown that we must be on our guard not to 
 be overawed by evolutionary formulae and by metaphors 
 from organic structure. I should be the last to question 
 the statement that in many of its aspects society is an 
 organism. But I refuse to push the parallel too far. We 
 saw that two factors remain altogether outside all bio- 
 logical conceptions and methods — consciousness, and the 
 moral " ought " set over against the " is " of the actual. 
 Each of these factors, as we have seen, presents features 
 which differ by whole spheres of being from those in- 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 285 
 
 vestigated In biology. As far as organic phenomena 
 transcend physical, so far, if not farther, do social 
 phenomena transcend organic. As the possibilities of life 
 could never be gauged from a study of the mechanical, so 
 the possibilities of social life can never be gauged by the 
 study of biology. Progress has been slow in the past. 
 But who shall venture to prophesy of the future ? 
 
 There are many who cannot be induced to look beyond 
 their own little world. What human nature is in their 
 experience, that it will always be. They wag their heads 
 wisely, and talk of the leopard changing his spots. The 
 industrial type of social organisation is for them the only 
 possible type ; and if you venture to suggest that there 
 might be a better, they set you down as a dangerous 
 revolutionary. Such people have either never read 
 history, or else they are devoid of historical imagination. 
 Let me therefore bring them down to consider certain 
 actually existing types of social development. The 
 people I shall introduce to their notice are contemporaries 
 of theirs — belong to the same race of beings as themselves, 
 and yet look at life in a very different way. I shall con- 
 fine myself to four such types, as sufficient for my 
 purpose. I trust they will impress the imagination even 
 of the most matter-of-fact representative of modern 
 commercialism. I trust they will prove to you that 
 human nature is enormously elastic, and that there may 
 yet come astounding changes in the ideals which make 
 life worth living. 
 
286 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 VII. Dyak — Arab — Hindoo — Albanian. 
 
 Let us travel first to Borneo, and visit the tribes of the 
 head-hunters. I was particularly struck by a canoe of 
 theirs which I saw in your Museum on the occasion of 
 my first visit to your city.^ The tribes of the Dyaks still 
 persist in the barbarous practice of killing, simply to 
 secure the heads of their victims. To secure heads is 
 part and parcel of their life ideal. A recent explorer^ 
 tells us it is " the keystone in the edifice of Dyak religion 
 and character.*' He surmises that the continuance of 
 this practice is leading to the rapid extinction of the race, 
 and that it is possible the people will have improved 
 themselves off the face of the earth before the custom can 
 be entirely abolished. " Births and namings, marriages 
 and burials, not to mention less important events, cannot 
 be properly celebrated unless the heads of a few enemies, 
 more or less, have been secured to grace the festivities or 
 solemnities." 
 
 Here is an account of an interview which the same 
 explorer had with a famous, or infamous, chief of the 
 cannibal Dyaks.^ " He came into my house one day, 
 accompanied by his suite of two women and three men, 
 and I hardly know whether host or visitor felt the more 
 uncomfortable. His personal appearance bore out the 
 
 ^ Melbourne. 
 
 2 Bock, The Head Hunters of Borneo^ pp. 215, 216. 
 
 3 Qp^ ^//_^ pp^ 1^4^ j^^^ 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 287 
 
 Idea I had formed of him by the reports. I had heard of 
 his ferocity and of the depravity of his nature ; but I was 
 hardly prepared to see such an utter incarnation of all 
 that is most repulsive and horrible in the human form." 
 After giving a detailed description of the man, sufficiently 
 ghastly, the author continues : "At that very time, as 
 he sat conversing with me through my interpreter, and I 
 sketched his portrait, he had fresh upon his head the 
 blood of no less than seventy victims, men, women, and 
 children, whom he and his followers had just slaughtered, 
 and whose hands and brains he had eaten." 
 
 I must crave your forgiveness for bringing before 
 you horrors such as these. But we are facing facts. 
 Here are fellow-beings of the hard-headed commercial 
 man — of the laissez faire capitalist or cultured dilettante 
 — actually now walking on this same globe. It is not 
 such a very great time ago since our own ancestors were 
 unpleasantly like them. And it is interesting to know 
 that the Dyaks defend their own practice of head-hunt- 
 ing by arguing that white men kill in war far greater 
 numbers than are ever killed in Borneo ! Of course 
 such observations as these must be treated with the 
 contempt they deserve. 
 
 Let us away to a race in marked contrast to this — let 
 us visit the unchanging Arab wandering over his unchang- 
 ing deserts. In order that I may not impose upon you 
 creations of my own imagination, I will take as my guide 
 a man whose special knowledge is recognised by general 
 
288 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 consent. He tells us ^ that the Arab " is not in the least 
 
 like an Englishman. His mind travels by entirely 
 
 different routes from ours, and his body is built up of 
 
 much more inflammable materials. His free desert air 
 
 makes him impatient of control in a degree which we 
 
 can scarcely understand in an organised community. It 
 
 is difficult now to conceive a nation without cabinets and 
 
 secretaries of state and policemen, yet to the Arab these 
 
 things were not only unknown but inconceivable. He 
 
 lives the free, aimless life of a child." 
 
 The same authority remarks that " Arab poetry is a 
 
 sealed book to most, even among special Orientalists ; 
 
 they construe it, but it does not move them." But he 
 
 tells us that Browning has got to the heart of it, and 
 
 done it triumphantly in his " Saul," as Semitic a poem as 
 
 ever came from the desert itself. We see, he says, the 
 
 whole life and character of the Bedawy in these lines : — 
 
 " Oh, our manhood's prime vigour ! No spirit feels waste, 
 Not a muscle is stopped in its playing, nor sinew unbraced. 
 Oh, the wild joys of living ! the leaping from rock unto rock. 
 The strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree, the cool silver shock 
 Of the plunge in the pool's living water, the hunt of the bear. 
 And the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair. 
 And the meal, the rich dates yellowed over with gold dust divine. 
 And the locust flesh steeped in the pitcher, the deep draught of wine. 
 And the sleep in the dried river-channel, where bulrushes tell 
 That the water was wont to go warbling so softly and well 
 How good is man's life, the mere living ! how fit to employ 
 All the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy ! " 
 
 ^ Lane Pool, Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad, Introduction, 
 passim. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 289 
 
 We are a long way from commercialism here ! And 
 let us remember that the chivalry of Western Europe is 
 forced to own an Arabian origin. Chivalry and trade 
 seem to drift apart — witness the bayonets I mentioned 
 as supplied to our troops in South Africa, not to mention 
 the sham leather in the boots, and the rotten meat in the 
 tins. But chivalry and trade need not drift apart. Each 
 in its highest form ennobles the other. 
 
 Let us take as a third type the ideals which have 
 prevailed so largely in our great dependency of India. 
 The chief inductions of our scientific political economics 
 will hardly find recognition — often they would be in- 
 dignantly flung to the winds. The most eminent 
 Brahmans and Buddhists have definitely preferred poverty 
 to wealth. The Kshatriyas loved power and honoured 
 courage. It was the Visas, who did not belong to 
 the aristocracy, who set a high value on wealth, and 
 strove to amass it by industry, trade, and usury. 
 The Sudras were reduced to a servile condition, not 
 because they were poor^ but because they were a con- 
 quered population of inferior race. Modern ideals are 
 almost reversed. 
 
 The closest approximation to our modern type is found 
 
 in the caste system. I will cite Sir Monier Williams. 
 
 " Notwithstanding the constant efforts of great religious 
 
 leaders in India to deliver their fellow countrymen from 
 
 the tyranny of caste, the power of caste has always in the 
 
 end recovered its ascendency. So long as a man holds 
 
 19 
 
290 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 to his caste, he is at liberty to hold any opinions he likes, 
 even to accepting the doctrines of Christianity." Oh, 
 what cruel comments these, the more cruel because 
 undesigned, on the caste system as developed in modern 
 society ! Our social exclusiveness, our pride of birth, 
 or of wealth or privilege, is in spite of our Christianity, 
 which is the religion of brotherhood. In spite of it, our 
 caste system always in the end recovers itself. And in 
 the drawing-rooms of the select, a new arrival is discussed, 
 not on the score of the opinions he may hold, nor of 
 what he knows, nor even of his morals ; but judgment 
 turns upon who his father was, or upon the set to which 
 he belongs. 
 
 Our caste system is being rudely shaken, not by our 
 religion so much as by our mammon worship. But even 
 so, it dies hard. And we have not the excuses which the 
 Hindoo can plead — we do not pretend to hold, as they 
 do, that the different grades of society have different skins 
 — nor can we urge any form of religious sanction for our 
 unbrotherliness. 
 
 As a last type, let us take the races now inhabiting the 
 Balkan Peninsula. Here is an extract from a recent book 
 of travels ^ in that group of provinces or petty kingdoms. 
 Describing the fierce Albanians, the author writes : 
 "When a man kills his enemy, he must flee to the moun- 
 tains, because it is the duty of the nearest of kin of the 
 dead man to sally forth with gun and stalk the murderer 
 ^ Foster Fraser, Pictures from the Balkans, p. 248. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 291 
 
 till he kills him. Sometimes he gets killed himself. 
 Then the family of the dead man wage war on the family 
 of the man who shot first. The vendetta begins, and 
 lasts for years. Straight face to face fighting is not 
 necessary. A bullet from behind a boulder, or a stab 
 between the shoulders in the darkness of the night, are 
 constant methods by which wrongs are avenged. There 
 is nothing very unusual in finding a murdered Albanian ; 
 indeed it is so usual that the Albanians take it all as a 
 matter of course. They know nothing about courts of 
 law and such-like methods of settling differences. Their 
 instincts are primitive : a man offends you and you 
 remove him by killing him. Elbasan is a town of some 
 twenty thousand people. There is plenty of room for 
 quarrelling. A murder in the streets is rather more 
 common than a street fight is in an English town on a 
 Saturday night." 
 
 Comment on this extract is needless. But this which 
 1 have given you is by no means the worst. The book 
 abounds in gruesome details of terrible outrages on 
 women and children, of brutal and gratuitous tortures 
 inflicted, of wholesale murders committed at weddings, of 
 nails drawn from the quick by robbers to compel con- 
 fession of wealth — but I spare your feelings. Read the 
 book itself— it gives startling " Pictures from the Bal- 
 kans " of a social environment which one would have 
 fain believed impossible for peoples of modern Europe. 
 It is infinitely sad to learn that some of the Christians in 
 
292 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 this distracted Balkan Peninsula are even fiercer than the 
 Mahomedans. 
 
 There are my four types, and here is my moral. If 
 such fundamental changes in character and in ideals 
 actually exist now upon our globe, how enormously 
 elastic must human nature be, and how capable of pro- 
 digious modifications. And when we contrast the lowest 
 of these types with the highest specimens of the race, who 
 shall say what men may be hereafter. Let us shake off 
 our faithless surrender to the actual, and march forward 
 into the ideal. Vast social forces are at work. It is no 
 mere matter of counting the proportion of socialists in 
 legislative assemblies — it is the upheaval of a new order. 
 Let us see to it that our ideals are noble, rational, 
 brotherly, then we need not fear for the future. 
 
 '* For while the tired waves vainly breaking 
 Seem here no weary inch to gain, 
 Far back, through creeks and inlets making, 
 Comes silent, flooding in, the main. 
 
 And not by eastern windows only, 
 
 When daylight comes, comes in the light ; 
 
 In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly. 
 But westward, lookj the land is bright."^ 
 
 VIII. The Alpha and the Omega. 
 
 Let me gather my scattered strands together. / define 
 the goal of progress to he self-realisation on the part of beings 
 
 ' A. H. Clough. 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 293 
 
 who are members of a spiritual society. The soul of progress 
 I declare to he the Ideal, The Ideal, as it exists in the 
 minds of men, is progressive. The Ideal in its self- 
 existence is God. Such are the propositions which 1 have 
 endeavoured to establish. 
 
 Man may be of good cheer, and may brace himself 
 for further strenuous effort as he reflects on what has 
 been, what is, and what is yet to come. For he can 
 trace the process by which the will to live has, in him, 
 emerged into self-determining consciousness and moral 
 purpose. 
 
 In the material world he has largely conquered the 
 forces which would have crushed him. He has flaked 
 the flint. He has forged the metal. By patient toil and 
 infinite cunning he has discovered the magic formulae 
 which are rendering him lord of the forces of Nature and 
 are opening for him the chambers of her hidden wealth. 
 The world of matter cannot be omnipotent. For it in- 
 creasingly obeys his will. True, the portion of the 
 material which he guides is an infinitesimal portion of the 
 whole ; yet it suffices as a type. It proves that mind can 
 be master of matter, and that what is possible on the 
 scale of the microcosm is possible also on the scale of the 
 macrocosm. 
 
 But man's triumphs in the material sphere are but the 
 lowest of his grounds for hope. He can frame ideals. 
 That is to say, he transcends the mechanical, and pierces 
 through to modes of existence beyond the veil of sense. 
 
294 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 His ideals are imperfect, but they develop. They beckon 
 to him from the front. They guide him on his way to 
 worlds fairer than any he has yet realised. They fill his 
 existence with meanings and purposes which burst the 
 bonds of the actual and expand with the bloom and the 
 promise of the infinite. They nurse into being and foster 
 the irrepressible conviction that the power behind the 
 imposing immensity of the material is in league with him 
 in his upward struggles and aspirations. They tell him 
 he is akin to the ultimate reality — that behind the apparent 
 indifference of the external, there is the sympathy of a 
 kindred nature. The very fact that man makes his claim 
 on reality for more than the actual can give is itself 
 assurance that he is greater than the actual, and will not 
 be disappointed of his hope. 
 
 This instinct — this conviction — that the power behind 
 the phenomenal world is on his side, gains its content 
 from the facts of social life. In society, man comes into 
 relation with other centres of the will to live. And he 
 finds that the more many-sided the intercourse so 
 established, the more can he develop and multiply the 
 possibilities of his own being. Thus it comes that the 
 fierce struggle for existence first softens into the spirit of 
 mutual helpfulness, and then is fanned into the flame of 
 love. It is seen that the surest way of fulfilling the will 
 to live is to allow free expansion to the will to love. Love 
 once kindled brings out the inmost significance of the 
 personal element in human nature. Love established 
 
WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 295 
 
 between persons is felt to have in it the germ of im- 
 mortality. And so the heart of human love, reaching out 
 into the great unknown, lays hold on the Personality of 
 the Supreme Being, reads His nature in the light of love, 
 and henceforth feels secure that the secret of existence lies 
 in personal relations which are free from conditions of 
 time and space. The social bonds developed in time are 
 recognised as having their origin and their perfection in 
 the eternal. And the keystone to the arch of existence is 
 discovered in the truth that God Himself is Love. 
 
 Such is the trend of progress. It is movement in the 
 direction of the self-existent Ideal. The Ideal, as appre- 
 hended by us, shines " through the arch of experience," 
 and reveals to us " the gleam of that untrodden world to 
 which we move." The course is seldom or never a direct 
 one. It oscillates in spirals round the guiding line. But 
 as knowledge grows from more to more, and as the social 
 consciousness of the race deepens and broadens, the 
 oscillations will diminish and the speed will quicken. 
 
 Stonehenge and Salisbury — what is their meaning ? 
 These and all our ultimate questions find answer in the 
 sphere of the Ideal. Man reaches out into the Ideal, 
 and finds that the self-existent Ideal is nothing less than 
 God. Whence.? From God. Whither.? To God. What 
 are Stonehenge and Salisbury .? Manifestations of the 
 process by which the soul of man, which came from God, 
 yearns to return to Him. And there in the midst of 
 human history is the Incarnation, presenting to us the 
 
296 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 
 
 One who is at once the Ideal Man and the express image 
 
 of the Father's Person. 
 
 " So through the thunder comes a human voice, 
 Saying, ' O heart I made, a heart beats here ! 
 Face, my hands fashioned, see it in Myself ! 
 Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of Mine, 
 But love I gave thee, with Myself to love, 
 And thou must love Me Who have died for thee.' " ^ 
 
 He it is who has founded the divine brotherhood, the 
 Church, which is to expand and triumph until a perfected 
 humanity stands before the throne of the universe. There 
 is but one body, and one spirit, and one hope of our calling. 
 
 From God and to God. Our words are stammering 
 when we deal with such mighty themes. But may we not 
 venture to say that in the mysterious process of evolution 
 God has gone out of Himself into the world, founding a 
 kingdom of persons who, by the training of experience 
 and the development of moral purpose, are capable of 
 becoming sons of God and sharing His existence ? Evolu- 
 tion is thus the return of the world to God in all the 
 fulness of its added wealth of being. This is what St 
 Paul means when he declares that Jesus Christ shall give 
 up to the Father the completed kingdom, " that God 
 may be all in all." This is what the seer of the 
 Apocalypse means when he holds up for our worship and 
 our love the Being who declares, " I am the Alpha and 
 the Omega, which is and which was and which is to come.'* 
 
 ^ Browning, An Epistle from Karshish. 
 
 PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH. 
 
A Catalogue 
 
 of 
 
 Williams & Norgate's 
 
 Publications 
 
 Divisions of the Catalogue 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. THEOLOGY 3 
 
 II. PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY 29 
 
 III. ORIENTAL LANGUAGES, LITERATURE, AND HISTORY . 34 
 
 IV. PHILOLOGY, MODERN LANGUAGES . , . •39 
 
 V. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, CHEMISTRY, ETC. ... 45 
 
 VL BIOGRAPHY, ARCHiEOLOGY, LITERATURE, MISCEL- 
 LANEOUS 56 
 
 FULL INDEX OVER PAGE 
 
 London 
 Williams & Norgate 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W.C. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abyssinia, Shihab al Din, 37. 
 Agricultural Chemical Analysis, Wiley, 
 
 Alcyonium, Liverpool Marine Biol. C. 
 
 Ments., 4g. 
 Americans, The, MunsUrberg, 30. 
 Anarchy and Law, Brewster, 29. 
 Anatomy, Cunningham Memoirs, 46. 
 
 Surgical, of the Horse, 49. 
 Antedon, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 4g. 
 Anthropolog:y, Prehistoric, Avebury, 56 ; 
 EngelJiardt , 57. 
 Evolution of Religion, Farnell, 12. 
 Anurida, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 49. 
 Apocalypse, Bleek, 8 ; Clark, 16. 
 Apostles and Apostohc Times, Dob- 
 schiitz, 4 ; Hausrath, ig ; Weinel, 
 4 ; Weizslicker, 7 ; Zeller, 9. 
 Statutes of, edit. G. Horner, 26. 
 Apostolic Succession, Clark, 17. 
 Arabic, Grammar, Socin, 37. 
 
 Poetry, Faizullah Bhai, 35 ; Lyall, 36 ; 
 Noldeke, 36. 
 Arenicola, L iverpool Marine Biol. Mems. , 
 
 49. 
 hsc\6\a.,Liverpool Marine Biol.Mems.,^^. 
 Assyrian, Dictionary, Muss-Arnolt, 36; 
 Norris, 36. 
 Grammar, Delitzsch, 34. 
 Language, Delitzsch, 34. 
 Assyriolog-y, Brown, 56; Delitzsch, 10,34; 
 Evans, 35 ; Sayce, 15 ; Schrader, 9. 
 Astigmatic Tests, Pray, 52 ; Snellen, 54. 
 Astronomy, Cunningham Mems., V., 
 46 ; Memoirs 0/ Roy. Astronom. 
 Soc, 62, 
 Atom, Study of, Venable, 55. 
 Augustine, St., Confessions of, Harnack, 
 
 18. 
 Babylonia, ^^^ Assyriology. 
 Belief, Religious, Upton, 15. 
 Beneficence, Negative and Positive, 
 Spencer, Principles of Ethics, IL, 31. 
 Bible, 16. 
 
 See also Testament. 
 Beliefs about. Savage, 25. 
 Hebrew Texts, 19. 
 History of Text, Weir, 27. 
 How to Teach, 22. 
 Plants, Henslow, 19. 
 Problems, Cheyne, 11. 
 Bibliography, Bibliographical Register, 56. 
 Biology, Basiian, 45 ; Liverpool Marine 
 
 Biol. Me7ns., 49 ; Spencer, 31. 
 Botany, Jour, of the Linnean Soc, 48. 
 Brain, Cicnnitigham Mans., VII., 46. 
 Buddha, Buddhism, Davids, 14 ; Hardy, 
 
 35 ; Oldcnberg, 36. 
 Calculus, Harnack, i,-j. 
 Canons of Athanasius, Text &= Trans. 
 
 Soc, 38. 
 Cardium, Liverpool Mar.Biol. Menis.,\Z. 
 Celtic, sec also Irish. 
 
 Stokes, 43 ; Sullivan, 42. 
 Heathendom, Rhys, 15. 
 Ceremonial Institutions, Spencer, Princ. 
 
 of Sociology, II., 31. 
 Chaldee, Grammar, Turpie, 38. 
 
 Lexicon, Fuerst, 35. 
 Chemistry, Van't Hoff, 47 ; Hart, 47 ; 
 Noyes,%-i\ Mulliken,i\\ Venable,^^. 
 
 Chemist's Pocket Manual, 49. 
 Christ, Early Christian Conception of, 
 Pfleiderer, 11, 23. 
 
 Life of, Keitn, 8. 
 
 No Product of Evolution, Henslow, 19. 
 
 Resurrection of, 13. 
 
 Study of, Robinson, 24. 
 
 Teaching of, Harnack, 6, 11. 
 
 The Universal, Beard, 16. 
 Christianity, Evolution of. Gill, 18. 
 
 History of, Baur, 8 ; DobschUtz, 4 ; 
 Harnack, 6, 11, 18; Hausrath, 8, 
 19 ; Johnson, 20 ; Wernle, 4. 
 
 in Talmud, Her/ord, 19. 
 
 Liberal, Reville, 11. 
 
 Primitive, PJleiderer, 3, 23. 
 
 Simplest Form of, Drummond, 14. 
 
 Spread of, Harnack, 4. 
 
 What is? Harnack, 6, 11. 
 Church, Catholic, Renan, 14. 
 
 Catholic, A Free, 26. 
 
 Christian, Baur, 8 ; Clark, 16 ; Z?<?3- 
 schiitz, 4 ; Hatch, 14 ; Wernle, 4. 
 
 Christian, Sacerdotal Celibacy in, ai. 
 
 Coming, Hunter, 20. 
 
 History of, z'^jw Schubert, 3, 25. 
 Codex Palatino-Vaticanus, 7"<7rfrf Z^c- 
 
 tures. III., 43. 
 Codium, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems.,/^g. 
 Communion of Christian with God, Herr- 
 mann, 6, 20. 
 Comte, Spencer, 32. 
 Conductivity of Liquids, Tower, 55. 
 Constellations, Primitive, Brown, 56. 
 Creed, Christian, 16. 
 Crown Theological Library, 10. 
 Cuneiform Inscriptions, Schrader, 9. 
 Daniel and his Prophecies, C. H. H. 
 Wright, 28. 
 
 and its Critics, C. H. H. Wright, 28. 
 Danish Dictionary, Rositig, 43. 
 Darwinism, Schu->tnan, 30. 
 Denmark, Engelhardt, 57. 
 Doctrine and Principle, Beeby, 16. 
 Dogma, History of, Harnack, 5. 
 
 of Virgin Birth, Lobstein, 10. 
 Domestic Institutions, Spencer, Princ. 
 
 of Sociology, I., 31. 
 Duck Tribes, Morphology of, Cunning- 
 ham Mems., VI., 46. 
 Dutch, Cape, Oordt, 42 ; Werner, 43. 
 Dynamics, Cunningham Mems., IV., 47. 
 
 Chemical, Van't Hoff", 47. 
 Ecclesiastes, Taylor, 26. 
 Ecclesiastical Institutions, Spencer, 
 Princ. of Sociology, III., 31, 32, 
 
 of Holland, Wicksteed, 27. 
 Echinus, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 
 
 49. 
 Economy, Political, Mackenzie, 30. 
 Education, Herbert, 57 ; Lodge, 41 ; 
 
 Spencer, 30 ; Hagmann, 42. 
 Educational Works, see Special Cata- 
 logue. 
 Egypt, Religion of, Renouf, 15. 
 Egyptian Grammar, Erma7t, 35. 
 Electric Furnace, The, Moisson, 51. 
 Electrolytic Laboratories, Arrange- 
 ments of, 51. 
 Engineering Chemistry, Stillman, 54. 
 Enoch, Book of, Gill, 18. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Epidemiologry, Trans, of Epidemiolog: 
 
 Soc, 55. 
 Epizootic Lymphangitis, Treatise on, 
 
 Pal lift, 52. 
 Ethics, and Religion, Martineau, 22. 
 Data of, Spencer, Principles of E., I., 31. 
 Individualism and Collectivism, 30. 
 Induction of, Spencer, Principles of E., 
 
 I-, 31- 
 
 Kantian, Schurman, 30. 
 
 of Evolution, Schurman, 30. 
 
 of Individual Life, Spencer, Principles 
 ofE., I., 31. 
 
 of Reason, Laurie, 29. 
 
 Principles of, Spencer, 31. 
 Ethiopic Grammar, 34. 
 Ethnology, Cunningham Mems., X., 46. 
 Evolution, Spencer, 31, 32. 
 
 of the Idea of God, D' Alviella, 14. 
 
 of Religious Thought, D' Alviella, 15. 
 Exodus, Hoerning-, 20. 
 Ezekiel, Mosheh ben Shesheth, 22. 
 Faith, Herrmann, 11 ; Rix, 24 ; Witn- 
 
 mer, 27. 
 Fisheries, British, Johnstone, 46. 
 Flinders Petrie Papyri, Cunningham, 
 
 Mems., VIII., IX., 46. 
 Flora of Edinburgh, Sonntag, 54. 
 French, Bolelle, 40 ; Dclbos, 40 ; Eugene, 
 40 ; Hugo, 41, 42 ; Roget, \2 ; also 
 Special Education Catalogue. 
 
 Literature, Roget, 43. 
 
 Novels, Arjny Series, 39. 
 Gammarus, Liverpool Marine Biol. 
 
 Mem-s., 49. 
 Genesis, Hebrew Texts, 19, 35 ; Wright, 
 
 C. H. H., 28. 
 Geography, Ancient, Kiepert, 58. 
 Geometry, Analytical, Elements of, 47. 
 German, Literature, Nibelungenlied, 
 41 ; Phillipps, 42. 
 
 Novels, Army Series, 39. 
 Germany, Marcks, 59. 
 God, Idea of, D' Alviella, 14. 
 Gospel, Fourth, Drummond, 17 ; Tayler, 
 26. 
 
 Social, Harnack and Heyrmann,iT„xg. 
 Gospels, Old and New Certainty, Robin- 
 son, 24. 
 Greek, Modern, Zompolides, 44. 
 Gymnastics, Medical, Schrcber, 53. 
 Hebrew, Biblical, Kennedy, 35. 
 
 Language, Delitzsch, 34. 
 
 Lexicon, Fuerst, 35. 
 
 New School of Poets, Albrecht, 36. 
 
 Scriptures, Sharpe, 25. 
 
 Story, Peters, 23. 
 
 Synonyms, Kennedy, 35. 
 
 Text ofO.T., Weir, 27. 
 
 Texts, 19, 35. 
 Hebrews, History of, Kittel, 6 ; Peters, 
 II ; Sharpe, 25. 
 
 Religion of, Kuenen, 9 ; Montefiore, 14. 
 Heterogenesis, Bastian, 45. 
 Hibbert Lectures, 14, 15. 
 Horse, Life-size Models ot, 48. 
 Hygiene, Practical, Handbook of, 45. 
 Hymns, Jones, 20. 
 Icelandic, jLz7/a, 41 ; VigaGlums Saga,i,7,. 
 
 Dictionary, Zoega, 44. 
 
 Grammar, Bayldon, 39. 
 
 —continued. 
 
 Individualism, Spencer, Man v. State, 32. 
 
 Infinitesimals and Limits, 47. 
 
 Irish, Hogan, 40 ; Leabhar Breac, 41 ; 
 
 Leabhar na H- Uidhri,^\; O'Grady, 
 
 42 ; Todd Lectures, 42 ; Yellow Book 
 
 0/ Lecan, 43. 
 \&2\si\\,Dicttrich, 34 ; Hebrew Texts,ig,25. 
 Israel, History of, Kittel, 6 ; Peters, 33 ; 
 
 Sharpe, 25. 
 Religion of, Kuenen, 9. 
 in Egypt, Wright, C. H. H., 28. 
 Jeremiah, Mosheh ben Shesheth, a2. 
 Jesus, Life of, Keim, 8. 
 Sayings of, 13. 
 The Real, Vickers, 27. 
 Times of, Hausrath, 8. 
 6"^^ also Christ. 
 Job, Book of, Ewald, 8 ; Hebrew Text, 
 
 19, 35 ; Wright, C. H. H., 28. 
 Rabbinical Comment, on, Text it* 
 
 Trans. Soc, 38. 
 Justice, Spencer, Princ. of Ethics, II., 31. 
 Kant, Schurman, 30. 
 Kindergarten, Goldammer, 57. 
 Knowledge, Evolution of, Perrin, 30. 
 Labour, Harrison, 57 ; Schloss, 59 ; 
 
 Vynne, 60. 
 Leabhar Breac, 41 ; Hogan, 40. 
 Life and Matter, Lodge, 21. 
 Ligia, Liverpool Marine Biol. Mems., 49. 
 Liverpool, History of, Muir, 59. 
 Lives of the Saints, Hogan, 40. 
 Logarithms, Sang, 53 ; Schroen, 54 ; 
 
 ^ega, 55. 
 London Library Catalogue, 57. 
 Lumbar Curve, Cunningham Merits.^ 
 
 II., 46. 
 Mahabharata, Sorensen, 37. 
 Malaria, Annett, 45 ; Boyce, 45 ; Button, 
 
 46 ; Mems. of Liverpool School oj 
 
 Tropical Medicine, 50 ; i?^^^, 53 ; 
 
 Stephens, 54. 
 Maori, Dictionary, Williams, 43. 
 
 Manual, Maori, 41. 
 Materialism, Martineau, 22. 
 Mathematics, Harnack, 47. 
 
 ^^-t? rt/j^ Logarithms. 
 Mediaeval Thought, Poole, 23. 
 Mesca Ulad, Todd Lectures, I., 42. 
 Metallic Objects, Production of, 52. 
 Metaphysics, Laurie, 29. 
 Mexico, Religions of, Reville, 15. 
 Micah, Book of, Taylor, 26. 
 Microscopy, Journal 0/ the Roy. Micro. 
 
 Soc, 48; Journal 0/ the Quekctt 
 
 Micro. Club, 48. 
 Midrash, Christianity in, Her/ord, 19. 
 Mineral Systems, Chapman, 47. 
 Molecular Weights, Methods of Deter- 
 mining, 45. 
 Monasticism, Harnack, 18. 
 Moorhouse Lectures, 22. 
 Mosquitoes, Mems. of Liverpool School 
 
 of Trop. Medicine, 50. 
 Municipal Government, A History of, in 
 
 Liverpool, 59. 
 Mythology, Greek, Brown, 56 ; St. Clair, 
 
 59- 
 Northern, Stephens, 60. 
 Naturalism and Religion, Otto, 13. 
 Nautical Terms, Delbos, 40. 
 
WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION LIBRARY— Continued. 
 The following Volumes are published at ids. 6d. per Volume. 
 
 Vol. XXI. 
 ST. PAUL: The Man and his Work. By Prof. H. Weinel of 
 the University of Jena. Translated by Rev. G. A. Bienemann, 
 M.A. Edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, M.A., LL.D. 
 
 " Prof. Weinel may be described as the Dean Farrar of Germany ; the work 
 is quite equal to Dean Farrar's work on the same subject. In some respects it 
 is better." — Daily News. 
 
 Vols. XIX. and XX. 
 
 THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST 
 THREE CENTURIES. By Adolf Hamack, Ordinary Pro- 
 fessor of Church History in the University, and Fellow of the 
 Royal Academy of the Sciences, Berlin. Translated and edited by 
 James Moffatt, B.D., D.D., St Andrews. Vol. I. being out of 
 print. 
 
 " It is bare justice to say that in the present monograph, the outcome of his 
 preliminary studies in the Berlin Academy's transactions for 1901, Harnack has 
 once more brilliantly shown his power of combining verve and learning, mastery 
 of salient detail, and an outlook upon the broad movements of the period in 
 question. The ' Ausbreitung ' forms a sequel and supplement to works like his 
 own ' Wesen ' and Weiszacker's ' Apostolic Age.' It is a diagnosis rather than 
 a story, yet an analysis in which eloquent facts lose little or nothing of their 
 eloquence. " — Hibbert Journal. 
 
 Vol. XVIIL 
 
 CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. By 
 
 Ernst von Dobschiitz, D.D., Professor of New Testament Theology 
 in the University of Strassburg. Translated by Rev. G. Bremner, 
 and edited by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. 
 
 "It is only in the very best English work that we meet with the scientific 
 thoroughness and all-round competency of which this volume is a good speci- 
 men ; while such splendid historical veracity and outspokenness would hardly 
 be possible in the present or would-be holder of an English theological chair." 
 — Dr Rashdall in The Speaker. 
 
 " Some may think that the author's finding is too favourable to the early 
 churches ; but, at anj' rate, there is no volume in which material for forming a 
 judgment is so fully collected or so attractively presented." — British Weekly. 
 
 Vol. XVI. 
 
 THE RELIGIONS OF AUTHORITY AND THE RE- 
 LIGION OF THE SPIRIT. By the late Anguste Sabatier, 
 Professor of the University of Paris, Dean of the Protestant Theo- 
 logical Faculty. With a Memoir of the Author by Jean Reville, 
 Professor in the Protestant Theological Faculty of the University 
 of Paris, and a Note by Madame Sabatier. 
 
 "Without any exaggeration, this is to be described as a great book, the 
 finest legacy of the author to the Protestant Church of France and to the theo- 
 logical thought of the age. Written in the logical and lucid style which is 
 characteristic of the best French theology, and excellently translated, it is a 
 work which any thoughtful person, whether a professional student or not, 
 might read without difficulty." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION LIBRARY— Continued. 
 Vols. XV. and XVII. 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY. By Paul Wernle, 
 Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the Uni- 
 versity of Basel. Revised by the Author, and translated by the 
 Rev, G. A. Bienemann, M.A,, and edited, with an Introduction, 
 by the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. 
 
 Vol. I. The Rise of the Religion. 
 
 Vol. II. The Development of the Church. 
 
 From some of the Reviews of the Work. 
 
 Dr. Marcus Dods in the British Weekly — "We cannot recall any work by 
 a foreign theologian which is likely to have a more powerful influence on the 
 thought of this country than Wernle's Beginnings of Christianity. It is well 
 written and well translated ; it is earnest, clear, and persuasive, and above all 
 it is well adapted to catch the large class of thinking men who are at present 
 seeking some non-miraculous explanation of Christianity." 
 
 " No English book covers the same ground, or is conceived with the same 
 breadth and sanity; in few works in any language are learning and insight so 
 happily combined." — Edinburgh Review. 
 
 " The translation is well done, and the book is full of interest." — Athenaeum. 
 
 The Earlier Works included in the Library are : — 
 
 HISTORY OF DOGMA. By Adolf Harnack, Ordinary Professor 
 of Church History in the University, and Fellow of the Royal 
 Academy of the Sciences, Berlin. Translated from the Third 
 German Edition. Edited by the Rev. Prof. A. B. Bruce, D.D. 
 7 vols. (New Series, Vols. IL, VII., VIII., IX., X., XL, XII.) 
 8vo, cloth, each \os. 6d. ; half-leather, suitable for presentation, 
 12 s. 6d. 
 
 ABBREVIATED LIST OF CONTENTS :— Vol, I. : Intro- 
 ductory Division : — I. Prolegomena to the Study of the History 
 of Dogma. II. The Presuppositions of the History of Dogma. 
 Division I. — The Genesis of Ecclesiastical Dogma, or the 
 Genesis of the Catholic Apostolic Dogmatic Theology, and the 
 first Scientific Ecclesiastical System of Doctrine. Book I. : — 
 The Preparation. Vol. II. : Division I. Book II. : — The 
 Laying of the Foundation. — I. Historical Survey. — /. Fixing and 
 gradual Secularising of Christianity as a Church. — //. Fixing and 
 gradual Helknising oj Christianity as a System of Doctrine. Vol, 
 HI. : Division I. Book II.: — The Laying of the Foundation — 
 continued. Division II. — The Development of Ecclesiastical 
 Dogma. Book I. : — The Llistojy of the Development of Dogma as 
 the Doctrine of the God-vian on the basis of Natural Theology. 
 
 A. Presuppositions of Doctrine of Redemption or Natural Theology. 
 
 B. The Doctrine of Redemption in the Person of the God-man in 
 its historical development. Vol. IV. : Division II. Book I. : — 
 The History of the Developinent of Dog??ia as the Doctrine of the 
 God-man on the basis of Natural Theology — continued. Vol. V. : 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
8 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND LIBRARY. 
 
 ©ID Series. 
 
 Uniform Price per Volume, 6s. 
 
 BAUR (F. C). CHURCH HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
 THREE CENTURIES. Translated from the Third German 
 Edition. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s. 
 
 PAUL, THE APOSTLE OF JESUS CHRIST, HIS 
 
 LIFE AND WORK, HIS EPISTLES AND DOC- 
 TRINE. A Contribution to a Critical History of Primitive 
 Christianity. Edited by Rev. Allan Menzies. 2nd Edition. 
 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. I2s. 
 
 BLEEK (F.). LECTURES ON THE APOCALYPSE. 
 
 Translated. Edited by the Rev. Dr. S. Davidson. 8vo, cloth. 
 6s. 
 
 EWALD'S (Dr. H.) COMMENTARY ON THE PRO- 
 PHETS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Translated by 
 the Rev. J. F. Smith. [Vol. I. General Introduction, Yoel, Amos, 
 Hosea, and Zakharya 9-1 1. Vol. II. Yesaya, Obadya, and Mikah. 
 Vol. III. Nahilm, Ssephanya, Habaqquq, Zakharya, Yeremya. 
 Vol. IV. Hezekiel, Yesaya xl.-lxvi. Vol. V. Haggai, Zakharya, 
 Malaki, Jona, Baruc, Daniel, Appendix and Index.] 5 vols. 8vo, 
 cloth. 30X. 
 
 COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS. Translated by 
 
 the Rev. E. Johnson, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s. 
 
 COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JOB, with 
 
 Translation. Translated from the German by the Rev. J. 
 Frederick Smith. 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 HAUSRATH (Prof. A.). HISTORY OF THE NEW 
 TESTAMENT TIMES. The Time of Jesus. Translated 
 by the Revs. C. T. Poynting and P. Quenzer. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 
 12S, 
 
 The second portion of this work, "The Times of the Apostles," 
 was issued apart from the Library, but in uniform volumes ; see 
 p. 19. 
 
 KEIM'S HISTORY OF JESUS OF NAZARA : Considered 
 in its connection with the National Life of Israel, and 
 related in detail. Translated from the German by Arthur Ransom 
 and the Rev. E. M. Geldart. [Vol. I. Second Edition. Intro- 
 duction, Survey of Sources, Sacred and Political Groundwork. 
 Religious Groundwork. Vol. II. The Sacred Youth, Self-recog- 
 nition, Decision. Vol. III. The First Preaching, the Works of 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
Catalogue of publications. 
 
 THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND LIBRARY-Continued. 
 
 Jesus, the Disciples, and Apostolic Mission. Vol. IV. Conflicts 
 and Disillusions, Strengthened Self-confidence, Last Efforts in 
 Galilee, Signs of the Approaching Fall, Recognition of the Messiah. 
 Vol. V. The Messianic Progress to Jerusalem, the Entry into 
 Jerusalem, the Decisive Struggle, the Farewell, the Last Sapper. 
 Vol. VI. The Messianic Death at Jerusalem. Arrest and Pseudo- 
 Trial, the Death on the Cross, Burial and Resurrection, the 
 Messiah's Place in History, Indices.] Complete in 6 vols. 
 8vo. 365-. 
 
 (Vol. I. only to be had when a complete set of the work is 
 ordered.) 
 
 KUENEN (Dr. A.). THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL TO 
 THE FALL OF THE JEWISH STATE. By Dr. A. 
 
 Kuenen, Professor of Theology at the University, Leiden, Trans- 
 lated from the Dutch by A. H. May. 3 vols. 8vo, cloth, iSs. 
 
 PFLEIDERER (O.). PAULINISM : A Contribution to the 
 History of Primitive Christian Theology. Translated by E. 
 Peters. 2nd Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 12s. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ON THE BASIS OF 
 
 ITS HISTORY. (Vols. I. II. History of the Philosophy of 
 Religion from Spinoza to the Present Day ; Vols. III. IV. Genetic- 
 Speculative Philosophy of Religion.) Translated by Prof. Allan 
 Menzies and the Rev. Alex. Stewart. 4 vols. Svo, cloth. 245. 
 
 REVILLE (Dr. A). PROLEGOMENA OF THE HIS- 
 TORY OF RELIGIONS. With an Introduction by Prof 
 F. Max Miiller. Svo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 PROTESTANT COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TES- 
 TAMENT. With General and Special Introductions. Edited 
 by Profs. P. W. Schmidt and F. von Holzendorff. Translated 
 from the Third German Edition by the Rev. F. H. Jones, B.A. 
 3 vols. Svo, cloth. iSs. 
 
 SCHRADER (Prof. E.). THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIP- 
 TIONS AND THE OLD TESTAMENT. Translated 
 from the Second Enlarged Edition, with Additions by the Author, 
 and an Introduction by the Rev. Owen C. Whitehouse, M.A. 
 2 vols. (Vol. I. not sold separately.) With a Map. Svo, cloth. 
 
 12S. 
 
 ZELLER (Dr. E.). THE CONTENTS AND ORIGIN OF 
 THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES CRITICALLY 
 INVESTIGATED. Preceded by Dr. Fr. Overbeck's Intro- 
 duction to the Acts of the Apostles from De Wette's Handbook. 
 Translated by Joseph Dare. 2 vols. Svo, cloth. 12s. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
16 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 THE CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. 
 
 The volumes are uniform in size [crown octavo) and binding, but the 
 price varies according to the size and importance of the work. 
 
 A Few Opinions of the Series. 
 
 Professor Marcus Dods : "By introducing to the English-speaking public 
 specimens of the work of such outstanding critics and theologians, your 
 ' Crown Theological Library ' has done a valuable service to theological 
 learning in this country " 
 
 Dr. John Watson : " The Library is rendering valuable service to lay theologians 
 in this country, as well as to ministers." 
 
 Rev. Principal P. T. Forsyth: "As a whole it is an admirable series, and 
 opens to the English reader at a low price some books which are of prime 
 importance for religious thought." 
 
 Sir Edward Russell : " I have formed the highest opinion of this series. Each 
 of the books is animated by a fine intelligent and at the same time devout 
 spirit." 
 
 Rev. Principal D. L. Ritchie : " I have read many of the volumes in the 
 ' Crown Library,' and I think it an admirable and useful series." 
 
 Rev. Professor A. E. Garvie : " I am very grateful for the publication of these 
 volumes, as they bring within the reach of the English student, in a correct 
 translation and at cheap price, important theological works, which other- 
 wise would be accessible only to those familiar with French or German." 
 
 Rev. R. J. Campbell : " Your ' Crown Theological Library' is invaluable, and 
 is doing excellent service for liberal Christianity." 
 
 Professor G. Currie Martin : " I think you are rendering a most valuable service 
 to all serious students of theology by your publication of the 'Crown 
 Theological Library.' " 
 
 Vol. I. BABEL AND BIBLE. By Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch, Pro- 
 fessor of Assyriology in the University of Berlin. Authorised 
 Translation. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. C. H. W. 
 Johns. Crown 8vo, with 77 illustrations, cloth. 5^. 
 
 Vol. II. THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST: An Historical 
 
 and Critical Essay. By Paul Lobstein, Professor of Dogmatics -^ 
 
 in the University of Strassburg. Translated by Victor Leuliette, 
 A.K.C, B.-es-L., Paris. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. ;>. 
 
 W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 3^. w 
 
 Vol. III. MY STRUGGLE FOR LIGHT : Confessions of a ;| 
 
 Preacher. By R. Wimmer, Pastor of Weisweil-am-Rhein in ''i:, 
 
 Baden. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3^. ^d. v' 
 
 I 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. ii 
 
 THE CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY— Continued. 
 
 Vol. IV. LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY: Its Origin, Nature, and 
 Mission. By Jean Reville, Professeur adjoint a la Faculte de 
 Theologie Protestante de I'Universiie de Paris. Translated and 
 edited by Victor Leuliette, A.K.C., B.-es-L. Crown 8vo, 
 cloth. 4^. 
 
 Vol. V. WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? By Adolf Hamack, 
 Professor of Church History in the University, Berlin. Translated 
 by Thomas Bailey Saunders. Crown 8vo. 5^. 
 
 Vol. VI. FAITH AND MORALS. By W. Herrmann, Professor of 
 Systematic Thtology at the University of Marburg; Author of "The 
 Communion of the Christian with God." Crown 8vo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 Vol. VII. EARLY HEBREW STORY. A Study of the Origin, 
 the Value, and the Historical Background of the Legends of Israel. 
 By John P. Peters, D.D., Rector of St. Michael's Church, New 
 York ; author of '* Nippur, or Explorations and Adventures on the 
 Euphrates." Crown 8vo, cloth. 51. 
 
 Vol. VIII. BIBLE PROBLEMS AND THE NEW 
 MATERIAL FOR THEIR SOLUTION. A Plea for 
 Thoroughness of Investigation, addressed to Churchmen 
 and Scholars. By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, D.Litt., D.D., 
 Fellow of the British Academy ; Oriel Professor of Interpretation 
 in the University of Oxford, and Canon of Rochester. Crown 
 8vo. 5^. 
 
 " The work is remarkably interesting and learned .... those who wish to 
 understand what problems are likely to engage attention in the near future 
 ought not to neglect the book." — British Friend. 
 
 Vol. IX. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT AND 
 
 ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION ; and RELIGION 
 
 AND MODERN CULTURE. By the late Auguste Sabatier, 
 
 Professor in the University of Paris. Translated by Victor Leuliette, 
 
 A.K.C., B.-es-L. Crown 8vo. 4J-. 6^. 
 
 "... Both the studies in the volume are profoundly interesting; marked 
 everywhere by the piercing insight, philosophic grasp, and deep spirituality 
 which are characteristic of this great and lamented Christian thinker." — The 
 Christian World. 
 
 Vol. X. THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF 
 
 CHRIST: Its Value and Significance in the History of 
 
 Religion. By Otto Pfleiderer, D.D. , Professor of Practical 
 
 Theology in the University, Berlin. Crown 8vo. t^s. 6d. 
 
 *' It would be difficult to name any recent English work which could compare 
 with this brilliant essay, as a concise but lucid presentation of the attitude of 
 the more advanced school of German theologians to the Founder of the Chris- 
 tian religion." — Scotsman. 
 ■ ^ — - — -^ — — — — — — ^^^— — _^— _^— — _^-^~^-^— — — — — ^— — ^— — — 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
12 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 THE CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY-Continued. 
 
 Vol. XL THE CHILD AND RELIGION. Eleven Essays. By 
 
 Prof. Henry Jones, M.A., LL.D., University of Glasgow ; C. F. G. 
 Masterman, M.A. ; Prof. George T. Ladd, D.D., LL.D., Uni- 
 versity of Yale; Rev. F. R. Tennant, M.A., B.Sc, Hulsean 
 Lecturer ; Rev. J. Cynddylan Jones, D.D. ; Rev. Canon Hensley 
 Henson, M.A. ; Rev. Robert F. Horton, M.A., D.D. ; Rev. G. 
 Hill, M.A., D.D. ; Rev. J. J. Thornton; Rev. Rabbi A. A. 
 Green ; Prof. Joseph Agar Beet, D. D. Edited by Thomas 
 Stephens, B.A. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " No fresher and more instructive book on this question has been issued for 
 years, and the study of its pages will often prove a godsend to many perplexed 
 minds in the church and in the Christian home." — British Weekly. 
 
 Vol. XIL THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION: An Anthro- 
 pological Study. By L. R. Farnell, D.Litt., Fellow and Tutor 
 of Exeter College, Oxford ; University Lecturer in Classical 
 Archaeology, etc., etc. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5J. 
 
 "It is one of the most valuable volumes that have appeared in this excellent 
 series. He gives so clear and lucid a picture of the actual results of anthro- 
 pology that his book is certainly the one we should put in the hands of 
 students." — Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 Vol. XIIL THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 
 
 By H. von Suden, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University 
 of Berlin. Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, and edited by 
 Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 Vol. XIV. JESUS. By Wilhelm Bousset, Professor of Theology in 
 Gottingen. Translated by Janet Penrose Trevelyan, and edited by 
 Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. Crown Svo. 45-. 
 
 " It is true the writers, von Soden and Bousset, have in the course of their 
 papers said things that I regard as as nothing less than admirable. I very 
 much doubt whether we have anything so admirable in English." — Rev. Dr. 
 Sanday in the Guardian. 
 
 Vol. XV. THE COMMUNION OF THE CHRISTIAN 
 WITH GOD. By Prof. Wilhelm Herrmann. Translated from 
 the new German Edition by Rev. J. S. Stanyon, M.A., and Rev. 
 R. W. Stewart, B.D., B.Sc. Crown Svo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 Vol. XVL HEBREW RELIGION TO THE ESTABLISH- 
 MENT OF JUDAISM UNDER EZRA. By W. E. Addis, 
 M.A. Crown Svo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 "It would be difficult to name a book better adapted to give the student 
 a clear and reliable impression of the results of recent research into the origin 
 and historical development of Hebrew religion." — Scotsman, 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 13 
 
 THE CROWN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY— Continued. 
 
 Vol. XVn. NATURALISM AND RELIGION. By Rudolf 
 Otto, Professor of Theology in the University of Gottingen. Trans- 
 lated by J. Arthur Thomson, Professor of Natural History in the 
 University of Aberdeen, and Margaret R. Thomson. Edited with 
 an Introduction by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL. D. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 "... A valuable survey, and a critical estimate of scientific theory and 
 kindred ideas as they concern the religious view of the world. . . . It is well 
 written, clear, and even eloquent." —lixjiosi^ory Times. 
 
 Vol. XVIII. ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL GOSPEL. By Pro- 
 fessor Adolf Harnack, of Berlin, and Professor W. Herrmann, of 
 Marburg. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4^'. 6d. 
 
 "Hermann's essay on 'The Moral Teaching of Jesus' is profoundly in- 
 teresting and suggestive. He agrees with Harnack that the conception which 
 rules in the Gospel precepts on social questions of an approaching end of the 
 world, must modify in an important degree the meaning we read into them, and 
 the lessons we derive from them. Altogether the volume, which has been 
 excellently translated, is well deserving the attention of English students of 
 social and religious questions." — TAe Christian World. 
 
 Vol. XIX. THE RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT: 
 Its Place among the Religions of the Nearer East. By 
 
 Karl Marti, Professor of Old Testament Exegesis, Bern. Crown 
 
 8vo, cloth. 4i-. dd. 
 
 In a leading review The Spectator says: — "It is a valuable contribution 
 to a great theme by one who has devoted his life to its study. Not only the 
 general reader, for whom it is specially intended, but the theologian will learn 
 not a little from its pages." 
 
 Vol. XX. LUKE, THE PHYSICIAN. By Adolf Harnack, D.D. 
 
 Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A. Crown Svo, 
 
 cloth, ds. 
 
 "What is new and interesting and valuable is the ratiocination, the theorising, 
 and the personal point of view in the book under review. We study it to under- 
 stand Professor Harnack, not to understand Luke ; and the study is well worth 
 the time and work. Personally, I feel specially interested in the question of 
 Luke's nationality. On this the author has some admirable and suggestive 
 pages." — Prof. Sir W. M. Ramsay in The Expositor. 
 
 Vol. XXI. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE 
 RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST. By Kirsopp 
 Lake, Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University ol 
 Leiden, Holland. Crown Svo, cloth. 55-. 
 
 In Active Preparation. 
 
 Vol. XXIL THE APOLOGETIC OF THE NEW TESTA- 
 MENT. By E. F. Scott, M.A., author of "The Fourth Gospel : 
 Its Purpose and Theology." Crown Svo, cloth. 5^-. 
 
 Vol. XXIIL THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. By Adolf Harnack, 
 D.D. Being Vol. II. of Dr Harnack's New Testament Studies. 
 Crown Svo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 (Vol. III. of these Studies will be added to the Library, but the 
 title has not yet been decided upon. ) 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
14 
 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 THE HIBBERT LECTURES. 
 
 Library Edition, demy 8vo, los. 6d, per volume. Cheap Popular 
 
 Edition, 2^. 6d. per volume. 
 
 ALVIELLA (Count GOBLET D'). EVOLUTION OF THE 
 IDEA OF GOD, ACCORDING TO ANTHROPOLOGY 
 AND HISTORY. Translated by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. 
 (Hibbert Lectures, 1891.) Cloth, los. 6d. Cheap Edition, 2^. 6d. 
 
 BEARD (Rev. Dr. C). LECTURES ON THE REFORMA- 
 TION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY IN ITS 
 RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT AND KNOW- 
 LEDGE. (Hibbert Lectures, 1883.) 8vo, cloth. los. 6d. 
 Cheap Edition, 3rd Edition, 3J. 6d. 
 
 DAVIDS (T. W. RHYS). LECTURES ON SOME POINTS 
 IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHISM. (Hib. 
 Lee, 1 88 1.) 2nd Ed. 8vo, cloth, los. 6d. Cheap Ed., 35. 6d. 
 
 DRUMMOND (Dr.) VIA, VERITAS, VITA. Lectures on 
 Christianity in its most Simple and Intelligible P'orm. (The 
 Hibbert Lectures, 1894.) los. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 HATCH (Rev. Dr.). LECTURES ON THE INFLUENCE 
 OF GREEK IDEAS AND USAGES UPON THE 
 CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Edited by Dr. Fairbairn. (Hibbert 
 Lectures, \888. ) 3rd Edition. 8vo, cloth, los. 6d, Cheap 
 Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 KUENEN (Dr. A.). LECTURES ON NATIONAL 
 RELIGIONS AND UNIVERSAL RELIGION. (The 
 Hibbert Lectures, 1882.) 8vo, cloth, los, 6d. Cheap Edition, 
 3J. 6d. 
 
 MONTEFIORE (C. G.). ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF 
 RELIGION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RELIGION 
 OF THE ANCIENT HEBREVn/'S. (The Hibbert Lectures, 
 1892.) 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 105. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 PFLEIDERER (Dr. O.). LECTURES ON THE IN- 
 FLUENCE OF THE APOSTLE PAUL ON THE 
 DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY. Translated by 
 the Rev. J. Frederick Smith. (Hibbert Lectures, 1885.) 2nd 
 Edition. 8vo, cloth. los. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3^-. 6d. 
 
 RENAN (E.). ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSTITU- 
 TIONS, THOUGHT, AND CULTURE OF ROME 
 ON CHRISTIANITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
 OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. Translated by the Rev. 
 Charles Beard. (Hibbert Lectures, 1880.) 8vo, cloth. iQs. 6d. 
 Cheap Edition, 3rd Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 15 
 
 THE HIBBERT LECTURES— Continued. 
 
 RENOUF (P. LE PAGE). ON THE RELIGION OF 
 ANCIENT EGYPT. (Hibbert Lectures, 1879.) 3rd Edition. 
 8vo, cloth, los. dd. Cheap Edition, 35-. dd. 
 
 RHYS (Prof. J.). ON THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH 
 OF RELIGION AS ILLUSTRATED BY CELTIC 
 HEATHENDOM. (Hibbert Lectures, 1886.) Svo, cloth. 
 \os. 6d. Cheap Edition, 35-. dd, 
 
 R^VILLE (Dr. A.). ON THE NATIVE RELIGIONS OF 
 MEXICO AND PERU. Translated by the Rev. P. H. 
 Wicksteed. (Hibbert Lectures, 1884.) 8vo, cloth. lOi". 6d. 
 Cheap Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 SAYCE (Prof. A. H.). ON THE RELIGION OF 
 ANCIENT ASSYRIA AND BABYLONIA. 4th Edition. 
 (Hibbert Lectures, 18S7.) 8vo, cloth. loj-. 6d. Cheap Ed., 35-. 6d. 
 
 UPTON (Rev. C. B.). ON THE BASES OF RE- 
 LIGIOUS BELIEF. (Hibbert Lectures, 1893.) Demy 8vo, 
 cloth, los. 6d. Cheap Edition, 3^. 6d. 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST. 
 
 ADDIS (W. E.). HEBREW RELIGION. See Crown 
 Theological Library, p. 12. 
 
 ALLIN (Rev. THOS.). UNIVERSALISM ASSERTED 
 AS THE HOPE OF THE GOSPEL ON THE 
 AUTHORITY OF REASON, THE FATHERS, AND 
 HOLY SCRIPTURE. With a Preface by Edna Lyall, and a 
 Letter from Canon Wilberforce. Crown 8vo. Sewed, is. 6d. net; 
 cloth, 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 ALVIELLA (Count GOBLET D'). THE CONTEMPOR- 
 ARY EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN 
 ENGLAND, AMERICA, AND INDIA. Translated from 
 the French by the Rev. J. Moden. Svo, cloth, los. 6d. 
 
 EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF GOD. See The 
 
 Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 ANNOTATED CATECHISM. A Manual of Natural Religion 
 and Morality, with many practical details. 2nd Edition. Crown 
 8vo, cloth. IS. 
 
 BAUR (F. C). CHURCH HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
 THREE CENTU RI ES. See Theological Translation Library, 
 Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 PAUL, THE APOSTLE OF JESUS CHRIST. 
 
 See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 2 
 
i6 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 BEARD (Rev. Dr. C). THE UNIVERSAL CHRIST, 
 AND OTHER SERMONS. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. 
 
 LECTURES ON THE REFORMATION OF THE 
 
 SIXTEENTH CENTURY IN ITS RELATION TO 
 MODERN THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. See The 
 
 Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 BEEBY (Rev. C. E., B.D., Author ot "Creed and Life"). 
 DOCTRINE AND PRINCIPLES. Popular Lectures on 
 Primary Questions. Demy 8vo, cloth. 4^. 6d. 
 
 BIBLE. Translated by Samuel Sharpe, being a Revision of the 
 Authorised English Version. 6th Edition of the Old, loth Edition 
 of the New Testament. 8vo, roan. 5^. See also Testament. 
 
 BLEEK(F.). LECTURES ON THE APOCALYPSE. See 
 
 Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 BREMOND (HENRI). THE MYSTERY OF NEWMAN. 
 
 With an Introduction by Rev. George Tyrrell, M.A. Medium 8vo, 
 cloth. \os. 6d. net, 
 
 "From France comes a remarkable volume, excellently translated, which 
 endeavours to probe the mystery ; to realise, as it were, the soul of Newman, 
 to describe to us justly and truthfully the personality of the man." — Daily 
 Chronicle. 
 
 "No subsequent work can deprive M. Bremond's book of its great psycho- 
 logical interest ; it is a work that, unlike many books on Newman and the 
 Tractarians, no student of modern Christianity can afford to miss." — Pall Mall 
 Gazette. 
 
 BROADBENT (The late Rev. T. P., B.A.). THIRTEEN 
 SERMONS, AN ESSAY, AND A FRAGMENT. With 
 a Prefatory Note by Rev. Prof. J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A. Crown 
 8vo, cloth, /^s. net. 
 
 CAMPBELL (Rev. Canon COLIN). FIRST THREE 
 GOSPELS IN GREEK. See Testament, New, p. 26. 
 
 CHANNING'S COMPLETE WORKS. Including ''The 
 Perfect Life," with a Memoir. Centennial Edition. 4to Edition. 
 Cloth. 7J-. 6d. 
 
 CHEYNE (Prof. T. K.). BIBLE PROBLEMS AND THE 
 NEW MATERIAL FOR THEIR SOLUTION. See 
 
 Crown Theological Library, p. 1 1. 
 
 CHILD AND RELIGION. Edited by Thomas Stephens, E.A. 
 6"^^ Crown Theological Library, p. 12. 
 
 CHRISTIAN CREED (OUR). 2nd and greatly Revised Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, cloth. 35-. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 17 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST-Continued. 
 
 CLARK (ARCHD. JAS.). DE SUCCESSIONE APOS- 
 TOLICA NEC NON MISSIONE ET JURIS- 
 DICTIONE HIERARCHIC ANGLICAN/E ET 
 CATHOLICiE. 8vo. {Geo?'getown, Guiana.) Clolh. 21s. 
 
 SEVEN AGES OF THE CHURCH ; or, Exposition of 
 
 the Apocalypse. Sewed, is. 
 
 COMMON PRAYER FOR CHRISTIAN WORSHIP: in 
 Ten Services for Morning- and Evening. 32mo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 Also in 8vo, clolh. 35-. 
 
 CONWAY (MONCURE D.). CENTENARY HISTORY 
 OF THE SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 With numerous Portraits, a facsimile of the original MS. of the 
 hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee," and Appendices. Crown 
 8vo, half vellum, paper sides, ^s. 
 
 CORNILL (Prof. CARL). INTRODUCTION TO THE 
 CANONICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. 
 
 Demy Svo, cloth. loj-. 6d. net. See Theological Translation 
 Library, New Series, p. 3. 
 
 DAVIDS (T. W. RHYS). LECTURES ON SOME 
 POINTS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDH- 
 ISM. See The Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 DELITZSCH (F.). BABEL AND BIBLE. Two Lectures 
 delivered before the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft in the presence 
 of the German Emperor. See Crown Theological Library, p. 10. 
 See also Harnack, A., " Letter to Prettss. lahrhiicher,^'' p. 18. 
 
 DOBSCHOTZ (E. VON). CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE 
 PRIMITIVE CHURCH. 6"^^ Theological Translation Library. 
 New Series, p. 4. 
 
 DRIVER (S. R.). See Mosheh ben Shesheth, p. 22. 
 
 DRUMMOND (JAMES, M.A., LL.D., Hon. Litt.D., late 
 Principal of Manchester College, Oxford). AN INQUIRY 
 INTO THE CHARACTER AND AUTHORSHIP OF 
 THE FOURTH GOSPEL. Demy Svo, cloth, los. 6d. 
 
 " The bookis not only learned, but also reverent and spiritual in tone, and 
 ought to find its way into the libraries of students of all shades of belief, as a 
 very notable attempt to solve one of the most important of New Testament 
 problems." — Christian World. 
 
 VIA, VERITAS, VITA. See The Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 PHILO JUD.^US. See p. 29. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
z8 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 ECHOES OF HOLY THOUGHTS : Arranged as Private 
 Meditations before a First Communion. 2fid Edition, with a 
 Preface by Rev. J. Hamilton Thorn. Printed with red lines. 
 Fcap. 8vo, cloth, is. 
 
 EWALD (H.). COMMENTARY ON THE PROPHETS 
 OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. See Theological Transla- 
 tion Library, Old Series, p. 8, 
 
 COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS. See Theological 
 
 Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 EWALD (H.). COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF 
 JOB. See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 FIGG (E. G.). ANALYSIS OF THEOLOGY, NATURAL 
 AND REVEALED. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 FOUR GOSPELS (THE) AS HISTORICAL RECORDS. 
 
 8vo, cloth. 1 5 J. 
 
 GILL (C). THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 By Charles Gill. 2nd Edition. With Dissertations in answer to 
 Criticism. 8vo, cloth. I2s, 
 
 THE BOOK OF ENOCH THE PROPHET. Trans- 
 lated from an Ethiopic MS. in the Bodleian Library, by the late 
 Richard Laurence, LL. D., Archbishop of Cashel. The Text 
 corrected from his latest Notes by Charles Gill. Re-issue, 8vo, 
 cloth. 5^. 
 
 HARNACK (ADOLF). MONASTICISM : Its Ideals and 
 History; and THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUS- 
 TINE. Two Lectures by Adolf Plarnack. Translated into 
 English by E. E. Ktllett, M.A., and F. H. Marseille, Ph.D., 
 M.A. Crown 8vo, cloth. 4s. 
 
 " The lectures impart to these old subjects a new and vivid interest which 
 cannot but win this faithful version many admiring readers." — Scoisman. 
 
 " One might read all the ponderous volumes of Montalembert without 
 obtaining so clear a view or so rare a judgment of this immense subject as are 
 offered in these luminous pages. . . . The translation is excellent, and gives us 
 Harnack in piure and vigorous English." — Christian World. 
 
 LETTER to the * ' Preussische Jahrbiicher " on the German 
 
 Emperor's Criticism of Prof. Delitzsch's Lectures on " B-xbel 
 and Bible." Translated into English by Thomas Bailey Saunders. 
 6(f. net. 
 
 - LUKE, THE PHYSICIAN. See Crown Theological Library. 
 
 - HISTORY OF DOGMA. See Theological Translation 
 
 Library, New Series, p. 5. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 19 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 HARNACK (ADOLF). THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. See 
 
 Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? See Theological Transla- 
 tion Library, New Series, p. 6. Also Crown Theological Library, 
 p. II. See Saunders (T. B.), " Professor Harnack and his Oxford 
 Critics," p. 25. 
 
 EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST 
 
 TH REE CENTU RI ES. See Theological Translation Library, 
 p. 4. 
 
 and HERRMANN (Dr. WILHELM). ESSAYS ON 
 
 THE SOCIAL GOSPEL. Translation edited by Maurice 
 A. Canney, M.A. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 HATCH (Rev. Dr.). LECTURES ON THE INFLUENCE 
 OF GREEK IDEAS AND USAGES UPON THE 
 CHRISTIAN CHURCH. See The Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 HAUSRATH (Prof. A.). HISTORY OF THE NEW 
 TESTAMENT TIMES. The Time of the Apostles. Trans- 
 lated by Leonard Huxley. With a Preface by Mrs Humphry 
 Ward. 4 vols. 8vo, cloth. 425-. (Uniform with the Theological 
 Translation Library, Old Series.) 
 
 NEW TESTAMENT TIMES. The Times of Jesus. See 
 
 Theological Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 HEBREW TEXTS, in large type for Classes : 
 
 Genesis. 2nd Edition. i6mo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 Psalms. i6mo, cloth, is. 
 Isaiah. i6mo, cloth, is. 
 Job. i6mo, cloth, is. 
 
 HENSLOW (Rev. G.). THE ARGUMENT OF ADAPTA- 
 TION ; or, Natural Theology reconsidered. Svo, cloth, is. 
 
 SPIRITUAL TEACHINGS OF BIBLE PLANTS; 
 
 or, The Garden of God. Svo, cloth, is. 
 
 THE AT-ONE-MENT ; or. The Gospel of Reconciliation. 
 
 Svo, cloth. IS. 
 
 THE SPIRITUAL TEACHING OF CHRIST'S LIFE. 
 
 Svo, cloth. 5^. net. 
 
 CHRIST NO PRODUCT OF EVOLUTION. Svo. 
 
 cloth, i^. 
 
 HERFORD (R. TRAVERS, B.A.). CHRISTIANITY IN 
 TALMUD AND MIDRASH. Demy Svo, cloth. i8j. net. 
 
 CONTENTS : — Introduction. Division I. Passages from the 
 Rabbinical Literature : A. Passages relating to Jesus. B. Passages 
 relating to Minim, Minuth. Division II. General Results. Appen- 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
20 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 dix containing the Original Texts of the Passages translated. 
 Indices. 
 
 " His book (if he is right in his identification of the Minim) is a history of 
 Judaising Christianity — the first independent and competent history written in 
 English." — Expository Times. 
 
 " It must become at once the standard authority on its subject." — Manchester 
 Guardian. 
 
 "It is no exaggeration to say that it will prove indispensable not only to 
 scholars interested in Talmudic literature, but to all who study the subject of 
 the evangelical tradition. It will introduce the reader into a new world — that 
 of Jewish thought in the centuries after Christ." — Cambridge Review. 
 
 HERRMANN (W.). THE COMMUNION OF THE 
 CHRISTIAN WITH GOD. See Theological Translation 
 Library, New Series, p. 6, 
 
 FAITH AND MORALS. See Crown Theological Library, 
 
 p. II. 
 
 and HARNACK (ADOLF.). ESSAYS ON THE 
 
 SOCIAL GOSPEL. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 HIBBERT JOURNAL: A Quarterly Review of Religion, 
 Theology, and Philosophy. Edited by L. P. Jacks and G. 
 Dawes Hicks. Vol. I. Royal 8vo, 856 pp. Vol. II., 864 pp. 
 Vol. III., 869 pp. Vols. IV. and V., 960 pp. Cloth. Each 12s. 
 6d. net. Annual Subscription, los. post free. 
 
 HOERNING (Dr. R.). THE KARAITE MSS., BRITISH 
 MUSEUM. The Karaite Exodus (i. to viii. 5) in Forty-two 
 Autotype Facsimiles, with a Transcription in ordinary Arabic type. 
 Together with Descriptions and Collation of that and five other 
 MSS. of portions of the Hebrew Bible in Arabic characters in the 
 same Collection. Royal 4to, cloth, gilt top. 20s. 
 
 HUNTER (Rev. J., D.D.). THE COMING CHURCH. A 
 Plea for a Church simply Christian. Cloth, is. 6d. net. 
 
 JOHNSON (EDWIN, M.A.). THE RISE OF CHRISTEN- 
 DOM. Demy 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d. 
 
 ANTIQUA MATER ; A Study of Christian Origins. 
 
 Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. 
 
 THE RISE OF ENGLISH CULTURE. Demy 8vo, 
 
 cloth. 15^-. net. 
 
 JONES (Rev. R. CROMPTON). HYMNS OF DUTY AND 
 FAITH. Selected and Arranged. 247 pp. Fcap. 8vo, cloth. 
 2nd Edition. 3^. 6d. 
 
 CHANTS, F;SALMS, AND CANTICLES. Selected 
 
 and Pointed for Chanting. i8mo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 
 ANTHEMS. With Indexes and References to the Music. 
 
 i8mo, cloth. IS. "^d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. ii 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST-Continued. 
 
 JONES (Rev. R. CROMPTON). THE CHANTS AND 
 ANTHEMS. Together in i vol., cloth. 2s. 
 
 A BOOK OF PRAYER. In Thirty Orders of Worship, with 
 
 Additional Prayers and Thanksgivings. l8mo, cloth. 2s. 6d. 
 With Chants, in I vol. i8mo, cloth. 3^. 
 
 KAUTZSCH (E.). AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY 
 OF THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTA- 
 MENT, With Chronological Tables for the History of the 
 Israelites, and other Aids to the Explanation of the Old Testament. 
 Reprinted from the "Supplement to the Translation of the Old 
 Testament." By E. Kautzsch, Professor of Theology at the Uni- 
 versity of Halle. Edited by the Author. Translated by John 
 Taylor, D.Lit., M.A., etc. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. 6d. 
 
 " This English translation ... is likely to prove very acceptable to all those 
 students who desire to see for themselves the view taken by the ' higher critics ' 
 of the growth of the Old Testament." — The Guardian. 
 
 "Dr. Taylor has rendered a great service to the English readers by his 
 excellent translation of this important work." — British Weekly. 
 
 KEIM;S history of JESUS of NAZARA. 5-^^ Theo- 
 logical Translation Library, Old Series, p. 8. 
 
 KENNEDY (Rev. JAS.). BIBLICAL HEBREW. ^^^ p. 35. 
 
 KITTEL (R.). HISTORY OF THE HEBREWS. See 
 
 Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 6. 
 
 KUENEN (Dr. A.). LECTURES ON NATIONAL AND 
 UNIVERSAL RELIGIONS. See The Hibbert Lectures, 
 p. 14. 
 
 THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL TO THE FALL OF 
 
 THE JEWISH STATE. 6"^^ Theological Translation Library, 
 Old Series, p. 9. 
 
 LAKE (Professor KIRSOPP). THE HISTORICAL EVI- 
 DENCE FOR THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS 
 CHRIST. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 LEA (HENRY CHARLES, LL.D.). HISTORY OF SAC- 
 ERDOTAL CELIBACY IN THE CHRISTIAN 
 CHURCH. Third Edition. Thoroughly Revised and Reset. 
 2 vols. Medium 8vo, cloth. 21s. net. 
 
 LOBSTEIN(P.). THE DOGMA OFTHE VIRGIN BIRTH 
 OF CHRIST. See Crown Theological Library, p. 10. 
 
 ^ODGE (Sir O.). LIFE AND MATTER. A Criticism of 
 Professor Haeckel's " Riddle of the Universe." Fourth 
 Impression. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2.s. 6d. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
22 
 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 MACAN (R. W.). THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS 
 CHRIST. An Essay in Three Chapters. 8vo, cloth. 5^-. 
 
 MACKAY (R. W.). SKETCH OF THE RISE AND 
 PROGRESS OF CHRISTIANITY. 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 MARCHANT (JAMES). THEORIES OF THE RESUR- 
 RECTION OF JESUS CHRIST. Crown 8vo, stiff covers, 
 2s. net ; superior cloth binding, 3J-. 
 
 MARTI (KARL). RELIGION OF THE OLD TESTA- 
 MENT. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 MARTINEAU (Rev. Dr. JAMES). THE RELATION 
 BETWEEN ETHICS AND RELIGION. An Address. 
 8vo, sewed, is. 
 
 MODERN MATERIALISM : ITS ATTITUDE TO- 
 WARDS THEOLOGY. A Critique and Defence. 8vo, 
 sewed. 2s. 6d. 
 
 MITCHELL (Rev. A. F.). HOW TO TEACH THE BIBLE. 
 
 2nd Edition, thoroughly revised and reset. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 Sir Oliver Lodge quotes the book in an article in Contemporary 
 Review^ and states that the book contains many useful hints 
 and much information. 
 
 " The lectures are marked by much insight and moderation. The book is 
 notable also for its gracious and cultured note, and for the quiet persuasiveness 
 with which a revolutionary reform ij advocated." — Sunday School Chronicle. 
 
 MONTEFIORE (C. G.). ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF 
 RELIGION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RELIGION 
 OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS. See The Hibbert Lec- 
 tures, p. 14. 
 
 MOSHEH BEN SHESHETH'S COMMENTARY ON 
 JEREMIAH AND EZEKIEL. Edited from a Bodleian 
 MS., with a Translation and Notes, by S. R. Driver. 8vo, 
 sewed. 35-. 
 
 MiJNSTERBERG (Prof. HUGO). THE AMERICANS. 
 
 See p. 30. 
 
 NESTLE (E.). INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXTUAL 
 CRITICISM OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT. 
 
 See Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 7. 
 
 OTTO(R.). NATURALISM AND RELIGION. 6"^^ Crown 
 Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 PERRIN (R. S.). THE EVOLUTION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 A Review of Philosophy. Crown 8vo, cloth, ds. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 23 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 PERSONAL AND FAMILY PRAYERS. 8vo, buckram. 
 IS. net. 
 
 PETERS (JOHN P.). EARLY HEBREW STORY. A 
 
 Study of the Origin, the Value, and the Historical Background 
 of the Legends of Israel. See Crown Theological Library, 
 p. II. 
 
 PFLEIDERER (Dr. O.). LECTURES ON THE IN- 
 FLUENCE OF THE APOSTLE PAUL ON THE 
 DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY. Sec The 
 
 Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 PAULINISM : A Contribution to the History of Primitive 
 
 Christianity. See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, 
 p. 9. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ON THE BASIS OF 
 
 ITS HIS! ORY. See Theological Translation Library, Old 
 Series, p. 9. 
 
 THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF 
 
 CHRIST : Its Sig^nificance and Value in the History of 
 Religion. See Crown Theological Library, p. ii. 
 
 PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. Vol. L Demy 8vo, cloth. 
 
 10^. 6d. net. See Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 3, 
 
 POOLE (REG. LANE). ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE 
 HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT IN THE 
 DEPARTMENTS OF THEOLOGY AND ECCLESI- 
 ASTICAL POLITICS. 8vo, cloth. io.y. 6d. 
 
 PROTESTANT COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TES- 
 TAMENT. See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, 
 p. 9. 
 
 RENAN (E.). ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSTI- 
 TUTIONS, THOUGHT, AND CULTURE OF ROME 
 ON CHRISTIANITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
 OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. See Hibbert Lectures, 
 p. 14. 
 
 RENOUF (P. LE PAGE). ON THE RELIGION OF 
 ANCIENT EGYPT. See Hibbert Lectures, p. 15. 
 
 REVILLE (A.). THE SONG OF SONGS, Commonly called 
 the Song of Solomon, or the Canticle. Translated from the 
 French. Crown 8vo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
24 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 R^VILLE (A.). ON NATIVE RELIGIONS OF MEXICO 
 
 AND PERU. See Hibbert Lectures, p. 15. 
 
 PROLEGOMENA OF THE HISTORY OF RE- 
 LIGIONS. See Theological Translation Library, Old Series, 
 
 p. 9. 
 
 RfeVILLE (JEAN). LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY. See 
 
 Crown Theological Library, p. II. 
 
 See also Sabatier's "Religions of Authority and Religion of the 
 
 Spirit," p. 4. 
 
 RIX (HERBERT). TENT AND TESTAMENT. A Camp- 
 ing Tour in Palestine, with some Notes on Scripture Sites. With 
 61 Illustrations, Frontispiece, and Maps. Demy 8vo, cloth. 
 ?>s. 6d. net. 
 
 " His narrative of travel is that of an intelligent and well-informed traveller 
 who went without prepossessions and was both able and willing to weigh 
 evidence. . . . Mr. Kix's contribution is one that must be taken into account." 
 — Spectator. 
 
 "The result is a thoughtful, well-written, even learned work, far from the 
 vain outpourings of the tourist. The narrative, though heavily charged with 
 information, is wonderfully unembarrassed, and the word-pictures which abound 
 are true to life." — Athenceuin. 
 
 RIX. SERMONS, ESSAYS, AND ADDRESSES. With 
 Introduction by Rev. P. H. Wicksteed, M.A. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 
 ROBINSON (ALEX., M.A., B.D.). A STUDY OF 
 THE SAVIOUR IN THE NEWER LIGHT. 2nd 
 
 Edition. Revised and partly re-written. Demy 8vo, cloth. 55, net. 
 
 OLD AND NEW CERTAINTY OF THE GOSPEL: 
 
 A Sketch. Crown Svo, cloth. 2s. 6d. 
 
 SABATIER (AUGUSTE). THE RELIGIONS OF AU- 
 THORITY AND THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT. 
 
 With a Memoir by Professor J. Reville. See Theological Transla- 
 tion Library, New Series, p. 4. 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT AND 
 
 ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION; and RELIGION 
 AND MODERN CULTURE. See Crown Theological 
 Library, p. 12. 
 
 SADLER (Rev. Dr.). PRAYERS FOR CHRISTIAN 
 WORSHIP. Crown 8vo, cloth. 3^.6^. 
 
 CLOSET PRAYERS, Original and Compiled. iSmo, 
 
 cloth. IS. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 25 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 SAUNDERS (T. BAILEY). PROFESSOR HARNACK 
 AND HIS OXFORD CRITICS. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 is. 6d. net. 
 
 " It gives thouglitful and acutely reasoned support to the great historical 
 student of Christianity who represents Berlin in theology against the pig- 
 tailed opposition which Oxford has offered to his learning. A spirited piece of 
 controversial writing, it cannot but prove stimulating to readers interested in 
 modern divinity, no matter to which side of the debate their private preposses- 
 sions incline them." — Scotsman. 
 
 "Mr. Saunders writes with sobriety and with a knowledge of the points 
 at issue. Readers of ' Harnack and his Critics ' will do well to read his 
 comments." — Sheffield Daily Telegraph. 
 
 SAVAGE (M. J.). BELIEFS ABOUT THE BIBLE. 8vo, 
 cloth. Ts. 6d. 
 
 SAYCE (A. H.). ON THE RELIGION OF ANCIENT 
 ASSYRIA AND BABYLONIA. See Hibbert Lectures, 
 P- 15. 
 
 SCHRADER (E.). CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS AND 
 THE OLD TESTAMENT. See Theological Translation 
 Library, Old Series, p. 9. 
 
 SCHUBERT (HANS VON). CHURCH HISTORY. See 
 
 Theological Translation Library, New Series, p. 3. 
 
 SCOTT (Rev. E. F., M.A.). THE APOLOGETIC OF THE 
 NEW TESTAMENT. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 SEVERUS (Patriarch of Antioch). THE SIXTH BOOK 
 OF THE SELECT LETTERS OF SEVERUS, 
 PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH, in the Syriac Version of 
 Athanasius of Nisibis. Edited and translated by E. W. Brooks. 
 Vol. I. (Text), Part i, and Vol. II. (Translation), Part i. 2 vols. 
 8vo, cloth. 42s. net. Vol. I. (Text), Part 2, and Vol. II. (Trans- 
 lation), Part 2. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 425-. net. See Text and 
 Translation Society, p. 38. 
 
 SHARPE (SAMUEL). HISTORY OF THE HEBREW 
 
 NATION AND ITS LITERATURE. With an Appendix 
 on the Hebrew Chronology. 5th Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 4J-. 6d. 
 
 CRITICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORISED ENG- 
 LISH VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 2nd 
 
 Edition. i2mo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 
 SMITH (MARTIN R.). WHAT I HAVE TAUGHT MY 
 CHILDREN. 2nd Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 3s. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
26 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 SODEN (H. von, D.D.). THE BOOKS OF THE NEW 
 TESTAMENT. See Crown Theological Library, p. 12. 
 
 THE STATUTES OF THE APOSTLES. The hitherto 
 unedited Ethiopia and Arabic Texts, Edited, with an Introduc- 
 tion and Translations of the Ethiopia, Arabic, and Coptic Texts, 
 by Rev. G. Horner, M,A, With an Appendix — a recently dis- 
 covered variant of the Coptic Text. i%s, net. 
 
 TAYLER (Rev. JOHN JAMES). AN ATTEMPT TO 
 ASCERTAIN THE CHARACTER OF THE FOURTH 
 GOSPEL, especially in its Relation to the First Three. 
 
 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 5^-. 
 
 TAYLOR (Rev. C). THE DIRGE OF COHELETH IN 
 ECCLES. XII. DISCUSSED AND LITERALLY 
 INTERPRETED. 8vo, cloth. 3^. 
 
 TAYLOR (Rev. Dr. J.). THE MASSORETIC TEXT AND 
 THE ANCIENT VERSIONS OF THE BOOK OF 
 MICAH. Crown 8vo, cloth. 55-. 
 
 See also Kautzsch, "Outline," p. 21. 
 
 TEN SERVICES OF PUBLIC PRAYER, with Special 
 Collects. 8vo, cloth, 1$. ; or 32mo, cloth, is. 6d. 
 
 PSALMS AND CANTICLES. 8vo, cloth, is. dd. 
 
 PSALMS AND CANTICLES, with Anthems. 8vo, 
 
 cloth. 2.S. 
 
 TEN SERVICES OF PUBLIC PRAYER, taken in Sub- 
 stance from the Common Prayer for Christian Worship, 
 with a few additional Prayers for particular Days. 8vo, 
 cloth, 2s. Gd. ; or 32mo, cloth, is. 
 
 TESTAMENT, THE NEW. TISCHENDORF (C). 
 NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GREECE. 3 vols. 8vo. 
 70.y. net. 
 
 CAMPBELL (Rev. Canon COLIN, M.A., D.D.). THE 
 
 FIRST THREE GOSPELS IN GREEK. Arranged in 
 parallel columns. 2nd Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 5^. net, 
 
 THOMAS (Rev. J. M. LLOYD). A FREE CATHOLIC 
 CHURCH. Crown 8vo, cloth, is. 6d. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 27 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 UPTON (C. B.). ON THE BASES OF RELIGIOUS 
 BELIEF. See Hibbert Lectures, p. 15. 
 
 VICKERS (J.). THE REAL JESUS : a Review of his Life, 
 Character, and Death, from a Jewish Standpoint. Crown 
 8vo. 6j, 
 
 THE CRUCIFIXION MYSTERY. Crown 8vo, cloth. 
 
 y. 6d. 
 
 VOYSEY (Rev. C). THE SLING AND THE STONE. 
 Vol. VIII. On the Lord's Prayer, 8vo, cloth. 3^. 6d. Vol. IX. 
 The Fatherhood of God. Sermon on the Mount, etc. Svo, cloth. 
 ^s. 6d. Vol. X. Revelation tested on Moral Grounds, etc. Svo, 
 cloth, los. 6d. 
 
 THEISM AS A SCIENCE OF NATURAL THE- 
 OLOGY AND NATURAL RELIGION. 2s. 6d. 
 
 THEISTIC PRAYER BOOK. 3rd Edition. i2mo, cloth. 
 
 3^. 6d. 
 
 WEIR (T. H., B.D.). A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
 HEBREW TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By 
 Thomas H. Weir, Assistant to the Professor of Oriental Languages 
 in the University of Glasgow. 2nd Edition, with Additions. 
 Crown Svo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 WEIZSACKER (C. von). THE APOSTOLIC AGE. 2 vols. 
 See Theological Translation Library, Nev/ Series, p. 7. 
 
 WERNLE (Paul). THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRIS- 
 TIANITY. 2 vols. Svo. See Theological Translation Library, 
 New Series, p. 4. 
 
 WICKSTEED (Rev. P. H.). THE ECCLESIASTICAL 
 
 INSTITUTIONS OF HOLLAND, treated with Special 
 Reference to the Position and Prospects of the Modern 
 School of Theology. A Report presented to the Hibbert 
 Trustees, and published by their direction. Svo, sewed, is. 
 
 WIMMER (R.). MY STRUGGLE FOR LIGHT: Con- 
 fessions of a Preacher. See Crown Theological Library, 
 p. II. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
28 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 ALPHABETICAL LIST— Continued. 
 
 WRIGHT (Rev. C. H. H.). BOOK OF GENESIS IN 
 HEBREW TEXT. With a critically revised Text, various 
 Readings, and Grammatical and Critical Notes. Demy 8vo. 
 
 BOOK OF RUTH IN HEBREW TEXT. With a criti- 
 cally revised Text, various Readings, including a new Collation of 
 Twenty-eight Hebrew MSS., and a Grammatical and Critical 
 Commentary ; to which is appended the Chaldee Targum. Demy 
 8vo. 7^-. 6d. 
 
 DANIEL AND HIS PROPHECIES. Demy 8vo, 
 
 cloth. 7j. 6d. 
 
 DANIEL AND ITS CRITICS. A Critical and Gram- 
 matical Commentary with Appendix. Demy 8vo, cloth, "js. 6d. 
 
 WRIGHT (G. H. BATESON). THE BOOK OF JOB. A 
 
 new critically revised Translation, with Essays on Scansion, Date, 
 etc. 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 WAS ISRAEL EVER IN EGYPT.? or, A Lost 
 
 Tradition. By G. H. Bateson Wright, D. D. , Queen's College, 
 Oxford ; Headmaster Queen's College, Hong-Kong ; Author of 
 "A Critical Revised Translation of the Book of Job." 8vo, art 
 linen. 7^. 6d. 
 
 WRIGHT (W. ALOIS), Edited by, and Dr S. A. HIRSCH. 
 A COMMENTARY OH THE BOOK OF JOB. From 
 a Hebrew MS. in the University Library, Cambridge. Med. 8vo, 
 cloth. 21 s. net. 
 
 ZELLER (E.). CONTENTS AND ORIGIN OF THE 
 ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. 5^^ Theological Translation 
 Library, Old Series, p. 9, 
 
 'II 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 29 
 
 II. Philosophy, Psychology. 
 
 BACON (ROGER), THE "OPUS MAJUS" OF. Edited, with 
 Introduction and Analytical Table, by John Henry Bridges, Fellow 
 of Royal College of Physicians, sometime Fellow of Oriel College. 
 Complete in 3 vols,, 3IJ. 6d. ; Vol. III. sold separately, ys. 6d. 
 
 BREWSTER (H. B.). THE THEORIES OF ANARCHY 
 AND OF LAW. A Midnight Debate. Crown 8vo, parch- 
 ment. 5-^- 
 
 THE PRISON. A Dialogue. Crown 8vo, parchment, ^s. 
 
 THE STATUETTE AND THE BACKGROUND. 
 
 Crown 8vo, parchment. 4s. 
 
 COLLINS (F. H.). AN EPITOME OF THE SYNTHETIC 
 PHILOSOPHY. By F. Howard Colhns. With a Preface by 
 Herbert Spencer, 5^^ Edition, The Synthetic Philosophy Com- 
 pleted. 8vo, cloth. 2 1 5", 
 
 DRUMMOND (Dr.). PHILO JUD^EUS; or, The Jewish 
 Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion. 
 By James Drummond, LL.D., Principal of Manchester New 
 College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth. 21s. 
 
 HODGSON (S. H.). PHILOSOPHY AND EXPERIENCE. 
 
 An Address delivered before the Aristotelian Society. 8vo, 
 sewed. 2s. 
 
 THE REORGANISATION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Address. 8vo, sewed, is. 
 
 LAURIE (Professor SIMON). ETHICA: or. The Ethics of 
 Reason. By Scotus Novanticus. 2nd Edition. 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 - — METAPHYSICA NOVA ET VETUSTA: A Return to 
 Dualism. 2nd Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 LODGE (Sir O.). LIFE AND MATTER. See Religion, 
 p. 21. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
32 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 Also to be had separately : 
 
 SPENCER (HERBERT). DATA OF ETHICS. Reset 
 uniform with popular edition of ** First Principles." Sewed, 2s. 6d. 
 net. ; cloth, 3s. net. 
 
 JUSTICE. Being Part 4 of the Principles of Ethics. 2nd 
 
 Thousand. 8vo, cloth, 6s. 
 
 Other Works. 
 
 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY. Library Edition (21st 
 
 Thousand), with a Postscript. 8vo, cloth. \os. 6d. 
 
 DATA OF ETHICS. Small Demy 8vo, cloth. 31. net. ; 
 
 sev/ed, 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 EDUCATION : Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. Cheap 
 
 Edition. Entirely reset. 46th Thousand. Crown Svo, cloth. 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 ESSAYS : Scientific, Political, and Speculative. A new 
 
 Edition, rearranged, with additional Essays. 3 vols. Svo, cloth. 
 (Each los.) 30^-. 
 
 SOCIAL STATICS. Abridged and revised, together with 
 
 "The Man v. The State." Svo, cloth, los. 
 
 VARIOUS FRAGMENTS. Uniform in Library binding. 
 
 Demy Svo, cloth. Enlarged Edition. 6s. 
 
 FACTS AND COMMENTS. Demy Svo, cloth. 6s. 
 
 THE MAN versus THE STATE. 14th Thousand. 
 
 Sewed, is. 
 
 A REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR WEISMANN. 
 
 Sewed. 6d. 
 
 REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHIL- 
 OSOPHY OF M. COMTE. Sewed, bd 
 
 DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY; or, Groups of Socio- 
 logical Facts. Compiled and abstracted by Professor D. 
 Duncan of Madras, Dr. Richard Scheppig, and James CoUier. 
 Folio, boards. 
 
 No. I. English. iSj. 
 
 No. 2. Ancient American Races. i6s. 
 
 No. 3. Lowest Races, Negritto Races, Polynesians. i8j. 
 
 No. 4. African Races. i6i-. 
 
 No. 5. Asiatic Races. iSj. 
 
 No. 6. American Races. i8j. 
 
 No. 7. Hebrevvs and Phoenicians. 21s. 
 
 No. 8. The French Civilisation. 30J. 
 
 New volumes in preparation. 
 14 Henrietta Street, Co vent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 33 
 
 SPENCER (HERBERT). COLLINS (F. H.). AN 
 EPITOME OF THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 By F. Howard Collins. Being a Digest of Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
 Works. 5th Edition, the Synthetic Philosophy Completed. With 
 a Preface by Herbert Spencer. 8vo, cloth. 21s. 
 
 DREY (S.). HERBERT SPENCER'S THEORY OF 
 
 RELIGION AND MORALITY. By Sylvan Drey. 8vo, 
 sewed, is. 
 
 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED FROM THE 
 
 EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. Demy 8vo, sewed, i^. 
 
 SPINOZA : Four Essays. By Professors Land, Van Vloten, and 
 Kuno Fischer, and by E. Renan. Edited by Professor Knight, of 
 St. Andrews. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5i-. 
 
 STUDIES FROM THE YALE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 LABORATORY. Edited by Professor E. W. Scripture. 
 With many Illustrations. 8vo, sewed. 4.S. 2d. each net. Vol, I. 
 1892-93, 100 pages. Vol. II. 1894, 124 pages. Vol. III. 1895, 
 no pages. Vol. IV. 1896, 141 pages. Vol. V. 1897, 105 pages. 
 Vol. VI. 1898, 105 pages. 
 
 WUNDT (WILHELM). OUTLINES OF PSYCHOL- 
 OGY. Translated, wath the co-operation of the Author, by 
 Charles Hubbard Judd, Ph.D., Instructor in the Wesleyan 
 University. 3rd Enlarged Editioa Demy 8vo, cloth. 8j. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
34 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 III. Oriental Languages, Literature, 
 
 and History. 
 
 ABHIDHANARATNAMALA (THE) OF HALAyUDHA. 
 
 A Sanskrit Vocabulary (120 pp.)- Edited, with a Sanskrit-English 
 Glossary (180 pp. )> by Dr. T. Aufrecht. 8vo, cloth. (Published 
 at I Si-.) los. 
 
 AVESTI, PAHLAVI, and ANCIENT PERSIAN STUDIES 
 in Honour of the late SHAMS-UL-ULAMA DASTUR 
 PESHOTANJI BEHRAMJI SANJANA, M.A., Ph.D. 
 Paper cover, 12s. 6d. net; cloth, I3J-. 6d. net. 
 
 BERNSTEIN and KIRSCH. SYRIAC CHRESTOMATHY 
 AND LEXICON (Chrestomathia Syriaca cum Lexico). 
 2 vols, in I. 8vo, cloth boards, ys. 6d. I. Chrestomathia, 
 separately. Sewed. 3.^. 
 
 DAVIDS (T. W. RHYS). LECTURES ON SOME POINTS 
 IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHISM. See 
 
 The Hibbert Lectures, p. 14. 
 
 DELITZSCH (Prof. F.). ASSYRIAN GRAMMAR. With 
 Paradigms, Exercises, Glossary, and Bibliography. Translated by 
 the Rev. Prof. A. R. S. Kennedy. Crown Svo, cloth, i^s. 
 
 THE HEBREW LANGUAGE VIEWED IN THE 
 
 LIGHT OF ASSYRIAN RESEARCH. Demy Svo, 
 cloth. 4i'. 
 
 BABEL AND BIBLE. See Crown Theological Library, 
 
 p. 10. 
 
 DIETTRICH (GUSTAV). DIE MASSORAH DER OST- 
 LICHEN UND WESTLICHEN SYRER IN IHREN 
 ANGABEN ZUM PROPHETEN JESAIA nach funf 
 Handschriften des British Museum in Verbindung mit zwei 
 Tractaten iiber Accente. Sewed. 8^-. 6d. net. 
 
 DILLMANN (A.). ETHIOPIC GRAMMAR. Translated 
 from C. Bezold's Second German Edition. By Rev. J. A. 
 Crichton, D.D., with Index of Passages, Philological Tables, etc. 
 I vol., Royal Svo. 25^-. net. 
 
 DfPAVAMSA (THE) : A Buddhist Historical Record in the 
 Pali Language. Edited, with an English Translation, by Dr. 
 H. Oldenberg, Svo, cloth. 21s. 
 
 The "Dipavamsa" is the most ancient historical work of the Ceylonese ; it 
 contains an account of the ecclesiastical history of the Buddhist Church, of the 
 conversion of the Ceylonese to the Buddhist faith, and of the ancient history of 
 Ceylon. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 35 
 
 ERMAN'S EGYPTIAN GRAMMAR. Translated, under 
 Professor Ernian's supervision, by J. H. Breasted, Professor of 
 Egyptology in the University of Chicago. Crown 8vo, cloth. i8i". 
 
 EVANS (GEORGE). AN ESSAY ON ASSYRIOLOGY. 
 
 With 4to Tables of Assyrian Inscriptions. 8vo, cloth, ^s. 
 
 FAIZULLAH-BHAI (Shaikh, B.D.). A MOSLEM 
 PRESENT. Part I., containing the famous poem of Al-Busaree. 
 With an English Version and Notes. 8vo, cloth. 4^. 
 
 AN ESSAY ON THE PRE-ISLAMITIC ARABIC 
 
 POETRY, with special reference to the Seven Suspended 
 Poems. 8vo, sewed. 4^. 
 
 FLINDERS PETRIE PAPYRI. See Cunningham Memoirs, 
 vols. 8, 9, and 11, p. 46. 
 
 FRANKFURTER (Dr. O.). HANDBOOK OF PALI : Being 
 an Elementary Grammar, a Chrestomathy, and a Glossary. 
 8vo, cloth. i6s. 
 
 FUERST (Dr. JUL.). HEBREW AND CHALDEE 
 LEXICON TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. 5th Edition, 
 improved and enlarged. Translated by Rev. Dr. Samuel Davidson. 
 Royal 8vo, cloth. 21s. 
 
 HARDY (R. SPENCE). MANUAL OF BUDDHISM IN 
 ITS MODERN DEVELOPMENT. Translated from 
 Singhalese MSS. 2nd Edition, with a complete Index and 
 Glossary. 8vo, cloth. 21s. 
 
 HEBREW TEXTS. Large type. i6mo, cloth. 
 
 Genesis. (2nd Edition. Baer and Delitzsch's Text. ) is. 6d. 
 Psalms, is. 
 Job. IS. 
 Isaiah, is. 
 
 KENNEDY (Rev. JAS.). INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL 
 HEBREW, presenting Graduated Instruction in the 
 Language of the Old Testament. By James Kennedy, B.D., 
 Acting Librarian in the New College, and one of the additional 
 Examiners in Divinity at the University, Edinburgh. 8vo, cloth. 
 
 I2S. 
 
 STUDIES IN HEBREW SYNONYMS. Demy 8vo, 
 
 cloth, 5J-. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
36 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 LYALL (C. J., M.A., K.C.I.E.). ANCIENT ARABIAN 
 POETRY, CHIEFLY PR^-ISLAMIC. Translations, with 
 an Introduction and Notes. Fcap. 4to, cloth. los. 6d. 
 
 MACHBEROTH ITHIEL. By Yehuda ben Shelomoh Alcharizi. 
 Edited from the MS. in the Bodleian Library, by Thomas 
 Chenery, M.A. 8vo, cloth. 3^. 
 
 MILANDA PANHO, THE: Being Dialogues between King 
 Milanda and the Buddhist Sage Nagasena. The Pali Text, 
 edited by V. Trenckner. 440 pp. 8vo, sewed. 21s. See also 
 " Pali Miscellany." 
 
 MOSHEH BEN SHESHETH'S COMMENTARY ON 
 JEREMIAH AND EZEKIEL. See p. 22. 
 
 MUSS-ARNOLT (W.). A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF 
 THE ASSYRIAN LANGUAGE (Assyrian -English- 
 German). By W. Muss-Arnolt. Completed in 19 parts. Each 
 5j. net. ; or bound in 2 vols., ;i^5 net. 
 
 NEW HEBREW SCHOOL of POETS of the SPANISH- 
 ARABIAN EPOCH. Selected Texts with Introduction, Notes, 
 and Dictionary. Edited by H. Brody, Ph.D., Rabbi in Nachod 
 (Bohemia), and K. Albrecht, Ph.D., Professor in Oldenburg 
 (Grand Duchy). English translation of the Introduction, etc., by 
 Mrs Karl Albrecht. Cloth. 7^. 6d. net. 
 
 NOLDEKE (THEODOR, Professor of Oriental Languages 
 in the University of Strassburg). COMPENDIOUS 
 SYRIAC GRAMMAR. With a Table of Characters by Juhus 
 Euting. Translated (with the sanction of the author) from the 
 second and improved German Edition by Rev. James A. Crichton, 
 D.D. Royal 8vo. i8j-.net. 
 
 DELECTUS VETERUM CARMINUM ARABI- 
 
 CORUM GLOSSARIUM CONFECIT A. MULLER. 
 
 Crown 8vo, cloth, ys. 6d. 
 
 NORRIS (E.). ASSYRIAN DICTIONARY. Intended to 
 further the Study of the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Assyria and 
 Babylonia. Vols, I. to III. 4to, cloth. Each 2Ss. 
 
 OLDENBERG (Prof. H.). BUDDHA : His Life, his Doctrine, 
 
 his Order. By Dr. Hermann Oldenberg, Professor at the 
 University of Berlin. Translated by W. Hoey, M.A. 8vo, cloth 
 gilt. 185-. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 37 
 
 PALI MISCELLANY. By V. Trenckner. Part I. The Intro- 
 ductory Part of the Milanda Panho, with an English Translation 
 and Notes. 8vo, sewed. 4^. 
 
 PLATTS (J. T.). A GRAMMAR OF THE PERSIAN 
 LANGUAGE. By John T. Platts, Hon. M.A. (Oxon.), Teacher 
 of Persian in the University of Oxford ; late Inspector of Schools in 
 the Central Provinces of India. Part I. Accidence. Broad crown 
 8vo. los. 6d. 
 
 RENOUF (P. LE PAGE). LECTURES ON THE RE- 
 LIGION OF ANCIENT EGYPT. See Hibbert Lectures, 
 
 p. 15. 
 
 SADI. THE GULISTAN (ROSE GARDEN) OF SHAIK 
 SADI OF SHIRAZ. A new Edition of the Persian Text, with 
 a Vocabulary, by F. Johnson. Square royal 8vo, cloth. 15^. 
 
 SAYCE (Prof. A. H.). LECTURES ON THE RELIGIONS 
 OF ANCIENT BABYLONIA AND SYRIA. See the 
 
 Hibbert Lectures, p. 15. 
 
 SCHRADER (E.). THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS 
 AND THE OLD TESTAMENT. See Theological Trans- 
 lation Library, Old Series, p. 9. 
 
 SHIHAB AL DIN. FUTOH AL-HABASHAH ; or, The 
 Conquest of Abyssinia. By Shinab al Din Ahmad B. 'Abd al 
 Kadir B. Salim B. 'Uthman. Edited, from an Arabic MS., by 
 S. Arthur Strong. Part I. Svo, sewed. 35-. net. 
 
 SOCIN (Dr. A.). ARABIC GRAMMAR. Paradigms, Litera- 
 ture, Exercises, and Glossary. 2nd Edition. Translated from the 
 3rd German Edition by the Rev. Prof. A. R. S. Kennedy, D.D, 
 Crown Svo, cloth. Ss, 6d. 
 
 KEY FOR TRANSLATING THE GERMAN EXER- 
 CISES IN ABOVE GRAMMAR. Sewed, is. 6d. 
 
 SORENSEN (S., Ph.D.), Compiled by. AN INDEX TO 
 THE NAMES IN THE MAHABHARATA. With short 
 explanations. Royal 4to, in twelve parts, which are not sold 
 separately, at 7^. 6d. per part net. Parts I. and III. now ready. 
 
 STATUTES, THE, OF THE APOSTLES. The hitherto 
 unedited Ethiopic and Arabic Texts, with translations of Ethiopic, 
 Arabic, and Coptic Texts, by G. Horner, M.A. See p. 26. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
38 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 TEXT AND TRANSLATION SOCIETY. Established for the 
 purpose of editing and translating Orietttal Texts chie^y preserved 
 in the British Museujn. 
 
 Volumes already issued— 
 
 THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE SELECT LETTERS 
 OF SEVERUS, PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH, in 
 the Syriac Version of Athanasius of Nisibis. Edited 
 and translated by E. W. Brooks, M.A. Vol. I. Text, Parts I. 
 and II. Vol. II. Translation, Parts I. and II. 84^. net. 
 
 THE CANONS OF ATHANASIUS OF ALEX- 
 ANDRIA, in Arabic, Ethiopic, and Coptic. Edited 
 and Translated by Prof. W. Riedel (Griefswald) and W. E. 
 Crum. 2.\s. net. 
 
 A RABBINIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF 
 JOB, contained in a unique MS. at Cambridge. 
 Edited, with Translation and Commentary, by W. Aldis 
 Wright, LL.D. 2\s. net. 
 
 TURPIE (Dr. D. McC). MANUAL OF THE CHALDEE 
 
 LANGUAGE. Containing Grammar of the Biblical Chaldee 
 and of the Targums, and a Chrestomathy, with a Vocabulary. 
 Square 8vo, cloth, ^s. 
 
 VINAYA PITAKAM : One of the Principal Buddhist Holy 
 Scriptures. Edited in Pah by Dr. H. Oldenberg. 5 vols. 8vo, 
 cloth. Each 2\s. 
 
 WALLIS (H. W.). THE COSMOLOGY OF THE RIG- 
 VEDA : An Essay. 8vo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 39 
 
 IV. Modern Languages & Literature. 
 
 A co7npleie list of Messrs. Williams dr' Norgate's Educational Publi- 
 cations on Modern Languages may be had on application. 
 
 ARMY SERIES OF FRENCH AND GERMAN NOVELS. 
 Edited, with short Notes, by J. T. W. Perowne, M.A. 
 
 This series is equally well adapted for general reading, and for those 
 preparing for the Arnay, Oxford and Cambridge Certificates, and other 
 Examinations — in fact, for all who wish to keep up or improve their French 
 and German. The notes are as concise as possible, with an occasional 
 etymology or illustration to assist the memory. The books selected being 
 by recent or living authors, are adapted for the study of most modern French 
 and German. 
 
 LE COUP DE PISTOLET, etc. Prosper Merimee. zs. 6d. 
 
 "A book more admirably suited to its purpose could not be desired. The 
 Editors deserve to be congratulated." — National Observer. 
 
 VAILLANTE. Jacques Vincent. 2s. 6d. 
 
 " The books are well got up, and in Vaillante an excellent choice has been 
 mzA^."— Guardian. 
 
 AUF VERLORNEM POSTEN AND NAZZARENA 
 DANTI. Johannes v. Dewall. 33-. 
 
 "Well piinted, well bound, and annotated just sufficiently to make the 
 reading of them sure as well as easy." — Educational Times. 
 
 CONTES MILITAIRES. A. Daudet. 2s. ed. 
 
 " These stories are mainly culled from a series called Contes du Lundi, 
 originally contributed by their author to the Figaro. Written at fever heat 
 immediately after the great 1870 war, they show Daudet's power in many ways 
 at its highest. . . . We therefore do more than recommend — we urge all 
 readers of French to get the stories in some form, and the present one is both 
 good and cheap." — The Schoolmaster. 
 
 ERZAHLUNGEN. E. Hofer. ^s. 
 
 "The series has brought fascinating examples of fiction under the eyes of 
 English readers in a neat and handy form. Besides having the military flavour, 
 they are models of style." — Scotsman. 
 
 BAYLDON (Rev. G.). ICELANDIC GRAMMAR. An 
 Elementary Grammar of the Old Norse or Icelandic Language. 
 8vo, cloth, 'js. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
40 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 BOlELLE (JAS.). FRENCH COMPOSITION THROUGH 
 LORD MACAULAY'S ENGLISH. Edited, with Notes, 
 Hints, and Introduction, by the late James Boielle, B.A. (Univ. 
 Gall.), Officier d' Academic, Senior French Master, Dulwich 
 College, etc., etc. Crown 8vo, cloth. Vol. I. Frederick the 
 Great. 3^. Vol. II. Warren Hastings. 3^. Vol. III. Lord 
 Clive. 35. 
 
 See Victor Hugo, "Les Miserables" and "Notre Dame." 
 
 DELBOS (L.). NAUTICAL TERMS IN ENGLISH 
 AND FRENCH AND FRENCH AND ENGLISH. 
 
 With Notes and Tables. For the use of Naval Officers and Naval 
 Cadets. By Leon Delbos, M.A., of H.M.S. Britannia, Dart- 
 mouth. 4th Edition, thoroughly revised and considerably 
 enlarged, with additional Plates. Crown 8vo, cloth, 7^. dd. net. 
 
 EUGENE'S STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR 
 OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE, with an Historical 
 Sketch of the Formation of French. For the use of Public 
 Schools. With Exercises. By G. Eugene-Fasnacht, late French 
 Master, Westminster School. 23rd Edition, thoroughly revised. 
 Square crown 8vo, cloth, 5^-. ; or separately, Grammar, 3^. ; 
 Exercises, 2,s. 6d. 
 
 GOETHE (W. v.). ANNOTATED TEXTS. 6"^^ Educational 
 Catalogue. 
 
 HAGMANN (J. G., Ph.D.). REFORM IN PRIMARY EDU- 
 CATION. Translated from Second German Edition by R, H. 
 Hoar, Ph.D., and Richmond Barker, M.A. Cr. Svo, cl, 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 HOGAN (E.). CATH RUIS NA RIG FOR BOINN. With 
 Preface, Translation, and Indices ; also a Treatise on Irish Neuter 
 Substantives, and a Supplement to the Index Vocabulorum of 
 Zeuss's "Grammatica Celtica." Todd Lecture Series, Vol. IV. 
 Svo, sewed. 3^. 6d. 
 
 THE LATIN LIVES OF THE SAINTS AS AIDS 
 
 TOV^ARDS THE TRANSLATION OF IRISH TEXTS 
 AND THE PRODUCTION OF AN IRISH DICTION- 
 ARY. By Edmund Hogan, S.J., F.R.U.I., M.R.I. A., Royal 
 Irish Academy's Todd Professor of Celtic Languages. Todd 
 Lecture Series, Vol. V. 2s. 6d. 
 
 THE IRISH NENNIUS FROM L. NA HUIDRE, 
 
 AND HOMILIES AND LEGENDS FROM L. BREAC. 
 
 Alphabetical Index of Irish Neuter Substantives. Todd Lecture 
 Series, Vol. VI. 2s. 6d. 
 
 HUGO (VICTOR). LES MISERABLES: Les Principaux 
 Episodes. Edited, with Life and Notes, by the late J. Boielle. 
 2 vols. 6th Edition. Crown Svo, cloth. Each 35. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 41 
 
 HUGO (VICTOR). NOTRE DAME DE PARIS. Adapted 
 for the use of Schools and Colleges. By the late J. Bo'ielle. 
 2 vols. 2nd Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth. Each 3^. 
 
 LEABHAR BREAC. The "Speckled Book," otherwise styled, 
 "The Great Book of Dun Doighre": a Collection of Pieces in 
 Irish and Latin, transcribed towards the close of the Fourteenth 
 Century. "The oldest and best Irish MS. relating to Church 
 History now preserved" {G. Pet7-ie). Now first published, from 
 the original MS. in the Royal Irish Academy's Library. In 
 imperial folio, on toned paper. In one vol., half-calf, £^, 4^. 
 (200 copies only printed. ) 
 
 LEABHAR NA H-UIDHRI. A Collection of Pieces in Prose 
 and Verse, in the Irish Language, transcribed about a.d. iioo; 
 the oldest volume now known entirely in the Irish language, 
 and one of the chief surviving native literary monuments — not 
 ecclesiastical — of ancient Ireland ; now for the first time pub- 
 lished, from the original in the Library of the Royal Irish 
 Academy, with account of the Manuscript, description of its 
 contents, index, and facsimiles in colours. In folio on toned 
 paper, half-calf. ;[^3, 3^. (200 copies only printed.) 
 
 LILJA (The Lily). An Icelandic Religious Poem. By Eystein 
 Asgrimson. Edited, with Translation, Notes, and Glossary, by 
 E. Magnusson. Crown 8vo, cloth extra, ioj. dd. 
 
 LODGE (Sir O.). SCHOOL TEACHING AND SCHOOL 
 
 REFORM. A Course of Four Lectures on School Curricula 
 and Methods, delivered to Secondary Teachers and Teachers in 
 Training at Birmingham during February 1905. 3i'. 
 
 " The work of a sensible iconoclast, who does not pull down for the sake of 
 mere destruction, but is anxious to set up something more worthy in place of 
 the mediaevalism he attacks." — Outlook. 
 
 " Let me commend this wise volume not only to teachers but to all concerned 
 in national education. And especially to the politician. Half an hour with 
 Sir Oliver Lodge would make him realise that there are problems on the inner 
 side of the school door not dreamt of in his philosophy — would make him feel 
 that the more he knows of these the better will he be able wisely to handle those 
 others about which he is glibly talking every day." — Dr Macnamara in the 
 Daily Chronicle. 
 
 MAORI. NEW AND COMPLETE MANUAL OF 
 MAORI CONVERSATIONS. Containing Phrases and 
 Dialogues on a variety of Topics, together with a few general 
 rules of Grammar, and a comprehensive Vocabulary. 45-. net. 
 See also Williams. 
 
 NIBELUNGENLIED. "The Fall of the Nibelungens," other- 
 wise "The Book of Kriemhild." An English Translation by 
 W. N. Lettsom. 4th Edition. 8vo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
42 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 O'GRADY (STANDISH H.). SILVA GADELICA (I.- 
 XXXI.). A Collection of Tales in Irish, with Extracts illus- 
 trating Persons and Places. Edited from MSS. and translated. 
 2 vols, royal 8vo, cloth. ^2s. Or separately, Vol. I., Irish 
 Text; and Vol. II., Translation and Notes. Each vol. 2is. 
 
 OORDT (J. F. VAN, B.A.). CAPE DUTCH. Phrases and 
 Dialogues, with Translations, preceded by short Grammatical 
 Notes. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 PHILLIPPS (V., B.A.). A SHORT SKETCH OF 
 GERMAN LITERATURE, for Schools. By Vivian 
 Phillipps, B.A., Assistant Master at Fettes College, Edinburgh. 
 2nd Edition, revised. Pott 8vo, cloth, is. 
 
 ROGET (F. F.). AN INTRODUCTION TO OLD 
 FRENCH. History, Grammar, Chrestomathy, and Glossary, 
 2nd Edition. Crown Svo, cloth. 6^. 
 
 FIRST STEPS IN FRENCH HISTORY, LITERA- 
 TURE, AND PHILOLOGY. For Candidates for the Scotch 
 Leaving Certificate Examinations, the various Universities Local 
 Examinations, and the Army Examinations. 4th Edition. Crown 
 Svo, cloth. 5J-. 
 
 See also Voltaire. 
 
 ROSING (S.). ENGLISH-DANISH DICTIONARY. New 
 
 Edition. Large Svo, strongly bound, half-roan. lis. 6d. 
 
 SCHILLER (F. VON). THE BALLADS AND SHORTER 
 POEMS. Translated into English Verse by Gilbert Clark. 
 Fcap. Svo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 ANNOTATED TEXTS. See Educational Catalogue. 
 
 SULLIVAN (W. K.). CELTIC STUDIES FROM THE 
 GERMAN OF EBEL. With an Introduction on the Roots, 
 Stems, and Derivatives, and on Case-endings of Nouns in the 
 Indo-European Languages. Svo, cloth, los. 
 
 TODD LECTURE SERIES (Royal Irish Academy)— 
 
 Vol. I. Part I. Mesca Ulad ; or, The Intoxications of the 
 Ultonians. Irish Text, with Translation and Notes, by W. M. 
 Hennesy. Svo, sewed. li-. 6d. 
 
 Vol. II. Leabhar Breac, Passions and Homilies from. 
 
 Irish Text, Translation, and Glossary, with Lecture on Irish 
 Lexicography, by Dr. R. Atkinson. Svo, cloth. Part I, pages 
 1-34, out of print. Part 2, pages 35-958, 6s. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 43 
 
 TODD LECTURE SERIES-Continued. 
 
 Vol, III. The Codex Palatine- Vaticanus. No. 830. Texts, 
 Translations, and Indices, by B. MacCarthy, D.D. 8vo, sewed. 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 Vol. IV. Cath Ruis na Rig for Boinn. With Preface, Trans- 
 lation, Indices, a Treatise on Irish Neuter Substantives, and a 
 Supplement to the Index Vocabulorum of Zeuss's " Grammatica 
 Celtica. " By E. Hogan, Svo, sewed, ^s. 6d. 
 
 Vol, V. The Latin Lives of the Saints as aids towards the 
 Translation of Irish Texts and the Production of an Irish 
 Dictionary. By Edmund Hogan, S.J., F.R.U.I., M.K.I. A., 
 Royal Irish Academy's Todd Professor of the Celtic Languages. 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 Vol. VI. The Irish Nennius from L. Na Huidre, and 
 Homilies and Legends from L. Breac. Alphabetical Index of 
 Irish Neuter Substantives, By Edmund Hogan, S.J., F, R.U.I. , 
 M.R.I. A., Royal Irish Academy's Todd Professor of the Celtic 
 Languages. 2s. 6d. 
 
 VELASQUEZ. LARGER SPANISH DICTIONARY. 
 
 Composed from the Dictionaries of the Spanish Academy, Terreros 
 and Salva. Spanish-Enghsh and English-Spanish. 1279 pp., 
 triple columns. 2 vols, in I. Imp. Svo, cloth. 24J. 
 
 VIGA GLUMS SAGA. Translated from the Icelandic, with Notes 
 and an Introduction, by Sir Edmund Head, Bart. Fcap. Svo, 
 cloth. 5^-. 
 
 WEISSE (T. H.). SYSTEMATIC CONVERSATIONAL 
 EXERCISES FOR TRANSLATING INTO GERMAN, 
 adapted to his Grammar. New Edition. Crown Svo, cloth. 
 (Key, 5j. net.) 3^. 6d. 
 
 WEISSE (T. H.). A SHORT GUIDE TO GERMAN 
 IDIOMS : being a Collection of the Idioms most in use. 
 
 With Examination Papers. 3rd Edition. Cloth. 2s. 
 
 WERNER'S ELEMENTARY LESSONS IN CAPE 
 DUTCH (AFRIKANDER TAAL). By A. Werner and 
 G. Hunt. i6mo, cloth, is, 6d. 
 
 " We most cordially recommend this book to anyone going out to settle in 
 South Africa. • . . The dialogues and exercises are admirably planned." — 
 Re/orf)ier. 
 
 "To those outward bound such a book is sure to be useful." — Practical 
 Teacher. 
 
 WILLIAMS (The Rig-ht Rev. W. L., D.C.L.). A DICTION- 
 ARY OF THE NEW ZEALAND LANGUAGE. 4th 
 
 Edition. Edited by the Right Rev. Bishop W. L. Williams, with 
 numerous additions and corrections. Demy Svo, cloth, 12s. 6d. 
 
 LESSONS IN MAORI. 3rd Edition. Fcap. Svo, cloth. 
 
 3^- 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
44 
 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 YELLOW BOOK OF LECAN. A Collection of Pieces (Prose 
 and Verse) in the Irish Language, in part compiled at the end of 
 the Fourteenth Century ; now for the first time published from the 
 original Manuscript in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, by 
 the Royal Irish Academy. With Introduction, Analysis of Con- 
 tents, and Index, by Robert Atkinson. 30 and 468 pp. (Royal 
 Irish Academy's Irish facsimiles.) Large post folio, 1896, half- 
 roan, Roxburghe, cloth sides. £^, 4s. 
 
 ZOEGA (G. T.). ENGLISH-ICELANDIC DICTIONARY. 
 
 8vo, cloth. 6s. net. 
 
 ZOMPOLIDES (Dr. D.). A COURSE OF MODERN 
 GREEK ; or, The Greek Language of the Present Day. 
 I. The Elementary Method. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5^. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 45 
 
 V. Science. 
 
 MEDICINE-CHEMISTRY— BOTANY— ZOOLOGY- 
 MATHEMATICS. 
 
 ANNETT (H. E., M.D., D.P.H.), J. EVERETT DUTTON, 
 M.B., B.Ch., and J. H. ELLIOTT, M.D., Toronto. 
 REPORT OF THE MALARIA EXPEDITION TO 
 NIGERIA (1900). Part I. Malarial Fever, etc. (Liverpool 
 School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir III.). los. 6d. Part II. 
 Filariasis (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir IV.). 
 Otti of print separately, but is contained in the Thompson- Yates 
 Laboratory Reports, Vol. IV., Pari I. Price 20s. 
 
 BASTIAN (H. CHARLTON, M.A., M.D., F.R.S.). 
 STUDIES IN HETEROGENESIS. With 825 Illustra- 
 tions from Photomicrographs. Royal 8vo, cloth. 315. dd. 
 
 BENEDICT (F. E., Ph.D.). ELEMENTARY ORGANIC 
 ANALYSIS. Small Svo. Pages vi + 82. 15 Illustrations. 
 ^s, 6d. net. 
 
 BERGEY (D. G.). HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL HY- 
 GIENE. Small 8vo. Pages v+ 164. 65. 6a'. net. 
 
 BERGMANN (Prof. E. von, M.D.). A SYSTEM OF 
 PRACTICAL SURGERY. Edited by William T. Bull, 
 M.D. In five imperial Svo volumes, containing 4174 pages, with 
 1976 illustrations in the text, and 102 superb full-page plates 
 in colours and monochrome. Extra cloth, £6, ds. ; half-leather, 
 marble sides and edges, £'] , 'js. ; half-morocco, £2>, 8^. 
 
 BILTZ (HENRY). THE PRACTICAL METHODS OF 
 DETERMINING MOLECULAR WEIGHTS. Trans- 
 lated by Jones. Small Svo. Pages viii-f245. 44 Illustrations. 
 ?>s. 6d. net. 
 
 BOLTON. HISTORY OF THE THERMOMETER. 
 
 i2mo. 96 pages. 6 Illustrations, ^s. 6d. net, 
 
 BOYCE (RUBERT, M.B., F.R.S.). THE ANTI-MALARIA 
 MEASURES AT ISMAILIA. (Liverpool School of Tropical 
 Medicine, Memoir XII.) Price is. 
 
 YELLOW F^VER PROPHYLAXIS IN NEW OR- 
 LEANS, 1905. (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir 
 XIX.) 5 J. net. 
 
 BOYCE (RUBERT), A. EVANS, M.R.C.S., and H. H. 
 CLARKE, M.A., B.C. REPORTS ON THE SANITA- 
 TION AND ANTI - MALARIAL MEASURES IN 
 PRACTICE AT BATHURST, CONAKRY, AND 
 FREETOWN (1905). (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 
 Memoir XIV.) With 8 Plates. 5j. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
46 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 BRUCE (ALEX., M.A., M.D., F.R.C.P.E., F.R.S.E.). A 
 TOPOGRAPHICAL ATLAS OF THE SPINAL CORD. 
 
 Fcap. folio, half-leather. £2, 2s. net. 
 
 CUNNINGHAM MEMOIRS— 
 
 1. Cubic Transformations. By John Casey, LL.D. 4to, 
 sewed. 2s. 6d. 
 
 2. On the Lumbar Curve in Man and the Apes. By D. 
 J. Cunningham, M.D. 13 Plates. 4to, sewed. 55-. 
 
 3. New Researches on Sun-heat, Terrestrial Radiation, 
 etc. By Rev. Samuel Haughton, M.A., M.D. 9 Plates. 4to, 
 sewed, is. 6d. 
 
 4. Dynamics and Modern Geometry. A New Chapter in 
 the Theory of Screws. By Sir Robert S. Ball, LL.D. 4t,o, 
 sewed. 2s. 
 
 5. The Red Stars. Observations and Catalogue. New 
 Edition. Edited by Rev. T. Espin, M.A. 4to, sewed, y. 6d. 
 
 6. On the Morphology of the Duck Tribe and the Auk 
 Tribe. By W. K. Parker, F.R.S. 9 Plates. 4to, sewed. 3^. 6d. 
 
 7. Contribution to the Surface Anatomy of the Cerebral 
 Hemispheres. By D. J. Cunningham, M.D. With a Chapter 
 upon Cranio-Cerebral Topography by Victor Horsley, M.B., 
 F.R.S. 4to, sewed. Ss. 6d. 
 
 8. On the Flinders Petrie Papyri. Part I. Out of Print. 
 
 9. On the Flinders Petrie Papyri. Part II. With 18 Auto- 
 types. 4to, sewed. 42J-. net. Appendix to 8 and 9. 5^-. net. 
 
 10. The Decorative Art of British New Guinea. A Study 
 in Papuan Ethnography. By Alfred C. Haddon, M.A. With 
 12 Plates, and numerous other Illustrations. 4to, sewed. 14^. net. 
 
 11. On the Flinders Petrie Papyri. With Transcriptions, 
 Commentaries, and Index. By John P. Mahaffy, D.D., and Prof. 
 J. Gilbert Smyly. With 7 Autotypes. 4to, sewed. 42J-. net. 
 
 DURHAM (H. E., M.A., M.B., F.R.C.S.), and the late 
 WALTER MYERS, M.B. REPORT OF THE 
 YELLOW FEVER EXPEDITION TO PARA (1900). 
 
 (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir VII.) 4to, 
 Ts. 6d. 
 
 DUTTON (J. E., M.B., Ch.B.). REPORT OF THE 
 MALARIA EXPEDITION TO THE GAMBIA. (Liver- 
 pool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir X.) 4to. lOi-. 6d. net. 
 
 and JOHN L. TODD, B.A., M.D., CM., M'Gill. FIRST 
 
 REPORT OF THE TRYPANOSOMIASIS EXPEDI- 
 TION TO SENEGAMBIA (1902). (Liverpool School of 
 Tropical Medicine, Memoir XI.) 4to. lOs. 6d.net. 
 
 RAPPORT SUR L'EXPEDITION AU CONGO 
 
 1903-5- P"ce 5^. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 47 
 
 DUTTON (J. E., M.B., Ch.B.) and JOHN L. TODD, B A., 
 M.D., CM., M'GILL. THE NATURE OF HUMAN 
 TICK-FEVER IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE 
 CONGO FREE STATE. (Liverpool School of Tropical 
 Medicine, Memoir XVII.) 4to. With Map, 4 Plates, and 9 
 Temperature Charts. Price 'js. 6d. net. 
 
 ENGELHARDT (V.). THE ELECTROLYSIS OF 
 WATER. 8vo. Pages x+ 140. 90 Illustrations. 5j-.net. 
 
 GILES (Lieut-Col.). GENERAL SANITATION AND 
 ANTI-MALARIAL MEASURES IN SEKONDI, THE 
 GOLDFELDS, AND KUMASSI, AND A COM- 
 PARISON BETWEEN THE CONDITIONS OF 
 EUROPEAN RESIDENCE IN INDIA. (Liverpool School 
 of Tropical Medicine, Memoir XV.) 4to. Price Js. 6d. net. 
 
 HANTZSCH (A.). ELEMENTS OF STEREOCHEM- 
 ISTRY.* Translated by Wolf. i2mo. Pages viii + 206. 26 
 Figures. 6s. 6d. net. 
 
 HARDY. ELEMENTS OF ANALYTICAL GEOMETRY. 
 
 8vo. Pages iv + 365. 163 Figures. 85-. 6d net. 
 
 INFINITESIMALS AND LIMITS. Sm. i2mo, paper. 
 
 22 pp. 6 Figures, is. net. 
 
 HARNACK (AXEL). INTRODUCTION TO THE ELE- 
 MENTS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL AND INTEGRAL 
 CALCULUS. From the German. Royal 8vo, cloth, los. 6d, 
 
 HART (EDWARD, Ph.D.). CHEMISTRY FOR BE- 
 GINNERS. Small i2mo. 
 
 Vol.1. Inorganic. Pages viii-f 188. 55 Illustrations and 2 
 
 Plates. Fourth Edition. 4^-. 6d. net. 
 Vol. II. Organic. Pages iv + 98. 11 Illustrations. 2s. net. 
 Vol. III. Experiments. Separately. 60 pages, is. net. 
 
 SECOND YEAR CHEMISTRY. Small i2mo. 165 pages. 
 
 31 Illustrations. 55. net. 
 
 HOFF (J. H. VAN'T). STUDIES IN CHEMICAL 
 
 DYNAMICS. Revised and enlarged by Dr. Ernst Cohen, 
 
 ' Assistant in the Chemical Laboratory of the University of Amster- 
 
 I dam. Translated by Thomas Ewan, M.Sc, Ph.D., Demonstrator 
 
 of Chemistry in the Yorkshire College, Leeds. Royal 8vo, cloth. 
 
 los. 6d. 
 
 JOH^fSTONE (J.). BRITISH FISHERIES: Their Ad- 
 I ministration and their Problems. A short account of the 
 
 \ Origin and Growth of British Sea Fishery Authorities and Regu- 
 
 lations, los. 6d. net. 
 
 I 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
 4 
 
48 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 JONES (J. T. SHARE-). SURGICAL ANATOMY OF 
 THE HORSE. To be completed in 4 Parts. With above 100 
 Illustrations, a number being in colour. Part I. Head and Neck ; 
 Part II. Fore Limb. Price per part, 15J. net, sewed; cloth, 
 16s. 6d. net. 
 
 LIFE-SIZE MODELS, Illustrating the Superficial 
 
 Anatomy of the Limbs of the Horse. Price per set of four 
 models, £21 ; or separately — Fore Limb, Inner and Outer 
 Aspects, £6, i6s. 6d. each; Hind Limb, Inner and Outer 
 Aspects, £6, 6s. each. 
 
 JONES. THE FREEZING POINT, BOILING POINT, 
 AND CONDUCTIVITY METHODS. i2mo. Pages 
 vii + 64. 14 Illustrations. 3^'. net. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE LINNEAN SOCIETY. Botany. At 
 
 various prices. Index to Journal (Botany), 20s. Zoology. At 
 various prices. General Index to the first 20 vols, of the Journal 
 (Zoology) and the Zoological portion of the Proceedings, 20^. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL MICROSCOPICAL 
 SOCIETY, containing its transactions and Proceedings, with 
 other Microscopical information. Bi-monthly. Previous to 1893 
 at various prices ; after that date bi-monthly, each 6s. net. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE QUEKETT MICROSCOPICAL 
 CLUB. Nos. 1-26, IS. net; Nos. 27-31, 2s. 6d. net. 1893, 
 No. 32, and following Nos., half-yearly, 3^. 6d. net. 
 
 LANDOLT (Dr. HANS). THE OPTICAL ROTATING 
 POWER OF ORGANIC SUBSTANCES AND ITS 
 PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS. 8vo. Pp. xxi4-75i. 83 
 Illustrations. 3IJ. 6d, net. 
 
 LANGENBECK. THE CHEMISTRY OF POTTERY. 
 
 Small i2mo. Pages viii-+- 197. Illustrated. Out of Print. %s.6d. 
 net. 
 
 LEAVENWORTH (Prof. W. S., M.Sc). INORGANIC 
 QUALITATIVE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS FOR AD- 
 VANCED SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES. 8vo. Pages 
 vi-f 154. 6s. 6d. net. 
 
 LEBLANC (Dr. MAX). THE PRODUCTION OF 
 CHROMIUM AND ITS COMPOUNDS BY THE AID 
 OF THE ELECTRIC CURRENT. 8vo. 122 pages. 5^. 
 net. 
 
 LIVERPOOL MARINE BIOLOGY COMMITTEE. 
 MEMOIRS ON TYPICAL BRITISH MARINE 
 PLANTS AND ANIMALS. Edited by W. A. Herdman, 
 D.Sc, F.R.S. All demy 8vo, stiff' boards. ij: 
 
 1. Ascidia. By W. A, Herdman. With 5 Plates. Price2j.net. 
 
 2. Cardium. By J. Johnstone, Fisheries Assistant, University 
 College, Liverpool. With 7 Plates. Price 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. q 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 49 
 
 3. Echinus. By Herbert Clifton Chadwick, Curator of the Port 
 Erin Biological Station. With 5 Plates. Price 2s. net. 
 
 4. Codium. By R.J. Harvey Gibson, M. A., F.L.S., Professor of 
 Botany in University College, Liverpool, and Helen P. Auld, B.Sc, 
 With 3 Plates. Price is. 6d. net. 
 
 5. Alcyonium. By Sydney J. Ilickson, M.A., D.Sc, F.R.S., 
 Beyer Professor of Zoology in Owens College, Manchester. With 
 3 Plates. Price is. 6d. net. 
 
 6. Lepeophtheirus and Lernea. By Andrew Scott, Resident 
 Fisheries Assistant at the Peel Hatchery. With 5 Plates. 2s. net. 
 
 7. Lineus. By R. C. Punnett, B.A., with 4 Plates. 2s. net. 
 
 8. Pleuronectes. By Frank J. Cole, Jesus College, Oxford, 
 Lecturer in the Victoria University, Demonstrator of Zoology, 
 University, Liverpool, and James Johnstone, B.Sc. Lond. , Fisheries 
 Assistant, University, Liverpool. With il Plates, ys. net. 
 
 9. Chondrus. By Otto V. Darbishire, Owens College, Man- 
 chester. With 7 Plates. 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 10. Patella (the Common Limpet). By J. R. Ainsworth 
 Davis, M.A., Professor of Zoology in the University College of 
 Wales, Aberystwyth, and H. J. Fleure, B.Sc, Fellow of the 
 University of Wales. With 4 Plates. 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 11. Arenicola (the Lug- Worm). By J. H. Ash worth, D.Sc, 
 Lecturer in Invertebrate Zoology in the University of Edinburgh. 
 With 8 Plates. Price 4J. 6d. net. 
 
 12. Gammarus. By Margaret Cussans, B.Sc, Zoological 
 Department, University of Liverpool. With 4 Plates. 2s. net. 
 
 13. Anurida. By A. D. Imms, B.Sc. (Lond.). With 7 
 Plates. Price 4s. net. 
 
 14. Ligia. By C. Gordon Hewitt, B.Sc, Demonstrator in 
 Zoology, University of Manchester. With 4 Plates. 2s. net. 
 
 15. Antedon. By Herbert Clifton Chadwick. With 7 Plates. 
 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 LONG (J. H.). A TEXT-BOOK OF URINE ANALYSIS. 
 
 Small 8vo. Pages v + 249. 31 Illustrations. 6s. 6d. net. 
 
 MASON (W. P., Prof, of Chem.). NOTES ON QUALITA- 
 TIVE ANALYSIS. Sm. i2mo. 56 pp. 31. 6d net. 
 
 MEADE (RICHARD K., B.Sc.) CHEMIST'S POCKET 
 MANUAL. i6mo. Leather. Pocket Edition. Pages vii + 204. 
 Out of Print. 8s. 6d. net. 
 
 PORTLAND CEMENT: ITS COMPOSITION, RAW 
 
 MATERIALS, MANUFACTURE, TESTING, AND 
 ANALYSIS. Second Edition. With 100 Illustrations. 14^-. 6d. 
 net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
50 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 MEMOIRS OF THE LIVERPOOL SCHOOL OF TROPI- 
 CAL MEDICINE. 
 
 I. Ross (R.) Malarial Fever: Its Cause, Prevention, 
 and Treatment. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 II. Ross (R.), H. E. Annett, and E. E. Austen. Report 
 of the Malaria Expedition to Sierra Leone (1899). 4to. 21s. 
 
 III. Annett (H. E.), J. E. Button, and J. H. Elliott. 
 Report of the Malaria Expedition to Nigeria (1900). I. 
 Malarial Fever. 4to. los. 6d. 
 
 V. Ross (R.) and M. L. Taylor. Progress Reports of 
 the Campaign against Mosquitoes in Sierra Leone. Part I. 
 1901. With a Letter from Dr. Daniels regarding the results 
 arrived at to date. 8vo. is. Part II. 1902. 8vo. is. 
 
 VI. [Not issued yet.'] 
 
 VII. Durham (H. E.) and W. Myers. Report of the 
 Yellow Fever Expedition to Para (1900). 4to. 7^-. 6d. 
 
 VIII. Taylor (M. L.). Report on the Sanitary Conditions 
 of Cape Coast Town. 8vo. is. 
 
 IX. Ross (R.). Report on Malaria at Ismailia and 
 Suez. 8vo. IS. 
 
 X. Dutton (J. E.). Report of the Malaria Expedition to 
 
 the Gambia. 4to, 10s. 6d. net. 
 
 XI. Dutton (J. E.) and J. L. Todd. First Report of the 
 Trypanosomiasis Expedition to Senegambia (1902). 4to. 
 los. 6d. net. [Also contained in Thompson-Yates Laboratories 
 Reports, V. 2.] 
 
 XII. Boyce(R.). The Anti-Malaria Measures at Ismailia. 
 
 Svo. IS. 
 
 XTII. Dutton (J. E) and J. L. Todd. Reports of the 
 Trypanosomiasis Expedition to the Congo (1903-1904). With 
 a Comparison of the Trypanosomes of Uganda and the Congo Free 
 State by H. W. Thomas, M.D. M'GilI,and Stanky F, Linton, B.Sc, 
 M.B. Liverpool; and a Note on Tsetse Flies by E. E. Austen, 
 Zoological Department, British Museum. Paper covers, i^s. 
 
 XIV. Boyce (Rubert, M.B., F.R.S.), Arthur Evans, 
 M.R.C.S., H. Herbert Clarke, M.A., B.C., Cantab. 
 Report on the Sanitation and Anti-Malarial Measures in 
 practice in Bathurst, Conakry, and Freetown (1905). 4to. 
 8 Plates. Price Ss. 
 
 XV. Giles (Lieut. -Colonel). General Sanitation and Anti- 
 Malarial Measures in Sekondi, the Goldfields, and Kumassi, 
 and a Comparison between the Conditions of European 
 Residence in India. 4to. Price 7^-. 6d. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 51 
 
 LIVERPOOL SCHOOL OF TROPICAL MEDICINE-continued. 
 
 XVI. Thomas (H. Wolferstan, M.D., M'Gill) and 
 Anton Breinl, M.U.Dr., Prag. Trypanosomes, Trypano- 
 somiasis, and Sleeping- Sickness : Pathology and Treatment. 
 4to. 6 Plates (5 coloured) and 7 Charts. Trice I2s. 6d. net. 
 
 XVII. Button (J. Everett, M.B.) and John L. Todd, B.A., 
 M.D., M'Gill. The Nature of Human Tick- Fever in the 
 Eastern Part of the Congo Free State. 4to. With Map, 4 
 Plates, and 9 Temperature Charts. Price ys, 6d. net. 
 
 XVIII. I. Button (J. Everett, M.B.) and John L. Todd, 
 B.A., M.D., CM., M'Gill. Gland Palpation in Human 
 Trypanosomiasis ; and 2. The Distribution and Spread of 
 " Sleeping Sickness " in the Congo Free State. With 4 
 Maps (2 colours) and 4 Plates. 3. Newstead (R., A.L.S., 
 F.E.S.) and John L. Todd, B.A., M.D., CM., M'Gill. 
 A New Dermanyssid Acarid. With i Plate. 4. Newstead 
 (R., A.L.S., F.E. S.). Another New Dermanyssid Acarid. 
 With I Plate. 5. Stephens (J. W. W., M.D., Cantab.) and 
 R. Newstead, A.L.S., F.E.S. Anatomy of the Proboscis of 
 Biting Flies. With 6 Plates. Imp. Svo, Price 7s. 6d. net. 
 
 XIX. Boyce (Rubert, M.B., F.R.S.). Yellow Fever 
 Prophylaxis in New Orleans in 1905. Imp. Svo. Maps and 
 6 Plates. Price ^s. net. 
 
 XX. I. Button (J. Everett, M.B.) and John L. Todd, 
 B.A., M.D. La prophylaxie de la Malaria dans les 
 principaux postes de I'Etat Independant du Congo. With 
 4 Maps, and 4 Illustrations. Imp. Svo. 2. Breinl (Anton, 
 M.D.) and A. Kinghorn, M.B. The Animal Reactions of 
 the Spirochaeta of African "Tick Fever." Imp. Svo. 3. 
 Breinl (Anton, M.D.). The Specific Nature of the Spiro- 
 chaeta of African "Tick Fever." Imp, Svo. Price 5^. 
 
 XXI. Runcorn Research Laboratories. An Experimental 
 Study of the Parasite of the African "Tick Fever." Note 
 on a new Spirochaeta found in a Mouse. Comparison between the 
 Trypanosomes, and other articles. 4to. ^s. 6d. net. 
 
 MOISSON (HENRI). THE ELECTRIC FURNACE. Svo. 
 Pages X + 305. 41 Illustrations, los. 6d. net. 
 
 NISSENSON. THE ARRANGEMENTS OF ELECTRO- 
 LYTIC LABORATORIES. Svo. Si pages. 52 Illustra- 
 tions. 5^. net. 
 
 NOTES ON SANITARY CONDITIONS OBTAINING IN 
 PARA. By the Members of the Yellow Fever Expedition. 
 (Published by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.) is. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C 
 
52 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 NOYES (ARTHUR A., Ph.D.) ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 
 FOR THE LABORATORY. Small i2mo. Pages xii + 257. 
 22 Illustrations. 6s, 6d. net. 
 
 and MULLIKEN (SAMUEL P., Ph.D.). LABORA- 
 TORY EXPERIMENTS ON CLASS REACTIONS 
 AND IDENTIFICATION OF ORGANIC SUB- 
 STANCES. 8vo. 81 pp. 2x. net. 
 
 OTTO (RUDOLF). NATURALISM AND RELIGION. 
 
 See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 
 
 PALLIN (Capt. W. A., F.R.C.V.S.). A TREATISE ON 
 EPIZOOTIC LYMPHANGITIS. Second Edition. Demy 
 Svo, cloth. 3^. 6d. net. Nearly 100 pages, 17 full -page Plates. 
 
 PATERSON (ANDREW MELVILLE, M.D., Derby Pro- 
 fessor of Anatomy in the University of Liverpool, Hunterian 
 Professor at the Royal College of Surgeons of England). 
 THE HUMAN STERNUM. Three Lectures delivered at 
 the Royal College of Surgeons, England, November 1903, With 
 10 Plates. Crown 4to. 10s, net. 
 
 PFANHAUSER (Dr. W.). PRODUCTION OF METAL- 
 LIC OBJECTS ELECTROLYTICALLY. Now in 
 
 preparation, ^s net, 
 
 PHILLIPS(FRANCISC.). METHODS FORTHE ANALY- 
 SIS OF ORES, PIG IRON AND STEEL. Second 
 Edition. Svo. Pages viii+ 170. 3 Illustrations, /^s. 6d. nti. 
 
 PIDDINGTON (HENRY). THE SAILORS' HORN-BOOK 
 
 FOR THE LAW OF STORMS. Being a Practical Exposi- 
 tion of the Theory of the Law of Storms, and its uses to Mariners of 
 all Classes in all Parts of the World. Shown by transparent Storm 
 Cards and useful Lessons. 7th Ed. Demy Svo, cloth. lo^-. 6d. 
 
 PRAY (Dr.). ASTIGMATIC LETTERS. Printed on Mill- 
 board, size 22 by 14 inches, is. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE OPTICAL CONVENTION, 
 No. I, 1905. Crown 4to, cloth. 10s. net. 
 
 RANSOM (W. H., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.). THE IN- 
 FLAMMATION IDEA IN GENERAL PATHOLOGY. 
 
 Demy Svo, cloth. 7^-. 6d. 
 
 RAY (Prof. P. C). A HISTORY OF HINDU CHEMISTRY 
 FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE MIDDLE 
 OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY A.D. With Sanskrit 
 Texts, Variants, Translation, and Illustrations. Vol. I. Second 
 Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Crown Svo. los. 6d. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 53 
 
 REPORTS OF THE THOMPSON-YATES AND JOHN- 
 STON LABORATORIES. Demy 4to, with Illustrations. 
 Vol. I. 1898-9. 10^. dd. Vol. II. 1898-9. 255. Vol. III. 
 Part I. 1900. 7^-. ()d. Vol. III. Part 2. 1901. \2s. 6d. Vol. 
 
 IV. Part I. 1901. 20s. Vol. IV. Part 2. 1902. 21s. New 
 Series. Vol. V. Part i. 1903. Limp, 20s. ; cloth, 2ix. Vol. 
 
 V. Part 2. 1903. Limp, 12s. 6d. ; cloth, 13^. 6d. Vol. VI. 
 Part I. 1905. Limp, 12s. 6d. ; cloth, 13^. 6d. Vol. VI. Part 
 2. 15J. Vol. VII. Part I. los. 6d. 
 
 ROSS (RONALD, C.B., F.R.S., etc., Major I. M.S. (retired) ). 
 MALARIAL FEVER ; Its Cause, Prevention, and Treat- 
 ment. (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir I.) 8vo, 
 cloth. 2s. 6d. 
 
 H. E. ANNETT, M.D., D.P.H., and E. E. AUSTEN. 
 
 REPORT OF THE MALARIA EXPEDITION TO 
 SIERRA LEONE (1899). (Liverpool School of Tropical 
 Medicine, Memoir II.) 4to, 21s. 
 
 FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 AGAINST MOSQUITOES IN SIERRA LEONE (1901). 
 
 With a Letter from Dr. Daniels regarding the results arrived at to 
 date. (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir V. i.) is. 
 
 SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE CAM- 
 PAIGN AGAINST MOSQUITOES IN SIERRA LEONE 
 (1902). By M. Logan Taylor, M.B. (Liverpool School of 
 Tropical Medicine, Memoir V. 2.) is. 
 
 REPORT ON MALARIA AT ISMAILIA AND 
 
 SUEZ. (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir IX.) 
 
 IS. 
 
 SANG'S LOGARITHMS. A new Table of Seven-place Loga- 
 rithms of all Numbers continuously up to 200,000. 2nd Edition. 
 Royal Svo, cloth. 21s, 
 
 SCHREBER (D. G. M.). MEDICAL INDOOR GYMNAS- 
 TICS, or a System of Hygienic Exercises for Home Use, to be 
 practised anywhere, without apparatus or assistance, by young and 
 old of either sex, for the preservation of health and general activity. 
 Revised and Supplemented by Rudolf Graefe, M.D. With a 
 large plate and 45 illustrations in the text. Royal Svo, cloth. 
 3^. net. 
 
 " The exercises described, when efficiently used, will undoubtedly be of value 
 in strengthening and developing the muscular system. The descriptions of the 
 exercises and the figures in the text are excellent." — Physician and Surgeon. 
 
 "Well worthy of the attention of those who go in for regular physical train- 
 ing as a means for the preservation of health." — Scotstnan. 
 
 "A very sensible little treatise." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
54 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 SCHROEN (L.). SEVEN-FIGURE LOGARITHMS OF 
 NUMBERS from i to 108,000, and of Sines, Cosines, 
 Tangents, Cotangents to every 10 Seconds of the Quad- 
 rant. With a Table of Proportional Parts. By Dr. Luclwig 
 Schroen, Director of the Observatory of Jena, etc., etc. 5th 
 Edition, corrected and stereotyped. With a description of the 
 Tables by A. De Morgan, Professor of Mathematics in University 
 College, London. Imp. 8vo, cloth, printed on light green paper. 
 
 SEGER. COLLECTED WRITINGS OF HERMAN 
 AUGUST SEGER. (Papers on Manufacture of Pottery.) 
 2 vols. Large Svo. £2,^ y. net per set ; per volume, ^^s. 6d. 
 net. 
 
 SNELLEN'S OPHTHALMIC TEST TYPES. Best Types 
 for the Determination of the Acuteness of Vision. 14th Edition, 
 considerably augmented and improved. Svo, sewed. 45. Single 
 Sheets : E T B, MOV, B D E, U LU UJ, and Large Clock Sheet. 
 8^. each. Small Clock Sheet and R T V Z. 4^. each. 
 
 ASTIGMATIC TEST CHART. Long folio, varnished, 
 
 mounted on rollers. 2s. net. 
 
 SNYDER (HARRY, B.Sc). SOILS AND FERTILISERS. 
 
 Second Edition. Svo. Pages x + 294. i Plate. 40 Illustrations. 
 6s. 6d. net. 
 
 SONNTAG (C. O.). A POCKET FLORA OF EDIN- 
 BURGH AND THE SURROUNDING DISTRICT. 
 
 A Collection and full Description of all Phanerogamic and the 
 principal Cryptogamic Plants, classified after the Natural System, 
 with an artificial Key and a Glossary of Botanical Terms. By the 
 late C. O. Sonntag, the Royal High School, Edinburgh ; formerly 
 Secretary of the Microscopical Society of Glasgow, etc. Fcap. Svo, 
 limp cloth, round corners, with Map of the Environs of Edinburgh. 
 3 J. 6d. net. 
 
 STEPHENS (J. W. W., M.D. Cantab., D.P.H.) and S. R. 
 CHRISTOPHERS, M.B. Vict., I. M.S. PRACTICAL 
 STUDY OF MALARIA AND OTHER BLOOD PARA- 
 SITES. (Published for the Liverpool School of Tropical Medi- 
 cine). Svo, cloth. 2nd Edition. 12s. 6d. net. 
 
 STILLMAN (THOS. B., M.Sc, Ph.D.). ENGINEERING 
 CHEMISTRY. Third Edition. Svo. Pages x + S97' I39 
 Illustrations, igs. net. 
 
 TAYLOR (M. LOGAN, M.B., Ch.B.). REPORT ON THE 
 SANITARY CONDITIONS OF CAPE COAST TOWN. 
 
 (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir VIII.) Svo. 
 
 IS. 
 
 REPORT OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
 
 MOSQUITOES IN SIERRA LEONE. See Ross and 
 Taylor. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 55 
 
 
 THOMAS (H. WOLFERSTAN, M.D., M'Gill) and 
 ANTON BREINL,M.U.Dr.,Prag:. TRYPANOSOMES, 
 TRYPANOSOMIASIS, AND SLEEPING SICKNESS: 
 PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT. 4to. (Liverpool 
 School of Tropical Medicine, Memoir XVI.) 6 Plates (5 coloured) 
 and 7 Charts. Price 7^-. 6<f. net. 
 
 TOWER (O. F., Ph.D.). THE CONDUCTIVITY OF 
 LIQUIDS. 8vo. Pages iv+190. 2J Illustrations. Ts. 6d. 
 net. 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
 SOCIETY OF LONDON. New Series. Vol. XXIII. Session 
 1903-1904. Demy 8vo, cloth. 6s. net. The earlier volumes of 
 the New Series, I.-XXII., are still obtainable. Price 6s. net each. 
 Commemoration Volume, containing an account of the Founda- 
 tion of the Society and of the Commemorauon Dinner, together 
 with an Index of the papers read at its meetings between 1855 ^^^^ 
 1900. 8vo, cloth, ^s. net. 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF 
 EDINBURGH. Vol. XXXVIII. Part i, 40^. Part 2, 25^. 
 Part 3, 30J-. Part 4, ^s. 6d. Vol. XXXIX. Part I, 30^-. Part 
 2, I9J-. Part 3, 43 J-. Part4, 9J. Vol. XL. Parti,25x. Complete 
 parts only — we do not supply separate papers. General Index to 
 First Thirty-four Volumes (1783-1S88), with History of the 
 Institution. 4to, cloth. 2.\s. 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY, 
 DUBLIN. Vols. I.-XX. 4to. ^^22, 5^. 6d. Vols. XXI.- 
 XXXI. Various prices. 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL DUBLIN SOCIETY. 
 
 Various volumes at various prices. 
 
 VEGA. LOGARITHMIC TABLES OF NUMBERS AND 
 TRIGONOMETRICAL FUNCTIONS. Translated from 
 the 40th, or Dr. Bremiker's Edition, thoroughly revised and en- 
 larged, by W. L. F. Fischer, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow of Cla^e 
 College, Cambridge, ; Professor of Natural Philosophy in the 
 University of St. Andrews. 75th Stereotyped Edition. Royal 8vo, 
 cloth. ']s. 
 
 VENABLE (T. C, Ph.D.). THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
 THE PERIODIC LAW. Small i2mo. Pages viii -1-321. 
 
 Illustrated. \os. bd. net. 
 
 THE STUDY OF THE ATOM. i2mo. Pages vi-f290. 
 
 Zs, 6d. net. 
 
 and HOWE. INORGANIC CHEMISTRY ACCORD- 
 ING TO THE PERIODIC LAW. i2mo. Pages vi -f 266. 
 35 Illustrations. New Edition in preparation. 6s. 6d. net. 
 
 WILEY (HARVEY W., A.M., Ph.D.). PRINCIPLES AND 
 PRACTICE OF AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL 
 ANALYSIS. Vol. i. Soils. 3 vols. 8vo. New Edition in 
 preparation. Vol. I. ready. i8j'. net. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
56 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 VI. Miscellaneous. 
 
 ANTHROPOLOGY— SOCIOLOGY— MYTHOLOGY- 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY— BIOGRAPHY, ETC. 
 
 AVEBURY (Lord, D.C.L., F.R.S., etc.) (Sir John Lubbock). 
 PREHISTORIC TIMES, as Illustrated by Ancient Re- 
 mains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages. 
 
 6th Edition, revised, with 239 Illustrations, a large number of 
 which are specially prepared for this Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth, 
 gilt tops. iSs. 
 
 " To anyone who wishes to obtain a succinct conspectus of the present state 
 of knowledge on the subject of early man, we recommend the perusal of this 
 comprehensive volume." — Jour. Brit. Archteolog. Assoc. 
 
 " The fact that this well-known standard work has reached a sixth edition is 
 evidence of its value to ethnologists and archaeologists. The many and beautiful 
 illustrations are most helpful in better understanding the plain but accurate 
 letterpress. Lord Avebury is to be congratulated on the new edition, which 
 is sure to further popularise a fascinating subject for investigation by cultured 
 people." — Science Gossip. 
 
 "It is necessary to compare the present volume with the fifth edition in 
 order to see how much it has been improved. The illustrations to this sixth 
 edition are immeasurably superior to the fifth." — Knowledge. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER. Published Quarterly. 
 dd. net ; 2$. 2d, per annum post free. Nos. 1-4 ready. 
 
 BLACKBURN (HELEN). WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE. A 
 
 Record of the Women's Suffrage Movement in the British Isles, 
 with a Biographical Sketch of Miss Becker. Portraits. Crown 8vo, 
 cloth. 6s. 
 
 See also Vynne, Nora, and Blackburn, " Women under the Factory 
 
 Acts." 
 
 BROWN (ROBERT, Jun., F.S.A.). SEMITIC INFLU- 
 ENCE IN HELLENIC MYTHOLOGY. With special 
 reference to the recent mythological works of the Right Hon. 
 Prof. Max Mliller and Mr. Andrew Lang. Demy 8vo, cloth. 
 7^. 6d. 
 
 RESEARCHES INTO THE ORIGIN OF THE 
 
 PRIMITIVE CONSTELLATIONS OFTHE GREEKS, 
 PHCENICIANS, AND BABYLONIANS. With a large 
 map of the Northern Hemisphere as viewed at Phoenicia 1200 B.C., 
 and other maps. 2 vols, demy Svo, cloth, los. 6d. each. 
 
 MR. GLADSTONE AS I KNEW HIM, and other 
 
 Essays. Demy Svo, cloth. Js. 6d. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 57 
 
 CATALOGUE OF THE LONDON LIBRARY, St James's 
 Square. By C. T. Hagberg Wright, LL.D., etc. xiv+1626 pp. 
 4to, cloth. 42i-.net. Supplement I., 1902-3. Buckram, i vol., 
 196 pp. 5j.net. Supplement II. 198 pp. 1903-4. Buckram, 
 5^-. net. Supplement III. 1904-5. 5^. net. 
 
 " The present catalogue is essentially a working catalogue. . . . The general 
 level of accuracy in the printing and editing of the work appears to us to be an 
 unusually high one. . . . We heartily applaud the work, both as a landmark 
 in library land, and as a monument standing upon a firm foundation of its own." 
 — The T ivies. 
 
 DIETRICHSON (L.). MONUMENTA ORCADICA. The 
 
 Norsemen in the Orkneys, and the Monuments they have left, 
 with a Survey of the Celtic (Pre-Norwegian) and Scottish (Post- 
 Norwegian) Monuments on the Islands. With original drawings 
 and some Chapters on St Magnus' Cathedral, Kirkwall, by Johan 
 Meyer, Architect. Demy 4to, cloth. £,'i^ net. 
 
 ENGELHARDT (C). DENMARK IN THE EARLY 
 IRON AGE. Illustrated by recent Discoveries in the Peat- 
 Mosses of Slesvig. 33 Plates (giving representations of upwards of 
 a thousand objects). Maps, and numerous other Illustrations on 
 wood, 1866. 4to, cloth. 3IJ. (>d. 
 
 GOLDAMMER (H.). THE KINDERGARTEN. A Guide 
 to Frobel's Method of Education. 2 vols, in i. 120 pp. of Illus- 
 trations. 8vo, cloth. \os, 6d, 
 
 HARRISON (A., D.Sc). WOMEN'S INDUSTRIES IN 
 LIVERPOOL. An Inquiry into the Economic Effects of Legisla- 
 tion regulating the Labour of Women. 8vo. 35. 
 
 HENRY (JAMES). iENEIDEA ; or, Critical, Exegetical and 
 iEsthetical Remarks on the iEneis. With a personal collation 
 of all the first-class MSS., and upwards of lOO second-class MSS., 
 and all the principal editions. Vol. I. (3 Parts), Vol. II. (3 Parts), 
 Vol. III. (3 Parts), Vol. IV. (i Part). Royal 8vo, sewed. 
 £2, 2s. net. 
 
 HERBERT (Hon. A.). THE SACRIFICE OF EDUCA- 
 TION TO EXAMINATION. Letters from "All Sorts and 
 Conditions of Men." Edited by Auberon Herbert. Half-cloth 
 boards c 2s. 
 
 WINDFALL AND WATERDRIFT. Verse Mmiatures. 
 
 Square i2mo, cloth limp, gilt tops. 2s. 
 
 and WAGER (HAROLD). BAD AIR AND BAD 
 
 HEALTH. Dedicated to Professor Clifford Allbutt. Reprinted 
 from the " Contemporary Review," 8vo, cloth, is. 6d. ; sewed, ij. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
 
58 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 JOHNSON (E.). THE RISE OF ENGLISH CULTURE. 
 
 With a brief account of the Author's Life and Writings. Demy 
 8vo, cloth, i^s. net. 
 
 KIEPERT'S NEW ATLAS ANTIQUUS. Twelve Maps of 
 the Ancient World, for Schools and Colleges. Third hundred 
 thousand. 1 2th Edition, with a complete Geographical Index. 
 Folio, boards. 6s. Strongly bound in cloth. 7^. 6d. 
 
 WALL-MAPS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD— 
 
 Wall-map of Ancient Italy. Italia antiqua. For the study of 
 Livy, Sallust, Cicero, Dionysius, etc. Scale i : 800,000. Mounted 
 on rollers, varnished. 20s. 
 
 General Wall-map of the Old World. Tabula orbis terrarum 
 antiqui ad illustrandam potissimum antiquissimi sevi usque ad Alex- 
 andrum M. historiam. For the study of ancient history, espe- 
 cially the history of the Oriental peoples : the Indians, Medes, 
 Persians, Babylonians, Assj^ians, Egyptians, Phoenicians, etc. 
 Scale I : 5,400,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished, 20s. 
 
 General Wall-map of the Roman Empire. Imperii Romani 
 tabula geographica. For the study of the development of the Roman 
 Empire. Scale i : 300,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 24s. 
 
 Wall-map of Ancient Latium. Latii Veteris et finitimarum 
 regionum tabula. For the study of Livy, Dionysius, etc. Scale 
 I : 125,000. With supplement : Environs of Rome. Scale 
 I : 25,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. iSs. 
 
 Wall-map of Ancient Greece. Grseciae Antiquae tabula. For 
 the study of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Slrabo, Cornelius 
 Nepos, etc. Scale i : 500,000. Mounted on rollers, varnished. 
 245-. 
 
 Wall- Map of the Empires of the Persians and of 
 Alexander the Great. Imperia Persarum et Macedonum. For 
 the study of Herodotus, Xenophon, Justinian, Arian, Curtius. 
 Scale I : 300,000. Mounted on rollers and varnished. 20^. 
 
 Wall-Map of Gaul, with portions of Ancient Britain and 
 Ancient Germany. Galliae Cisalpinae et Transalpinse cum parti- 
 bus Britannise et Germaniae tabula. For the study of Caesar, 
 Justinian, Livy, Tacitus, etc. Scale I : 1,000,000. Mounted on 
 rollers and varnished. 24^. 
 
 Wall-Map of Ancient Asia Minor. Asise Minoris Antiquae 
 Tabula. For the study of Herodotus, Xenophon, Justinian, Arian, 
 Curtius, etc. Scale i : 800,000. Mounted on rollers and var- 
 nished. 20s. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS 59 
 
 MARCKS (ERICH, Professor of Modern History at the 
 University of Leipzig). ENGLAND AND GERMANY: 
 Their Relations in the Great Crises of European History, 
 1500-1900. Demy 8vo, stiff wrapper, is. 
 
 MUIR (Prof. RAMSAY). A HISTORY OF LIVERPOOL. 
 
 With Maps, Illustrations. Crown 8vo, art linen. 6s. net. 
 
 MUIR (RAMSAY) and EDITH M. PLATT. A HISTORY 
 OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN LIVERPOOL. 
 
 From the Earliest Times to the Municipal Reform Act of 1835. 
 4to, cloth. 21s. net. 
 
 OTIA MERSEIANA. The Publication of the Arts Faculty of the 
 University of Liverpool, Vols. I.-III. 8vo. 1899-1903. Each 
 lOi-. 6d. 
 
 PEDDIE (R. A.). PRINTING AT BRESCIA IN THE 
 FIFTEENTH CENTURY. A List of the Issues. 5j.net. 
 
 ST. CLAIR (GEORGE, Author of -'Creation Records," "Buried 
 Cities and Bible Countries," etc.). MYTHS OF GREECE 
 EXPLAINED AND DATED. An Embalmed History from 
 Uranus to Perseus, including the Eleusinian Mysteries and the 
 Olympic Games. Demy 8vo. 2 vols. i6s. 
 
 SCHLOSS (DAVID F.). METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL 
 REMUNERATION. 3rd Edition, revised and enlarged. 
 Crown Svo, cloth. 7^-. 6d. Popular Edition, 3^-. 6d. 
 
 " In its new as in its old form the book is well nigh indispensable to the 
 student who desires to get some insight into the actual facts about the various 
 methods of industrial remuneration, and the degree of success with which they 
 have been applied in the various trades. " — Manchester Guardian. 
 
 " More useful than ever to the students of the labour problem." — Political 
 Science Qicarterly. 
 
 SPENCER (HERBERT). AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. See 
 p. 31- 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. See^, 31. 
 
 STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY. See p. 32. 
 
 — - DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY. Seey^. 32. 
 
 STEPHENS (GEORGES PROFESSOR BUGGE'S 
 STUDIES ON NORTHERN MYTHOLOGY EX- 
 AMINED. Illustrations. Svo, cloth. 8^. 
 
 THE RUNES, WHENCE CAME THEY? 4to, sewed. 
 
 6j". 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
6o WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S 
 
 STEPHENS (GEORGE). OLD NORTHERN RUNIC 
 
 MONUMENTS. Vol. IV. Folio. 20s. net. 
 
 VEILED FIGURE (THE), and Other Poems. Large post 8vo, 
 buckram, gilt, cover designed by Mr. T. Blake Wirgman. 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 VYNNE (NORA) and HELEN BLACKBURN, and with 
 the Assistance of H. W. ALLASON. WOMEN UNDER 
 THE FACTORY ACTS. Part i. Position of the Employer. 
 Part 2. Position of the Employed. Crown 8vo, cloth, is, net. 
 
 WELD (A. G.). GLIMPSES OF TENNYSON AND OF 
 SOME OF HIS FRIENDS. With an Appendix by the late 
 Bertram Tennyson. Illustrated with Portraits in photogravure 
 and colour, and with a facsimile of a MS. poem. Fcap. 8vo. 
 art linen. 4s. 6d. net. 
 
 " This is a delightful little book, written by one who has all the qualifications 
 for the task — the opportunities of observation, the interest of relationship, and the 
 sympathetic and appreciative temper. . . . We do not attempt to criticise, 
 but only to give such a description as will send our readers to it." — Spectator. 
 
 " Everyone who reads the book will understand Tennyson a little better, 
 and many will view him in a new aspect for the first time." — Daily Chronicle. 
 
 " It is quite worthy of a place side by side with the larger ' Life.' " — Glasgow 
 Herald, 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C, 
 
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 6i 
 
 LIST OF PERIODICALS, REVIEWS, AND 
 
 TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 OF LEARNED SOCIETIES 
 
 PUBLISHED BY WILLIAMS & NORGATE. 
 
 THE HIBBERT JOURNAL: A Quarterly Review of 
 
 Religion, Theology, and Philosophy. Single numbers, 2s. 6c/. 
 
 net. Subscription, los. per annum, post free. 
 
 "There is, for English readers at least, no existing medium for expression of 
 free-thought in this best sense ; and should anything but success await the venture 
 of publishing ' The Hibbert Journal,' we shall confess painful surprise. . . . 
 It will be a reflection on our theological and philosophical students if they do not 
 show full appreciation of a journal so admirably planned and so strongly 
 commenced. . . . For the form of the journal we have nothing but_ praise, 
 the print being large and the margins ample. We have never with more sincerity 
 wished well to a new undertaking ; and should it fulfil its undoubted possibilities, 
 ' The Hibbert Journal ' must be of immense service to all serious and progressive 
 students of the subjects with which it deals." — Christian World. 
 
 THE ENGLISHWOMAN'S REVIEW OF SOCIAL AND 
 INDUSTRIAL QUESTIONS. Edited by Antoinette M. 
 Mackenzie. Issued quarterly on 15th January, April, July, and 
 October. Price i^. Per annum, 4J. 6af., post free. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES 
 MUSEUMS. Issued quarterly. Single numbers, \s. 6d. net. 
 Subscription, ^s. per annum. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL MICROSCOPICAL 
 SOCIETY, containing its Transactions and Proceedings, with 
 other Microscopical Information. Bi-monthly. 6s. net. Yearly 
 subscriptions, 37^. 6d., post free. 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE QUEKETT MICROSCOPICAL 
 CLUB. Issued half-yearly, April and November. Price 3^. 6d. 
 net. 7j. 6d. per annum, post free. 
 
 LINNEAN SOCIETY OF LONDON. Journal ot Botany and 
 Journal of Zoology. Published irregularly at various prices. 
 
 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 
 
62 
 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE'S CATALOGUE 
 
 LIST OF PERIODICALS, Etc.— Continued. 
 
 ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH. Transactions. Issued 
 irregularly at various prices. 
 
 LIVERPOOL MARINE BIOLOGY COMMITTEE. 
 Memoirs. I. -XV. already published at various prices. Fauna of 
 Liverpool Bay. Fifth Report written by Members of the Com- 
 mittee and other Naturalists, Cloth. 8s. 6d. net. See p. 48. 
 
 LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF COM- 
 MERCIAL RESEARCH IN THE TROPICS. Quarterly 
 Journal. Numbers, 2s. net. 
 
 MEMOIRS OF THE LIVERPOOL SCHOOL OF 
 TROPICAL MEDICINE. See p. 50. 
 
 ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY. Memoirs and Monthly 
 Notices. Yearly volumes at various prices. 
 
 ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY. Transactions and Proceedings 
 issued irregularly ; prices vary. Cunningham Memoirs. Vols. 
 I.-X. already issued at various prices. 
 
 ROYAL DUBLIN SOCIETY. Transactions and Proceedings. 
 Issued irregularly at various prices. 
 
 REPORTS OF THE THOMPSON-YATES LABORA- 
 TORIES. See p. 53. 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
 SOCIETY OF LONDON. See p. 55. 
 
 PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH. 
 
14 DAY USE 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or 
 on the date to which renewed. 
 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 
 
 ft'- 
 
 !2Jan'60IV l H^ 
 RCaD LP 
 
 DEC 23 1959 
 
 LD 21A-50m-4,'59 
 (A1724sl0)476B 
 
 General Library 
 
 Universiry of Califoroia 
 
 Berkeley 
 
r 
 
 >'C X80b 
 
 .^ 
 
 7- 
 
 18^16; 
 
 a 
 
 VTV 
 
 L