7^^- /\ LI 15 U A It Y OF THE lumrsitg of Califoitttia. ^/Y:^ 187^. T ELEMENTS OF THE \= PHILOSOPUf"^!^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. BY DUGALD STEWART, i PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSTTY, AND EEILOW OS THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH J HONORARY MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AT ST. PETERSBURGH J AND MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SO- CIETY HELD AT PHILADELPHIA. ■^$;44 THIRD AMERICAN EDITION, CORRECTED. BRArrLEMOROUCH^ FT. PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM FESSENDEN. 1813. Iftii ADVERTISEMENT. IN various parts of the following Work, referen- ces are made to fubfequent fpeculations, which are not contained in it. Thefe fpeculations it is my in- tention to refume at fome future period : but when I confider the extent of my fubjed, and the many accidents which may divert me from the profecution of it, I cannot venture fo far as to announce, in the title-page of this volume, any promife of a future publication. Some additional chapters are ftill wanting, to com- plete the Analyiis of the Intellectual Powers. After finilhing this, the courfe of my inquiries would lead me to treat, in the fecond place, of Man confidered as an Adive and Moral being ; and, thirdly, of Man confidered as the member of a Political Society. College of Edinburgh^ March 13, 1792. Digitized by tine Internet, Arciiive in 2bo7'with fundiHgtrom ' IVIicrdsoft Coroorktioh http://www.archive.org/details/elementsofphilosOOstewricli CONTENTS, INTRODUCTION. PART 1. Page. OF the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 9 PART II. Sect, I.— Of the Utility of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, ... - 23 II. — Continuation of the same Subject, - 46 CHAP. I. Of the Powers of External Perception, Sect. I.— Of the Theories which have been formed by Philosophers, to explain the Manner in which the Mind perceives external Objects, 62 II. — Of certam natural Prejudices, which seem to have given rise to the common The- ories of Perception, - - - 68 III. — Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the Sub- ject of Perception, 83 IV. — Of the Origin of our Knowledge, 88 CHAP. II. Of Attention^ « - 96 CHAP. III. Of Conception^ - - 121 CHAP. IV. Of Abstraction, Sect. I.— General Observations on this Faculty of the Mind, . - - 137 vi CONTENTS. II. — Of the Objects of our Thoughts, when we employ general Terms, - 144 III.— -Remarks on tht; Opinions of some mod- ^ ern Philosophers on the Subject of the foregoing Section, - - 163 IV. — Continuation of the same Subject. — In- ferences with respect to the Use of Language as an instrument of Thought and the Errors in Reasoning to which it occasionally gives rise, - 17ft V. — Of the Purposes to which the powers of Abstraction and Generalization are subservient, - - - 182, VI. — Of the Errors to which we are liable in Speculation, and in the Conduct of Affairs, in consequence of a rash Ap- plication of general Principles, - 191 VII. — Continuation ot the same Subject. — Dif™ ferences in the intellectual Characters of individuals, arising from their differ- ent Habits of Abstraction and Gener- alisation, - . - - 199 VIII. — Continuation of the same Subject. — Use and Abuse of general Principles in Politics, - - . _ 20T CHAP. V. Of the Association of Ideasy - 245 PART I. Of the Influence oj Association in regulating the Succes- sion of our Thoughts, Sect. I. — General Observations on this Part of our Constitution, and on the Language of Philosophers with respect to it, - jb. CONTENTS. vii II. — Of the Principles of Associaiion ameng oui Ideas, - - - 255 HI. — Of the Power which the Mind has over the Train of its Thoughts, - 264 IV. — Illustrations of the Doctrine stated in the preceding Section, - - ^65 1. Of Wit, - - ib. 2. Of Rhyme, - - 270 3. Of Poetical Fancy, - - 275 4. Of Invention in the arts and Sci- ences, - - - - 279 V. — Application of the Principles stated in the foregoing Sections of this Chapter, to explain the Phenomena of Dreaming, 288 PART II. Cf the Influence of Association on the Intellectual and on the Active Powers. Sect. I. — Of the Influence of casual Associations on our speculative conclusions, - 306 Il.—Of the Influence of the association of Ideas on our Judgments in Matters of Taste, 324 III. — Of the Influence of Association on our ^ active Principles and on our moral Judgments, - . - . 339 IV. — General remarks on the Subjects treated in the foregoing sections of this chapter 349 CHAP. VI. Of Memory. Sect. I. — General Observations on Memory, 5s:i II« — Of the varieties of Memory in different individuals, - . . ^^$ III. — Of the improvement of Memory. — Anal- ysis of the principles on which the Cuhure of Memory depends, - 376 vhi. CONTENTS. IV. — Continuation of the same subject. — Of the aid which the Memory derives from Philosophical Arrangement, 382 v.— Continuation of the same subject. — Ef- fects produced on the Memory by committing to writing our acquired Knowledge, - - - 391 VI. — Continuation of the same subject. — Of Artificial memory, - - - 3J8 VII.— Continuation of the same subject. — Im- portance of making a proper Selection among the Objects of our Knowledge, in order to derive advantage from the acquisitions of Memory, - 404 VIII.— Of the Connexion between memory and Philosophical Genius, - - 412 CHAP. VII. Of Imagination* Sect. I. — Analysis of Imagination, - - 420 II — Of Imagination considered in its relation to some of the Fine Arts, - - 428 III. — Continuation of the same subject. — Re- lation of Imagination and of Taste to Genius, - - - 442 IV. — Of the influence of Imagination on Hu- man Character and Happiness, - 444 V — Contmuation of the same Subject. — In- conveniences resultmg from an ill-reg- ulated Imagination, - - 451 VI. — Continuation of the same Subject. — Im- portant Uses to which the power of Imagination is subservient, - 462 Notes and Illustrations, - - ^ 46r ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. "»•• e se® i<£S^!® ® ® ««e • INTRODUCTION. PARTL Of the Nature andObjed of the Philofophy of the Human Mind, THE prejudice which is commonly entertained a- gainft metaphyfical fpeculations, ieems to arile chief-, ly from two caufes : Firll, from an apprehenfion that thefubjects about vvhich they are emphu ed, are pla- ced beyond the reach of the human faculties ; and, fecondly, from a belief that theie fubjects have no relation to the bufinefs of life. The frivolous and abfurd difcuflions which abound in the writings of moft Metaphyfical authors, afford but too many arguments in juitification of thefe o*. pinions; and if fuch difcuflions were to be admit- ted as a fair fpecimen of wliat the human mind is able to accomplilh in this department of fcience, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with B J(5 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILSOPHY juftice be regarded, as no inconfiderable evidence of the progrcfs which true philofophy has made in the prelent age. Among the various fubjects of inqui- ry, however, which, in confcquence of the vague ufe of language, are comprehended under the general ti- tle of Metaphyfics, there are fome, which are eflen- tially dillinguiflied from the reft, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to.theufefulfciences and arts : and it has unfortunately happened, that thefe have (liared in that general difcredit, into which the other branches of metaphyfics have juftly fallen. To this circumilance is probably to be afcribed, the little progrcfs which has hitherto been made in the Philofophy oj the Human Mind ; a fcience, fo intereft- ing in its nature, and fo important in its applications, that it could fcarcely have failed, in thefe inquifitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very gener- al attention, if it had not accidentally been claffed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable dilquifitions of the fchool-men. In order to obviate thefe mifapprehenfions with relped to the fubject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, firft, to explain the Nature of the truths which I propofe to inveftigate ; and, fecondly, to point out fome of the more important Applications of which they are . fufceptible. In ftating thefe prelimiBary obferva- tions, I may perhaps appear to fome to be minute and tedious ; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by thofe, who have fi:udied with care the principles of that fcience of which I am to treat ; and who are anxious to remove the prejudi- ces which have, in a great meafure, excluded it from the modern lyftems of education. In the progrefs of my work, I flatter myfelf that I Ihall not often have occafion to folicit the indulgence of my read- ers, for an unueceiiarv diflufenefs. Ol' THE HUMAN MIND. 11 The notions v\ve annex to the words, matter, and •ja^ind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid,* are merely- relative. If I am alked v/hat I mean by matter ? [ can only explain myfeif by faying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or foft, rough or fmooth, hot or cold ; — that is, I can de- fine it in no other way, than by enumerating its fenfi- ble qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I per- ceive by my fenfes ; but only extenfion, figure, col- our, and certain other qualities, which the conftitu- tion of my nature leads me to refer to fonething, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The cafe is precifely fimilar with refpeci to Mind. We are not immediately conlcious of its exillence, but we are confcious of fenfation, thought, and volition ; operations, which imply the exiftence of fomething which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffed with an irrefiftible convidion, that all thefe fenfations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the fame being ; to that being, which he calls himfelf ; a being, which he is led, by the confti- tution of his nature, to confider as fomething dif- tincl from his body, and as not liable to be impair- ed by the lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From thefe confiderations, it appears, that we have the fame evidence for the exiftence of mind, that we have for the exiftence of body ; nay, if there be any difference between the two cafes, that we have ftron- ger evidence for it ; inafmuch as the one is fuggtft- ed to us by the fubjedls of our own conlcioufnefs, and the other merely by the objedls of our own per- ceptions : and in this light, undoubtedly, the face would appear to every perfon, w^ere it not, that, from our earlieft years, the attention is engrofled with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquain- tance with which is abfolutely neceflary for the prefervation of our animal exiftence. Hence it is, * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8, 9, 13 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY that tliefc phenomena occupy our thoughts more than thofe of mind : that we are perpetually tempt- ed to explain the latter by the analogy of the for- iner^ and even to endeavor to refer them to the fame general laws ; and that we acquire habits of inatten- tion to the fubjecls of our confcioufnefs, top ftrong to be afterwards furmounted, without the moil per- fevering induilry. If the foregoing obfervations be well founded, they cftablifli the difHnclion between mind and matter, without any longprocefs of metaphyfical reafoning*: for if our notions of both are merely relative ; if we know the one, only by fuch fenfible qualities as extenfion, figure, and folidity ; and the other, by fuch operations as fenfation, thought, and voHtion ; we are certainly entitled to fay, that matter and mind, conlidered as objects of human ftudy, are ef- fentially different ; the fcience of the former refling ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to our fen- fes ; that of the latter, on the phenomena of which we are confcious. Inftead, therefore, of objeding to the fcheme of materialifm, that its conclufions are falfe, it would be more accurate to fay, that its aim is unphilofophical. It proceeds on a mifapprehen- fion of the proper object of fcience; the difficulty which it profeiTes to remove being manifeflly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of thai principle which feels and thinks and wills, by faying, that it is a material iubftance, or that it is the refult of ma- terial organization, we impofe or, durfelves by words — forgetting, that matter as well as mind is known to us by its quaUties and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the eflence of either.f * See Note [A] at the end of the volume. t Some Metaj)hysicians, who appear to admit the truth of the foregoing reasoning, have farther urged, that for any thing we can OF THE HUMAN MIND. 13 As all our knowledge of the material world is de- rived from the information of our fenfes, natural philofophers have, in modern times, vv'ifely abandon- ed to metaphyficians, all (peculations concerning the nature of that fubftance of which it is composed ; concerning the pollibility or impofTibility of its being created ; concerning the efficient caufes of the chan- ges which take place in it ; and even concerning the reality of its exiftence, independent of that of per- cipient beings : and have confined themfelves to the humbler province of obferving the phenomena it ex- hibits, and of afcertaining their general laws. By purfuing this plan fteadily, they have, in the courfe of the two laft centuries, formed a body of fcience, which not only does honor to the human underftand- ing, but has had a moft important influence on the practical arts of life. This experimental philofophy, no one now is in danger of confounding with the metaphylical fpeculations already mentioned. Of the importance of thefe, as a feparate branch of ftudy, it is poflible that fome may think more favorably than others ; but they are obvioufly different in their nature, from the invefligations of phyfics ; and it is of the utmoft confequence to the evidence of this laft fcience, that its principles Ihould not be blen- ded with thofe of the former. A fimilar diftinclion takes place among the ques- tions which may be flated relative to the human miad.^— Waether it be extended or unextended ; whether or not it has any relation to place ; and (if it hasj whether it refides in the brain, or be fpread prove to the contrary, it is }jossible, that the unknown substance which has the qualities of extciision, figure, and colour, may be the sanoe with the unknown s-ubstiince which h.ist he attributes o' feel- ing thinking and willing. But besides that this is only an hypo- thesis, which amounts to nothing more than a mere possibility, even if it were true, it would no more be proper to say of mind, that it is material, than to tay ol body, that it is spirituul. 14 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY over the body, by difiufion ; are queftions perfectly analogous to thofe which metaphyficians have ftarted on the iubject of matter. It is iinnecefTary to inquire at prefent whether or not they admit of anfwer. It is fulEcient for my purpofe to remark, that they are as widely and obvioufly different from the vievv- which I propofe to take, of the human mind in the following work, as the reveries of Berkeley concern- ing the non-exiftence of the material world, are from the conclufions of Newton and his followers. — It is farther evident, that the metaphyfical opinions, which we may happen to have formed concerning the na- ture either of body or of mind, and the efficient caufes by which their phenomena are produced, have no neceffary connexion with our enquiries concern- ing the laws, according to which thefe phenomena take place. — Whether (for example) the caufe of gravitation be material or immaterial, is a point about which two Newtonians may differ, while they agree perfectly in their phyfical opinions. It is fufficient if both admit the general fad, that bodies tend to approach each other, with a force varying with their mutual diftance, according to a certain law. In like manner in the ftudy of the human mind, the con- clufion to which we are led by a careful examination of the phenomena it exhibits, have no neceffary con- nexion with our opinions concerning its nature and cffence. — That when two fubje6ts of thought, for in- ftance, have been repeatedly prefented to the mind in conjunction, the one has a tendency to fugged the other, is a fact of which I can no more doubt, than of any thing for which I have the evidence of my fenfes ; and it is plainly a fad totally unconneded with any hypothefis concerning the nature of the foul, and which will be as readity admitted by the materialift as by the Berkeleian. Notwithftanding, however, the reality and im- portance of this diftinction, it has not hitherto beeH OF THE HUMAN MINDr 15 fufficiently attended to, by the philofophers who have treated of the human mind. Dr. Reid is per- haps the only one who has perceived it clearly, or at leaft who has kept it lleadiiy in view, in ail his inqui- ries. In the writings, indeed, of feveral other mod- ern metaphyficians, we meet with a variety of irfi- portant and well afcertained facls ; but in general, thefe facls are blended with fpeculations upon ful> jeds which are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties. — It is this mixture of fact, and of hypothe- cs, which has brought the philofophy of mind into fome degree of difcredit ; nor will ever its real value be generally acknowledged, till the difiinclion I have endeavoured to illuftrate, be underftood, and attend- ed to, by thofe who fpeculate on the fubjed. By confining their attention to the fenfible qualities of body, and to the fenfible phenomena it exhibits, we know what discoveries natural philofophers have .made : and if the labours of Metaphyficians fhall ever be rewarded with fimilar fuccefs, it can only be, by attentive and patient reflection on the fubjects of their own confcioufnefs. I cannot help taking this opportunity of remark- ing on the other hand, that if phyfical inquirers Ihould think of again employing themfelves in fpecuhtions about the nature of matter, inftead of attempting to afcertain its fenfible properties and laws, (and of late there feems to be fuch a tendency among fome of the followers of Bofcovich,) they will foon involve them- felves in an inextricable labyrinth, and the firft prin- ciples of phyfics will be rendered as myfterious and chimerical, as the pncumatology of the ichool-men. The little progrefs which has hitherto been made in the philofophy of mind, will not appear furprifing to thofe who have attended to the hillory of natui al knowledge. It is only fince the time of Lord Bicon, that the lludy of it has been profecuted with any degree of fuccels, or that the proper method of con- 16 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY dueling it has been generally underflood. There is even fome reafon for doubting, from the crude fpec- illations on medical and chemical fubjecls which are daily offered to the public, whether it be yet under- flood fo completely as is commonly imagined ; and whether a fuller illuflration ot the rules of philofo- phifing, than Bacon or his followers have given, might not: be ufeful, even to phyfical inquirers. When we reflect, in this manner, on the fliortnefs of the period during which natural philofophy has been fuccefsfully cultivated ; and at the fame time, confider how open to our examination the laws of matter are, in comparifon of thofe which regulate the phenomena of thought, we fhall neither be dis- pofed to wonder, that the philofophy of mind fliould ilill remain in its infancy, nor be difcouraged in our hopes concerning its future progrefs. The excellent models of this fpecies of invefligation, which the writings of Dr. Reid exhibit, give us ground to ex- pect that the time is not far diflant when it fhall as- fume that rank which it is entitled to hold among the fciences. It would probably contribute much to accelerate the progrefs of the philofophy of mind, if a diflinCt explanation were given of its nature and object ; and if fome general rules were la'd down, with refpecl to the proper method of conducing the fludy of it. To this fubject, however, which is of fullicient extent to furnifh matter for a feparate work, I cannot at- tempt to do jullice at prefent ; and fhall therefore confine myfelt to the illuflration of a few fundamen- tal principles, which it will be of effential importance for us to keep i-n view in the following inquirers. . Upon a flight attention to the operations of our own minds, they appear to be fo compHcated, and fo infinitely diverfified, that it feems to be impofTible to reduce them to any general laws. In confequence, however, of a more ac'curate examination, the prof- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 17 J?e<5t dears up 5 and the phenomena, which appearedj at firft, to be too various tor our comprehenlion,are found to be the refuit of a comparatively fmali num- ber of fimpie and uncompounded faculties, or of fimple and uncompounded principles of action. Thefe faculties and principles are the general laws of our conlHtutioUj and hold the fame place in the philofophy of mind, that the general laws we invef- tigate in phyfics, hold in that branch of fcience. In both cafes, the laws which nature has eftabliflied, are to be inveftigated only by an examination of fads ; and in both cafes, a knowledge of thefe laws leads to an explanation of an infinite number of phenomena. In the inveftigation of phyfical laws, it is well known, that our inquiries muft always terminate in fome general fad:, of which no account can be given, but that fuch is the conftitution of nature. After we have eftabhftied, for example, from the aftro- novnical phenomena, the univerfality of the law of gravitation, it may ftili be afkvd, whether this law implies the conftant agency of mind ; and (upon the fuppolltion that it does) whether it be probable that the Deity always operates immediately, or by means of fubordinate inftrun ents ? But thefe queftions, however curious, do not fall under the province of the natural philoiopher. It is iufficient for his pur- pofe, if the univerfality of the facl be admitted. The cafe is exactly the fame in the philofophy of mind. When we have once afcertaincd a gen- eral fact ; fuch as, the various laws which regulate the aflbciation of ideas, or the dependence of mem- ory on that effort of the mind which we call i^tten- tion ; it is all we ought to aim at, in this branch of fcience. If we proceed no farther than fads for which we have the evidence of our own coi:lci(>uf- nefs, our con'-lufioi.s v\ill be no lefs certain, 1 n thofe in phyfics : but if our curiuiiiy leads Ub to at- C 18 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY tempt an explanation of the afTociation of ideas, by certain fuppofed vibrations, or other changes, in the ftate of the brain ; or to explain memory, by means of fuppofed impreflions and traces in the fenforium ; we evidently blend a coliedion of important and well afcertained truths, with principles which reft wholly on conjecture.* * There is indeed one view of the connexion between Mind and Matter, which is perfectly agreeable to the just rules of philosophy. "The object of this is, to ascertain the laws which regulate their union, without attempting to explain in wlmt manner they are united. Lord Bacon was, T believe, the first who gave a distinct idea of this sort of speculation; and I do not know that much progress has yet been made in it. In his books de Augmentis Scientiarum, » variety of subjects are enumerated, in order to illustrate its nature; and, undoubtedly, most of these are in a high degree curious and important. The following list comprehends the chief of those he has mentioned ; with the addition of several others, recommended to the consideration of Philosophers and of Medical Inquirers, by the late Dr. Gregory. See his Lectures on the Duties and Qualifica- tions of a Physician. < 1. The doctrine of the preservation and improvement of the dif- ferent senses. 2. The history of the power and influence of imagination. 3. The history of the several species of enthusiasm. 4 The history oi the various circumstances in parents, that have- an influence on conception, and the constitution and characters of their children. 5. The history of dreams. 6. The history of the laws of custom and habit. 7. The history of the effects of music, and of such other thing? as operate on the mind and body, in consequence of impressions made on the senses. 8. The history of natural signs and language, comprehending the doctrifieof physiognomy and of outward gesture. 9. The history of the power and laws of the principle of imita- tion. To this list various other subjects might be added ; particularly, the hifatory of the laws of memory^ in so far as they appear to be connected with the state of the body ; and the history of the di!^ ferent species of madness. This view of the connection between Mind and Matter does not fall properly under the plan of the following work ; in which my of THE HUMAN MIND. 19 The obfervations which have been now ftated, with refpecl to the proper Umits of philofophical cu- rioiity, have too frequently efcaped the attention of fpeculative men, in all the different departments of fcience. In none of thefe, however, has this inat- tention produced fuch a variety of errors and abfur- dities, as in the fcience of mind ; a fubjed; to which, till of late, it does not feem to have been fufpeded, that the general rules of philofophifing are applicable. The llrange mixture of fad: and hypotheiis, which the greater parr of mctaphyfical inquiries exhibit, had led almolt univerfally to a belief, that it is only a very faint and doubtful light, which human reafon can ever exped to throw on this dark, but intereft- mg, field of fpeculation. Befide this inattention to the proper limits of phi- lofophical inquiry, other fources of error, from which the fcience of phyfics is entirely exempted, have contributed to retard the progrefs of the phi- lofophy of mind. Of thefe, the moft important proceed from that difpofition which is fo natural to every perfon at the commencement of his philo- fophical purfuits, to explain intelledual and moral phenomena by the analogy of the material world. I before took notice of thofe habits of inattention to the fubjects of our confcioufnefs, which take their rife in that period of our lives when we are ne- ceffarily employed in acquiring a knowledge of the properties and laws of matter. In confequence of this early familiarity with the phenomena of the material world, they appear to us lefs myfterious than thofe of mind ; and we are apt to think that leading object is to ascertain the principles of our nattire, in so far as they can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our own consciousness; and to apply these principles to explain the phe- nomena arising from them. Variouii incidejital remarks, however, will occur in the course of our inquiries, tending to illustrate some of the subjects comprehended in tlie foregoing enumeration. 20 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPf^Y « 'ive have advanced one ftep in explaining the latter, when we can point out fome analop^y between theiH and the former. It is owing to the fame circum- fiance, that we have fcarcely any appropriated lan- guage with refpe(^ to mind, and that the words wliich exprefs its different operations, are aim- ft 41 borrowed from the objects of our fenfes. It muft, however, appear manifeft, upDn a very little reflec- tion, that as the two fubjefts are eifeiitially diftincl, and as each of them has its peculiar laws, the analo- gies we are pleafed to fancy between them, can be of no ufe in illuftrating either ; and* that it is no lefs unphilofophical to attempt an explanation of percep- tion, or of the affociation of ideas, upon mechanical principles ; than it would be to explain the phenomp ena of gravitation, by fupi-oQng, as fome of he an- cients did, the particles of matter to be animated with principles of motion ; or to explain the chem- ical phenomena of elective attractions, by fuppofmg the fubftances among which they are obferved, to be endowed with thought and volition.— The analogy of matter, therefore, can be of no ufe in the inqui- ries which form the object of the following work ; but, on the contrary, is to be guarded againft, as one of the principal fources of the errors to which we are liable. Among the difFef ent philofophers who have Ipec- ulated concerning the human mind, very few indeed can be mentioned, who have at all times been able to guard againft analogical theories. At the fame time, it muft be acknowledged, that fince the publi- cation of Des Cartes' writings, there has been a grad- ual, and, on the whole, a very remark ible improve- ment in this branch of fcience. One ftr.ldng proof of this is, the contraft between the metaphyfical ipec- ulations of fome of the n)oft eminint philofophers in England at the end of the laft century, and thofe which we find in the fyftems, however imperfect., of OF THE HUMAN MTND. 21 the prefent age. Would any writer now offer to the world, fuch conclufions with refpefl to the mind, as are contained in the two following paffages from Locke and Newton ? "Habits," (fays Locke,) "feetn " to be but tra ns of motion, in the animal fpirits, " which, once fet a-going, contiiiue in the (lime fteps " they had been ufed to, which, by often treading, ^' are worn into a fmooth path." And Newton hiin- felf has propofed the folio ^ing query, concerning the manner in which the mind perceives external obj;cts. *' Is not," (fays he,) " the fenforium of aninials the *' place where the fentient fubltance is prefent, and *' to which the fenfible fpecies of things are brought, " through the nerves and brain, that they may be *' perceived by the mind prefent in that place ?*' — In the courfe of the following Effays, I (hall have oc- cafion to quote various other piffages from later writers, in which an attempt is made to explain the other phenomena of mind upon finiilar priiciples. It is however much to be regretted, that even lince the period when philofophers began to adopt a more rational plan of inquiry with refpect to fuch fubjccts,they have been obliged to fpend fo much of their time in clearing away the rubbifh collected by their predeceffurs. This indeed was a preliminary flep, which the ftate of the kience, and the conciu- fions to which it had led, rendered abfolutely nectf- fary ; for, however important the pofitive advanta- ges may be, which are to be expected from it^ future progrefs, they are by no mear.s fo eifential to human improvement and happinefs, as a fatistadory refuta- tion of that fceptical philofophy, which had ftruck at the root of all knowledge, and a.l belief. Such a refutation feems to have been the principal object which Dr. Reid propofed to himfelf in his metaphys- ical inquiries ; and to this object his labours have been directed with fo much a ility, candor, and per- feverance, that unlefs future fceptics ihouid occupy ti2 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY a ground very different from that of their predecef- fors, it is not likely that the controverfy will ever be renewed. The rubbilh being now removed, and the foundations laid, it is time to begin the fuper- ftruclure. I'he progrefs which I have made in it is, I am fenlible, very inconfiderable ; yet I flatter my- felf, that the little 1 have done, will be fufficient to il- luitrate the importance of the ftudy, and to recom- mend the fubjects of which I am to treat, to the at- tention of others. After the remarks which I have now made, the reader will not be furprifed to find, ihc\t I have ftudi- oufly avoided the confideration of thofe queftions which have been agitated in the prefent age, between the patrons of the fceptical philofophy, and their op- ponents. Thefe controverfies have, in truth, no pe- culiar connexion with the inquiries on w^hich I am to enter. It is indeed only by an examination of the principles of our nature, that they can be brought to a fatisfaclory conclufion ; but fuppofing them to remain undecided, our fceptical doubts concerning the certainty of human knowledge, would no more affecl the philofophy of mind, than they would affed any of the branches of phyfics; nor would our doubts concerning even the exiftence of mind, affedl this branch of fcience, any more than the doubts of the Berkeleian, concerning the exiftence of matter, affed: his opinions in natural philofophy. To what purpofes the philofophy of the human mind according to the view which I propofe to take of it, is fubfervient, I (hall endeavor to explain, at foaie length, in the following fection* OF THE HUMAN MIND. 23 PART SECOND. SECTION I. Of the Utility of the Philofophy of the Human Mind. IT has been often remarked, that there is a mu- tual connexion between the different arts and fcien- ces, and that the improvements which are made in one branch of human knowledge, frequently throw light on others, to which it has apparently a very re- mote relation. The modern difcoveries in aflrono- my, and in pure mathematics, have contributed to bring the art of navigation to a degree of perfection formerly unknown. The rapid progrefs which has been lately made in aftronomy, anatomy, and bota- ny, has been chiefly owing to the aid which thefe fciences have received from the art of the optician. Although, however, the different departments of fcience and of art mutually refled light on each oth- er, it is not always neceffiry either for the philofopher or the artift to aim at the acquifition of general knowledge. Both of them may fafely take many principles for granted, without being able to demon- ftrate their truth. A feaman, though ignorant of mathematics, may apply, with corredinefs and dex- terity, the rules for finding the longitude : An allro- nomer, or a botanift, though ignorant of optics, may avail himfelf of the ufe of the telefcope, or the mi- crofcope.. Thefe obfervations are daily exemplified in the cafe of the artift ; who has feldom either inclination or leifure to fpeculate concerning the principles of his art. It is rarely, however, we meet with a man of fcience, who has confined his ftudles wholly to one branch of knowledge That curiofity, which he has been accuftomed to indulge in the courfe of 34 ELEMENTS OE T*HE PHILOSOPHY' his favorite purfuit, \vill naturally extend itfelf to every remarkable objecV. which falls under his obfer- vatiim ; and can icarcely fail to be a fource of perpet- ual diffitisfaclion to his mind, till it has been fo far gratified as to enable him to explain all the various phenomena, which his profeilional habits are every day preienting to his view. As every particular Icience is in this manner con- nefted with others, to which it naturally directs the; attention, fo all the purfuits of life, whether they terminate infpeculation or aclion, are connected with that general fcience, which has the human mind for its objecl. The powers of the underftanding are infcruments which all men employ ; and his curiofi- ty muft be fmall indeed, who paffes through life in a total ignorance of faculties, which his wants and necefllties force him habitually to exercife, and which fo remarkably diftinguilh man from the lower ani- mals. The active principles of our nature, which, by their various modifications and combinations^ give rife to all the moral differences among men, are fitted, in a ftill higher degree, if poffible, to intereft thofe, who are either difpofed to reflecV on their own characters, or to obferve, with attention, the charac- ters of others. The phenomena refulting from thefe faculties and principles of the mind, are every mo- ment foliciting our notice ; and open to our exa'min- atlon, a field of difcovery, as inexhauftible as the phenomena of the material world ; and exhibiting not lefs ftriking marks of divine wifdom. While all the fciences, and all the purfuits of life, have this common tendency to lead our inquiries to the philofophy of the human nature, this laft branch of knowledge borrows its principles from no other fcience whatever. Hence there is fomething in the ftudy of it, which is peculiarly gratifying to a reflecl: ing and inquifitive mind ; and fomething in the con tluuons to which it leads, on which the mind re" -|| OF THE HUMAN MIND. 25 With peculiar fitisfaction. Till once our opinions are in iome degree fixed with refpect to it, we abandon ourfelv^es, with relu<5lance, to particular fcientific in- veftigations ; and on the other hand, 2^ general knowledge of fuch of its principles as are moil fitted to excite the curiofity, not only prepares us for en- gaging in other purfuits with more liberal and com- prehenfive views, but leaves us at liberty to profe- cute them with a more undivided and concentrated attention.. It is not, however, mer ly as a fubjed of fpecula- tive curiofity, that the principles of the human mind deferve a careful examination. The advantages to be expected from a fuccelsful analyfis of it are vari- ous ; and fome of them of fuch importance, as to render it aftonifhing, that, amidft all the fuccefs with which the fubordinate fciences have been cultivated, this, which comprehends the principles of all of them, fhould be Hill fuifered to remain ir its infancy. I (hall endeavor to illuftrate a few of thefe advan- tages, beginning with what appears to me to be the moft important of any ; the light, which a philofophi- cal analyfis of the principles of the mind would lie- ceflarily throw, on the lubjects of intellectual and moral education. rhe moft effential obje(51:s of education are the two following : Firit, to cultivate all the various princi- ples of our nature, both fpeculative and active, in fuch a manner as to bring them to the greateft per- fection of which they are fufceptible ; and. Secondly, by w.atching over the impreflions and alTociations which the mind receives in early life, to fecure it againft the influence of prevailing errors ; and, as far as poifible, to engage its prepofleflions on the fide of truth. It is only upon a philofophical analyfis of the mind, that a fyftematicd plan can be founded, for the accompliihment of either of thefe purpofcs. There are few individuals, whufe education has D 2& ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY been conduci:ed in every refpe(^ with attention and judgment. Almoft every man of refleclion is con- fcious, when he arrives at maturity, of many defects in his mental powers ; and of many inconvenient habits, which might have been prevented or reme- died in his infancy or youth. Such a confcioufnefk is the firft flep towards improvement ; and the per- fon who feels it, if he is pojDTeffed of refoiution and fteadinefe, will not fcruple to begin, even in advan- ced years, a new courfe of education for himfelf. The degree of reflection and obfervation, indeed, which is necefTiry for this purpofe, cannot be expect- ed from any one at a very early period of life, as thefe are the loft powers of the mind which unfold themfelves ; but it is never too late to think of the improvement of our faculties ; and much progrefs may be made, in the art of applying them fuccelsful- ly to their proper objeds, or in obviating the in- conveniencies refulting from their imperfe^ion, not only in manhood, but in old age. It is not, however, to the millakes of our early in. llrud ors, that all our intellectual defects are to be afcribed. There is no profeflion or purfuit which has not habits peculiar to itfelf ; and which does not leave fome powers of the mind dormant, while it exercifes and improves the reft. If we wifti, there- fore, to cultivate the mind to the extent of its capaci- ty, we muft not reft fatisfied with that employment which its faculties receive from our particular fitua- tion in life. It is not in the awkward and profefli >n- al fv)rm of a mechanic, who has ftrengthened partic- ular mufcles of his body by the habits of his trade, that w^e are to look for the perfection of our animal nature : neither is it among men. of confined pur- fuits, whether fpeculative or adive, that we are to ex;)ed to hiid the huinan mind in its higheft ftate of cui rival ion. A variety of exercifes is necefTary to preferve the animal frame in vigour and beauty ; and OF THE HUMAN MINB. 2Y a variety of thofe occupations which literature and fcience afford, added to a promifcuous intercourfe with the world, in the habits of converfation and bu« finefs, is no lefs neceflkry for the improvement of the underftanding. T acknowledge, that there are fome profeffions, in which a man of very confined acqui- iitions may arrive at the firlf eminence ; and in which he will perhaps be the more likely to excel, the more he has coiicentrated the whole force of his mind to one particular objed. But fuch a perfon, however diftinguiihed in his own fphere, is educated merely to be a literary artifan ; and neither attains theperfedioUjUor the happinefs of his nature. "That " education only can be confidered as complete and " generous, which" (in the language of Milton ) " fits *' a man to perform juftly, fkilfully, and magnanim- " oully, all the offices, both private and public, of " peac^, and of war*." I hope it will not be fuppofed, from the foregoing obfervations, that they are meant to recommend an indiscriminate attention to all the objects of fpecula- tion and of a(!lion. Nothing can be more evident, than the neceffity of limiting the field of our exertion, if we wifti to benefit fociety by our labours. But it is perfectly ccnfiftent with the moft intenfe applica^ tion to our favourite purfuit, to cultivate that gen- eral acquaintance with letters and with the world, which may be fufficient to enlarge the mind, and to preferve it from any danger of contracting the pe- dantry of a particular profeflion. In many cafes, (as was already remarked,) the fciences refled light on each other ; and the general acquifitions which we have made in other purfuits, may furnifh us with ufeful helps for the farther profecution of our own. But even in thofe inflances in which the cafe is oth- erwife, and in which thefe liberal accomplilhments mud be purchafed by the facrifice of a part of our * Tractate of Education, 28 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY profeffional eminence, the acquiTition of them will amply repay any lofs we may luUain. It ought not' to be the leading object: of any one, to become an emi- nent metaphyfician, mathematician, or poet ; but to render himfelf happy as an individual, and an agree- able, a refped:able, and an ufeful niember of fociety- A man who lofes his light, improves the fenf^biiity of his touch ; but who would confent, for fuch a re- compence, to part with the pleafiues which he receives from the eye ? It is almoft unnecelTary for me to remark, how much individuals would be afTifted in the proper and liberal culture of the mind, if they were previoufly led to take a comprehenfive furvey of human nature in all its parts ; of its various faculties, and powers and fources of enjoyment; andof the eifeds which are pro- duced on thefe principles by particular fituations. It is fuch a knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can enable a perfon to judge of his own acqui- fitions ; and to en^ploy the moft effeduai means for fupj3lying his defects, and removing l^s inconvenient habits. Without fome degree of it, every man is in danger of coptracling bad habits, before he is aware ; and of fuffering fome of his powers to go to decay, for want of proper exercife. If the bufmefs of early educatic^n were more tho- roughly, and more generally, underllood, it would be lefs necefi'ary for individuals, when they arrive at maturity, to form plans of improvenient for them- felves. But education never can be iyilerriatically directed to its proper objects, till we have obtained, not only an accurate analylis of the general princi- ples of our nature, and an account ot the moft im- portant laws which regulate their operation ; but an explanation of the various modifications and combi- nati(^ns of thefe principles, which produce that di- verfity of talents, genius, and cl^ar^cter, we obferve among men. To inibuct youth in the languages. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 20 and in the fciences, is comp iratively of little impor- tance, it we are inattentive to the habits tliey ac- quire ; and are not careful in giving, to all their different faculties, and ail their different principles of adion, a proper degree of emplo) ment. Abftnct- ing entirely from the culture of their moral povi^ers, ho\^ extenfive and difficult is the bufinefs of con- dueling their intelledfual improvement ! I'o watch over the .ifTociations which they form in their ten- der years ; to give them early habits of n ental activ- ity ; to roufe their curiofity, and to direct it to prop- er objects ; to exercife their ingenuity and inven- tion ; to cultivate in their minds a turn for fpecula- tion, and at the fame time prelerve their attention alive to the objects around them ; to awaken their fenfibilities to the beauties (»f nature, and to infpire them with a relifti for intellectual enjoyment ; thefe form but a part of the bufinefs of education ; and yet the execution even of this part requires an ac- quaintance with the general principles ot our nature, which feldom falls to the fhare of thofe to whom the inftru^lion of youth is commonly intrufted. — Nor will fuch a theoretical knowledge of the hunum mind, as I have now defcribed, be always fufficient in prad:ice. An uncommon degree of fagacity is frequently requifite, in order to accommodate gene- ral rules to particular tempers, and characters. — In whatever way we chufe to account for it, whether by original organization, or by the operation of mor- al caufes, in very early infancy ; no fact can be more undeniable, than that there are important differences difcernible in the minds of children, previous t(^ that period at which, in general, t eir intellectual educa- tion commences. There is, too, a certain heredita- ry chara(5ter (whether refulting from phyiical con- {titution, or caught from imitation and the influence of fituation.) which appears remarkably inpn-ticiilar families. One race, for a fucceffiun ot generations. so ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPY is diftinguifhed by a genius for the abftra6l: fciences, while it is deficient in vivacity, in imagination, and in rafte : another is no lefs diftinguifhed for wit, and gaiety, and fancy ; while it appears incapable of patient attention, or of profound refearch. The fyftem of education which is proper to be adopted in particu ar cafes, ought, undoubtedly, to have fome reference to thefe circumftances ; and to be calcula- ted, as much as poffible, to develope and to cherifli f^ thofe intelUclual and active principles, in which a natural deficiency is moft to be apprehended. Mon- tefquieu, and other fpeculative politicians, have in- fifted much on the reference which education and laws fhould have to climate. I fhall not take upon me to fay, how far their conclufions on this fubje^b are juft ; but I am fully perluaded, that there is a foundation in philofophy, and good fenfe, for ac- commodating, at a very early period of life, the ed- ucation of individuals to thofe particular turns of mind, to which, from hereditary propenfities, or from moral fituation, they may be prefumed to have a natural tendency. There are few fubje<^s more hackneyed than that of education ; and yet there is none, upon which the opinions of the world are ftill more divided. Nor is this furprifing ; for moft of thofe who have fpec- ulated concerning it, have confined their attention chiefly to incidental queftions about the compara- tive advantages of public or private inftruclion, or the utility of particular languages or fciences ; with- out attempting a previous examination of thofe fac- ulties and principles of the mind, which it is the great object of education to improve. Many excel- lent detached obfervations, indeed, both on the in- telledlual and moral powers, are to be collected from the writings of ancient and modern authors ; but I do not know, that in any language an attempt has been made to analyfe and iliuftr^te the principles of OF THE HUMAN MIND^ 31 human nature, in order to lay a philofophical foun- dation for their proper culture. I have even heard fome very ingenious and in- telligent men difpute the propriety of fo fyftematical a plan of inftru<5i:ion. The moft fuccefstul and fplendid exertions, both in the fciences and arts, (it has been frequently remarked,) have been made by individuals, in whofe minds the feeds cf genius were allowed to ftioot up, wild and free ; while, from the moft careful and Ikilful tuition, feldom any thing refults above mediocrity. I (hall not, at pref- ent, enter into any difcuflions with refpe^l to the certainty of the fad: on which this opinion is found- ed. Suppofing the facl to be completely eftablifhed, it muft ftill be remembered, that originality of gen- ius does not always imply vigor and comprehenlive- nefs, and liberality of mind ; and that it is defirable only, in fo far as it is compatible with thele more valuable qualities. I already hinted, that there are fome purfuits,in which, as they require the exertion only of a fmall number of our faculties, an individu- al, who has a natural turn for them, will be more likely to diftinguifh himfelf, by being fufFered to fol- low his original bias, than if his attention were dif; traded by a more liberal courfe of iludy. But wherever fuch men are to be found, they muft be conlidered, on the moft favorable fuppofition, as having facrificed, to a certain degree, the perfe<^- ion and the happinefs of their nature, to the aniufe- ment or inftrudion of others. It is too, in times of general darknefs and barbarifm, that wliat is com- monly called originality of genius moft frequently appears : and furely the great aim of an enlighten- ed and benevolent philofophy, is not to rear a fmall number of individuals, who may be regarded a^ prodigies in an ignorant and admiring age, but to diffufe, as widely as poflible, that degree of cuhiva- tion which may enable the bulk of a people to pof- 3-2 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fefs all the intelledual and moral improvement ot which their nature is fuTceptible. " Original gen- ius" (»ays Voltaire) " occurs but feldom in a nation *' where the literary tafte is formed. The number *' of cultivated minds which there abound, like the " trees in a thick and flourifhing foreft, prevent any " fmgie individual from rearing his head far above the *' reft. Where trade is in few hands, we meet with " a fmall number of ovrer-grown fortunes in the <' midft of a general poverty : in proportion as it " extends, opulence becomes general, and great for- " tunes rare. It is, precifely, becaufe there is at " prefent much light, and much cultivation, in " France, that we are led to complain of the want *' of fuperior genius." To what purpofe, indeed, it may be faid, all this labor ? Is not the importance of every thing to man, to be ultiniately eftimated by its tendency to pro- mote his happinefs ? And is not our daily experi- ence fufEcient to convince us, that this is^ in geiier- al, by no means proportioned to the culture which his nature has received ? — Nay, is there not fome ground for fufpedling, thai the lower orders of men enjoy, on the wht)ie, a more enviable condition, than their more enlightened and refined fuperiors ? The truth, 1 apprehend, is, that happinefs, in fo far as it arifes from the mind itfelf, will be always proportioned to the degree of perfection which its powers have attained ; but that, in cultivating thefe powers, with a view to this mofl important of all objects, it is effentially neceffary that fiich a degree of attention be beftowed on all of them, as may pre- ferve them in that ftate of relative ftrength, which appears to be agreeable to the intentions of nature. In confequence of an exclufive attention to the cul- ture of the imaginition, the tafte, therealoning fac- ulty, or any of the active principles, it is poflible that the pleafures of human life may be diminiihed, or OF THE HUMAN MIND. 33 its pains increafed ; but the inconvenienees which are experienced in fuch cafes, are not to be alcribed to education, but to a partial and injudicious educa- tion. In fuch cafes, it is poflible, that the poet, the metaphyfician, or the man of tafte and refinement, may appear to difadvantage, when comf)ared with the vulgar ; for fuch is the benevolent appointn^ent of Providence with refpect to the lower orders, that although not one principle of their nature be com- pletely unfolded, the whole of thefe principles pre- ferve among themfelves, that balance which is fa- vorable to the tranquillity of their minds and to a prudent and fteady conduct in the limited Iphere which is afligned to them, far more completely, than' in thofe of th«ir fuperiors, whofe education has be4?n conduced on an erroneous or imperfedl fyttem : but all this, far from weakening the force ot the forego- ing obfervations, only ferves to denionftrate how impoflible it always uill be, to form a rational plan for the improvement of the mind, without an accu- rate and comprehenfive knowledge ot the principles of the human conllitution. "(he remarks which have been already made, are fufficient to illuftrate the dangerous conlequences which are likely to refult from a partial and injutii- cious cultivation of the mind ; and, at the fame time, to point out the utility of the intelledual philofophy, in enabling us to preferve a proper balance among all its various faculties, principles of action, and ca- pacities of enjoyment. Many additional obfierva- tions might be offered, on the tendency which an accurate analyfis of its powers n ight probably have, to fuggeft rules for their farther improvement, and for a more fuccefsful application of them to their proper purpofes : but this fubjed I (hall not prole- cute at prefent, as the illuftration of it is one of the leading obje(51:s of the following work. — Ihat tiie memory, the imaginaiion, or tne reaionig fatuity, E 34f ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY are to be inftantly ftrengthened in confequence of our fpeculations concerning their nature, it would be abfurd to fuppofe ; but it is furely far from be- ing unreafonable to think, that an acquaintance with the laws which regulate thefe powers, may fuggeil some ufeful rules for their gradual cultivation ; for remedying their defects, in the cafe of individuals, and even for extending thofe limits, which nature feems, at firft view, to have ailigned them. To how great a degree of perfection the intellect- ual and moral nature of man is capable of being raifed by cultivation, it is difficult to conceive. The effects of early, continued, and fyftematical educa- tion, in the cafe of thofe children who are trained, for. the fake of gain, to feats of ftrength and agility, juftify, perhaps, the moft fanguine views which it is poffible for a philofopher to form, with refped to the improvement of the fpecies. I now proceed to confider, how far the philofo- phy of mind may be ufeful in accomplifliing the fec- ond object of education ; by afliiting us in the man- agement of early imprelfions and afibciations. By far the greater part of the opinions on which we act in life, are not the refult of our own invefti- gations ; but are adopted implicitly, in infancy and youth, upon the authority of others. Even the great principles of morality, although implant- ed in every heart, are commonly aided and cher- ifhed, at leaft to a certain degree, by the care of our inftru6tors. — All this is undoubtedly agreea- ble to the intentions of nature ; and, indeed, were the cafe other wife, fociety could not fubfift ; for nothing can be more evident, than that the bulk of mankind, condemned as they are to laborious oc- cupations, which are incon patible with intelledu- al improvement, are perfectly incapable of foruiing their own opinions on fonie of the molt imp(irtant fubjeds that CJWi employ the human mind. It is ev- OF THE HUMAN MIND. «J ident, at the fame time, that as no fyftem of educa- tion is perfect, a variety of prejudices muft in this way, take an early hold of our belief ; fo as to acquire over it an influence not inferior to that of the moft incontrovertible truths. When a child hears, either a fpeculative abfurdity, or an erroneous principle of action, recommended and enforced daily, by the fame voice vi^hich firft conveyed to it thofe fimple and fub- lime leiTons of morality and religion which are con- genial to its nature, is it to be wondered at, that, in future life, it ihould find it fo difficult to eradicate prejudices which have twined their roots with all the effential principles of the hum/an frame ? — If fuch, however, be the obvious intentions of nature, with refped to thofe orders of men who are employed in bodily labor, it is equally clear, that (he meant to im- pofe it as a double oblig^ition on thofe who receive the advantages of a liberal education, to examine, with the moft fcrupulous care, the foundation of all thofe received opinions, which have any connexion with morality, or with human happinefs. If the multi- tude muft; be led, it is of confequence, furely, that it fliould be led by enlightened conductors ; by men who are able to diftinguifh truth from error ; and tf'i draw the line between thofe prejudices which are innocent or falutary, (if indeed there are any preju- dices which are really falutary,) and thofe which are hoftile to the interells of virtue and of mankind. In fuch a flate of fociety as that in which we live, the prejudices of a moral, a political, and a religious nature, which we imbibe in early life, are fo various,, and at the fam.e time fo intimately blended with the belief we entertain of the mofl facred and important truths, that a great part of the life of a philofopher mufl neceffirily be devoted, not fo much to the ac- quifition of new knowledge, as to unlearn the er- rors to which he had been taught to give an impli- cit affent, before the d;^wn of reafon and refleclion. 36 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY Aiid unlefs he fuSmit in this manner to bring all his opinions to the teft of a fevere examination, his in- genuity, and his learning, instead of enlightening the world, will only en ible him to give an additional currency, and an additional authority, to eftabliihed errors. To attempt fuch a ftruggle againll early prejudices, is, indeed, the profeffed aim of all philof- ophers ; but how few are to be found who have force of mind fufficient for accompliihing their ob- ject ; and who, in freeing themfelves from one let of errors, do not allow themfelves to be carried away with another ? To fucceed in it completely. Lord Bacon feems to have thought, fin one of the moft re-.f'arkable paffages of his writings,) to be more than can well be expelled from human frailty.— " Nemo adhuc tanta mentis conftantia inventus eft, *' ut decreverit, et li i impofuerit, theorias et no- *' tiones communes peuitus abolere, et intelle£lum " abrafum et aequum ad particularia, de integro, ap- *' plicare. Itaque ilia ratio humana, qiiam habemus, " ex multa fide, et multo etiam caiii, nee non ex " puerilibus, quas primo haufimus, notionibus, far- " rago qusedam eft, et congeries. Quod fiquis, aetate '' matura, et fenfibus integris, et mente repurgata, " fe ad experientiam, et ad particularia deitegro ap. " plicet, de eo melius fperaudum eft.*' Nor is it merely in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is ufeful to examine the foundation of eftabliftied opinions. It is fuch an examination alone, that, in an inquiiitive age like the prefent, ''an fecure a philofopher from the dan- ger of ultimated fcepticifm. To this extreme, in- deed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and fuperftition, the intimate aflbciation which had been formed, in the prevailing fyftems of education, between truth and error, had given to the latter an afcendant over the. OF THE H'-^MAN MIND. S? minds of men, which it could never have acquired, if divefted of fuch an alliance. The cafe has, of late years, been moft remarkably reverfed : the common fenfe of mankind, in confequence of the growth of a more liberal fpirit of inquiry, has revolted againft ma- ny '>f thofe abfurdities, which had fo long held human reafon in captivity ; and it was, f>erhaps, more than could reafonably have been expected, that, in the firft m< ^ments of their emancipation, philofophers fhould have flopped ihort, at the precife boundary, which C) :er refleclion, and more moderate views, would h r/e prefcribed. The fact is, that they have pafTed far beyond it ; and that, in their zeal to deftroy preju- dices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots, niany of ♦^he bed and happleftand moft elTential princi- ples of our nature. Having remarked the powerful influence of education over the mind, they have con- cluded, that man is wholly a factitious being ; not re- collecting, that this very fufceptibility of education preiiippofes certain original principles, which are com- mon to the whole fpecies ; and that, as error can only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being graf t^ed on truths, which it is unwilling or unable to eradicate ; even the influence, which falfe and abfurd opinions occalionally acquire over the belief, inftead of being an argument for univerfal fcepticifm, is the moft decifive argument* againft it ; inafmuch as it fliews, that there are fome truths fo incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can recon- cile us even to the abfurdities and contradictions with which we fuppofe them to be infeparably connected. The fceptical philofophers, for example, of the pres- ent age, have frequently attempted to hold up to rid- icule, thofe contemptible and puerile fuperftitions, which havje difgraced the creeds of fome of the moft enlightened nations ; and which have not only com- manded the aflent, but the reverence, of men of the moft accompiiflied underftandings. But thefe his- 38 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY tories of human imbecility are, in truth, the (Irong- ^ft teftimonies which can be produced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental prin- ciples of morality over the belief; when they are able to fanclify, in the apprehenfions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us to affociate with them. I hat implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be difputed ; but it may not, perhaps, be as generally acknowledged, that the cafe is the fame with unlimited fcepticifm : on the contrary, we are •fometimes apt to afcribe this difpofition to a more than ordinary vigor of intellect. Such a prejudice w^as by no means unnatural at that period in the hiftory of modern Europe, when reafon firft began to throw off the yoke of authority ; and when it unqueftionably required a fuperiority of underftand- ing, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to re- iid the contagion of prevailing fuperilition. But in the prefent age, in which the tendency of falhiona- ble opinions is dire6lly oppofite to thofe of the vul- gar ; the philofophical creed, or the philofophical fcepticifm of by far the greater number of thi)fe who value themfelves on an emancipation from popular errors, arifes from the very fame weaknefs with the credulity of the multitude "^ nor is it going too far to fay, with Roufleau, that " He, who, in the end ^^ of the eighteenth century, has brought himfelf to " abandon all his early principles without difcrimina- ^' tion, would probably have been a bigot in the '' days of the League." In the midft of thefe con- trary impulfes, of fafhionable and of vulgar prejudi- ces, he alone evinces the fuperiority and the ilrength of his mind, who is able to difentangle truth from error ; and to oppofe the clear conclulions of his own unbiafled faculties, to the united clamours of fuperflition, and of talfe philofophy. — Such are the OF THE HUMAN MIND. 39 men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world ; to fix the wavering opinions of the multi- tude, and to imprefs their own characters on that of their age. For fecuring the mind completely from the weak- nefles I have now been defcribing and enabling it to maintain a fteady courfe of inquiry, between inipiicit credulity, and unlimited fcepticifm, the moil impor- tant of all qualities is a iincere and devoted attach- ment to truth ; which feldom fails to be accompani- ed with a manly confidence in the clear conclufions of human reafon. It is fuch a confidence, united, (as it generally is) with perfonal intrepidity, which forms what the French writers call force of character; one of the rareft endowments, it muft be confefled, of our fpecies ; but which, of all endowments, is the moft effential for rendering a philofopher happy in himfelf, and a bleffing to mankind. There is, I think, good reafon for hoping, that the fceptical tendency of the prefent age, will be only a temporary evil. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the moft alarming nature ; and, as it ex- tends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but in fome meafure, alfo, to politics, and the conduct of life, it is equally fatal to the comfort of f.he indi- vidual, and to the improvement of fociety. Even in its moft inoffenfive form, when it happens to be united with a peaceable difpofition and a benevolent heart, it cannot fail to have the effect of damping every ad:ive and patriotic exertion. Convinced tiiat truth is placed beyond the reach of human faculties ; and doubtful how far the prejudices we delpife may not be eflential to the well-being of fociety, we re- folve to abandon completely all fpeculative inquiries ; and fuffering ourfelves to be carried quietly aie6led with human happiriefs ? The long reign of error in the world, and the influence it maintains, even in an age of liberal inquiry ; far from being favourable to the fuppofition, that human renfon is deftined to be for ever the fport of prejudice and abfurdity, demonftrates the tendency which there is to permanence in eflabhflied opinions, and in eftab- lifhed inftitutions ; and promifes an eternal liability to true philofophy, when it fliall once have acquired the afcendant ; and when proper means fhall be em- ployed to fupport it, by a more perfed: fyftem of education. Let us fuppofe, for a moment, that this happy asra were arrived, and that all the prepofTefllons of child- hood and youth were directed to fupport the pure and fublime truths of an enliglitened morality. — "With what ardour, and with what tranfport, would the underftanding, when arrived at maturity, pro- ceed in the fearch of truth ; when, inftead of being obliged to ftruggle, at every ftep, with early preju- dices, its office was merely to add the force of philo- fophical conviclion, to impreflions, which are equally delightful to the imagination, and dear to the heart ! The prepofieflions of childhood would, through the whole of life, be gradually acquiring ftrength from the enlargement of our knowledge ; and, in their turn, would fortify the conclufions of our realon, againft the fceptical fuggeflions of difappointment or melar^choly. Our daily experience may convince us, how fus- CQptible the tender mind is of deep impreilions ; and what important and permanent effects are produced on the characters, and the happinefs of individuals, by the cafual aflociations formed in childhood among the various ideas, feelings, and affections, with which they were habitually occupied. It is the bufinefs of education not to countcrad this conflitution of na- ture, but-to give it a proper direction : and the mifer OF THB HUMAN MIND. ^ 4G Able confequences to whicli it leads, when under an improper regulation, only flievv, what an important inilrument of human improvement it might be ren- dered, in more Ikiltul hands. If it be poflible to in« tereft the imagination and the heart in favor of error, it is, at leaft, no lefs poiTible to intereil them in favor of truth. If it be poflible to ^xtinguifti all the moft generous and heroic feelings of our nature, by teach- ini^ us to conned the idea of them with thofe of guilt and impiety ; it is furely equally poflible to cherifh and ftrerigthen them, by eftablifliing the na- tural alliance between our duty and our happinefs. If it be poflible for the influence of fafhion to veil the native deformity of vice, and to give to low and criminal indulgences the appearance of fpirit, of ele- gance, and pf gaiety ; can we doubt of the poflibility of connecting, in the tender mind, thefe pleafing aa- fociationSy with purluits that are truly worthy and honorable ? — There are few men to be found, among thgfe who have received the advantages of a liberal education, who do not retain, through life, that ad- miration of the heroic ages of Greece nnd Rome, with v/hich the clafllcal authors once infpired them. It is, in truth, a fortunate prcpoflefllon, on the whole, and one, of which 1 fliould be forry to counteracb the influence. But are there not others of equal impor- tance to morality and to happinefs, with which the mind might, at the fame period of life, be infpired ? If the firil conceptions, for example, which an infant formed of the Deity, and its flrll moral perceptions, were afl(iciated with the early impreffions produced on the heart by the beauties of nature, or the charms of poetical defcription, thofe ferious tlioughts which are reforted to, by moil men, merely as a fource of confolation in adverfity ; and which, on that very account, are frequently tinctured with fome degree of gloom, would recur fpontaneoufly to the mind, in its beif and happietl hours ; and would infenflbly 4'4 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY blend themfelves with all its pureft and moft refined enjoyments. In thofe parts of Europe, where the prevailing opin- ions involve the greateft variety of errors and cor- ruptions, it is, I believe, a common idea wiih niany refpeclable and enlightened men, that, in every coun- try, it is moft prudent to coi:ducl the religious in- ftrudion of youth up'>n the plan which is preicribed by the national eftabiifhment ; in order that the pu- pil, according to the vigour or feeblenefs of iiis mind, may either Ihake off, in future life, the preju- dices of the nurfery, or die in the popular perlu.ifion. This idea, I own, appears to me to be equally iii t( un- ded and dangenms. If religious opinions have, as will not be difputed, a powerful influence on the hap- pinefs, and on the conducl of mankind, does not hu- manity require of us, to refcue as many viclin-s as pofli >le from the hands of bigotry ; and to lave them from the cruel alternative, of remaining under the gloom of adeprelling fuper{tition,or of being oifti jd:- ed by a perpetual conflict between the heart and the underftanding ? — It is an enlightened education alone, that, in moft countries of Europe, can fave the young philofopher from that anxiety and defpondence, which every man of fenlibility, who, in his childhood, has imbibed the popular opinions, mull necefl?rily experience, when he hrft begins to exan ine their foundation ; and, what is of itiil greater in pc^rtance, which can fave him, during life, from that ( ccaiion- al fcepticifm, to which all men are liable, whofe Sys- tems fluctuate with the inequalities of their ipirits, and the variations of the atmofphere. I Ihall conclude this fuljecl, with remarking, that, although in all moral and religious f)ftems, there is a great mixture of important truth ; and although it is, in confequence of this alliance, that errors and abfurdities are enabled to preferve their hold ( f ^he belief, yet it is commonly found, that, in propurtioa t)F THE HUMAN MIND, 45 as an eflablifhed creed is complicated in its dogmas and in its ceremonies, and in proportitn to the num- ber of acceffory ideas which it has grafted upm^ the truth, the more difficult is it, for thofe who have adopted it in childhood, to emancipate themfclves completely from its influence ; and, in ihofe caiesin which they at laft fucceed, the greater is their dan- ger of abandoning, along with their errors, all the truths which they had been taught to connefl with them. The Roman Catholic fyftem is fhaken off with much greater diffijulty, than thofe which are taught in the reformed churches ; but when it lofes its hold of the mind, it much m.ore frequently pre- pares the way for unlimited fcepticiim. Ihecau- fes of this I may perhaps have an opportunity ot plant- ing out, in treating of the affociation of ideas. I have now finifhed all that I think neceflary to offer, at prefeht, on the application of the philofd. phy of mind to the fubjed: ot education. To fbme readers, I am afraid, that what I have advanced on the fubjecl, will appear to border upon enthu afn ; and I will not aitempt to juftify myfelf againft the charge. I am well aware of the tendency, which fpeculaiive men fometimes have, to magnify the cfTecls of edu- cation, as well as to entertain too fanguine vie^- s of the improvement of the world ; and I am ready to acknowledge, that there are inflances of individuals, whofe vigor of mind is fufficient to overcome every thing that is pernicious in their early habits : but I am fully perfuadcd, that thefe inilances are rare ; and that, by far the greater part of mankind con- tinue, through life, to purfue the fame track into which they have been thrown, by the accidental cir- cumflances of fituation, inftrudion, and example. 46 . ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY PART SECOND. SECTION II. Continuation of the fame Subject. THE remarks which have been hitherto made, on the utility of the philofophy of the human mind, are of a very general nature, and apply equally to all defcriptions of men. Befides, however, thefe more obvious advantages of the fludy, there are others, which, though lefs ftrikiog, and lefs extenfive in their application, are neverthelefs, to fome particular claffes of individuals, of the higheft importance. XVirhout pretending to exhauft the fubje6l, T Ihall off-r a few detached obfervaiions upon it, in this feclion. I already took notice, in general terms, of the common relation which all the different branches of our knowledge bear to the philofophy of the human mind. In confequence of this relation, it not only- forms an iiiterefting object of curiofity to literary men of every denomination ; but, if fuccefsfuliy prof- ecuted, it cannot fail to furnifli uleiul lights for di- recling their inquiries ; whatever the nature of the fubje(Ss may be, which happen to engage their at- tention. In order to be fatisfied of the juftnefs of this ob- fervation, it is fufBcient to recollect, that to the phi. lofophy of the mind are to be referred, all our in- quiries concerning the divifions and the claiTifica- tions of the objects of human knowledge ; and alfo, all the various rules, both for.the invelligation,and the communication, of truth. Thefe general views of fciepce, and thefe general rules of method, ought to form the fubjeds of a rational and ufeful logic ; a ftudy, undoubtedly, in itfelf of the greatefl impor- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 4? tance and dignity, but in which lefs progrefs has hitherto been made than is commonly imagined. I fliall endeavor to illuftrate, very briefly, a few of the advantages which might be expected to re- fult from fuch a fyflem of logic, if properly execu- ted. I. And, in the firft place, it is evident that it would be of the higheft importance in all the fciences, (in fome of them, indeed, much more than in others,) to exhibit a precife and fceady idea of the objects which they prefent to our enquiry. — What was the principal circumftance which contributed to miflead the ancients, in their phylical refearches ? Was it not their confufed and wavering notions about the par- ticular clafs of truths, which it was their bufinefs to inveftigate .? It was owing to this, that they were led to neglect the obvious phenomena and laws of moving bodies ; and to indulge themfelves it con- jedures about the efficient caufes of motion, and the nature of thofe minds, by which they conceived the particles of matter to be animated ; and that they lb often blended the hiftory of facts, with their met* aphyfical fpeculations. In the prefent flate of fci- ence, indeed, we are not liable to fuch roiftakes in natural philofophy ; but it would be difficult to mention any other branch of knowledge, which is entirely exempted from them. In metaphyfics, I might almoft fay, they are at the bottom of ali^ur controverlies. In the celebrated difpute, for exam- ple, which has been lo long carried on, abcmt the explanation given by the ideal theory of the phe- nomena of perception, the wiiole difficulty arofe from this, that philofophers had noprecite notion of he point they wifhed to afcertain ; and now that the controverfy has been brought to a conciufion, (as I think all men of candour muil: confefs it to have been by Dr. Reid) it will be found, that his doctrine on the fubjed throws no light whatever, 48 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY on what was generally underflood to be the great objedl of inquiry ; I mean, on the mode of commu- nication between the mind and the material world : and, in truth, amounts only to a precife defer iption of the facl, (tripped of all hypothefis, and dated iu fuch a manner as to give us a diftincl view of the infurmountable limits which nature has in this in- ftance prefcribed to our curiofity. The fame obfer- vation may be made, on the reaonings of this pro- found and original author, with refped to fome metaphyfical queilions that had been ftarted on the fubjecl of vifion ; in particular, concerning the caufe of our feeing objects fmgle with two eyes, and our feeing objed:s erecl, by means of inverted images on the letina. If we were to examine, in like manner, the prefent flate of morals, of jurifprudence, of politics, and of philofophical criticifm ; I believe, we Ihould find, that the principal circumftance which retards their progrefs, is the vague and indiflincl idea, which thoie who apply to the ftudy of them have formed to themfelves of the objects of their refearches. Were thefe objects once clearly defined, and the proper plan of inquiry for attaining them illuftrated by a few unexceptionable models, writers of inferior genius would be enabled to employ their induflry to much more advantage ; and would be prevented from adding to that rubbiih, which, in conlequence of the ill-directed ingenuity of our predecefTors, ob- ftructs our progrefs in the purfuit of truth. As a philofophical fyftem of logic would aflift us in our particular fcUntific inveftigations, by keeping lleadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiofity ; fo, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they ail ftand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their com^ liion aim, the advancement of human happinefs, it would have a tendency to confine induilry and gen- OF THE HUMAN MlND. 49 ius to inquiries which are of real practical utility ; and would communicate a dignity to the moft fub- ordinate purfuits, which are in any refped fubfervi- ent to fo important a purpofe. When our views are limited to one particular (cience, to which we have been led to devote ourfelves by tafte or by ac- cident, the courfe of our ftudies refembles the prog- refs of a traveller through an unknown country ; whofe wanderings, from place to place, are deter- mined merely by the impuife of occalional curiofity ; and whofe opportunities of information muft necef- farily be limited to the objects which accidentally prefent themfelves to his notice. It is the philofo- phy of the mind alone, which, by furnifhing us with a general map of the field of human knowledge, can enable us to proceed with fteadinefs, and in an ufo- ful direction ; and while it gratifies our curiofity, and animates our exertions, by exhibiting to us all the various bearings of our journey, can condud us to thofe eminences from whence the eye may wan- der over the vaft and unexplored regions of fcience. Lord Bacon was the firft perfon who took this com- prehenfive view of the different departments of flu- dy ; and who pointed out, to all the clafles of litera- ry men, the great end to which their labors fliould confpire ; the multiplication of the fources of human enjoyment, and the extenfion of man's dominion over nature. Had this objed been kept fteadily in view by his followers, their difcoveries, numerous and important as they have been, would have ad- vanced with ftill greater rapidity, and would have had a much more extenfive influence oi? the practic- al arts of life.* * Omnium autem gravissimns error in deviatione ab ultimo doc- trinarum fine consistit. nppetunt enim homines scientiara, alii ex insita curiositate et irrequieta ; alii animi causa et delectationis, alii existimationis gratia : alii contentionis ergo, atque ut in disser- endo superiorcs sint : plerique propter lucrum et victum; paocis»i- G so ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY From fuch a fyftem of logic, too, important aflift> ance might be expected, for reforming the eftablifbi- ed plan of public or academical education. It is melancholy to refled: on the manner in which this is carried on, in moll, perhaps, I might {:\y, in all the countries of Europe ; and that in an age of compar- ative light and liberality, the intelledual and moral chara^ers of youth fhould continue to be formed on a plan devifed by men, who were not only Rrangers to the buiinefs of the world, but who felt themfeives interefted in oppofmg the progrefs of ufeful knowl- edge. For accomplifhlng a reformation in the plan of ac- ademical ftudy, on rational and fyftematical princi- ples, it is neceffary, in the firfl place, to conlider the velation in which the different branches of literature, and the different arts and fciences, {land to each oth- er, and to the practical purpofes of life : and fecond- ly to conlider them in relation to the human mind, in order to determine the arrangement, bell fitted for unfolding and maturing its faculties. Many val- uable hints towards fuch a work may be collected from Lord Bacon*s writings, II. Another very important branch of a rational fyllem of logic (as I had occafion already to obferve) ought to be ; to lay down the rules of invelligation which it is proper to follow in the different fciences. In all of thefe, the faculties of the underflanding are the inftruments with which v/c operate ; and with- out a previous knowledge of their nature, it is im- pollible to employ them to the bell advantage. In every exercife of our reafoning and of our inven- tive powers, there are general laws which regulate the progrefs of the mind ; and when once thefe laws xni, ot donuna- rationis, divinitus datura, in usus hiimani generis im- pendant. Hoc enira illud est, quod reveradootrinamatqueartes oondecorarct, et attolleret, si cotitemplatio, et actio, arctiore quan* adbuc vinculo copularewtur. De Aug. Scient. lib. i. OF THE HUMAN IvllND, 51 are afcertained, they enable us to fpeculate and to invent, for the future, with more fyftem, and with a greater certainty of fu'-cefs. — ^In the mechanical arts, it is well known, how much lime and ingenui- ty are mifapplied, by thofe w^ho» acquire their prac- tical fldli, by their own trials, undire&d by the pre- cepts or example of others. What we call the rules of an art, are merely a coUedHon of general obferva- tions, fuggelled by long experience, with refpcd: to the moft compendious and eiFcdual means of perfor- ming every diiFerent ilep of the procefTes which the art involves. In confequence of fuch rules, the ar- tift is enabled to command the fame fuccefs in all his operations, for which the unlkilied w^orkman mufl truft to a happy <:ombination of accidental circum- ftances ; the mifapplications, too, of the labor of one race are faved to the next ; and the acquifition of pra<5tical addrefs is facilitated, by confining its exer- tion to one direction. The analogy is perfect, in thofe procefles which are purely inteiiefluai ; ard to regulate which, is the great object of logic. In the cafe of individuals, who have no other guide to di- rect them in their inquiries than their own natural fagacity, much time and ingenuity muil inevitably be thrown away, in every exertion of the inventive powers. In proportion, however, to the degree of their experience and obfervation, the number of thefe mifapplications will diminifli ; and the power of invention will be enabled to proceed with more certainty aiid fteadinefs to its object. The misfor- tune is, that as the aids which the underilanding de- rives irom experience, are feldom recorded in wri- ting, or even defcribed in words, every fucccedirg inquirer finds himfclf, at the commencement of his philofophical purfutts, obliged to ftruggle with the i'ame difadvantages which had retarded the progrefs of his predeceflbrs. If the more important praciic- .dl rules, which habits of invefiigation fuggelt to ixir 52 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY dividuals, were diligently preferved, each generation would be placed in circumftances more favorable to invention than the preceding ; and the progrefs of knowledge, inftead of cramping original geiiius, would affifl. and direct its exertions. In the infancy of literature, indeed, its range may be more un- bounded, and its accidental excuriions may excite more aftonilhment, than in a cultivated and enlight- ened age ; but it is only in fuch an age, that inven- tive genius can be trained by rules founded on the experience of our predeceflbrs, in fuch a manner as to infure the gradual and regular improvement of fcience. So juft is the remark of Lord Bacon ; '^ Certo fciant homines, artes inveniendi folidas et " veras adolefcere et incrementa fumere cum ipfis •^' inventis," The analogy between the mechanical arts, and the operations of fcientific invention, might perhaps be carried further. In the former, we know how much the natural powers of man have been allilied, by the ufe of tools and inflruments. Is it not pofli- ble to devife, in like manner, certain aids to our in- telledual faculties ? I'hat fuch a query is not altogether chimerical, ap- pears from the wonderful efFe6ls of algebra (which is precifely fuch aninftrument of thought, as I have been now alluding to) in facilitating the inquiries of mod- ern mathematicians. Whether it might not be pof- fible to realife a projecl which Leibnitz has fome- wherc mentioned, of introducing a fimilar contri- vance into other branches of knowledge, I fliall not take upon me to determine ; but that this idea has at leati feme plaulibility, mull, 1 think, be evident to thofe who have relieved on the nature of the general terms vthich abound more or lefs in every cultivated language; and which may be confidered as one fpecies of inftrumental aid, which art has difcovered to our intelledual powers. From the obfervations wbich I OF THE HUMAN MIND. am afterwards to make, it will appear, that, without general terms, all our reaibnings niuft neceffarily have been limited to particulars ; and, confequently, it is owing to the ufe of thefe, that the philofopher is enabled to fpeculate concerning clalTes of objects, with the fame faciUty with which the lavage or the peafant fpeculates concerning the individuals of which they are compofed. The technical terms, in the different fciences, render the appropriated lan- guage of philofophy a (till more convenient inftru- ment of thought, than thofe languages which have originated from popular ufe ; and in proportion as thefe technical terms improve in pomt of preciiion and comprehenlivenefs, they will contribute to ren- der our intellectual progrefs more certain and more rapid. " While engaged" (fays Mr. Lavoilier) " in " the compofition of my elements of Chemiftry, I " perceived, better than I had ever done before, the " truth of an obfervation of Condillac, that we think " only through the medium of words ; and that lan- " guages are true analytical methods. Algebra, " which, of all our modes af exprefTion, is the moft " fniiple, the moft exact, and the beft adapted to its " purpofe, is, at the fame time, a language and an " analytical method. The art of reafoiiing is noth- " ing more than a language well arranged." 'Ihe influence which thefe very enlightened and philo- fophical views have already had on the doctrines of chemiftry, cannot fail to be known to moft of my readers. The foregoing remarks, in fo far as they relate to the pofQbility of affifting our reafoning and inven- tive powers, by new inftrumentalaids, may perhaps appear to be founded too much upon theory ; but this objection cannot be made to the reafonings I have offered on the importance of the fludy of meth- od. — To the juftnefs of thefe, the whole hiftory of fcience bears teftimony j but more efpecially, the 54 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY hiftories of Phyfics and of pure Geometry ; which afFord fo remarkable an illuftration of the general doctrine, as can fcarcely fail to he fluisfa^lory, even to thofe who are the moft difpofed to doubt the ef- ficacy of art in directing the exertions of genius. With refpecl to the former, it is (ufiicient to men- tion the wonderful effeds which the writings of Lord Bacon have produced, in accelerating its pro- grefs, The philofophers, who ilourilhed before his time, were, undoubtedly, not inferior to their luc- cefTors, either in genius or induftry : but their plan of inveftigation was erroneous ; and their labours Iiave produced only a chaos of fictions and abfurdi- ties. The illullrations which his works contain, of the method of induction, general as the terms are, in which they are exprelTed, have gradually turned the attention of the moderns'to the rules of philofo- phifmg ; and have led the way to thofe important and fublime difcoveries in phylics, which reflect fo much honour on the prefent age. The rules of philofophifing, however, even in phyfics, have never yet been laid down with a fuf- ficient degree of precifion, minutenefs, or method ; Kor have they ever been ftated and illuftrated in fo clear and popular a manner, as to render them intel- Mgible to the generality of readers. The truth, per- haps, is ; that the greater part of phyfical inquirers have derived what knowledge of them they poiiefs, rather from an attention to the excellent models of inveftigation, which the writings of Newton exhibit, than from any of the fpeculations of lord Bacon, or his commentators : and, indeed, fuch is the incapa- city of moft people for abftract reafoning, that I am inclined to think, even if the rules of inquiry were delivered in a perfectly complete and unexceptiona- ble form, it might ftill be expedient to teach them to the majority of ftudents, rather by examples, than in the form of general principles. But it does not ■ OF THE HUMAN MIND. JJ therefore follow, that an attempt to illuftrate and to methodize thefe rules, would be uielefs ; for it mufl be remembered, that, although an original and in- ventive genius, like that of Newton, be fufficient to eftablifli a ftandard for the imitation of his age, yet, that the genius of Newton himfelf was encouraged and led by the light of Bacon's philofophy. The ufe which the ancient Greek geometers made of their analyfis^ affords an additional illuftration of the utility of method in guiding fcientific invention. To facilitate the ftudy of this fpecies of inveftigation, they wrote no lefs than thirty-three preparatory book ; and they confidered an addrefs, in the praclice of it, (or,asMarinus calls it a ot^va/^/j av«Ayr/>t*3) as of much more value, than an extenfive acquaintance with the principles of the fcience.* Indeed, it is well known, to every one who is at all converfant with geome- trical inveftigations, that although it may be poffible for a perfon, without the affiftance of the method of analyfis, to ftumble accidentally on a folution, or on a demonftration ; yet it is impoilible for him to pof- fefs a juft confidence in his own powers, or to carry- on a regular plan of invention and difcovery. It is well known, too, that an acquaintance with this me- thod brings geometers much more nearly upon a level with each other, than they would be other wife : not that it is poffible, by any rules, to fupercede, en- tirely, ingenuity and addrefs ; but, becaufe, in con- fequence of the uniformity of the plan on which the method proceeds, experience communicates a cer- tain dexterity in the ufe of it ; which muft in time gi*re to a very ordinary degree of fagacity, a fuperi- ority, on the whole, to the greateft natural ingenui- ty, unaffilled by rule.f * MsiC«v fr' T« Jtvaja/v a-ixhwi-Kr,* liTnaxaOxii rov TtcXXx'; a<7rodsi^Ei.; Ten ttrt fcspovi e%£'v. t " Mathematica molti sciunt, mathesin pauci. Aliud est enim nosse propobitiones aliquot, et nonnullas ex iis obvias elicere, casu 5Q ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY To thefe obfervations, I believe, I may add, that, .after all that was done by the Greek philofophers to facilitate mathematical invention, many rules ftil) re- main to be fugj>efted, which m.ight be of important ule, even in pure geometry. A variety of fuch oc- cur to every experienced mathematician, in the courfe of his inquiries, although, perhaps, he may not be at the trouble to ftate them to himfeif in words ; and it would plainly have faved him much expence of time and thought, befide enabling him to condud his refearches on a more regular plan, if he had been taught them fyftematically at the com- mencement of his ftudies. The more varied, abftrufe, and general inveftigations of the moderns, ftand in need, in a much greater degree, of the guidance of philofophical principles ; not only for enabling us to condud:, with fkill, our particular refearches, but for directing us to the different methods of reafoning, to which we ought to have recourfe on different occa- fions. A coUedion of fuch rules would form, what might be called with propriety, the logic of mathe- matics ; and would probably conrtibute greatly to the advancement of all thofe branches of knowledge, to which mathematical learning is fubfervient. The obfervations which have been now made, on the importance of method in conducting phyfical and mathematical refearches, particularly thofe which re- polios quam certa aliqua discurrendi norma, alind scientla? ipsius jnaturam nc iiidolem perspectam habere, in ejus se adyta penetrare, ot ab universaiibns instructum essepr^eceptis, quibustheoremata ac probleitiata innumera excogitandi,eademqnedenaon£trandi faci'ilas comparetur. Ut enim pictorum vulgu-; prototypon s?epe sappius f^xprimendo, quendam pingendi usunn, riuilam vero pictoriae artis quam optica suggorit,, scientiara adquirii, ita multi, lectis Euclidis et alionim geometrarum libris, eorura imitatione fingere proposi- tiones aliquas ac demons+rare sclent, ipsaai tainen secrelissimain dif- ficiliorumtheorematorn ac problemat um solvendimethodnmprorsus ignorant." — J mnuis de !a Fadle Tlieoremata de Centro Gravitatis, in praE?fat, — Antwerpla?, 1G33* OF THE HtJMAN MIND. 57 iate to the lafl of thefe fubjecls, will not apply lite- rally to our inquiries in metaphyfics, morals, or politics ; becaufe, in thefe fciences, our reafonings always confift of a comparatively fmall number of intermediate Heps ; and the obftacles which retard our progrefs, do not, as in mathematics, arife from the difficulty of finding media of comparifon among our ideas. Not, that thefe obftacles are lefs real, or more eafily furmounted : on the contrary, it feems to require a ftill rarer combination of talents to fur- mount them ; for how fmall is the number of indi- viduals, who are qualified to think juftly on meta- phyfical, moral, or political fubjecis ; in comparifon of thofe, who may be trained by practice to follow the longeft procefl'es of mathematical reafoning. From what thefe obftacles arife, I ftiall not inquire particularly at prefent. Some of the more impor- tant of them may be referred to the imperfedions of language ; to the difficulty of annexing prepfe and fteady ideas to our words ; to the difficulty, in fome cafes, of conceiving the fubje^ts of our reafon- ing ; and, in others, of difcovering, and keeping in view, all the various circumftances upon which our judgment ought to proceed ; and above all, to the prejudices which early imprefiions and aflliciations create, to warp our opinions. — To illuftrate thefe fources of error, in the different fciences which are liable to be affedled by them, and to point out the moft effedlual means for guarding againft them, would form another very interefting article, in a philofophical fyftem of logic. The method of communicating to others, the principles of the different fciences, has been as much negle^ed by the writers on logic, as the rule of in- veftigation and difcovery ; and yet, there is certain- ly no undertaking whatever, in which their affiftance is more indifpenfibly requifite. The firft principles of all the fciences are intimately connected with the H S8 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY pliilofaphy of the human mind ; and it is the proi' vince of the logician, to (late thefe in fuch a manner, as to lay a folid foundation for the fuperftructures- which others are to rear. — It is in ftating fuch prin- ciples, accordingly, that elementary writers are chief- ly apt to fail. How unfatisfaclory, for example, are the introductory chapters in moil fyftems of natural philofophy ; not in confequence of any defe<^ of phyfical or of mathematical knowledge in their authors, but in confequence of a want of attention to the laws of human thought, and to the general rules of juft reafoning ! The fame remark may be extended to the form, in which the elementary principles of many of the other fciences are com- monly exhibited ; and, if I am not miftaken, this want of order, among the firft ideas which they prefent to the mind, is a more powerful obftacle to the progrefs of knowledge, than is generally im- agined. I fliall only obferve farther, with refped to the utility of the philofophy of mind, that as there are fome arts, in which we not only employ the intellec- tual faculties as inttruments, but operate on the mind as a fubjedl ; fo, to thofe individuals who aim at excellence in fuch purfuits, the ftudies I have now been recommending are, in a more pecul- iar manner, interefting and important. In poetry, in painting, in eloquence, and in all the other fine arts, our fuccefs depends on the fkill with which we are able to adapt the efforts of our genius to the human frame ; and it is only on a phylofophical analyfis of the mind^ that a folid foundation can be laid for their farther improvement. Man, too, is the fubjedl on which the practical moralill and the en- lightened ftatesman have to operate. Of the former, it is the profeiTed object to engage the attention of individuals to their own bed interefis ; and to allure them to virtue and happinefs, by every confidera- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 3^ tion that can influence the underftanding, the imag- ination, or the heart. To the latter, is afligned the fublimer office of fecoriding the benevolent inten- tions of Providence in the adminiftration of humaa affairs ; to difFufe as widely and equally as poffible, among his fellow citizens, the advantages of the fe- cial union ; and, by a careful ftudy of the conftitu- ti'jn of man, and of the circumllances in which he is placed, to modify the political order, in fuch a man- ner as may allow free fcope and operation to thofe principles of intellectual and moral improvement, which nature has implanted in our fpecies. In all thefe cafes, I -am very fenfible, that the util- ity of fyftematical rules has been called in queftion by philofophers of note ; and that many plaufible arguments in fupport of their opinion, may be de- rived from the fmall number of individuals who have been regularly trained to eminence in the arts, in comparifon of thofe who have been guided mere- ly by untutored genius, and the example of their predeceflbrs. I know, too, that it may be urged with truth, that rules have, in fome cafes, done more harm than good ; and have milled, inilead of di- recling, the natural exertions of the mind* But, in all fuch inftances, in which philofpphical principles have failed in producing their intended effed, I will venture to alTert, that they have done fo, either in conlequence of errors, which were accidentally blen- ded with them ; or, in confequence of their poflesr fing only that flight and partial influence over the genius, which enabled them to derange its previous.- ly acquired habits ; without regulating its operations, upon a fyftematical plan, with lleadinefs and eflicacy. In all the arts of life, whether trifling or important, there is a certain degree of Ikili, which may be at- tained by our untutored powers, aided by imitation ; and this flsiill, inftead of being perfected by rules, may, by means of them, be diminilhcd or deflroyed. 60 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY if thefe rules are partially and imperfeclly appre- hended ; or even if they are not fo familiarized to the underftanding, as to influence its exertions uni- formly and habitually. In the cale of a mufical per- former, who has learned his art merely by the ear, tl'e firft effects of fyftematical inftru<5l".on are, I be- lieve, always unfavourable. The effecl is the fame, of the rules of elocution, when firfl communicated to one who has attained, by his natural tafte and good fenfe, a tolerable propriety in the art of reading. But it does not follow from this, that, in either of thefe arts, rules are ufelefs. It only follows, that, in order to unite eafe and grace with corrednefs, and to preferve the felicities of original genius, amidft thofe reftraints which may give them an ufeful di- rection, it is neceffary that the acquifltions of educa- tion fliould, by long and early habits, be rendered, in fome meafure, a fecond nature.— The fame obfer- vations will be found to apply, with very flight alter- ations, to arts of more ferious importance. — In the art of legiflation, for example, there is a certain de- gree of fkill, which may be acquired merely from the routine of bulinefs ; and when once a poUtician has been formed, in this manner, among the details of office, a partial ftudy of general principles, will be much more Hkely to lead him aflray, than to en- lighten his Gonducl. But there is neverthelefs a fcience of legiflation, which the details of office, and the intrigues of popular affemblies, will never com- municate ; a fcience, of which the principles muff: be fought for in the conftitution of human nature, and in the general laws which regulate the courfe of hu- man affairs ; and which, if ever, in confequence of the progrefs of reafon, philofophy fliould be enabled to affunie that afcendant in the government of the world, which has hitherto been maintained by acci- dent, combined with the paffions and caprices of a few leading individuals, may, perhaps, produce more OF THE HUMAN MIND. 61 perfed and happy forms of fociety, than have yet been realized in the hiftory of mankind. I have thus endeavored to point out, and illuftrate, a few of the moft important purpofes to which the philofophy of the human n\ind is fubfervient. It will not, however, I flatter myfelf, be fuppofed by any of my readers, that I mean to attempt a fyftem- atical work, on all, or any of the fubjefls I have now mentioned; the moft limited of which, would fur- nifh matter for many volumes. What I have aim- ed at, has been, to give, in the firft place, as diftin<5l and complete an analyfis as I could, of the principles, both intelledual and adive, of our nature ; and, in the fecond place, to illuftrate, as I proceed, the appli- cation of thefe general laws of the human conftitu- tion, to the uifFerent clafles of phenomena which re- fult from them. In the feleclion of thefe phenom- ena, although I have fometimes been guided chiefly by the curiofiry of the moment or the accidental courfe of my own ftudies ; yet, I have had it in view, to vary, as far as poffible, the nature of my fpeculations, in order to fliow how numerous and different the applications are, of which this philofo- phy is fufceptible. It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blamea- ble violation of unity in the plan of my work, till it be coniidered how far fuch a violation was ufeful for accomplifliing the purpofes for which I write. One fpecies of unity, I am willing to believe, an at- tentive reader will be able to trace in it ; I mean that uniformity of thought and deflgn, " which" (as But- ler well remarks,) "' we may always exped: to meet " with in the compofitions of the fame author, when " he writes with fimplicity, and in earneft." ELEMENTS OP THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. »e«4»9®@K^i€^90«»««ai CHAPTER FIRST. OF THE POWERS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. SECTION I. Of the Theories which have been formed by Philofophers^ to explain the manner in which the Mind perceives ex- ternal Objects, AMONG the various phenomena which the hu- man mind prefents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiofity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on be- tween the fentient, thinking, and aflive principle within us, and the material objects with which we are furrounded. How little foever the bulk of m?.n- kind may be difpofed to attend to fuch inquiries, there is fcarcely a perfon to be found, who has not occafionally turned his thoughts to that myfterious OF THE HUMAN MIND. 6& * influence, which the will pofleffes over the members of the body ;' and to thofe powers of perception, which feem to inform us, by a fort of infpiration, of the various changes which take place in the external univerfe. Of thofe who receive the advantages of a liberal education, there are perhaps few, who pafs the period of childhood, without feeling their curi- oiity excited by this incomprehenfible communica- tion between mind and matter. For my own part, at leaft, I cannot recollect the date of my earliefl fpeculations on the fubjed. It is to the phenomena of perception alone, that I am to confine myfelf in the following elTay ; and even with refpecl to thefe, all that I propofe, is to offer a few general remarks on fuch of the common miftakes concerning them, as may be moft likely to miflead us in our future inquiries. Such of my readers as wifh to confider them more in detail, will find ample fatisfadion in the writings of Dr. Reid. In confidering the phenomena of perception, it is natural to fuppofe, that the attention of philofophers would be directed, in the firft inftance, to the fenfe of feeing. The variety of information and of enjoy- ment we receive by it ; the rapidity with which this information and enjoyment are conveyed to us ; and above all, the intercourfe it enables us to maintain with the more dillant part of the univerfe, cannot fail to give it, even in the apprehenlion of the moil carelefs obferver, a pre-eminence over all our other perceptive faculties. Hence it is, that the various theories, which have been formed to explain the op- €i*atious of our fenfes, have a more immediate ref- erence to that of feeing j and that th^^ greater part of the metaphyfical language, concerning perception in general, appears evidently, from its etymology, to have been fuggefted by the phenomena of viiion. Even when applied to this fenfe, indeed, it can at moft amufethe fajicv, without conveying ui.v \ r*"*- 64 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY cife knowledge ; but, when applied to the other fen- ces, it is altogether abfurd and unintelligible. It would be tedious and uieiefs, to confider partic- ularly, the different hypothefis which have been ad- vanced upon this fubjeci: To all of them, I appre- hend, the two following remarks will be found ap- plicable : Firft, that, in the formation of them, their authors have been influenced by fome general max- ims of philofophifing, borrowed from phyiics 5 and, fecondly, that they have been influenced by an in- diftincl, but deep-rooted, conviction, of the immate- riality of the foul ; which, although not precife e- nough to point out to them the abfurdity of at- tempting to illuftrate its operations by the analogy of matter, was yet fufficiently ftrong, to induce them to keep the abfurdity of their theories as far as pof- iible out of view, by allufions to thofe phyfical fadls, in which the diflindtive properties of matter are the leaft grofsly and palpably expofed to our obfervation. To the former of thefe circumftances, is to be afcri- bed, the general principle, upon which all the known theories of perception proceed ; that, in order to explain the intercourfe between the mind and dif- tant objects, it is neceflary to fuppofe the exiftence of fomething intermediate, by which its perceptions are produced ; to the latter, the various metaphor- ical expreflions oi ideas ^ fpecks^ forms ^ fnadoivs^ phan- tafms^ images ; which, while they amufed the fancy with fome remote analogies to the objeds of our fen- fes, did not diredly revolt our reafon, by prefenting to us any of the tangible qualities ot body. " It was the doclrine of Ariftotle, (fays Dr. Reid) " that, as our fenfes connot receive external materi- " al objects themfelves, they receive their fpecies ; " that is, their images or forms, without the mat- " ter ; as wax receives the form of the feal, " without any of the matter of it. Thefe images '' or forms, imprefled upon the fenfes, are caliedyi?;. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 65 ^^ fihle fpecies ; and are the objeds only of the fenfi- " tive part of the mind : but by various, internal " powers, they are retained, refined, and fpirituali. " zed, fo as to become objects of memory and ima- " gination ; and at laft, of pure intelledion. When " they are objeds of memory and imagination, they " get the name o^phantafnu. When, by farther re- " finement, and being ftripped of their particulari- " ties, they become objects of (cience, they are caU " led intelligible /pedes : fo that every immediate ob- '' jecl, whether of fenfe, of memory, of imagination, " or of reafoning, muft be fome phantafm, or fpe- " cies, in the mind itfeif. '' The followers of Ariftotle, efpecially the fchool- '' men, made great additions to this theory ; which " the author himfelf mentions very briefly, and with ** an appearance of referve. They entered into large " difquifitions with regard to the fenfible fpecies, ** what kind of things they are j how they are fent *' forth by the objed, and enter by the organs of the " fenfes ; how they are preferved, and refined by va- " rious agents, called internal fenfes, concerning the " number and offices of which they had many con- " troverfies."* The Platonifts, too, although they denied the great dodrine of the Peripatetics, that all the objeds of human underftanding enter at firft by the fenfes ; and maintained, that there exift eternal and immu- table ideas, which were prior to the objeds of fenfe, and about which all fcience was employed ; yet ap- pear to have agreed with them in their notions con- cerning the ;[node in which external objects are per- ceived. This, Dr. Reid infers, partly from the fi- lence of Ariftotle about any difference between him- felf and his mafler upon this point ; and partly from a pafTage in the feventh book of Plato's Republic ; in which he compares the procefs of the mind in per- * Essajson the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 25. T 06 ELEMENTS Of THE PHILOSOPHY ception, to that of a perfon in a cave, who fees not external objecls themfelves, but only their fhadows.* " Two thoufand years after Plato, (continues Dr, " Reid,) Mr. Locke, who fludied the operations of *' the human mind fo much, and with fo great fuc- *' cefs, reprefcnts our manner of perceiving external *' objects, by a fimilitude very much refembling that *' of a cave. — " Methinks," fays he, " the under- *' (landing is not much unlike a clofet, wholly fhut *' from light, with only fome little opening left, to *' let in external vilible refemblances or ideas of *' things without. Would the pidures coming into *' fuch a dark room but ftay there, and lie fo orderly *' as to be found upon occafion, it would very much ** refemble the underftandingof i man, in reference " to all objeAs of fight, and the ideas of them."t " Plato's fubterranean cave, and Mr l^ocke's dark *' clofet, may be applied with eafe to all the fyftems " of perception, that have been invented : for they *' all fuppofe, that we perceive not external objeds ^' immediately ; and that the immediate objeds of *' perception, are only certain fliadows of the exter- *' nal objedls. Thofe fhadows, or images, which we *' immediately perceive, were by the ancients called ^^ fpecies^ forms^ phantafms. Since the lime of Des *' Cartes, they have commonly been called ideas ; J *' and by Mr. Hume, imprejjtons. But all the philof- *' ophers, from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in this, *' that we do not perceive external objeds immedi- *' ately ; and that the immediate obje<5l of percep- " tion muft be fome image prefent to the mind.'* On the whole. Dr. Reid remarks, " that in their *' fentiments concerning perception, there appears *' an uniformity, which rarely occurs upon fubjeds *^ of fo abftrufe a nature." § * Ibid. p. 99. t Locke on Human Understanding, book ii. chap. 1 1. § 17. t See Note [B.] § Reid, p. 1 1 6, 1 1 7. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 67 The very Ihort and imperfect review we have mow taken, of the common theories of perception, is almoft fuiEcient, without any commentary, to ef- tabliih the truth of the two general obfervations for- merly made ; for they all evidently proceed on a fuppofition, fuggefted by the phenomena of phyfics, that there muft of neceflity exift fome medium of communication between the objeds of perception and the percipient mind ; and they all indicate a fe- cret conviction in their authors, of the effential dif- tin<^ion between mind and matter ; which, although not rendered, by reflection, fufiiciently precife and fatisfadory, to fhew them the abfurdity of attempt- ing to explain the mode of their communication ; had yet fuch a degree of influence on their fpecula- tiong, as to induce them to exhibit their fuppofed medium under as myfterious and ambiguous a form as poflible, in order that it might remain doubtful, to which of the two predicaments, of body or mind, they meant that it fliould be referred. By refining away the grofler qualities of matter ; and by allu- fions to fome of the mod: aerial and magical appear- ances it aflumes, they endeavored, as it were, to fpir- ituahze the nature of their medium ; while, at the fame time, all their language concerning it, implied fuch a reference to matter, as was necerfary for fur- nifliing a plauiible foundation, for applying to it the received maxims of natural philofophy- Another obfervation, too, which was formerly hinted at, is confirmed by the fame hiftorical re- view ; that, in the order of inquiry, the phenome- na of vifion had firft engaged the attention of phi- lofophers ; and had fuggeiled to them the greater part of their language, with refpecl to perception in general ; and that in confequence of this circumflance, the common modes of expreflion on the fubjecl, un- philofophical and fanciful at beft, even when appli- ed to the fenfe of feeing,are,in the cafe of all the other 68 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fenfes, obvioufly unintelligible and felf-contradido- ry. — " As to the objeds of fight," fays Dr. Reid, " I *' underftand what is meant by an image of their .*' figure in the brain : but how fhall we conceive *' an image of their colour, where there is abfolute *' darknefs ? And, as to all other objects of fenfe, *' except figure and colour, I am unable to conceive " what is meant by an image of them. Let any" " man fay, what he means by an image of heat and " cold, an image of hardnefs or foftnefs, an image " of found, or fmell, or taile. The word i7nage^ when *' app[ied to thefe objeds of fenfe, has ablblutely no *^ meaning.'* — This palpable imperfedion in the ideal theory, has plainly taken rife from the natural or- der in which the phenomena of perception prefent themfelves to the curiofity. The miftakes, which have been fo long current in the world, about this part of the human conftitution, will, I hope, juftify me for profecuting the fubje<5l a little farther j in particular, for illufirating, at fome length, the firfi: of the two general remarks already referred to. This fpeculation I enter upon the more willingly, that it affords me an opportunity of dating fome important principles with refpedl to the objed, and the limits, of philofophical inquiry ; to which I ftiall frequently have occafion to refer, in the courfe of the following difquifitions. SECTION II. Of certain natural prejudices^ whithfeem to have given rife to the common Theories of Perception, IT feems now to be pretty generally agreed a- mong philofophers, that there is no inflance in which we are able to perceive a necelfary connexion between two fuccefiive events ; or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 09 as its caufe. From experience, indeed, we learn, that there are many events, which are conftantly conjoined, fo that the one invariably follows the oth- er : but it is poflible, for any thing we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a conftant one, as far as our obfervation has reached, may not be a necefl'ary connexion ; nay, it is poflible, that there may be no neceflary connexions among any of the phenomena we fee : and if there are any fuch connexions exifting, we may reft affured that we fliall never be able to difcover them.* I fhall endeavor to Ihew, in another part of this work, that the doctrine I have now ftated does not lead to thofe fceptical conclufions, concerning the exiftence of aFirft Caufejwhich an author of great in- genuity has attempted to deduce from it. At pref* ent, it is fufficient for my purpofe to remark, that the word caufe is ufed, both by philofophers and the vulgar, in two fenfes, which are widely different. — "When it is faid, that every change in nature indi- cates th© operation of a caufe, the word caufe exprefl". es fomething which is fuppofed to be neceffarily con- necled with the change ; and without which it could not have happened. This may be called the metaphyfical meaning of the word ; and fuch caufes may be called Tuetaphyfical or efficient caufes. — In nat- ural philofophy, however, when we fpeak of one thing being the caufe of another, all that we mean is, that the two are conftantly conjoined ; fo that, when we fee the one, we may expect the other. Thefe conjunftions we learn from experience alone ; and without an acquaintance with them, we could not accommodate our condud to the eftabliflied courfe of nature. — The caufes which are the objecEls of our inveftigation in natural philofophy, may, for the lake of diftindion, be cAled fby/icai caufes. ♦ See note [C]. 70 ELEMENTS OP THE PHILOSOPHY I am very ready to acknowledge, that this doc- trine, concerning the obje<^ of natural philoibphy, is not altogether agreeable to popular prejudices. When a man, unaccuftomed to metaphylical fpccu- lations, is told, for the firfl time, that the fcience of phylics gives us no information concerning the effi- cient caufes of the phenomena about which it is em- ployed, he feels fome degree of furprife and mortifi- cation. The natural bias of the mind, is furely to conceive phyfical events as fomehow linked togeth- er ; and material fubttances, as poffefled of certain powers and virtues, which fit them to produce par- ticular effed:s. That we have no reafon to believe this to be the cafe, has been fliewn in a very fatis- fa<5tory manner by Mr. Hume, and by other writ- ers ; and muft, indeed, appear evident to every per- fon, on a moment's refl?dion. It is a curious quef- tion, what gives rife to the prejudice ? In fiiating the argument for the exiftence of the Deity, feveral modern philofophers have been at pains to illuftrate that law of our nature, which leads us to refer every change we perceive in the univerfe, to the operation of an efficient caufe.* — This refer- ence is not the refult of reafoning, but neceflarily ac- companies the perception, fo as to render it impofli- ble for us to fee the change, without feeling a con- viction of the operation of some caufe by which it was produced ; much in the fame manner in which we find it to be impoflible to conceive a fenfation, without being imprefied with a belief of the exill- ence of a fentient being. Hence, I apprehend, it is, that when we fee two events conftantly conjoined, we are led to aflbciate the idea of caufation, or effi- ciency, with the former, and to refer to it that pow^ er or energy by which the change was produced ; in confequence of which aflbciation, we come to * See, in particular, Dr. Raid's Essays on the Intellectual Pow- ers of Man. OF THE HUMAN MIND* 71 Gonfider philofophy as the knowledge of efficient caufes ; and Jofe fight of the operation of mind, in producing the phenomena of nature. — It is by an af- fociation fomewhat fimilar, that we connect our fen- fations of color, with the primary qualities of body. A moment's refledion mutt fiatisfy any one, that the fenfation of color can only refide in a mind ; and yet our natural bias is iurely to connect color with extenfion and figure, and to conceive white^ blue, and yellow, as fomething fpread over the bodies. In the fame way, we are led to affociate with inanimate matter, the ideas oi power,force, energy, and caufation ; which are all attributes of mind, and can exitt in a mind only. This bias of our nature is ftrengthened by another aflbciation. Our language, with refpe6fc to caufe and efFedl, is borrowed by analogy from material objefts. Some of thefe we fee fcattered about us, without any connexion between them ; fo that one of them may be removed from its place, without difturbing the reft. We can, however, by means of fome ma- terial vinculum, conned two or more objects togeth- er ; fo that whenever the one is moved, the others Ihall follow. In like manner, we fee fome events, which occafionally follow one another, and which are occafionally disjoined : we fee others, where the fucceffion is conftant and invariable. The former we conceive to be analogous to obje<^s which are loofe, and unconneded with each other, and whofe contiguity in place, is owing merely to accidental pofition ; the others to objeds, which are tied to- gether by a material vinculum. Hence we transfer to fuch events, the fame language which we apply to conneded objeds. We fpeak of a connexion be- tween two events,andof a chain of caufes and effeds.* That this language is merely analogical, and that ♦ See Note [D.] 72 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY we know nothing of phylical events, but the laws which regulate their fucceflion, muft, I think, appear very obvious to every perfon who takes the trouble to refled on the fubjed ; and yet it is certain, that it has mifled the greater part of philofophers ; and has had a furprifmg influence on the fy Items, which they have formed in very different departments of fcience, A few remarks, on fome of the miftaken conclu- fions, to which the vulgar notions concerning the connexions among phyfical events have given rife, in natural philofophy, will illuftrate clearly the origin of the common theories of perception ; and will, at the fame time, fatisfy the reader, with refpedt to the train of thought which fuggelled the foregoing ob- fervations. The maxim, that nothing can adl but where it is, and when it is, has always been aumitied, with refpect to metaphyfical or efficient caufes. " Whatever ob- "jefls," fays Mr Hume, " are confidered as caufes " or effects, are contiguous ; and nothing can ope- " rate in a time or place, which is ever fo little re- ^* moved from thofe of its exiftence." " We may *' therefore (he adds) confider the relation of conti- " guity as eflential to that of caufation." — But al- though this maxim fhould be admitted, with ref- ped to caufes which are efficient, and which, as fuch, are neceflarily connected with their effects, tlv re is furely no good reafon for extending it to phyfical caufes, of which we know nothing, but that they are the conflant forerunners and iigns of certain nat- ural events. It may, indeed, be improper, accord- ing to this doctrine, to retain the expreffions, cavfe and effed;^ in natural philofophy ; but, as long as the prefent language upon the fubjed continues in ufe, the propriety of its application, in any particular in- ftance, does not depend on the contiguity of the two events in place or time, but folely on this queftion, whether the one event be the conftant and invaria- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 73 ble forerunner of the other, fo that it may be confid- ered as its infallible fign ? — Notwithftanding, how- ever, the evidence of this conclulion, philofophers have in general proceeded upon a contrary fuppofi- tion ; and have difcovered an unwillingnefs, even in phyfics, to call one event the caufe of another, if the fniaiieft interval of fpace or time exifted between them. In the cafe of motion, communicated by impulfe, they have no fcruple to call the impuUe the caufe of the motion ; but they will not admit that one body can be the caufe of motion in another, pla- ced at a diiimce from it, unlefs a connexion is car- ried on between them, by means of fome interven- ing medium. It is unneceffary for me, after what has already been faid, to employ any arguments to prove, that the communication of motion by impulfe, is as un- accountable, as any other phenomenon in nature. Thofe philofophers who have attended at all to the fubject, even they who have been the leall: fceptical with refped to caufe and effecl, and who have ad- mitted a neceifary connedlion among phyfical events, have been forced to acknowledge, that they could not difcover any neceifary connexion between im- pulfe and motion. Hence, fome of them have been led to conclude, that the impulfe only roufes the ac- tivity of the body, and that the fubfequent motion is the effed of this activity, conftantiy exerted. *' Motion," fays one writer, " is adion ; and a con- *' tinned motion implies a continued adion." " The " impulfe is only the caufe of the beginning of the *' motion ; its continuance muft be the effed of fome " other caufe, which continues to act as long as the *' body continues to move." The attempt which another writer of great learning has made, to revive the ancient theory of mind, has arifen from a firai- lar view of the fui>jecl before us. He could difcov- er no neceflary connection between impulfe and K 74 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY motion ; and concluded, that the impulfe was only the occafton of the motion, the beginning and con- tinuance of which he afcribed to the continued agen- cy of the mind with which the body is animated. Although, however, it be obvious, on a moment's confideration, that we are as ignorant of the con- nexion between impulfe and motion, as of the con- nexion between fire and any of the efFccbs we fee it produce, philofophers, in every age, feem to ha/e confidered the production of vnotion by impulfe, as almoft the only phyfical fact which flood in need of no explanation. When we fee one body attrad an- other at a diilance, our curiolity is roufed, and we inquire how the connexion is carried on between them. But when v/e fee a body begin to move in confequence of an impulfe which another has given it, we inquire no farther : on the contrary, we think a fa6t fufHciently accounted for, if it can be ihewn to be a cafe of impulfe. This difHnclion, between motion produced by impulfe, and the other phenom- ena of nature, we are led, in a great meafure, to make, by confounding together efficient and phyfi- calcaufesj and by applying to the latter, maxims which have properly a reference only to the former. — Another circumftance, likewife, has probably ci^n- liderabie influence : that, as it is by means of im- puiie alone, that we ourfelves have a power of mov- ing external objects ; this facl is more familiar to us from our infancy than any other ; and flrikes us as a fact which is neceflary, and which could not have happened otherwife. Some writers have even gone fo far as to pretend that, although the experiment had never been niiide, the communication of the mo- tion by impulfe, might have been predicted by rea- foning a prior u* * See an Answer to Lord Kainis's E?feay on motion ; by John Stewart. M. D. n OF THE HUMAN MIND. 75 From the following pafllige, in one of Sir Ifaac Newton's letters to Dr. Bentley, it appears that he fuppofed the communication of motion by impulfe, to be a phenomenon much more explicable, than that a connexion ihould fubfift between two bodies pla- ced at a diftance from each other, without any in- tervening medium. " It is inconceivable," fays he, ^' that inzinimate brute matter fhould, without the *' mediation of fomething elfe which is not material, " operate upon, and afl'ed other matter, without *' mutual contact ; as it muft do, if gravitation, in " the fenfe of Epicurus, be cilbntial and inherent in *' it. And this is one reafon why I defired that you ** would not afcribe innate gravity to me. That <« gravity fliould be innate, inherent, and effential to " matter, fo that one body may acl on another, *' through a vacuum, without the mediation of any " thing elfe, by and through which their adion and *' force may be conveyed from one to another, is to *' me fo great an abfurdity, that I believe no man ** who has, in philofophical matters, a competent ** faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it." With this paliage I fo far agree, as to allow that it is impoflible to conceive, in what manner one body afe on another at a dillance, through a vacuum. But I cannot admit that it removes the difficulty to fuppofe that the two bodies are in actual contact. That one body may be the efficient caufe of the mo- tion of another body placed at a dillance from it, I do by no means ailert ; but only, that we have as good reafon to l)^lieve that this may be poffible, as to believe that any one natural event is the efficient caufe of another. I have been led into this very long dlfquifition, concerning efficient and phyfical caufes, in order to point out the origin of the conunon theories of per- ception ; all of which appear to me to have taken rife from th« fame prejudice, which I have already 76 ELEMENTS OP THE PHILOSOPHY remarked to have had fo extenfive an influence up* op the fpeculatians of natural philofophers. That, in the cafe of the perception of diftant ob- jeds, we are naturally inclined to fufped, either fomething to be emitted from the object to the or- gan of lenfe, or fome medium to intervene between the object and organ, by means of whicli the former may communicate an impulfe to the latter ; appears from the common modes of expreflion on the fubjecl, which are to be found in all languages. In our own, for example, we frequently hear the vulgar fpeak, of light ftriking the eye ; not in confequence of any philofophical theory they have been taught, but of their own crude and undirected fpeculations. Per- haps there are few men among thofe who have at- tended at all to the hiftory of their own thoughts, who will not recoiled: the influence of thefe ideas, at a period of life long prior to the date of their philo- fophical ftudies. Nothing, indeed, can be conceiv* ed more fimple and natural than their origin. When an object is placed in a certain lituation with refpe(^ to a particular organ of the body, a perception arifes in the mind ; when the object is removed, the per- ception ceafes. * Hence we are led to apprehend fome connexion between the objed: and the per- ception ; and as we are accuftomed to believe, that matter produces its efFe<5ts by impulfe, we conclude that there muft be fome material medium interven- ing between the objed: and organ, by means of wJiich the impulfe is communicated from the one to the other. — That this is really the cafe, I do not mean * Turn porro varies rerum sentimus odores, Nee tamen ad nareis venienteis cernimus unquam : Nee calidos aestus tuimur, nee frigora quimus Usurpare oculis, nee voces cernere suemus ; (iua? tamen omnia corporea oonstare necesse 'st Natura ; quoniam sensus impellere possunt. LucRET. lib. i. p. 299. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 77 to difpute. I think, however, it is evident, that the exillence of fuch a medium does not in any cafe ap- pear a priori ; and yet the natural prejudices of men have given rife to an univerfal belief of it, long be- fore they were able to produce any good arguments in fupport of their opinion. Nor is it only to account for the connexion, be- tween the objed: and the organ of fenfe, that philof- ophers have had recourfe to the theory of impulfe. They have imagined that the imprellion on the or- gan of fenfe is communicated to the mind, in a fim- ilar manner. As one body produces a change in the ftate of another by impulfe, fo it has been fuppofed, that the external objeA produces perception, (which is a change in the ftate of the mind,) firft, by fome material impreflion made on the organ of lenfe ; and, fecondly, by fome material impreffion communica- ted from the organ to the mind along the nerves and brain. Thefe fuppofitions, indeed, as I had oc- calion already to hint, were, in the ancient theories of perception, rather implied than exprelTed ; but by modern philofophers, they have been ftated in the form of explicit propofitions. " As to the man- " ner," fays Mr, Locke, " in which bodies produce *' ideas in us ; it is manifeftly by impulfe, the only " way which we can conceive bodies operate in."* And Sir Ifaac Newton, although he does not fpeak of an impulfe made on the mind, plainly proceeded on the principle that, as matter can only move mat- ter by impulfe, fo no connexion could be carried on between matter and mind, unlefs the mind were prefent (as he exprelTes it) to the matter from which the iaft impreflion is communicated. " Is not'* (fays he) " the fenforium of animals, the place where the *' lentient fubftance is prefent ; and to which the " fenfible fpecies of things are brought, through the * Essay on Human Understanding, book ii. chap. viii. § 1 1. 78 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPPIY " nerves and brain, that there they may be perceiv- " ed by the mind prelent in that place ?" Dr. Clarke has expreffed the l-ime idea ftill more confidently, in the folh'wing pailage of one of his letters to Leib- nitz. " Without being prefent* to the images of *' the things perceived, the foul could not poflibly " perceive them. A living fubftance can only there *' perc(^ive, where it is prefent. Nothing can any *' more act, or be a(5led upon, where it is not prell *' ent, than it can when it is not." " How body " a6i:s upon mind, or mind upon body," (fays Dr. Porterfield,t) "I know not; but this 1 am very certain " of, that nothing can acf, or be a6led upon, where *' it is not ; and therefore, our mind can never per- *' ceive any thing but its own proper modifications, " and the various ftates of the fenforium, to which " it is prefent : fo that it is not the external lun and *' moon, which are in the heavens, which our mind ^^ perceives, but only their image or reprefentation, " impreffed upon the fenforium. How the foul of " a feeing man fees thefe images, or how it receives *' thofe ideas, from fuch agitations in the fenforium, * This phrase of " the soul he'mg present to the images of exter- nal objects," has been Ubed by many philosophers, siiice the time of Des Cartes ; evidently from a desire to avoid the absurdity of supposii)g, that images of extension and figure can exist in an un- ext ended mind. " Qurerib," (sti^^s Des Cartes liimrelf, in replying to the objec- tions of one of his antagonists) "quomodo exi&timjem in me tub- " jec*o inextenso recipi posse speciem, ideamve corporis quod ex- " tensum est. Respondeo nullam speciem corpoream in mente re- '' cipi, sed puram intellectionem tam rei corpcrt^ quam incorportae " fieri absque ulla specie oorporea ; ad iraaginationem vera, quae *' noil nisi de rebus corporeis esse potest, opus quidem esse specie *' qii« sit verura corpus, et ad quatn vienssc appUcct, sed non quae in " mente recipiatur." It appears, therefore, that this pkilcso- pher supposed hi- images, or ideas, to exist in the brow, aiKi not in the mind, Mr. I^cke's expressions sometimes imply the one supposition, and sometimes the other. tSee his Treatise on the Eye, vol. ii. p. 350. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 7& " I know not ; but I am fure it can never perceive *' the external bodies themfelves, to which it is not " prefent." *The fame train of thinking, which had led thefe philofophers to fuppofe, that external objects are per- ceived by means of fpecies proceeding from the ob- ject to the mind, or by means of fome material im- preffion made on the mind by the brain, has fuggeft- ed to a late writer a very different theory ; that the mind, when it perceives an external objedl, quits the body, and is prefent to the objefl of perception. " The mind," fays the learned author of Antient Metaphyfics,) " is not where the body is, when it *' perceives what is diftant from the body, either in " time or place, becaufe nothing can act, but w^hen, *' and where, it is. Now, the mind adis when it per- " ceives. The mind, therefore, of every animal who *' has memory or imagination, ads, and by confe- *' quence exifts, when and where the body is not ; *' for it perceives objects diftant from the body both " in time and place."! Indeed^ if we take for gran- ted, that in perception the mind acts upon the oi3Jecl, or the object upon the mind, and, at the fame time, admit the truth of the maxim, that " nothing can *' act but where it is," we muft, of neceilky, con- clude, either that obje<5ts are perceived in a way fim- ilar to what is fuppofed in the ideal theory, or that, * " The slightest philosophy" (says Mr. Hnme) "teaches us, that " nothing can ever be present to the mind, hot an image, or per- " ception ; and that the senses are only the inlets through which *' these images are conveyed ; without being able to produce any " immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The " table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther " from it : but the real table, which exists independent of us, buf- " fers no alteration : it was, therefore, nothing but its image which ** was present to the mind. These (he adds) are the obvious dic- " tates of reason." Essay on the Academical or ScnpricAL Philosophy. t Ant. Met. vol.ii. p. 300. 80 "^''^ ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSePHY in every acl of perception, the foul quits the body, and is prefent to the object perceived. And accor- dingly this alternative is exprefsiy ftated by Male- branche ; who differs, however, from the writer laft quoted, in the choice which he makes of his hypoth- efis ; and even refts his proof of its truth on the im- probability of the other opinion. " I fuppofe,** fays he, " that every one will grant, that we perceive not *' external objeds immediately, and of themfelves. " We fee the fun, the liars, and an infinity of objects " without us ; and it is not at all likely that, upon " fuch occafiQns, the foul failles out of the body, in or *' der to be prefent to the objects perceived. She fees '* them not therefore by themfelves ; and the im* " mediate objed of the mind is not the thing per- " ceived, but fomething which is intimately united " to the foul ; and it is that which I call an idea : fo " that by the word idea, I underftand nothing elfe *' here but that which is nearell to the mind when " we perceive any object. -It ought to be careful- " ly obferved, that, in order to the mind's perceiv- " ing any object, it is abfolutely necellary that the " idea of that object be actually prefent to it. Of *' this it is not poflible to doubt. The things which " the foul perceives, are of two kinds. They are " either in the foul, or they are without the foul. *' Thofe that are in the foul, are its Qwn thoughts ; *' that is to fay, all its different modifications. The *' foul has no need of ideas for perceiving thefe " things. But with regard to things without the " foul, we cannot perceive them but by means of " ideas." To thefe quotations, T fhall add another, which contains the opinion of BufFon upon the fubject. As I do not underftand it fo completely, as to be able to tranflateit in a manner intelligible to myfelf, I ihall tranfcribe it in the words of the author. " L'arae s'unit intimcment a tel objet qu*il iui plait^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. 81 " la diftance, la grandeur, la figure, rien ne peut *' nuire a cette union lorfque Tame la veut : elle fe " fait et fe fait en un inftant la volonte " n'eft elle done qi\'un mouvement corporel, et ia " contemplation un fimple attouchement ? Com- " ment cet attouchement pourroit-il fe faire fur un ^' objet eloigne, fur un fujet abftrait ? Comment " pourroit-il s'operer en un indent indivifible? A-t-on " jamais con9u du mouvement, fans qu'il y eut de " Tefpace et du tems ? La volonte, fi c'eil un mouve- " ment, n'eft done pas un mouvement materiel, et " fi Tunion de Tame a fon objet eft un attouchement, " un contaft, cet attouchement ne fe fait-il pas au " loin ? ce conta6l n'eft il pas une penetration ?" All thefe theories appear to me to have taken rife, firft, from an inattention to the proper object of philofophy, and an application of the fame general maxims to phyftcal and to efficient caufes ; and,fec- ondly, from an apprehenfion, that we underftand the connexion between impulfe and motion, better than any other phyftcal fact. From the detail which I have given, it appears how extenfive an influence this prejudice has had on the inquiries both of nat- ural philofophers and of metaphyficians. In the foregoing reafonings, I have taken for gran- ted, that motion may be produced by impulfe ; and have contented myfelf with aflerting, that this fadt is not more explicable, than the motions which the Newtonians refer to gravitation ; or than the inter- courfe which is carried on betvveen the mind and external objects in the cafe of perception. The truth, however, is, that fome of the ableft philofo- phers in Europe are now fatisfied, not only that there is no evidence of motion being in any cafe pro- duced by the a«5lual contadt of two bodies ; but that very ftrong proofs may be given, of the abfolute im- poflibility of fuch a fuppofttion ; and hence th^Y have been led to conclude, that all the eficofcs which I. S2 ELEMENTS OF tHE PHlLOSOPHr are commonly referred to impulfe, arife from a pow- er of repulfion, extending to a fmall and impercept- ible diftance round every element of matter. If this do&ine Ihall be confirmed by future fpeculations in phylics, it muft appear to be a curious circum- ftance in the hiftory of fcience, that philofophers have been fo long occupied in attempting to trace all the phenomena of matter, and even fome of the phenomena of mind, to a general facb, vi^hich, upon an accurate examination, is found to have no exig- ence.— I do not make this obfervation with a view to depreciate the labours of thefe philofophers ; for, although the fyftem of Bofcovich were completely eftabliihed, it would not diminifh, in the fmalieft de- gree, the value of thofe phy Ileal inquiries, which have proceeded on the common hypothefis, with re- fpe^t to impulfe. The laws which regulate the com- munication of motion, in the cafe of apparent con- tad, are the moft general fads we obferve among the terreftrial phenomena ; and they are, of all phyf- ical events, thole which are the moft familiar to us, from our earlieft infancy. It was therefore not on- ly natural but proper, that philofophers fhould be- gin their phyfical inquiries, with attempting to re- fer to thefe, (which are the moft general laws of na- ture, expofed to the examination of our fenfes,) the particular appearances they wifhed to explain. And, if ever the theory of Bofcovich fhould be complete- ly eftablifhed, it will have no other effect, than to re- folve thefe laws into fome principle ftill more general, without affeding the folidity of the common doc- trine, fo far as it goes. OF THE HUMAN MIND- .jS'3 SECTION III. Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the Subjed of Perception^ IT was chiefly in confequence of the fceptical con- clufions which Biihop Berkeley and Mr. Hume had deduced from the ancient theories of perception, that Dr. Reid was led to call them in queftion ; and he appears to me to have ihewn,'in the moft fatisfac- tory manner, not only that they are perfectly hy- pothetical, but that the fuppolitions they involve, are abfurd and impoflible. His reafonings, on this part of our conftitution, undoubtedly form the moft important acceflion which the philofophy of the hu- man mind has received fmce the time of Mr. Locke. But although Dr. Reid has been at nmv.h pains to overturn the old ideal fyftem, he has not ventured to fubftitute any hypothefis of his own in its place. And, indeed, he was too well acquainted with the limits prefcribed to our philofophical inquiries^ to think of indulging his curiofity, in fuch unprofita- ble fpeculations. All, therefore, that he is to be underftood as aiming at, in his inquiries concerning our perceptive powers is, to give a precife ftate of the fad, diverted of all theoretical expreflions ; in order to prevent phLlofophers from impofing on themfelves any longer, by words without meaning ; and to extort from them an acknowledgment, that, with refpetl to the procefs of nature in perception, they are no lefs ignorant than the vulgar. According to this view of Dr. Reid*s reafonings, on the fubjec^ of perception, the purpofe to which they are fubfervient may appear to fome to be of no very confiderable importance ; but the truth is, that one of the moft valuable effects of genuine phi- lofophy, is to remind us of the limited powers of the human underftanding ; and to revive thofe nat- S'if ELEMENTS OF THB PHILOSOPHY ural feelings of wonder and admiration, at the fpec- tacle of the univerfe, which are apt to languifti, in confequence of long familiarity. The moft profound difcoveries which are placed within the reach of our refearches lead to a confeffion of human ignorance ; for, while they flatter the pride of man, and increafe his power, by enabUng hi in to trace the fimple and beautiful laws by which phyfical events are regula- ted, they call his attention, at the fame time, to thofe general and ultimate fads which bound the narrow circle of his knowledge ; and which, by evincing to him the operation of powers, whofe nature muft for ever remain unknown, ferve to remind him of the infufficiency of his faculties to penetrate the fecrets of the univerfe. Wherever we dired our in quiries ; whether to the anatomy and phyfiology of animals, to the growth of vegetables, to the chemical attrac- tions and repulfions, or to the motions of the heav- enly bodies ; we perpetually perceive the effects of powers which cannot belong to matter. To a cer- tain length we are uble to proceed ; but in every refearch, we meet with a line, which no induflry nor ingenuity can pafs. It is a line too, which is marked with fulhcient diflinclnefs ; and which no man now thinks of pafling, who has jufl views of the nature and object of philofophy. It forms the feparation between that field which falls under the furvey of the phyfical inquirer, and that unknown region, of which, though it was neceflary that we fliould be affured of the exiftence, in order to lay a foundation for the doctrines of natural theology, it hath not pleafed the Author of the univerfe to re- veal to us the wonders, in this infant flate of our being. It was, in fad, chiefly by tracing out this line, that Lord Bacon did fo much fervice to fcience. Befides this effed, which is common to all our phiiofophical purfuits, of ia.preffing the mind wirli a fenfe of that myflerious agency, cr efficiency, into OF THE HUMAN MIND. 85 wLich general laws mufl be refolved ; they have a tendency, in many cafes, to counteracl the influence of habit, in weakening thofe emotions of wonder and of curiofity, w hich the appearances of nature are fo admirably fitted to excite. For this pnrpofe, it is neceilliry, either to lead the attention to fads which are calculated to ftrike by their novelty, or to prefent familiar appearances in a new light ; and fuch are the obvious eifccls of philofophical inquiries ; fometimes extending our views to objecls which are removed from vulgar obfervation ; and fometimes correding our firft apprehenfions with refpect to or- dinary events. — The communication of motion by impulfe, (as I already hinted,) is as unaccountable as any phenomenon we know ; and yet, moil men are difpofed to condder it, as a fact which does not re- fult from will, but from necefilty. To fuch men, it may be ufeful to dired their attention to the uni- verfal law of gravitation ; which, although not more wonderful in itfelf, than the common effeds of im- pulfe, is more fitted, by its novelty, to awaken their attention, and to excite their curiofity. If the theo- ry of Bofcovich (liould ever be cftablifhed on a fat- isfadory foundation, it would have this tendency in a Hill more remarkable degree, by teaching us that the communication of motion by impulfe, (which we are apt to confider as a neceflary truth,) has no exiftence whatever ; and that every cafe in whicli it appears to our fenfes to take place, is a phe- nomenon no lefs inexplicable, than that principle of attriclion which binds together the mod remote parts of the univerfe. If fuch, however, be the effects of our philofophi- cal purfuits when fuccefsfully conducted, it mull be confefled that the tendency of imperfcci or errone- ous theories is widely different. By a fpecious fo- lution of infuperable dilliculties, they fo dazzle and bewilder the underflanding, as, at once, to prevent 86 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY US from advancing, with fteadinefs, towards the lim- it of human knowledge ; and from perceiving the exiftence of a region beyond it, into which pliilofo- phy is not permitted to enter. In fuch cafes, it is the bufinefs of genuine fcience to unmaik the impof- ture, and to point out clearly, both to the learned and to the vulgar, what reafon can, and what (he cannot, accomplifti. This, I apprehend, has been done, with refped to the hiftory of our perceptions, in the mod fatisfactory manner, by Dr. Reid. ■ "When a perfon little accuftomed to metaphyfical fpeculations is told, that, in the cafe of volition, there are certain invifible fluids, propagated from the mind to the organ which is moved ; and that, in the cafe of perception, the exiftence and qualities of the external object are made known to us by means of fpecies, or phantafms, or images, which are prefent to the mind in the fenforium ; he is apt to conclude, that the intercourfe between mind and matter is much lefs myfterious than he had fuppofed ; and that, although thefe expreflions may not convey to him any very diftincl meaning, their import is perfectly underftood by philofophers. It is now, I think, pretty generally acknowledged by phyiiologifts, that the influence of the will over the body, is a myftery which has never yet been unfold- ed ; but, lingular as it m.iy appear. Dr. Reid was the firft perfon who had courage to lay completely afide all the common hypothetical lang;uas;e concern- ing perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain ftatement of the facl. To what then, it may be aflced, does this ftatement amount ? — Merely to this ; that the mind is fo for- med, that certain imprefiions produced on our or- gans of fenfe by external objecls, are followed by correfpondent fenfations ; and that thefe fenfations, (which have no more refemblance to the qualitievS of aiatter, than the words of a language have to thp • OF THE HUMAN MIN0. S7 things they denote,) are followed by a perception of fhe exiilence and qualities of the bodies by which the imprellions are made ; that all the fteps of this procefs are equally incomprehenfible ; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the con- nexion between the fenfation and the perception, as well as that between the impreflion and the fenfation, may be both arbitrary : that it is therefore by no means impoilible, that our fenfations may be merely the occafions on which the correfpondent perceptions are excited ; and that at any rate, the confideration of thefe fenfations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the exiftence and qualities of bo- dy. From this view of the fubjecl, it follows, that it is external objeds themfelves, and not any fpecies or images of thefe obje(5ls, that the mind perceives ; and that although, by the conftitution of our nature, certain fenfations are rendered the conftant antece- dents of our perceptions, it is juft as difficult to ex- plain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be, upon the fuppofition, that the mind were all at once infpired with them, with- out any concomitant fenfations whatever. Thefe remarks are general, and apply to all our various perceptions ; and they evidently flrike at the root of all the common theories upon the fub- jed. The laws, however, which regulate thefe per- ceptions, are different in the cafe of the different fen- fes, and form a very curious object of philofophical inquiry. — Thofe, in particular, which regulate the acquired perceptions of fight, lead to feme very in- terefling and important fpeculations ; and, I think, have never yet been explained in a manner com- pletely fatisfoclbry. To treat of them in detail, does not fall under the plan of this work ; but I fliall have occafion to make a few remarks on them, in tlie chapter on Conception. 88 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY In oppofltion to what I h;ive here obferved on the inaportance of Dr. Reid's fpecuLitions concerning our perceptive powers, I am fenfibie it may be ur- ged, that they amount merely to a negative difcovery ; and it is poflible, that fome may even be forward to remark, that it was unneceilary to employ fo much Jabor and ingenuity as he has done, to overthrow an hypothecs of which a plain account would have been a fufficient refutation. — To luch perfons, I would beg leave to fuggeft, that, although, in confe- quenceof the jufter .views in pneumatology, which BOW begin to prevail, (chiefly, I believe, in confe- quence of Dr. Reid's writings,) the ideal fyflem may appear to many readers unphilofophical and puerile ; yet the cafe was very different w^hen this author entered upon his inquiries : and I may even venture to add, that few politive difcoveries, in the whole hiftory of fcience, can be mentioned, w^hich found a jufter claim to literary reputation, than to have detected, fo cle2.rly and unanf\^'erably, the fallacy of an hypothelis, which has defcended to us from the earlieft ages of philofophy : and which, in modern times, has not only ferved to Berkeley and Hume as the bafis of their fceptical fyilems, but was adopted as an indisputable iratii by Locke, bv Clarke, and by Newton. SECTION IV. Of the Origin of our Knowledge. THE philofophers who endeavored to explain the operations of the human mind by the theory ot iaeas, and who took for grartfd, that in every exertion of thought there exiiis ii) ihe mind fomeobjcddii incl from the thinking fubltance were naturally led u> in- quire whence thele ideas derive their origin ; OF THE HUMAN MIND. 89 particular, whether they are conveyed to the mind from without by means of the fenfes, or from part of its original furniture ? Wich refpect to this queflion, the opinions of the ancients were various ; but as the influence of thefe opinions on the prevailing fystems of the prefent age is not very confiderable, it is not neceiliry, for any of the purpofes I have in view in this work, to conlid- er them particularly. The moderns, too, have been much divided on the fubjecl ; ft)me holding with Des Cartes, that the mind is furniihed with certain innate ideas ; others, with Mr. Locke, that all our ideas may be traced from fenfation and reflection ; and many, (efpecially among the later metaphyficians in France,) that they may be all traced from fenfa- tion alone. Of thefe theories, that of Mr. Locke deferves more particularly our attention ; as it has ferved as the bafis of moft of the metaphyfical fyftems which have appeared fince his time ; and as the difference be- tween it and the theory which derives all our ideas from fenfation alone, is rather apparent than real. In order to convey a juft notion of Mr. Locke's do(5trine concerning the origin of our ideas, it is ne- ceflary to remark, that he refers to fenfation, all the ideas which we are fuppofed to receive by the exter- nal fenfes ; our ideas, for example, of colours, pf founds, of hardnefs, of extenfion, of motion ; and, in fliort, of all the qualities and modes of matter ; to reflectioill the ideas of our own mental operations which we derive from confcioufnefs ; our ideas, for example, of memory, of imagination, of voHtion, of pleafure, and of pain. Thefe two fources, according to him, furnifli us with all our fimple ideas, and the only power which the mind poflcffes over them, is to perform certain operations, in the way of com- polition, abftradi()n,generalifition. &c on the mare- rials which it thus colleds in the courfe of its experi- M .90 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ence. The laudable defire of Mr. Locke, to intro- duce precifion and perfpicuity into metaphyfical fpeculations, and his anxiety to guard the mind againft error in general, naturally prepc ffefled him in favor of a dodrine, which, when compared with thofe of his predeceflbrs, was intelligible and fimple ; and which, by fuggefting a method, apparently eafy and palpable, of analyfing our knowledge into its elementary principles, feemed to furnifh an antidote againft thofe prejudices which had been favoured by the hypothecs of innate ideas. It is now a confid- erable time fince this fundamental principle of Mr. Locke's fyftem began to lofe its aut^rity in England j and the fceptical conclufions, whicWit had been em- ployed to fupport by fome later writers, furnifhed its opponents with very plaufible arguments againft it. The iate learned Mr. Harris, in particular, fre- quently mentions this doctrine of Mr. Locke, and always in terms of high indignation. " Mark," (fays he, in one paffage,) " the order cf things, according *' to the account of our later metaphyficians. Firft, *' comes that huge body, the fenfible world. Then " this, and its attributes, hegetfenfible ideas. Then, " out of fenfible ideas, by a kind of lopping and pru- " ning, are made ideas intelligible, whether fpecific *' or general. Thus, fliould they admit that mind *' was coeval with body ; yet, till body gave it ideas, " and awakened its dormant powers, it could at beft *' have been nothing more than a fort of dead capa- " city ; for innate ideas it could not po^bly have " any." And, in another paffage : " For my own *' part, when I read the detail about fenfation and re- *' fledion, and am taught the procefs at large how *' my ideas are all generated, I feem to view the hu- " man foul, in the light of a crucible, where truths " are produced by a kind of logical chemiftry." If Dr. Reid's reafonings on the fubjed: of ideas be admitted, all thefe fpeculations with refpecl to their mm OF THE HUMAN MIND. 51 origin fall to the ground ; and the queftion to which they rela' e, is reduced merely to a queftion of facl ; concerning the occalions on which the mind is Hrft le^l to form thofe fimple notions into which our thoughts may be analyfed, and which may be con- lidered as the principles or elements of human knowledge With refped to many of thefe notions, this inquiry involves no difficulty. No one, for ex- ample, can be at a lofs to afcertain the occalions on which the notions of colours and founds are fi^-ft for- med by the mind : for thefe notions are confined to individuals who are pofleffed of particular fenfes, and cannot, by any combination of words, be conveyed to thofe who never enjoyed the ufe of them. The hiftory of our notions of extenfion and figure, (which may be fuggefted to the mind by the exercife either of fight or of touch,) is not altogether fo obvious ; and accordingly, it has been the fubjecl of various controverfies. To trace the origin of thefe, and of our other iimple notions with refped: to the qualities of matter ; or, in other words, to defcribe the oc- calions on which, by the laws of our nature, they are fuggefted to the mind, is one of the leading ob- jects of Dr. Reid's inquiry, in his analyfis of our ex- ternal fenfes ; in which he carefully avoids every hy- pothefis with refpecl to the inexplicable phenomena of perception and of thought, and confines himfelf fcrupuloufly to a literal ftatement of fads. — Similar inquiries to thefe, may be propofed, concerning the occafions on which we form the notions of iime^ of motion, of number, of caufaiion, and an infinite variety of others. Thus, it has been obferved by different authors, that every perception of change fuggefts to the mind the notion of a caufe, without which that change could not have happened. ,Dr. Reid remarks, that, without the faculty of memory, our perceptive powers could never have led us to form the idea of motion, I fliall afterwards fliew, in the fequel of this 9^ ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY work, that without the fame faculty of memory, we never could have formed the notion of time ; and that without the faculty of abftradion, we could not have formed the notion of number. — Such inquiries, with refpedl to the origin of our knowledge, are curious and important ; and if conduced with judg- ment, they may lead to the moft certain conclu lions ; as they aim at nothing more than to afcertain fadls, which, although not obvious to fuperficial obfervers, may yet be difcovered by patient inveftigation. From the remarks which have been juft made on our notions of titne, of motion, and of number, it is evident, that the inquiry concerning the origin of human knowledge cannot poflibly be difculTed at the commencement of fuch a work as this; but that it muft be refumed in different parts of it, as thofe fa- culties of the mind come under our view, with which the formation of our different (impie notiong is conneded. With refped to the general queftion. Whether all our knowledge niay be ultimately traced trom our fenfations ? 1 fiiall only obferve at prefent, that the opinion we form concerning it, is of n^uch lefs cbnfequence than is commonly fuppofed. That the mind cannot, without the groffefl abfurdity, be con- fidered in the light of a receptacle which is gradual- ly furnifhed from without, by materials introduced by the channel of the fenfes ; nor in that of a tabula rufa., upon which copies or refemblances of things external are imprinted ; I have already Ihewn at fuflicient length. Although, therefore, we fliould acquiefce in the conclufion, that, without our organs of fenfe, the mind muff have remained deftitute of knowledge, this conceilion could have no tendency whatever to favour the principles of materialifm ; as it implies nothing more than that the impreffions made on our fenies by external objeds, furniih the Qccafions on which the mind, by the laws of its con- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 05 ftitution, is led to perceive the qualities of the mate- rial world, and to exert all the different modifica- tions of thought of which it is capable. From the very fli.';ht view of the fubje^t, howev- er, which has been already given, it is fufficiently ev- ident, that this dodlrine, which refers the origin of all our knowledge to the occa(it)ns furniflied by ferfe, mud be received with many limitations. "1 hat th'-fe ideas, which Mr. Locke calls ideas of refledlion, (or, in other words, the notions which we form of the fubje^ts of our own confcioulnefs,) are not fuggeft- ed to the mind immediately by the fenfations arif- ing from the ufe of our organs of perception, is granted on all hands; and, therefore, the anount of the doclrine now mentioned, is nothing more than this ; that the firft occaiions on which our va- rious intellectual faculties arc exercifed, are furrifh- ed by the impreflions made on our organs of dnie ; and confequently, that, without thefe impreflions, it would have been impoffible for us to arrive at the knowledge of our faculties. Agreeably to this ex- planation of the doctrine, it may undoubtedly be faid with plaufibility, (and, I am inclined to believe, with truth,) that the occaiions on which all our no- tions are formed, are furniflied either immediately or ultimately by fenfe ; but, if I am not much mil- taken, this is not the meaning which is commonly annexed to the dodrine, either by its advocates or their opponents. One thing at leaft is obvious, th;it, in this fenfe, it does not lead to thofe confequerces which have interefted one party of philofophers in its defence, and another in its refutation. There is another very important confideration which deferves our attention in this argument: that,even on the fuppofition that certain iir.prelTions on our organs of fenfe are neceffary to awaken the mind to a con- fcioufnefs of its own exiftence, and to give rife to the exercife of its various faculties j yet all this might y4 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY have happened, without our having any knowledge of the qualities, or even of the exiftence, of the ma- terial world. . To facilitate the admiflion of this pro- pofition, let us liippofe a being formed in every oth- er refpecl like man ; but pofleffed of no fenfes, ex- cepting thofe of hearing and fmelling. I make choice of thele two fenfes, becaufe it is obvious, that by means of them alone we never could have arrived at the knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, or even of the exiftence of things external. All that we could poflibly have inferred from our occafional fenfations of fmell and found, would have been, that there exifted fome unknown caufe by*' which they were produced. Let us fuppofe then a particular fenfation to be ex- cited in the mind of fuch a being. The moment this happens, he muft necelTarily acquire the knowl- edge of two facts at once : that of the exiftence of the fenfation ; and that of his own exiftence^ as a fenti- ent being. After the fenfation is at an end, he can remember he felt it ; he can conceive that he feels it a- gain. If he has felt a variety of different fenfations, he can compare them together in refpecl of the pleaf- ure or the pain they have aff*orded hini ; and will naturally defire the return of the agreeable fenfations, and be afraid oi the return of thofe which were pain- ful. If the fenfations of fmell and found are both excited in his mind at the fame time, he can attend to either of them he chufes, and withdraw his at- tention from the other ; or he can withdraw his at- tention from both, and fix it on fome fenfation he has felt formerly. In this manner, he might be led, merely by fenfations exifting in his mind^ and con- veying to him no information concerning matter, to exercife many of his moft important faculties ; and amidft all thefe different modifications and ope- rations of his mind, he would feel, with irrefiftible convidion, that they all belong to one and the fame OF THE HUMAN MIND, 95 fentient and intelligent being ; or, in other words, that they ar« all modifications and operations of himfelf. — I fay nothing, at prefent, of the various fimple notions, (or fimple ideas, as they are com- monly called,) which would arife in his mind ; for example, the ideas of number^ of duration^ of caufe and effeByOiperfonal identity; all of which, though per- fedly unlike his fenfati(Mis, could not fail to be fug- gefted by means of them. Such a being, then, might kn^w all that we know of mind at prefent ; and as his language would be appropriated to mind folely, and not borrowed, by analogy, from material phe- nomena, he would even poffefs important advanta- ges over us in conducing the ftudy of pneumatol- From thefe obfervations it fufEciently appears, what is the real amount of the celebrated doctrine, which refers the origin of all our knowledge to our fenfations ; and that, even granting it to be true, (which, for my own part, I am difpofed to do, in the fenfe in which I have now explained it,) it would by no means follow from it, that our notions of the op- erations of mind, nor even many of thofe notions which are commonly fuggefted to us, in the jirji in- fiance^ by the perception of external objects, are ne^ cejfarily fubfequent to our knowledge of the qualities, or even of the exiftence, of matter. The remarks which I have offered on this dodrine will not appear fuperfluous to thofe who recollect that, although it has, for many years paft, been a fubjed of controverfy in England, it continues ftill to be implicitly adopted by the bell philofophical writers in France ; and that it has been einployed by fome of them to fupport the fyftem of material- ifm ; and by others to (hew, that the intellectual diftin(5tions between man and brutes, ariie entirely from the differences in their animal orgimization, and in their powers of external perception. 96 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER SECOND. Of Attention. AVHEN we are deeply engaged in converfation, or occupied with any fpeculation that is interefting to the mind, the furrounding objedls either do not produce in us the perceptions they are fitted to ex- cite ; or thefe perceptions are inftantly forgotten. A clock, for example, may ilrike in the fame room with US5 without our being able, next moment, to recoiled whether we heard it or not. In thefe, and limilar cafes, I believe, it is com- monly taken for granted, that we really do not per- ceive the external objed. From fome analogous fads, however, I am inclined to fufped that this opinion is not well founded. A perfon who falls afleep at church, and is fuddenly awaked, is unable to recoiled the iaft words fpoken by the preacher ; or even to recoiled that he was fpeaking at all. And yet, that fleep does not fufpend entirely the powers of perception, may be inferred from this, that if the preacher were to make a fudden paufe in his dif- courfe, every perfon in the congregation who was afleep would inftantly awake. In this cafe, there- fore, it appears, that a perfon may be confcious of a perception, without being able afterwards to recolr led it. Many other inllances of the fame general fad might be produced. When we read a book, (efpe- cially in a language which is not perfedly familiar to us,) we muft perceive fucccflively every different letter, and muft afterwards combine thefe letters in- to fylldbles and words, before we comprehend the meaning of a fentence. This procefs, however, pas- fes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 97 It has been proved by optical writers, that, in per- ceiving the diftances of vifible objects from the eye, there is a judgment of the underflanding antecedent to the perception. In fome cafes this judgment is founded on a variety of circumftances combined to- gether ; the conformation of the organ neceflary for diftind; vifion ; the incUnation of the optic axes ; the diftincVnefs or indiftindnefs of the minute parts of the objed: ; the diftances of the intervening ob- jeds from each other, and from the eye ; and, per- haps, on other circumftances befidesthefe : and yet, in confequence of our familiarity with fuch procef- fes from our earlieft infancy, the perception feems to be inftantaneous ; and it requires much reafon- ing, to convince perfons unaccuftomed to philofoph- ical fpeculations, that the fad: is otherwife. Another inftance of a ftill more familiar nature, may be of ufe for the farther^illuftration of the fame fubjed. It is well known, that our thoughts do not fucceed each other at random, but according to cer- tain laws of aftbciation, which modern philofophers have been at much pains to inveftigate. It frequent- ly, however, happens, particularly when the mind is animated by converfation, that it makes a fudden tranlition from one fubjed: to another, which, at firft view, appears to be very remote from it ; and that it requires a confiderable degree of refledion, to ena- ble the perfon himfelf by whom the tranfition was made, to afcertain what were the intermediate ideas. A curious inftance of fuch a fudden tranfition is mentioned by Hobbes in his Leviathan. " In a com- *' pany,*' (fays he,) " in which the converfation turn- *' ed on tlie civil war, what could be conceived more " impertinent, than for a perfon to afk abruptly, " What was the value of a Roman denarius ? On a " little rciledion, however, I was eafily able to trace *' the train of thought ^a hich fuggefted the queftion : " for the original fuljedl of diicourie naturally in- N 98 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY *' troduced the hiftory of the King, and of the treach- " ery of thofe who furrendered his perfon to his en- '' emies ; this again introduced the treachery of Ju- *• das Ifcariot, and the f^m of money which he re- *' ceived for his reward. — And all this train of i- " deas," fays Hobbes, " palTed through the n)ind of " the fpeaker in a twinkling, in confequence of the *' velocity of thought." It is by no means improb- able, that if the fpeaker himfelf had been interroga- ted about the connection of ideas, which led him a- iide from the original topic of difcourfe, he would have found himfelf, at firft, at a lofs for an anfwer. In the inftances which have been laft mentioned, we have alfo a proof, that a perception, or an idea, which palTes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory, may yet ferve to introduce other ideas connected with it by the laws of aflbcia- lion. Other proofs of this important fact ihall be mentioned afterwards. When a perception or an idea paffes through the mind, without our being able to recoiled it next moment, the vulgar themfelves afcribe our want of memory to a want of attention. Thus, in the in- ftance already mentioned, of the clock, a perfon, up- on obferving that the minute hand had juft paffec twelve, would naturally fay, that he did not atten( to the clock when it was ftriking. There feemsj therefore, to be a certain effort of the mind upoaj which, even in the judgment of the vulgar, memo-j ry in fome meafure depends ; and which they dif- tinguifh by the name of attention. The connexion between attention and memory, has been remarked by many authors. " Nee dubi- " urn eft," (fays Quindilian, fpeaking of memory,) " quin plurimum in hac parte, valeat mentis inten- *' tio, et velut acies luminum a profpeclu rerum quas| " intuetur non averfa.'* The fame obfervation has OF THE HUMAN MIND. i)9 Ibeen made by Locke,* and by mod of the writers on the fubjed of education. But although the conne6lion between attention and memory has been frequently remarked in gene- ral terms, I do not recoiled that the power of atten- tion has been mentioned by any of the writers on pneumatology, in their enumeration of the faculties of the mind f ; nor has it been confidered by any one, fo far as I know, as of fufficient importance to de- ferve a particular examination. Helvetius, indeed, in his very ingenious work, De I'Efprit, has entitled one of his chapters, De Tinegale capacite d' Atten- tion ; but what he confiders under this article, is chiefly that capacity of patient inquiry, (or as he calls it, une attentmifuivie^) upon which philofophical genius feems in a great meafure to depend. He has alfo remarked,! with the writers already mentioned, that the impreflion which any thing makes on the memory, depends much on the degree of attention Memory depends much on attention and repetition." Locke's , b. i. chap. X. t Some important observations on the subject of attention occur in different parts of Dr. lleid's writings ; particularly in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 62. ; and in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 78, et seq. — To this ingenious au- thor we are indebted for the remark, that attention to things ex- ternal, is properly called vhservatJon; and attention to the subjects of our consciousness, rejlectlon. He has also explained the causee of the peculiar difficulties which accompany this last exertion of the mind, and which form the chief obstacles to the progress of pneu- matology. I shall have occasion, in another part of this work, to treat of habits of inattention in general, and to suggest some prac- tical hints with respect to the culture both of the powers of obser- vation and reflection. The view which ] propose to take of at- tention at present, is extremely limited ; and is intended merely to comprehend such general principles as are necessary to prepare the reader for the chapters which are to follow. X " C'est Pattention, plus ou moins grande, qui grave plus au ** moins prpfondement les objets dans la memoire^." ]00 ELEMENTS 0? THB J>H1LOSOPHY we give to it ; but he has taken no notice of that ef- fort which is abfohitely effential to the lovveft degree of memory. It is this effort that I propofe to con- lider at prefent ; — not thofe different degrees of at- tention which imprint things more or lefs deeply on the mind, but that ad or effort without which we hav^e no recolieclion or memory whatever. With refpe^l to the nature of this effort, it is per- haps impoffible for us to obtain much fatisf action. We often fpeak of greater and lefs degrees of atten- tion ; and, I believe, in thefe cafes, conceive the mind (if I may ufe the exprelTion) to exert itfelf with different degrees of energy. I am doubtful, however, if this expreflion conveys any diflin^l mean- ing. For my own part, I am inclined to fuppofe, (though I would by no means be undorflood to ^eak with confidence,) that it is effential to memo- ry, that the perception or the idea that we would wifh to remember, fliould remain in the mind for a certain fpace of time, and fhould be contemplated by it exclufively of every thing elfe ; and that atten- tion confiits partly (perhaps entirely) in the effort of the mind, to detain the idea or the perception, and to exclude the other objeds that folicit its no- tice. Notwithflanding, however, the difficulty of afcer- taining, in what this ad: of the mind confifls, every perfon mufl be fatisfied of its reality from his own conicioufnefs ; and of its effential connexion with the power of memory. I have already mentioned feveral inflances of ideas pafling through the mind, without our being able to recollecfc them next mo- ment. Thefe inllances were produced, merely to illuftrate the meaning I annex to the word atten- tion ; and to recall to the recolledion of the reader, a few flriking cafes, in which the poflibility of our carrying on a procef s of thought, which we are una- ble to attend to at the time, or to remember after- OP ttiE HUMAN MIND. 101 wards, is acknowledged in the received fyftems of philofophy. I (hall now mention fome other phe- nomena, which appear to me to be very iimilar to thefe, and to be explicable in the fame manner ; al- though they have commonly been referred to very different principles. The wonderful effed: of pra6lice in the formation of habits, has been often, and juftly, taken notice of, as one of the moft curious circumftances, in the hu- man conftitution. A mechanical operation, for ex« ample, which we at firft performed with the utmoft difficulty, comes, in time, to be lo familiar to us, that we are able to perform it without the fmalleft danger of miftake ; even while the attention ap- pears to be completely engaged with other fubjecls. The truth feems to be, that in confequence of the aflbciation of ideas, the different fleps of the procefs prefent themfelves fucceflively to the thoughts, without any recollection on our part, and with a degree of rapidity proportioned to the length of our experience ; fo as to fave us entirely the trouble of hefitation and reflection, by giving us every moment a precife and fteady notion of the effed to be pro- duced.* In the cafe of fome operations which are very fa- miliar to us, we find ourfelves unable to attend to, or to recollect, the a<51:s of th^ will by which they were preceded ; and accordingly, fome philofophers of great eminence have called in queflion the exift- ence of fuch volitions ; and have reprefented our habitual adions as involuntary and mechanical. But * I do not mean by this observation, to call in question the ef. fects which the practice of the mechanical arts has on the muscles of the body. These are as indisputable as its effects on the mind. A man who has been accustomed to write with his right hand, can write better with his left hand, than another who never practised the art at all ; but he cannot write so well with his left hand &s with his right. —The effects of practice, therefore, it should seem, ire produced partly on the mind, and partly on the body. i02 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY furely the circumftance of our inability to recolle£l our volitions, does not authoriCc us to difpute their poffibility ; any more than our inability to attend to the procefs of the mind, in eftimating the diftance of an objecl: from the eye, authorifes us to af- firm that the perception is inftantaneous. Nor does it add any force to the objection to urge, that there are inftances in which we fmd it diflicult, or per- haps impolTible, to check our habitual actions by a contrary volition. For it mufi: be remembered, that this contrary volition does not remain with us ftead- ily during the whole operation ; but is merely a general intention or refolution, which is baniflied from the m nd, as foon as the occafion prefents it- felf, with which the habitual train of our tlioughts and volitions is afTociated.* It may indeed be faid, that thefe obfervations on- ly prove thepoflibility that our habitual actions may be voluntary. But if this be admitted, nothing more can well be required ; for furely, if thefe phenom- ena are clearly explicable from the known and acknowledged laws of the human mind, it would be unphilofophical to devife a new principle, on pur- pose to account for them. The doctrine, therefore, which I have laid down with refpect to the nature * The solution of this difficulty, which is given by Dr. Porter- fieldjis somewhat curious. " Such is the power of custom and habit, that many actions, " which are no doubt voluntary, and proceed from owr mind, are ** in certain circumstances rendered necessary, so as to appear alto- ** gether mechanical, and independent of our wills ; but it does not •* from thence follow, that ov mind is not concerned in such mo- ** tions, but only that it has imposed upon itself a law, whereby it " regulates and governs them to the greatest advantage. In all this, " there is nothing of intrinsical necessity ; the mind is at absolute '* liberty to act as it pleases ; but being a wise agent, it cannot ** chuse but to act in conformity to this law, by reason of the utility " and advantage that arises from this way of acting." Treatise on the Eye, vol. ii. p, IT I OF THE HUMAN MIND. 105 of habits, is by no means founded on hypothefis, as has been objected to me by fome of my friends ; but, on the contrary, the charge of hypothecs falls on thofe who attempt to explain them, by faying that they are mechanical or automatic ; a dodrine which, if it is at all intelligible, muft be underftood as im- plying the exiftence of fome law of our conttitution, which has been hitherto unobferved by philofophers ; and to which, I believe, it will be difficult to find any thing analogous in our conftitution. In the foregoing obfervations, I have had in view a favourite doctrine of Dr. Hartley's ; which has been maintained alfo of late by a much higher au- thority, I mean Dr. Reid. " Habit"* (fays this ingenious author) " differs " from inftindt, not in its nature, but in i:s origin ; *' the laft being natural, the firil acquired. Both " operate without will or intention, without thought, *' and therefore may be called mecanical principles.** In another paffage,t he exprefles hinifeif thus ; " I *' conceive it to be a part of our conftitution, that ** what we have been accuftomed to do, we acquire *' not only a facility but a pronenefs to do on like " occafions ; fo that it requires a particular will or " effort to forbear it, but to do it requires, %rory often, « no will at all." The fame dodrine is laid down Hill more explicit- ly by Dr. Hartley. " Suppofc," (fays he,) " a perfon who has a perfeft- " ly voluntary command over his fingers, to begin to " learn to play on the harpfichord. The firlt ftep is *' to move his fingers from key to key, with a flow *' motion, looking at the notes, and exerting an ex- " prefs act of volition in every motion. By degrees ' tlie motions ding to one another, and to the inv * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 128. t Ibid.' p. 130. 104 ELEMENTS OF THE PHULOSOPHV ' " preffions of the notes, in the way of aflbciation, fo " often mentioned, the acls of volition growing lefs " and lefs exprefs all the time, till at laft they become " evanefcent and imperceptible. For an expert per- " former will play from notes, or ideas laid up in " the memory, and at the fame time carry on a quite « different train of thoughts in his mind ; or even " hold a converfiuion with another. Whence we " may conclude, that there is no intervention of the *• idea, or ftate of mind, called Will.*** Cafes of this fort, Hartley calls " tranfitions of voluntary ac- " tions into automatic ones.'* I cannot help thinking it more philofophlcal tCf fuppofe, that thofe actions which are originally vol- untary, always continue fo ; although, in the cafe of operations which are become habitual in confequence of long practice, we may not be able to recollect every different volition. Thus, in the cafe of a performer on the harpfichord, I apprehend, that there is an aft of the will preceding every motion of every finger, although he may not be able to recolle6t thefe voli- tions afterwards ; and although he may, during the time of his performance, be employed in carrying on a feparate train of thought. For, it muft be ren ark- ed, that the moft rapid performer can, when he piea- fes, play fo Howly, as to be able to attend to, and to recoiled, every feparate aft of his will in the various movements of his fingers ; and he can gradually ac- celerate the rate of his execution, till he is unable to recolleft thefe afts. Now, in this inftance, ore o< two fuppolitions mufl be made ; the one is, that th^ operations in the two cafes are carried on precifei] in the fame manner, and differ only in the degree oi rapidity ; and that when this rapidity exceeds a cer^ tain rate, the afts of the will are too monu r tary to leave any impreflion on the memory. — The other is, * Vol. i. p. 108, 109. .. OF THE HUMAN MIND. J 05 that when the rapidity exceeds a certain rate, the operation is taken entirely out of our hands ; and is carried on by fome unknown power, of the nature of which we are as ignorant, as of the caufe of the circulation of the blood, or of the motion of the in- teftines.* The laft fuppofition feems to me to be fomewhat fimilar tcT that of a man who fhould main- tain, that, although a body projected with a mode- rate velocity, is leen to pafs through all the interme- diate fpaces in moving from one place to another, yet we are not intitled to conclude, that this happens when the body moves fo quickly as to become invis- ible to the eye. The former fuppofition is fupp;)rt- ed by the analogy of many other facts in our confti- tution. Of fome of thefe, I have already taken no- tice ; and it would be eafy to add to the number. — An expert accountant, for example, can fum up, al- moft with a iingle glance of his eye, a long column of figures. He can tell the fum, with unerring certainty j while, at the fame time, he is unable to recoiled any one of the figures of which that fum h compofed ; and yet nobody doubts, that each of thefe figures has paffed through his mind, or fuppofes, * This seems to have been the opinion of Bishop Berkeley, whose doctrine concerning the nature of our habitual actions, coincides with that 6f the two philosophers already quoted. " It must be ** owned, we are not conscious of the systole and diastole of the ** heart, or the nnotion of the diaphragm. It may not, neverthe- " less, be thence inferred, that imknowing nature can act regularly « as well as ourselves. The true inference is, that the self-think- •< ing individual, or human person, is not the real author of those " natural motions. And, in fact, no man blames himself, if they ** are wrong, or values himself, if they are right. The same may " be said of the fingers of a musician, which some object to be " moved by habit, which understands not ; it being evident that " what is done by rule, must proceed from something that under- " stands the rule ; therefore, if not from the musician himself, *' from some other active intelligence ; the same, perhaps, which ** governs bees and spiders, and moves the limbs of those who walk " in their sleep."— bee a Treatise, entitled, Sirisy p. 123. 2d edit. o 106 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY that when the rapidity of the procefs becomes fo- great that he is unable to rccolleft the various fteps of it, he obtains the refult by a fort of infpiration. This lail: fuppofition would be perfectly analogous to Dr. Hartley's dodrine concerning the nature of our habitual exertions. The only plaufible objecllon which, I think, can be offered to the principles I have endeavoured to eftabiifh on this fubjecl, is founded on the aftonifh- ing, and almoft incredible rapidity, they neceffarily fuppofe in our intelledluai operations.— When a per- fon, for example, reads aloud ; there muft, accord- ing to this dodrine, be a feparate volition preceding the articulation of every letter ; and it has been found, by actual trial,* that it is poflible to pro- nounce about two thoufand letters in a minute. Is it reasonable to fuppofe, that the mind is capable of fo many different a<5ts in an interval of time fo very inconfiderable ? With refpect to this objection, it may be obferved, in the firft place, that all arguments againft the fore- going doctrine with refpecl to our habitual exertions, in fo far as they are founded on the inconceivable ra- pidity which they fuppofe in our intellectual opera- tions, apply equally to the common doctrine con- cerning our perception of diftance by the eye. But this is not all. To what does the fuppofition amount, which is conlidered as fo incredible ? Only to this, that the mind is fo formed, as to be ablle to carry on certain intelledual proceffes, in intervals of time toa * Tncredibili velocitate peraguntur et repetuntur musculorum contractiones. Docent cursus, praesertim quadrupedum ; vel^ lingua, quae quadringinta vocabula, forte bis raille literas. expr rait, spatio temporis quod tnin turn vocare solemus, quamvis a( multas litras exprimendas plures musculorum contractiones requi- rantur. Conspectus Meduince Theoretic^, Aud. Jac. Gregory, Mit, altera, p« 171. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 107 Ihort to be cftirnated by our faculties ; a fuppofition which, fo far from being extravagant, is fupported by the analogy of many of our moft certain conclu- iions in natural philofophy. The difcoveries made by the microfcope, have laid open to our fenfes a world of wonders, the exiftence of which hardly any man would have admitted upon inferior evidence ; and have gradually prepared the way for thofe phy- fical fpeculations, which explain fome of the moft extraordinary phenomena of nature, by means of modifications of matter far too fubtile for the ex- amination of our organs. Why then fliould it be confidered as unphilofophical, after having demon- ftrated the exiftence of various intellectual procefles which efcape our attention in confequence of their rapidity, to carry the fuppofition a little farther, in order to bring under the known laws of the human conftitution, a clafs of mental operations, which muft otherwife remain perfedly inexplicable ? Surely, our ideas of time are merely relative, as well as our ideas of extention ; nor is there any good reafon for doubting, that, if our powers of attention and mem- ory were more perfe6t than they are, fo as to give us the fame advantage in examining rapid events, which the microfcope gives for examining minute portions of extenfion, they would enlarge our views with refpecl to the intellectual world, no lefs than that inftrument has with refped to the materirJ. It may cantribute to remove, ftill more completely, fome of the fcruples which are naturally fuggefted by the foregoing dodrine, to remark, that, as the great ufe of attention and memory is to enable us to treafure up the refults of our experience and reflec- tion for the future regulation of our conduct, it would have anfwered no purpofe for the author of our nature to have extended their province to thofe intervals of time, which we have no occafion to efti- mate in the common bufinefe of life. All the Intel- , 108 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPPIY ledual procefles I have mentioned are fubfervient to fome particular end, either of perception or of ac- tion ; and it would have been perfeAly fuperfluous, if, after this end were gained, the fteps which are in- ftrumental in bringing it about, were all treafured up in memory. Such a conftitution of our nature would have had no other effeS: but to (lore the mind with a variety of ufelefs particulars. After all I have faid, it will perhaps be flill thought, that fome of the reafonings I have offered are too hypothetical ; and it is even poffible, that fome may- be difpofed rather to difpute the common theory of vifion, than admit the conclufions I have endeavored to eftablifli. To fuch readers the following conlid- erations may be of ufe, as they afford a more palpa- ble inflance, than any I have yet mentioned, of the rapidity with which the thoughts may be trained by practice, to fhift from one thing to another. When an equilibrifl balances a rod upon his lin- ger, not only the attention of his mind, but the ob- fervation of his eye, is conftantly requifite. — It is evi- dent that the part of his body which fupports the object is never wholly at reft ; otherwife the objed: would no more ftand upon it, than if placed in the fame poiition upon a table. The equilibrift, there- fore, muft watch, in the very beginning, every incli- nation of the object from the proper pofition, in or- der to counteract his inclination by a contrary move- ment. In this manner, the object has never time to fall in any one direction, and is fupported in a way fomewhat analogous to that in which a top is fup- ported on a pivot, by being made to fpin upon" an axis. — That a perfon fliould be able to do this in the cafe of a fingle object, is curious ; but that he fhould be able to balance in the fame way, two, or three, upon different parts of his body, and at the fame time balance himfelf on a fmall cord or wire, is in- deed wonderful. Nor is it poilible to conceive that. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 109 in fuch an inftance, the mind, at one and the fame momentj attends to thefe different equilibriums; for it is not merely the attention which is requifite, but the eye. We muft therefore conclude, that both of thefe are directed fuccefUvely to the differ- ent equilibriums, but change from one objed to an- other with iiich velocity, that the effeft, with ref> pe<51: to the experiment, is the fame as if they were dire(5led to all the objeds conflantly. It is worth while to remark farther, with refped to this lail illuftration, that it affords direct evidence of the poflibiiity of our exerting acts of the will, which we are unable to recollect ; for the move- ments of the equilibrifl: do not fucceed each other in a regular order, like thofe of the harpfichord player, in performing a piece of mufic ; but muft in every in- ftance be regulated by accidents, which may vary in numberlefs refpedts, and which indeed muft vary in numberlefs refpeds,every time he repeats the exper- iment : and therefore, although, in the former cafe, we fliould fuppofe, with Hartley, " that the motions " cling to one another, and to the imprelTions of the " notes, in the way of afTociation, without any in- " tervention of the ftate of mind called virill," yet, in this inftance, even the pofTibility of fuch a fuppo- fition is dired:ly contradicted by the fact. The dexterity of jugglers, (which, by the way, merits a greater degree of attention from philofo- phers, than it has yet attradted,) affords many curi- ous illuftrations of the fame doctrine. The whole of this art feems to me to be founded on this prin- ciple ; that it is poflible for a perfon, by long prac- tice, to acquire a power, not only of carrying on certain intellectual proceffes more quickly than oth- er men, (for all the feats of legerdemain fuppofe the exercife of obfervatlon, thought, and volition,) but of performing a variety of movements with the hand, before the eyes of a company, in an interval 110 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY of time too fliort to enable the fpectators to exert that degree of attention which is necelTary to lay a foundation for memory.* As fome philofophers have difputed the influence of the will in the cafe of habits, fo others (particu- larly Stahl and his followers) have gone into the op- polite extreme, by referring to the will all the vital motions. If it be admitted, (fay thefe philofophers,) that there are inftances in whirh we will an effedl, without being able to make it an object of attention, is it not poflible that, what we commonly call the vital and involuntary motions, may be the conie- quences of our own thought and volition ? But there is furely a wide difference between thofe cafes, in which the mind w^as at firft confcious of thought and volition, and gradually loft the power of atten- ding to them, from the growing rapidity of ihe in- tellectual procefs ; and a cafe in which the effect it- felf is perfedly unknown to the bulk of mankind, even after they arrive at maturity, and in which this effect has continued to take place with the moft perfect regularity, from the very beginning of their animal exiftence, and long before the firft dawn of either reflection or experience. Some of the followers of Stahl have ftated the fact rather inaccurately, even with refpect to our habit- ual exertions. Thus Dr. Porteriield, in his Treatife on the Eye, is at pains to prove, that the foul may think and will without knowledge or confcioufnefs. But this, I own, is to me inconceivable. The true ftate of the facl, I apprehend, is, that the mind may think and will, without attending to its thoughts and volitions, fo as to be able afterwards to recoi- led them. — Nor is this merely a verbal criticifm ; for there is an important difl'erence between con- fcioufnefs and attention, which it is very neceflary * See Note [E.] OF THE HUMAN MINI>. 1 1 1 to keep in view, in order to think upon this fubject with any degree of precifion. * The one is an in- voluntary ftate of the mind ; the other is a volunta- ry ad: : the one has no immediate connection with memory ; but the other is fo effentially fubfervient to it, that, without fome degree of it, the ideas and perceptions which pafs through the mind, feem to leave no trace behind them. When two perfons are fpeaking to us at once, we can attend to either of them at pleafure, without be- ing much difturbed by the other. If we attempt to liften to both, we can underftand neither. The fad feems to be, that when we attend conflantly to one of the fpeakers, the words fpoken by the other make no impreffion on the memory, in cotifequence of our not attending to them ; and afFed us as little as if they had not been uttered. This power, however, of the mind to attend to either fpeaker at pleafure, fuppofes that it is, at one and the fame time, con- fcious of the fenfations which both produce. Another well-known facl may be of ufe in illuf- trating the fame diftindion. A perfon who acci- dentally lofes his fight, never fails to improve grad- ually in the fenfibility of his touch. — Now, there are only two ways of explaining this. The one is, that, in confequence of the lofs of the one fenfe, fome change takes place in the phyfical conftitution of the body, fo as to improve a different organ of percep- tion. The other, that the mind gradually acquires a power of attending to and remembering thofe * The distinction between attention and consciousness is pointed out by Dr. Keid, in his Essay? on the intellectual Powers of Man, p. 60. " Attention is a voluntary act ; it requires an active exer- " tion to begin and to continue it ; and it may be continued a« ** long as we will ; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no con- " tinuance, chanojing with every thought." ihe same author has remarked, tha:^ these two operations of the mir.d have been frequently confounded by philosophers, and particularly by Mr, Locke. J J 2 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fllgbter fenfations of which it was formerly con* fcious, but which, from our habits of inattention, made no impreffioti whatever on the memory. No one, furely, can hefitate for a moment, in pronoun- cing which of thefe two fuppofitions is the more philofophical. Having treated, at confiderable length, of thofe habits in which both mind and body are concerned, I proceed to make a few remarks on fome phenome- na which are purely intellectual ; and which, 1 think, are explicable on the fame principles with thofe which have been now under our review. Every perfon who has ftudied the elements of ge- ometry, muft have obferved many cafes in which the truth of a theorem flruck him the moment he heard the enunciation. I do not allude to thofe theorems the truth of which is obvious almoft to fenfe ; fuch as, that any two fides of a triangle are greater than the third fide ; or that one circle can- not cut another circle in more than two points ; but to fome propofitions with refpect to quantity, con- lidered abftradly, (to fome. for example, in the fifth book of Euclid,) which almofi: every fi.udent would be ready to admit without a demonftration. Thefe propofitions, however, do by no means belong to the clafs of axioms ; for their evidence does not ftrike every perfon equally, but requires a certain degree of quicknefs to perceive it. At the fame time, it frequently happens, that, although we are convin- ced the propofition is true,w^e cannot fi:ate immedi- ately to others upon what our convidion is found- ed. In fuch cafes, I th'nk it highly probable, that before we give our afTent to the theorem, a procefs of thought* has pafled through the mind, but has paf- * Of tUe nature of these processes of thought, I shall treat fully in another \mTt of my work, under the article of l\easoning. I have expresbed myself concernijig them in this chapter, in as gen- eral ternis as possible. OF THE HUMAN MIND. US fed through the mind, b^t has paffed through it fo quickly, that we cannot, without difficulty, arreft our ideas in their rapid fucceffion, and ftate them to others in their proper and logical order. It is fome confirmation of this theory, that there are no prop- ofitions of which it is more difficult to give a legiti- mate proof from firft principles, than of thofe which are only removed a few Heps from the clafs of axioms —and that thofe men who are the moft remarkable for their quick perception of mathematical truth, are feldom clear and methodical in communicating their knowledge to others. — A man of a moderate degree of quicknefs, the very firtt time he is made acquainted with the fundamental principles of the method of fluxions, or of the method of prime and ultimate ratios, is almoft inftantaneoufly fatisfied of their truth ; yet how difficult is it to demonilrate thefe principles rigoroufly ! What I have now faid with refpecl to mathemat- ics, may be applied in a great meafure to the other branches of knowledge. How many queilions dai- ly occur to us, in morals, in politics, and in common life ; in confidering which, we ahnoft inftantaneouf- ly fee where the truth lies, although we are not in a condition, all at once, to explain the grounds of our convidion ! Indeed I apprehend, there are few, even among thofe who have devoted themfelves to ftudy, but who have not been habituated to communicate their knowledge to others, who are able to exhibit, in their natural order, the different iteps of any in- veftigation by which they have been led to form a particular conclufion. Fhe common obfervation, therefore, that an obfcure elocution always indicates an imperfect knowledge of the fubject ; although it may perhaps be true with refpecl to men who have cultivated the art of fpeaking, is by no means to be relied on as a general rule, in judging of the talents of thofe whofe fpeculations have been carried on 114 ELEMENTS OF THB PHILOSOPHY with a view merely to their own private fatisfac- tion. In the courfe of my own experience, I have heard of more than one inftance, of men who, without any mathematical education, were able, on a little reflection, to give a folution on any finiple algebra- ical problem ; and who, at the fame time, were per- fedly incapable of explaining by what iteps they ob- tained the refult. In thefe cafes, we have a direct proof of the pollibility of inveftigating even truths which are pretty remote, by an intelledual procefs, which, as ioon as it is finilhed, vanilhes almoft en- tirely from the memory. — It is probable, that fon e- thing of the fame kind takes place much more fre- quently in the other branches of knowledge, in w^hich our reafonings con fift commonly but of a lew ileps. Indeed, 1 am inclined to think, that it is in this way that by far the greater part of our fpecula- tive concluiions are formed. There is no talent, I apprehend, fo elTential to a public fpeaker, as to be able t(^ ftate clearly every different ftep of thofe trains of thought by which he himfelf has led to the conclufions he wifhea to eflab- lifh. Much may be here done by ttudy and expe- rience. Even in thofe cafes in which the truth of a propofition feem§ to ftrike us inftantaneoufly, al- though we may not be able, at firft, to difcover the media of proof, we feldom fail in the difcovery by perfeverance. — Nothing contributes fo much to form this talent as the ftudy of metaphyfics ; not the ab- furd metaphyfics of the fchools,but that ftudy which has the operations of the mind for its object. By habituating us to reflect on the fubjects of our con- fcioufnels, it enables us to retard, in a conficlerable ^ degree, the current of thought ; to arreft many of thofe ideas, which w^ould otherwife efcape our no- tice ; and to render the arguments which we em- ploy for the convidion of others, an exad tranfcript OF THE HUMAN MIND, 1 >5 of thofe trains of inquiry and reafoning, which ori- ginally led us to form our opinions. Thefe obfervations lead rne to take notice of an important diftinc^ion between the intelledual habits of men of fpeculation and of aflion. The latter, who are under a neceflity of thinking and deciding on the fpur of the occafion, are led to cultivate, as much as poffible, a quicknefs in their ment»t opera- tions ; and fometimes acquire it in fo great a degree, that their judgments feem to be almoil intuitive. To thofe, on the other hand, who have not merely to form opinions for themfelves, but to communi- cate them to others, it is neceffary to retard the train of thought as it palTes in the mind, fo as to be able afterwards to recolledl every different ftep of the pro- cefs ; a habit, which, in fome cafes, has fuch an in- fluence on the intelledual powers, that there are men, who, even in their private fpeculations, not on- ly make ufe of words as an inltrument of thought^ but form thefe words into regular fentences. It may perh^^^ps appear, at firft, a paradoxical ob- fervation, that one great employment of philofo- phers, in a refined age, is to bring to light, and ar- range, thofe rapid and confufed trains of thought, which appear from the ftruclure of languages, and from the monuments of ancient laws and govern- ments, to have paffed through the minds of men in the moft remote and unenlightened periods. In proof, however, of this, it is fufficient to mention, the fyilematical analogy which we find, to a certain degree, running through the fl:rud:ure of the moft imperfect tongues, (for example, in the formation of the different parts of the verbs,) and thofe general principles, which the philofophical lawyer traces a- midft an apparent chaos of precedeiits and flatutes. In the language, too, of the rudtft tribe, we find words transferred from one lubjecl to another, which indicate, in the mind of the individual who 116 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY firft made the transference, fome perception of re- femblance or of analogy. Such transferences can hardly be afcribed to accident, but may be confider- ed as proofs that the analogies which the phiiofo- pher afterwards points out between the objects which are diftinguifhed by the fame name, had been perceived by the inventors of language, although it is more than probable that they never expreffed them in words, nor could even have explained them if they had been queftioned on the fubjecl. Nor will this appear a bold or incredible fuppofi- tion, if we reflect on the fagacity and ingenuity which favages, and even peafants, difcover, in over- coming the difficulties which occur in their fitua- tion. They do not, indeed, engage in long procef- fes of abftra<5b reafoning, for which they have no in- clination, and which it is impoffible to carry on with- out the ufe of a cultivated and a copious language ; but, when preffed by prefent circumftances,they com- bine means to accompiifh particular ends,in a manner which indicates the exercife both of invention and of reafoning. It is probable that fuch procefles are carried on in their minds, with much lefs afliftance from language, than a philofopher would derive on a fimilar occalion ; and it is almoft certain, that they would find themfelves perfectly incapable of com- municating to others the fteps by which they were led to their conclufions. In confequence of thefe circumftances, the attainments ot the human mind, in its ruder Hate, perifli with the individual, with- out being recorded in writing, or perhaps exprefled in v/ords ; and we are left to infer them indireclly from the ftruclure of language, or from the monu- ments of ancient cuftoms and inftitutions. When a train of thought leads to any interefting conclufion, or excites any pleasant feeling, it becomes peculiarly difficult to arreil: our fleeting ideas ; be- caufe the mind, when once it has felt the pleafure. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 1 17 has little inclination to retrace the fteps by which it arrived at it. This is one great caufe of the difficul- ty attending philofophical criticifm. When a critic explains to us, why we are pleafed with any partic* utar beauty, or offended with any defect, it is evi- dent, that if his theory be juft, the circuniftances which he points out as the foundation of our pleaf- ure or uneaiiness, muft have occurred to our minds before we were pleased with the beauty, or offended with the defed:. In fuch cafes, it fometimes hap- pens, when a critic has been fortunate in his theory, that we recognize at firft light our old ideas, and, without any farther coniideration, are ready to bear tellimony to the truth, from our own con- fcioufness. So very difficult, however, is it to at- tend to the ideas which excite fuch feelings, that it often appears to be doubtful, whether a theory be right or wrong ; and that where there is every rea- fon to believe that the pleafure is produced in all men in the fame way, different critics adopt different theories with refpe61: to its caufe. It is long pradlice alone, joined to what is commonly called a meta- phyfical turn of mind, (by which I think is chiefly to be underftood, a capacity of reflecting on the fub- jeds of our confcioufnefs,) that can render fuch ef- forts of attention eafy. Exquifite fenfibility, fo far from being ufeful in this fpecies of criticifm, both gives a difrelifli for the fl:udy, and difqualifies for purfuing it. Before we leave the fubjec^ of attention, it is pro- per to take notice of a queftion which has been ftated with refpect to it ; whether we have the power of attending to more than one thing at one and the fame inftant ; or, in other words, whether we can attend at one and the fame inftant, to objects which we can attend to feparately ?* This quellion has, it * I have added this explanation to obviate the question, what "5 meant by one object ? 118 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY I am not miftaken, been already decided by feveral philofophers in the negative ; and I acknowledge, for my own part, that although their opinion has not only been called in queftion by others, but even treated with fome degree of contempt as altogether hypothetical, it appears to me to be the moft reafon- able and philofophical that we can form on the fub- ject. There is indeed a great variety of cafes, in which the mind apparently exerts different acls of atten- tion at once ; but from the inflances which have already been mentioned, of the aftonifhing rapidity of thought, it is obvious, that all this may be explain- ed, without fuppofing thefe ads to be co-exiftent ; and 1 may even venture to add, it may all be axplain- ed in the moft fatisfad:ory manner, without afcribing to our intellectual operations, a greater degree of rapidity than that with which we know from the fa(5l that they are fometimes carried on. The efFecl of practice in increafmg this capacity of apparently attending to different things at once, renders this explanation of the phenomenon in queftion, more probable than any other. The cafe of the equilibrift and rope-dancer already mentioned, is particularly favourable to this expla- nation ; as it affords direct evidence of the poiTibili- ty of the mind's exerting different fucceilive ac^fs in an interval of time fo fhort, as to produce the fame fenfible effed, as if they had been exerted at one and the fame moment. In this cafe, indeed, the rapidity of thought is fo remarkable, that if the different acts of the mind were not all neceffarily accompanied with different movements of the eye, there can be no reafon for doubting, that the philofophers, whofe dodrine I am nov^' controverting, would have as- ferted, that they are all mathematically co-exiftent. Upon a queftion, however, of this fort, which does not ^dmit of a perfectly direct appeal to the fad, I OF THE HUMAN MIND. Il9 would by no means be underftood to decide with confidence ; and therefore Ifhouid wifh the cor.clu- iions I am now to (late, to be received as cnly c^^n- ditionally eftabliihed. They are neceffiry and obvi- ous confequences of the general principle, " that the " mind can only attend to one thing at once ;'* but muft Hand or fall with the truth of that fuppofition. It is commonly underftood, I believe, that, in a concert of mufic, a good ear can attend to the dif- ferent parts of the mufic feparately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the har- mony. If the doctrine, however, which I have en- deavored to eftablifh, be admitted, it will follow, ^ that in the latter cafe, the mind is conftantly vary- ing its attention from the one part of the mufic to the other, and that its operations are fo rapid, as to give us no perception of an interval of time. The fame dodrine leads to fome curious conclu- fions with refped to vifion. Suppofe the eye to be fixed in a particular pofition, and the picture of an objed: to be painted on the retina. Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the refult of the various percep- tions we have of the different p^)ints in the outline ? With refpect to this queftion, the prin iples already ftated lead me to conclude, that the mind does at one and the fame time perceive every point in the outline of the objed, (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the fame inftant.) for per- ception, like confcioufnefs, is an involuntary opera- tion. As no two points, however, of tlie outline are in the fame direction, every point, by itfelf, con- ftitutes juft as diftind an objed of attention to the mind, as if it were feparated by an interval of empty fpace from all the reft. If the doctrine therefore for- merly ft^^ied be juft, it is impofTible for the mind to attend to more than one of thefe points at once ; and as the perception of the figure of the object, im- 120 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY plies a knowledge of the relative fituation of thedif- fereiu points with refpect to each other, we n uft conclude, that the perception of figure by the eye, is the refult of a number of different acis of atten- tion. Thefe acls of attention, however, are per- forated with fuch rapidity, that the efied, with re- fpt 6t to us, is the fame as if the perception were in- ftantaneous. In fiirther confirmation of this reafoning, it may be remarked, that if the perception of vifible figure were an immediate confequence of the pidure on the retina, we fliould have, at the firft glance, as diftind an idea of a figure of a thoufand fides, as of a tri- angle or afquare. The truth is, that when the fig- ure is very fimple, the procefs of the mind is fo rapid, that the perception feems to be inftantaneous ; but when the fides are multiplied beyond a certain num- ber, the interval of time neceflary for thefe different ads of attention becomes perceptible. It may perhaps be afked, what I mean by a point in the outline of a figure, and what it is that confli- tutes \his point one object of attention ? 1 he anfwer, I apprehend, is, that this point is the minmum vifibile. If the point be lefs, we cannot perceive it : it it be greater, it is not all feen in one diredion. If thefe obfervations be adirittcd, it will follow, that, without the faculty of mem>ory, we could have had no perception of vifiible figure. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 121 CHAPTER THIRD. Of Conception, BY Conception, I mean that power of the mind, which enables it to form a notion of an abfent ob- ject of perception ; or of a fenfation which it has formerly felt. I do not contend that this is exclu- fively the proper meaning of the word, but I think that the faculty which I have now defined delerves to be diftinguiflied by an appropriated name. Conception is often confounded with other pow- ers. When a painter makes a picture of a friend, who is abfent or dead, he is commonly faid to paint from memory : and the expreffion is fufHciently cor- red for common converfation. But in an analyfis of the mind, there is ground for a diftindlion. The power of conception enables him to make the features of his friend an object of thought, fo as to copy the refemblance ; the power of memory recog- nifes thefe features as a former obje tinc^ion between perception and imagination, that the former is always attended with belief, and the latter with none ; then the more lively our imagin- ation were of any object, and the more completely that object occupied the attention, the lefs ftiouid we be apt to believe its exiftence ; for it ii^ reafona- ble to think, that when any of our powers is em- ployed feparately from the reft, and there is nothing 128 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY to withdraw the attention from it, tlie laws which regulate its operation will be moft obvious to our obfervation, and will be nioft completely difcrimin- ated from thofe which are chara6teriftical of the oth- er powers of the mind. So very different however is the fad, that it is matter of common remark, that when imagination is very lively, we are apt to af- cribe to its objeds a real exiftence, as in the cafe of dreaming or of rnadnefs ; and we may add, in the cafe of thofe who, in fpite of their own general be- lief of the abfurdity of the vulgar llories of appari- tions, dare not trutl themfelves alone with their own imaginations in the dark. That imagination is in thefe inftances attended with belief, we have all the evidence that the nature of the thing admits of; for we feel and a6t in the fame manner as we fhould do, if we believed that the objecls of our attention were real ; which is the only proof that metaphyficians produce, or can produce, of the belief which accom- panies perception. In thefe cafes, the fa6l that I wifh to eftablifh is fo flriking, that it has never been called in queflion ; but in mofl cafes, the imprefTion which the objedls of imagination make on the mind is lo momentary, and is fo immediately corredled by the furrounding objeds of perception, that it has not time to influ- ence our conduct. Hence we are apt to conclude on a fuperficial view, that imagination is attended with no belief; and the conclufion is furely jufl in moil cafes, if by belief we mean a permanent con- viction which influences our condud. But if the word be ufed in the flrid logical fenfe, I am inclin- ed to think, after the mofl careful attention to what I experience in myfelf, that the exercife both of conception and imagination is always accompanied with a belief that their objeds exifL* When a * As the foregoing reasoning, though satisfactory to myself, has not appeared equally so to some of oy friends ; I should vhh the OF THE HUMAN MIND. 129 painter conceives the face and figure of an abfent friend, in order to draw his pi6ture,he believes for the moment that his friend is before him. The belief, reader to consider the remarks which I now offer, as amounting rather to a query, than to a decided opinion. May I take the liberty of adding, that one of the arguments which I have stated, in opposition to the common doctrine con- cerning imagination, appears to me to be authorised, in some measure, by the following reasoning of Dr. Reid's on a different subject ? In considering thobe sudden bursts of passion, which lead us CO wreak our vengeance upon manimate objects, he endeavors to shew, that we have in such cases, a momentary belief thgt the object is alive. " I confess," says he, *' it seems to me impossible, " that there should be resentment against a thing, which, at that " very moment, is considered as inanimate ; and consequently in- " capable either of intending hurt, or of being punished. — There •* must, therefore. I conceive, be some momentary notion or con- •' ception, that the object of our resentment is capable of punish- « ment." In another passage, the same author remarks, that »* men may *' be governed, in their practice, by a belief, which, in speculation, ** they reject." " 1 knew a man," says he, " who was as much convinced as a- •* ny man, of the folly of the popular belief of apparitions in the " dark : yet he could not sleep in a room alone, n r go alone into " a room in the dark. Can it be said, that his fear did not imply •* a belief of danger ? This is impossible. Yet his.pliilosophy con- " vinced him, that he was in no more danger in the dark when a- " lone, than with company. Here an unreasonable belief, which ** was merely a prejudice of the nurisery, stuck so fast as to govern <* his conduct, in opposition to his speculative belief as a philoso- " pher, and a man ©f sense." ** There are few persons who can look down from the battle- " ment of a very high tower without fear; while their reason con- " vinces them, that they are in no more danger than when stand- ** ing upon the ground." These facts are easily explicable, on the supposition, that when- ever the objects of imagination engross the attention wholly (which Ihey may do, in opposition to any speculative opinion with re- spect to their non existence.) they produce a temporary belief of their reality. — Indeed, in the last passage, Dr. Reid seems to ad- mit this to be the case ,* for, to say that a man who has a dread of apparitions, believes himself to be in danger when left alone in the dark, is to say, in other words, that he believes (lor the Ume) that the objects of his ioidgination a^e real. ISO ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY indeed, is only momentary ; for it is extremely dii^ ficult, in our waking hours, to keep up a fteady and undivided attention to any objedl we conceive or imagine ; and, as foon as the conception or the im- agination is over, the belief which attended it is at an end. We find that we can recal and difmifs the objects of thefe powers at pleafure ; and therefore we learn to confider them as creations of the mind, which have no feparate and independent exiftence. The compatibility of fuch a fpeculative difbelief, as I have here fuppofed, of the exillence of an ob- ject, with a contrary momentary belief, may perhaps be more readily admitted, if the following experi- ment be confidered with attention. Suppofe a lighted candle to be fo placed before a concave mirror, that the image of the flame may be feen between the mirror and the eye of the obferven In this cafe, a perfon who is acquainted with the principles of optics, or who has feen the experiment made before, has fo ftrong a fpeculative conviction of the non-exiftence of the object in that place where he fees its image, that he would not hefitate to put his finger to the apparent flame, without any apprehenfion of injury. Suppofe, however, that in fuch a cafe it were pof- fible for the obferver to banifli completely from his thoughts all the circumflances of the experiment, and to confine his attention wholly to bis percep- tion ; would he not believe the image to be a reali- ty ; and would he not expert the fame confequences from touching it, as from touching a real body in a ftate of inflammation ? If thefe quefi:ions be anfwer- ed in the affirmative, it will follow ; that the effect of the perception, while it engages the attention completely to itfelf, is to produce belief ; and that the fpeculative difbelief, according to which our con- dud in ordinary cafes is regulated, is the refult of a reeolledtion of the various circumflances with which the experiment is accompaiued. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 131 If, in fuch a cafe as T have now fuppofed, the ap- pearance exhibited to us is of fuch a nature, as to threaten us with any immediate danger, the efted is the fame as if we were to banifh from our thoughts the circumftances of the experiment, and to limit our attention folely to what we perceive : for here the belief, which is the firft effecl of the perception, alarms our fear?, and influences our conduft, before reflection has time to operate. In a very ingenious optical deception, which was lately exhibited in this city, the image of a flower was prefented to the fpec- tator ; and when he was about to lay hold of it with his hand, a ftroke was aimed at him by the image of a dagger. If a perfon who has feen this experi- ment is afked in his cooler moments, whether or not he believes the dagger which he faw to be real, he will readily anfwer in the negative ; and yet the accurate fiatement of the fad undoubtedly is, that the firfl and the proper efFed of the perception is belief ; and that the diibelief he feels, is the effect of fubfequent refledion. The fpeculative difbelief which we feel with re- fped to the illufions of imagination, I conceive to be analogous to our fpeculative difbelief of the exiflence of the objed exhibited to the eye in this optical de- ception ; as our belief that the illufions of imagina- tion are real, while that faculty occupies the mind exclufively, is analogous to the belief produced by the optical deception while the attention is limited to our perception, and is withdrawn from the cir- cumflances in which the experiment is made.* Thefe obfervations lead me to t^ke notice of a cir- * It may appear to some readers r&thcr trifling to add, and yet to others the remark may not be altogether superfluous, that it is not my intention to insituiate by the foregoing illustrations, that the relation between perception and imagination has the most dis- tant analogy to that betW'een the perceptbn of the object, and tlie |)erception of its optical image. ^32 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY cumftance with refped to the belief accompanying perception, which it appears to nie neceiTiiry to ftate, in order to render Dr. Reid's dodrine on that fub- jed completely fatisfadory. He has Ihewn, that certain fenfations are, by a law of our nature, ac- companied with an irrefiftible belief of the exiftence of certain qualities of external objeds. But this law extends no farther than to the preient exiftence of the quality ; that is, to its exiftence while we feel the correlponding fenfation. When^ e is it then, that we afcribe to the quality, an exiftence indepen- dent of our perception ? I apprehend we learn to do this by experience alone. We find that we cannot, as in the cafe of imaginatirn, difmifs or recal the per- ception of an external objed:. If I open my eyes, I cannot prevent myfelf from feeing the profped •which is before me. I learn therefore, to afcribe to the objeds of my lenfes, not only an exiftence at the time I perceive them, but an independent and a permanent exiftence. It is a ftrong confirmation of this dodrine, that in fleep, when (as I fliail endeavor afterwards to fhew) the influence of the will over the train of our thoughts is fufpended, and when, of confequence, the time of their continuance in the mind is not regula- ted by us, we afcribe to the objeds of imagination an independent and permanent exiftence, as we do when awake to the objeds of jverception. The fame thing happens in thofe kinds of madnefs, in which a particular idea takes pollellion of the attention, and occupies it to the exclufion of every thing elfe. Indeed, madnefs feems in many cafes to arife entire- ly from a fulpenfion of the influence of the will over the lucceilion of our thoughts ; in confequence of which, the objedls of imagination appear to have an exiftence independent of our volition ; and are therefore, agreeably to the foregoing dodrine, mis- taken for realities. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 1S3 Numberlefs other illuftrations of the fame general fact occur to me ; but the ftiiiowing is, I think, one of the moft llrik ng. I mention it, in preference to the reft, as it appears to me to connect the dc^drine in queftion with fome principles which are now uni- verlally admitted among philofophers. The diftinction between the original and the ac- quired perceptions of fight, is familiarly known to every one who has the ilighteft acquaintance with the elements of optics. That this fenfe, prior to ex- perience, conveys to us the notion of extenfion in two dimenfions only, and that it gives us no infor- mation concerning the diftances at which obje6:s are placed from the eye, are proportions which nobody, I prefume, in the prefent ftate of fcience, will be dif- pofed to controvert. In what manner we are ena- bled, by a comparifon between the perceptions of fight and thofe of touch, to extend the province of the former fenfe to a variety of qualities originally perceived by the latter fenfe only, optical writers have explained at great length ; but it is not necef- fary for my prefent purpofe to enter into any partic- ular details with refpecl to their reafonings on the iiibjecft. It is fufficient for me to remark, that, ac- cording to the received doclrine, the original percep- tions of fight become, in confequence of experience, fignsof the tangible qualities of external objects, and of the diftances, at which they are placed from the organ ; and that, although the knowledge we obtain, in this manner, of thefe qualities and diftances, feems, from early and conftant habits, to be an inftantane- ous perception ; yet, in many cafes, it implies an ex- ercife of the judgment, being founded on a compar- ifon of a variety of different circumftances. From thefe principles, it is an obvious confequence, that the knowledge we obtain, by the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, involves the exercile of conception, according to the definition of that pow- IS4 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY which has already been given. In ordinary difcourfe, indeed, we afcribe this knowledge, on account of the inftantaneoufnefs with which it is obtained, to the power ot perception ; but if the common doctrine on the fubjeA be juft, it is the refult of a complex ope- ration of the mind ; comprehending, firft, the per- ception of thofe qualities, which are the proper and originalobje(Els of fight ; and, fecondly, the concep- tion of thofe tangible qualities of which the original perceptions of fight are found from experience to be the figns. The notions, therefore, we form, by means of the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, and of the diftances of thefe objeds from the organ, are mere conceptions ; ftrongly, and indeed indiflb- lubly, aifociated, by early and conftant habit, with the original perceptions of fight. When we open our eyes on a magnificent profpect, the various diftances at which all its different parts are placed from the eye, and the immenfe extent of the whole fcene before us, feems to be perceived as immediately, and as inftantaneoufly, by the mind, as the coloured furface which is painted on the retina. The truth, however, unqueftionahly is, that this va- riety of diftance, and this immenfity of extent, are not objects of fenfe but of conception ; and the no- tions we form of them when our eyes are open, dif- fer from thofe we fliould form of them with our eyes fhut, only in this, that they are kept fteadily in the view of the mind, by being ftrongly affociated with the fenfations of colour, and with the original perceptions of fight. — This obfervation will be the more readily admitted, if it be confidered, that, by a Ikilful imitation of a natural landfcape, in a com- mon fhew-box, the mind may be led to form the fame notions of variety of diftance, and even of im- menfe extent, as if the original fcene were prefented to our fenfes : and that, although, in this cafe, we have a fpeculative convidion that the fphere of our OF THE HUMAN MIND. vifion only extends to a few inches ; yet fo tv is the airociation between the original perceptions^ fight, and the conceptions which they habitually pr6. duce, that it is not poffible for us, by any effort or our will, to prevent thefe conceptions from taking place. From thefe obfervations it appears, that when the conceptions of the mind are rendered fteady and permanent, by being ftrongly affociated with any fenfible impreflion, they command our belief no lefs than our aciual perceptions ; and, therefore, if it were poffible for us, with our eyes fhut, to keep up, for a length of time, the conception of any fenfible object, we fhould, as long as this effort continued, be- lieve that the objed: was prefent to our fenfes. It appears to me to be no flight confirmation of thefe remarks, that although, in the dark, the illu- fions of imagination are much more liable to be mif- taken for realities, than when their momentary ef- feds on the belief are continually checked and cor- reded by the objects which the light of day prefents to our perceptions ; yet, even total darknefs is not fo alarming to a perfon impreifed with the vulgar ftories of apparitions, as a faint and doubtful twilight, which affords to the conceptions an opportunity of fixing and prolonging their exiflence, by attaching themfelves to fomething which is obfcurely exhibit- ed to the eye. — In like manner, when we look through a fog, we are frequently apt to miflake a crow For a man ; and the conception we have, upon fuch an occafion, of the human figure, is much more diflind and much more fleady, than it would be poffi- ble for us to form, if we had no fenfible object before us ; infomuch that when on a more attentive obferva- tion, the crow fhrinks to its own dimenfions, we iind it impoffible, by any effort, to conjure up the phantom which a moment before we feemed to perceive. If thefe obfervations are admitted, the effects which J ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY exhibitions of fictitious diftrefs produce on the mind, will appear lefs wonderful, than they are fuppofed to be. During the reprefentation of a tragedy, I ac- knowledge, that we have a general conviction that the whole is a fidion ; but, I believe, it will be found, that the violent emotions which are fometimes pro- duced by the diftrelTes of the ftage, take their rife, in moft cafes, from a momentary belief, that the dif- treffes are real. I fay, in moft cafes ; becaufe I ac- knowledge, that independently of any fuch belief, there is fomething contagious in a faithful exprefflon of any of the pailions. The emotions produced by tragedy are, upon this fuppofition, fomewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlement of a tower.* In both cafes, we have a general conviction, that there is no ground for the feelings we experi* ence ; but the momentary influences of imagination are fo powerful as to produce thefe feelings, before reflection has time to come to our relief. * With respect to the dread which we feel in looking down from the battlement of a tower, it is curious to remark the effects of habit in gradually destroying it. The manner in which habit operates in this case, seems to be by giving us a command over our thoughts, so as to enable as to withdraw our attention from the precipice before us, and direct it to any other object at pleasure. It is thus that the mason and the sailor not only can take precau- tions for their own safety, but remain completely masters of them- selves in situations where other men, engrossed with their imagi- nary danger, would experience a total suspension of their faculties, x^ny strong passion which occupies the mind produces, for the mo- ment, the same effect with habit. A person alarmed with the ap- prehension of fire, has been known to escape from the top of a house, by a path which, at another time, he would have considered as impracticable ; and soldiers, in mounting a breach, are said to have sometimes found their way to the enemy, by a route which ap.- peared inaccessiMe after their violent passions had subsided. I OF THE HUMAN MIND, 13? CHAPTER FOURTR Of AhJiraEiion. SECTION I. General obfervations on this Faculty of the Mind. THE origin of appellative, or, in other words, the t)rigin of thofe clalTes of objedls which, in the fchools, are called genera^ 2Lndfpecies, has been confidered by fome philofophers as one of the moft difficult prob- lems in metaphyfics. The account of it which is given by Mr. Smith, in his Diflertation on the Ori- gin of Languages, appears to me to be equally fimple and fatisfaclory. " The aflignation'* (fays he) " of particular names, *' to denote particular objeds ; that is, the inftitution *' of nouns fubftantive ; would probably be one of " the firft fteps towards the formation of Language. *' The particular cave, whofe covering fheltered the ** favage from the weather ; the particular tree, *' whofe fruit relieved his hunger ; the particular " fountain, whofe water allayed his thiril ; would *' firft be denominated by the words, cave, tree, foun- *' tain ; or by whatever other appellations he might *' think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark *' them. Afterwards, when the more enlarged ex- ** perience of this f ivage had led him to obferve, *' and his neceffary occafions obliged him to make " mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other " fountains ; he would naturally beftow upon each *' of thofe new objeds, the fame name by which he *'' had been accuftomed to exprefs the fimilar objed S 1S8 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " he was firft acquainted with. And thus, thofe ** woods, which were originally the proper names of " individuals, would each of them infenfibly become " the common name of a multitude."* " It is this application" (he continues) " of the *' name of an individual to a great number of obje<5ls, ** whofe refemblance naturally recals the idea of that " individual, and of the name which expreffes it, " that feems originally to have given occafion to the " formation of thofe clafles, and affortments, which, *' in the fchools, are called genera 2iud /pedes ; and of *' which the ingenious and eloquent Rouffeau finds ** himfelf fo much at a lofs to account for the origin. " What conftitutes a /pedes, is merely a number o'f *' objeds, bearing a certain degree of refemblance to *' one another ; and, on that account, denominated " by a fingle appellation, which may be applied to *' exprefs any one of them."t This view of the natural progrefs of the mind, in forming claflifications of external obje<5ls, receives fome illuftration from a fad mentioned by Captain Cook in his account of a fmall illand called Wateeoo, which he vifited in failing from New Zealand to the Friendly iflands. " The inhabitants," fays he, were " afraid to come near our cows and horfes, nor did " they form the leaft conception of their nature, " But the flieep and goats did not furpafs the limits * The same account of the progress of the mind in the formation of genera, is given by the Abbe de Condillac. ** Un enfant appelle du nom cl^Arl/re le premier arbre " que Hvous lui montfons. Un second arbre qu'il voit en- '^ suite lui rapelle la meme idee ; il lui donne le meme " nom ; de meme a un troisieme, a un quatrieme, et voila " le mot d"* Arbre donne d'abord a un individu, qui devient ** pDUf lui un nom de classe ou de g. nre, une idee abstraite " qui comprend tous les arbres en general." f Dissertation on the Origin of Languages, annexed t^ Mr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. OP THE HUMAN MIN1>. 139 '^ of their ideas ; for they gave us to unclerftand that " they knew them to be birds. It will appear^" he adds, "rather incredible, that human ignorance could " ever make fo ilrange a miftake, there, not being " the moft diftant limilitude between a fheep or " goat, and any winged animal. But thefe people " feemed to know nothing of the exiftence of any *' other land animals, befides hogs, dogs, and birds. " Our (heep and goats, they could fee, were very " different creatures from the two firfl, and therefore " they inferred that they muft belong to the latter " clafs, in which they knew that there is a conlider- *' able variety of fpecies.*' — I would add to Cook's very judicious remarks, that the miftake of thefe iflanders probably did not arife from their coniider- ing a flieep or a goat as bearing a more ftriking re- femblance to a bird, than to the two claffes of quad- rupeds with which they were acquainted ; but to the want of a generic word, fuch as quadruped^ com- prehending thefe two fpecies ; which men in their fituation would no more be led to form, than a per- fon who had only feen one individual of each fpecies, would think of an appellative to exprefs both, inftead of applying a proper name to each. In confequence of the variety of birds, it appears, that they had a generic name comprehending all of them, to which it was not unnatural for them to refer any new ani- mal they met with. The claflihcatiou of different objects fuppofes a power of attending to fome of their qualities or at- tributes, without attending to the reft ; fi)r no two objects are to be found without fome fpecific differ- ence ; and no affortment or arrangement can bo for- med among things not perfectly alike, but by lofing fight of their diftinguifhing peculiarities, and limit- ing the attention to thofc attributes which belong to tliem in common. Indeed, without this power of attending feparately to things which our feiifes 140 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY prefent to us in a ftate of union, we never could have had any idea of number ; for, before we can confider different objeds as forming a multitude, it is necef- fa: y that we fhould be able to apply to ail of them one common name ; or, in other words, that we fliould reduce them all to the fame genus. The va- rious objeds, for example, animate and inanimate, which are, at this moment, before me, I may clafs and number in a variety of different ways, according to the view of them that I chufe to take. I may reckon fuccellively the number of (heep, of cows, of horfes, of elms, of oaks, of beeches ; or I may firft reckon the number of animals, and then the number of trees ; or I may at once reckon the number of all the organized fubftances which my fenfes prefent to me. But whatever be the principle on which my claflification proceeds, it is evident, that the objeds numbered together, muft be conlidered in thofe re- fpecls only in which they agree with each other ; and that it I had no power of feparating the combi- nations of fenfe, I never could have conceived them as forming a plurality. Ihis power of confidering certain qualities or at- tributes of an objecl apart from the refl ; or, as I would rather chufe to define it, the power which the underftanding has, of feparating the combinations which are prefented to it, is diflinguifhed by logi- cians by the name of abjiradion. It has been fup- pofed, by fome philofophers, (with what probability I fhall not now inquire,) to form the characleriftical attribute of a rational nature. That it is one of the moil important of all our faculties, and very inti- mately connected with the exercife of our reafoning powers, is beyond difpute. And, I flatter myfelf, it will appear from the fequel of this chapter, how much the proper management of it conduces to the fucccfs of our philofophical purfuits, and of our gen- eral condud in life. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 141 The fubferviency of Abftraclion to the power of Reafoiiing, and alfo, its fubferviency to the exertiv>ns of a Poetical or Creative Imagination, (hall be after- wards fully illuftrated. At prefent, it is fufEcient for my purpofe to remark, that as abftra<5lion is the ground- work of claffification, without this faculty of the mind we Ihould have been perfectly incapable of general fpeculation, and all our knowledge muft necefTarily have been limited to individuals ; and that fome of the moft ufeful branches of fcience, particularly the different branches of mathematics, in which the very fubjects of our reafoning are ab- ftraclions of the underftanding, could never have poilibly had an exiftence. With refped to the fubferviency of this faculty to poetical imagination, it is no lefs obvious, that, as the poet is fupplied with all his materials by experience ; and as his province is limited to combine and modify things which really exift, fo as to produce new wholes of his own ; fo every exertion which he thus makes of his powers, prefuppofes the exercife of abftraclion in decompohng and feparating actual combinations. And it was on this account, that, in the chapter on Conception, I was led to make a diftinclion between that faculty, which is evidently hmple and uncom- pounded, and the power of Imagination, which (at leaft in the fenfe in which I employ the word in thefe inquiries) is the refult of a combination of va- rious other powers. I have introduced thefe remarks, in order to point out a difference between the -ibflradions which are fubfervient to reafoning, and vhofe which are lubfer- vient to imagination. And, if I am not miftaken,it is a diflindion which has not been fufHcientiy attended to by fome writers of eminence. In every inlf ance in which imagination is employed in forming new wholes, by decompounding and combining the per- ceptions of fenfe, it is evidently nccelTary that the 142 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY poet or the painter fhould be able to ftate to him- felf the circumftances abftracled, as feparate objeds of conception. But this is by no means requifite in every cafe in which abftradion is fubfervient to the power of reafoning ; for it frequently happens, that we can reafon concerning one quality or property of an objedl abftracted from the reft, while, at the fame time, we find it impoflible to conceive it fepa- rately. Thus, I can reafon concerning extenfion and figure, without any reference to color ; although it may be doubted, if a perfon poifefled of fight can make extenfion and figure fteady objects of concep- tion, without conneding with th^m one color or another. Nor is this always owing (as it is in the inftance now mentioned) merely to the affociatiou of ideas ; for there are cafes, in which we can r6afon concerning things leparately, which it is impoffible for us to fuppofe any being fo conftituted as to con- ceive apart. Thus, we can reafon concerning length, abftracled from any other dimenfion ; al- though, furely, no underftanding can make length, without breadth, an object of conception. And, by the way, this leads me to take notice of an error, which mathematical teachers are apt to commit, in explaining the firft principles of geometry. By dwelling long on Euclid's firft definitions, they lead the ftudent to fuppofe that they relate to notions which are extremely myfterious ; and to ftrain his powers in fruitlefs attempts to conceive, what cannot poffibly be made an objed: of conception. If thefe definitions were omitted, or very flightly touched upon, and the attention at once directed to geomet- rical reafonings, the ftudent would immediately per- ceive, that although the lines in the diagrams are really extended in two dimenfions, yet that the de- monftrations relate only to one of them ; and that the human underftanding has the faculty of reafon- ing concerning things feparately, which are always OP THE ITUMAN MIND. 14S prefented to us, both by our powers of perception and conception, in a ftate of union. Such abftrac- tions, in truth, are familiar to the moft illiterate of mankind ; and it is in this very way that they are infenfibly formed. When a tradefman fpeaks of the length of a ruom, in contradillindion to its breadth ; or when he fpeaks of the diftance between any two objeds ; he forms exauititude of different individuals, is in itfelf one, and indivifi- ble. On mod of thefe points, the philofophy of Arlf- totle feems to have coincided very nearly with that of Plato. The language, ho v ever, which thefe phi- lofophers employed on this lubjed was different, ^nd gave to their doctrines the appearance of a wid- er diverfiiy than probably exilled between their o- pinions. While Plato was led, by his pailion for the marvellous and the myfterious, to inlift on the incomprehenfible union of the fam.e idea or eifence, with a number of individuals, without multiplication or divifion ;! Ariilotle, more cautious, and aiming at * In this very imperfect sketch of the opinions of the ancients concerning universalt-^ I have substituted, instead of the word i^^^?, the ord esse^Ke, as better fitted to convey to a n odern reader the true import of Plato's expressions. 1 he word emntta is said to have hf en lirst emplo} ed by Cicero ; and it was afterwards adopted by the schoolmen, in the same sense in which the Platonists uted the word idea. See Dr. Keid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, page 473. t '* The idea of a thing," (says Plato,) " is that w hich makes ** Q7ie of the nic.r.y ; which, preserving the unity ard inrcgrity ol its " own nature, runs through and mixes with things it^inite jn OF THE HUMAN MIND. 149 greater perfpicuity, contented himfelf with faying, that all individuals are compofed of maiter and form; and that it is in confequence of poiTefli cr a common form, that different individuals belong to the fame genus. But they both agreed, that, as the matter, or the individual natures of objects were per- ceived by fenfe ; fo the general idea, or effence, or form, was perceived by the intellect ; and that, as the attention of the vulgar was chiefly engrolTed with the former, fo the latter furnifhed to the philofopher the materials of his fpeculations. The chief difference between the opinions of Plato and Ariftotle on the fubjedt of ideas, related to the mode of their exiftence. That the matter of which all things are made, exifted from eternity, was a principle which both admitted ; but Plato farther taught, that, of every fpecies of things, there is an idea or form which alfo exifted from eternity ; and that this idea is the exemplar or model according to which the individuals of the fpecies were made ; whereas Ariftotle held, that, although matter may exift without form, yet that forms could not exift without matter.* <* numbpr ; and yet, however multiform it may appear, is always " the same • so that by it we find out and discriminate the thing, ** whatever shapes it may assume, and under whatever disguise it ** may cunceal itself." — Flaio in Philebo ; (q loted by ttje Au- thor of the Origin and progress of Language, vol. i. p. 100, 2d edit.) * In this axjcour^t of the difference betweeit Plato and Aristotle on the subject of ideas, 1 have chiefly followed Brucker, whose -very laborious researches with respect to 'his article of the history- Of philosophy are well known. In stating the distinction, how- ever, I have confined myself to as general terms as possible ; as tlie subject is involved in much obscurity, and has divided the opinions of verv eminent writers. The reader will find the result of Brucker's inquiries, in his own words, in Note QF.3 The authority of Brucker, in this instance, has the more weight 150 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY The dodrine of the Stoics concerning univerfals, differed widely from thofe both of Plato and Arifto- tle, and feems to have approached to a fpeculation which is commonly fuppofed to be of a more recent origin, and which an eminent philofopher of the pref- ent age has ranked among the difcoveries which do the greateft honour to modern genius.* Whether this doctrine of the Stoics coincided en* tirely with that of the Nominalifts, (whofe opinions I fhall afterwards endeavour to explain,) or whether it did not refemble more, a doctrine maintained by another feci of fchoolmen called Conceptualifts, I fhall not inquire. The determination of this queftion is interefiing only to men of erudition ; for the knowl- edge we pofTefs of this part of the Stoical philofophy, is too imperfect to afllil us in the farther profecution of the argument, or even to diminifh the merit of thofe philofophers who have, in modern times, been led to iimilar conclufions.f with me, as it coincides in the noost material respects with that of Dr. Reid. See his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, and the conclusion of his Inquiry into the Human mind. A very different account of Aristotle's doctrine, in those particu- lars in which it is commonly supposed to differ from that of Plato, is given by two modern writers of great learning, whose opinions are justly entitled to much respect, from their familiar acquaintance with Aristotle's latter Commentators of the Alexandrian School. — See Origin and Progress of Language, vol. i. and Harris's Hermes. It is of no consequence, for any of the purposes which I have at present in view, what opinion we form on this much contro- verted point of philosophical history. Ir; so far as the ideal theory was an attempt to explain the manner in which our general spec- ulations are carried on, it is agreed on all hands, that the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle were essentially the same ; and accordingly, what I have said on that subject, coincides entirely with a passage which the reader will find in" Origin and Progress of Language,'* vol. i. p. 33. 2d edit. * Treatise of Human Nature, book i. part i. sect. 7. t See Note [G.] OF THE HUMAN MIND. 151 As it IS not my obje^l, in this work, to enter into hiftorical details, any farther than is neceflary for il- luftrating the fubjefts of which I treat, I (hall pafs over the various attempts which were made by the Ecledic philofophers, (a feci which arofe at Alexan- dria about the beginning of the third century,) to reconcile the dodlrines of Piaro and Ariftotle con- cerning ideas. The endlefs difficulties, it would ap- pear, to which their fpeculations led, induced, at iaft, the more cautious and modeft inquiries to banifh them entirely from Dialedics, and to content them- felves with ftudying the arrangements or claflifica- tions of univerfals, which the antient philofophers had made, without engaging in any metaphyfical difquifitions concerning their nature. Porphyry, in particular, although he tells us, that he had fpecula- ted much on this fubjecl ; yet, in his Introduction to Ariftotle's Categories, waves the confideration of it as obfcure and intricate. On fuch queftions as thefe 'y " Whether genera and fpecies exift in nature, " or are only conceptions of the Human Mind ; and *' (on the fuppolition that they exift in nature) ** whether they are inherent in the objedls of fenfe, *' or disjoined from them ?" he declines giving any determination. This paffage in Porphyry's Introduction is an ob- jed of curioiity ; as, by a fmgular concurrence of circumftances, it ferved to perpetuate the memory of a controverfy from which it was the author's in- tention to divert the inquiries of his readers. Amidft the diforders produced by the irruptions of the Bar- barians, the knowledge of the Greek tongue was al- moft entirely loft ; and the ftudies of philofophers were confined to Latin verfions of Ariftotle's Di.'.lec- tics, and of Porphyry's Introduction concerning the Categories. With men who had a relifli for fuch difquifitions, it is probable that the pi^fiage already quoted from Porphyry, would have a rendcncy rath- 152 ELEMENTS OE THE l»mLOSOPHY er to excite than to damp curiofity ; and according* ly, we have reafon to believe, that the controverfy to which it relates continued, during the dark ages, to form a favourite fuhject of diicullion. The opin- ion which was prevalent was, (to ufe the fcholafiic language of the times,) that univerfals do not exift before things, nor after things, but in things \ that is, (if I may be allowed to attempt a commentary upon expreffions to which I do not pretend to be able to annex very precife notions,) univerfal ideas have not (as Plato thought) an exiflence feparable from indi- vidual objefts ; and, therefore, they could not have exiiled prior to them in the order of time ; nor yet, (according to the dodlrine of the Stoics,) are they mere conceptions of the mind, formed in confequence of an examination and comparifon of particulars ; but thele ideas or forms are from eternity unitedin* feparably with that matter of which things confiit ; ©r, as the Ariftotelians fometimes exprefs themfelves, the forms of things are from eternity immerfed in matter. — The reader will, I hope, forgive me for en- tering into thefe details, not only on account of t^^eir connection with the obfervations which are to follow; but as they relate to a controverfy which, for maijy ages, employed all the ingenuity and learning in Eu- rope ; and which, therefore, however frivolous in it- felf, deferves the attention of phiioiophers, as one of the mod curious events which occurs in the hiftory of the Human Mind. Such appears to have been the prevailing opinion concerning the nature of univerlals, till the eleven tUj century ; when a new do6trinc, or (as fome autho think) a doctrine borrowed from the fchool of Zen( was propofed by Rofcelinus ;* and foon after ver widely propagated over Europe by the abilities anj eloquence of oneof hisfcholars, the celebrated Pet( * See Note [H.] OF THE HUMAN MIND. 1^ Abelard. According to thefe philofophers, there are no exiftences in nature correfponding to general terms ; and the objeds of our attention in all our general fpeculations are not ideas, but words. In confequence of this new doctrine, the fchoolmen gradually formed thenifelves into two fedls : one of which attached itfelf to the opinions of Rofcelinus and Abelard ; while the other adhered to the principles of Aridotle. Of thefe fecfs, the former are known in literary hiftory by the name of the Nominalifts j the latter by that of the Realiils. As it is with the doctrine of the Nominalifts that my own opinion cm this fubject coincides ; and as I propofe to deduce from it fome confequences, which appear to me important, 1 (hall endeavor to ftate it as clearly and precifely as I am able, purfuing, how- ever, rather the train of my own thoughts, than guided by the reafonings of any particular author. I formerly explained in what manner the words, which, in the infancy of language, were proper names, became gradually appellatives ; in confe- quence of which extenlion of their fignification, they would exprefs, when applied to individuals, thofe qualities only which are common to the whole gen- us. Now, it is evident, that, with refpedt to indi- viduals of the favne genus, there are two clafles of truths ; the one, particular truths relating to each individual ap2.rt, and deduced from a confideration of its peculiar and diftinguifhing properties ; the other, general truths, deduced trom a confideration of their common qualities ; and equally applica- ble to all of them. Such truths may be conven- iently exprefled, by means of general terms j fo as to form propofitions, comprehending under them as many particular truths, a^ there are individuals com- prehended under the general terms. It is farther evident, that there are two ways in which fuch gen- eral truths may be obtained ; either by fixing the U 154 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY attention on one individual, in fuch a manner that our reafoning may involve no circumftmces but thofe which are common to the whole genus ; or, (laying afide entirely the conlideration of things,) by means of the general terms with which language fuppl'es us. In either of thefe cafes, our inveftiga- tions muft neceffarily lead us to general conclufions. In the firft cafe ; our attention being limited to thofe circumftances, in which the fubjecl of our rea- foning refembles all other individuals of the fame genus, whatever we demonftrate with refped: to this fubjecl muft be true of every other to which the fame attributes belong. In the fecond cafe ; the fubjedt of our reafoning being expreifed by a generic word, which applies in common to a number of in- dividuals, the conclufion we form muft be as exten- five in its application, as the name of the fubjecl is in its meaning. The former procefs is analogous to the pradice of geometers, who in their moft general reafonings, dired the attention to a particular dia- gram : the latter, to that of algebraifts, who carry on their inveftigations by means of fymbols.* In cafes of this laft fort, it may frequently happen, from the affociation of ideas, that a general word may recal fome one individual to which it is applicable ; but this is fo far from being neceifary to the accuracy of our reafoning, that, excepting in fome cafes, in which it may be ufeful to check us in the abufe of general * These two iivetliods of obtaining general truths proceed on the same principles ; and are in fact, much less different from each other, than they appear tp be, at first view. When we carry on a process of general reasoning, by fixing our attention on a partic- ular individual of a genus, this individual is to be considered merely as a sign or representative ; and differs from any other sign only m this, that it bears a certain retsemblance to the things it denotes. — The straight lines which are employed in the fifth book of Euclid to represent magnitudes in general, differ from the algebraical ex- pressions of these magnitudes, in the same respects which picture- writing differs from arbitrary characters. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 155 terms, it always has a tendency, more or lefs, to miflead us from the truth. As the decifion of a judge muft neceffarily be impartial, when he is only ac- quainted with the relations in which the parties (land to each other, and when their names are fupplied by letters of the alphabet, or by the fiditious names of Titius, Caius, and Sempronius ; fo, in every procefs of reafoning, the concluiion we form is moft likely to be logically juft, when the attention is confined folely to figns ; and when the imagination does not prefent to it thofe individual objeds which may warp the judgment by cafual affociations. To thefe remarks, it may not be improper to add, that although in our fpeculations concerning indi- viduals, it is pollible to carry on procelTes of reafon- ing, by fixing our attention on the objeds themfelves, without the ufe of language ; yet it is alfo in our power to accomplifli the fame end, by fubilituting for thefe objects, words, or other arbitrary figns. The difference between the employments of language in fuch cafes, and in our fpeculations concerning claffes or genera, is ; that in the former cafe the ufe of words is, in a great meafure, optional ; whereas, in the latter, it is eflentially neceffary. This obfer- vation deferves our attention the more, that, if I am not miftaken, it has contributed to miflciid fome of the Realifts ; by giving rife to an idea, that the ufe of language, in thinking about univerfals, however convenient, is not more neceffary than in thinking about individuals. According to this view of the procefs of the mind, in carrying on general fpeculations, that idea which the antient philofophers confidered as the ciTence of an individual, is nothing more than the particular quality or qualities in which it refembles other indi- viduals of the fame clafs ; and in confequence of which, a generic name is applied to it. It is the pof- feflion of this quality, that entitles the individual to 156 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY the generic appellation ; and which, therefore, may be faid to be eflential to its claffification vvirh that particular genus ; but as all clarifications are to a certain degree arbitrary, it does not neceffaniy tol- low, that it is more effentiai to its exiflence as an in- dividual, than various other qualities which we are accuftomed to regard as accidental. In other words, (if I may borrow the language of modern philolo- phy,) this quality forms its nominal, but not its real elTence. Thefe obfervations will, I flatter myfelf, be fuffi- cient for the latisfaclion of fuch of my readers as are at all converfant with philofophical inquiries. Fur the fake of others, to whom this dilquifition may be new, I have added the following illullrations. J fhall have occafion to examine, in another part of my work, how far it is true, (as is commonly be- lieved,) that every procefs of reafoning may be re- folved into a feries of fyilogifms ; and to point out fome limitations, with which, 1 apprehend, it is ne- cefTary that this opinion fliould be received. As it would lead me, however, too far from n':y preient fubjed, to anticipate any part of the doctrine which I am then to propof , I fhall, in the following re- marks, proceed on the fuppofition, that the fyllogiftic theory is well-founded ; a fuppofition which, altho' not fi:ri(5lly agreeable to truth, is yet fufhciently ac- curate for the ufe which I am now to make of it. Take, then, any flep of one of Euclid's demonflra- tions ; for example, the firil flep of his firft propofi- tion, and flate it in the form of a fyllogifm. — " All *' flrait lines, drawn from the centre of a circle to the *^ circumference, are equal to one another." " But A *' B, and C D, are flraight lines, drawn from the centre '' of a circle to the circumference. Therefore, A B " is equal to C D." — It is perfe<5l:iy manifeff , that, in order to feel the force of this conclufion, it is by no means neceffary, that I fliould annex any particular OF THE HUMAN MIND. 157 notions to the letters AB or CD, or that I fhould comprehend what is meant by equality^ or by a circle^ its centre^ and its circumference. Every perfon muft be latisfied, that the truth of the conclulion is ne- celTarily implied in that of the two preniites ; w hat- ever the particular things may be to which thefe premifes may relate. In the following fyllnglfm, too : — *' All men mull die ; — Peter is a man ; — there- *' fore Peter muft die ;" — the evidence of the conclu- fion does not in the ieaft depend on the particular notions 1 annex to the words man^ and Peter ; but would be equally complete, if we were to fubltitute inftead oF them, two letters of the alphabet, or any other iniignificant characters. — " All X's muft die ; *' — Z is an X ; — therefore Z muft die ;" — is a lyllo- gifm which forces the affent nolefs than the former. It is farther obvious, that this fyllogifm would be equally conclufive, if, inftead of the word die^ I were to fubftitute any other verb that the language con- tains ; and that, in order to perceive the juftneis of the inference, it is not even neceffary that I fhouid underftand its meaning. In general, it might be eafily fhewn, that all the rules of logic, with refpecl to lyllogifms, might be demonftrated, without having recourfe to any thing but letters of the alphabet ; in the fame manner, (and I may add, on the very fame principles,) on which the algebraift demonftrates, by means of thefe letters, the various rules for tranfpofing the terms of an equation- From what has been faid, it follows, that the af- fent we give to the conciufion of a fyllogifm does not refult from any examination of the notions ex-" preiled by the different propositions of which it is composed, but is an immediate confequence of the relations in which the words ftand to each other. The truth is, that, in every fyllogism, the inference is only a particular inftance of the general axiom. 158 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY that whatever is true universally of any fign, muft also be true of every individual which that fign can be euipioyed to exprefs. Adiritting, therefore, that every procels ot reasoning may be refolved in- to a ieries of fyllogiims, it follows, that this opera- tion of the mind furnifhes no proof of the exiftence of any thing correfponding to general terms, dis- tind from the individuals to which thefe terms are applicable. rhese remarks, I am very fenfible, do, by no means, exhaufl the fubjed ; for there are various nujJes of reaioning, to which the fylogiftic theory does not apply. 13ut,in ail of them, without excep- tion, it will be found, on examination, that the evi- dence of our -^oncfulions appears imn ediately from the confideration of the words in which the premif- es are exprefl'ed ; without any reference to the things which they denote. Ihe imperfect account which is given of dedudive evidence, in the recei- ved fyftems of logic, makes it iti.pofTible for me, in this place, to profecute the fubjed ar.y farther. After all that I have faid on the ule of laiiguage as an inftrument of reafoning, I can ealily foreiee a variety of objedions, which may occur to the di»d- rine I have been endeavouring to eftablifh. But without entering into a particular examination of thefe ohjedions, I believe 1 may venture to afjirm, that moii:, if not all, of them take their rife from confounding reafoning, or dedudion. properly so called, with certain other intelledual procefies, which ir la nectfiary for us to employ in the invefti- gation of truth. That it is frequently of effential importance to us, in our fpeculations, to withdraw our attention from w^ords, and to dired it to the things they denote, I am very ready to acknowl- edge. All that I afTert is, that, in so far as our fpeculations con (id of that procefs of the mind which is properly called reafoning, they may be carried on OF THE HUMAN MIND. 159 by words alone ; or, which comes to the fame thing, that every procefs of reafoning is perfectly analo- gous to an algebraical operation. What 1 mean by " the other intelle<5lual procefTes diftin<51: from rea- *' foning, which it is neceflary for us fometimes to " employ in the inveftigation of truth," will, I hope, appear clearly from the following remarks. In algebraical inveftigations, it is well known, that the practical application of a general expreffion, is frequently limited by the conditions which the hypothefis involves ; and that, in confequence of a want of attention to this circumftance, fome math- ematicians of the firft eminence have been led to a- dopt the moft paradoxical and abfurd conclufions> Without this cautious exercise of the judgment, in the interpretation of the algebraical language, no dexteritv in the use of the calculus will be fufficient 4 to preferve us from error. Even in algebra, there- fore, there is an application of the intellectual pow- ers perfedily diftindt from any procefs of reafoning ; and which is abfolutely neceflary for conducting us to the truth. In geometry, we are not liable to adopt the fame paradoxical conclufions, as in algebra ; becaufe the diagrams to which our attention is directed, ferve as a continual check on our reafoning powers. Thefe diagrams exhibit to our very fenfes, a variety of relations among the quantities under confidera- tion, which the language of algebra is too general to exprefs ; in confequence of which, we are not confcious of any effort of the judgment diftinct from a procefs of reafoning. As every geometrical in- veftigation, however, may be exprefled algebraxally, it is manifeft, that, in geometry, as well as in alge- bra, there is an exercife of the intellectual powers, diftinct from the logical procefs ; although, in the former fcience, it is rendered iiy eafy, by the ufe of diagrams, as to efcape our attention. 160 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY The fame fource of error and of abfurdity, which exiils in algebra, is to be found, in a much greater degree, in the other branches of knowledge. Ah- ftracting entirely from the ambiguity of laniruage ; and fuppofing alfo our reafonings to be logically ac- curate, it would ftill be neceffary for us, from time to time, in all our fpeculations, tp lay alide the ufe of words, and to have recourfe to particular examples, or illuftrations, in order to correct and to limit our general concluiions. — To a want of attention to this circumftance, a number of the fpeculative abfurdi- ties which are current in the world, might, I am perfuaded, be eafily traced. Belides, however, this fource of error, which is in fome degree common to all the fciences, there is a great variety of others, from which mathematics are entirely exempted : and which perpetually tend to lead us aftray in our philofophical inquiries. Of thefe, the moft important is, that ambiguity in the fignification of words, which renders it fo difficult to avoid employing the fame expreflions in different fenfes, in the courfe of the fame procefs of reafon- ing. This fource of miftake, indeed, is apt, in a much greater degree, to affect our conclufions in metaphyfics, morals, and politics, than in the differ- ent branches of natural philofophy ; but, if we ex- cept mathematics, there is no fcience whatever, in which it has not a very fenfible influence. In alge- bra, we may proceed with perfect fafety through the longed: inveftigations, without carrying our at- tention beyond the ligns, till we arrive at the laft re- fult. But in the other fciences, excepting in thol cafes in which we have fixed the meaning of all oui terms by accurate definitions, and have rendered th< ufe of thefe terms perfectly familiar to us by ver] long habit, it is but feldom that we can proceed ii this manner without danger of error. In many ci fes, it is neceffary for us to keep up, during th^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. 161; whole of our inveftigations, a fcrupulous and con- ftant attention to the (ignification of our exprefiions ; and, in mofl cafes, this caution in the ufe of words, is a much more difficult effort of the mind, than the logical procefs. But iliil this furniflies no excep- tion to the general do6lrine already delivered j for the attention we find it neceifary to give to the im- port of our words, arifes only from the accidental circHmftance of their ambiguity, and has no effen- tial cbnne(flion with that procefs of the mind, which is properly called reafoning ; and which confills in the inference of a conclufion from premifes. In all the fciences, this procefs of the mind is perfedlly a- nalogous to an algebraical operation ; or, in other words, (when the meaning of our expreffions is once fixed by definitions,) it may be carried on intirely by the ufe of figns, without attending, during the time of the procefs, to the things fignified. The conclufion to which the foregoing obferva- tions lead, appears to me to be decifive of the queC- tion, with refped to the objects of our thoughts when we employ general terms ; for if it be grant- ed, that words, even when employed without any reference to their particular fignification, form an inftrument of thought fufficient for all the purpofes of reafoning; the only fliadow of an argument in proof of the common do<5i:rine on the iuhjecl, (I mean that which is founded on the impoffibility of explaining this procefs of the mind on any other hy- pothefis,) falls to the ground. Nothing lefs, furely, than a convi<5lion of this impoffihiiity, could have fo long reconciled philoibphers to an hypothefis unfup- ported bv any diredl evidence ; and acknowledged even by its warmeft defenders, to involve muchdif* ficulty and myfi:ery. It does not fall within my plan, to enter, in this part of my work, into a particular confideration of the practical confecjueates which loiiow from tUe 162 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHV foregoing doi^rine. I cannot, however, help re- marking the innpartance of cultivating, on the one hand, a talent for ready and various iiluftration ; and, on the other, a habit of reafoning by means of general terms. The former talent is neceflary, not only for corred:ing and limiting our general conclu- fions, but for enabling us to apply our knowledge, when occalion requires, to its real practical ufc. The latter ferves the double purpofe, of preventing our attention from being diftracted during the courfe of our reafonings, by ideas which are foreign to the point in queilion ; and of diverting the attention from thofe conceptions of particular objedtsand par- ticular events which might diflurb the judgment, by the ideas and feelings, which are apt to be affo- ciated with them, in confequence of our own cafual experience. This laft obfervation points out to us, alfo, one principal foundation of the art of the orator. As his obje6l is not fo much to inform and to fatisfy the underflandings of his hearers, as to force their im- mediate affent ; it is frequently of ufe to him to clothe his reafonings in that fpecific and figurative language, which may either awaken in their minds aflbciations favorable to his purpofe, or may divert their attention from a logical examination of his ar- gument. A procefs of reafoning fo expreffed, af fords at once an exercife to the judgment, lo the imi agination, and to the paflions ; and is apt, evei when loofe and inconiequential, to impofe on tlu bell underftandings. It appears farther, from the remarks which hav< been made, that the perfedion of philofophical Ian;i guage, confidered either as an infirurricnt of thought; or as a medium of communication with others^ con- fifts in the ufe of expreflions, which from their gen- erality, have no tendency to awaken the powers o£ ^ conception and imagination ^ or, in other words, it j OF THE HUMAN MIND. 163 confifts in its approaching, as nearly as pofTible, in its nature, to the language of algebra. And hence the effects which long habits of philofophical fpecu- lation have, in weakening, by difufe, thofe faculties of the mind, which are neceffary for the exertions of the poet and the orator ; and of gradually form- ing a ftyle of compofition, which they who read merely for amufement, are apt to cenfure for a want of vivacity and of ornament. SECTION III. Remarks on the Opinions of fome modern Fhilofophers on the Subjed of the foregoing SeStion, AFTER the death of Abelard, through whofe a* bilities and eloquence the fed of Nominalifts had enjoyed, for a few years, a very fplendid triumph, the fyftem of the Realifts began to revive ; and it was foon fo completely re-eftablifhed in the fchools, as to prevail, with little or no oppofition, till the fourteenth century. What the circumlhnces were, which led philofophers to abandon a do<5lrine, which feems fo ftrongly to recommend itfelf by its fimpli- city, it is not very eafy to conceive. Probably the heretical opinions, which had fubjed:ed both Abe- lard and Rofcelinus to the cenfure of the church, might create a prejudice alfo againft their philofoph- ical principles ; and probably too, the manner in which thefe principles were ftated and defended, was not the cleared, nor the moft fatisfaclory.* The principal caufe, however, I am difpofed to think, of the decline of the fedl of Nominalills, was their want ♦ The great argument which the Nominalists employed against the existence of universals was : " Entia non sunt multiplicanda '■' prajter nsc.-^Siitateno." 164 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY of fome palpable example, by means of which they might illuftrate their doci:rine. It is by the ufe which algebraifts make of the letters of the alphabet in carrying on their operations, that Leibnitz and Berkeley have been moil fucceisful in explaining the ufe of language as an inllrument of thought; and,as in the Xllth century, the algebraical art was entirely un^ known,RofceUnus and Abelard muft have been redu- ced to the neceffity ot conveying their leading idea by general circumlocutions ; and muft have found conliderable difficulty in ftating it in a manner fatis- fadory to themfelves : a confideration, by the way, •which, if it accounts for the flow progrefs which this dodlrine made in the world, places in the more ftr iking light, the genius of thofe men whole fagacity led them, under fo great difadvantages, to approach fc a conc'ufion fo juft and pliilofophic il in itfelf, and fo oppofite to the prevailing opinions of their age. In the fourteenth century, this fe<^feems to have been almoft completely extindl ; their doctrine being equally reprobated by the two great parties which then divided the fchools, the followers of Duns Sco- tus and of Thomas Aquinas. Thefe, although they differed in their manner of explaining the nature of \uuverfals, and oppofed each other's opinions wiih much afperity, yet united in reje^ling the dodrine of the Nominalifts, not only as abfurd, but as lead- ing to the moft dangerous confequences. At laft, William Occam, a native of England, and a fchilar of Duns Scotus, revived the ancient controverfy : and with equal ability and fuccefs vindicated the long-abandoned philofophy of Rofcelinus. From this time the difpute was carried on with great warmth, in the univerfities of France, of Germany, and of England ; more particularly in the two for- mer countries, where the fovereigns were led, by fom.e political views, to intereft themfelves deeply in the conteft j and even to employ the civil power OF THE HUMAN MINB. J 65 in fupporting their favorite opinions. The emperor Lewis of Bavarii, in return for the afliriance which, in his difputes with the Pope,* Occam had given to him by his writings, fided with the Nominalifts. Lewis the Eleventh of France, on the other hand, at- tached himfelf to the Realifts, and made their an- tagonifh the objects of a cruel pcrfecution.f The proteftant reformation, at length involved xnen of learning in difcuflions of a more interefting nature ; but even the zeal of theological controver- fy could hardly exceed that with which the N omin- alifts and Realifts had for fometime before maintain- ed their reipe£tive doctrines. " Clamores primuru " ad ravim," cfays an author who had himfelf been an eye-witnefs of thefe Uterary difputes) " hinc im- " probitas, faunae, minae, convitia, dum luclantur, et " uterque alterum tentat profternere : confumtis *' verbis venitur ad pugnos, ad veram lu6tam ex fi(5i:a " et fimulata. Quia etiam, qua2 contingunt in palae- " ftra, illic non defunt, colaphi, alapae, confputio, cal- " ces, morfus, etiam quae jam fupra leges palaeftrae, " fufles, ferrum, faucii multi, nonnunquam occi(i.**+ That this account is not exaggerated, we have the teftimony of no lefs an author than Erafmus, who mentions it as a common occurrence : " Eos ufque *' ad pallorem, ufque ad convitia, ufque ad fputa, *' nonnunquam et ufque ad pugnos invicem digladi- *' ari, alios ut Nominales, alios ut Reales, loqui,"§ * Occam, we are told, was accustomed to say to the Emperor : " Tu me defendas gladio, et ego te defeadam calaino.'* Brucker, vol. iii. p. 848. t Mostieim's Ecclesiastical History. t LUDOVICUS ViVES. § The Nominalists procured the death of John Haes, who was a "Realist ; and in their letter to Lewis King of France, do not pre- tend to deny that he fell a victim to the resentment of their gect. The Realists, on the other hand, obtained, in the year 1479, the condemnation of John de Wesalia, who was attached to the party 166 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY The difpute to which the foregoing obfervations relate, although for fome time after the Reformation, interrupted by theological difquifitions, has been fince occafionally revived by difff^rent writers ; and, fingular as it may appear, it has not yet been brought to a concluiion in which all parties are agreed. 1 he names, indeed, of Nominalifts and Realitls ex^ft no longer ; but the point in difpute between thefe two celebrated ieds, coincides precifely wirh a queftion which has been agitated in our own times, ano which lias led to one of the moli beautiful fpeculations of modern philofcphy. Of the advocates who have appeared for the doc- trine of the Nviminalifts, (ince the revival of letters, the moft diilinguifhed are, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume. The firft has, in various parts of his works, reprobated the hypotheiis of the Realiils ; and has ftated the opinions of their antagonifts with that acutenefs, fimplicity, and precifion, which diftinguifh all his writings.* The fecond, coniidering (and in of the Nominalists. These eontfending sects carried their fury so far as to charge each other with ** the sin against tiie Hoi/ Ghost." Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History. * *' The nniversaiity of one name to many things, hath been the " cause that men think the thing.-' themselves are universal ;-.and " so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest " of the men that are, have been, or shall be, in the world there is *' yet somethifig else, that we call Man, viz. Man in g:eneraj ; de- *' ceiving themselves, by taking tlie universal, or general appella- *' tion. for the thing it slgnifielh : For if one bhould desire the ** painter to make liim the picture of a man, which is as much as " to say, of a man in general ; he ;nea;uth no more, but that the *' painter should chuse what man he plea?erh to draw, which must " needs be some of tliem that are, or have been, or may be ; none " of which are univer^al. But when he would have him to draw " the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the *• painter to that one person he chuseth. It is plain, therefore, *• that there is nothing universal btit names ; which are therefore '^ called indefinite, because we limit them not ourselves, but lc«u'& OF THE HUMAN MIND* 167 my opinion, juftly) the docElrines of the antients con- cerning univerfals, in fupport of which fo much in- genuity had been employed by the Realifts, as the great fource of my-ftery and error in the abftradt faiences, was at pains to overthrow it completely, by fome very ingenious and original fpeculations of his own. Mr. Hume's* view of the fubjeSeeNote[L.] OF THE HUMAN MIND. 181 it had engaged his attention. In the courfe of this converfation he obferved, that Wilkins had mifta- ken the true end of a real charader which was not merely to enable different nations to correfpond ea- fily together, but to ajffift the reafon, the invention, and the memory. In his writings, too, he fome- where fpeaks of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in forming, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked) had fome re- lation to his univerfal language.* The new nomenclature which has been introduced into chymiftry, feems to me to furnifh a ftriking il- luftration of the effecl of appropriated and well-de- fined expreilions, in aiding the intellectual powers ; and the period is probably not far diftant, when iim« ilar innovations will be attempted in fome of the oth- er fciences. * " M. Leibnitz avoit conga le pfojet d'une langue philo- ** sophique et universelle. Wilkins Eveque de Chester, et '* Dalgarnoy avoient travaille ; mais des le tems qu'il etoit " en Angleterre, il avoit dit a Messieurs Boyle et d* Old- " enboiirg qa'il ne croj'oit pas que ces grands honnnies *' eussent encore frappe au bur. lis pouvoient bien faire " que des nations qui na s'enlendoient pas eussent aisement ** commerce, maia ils n 'avoient pas attrappe les veri tables " caracteres reels, qui eloient Tinstrament le plus fin dont ** Pesprit bumain se put servir, et qui devoient extremc- " ment faciliter et le raisonnement, et la memoire, et l*in- " veniion des chose?. Ils devoient ressembler, autant qu'il ** etoit possible, aux caracteres d'algebre, qui en effct sont *' tres simples, et ties expressifs, qui n'ont jamais ni super- " fluite ni equivoque, et dont toutes les varietes sont rai- '' sonnees. II a parle en quelque endroit, d'un alpliabet '^^ des pensees humaines, qu'il meditnit. Selon toutes les • appareDces,cet alphabet avoit rapport a ss langue univer- n-'lle." Ehge de jM. Lei hsnz, par M. de Fontekelle. 182 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY SECTION V. Of the Purpofes to which the Powers of AhflraBion and Generaufatwi are fuhfervitnt, IT has been already ftiewn, that, without the ufe of figns, all our knowledge muft neceflkrily have been limited to individuals, and that we {ht)uld have been perteclly incapable both of claffification and general reafoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalifation, (which I have endeavored to fhow, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoflible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reafoning whatever. But 1 cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous ; or, at leaft, that it is very imperfeclly Hated, The truth is, it appears to me to be juft in one fenfe of the word reafoning^ but falfe in another ; and I even fufped it is falle in that fenfe of the word in which it is moft commonly em- ployed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a gen- eral propofition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fliould be afcertained with precilion. It has been remarked by feveral writers that the cxpeclition which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon rea- foning ; and different theories have of late beei propofed to account for its origin. Mr. Hum< refblves it into the affociation of ideas. Dr. Reid^ on the other hand, maintains, that it is an origi principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation ; and which, therefore, is to b< ranked among thofe general and ultimate fadls, be^ yond which, philofophy is unable to proceed.* With- * In inqnirjes of this nature, so far removed from the common courte of literary pursuits, it always gives me OP THE HUMAN MIND. 183 out this principle of expeftation, it would be impof- fiblc for us to accommodate our conduct to the ef- tablifhed courfe of nature ; and, accordingly, we find that it is a principle coeval with our very exiftence ; and, in fome meafure, common to man with the lower animals. It is an obvious confequence of this doftrine, that, although philofophers be accuftomed to ftate what are commonly called the laws of nature, in the form of general propofitions, it is by no means neceffary for the pradical purpofes of life, that we fhould ex- prefs them in this manner ; or even that we Ihould exprefs them in words at all. The philofopher, for pleasure to remark a coincidence of opinion among different philosophers ; particularly among men of original genius, and who have been educated in different philosophical sys- tems. The following passage, in which M. de Condorcet gives an account of some ot the metaphysical opinions of the late Mr. Turgot, approaches very nearly to Dr. Reid's doctrines. ** La memoire de nos sensations, et la faculte que nous •' avons de reflechir sur ces sensations passees et de les *' combiner, sont le seul principe de nos ccnnoissances. La " supposition qu'il existe des loix constantcs auxquelles " tons ies phenomenes observes sont assujettis de maniere " a reparoitre dans tous les temps, dans toutes les circon- '• stances, lels qu'ils sent determines par ces loix, est le *' seul fondement de la certitude de ces connoissances. " Nous avons la conscience d'avoir observe cette con- ** stance, et un sentiment involontaire nous force de croire '* qu'elle continue a de subsister. La probabilite qui en " resulte, quelque grande qu'elle soit, n'est pas une certi- " tude. Aucune relation necessaire ne lie pour nous le " passe a Tavenir, ni la Constance de ce que j'ai vu a celle '* de ce que j'aurois continue d'observer si j'etoisresie dans " des circonstances semblables ; mais I'imfTession qui me ** porte a regarder comme existant, comme red ce qui m'a *' presenie ce caractere de Constance est irresistible." — Fif de Turcot, partie ii. p. 56. " Quand un Francois et un Anglois present de meme, ** (says Voltairc,j il faut bien qu'iis aient raison." 184 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPiriT example, may ftate it as a law of nature, that " fir^ fcorches ;" or that " heavy bodies, when unlupport* ed, fall downwards :" but, long before the ufe of artificial figns, and even before the dawn of reafon^ a child learns to ad: upon both of thefe fuppolitions. In doing fo, it is influenced merely by the inftinctive principle which has now been mentioned, directed in its operation (as is the cafe with many other in- ftinds) by the experience of the individual. If man, therefore, had been deilined for no other purpofes, than to acquire fuch an acquaintance with the courfe of nature, as is necellary for the prefervation of his animal exiflence ; he might have fulfilled all the ends of his being without the ufe of language. As we are enabled, by our inftinclive anticipation of phyfical events, to accommodate our conduct to what we forefee is to happen, fo we are enabled, in many cafes, to increafe our power, by employing phyfical caufes as inftruments for the accomplilliment of our purpofes ; nay, we can employ a feries of fuch caufes, lo as to accomplifh very remote effects. We can employ the agency of air, to increafe the heat of a furnace ; the furnace, to render iron malleable ; and the iron to all the various purpofes of the me- chanical arts. Now, it appears to me, that all ':his may be conceived and done without the aid of ian* guage : and yet, afl'urediy, to difcover a ferit:^. of means fubfervient to a panicular end ; or, in other words, an effort of m-echanicai invention ; implies, according to the common doctrines of philofophers, the excrcife of our reafoning powers. In this fenfe, therefore, of the word realoning, I am inclined to think, that it is not effentially connected with the faculty of generalifation, or with the ufe of figns. It is fome confiruiation of this conciufion, that favages, whofe mjnds are almoft wholly occupied \vith particulars, and who have neither inclination nor capacity fcr general fpcculations, are yet occa- OP THE HUMAN MIND. 18,^ iionally obferved to employ a long train of means for accomplifliing a particular purpofe. Even fomething of this kind, but in a very inferior degree, may, I think, be remarked in the other animalb ; and that they do not carry it farther, is probably not the ef- fedb of their want of generalifation, but of the imper- fection of fome of thofe faculties which are common to them with our fpecies ; particul irly of their pow- ers of attention and recollection. I he inftances which are commonly produced, to prove that they are not deftitute of the power of reafoning, are all examples of that fpecies of contrivance which has been men- tioned ; and are perfectly diftind from thofe intel- lectual proceffes to which the ufe of iigns is effential- ly fubfervient.* *One of the best attested instances which I have met with, of sagacity in the lower aninaals, is iricrntioned b^' M, Bailly, in his Lettre sur les Animaux^ addressed to M. Le Roy. *' Un dc mes amis, homme d'espritet digne deconfiance, *' m'a raconie deux faits dont il a ee temoin. II a* oil ua ** singe tres intelligent ; il s'amufoii a lui donner des noix " dont Tanimal etoit ires friand ; mais il les ph'^oit assez ** loin, pour que retenu par sa chaine, le singe ne pUf pas les *' aiteiodre : apies bien des efforts inutilt^s qui ne servent *'* qu'a preparer Tinvention, le singe, voyani passer un do- ** mesiique portant une serviette sous le bras, fe saisii de " cette serviette, et s'en servit pour atteindre a la noix et '* Tamener jusqu' a lui. La maniere de casser la noix exi- " gea une nouvclle invention ; il en vint a bout, en p]a9:int ** la noix a terre, en y faifant tomber de haut une pierjeoa *' un caillou pour la briser. Vous vovez. Monsieur, que *' sans avoir connu, comme Gallilee, les l»>ixd«r la chute des " corps, le singe avoit bien remarque la torce que ces corps ** acquierent par la chutt;. Ce moycn cependi»nt se trouva " en defaut. Un jour qu'il avoit plu, la terre etoit molle, *' la noix enfon^-it, tt la pierre n'avoit plus d'aciion pour " la briser. Que fii le singe ? II alia chercher un tuileau, " pla^alanoix dr^ssus^eten laissant tombe- la pierre il brisa ** la noix qui nN-nfonCoit plus."— Z)wc6>t/r5 et memoires par z 186 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY Whether that particular fpecies of mechanical con-* trivance which has now been mentioned, and which confifts merely in employing a feries of phyfical cau- fes to accomplifh an effeft which we cannot produce immediately, Ihould or fhould not be dignified with the name of reafoning, 1 ftiall not now inquire. It is fufficient for my prefent purpofe to remark, that it is ell'entially different from thofe intellectual pro- ceffes to which the ufe of iigns is indifpenfibly ne- ceffiry. At the fame time, I am ready to acknowl- edge, that what I have now faid, is not ftrictly ap- plicable to thofe more complicated mechanical inven- tions, in which a variety of powers are made to con- fpire at once to produce a particular effed. Such contrivances, perhaps, may be found to involve pro- ceffes of the mind which cannot be carried on with- out figns. But thefe queftions will fall more pro- perly under our confideration when we enter on the fubject of reafoning* In general, it may be remarked, that, in fo far as our thoughts relate merely to individual objeds, or to individual events, which we have adually per- ceived, and of which we retain a diftinft remem- brance/ we are not under the necelTity of employing PAvteitr de VHistoire de VAstronotmc, A Paris, 1790, tome ii. p. 126. Admitting thf;se facts to be accurately stated, the}- siiH leave an essential distinction between man and brutes j for in none of the contrivances here mentioned, is there any thing analogous to tnose ihtc llcctual processes which lead ihe mind to general conclusions, and which (according to the foregoing doctrine) imply the use of the general terms. Those powers, therefore, which enable us to classify ob- jects, and to employ signs as an instrument of thought, are, as far as we can judge, peculiar to the human species. * I have thought it proper to add this limitation of the general proposition ; because individual objects^ and indi- vidual events, which have not fallen under the examination OF THE HUMAN MIND. iS? words. It frequently, however, happens, that when the fubjeds of our confideration are particular, our reafoning with refped: to them may involve very general notions ; and, in fuch cafes, although we may conceive, without the ufe of words, the things about which we reafon, yet we muft neceffarily have recourfe to language in carrying on our fpeculations concerning them. If the fubjeds of our reafoning be general, (under which defcription I include all our reafonings, whether more or kfs comprehenfive, which do not relate merely to individuals,) words are the fole objeds about which our thoughts are employed. According as thefe words are compre- henfive or limited in their lignification, the conclu- lions we form will be more or lefs general ; but this accidental circumftance does not in the leaft afFcol the nature of the intelledtual procefs ; fo that it may be laid down as a propofitijon which holds without any exception, that, in every cafe, in which we ex- of our senses, cannot possibly be made the subjects of our consideration, but by means of language. The manner irj whiclj we think of such objects and events, is accurately described in the foUowinj^ passage of Wollaston ; however unphiiosophical the conclusion may be v/hich he iiedu.ces from his reasoning, *^ A njan is not known ever the more to posterity, because *^ his naii>e is transmitted to them ; he doih not live, because " his pame does. When it is said, Julius Caesar subdued " Gaul, beat Pompey, changed liie Koman commonwealth *' into a monarchy, Sec. it is the same thing as to say, the *' conqueror of Pompey wa«» C«sar ; that is, Csesar, and the " conqueror of Pompey, ar^ ihe siime thing ; and Caesar is *' as much known by the one distinction as the other.— *' The amount then is only this : ihat the conqueror of *' Pompey conquered Pompey ; or somebody concjuered ** Pompey ; or rather, since Pompey is as litde known ncvr *' as Ciesar, somebody conquered somebody. Such a poor '* business is this boasted immortality ; and such, as has ' been here described, is the ihiug calh d glory among us T' Reli^'wn of Nat> Df.l. p. ur. 18S ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY tend our fpeculations beyond individuals, language? is not only an ufeful auxiliary, but is the fole inftru- ment by which they are carried on. Thefs remarks naturally lead me to take natice of what forms the charaderiftical diftind:ion between the fpeculations of the philofopher and of the f ulgar. It is not, that the former is accuftomed to carry on his proceffes of reafoning to a greater extent than the latter ; but that the conclufions he is accuftom- ed to form, are far more comprehenlive, in confe- quence of the habitual employment of more compre- henlive terms. Among the moft unenlightened of mankind, we often meet with individuals who pof- fefs the reafoning faculty in a very eminent degree ; but as this faculty is employed merely about partic- ulars, it never can condud them to general truths ; and, of conlequence, whether their purfuits in life lead them to fpeculation or to adion, it can only fit them for d'^ftinguifhing themfelves in fome very lim- ited and fubordinate fphere. The philofopher, whofe mind has been familiarifed by education, and by his own refiedlions, to the correct ufe of more comprehenlive terms, is enabled, without perhaps a greater degree of intellectual exertion than is necef- fary for managing the details of ordinary bufinefs, to arrive at general theorems ; which, when illuftrated to the lower dalles of men, in their particular appli- cations, feem to indicate a fertility of invention, lit- tle fhort of fupernatural* *"• General reasonings seem intricate, merely because " ih-y are general; nor is it easy for the bulk of mankind ** to (iistingulsh,in a great number of pariiculars, that com- ** mon circumstance in which they all agree, or to extract *' it, pure and unmixt, from the other superfluous circum- *' stances. Every judgment or conclusion with them is *' pa'ticular. They cannot enlarge their view to those uni- " versal propositions, ^vhich comprehend under them an in- *' finite number of individuals, and include a v/hole science OF THE HUMAN MIND. 189 The analogy of the algebraical art may be of uib in iUuftrating thefe obfervations. The difference, in fa6l, between the inveiligations we carry on by its aflillance, and othtr procefles of reafoning, is more inconfiderable than is commonly imagined ; and, if I am not miftaken, amounts only to this, that the former are expreffed in an appropriated language, with which we are not accuftomed to alTociate par- ticular notions. Hence they exhibit the efficacy of figns as an inftrument of thought in a more diflinct and palpable manner, than the Ipeculations we car- ry on by words, which are continually awakening the power of Conception. When the celebrated Vieta fhewed algebraifts, that, by fubftituting in their invefligations letters of the alphabet, inftead of known quantities, they might render the folution of every problem lubfervient to the difcovery of a general truth, he did not increafe the difHculty of algebraical reafonings ; he only en- larged the lignification of the terms in which they were expreffed. And if, in teaching that fcience, it is found expedient to accuftom itudents to folve problems by means of the particular numbers which are given, before they are made acquainted with lit- eral or fpecious arithmetic, it is not becaufe the for-. mer procefles are lefs intricate than the latter, but be- caufe their fcope and utility are more obvious, and becaufe it is more eafy to illuftrate, by examples than by words, the difference between a particular couj- cluiion, and a general theorem. The difference between the intelleflual procefTes of the vulgar and of the philofopher, is perfectly a- nalogous to that between the two dates of the alge- ** in a singli; theorem. Their eve is confounded with such " an exici^s ve prospect ; and the conclusior.s derived fr( m " it, «;ven though clearly expressed, seem intricate and ob- scure." Hume's Political Discourses. 190 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY braical art before and after the time of Vieta ; the general terms which are ufed in the various fciences, giving to thofe who can employ them with corred:- nefs and dexterity, the fame fort of advantage over the uncultivated iagacity of the bulk of mankind, which the expert algebraift pofleffes over the arith* fnetical accomptant. If the foregoing dodrine be admitted as juft, it exhibits a view of the utility of language, which ap- pears to me to be peculiarly (Iriking and beautiful ; as it fhews that the fame taculties which, without the ufe of figns, muft neceffariiy Iiave been limited to the confideration of individual obje<5is and partic- ular events, are, by means of figns, fitted to embrace, without effort, thofe comprehenfive theorems, to the difcovery of which, in detail, the united efforts of the whole human race would ha/e been unequal. The advantage our animal Ifrength acquires by the ufe of mechanical engines, exhibits but a faint inu age of that increafe of our intelle(5tual capacity which we owe to language. — It is this increafe of our nat- ural powers of comprehenfion, which feems to be the principal foundation of the pleafure we receive from the difcovery of general theorems. Such a dffcovery gives us at once the command of an infin- ite variety of particular truths, and cotnmunicates to the mind a fentiment of its own power, not un- like tt> what we feel when we contemplate the mag- nitude of thofe phyfical effects, of which we have acquired the command by our mechanical contri- vances. It may perhaps appear, at firfl, to be a farther con- fequence of the prmciples I have been endeavoring to eflablifh, that the difficulty of philofophical diC coveries is much lefs than is commonly imagined j but the truth is, it only follows from them, that this difficulty is of a different nature from what we are apt to fuppofe, on a fuperficial view of the fubjed. OF THE HUMAN Mmo. 191 To employ, with Ikill, the very delicate inllrument which nature has made eflentially fubfervient to general reaioning, and to guard againft the errors which refult from an injudicious ufe of it, require an uncommon capacity of patient attention, and a cautious circumfpeclion in conducing our various intelleclual proceffes, which can only be acquired by early habits of philofophical refledlion. To aflift and dired us in making this acquifition ought to form the moft important branch of a rational logic ; a fcience of far more extenfive utility, and of which the principles lie much deeper in the philofopby of the human mind, than the trifling art which is com- monly dignified with that name. The branch in particular to which the foregoing obfervations more immediately relate, muft forever remain in its in- fancy, till a moft difficult and important defidera- tum in the hiftory of the mind is fupplied, by an ex- planation of the gradual fteps by which it acquires the ufe of the various clafles of words which com- pole the language of a cultivated and enlightened people. Of fome of the errors in reafoning to which we are expofed by an incautious ufe of words, I took notice in the preceding fedion ; and I Ihall have occafion afterwards to treat the fame fubjed more in detail in a fubfequent part of my work. SECTION VI. Of the Errors to which ive are liable in Speculation, and in the condud of affairs ^ in confcquence of a rafh appli- cation of general Principles* IT appears fufficiendy from the reafonings which I offered in the preceding Setlion, how important are the advantages wliich the philofopher acquires, by quitting the ftudy of particular'^:, and dirccling 192 ELEMENTS OP THE PHILOSOPHY his attention to general principles. I flatter myfelf it appears farther, from the fame reafonings, that it is in confequenee of the ufe of language alone, that the human mind is rendered capable of thefe com- prehenfive ipeculations. In order, however, to proceed with fafety in the tife of general principles, much caution and addrefs are neceffary, both in eftablifliing their truth, and in applying them to practice. Without a proper attention to the circumftances by which their appli* cation to particular cafes muft be modified, they will be a perpetual fource of miftake, and of difap- pointment, in the condufl of affairs, huwever rigid- ly juft they may be in themfelves, and however ac- curately we may reafon from them. If our general principles happen to be falfe, they will involve us in errors, not only of conduct but of (peculation ; and our errors will be the more numerous^ the more comprehenfive the principles are on which we pro- ceed. To illuftrate thefe obfervations fully, would lead to a minutenefs of dilquifition inconfiftent with my general plan ; and I fhall therefore, at prefent, con- fine myfelf to fuch remarks as appear to be of moft elTential im]>ortance. And, in the firft place, it is evidently impofiible to eftablifh folid general principles, without the pre- vious lludy of particulars ; in other words, it is ne- celLiry to begin with the examination of individual objeds, and individual events; in order to lay a ground- work of accurate clafiification, and for a juft inveiligation of the laws of nature. It is in this way only that we can expect to arrive at gene- ral principles, which may be fafely relied on, as guides to the knowledge of particular truths : and unless our principles admit of such a pradical ap- plication, however beautiful they may appear to be in theory, they are of far less value than the iimit- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 193 ed acquifitions of the vulgar. The truth of thefe remarks is^now fo univerfally admitted, and is in- deed fo obvious in itfelf, that it would be fuperflu- ous to multiply words in fupporting them ; and I fhould fcarcely have thought of ftating them in this Chapter, if lome of the moft celebrated philof- ophers of antiquity had not been led to difputc them, in conlequence of the miftaken opinions which they entertiiined concerning the nature of u- niverfals. Forgetting that genera and /pedes are mere arbitrary creations which the human mind forms, by withdrawing the attention from the dif. tinguifhing qualities of objects, and giving a common name to their refembling qualities, they conceived univerfals to be real exiliences, or, (as they expref- fed it) to be the elTences of individuals ; and flatter- ed themfelves with the belief, that by direding tlieir attention to thefe eHences m the firft inftance, they might be enabled to penetrate the fecrets of the uni- verfe, without fubmittiiig to the ftudy of nature in detail. Thefe errors, which were common to the Piatonifts and the Peripatetics, and which both of them feem to have adopted from the Pythagorean fchool, contributed,' perhaps, more than any thing elfe, to retard the progrefs of the ancients in phyfic- al knowledge. The late learned Mr. Harris is al- moft the only author of the prefent age who has ventured to defend this plan of philolophifing, in oppofition to that which has been fo fuccelstuiiy fol- lowed by the difciples of lord Bucon. " The Platonics," fays he, " confidering fcience " as fomething aicertained, definite, and fleady, *' would admit nothing to be its objccSi: which was *' vague, indefinite, and paffing. For this realon *' they excluded all individuals or objeds of fenle, " and (as Amutor.ius oxprefles it) railed themfelves *' in their contemplations from beings particular to "beings univerfal, and which, from their own na^ Aa 194* ELEMENTS OE THE PHILOSOPHY " ture, were eternarl and definite.'" — " Confonant to" " this was the advice of Plato, with refpecl to the " progrefs of our fpeculations and inquiries, to de- " fcend from thofe hi^s^her genera, which include ma- ** ny fubordinate fpecies, down to the loweft rank ** of fpecies, thofe which include only individuals. *' But here it was his opinion, that our inquiries *' fhould flop, and, as to individuals, let them whol- *' ly alone ; becaufe of th^fe there could not pofTibly *' be any fcience/'* " Such," continues this author, " was the method ^* of ancient philofophy. The fafliion, at prefent, " appears to be fomewhat altered, and the bufinefs *' of philofophers to be little elfe than the colleding *' from every quarter, into voluminous records, an ** infinite number of fenfible, particular, and uncon- •' neded fads, the chief effect of which is to excite ** our admiration." — In another part of his works the fame author obferves, that " the mind, truly *' wife, quitting the ftudy of particulars, as knowing *' their multitude to be infinite and incomprehenfi- *' ble, turns its intellectual eye to what is general ** and comprehcnfive, and through generals learns to •' fee, and recognife whatever exifts."t If we abftract from thefe obvious errors of the an- cient philofophers, with refped to the proper order to be obferved ia our inquiries, and only fuppofe them to end where the Piatonifts faid that they fliould begin the magnificent encomiums they be- ftowed on the utility of thofe comprehenfive truths which form the obje<5l: of fcience (making allowance for the obfcure and myfterious terms in which they expreffed them) can icarcely be regarded as extrava- gant. It is probable tiiat from a few accidental in- ilances of luccefsful inveftigation, they had beeis * Harris's Three Treatises, page 341, 342. t Ibid p. 227. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 195 •itruck with the wonderful effed of general principles in increafmg the intdledual power of the human mind ; and, mifled by that impatience in the fludy of particulars which is fo often connected with the confcioufnefs of fuperior ability, they'labored to per- fuade themfelves, that, by a life devoted to abftrad meditation, fuch principles might be rendered as immediate objeds of intellectual perception, as the individuals which compofe the material world arc of our external fenfes. By connedling this opinion with their other d®clrlnes concerning univerlals, they were unfortunately enabled to exhibit it in fo myfterious a form, as not only to impofe on them- felves, but to perplex the underilandings of all the Jearned in Europe, for a long fuccefllon of ages. The conclulion to which we are led by the fore- going obfervations is, that the foundation of all hu- man knowledge muft be laid in the examination of particular objects and particular fad:s ; and that it is only as far as our general principles are refolvable into thefe primary elements, that they poflefs either truth or utility. It muft not, however, be under- llood to be implied in this conclufion, that all our knowledge muft ultimately reft on our own proper experience. If this were the cafe, the progrefs of fcience, and the progrefs of human improvement, muft have been wonderfully retarded ; for, if it had been neceftary for each individual to torm a claflifi- cation of objects, in confequence of obfervations and abftradtions of his own, and to infer from the actual examination of particular facts, the general truths on which his conduct proceeds ; human aftVirs would at this day remain nearly in the fame ftate to which they were brought by the experience of the firft gen- eration. In fact, this is very nearly the (ituation of the fpecies in all thole parts of the world, in which "the exiftence of the race depends on the feparate ef- forts which each individual makes, in procuring for 196 fiLEMENTS OF THB PHILOSOPHY himfelf the necefTaries of life ; and in which, of con- fequence, the habits and acquirements of each indi- vi«lual muft be the refuk of his own perfonal expe- rience. In cultivated fociety, one of the firft acqui- iitions which children make, is the ufe of language ; by which means they are familiarifed. from their earlieft years, to the confideratic »n of ciiilTes of objedls, and of general truths ; and before that time of life at which the favage is poffefTed of the knowledge ne- celTary for his own prefervation, are ena' 'led to ap- propriate to themfelves the accumulated dilcoveries of ages. Notwithftanding, however, the ftationary condi- tion in which the race mult, of neceflity, continue, prior to the feparation of arts and profeflions ; the natural difpofition of the mind to afcend from par- ticular truths to general conclufions, could not fail to lead individuals, even in the rudeft itate of fociety, to colled: the refults of their experience, for their own inftrudion and that of others. But, without the ufe of general terms, the only poilible way of communicating fuch conclulions, would be by means of fome particular example, of which the general application was (Iriking and obvious. In other •words, the wifdom of luch ages will neceflarily be exprefTed in the form of fables or parables, or in the Hill (impler form of proverbial inftances ; and not in the fcientific form of general maxims. In this way, undoubtedly, much ufeful inftrudion,both of a pru- dential and moral kind, might be conveyed : at the fame time, it is obvious, that, while general truths continued to be exprefsed merely by particular exem- plifications, they would afford little or no opportu- nity to one generation to improve on the fpeculations of another ; as no effort of the underflanding could combine them together, or employ them as premifes, in order to obtain other conclufions more remote and comprehenfive. For this purpofe, it is ablolute- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 197 ly neceflary that the fcope or nidral of the fable fliouU be feparated entirely from its acceflfory cir- cumftances, and ftated in the form of a g-^nerai pro- poiition. From what has nvow been faid, it appears, how much the progrefs of human reafon, which neceffa- rily accompanies the progrefs of Ibciety, is owing to the introduction of general terms, and to the ui'e of general proportions. In confpquence of the gradual improvements which take place in language as an inftrument of thought, the claffifications both of things and fids with which the infant faculties of each fucceflive race are converfant, are more juil and more comprehenfive than thofe of their predeceflors : the difcoveries which, in one age, were confined to the ftudious and enlightened few, becoming in the next the eftabliflied creed of the learned ; and in the third, forming part of ttie elementary principles of education. Indeed, among thofe who enjoy the ad- vantages of early inftru6lion,fome of the moll remote and wonderful conclufions of the human intelled, are, even in infancy, as completely famiUarifed to the mind, as the moil obvious phenomena which the material world exhibits to their fenfes. If thefe remarks be juft, they open an unbounded profpedt of intellectual improvement to future ages ; as they point out a provifion made by nature to fa- cilitate and abridge, more and more, the procefs of ftudy, in proportion as the truths to be acquired in- creafe in number. Nor is this profped derived from theory alone. It is encouraged by the pad hillory of all the fciences ; in a more particular man^^er, by that of mathematics, in which the ftate of difcovery, and the prevailing methods of inftrudion, may, at all times be eafily compared together. In this lail obfervation I have been anticipated by a late emi- nent mathematician, whofe eloquent and philofoph- ical llatement of the argument cannot fail to carry 198 ELExMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY convi6lion to thofe, who are qualified to judge ot the fads on which his conclufion is founded : " To fuch ot my readers, as may be flow in *' admitting the poflibility of this progreffive im- *' provement in the human race, allow me to ftate *' as an example, the hiflory of that fcience in which ** the advances of difcovery are the moft certain, and " in which they may be meafured with the greateft *' precifion. Thofe elementary truths of geometry ^' and of aftronomy which, in India and Egypt, *' formed an occult fcience, upon which an ambitious *' priefthood founded its influence, were become, in *' the times of Archimedes and Hipparchus, the fub- *' je6ls of common education in the public fchools of *' Greece. In the lafl: century, a few years of fludy " were fufficient for comprehending all that Archi- *' medes and Hipparchus knew ; and, at prefent, *' two years employed under an able teacher, carry *' the ftudent beyond thofe conclufions, which limit- *' ed the inquiries of Leibnitz and of Newton. Let ** any perfon reflect on thefe fads : let him follow *' the immenfe chain which conneds the inquiries of *' Euler with thofe of a Prieft of Memphis ; let him " obferve, at each epoch, how genius outftrips the *' prefent age, and how it is overtaken by mediocrity *• in the next ; he will perceive, that nature has " furniflied us with the means of abridging and fa- *' cilitating our intelledual labor, and that there is *' no reafon for apprehending that fuch fimplifica- *' tions can ever have an end. He will perceive, ^^ that at the moment when a multitude of particu- " lar folutions, and of infulated fads, begin to dis- " trad the attention, and to overcharge the memo- " ry, the former gradually lofe themfelves in one *' general method, and the latter unite in one gen- *' eral law ; and that thefe generalizations continu- *' ally fucceeding on.e to another, like the fucceilive OF THE HUMAN MIND. , I9^ ** multiplications of a number by itfelf, have no ^ other limit, than that infinity which the human " faculties are unable to comprehend.* SECTION VII. Continuation of the fame Subje6l^ — Differences in the In* ielledual Charaders of Individuals^ arifingfrom their Afferent Habits of Ab/ira6lion and Generalifation, IN mentioning as one of the principal efFeci:s of civllifation, its tendency to familiarife the mind to general terms, and to general propofitions, I did not mean to fay, that this influence extends equally to all the claffes of men in fociety. On the contrary, it is evidently confined, in a great meafure, to thofe who receive a liberal education ; while the minds of the lower orders, like thofe of favages, are fo habitu- ally occupied about particular objeds and particular events, that, although they are fometimes led, from imitation, to employ general exprefilons, the ufe which they make of them is much more the refult of memor}' than judgment ; and it is but feldom that they are able to comprehend fully, any procefs of reafoning in which they are involved. It is hardly neceffary for me to remark, that this obfervation, with refpe6l: to the incapacity of the vulgar for general fpeculations, (Pike all obfervations of a fimilar nature,) mufl be received with fome re- ftrictions. In fuch a ftate of fociety as that in which we live, there is hardly any individual to be found, to whom fome general terms, and Ibme general truths, are not pertedly familiar ; and, thei efore, the foregoing conclulions are to be confidercd as deicrip- tive of thofe habits of thought alone, which are moll * See Note [M.] 200 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY prevalent in their mind. To abridge the labor of reafoning, and of memnry, by direding the attention to general principles, inftead of particular truths, is the profefled aim of all philofophy ; and according as individuals have more or lels of the philofophic fpirit, their habitual fpeculations (whatever the na- ture of their purfuits may be) will relate to the for- mer, or to the latter, of thefe obje^fls. There are, therefore, among the men who are ac- cuftomed to the exercile of their intelleffual powers, two claiTes, whofe habits of thought are remarkalDly diftinguillied from each other ; the one clafs com- prehending what we commonly call men of bufinefs, or, more properly, men of detail ^ the other, men of abftradlion ; or, in other words, philofophers. The advantages which, in certain rcfpefts, the latter of thefe poflefs over the former, have been already pointed out ; but it muft not be fuppofed, that thefe advantages are always pur chafed without fome inconvenience. As the folidity of our general principles depends on the accuracy of the particular obfervations into which they are ultimately refolva- ble, fo their utility is to be eftimated by the practical applications of which they admit : and it unfortu- nately happens, that the fame turn of mind which is favourable to philofophical purfuits, unlefs it be kept under proper regulation, is extremely apt to difqual- ify us for applying our knowledge to ufe, in the ex- ercife of the arts, and in the conduct of affairs. In order to perceive the truthof thefe remarks, it is almoft fulEcient to recollect, that as claflification, and, of confequence, general reafoning, prefuppofe the exercife of abftraftion ; a natural dilpofition to indulge in them, cannot fail to lead the mind to over- look the fpecific difference of things, in attending to their common qualities. To fucceed, however, in pradice, a familiar and circumftantial acquaintance with the particular objects which fall under our ob- fervation, is indifpenlably neceffary. OF THfi HUMAN MIND. 201 But, farther ; As all general principles are founded on claffifications which imply the exercife of abilrac- tions ; it is neceflary to regard them, in their prac- tical applications, merely as approxinidtions to the truth ; the defeds of which, muft be fupplied by habits acquired by perfonal experience. In conlid- ering, for example, the theory of the mechanical powers ; it is ufual to hmplify the objects of our conception, by abftracling from friction, and from the weight of the different parts of which they are compofed. Levers are confidered as mathematical lines, perfectly inflexible ; and ropcb, as matheniati- cal lines, perfectly flexible ; and by means of thefe, and fimilar abftraclions, a fubjecf, which is in itfeif extremely complicated, is brought within the reach of elementary geometry. In the theory of politics, we find it neceflary to abftracf from many of the peculiarities which diftinguifli diff'erent forms of government from each other, and to reduce them to certain general clafles, according to their prevailirg tendency. Although all the governments we have ever feen, have had more or lefs of mixture in their compofltion, we reafon concerning pure monarchies, pure ariftocracies, and pure democracies, as if thei e really exifted political eftablifliments correfpondirg to our definitions. Without fuch a claflification, it would be impoflible for us to fix our attention, amidfl: the multiplicity of particulars which the iiibjed pre- fents to us, or to arrive at any general principles, which might f^rve to guide our enquiries in com* paring different inftitutions together. It is for a fimilar reafon, that the fpeculative farmer reduces the infinite variety of foils to a few general defcriptions 5 the phyfician, the infinite variety of bodily conftitutions to a few temperaments ; and the moralift, the infinite variety of human characters to a few of the ruling principles of action. Notwithftanding, however, the obvious advanta- Bb 202 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ges we derive from thefe clafTifications, and the gen- eral conclufions to which they lead ; it is evidently impollible, that principles, which derived their ori- gin from efforts of abilra^lion, ftiould apply literally to praciice ; or, indeed, that they {hould afford us any confiderable affiftance in conduct, without a certain degree of practical and experimental fkill. Hence it is, that the mere theorift fo frequently ex- pofes himfelf, in real life, to the ridicule of men whom he defpifes ; and in the geneal eftimation of the world, falls below the level of the common drudges in bufinefs and the arts. The walk, indeed, of thefe unenlightened praditioners, muft neceifari- ly be limited by their accidental opportunities of ex- perience ; but, fo far as they go, they operate with facility and fuccefs ; while the merely fpeculative philofopher, although pofTelfed of principles which enable him to approximate to the truth, in an infin- ite variety of untried cafes, and although he fees, with pity, the narrow views of the multitude, and the ludicrous pretenfions with which they frequent- ly oppofe their trifling fuccelTes to his theoretical fpec- ulations, finds himfelf perfecl:ly at a lofs, when he is called upon, by the fimpleil occurrences of ordinary life, to carry his principles into execution. Hence the origin of that maxim, " which" (as Mr. Hume remarks) " has been fo induftriouHy propagated by *^ the dunces of every age, that a man of genius is unfit for bufinefs." In what confifts practical or experimental Ikill, it is not eafy to explain completely ; but, among other things, it obvioufly implies, a talent for minute and comprehenfive and rapid obfervation ; a memory, at once retentive and ready ; in order to prefent to us accurately, and without reflection, our theoi et'cal knowledge ; a prefence of mind, not to be difcon- certed by unexpectv^d occurrences ; and, in fome cafes, an uncommon degree of perfection in the ex- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 2QS ternal fenfes, and in the mechanical capacities of the body. All thefe elements of praclical (kill, it is ob- vious, are to be acquired only by habits of active ex- ertion, and by a familiar acquaintance with real oc- currences ; for, as all the pradical principles of our nature, both intellecflual and animal, have a reference to particulars, and not to generals, fo it is in the ac* tive fcenes of life alone, and amidft the details of bu- finefs, that they can be cultivated and improved. The remarks which have been already made, are fufficienc to iiluftrate the impoifibility of acquiring a talent for bufmefs, or for any of the pradical arts of life, without actual experience. They Ihew alfo, that mere experience, without theory, may qualify a man, in certain cafes, for diftinguifhing himfeif in both. It is not, however, to be imagined, that in this way individuals are to be formed for the un- common, or for the important fituations of fociety, or even for enriching the arts by new inventions 5 for, as their addrefs and dexterity are founded en- tirely on imitation, or derived from the lelTons which experience has fuggefted to them, they cannot polli- bly extend to new combinations of circumftances. Mere experience, therefore, can, at beft, prepare the mind for the fubordinate departments or Hfe ; for conducting the eftabliflied routine of bufiiiefs, or for a ferviie repetition in the arts of common opera- tions. In the charader of Mr. George Grenville, which Mr. Burke introduced in his celebrated Speech on American Taxation, a lively pidture is drawn of the infudiciency of mere experience to qualify a man for new and untried fituations in the adminiftration of government. The obfervations he makes on this fubject, are exprelTed with his ufual beauty and feli- city of language ; and are of fo general a nature, that, with fome trifling alterations, they may be ex- tended to all the pradical purfuits of life. 204 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " Mr. Grenville was bred to the law, whkh is, in *' my opinion, one of the firft and nobleft of human *' fciences ; a fcience which does more to quicken *' and invigorate 'heunderftanding, than all the oth- *' er kinds of learn* ng put together ; but it is not " apt, except in perfons very happily born, to open *' and to liberalife the mind exactly in the fame pro- *' P')rtion. Pafling from that fludy, he did not go " very largely into the world, but plunged into bu- " linefs ; I mean, into bufinefs of office, and the lim- *' ited and fixed methods and forms eftabliftied *' there. Much knowledge is to be had, undoubted- *' ly, in that line ; and there is no knowledge which *' is not valuable. But it may be truly laid, that " men too much converfant in office, are rarely *' minds of remarkable enlarajement. Their habits *' of office are apt to give them a turn to think the *' fubftance of bufinefs not to be much more impor- " tant, than the forms in which it is conducted* *' Thefe forms are adapted to ordinary occafior-s ; " and, therefore, perfons who are nurtured in office, *' do admirably well, as long as things go on in their *' common order ; but when the high roads are bro- *' ken up, and the waters out, when a new and *' troubled fcene is opened, and the file affords no *' precedent, then it is, that a greater knowledge of *' mankind, and a far more extenfive comprehenfion " of things, is requifite, than ever office gave, or than *' office can ever give." Nor is it in new combinations of circumftances alone, that general principles affift us in the conduct of affairs ; they render the application of our pradli- cal fkill more unerring, and more perfed. For, as general principles limit the utility of practical Ikill to fupply the imperfections of theory, they diminifh the number of cafes in which this fkill is to be em- ployed ; and thus, at once, facilitate its improve- ment, wherever it is requifite j and leflen the errors OF THE HUMAN MIND. 205 to which It is liable, by contrafting the field within which it is poflible to commit them. It would appear then, that there are two oppofite extreme . into which men are apt to fall, in prepar- ing themfelves for the duties of adive life. 1 he one arifes from habits of abftracElion and generalifa- tion carried to an excefs ; the other from a minute, an exclufive, and an unenlightened attention to the objects and events which happen to fall under their actual experience. In a perfect fyftem of education, care fliould be taken to guard againft both extremes, and to unite habits of abftradlion with habits of bufinefs, in fuch a manner as to enable men to confider things, either in general, or in derail, as the occafion may require. Whichever of thefe habits may happen to gain an undue afcendant over the mind, it will neceffarily produce a character limited in its powers, and fitted only for particular exertions. Hence fome of the apparent inconfiftencies which we may frequently remark in the intellectual capacities of the fame per- fon. One man, from an early indulgence in ab- ftra6t fpeculation, pofT ffes a knowledge of general principles, and a talent for general reafoning, united with a fluency and eloquence in the ufe of general terms, which feem, to the vulgar, to announce abili- ties fitted for any given ficuation in life : while, in the conduct of the fimpleft afiliirs, he exhibits every mark of irrefolution, and incapacity. Another not only a.ts with propriety, and fkill, in circumftances which require a minute attention to details, but pof- felT^s an acutenefs of reafoning, and a facility of ex- preflion on all fubjects, in which nothing but what is particular is involved ; while, on general topics, he is perfectly unable either to reafon, or to judge. It is this lalt turn of mind, which I think we have, in moft inftances, in view, when we fpeak of good fenfe, Or common fenfe, in oppofition to icience and 206 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY philofophy. Both philofophy and good fenfe imply the exercife of our reafoning powers ; and they dif- fer from each other only, according as thele powers are applied to particulars or to generals. It is on good ienfe (in tlie acceptation in which 1 have now explained the tern)) that the fuccefs of men in the inlerior walks of life chiefly depends ; but, that it does not always indicate a capacity for abftracl fci- ence, or for general fpeculation, or for able condud in fituations which require comprehenfive views, is matter even of vulgar remark. Althofigh, however, each of thefe defers has a tendency to limit the utility of the individuals in whom it is to be found, to certain ftations in focie- ty ; no comparifon can be made, in point of origin- al value, between the intelled:ual capacities of the two clalTes of men to which they charadleriflical- ly belong. The one is the defect of a vigorous, an ambitious, and a comprehenfive genius, improperly directed ; the other, of an underftanding, minute and circumfcribed in its views, timid in its exertions, and formed for fervile imitation. Nor is the for- mer Refect, (hovi^ever difficult it may be to remove it when confirmed by long habit,) by any means fo incurable as the latter ; for it arifes, not from ori- ginal conftitution, but from fome fault in early education ; while every tendency to the oppofite ex- treme is more or lefs charad:eriftical of a mind, ufe- ful, indeed, in a high degree, when confined to its proper fphere, but deftined, by the hand that form- ed it, to borrow its lights from another. As an additional proof of the natural fuperiority which men of general views poflefs over the com- mon drudges in bufinefs, it may be farther obferved, that the habits of inattention incident to the former, arife in part from the little interefi: which they take in particular objeds and particular occurrences, and are not wholly to be afcribed to an incapacity of at- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 20? tention. When the mind has been long acaiftora- ed to the confideration of claffes of objects and of comprehenfive theorems, it cannot, without fome degree of effort, defcend to that humble walk ot ex- perience, or of ad:ion, in which the nieaneft of mankind are on a level with the greateft. In im- portant iituations, accordingly, men of the moft general views, are found not to be ini^erior to the vulgar in their attention to details ; becaufe the ob- jedls and occurrences which fuch fituations prefent, roufe their pa (lions, and intereft their curiofity,from the magnitude of the confequences to which they fead. When theoretical knowledge and practical Ikili are happily combined in the fame perfon, the intel- le^rual power of man appears in its full perfection ; and fits him equally to conduct, with a mafterly hand, the details of ordinary bufinefs, and to con- tend fuccefsfully with the untried difficulties of new and hazardous fituations. In conducing the for- mer, mere experience may frequently be a fufficient guide, but experience and fpeculation muft be com- bined together to prepare us for the latter. " Ex- " pert men," fays Lord Bacon, " can execute and " judge of particulars one by one ; but the general " counfels, and the plots, and the marfhalling of af- " fairs, come bell from thofe that are learned." SECTION VIII. Continuation of the fame Subjed. — life and Abufj of gen- eral Principles /'« Politics,* THE foregoing remarks, on the dangers to be apprehended from a rafli application of general prin- * The events which have happened since the publication of the former edition of this volume in 1792, naight hiive enabled me \f* 208 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ciples, hold equally with refpe^l to raoft of the prac- tical arts. Among thefe, however, there is one of far fuperior dignity to the reft ; which, partly on account of its importance, and partly on account of fome peculiarities in its nature, feems to be entitled to a more particular confideration. The art 1 allude to, is that of Legillation ; an art which differs from all others in fome very eil'ential refpecls, and to which, the reafonings in the laft Section muft be ap- plied with many reftriclions. Before proceeding farther, it is neccffary for me to premife, that it is chiefly in compliance with common language and common prejudices, that I am fometimes led, in the following obiervations, to contraft theory with experience. In the proper fenfe of the word Theory, it is fo far from {landing in oppofition to experience, that it imphes a knowl- edge of principles, of which the moll extenfive ex- perience alone could put us in pofTeflion. Prior to the time of Lord Bacon, indeed, an acquaintance with facls was not confidered as effential to the form- ation of theories ; and from thefe ages, has defcen- dedto us, an indifcriminate prejudice againfl gener- al principles, even in thofe cafes in which they have been fairly obtained in the way of induction. confirm many of the observations in this Section, by an appeal to facts stiU fresh in the reco!lechanical arts, limit the application of general principles, remain in- variably the fame from age to age : and whatever obfervations we have made on them in the ccmrfe of our paft experience, lay a fure foundation for future practical ikill ; and fupply, in fo far as they reach, the defecfts of our theories. In the art of govern- ment, however, the pradical difficulties whicTi occur are of a very different nature. They do not prefent to the ftatefman, the fame fteady fubjecl of examin- ation, which the effeds of fridion do to the engi- neer. They arife chiefly from the paffions and o- pinions of men, which are in a (late of perpetual change ; and, therefore, the addrefs which is necef- fary to overcome them, depends lefs on the accura- cy of our obfervations with relpeft to the paft, than on the fagacity of our conjectures with refpect to the future. In the prefent age, more particularly, when the rapid communication, and the univerfal diffufion of knowledge, by means of the prefs, ren- der the lituation of political focieties effentially dif- ferent from what it ever was formerly, and fecure in- fallibly^ againft every accident, the progrefs of hu- man reafon ; we may venture to predid, that they are to be the moft fuccefsful ftatefmen, who, paying all due regard to paft experience, fearch for the rules of their conduct chiefly in the peculiar circumftan- ces of their own times, and in an enlightened an- ticipation of the future hiftory of mankind. Ill In the mechanical arts, if, at any time we are at a lofs about the certainty of a particular fact, we have it always in our power to bring it to the teft of * Political Discourses^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. 213 experiment. But it is very feldom that we can ob- tain in this way any ufeful conclufion in politics : not only becaufe it is difficult to find two cales in which the combinations of circumftances are precife- ly the fame, but becaufe our acquaintance with the political experience of mankind is much more im- perfecl than is commonly imagined. By far the greater part of what is called matter of fact in poli- tics, is nothing elfe than theory ; and, very frequent- ly, in this fcience, when we think we are oppofing experience to fpeculation, we are only oppofing one theory to another. To be fatisfied with the truth of this obfervation, it is almoft fufficient to recoiled how extremely dif- ficult it is to convey, by a general defcription, a juft idea of the actual ftate of any government. That every fuch defcription muft neceifarily be more or lefs theoretical, will appear from the following re» marks. 1. Of the governments which have hitherto ap- peared in the hiftory of mankind, few or none have taken their rife from political wifdom, but have been the gradual refult of time and experience, of circum- ftances and emergencies. In procefs of time, indeed, every government acquires a fyfl:ematical appear- ance : for although its different parts arofe from cir- cumftances which may be regarded as accidental and irregular ; yet there muft exift, among thefe parts, a certain degree of confiftency and analogy. Where- ever a government has exifted for ages, and men have enjoyed tranquillity under it, it is a proof that its principles are not eifentially at variance with each other. Every new inftitution which was intro- duced, muft have had a certain rererence'to the laws and ufagcs exifting before, otherwife it could not have been permanent in its operation. If any one, contrary to the fpirit of the reft, fhould have occa- fionally mingled with them, it muft foon have fallen S14 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY inty defuetude and oblivion ; and thofe alone would remain, which accorded in their general tendency, *' Quas ufu obtinuere,*' fays Lord Bacon, " li non *' bona, at faltem apta inter fe funt." The neceflity of ftudying particular conftitutions of government, by the help of fyftematical defcrip- tions of them,(fuch defcriptions, for example, as are given of that of England by Montefquieu and Black- Hone,) arifes from the fame circumftances, which render it expedient, in moil inftances, to ftudy par- ticular languages, by conlulting the writings of grammarians. In both cafes, the knowledge we wifli to acquire, comprehends an infinite number of particulars, the confideration of which, in detail, would diftracfl the attention, and overload the mem- ory. The fyftematical defcriptions of politicians, like the general rules of grammarians, are in a high degree ufeful, for arranging, and Amplifying, the ob- jeds of our ftudy ; but in both cafes, we muft re- member, that the knowledge we acquire in this man- ner, is to be received with great limitations, and that it is no more pollible to convey, in a fyftemati- cal form, a juft and complete idea of a particular go- vernment, than it is to teach a language completely by means of general rules, without any practical af- iiftance from reading or converfation. 2. The nature and fpirit of a government, as it is actually exertifed at a particular period, cannot always be colled:ed ; perhaps it can feldom be col- leded from an examination of written laws, or of the eftablifhed forms of a conftitution. Thefe may continue the fame for a long courfe of ages, while the government may be modified in its exercife, to a great extent, by gradual and undefcribable altera- tions in the ideas, manners, and character, of the people ; or by a change in the relations which dif- ferent orders of the community bear to each other. In every country whatever, befide the eftablilhed OF THE HUMAN MIND. 215 laws, the political flate of the people is affefied with a meafure of political hap- pinefs, which appears, from the hiftory of the world, to be greater than has commonly fallen to the lot of nations ? With thofe who would carry their zeal againft re- formation fo far, it is in^poflible to argue ; and it only remains for us to regret, that the number of fuch reafoners has, in all ages of the world, been fo great, and their influence on human affairs fo exten- five. j:: " There are fome men,'* (fays Dr. Johnfon,) of " narrow views, and grovelling conceptions, who, " without the inftigation of perfonal malice, treat *' every new attempt as wild and chimerical 4 and " look upon every endeavor to depart from the " beaten traft, as the rafli effort of a warm imagin- " ation, or the glittering fpeculation of an exalted " mind, that may pleafe and dazzle for a time, but " can produce no real or lafting advantage. " Thefe men value themfelves upon a perpetual " fcepticifm ; upon beUeving nothing bur their own *' fenfes ; upon calling for demonftration where it ** cannot pofTibly be obtained ; and, iometimes, Dd 215 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " upon holding out againfl it when it is laid before *' them ; upon inventing arguments againft the fuc- " cefs of any new undertaking ; and, where argu- " ments cannot be found, upon treating it with con- *'' tempt and ridicule. " Such have been the mofl formidable enemies of " the great benefactors of the world ; for their no- "^ tions and discourfe are fo agreeable to the lazy, " the envious, and the timorous, that they feldom " fail oi becoming popular, and directing the opin- " ions of mankind."* With refpe6i: to this fceptical dispofition, as appli- cable to the prefent ftate of fociety, it is of impor- tance to add, that, in every government, the ftabili- ty and the influence of eftabliftied authority, muft depend on the coincidence between its meafures and the tide of public opinion ; and that, in modern Eu- rope, in confequence of the invention of printing, and the liberty of the prefs, public opinion has ac- quired an afcendant in human affairs, which it never poffeffed in thofe ftates of antiquity from which mod of our political examples are drawn. The danger, indeed, of fudden and rafli innovations cannot be too ftrongly inculcated ; and the views of thofe men who are forward to promote them, cannot be reprobated with too great feverity. But it is poflible alfo to fall into the oppofite extreme ; and to bring upon focie- ty the very evils we are anxious to prevent, by an obftinate oppofition to thofe gradual and neceiTary reformations which the genius of the times demands. The violent revolutions which, at different periods, have convulfed modern Europe, have arifen, not from afpirit of innovation in fovereigns and flates- men ; but from their bigotted attachment to antiqua- ted forms, and to principles borrowed from lels en- lihtened ages. It is this reverence for abufes which * Life of Drake, by Dr. Johksok. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 21^ liave been fanclioned by time, accompanied with an inattention to the progrefs of public opinion, which has, in moft inftances, blinded the rulers of manking, till government has loft all its efficiency ; and till the rage of innovation has become too general and too violent, to be fatislied wih changes, which, if propof- ed at an earlier period, would have united, in the fupport of eftablifhed inftitutions, every friend to order, and to the profperity of his country. Thefe obfervations I ftate with a greater confi- dence, that thefubllanceof them is contained in the following aphorifms of Lord Bacon ; a philofopher who (if we except, perhaps, the late Mr. Turgot) feems, more than any other, to have formed enlight- ened views with refpedl to the poffible attainments of mankind ; and whofe fame cannot fail to increafe as the world grows older, by being attached, not to a particular fyftem of variable opinions, but to the general and infallible progrefs of human reafon, " Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes *' ita inlinuat, ut fenfus fallant ? " Novator maximus tempus ; quidni igitur tem- •' pus imitemur ? " Morofa morum retentio, res turbulenta eft,3eque *' ac novitas. " Cum per fe res, mutentur in deterius, fi confilio "in melius non mutentur, quis tinis erit mali ?" The general conclufion to which thefe obferva- tions lead, is fufficiently obvious ; that the perfeclion of political wifdom does not confift in an indifcrimi- nate zeal againft reforms, but in a gradu:il ard pru- dent accommodation of eftabliOied inftitutions to the varying opinions, manners, and circumltances of mankind. In the actual application, however, of this principle, many difficulties occur, which it re- quires a very rare combination of talents to fur- mount : more particularly in the prefent age ; when the prefs has, to ib wonderful a degree, emancipated ^20 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY human reafon from the tyranny of antient prejudi- ces ; and has roufed a fpirit of free difcuflion, unex- ampled in the hiftory of former times. 1 hat this fudden change in the ftate of the world, fliould be accompanied with fome tempcTary difor- ders, is by no means furprifing. While the multi- tude continue imperfectly enlightened, they will be occafionaliy mifled by the artifices of demagogues ; and even good men, intoxicated with ideas of theo- retical perfection, may be expected, fon etimes to facrifice, unintentionally, the tranquillity of their coremporaries, to an over-ardent zeal for the g( od of pofterity. Notwithllanding, however, thefe evils, which every friend to hun^anity muft lament, I. would willingly believe, that the final effects refult- ing from this fpirit of reformation, cannot fail to be favourable to human happinefs ; and there are fome peculiarities in the prefent condition of mankind, which appear to me to juftify more fanguine hopes upon the fubject, than it would have been reafona- ble for a philofopher to indulge at any former period. An attention to thefe peculiarities is abfoiurely ne- ceffary to enable us to form a coiT»petent judgment on the queilion to which the foregoing obfervations relate ; and it leads to the illuftration of a doctrine to which I have frequently referred in this work ; the gradual improvement in the condition of thefpecies^ which may be expected from the progrefs of reafon and the diffufion of knowledge. Among the many circumitances favorable to hu- man happinefs in the prefent ftate of the world, the moft important perhaps, is, that the fame events which have contributed to loofen the foundations of the ancient fabrics of defpotifm, have made it prac- ticable in a much greater degree than it ever was formerly, to reduce the principles of.legiflation to a fcience, and to anticipate the probable courfe of pop- ular opinions. It is ealy for the ftatefman to form OF THE HUMAN MIND. 22) to himfelf adiftinct and fteady idea of the ultimate objects at which a wife legillitor oupjht to aim, and to fbrefee that modification of the foci il order, to which human affairs have, of then^felves, a tendency to approach ; and, therefore, his praclical fa,L>; tcity and addrefs are limited to the c ire of accompiifhing the important ends which he has in view, as effv:ctu- ally and as rapidly as is confident with the quct of individuals, and with the rights arifing from actual efl:abliihments. In order to lay a folid foundation for the fcience of politics, the firft fi:ep ought to be, to ^.fcertain that form of fociety which is perfectly agreeable to na- ture and to juflice ; and what are the principles of lei^illation neceffary for maintaining it. Nor is the inquiry fo difficult as might at firft be apprehended ; for it might be eafily fhewn, thai the greater part of the political diforders which exit! among mankind, do not arife from a want of fdrefight in politicians, which has rendered their laws too general, but f rum their having trufted too little to the operation of thofe fimple inititutions which nature and juftice recommend ; and, of confequence, that, as fociety ad- vances to its perfection, the number of laws may be expected to diminilh, initead of increafing, and the fcience of legillation to be gradually fiiijpiified. The CEconomical fyftem which, about thirty years ago, employed the fpeculations of fome ingenious men in France, feems to me to have been the firft at- tempt to afcertain this ideal perfection of the focial order ; an J the light which, fince that period, has been thrown on the fubje6t, in different parts of Eu- rope, is a proof of what the human mii^d is able to accomplifh in fuch inquiries, when it jias once re- ceived a proper direction. To all the various tenets of theie writers, I would, by no means, be under- ftood to fubfcribe ; nor do I confider their fylfem as fo perfect in every different part, as fome of its ^2^ ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY more fanguine admirers have reprefented it to be. A few of the moft important principles of political ^economy, they have undoubtedly eibibliftied with demonftrative evidence ; but what the world is chiefly indebted to them for, is, the commencement which they have given to a new branch of fcience, and the plan of inveftigation which they have ex- hibited to their fuccelTors. A fhort account of what I conceive to be the fcope of their fpeculations, will juliify theie remarks, and will comprehend every thing w^hich I have to ofFer at prefent, in anfwer to the queftion by which they were fuggelled. Such an account I attempt with the greater fatisfa£fion, that the leading views of the earlieft and moft en- lightened patrons of the ceconomical fyftem have, in my opinion, been not more mifreprefcnted by its op- ponents, than mifapprehended by fome who have adopted its concluhons,* In the firit place, then, I think it of importance to remark, that the objecl of the ceconomical fyftem ought by no means to be confounded (as I believe it commonly is in this country) with that of the U- topian plans of government, which have, at different times, been offered to the world ; and which have fo often excited the juft ridicule of the more fober and reafonable inquirers. Of thefe plans, by far the greater ilumber proceed on the fuppofition, that the focial order is entirely the effocl of human art ; and that wherever this order is imperted, the evil may be traced to fome wMut of forefight on the part of the legiflitor ; or to fome inattention of the ma- giftrate to the compHcated ftrudure of that machine of which h^ '^regulates the movements. The pro- jects of reform, therefore, which fuch plans involve, are, in genefal, well entitled to all the ridicule and contempt they have met with ; inafmuch as they * See Note [N.] OF THE HUMAN MIND. 22S imply an arrogant and prefumptuous belief in their authors, of the fuperiority of their own political fa- gacity, to the accumulated wifdom of former ages. The cafe is very different with the ceconomical fyf- tem ; of which the leading views (fo far as I am able to judge) proceed on the two following fuppofi- tions : Firft, that the focial order is, in the moll ef- fential refpects, the refult of the wifdom of nature, and not of human contrivance ; and, therefore, that the proper bufinefs of the pohtician, is not to divide his attention among all the different parts of a ma- chine, which is by far too complicated for his com- prehenfion ; but by proteding the rights of individ- uals, and by allowing to each, as complete a liberty as is compatible with the perfed: fecurity of the rights of his fellow-citizens ; to remove every obftacle which the prejudices and vices of men have oppof- ed to the eftablifhment of that order which fociety has a tendency tg afiume. Secondly ; that, in pro- portion to the progrefs and the diffuiion of knowl- edge, thofe prejudices, on a Ikilful management of which, all the old fyftems of policy proceeded, muft gradually difappear ; and, confequently, that (what- ever may be his prediledlion for ancient ufages) the inevitable courfe of events impofes on the politician the neceflity of forming his meafures on more folid and permanent principles, than thofe by which the w^orld has hitherto been governed. Both of thefe fuppofitions are of modern origin. The former, fo far as I know, was firil Hated and illuftrated by the French CEconomifts. The latter has been obviouily fuggefted by that rapid improvement which has ac- tually taken place in every country in Europe where the prefs has enjoyed a moderate degree of liberty. It may be farther remarked, with refpect to the greater part of the plans propofed by Utopian pro- jectors, that they proceed on the fuppf)^ition of x miraculous reformation in the moral character of a. 224 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY people^ to be efledicd by fome new fyftem of educa- tion. All fuch plans (as Mr. HuniC has judly obfer- ved) may be fafely abandoned as imprad:icable and vifionary. But this objedion does not app^y to the ceconomical fyftern ; the chief expedieni of which, for promoting moral improvement, is not that edu- cation which depends on the attention and care of our inflruclors ; but an education which necelTariiy refults from tlie political order of fociety. " How " ineffeclual" (faid the Roman poet) " are the wif- " eft laws, if they be not fupported by good morals!" How ineffeclual ffay the CEconomifts) are all our ef- forts to preferve the morals of a people, if the laws which regulate the political order, doom the one half of mankind to indigence, to fraud, to fervility, to ignorance, tofuperftition ; and the other half to be the Haves of all the follies and vices which relult from the infolence of rank, and the felfiilinefs of opu- lence ? Suppofe for a moment, th»it the inordinate accumulation of wealth in the hands of individuals, which we every w^here meet with in modern Eu- rope, w^ere gradually dimirifhcd by abolifhing the law of entails, and by eftabiifhing a perfecfl freedom of commerce and ot induftrv ; it is almoft felf evi- dent, that thib fimple alteration in the order of loci- ety ; an alteration which has been often demonftra- ted to be the moft effedual and the moft infallible meafure for promoting the wealth and population of a country ; would contribute, m.ore than all the labours of moralifts, to fecure the virtue and the hap- pinefs of all the claffes of mankind. It is w'orthy too of remark, that fuch a plan of reformation does not require, for its accomplifliment, any new^ and complicated inftitutions ; and therefore docs not proceed upon any exaggerated conception of the ef- ficacy of human policy. On the contrary, it requires only (like moft of the other expedients propoied by this fyftern) the gradual abolition of thofe arbitrary OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^ 2^5 and unjuft arrangements, by which the order of na- ture is difturbed. Another miftaken idea concerning the ceconomi- cal fyftem is, that it is founded entirely upon theory, and unfupported by facts. That this may be the cafe with refped: to fome of its doctrines, I (hall not difpute : but, in general, it may be fafely affirmed, that they reft on a broader baiis ot facls, than any- other fpeculations which have been yet offered to the world ; for they are founded, not on a few ex- amples collected from the fmall number of govern- ments of which we poil'efs an accurate know ledge ; but on thofe laws of human nature, and thofe max- ims of common fenfe, which are daily verified in the intercourfe of private life. Of thofe who have fpeculated on the fubjedt of le- giflition, by far the greater part feem to have con- fidered it as a fcience fui getieris ; the firft principles of which can be obtained in no other way, than by an examination of the condu<5t of mankind in their political capacity. The CEconomifts, on the contra- ry, have fearched for the caufes of national profperi- ty, and national improvement, in thofe arrange- ments, which our daily obfervations (hew to be fa- vorable to the profperity and to the improvement of individuals* The form'er refemble thole philofo- phers of antiquity, who, affirming, that the phenom- ena of the heavens are regulated by laws pecuUar to themfelvcs, difcouraged every attempt to invefiigate their phyfical caufes, which was founded upon facts collected from common experience. The latter have aimed at accomplifhing a reformation in pofitics, fimilar to what Kepler and Newton accomplifhed in aftronomy ; and, by fubjeding to that cc^mmon- fenfe, which guides mankind in their private con-- cerns, thofe queftions, of which none were fuppofed to be competent judges, bui men initiated in the myfteries of goveruuieut, have given a beginning to E R 226 ELEMENTS OF THB PHrLOSOPHY a fcience which has already extended very widely our political profpecls ; and which, in its progrefs^ may probably aflford an illuflration, not lefs flriking than that which phyfrcal aftronomy exhibits, of the limplicity of thofe laws by which the univerfe is gov- erned. When a political writer, in order to expofe the folly of thofe commercial regulations, which aim at the encouragement of domeftic induftry by reftraints on importation, appeals to the maxims upon which men adl in private life ; when he remarks, that the taylor does not attempt to make his own flioes, but buys them of the fhoemaker ; that the flioemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but em- ploys a taylor ; and when he concludes, that what is prudence in the conducl: of every private family, can icarcely be folly in that of a great kingdom ;* he may undoubtedly be faid, in one fenfe, to indulge in theory ; as he calls in queftion the utiUty of inilitu- tions which appear, from the fact, to be not incom- patible with a certain degree of political profperity. But, in another fenfe, and in a much more philo- fophical one, he may be faid to oppofe to the falfe theories of ftatefmen, the common fenfe of man- kind ; and thofe maxims of expediency, of which every man may verify the truth by his own daily obfervation. There is yet another miftake, (of ftill greater con- fequence, perhaps, than any of thofe I have mention- ed,) which has milled moft of the opponents, and even fome of the friends, of the eeconomical fyftem ; an idea that it was meant to exhibit a political or- der, which is really attainable in the prefent itate of Europe. So different from this were the vii^ws of its moil enlightened advocates, that they have uni- * See Mr. Smith's profound and original " Inquiry into theNa- ** ture and Causes of the Wealth of Nations;' rder oF political socie- ties," might have been expected to attract some roticc in this country, from the praise which iMr. Smith has bestow- ed on the perspicuity of his style, and the dislirctness ot his arrangement. If some individuals who formerly professed an enthusi- astic attachment to the doctrines of this sect, have, at a later period of their lives, distinguished themselves bv an enthu- siasm no less ardent in opposition to the principles advan- ced in their writings, the fact only aflcrds an additional il- lustration of a trmh verified by daily experience, that the most solid foundation for political consistency is a spirit of moderation, and that the most natural and easy of all trans- itions is from the violence and intolerance of one extreme to those of another. \Note to ftecQ7id Edition,] Ff ^34 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fcience, of civilization, and of liberty, at prefent inn. merfed in fuperftition, and laid wafte by defpolifm. After a fhort period of civil, of military, and of literary glory, the profpe6l has changed at once : the career of degeneracy has begun, and has proceed- ed till it could advance no farther ; or fome unfore- feen calamity has occurred, which has obliterated, for a time, all memory of former improvements, and has condemned mankind to re-trace, flep by ftep, the fame path by which their forefathers had rifen to great nefs. In a word ; on fuch a retrofpecl- ive view of humaan aflfairs, man appears to be the mere fport of fortune and of accident ; or rather, he appears to be doom.ed, by the condition of his nature, to run alternately the career of improvement and of degeneracy ; and to realife the beautiful but melancholy fable of Sifyphus, by an eternal renova- tion of hope and of difappointment. In oppofition to thefe difcouraging views of the Hate and profpecl of man ; it may be remarked in general, that in the courfe of thele latter ages, a va- riety of events have happened in the hiftory of the world, w^hich render the condition of the human race effentially different from what it ever was among the nations of antiquity ; and which, of con- fequence, render all our reafbnings concerning their future fortunes, in fo far as they are founded mere- ly on their paft experience, unphilofophical and in- conclulive. The alterations which have taken place in the art of war, in confequence of the invention of firearms, and 'of the modern fcience of fortification, have given to civilized nations a fecurity againft the irruptions of barbarians, which they never before pijfieiTed. The more extended, and the more con- ftant intercourfe, v^hich the improvements in com- merce and in the art of navigation have opened, among the diftant quarters of the globe, cannot fail to operate in undermining local and national preju- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 2S5 dices, and in imparting to the whole fpecies the in- telleclual acquifitions of each particular community. The accumulated experience of ages has already- taught the rulers of mankind, that the moil fruitful and the moft permanent fources of revenue, are to be derived, not from conquered and tributary provin- ces, but from the internal profperity and wealth of their own fubjer never taken their rife from deep-laid fchemes of human policy. In every ftate of fociety which has yet ex- ifted, the multitude has, in general, aded trom the immediate impulfe of paflion, and from the prefTure of their wants and neceffiries ; and, therefore, what we commonly call the political order, is, at leaft in a great meafure, the refult of the paflions and wants of man, combined with the circumftances of his fitua- tion ; or, in other words, it is chiefly the refult of the wiCdom of nature. So beautifully, indeed, do thefe paflions and circumllances a my " fenfes, I fancy to rnyfclf, that here flood Sptufip- *' pus ; there Xenocrates, and here, on this bench, *' fat his difcipie Polemo. To me, our antient fenate- " houfe leems peopled with the like viionary Forms ; " for, often, when I enter it, the ihades of Scipi(>, of '' Cato, and of Laslius, and, in particular, of my vcn- *' arable grandfather, rife to my imagination. In *' fliort, fuch is the effect of local fituation in recall- '' ing affociated ideas to the mind, that it is not *' without reafon, fome philofophers have founded " on this principle a fpecies of artificial memory." This iiiiluence of perceptible objects, in awaken- ing affociated thoughts and affociated feelings, feems to arife, in a great meafure, from their permanent operation as exciting or iuggefting caufes. When a train of thought takes its rife from an idea or con- ception, the firff idea foon difappears, and a feries of others fucceeds, which are gradually lefs and lefs related to that with which the train commenced ; but, in the cafe of perception, the exciting caufe re- OP THE HUMAN MIND. 249 mains fteadily before us ; and all the thoughts and feelings which have any relation to it, crowd into the mind in rapid fucceffion ; ftrengthening each other's effects, and all confpiring in the fame general im- preffion. I already obferved, that the connections which exift among our thoughts, have been long familiirly known to the vulgar, as well as to philof jphers. It is, indeed, only of late, that we have been poffeffed of an appropriated phrafe to exprefs them ; but that the general fad is not a recent difcovery, may be in- ferred from many of the common maxims of pru- dence and of propriety, which have plainly been lug- gefted by an attention to this part of our conftitu- tion. When we lay it down, for example, as a gen- eral rule, to avoid in converfation all expreflions, and all topics of difcourfe, v/hich have any relation, however remote, to ideas of an unpleafant nature, we plainly proceed on the fuppofition that there are certain connexions among our thoughts, which have an influence over the order of their fucceffion. It is unneceflary to remark, how much of the com- fort and good-humor of focial life depends on an at- tention to this confideration- Such attentions are more particularly eflential in our intercourfe with men of the world ; for the commerce of fociety has a wonderful efFed in increaiing the quicknefs and the faciUty with which we affociate all ideas which have any reference to life and manners ;* and, of * The superiority which the man of the world possesses over the recluse student, in his knowledge of mankind, is partly the re- sult of this quickness and facility of aJ-sociation. Thoi^e trifling circumstances in conversation and behavior, which, to the latter, convey only their most obvious and avowed meaning, lay open to the former, many of the trains of thought which are connected with them, and frequentl)i give him a distinct view of a character, on that very side where it is supposed to be most concealed from his observation. Hh 250 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY confequence, it muft render the fenfibllity alive to many circumftances which, from the remotenefs of their relation to the fituation and hiftory of the par- ties, would otherwife have pafTed unnoticed. When an idea, however, is thus fuggefled by aflb- ciation, it produces a flighter imprellion, or, at leaft; it produces its impreilion more gradually, than if it were prefented more diredly and immediately to the mind. And hence, when we are under the ne- ceffity of communicating any difagreeable informa- tion to another, delicacy leads us, inftead of mention- ing the thing itfelf, to mention fomething elfe from which our meaning may be underftood. In this manner, we prepare our hearers for the unwelcome intelligence. The distinction between grofs and delicate flattery, is founded upon the fame principle. As nothing is more ofFc-nlive than flattery which is direct and point- ed, praife is confidered as happy and elegant, in pro- portion to the flightnefs of the affociations by which it is conveyed. To this tendency which one thought has to intro- duce another, phllofophers have given the name of the AJfociation cf ideas ; and, as I would not wifli, ex- cepting in a cafe of neceility, to depart from common language, or to expofe myfelf to the charge of deli- vering old doctrines in a new form, I fliall continue to make ufe of the lame expreffion. I am fenfible, indeed, that the expreffion is by no means unexcep- tionable ; and that, if it be ufed (as it frequently has been) to comprehend thofe laws by which the fuc- cellion of all our thoughts and of all our mental op- erations is regulated, the word idea muft be under- flood in a fenle much more extenfive than it is com- monly employed in. It is very juftly remarked by Dr. Reid, that " memory, judgment, reafoning, *^ paffions, afiedlions, and purpofes ; in a word, every *' operation of the niind, excepting thofe of fenfe, is OF THE HUMAN MIND. 251" ^^ excited occafionally^in the train of our thoughts : " fo that, if we make the train of our thoughts to be *' only a train of ideas, the word idea muft be under- " ftood to denote all thefe operations." In contin- uing, therefore, to employ, upon this fubjecl, that language, which has been confecrated by the practice of our bell philofophical wTiters in England, I would not be underftood to difpute the advantages which might be derived from the introduction of a new phrafe, more precife and more applicable to the fad. The ingenious author Vv'hom I lad quoted, feems to think that the affocialion of ideas has no claim to be conlidered as an original principle, or as an ultimate fact in our nature. " I believe," (fays he,) " that " the original principles of the mind, of which we *' can give no account, but that fuch is our conftitu- '' tion, are more in number than is commonly " thought. But we ought not to multiply them *« without neceffity. That trains of thinking, which, " by frequent repetition, have become familiar^ *' ftiould fpontaneoufly offer themfelves to our fancy, " feems to require no other original quality but the" " power of habit." With this obfervation I cannot agree ; becaufe I think it more philofophical to rcfolve the power of habit into the affociation of ideas, than to refolve the affociation of ideas into habit. The word habit, in the fenfe in which it is com- monly employed, expreffes that facility which the mind acquires, in all its exertions, both animr.l and intellectual, in confequence of practice. We apply it to the dexterity of the workman ; to the extempo- rary fluency of the orator ; to the rapidity of the arithmetical accountant. That this facility is the effect of practice, we know from experience to be a fad: : but it does not feem to be an ultimate fact, nor incapable of analyfis. 252 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY In the Effay on Attention, I ihewed that the efFe6ls of practice are produced partly on the body, and partly on the mind. The mufcles which we employ in mechanical operations, become ftronger, and be- come more obedient to the will. This is a fad, of which it is probable that philofophy will never be able to give any explanation. But even in mechanical operations, the effeds of practice are produced partly on the mind ; and, as far as this is the cafe, they are refolvable into what philofopliers call, the ajfociation of ideas ; or into that general fact, which Dr. Reid himfelf has ftated, " that *' trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, *' have become familiar, fpontaneoufly offer them- " felves to the mind." In the cafe of habits which are purely intellectual, the eifeds of pradice refolve themfelves completely into this principle : and it ap- pears to me more precife and more fatisfad:ory, to ilate the principle itfelf as a law of our conftitution, than to flur it over under the concife appellation of habit^ which we apply in comnion to mind and to body. 1 he tendency in the human mind to afTociate or connect its thoughts together, is fometimes called (but very improperly) the imagination. Between thefe two parts of our conftitution, there is indeed a very intimate relation ; and it is probably owing to this relation, that they have been fo generally con- founded under the fame name. "When the mind is occupied about abfent objects of fenfe, (which, I be- lieve, it is habitually in the great majority of man- kind,) its train of thought is merely a feries of con- ceptions ; or, in common language, of imaginations.* In the cafcj too, of poetical imagination, it is the af- * Accordingly, Hobbes calls the train of thought in the mil " Consequentia sive series imaginationum.'* *' Per seriem imaj " nationum intelligo successionecn unius cogitationis ad aliam." J^EviATHAN, cap. iii. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 253 fociation of ideas that fupplies the materials out of which its combinations are formed ; and when fuch an imaginary combination is become familiar to the mind, it is the aflbciation of ideas that connects its different parts together, and unites them into one whole. The aflbciation of ideas, therefore, although perfedlly diftind: from the power of im.agination, is immediately and eflentially fubfervient to all its ex- ertions. The laft obfervation feems to me to point out, al- fo, the circumftance which has led the greater part of Engliih writers, to ufe the words Imagination and Fancy as fynonymous. It is obvious that a cre- ative imagination, when a perfon poflefles it fo ha- bitually that it may be regarded as forming one of the characleriftics of his genius, implies a power of fummoning up, at pleafure, a particular cUfs of ideas ; and of ideas related to each other in a par-* ticular manner ; which power can be the refult on^ ly, of certain habits of aflbciation, which the indi- vidual has acquired. It is to this power of the mindjwhich is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature, that our befl: writers (fo for as I am able to judge) refer, in general, when ihey make ufe of the word fancy : I fay, in general ; for in difquifitions rf this fort, in which the beft writers are feldom precife and fteady in the employment of words, it is only to their prevailing practice that we can appeal as an au-^ thority. What the particular relations are, by which thofe ideas are connected that are fubfervi- ent to poetical imagination, I fhall not enquire at prefent. I think they are chiefly thofe of refem- blance and analogy. But whatever they may be, the power of fummoning up at pleafure the ideas fo related, as it is the ground-work of poetical genius, is of fufEcient importance in the human conftitu- tion to deferve an appropriated name \ and, for this 2^4 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY purpofe, the word fancy would appear to be the moft convenient that our language affords. Dr Rcid has fomewhere obfierved, that " the part " of our conftitution on which the aflociation of *' ideas depends, was called, by the older Englifh " writers, /tf 7^/^ or fancy •** an ufe of the word, wc may remark, which coincides, in many inftances, with that which I propofe.to make of it. It differs from it only inthis,that thefe writers applied it to the affociation of ideas in general, whereas I reftricl its application to that habit of affociation, which is fub- fervient to poetical imagination. According to the explanation, which has now- been given of the word Fancy, the office of this pow- er is to colled: materials for the Imagination ; and therefore the latter power prefuppofes the former, while the former does not neceffarily fuppofe the latter. A man whole habits of affociation prefent to him, for illuftrating or embellifhing a fubjecl, a num- ber of refembling or of analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy ; but for an effort of imagination, va- rious other powers are neceffary, particularly the powers of tafle and of judgment ; without which, we can hope to produce nothing that will be a fcmrce of pleafure to others. It is the power of fancy which fupplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allufions ; but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex fcenes he defcribes, and the fic- titious charaders he delineates. To fancy, we ap- ply the epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagina- tion, thofe of beautiful or fublime. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 255 SECTION II. Of the principles of ajfociation among our idem, THE facls which I flated in the former feclion, to illuftrate the tendency of a perception, or of an idea, to fuggeft ideas related to it, are io obvious as to be matter of common remark. But the relations which connedl all our thoughts together, and the laws which regulate their fucceflloup were but little attended to before the publication of Mr. Hume's writings. It is well known to thofe who are in the leaft con-- verfant with the prefent ftate of metaphyiical fci- ence, that this eminent writer has attempted to re- duce all the principles of affociation among our ideas to three : Refemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Caufe and EfFed. The attempt was great, and worthy of his ^nnius ; but it has been Ihewn by feveral writers lince his time,* that his enumeration is not only incomplete, but that it is even indiftind, fo far as it goes. * See in particular, Lord Kaincies's Elements of Criticism, and Dr. Gerard's Essay on Genius. See also Dr. Campbell's Philoso- phy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 197. It is observed by Dr. Beattie, that something like an attempt to enumerate the laws of association is to be found in Aristotle ; who, in speaking of Recollection, insinuates, with his usual brevity, that" the relations, by which we are led from one thought toan- " other, in tracing out, or hunting ofter^^ (as he calls it,) " any par- " ticular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly " three ; Resemblance, Contrariety, and Contiguity." See Drntrtathm^ Mora: and CriUcal,]^. 9. Also p. 145. The passage to which Dr. Beattie refers, is as follows : 'Ora.v uv avj5^'f<.v>)0'xa,7>(.«.^flt, KivuyLi^oc, rojv ttporffoji rtva Ktm<7fUf., tois ■a* KtvYi^uiMtv, (xs^ yiv bkuvt) siu/^s. Alo xxt TO s^s^ns ^psvofjiey totiaravres rnro yivtrxi -n ava^nKris. Ari^tot. de MeniQr. et Rem'miic, vol. i. p. 681. Edit. Lu Val. ^56 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY It is not neceffary for my prefent purpofe, that I fliould enter into a critical examination of this part of Mr. Hume's fyftem ; or that I Ihould attempt to fpecify thofe principles of aifociation which he has omitted. Indeed it does not feem to me, that the problem admits of a fatisfaclory folution ; for there is no poflible relation among the obje<^s of our knowledge, which may not ferve to connect them together in the mind ; and, therefore, although one enumeration may be more comprehenfive than an- other, a perfectly complete enumeration is fcarcely to be expected. Nor is it merely in confequence of the relations among things, that our notions of them are alTo- ciated : they are frequently coupled together by means of relations among the words which denote them ; fuch as a fimilarity of found, or other cir- cumftances ftill more trifling. The alliteration which is fo common in poetry, and in4)roverbial fayings, feems to arife, partly at leaft, from aflbciations of ideas founded on the accidental circumftance, of the two words which exprefs them beginning with the fame letter. " But thousands die, without or this or that, ^^ Die ; and endow a College, or a Cat.'* Pope's Ep. to Lord Batiiurst. ''• Ward tried, on Puppies, and the poor, his drop." Id. Imitat. of Horace. ^' Puffd, powders, patches ; Bibles, billets-doux-" Rape of the Lock, This indeed pleafes only on flight occafions, when it may be fuppofed that the mind is in fome degree play- ful, and under the influence of thofe principles of aflbciation which commonly take place when we are carelefs and difengaged. Every perfon mufl: be of- fended with the fecund line of the following couplet. ©F THE HUMAN MiND. 25? which forms part of a very fublime defcription of the Divine power : " Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part, " As full , as perfect, in a Hair as Heart." Essay on Man, Ep. i. To thefe obfervations, it may be addedsthat things which have no known relation to each other are of- ten aflbciated, in confequence of their producing fimilar efleds on the mind. Some of the fineft po- etical allufions are founded on this principle ; and occordingly,if the reader is not poffefled of fenfibility congenial to that of the poet, he will be apt to over- look their meaning, or to cenfure them as abfurdJ To fuch a critic it would not be eafy to vindicate the^ beauty of the following flanza, in an Ode addreffed to a Lady by the Author of the Sea/ens. Oh thou, whose tender, serious eye Expressive speaks the soul I love ; The gentle azure of the sky, The pensive shadows of the grove. I have already faid, that the view of the fubject which I propofe to take, does not require a complete enumeration of our principles of affociation. There is, however, an important diftindion among them, to which I (hall have occafion frequently to refer ; and which, as far as I know, has not hitherto attract- ed the notice of philofophers. The relations up- on which fome of them are founded, are perfectly obvious to the mind ; thofe which are the founda- tion of others, are difcovered only in confequence of particular efforts of attention. Of the former kind, are the relations of Relemblance and Analogy, of Contrariety, of Vicinity in time and place, and thofe which arise from accidental coincidences in the found of different words. Thefe, in general, connedl our thoughts together, when they are fuffered to take I I 25S ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY their natural courfe, and when we are confcioiis of little orno adive exertion. Of the latter kind, are the relations of C lufe and Eifed:, of Means and End, of Pre mi fes and Condudon ; and thofe others, which- regulate the train of thought in the mind of th^ phi- lofopher, when he is engaged in a particular invefti- gation. It is owing to this diftinclion, that tranfitions,. which would be highly offenfive in philofophical writings, are the moll: plealing of any in poetry. In the former fpecies of compofition, we exped to fee an author lay down a diftinct plan or method, and ob- ferveit rigoroufly ; without allowing hirafelf to ram- ble into digrefiions, fuggefted by the accidental ideas or expreflions which may occur to bjm in his prog- refs* In that ftate of mind in which poetry is read, fuch digrefiions are not only agreeable, but neceffary totheeffed; and an arrangement founded on the fpontaneous and feemingly cafual order of our thoughts, pleafes more than one fuggefted by an ac- curate analyfis of the fubjed:. How a jfurd would the long digreffion in praife of Liduftry, in Thompfon's Autumn, appear, if it occurred in a profe effay ! — a digreflion, however^ which, in that beautiful poem, arifes naturally and infenlibly from the view of a luxuriant harveft ; and which as naturally leads the Poet back to the points where his excurfiou began : All is the gift of Industry ; whatever Exalts, embellishes, and renders life Delightful. Pensive Winter, cheer'd bv him, Sits at the social fire, and happy hears Th' excluded tempest idly rave abng ; His harden'd fingers deck the gaudy Spring ; Without him Summer were an arid waste ; Nor to th' Autumnal months could thus transmit Those full, mature, immeasurable stores, That waving round, recal my wandering Song. &V THE HUMAN MIND. 25^ In Goldfmith's Traveller, the tranfitions are ma- aged with confumniate skill ; and yet, how differ- ent from that logical method which would be f uited to a philofophical difcourfe on the ftate of fociety in the different parts of Europe ! Some of the fineft are fuggefted by the afTociating principle of Contrafl. Thus, after defcribing the effeminate and debaied Romans, the Poet proceeds to the Swifs : My soul, turn from them-— turn we to survey Where rougher climes a nobler race display. And, after painting fome defeds in the manners of this gallant but unrefined people, his thoughts are led to thofe of the French : To kinder skies, where gentler manners reign, I turn — and France displays her bright domain. The tranfition which occurs in the following lines, feems to be fuggefted by the accidental mention of a word .; and is certainly one of the happieft in cmr language. Heavens ! how unlike their Belgic Sires of old ! Rough, poor, content, ungovernably bold ; War in each breast, and freedom on each brow, How much unlike the Sons of Britain now 1 — Fired at the sound, my Genius spreads her wing. And flies, where Biitain courts the western spring. Numherlefs illuilrations of the fame remark niight be colleded from the ancient Poets, more particu- larly from the Georgics of Virgil, where the fingu- iar felicity of the tranfitions has attra<5led the notice even of thofe, who 'iiave been theleail dilpofed to in- dulge themfelves in philofophical refinements con- cerning the principles of Critic ifm. A celebrated inftance of this kind occurs in the end of the firft Book : — the confideration of the weather and of its xiommon prognoftics leading the fancy, in the firft 260 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY place, to thofe more extraordinary phenomena which, according to the luperftirious belief of the vulgar, are the forerunners of political Revolutions ; and, afterwards, to the death of Caefar, and the bat- tles ofPharfalia andPhilippi. The manner in which the Poet returns to his original fubje^t, difplays that exquifite art which is to be derived only from the diligent and enlightened ftudy of nature. Scilicet et tempus veniet, cum finibus illis i-\gricohi, incur vo terram niolitus aratro, Exe^a invenit't scaNi a ruhigine pila j Aut gravibus rastris galeas pulsabit inanes, Gtandiaque effossis mirabitur ossa sepulcbris. The facility with which ideas are affociated in the mind, is very different in different individuals : a circumflance which, as I Ihall afterwards Ihew, lays the foundation of remarkable varieties among men, both in refpecf of genius and of charader. I am inclined, too, to think that in the other fex (proba-- bly in confequence of early education) ideas are more eafily affociated together, than in the minds of men. Hence the livelinefs of their fancy, and the fuperi- ority they pofTefs in epiflolary writing, and in thofe kinds of poetry, in which the principal recommenda- tions are, eafe of thought and exprefTion. Hence, too, the facility with which tkey contnici: or lofe habits, and accommodate their minds to new fitua- tions ; and, I may add, the dilpofition they have to that fpecies of fuperflition v hich is founded on acci- dental combinations of circumflances. The influ- ence which this facility of affociation has on the pow- er of Tafte, Ihall be afterwards ccnfidcrcd. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 26l SECTION III. 0/tJje Power which the Mind has over the Train of its Thoughts, BY means of the Affociation of Ideas, a conftant current of thoughts, if I may uie the expreilion, is made to pafs through the mind while we are awake. Sometimes the current is interrupted, and the thoughts diverted into a new channel, in confe- quence of the ideas fuggefted by other men, or of the objects of perception with which we are iur- rounded. So completely, however, is the mind in this particular fubje^ted to phyfical laws, that it has been juftly obferved,* we cannot, by an eifort of our will, call up any one thought ; and that the train of our ideas depends on cauies which operate in a man- ner inexplicable by us. This obfervation, although it has been cenfured as paradoxical, is almoft felt-evident ; for, to call up a particular thought, fuppofes it to be already in the mind. As I fliall have frequent occafion, however, to refer to the obfervation afterwards, I (h.ill endea- vor to obviate the only objection which, 1 think, can reafonably be urged againft it ; and which is found- ed on that operation of the mind, which is common- ly called recollection or intentional memory. It is evident, that, before we attempt to recolle(5t the particular circumflances of any event, that event in general muft have been an object of our attention. We remember the outlines of the ftory, but cannot at hrft give a complete account of it. If we wifli to recal thefe circumftar.ces, there are only two ways in which we can proceed. We mull either form dif- * By Lord Kaimes, and others. 262 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ferent fuppofitions, and then confider which of thefe tallies beft with the other circumftances of the event ; or, by revolving in our mind the circun)ftances we remember, we muft endeavor to excite the recollec- tion of the other circumftances affociated with them. The firft of thefe procefTes is, properly fpeaking, an inference of reafon, and plainly furniflies no excep- tion to the doctrine already delivered. We have an inftance of the other mode of recollection, when we, are at ^ lofs for the beginning of a fentence in recit- ing a compcjfition that we do not perfe<51:ly remem- ber ; in which cafe we naturally repeat over, two or three times, the concluding words of the preceding fentence, in order to call up the other words which aifed to be connected with them in the memory. In this inftance, it is evident, that the circumftances we delire to remember, are not recalled to the mind in immediate confequence of an exertion of volitionj^ but are fuggelted by fome other circumftances with ■which they are connected, independently of our will, by the laws of our conftitution. NoCwithftanding, however, the immediate depen- dence of the train of our thoughts on the laws of aflt)ciation, it muft not be imagined that the will pof- fefles no influence over it. This influence, indeed, is not exercifed directly and immediately, as we are apt to iuppofe, on a fuperficial view of the fubject : but it is, neverthelefs, very extenfive in its effects 5 and the different degrees in which it is pofleffed by /iifferent individuals, conftitute fome of the moft ftriking inequalities among men, in point of intellec- tual capacity. Of the powers which the mind poflefles over the train of its thoughts, the moft obvious is its power of Angling out any one of them at pleafure ; of de- taining it ; and of making it a particular objedt of attention. By doing fo, we not only flop the fuc- cfiflion that would otherwife take place ; but in coiu O^ THE HUMAN MIND, ^QS- ieqii^nce of our bringing to view the lefs obvious re- lations among our ideas, we freq^uently divert the current of our thoughts into a new channel. If, for example, when I am indolent and inactive, the name of Sir Ifaac Newton accidentally occur to me, it wili perhaps fuggeft, one after another, the names of fome other eminent mathematicians and aftrono- mers, or of fome of his illuftrious contemporaries and friends : and a number of them may pafs in review before me, without engaging my curiofity in any conGderable degree. In a different ftate of mind, the name of Newton will lead my thoughts to the principal incidents of his life, and the more ftriking features of his character : or, if my mind be ardent and vigorous, will lead my attention to the fublime difcoveries he made ; and gradually engage me in fome philofophical inveftigation. To every objed:, there are others which bear obvious and ftriking re- lations ; and others^ alfo, whofe relation to it does not readily occur to us, unlefs we dwell upon it for fomt: time, and place it before us in different points of view. But the principal power we pofTefs over the train of -mr ideas, is founded on the influence which our habits of thinking have on the laws of Afibciation ^ an influence which is fo great, that we may often form a pretty fhrewd judgment concerning a man's prevailing turn of thought, from the tranfitions he makes in converfation or in writing. It is well known, too, that by means of habit, a particular aflbeiating principle may be ftrengthened to fuch a degree, as to give us a command of all the different ideas in our mind, which have a certain relation to each oth- er ; fo that when any one of the clafs occurs to us we have almoft a certainty that it will fuggeft the reft. What confidence in his own powers muft a fpeaker polTefs, wiien he rites without premeditation, in a popular aiTembiy, to amufe his audience with a ^64 ELEMENTS OF TttE PHILOSOPHY lively or an humorous fpeech ! Such a confHcnce, it is evident, can only ariie from a long experience of the flrength of particular affociating principles. To how great a degree this part ot our conlHtu- tion may be influenced by habit, appears from facls which are famiUar to every one. A man who has an ambition to become a punfter, feldom or never fails in the attainment of his object ; that is, he feldom or never fails in acquiring a power which other men have not, of fummoningup,on a particular ^ccafion, a num. ber of words different from each other in meaning, & refembling each other, more or lefs, in found. I am inclined to think that even genuine wit is a habit ac- quired in a limilar way ; and that, although forhe individuals may, from natural conftitution, be more fitted than others to acquire this habit ; it is found- ed in every cafe on a peculiarly ftrong aiTociation among certain claffes of our ideas, which gives the perfon who poffeffes it, a cdrhmand over thofe ideas which is denied to ordinary men^ But there is no inflance in which the effecf of habits of aiTociation is more remarkable, than in thofe men who poffefs a facility of rhyming. That a man fliould be able to exprefs his thoughts perfpicuoufly and elegantly, un- der the reftraints which rhyme impofes, would ap- pear to be incredible, if we did not know it to bo fa^. Such a pov^;er implies a wonderful command both of ideas and of expreflbns ; and yet daily expe- rience fhews, that it may be gained v/ith very little pradice. Pope tells us with refpefl to himfelf, that he could exprefs himself not only more cbncifely, but more eaiily, in rhyme than in profe* * *' When habit is OKce gained, nothing so easy as practice, " Cicero writes, that Antipater the Sidonian could pour forth " hexameters extempore,- and that, whenev^er he chose to versify, *' words followed him of course. We may add to Ant»p:itrr, the *^ antient rhapscdists of the Greeks, and the modern Jinpioviaa-tori *< of the Italian*." Ha^^s'b PhU. hiq. 109, 1 l.Oi' ' OF THE HUMAN MIND. 265 Nor IS it only in thefe trifling accomplifliments that we may trace the influence of habits of afTocia- tion. In every inftance ot invention, either in the fine arts, in the mechanical arts, or in the fciences, there is fome new idea, or forae new, combination of ideas, brought to light by the inventor. This, undoubtedly, may often happen in a wa/ which he is unable to explain ; that is, his invention may be fuggefted to him by fome lucky thought, the origin of which he is unable to trace. But when a man poflefles an habitual fertility of invention in any par- ticular art or fcience, and can rely, with confidence, on his inventive powers, whenever he is called upon to exert them, he mufl have acquired, by previous habits of fludy, a command over certain clafTes of his ideas, which enables him, at pleafure, to bring them under his review. The illuftration of thele fubjedls may throw light on fome procefTes of the mind, which are not in general well underflood : and I (hall, accordingly, in the following Sedion, of- fer a few hints with refped to thofe habits of affo- ciation which are the foundation of wit ; of the < tf>w er of rhyming ; of poetical fancy j and of in- vention in matters of fcience. SECTION IV. Itluji rations of the Do6lrine ftated in the -preceding Sedion, I. Of Wit. ACCORDING to Locke, Wit confifls " in the " aflfemblige of ideas ; and putting thofe together *' with quicknefs and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity."* I would add to cc * Essp/ on Htiman Understanding, book ii. chap. 1 1 Kk 266 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY this definition, (rather by way of explanation thaii aniendment,) that Wit implies a power of calling up at pleafure the ideas which it combines : and I ana inclined to believe, that the entertainment which it gives to the hearer, is founded, in a confiderable de- gree, on his furprife, at the command which the man of wit has acquired over a part of the conftitution, which is fo little fubjecl to the will. That the efFe6b of wit depends partly, at leaft, on the circumftance now mentioned, appears evidently from this, that we are more pleafed with a bon inotj which occurs in converfation, than with one in print ; and that we never fail to receive difgull from wit, when we fufpect it to be premeditated. The plea- fure, too, we receive from wit, is heightened, when the original idea is ftarted by one perfon, and the re- lated idea by another. Dr. Campbell has remarked, that " a witty repartee is infinitely more pleafmg, " than a witty attack ; and that an allufion will ap- " pear excellent when thrown out extempore in con- " verfation, which would be deemed execrable in *' print." In all thefe cafes, the wit confidered abfo- lutely is the fame. The relatione which are difcov- ered between the compared ideas are equally nevy : and yet, as foon as we fufpecl that the wit was pre- meditated, the pleafure we receive from it is infinite- ly diminiflied. Inffances indeed may be mentioned, in which we are pleafed with contemplating an un- expeded relation between ideas, without any refer- ence to the habits of alTociation in the mincl of the perfon who difcovered it. A bon mot produced at the game of crofs-purpofes, would not fail to create amufenient ; but in fuch cafes, our pleafure feems chiefly to arife from the furprife we feel at fo extra- ordinary a coincidence between a queftion and an anfwer coming from perfons who had no direct com- munication with each other. Of the efFed added to wit by the promptitude OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^7 With which its combinations are formed. Fuller ap- pears to have had a very juft idea, from what he has recorded of the focial hours of our two great Eng- 3i(h Dramatifts. " Johnfon's parts were not fo rea- " dy to run of themfelves, as able to anfwer the fpur ; " fo that it may be truly faid of him, that he had an *' elaborate wit, wrought out by his own induftry. — *' Many were the wit-combats between him and *' Shakespeare, which two I behold like a Spanifh *' great galleon, and an Englifh mao of war. John- " fon (like the former) was built far higher in learn- " ing ; folid, but flow in his performances. Shake- " fpeare, with the Englifh man of war, leil'er in bulk, *' but lighter in failing, could turn with all tides, tack ** about and take advantage of all winds, by the *' quicknefs of his wit and invention.*'* I before obferved, that the pleafure we receive from wit is increafed, when the two ideas between which the relation is difcovered, are fuggufted by different perfons. In the cafe of a bon mot occur- • ring in converfation, the reafon of this is abundant- ly obvious ; becaufe, when the related ideas are fuggefted by different perfons, we have a proof that the wit was not premeditated. But even in a writ- ten compofition , we are much more delighted when the fubjed was furnifhed to the author by an* other perfon, than when he chufes the topic on which he is to difplay his wit. How much would the plea- fure we receive from the Key to the Lock be diminifli- ed, if we fufpected that the author had the key in view when he wrote that poem ; and that he intro- duced fome expreflions, in order to furnifli a fubje<^ for the vvit of the commentator ? How totally would It deftroy the pleafure we receive from a parody on a poem, if we fufpefled that both were productions of the fame autlior ? The truth feems to be, that * History of the Worthies of England. London, 1 662. '^68\ ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY when both the related ideas are fuggefted by the fame perfoii, we have not a very fatisfadory proof of any thing uncommon in the intelledual habits of the author. We may fufped that both ideas occur- red to him at the fame time ; and we know that in the duUeft and moft phlegmatic minds, fuch extra- ordinary aflbciations wili fome tinies take place. But when the fubjed: of the wit is furnifhed by one perfon, and the wit fuggefted by another, we have a proof, not only that the author's ndnd abounds with fuch fingular aflbciations, but that he has his wit per- fectly at command. As an additional confirmation of thefe obfer ra- tions, we may remark, that the more an author is limited by his fubject, the more we are pleafed with his wit. And, therefore, the effect of wit does not arife folely from the unexpeded relations which it prefents to the mind, but arifes, in part, from the furprife it excites at thofe intelledual habits which give it birth. It is evident, that the more the au- thor is circumfcribed in the choice of his materials, the greater muft l^e the command which he has ac- quired over thofe aflbciating principles on which wit depends, and of confequence, according to the fore- going dodrine, the greater muft be the furprife and the pleafure which his wit produces. In Addifon's celebrated verfes to Sir Godfrey Kneller on his pid- ure (^f George the Firft, in which he compares the painter to Phidias, and the fubjeds of his pencil to the Grecian Deities, the range of the Poet's wit was rieceffarily confined within very narrow bounds; and what principally delights us in that performance is, the furprifiog eafe and felicity with which he runs the parallel between the Englifh hiftory and the Greek mythology. Of all the allufions which the following pafiage contains, there is not one, taken fingly, of very extraordinary merit ; and yet the ef- fed of the whole is uncommonly great, from the fm- CF THE HUMATT MIND. 269 guhf power of combination, which fa long and fo difficult an exertion difcovers. ** Wise Phidias thus, his skill to prove, " Thro' many a god advanced to Jove, " And taught the polish'd rocks to shine " Wilh airs and lineanoentb divine, " Till Greece amaz'd and half afraid, *< Th* asse -nbled peities survey'd. " Great Pan, who wont to chase thefarr, " And lov'd the spreading oak, was there ; ** Old Saturn, too, with up -cast eyes^ " Beheld his abdicated skies ; "^And mighty Mars for war renowned, ** In adamantine armour frown'd ; " By him the childless Goddess rose,, " Minerva, studious to compose *' Her twisted threads ; the web she strung, ** And o'er a loom of marble hung ; ♦< Thetis, the trouWed ocean's queen, " Match'd with a mortal next was saSBJ ** Reclin n^ on a funeral urn, " Her short-liv'd darling son to mourn ; " The last was he whose thunder slew ** The Titan race, a rebel crew, " That from a hundred hills ally'd, ^* In impious league their King defy'd." According to the view which I have given of the nature of Wit, the pleafure we derive irom that af- femblage of ideas which it prefents, is greatly height- ened and enlivened by our furprife at the conaniand difplayed over a part of the conflitution, which, in our own cafe, we find to be fo little fubje^l to the will. We confider Wit as a fort of feat or trick of intellectual dexterity, analogous, in fome relpeds, to the extraordinary performances of jugglers ana rope- dancers ; and . in both caies, the pieafure we receive from the exhibition, is explicable m part, (I, by no means, fay entirely J or. the fame principles. If thefe remarks be juft, it feems to follow as a con- fecjuence, that thofe men who are moil deficient in t>70 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY the power of prompt combination,will be moft poign- antly afFecled by it, when exerted at the will of an- other : and therefore, the charge of jealoufy and en- vy brought againft rival Wits, when difpofed to look gra^re at each other's jefts, may perhaps be ob- viated in a way lefs injurious to their charafters. The fame remarks fugged a limitation, or rather an explanation, of an alTertion of Lord Chefterfield's that " genuine wit never made any man laugh " fmce the creation of the world." The obferva- tion, I br^lieve, to be juft, if by genuine wit, we mean wit wholly divefted of every mixture of hum- or : and if by laughter we mean, that convulfive and noify agitation which is excited by the ludicrous. — But there is unqueftionably ^ifmUe appropriated to the flaihes of wit 5 — a fmile of furprife and wonder ; -—not altogether unlike the efFed produced on the mind and the countenance, by a feat of legerdemain when executed with uncommon fuccefs. 11. Of Rhyme, The pleafure we receive from rhyme, feems alfo to arife, partly, from our furprife at the cammand which the Poet muft have acquired over the train of his ideas, in order to be able to exprefs liimfelf with elegance, and the appearance of eafe, under the reftraint which rhyme impofes. In witty or in hu- morous performances, this furprife ferves to enliven that which the wit or the humor produces, and renders its efFecls more fenfible. How flat do the livelieft and moft ludicrous thoughts appear in blank verfe ? And how wonderfully is the wit of Pope heightened, by the eafy and happy rhymes in which it is expreffed ? It muft not, however, be imagined, either in the cafe of wit or of rhyme,that the pleafure arifes foleljr from our furprife at the uncommon habits of alfoci- dF THE HUMAN MIND. 271 ation which the author difcovers. In the former cafe, there muft be prefented to the mind, an unex- pected analogy or relation between different ideas ; and perhaps other circumftances muft concur to ren- der the wit perfed. If the combination has no oth- er merit than that of bringing together two ideas which never met before, we may be furprifed at its oddity, but we do not confider it as a proof of wit. On the contrary, the want of any analogy or rela- tion between the combined ideas, leads us to fufpe<51:, that the one did not fugged the other, in confe- quence of any habits of affociation ; but that the two were brought together by ftudy, or by mere accident. All that I affirm is, that when the analo- gy or relation is pleaiing in itfelf, our pleafure is heightened by our furprife at the author's habits of affociation when compared with our own. In the cafe of Rhyme, too, there is undoubtedly a certain degree of pleafure ariling from the recurrence of the same found. We frequently obferve children amufe themfelves with repeating over fingle words which rhyme together : and the lower people, who derive little pleafure from poetry, excepting in fo far as it affeds the ear, are fo pleafed with the echo of the rhymes, that when they read verfes where it is not perfed:, they are apt to fupply the Poet's de- fers, by violating the common rules of pronuncia- tion. This pleafure, however, is heightened by our admiration of th<3 miraculous powers which the poet muft have acquired over the train of his ideas, and over all the various modes of exprelTion which the language affords, in order to convey inilruclion and entertainment, without tranfgrefling the eftab- iifhed laws of regular verfification. In fome of the lower kinds of poetry ; for example, in acroftics, and in the lines which are adapted to bouts rmci^ t! e merit lies entirely in this command of thought and expreUion \ or, in other words, in a command of 272 ELEMENTS OF THE PHfLOSOPHY ideas founded on extraordinary habits of affociation. Even feme authors of a fuperior clafs, occalionaily ihew an inclination to ditplay their knack at rhym- ing, by introducing, at the end of the iirft line of a couplet, fome word to which the language hardly af- fords a correfp:)i.ding found. Swift, in his more trifling pieces, abounds with inftances of this ; and in Hudibras, when the author ufes his double and tripple rhymes, many couplets have no merit what- ever but what arifes from dilScuIty of execution. The pleafure we receive from rhyme in lerious compofitions, arifes from a combination of different circumftances which my prefent fubject does not lead me to inveftigate particularly.* lam perfuad- €d, however, that it arifes, in part, from our fur- prife at the Poet's habits of aflbciation, which enable him to convey his thoughts with eafe and beauty, notwithftanding the narrow limits within which his choice of expreftion is confined. One proof of this is, that if there appear any mark of conftraint, eith- er in the ideas or in the exprefTion, our pleafure is proportionally diminiflied. The thoughts muft feem to fuggeft each other, and the rhymes to be only an accidental circumflance. The fame remark may • In Elegiac poetry, the recurrence of the same sound, and the un;formity in the structure of the vt-rbification which thisneces- t^arily occasions, are peculiarly suited to the inactivity of the mind, and to the slow and equable siccebsion of its ideas, when under the influence of tender or melancholy passions ; and, accordingly, in such cases, even the La*in jwets, though the genius of their language be vtry ill fitted for compositions in rhyme, occasionally indulge themselves in something very nearly approaching to it. ** Memnona si mater mater pioravit Achillem, " Et tangant roagnas tristia fata DeiiS ; *' Flebilis indignos Elegeia solve capHIos, '' Ah nimis ex verouunc tibi nomen erit." Ivlany other instances of the same kiud might be produced frwn Elegiac verse? of Ovid and Tib«jllo9; OF THE HUMAN MIND. 273 be made on the meafure of the verfe. When in its greateft perfection, it does not appear to be the re- fult of labor, but to be dictated by nature, or prompted by infpiration. In Pope's bed verfes, the idea is exprefled with as little inverfion of ftyle, and with as much concifenefs, precifion, and propriety, as the author could have attained, had he been writ- ing profe : without any apparent exertion on his part, the words feem fpontaneouily to arrange themfelves in the moil mufical numbers. " While still a child, nor yet a fool to fame, '* 1 lisp'd in numbers, for the numbers came.'* This facility of verfification, it is true, may be, and probably is, in mod cafes, only apparent : and it is reafonable to think, that in the moll perfedl poet- ical productions, not only the choice of w^ords, but the choice of ideas, is influenced by the rhymes. — In a profe compofition, the author holds on in a di- rect courfe, according to the plan he has previoufly formed ; but in a poem, the rhymes which occur to him are perpetually diverting him to the right hand or to the left, by fuggefting ideas which do not naturally rife out of his fubjecl. This, I pre- fume, is Butler's meaning in the following couplet : " Rhymes the rudder are of verses " With which, like ships, they steer their courses.** But although this may be the cafe in facl, the Foet mufl employ all his art to conceal it : infomuch that, if he finds himfelf under the neceflity to introduce,on account of the rhymes, a fuperfluous idea, or an awkward exprefGon, he mud place it in the firfl line of the couplet, and not in the fecond ; for the reader, naturally prefuming that the lines were com- pofed in the order in which the author arranges L L 374 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY / thetn^ is more apt to fufpe^l the fecond line to be ac- commodated to the firft, than the firft to the fecond. And this flight artifice is, in general, fufilcient to impofe on that degree of attention with which poe- try is read. Who can doubt that, in the follow- ing lines, Pope wrote the firft for the fake of the fecond I " A wit's a feather, and a chief a rod ; « An honest man's the noblest work of God." Were the firfi: of thefe lines, or a line equally un- meaning, placed laft, the couplet would have ap- peared execrable to a perfon of the moft moderate tafte. It affords a ftrong confirmation of the foregoing obfervations, that the Poets of fome nations have de- lighted in the pradice of alliteration, as well as of rhyme, and have even confidered it as an effential circumftance in verfification. Dr. Beattie obferves, that " fome antient Englifli poems are more diftin- " guifhed by alliteration, than by any other poetical *' contrivance. In the works of Langland, even " when no regard is had to rhyme, and but little to *^ a rude fort of anapeftic meafure, it feems to have " been a rule, that three words, at leaft, of each line " fhould begin with the fame letter." A late author informs us, that, in the Icelandic poetry, aUiteration is confidered as a circumfi:ance no lefs effential than rhyme.* He mentions alfo feveral other reftraints, which muft add wonderfully to the difficulty of ver- fification y and whicli" appear to us to be perfedly * '* The Icelandic poetry requires two things ; viz. words with " the same initial letters, and words of the same sound. It was " divided into stanzas, each of which consisted of four couplets ; " and each of these couplets was again composed of two hemis* " ticks, of which every one contiiined six syllables ; and it was ** not allowed to augment this number, except in cases of th*j *' greatest necessity." See Van Troil's Letters^n Iceland, p. 2C8> OF THE HUMAN MIND. 275 Arbitrary and capricious. If that really be the cafe, the whole pleafure of the reader or hearer arifes from his furprife at the facility of the Poet's compo- lition under thefe complicated reftraints ; that is, from his furprife at the command which the Poet has acquired over his thoughts and expreflions. In our rhyme, I acknowledge, that the coincidence of found iS agreeable in itfelf ; and only aiErm, that the plea- fure which the ear receives from it, is heightened by the other coniideration. III. OfPoeUcal Fancy, Tfiere is another habit of aflbciation, which, in fome men, is very remarkable ; that which is the foundation of Poetical Fancy : a talent which agrees with Wit in fome circumftances, but which differs from it eifentially in others. The pleafure we receive from Wit, agrees in one particular with th^ pleafure which arifes from poet- ical allufions ; that in both cafes we are pleafed with contemplating an analogy between two different subjects. But they differ in this, that the man of Wit has no other aim than to combine analogous ideas ;* whereas no allufion can, with propriety, have a place in ferious poetry, unlefs it either illuf- trate or adorn the principal fubjecl. If it has both thefe recommendations, the allufion is perfeof ileep. But the more probable fuppoflrion feems to be, that every fpecies of fleep is accompanied with a fufpenfion of the faculty of vol- untary motion ; and that the incubus has nothing pe- culiar in it but this, that the uneaiy fenfations which areproduced by the accidental pofiure of the body^ and which we find it impoffible to remove by our own efforts, render us diftincliy confcious of our in-- capacity to move. One thing is certain, that the inflant of our awaking, and of our recovering the command of our bodily organs, is one and the fame. 2. The lame conclufion is confirmed by a differ- ent view of the fubjecl. It is probable, as was aU ready obferved, that when we are anxious to pro^ cure fleep, the ftate into which we naturally bring the mind, approaches to its ftate after fleep commen- ces. Now it is nianifeft, that the means which na* ture directs us to employ on fuch occafions, is net to Of THE HUMAN MINlf. 293 fufpend the power of volition, but to fufpend the ex- ertion of thofe powers whofe exercife depends on volition. If it were necefTary that volition fliould be fufpended before we fall afleep, it would be im- poiUbie for us, by our own efforts, to halten the mo- ment of reft. The very fuppolition of fuch eftbrts is abfurd ; for it implies a continued will to fupend the ads of the will. , According to the foregoing do<5lrine with refpe^t to the ftate of the mind in lleep, the effecl which is produced on our mental operations. Is ftrikingly an- alogous to that which is produced on our bodily powers. From the obfervations which have been already made, it is manifeft, that in fleep, the body is, in a very inconfiderable degree, if at ail, fubjedl to our command. The vital and involuntary motions, however, fufter no interruption, but go on as when we are awake, in confequence of the operation of fome caufe unknown to us. In Hke manner, it would appear, that thofe operations of the mind which de- pend on our volition are fufpended ; while certain other operations are, at leaft, occalionally, carried on. This analogy naturally fuggefts the idea, that all our mental operations, which are independent of our will, may continue during fleep ; and that the phenomena of dreaming may, perhaps, be produced by thefe, diveriified in their apparent effedls, in con- fequence of the fufpenfion of our voluntary pov.ers. If the appearances which the mind exhibits during fleep, are found to be explicable on this general principle, it will pollefs all the evidence which the nature of the fubjecf admits of. It was formerly fhcwn, that the train of thought in the mind does not depend invnediately on our will, but is regulated by certain general laws of aflbcia- tion. At the fame time, it appeared, that among the various fubjcc^s which thus fpontaneoufly pre- fent thcmfelves to our notice, w-© have the power of 294 ELERftNTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY lingling out any one that we chufe to confider, and of making it a particular object of attention ; and that by doing fo, we not only can flop the train tha^ would otherwife have fucceeded, but frequently can divert the current of our thoughts into a new chan- nel. It alfo appeared, that we have power (which may be much improved by exercife) of recalling paft occurrences to memory, by a voluntary effort of recollection. The indire6l influence which the mind thus pofTeff. es over the train of its thoughts is fo great, that dur- ing the whole time we are awake, excepting in thofe cafes in which we fall into what is called a reverie, and fufFer our thoughts to follow their natural courfe, the order of their fucceflioil is always regu- lated more or iefs by the will. The will, indeed, in regulating the train of thought, can operate only (as I already fliewel) by availing itfelf of the efUblifhed laws of affociation ; but ftill it has the power of ren- dering this train very different from what it would have been, if thefelaws had taken place without its interference. From thefe principles, combined with the general fa6f which I have endeavored to eflablifh, with re- fpecl to the ftate of the mind in fleep, two obvious confequences follow : Firfl,That when we are in this fituation, the fucceflion of our thoughts, in fo far as it depends on the laws of affociation, may be carried on by the operation of the Cime unknown caufes by which it is produced while we are awake ; and, Sec- ondly, that the order of our thoughts, in thefe two flates of the mind, muft be very different ; inafmuch as, in the one, it depends folely on the laws of affoci- ation ; and in the other, on thefe laws, combined with our own voluntary exertions. In order to afcertain how far thefe concluiions are agreeable to truth, it is neceffary to compare them with the known phenomena of dreaming. For which purpofe, I ihall endeavor to fliew, Firft, That OF THE HUMAN MIND* 29S the fucceflion of our thoughts in fleep, is regulated by the fame general laws of affociation to which it is fubje6ted while we are awake ; and. Secondly, That the circumftances which difcriminate dreaming from our waking thoughts, are fuch as muil neceffarily arife from the fufpeniion of the influence of the will. I. That the fucceflion of our thoughts in fleep, is regulated by the fame general laws of aflociation, which influence the mind while we are awake, ap- pears from the following confiderations. 1. Our dreams are frequently fuggefted to us by bodily fenfations : and with thefe, it is well known, from what we experience while awake,that particu- lar ideas are frequently very fl:rongly aflbciated. I have been told by a friend, that having occafion, in confequence of an indilpofition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, he dream- ed that he was making a journey to the top of Mount ^tna, and that he found the heat of the ground almoft infupportable. Another perfon, hav- ing a blifl:er applied to his head, dreamed that he was fcalped by a party of Indians. I believe every one who is in the habit of dreaming, will recoiled inftan- ces, in his own cafe, of a fimilar nature. 2. Our dreams are influenced by the prevailing temper of the mind ; and vary, in their complexion , according as our habitual difpoiilion, at the time, in- clines us to checrfulnefs or to melancholy. Not that this obfervation holds without! exception; but it holds fo generally, as must convince us, that the ftate of our fpirits has fome effect on our dreams, as well as on our v/aking thoughts. Indeed, in rhe lat- ter cafe, no lefs than in the former, this effect may be countcraded, or modified, by various other cir- cumdances. After having made a narrow efcape from any al- arming danger, we are apt to awake, in the courfe 296 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY of our fleep, with fudden ftartings ; imagining that we are drowning, or on the brink of a precipice. — ^ A fevere misfortune, which has affected the mind deeply, influences our dreams in a fimilar way ; and fuggells to us a variety of adventures, analogous, ih fome meafure, to that event from which our diflrefs arifes. Such, according to Virgil, were the dreams of the f orfaken Dido. '* Agjt ipse farentem, *' In somis ferus ^neas ; semperque rellnqni, '* Sola sibi ; semper longam i icomitata videlur, **• Ire viam, et Tyrlos des^rla quserere terra.'* 3. Oar dreams are influenced by our prevailing habits of aflbciation while awake. In a former part of this work, I conlidered the extent of that power which the mind may acquire over the train of its thoughts j and I obferved, that thofe intelledual diver fities among men, which we commonly refer to peculiarities of genius, are, at lead in a great meafure, refoivable into difi'erences in their habits of afllKiation. One man poflefles a rich anci beautiful fancy, which is at all times obedi- ent to liis will. Another poflefles a quicknefs of re- coiieclion, which enables him, at a moment's v.'arn- ing, to bring together all the refults of his pafl: expe- rience, and of his part refleclions, which can be of ufe for illuftrating any propofed fubjecc. A third can, without effort, coiled his attention to the moil ab- ftract queftions in philofophy ; can perceive, at a glance, the fliortefl and the mofl: effedual procefs for arriving at the truth ; and can banifli from his mind every extraneous idea, which fancy or cafual aflbciation may fuggefl, to diflract his thoughts, or to miflead his judgment. A fourth unites all thefe pow- ers in a capacity of perceiving truth with an almoft intuitive rapidity ; and in an eloquence which ena- bles him to command, at pleafure, whatever his OF THE HUMAN MIND. 29? memory and his fancy can fupply, to illu (Irate and to adorn it. The occalional exercife which fuch men make of their powers, may undoubtedly be faid, in one fenfe, to be unpremeditated or uniludied ; but they all indicate previous habits of meditation or ftudy, as unqueftionably, as the dexterity of the ex- pert accountant, or the rapid execution of the profef- fional mulician. From what has been faid, it is evident, that a train of thought which, in one man, would require a pain- ful effort of ftudy, may, in another, be almoft Spon- taneous ; nor is it to be doubted, that the reveries of.iludious men, even when they allow, as much as they can, their thoughts to follow their own courfe, are more or lefs connected together by thofe princi- ples of aflbciation, which their favorite purfuits tend more particularly to ftrengthen. The influence of the fame habits may be traced diftindly in fleep. There are probably few mathe- maticians, who have not dreamed of an intereding problem, and who have not even fancied that they were profecuting the inveftigation of it with much fuccefs. They whofe ambition leads them lo the ftudy of eloquence, are frequently confcious, during fleep, of a renewal of their daily occupations ; and fometimes feel themfelves pofTelTed of a fluency of fpeech, which they never experienced before. The Poet, in his dreams, is tranfported into Elyiium, and leaves the vulgar and unfatisfadory enjoyments of humanity, to dwell in thofe regions of enchantment and rapture, which have been created by the divine imaginations of Virgil and of Taffo. " And hither Morpheus sent his kindest dreams, ** Raising a world of gayer tinct and grace ; ** O'er which were shadowy cast Elysian gleams, " That play'd, in waving lights, from place to pUw, *^ And shed a roseate smile on Nature's face. Oo 29^8 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " Not Titian's pencil e'er could so array, *^ So fieece with clouds the pure etherial space; *' Nor could it e'er such melting forms display, " As loose on flowery beds all langaishingly lay. " No, fair illusions !' artful phantoms, no ! " My muse will not attempt your fairy land : ** She has no colours, that like your's can glow ; *' To catch your vivid scenes, too gross her hand."* As a farther proof that the fucceflion of our thoughts in dreaming, is influenced by our prevail- ing habits of alTociation ; it may be remarked, that the fcenes and occurrences which mod frequently prefent themfelves to the mind while we are aileej), are the fcenes and occurrences of childhood and early youth. The facility of alTociation is then much greater than in more advanced years ; and although, during the day, the memory of the events thus aiTo- ciated, may be banilhed by the objeds and purfuits which preis upon our fenfes, it retains a more perma- nent hold of the mind than any of our fubfequent ac- quifitions ; and, like the knowledge which we poflefs of our mother tongue, is, as it were, interwoven and incorporated with all its moil effential habits. Ac- cordinglyy in old men, whofe thoughts are, in a great meafure, difengaged from the world, the tranfactions of their middle age, which once feemed fo important, are often obliterated j while the mind dwells, as in a dream, on the fports and the compan- ions of their infancy. I (hall only obferve farther, on this head, rhat in our dreams, as well as when awake, we occafionally make ufe of words as an inftrument of thought. Such dreams, however, do not affect the mind with fuch emotions of pleafare and of pain, as thofe in which the imagination is occupied with particular objects of fenfe. The effect of philofophical fludies, * Castle of Indolence. OF THE HUMAN MIND. f M in habituating the mind to the almoft conftant em- ptoyment of this inflrument, and of confequence, its effect in weakening the imagination, was formerly- remarked. If I am not millaken, the influence of thefe circumftances may alfo be traced in the hiftory of our dreams ; which, in youth, commonly involve, in a much greater degree, the exercife of imagination ; and afFedt the mind with much more powerful emo- tions, than when we begin to employ our maturer faculties in more general and abftrad fpeculations. From thefe different obfervatioiiS, we are author- ifed to conclude, that the fame laws of alfociation which relgulate the train of our thoughts while we are awake, continue to operate during ileep. I now proceed to confider, how far the circumftances which difcriminate dreaming from our waking thoughts, correfpond with thole which might be expected to refult from the fufpenflorj^of the influence of the will. 1. If the influence of the will be fufpended du- ring fleep, all our voluntary operations, fuch as re- collection, reafoning, &c. muft alfo be fufpended. That this really is the cafe, the extravagance and inconfiftency of our dreams are fufHcient proofs. We frequently confound together times and places the molt remote from each other ; and, in the courfe of the fame dream, conceive the fame perfon as exift- ing in different parts of the world. Sometimes we imagine ourfelves converfing with a dead friend, without remembering the circumftances of his death, although, perhaps, it happened but a few days be- fore, and affedted us deeply All this proves clearly, that the fubjeds which then occupy our thoughts, are luch as prefent themfelves to the mind fpontane- oufly ; and that we have no power of employing our reafon in comparing together the different parts of our dreams ; or even of exerting an a(ft of recol- le<^ion, in order to afcertain how far they are con- fiftent and poflible. 30® ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY The proceffes of reafoning, in which we fometimes fancy ourfelves to be engaged during lleep, furnifh no exception to the foregoing obfervation ; for al- though every fuch procefs, the firft time we form it, implies volition ; and, in particular, implies a recol- lection of the premifos, till we arrive at the conclu- iion ; yet when a number of truths have been often prefented to us as necelfarily connected with each other, this feries may afterwards pafs through the mind, according to the laws of affociation, without any more activity on our part, than in thofe trains of thought which are the moft loofe and incoherent. Nor is this mere theory. I may venture to appeal to the confcioufnefs of every man accuftomed to dream, whether his reafonings during fleep do not feem to be carried on without any exertion of his wiij ; and with a degree of facility, of which he was never confcious while awake. Mr. Addifon, in one of his Spedators, has made this obfervation ; and his teftimony, in the prefent inftance, is of the greater weight, that he had no particular theory on the fub- ject to fupport. " There is not,*' (fays he,) " a more *' painful action of the mind than invention, yet in *' dreams, it works with that eafe and adivity, that *' we are not fenfible when the faculty is employed. '' For inftance, I believe every one, fome time or *' other, dreams that he is reading papers, books, or *' letters ; in which cafe the invention prompts fo " readily, that the mind is impoled on, and mif- *' takes its own fuggeftions for the compofition of ** another."* 2. If the influence of the will during fleep be fuf- pended, the mind will remain as paifive, while it? thoughts change from one fubjecl to another, as it does during our waking hours while different per^ cepK:ible objects are prefented to our fenf©s. * 1^0. 487. OF THE HUMAN MIND. SOI Of this paflive It^ite of the mind in our dreams, it is unneceflary to multiply proofs ; as it has always been confidered as one of the mofi: extraordinary circumiiances with which they are accompanied. If our dreams, as well as our waking thoughts, were fubjecl to the will, is it not natural to conclude, that, in the one cafe, as well as in the other, we would en- deavor to banifli, as much as we could, every idea which had a tendency to difturb us ; and detain thofe only which we found agreeable ? So far, how- ever, is this power over our thoughts from being exercifed, that we are frequently opprelTed, in fpite of all our efforts to the contrary, with dreams which affedt us with the moft painful emotions. And, in- deed, it is matter of vulgar remark, that our dreams are, in every cafe, involuntary on our part ; and that they appear to be obtruded on us by fome ex- lernal caufe. This fad: appeared fo unaccountable to the late Mr. Baxter, that it gave rife to his very whimfical theory, in which he afcribes dreams to the immediate influence of feparate fpirits on the mind. 3. If the influence of the will be fufpended during fleep, the conceptions which we then form of fenfible objeds will be attended with a belief of their real ex- iftence, as much as the perception of the fame objeds is while we are awake. In treating of the power of Conception, I former- ly obferved, that our belief of the feparate and inde- pendent exiftence of the objects of our perceptions, is the refult of experience ; which teaches us that thefe perceptions do not depend on our will. If I open my eyes, I cannot prevent myfelf from feeing the proipccl before me. The cafe is different with refpect to our conceptions. While they occupy the mind, to the exclufion of every thing elfe, I endeav- ored to fhew, that they are always accompanied with belief j but as we can banifli them from the 502 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY mind, during our waking hours, at pleafure 4 and as the momentary belief which they produce, is con- tinually checked by the furrounding objeds of our perceptions, we learn to confider them as fictions of our own creation ; and, excepting in fome accident- al cafes, pay no regard to them in the condud: of life. If the dodrine, however, formerly ftated with refped to conception be juft, and if, at the fame time, it be allowed, that deep fufpends the influence of the will over the train of our thoughts, we fhould naturally be led to expect, that the fame belief which accompanies perceptions while we are awake, fliould accompany the conceptions which occur to us in our dreams. It is fcarcely neceflliry for me to remark, how ftrikingly this conclufion coincides with ac- knowledged fads. May it not be confidered as fome confirmation of the foregoing do6fcrine, that when opium fails in producing complete fleep, it commonly produces one of the effects of fleep, by fufpending the adivity of the mind, and throwing it into a reverie ; and that •while we are in this ftate, our conceptions frequent- ly aiFe<^ us nearly in the fame manner, as if the ob- jefts conceived were prefentto our fenfes ?* Another circumflance with refped to our concep- tions during fleep, deferves our notice. As the fub- jecls which we then think upon occupy the mind exclufively ; and as the attention is not diverted by the objeds of our external fenfes, our conceptions muft be proportionably lively and fteady. Every perfon knows how faint the conception is which we form of any thing, with our eyes open, in compari- fon of what we can form with our eyes fliut : and that, in proportion as we can fufpend the exercife of all our other fenfes, the livelinefs of our conception * See Ihe Baron de Tott's Account of the Opiuai-takers at Constantinople. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 50S increafes. To this caufe is to be afcribed, in part, the efFed which the dread of fpirits in the dark, has on fome perfons, who are fully convinced in fpecula- tion, that their apprehenfions are groundlefs ; and to this alfo is owing, the effect of any accidental per- ception in giving them a momentary relief from their terrors. Hence the remedy which nature points out to us, when we find ourfelves overpow- ered by imagination. If every thing around us be lilent, we endeavor to create a noife, by fpeaking a- loud, or beating with our feet ; that is, we flrive to divert the attention from the fubjeds of our im- agination, by prefenting an objedt to our powers of perception. The conclufion which I draw from thefe obfervations is, that, as there is no ftate of the body in which our perceptive powers are fo totally unemployed as in fleep, it is natural to think, that the objects which we conceive or imagine, muft then make an impreffion on the mind, beyond compari- fon greater, than any thing of which we can have experience while awake. From thefe principles may be derived a fimple, and, I think, a fatisfadory explanation of what fome writers have reprefented as the moft myfterious of all the circumftances conneded with dreaming ; the inaccurate eftimates we are apt to form of Time^ while we are thus employed 'y- — an inaccuracy which fometimes extends fo far, as to give to a fingle in- fiance, the appearance of hours, or perhaps of days. A fudden noife, for example, fuggeils a dream con- neded with that perception ; and, the moment af- terwards, this noife has the effed of awaking us ; and yet, during that momentary interval, a long feries of circumftances has paffed before the imagination. The ftory quoted by Mr. Addifon* from the Turkifli Tales, of the Miracle wrought by a Mahometan * SPEfTATOR, No. 94, 304 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY Doctor, to convince an infidel Sultan, is, in fuch cafes, »early verified. The hicts I allude to at prefent are generally ex- plained by fuppofing, that, in our dreams, the rapdi- ity of thought is greater than while we are awake : but there is no neceflity for having recourfe to fuch a fuppofition. The rapidity of thought is, at all times fuch, that, in the twinkling of an eye, a crowd of ideas may pafs before us, to which it would re- quire a long difcourfe to give utterance ; and tranf- adions may be conceived, which it would re- quire days to realize. But, in fleep, the conceptions of the mind are mifl:aken for realities ; and there- fore, our efl:imates of time will be formed, not accor- ding to our experience of the rapidity of thought, but according to our experience of the time requi- fite for realizing what we conceive. Something perfe are fufficient to fhew, how neceiLiry it is for us, in the formation of our philofophical principles, to exam- ine with care all thofe opinions which, in our early- years, we have imbibed from our inffrudors ; or which are connected with our own local situation. Nor does the univerfility of an opinion among men who have received a fimilar education, afford any prefumption in its favor ; for however great the dif- ference is, which a wife man will always pay to com- mon belief, upon thofe fubjects which have employ- ed the unbialfed reafon of mankind, he certainly owes it no refpecl, in fo far as he fufpeds it to be in- fluenced by fafhion or authority. Nothing can be more jufl than the obfervation of Fontenelle, that " the number of thofe who believe in a fyflem al- " ready eflabliflied in the world, does not, in the OF THE HUMAN MIN©. S2l *' leaft, add to its credibility ; but that the number *^ of thofe who doubt of it, has a tendency to dimin- « ifh it/' The fame remarks lead, upon the other hand, to another conclufion of ftill greater importance ; that, notwithftanding the various falfe opinions which are current in the world, there are fome truths, which are infeparable from the human underftanding, and by means of which, the errors of education, in moft inftances, are enabled to take hold of our belief. A weak mind, unaccuilomed to reflexion, and which has paflively derived its moft important opin- ions from habit or from authority, when, in confe- quence of a more enlarged intercourfe with the world, it finds, that ideas which it hod been taught to regard as facred, are treated by enlightened and worthy men with ridicule, is apt to lolie its rever- ence for the fundamental and eternal truths on which thefe acceflbry ideas are grafted, and eafily falls a prey to that fceptical phiiofophy which teaches, that all the opinions, and all the principles of adlion by which mankind are governed, may be traced to the influence of education and exmaple. Amidft the infinite variety of forms, however, which our verfa- tile nature afTumes, it cannot fail to ftrike an atten- tive obferver, that there are certain indeHble fea- tures common to them all. In one fituation, we find good men attached to a republican form of gov- ernment ; in another, to a monarchy ; but in all fit- uations, we find them devoted to the fervice of their country and of mankind, and difpofed to regard, with reverence and love, the mofl abfurd and capri- cious inftitutions which cuflom has led them to con- nect with the order of fociety. The different ap- pearances, therefore, which the political opinions and the political condudl of men exhibit, while they demonftrate to what a wonderful degree human na- ture may be influenced by fituation and by early R R 322 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY inftru^lion, evince the exigence of fome commorjr and original principles, which fit it for the political uni')n, and iUuftrate the uniform operation of thofe laws of affociation, to which, in all the ftages of fo- ciety, it is equally fubjecl. Similar obfervations are applicable, and, indeed,. in a ftill more ftriking degree, to the opinions of mankind on the important queftions of religion and morality. The variety of fyftems which they have formed to themfelves concerning thefe fubjedls, has often excited the ridicule of the fceptic and the liber- tine ; but if, on the one hand, this variety fliews, the folly of bigotry, and the reafonablenefs of mu- tual indulgence ; the curiofity which has led men in every lituation to fuch fpeculations, and the influ- ence which their, con clulions, however abfurd, have had on their character and their happinefs, prove, no lefs clearly, on the other,that there muft be fome prin- ciples from which they all derive their origin ; and invite the philofopher to afcertain what are thefe original and immutable laws of the human mind. " Examine" (fays Mr. Hume) " the religious prin- ^^ ciples which have prevailed in the w^orld. You *' will fcarcely be perfuaded, that they are any thing " but fick men's dreams j or, perhaps, will regard " them more as the playfome whimfies of monkeys " in human fliape, than the ferious, pofitive, dog- " matical afleverations of a being, who dignifies him- " felf with the name of rational." " To oppofe " the torrent of fcholaftic religion by fuch feeble " maxims as thefe, that it is impoflible for the fame '' thing to be and not to be ; that the whole is great- *' er than a part ; thai two and three make five ; is *' pretending to fl:op the ocean with a bulrufli.'* But what is the inference to which we are led by thefe obfervations ? Is it, (to ufe the words of this ingenious writer,) " that the whole is a riddle, an " aenigma, an inexplicable myftery j and that doubt. OF THE HUMAN MINO. ^523 "^^ uncertainty, and fufpenfe, appear the only refult " of our moft accurate fcrutiny concerning this fub- *' jecl ?'* Or fliould not rather the melancholy hif^ tories which he has exhibited of the follies and ca- prices of fuperftition, direct our attention to thofe facred and indelible chara6lers on the human mind, which all thefe perveriions of reafon are unable to obliterate ; like that image of himfelf, which Phidi- as wifhed to perpetuate, by ftamping it fo deeply on the buckler of his Minerva ; "^ ut nemo delere pof- ^' fet aut divellere, qui totam ftatuam non imminuer- " et."* In truth, the more ftriking the contradic- tions, and the more ludicrous the ceremonies to which the pride of human reafon has thus been rec- onciled ; the ftronger is our evidence that religion has a foundation in the nature of man. When the greateft of modern philofophers declares, that " he *' would rather believe all the fables in the Legend, " and the Talmud, and Alcoran, than that tliis uni- ^' verfal frame is without mind ;"t he has exprefled the fame feeling, which, in all ages and nations, has led good men, unaccuftomed to reafoning, to an implicit faith in the creed of their infancy ; — a feel- ing which affords an evidence of the ^xiftence of the Deity, incomparably more ftriking, than if, unmixed with error and undebafed by fuperlHtion, this moft important of all principles had command- ed the univerfal affent of mankind. Where are the other truths, in the whole circle of the fciences, which are fo effential to human happinefs, as to pro- cure an eafy accefs, not only for themfelv€s, but for whatever opinions may happen to be blended with them ? Where are the truths fo venerable and com- manding, as to impart their own fublimity to every * Select Discourses by John Smith, p. 1 19. Cambridge, 1 67S. .t Loid Bacon, in his Essays. 324 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY trifling memorial which recals them to our remem- brance ; to bellow folemnity and elevation on every mode of expreflion by which they are conveyed ; and which, in whatever fcene they have habitually occu- pied the thoughts, confecrate every obje8: which it prefents to our fenfes, and the very ground we have been accuitomed to tread ? To attempt to weaken the authority of fuch impreflions, by a detail of the endlefs variety of forms, which they derive from calual afTociations, is furely an employment unfuita- ble to the dignity of philoibphy. To the vulgar, it may be amuling, in this, as in other inff ances, to in- dulge their wonder at what is new or uncommon ; but to the philofopher it belongs to perceive, under all thefe various difguiles, the workings of the fame common nature ; and in the fuperftitions of Egypt, no lefs than in the lofty vifions of Plato, to recog- nize the exiilence of thofe moral ties which unite the heart of man to the Author of his being. SECTION II. Influence of the AJfociation of Ideas on our Judgments in Matters ofTafie. THE very general obfervations which I am to make in this Sedion, do not prefuppofe any particu- lar theorv concerning the nature of Tafte. It is fuf- ficient for my purpofe to remark, that Tafle is not a fimple and original faculty, but a power gradually formed by experience and oblervation. It implies, indeed, as its ground-work, a certain degree of nat- ural fenfibility ; but it implies alfo the exercife of the judgment ; and is the flow refult of an attentive examination and comparifon of the agreeable or difa- greeable effects produced on the mind by external objeds. OF THE HUMAN MINB. 325 Such of my readers as are acquainted with *' An " Effay on the Nature and Principies of Tafte," late- ly publiflied by Mr. Alifon, will not be furprifed that I decline the difcuilion of a fubjed: which he has treated with fo much ingenuity and elegance. The view which was formerly given of the pro- cefs, by which the general laws of the material world are inveftigated, and which I endeavoured to illuftrate by the Sate of medicine among rude na- tions, is ftridly applicable to the hiilory of Tafte. That certain objeds are fitted to give pleafure, and others difguft, to the mind, we know from experi- ence alone ; and it is impollible for us, by any rea- foning a priori^ to explain, how the pleafure or the pain is produced. In the works of nature we find, in many inftances. Beauty and Sublimity involved among circumftances, which are either indifferent, or which obftrucls the general efFed : and it is only by a train of experiments, that we can feparate thofe circumflantes from the reft, and afcertain with what particular qualities the pleafing effect is con- neded. x'^ccordingly, the inexperienced artift, when he copies Nature, will copy her fervilely, that he may be certain of fecuring the pleafing effect ; and the beauties of his performances will be encum- bered with a number of fuperfluous or of difagreea- ble concomitants. Experience and obfervation a- lone can enable him to make this difcrimination : to exhibit the principles of beauty pure and unadul- terated, and to form a creation of his own, more faultlefs than ever fell under the obfervation of his fenfes. This analogy between the progrefs of Tafte from rudenefs to refinement ; and the progrefs of phyfical knowledge from the fuperftitions of a favage tribe, to the inveftigation of the laws of nature, proceeds on the fuppofition, that, as in the material world there are general facts, beoynd which philofophy is 326 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY unable to proceed ; fo, in the conftitution of man, there is an inexplicable adaptation of the mind to the objeds with which his faculties are converfant ; in confequence of which, thefe objects are fitted to produce agreeable or difagreeable emotions. In both cafes, reafoning may be employed with propriety to refer particular phenomena to general principles ; but in both cafes, we mull at laft arrive at principles of which no account can be given, but that fuch is the will of our Maker. * A great part, too, of the remarks which were made in the lafl Sed:ion on the origin of popular prejudices, may be applied to explain the influence of cafual afl'ociations on Tafte ; but thefe remarks do not fo completely exhauft thefubject, as to fuperfede the neceflity of farther illuftration. In matters of Tafte, the effects which we confider, are produced on the Minditfelf ; and are accompanied either with pleafure or with pain. Hence the tendency to cafual afTociation, is much ftronger than it commonly is, with refpecl to phyfical events ; and when fuch af- fociations are once formed, as they do not lead to any important inconvenience, fimilar to thofe which refult from phyfical miftakes, they are not fo likely to be corrected by mere experience, unaflifted by ftudy. To this it is owing, that the influence of af- fociation on our judgments concerning beauty and deformity, is ftill more remarkable than on our fpec- ulative conclulions ; a circumftance which has led fome philofophers to fuppofe, that aflbciation is fuf- ficient to account for the origin of thefe notions ; and that there is no fuch thing as a ftandard of Tafte, founded on the principles of the human conftitution. But this is undoubtedly puftiing the theory a great deal too far. The aflbciation of ideas can never ac- count for the origin of a new notion ; or of a plea- fure eflentially different from all the others which we know. It may indeed, enable us to conceive O? THE HUMAN MIND. S27 how a thing indifferent in itfelf, may become a fource of pleafure, by being conneded in the mind with fomething elfe which is naturally agreeable ; but it prefuppofcs, in every inftance, the exiftence of thofe notions and thofe feelings which it is its province to combine : infomuch that, I apprehend, it will be found, wherever affociation produces a change in our judgments on matters of Tafte, it does io, by co- operating with fome natural principle of the mind;, and implies the exiftence of certain original fources of pleafure and uneaiinefs. A mode of drefs, which at firft appeared awkward, acquires, in a few weeks or months, the appearance o£ elegance. By being accuflomed to fee it worn by thofe whom we conSder as models of Tafte, it be- comes affociated with the agreeable impreflicms which we receive from the eafe and grace and re- finement of their manners. When it pleafes by it- felf, the effect is to be afcribed, not to the objed: ac- tually before us, but to the impreflions with which it has been generally connected, and which it nat- urally recals to the mind. This obfervatioR points out the caufe of the perpet- ual viciffitudes in drefs, and in every thing whofe chief recommendation arifes from faihion. It is evi- dent that, as far as the agreeable effed: of an orna- ment arifes from aflbciation, the effedt will continue only while it is confined to the higheft orders. When it is adopted by the multitude, it not only ceafes to be affociated with ideas of tafte and refinement, but it is affociated with ideas of affedation, abiurd imi- tation, and vulgarity. It is accordingly laid afide by the higher orders, who ftudioully avoid every circumftance in external appearance, which is dc- bafed by low and common ufe ; and they are led to exercife their invention, in the introduction of fome new peculiarities, which firft become fafhionable, then common, and laft of all, are abandoned as vul- gar. 528 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY It has been often remarked, that after a certain period in the progrefs of fociety, the public Tafle becomes corrupted ; and the different produdions of the fine arts begin to degenerate from that fim- plicity, which they had attained in their ftate of greateil perfection. One reafon of this decline is fuggefted by the foregoing obfervations. From the account which has been given of the natural progrefs of Tafte, in feparating the genuine principles of beauty from fuperiluous and from of- fenlive concomitants, it is evident, that there is a limit, beyond which the love of fimplicity cannot be carried. No bounds, indeed, can be fet to the cre- ations of genius ; but as this quality occurs feldogi in an eminent degree, it commonly happens, that after a period of great refinement of Tafte, men be- gin to gratify their love of variety, by adding fu- perfluous circumllances to the finifhed models ex- hibited by their predeceflors, or by making other trifling alterations on them, with a view merely of diveriifying the effed. Thefe additions and altera- tions, indifferent, perhaps, or even in fome degree offenfive in them.felves, acquire foon a borrowed beauty, from the connexion in which we fee them, or from the influence of fafliion ; the fame caufe which at firft produced them, continues perpetually to increafe their number ; and Tafte returns to bar- barifm, by almoft the fame fteps which conduded it to perfection. The truth of thefe remarks will appear ftill more Unking to thofe who con Oder the wonderful effect which a writer of fplendid genius but of incorred tafte, has in misleadir^g the public judgn.ent. The peculiarities of fuc-i an author are confecrated by the' connexion in which we fee them, and even pleafe, to a certain degree, when detached from the excellencies of his composition, by recalling to us the agreeable impreffions with which they have been OF THE HUMAN MIND. 329 formerly aflbciated. How many imitations have we feen, of the affedtations of Sterne, by men who were unable to copy his beauties ? And yet thefe imitations of his defers ; of his abrupt manner ; of his minute fpecifications of circumftances ; and e- ven of his dafhes, produce, at firft, fome effect on readers of fenfibility, but of uncultivated tafte, in confequence of the exquiiite ftrokes of the pathetic, and the fingular vein of humour, with which they are united in the original. From what has been faid, it is obvious, that the circumftances which please, in the objeds of Tafte, are of Two kinds : Firft, thofe which are fitted to pleafe by nature, or by affociations which all man- kind are led to form by their common condition ; and Secondly, thofe which pleafe in confequence of affociations arifing from local and accidental circum- ftances. Hence, there are two kinds of Tafte : the one enabling us to judge of thofe beauties which have a foundation in the human conftitution ; the other, of fuch objects as derive their principal rec- ommendation from the influence of fafliion. Thefe two kinds of Tafte are not always united in the fame perfon : indeed, I am inclined to think, that they are united but rarely. The perfedicm of the one, depends much upon the degree in which we are able to free the mind from the influence of cafual affociations ; that of the other, on the contra- ry, depends on a facility of affociation which ena- bles us to fall in, at once, with ail the turns of the fafliion, and (as Shakefpeare exprefles it,) "to catch the tune of the times." I fliall endeavour to illuftrate fome of the forego- ing remarks, by applying them to the fubje<5l of language, which affords numberlefs inftances to ex- emplify the influence which the affociation of ideas has on our judgments in matters of Tafte. In the fame manner in which an article of drefs S s 330 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY acquires an appearance of elegance or of vulgarity from the perfons by whom it is habitually worn y fo a particular mode of pronunciation acquires an air of fafhion or of rufticity, from the perfons by whom it is habitually employed. The Scotch accent is furely in itfelf as good as the Englifti ; and with a few exceptions, is as agreeable to the ear : and yet how ofFenfive does it appear, even to us, who have been accuftomed to hear it from our infancy, when compared with that which is ufed by our fouthern neighbours ! — No reafon can be given for this, but that thf capital of Scotland is now become a provin- cial town, and London is the feat of our court. The diftinclion which is to be found, in the lan- guages of all civilifed nations, between low and po- lite modes of expreffion, arifes from fimilar caufes. It is, indeed, amufing to remark, the folicitude with which the higher orders, in the monarchies of mod- ern Europe, avoid every circumftance in their exte- rior appearance and manner, which, by the moft remote affociation, may in the minds of others, connect them with the idea of the multitude. Their whole drefs and deportment and converfation are ftudioufly arranged to convey an impofing notion of their confequence ; and to recal to the fpeflator by numberlefs flight and apparently unintentional hints, the agreeable impreffions which are affocia- ted with the advantages of fortune. To this influence of aflbciation on language, it is necefTary for every writer to attend carefully, who wifhes to exprefs himfelf with elegance. For the attainment of correclnefs and purity in the ufe of words, the rules of grammarians and of critics may be a fufficient guide ^ but it is not in the works ©f this clafs of authors, that the higher beauties of flyle are to be ftudied. As the air and manner of a gentleman can be acquired only by living habitu- ally in the befl fociety, fo grace in compufition mufl OF THE HUMAN MIND, 331 be attained by an habitual acquaintance with clafli- cal writers. It is indeed neceflary fo^ our informa- tion, that we ihould perufe occafionally, many books which have no merit in point of expreffion ; but I believe it to be extremely ufeful to all literary men, to counterad the efFed of this mifcellaneous reading, by maintaining a conftant and familiar acquaintance with a few of the moil faultlefs models which the language affords. For want of fome ftandard of this fort, we frequently fee an author's tafte in wri- ting alter much to the worfe in the courfe of his life ; and his later productions fall below the level of his early effays. D'Alembert tells us, that Vol- taire had always lying on his table, the Petit Car- cniie of Maffillon, and the tragedies ot Racine ; the former to fix his tafte in profe compoiition, and the latter in poetry. In avoiding, however, expreflions which are de- bafed by vulgar ufe, there is a danger of running into the other extreme, in queft of fafluonable vi^ords and phrafes. Such an affedlation may, for a few years, gratify the vanity of an author, by giv- ing him the air of a man of the world; but the rep- utation it beftows, is of a very tranfitory nature. The works which continue to pleafe from age to age, are written with perfed fimplicity ; while thofe which'captivate the multitude by a display of mere- tricious ornaments, if, by chance, they Ihould fur- vive the fafliions to which they are accommodated, remain only to furnilh a fubjecl of ridicule to pof- terity. The portrait of a beautiful woman, in the fafliionable drefs of the day, may pleafe at the mo- ment it is painted ; nay, may perhaps pleafe more than in any that the fancy of tlie artift could have fugqjefted ; but it is only in the plainefl and fimpleft drapery, that the moft perfect form can be tranf- mitted with advantage to future tinies. The exceptions which the hiftory of literature 3-32 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY feems to furnifli to thefe obfervations, are only ap- parent. That, in the works of our beft autliors, there are many beauties which have long and gen- erally been admired, and which yet owe their whole efFed to affociation, cannot be disputed : but in iuch cafes, it will always be found, that the afTocia- tions which are the foundation of our pleafure, have, in confequence of fome peculiar combination of circumftances, been more widely difFufed, and more permanently eftablifhed among mankind, than thofe which date their origin from the capri- ces of our own age are ever likely to be. An ad- miration for the claflical remains of antiquity is, at prefent, not lefs general in Europe, than the advan- tages of a liberal education : and that fuch is the ef- fect of this admiration, that there are certain capri- ces of Tafte, from which no man who is well edu- cated is entirely free. A compofition in a modern language, which fliould fometimes depart from the ordinary modes of expreffion, from an affedation of the idioms which are confecrated in the claffies, would pleafe a very wide circle of readers, in con- fequence of the prevalence of claflical aflbciations ; and, therefore, iuch afFe<51:ations, however abfurd when carried to a degree of Angularity, are of a far fuperior clafs to thofe which are adapted to the fafli- ions of the day. But ttill the general principle holds true, that whatever beauties derive their ori- gin merely from cafual aflbciation, muft appear ca- pricious to thofe to whom the aflbciation does not extend ; and that th^ fimplefl: fl:yle is that which continues longefl: to pleafe, and which pleafes mofl: univerfally In the writings of Mr. Harris, there is a certain claflical air, which will always have many admirers, while antient learning continues to be cultivated ; but which, to a mere Englifli reader, appears fomewhat unnatural and ungraceful, when compared with the compolition of Swift or of Ad- difon. QF THE HUMAN MmD. 333 The analogy of the arts of ftatuary and painting, may be of ufe in ill u ft rating thefe remarks. The influence of antient times has extended to thefe, as well as lo the art of writing ; and in this cafe, no lefs than in the other, the tranfcendant power of genius has eftabliflied a propriety of choice in mat- ters of indifference, and has, perhaps, confecrated, in the opinion of mankind, fbme of its own caprices. " Many of the ornaments of art," (fays Sir J( >ftiua Reynolds,) " thofe at leaft for which no reafon can *^ be given, are tranfmitted to us, are adopted, and " acquire their confequence, from the company in *' which we have been uied to fee them. As Greece *' and Rome are the fountains from whence have " flowed all kinds of excellence, to that veneration *V which they have a right to claim for the pleafure " and knowledge which they have afforded us, we *' voluntarily add our approbation of every orna- " ment and every cuftom that belonged to them, *' even to the fafliion of their drefs. For it may be " obferved, that, not fatisfied with them in their " own place, we make no difficulty of drefling ftat- *' utes of modern heroes or fenators in the fafhion " of the Roman armour, or peaceful robe ; and e- " ven go fo far as hardly to bear a ftatue in any oth- " er drapery.** " The figures of the great men of thofe nations ** have come down to us in fculpture. In fculpture ** remain almoft all the excellent fpecimens of ancient *' art. We have fo far aflbciated perfonal dignity *' to the perfons thus reprefented, and the truth of *' art to their manner of reprefentation, that it is not *« in our power any longer to feparate them. This *« is not fo in painting : becaufe, having no excellent *' ancient portraits, that connection was never form- " ed. Indeed, we could no more venture to paint " a general ofiicer in a Roman military habit, than *f we could make a llatue in the prefent uniform. 36-4 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY «' But fince we have no ancient portraits, to fhew *' how ready we are to adopt thofe kind of prejudi- <« ces, we make the beft authority among the mod- '^ erns ferve the fame purpofe. The great variety of <« excellent portraits with which Vandyke has en- " riched this nation, we are not content to admire *^ for their real excellence, but extend our approba- " tion even to the drefs which happened to be the «* fafliion of that age. By this means, it muft be *' acknowledged, very ordinary pidlures acquired '' fomething of- the air and effecl of the works of " Vandyke, and appeared therefore, at firft fight, ** better pidlures than they really were. They ap- *' peared fo however, to thofe only who had the " means of making this afibciation."* The influence of affociation on our notions con- cerning language, is ftill more ftrongly exempUfied in poetry than in profe. As it is one great objedt of the poet, in his ferious productions, to elevate the imagination of his readers above the groffnefs of fen- lible objects, and the vulgarity of common life, it be- comes peculiarly neceifary for him to rejed the ufe of all words and phrafes which are trivial and hack- neyed. Among thofe which are equally pure and equally perfpicuous, he, in general, finds it expedient to adopt that which is the leaft common. Milton prefers the words Rhene and Danaw, to the more common words Rhine aud Danube. " A multitude, like which the populous North <* Pour'd never from his frozen loins, to pass ** Rhene or the Danaw."t In the following line, " Things unatteaipted yet in prose or rhyme/* ♦Reynold's Discourses, p. 313, etseq. t Paradise Lost, book i. I. 351, OF THE Human mind. 335 how much more fuitable to the poetical ftyle does the expreffion appear, than if the author had faid, " Things unattempted yet in prose or verse." In another paflage, where, for the fake of variety, he has made ufe of the laft phrafe, he adds an epi« thct, to remove it a little from the familiarity of or- dinary difcourfe, -*' in prose or numerous verse."* In confequence of this circumftance, there arifes gradually in every language a poetical diction, which differs widely from the common dicl:ion of profe. It is much lefs fubjed to the vicifTitudes of fafhion, than the polite modes of expreflion in fa- miliar converfation ; becaufe, when it has once been adopted by the poet, it is avoided by good profe writers, as being too elevated for that fpecies of com- pofiiion. It may therefore retain its charm, as long as the language exifts ; nay, the charm may increafe, as the language grows older. Indeed, the charm of poetical diction muft increafe to a certain degree, as polite literature advances. For when once a fet of words has been confecrated to poetry, the very found of them, independently of the ideas they convey, awakens, every time we hear it, the agreeable imprellions which were connected with it when we met with them in the performan- ces of our favorite authors. Even when ilrung to- gether in fentences which convey no meaning, they produce fome effed: on the mind of a reader of fen- iibility : an effedt, at leaft, extremely different from that of an unmeaning fentence in profe. Languages differ from each other widely in the copioulnefs of their poetical didion. Our own pof- * Paradise Lost, book i. I. 150. See Newton's Edit. 336 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY feffes, in this refpec^, important advantages over the French : not that, in this language, there are no words appropriated to poetry, but becaufe their number is, comparatively fpeaking, extremely lim- ited. The fcantinefs of the French poetical di^lion is, probably, attended with the lefs inconvenience, that the phrafes which occur in good profe writing are lefs degraded by vulgar application than in Englifh, in confequence of the line being more diftind:ly and more ftrongly drawn between polite and low ex- preffions in that language than in ours. Our po- ets, indeed, by having a language appropriated to their own purpofes, not only can preferve a dignity of expreflion, but can connect with the perufal of their compofitions, the plealing im- preffions which have been produced by thofe of their predeceffors. And hence, in the higher forts of poetry where their object is to kindle, as much as poflible, the enthufiafm of their readers, they not only avoid, fludioufly, all expreflions which are vulgar, but all fuch as are borrowed from falh- ionable life. This certainly cannot be done in an equal degree by a poet who writes in the French lan- guage. In Englifh, the poetical didion is fo extremely co- pious, that it is liable to be abufed ; as it puts it in the power of authors of genius, merely by ringing changes on the poetical vocabulary, to give a certain degree of currency to the moft unmeaning compo- fitions. In Pope's Song by a Per/on of Quality^ the incoherence of ideas is fcarceiy greater than what is to be found in fome admired paffages of our fafh- ionable poetry. Nor is it merely by a difference of words, that the language of poetry is diflin^uifhed from that of profe. When a poetical arrangement of words has once been eiiablifhed by authors of reputation, the moft common expreflions. by being prefented in this OF THE HUMAN MIND. SS7 ©onfecrated order, may ferve to excite poetical aflb- ciatioiis. On the other hand, nothing more completely de- ftroys the charm of poetry, than a tiring of words which the cuftom of ordinary difcourfe has arran- ged in fo invariable an order, that the whole phrafe ,may be anticipated from hearing its commencement. A lingle word frequently ftrikes us as flat and profaic, in confequence of its familiarity ; but two fuch words coupled together in the order of converfation can fcarcely be introduced into ferious poetry with- out appearing ludicrous. No poet in our language has fhewn fo ftrikingly as Milton, the wonderftil elevation which ftyle may derive from an arrangement of words, which, while it is perfedly intelligible, departs widely from that to which we are in general accuftomed. M?.ny of his moft fublime periods, when the order of the words is altered, are reduced nearly to the level of profe. To copy this artifice with fuccefs, is a much more difficult attainment than is commonly imagined ; and, of confequence, when it is acquired, it fecures an author, t© a great degree, from that crowd of imi- tators who fpoil the efFed of whatever is noj: beyond their reach. To the poet who ufes blank verfe, it is an acquifition of ftill more efTential confequence than to him who exprelTes himfelf in rhyme ; for the more that the ftrudlure of the verfe approaches iq profe, the more it is necelfary to give novelty and dignity to the compofition. And accordingly, a- mong our magazme poets, ten thoufand catch the ftruAure of Pope's vorfification, for one who ap* proaches to the manner of Milton, or of Thomfon. The facility, however, of this imitation, like eve- ry other, increafes with the number of thole who have ftudied it with fuccefs ; for the more numer- ous the authors who have employed their genius in any one dire6bion, the more copious are the materi- SS8 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY als out of which mediocrity may felec^ and combine, fo as to efcapc the charge of plagair'-fm. And, in fa6l, in our own language, this, as well as the other great refource of poetical expreflion, the employ- ment of appropriated words, has had its efFe6l fo much impaired by the abule which has been made of it, that a few of our beft poets of late have en- deavored to ftrike out a new path for themfelves, by refting the elevation of their compofition chiefly on a fingular, and, to an ordinary writer, an unattaina- ble union of harmonious verlification, with a natu- ral arrangement of words, and a fimple elegance of expreflion. It is this union which feems to form the diftinguifliing charm of the poetry of Gold- fmith. From the remarks which have been made on t he influence of the aflbciation of ideas on our ju dg- ments in matters of tafte, it is obvious how much the opinions of a nation with refped to merit in the fine arts, are likely to be influenced by the form of their government, and the ftate of their man- ners. Voltaire, in his difcourfe pronounced at his reception into the French academy, gives feveral reafons why the poets of that country have not fuc- ceeded in defcribing rural fcenes and employm.ents. The principal one is, the ideas of meannefs, and pov- erty and wretchednefs, which the French are accuf- tomed to aflcKiate with the profefiion of hufbandry. The fame thing is alluded to by the Abbe de Lille, in the preliminary difcourfe prefixed to his tranflation of the Georgics. " A tranflation," fays he, " of this *' poem, if it had been undertaken by an author of " genius, would have been better calculated than '* any other work, for adding to the riches of our " language. A verfion of the ^neid itfelf, howev- *« er well executed, would, in this refped:, be of lefs " utility ; inafmuch as the genius of our tongue ac- *' commodates itfelf m.ore eafily to the defcription QF THE HUMAN MIND. 559^ " of heroic achievements, than to the details of nat- " ural phenomena, and of the operations of hufband- " ry. To force it to exprefs thefe with fuitable dig- " nity, would have been a real conqueft over that " falfe delicacy, which it has contracted from our " unfortunate prejudices." How different muft have been the emotions with which this divine performance of Virgil was read by an ancient Roman, while he recoiieded that period in the hiftory of his country, when dictators were called from the plough to the defence of the ftate, and after having led monarchs in triumph, returned again to the fame happy and independent occupa- tion. A ftate of manners to which a Roman author of a later age looked back with fuch enthujlafm, that he afcribes, by a bold poetical figure, the flour- ifhing ftate of agriculture under the republic, to the grateful returns which the earth then made to the illuftrious hands by which flxe was cultivated. — " Gaudente terra vomere laureato, et triumphali " aratore.'** SECTION III. Oft/je Influence of AJfodation on our aBive PrincipleSy and on our moral Judgments, IN order to illuftrate a little farther, the influ- ence of the Affociation of Ideas on the human mind, I fhall add a few remarks on lome of its eft'edls on our a6live and moral principles. In ftating thefe re- marks, I fliall endeavor to avoid, as much as poflible, every occafion of controverfy, by confining myfelf to fuch general views of the fubje<5t, as do not pre- fuppofe any particular enumeration of our original principles of acT:ion, or any particular fyflera con- * riin. Nat. Hiit.xviiL 4. 340 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY cerning the nature of the moral faculty. If my health and leifure enable me to carry my plans into execution, I propofe, in the fequel of this work, to refume thefe inquiries, and to examine the various opinions to which they have given rife. The manner in which the aifjciation of ideas ope- rates in producing new principles of adion, has been explained very diltindlly by different writers. What- ever conduces to the gratification of any natural ap- petite, or of any natural defire, is itfelf defired on account of the end to which it is fubfervient ; and by being thus habitually affociated in our apprehen- lion with agreeable objects, it frequently comes, in procefs of time, to be regarded as valuable in itfelf, independently of its utility. It is thus that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate obje6l of purfuit ; although, at firft, it is undoubtedly valued, merely on account of its fubferviency to the attainm.ent of other objecls. In like manner, men are led to defire drefs, equipage, retinue, furniture, on account of the eftimation in which they are fuppofed to be held by the public. Such delires are called by Dr. Hutche- l^on* fecondary defires ; and the origin is explained by him in the way which I have mentioned. " Since *' we are capable," fays he, " of reflection, memory, " obfervation, and reafoning about the diltant ten- " dencies of objects and actions, and not confined to " things prefent, there muft arife, in confequenceof *' our original delires, fecondary deOres of every *' thing imagined ufeful to gratify any of the primg^ '* ry defires ; and that with ftrength proportioned to ** the feveral original defires, and imagined ufeful- *^* nefs or neceflity of the advantageous objed." — " Thus," he continues, " as foon as we con^e to ap- " prehend the ufe of wealth or power to gratify any *' of our original defires, we muft alfo defire them ; " and hence arifes the univerfality of thefe defires * See his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions. OF THE HUMAN MINB. 341 " of wealth and power, fince they are the means of *« gratifying all other defires." The only thing that appears to me exceptionable in the foregoing paf- fage is, that the author claffes the defire of power with that of wealth ; whereas I apprehend it to be clear, (for reafons which I (hall ftate in another part of this work,) that the former is a primary defire, and the latter a fecondary one. Our moral judgments, too, may be modified, and even perverted, to a certain degree, in confequence of the operation of the lame principle. In the fame manner in which a perfon who is regarded as a mo- del of tafi:e may introduce, by his example, an abfurd or fantaftical drefs ; fo a man of fplendid virtues may attract fome efteem alfo to his imperfections ; and, if placed in a confpicuous fituation, may render his vices and follies objeiEls of general imitation among the multitude. " In the reign of Charles 11." fays Mr. Smith,* " a degree of licentioufnefs was deemed the charac- ** terillic of a liberal education. It was conneded, " according to the notions of thofe times, with gen- <« erofity, fincerity, magnanimity, loyalty ; and pro- « ved that the perfon who aded in this manner, was " a gentlem^, and not a puritan. Severity of man- " riers, and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, " were altogether unfafliionable, and were connedt- <« ed, in the imagination of that age, with cant^ cun- " ning, hypocrify, and low manners. To fuperfi- " cial minds, the vices of the great feem at all times " agreeable. They jonneft them, not only with ** the fplendor of fortune, but with many fuperior ** virtues which they afcribe to their fuperiors ; with " the. fpirit of freedom and independency ; with *' franknefs, generofity, humanity, and poUtenefs. *' The virtues of the inferior ranks of people, on • * Theory of Moral Sentiments. 342 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " the contrary, their parfimonious frugality, their " painful induftry, and rigid adherence to rules, " feeni to them mean and difagreeable. They con- " ned them both with the meannefs of the ftation " to which thefe qualities commonly belong, and " with many great vices which they fuppofe ufually " accompany them ; fuch as an abjefl, cowardly, ill- *' natured, lying, pilfering difpofition." The theory which, in the foregoing palTages from Hutchefonand Smith, is employed fojuftly and phi- lofophically to explain the origin of our fecondary defires, and to account for fome perverfions of our moral judgments, has been thought fufficient, by fome later writers, to account for the origin of all our adive principles without exception. The firft of thefe attempts to extend fo very far the applica- tion of the dv)dlrine of Aflbciation was made by the Rev, Mr. Gay, in a diifertation " concerning the " fundamental Principle of Virtue," which is prefix- ed by Dr. Law to his tranilation of Archbifhop King's Effay " On the Origin of Evil." In this differtation, the author endeavours to fhew, " that " our approbation of morality, and all affeclions '' whatfoever, are finally refolvable into reafon, " pointing out private happinefs, and are conver- '' fant only about things apprehended to be means " tending to this end ; and that wherever this end *' is not perceived, they are to be accounted for *' from the aflbciation of ideas, and may properly " be called habits" The fame principles have been fince pufhed to a much greater length by Dr. Hart- ley, whofe fyftem (as he himfelf informs us) took rife from his accidentally hearing it mentioned as an opinion of Mr. Gay, " that the afl()ciation of i- " deas was fufficient to account for all our intelled:- *' ual pleafures and pains*." *Mr. Hume too, who in mj opinion has carried this principle ©f the Association of Ideas a great deal too far; has compared the OF THE HUMAN MIND. 34S It muft, I think, in juftice, be acknowledged, that this theory, concerning the origin of our affect- ions, and of the moral fense, is a moft ingenious re- finement upon the felfifh fyftem, as it was formerly taught ; and that, by means of it, the force of many of the common reafonings againft that fyftem is e- luded. Among thefe reafonings, particular ftrefs has always been laid on the inftantaneousnefs with which our affe(^ions operate, and the moral fenfe approves or condemns ; and on our total want of confcioufnefs, in fuch cafes, of any reference to our own happinefs. The modern advocates for the felfifh fyftem admit the fad to be as it is ftated by their opponents ; and grant, that after the moral fense and our various affedlions are formed, their exercife, in particular cafes, may become completely difinterefted ; but ftill they contend, that it is upon a regard to our own happinefs that all thefe princi- ples are originally grafted. The analogy of avarice will ferve to illuftrate the fcope of this theory. It cannot be doubted that this principle of action is ar- tificial. It is on account of the enjoyments which it enables us to purchafe, that money is originally de- fired ; and yet, in procefs of time, by means of the agreeable impreffions which are afTociated with it, it comes to be defired for its own fake ; and even continues to be an objed of our purfuit, long after we have loft all relifh for thofe enjoyments which it enables us to command. Without meaning to engage in any controverfy on the fubjed, I fhall content myfelf with obferving, in general, that there muft be fome limit, beyond universality of its applications in the philosophy of nriind, to that of the principle of attraction in physics. " Here," says he, " is a " kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to ** have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself " in as many and as various forms.'* Trent, if Hum. Nat. vol. i. p. 30 344 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPIiy which the theory of aflbciation cannot poflibly be car- ried ; for the explanation which it gives, of the for- mation of new principles of action, proceeds on the fuppofition that there are other principles previoufly exifling in the mind. The great queftion then is, when we are arrived at this Umit ; or, in other words, when we are arrived at the fimple and origin- al laws of our conftitution. In conducing this inquiry, philofophers have been apt to go into extremes. Lprd Kaims, and fome otherauthors, have been cenmred, and perhaps juft- ly, for a difpofition to multiply original principles to an unneceffary degree. It may be queftioned, whe- ther Dr. Hartley, and his followers, have not fome- times been milled by too eager a deiire of abridging their number. Of thefe two errors, the former is the leaft com- mon, and the leaft dangerous. It is the leaft com- mon, becaufe it is not fo flattering as the other to the vanity of a theorift ; and it is the leaft danger- ous, becaufe it has no tendency, like the other, to give rife to a fuppreflion, or to a mifreprefentation of fads ; or to retard the progrefs of the fcience, by beftowing upon it an appearance of fyftematical per- fedion, to which, in its prefent ftate, it is not enti- tled. Abftrading, however, from thefe inconveniences, which muft always refult from a precipitate reference of phenomena to general principles, it does not feem to me that the theory in queftion has any tendency to weaken the foundation of morals. It has, indeed, fome tendency, in common with the philofophy of Hobbes and of Mandeville, to degrade the dignity of human nature ; but il leads to no fceptical conclu- fions concerning the rule of life. For, although we were to grant, that all our principles of action are acquired ; fo ftriking a difference among them muft ftill be admitted, as is fufiicient to diftinguifti clearly OF THE HUMAN MIND. 345 thofe univerfal laws which where intended to regu- late human condud, from the local habits which are formed by education and fafliion. It muft ftill be admitted, that while fome adive principles are con- fined to particular individuals, or to particular tribes of men ; there are others, which, arifing from cir- cumftances in which all the lituations of mankind mud agree, are common to the whole fpecies. Such adive principles as fall under this laft defcription, at whatever period of life they may appear, are to be regarded as a part of human nature, no lefs than the inftincl of fudion ; in the fame manner as the acquired perception of ditlance by the eye, is to be ranked among the perceptive powers of man, no lefs than the original perceptions of lany of our other fenfes. Leaving, therefore, the queftion concerning the origin of our adive principles, and of the moral fac- ulty, to be the fubjed of future dilcuflion, I (hall conclude this Sedion with a few remarks of a more pradical nature. It has been fhewn by different writers, how much of the beauty and fublimity of n.aterial objeds arifes from the ideas and feelings which we have been taught to afTociate with them. The impreflion pro- duced on^the external fenfes of a poet, by the moft fir iking fcene in nature, is precifely the fame with what is produced on the fenfes, of a peafant or a tradefman ; yet how different is the degree of plea- fure refulting from this impreflion ! A great part of this difference is undoubtedly to be afcribed, to the ideas and feelings which the habitual fludies and amufetnents of the poet have affociated with his or- ganical perceptions. A fimilar obfervation may be applied to all the va- rious objeds of our purfuit in life. Hardly any one of them is appreciated by any two men in the fame manner ; and frequently what one man confiders ^s Uu 346 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY effential to his happinefs, is regarded with indifier- ence or diflike by another. Of thefe differences of opinion, much is, no doubt, to be afcribed to a diverfi- ty of conftitution, which renders a particular employ- ment of the intellecftual or adive powers agreeable to one man, which is not equally fo to another. But much is alfo to be afcribed to the effefl of afTociation ; which, prior to any experience of human life, con- neds pleafmg ideas and pleafmg feelings with differ- ent objedls, in the minds of different perfons. In confequence of thefe afG)ciations, every man appears to his neighbor to purfue the object of his wifhes, with a zeal difproportioned to its intrinfic value ; and the prilofopher (whofe principal enjoy- ment arifes from fpeculation) is frequently apt to fmile at the ardour with which the aftive part of mankind purfue, what appear to him to be mere fliadows. This view of human affairs, fome writers have carried fo far, as to reprefent life as a fcene of mere illuiions, where the mind refers to the objecls around it, a coloring which exifts only in itfelf ; and where, as the Poet expreffes it, *' Opinion gilds with varying rays, " Those painted clouds which beautify out days.*' It may be queffioned, if thefe reprefentations of human life be ufeful or juft. That the cafual affo- ciations which the mind forms in childhood, and in early youth, are frequently a fource of inconvenience and of mifcondud, is fufliciently obvious ; but that this tendency of our nature increafes, on the whole, the fum of human enjoyment, appears to me to be indifputable ; and the inftances in which it mifleads us from our duty and our happinefs, only prove, to what important ends it might be fubfervient, if it were kept under proper regulation. Nor do thefe leprefen tat ions of life (admitting them in their full extent) julUf y the pradical infer- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 347 ences which have been often deduced from them,with refpect to the vanity of our purfuits. In every cafe, indeed, in which our enjoyment depends upon aflb- ciaiion, it may be faid, in one fenfe, that it arifes from the mind itfelf ; but it does not therefore fol- low, that the external objed which cuftom has ren- 3y, T*) (Tvn^iKx. ruv roturuv ^ocrraa-tuvj &C. &C. Allton, I. V. C 16. ' t Pleasures of ImaginRtion, b iii* OF THE HUMAN MIND. 349 SECTION IV. General Remarks on the Subjeds treated in the foregoing Sedions of this Chapter* IN perufing the foregoing Sedions of this Chap, ter, I am aware, that fome of my readers may be apt to think that many of the obfeivations which I have made, might eafily be refolved into more general principles. I am alfo aware, that, to the followers of Dr. Hartley, a fimilar objedlion will occur againft all the other parts of this work; and that it will appear to them the effed of inexcufable prejudice, that I fhould ftop ftiort fo frequently in the explanation of phenomena ; when he has accounted in fo fatif- fadory a manner, by means of the aiTociation of ideas, for all the appearances which human nature exhibits. To this objedion, I fhall not feel myfelf much in- terefted to reply, provided it be granted that my obfervations are candidly and accurately ftated fo far as they reach. Suppofmg that in fome cafes I may have flopped fhort too foon, my fpeculations, although they may be cenfured as imperfeft, cannot be confidered as Handing in oppofition to the conclu- fions of more fuccefsful inquirers. May I be allowed farther to obferve, that fuch views of the human mind as are contained in this work, (even fuppofing the obiedion to be well- founded,) are, in my opinion, mdifpenfably necef- fary, in order to prepare the way for thofe very ge- neral and comprehenfive theories concerning it, which fome eminent writers of the prefent age have been ambitious to form. ? Concerning the merit of thefe theories, I fhall not prefume to give any judgment. I fhall only remark, 330 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY that, in all the other fciences, the progrefs of difcov- ery has been gradual, from the lefs general to the more general laws of nature ; and that it would be fingular, indeed, if, in the Philoiophy of the Hu- man Mind, a fcience, which but a few years ago was confeffedly in its infancy, and which certainly labours under many difadvantages peculiar to itfelf, a ilep fhould, all at once, be made to a fingle princi- ple comprehending all the particular phenomena Wtiich we know. Suppofmg fuch a theory to be completely eftablifli- ed, i. would dill be proper to lead the minds of flu- dems to it by gradual fleps. One of the mofl important ules of theory, is to give the memory a permanent hold, and a prompt command, of the particular facts which we were previoufly acquaint- ed with ; and no theory can be completely under- ftood, unlefs the mind be led to it nearly in the or- der of invefligation. It is more particularly ufeful, in conducing the fludies of others, to familiarife their minds, as com- pletely as poilible, with thofe laws of nature for which we have the direct evidence of fenfe, or of confcioufnefs, before directing their inquiries to the more abftrufe and refined generalizations of fpecula- tive curioiity. In natural philofophy, fuppofmg the theory of Bofcovich to be true, it would llill be pro- per, or rather indeed abfolutely necefTary, to accuf- tom ftudents, in the firft flage of their phyfical edu- cation, to dwell on thofe general phyfical fadts which fall under our adual obfervation, and about which all the practical arts of life are converfant. In like manner, in the philofophy of mind, there are many general facets for which we have the direr/(?r/. An example will illuftrate and confirm this obferva- tion. Suppofe that a glafs tube, thirty inches long, is filled with mercury, excepting eight inches, and is inverted as in the Torricellian experiment, fo that the eight inches of common air may rife to the top ; and tiiai I wifh to know at what height the mercu- ry will remain fufpended in the tube, the barometer being at that time twenty-eight inches high. There is here a combination of diiferent laws, which it is neceffary to attend to, in order to be able to predict the refult. 1. The air is a heavy fluid, and the preffure of the atmofphere is meafured by the col- umn of mercury in the barometer. 2. The air is an elaftic fluid ; and its elaflicity at the earth's fur- face (as it refifts the preiTure of the atmofphere) is meafured by the column of mercury in the barometer* 3. In different flates, the elaftic force of the air i; re- ciprocally as the fpaces which it occupies. But, in this experiment, the mercury which remains fufpen- ded in the tube, together with the elaftic force of the air in the top of the tube, is a counterbalance to the preflure of the atmofphere y and therefore their joint elled mull be equal to the preflure of a column of mercury twenty- eight inches high. Hence we €>? THfi HUMAN MIND. 589 obtain an algt^braical equation, which afTords an eafy folution of the problem. It is further evident, that my knowledge of the phyfical laws which are here combined, puts it in my power to foretell the refult, not only in this cafe, but in all the cafes of a fimilar nature which can be fuppofed. 'Ihe problem, in any particular inftance, might be folved by making the experiment ; but the refult would be of no ufe to me, if the flighted alteration were made on the data. It is in this manner that philofophy, by putting us in pofTefllon of a few general fadis, enables us to determine, by reafoning, what will be the refult of any fuppofed combination of them, and thus to comprehend an infinite variety of particulars, which no memory, however vigorous, would have been able to retain. In confequence of the knowledge of fuch general fadls the philofopher is relieved from the neceffiiy of treafuring up in his mind, all tbofe truths which are involved in his principles, and which may be dedu- ced from them by reafoning ; and he can often pro- fecute his difcoveries fynthetically, in thofe parts of the univerfe which he has no accefs to examine by immediate obfervation. There is, therefore, this important difference between a hypothetical theory, and a theory obtained by induction ; that the latter not only enables us to remember the facls we already know, but to afcertain by reafoning, many facts which we have never had an opportunity of examining : whereas, when we reafon from a hypothelis a priori^ we are almoft certain of running into error ; and, confequently, whatever may be its ufe to the mem- ory, it can never be trufled to, in judging of cafes which have not previoufly fallen within our experi- ence. There are fome fciences, in which hypothetical theories are more ufeful than in others ; shofe fcien- ces, to wit, in which we have occafion for an exten- a^O ELEMENTS (VF THB PHILOSOPHY five knowledge and a ready recolledion of facls, and which, at the fame time, are yet in too imperfect a ftate to allow us to obtain juft theories by the meth- od of indudion. This is particularly the cafe in the fcience of medicine, in which we are under a ne- ceflity to apply our knowledge, fuch as it is, to prac« tice. It is alfo, in fome degree, the cafe in agricul- ture. In the merely fpeculative parts of phifics and chemiftry, we may go on patiently accumulating fads, without forming any one conclufion, farther than our fa6ls authorize us ; and leave to pofterity the credit of eflablifhing the theory to which our labors are fubfervient. But in medicine, in which it is of confequence to have our knowledge at com- mand, it feems reafonable to think, that hypothetical theories may be ufed with advantage ; provided al- ways, that they are confidered merely in the light of artificial memories, and that the ftudent is prepared to lay them afide, or to correct them, in proportion as his knowledge of nature becomes more extenfive. I am, indeed, ready to confefs that this is a caution which it is more eafy to give than to follow : for it is painful to change any of our habits of arrangement, and to relinquifli thofe fyftems in which we have been educated, and which have long flattered us with an idea of our own wifdom. Dr Gregory mentions* it as a ftriking and diftinguifhing circumftance in the charader of Sydenham, that, although full of hypo- thetical reafoning, it did not render him the lefs at- tentive to obfervation ; and that his hypothefes feem to have fat fo loofely about him, that either they did not influence his practice at all, or he could ea- fily abandon them, whenever they would not bend to his experience. * Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician. ^F THE HUMAN MIN-D. $91 SECTION V, Continuation of the fame fubjed, — Effe6ls produced on iJye Memory by committing to Writing our acquired Knowl- edge. HAVING treated at confiderable length of the improvement of memory, it may not be improper, before leaving this part of the fubjecl, to confider what effech are likely to be produced on the mind by the practice of committing to writing our acquir- ed knowledge. That fuch a practice is unfavorable, in fome refpecls, to the faculty of memory, by fuper- feding, to a certain degree, the necellity of its exer- tions, has been often remarked, and I believe is true ; but the advantages with which it is attended in otb- er refpeds, are fo important, as to overbalance great- ly this trilling inconvenience. It is not my intention at prefent to examine and compare together the different methods which have been propofed, of keeping a common-place book. In this, as in other cafes of a fimilar kind, it may be difficult, perhaps, or impolTible, to eflablifti any rules which will apply univerfally. Individuals muft be left to judge for themfelves, and to adapt their con- trivances to the particular nature of their literary purfuits, and to their own peculiar habits of affocia- tion and arrangement. The remarks which I am to offer are very general, and are intended merely to illuflrate a few of the advantages which the art of writing affords to the philofopher, for recording, in the courfe of his progrefs through life, the reiuits of his fpeculations, and the fruits of his experience. The utility of writing, in enabling one generation to tranfmit its difcoveries to another, and in thus giving rife to a gradual progrefs in the fpecies, has been fufliciently illuftrated by m^ny authors. Little 392 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHV attention, however, has been paid to another of itr^ effects, which is uo lefs important ; I mean, to the foundation which it lays for a perpetual progrefs in the intelleclu il powers of the individual It k to experience, and to our own refledions, that we are indebted for by far the moft valuable part of our knowledge : and hence it is, that although in youth the imagination may be more vigorous, and the genius more original, than in advanced years ; yet, in the cafe of a man of obfervation and inquiry, the judgment may be expected, at lead as long as his faculties remain in perfection, to become every day founder and more enlightened. It is, however, only by the conihnt pradice of writing, that the refuits of our experience, and the pro- grefs of our ideas, can be accurately recorded* If they are trufted merely to the memory, they will gradually vani,fh from it hke a dream, or will come in time to be fo blended with the fuggefl- ions of imagination, that we fhall not be able to realon from them with any degree of confidence. What improvements in fcience might we not flatter our- felves with the hopes of accomplifliing, had we only activity and induftry to treafure up every plaufible hint that occurs to us ! Hardly a day paffes, when many fuch do not occur to ourfelves, or are luggeft- «d by others ; and detached and infulated, as they may appear at prefent, fome of them may perhaps afterwards, at the diitance of years, furniih the key* ilone cf an important fyil:em. But it is not only in this point of view that the philolopher derives advantage from the prad:i; e of wricino:. Vv^ithout its aiTiltance, he could feldom be able to advance beyond thofe iimple elenientary truths vi'hich are current in the world, and which form, in the various branches of fcience, the eftab- liflied creed of the age he lives in. How inconfider- able would have been the progrefs of mathematicians.. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 393 ill their more abftrufe fpeculations, without the aid of the algebraical notation ; and to what fublime difcoveries have they been led by this beautiful con- trivance, which by relieving the memory of the ef- fort neceflary for recollecting the fteps of a long in- Veftigation, has enabled them toprofecute an infinite variety of inquiries, to which the unafntied powers of the human mind would have been altogether un- equal ! In the other fciences, it is true, we have (eU dom or never occafion to follow out fuch long chains of confequences as in mathematics ; but in thefe fciences, if the chain of inveftigation be ihorter, it is far more difficult to make the tranfition from one link to another ; and it is only by dwelling long on our ideas, and rendering them perfed:ly familiar to U3, that fuch tranfitions can, in moft inftances, be made with fafety. In morals and politics^ when we advance a ftep beyond thofe elementary truths which are daily prefented to us in books or converfation, there is no method of rendering our conclufions fa- miliar to us, but by committing them to writing, and making them frequently the fubjedls of our med- ication. When we have once done fo, thefe con- clufions become elementary truths with refpecl to us; and we may advance from them with confidence to others which are more remote, and which are far beyond the reach of vulgar difcovery. By follow- ing fuch a plan, wc can hardly fail to have our in- duftry rewarded in due time by fome important im- provement ; and it is only by fuch a plan that we can reasonably hope to extend coniiderably the bounda- ries of human knowledge. I do not fay that thefe hab- its of ffudy are equally favorable to brilliancy of con- verfation. On the contrary, I believe that thofe men who poffefs this accomplifhment in the highefl degree, are fuch as do not advance beyond elemen- tary truths ; or rather, perhaps, who advance only a fingle Itep beyoild them ; that is, who think a lit- Bfib 394 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILO&OPHY tie more deeply than the vulgar, but whofe conclu- fions are not fo far removed from common opinions, as to render it neceflary for them, when called upon to defend them, to exhauft the patience of their hear- ers, by Hating a long train of intermediate ideas* They who have pulhed their inquiries much farther than the common fyftems of their times, and have rendered familiar to their own minds the intermedi- ate tteps by which they have been led to their con- clulions, are too apt to conceive other men to be in the fame fituation with themfelves ; and when they mean to inilrucl, are mortified to find that they are only regarded as paradoxical and vifionary. It is but rarely we find a man of very fplendid and vari- ous converfation to be poiTeffed of a profound judg- ment or of great originality of genius. Nor is it merely to the philofopher, who wifhes to diftinguifh himfelf by his difcoveries, that waiting affords an ufeful inflrument of fi:udy. Important ailidance may be derived from it by all thofe who wifh to imprels on their minds the inveftigations which occur to them in the courfe of their reading ; for although writing may w^eaken (as I already ac- knowledged it does) a memory for detached obfer- vations, or for infulated facls, it will be found the only effedual method of fixing in it permanently, thofe acquifitions which involve long procefTes of reafoning. When we are employed in inquiries of our own, the conclufions which we form make a much deeper and more lailing imprefTion on the memory, than any knowledge which we imbibe pafilvely from an- other. This is undoubtedly owing, in part, to the efFecl which the ardour of difcovery has, in roufing' the activity of the mind, and fixing its attention j but I apprehend it is chiefly to be afcribed to this, that when we follow out a train of thinking of our own, our ideas are arranged in that order which is OF THE HUMAN MIND. S95 moft agreeable to our prevailing habits of afTociation. The only method of putting our acquired knowledge on a level, in this refpedl, with our original fpecula- tions, is, after making ourfelves acquainted with our author's ideas, to (ludy the fubjecl over again in our own way ; to paufe, from time to time, in the courfe of our reading, in order to confider what we have gained ; to recolle<5t what the proportions are, which the author wifhes to eftablifh, and to exam- ine the different proofs which he employs to fupport them. In making fuch an experiment, we com- monly find, that the different fleps of the procefs ar- range themfelves in our minds, in a manner different from that in which the author has ftated them ; and that, while his argument teems, in fome places, obfcure, from its concifenefs ; it is tedious in others, from being unneceffarily expanded. When we have reduced the reafoning to that form, which appears to ourfelves to be the moft natural and fatisfadory, we may conclude with certainty, not that this form is better in itfelf than another, but that it is the beft adapted to our memory. Such reaibnings, there- fore, as we have occafion frequently to apply, either in the bufinefs of life, or in the courfe of our fludies, it is of importance to us to commit to writing, in a language and in an order of our own ; and if, at any time, we find it neceffary to refrefh our recollection on the fubjed:, to have recourfe to our own compo- fitton, in preference to that of any other author. - That the plan of reading which is commonly fol- lowed is very different from that which I have been recommending, will not be difputed. Moll people read merely to pafs an idle hour, or to pleafe them- felves with the idea of employment, while their indo- lence prevents them from any aftive exertion ; and a confiderable number with a view to the difplay which they are afterwards to make of their literary' acquifitions. From whiclifoever of thefe motives a 396 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY perfon is led to the perufal of books, it is hardly poflible that he can derive from them any material advantage. If he reads merely from indolence, the ideas which pafs through his mind will probably leave little or no impreflion ; and if he reads from vanity, he will be more anxious to felect ftriking partic- ulars in the matter or expreflion, than to leize the fpirit and fcope of the author's reafoning, or to ex- amine how far he has made 2Lny additions to the ftock of ufeful and folid knowledge. " Though it " is fcarce pollibie," fays Dr. Butler,* " to avoid *' judging, in fome way or other, of almoft every '' thing which offers itfelf to one's thoughts, yet it *' is certain, that many perfons, from different caufes, " never exercife their judgment upon what comes ** before them, in fuch a manner as to be able to deter- " mine how far it be conclufive. They are perhaps *' entertained with fome things, not fo with others ; *' they like, and they diflike ; but whether that which *' is propofed to bs made out, be really made out or *' not ; whether a matter be ftated according to the " real truth of the cafe feems, to the generality of peo- " pie, a circumftance of little or no importance. Ar- " guments are often wanted for fome accidental pur- *' pofe ; but proof, as fuch, is what they never want, *' for their own fatisfaclion of mind, or conduct in *' life. Not to mention the multitudes who read " merely for the fake of talking, or to qualify them- /*^ leives for the world, c>r fome fuch kind of reafons ; " there are even of the few who read for their own *' entertainment, and have a real curiofity to fee ** what is faid, feveral, which is aftonilhing, who " have no fort of curiofity, to fee what is true : *' I fay c**jrioiity, becaufe it is too obvious to be " mentioned how much that religious and facred at- " tention which is due to truth, and to the impor- * See the Preface to bis Sermons. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 397 " tant queftion, what is the rule of life, is loft out *' of the world. " For the fake of this whole clafs of readers, for " they are of different capacities, different kinds, and " get into this way froni different occafions, I have ** often wifhed that it had been the cuftom to lay " before people nothing in matters of argument but ^' premifes, and leave them to draw conclufions " themfelves ; which, although, it could not be done " in all cafes, might in many. " The great number of books and papers of a- " raufement, which, of one kind or another, daily ••^ come in one's way, have in part occafioned, and *^ moft perfectly fall in with and humor this idle '^ way of reading and confidering things. By this " means, time, even in folitude, is happily got rid of " without the pain of attention ; neither is any part " of it more put to the account of idlenefs ; one " can fcarce forbear faying, is fpent with lefs thought, " than great part of that which is fpent in reading." If the plan of ftudy which I formerly defcribed were adopted, it would undoubtedly diminiih very much the number of books which it would be pof- fible to turn over ; but I am convinced that it would add greatly to the flock of ufeful and fohd knowl- edge ; and by rendering our acquired ideas in fome meafure our own, would give us a more ready and practical command of them : not to mention, that if we are pofTefled of any inventive powers, fuch ex- ercifes would continually furnifli them with art op- portunity of difplaying themfelves upon all the dif. ferent fubjecls which may pafs under our review. Nothing, in truth, has fuch a tendency to weaken, not only the powers of invention, but the intelleclu- al powers in general, as a habit of extenfive and va- rious reading, without reflection. The activity and force of the mind are gradually impaired, in confe- quence of difufej and not unfrequently all our 398 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY principles and opinions come to be loft, in the infift- ite niultiplicity and difcordancy of our acquired ideas. By confining our ambition to purfue the truth with modefty and candor, and learning to value our acquifitions only as far as they contribute to make us wV'?r ind happier, we m ly perhaps be obliged to facrifice the temporary admiration of the common difpenfers of literary fame ; but we may reft aflur- cd, that it is in this way only we can hope to make real pro.grefs in knowledge, or to enrich the world with ufeful inventions. " It requires courage, indeed," (as Helvetius has remarked,) " to remain iu,norant of thofe ufelefs fub- *' jecls which are generally valued ;'* but it is a cour- age necelTary to men who either love the truth, or who afpire to eftabiifh a permanent reputation. SECTION VI. Continuation of the fame Subjed. — Of Artificial Memory* BY an Artificial Memory is meant, a method of conneding in the mind, things difficult to be remem- bered, with things eafily remembered ; fo as to ena- ble it to retain, and to recollect the former by means of the latter. For this purpofe, various contrivan- ces have been propofed, but I think the foregoing definition applies to all of them. Some forts of artificial memory are intended to affift the natural powers of the human mind on par- ticular occafions, which require a more than ordina- ry effort of recollection ; for example, to affift a public fpeaker to recoiled: the arrarjgement of a long difcourfe. Others have been devifed with a view to enable us to extend the circle of our acquired knowledge, and to give us a more ready command of all the various particulars of our information. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 395i> The topical Memory, fo much celebrated among the ancient rhetoricians, comes under the former defcription. I already remarked, the efFed of fenfible objeds in recalling to the mind the ideas with which it hap- pened to be occupied, at the time when thefe objects were formerly perceived. In travelling along a road the fight of the more remarkable fcenes we meet with, frequently puts us in mind of the fubjecls we were thinking or talking of when we lafl faw them. Such fads, which are perfectly familiar even to the vulgar, might very naturally fuggeft the poflibility of affifting the memory, by eftabiifhing a connection between the ideas we wifli to remember, and cer- tain fenfible objects, which have been found from experience to make a permanent impreffion on the mind.* I have been told of a young woman, in a ve- ry low rank in life, who contrived a method of com- mitting to memory the fermons which fhe was ac- cuftomed to hear, by fixing her attention during the different heads of the difcourfe, on different com- partments of the roof of the church ; in fuch a man- ner, as that, when fhe afterwards faw the roof, or recollected the order in which its compartments were difpofed, (he recollected the method which the preacher had obferved in treating his fubject. This contrivance was perfectly analogous to the topical memory of the ancients; an art which, whatever be the opinion we entertain of its ufe, is certainly entitled, in a high degree, to the praife of ingenui- Suppofe that I were to fix in my memory the dif- * " Cum in loca aliqua post tempus reversi sumu«, non ipsa ag- <« noscimus tantum, sed etiam, quae in his fecerimus, reminiscimur, ** per^oneeque subeunt, nonunquam tacitae quoque cogitationes in « mentem reverluntur. Nata est igitur, ut in plerisque, ars ab ex- «' perimento." tiLi>cT. Liit. Or at. lib. xi. cap. 2. 400 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ferent apartments in feme very large building, and that I had accuftomed myfelf to think of thefe a- partments always in the fame invariable order. Sup- pofe farther, that, in preparing myfelf for a public difcourfe, in which T had occailon to treat of a great variety of particulars, I was anxious to fix in my memory the order I propofed to obferve in the com- munication of my ideas. It is evident, that by a proper divifion of my fubjed into heads, and by conneding each head with a particular apartment^ (which 1 could ealily do, by conceiving myfelf to be fitting in the apartment while I was fludying the part of my difcourfe I meant to conned w^ith it,) the habitual order in which thefe apartments occurred to my thoughts, would prefent to me, in their prop- er arrangement, and without any effort on my part^ the ideas of which I was to treat. It is alfo obvious; that a very little pradice would enable me to avail myfelf of this contrivance, without any embarrafT- ment or diftradion of my attention.* As to the utility of this art, it appears to me to depend entirely on the particular objed which we fuppofe the fpeaker to have in view ; whether, as was too often the cafe with the ancient rhetoricians, to bewilder a judge, and to filence an adverfary ; or fairly and candidly to lead an audience to the truth. On the former fuppofition, nothing can poffibly give an orator a greater fuperiority, than the poflellion * In so far as it was the object of this species of artificial mem- ory to assist on orator in recollecting the plan and arrangennent of his discourse, the accounts of it which are given by the ancient rhetoricians are abundantly satisfactory. It appears, however, that its use was more extensive; and that it was so contrived, as to fa- cilitate the recollection of a premeditated composition. In what manner this was done, it is not easy to conjecture from the imper- fect explanations of the art, which have been transmitted to mod- ern times. The reader may consult Cicero de Orat. lib. ii. cap. S7, 88. Rhetor, ad Herenniuvij lib. iii. cap. 16. et sccji. — Qv:^C'njfc. luit, Orat. lib, xi. cap. 2. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 401 of a fecret, which, while it enables him to exprefs himfelf with facility and the appearance of method, puts it in his power, at the fan^e time, to difpofe his arguments and his facts, in whatever order he judg- es to be the moft proper to rniflead the judgment, and to perplex the memory, of thofe whom he ad- dreffes. And fuch, it is manifeft, is the effect, not only of the topical memory of the ancients, but of all other contrivances which aid the recoUedion, up- on any principle different from the natural and lo- gical arrangement of our ideas. To thofe on the other hand, who fpeak with a view to convince or to inform others, it is of confequence that the topics which they mean to illuftrate, fhould be arranged in an order equally favorable to their own recolledion and to that of their hearers. For this purp-^fe, nothing is effedual, but that method which is fuggefted by the order of their own invef- tigations ; a method which leads the mind from one idea to another, either by means of obvious and ftriking alfociations, or by thofe relations which connect the different ileps of a clear and accurate proceis of reafoning. It is thus only that the atten- tion of an audience can be completely and inceffant- ly engaged, and that the lubflance of a long dif- courfe can be remembered without effort. And it is thus only that a fpeaker, after a mature confider- ation of his fubjedl, can poffefs a juft confidence in his own powers of recolledion, in Hating all the different premifes which lead to ihe conclufion he wifhes to eftabiifli. In modern times, fuch contrivances have been ve- ry little, if at all, made ufe of by public Ipe.ikers; but various ingenious attempts have been made, to afliff the memory, in acquiring and retaining thofe branches of knowledge which it has been fuppoied neceffary for a fcholar to carry always about wltli him ; and which, at the fame time, from the num- C cc 402 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ber of particular details which they involve, are not calculated, of themfelves, to make a very lafting im- preflion on the mind. Of this fort is the Menioria Technica of Mr. Grey, in vv'hich a great deal of his- torical, chronological and geographical kowledge is comprifed in a fet of verfes, which the ftudent is fup- pofed to make as familiar to himfelf as fchool-boys do the rules of grammar. Thefe verfes are, in gen- eral, a mere affemblage of proper names, difpofed in a rude fort of meafure ; fome flight alterations be- ing occafionally made on the final fyllables of the words, fo as to be fignificant (according to certain principles laid down in the beginning of the work) of important dates, or of other particulars which it appeared to the author ufeful to affociate with the names. I have heard very oppofite opinions w**th refped: to the utility of this ingenious fyftem. The prevail- ing opinion is, I believe, againft it ; although it has been mentioned in terras of high approbation by fome writers of eminence. Dr. Prieftley, whofe judgment, in matters of this fort, is certainly enti- tled to refpect, has fald, that " it is a method fo ea- " fiiy learned, and which may be of fo much ufe in *' recolleding dates, when other methods are not at " hand, that he thinks all perfons of a liberal educa- " tion inexcufable, who will not take the fmall de- " gree of pains that is neceffary to make themfelves " matters of it; or who think any thing mean, or '' unworthy of their notice, which is fo ufeful and " convenient."* In judging of the utility of this, or of any other contrivance of the fame kind, to a particular perfon, a great deal mufl depend on the fpecies of memory which he has received from nature, or has acquired in the courfe of his early education. Some men, as I already remarked,) efpecially among thofe who * Lectures on History, p. 15T, OF THE HUMAN MIKD, 403 have been habitually exercifed in childhood in get- ting by heart grammar rules,) have an extraordina- ry facility in acquiring and retaining the mofl bar- barous and the moft infignificant verfes ; which an- other perfon would find as difficult to remember, as the geographical and chronological details of which it is the objed of this art to relieve the memory. Allowing, therefore, the general utility of the art, no one method, perhaps is entitled, to an exclufive preference ; as one contrivance may be beft fuited to the fiiculties of one perfon, and a very different one to thofe of another. One important objedion applies to all of them, that they accuftom the mind to aflbciate ideas by ac- cidental aud arbitrary connexions ; and, therefore, how much foever they may contribute in tlie courfc of converfation, to an oftentatious difplay of acquir- ed knowledge, they are, perhaps, of little real fer- vice to us, when we are feriouily engaged in the purfuit of truth. I own, too, I am very doubtful with refpecl to the utility of a great part of that in- formation which they are commonly employed to impreft on the memory, and on which the generali- ty of learned men are difpofed to value themfelves. It certainly is of no ufe, but in fo far as it is fubfervi- ent to the gratification of their vanity ; and the ac- quifition of it confumes a great deal of time and at- tention, which might have been employed in extend- ing the boundaries of human knowledge. To thofe, however, who are of a different opinion, fuch con- trivances as Mr. Grey's may be extremely ufeful : and to all men they may be of fervice, in fixing in the memory thofe infuiated and uninterefling par- ticulars, which it is either neceffary for them to bs acquainted with, from their fituation ; or which cuf- tom has rendered, in the conmion opinion, eiTential branches of a liberal education. I w^ould, in particu- lar, recommend this author's method of recolleding 404 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY dates, by fubftituting letters for the numeral cy- phers ; and forming theie letters into words, and the words into verles. I have found it, at leaft in my own cafe, the moft effeclual of all fuch contrivan^ ces of which I have had exoerience. SECTION vn. Continuation of the fame Std)jed. — Importance of making a preper Se'edion among the Objects of our Knowledge^ in order to derive Advantage from the Acquifttions of Memory, THE cultivation of Memory, with all the helps that we can derive to it from art, will be of little ufe to us unlefs w^e make a proper felection of the par- ticulars to be remembered. Such a felection is ne- celTary to enable us to profit by reading ; and ftiil more fo, to enable us to profit by obfervation, to wh'ch every man is indebted for by far the moft val- uable part of his knowledge. When we firft enter on any new literary purfuit, we commonly find our efforts of attention painful and unfatisfadlory. We have no difcrimination in our curiofity ; and by grafping at every thing, we fail in making thofe moderate acquifitions which are fuited to our limited faculties. As our knowledge extends, we learn to know what particulars are like- ly to be of ufe to us ; and acquire a habit of dired- ing our examination to thefe, without difiracling the attention with others. It is partly owing to a fimi- 3ar circumftance, that moft readers complain of a de- fect of memory, when they firft enter ^n the ftudy of hiftory. They cannot fep..* ate important from trifling fads, and find themlelves unable to retain any thing, from their anxiety to fecure the whole. In order to give a proper diredion to our atten- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 405 tion in the courfe of our ftudles, it is ufeful, before engaging in particular purfuits, to acquire as famil- iar an acquaintance as pofTible with the great outlines of the different branches of fcience ; with the moft important conclufions which have hitherto been formed in them, and with the moft important defid- erata which remain to be fupplied. In the cafe too of thofe parts of knowledge, which are not yet ripe for the formation of philofophical fyttems, it may be of ufe to ftudy the various hypothetical theories which have been propofed for connecting together and arranging the phenomena. By fuch general views alone we can prevent ourfelves from being loft, amidft a labyrinth of particulars, or can engage in a courfe of extenfive and various reading, with an en- lightened and difcriminating attention. While they withdraw our notice from barren and infulated fa<5ls, they direct it to fuch as tend to illutlrate principles which have either been already eftablilhed, or which^ from having that degree of connexion among them- felves, which is ncceffary to give plaufibility to a hy- pothetical theory, are likely to furnifli, in time, the materials of a jufter fyiiem. Some of the followers of Lord Bacon have, I think, been led, in their zeal for the method of in- duction , to cenfure hypothetical theories with too great a degree of feverity. Such theories have cer- tainly been frequently of ufe, in putting philofophers upon the road of difcovery. Indeed, it has proba- bly been in this way, that moft difcoveries have been made ; for although a knowledge of fads muft be prior to the formation of a juft theory, yet a hypo- thetical theory is generally our beft guide to the knowledge of ufeful facts. If a man, without for- ming to himfelf any conjecture concerning the un- known laws of nature, were to fet himfelf merely to accumulate fads at random, he might, perhaps, ftum- ble upon feme important difcovery j but by far the 406 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY greater p:irt of his labors would be wholly ufelefs. Every philofophical inquirer, before he begins a fet of experiments, has fome general principle in his view, which he fufpecls to be a law of nature :* and although his conjedlures may be often wrong, yet they ferve to give his inquiries a particular direction, and to bring under his eye a number of facts which have a certain relation to each other. It has been often remarked, that the attempts to difcover the phiio fcipher's ftone, and the quadrature of the circle, have led to many ufeful difcoveries in chemiflry and mathematics. And they have plainly done fo, mere- ly by limiiting the field of obfervation and inquiry, and checking that indifcriminate and defultory at- tention which is fo natural to an indolent mind. A hypothetical theory, however erroneous, may an- fwer a fimilar purpofe. " Prudens interrogatio,'* (fays Lord Bacon,) " eft dimidium fcientias. Vaga " enim expericntia et fe tantum fequens mera palpa- *' tio eft, et homines potius ftupefacit quam infor- " mat " What, indeed, are Newton's queries, but fo many hypothefes which are propof^d as fubjects of examination to philofophers ? And did not even the great doctrine of gravitation take its firft rife from a fortunate conjedure ? While, therefore, we maintain with the followers of Bacon, that no theory is to be admitted as proved, any farther than it is fupported by facts, we (hould, at the fame time, acknowledge our obligations to thofe writers who hazard their conjectures to the world with modefty and diffidence. And it may not be improper to add, that men of a fyftematizing * « Recte siqiiidem Piato, " Qui aliquid quaprit, id ipsum, quo4 •■' quaerit, general! quadam notions comprehendit : aliter, qui fieri " potest, ut iUud, cmn fuerit inventum, agnoscat ?" Idcirco quo -'- ampiior et certior fuerit anticipatio nostra ; eo magis directa et '- compendiosa erit investigatio.'* De Aug. Sclent, lib V. cap. 3. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 407 turn are not now fo ufelefs as formerly ; for we are already pofTefled of a great ftock of fadls ; and there is fcarcely any theory fo bad as not to bring togeth- er a number of particulars which have a certain de- gree of relation or analogy to each other. The foregoing remarks are applicable to all our various (Indies ; whether they are condudled in the way of reading, or of obfervation. From neither of thefe two fources of information can we hope to de- rive much advantage, unlefs we have fome general principles to direc^t our attention to proper objeds.. With refpect to obfervation, fome farther cautions may be ufeful ; for in guarding againft an indifcrim- inate accumulation of particulars, it is poflible to fail into the oppofite extreme, and to acquire a habit of inattention to the phenomena which prefent them- felves to our fenfes. The former is the error of men of little education ; the latter is more common a« mong men of retirement and ftudy. One of the chief efFeds of a liberal education, is to enable us to withdraw our attention frpm the prefent objeds of the perceptions, and to dwell at pleafure on the pad, the abfent, or the future. But when we are led to carry thefe efforts to an excefs, either from a warm and romantic imagination, or from an anxious and fanguine temper, it is eafy to fee that the power of obfervation is likely to be weak- ened, and habits of inattention to be contraded. — The fame effect may be produced by too early an in- dulgence in philofophical purfuits, before the mind has been prepared for the ftudy of general truths by exercifmg its faculties among particular objeds, and particular occurrences. In this way, it contracts an averfion to the examination of details, from the pleafure which it has experienced in the contempla- tion or in the difcovery of general principles. Both of thefe turns of thought, however, preluppofe a certain degree of obfervation j for the materials of 408 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ioiagination are fapplied by the fenfes ; and the gen- eral truths which occupy* the philofopher, would be w^holly unintelligible to him, if he was a total ftran- ger to all experience with reipe£l to the courfe of na- ture and of human life. The obfervations, indeed, which are made by men of a warm imagination, are likely to be inaccurate and fallacious ; and thofe of the fpeculative philofopher are frequently carried no farther than is neceflary to enable him to compre- hend the terms which relate to the fubjecls of his reafoning ; but both the one and the other muft have looked abroad occaiionally at nature, and at the world ; if not to afcertain facls by aclual examina- tion, at leaft to ftore their minds with ideas. The metaphyfician, whofe attention is directed to the faculties and operations of the mind, is the only- man who poiTefles within himfelf the materials of liis fpeculations and rcafonings. It is accordingly- among this clafs of literary men, that habits of inat- tention to things external have been carried to the greateil extreme. <■■ It is obferved by Dr. Reid, that the power of reflec- tion, (by which he means the power of attending to the fubjecls of our concioufnefs,) is the laft of our in- telledual faculties which unfolds itfelf ; and that in the greater part of mankind it never unfolds itfelf at all. It is a power, indeed, which being fubfervient merely to the gratification of metaphyseal curiofity, it is not elTentially neceflary for us to poflefs, in any coftfiderable degree. The power of obfervation, on the other hand, which is necefl^u'y for the preferva- tion even of our animal exigence, diicovers itfelf in infants long before they attain the ufe of fpeech ; or rather, I fhould have faid, as foon as they come into the world : and where nature is allowed free fcope, it continues active and vigorous through life. Jt was plainly the intention of nature, that in infancy and youth it Ihould occupy the mind almoft cxclu- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 409 lively, and that we fliould acquire all our neceffary information before engaging in fpeculations which are lefs eflential : and accordingly this is the hiftory of the intelledual progrefs, in by far the greater number of individuals. In confequence of this, the difficulty of metaphyfical refearches is undoubtedly much increafed ; for the mind being conftantly oc- cupied in the earlier part of life about the proper- ties and laws of matter, acquires habits of inatten- tion to the fubjects of confcioufnefs, which are not to be furmounted, without a degree of patience and perfeverance of which few men are capable : but the inconvenience would evidently have been greatly increafed, if the order of nature had, in this refpeft, been reverfed, and if the curiofity had been excited at as early a period, by the phenomena of the intel- lectual world, as by thofe of the material. Of what would have happened on this fuppofition, we may form a judgment from thofe men who, in ( onfe- quence of an exceffive indulgence in metaphyfical purfuits, have weakened, to an unnatural degree, their capacity of attending to external objedls and occurrences. Few metaphyficians, perhaps, are to be found, who are not deficient in the power of ob- fervation : for, although a tafte for fuch abftracb fpeculations is far from being common, it is more apt, perhaps, than any other, when it has once been formed, to take an exclufive hold of the mind, and to {hut up the other lources of intelledual improve- ment. As the metaphyfician carries within himfelf the materials of his reafoning, he is not under a ne- ceffity of looking abroad for fubjecls of fpeculation or amufement ; and unlefs he be very careful to guard againft the efFeds of his favorite purfuits, he is in more danger than literary men of any other denomination, to lofe all intereft about the common and proper objects of human curiofity. Dod 410 ELEMENTS Of THE PHILOSOPHY To prevent any danger from this quarter, I appre- hend that the lludy of the mind Ihould form the iaft branch of the education of yi)uth ; an order which nature herfelf feems to point out, by what I have already remarked, with refpecl to the devel- opement of our facuhies. After the underftanding is well ftored with particular fads, and has been con- verfant with particular fcientific purfuits,it will be en- abled to fpecuhte concerning its own powers with additional advantage, and will run no hazard of in- dulging too far in fuch inquiries. Nothing can be more abfurd, on this as well as on many other ac- counts, than the common practice which is followed in our univerfities, of beginning a courfe of philofoph- ical education with the ftudy of logic. If this order were completely reverfed ; and if the ftudy of logic were delayed till after the mind of the ft:udent was well ftored with particular fadls in phyiics, in chem- iftry, in natural and civil hiftory ; his attention might be^ led with the moft important advantage, and without any danger to his power of obfervation^ to an examination of his own faculties ; which, be- fidcs opening to him a new and pleafing field of fpeculation, would enable him to form an eftimate of his own powers, of the acquifitions he has made, of the habits he has formed, and of the farther im- provements of which his mind is fufceptible. In general, wherever habits of inattention, and an incapacity of obfervation, are very remarkable, they will be found to have arifen from fome defect in ear- ly education I already remarked, that, when nature is allowed free fcope, the curiofity, during early youth, is alive to every external objed:, and to every external occurrence, while the powers of imagination and reflection do not difplay them- felves till a much later period ; the former till about the ag?^ of puberty, and the latter till we ap- proach to manhood. It fometimes, however, hap- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 4)1 pens that, in confequence of a peculiar difpofition of mind, or of an infirm bodily conilitution, a child is led to feek amufement from books, and to lofe a relifli for thofe recreations which are fuited to his age. In fuch inftances, the ordinary progrefs of the intellectual powers is prematurely quickened ; but that beft of all educations is loft, which nature has prepared both for the philofopher and the man of the world, amidft the active fports and the hazard- ous adventures of childhood. It is from thefe alone, that we can acquire, not only that force of character which is fuited to the more arduous fituations oi life, but that complete and prompt command gf at- tention to things external, without which the high- eft: endowments of the underftanding, however they may fit a man for the ft)litary fpeculations of the clofet, are but of little ufe in the practice of affairs, or for enabling him to profit by his perfonal experi- ence. Where, however, fuch habits of inattention have unfortunately been contracted, we ought not to de- fpair of them as perfectly incurable. The attention, indeed, as I formerly remarked, can feldom be forced in particular inftances ; but we may gradually learn to place the obje6ts we wifli to attend to, in lights more interefting than thofe in which we have been accuftomed to view them. Much may be expected from a change of fcene, and a change of purfuits ; but above all, much may be expected from foreign travel. The objects which we meet with excite our furprife by their novelty ; and in this manner we not only gradually acquire the power of obferving and examining them with attention, but, from the effects of contraft, the curiofity comes to be roufed with refpect to the correfponding objects in our own country, which, from our early familiarity with them, we had formerly been accultomed to overlook. In this refpect the effects of foreign travel, in direct- 412 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY ing the attention to familiar objects and occurrences, is Ibmewhat analogous to that which the ftudy of a dead or a foreign language produces, in leading the curiolity to exaniine the grammatical ftrudure of our own. Confiderable advantage may alfo be derived, in overcoming the habits of inattention, which we may have contracted to particular fubjecls, from ftudying the fyftems. true or falfe, which phllofophers have propofed for explaining or for arranging the h£ts conneded with them. By means of thefe fyftems, not only is the curiofity circumfcribed and direded, inftead of being allowed to wander at random, but, in confequence of our being enabled to conriect facts with general principles, it becomes interefted in the examination (;f thofe particulars which would other- wife have efcaped our notice. SECTION VIII. Of the Connexion between Memory and fhilofophical Genius. IT is commonly fuppofed, that genius is feldom united with a very tenacious memory. So far, how- ever, as my own obfervation has reached, I can fcarcely recoiledl one perfon who poffeffes the for- mer of thefe qualities, without a m.ore than ordinary Ihare of the latter. On a fuperficial view of the fubjeCl, indeed, the common opinion has fome appearance of truth ; for, we are naturally led, in confequence of the topics about which converfation is ufually employed, to ef- timate the extent of memory, by the impreflion which trivial occurrences make upon it ; and thefe in general efcape the recolledion of a man of ability, not becaufe he is unable to retain them, but becaufe OF THE HUMAN MIND. 413 he does not attend to them. It is probable, likewife, that accidental affociations, founded on contiguity in time and place, may make but a flight impreffion on his mind. But it does not therefore follow, that his ftock of fads is fmall. They are conneded to- gether in his memory by principles of aflbc^ation, different from thofe which prevail in ordinary minds; and they are on that very account the more uferul : for as the affcKiations are founded upon real connec- tions among the ideas, (although they may be lefs conducive to the fluency, and perhaps to the wit of converfation,) they are of incomparably greater ufe in fuggefting fads which are to ferve as a founda- tion for reafoning or for invention. It frequently happens, too, that a man of genius, in confequence of a peculiarly ftrong attachment to a particular fubjed, may firft feel a want of inclina- tion, and may afterwards acquire a want of capacity of attending to common occurrences. But it is probable that the whole ftock of ideas in his mind, is not inferior to that of other men ; and that how- ever unprofitably he may have direded his curiolity, the ignorance which he difcovers on ordinary fub- jeds does not arife from a want of memory, but from a peculiarity in the feledion which he has made of the objeds of his ftudy. Montaigne* frequently complains in his writings, of his want of memory ; and he indeed gives many very extraordinary inftances of his ignorance on fome of the moft ordinary topics of information- But it is obvious to any perfon who reads his works with attention, that this ignorance did not proceed from an original defed of memory, but from the * II n'est homme a qui il siese si mal de se mi^sler de par- ler de meinoire. Car je n'en recogoov quasi trace en inoy ; et ne pense qu'il y en ait au monde une autre si niarveil- leuse en defaillance. JEssais de Montaigne, liv. i. cb. 9. 414 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fingular and whimfical dire^lion which his curiofity had taken at an early period of life. " I can do " nothing," fays he, " without my memorandum *' book ; and fo great is my difficulty in remember- " ing proper names, that I am forced to call my do- " melHc fervants by their offices. I am ignorant of " the greater part of our coins in ufe ; of the difFer- " ence of one grain from another, both in the earth " and in the granary ; what ufe leaven is of m making " bread, and why wine muft Hand fome time in the *' vat before it ferments." Yet the fame author ap- pears evidently, from his writings, to have had his memory ftored with an infinite variety of apothegms, and of hiftorical palTages, which had itruck his imagi- nation ; and to have been familiarly acquainted, not oifly with the names, but with the abfurd and explo- ded opinions of the antient philofophers ; with the ideas of Plato, the atoms of Epicurus, the plenum and vacuum of Leucippus and Democritus, the water of Thaies, the numbers of Pythagoras, the infinite of Parmenides, and the unity of Mufasus. In complain- ing too of his want of prefence of mind, he direclly acknowledges a degree of memory which, if it had been juuicioufly employed, would have been more than fufficient for the acquifition of all thofe common branches of knowledge in which he appears \o have been deficient. " When I have an oration to fpeak," fays he, '^ of any confiderable length, I am reduced " to the miferable neceffity of getting it, word for " word, by heart." The firange and apparently inconfiflent combina- tion of knov/ledge and ignorance which the writings of Montaigne exhibit, led Malebranche (who feems to have formed too low an opinion both of his genius and charader) to tax him with affectation ; and even to call in queftion the credibility of fome of his affer- tions. But no one who is well acquainted with this mofl amufing author, can reafonably fufped his ve^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. 415 racity ; and, In the prefent inftance, I can give him complete credit, not only from my general opinion of his fincerity, but from having obferved, in the courfc of my own experience, more than one exam- ple of the fame fort of combination ; not indeed carried to fuch a length as Montaigne defcribes, but bearing a ftriking refemblance to it. The obfervations which have already been made, account, in part, for the origin of the common opin- ion, that genius and memory are feldom united in great degrees in the fame perfon ; and at the fame time fliew, that fome of the fads on which that opin- ion is founded, do not juftify fuch a conclufion. Be- fides thefe, however, there are other circumftances, which at firft view, feem rather to indicate an in- confiftency between extenlive memory and original genius. The fpecies of memory which excites the greateft degree of admiration in the ordinary intercourfe of fociety, is a memory for detached and infulated fads ; and it is certain that thofe men who are pof- felTed of it, are very feldom diftinguiflied by the higher gifts of the mind. Such a fpecies of memo- ry is unfavorable to philofophical arrangement ; be- caufe it in part fupplies the place of arrangement. One great ufe of philofophy, as I already ihewed, is; to give us an exteniive command of particular truths, by furnilhing us Vv'ith general principles, un- der which a number of fuch truths is comprehended. A perfon in whofe mind cafual affociations of time and place make a lafting impreflion, has not the fame inducements to philofophize, with others who conned fads together, chiefly by the relations of caufe and efFecl, or of premifes and conclufion. I I have heard it obferved, that thofe men who have; rifen to the grcatefl eminence in the profellion of law, have been in general fuch as had, at lirll, an avcrfion to the fludy. The reafon probably is, that to a mind 416 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY fond of general principles, every ftudy muft be at firft difguiling. which prefents to it a chaos of fadls apparently unconneded with each other. But this love of arrangement, if united with perfevering in- duftry, will at laft conquer every difficulty ; will in- troduce order into what feenied on a fuperficial view, a mafs of confulion, and reduce the dry and unin- terefting detail of pofitive iiatutes into a fyllem com- paratively luminous and beautiful. The oblervation, I believe, may be made more general, and may be applied to every fcience in which there is a great multiplicity of fa6ts to be remember- ed. A man deftitute of genius may, with little ef- fort, treafure up in his memory a number of partic- ulars in chemiftry or natural hiftory, which he re- feirs to no principle, and from which he deduces no conclufion ; and from his facility in acquiring this {lock of information, may flatter himfeif with the belief that he pofleffes a natural tafte for thefe bran- ches of knowledge. But they who are really deflin- ed to extend the boundaries of fcience, when they firil enter on new purfuits, feel their attention dis- tracted, and their rnemor}^ overloaded Vv^ith facls among which they can trace no relation, and are fometimes apt to defpair entirely of their future pro- grefs. In due time, however, their fuperiority ap- pears, and arifes in part from that very diflatisfac- tion which they at firft experienced, and which does not ceafe to ftimulate their inquiries, till they are enabled to trace, amidft a cliaos of apparently uncon- nected materials, that fimplicity and beauty which always charaderife the operations of nature. There are, befides, other circumftances which re- tard the progrel's of a man of genius, when he en- ters on a new purfuit, and which fometimes render him apparently inferior to thofe who are pofleffed of OF THE HUMAN MIND. 41? ordinary capacity. A want of curiofity,* and of in- vention, facilitates greatly the acquifition of knowl- edge. It renders the mind paffive, in receiving the ideas of others, and faves all the time which might be employed in examining their foundation, or in tracing their confequences. They who are pofTelTed of much acutenefs and originality, enter with diffi- culty into the views of others ; not from any defe6b in their power of appreheniion, but becaufe they cannot adopt opinions which they have not examin- ed ; and becaufe their attention is often feduced bv their own fpeculations. It is not merely in the acquifition of knowledge that a man of genius is likely to find himfelf furpaf- fed by others : he has commonly his information much lefs at command, than thofe who are polTefled of an inferior degree ot originahty ; and, what is /bmewhat remarkable, he has it leaft of all at com- mand on thofe fubjecls on which he has found his invention moft fertile. Sir Ifaac Newton, as we are told by Dr. Pemberton, was often at a lofs, when the converlation turned on his own difcoveries.f It is probable that they made but a flight impreflion on his mind, and that a confcioufnefs of his inven- tive powers prevented him from taking much jains to treafure them up in his memory. Men of little ingenuity feldom forget the ideas they acquire ; be- caufe they know that when an occalion occurs for applying their knowledge to ufe, they muft truft to memory and not to invention. Explain an arith- metical rule to a perfon of common underllanding, who is unacquainted with the principles of the fcience ; he will foon get the rule by heart, and be- * I mean a want of curiosity about truth. " There are many "men," says Dr. Butler, " who have a strong curiosity to know: " what is said, who have little or no curiosity to know what is " true." t See Note [T.] E E e 418 ELEMENTS Of THE PHILOSOPHY come dexterous in the application of it. Another^ of more ingenuity, will examine the principle of the rule before he applies it to ufe, and will fcarcely take the trouble to commit to memory a procefs, which he knows he can, at any time^ with a little reflection, recover. The confequence will be. that, in the prac- tice of calculation, he will appear more flow and hef- itating, than if he followed the received rules of a- rithmetic without reflection or reafoning. Something of the fame kind happens every day in converfation. By far the greater part of the o- pinions we announce in it, are not the immediate refult of reafoning on the fpot, but have been previ- oufly formed in the clofet, or perhaps have been a- dopted implicitly on the authority of others. The promptitude, therefore, with which a man decides in ordinary difcourfe, is not a certain teft of the quick- nefs of his appreheniion ;* as it may perhaps arife from thofe uncommon efforts to furnifh the memo- ry with acquired knowledge, by which men of flow parts endeavor to compenfate for their want of in- vention ; while, on the other hand, it is poflible that a confcioufnefs of originality may give rife to a manner apparently embarraffed, by leading the per- fon who feels it, to truft too much to extempore ex- ertions.! * Memoriafacit prompti ingenii famam,ut ilia quae dlcimusnon domo attulisse, sed ibi protinus sumpsisse videamur. ^uiNCfiL. Inst. Orat. lib. xi. cap. 2. fin the foregoing observations it is not meant to be implied, that originality of genius is incompatible with a ready recollection of acquired knov/ledge ; but only that it has a tendency unfavora- ble to it, and that more time and practice will commonly be re- cessary to familiarise the mind of a man of nivention to the ideas of others, or even to the conclusions of his own understanding, than are requisite in ordinary cases. Habits of literary conversation, and, still more, habits of extempore discussion in a popular assena- bly, are peculiarly useful in giving us a ready and practical com- OF THE HUMAN MIND. 419 III general, I believe it may be laid down as a rule, that thofe who carry about with them a great de- gree of acquired information, which they have al- ways at command, or who have rendered their own difcoveries fo familiar to them, as always to be in a condition to explain them, without recolledion, are very feldom pofieffed of much invention, or even of much quicknefs of apprehenfion. A man of origin- al genius, who is fond of exercifing his reafoning powers anew on every point as it occurs to him, and who cannot fubmit to rehearfe the ideas of oth- ers, or to repeat by rote the conclufions which he has deduced from previous reiledion, often appears, to fuperficial obfervers, to fall below the level of or- dinary underftandings ; while another, deftitute both of quicknefs and invention, is admired for that promptitude in his decifions, which arifes from the inferiority of his intelle<5lual abilities. It muft indeed be acknowledged in favor of the ^aft defcription of men, that in ordinary converfa- tion they form the moft agreeable, and perhaps the moft inftrud:ive, companions. How inexhaullible foever the invention of an individual may be, the variety of his own peculiar ideas can bear no pro- portion to the whole mafs of ufeful and curious in- formation of which the world is already poflbfled. The converfation, accordingly, of men of genius, is fometimes extremely limited ; and is interefting to the few alone, who know the value, and who can diftinguilh the marks of originality. In confequence too of that partiality which every man feels for his own fpeculations, they are more in daiigcr of being dogmatical and difputatious, tiian thofe who have no fyftem which they are interefted to defend. mand of our knowledge. There Is much good sense in the follov/- ing aphorism of Bacon : " Reading maUei: a full man, writing a *' correct man, and speaking a ready man." See a commentary c^n this aphorism in one of the Numbers of the Adventurer. 420 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY The fame obfervations may be applied to authors. A book which contains the difcoveries of one indi- vidual only, may be admired by a few, who are in- timately acquainted with the hiftory of t^he fcience to which it relates, but it has little chance for p(>pu- larity with the multitude. An author who poffeffes induftry fufHcient to collect the ideas of others, and judgment fufHcient to arrange them fkilfully, is the moft likely perfon to acquire a high degree of lite- rary fame : and although, in the opinion of enlight- ened judges, invention forms the chief characteriftic of genius, yet it commonly happens that the objecls of public admiration are men who are much lefs dif- tinguifhed by' this quality, than by extenfive learn- ing and cultivated tafte. Perhaps too, for the muU titude, the latter clafs of authors is the moft ufeful ; as their writings contain the more folid difcoveriea which others have brought to light, feparated from thofe errors with which truth is often blended in the firft formation of a fyftem. CHAPTER SEVENTH. OF IMAGINATION- SECTION I. Analyjis of Imagination. IN attempting to draw the line between Concep- tion and Imagination, I have already obferved, that the province of the former is to prefent us with an exact tranfcript of what we have formerly felt ancl Of THE HUMAN MIND. 421 perceived ; that of the latter, to make a feledion of qualities and of circum fiances from a variety of dif- ferent objecls, and by combining and difpofing thefe^ to form a new creation of its own. According to the definitions adopted, in general, by modern philofophers, the province of imagina- tion would appear to be limited to objedls of light, '' It is the fenfe of fight," (fays Mr. Addifon,; " which " furniflies the Imagination with its ideas ; fo that *^ by the pleafures of Imagination, 1 here mean fuch " as arife from vifible objecls, either when we have " them actually in view, or when we calbup their " ideas into our minds, by paintings, fi;atues, def- " criptions, or any the like occafions. We cannot, " indeed, have a fingle image in the fancy, that did " not make its firft entrance through the fight." Agreeably to the fame view of the fubjeCl, Dr. Reid oblerves, that " Imagination properly fignifies a iive- " ly conception of objecls of fight ; the former pow- ^' er being diflinguifhed from the latter, as a part " from the whole." That this limitation of the province of imagination to one particular clafs of our perceptions is altogeth- er arbitrary, feems to me to be evident ; for, al- though the greater part of the materials which Im- agination combines be fupplied by this fenfe, it is nev- erthelefs indifputable, that our other perceptive fac- ulties alfo contribute occafionally their lliare. How many pleafing images have been borrowed from the fragrance of the fields and the melody of the groves j not to mention that filler art, whole magical influ- ence over the human frame, it has been, in all ages, the highefl boafl of poetry to celebrate ! In the fol- lowing paflagc, even the more grofs fenfations of Tafle form the llibjedl of an ideal repalt, on which it is impofiible not to dwell with fome complacency ; particularly after a perufal of the preceding lines, in which the Poet defcribes ** the wonders of the Tor- rid Zone." 422 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY Bear me, Pomona ! to thy citron groves ; To where the lemon and the piercing lime, With the deep orange, glowing thro' the green, Their lighter glories blend. Lay me reclin'd Beneath the spreading tamarind that shakes, Fann'd by the breeze, its fever-cooling fruit : Or, otretch'd amid these orchards of the sun, O let me drain the cocoa's milky bowl, More bounteous far than all the frantic juice Which Baccus pours ! Nor, on its slender twigs Low bending, be the full pomegranate scorn'd j Nor, creeping thro' the woods, the geUd race Of berries. Oft in humble station dwells Unboastful worth, above fastidious pomp. Witness, thou best Anana, thou the pride Of vegetable life, beyond whate'er The Poets imag'd in the golden age ; (iuick let me strip thee of thy spiny coat, Spread thy ambrosial stores, and feast with Jove !* What an affemblage of other conceptions, differ- ent from all thofe hitherto mentioned, has the^ gen- ius of Virgil coiiibined in one diftich ! Hie gelidi fontes, hie mollia prata, Lycori, Hie nemus : hie ipso tecum consumerer aBVO. Thefe obfervations are fufficient to fhow, how in- adequate A notion of the province of Imagination (conlidered even in its reference to the fenfible world) is conveyed by the definitions of Mr. Addifon and of Dr. Reid. — But the fenfible world, it mufi: be remembered, is not the only field where Imagination exerts her powers. All the objeds of human knowl- edge fupply materials to her forming hand ; diver- fifying infinitely the works fhe produces, while the mode of her operation remains effentially uniform. "As it is the fame power of Reafoning which enables US to carry on our inve (ligations with refpecl to in- dividual objeds, and with refpecl to claffes or gene- ra ; fo it was by the fame proceiTes of analyfis and * Thprason's Summer. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 423 Combination, that the genius of Milton produ- ced the Garden of Eden ; that of Harrington, the Commonwealth of Qceana ; and that of Shakefpeare, the charaders of Hamlet and Falfiaff. '1 he difTer- ence between thefe feveral efforts of invention, coa- fifts only in the manner in which the original mate- rials were acquired ; as far as the power of Imagin- ation is concerned, the procefles are perfedly analo- gous. The attempts of Mr. Addifon and of Dr. Reid to limit the province of Imagination to objeds of fight, have plainly proceeded from a very important facl, which it may be worth while to illuflrate more par- ticularly ; — That the mind has a greater facility, and, of confequence, a greater delight in recalling the perceptions of this fenfe than thofe of any of the others ; while at the fame time, the variety of qual- ities perceived by it is incomparably greater. It is this fenfe, accordingly, which fupplies the painter and the ftatuary with all the fubjecls on which their gen- ius is exercifed ; and which furnifhes to the defcrip- tive poet the largefl and the mofl: valuable portion of the materials which he combines. In that abfurd fpecies of profe compofition, too, which borders on poetry, nothing is more remarkable than the pre- dominance of phrafes that recal to the memory, glaring colours, and thofe fplendid appearances of nature, which make a ftrong impreflion on the eye. It has been mentioned by different writers, as a char- acleriftical circumftance in the Oriental or Afiatic ftyle, that the greater part of the m.etaphors are ta- ken from the celeftial luminaries. " The Works of " the Perfians," (fays M. de Voltaire,) " are like th*. " titles of their kings, in which we are perpetually *' dazzled with the lun and the moon.'* Sir WiK liam Jones, in a fhort Eflay on the Poetry of Eaflern Nations, has endeavored to fliew, that this is not owing to the bad tafle of the Afialics, but to the old 424. ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHV language and popular religion of their country. But the truth is, that the very fame criticifm will be found to apply to the juvenile productions of every author pofleil'ed of a warm imagination ; and to the compofitions of every people among whom a culti- vated and philofophical tafle has not eftablilhed a fufficiently marked diftinclion between the appropri- ate ftyles of poetry and of profe. The account giv- en by the Abbe Girard of the meaning of the Vv'ord Phebus, as employed by the French critics, confirms Urongly this obfervation. " Le Phebus a un briilant '• qui iignifie, ou femble fignifier quelque chofe : le " foleil y entre d'ordinaire ; & c'eil peut-etre ce qui, *' en notre langue, a donne lieu au nom de Phe- Agreeably to thefe principles. Gray, in defcribing the infantine reveries of poetical genius, has fixed, with exquillte judgment, on this clafs of our con- ceptions : Yet oft before his infant eye would run , Such Forms as glitter in the Muse's ray With Orient hues — From thefe remarks it may be eafily nnderflood, why the word huagination, in its moft ordinary ac- ceptation, Ihould be applied to cafes where our con- ception's are derived from the fenfe of fight ; although the province of this power be, in fa6l, as unlimited as the fphere of human enjoyment and of human thought. Hence, the origin of thefe partial defini- tions which I have been attempting to correct ; and hence too, the origin of the word Lnagimiion ; the etymology of which implies manifeftly a reference to vifible objecls. i To all the various modes in which Imagination •may difplay itfelf, the greater part of the memarks * Synonymes Francois. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 425 tontained in this Chapter will be found to apply, under proper limitations ; but, in order to render the fubject more obvious to the reader's examina- tion, I fhall, in the farther profecution of it, endeav- or to convey my ideas, rather by means of particu- lar examples, than in the form of general principles ; leaving it to his own judgment to determine, with what modifications the conciuiions to which we are led, may be extended jio other combinations of cir- cumdances. Among the innumerable phenomena which this part of our conftitution prefents to our examination, the combinations which the mind forms out of ma- terials fupplied by the power of Conception recom- mend themfelves ftrongly, both by their fimplicity, and by the interefting nature of the difcuflions to which they lead. I fliall avail myfelf, therefore, as much as poflible, in the following enquiries, of w^hat- ever iliuftrations I am able to borrow from the arts of Poetry and of Painting ; the operations of Imagi- nation in thefe arts furnifhing the moil intelligible and pleafing exemplifications of the intelledlual pro- cefles, by which, in thofe analogous but lefs pal- pable inftances that fall under the confideration of the Moraliit, the mind deviates from the models pre- fented to it by experience, and forms to itfelf, new and untried objects of purfuit. It is in confequence of fuch proceffes (which, how little foever they n}ay be attended to, are habitually pafling in the thoughts of all men,) that huoian affairs exhibit lo bufy and fo various a fcene ; tending, in one cafe, to improve- ment, and, in another, to decline ; according as our notions of excellence and of happinefs are jull or er- roneous. It was obferved, in a former part of this work, that Imagination is a complex power.* It includes *See page 123, FFf 426 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY Conception or fimple Apprehenfion, which enables us to form a notion of thofe former objeds of per- ception or of knowledge, out of which we are to make a feleftion ; Abitraclion, which feparates the fele^ed materials from the qualities and circumllan- ces which are connected w^ith them in nature ; and Judgment or Tafte, which feleds the materials, and directs their combination. To thefe powders, we may add, that particular habit of affociation to which I formerly gave the name of Fancy ; as it is this which prefects to our choice, ail the different mate- rials which are fubfervient to the efforts of Imagin- ation, and which may therefore be confidered as forming the groundwork of poetical genius. To illuflrate thefe obfervations, let us confider the Heps by which Milton muft have proceeded in crea- ting his imaginary Garden of Eden. When he firft propofed to himfelf that fubje61: of defcription, it is reafonable to fuppofe, that a variety of the moil ftriking fcenes which he had feen crowded into his mind. The Affociation of Ideas fuggefled them, and the pow^er of conception placed t ach of them before him with all its beauties and imperfedions. In every natural fcene, if we delline it for any par- ticular purpofe, there are defeds and redundancies, which art may lometimes, but cannot always, cor- rect. But the power of Imagination is unlimited. She can create and annihilate ; and difpofe, at plea- fure, her woods, her rocks, and her rivers. Milton, accordingly, would not copy his Eden from any one fcene, but would felecl from each the features which were moil eminently beautiful. The power of ab- flraclion enabled him to make the feparation, and Tafte directed him in the felection. Thus he was furniilied with his materials ; by a fkilful combina- tion of which, he has created a iandfcape, more per- fe6t probably in all its parts, than was ever realifed in nature j and certainly very different from any OF THE HUMAN MIND. 42? thing which this country exhibited, at the period when he wrote. It is a curious remark of Mr. Wal- pole, that Milton's Eden is free from the defects of the old Englifli garden, and is imagined on the fame principles which it was referved for the prefent age to carry into execution. From what has been faid, it is fufEciently evident, that Imagination is not a fimple power of the mind, like Attention, Conception, or Abftraction ; but that it is formed by a combination of various facul- ties. It is farther evident, that it muft appear un- der very different forms, in the cafe of different individuals ; as fome of its component parts are liable to be greatly influenced by habit, and other accidental circumflances. The variety, for example, of the materials out of which the com- binations of the Poet or the Painter are formed, will depend much on the tendency of external fitu- ation, to ftore the mind with a multiplicity of Con- ceptions ; and the beauty of thefe combinations will depend entirely on the fuccefs with which the pow- er of Tafte has been cultivated. What we call, therefore, the power of Imagination, is not the gift of nature, but the refult of acquired habits, aided by favorable circumftances. It is not an original en- dowment of the mind, but an accomplifhment form- ed by experience and (ituation ; and which, in its different gradations, fills up all the interval between the firft efforts of uncutored genius, and the fublime creations of Raphael or of Milton. An uncommon degree of Imagination conftitutes poetical genius ; a talent which, although chieHy dif- played in poetical compofition, is alfo the foundation (though not precifely in the fame manner) of vari- ous other Arts. A few remarks on the relation which Imagination bears to fome of the moft inter- efting of thefe, will throw additional light on its nar tare and office. 428 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY SECTION 11. Of Imagination conftdered in its Relation to fonie of the Fine Arts, AMONG the Arts connefled with Imagination, fome not only take their rife from this power, but produce objeds which are addrelled to it Others take their rife from Imagination, but produce objects which are addreifed to the power of Perception. To the latter of thefe two claiTes of Arts, belongs that of Gardening ; or, as it has been lately call- ed, the art of creating Landiicape. In this Art, the defigner is limited in his creation by nature ; and his only province is to correct, to improve, and to adorn. As he cannot repeat his experiments, in or- ,der to obferve the effect, he muft call up, in his im- agination, the fcene which he means to produce ; and apply to this imaginary fcene his tafte and his judgment^; or, in other words, to a lively concep- tion of vifible objects, he muft add a power (which long experience and attentive obfervation alone can give him) of judging beforehand, of the effect which they would produce, if they were aftually exhibited to his fenfes. This power forms, what Lord Chat- Iiam beautifully and expreffively called, the Prophetic Eye oj Tajle ; that eye which (if I may borrow the language of Mr. Gray) " fees all the beauties that a *' place is fufceptible of, long before they are born ; " and when it plants a feedUng, already fits under " the fhade of it, and enjoys the effect it will have, " from every point of view that lies in the prof- " pe£t."* But although the artift who creates a landfcape, copies it from his imagination, the fcene which he exhibits is addreffed to the fenfes, and may * Gray's works, by Ma<;on^ p. 277. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 429 produce its full effect on the minds of others, with- out any effort on their part, either of imagination or of conception. To prevent being mifunderftood, it is neceffary for me to remark, that, in the laft obfervation, I fpeak merely of the natural effects produced by a land- fcape, and abftracl entirely from the pleafure which may refult from an accidental affociation of ideas with a particular fcene. The effect refulting from fuch aifociations will depend, in a great meafure, on the livelinefs with which the affociated objects are conceived, and on the affecting nature of the pict- ures which a creative imagination, when once rouf- ed, will prefent to the mind ; but the pleafures thus arifing from the accidental exercife that a landfcape may give to the imagination, muft not be confoun- ded with thofe which it is naturally fitted to pro- duce. In Painting, (excepting in thofe inflances in which it exhibits a faithful copy of a particular object,) the original idea mull: be formed in the imagination : and, in moft cafes, the exercife of imagination mufl concur with perception, before the picture can pro- duce that efted: on the mind of the fpectator which the artill has in view. Painting, therefore, does not belong entirely to either of the two claffes of Arts formerly mentioned, but has fomething in com- mon with them both. As far as the Painter aims at copying exactly what he fees, he may be guided mechanically by general rules ; and he requires no aid from that cre- ative genius which is charafteriflical of the Poet. The pleafure, however, which refults from painting, confidcred merely as an imitative art, is extremely trifling ; and is fpecifically different from that which it aims to produce, by awakening the imagination. Even in portrait-painting, the fervile copyift of na- ture is regarded in no higher light than that of a 430 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY tradefman. " Deception," (as Reynolds has excel- lently obferved,) " inftead of advancing the art, is *' in reality, carrying it back to its infant ftate. The " firll: eflays of Painting were certainly nothing but *' mere imitations of individual objects ; and when **= this amounted to a deception, the artift had accom- " plifhed his purpofe."* When the hiftory or the landfcape Painter indul- ges his genius, in forming new combinations of his own, he vies with the Poet in the nobleft exertion of the poetical art : and he avails himfelf of his profef- fionai Ikiil, as the Poet avails himfelf of language, only to convey the ideas in his mind. To deceive the eye by accurate reprefentations of particular forms, is no longer his aim ; but, by the touches of an expreflive pencil, to fpeak to the imaginations of others. Imitation, therefore, is not the end which he propofes to himfelf, but the means which he em- ploys in order to accomplilh it : nay, if the imita- tion be carried fo far as to preclude all exercife of the fpedator's imagination, it will difappoint, in a great meafure, the purpofe of the artift. In Poetry, and in every other fpecies of compofi- tion, in which one perfon attempts, by means of language, to prefent to the mind of another, the ob- jecls of his own imagination ; this power is neceffa- ry, though not in the fame degree, to the author and to the reader. When we perufe a defcription, we naturally feel a difpoiition to form, in our own minds, a diftindl pidure of what is defcribed ; and in proportion to the attention and intereft which the fubjed excites, the pidure becomes fteady and de- terminate. It is fcarcely poflible for us to hear much of a particular town, without forming fome notion of its figure and fize and fituation j and in * Notes on Mason's Translation of Fresno-^ 's Poem on the Art of Painting, p. 1 J 4. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 431 reading hiftory and poetry, I believe it feldom hap- pens, that we do not annex imaginary appearances to the names of our favorite charaders. It is, at the fame time, almoft certain, that the imaginations of no two men coincide upon fuch occaiions ; and, therefore, though both may be pleafed, the agreea- ble imprefHons which they feel, may be widely dif- ferent from each other, according as the pidures by which they are produced are more or lefs happily imagined. Hence it is, that when a perfon accuf- tomed to dramatic reading, fees, for the firfl time, one of his favorite charaders reprefented on the ftage, he is generally diifatisfied with the exhibition, however eminent the ador may be : and if he fhould happen, before this reprefentation, to have been ve- ry familiarly acquainted with the charader, the cafe may continue to be the fame through life. For my own part, I have never received from any Falftaft on the ftage, halt the pleafure which Shakefpeare gives me in the clofet ; "and I am perfuaded, that I Ihould feel fome degree of uneaiinefs, if I were pref- ent at any attempt to perfonate the figure or the voice of Don Quixote or Sancho Panca. It is not always that the ador, on fuch occaiions, falls fhort of our expedation. He difappoints us, by exhibiting fomething different from what our imagination had anticipated, and which confequently appears to us, at the moment, to be an unfaithful reprefentation of the Poet's idea : and until a frequent repetition of the performance has completely obliterated our former impreflions, it is impoffible for us to form an adequate eftimate of its merit. Similar obfervations may be applied to other fub- jeds. The fight of any natural fcene, or of any work of art, provided we have not previoufly heard of it, commonly produces a greater effed, at firft, than ever afterwards ; but if in confequence of a de- fcription, we have beep led to form a previous no- 432 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY tion of it, I apprehend, the eiFecl will be found leis pleaiing, the firft time it is feen, than the fecond. Although the defcription fiiould fall fliort greatly of the reality, yet the difappointment which we feel, on meeting with fomething different from what we expected, diminifhes our fatisfaction. The fecond time we fee the fcene, the effect of novelty is indeed lefs than before ; but it is ftill confiderable, and the imagination now anticipates nothing which is not reaiifed in the perception. The remarks which have been made, afford a fat- isfaclory reafon why fo few are to be found v/ho have a genuine relifh for the beauties of poetry. The defigns of Kent and of Brown evince in their authors a degree of imagination entirely analogous to that of the defcriptive poet ; but when they are once executed, their beauties (excepting thofe which refult from affociation) meet the eye of every fpec- tator. In poetry the effect is inconfiderable, unlefs upon a mind which poffeffes fome degree of the au- thor's genius ; a mind amply furnifhed, by its pre- vious habits, with the means of interpreting the language which he employs ; and able, by its own imagination, to co-operate with the efforts of his art. It has been often remarked, that the general words w^hich exprefs complex ideas, feldom convey pre- cifely the fame meaning to different individuals, and that hence arifes much of the ambiguity of language. The fame obfervation holds, in no inconfiderable de- gree, with refpedt to the names of fenfible objeiR^s. When the v/ords River, Mountain, Grove, occur in a defcription, a perfon of lively conceptions natur- ally thinks of fome particular river, mountain, and grove, that have made an impreflion on his mind ; and whatever the notions are, which he is led by his imagination to form of thefe objects, they mult neceflarily approach to the ilandard of what he has OF THE HUMAJr MIND. 433 feen. Hence it Is evident that, according to the different habits and education of individuals ; accor- ding to the livelinefs of their conceptions, and ac- cording to the creative power of their imaginations, the fame words will produce very different effedi on different minds. When a perfon who has re- ceived his education in the country, reads a defcrip- tion of a rural retirement ; the houfe, the river, the woods, to which he was firft accuftomed, prefent themfelves fpontaneoufly to his conception, accom- panied, perhaps, with the recollection of his early friendihips, and all thofe pleafing ideas which are commonly affociated with the fcenes of childhood and of youth. How different is the effedl of the de- fcription upon his mind, from what it would pro- duce on one who has paffed his tender years at a dittance from the beauties of nature, and whofe in- fant fports are conneded in his memory with the gloomy alleys of a commercial city ! But it is not only in interpreting the particular words of a defcription, that the powers of Imagina- tion and Conception are employed. They are far- ther neceffary for filling up the differeat parts of that pidure, of which the moft minute defcriber can only trace the outline. In the beft defcription, there is much left to the reader to fupply j and the efFed which it produces on his mind will depend, in a confiderable degree, on the invention and tafte with which the pidure is finifhed. It is therefore poffible, on the one hand, that the happiefl efforts of poetical genius may be peruied with perfed in- difference by a man c)f found judgment, and not def- titute of natural fenfibility ; and on the other hand, that a cold and commonplace defcription may be the means of awaken. ng, in a rich and glowing im- agination, a degree of enthufiafm unknown to the author. Gog 434? ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY All the different arts which I have hitherto men- tioned as taking their rife from the imagination, have this in common, that their primary objeft is to^ pleafe. This oblervation applies to the art of Poet- ry, no lefs than to the others ; nay, it is this circum- ftance which chara6lerifes Poetry, and diftinguiflies it from all the other claffes of literary compofition. The objed of the Philofopher is to inform and en- lighten mankind ; that of the Orator, to acquire an afcendant over the will of others, by bending to his ^ own purpofes their judgments, their imaginations, and their paflions : but the primary and the diftin- guifhing aim of the Poet is to pleafe ; and the princi- pal refource which he poiTeffes for this purpofe, is by addreffing the imagination. Sometimes, indeed, he may feem to encroach on the province of the Philofopher or of the Orator ; but, in thefe inftan- ces, he only borrows from them the means by which he accomplifhes his end. If he attempts to enlight- en and to inform, he addreffes the underftanding only as a vehicle of pleafure : if he makes an appeal to the paflions, it is only to paflions which it is pleaf- ing to indulge. The Philofopher, in like manner, in order to accomplifh his end of inflruc^ion, may find it expedient, occafionally, to amufe the imagin* ation, or to make an appeal to the paflions : the Or- ator may, at one time, ilate to his hearers a procefs of reafoning ; at another, a calm narrative of facls ; and, at a third, he may give the reins to poetical fan- cy. But flill the ultimate end of the Philofopher is to inflrud, and of the Orator to perfuade ; and w^hat- ever means they make ufe oif, which are not fubfer- vient to this purpofe, are out of place, and obflruct the effect of their labors. The meafured compofition in which the Poet ex- preffes himfelf, is only one of the means which he employs to pleafe. As the delight which he con- veys to the imagination, is heightened by the other OF THE HUMAN MIND. 435 agreeable impreffions which he can unite in the mind at the fame time ; he lludies to beftow, upon the medium of communication which he employs, all the various beauties of which it is fufceptible. i^mong thefe beauties, the harmony of numbers is not the leaft powerful ; for its effed is conflant, and does not interfere with any of the other pleaf- ures which language produces. A fuccdiion of a- greeable perceptions 'is kept up by the organical ef- fect of words upon the ear ; while they inform the underftanding by their pcrfpicuity and precifion, or pleafe the imagination by the pictures they fuggeft, or touch the heart by the aflbciations they awaken. Of all thefe charms of language, the Poet may avail himfelf ; and they are all (6 many inllruments of his art. To the Philofopher and the Orator they may Gccafionally be of ufe ; and to both they muft be con- fiantly fo far an objed of attention, that nothing may occur in their compofitions, which may diftrad the thoughts, by offending either the ear or the tafte ; but the Poet muft fiot reft fatisfied with this nega- tive praife. Pleafure is the end of his art ; and the more numerous the fources of it which he can open, the greater will be the effect produced by the efforts of his genius. The province of the poet is limited only by the variety of human enjoyments. Whatever is in the reality fubfervient to our happinefs, is a fource of pleafure, when prefented to our conceptions, and may fometimes derive from the heightenings of im- agination, a momentary charm, which we exchange with reludance for the fubftantial gratifications of the fenfes. The province of the painter, and of the flatuary, is confined to the imitation of vifible objeds and to the exhibition of fuch intellectual and moral qualities, as the human body is fitted to exprefs. In ornamental architecture, and in ornamental garden- ing, the fole aim of the artift is to give pleafure to 436 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY the eye, by the beauty or fublimity of material forms. But to the poet all the glories of external nature ; all that is amiable or interefting, or refpe£lable in human charader ; all that excites and engages our benevolent afFe(5lions : all thofe truths which make the heart feel itfelf better and more happy ; all thefe fupply materials, out of which he forms and peoples a world of his own, where no inconvenien* ces damp our enjoyments, and where no clouds dar- ken our profpects. That the pleafuresof poetry arife chiefly from the agreeable feelings which it conveys to the mind, by awakening the imagination, is a propofition which may feem too obvious to ftand in need of proof. As tke ingenious Inquirer, however, into " The Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful," has dif- puted the common notions upon this fubjed:, I fhall conlider fome of the principal arguments by which he has fupported his opinion The leading principle of the theory which I am now to examine is, " That the common efFecl of po- " etry is not to raife ideas of things ;" or, as I would rather chufe to exprefs it, its common effed is not to give exercife to the powers of conception and im- agination. That I may not be accufed of mifrepre- fentation, I fhall ftate the doclrine at length in the words of the author. " If words have all their pof- " fible extent of power, three effecls arife in the " mind of the hearer. The firft is the found ; the " fecond, the pidure, or reprefentation of the thing " lignified by the found ; the third is, the offeBion *' of the foul produced by one or by both of the fore- " going. Compounded abftrad: words, {^honor, juf- " tice, liberty, and the like,) produce the firit and " the lafl of thefe effects, bu^ not the fecond. Sim- " pie abilracts are uied to fignify fome one fmiple '* idea, without much adverting to others which ** may chance to attend it ; as blue, green, hot, cold^ OF THE HUMAN MIND. 4S7 " and the like : thefe are capable of efFeding all ^' three of the purpofes of words ; as the aggregate *' words, man, caftle, horfe, &c. are in a yet higher " degree. But I am of opinion, that the rnoft " general effed even of thefe words, does not arife " from their forming pictures of the feveral things « they would reprefent in the imagination ; be- " caufe, on a very diligent examination of my « own mind, and getting others to coniider theirs, « I do not find that once in twenty times any « fuch pidlure is formed ; and when it is, there is <« moil: commonly a particular effort of the imagina- <« tion for that purpofe. But the aggregate words <« operate, as I faid of the compound abftracts, not « by prefenting any image to the mind, but by hav- <« ing from ufe the fame effect on being mentioned, « that their original has when it is feen. Suppofe <« we were to treat a paiTage to this efFedt : " The « river Danube rifes in a moift and mountainous « foil in the heart of Germany, where, winding to « and fro, it waters feveral principalities, until turn- «« ing into Auftria, and leaving the walls of Vienna, « it paiTes into Hungary ; there with a vaft flood, «« augmented by the Saave and the Drave, it quits <« Chriftendom, and rolling through the barbarous " countries which border on Tartary, it enters by <« many mouths into the Black Sea." In this defcrip- <« tion many things are mentioned ; as mountains, '« rivers, cities, the fea, &c. But let any body exam- <« ine himfclf, and fee whether he has had imprelTed «' on his imagination any pictures of a n^er, moun- <« tain, watery foil, Germany, &c. Indeed, it is impof- <* fible, in the rapidity and quick fuccefllon of words " in converfation, to have ideas both of the found of " the word, and of the thing reprefented ; befides, " fome words exprefling real effences, are fo mixed " with others of a general and nominal import that *' it is impracticable to jump from fenfe to thought, 438 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY " from particulars to generals, from things to words, *' in fuch a manner as to anfwer the purpofes of life ; " nor is it neceffary that we fhould." In farther confirmation of this dodlrine, Mr. Burke refers to the poetical works of the late amiable and ing;enious Dr. Blacklock " Here^^ fays he, " is a< '' poet^ doubt lefs as much affeSled by his own defrriptionsy ^^ as any that reads them can be ; and yet he is affected " with this ftrong enthufiafm, by things of which he " neither has, nor can pofllbly have, any idea, far- " ther than that of a bare found ; and why may not *' thofe who read his works be affedled in the fame " manner that he was, with as little of any real ideas " of the things deCcribed." Before I proceed to make any remarks on thefe palTages, I muft obferve in general, that I perfeclly agree with Mr. Burke, in thinking that a very great proportion of the words which we habitually em- ploy, have no effect to " raife ideas in the mind ;'* or to exercife the powers of conception and imagin- ation. My notions on this fubjed: I have already fufHciently explained in treating of Abflradion. I agree with him farther, that a great proportion of the words which are ufed in poetry and eloquence, produce very powerful effecfls on the mind, by ex- citing emotions which we have been accuftomed to affociate with particular founds j without leading the imagination to form to itfelf any pidures or rep- refentations ; and his account of the manner in which fuch words operate, appears to me fatisfadtory. " Such words are in reality but mere founds ; but " they are founds, which, being ufed on particular ." occafions, wherein we receive feme good, or fuf- " fer fome evil ; or fee others affected with good or " evil ; or which we hear applied to other intereft- " ing things or events ; and being applied in fuch " a variety of cafes, that we know readily by habit " to what things they belong, they produce in the OF THE HUMAN MIND. 4S9 " mind, whenever they are afterwards mentioned, " eiFeds limilar to thofe of their occafioras. The " founds being often ufed without reference to any " particular occaiion, and carrying ftill their firft im- " preflions, they at laft utterly lofe their connection " with the particular occafions that gave rife to " them ; yet the found, without any annexed no- " tion, continues to operate as before." Notwithftanding, however, thefe conceflions, I cannot admit that it is in this way poetry produces its principal effect. Whence is it that general and abftradl expreffions are fo tame and lifelefs, in com- parifon of thofe which are particular and figurative ? Is it not becaufe the former do not give any exer- cife to the imagination, like the latter ? Whence the diftindion, acknowledged by all critics, ancient and modern, between that charm of words which evapo- rates in the procefs of tranflation, and thofa perma- nent beauties, which prefenting to the mind the dif- tindlnefs of a picture, may impart pleafure to the moft remote regions and ages ? Is it not, that in the one cafe, the Poet addrefl'es himfelf to affociations which are local and temporary ; in the other, to thofe effential principles of human nature, from which Poetry and painting derive their common at- tractions ? Hence, among the various fources of the fublime, the peculiar ftrefs laid by Longinus on what he calls ViJlOns^ QS?ixvToiaitxi'^ orav a. ^£7*3?, tu' £v$&t'cr OF THE HUMAN MINO. 443 who ftudy to improve it by the obfervation and comparifon of external objects only. A cultivated Talle, cotnbined with a creative Im- agination, conftitutes Genius in the Fine Arts. Without tafte, imagination could produce only a random analyfis and combination of our conceptions; and without imagination, talte would be deftitute of the faculty of invention. Thefe two ingredients of genius may be mixed together in all poiiible pro- portions ; and where either is poffefi'ed in a degree remarkably exceeding what falls to the ordinary ihare of mankind, it may compenfate in fome meaf- ufe ior a deficiency in the other. An uncommonly corred tafte, with little imagination, if it does not produce works which excite admiration, produces at leaft nothing which can offend. An uncommon fertility of imagination, even when it offends, excites our wonder by i's creative power ; and fhews what i-t could have performed, had its exertions been gui- ded by a more perfe<5l: model. In the infancy of the Arts, an union of thefe two powers in the fame mind is necelTary for the pro- duction of every work of genius. Tafte, without imagination, is, in fuch a fituation, impoflible ; for^ as there are no monuments of antient genius on which it can be formed, it muft be the reiult of ex- periments, which nothing but the imagination of every individual can enable him to make. Such a tafte muft neceffarily be imperfed^ in confequence of the limited experience of which it is the refult ; but, without imagination, it could not have been ac- quired even in this imperfecl degree. In the progrefs of the Arts the cafe comiCS to be altered. The produdions of genius accumulate to fuch an extent, that tafte may be formed by a care- ful ftudy of the works of others ; and as formerly imagination had ferved as a neceffary foundation for l:afte, fo tafte begins now to invade the province of 444< ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY imagination. The combinations which the latter faculty has been employed in making, during a long fucceflion of ages, approach to infinity ; and prefent fuch ample materials to a judicious feleclion, that with a high ftandard of excellence, continually pre- fent to the thoughts, induftry, affifted by the moft moderate degree of imagination, will, in time, pro- duce performances, not only more free from faults, but incomparably more powerful in their efifects, than the moil origiiiai efforts of untutored genius, which, guided by an uncultivated tafte, copies after an" inferior model of perfedion. What Reynolds obferves of Painting, may be applied to all the other Fine Arts ; that, '^ as the Painter, by bringing togeth- *' er in one piece, thofe beauties, which are difperfed *' amongft a great variety of individuals, produces a *' figure more beautiful than can be found in nature ; '' fo that artift who can unite in himfelf the excel- *^ lencies of the various painters, will approach near- *' er to perfeftion than any of his mailers,'** SECTION IV. Of ike Influence of Imagination on Human Chara^er and Happinefs. HITHERTO we have confidered the power of Imagination chiefly as it is connected with the Fine Arts. But it deferves our attention flill more, on account of its extenfive influence on human charac- ter and happinefs. The lower animals, as far as we are able to judge, are entirely occupied with the objects of their pref- ent perceptions : and the cafe is nearly the fame with the inferior orders of our own Ipecies. One OF THE HUMAN MIND. 445 of the principal efFeds which a Hberal education pro- duces on the mind, is to accullom us to withdraw our attention from the objects of fenfe, and to di- red: it, at pleafure, to thofe intellectual combiaations which delight the imagination. Even, however, a- mong men of cultivated underftandings, this faculty- is pofTeiTed in very unequal degrees by different in- dividuals ; and thefe differences (whether refulting from original conilitution or from early education) lay the foundation of fome llriking varieties in hu- man character. What we commonly call fenfibility, depends, in a great raeafure, on the power of imagination. Point out to two men, any objecl of compaflion ; — a man, for example, reduced by misfortune from eafy cir- cumflances to indigence. The one feels merely in proportion to what he perceives by his fenfes. The other follows, in imagination, the unfortunate man to his dwelling, and partakes with him and his fam- ily in their domeftic diftrefles. He liftens to their converfation, while they recal to remembrance the flattering profpects they once indulged ; the circle of friends they had been forced to leave ; the liberal plans of education which were begun and interrupt- ed ; and pictures out to himfelf all the various re- fources which dehcacy and pride fuggeft, to conceal poverty from the world. As he proceeds in paint- ing, his fenfibility increafes, and he weeps, not for what he fees, but for what he imagines. It will be faid, that it was his fenfibility which originally rouf- ed his imagination ; and the obfervation is undoubt- edly true ; but it is equally evident, on the other hand, that the warmth of his imagination increafes and prolongs his fenfibility. This is beautifully illuftrated in the Sentimental Journey of Sterne, While engaged in a train of re- fle^fions on the State Prifons in France, the acciden- tal fight of a flarling in a cage fuggefls to him the 4^6 ELEMENTS OF THE PHItOSOPHY • idea of a captive in his dungeon. He indulges lii^ imagination, " and looks through the twilight of the " grated door to take the pidture." '" I beheld/' (fays he,) '^ his body half-wafted a- ** way with long expedation and confinement, and '* felt what kind of ficknefs of the heart it is, which *' arifes from hope deferred. Upon looking nearer, " I faw him pale and feverifli ; in thirty years the *' wertern breeze had not once fanned his blood : he *' had feen no fun, no moon, in all that time, nor had *' the voice of friend or kinfman breathed through *' his lattice. His children But here my heart *' began to bleed, and I was forced to go on with an- *' other part of the portrait. " He was fitting upon the ground, in the fartheft " corner of his dungeon, on a little ftraw, which " was alternately his chair and bed : a little calen-^ " der of fmall fl:icks was laid at the head, notched all " over with the difmal days and nights he had paf- " fed there : — he had one of thefe little fiicks in his ** hand and with a rufl:y nail he was etching another *' day of mifery to add to the heap. As I darkened ** the little light he had, he lifted up a hopelefs eye *^ towards the door, then caft it down — {hook his *' head, and went on with his work of afEidion." The foregoing obfervations may account, in part, for the efFed: which exhibitions of fiftiiious difirefs produce on fome perfons, who do not difcover much fenfibility to the difiireifes of real life« In a Novel, or a Tragedy, the pidure is completely finiflied in all its parts ; and we are made acquainted not only with every circumfliance on which the difi:refs turns, but with the fentiments and feelings of every char- acter with refjped to his fituation. In real life we fee, in general, only detached fcenes of the Tragedy ; and the impreflion is flight, unlefs imagination fin- iflies the charaders, and fupplies the incidents that are wanting. OF THE HUMAN MIND, 447 it is not only to fcenes of diftrefs that imagina- tion increafes our fenfibility. It gives us a doub- le ihare in the profperity of others, and enables us to partake, with a more lively interefl, in every for- tunate incident that occurs either to individuals or to communities. Even from the productions of the earth, and the viciflitudes of the year, it carries for- ward our thoughts to the enjoyments they bring to the fenfitive creation, and by interefling our be- nevolent affections in the fcenes we behold, lends a new charm to the beauties of nature. I have often been inclined to think that the appa- rent coldnefs and felfifhnefs of mankind may be tra- ced, in a great meafure, to a want of attention and a want of imagination. In the cafe of misfortunes which happen to ourfelves, or to our near connec- tions, neither of thefe powers is neceffary to make us acquainted with our fituation ; fo that we feel, of neceflity, the correfpondent emotions. But without an uncommon degree of both, it is impoffible for any man to comprehend completely the fituation of his neighbor, or to have an idea of a great part of the diflrefs which exifls in the world. If we feel therefore more for ourfelves than for others, the dif- ference is to be afcribed, at leaft partly, to this ; that, in the former cafe, the fa^s which are the founda- tion of our feelings, are more fully before us than they poflibly can be in the latter. In order to prevent mifapprehenfions of my mean- ing, it is neceffary for me to add, that I do not mean to deny that it is a law of our nature, in cafes in which there is an interference between our own in- tereft and that of other men, to give a certain degree of preference to ourfelves ; even fuppofmg our neighbor's fituation to be as completely known to us as our own. I only affirm, that, where this prefer- ence becomes blameable and unjuff, the effect is to 44B ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY be accounted for partly in the way I mentioned.* One ilriking proof of this is, the powerful emo'ions which may be occafionally excited in the minds of the moil callous, when the attention has once been fixed, and the imagination awakened, by eloquent and circumftantial and pathetic defcription. A very amiable and profound moralift in the ac- count which he has given of the origin of our fjnfe of juftice, has, I think, drawn a lefs pleafing pidure of the natural conftitution of the human mind, than is agreeable to truth. " To difturb," (fays he,) '^ the happinefs of our neighbor, merely becaufe it *' ftands in the way of our own ; to take from him *' what is of real ufe to him, merely becaufe it may be " of equal or of more ufe to us ; or, to indulge, in this " manner, at the expence of other people^ the nat- *' ural preference which every man has for his own *' happinefs above that of other people, is what no '« impartial fpeclator can go along with. Every man " is, no doubt, firft and principally recommended to '' his own care ; and as he is fitter to take care of *' himfelf than of any other perfon, it is fit and right " that it fhould be fo. Every man, therefore, is " much more deeply interefted in whatever imme- " diately concerns himfelf, than in what concerns *' any other man : and to hear, perhaps, of the " death of another perfon with whom we have no " particular connection, will give us lefs concern, " will fpoil our ftomach, or break our reft, much " lefs than a very infignificant difafter which has be- " fallen ourfelves. But though the ruin of our '^^ neighbor may afFecl us much lefs than a very fmall *=' misfortune of our own, we mufi: not ruin him to <^.' prevent that fmall misfortune, nor even to pre- * I say parlly ; for habits of inattention to the situation of oth- er men, undoabtcdiy prei-uppoce sojxie defect in the Eocial affec. tions, OF THE HUMAN MIND, 449 *^ vent our own ruin. We muft here, as in all oth- *' er cafes, view ourfelves not fo much according to " that light in which we may naturally appear to our- " felves,as according to that in which we naturally ap- " pear to others. Tho' every man may, according to " the proverb, be the whole world to himfelf, to the " reft of mankind he is a moft infignificant part " of it. Though his own happinefs may be of more " importance to him than that of all the world be- *' fides, t@ every other perfon it is of no more con- " fequence than that of any other man. Though it " may be true, therefore, that every individual, in " his own breaft, naturally prefers himfelf to all man- *' kind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, *^ and avow that, he ads according to this principle. " He feels that, in this preference they can never go " along with him, and that how natural foever it *' may be to him, it muft always appear exceflive " and extravagant to them. When he views him- *' felf in the light in which he is confcious that oth- *' ers will view him, he fees that to them he is but " one of the multitude, in no reiped: better than *' any other in it. If he would acl fo as that the *' impartial fpedator may enter into the principles of " his conduA, which is what of all things he has the " greateft defire to do, he muft, upon this, as upon •' all other occalions, humble the arrogance of his " felf-love, and bring it down to fomething which " other men can go along with." I am ready to acknowledge, that there is much truth in this paffage ; and that a prudential regard to the opinion of others, might teach a man of good fenfe, without the aid of more amiable motives, to conceal his unreafonable partialities in favor of him- felf, and to acl agreeably to what he conceives to be the fentiments of impartial fpedators. But I cannot help thinking, that the fad is much too ftrongly ftated with refped to the natural partiality of felf- 1 1 i 450 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY love, fuppofing the fituation of our neighbors to be as completely prefented to our view, as our own muft of necellity be. When the Orator wifhes to combat the felfifti paffions of his audience, and to roufe them to a fenfe of what they owe to mankind ; what mode of perfuafion does nature didate to him ? Is it to remind them of the importance of the good opinion of the world, and of the necefllty, in order to obtain it, of accommodating their condud to the fentiments of others, rather than to their own feel- ings ? Such conliderations undoubtedly might, with fome men, produce a certain effed ; and might lead them to affume the appearance of virtue ; but they would never excite a fentiment of indignation at the thought of injuflice, or a fudden and involuntary burft of difintereiled aifeclion. If the Orator can only fucceed in fixing their attention to fad:s, and in bringing thefe hd:s home to their imagination by the power of his eloquence, he has completely at- tained his objed. No fooner are the fads appre- hended, than the benevolent principles of our na- ture diiplay themfelves in all their beauty. The moft cautious and timid lofe, for a moment, all thought of themfelves, and defpifing every confider- ation of prudence or of fafety, become wholly en« grolTed with the fortunes of others. Many other fads, which are commonly alleged as proofs of the original felfifhnefs of mankind, may be explained, in part, in a fimilar way ; and may be traced to the habits of inattention, or to a want of imagination, ariling, probably, from fome fault in early educationl What has now been remarked with refped to the focial principles, may be applied to all our other paf- lions, excepting thofe which take their rife from the body. They are commonly ftrong in proportion to the warmth and vigor of the imagination* It is, however, extremely curious,^ that when an imagination, which is naturally phiegmatic,or which. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 451 like thafe of the vulgar, has little adivity from a want of culture, is fairly roufed by the defcriptions of the Orator or of the Poet, it is more apt to produce the violence of enthufiafm, than in minds of a fupe- rior order. By giving this faculty occafional ex- €rcife, we acquire a great degree of command over it. As we can withdraw the attention at pleafure from objecls of fenfe, and tranfport ourfelves into a world of our own, fo when we wifli to moderate our enthuiiafm, we can difmifs the objeds of ima- gination, and return to our ordinary perceptions and occupations. But in a mind to which thefe in- telledlual vifions are not familiar, and which bor- rows them completely from the genius of another, imagination, when once excited, becomes perfedlly ungovernable, and produces foinething like a tem- porary infanity. Hence the wonderful efFed:s of popular eloquence on the lower orders ; effects which are much more remarkable, than what it ever produces on men of education ^ SECTION V. Continuation of the fame Suhje6i. — Inconveniences refuli^ ingfrom an ill-regulated Imagination, IT was undoubtedly the intention of Nature that the objects of perception fliould produce much ftron- ger impreffions on the mind than its own operations. And, accordingly, they always do fo, when proper care has been taken in early life, to exercife the dif- ferent principles of our conftitution. But it is pof- fible, by long habits of folitary refleclion, to reverfe this order of things, and to weaken the attention to fenfible objedts to fo great a degree, as to leave the condud almoft wholly under the influence of ima^ gination. Removed to a dillance from fociety, and 453 ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY from the purfuits of life, when we have been lon^ accuftomed to converfe with our own thoughts, and have found our ad:ivity gratified by intellectual ex- ertions, which afford fcope to all our powers and af- fections, without expoling us to the inconveniences refulcing from the buftle of the world, we are apt to contra<^ an unnatural predile6lion for meditation, and to lofe all intereft in external occurrences. In fuch a fituation too, the mind gradually lofes that com- mand which education, when properly conducted, gives it over the train of its ideas ; till at length the moft extravagant dreams of imagination acquire as powerful an influence in exciting all its paffions, as if they were realities. A wild and mountainous country, which prefents but a limited variety of ob- jects, and thefe only of fuch a fort as " awake to fol- " emn thought," has a remarkable effect in cherifh- ing this enthufiafm. When fuch diforders of the imagination have been long confirmed by habit, the evil may perhaps be beyond a remedy ; but in their inferior degrees, much may be expected from our own efforts ; in particular, from mingling gradually in the bufinefs and amufements of the world ; or, if we have fuffi. cient force of mind for the exertion, from refolutely plunging into thofe adtive and interefting and haz- ardous fcenes, which, by compelling us to attend to external circumftances, may weaken the impreffions of imagination, and ftrengthen thofe produced by re- alities. The advice of the poet, in thefe cafes, is Cr qually beautiful and juft : ** Go, soft enthusiast ! quit the cypress groves, " Nortotherivulet^s loDely moanings tune " Your sad complaint. Go, seek the cheerful haunts " Of men, and mingle with the bustling crowd ; " Lay schemes for wealth, or power, or fame, the wish " Of nobler minds, and puth them night and day. ^'' Or join the caravan in quest of scenes OF THE HUMAN MIND. 453 " New to your eyes, and shifting every hoqr, " Beyond the Alps, beyond the Appenines. " Or, more adventurous, rush into the the field " Where war grows hot ; and raging thiough the sky, " The lofty trumpet swells the madd'ning soui ; " And in the hardy camp and toilsome march, " Forget all softer and less manly cares."* The difordered ftate of mind to which thefe ob- servations refer is the more interefting, that it is chiefly incident to men of uncommon fenfibility and genius. It has been often remarked, that there is a connection between genius and melancholy ; and there is one fenfe of the word melancholy ^ in which the remark is undoubtedly true ; a fenfe which it may be diflSicult to define, but in which it implies nothing either gloomy or malevolent.! This, I think, is not only confirmed by fa6ts,but may be in- ferred from fome principles which were formerly ftated on the fubjecEl of invention ; for as the dif- pofition now alluded to has a tendency to retard the current of thought, and to colled the attention of the mind, it is peculiarly favorable to the dlfcov- ery of thofe profound conclufions which refult from an accurate examination of the lefs obvious relations among our ideas. From the fame principles too, may be traced fome of the effecls which lituation and early education produce on the intellectual charad- er. Among the natives of wild and folitary coun- tries we may exped to meet with fublime exertions of poetical imagination and of philofophical refearch ; while thofe men whofe attention has been diflipated from infancy amidft the buftle of the world, and whofe current of thought has been trained to yield * Armstrong. f A<(« ri Ttxtris ocrot 'jrs^trrot ysyovxaiv xvocbs, rt kxtx (piXocoptxy, n f!^oX/T/x>!v, -n votvcriV) ♦} rs^txs, (pxivovrxt [xtXtty^o^iKOi ovris. AiusroT. Problem, sect. xxx.. 4S4> ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY and accommodate itfelf, every moment, to the rapid fucceflian of trifles, which diverfify faihionable life, acquire, without any effort on their part, the intel- le(flu3l habits which are favorable to gaiety, vivaci- ty, and wit. When a man, under the habitual influence of a warm imagination, is obliged to mingle occaflonally in the fcenes of real bufinefs, he is perpetually in danger of being mifled by his own enthufiafm. — What we call good fenfe in the conduct of life, con- iiflis chiefly in that temper of mind which enables its poflefl*or to view, at all times, with perfe<5l coolnefs and accuracy, all the various circumfl;ances of his iitu- ation ; fo that each of them may produce its due impreflion on him, without any exaggeration arif- ing from his own peculiar habits. But to a man of an ill-regulated imagination, external circumflances only ferve as hints to excite his own thoughts, and the condud he purfues has, in general, far lefs ref- erence to his real fituation, than to fome imaginary one, in which he conceives himfelf to be placed : in confequence of which, while he appears to himfelf to be ading with the moft perfect wifdom and confift- ency, he may frequently exhibit to others all the appearances of folly. Such, pretty nearly, feems to be the idea which the Author* of the " Reflexions on the Character and Writings of Roufleau," has formed of that extraordinary man. " His faculties,'* we are told, " were flow in their operation, but his *' heart was ardent : it was in confequence of his " own meditations, that he became impaflioned : he *^ difcovered no fudden emotions, but all his feelings *' grew upon reflexion. It has, perhaps, happened " to him to fall in love gradually with a woman, by " dwelling on the idea of her during her abfence. *' Sometimes he would part with you with all his * Madame de Stail. OF THE HUMAN MIND. 455 " former afFedions ; but if an expreflion had efcaped *' you, which might bear an unfavorable conftruc- *' tion, he would recoiled it, examine it, exaggerate " it, perhaps dwell upon it for a month, and con- *' elude by a total breach with you. Hence it was, " that there was fcarce a poflibility of undeceiving ** him ; for the light which broke in upon him at ** once was not fufficient to efface the wrong im- *' preffions which had taken place fo gradually in his " mind. It was extremely difficult, too, to contin- ** ue long on an intimate footing with him. A word, *' a gefture, furniflied him with matter of profound *' meditation : he connected the moft trifling cir- ** cumftances like fo many mathematical propofitions, *' and conceived his conclufions to be fupported by *' the evidence of demonftration. I believe," contin- ues this ingenious writer, " that imagination was •^ the ftrongefl of his faculties, and that it had almoft " abforbed all the reft. He dreamed rather than ex- " ifted, and the events of his life might be faid, " more properly, to have paffed in his mind, than *^ without him : a mode of being, one fliould have " thought, that ought to have fecured him from " diftruft, as it prevented him from obfervation ; *' but the truth was, it did not hinder him from at- *' tempting to obferve ; it only rendered his obfer- " vations erroneous That his foul was tender, no ** one can doubt, after having read his works ; but ^ his imagination fometimes interpofed between hi& " affections, and deflroyed their influence : he ap- " peared fometimes void of fenfibility ; but it was *' becaufe he did not perceive objects inch as they " were. ' Had he feen them with our eyes, his " heart would have been more affected than ours.** In this very'ftriking defcription we fee the melan- choly picture of fenfibility and genius apprc^aching to infanity. It is a cafe, probably, that but rarely occurs, in the extent here defcribed : but, I believe. 456 ELEMENTS OF TKS PHILOSOPHY there is no man who has lived much in the world, who will not trace many refembling features to it, in the circle of his own acquaintances : perhaps there are few, who have not been occafionally confcious of fome refemblance to it in themfelves. To thefe obfervations we may add, that by an ex- ceffive indulgence in the pleafures of irhagination,, the tafte may acquire a faftidious refinement unfuit- able t© the prefent fituation of human nature ; and thofe intelledtual and moral habits, which ought to be formed by a<^ual experience of the world, may be gradually fo accommodated to the dreams of po- etry and romance, as to difqualify us for the fcenes in which we are deftined to ad:. Such a diftemper- ed ftate of the mind is an endles fource of error ; more particularly when we are placed in thofe crit- ical fituations, in which our condud: determines our future happinefs or mifery ; and which, on account of this extenfive influence on human life, form the principal ground-work of fiditious compofition. The efFed of novels, in mifleading the pallions of youth, with refpecl to the moft interefting and important of all relations, is one of the many inftances of the in- conveniences refulting from an ill- regulated imagin- ation. The paffion of love has been, in every age, the favorite fubjecft of the poets, and has given birth to the fined productions of human genius. Thefe are the natural delight of the young and fufceptible, long before the influence of the pallions is felt ; and from thefe a romantic mind forms to itfelf an ideal model of beauty and perfeclion, and becomes enamoured with its own creation. On a heart which has been long accuftomed to be thus warmed by the imagin- ation, the excellencies of real characters make but a flight impreflion : and, accordingly, it will be found, that men of a romantic turn, unlefs when under the influence of violent paflions, are feldoni attached to OF THE HUMAN MIND. 457 a particular objed. Where, indeed, fuch a turn is united with a warmth of temperament, the efFe us,) " through which, *' strictly speaking, the effect is necessarily supposed by the " supposition of the efficient cause, or any determinate cause *' by the supposition of the effect." He adds afterwards, *' Therefore there can be no argumentation from an efficient " cause to the effect, or form an effect to the cause which is " lawfully necessary.'* Mathematical Lectures read at Cambridge^ Dr. Butler too, in his discourse on the ignorance of man, has remarked, that ** it is in general no more than ejects " that the most knowing are acquainted with i for as to *' causes they are as entirely in the dark as the most ignor- ** ant." " What are the laws," (he continues,) '' by which ** matter acts on matter, but certain effects, which some, ** having observed to be frequently repeated, have reduced ** to general rules ?" Butler's Ser7nons, ** The laws of attraction and repulsion" (says Dr. Berke- ley) " are to be regarded a& laws of motion, and these only '* as rules or methods observed in the productions of natural *' effects, the efficient and final causes whereof are not of " mechanical consideration. Certainly, if the explaining a ** phenomenon be to assign its proper efficient and final " cause, it should seem the mechanical philosophers never " explained any thing ; their province being only to discov- " er the laws of nature ; that is, the general rules and *' methods of motion ; and to account for particular phe- NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. ^S. ** nomena, by reducing them under, or shewing their con- ** formity to such general rules." SiRis : or, PhiJo^Qphtcal Inquiries concerning the Fir- tues of Tar Water ^ p. 108. " The words attraction and repulsion may, in compliance " with custom, be used where, accurately speaking, motion " alone is meant." Ibid, p. 114. " Attraction cannot produce, and in that sense account, •* for the phenomena ; being itself one of the phenomena " produced and to be accounted for." Ibid, p. 115. " There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity *' in the plienomena or appearances of nature, which are a ** foundation for general rules : and these are a grammar ** for the understanding ot nature, or that series of effects " in the visible world, whereby we are enabled to foresee " what will come to pass in the natural course of things, " Plotinus observes, in his third Ennead, that the art of " presaging, is in some sort the reading of natural letters *' denoting order, and that so far forth as analogy obtains ** in the universe, there may be vaticination. And in reality " he that foretels the motions of the planets, or the effects *' of medicines, or the result of chemical or mechanical ex- " periments, may be said to do it by natural vaticination." Ibid, p. J 20, 121. " instruments, occasions, and signs, occur in, or rather " make up, the whole visible course of nature." //^zV. p. 123. The following very remarkable passage from Mr, Locke" shews clearly that this eminent philosopher considered the connection between impulse and motion, as a conjunction which we learn from experience only, and not as a conse- quence deducible from the consideration of impulse, by any reasoning rt />rzor7. The passage is ihe more curious, that it is this particular application of Mr, Hume's doctrine, that has been generally supposed to furnish the strongest objec- tion against it. " Another idea we have of body, is the power of com- *' municaiing motion by impulse ; and of our souls, the *< power of exciting motion by thought. These ideas, the '* one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experi- **^ ence clearly furnishes us with : but if here again we in- " quire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For •** in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as •^* much motion is lost to one body, as is got to the other, . 4r6 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. " which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other con- ** ception, but of the passing of motion out of the one into ** another ; which I think is as obscure and inconceivable, ** as how our minds mv.ve or stop our bodies by thought, *' which we every moment find they do." " The communication of motion by thought, " which we ascribe to spirit, is as evident as that of impulse " which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes ** us sensible of both of these, though our narrow under- " standings can comprehend neither." '* 1 o conclude, sensation convinces us, that there " are solid extended substances ; and reflection, that there " are thinkmg ones : experience assures us of the existence *' of such beings ; and that the one hath a power to move " body by impulse, and the other by thought. — If we •' would inquire farther into their nature, causes, and man- *' ner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than '' we do of thinking. If we would explain them any far-* *' ther, one is as easy as the other ; and there is no more *' difficulty to conceive, how a substance we know not, *' should by thought set body into motion, than how a sub- " stance we know not, should by impulse set body into mo- " tion." Locke, book ii. chap. 28. § S,3, 2S. It is not indeed very easy to reconcile the foregoing ob- servations, which are, in every respect, worthy of the saga- city of this excellent philosopher, with the passage quoted from him in page 81 of this work. Some of Mr Hume's reasonings concerning the nature of the connections among physical events, coincide perfect- ly with those of Malebranche on the same subject ; but they were employed by this last writer to support a very differ- ent conclusion. At a still earlier period, Hobbes expressed himself with respect to phys]cal connections, in terms so nearly approach- ing to Mr. Hume's, that it is difficult to suppose that they did not suggest to him the language which he has employed on that subject. *' What we call experience," (he remarks) ** is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents ** have been followed by what consequents." — " No man," (he continues,) ** can have in his mind a conception of the " future ; for the future is not yet ; but of our conceptions " of the past we make a future, or rather call past, future ** relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to " see like antecedents foliowed by like consequents, when- NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 477 " soever he seeihthe like come to pass to any thing he had *' seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that ** followed then. — When a man hath so often observed like *' antecedents to be followed by like consequents, that *' whersoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again " for the consequent, or when he seeth the consequent, *' raaketh account there hath been the like antecedent, then " he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent signs " of one another. Hobbes' Tripos. I am doubtful whether I should not add to these author - ties, that of Lord Bacon, who, although he has no where formerly stated the doctrine now under consideration, has plainly taken it for granted in all his reasonings on the method of prosecuting philosophical inquiries ; for if we could perceive in any instance the manner in which a cause produces its effect, we should be able to deduce the effect from its cause by reasoning a priori ; the impossibility of which he every where strongly inculcates. ** Homo natu- ** rae minister et Interpres tantum facit et intelligit quantum ** de naturae ordine re vel mente observaverit ; nee amplius *' scit aut potest." I acknowledge, at the same time, that, from the general scope of Lord Bacon's writings, as well as from some particular expressions in them with regard to causes, I am inclined to believe that his metaphysical no- tions on the subject were not very accurate, and that he was led to perceive the necessity of recurring to observa-i tion and experiment in natural philosophy, not from a spec- ulative consideration of our ignorance concerning necessa" ry connections, b«jt from a conviction, founded on a review of the history of science, of th(i insufficiency of those meth- ods of inquiry which his p.edecessors had pursued. The notion which the ancients had formed of the object of phi- losophy, (which they conceived to be the investigation of efficient causes,)\vas the principal circumstance which mis- led them in their researches ; and the erroneous opinions of Des Cartes on the same subject, frustrated all the efforts of his great and inventive genius, in the studv of physics. " Perspicuuni est," (sayi. he, in one passage,) " optirnam " philosophandi viam nos sequuturos, si ex ipsius Dei cog- " nitione rerum ab eo creatarum cognitionem deducere " coneraur, ut ita scientiam perfectissimam qusae est effect- " uum per causas acquiramus."* • There is, I believe, reason to doubt if Des Cartes had ever read the works ofBacoii. 4?* NOTES AND ILLLUSTRATIOKS: The strong prejudice which has been entertained of late against Mr. Hume's doctrine concerning the connection a- mong physical events, in consequence of the dangerous con- clusions to which it has erroneously been supposed to lead, "will, I hope, be a sufficient apology for multiplying so ma- ny authorities in support of it. NOTE [D,] page 7t. THIS language has even been adopted by philosophers, and by atheists as well as theists. The latter have repre- sented natural events as parts of a great chain, the highest link of which is supported by the Deity. The former have pretended, th.it there is no absurdity in supposing the num- ber ol links to be infinite. Mr. Hume had the merit of shewing clearly to philosophers, that our common language, with respect to cause and effect, is merely analogical ; and that if there be any links among physical events, they must forever remain invisible to us. If this pa'^t of his system be admitted ; and if, at the same time, we admit the author- ity of that principle of the mind, which leads us to refer every change to an efficient cause ; Mr. H\ime's doctrine seems to be more favorable to theism, than even the com- mon notions upon this subject ; as it keeps the Deity al- ways in view, not only as the first, but as the constantly • operating efficient cause in nature, and as the great con- necting principle among all the various phenomena which we observe. This, accordingly, was the conclusion which Malebranche deduced from premises very nearly the same with Mr. Hume's. NOTE [E,] page 110. MR. LOCKE, in his Essay on Human Understanding, has taken notice of the quickness with which the opera- tions of the mind are carried on, and has referred to the acquired perceptions of sight, as a proof of it. The same Author has been struck with the conaection between this class of facts and our habitual actions ; but he does not state the question, whether such actions are voluntary or not. I think it probable, from his mode of expression, that his opinion on the subject was the same with mine. The following quotation contains all the remarks I recoi-* NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS*: 4^9 Icct in his writings, that have any connection with the doc- trines of the present chapter : ** We are farther to consider, concerning perception, that •' the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown peo- " pie, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice *' of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe, of " any uniform color, e» £". gold, alabaster, or jet, it is eer- •' tain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a *' flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of " light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we, hav- " ing by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of *' appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, and " what alterations are made in the reflections of light by *' the difl^erence of the sensible figure of bodies ; the judg- " ment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appear- '* ances into their causes ; so that, from that which trulv *' is variety of shadow or color, collecting the figure, it •* makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself ** the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform color ; ** when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane va- ** riously colored ; as is evident in painting." Chap. ix. § 8. " But this is not, I think, usually in any of our ideas but " those received by sight ; because sight, the most ccm- •' prehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the " ideas of light and colors, which are peculiar only to that " sense, and also the far diff'erent ideas of space, figure, and ** motion, the several varieties whereof change the appear- " ances of its proper object, viz. light and colors, we bring " ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, ** in many cases, by a settied habit in things whereof we ** have frequent experience, is performed so constantly, and \ *' so quick, that we take that for the perception of oursen- " sation, which is an idea formed by our judgment ; so " that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the '* other, and is scarce taken any notice of itself; as a maa '* who reads or hears with attention and understanding, " takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the " ideas that are excited in him by them. '* Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little " notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the ** mind are performed ; for as itself is thought to take up " no space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to re- ^* quire no time, but many of them seem to be crowded in- 480 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. " into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the acJ- *' tions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in ** his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect oa " them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with " one glance, ice all parts of a demonstration, which may " very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it " will require to pat it into words, and step by step shew " it to another ? Secondly, we shall not be much surprised *' that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consid- *' er how the facility which we get of domg things by a •' custom of doing, makes them often pass in as without our " notice. Habits, especially such as arc begun very early, '* come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape '* our o'iservation. How frequently do we in a day cover *' our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we ** are at all in the dark ? Men that by custom have got the •* use of a bye-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce " sounds, which, though taken notice of by others, they *' themselves neither hear nor observe ; and, therefore, it *' is not so strange that our mind should often change the " idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make *' one serve only to excite the other, without our taking no- " tice of it." ' Ibid. $ 9, 10. The habit mentioned by Locke, in this paragraph, of oc- casionally winking with the eye-lids, (which is not accom- panied with any memory of our being, in every such in- stance, ill a momentary state of total darkness,) deserves to be added to the cases already mentioned, to shew the dependence of memory upon attention. NOTE [FJ page 149. "_« — PLATONI quid idea sit, peculiari tractatione ^* proiixe excussimus,* quae consuli ab iis debet, qui accu- ** rate totam rti seriem pernoscere cupiunt. Nos pro " prsesentis institati modo paucis notamus, Platoni ideam " non esse illam, qu£e ex contemplaiione objectorura singu* " larium exsurgit notionem jniversalem rique alicujus geft- *' eralem conceptum, quern recentiores ideam vocant, ille ** e^rj vocavit et ab idea distinxit. Sed idese sunt illi essen« ** tialia rerum omnium singulariura exemplaria, avxoa^tat^ *■'' gaudentia, ad quorum naturam indolemque res singularcs * Brucker here alludes to bis work, intitled, Historia Philosophica de Ideis ; which I have never had an opportunity of seeing. N^OTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 481 " fonrat92 sunt, et quse illis veram certamque atque stabi- " lem essentiana largiuntur. Has ideas ex divina mente ** oriri, inque ea radicari, sua autem propria substantia gau- '* derc, ct esse ctvrus x«/ ovrus ovrx statuit, et circa earum cog- ** nitipnem versari intellectum humanum, in his rerum es- " sentiis separatim et extra mater iam existentibus cognos- '* cendis cardinem verti totius philosophse asseruit. Ridi- " culutn id visum Aristoteli, dari extra m?teriam ejusmodi " essentias universales, quibus res omnes singulares essen- *' tialiter modificarentur, rato, esse hsec rspsna-i^xrix et nugas " otiosi ingenii, Platonemque sine causa rationeque sufii- " cientihsec somnia ex scholis Pythagoreorum, quae istis en- '" tibus personabant, recepisse, suoque intulisse systemati# *' Cum autem negare non auderet, esse in rebus formas es- " sentiales, has ideas, sive formas, qua voce Platonicum " nomen exprimere maluit, materise ab seterno esse impres- " sas, ct in eo latere affirmavit, et ita demum ex rationibus " istis formisque seminalibus, materiam esse formatam " statuit." Bruck, Hist. Phil, iii. p. 905. NOTE [G,] page 150. THE Stoics, who borrowed many of their doctrines from the other schools of philosophy, seem, in particular, to have derived their notions on this subject from some of their predecessors. Stilpo, who was of the Megaric sect, is said to have held opinions approaching nearly to those of the Nominalists. *' Stilpo universalia plane sustulit. Dicebat enim : qui *' hominem dicat eum neminem dicere, quod non hunc vel *•• ilium ea vox significet, nee huic magis, quam alteri con- '' veniat. — Scilicet supponebat Stilpo, non dari homin- ** em in abstr^cto, adeoque has species et genera rerum non '* natura existere ; cum ueque in hoc neque in alio homine, " ille homo universalis queat ostendi. Inductione itaque *' facta, cum neque hunc, neque illium, neque aluim hom- " inem esse coUigeret, inferebat nullum esse hominem, '* sicque ludendo ambigua hominis in genere sive abstracto, '* uti logici dicunt, & in individuo sive singulari considera- *' ti notione, incautos exagitabat. Altiora tamen hie latere *' putat P. Bayle, et non in solo verborum lusu substitisse *' Stilponem, sed universalia sive prsedicabilia negavissc.— " Neque prorsus est dissimilc, fuisse Stilponem inter eos, "NT vr n 432 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIOiJS. " qui universalia prseter nuda nomina nihil esse dicerent^ ** quod et cynicos fecisse et alios, alibi docuimus : quorum " partes postea susceperuut Abaelardi sequaces et lotanom- " inaliutn secia." Brucker, vol. i. p. 619. NOTE [H,] page 152. " SECULO XI. Ruscelinus vel Ruscelinus sacerdos et ** philosophus Cjmpendiensis, ab Aristotele stcessum fe- " cit, et in Stoicorum castra ita transtit, ut statueret, uni- " versalia, nee ante rem, nee in re existere, nee uUam ha- " bere realem existentiam, sad esse nuda nomina et voees, *' quibus rerum smgularium genera denotentur," Brucker, Hist, PhtU vol. iii. p. 906- *' Dum Porphyrius prudentur quses^tionem ; an universa- *' lia rvera eXistant, omittendam esse censet, de qua inter *' Platonlcos et Stoieos mire decertari novetat occasionem " suppeditavit otioso Roscelini ingenio, earn novo acuminc *' ingenii aggrediendi definiendique." Ibid, t^ol. iii. p. G74. Roscelinus was a native of Britanny, and canon of Com- piegne. He is much celebrated, even by his adversaries, for the acuteness and subtilty of his genius, which he dis- played both in scholastical and theological controversy. He was condemned for Tritheism bv a council assembled at Soissons in the year 1092- (See Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, J It does not appear that he ever taught in Pa- ris, or that he gave public Lectures ; but he had the honor to direct the studies, and to form the philosophical opin- ions of Abelard, by whose means the innovations he had introduced into Dialectics obtained a very wide and rapid circulation. — (Brucker, vol. iii. p. 728.) He is mention- ed as an Englishman by Mallet, in his life of Bacon, and by other writers j a mistake into which they have fallen, by confounding Britain with Bretagne. Very litde is known of the particulars of his life. " Primum nominali- *•■ um aiunt fuisse,'' says Leionitz ; " nescio quetn Ruceli- " num Britonem." See his Dissertation de Stylo Philosoph- ico Miirii Niz^lii. The opinion of Abelard concerning Universals, is said to have differed, in some respects, from that of his master, *^ Alius consisiit in vocibus/' says John of Salisbury, who was a scholar of Ai^clard, " licet ha3c opinio cum Roscelino ** suo fere omnino jam evanuerit ; alius sermones intueter, ■^ et ad illos detorquct, quicquid alicubi de univeisalibus NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 4S3 ^ meminit scriptum. In hac autem opinione deprehensufe " est Peripateticus Abelardus noster.'* Metalo^. lib. u. c. ir, or this difference between the doctrines of Roscelinus and Abelard, I find myself perfectly unable to give any ac- count ; and I am glad to find that MorhofF acknowledges his ignorance upon the same subject. ^' Alii fuerunt, qui ** universalia qusesiverunt,gnon tarn in vocibus quam in ser- *' monibus integris ; quod Joh. Sarisberiensis adscribit Pe* *' tro Abelardo ; quo quid intelhgat ille, mihi non satis li- " quet." Polyhist* torn. ii. lib. i. cap. 13, § 2. Absurd as these controversies may now appear, such was the prevailing taste of the twelfth century, that they se- duced the young and aspiring mind of Abelard from all the other pursuits which Europe then presented to his ambi- tion. — '"• Ut militaris gloriae pompam," says he, " cum hae- *' reditate et prcerogauva primogenitorum meorum fratri- ** bus derelinquens, Martis curiae penitus abdicarem, ut Mi- *' r«;r\ae gremio educarer." Hist. Calam. Suar. c. I. Amoag the literary men of this period, none seems to have arisen to such an eminent superiority above his age, in the liberality of his philosophical views, as John of Sal- isbury, the celebrated friend of archbishop Btd^et. In his youth he had studied at Paris under Abelard and other eminent masters, and had applied himself, with distinguish-^ ed ardor and succes, to the subtile speculations which then occupied the schools. After a long absence, when his mind was enlarged by more liberal and useful pursuits, and by an extensive intercourse with the world, he had the curiosi- ty to revisit the scene of his early studies, and to compare his own acquisitions with those of his old companions. The account which he gives of this visit is stiikingly character- istical, both of the writer and of his age: " Invcnti sunt, '* qui fuerant, et ubi : neque enim ad palmam visi sunt pro^ ** cessisse ad quaestiones pristinas dirimendas, neque propo- '* sitiunculam unam adjecerant. . Expertus " itaque sum, quod liquido colligi potest, quia sicut dialec- " tica alias expedit disciplinas, sic, si sola fuerir, jacet ex- sanguis et sterilis. &c." Metalo^. lib. ii. cap. 10. The same Author, speaking of the controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists, thus expresses himself : " Quaestionem de generibus et speciebus in qua laboran* " mundusjam senuit, in qua plus ten)poris consumptumest ** quam in acquirendo et regendo orbis imperio consum- 484 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. « serit Ceesarea domus : plus efFusum pecuniae, quam in ** omnibus divitiis suis posscderit Croesus. Hasc enim " tamdiu multos tenuit, ut cum hoc unum tota vita quaere- " rent, tandem nee istud, nee aliud invenirent." De Nugis Curialium, lib, vii. cap. 12. NOTE [I,] page 167. • *' SECTA nominalium, omnium inter scholasticas ** profundissima, et hodiernae reformaiae philosophandi ra *' tioni congruentissima ; quae quum olim maxima floreret '* nunc apud scholasticos quidem, extincta est. Unde con **jicias decrementa potius quam augmenta acuminis " Quum autem ipse Nizolius noster se Nominalem exser " te profitere non dubitet prope finem capitis sexti, libri ** primi ; et vero in realitate formalitatum et universalium * evertenda ncrvus disputationis ejus omnis potissimum *' contineatur pauca quaedam de Nominalibus subjicere ope- " rae pretium duxi. Nominalcs sunt, qui omnia putant cs- " se nuda nomina praecer substantias singulares, abstracto- " rum igitur et universalium realitatem prorsus tollunt. " Primum autem nominalium aiunt fuisse nescio quem Ru- ** cellinum Britonem, cujus, occasione cruenta certamina in ** academia Parisiensi fuerunt excitata. *' Diu autem jacuit in tenebris secta nominalium, donee " maximi vir ingenii, et eruditionis pro illo sevo summae, *' Wilhelmus Occam Anglus, Scoti discipulus, sed mox *' oppugnator maximus, de improviso eam resuscitavit ; *' consensereGregorius Ariminensis, Gabr. Biel, et plerique ** ordinis Augustinianorum, unde et in Martini Lutheri '* scriptis prioribus amor nominalium satis elucet, donee '* procedente tempore erga omnes monachos aequaliier af- ** fectus esse coepit. Generalis autem regula est, qua nom- *' inales passim utuntur ; entia non esse multiplicanda " praeter necessitatcm, Hsec regula ab aliis passim oppug- *' natur, quasi injuria in divinam ubertatem, liberalem poti- " us quam parcam, et varietate ac copia rerum gaudeatem. '' Sed, qui sic objiciunt, non satis mihi nominalium men- *' tem cepisse videntur^ quae, etsi obscurius proposita, hue ** redit : hypothesin eo esse meliorem, quo simpliciorem, ** et in causis eorum quae apparent reddendis eum optime '* se gerere, qui quam paucissima gratis supponat. Nam " qui aliter agit, eo ipso naturam, aut potius autorem ejus ^^ Deum ineptae superfluitatis accusat. Si quis astronomus NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 4S5 '* rationem phenomenorum ccelestium reddere potest paucis " suppositis, meris nimirum mutibus simplicibus circular i- *' bus, ejus certe hypothesis ejus hypothesi praeftirtuda eril, " qui multis orbibus varie implexis ad explicanda ccelestia *' indiget. Ex hac jam regula nominales deduxerunt, om- " nia in rerum natura explicari posse, eisi universalibus et *' formalitatibus realibus prorsus careatus ; qua sententia *' nihil verius, nihil nostri temporis philosopho dignius, us- " que adeo, ut credain ipsum Occamum non tuisse nomin- *' aliorem quam nunc est Thomas Hobbes, qui, ut verum " fatear, mihi, plusquam nominalis videtur. Non conten- '* tus enim cum nominalibus universalia ad nomina reduce- " re, ipsam rerum veritatem aii in nominidus consistere, ac, *' quod majus est, pendere ab arbitrio humano, quia Veritas " pendeat a definitionibus terminorum, defioitiones autem ^' terminorum ab arbitrio humano, Haec est senteniia viri " inter profundissimos seculi censendi, qua, ut dixi, nihil *' potest esse nominahus." This passage from Leibnitz has given rise to a criticism of MorhofF, which appears to me to be extremely ill-found- ed. — " Accenset nominalibus" (says he,) ** Leibnitzius *' Thomam Hobbesium, quem ille ipso Occamo nominalio- *' rem, et plusquam nominalem vocat, qui non contentus " cum nominalibus universalia ad nomina reducere, ipsam *' rerum veritatem ait in nominibus consistere, ac quod ma- ** jus est, pendere ab arbitrio humano. Quae bella ejus " sententia, quamquam laudat eam Leibnitzius, monstri " aliquid alit, ac plane nequam est. Immania enim ex uno " summo paradoxo fluunt absurda." MoRHoF. Folyhistor. vol. ii. page 81. I shall not at present enter into a particular examination of the doctrine here ascribed to Hcbbes, which I shall have occasion to consider afterwards under the article of Reasoning. I cannot, however, help remarking that noth- ing but extreme inattention to the writings of Leibnitz, could have led MorhofF to suppose, that he had given his sanction to such an opinion. In the very passage which has now been quoted, the cxpresr.ion (" qui ut verum fatear, mihi plus quam nofuinalis videtur") plainly implies a cen- sure of Hobbt 's philosophy ; and in another dissertation, intitled, Med'itationes de Cognitione^ Ferifate^ et Meis^ he is at pains directly to refute this part of hia svsiem : — *^ Ai- ** que ita habemus quoque discrimen inter definitiones nom- " inales,qua2 notas tantumreiab aliis disceruendse continent, 485 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. '* et reales, ex quibus constat rem esse possibilem, et hac *' ratione satisfit Hobbio qui v. ritates volebat esse arbitra- '* rias, qui exdefirjitionibasnonainalibus penderent^ non con- " siderans realitarem dcfinitionis in arbitrio non esse, nee " quaslibet notiones inter se posse conjungi. Nee defini- " tiones nr.minales sufficiunt ad perfectam scientam, nisi '* quando aliunde constat rem definitam esse possibilem, « &c. &c." Leibnitzii Opera^ Edit, Dutens^ torn. ii. p. 16, 17. NOTE [K,] page 173. *' To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to ^* consider truth of thoughc, and truth of words, distinctly " one from another ; but yet it is very difficult to treat of ** them asunder : because it is unavoidable, in treating of " mental propositions, to make use of words : and then the *' instances given of mental propositions cease immediately ** to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental « proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the " ideas, as they are in our minds stripped of names, they " lose the nature purely mental propositions, as soon as they ** are put into words. " And that vvhich makes it yet harder to treat of mental " and verbal propositions separately, is that most men, if '*noiall, in their thinki ig and reasonings within them- ** selves, make use of words instead of ideas, at least when " the sul)ject of their meditation contains in it complex " ideas." Locke, book iv. c. 5. § 3,4. " But to return to the consideration of truth. ** We must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions, that " we are capable of making. " First, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings «* are without the use of words put together or separated by " the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or " disagreement. " Secondly, verbal propositions, which are words, the " signs of our ideas put together or separated in affirmative " or negative sentences, &c." Ibid. § 5. " Though the examining and judging of ideas by ihem- " selves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and «' surest way to clear and distinct knowledge ; yet through ** the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it " is very seldom practised. Every one may observe, how NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 487 " common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the * ideas themselves^ even when men think and reason within ** their own breasts : especially if the ideas be very complex, " and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This " makes the consideration of words and propositions so ne- « cessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very <« hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining ** the other. " All the knowledge we have, being only of particular or " of general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done ** in the former of these, rhe latter can never be well made " known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceiv- ** ed and expressed in words.'' Book iv. c. 6. § 1,2. From thase passages it appears, that Locke conceived the use which we make of words in carrying on our reasonings both with respect to particular and to general truths to be chiefly the effect of custom ; and that the employment of language however convenient, is not essential to our intel- lectual operations. Plis opinion therefore did not coincide with that which I have ascribed to Nominalists. On the other hand, the following passage shews clearly, how widely his opinion differed from that of the Realists ; and indeed it would have led us to believe that it was the same with Berkley's, had not the foregoing quotations con- tained an explicit declaration of the contrary. " To return to general words, it is plain, by what has " been said, that general and universal belong not to the re- *' al existence of things, but are inventions and creatures of '* the understanding, made by it for its own use, and con- *' cern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are ** general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ** ideas*, and so are applicable indifferently to many particu- *' lar things ; and ideas are general, when they are set up *'' as the representatives of many particular things ; but uni- *' versality belongs not to things themselves, which are all ** of them particular in their existence ; even those words " and ideas whicli in their signification are general. When, " therefore, we quit parriculars, the generalb that rest are ** only creatures of our own making ; their general nature " being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the " understanding, of signifying or representing many partic- *' lars. For the signification they have, is nothing but a *' relation that by the mind of man is added to ihem." Book iii. c. 3. § 11. 483 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. On the whole, it is evident, that Mr. Locke was neithet completely satisfied with the doctrine of the Nominalists, nor with that of the Kealists ; and therefore I think it is with good reason, that Dr. Reid has classed him with the Conceptualists. Indeed, Mr. Locke has put this matter beyond all doubt himself ; for, in explaining the manner in which we conceive universals, he has stated his opinion in the strongest and most paradoxical and most contradictory terms. The ridicule bestowed on this part of his philoso- phy by the Author of Martinus Scriblerus, although cen* sured for unfairness by Dr. Warburton, is almost justified by some of his expressions. NOTE [L,] page 180. IN a letter from Leibnitz to a Scotch gentleman (Mr. Burnet of Kemney) dated in the year 1697, there is the following passage ? '• J'ay considere avec attention le grand ouvrage du cha- " ractere reel, et langage philosophique de Monsieur Wil- *' kins. Je trouve qu'il y a mis une infinite de belles choses, " et nous n'avons jamais eu une table des predicamens plus *' accomplie. Mais I'application pour les charactere, et •' pour la langue, n'est point conforme a ce'qu'on pouvoit *' et devoit faire. J'avois considerecette matiere avant le " livre de Monsieur Wilkins, quand j'etcis un jeune homme ** de dix neuf ans, dans mon petit livre de arte combinatorial ** et mon opinion est que ces characteres veritablement reels *' h. philosophiques doivent repondre a I'analyse des pen- ** sees. 11 est vray que ces characteres presupposent la " veritable philosophic, et ce n'est que presentement que *' j'oserois entrependre de les fabriquer. Les objections *' de M. Dalgarus, et de M. Wilkins, contre la methode -* veritablement philosophique ne sont que pour excuser *' rim perfection de leurs essais, et marquent seulcment Ics " difficnltes qui les en ont rebutes." The letter, of which this is a part, was published at the end of A defence of Dr. Clarke, (which I believe is com- monly ascribed to Dr. Gregory Sharpe,) and which was printed at London in 1744. The person mentioned by Leibnitz under the name of M. Dalgarus, was evidently George Dalgarno, a native of Aberd.^en, and author of a small and very rare book, intitled, *"• Ars Signoritm. vulgo *' c/iaracter tmiversalis et lingua phihsojjhicay qua poterunt^ NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 489 " homines diversissimorum idiomatum^ spatio duarunt septi- *' manarum, omnia animi sui sensa^ fm rebusfamiliaribus^J " non minus intelligibiliter^ sive scribendo^ sive loquendo^ " mutuo commumcare^ quam Unguis propriis vernaculis, *' Prceterea^ hinc etiam poterunt juvenes^ philosophice princi' *-^ pia^ et veram logicce praxin^ citius etfacilius multo im^ " bibere^ quam ex vulgaribus philosophorum scrtptis.'''' It is very remarkable that this work of Dalgarno is nev- er (at least as far as I recollect) mentioned by Wilkins ,• al- though it appears from a letter of Charles I. prefixed to Dalgarno's book, that Wilkins was one of the persons who had recommended him to the royal favour. The treatise de Arte Combinatoria is published in the se- cond volume of Dutens' edition of Leibnitz's works, but it does not appear to me to throw much light on his views with respect to a philosophical language. I must request the indulgence of the reader for adding to the length of ikis note, by quoting a passage from another performance of Leibnitz ; in which he has fallen into a train of thought remarkably similar to that of Mr. Hume and Dr. Campbell, in the passages already quoted from them in this section. The performance is entitled, Meditationes de Cogmtione^ Veritate £sf Idets^ and is printed in the second volume of Dutens' edition. *• Plerumque autem, prsesertim in analyst longiore, non " totam simul naturam rei intucmur, sed rerum loco signis *' utimur, quorum explicationem in prsesenti aliqua cogita- *' tione compendii causa solemus prsetermittere, scientes, *' aut credentes nos eam habere in protestate : ira cum chi- " liogonum,seu pollygonum mille eaqualium laterum cogito, '^ non semper naturam lateris, et sequalitatis, et millenarii *' (seu cubi a denario) considero, sed vocabulis istis (quo- " rum sensus obscure saltern, atque imperfecte menti ob- *' versatur) in animo utor loco idearum, quas de iis habeo, '* quoniam memini me significationem istorum vocabulorum *' habere, explicationem autem nunc judico necessariam non *' esse ; qualem cogiiationem csecam, vel etiam symbolicam *' appeliare solec, qua et in algebra, et in arithmetica utimur, *' imo fere ubique. Et certe cum notio ralde composita *' est, non possumus omnes ingredientes eam notiones simul *' cogitare : ubi tamen hoc licet, vel saltem in quantum licet, *^ cognitionem voco iniuitivam. Notionis distinctae pri- *' miiivse non alia datur cognitio, quam intuitiva, ut com- " positarum plerumque cogitatio non nisi svmbolica est. Ooo 490 NOTE^ AND ILLLUSTRATIONS: " Ex his jam patet, nos eoruna quoque, quse distincte *•* cognoscimus, ideas non precipere, nisi quatenus cogita- *' tione intuitiva utimur. Et sane contingit, ut nos ssepe " falso credames habern in animo ideas rerum, cum falso *' supponimus aliquos terminos, quibus utimur, jam a no- '' bis fuisse explicatos : nee verum aat certe ambiguitati " obnoxium est, quod aiunt aliqui, non posse nos de re ali- " qua dicere, intelligendo quod dicimus, quin ejus habea- " mus ideam. Ssepe enim vocabula ista singula atcunque " intelligimus, aut nos antea intellixisse meminimus, quia " tamen hac cogitatione caeca contenti sumus, et resolution- " em notionum non satis prosequimur, fit ut laieat nos con- " tradictio, quam forte notio composita involvit." NOTE [M,]page 199. AS the passage quoted in the text is taken from a work which is but little known in this country, I shall subjoin the original. " Qu'il me soit permis de presenter a ceux qui refusent " de croire a ces pcrfectionnemens successifs de I'espece " humaine un exemple pris dans les sciences ou la marche ** de la verite est la plus sure, ou elle peuj etre mesuree *' avec plus de precision. Ces verites elementaries de ge- ometric et d'astronomie qui avoient eie dans I'lnde et ' dans I'Egypte une doctrine occulte, sur laquelle des pre- ^^ tres ambitieux avoient fonde leur empire^ etoient dans la ^^ Grece, au temps d'Archimede ou d'Hipparquf, des con- ^j noissances vulgaises enseignees dans les ecolcs com- ^^ munes. Dans Ic siecle dernier, il suffisoit de quelques n annees d'eiude pour savoir tout ce qu'Archimede et Hip- it parque avoient pu connoitre ; et aujourd'hui deux annees a deTenseignement d'un professeur vont au-dela de ce que u savoient Leibnitz ou Newton. Qu'on medite cet exem- pt pie, qu'on saisisse cette chaine qui s'etend d'une pretre a de Memphis a Euler, et remplit la distance immense qui t' les separe ; qu'on observe a chaque epoque la genie de- u van^ant le siecle, present, et la mediocrite atteignant a ^^ ce qu'il avoit decouvert dans celui qui precedoii, on ap- ^j prendra que la nature nous a donnc les moyens d'eparg- ^^ ner le temps et de menager I'attention, et qu'il n'existe ^^ aucune raison de croire que ces moyens puissent avoir ^^ un terme. On verra qu'au moment ou une multitude de solutions pariiciilicres, de faits isoles commencent a. NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS- 491 ** epuiser I'attention, a fatiguer la memoire, ces theories *' dispersees viennent se perdredanj* une methode generale, " tous Lis faits se reunir dans un fait unique, et que ces " generalizations, ces reunions repetees n'ont, conrime les " multiplications successives d'un nombre par lui-meme, " d'autre limite qu'um infini auquel il est impossible d'at- " teindre." Sur P Instruction publique^ par M. Condorcet. Continuation of Note [M.] C Second Edition. J HOW much is it to be regretted, that a doctrine so pleasing, and, at the same time, so philosophical, should have been disgraced by what has been since written by Condorcet and others, concerning the Perfeciibiiity of Man, and its probable effect in banishing from the earth. Vice, Disease, and Mortality ! Surely they who can reconcile their minds to such a Creed, might be expected to treat with some indulgence the credulity of the multitude. Nor is it candid to complain of the slow progress of Truth, when it is blended with similar extravagances in Philo- sophical Systems. While, however, we reject these absurdities, so com- pletely contradicted by the whole analogy of human affairs, we ought to guard with no less caution against another Creed, much more prevalent in the present times ; — a Creed, which taking for granted that all things are govern- ed by chance or by a blind destiny,overlooksthe beneficentar- rangement made by Providence for the advancement and for the diffusion of useful knowledge ; and, in defiance both of the moral suggestions and of the universal experience of mankind, treats with ridicule the supposed tendency of truth and justice to prevail finally over falsehood and ini- quity. If the doctrine which encourages these favorable prospects of the future fortunes of our race, leads, when carried to an extreme, to paradox and inconsistency ; the system which represents this doctrine, even when stated with due limitations, as altogether groundless and visiona- ary, leads, by a short and inevitable process, to the conclu- sions either of the Arhrist or of the Manichaean. In the midst, indeed, of such scenes of violence and anarchy as Europe has lately witnessed, it is not always easy for the wisest and best of men to remain faithful to their princi- 492 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. pies and their hopes : But what must be the opinions and the views of those, who, during these storms and convul- sions of the Moral World, find at once, in the apparent ret- rogradation of Human Keason, the gratification of their Political Ambition, and the secret triumph of ihcir Scep- tical Theories ? Fond, impious Man ! Think' st thou yon Sanguine Cloud, Rais'd by thy breath has quench'd the Orb of Day ? To-niorrovv, he repairs the golden flood, And warms the Nations with redoubled rayt NOTE [N,] page 222. IT may be proper to remark, that under the title oiOccori' cmists, I comprehend not merely the disciples of ^uesnai, but all those writers in France, who, about the same time with him, began to speculate about the natural order of political societies ; or, in other words, about that order which a political society would of itself gradually assume, on the supposition that law had no other object than to protect completely the natural rights of individuals, and left every man at liberty to pursue his own interest in his own way, as long as he abstained from violating the rights of others. The connection between this natural order and the improvement of mankind, has been more insisted on by the biographers of Turgot than by any other authors ; and the imperfect hints which they have given of the views of that truly great man upon this important subject, leave us much room to regret that he had not leisure to execute a work, which he appears to have long meditated, on the principles of moral and political philosophy. Pie de M. Turcot. Partie ii. p. 5Z. It is merely for want of a more convenient expression that I have distinguished these different writers by the ti- tle of OcconomisU* It is in this extensive sense that the %vord is commonly imderstood in this country ; but I am sensible that it is somewhat ambiguous, and that, without the explanation which I have given, some of my observa- tions might have been supposed to imply a higher admira- tion dian I ieally entertain of the writings of M. Quesnai, and of the affected phras'rology employed by his sect. The connection between M. Turgot and M. Quesnai, and the coincidence of their opinions about the most essen- tial principles of legislation, will I hope justify me for rank- ing the former with the Oeconomists j although his views NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 493 seem to have been much more enlarged than those of his contemporaries ; and ahhough he expressly disclaimed an implicit acquiescence in the opinions of any particular sect. " M. Turgot etudia la doctrine de M. Gournay et de " M. Quesnai, en profita, se la rendit propre , et la com- *' binant avec la connoissance qu^il avoit du Droit, & avec *' les grandes vues de legislation civile & criminelle qui a- " voient occupe sa tete & interesse son coeur, parvint a en " former sur le gouvernement des nations un corps de prin- " cipes a lui, embrassent les deux autres, et plus complet Memoires sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M. Turcot, par M. DupoNT, p> 40, 41. " II a passe pour avoir ete attache a plusieurs sectes, ou' ** a plusieurs sociefes qu'on appelait ainsi ; et les amis ilou ** avait dans ces societes diverses lui reprochaient sons ces- " se de n'etre pas de leur avis ; & sans cesse il leur repro- " chait de son cote de vouloir faire communaute d'opin- " ions, & de se rendre solidaires les uns pour les autres. " II croyait cette marche propre a retarder les progres " memes de leurs decouvertes." Ibid. p. 41, 43. NOTE [O,] page 306. THE foregoing observations on the state of the mind in sleep, and on the phenomena of rdeaming, were written as long ago as the year 1772; and were read (nearly in the form in which they now are published) in the year 1773, in a private literary society in this university. A considera- ble number of years afterwards, at a time when I was oc- cupied with very different pursuits, I happened, in turning over an old volume of thebcots Magazine, (the volume for the year 1749,) to meet with a short essay on the same sub- ject, which surprised me by its coincidence with some ideas which had formerly occurred to me. I have reason to be- lieve that this essay is very little known, as I have never seen it referred to by any of the numerous writers who have since treated of the human mind ; nor have even heard it once mentioned in conversation. I had some time ago the satisfaction to learn accidentally, that the au- thor was Mr. Thomas Mtlville, a gentleman who died at the early age of 27 ; and whose ingenious observations on light and colors (published in the Essays of the Edinburgh Philosophical Society) are well known over Europe. 494 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. The passages which coincide the most remarkably v/ith the doctrine I have stated, are the following. I quote the first with particular pleasure, on account of the support which it gives to an opinion which I formerly proposed in the essay on Conception, and on which 1 have the misfor- tune to differ from some of my friends. *' When I am walking up the High-street of Edinburgh, " the objects which strike my eyes and ears give me an idea *' of their presence ; and this idea is lively, full, and per- *' manent, as arising from the continued operation of light " and sound on the organs of sense. ** Again, when I am absent from Edinburgh, but conceiv- " ing or imagining myself to walk up the High-street, in re- "■ lating, perhaps, what befel me on such an occasion, I have '^ likewise in my mind an idea of what is usually seen and " heard in the High-street ; and this idea of imagination is *• entirely similar to those of sensation, though not so strong *' and durable, " In this last instance, while the imagination lasts, be itev- " er so short, it is evident that I think myself in the street of " Edinburgh, as truly as when I dream I am there, or even " as when I see and feel I am there. It is true, we cannot " so well apply the word beliej in this case ; because the " perception is not clear or steady being ever disturbed, ** and soon dissipated, by the superior stsength of intruding *' sensation : yet nothing can be more absurd than to say, ** thai a man may, in the same individual instant, believe he " is in one place, and imagine he is in another. No man *' can demonstrate that the objects of sense exists without ^' him ; we are conscious of nothing but our own sensa- ** tions : however, by the uniformity, regularity, consisten- " cy, and steadiness ot the impressioa, we are led to be- *' lieve, that they have a real and durable cause without •' us ; and we observe not any thing which contradicts this *^ opinion. But the ideas of imagination, being transient *' and fleeting, can beget no such opinion, or habitual be- '* lief; though there is as much perceived in this case as *' in the former, namely, an idea of the object within the •' mind. It will be easily understood, that all this is inten- *' ded to obviate an objection that might be brought against *' the similarity of dreaming and imagination, from our be- *' lieving in sleep that all is real. But there is one fact, " that plainly sets them both on a parallel, that in sleep we '* often recollect that the scenes which we behold are a NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 495 ** mere dream, in the same manner as a person awake is " habitually convinced that the representations of his ima- " gination are fictitious." <■' In this essay we m^ke no inquiry into the state of " the body in sleep/' '* if the operations of the mind in sleep can be fair- <* ly deduced from the same causes as its operations when *' awake, we are certainly advanced one considerable step, ** though the causes of these latter should be still unknown, *' The doctrine of gravitation, which is the most wonderful « and extensive discovery in the whole compass of human « science, leaves the descent of heavy bodies as great a " mystery as ever. In philosophy, as in geometry, the " whole art of investigation lies in reducing things that are *' difficult, intricate, and remote, to what is simpler and easi- '* er of access, by pursuing and extending the analogies of « nature." On looking over the same essay, I find an observation which I stated as my own m page 135 of this work. " The •* mere imagination of a tender scene in a romance, or dra- " ma, will draw tears from the eyes of those who know « very well, when they recollect themselves, that the whole " is fictitious. In the mean time they must conceive it as *« real, and from this supposed reality arises all its influence " on the human mind." Continuation of Note [O.] C^^cond Edit? on J SOON after the publication of the First Edition of this Work, a difficulty was started to roe with respect to my conclusions concerning the state of the mind ?n sleep, by my excellent friend .vir. Prevost of Geneva ; a Gentleman who has long held a high rank in the republic of letters, and to whose valuable correspondence I have often been in- debted for much pleasure and instruction. The same dif- ficulty was proposed to me, nearly about the same time, by another friend (then at a very early period of life,) who has since honorably distinguished himself by his observa- tions on Dr. Darwin's Zoonomia ; the first fruits of a phi- losophical genius, which, I trust, is destined for yet more important undertakings.* # Observations on the Zoonomia of Dr Darwin. By Thomas Brown, Esq. Edinburgh, 1798. 496 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, As Mr. Prevost has, in the present instance, kindly aid- ed me in the task of removing his own objection, I shall take the liberty to borrow his words : ** Sans Taction de hi Volonte point d'effort d'attention. " Sans quelque effort d'attention point de Souvenir. Dans « le Sommeil, I'actione de la Volonte est suspendue. Cora- " ment done reste t-il quclque Souvenir des Songes? " Je vois hien deux ou trois responses a cette difficulte. '• Quant a present, elles se reduisent a dire, ou que dans un ** Sommeil parfait, il n'y a nul Souvenir, et que la ou il y a <' Souvenir, le Sommeil n'etoitpas parfait ,• ou que Taction ** de la Volonte qui suffit pour le Souvenir n'est pas suspen- ** due dans le Sommeil ; que ce degre d'activite reste a '* Tame ; que ce n'est, pour ainsi, dire, qu* une Volonte ** elemcntaire et comme insensible." I am abundantly sensible of the force of this objection ; and am far from being satisfied, that it is in my power to reconcilti completely the apparent inconsistency. The gen- eral conclusions, at the same time, to which I have been led, seem t9 result so necessarily from the facts I have sta- ted, that even although the difficulty in question should re- main for the present unsolved, it would not, in my opinion, materially aflfect the evidence on which they rest. In all our inquiries, it is of consequence to remember, that when we have once arrived at a general principle by a careful in- duction, we are not entitled to reject it, because we may find ourselves unable to explain from it, synthetically, all the phenomena in which it is concerned. The Newtonian Theory of the Tides is not the less certain, that some ap- parent exceptions occur to it, of which it is not easy (in consequence of our imperfect knowledge ot the local cir- cumstances by which, in particular cases, the effect is mod- ified) to give a satisfactory explanation. Of the solutions suggested by Mr. Prevost, the first co- incides most nearly with my own opinion ; and it approach- es to what I have hinted (in page 133 of this work) con- cerning the seeming exceptions to my doctrine, which may occur in those cases where sleep is partial. A strong con- firmation of it, undoubtedly, may be derived from the ex- perience of those persons (several of whom 1 have happen- ed to meet with) who never recollect to have dreamed, ex- cepting when the soundness of their sleep was disturbed by some derangement in their general health, or by some acci- dent which excited a bodily sensation. NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 49r Another solution of the difficulty might perhaps be de- rived from the facts (stated in pp. 197", 198, of this volume) which prove " that a perception^ or an idea, which passes " through the mind, without leaving any traoe in ihe menfi- " cry, may yet serve to introduce other ideas connected ** with it by the Laws of Association." From this principle it follows, that if any one of the more remarkable circumstances in a dream should recur to ws after we awake, it might (without our exerting during sleep that attention which is essential to memo>y) revive the same concatenation of particulars with which it was formerly accompanied. And what is a dream^ but such a concatenation of seeming events presenting itself to the imagination during our waking hours ; the origin cf which we learn by experience to refer to that interval which is employed in sleep ; — finding it impossible to conect it with any specific time or place in our past history ? One thing is certain, that we cannot, by any direct acts of recollection, recover the train of our sleeping thoughts, as we can, in an evening, review the meditations ©f the preceding day. Another cause, it must be owned, presents an Obstacle to such efforts of recollection ; and is, perhaps, adequate of it- self to explain the fact. During the day, we have many aids to memory which are wanting in sleep (those, in par- ticular, which are furnished by the objects of our external senses ;) and of these aids we never fail to avail ourselves, in attencpting to recollect the thoughts in which the day has been spent. We consider, m what place we were at a particular time, and what persons and things we ihete saw ; endeavoring thus to lay hold of our intellectual pro- cesses, by means of the sensible objects with which they were associated : and yet, with all these advantages, the account which most men are able give of their meditations at the close cf a long summer's dd\, will not be found to require many sentences. As in sleep, our communication with the external world is completely interrupted, it is not sui prising, that the memory of our dreams should be much more imperfect than that of our waking th'Ughts ; even supposing us to bestow, at the moment, an equal degree uf attention on both. It is of more importance to remark, in the present argu- ment, that those persons who are subject to Somnambulism^ seldom if ever, retain any recollection of the objects of iheir perceptions, while under -the influence of this disor- 498 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. den If the principles I have endeavored to establish be just, tiiis is a necessary consequence of their inattention to what then pa ses around them ; an inattention of which no- body can doubt» who has had an opportunity of witnessing the vacant, and unconscioos stare which their eyes exhibit. The same fact illusirates strongly the suspension, during sleep, of those voluntary powers, to which the operations both of mind and body are at other times subjected. These consi:ierations derive additional evidence from a GO'.nmon remark, thar idle people are most apt to dream, or, at least, to recollect dieir dreams. The thoughts of the busy and of the studious are directed by their habitual oc- cupations into a particular channel ; and the spontaneous course of their ideas is checked, and turned aside, by the unremitted activity of their minds. In the heedless and dissipated, the thoughts wander carelessly from object to object, according to the oovious relations of resemblance and of analogy, or of vicinity in place and time. As these are the prevailing principles of association in sleep, the chances that the dreams of such men shall be again present- ed to them m the course of the f jllowing day, are infinitely multiplied. Which of these solutions approaches most nearly to the real state of the fact, I do not presume to decide. I think it probable, that both of them are entitled to notice, in com- paring the pht-nomena of dreaming with the general prin- ciples to which I have endeavored to referthem. In cases where our dreams are occasioned by bodily sensations, or by bodily indisposition, it may be expected that the distur- bed state of our rest will prevent th?t total cessation of the power of attention, which takes place when sleep is pro- found and complete j and, in such instances, the attention which is given to our passing thoughts, may enable us af- terwards to retrace them bv an act ot recollection. On the other hand, the more general fact imquestionablv is, that at the moment of our awaking, the interval spent in sleep pre- sents a total blank to the memory ; and vet, it happens not unfrequently, ^hat, at the distance of hours, some acciden- tal circumstance occurring to our thoughts, or suggested to us from without, revives a long train of particulars associa- ted in the mind widi each other j to which train (not being able to account otheiwise for the concatenation of its parts) vre give the pame of a Dream, After all, I am very far 'from supposing that I have ex- hausted this subject ; and I shall be fully satisfied with the NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 499 success of my inquiries, if those who are qualified to dis- tinguish between legitimate and hypothetical theories shall admit, that I have pointed out the plan on which these phe- nomena should be studied, and have made so>r;e progress, (how small soever) towards its execution. Much addition- al light, I am sensible, might have been easily thrown on this part of our constitution, as well as upon many others, if I had not imposed on myself the restraint of adhering, wherever it was at all posssible, to the modes of speaking employed by my predecessors in describing our mental op- erations. One remark I must beg leave to recommend to the con- sideration of thorie who may hereafter engage in this re- search ; that, among the astonishing appearances exhibited by the mind in sleep, a very large proportion are precisely analogous to those of which we are every momtnt conscious while awake. If the exciting causes, for example, of our Dreams seem mysterious and inscrutable, is not the fact the same with the origin of every idea or thought which spontaneously solicits our notice ? The only difference is, that in the latter instance, in consequence of long and con- stant familiarity, they are surveyed by all with little won- der, and by roost with hardly any attention. In the for- mer instance, they rouse the curiosity of the most illiterate, from their comparative infrequency, and from the contrast which, in some respects, iht-y present to the results of our habitual experirnce. It is thus, that a peasant who has been accustomed from his infancy to see, withotit any emo- tion, the fall of heavy bodies to the ground, never fails to express the liveliest admiration when he first witnesses the powers of the loadstone. In such cases, the researches of genuine science have r tendency to produce two moral effects equally beneficial. The one is to illustrate the unity of design in nature, by reconciling vyhat seems, from \u rarity or singularity, to be mysterious or incomprehensible, with the general laws which are familiarised to us by daily experience ; the oth- er, to counteract the effects of familiarity in blunting our natural curiosity with respect to these laws, by leading the thoughts to some of their more curious and apparently a- nomalous applications. The phenomena of Dreaming may perhaps, in this last point of view, form an article not altogether useless in the Natural History of Man ; inasmuch as they contribute to attract our attention to those intellectual powers, from 500 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. which it is so apt to be withdrawn by that external world, which affords the first, and (for the comnnon purposes of life) the most interesting field for their exercise. In my own case, at least, this supposition has been exacily verifi- ed ; as the speculations concerning the human mind which I have ventured to present to the public, i^ll took their rise from the subject to which this note refers. The observa- tions which I have stated with respect to it iu the text (ex- cepting a very few paragraphs since added) were written at the age of eighteen, and formed a part of the first philo- sophical essay which I recollect to have attempted. I'he same essay contained the substance of w^iat I have introdu- ced in cha,)ter third, concerning the belief accompanying conception ; and of the remarks stated in the third section of chapter fifth, on the extent of the power which the mind has over the train of its thoughts. When I was afterwards led professionally, at the distance of man\ years, to resume the same studies, this short manuscript was almost the on- ly memorial I had preserved of these favorite pursuits of niy early youth ; and from the views which it recalled to me, insensibly arose the Analvsis I have since undertaken of our intellectual faculties in general. For some indulgence to the egotism of this note, I must trust to the good nature of my readers. It has been length- ened much beyond my original intention, by an anxiety (not, I hope, unpardonable in an Author) to fix the date of some of my disquisitions and conclusions, of which it is bighlv probable I may magnify the importance beyond their just value. The situation of a public teacher, (I must beg leave to add,) by Igiving an immediate circulation to the doctrines he delivers, exposes him to many inconven- iences which other classes of literary men have in their pow- er to avoid. Before concluding these remarks, I cannot help remind- ing my readers once more, that my fundamental principle with respect to the state of the mind in sleep is, — not that the power of volition is then suspended ; but, thai the infu- ence of thewillov^Y iV.G i^cuKiiis both of mind and body is then interrupted. (See pp. 290, 291, 292, 293.) I men- tion this chiefly, in order to mark the difference between ' my doctrine and that maintained in Dr. Darwin's Zoono- mia* According to this ingenious writer, " the power of *' volition is totally suspended in perfect sleep." (Zoono- mia, vol. }. p. 3 15.) — '' In the hicubus*' (he observes,) '' the *'• desire of moving the body is painfully exerted j but th^ NOTES AND ILLCSTRATIONS. 501 " power of moviJig it^ or volition, h incapable of action till '* we awake." (p. 288.) Would he no- have stated the fact more correctly, il he had B2iu\\\\^x. volition is painfully exerted ; but that the power of moving the body is suspttn- ded ? In the very accurate phraseology of Mr. Locke, *' volition is an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that " dominion it takes itself to hive over any part of the men, *' by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular '•action." This act of the mind, Dr. D:irwin expresses by the word desire ; an indistinctness still extremely common among metaphysical writers ; although it was long ago re- marked and censured by the eminent author jasr quoted: *' I find" 'says Locke,) " the xvill ofcen confoundt-d with " desire, and one put for the other ; and that by men, who ** would not willingly be thought, not to have very distinct " notions of things, and not to have written very clearly *' about them.'' (Essay on Human Understanding, vol. i. p. 203. 13th edition.) NOTE [P,] page 30r. Dr. REID has with great truth, observed, that Des Cartes"' reasoning against the existence '.f the secondary qualities of matter, owe all their plausibility to the ambiguity of words. — When he affirms, for example that the smell of a rose is not in the flower but in the mind, his proposition amounts only to this, that the rose is not conscious of the sensation of smell : but it does not follow from Des C^^rtes* reasonings, that there is no quality in the rose which ex- cites the sensation of smell in th" mind ; — which is all that any person means when he speaks of the sn^ell of that flow- er. For the word smelL like the names of all secondary qualities, signifies two things, a sensation in the mind, and the unknown quality which fits it to excite that sensation.* * Some judicious remarks on this ambiguity in the names of secondary qualities, are made by Malebranche : " It is only (says he) since the time of Des Cartes, that those; confused *' and indetermina'e questions, whether fire is hot, grass green, and sugar *' sweet, phihtsophers are in use to answer, b> distinguishing thv.- equivocal '* meaning of tlie words expressing sensible quahties It by heat, cold, and *' savour, yau understand such and such a disposition of parts, or some un- «' known motion of insensible particles, than fire is hot, grass green, and *• sugar sweet. But if by hear and other qualities you understand what I ** ftel by fire, what I see in grass, &.c. fire is not hot, nor gra^s gteen ; for " the heat I feel, and the colours 1 see, are only in th? soul.'* m NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. The same remark applies to that process of reasoning by which Des Caries attempts to prove that there is no hvtat in the fire. All this, I think, will he readily allowed with respect to smells and tastes, and also with respect to heat and cold ; concerning which I agree with Dr. Reid, in thinking that Dcs (yat tes' Jrictrine, when cleared of that air of mystery which it derives from the arahiguity of words, differs very little if at all, from (he commouly received notions. But the case seems to be different with respect to colours^ of the nature of which -he vulgar are apt to form a very confused conception, which the philosophy of D a Cartes has a ten- dency t'j correct. Dr. Rtid has jusdy distinguished the quality of colour from what he calls the appearance of col- our, which last can only exist in a mmd*. Now I am dis- posed to believe, that when the vulgar speak of colour, they commonly mean the appearance of colour, or rather they associate the appearance and its cause so intimately togeth- er, that they find it impossible to think of them separately.! The senaarion of colour never f(jrms one simple object of attention to (he mind like those of smell and taste ; but every time we are conscious of it, we perceive at the same time extension and figure. Hence it is, that we find it im- posiible to conceive colour without extension, though cer- tainly there is no more necessary connection between them, than between extension and smell. * Dr. Akens'de, inoneof hisNotes onhUPLEAsuiiEs of Imagination, observes, that colours, as apprehended by the mind, dt> not exist in the body. By trti'^ qualUicatiou, he piainly means lo dib niguish what Dr. Reid calls the appearance of colour, from colour considered as a qualiry of matter- + Dr. Reid is of opinion, that the vulgar always ipean to express by the ■word colow, a quality, and not a sensation. '■ Colour (says he) differs from *' other secondary qnaluiesin this, that whereas the name of the quality is *' sometimes given to the sensation which indicates it, and is occasioned by " it, we never, as far as I can judge, give the name of colour to the "^ensa- '♦ tion but to the quility oiily." This question is of no consequence for us to discuss at present, as Dr. Reid acknowledges in the following passage, rliat the sensation and quality are so intima ely united togc her in the mind, that they seem to f >rm only one simple object of thought. *' When we think *' or speak f any particular colour, however simple the notion may seem to '* be which is preseared to the imagination, it is really in some sort com- " pounded ; it involves an unknown cause and a known effect. The name '• of co/yur belongs indeed to the cause only, and not to the effect. But as '* the cause is unkno vn, we can form no distinct conception of it, but by its ** relatioH to the known effect. And therefore both go together in the im- " agination, and are so closely united that they are mistaken fjr one simple ^' object of thought.'* Inquiry into (be Human Mind, chap, vi. sect, 4, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 50S From this habit of associating the two together, we are led also to assign them the same place, and to conceive the different colours, or (to use Dr. Keid's language) the ap- pearance of the different colours, as something spread over the surfaces of bodies. I own that when we reflect on the subject with attention, we find this conception to be indis- tinct, and see clearly that the appearance of colour can exist only in a mind : but still it is some confused notion of this sort, which every man is disposed to form who has not been very familiarly conversant with philosophical inquir- ies. — 1 find, at least, that such is the notion which most readily presents itself to my own mind. Nor is this reference ot the sensation, or appearance of colour, to an external object, a face altogether singular in our constitution. It is extremely analogous to the reference which we always make, of the sensations of touch to those parts of the body where the exciting causes of the sensations exist. — If I strike my hand against a hard object, I natural- ly say, that 1 feel pain in my hand. The philosophical truth is, that I perceive the cause of the pain to be applied to that part of my body. The sensation itself I cannot re- fer in point of place to the hand, without conceiving the soul to be spread over the body by diffusion. A still more striking analogy to the fact under our con- sideratioli, occurs in those sensations of touch which we refer to a place beyond the limits of the body ; as in the case of pain felt in an amputated limb. The very mtimate combination to which the foregoing observations on the sensation of colour relate, is taken no- tice of by d'Alembert in the Encyclopedic^ as one of the most curious phenomena of the human mind. " II ebt tres evident que h mot couleur ne designe aucii- *' ne proprieie du corps, mais seulement une modificaiion ** de none ame ; qua la blancheur, par exemple,la rongeur, *' &CC. n'existent que dans nous, et nuUement dans le corps " ausquels nous les rapportons ; neanmoins par une habi- " tudc prise des nortre enfance, c'est une chose tres sigu- " Here et digiie de Tattention des metaphysicians, que cc *' penchant que nous avons a rapporter a nne substance *' m: ; which Aristides Quiruil'Jmus thus describes ; *' Tmrai ^e ^ />tav ^apvrvis, kxtuQev ava^£po//,iv» ru 'Trnvf/i.aros, 07 0' o^vrris ^^sirtTToKns 'Trpoisy.eya^ ^q, £t quidem gravitas fit, si ex inferi- NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS- 505 " ore parte (gutturis) spirltus sursum feratur, acumen vero, " si per sum mam partem prorumpat ;" (as Meibcmius translates it in his notes.) See Smith's Harmonics^ p. 3. Dr. Beattie,inhis ingenious Essa} on Poetry and Music, says, it is probable that the deepest or gravest sound v/as called summa by the Romans, and the shrillest or acutest ima : and he conjectures, that " this might have been owing '* to the construction of their instruments ; the string that " sounded the former being perhaps highest in place, and " that which sounded the latter lowest." If this conjecture could be verified, it would afford a proof from the fact how liable the mind is to be influenced in this respect by casual combinations. NOTE [R,] page 347. THE difference between the effects of association and of imagination^ (in the sense in which J employ these words,) in heightening the pleasure or the pain produced on the mind by external objects, will appear from the following remarks : 1. As far as the association of ideas operates in heighten- ing pleasure or pain, the mind is passive : and accordingly where such associations are a source of inconvenience, they are seldom to be cured by an effort of our volition, or even by reasoning ; but by the gradual formation of contrary as- sociations. Imagination is an active exertion of the mind ; and although it may often be difficult to restrain it, it i§ plainly distinguishable in theory from the associations now mentioned. 2. In every case in which the association of ideas ope- rates, is is implied that some pleasure or pain is recalled which was felt by the mind before. I visit, for example, a scene where I have been once happy ; and the sight of it affects me on that account, with a degree of pleasure, which I should not have received from any other scene equally beautiful. I shall not inquire, whether, in such cases, the associated pleasure arises iminedifttely upon the sight of the object, and without the intervention of any train of thought ; or whether it is produced by the recollection and conception of former occurrences which the perception rccals. On neither supposition does it imply the exercise of that crea- tive power of the mind to which we have given the name of Imagination. It is true, that commonlv, on such occa- QQq 5Q6 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. sioas, imagination is busy ; and our pleasure is n^uch heigh- tened by ihe colouring which she gives (O the objects of memory. But the difference betv/een the effects which arise from the operation of this facult)-, and those which resuh from association, is not, on that account, the less real. The influence of imagination on happiness is chiefly felt by cultivated minds, "j'hat of association extends to all ranks of men, and furnishes the chief instrument oT educa- tion ; insomuch that whoever has the regulacion of the a^^- sociations of another from early infany, is to a great de- gree, the arbiter of his happiness or misery. Some very ingenious writers have employed the word Association in so extensive a sense, as to comprehend, not onlv imagination, but all the other faculties of the mind. Wherever the pleasing or the painful effect of an object does not depend solely on the object itself, but arises eith- er wholly or in part from some mental operation to which the perception of it giver, rise, the effect is referred to as- sociation. And, undoubtedly, this language may be em- ployed with propriety, if the word Association be applied to all the ideas and feelings which may arise in the mind, in consequence of the exercise which the sight of the ob- ject may give to the imagination, to the reasoning powers, and to the other principles of our nature. But in (his work, and particularly in the second part of chap. v. I employ the word Association in a much more limited sense ; to express the effect which an object derives from ideas, or from feelings which it does not necessarily sug^jest, but which it uniformly recals to the mind, in consequence of early and long continued habits. NOTE [S,] page 361. THE following passage from Malebranche will be a suf- ficient specimen of the common theories with respect to memory, " In order to give an explanation of memory, it should *' be called to mind, that all our different perceptions are ** affixed to the changes which happen to the filjres of the ** principal parts of the brain, wherein the soul particularly *' resides. " This supposition being laid down, the nature of the " memory is explained : for as the branches of a tree, which NOTE S AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 507 " have continued for some time bent after a particular man- *' ner, preserve a readiness and facility of being bent afresh '* in the same manner ; so the (ibrcs of the brain, having *' once received certain impressions from the current of the ** animal spirits, and from the action of the objects upon " them, retain for a considerable time some facility of re- " ceiving the same dispositions. Now the memory consists *' only in that promptness or facility j since a man thinks " upon the same things, whenever the brain receives ihv' " same impressions."* " The most considerable difFcTences," says the same *^ Author in another passage, *"• that are found in one and " the same person, daring his whole life^ are in his infancy, *' in his maturity, and in his old age. The fibres in the " brain in a man's childhood are soft, flexible, and delicate ; *' a riper age dries, hardens, and corroborates them ; but " in old age they grow altogether inflexible, gross, and in- '" termixed wirh superfluous humors, which the faint and *' languishing heat ot that age is no longer able to disperse : " for as we sec that the fibres which compose the flesh "■ harden by time, and that the flesh of a young partridge is " without dispute more tender than that of an old one, so " the fibics of the brain of a child, or a young person, must " be more soft and delicate than those of persons more ad- *' vanced in years. " We shall understand the ground and the occasion of " these changes, if we consider that the fibres are continu- "*' ally agitated by the animal spirits, which whirl about them " in many different manners : for as the winds parch and " dry the earth by their blowing upon ir, so the animal *' spirits, by their perpetual agitaiion, render by degrees *' the greatest part of the fibres of a man's brain more dry, " more close, and solid ; so that persons more stricken In " age must necessarily have them almost always more in- " flexible than those of a lesser standing. And as for thos6 " of the same age, drunkards, who for many years togeiher *' have drank to excess either wine, or other such intoxica- " ting liquors, must needs have them more solid and more *' inflexible than those who have abstained from the use of *^ such kind of liquors all their lives/'f * Book ii- chap. 5. (Page 54 of Taylor's Transl.) tBook il chap, 6- (Page 56 of Taylor's TranJl.) 408 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. NOTE [T,] page 417. " THOUGH Sir Isaac's memory was much decayed in " the last years of his life, I found he perfectly understood '* his own writings, conirary to what I had frequently heard " in discourse from many persons. This opinion of theirs *^ might arise, perhaps, from his not being always ready at ** speaking on these subjects, when it might be expected he " should. But as to this it may be observed, that great " geniuses are frequently liable to be absent, not only in re- *' lation to common life, but with regard to some of the ** parts of science thev are the best informed of. Inventors " seem to treasure up in their minds what they have found " out after another manner than those do the same thiags, " who have not this inventive faculty. The former, when " they have occasion to produce their knowledge, are, in *' some measure, obliged immediately to investigate part ** ot what they want. For this they are not equally fit at " all times ; so it has often happened, that such as retain *' things chiefly by a very strong memory, have appeared " off-hand more expert than the discoverers themselves." Preface to Pemberton's View of Newton's Philosophy. NOTE [U,] page 458. " GOING over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts^ *' talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it ; this is so " far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a " habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may *' harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it grad- *' ually more insensible; i. e. form a habit of insensibility '* to all moral obligations. For, from our very faculty of " habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow^ '* weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, " are felt less sensibly : being accustomed to danger, be- " gets intrepidity, i. e. lessens fear ; to distress, lessens the " passion of pity ; to instances of others mortality, lessens *' the sensible apprehension of our own. And from these *' two observations together, that practical habits are form- *' ed and strengthened by repeated acts ; ard that passive " impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us ; it " must follow, that active habits may be gradually forming ** and strengthening by a course of acting upon such and NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 509 " such motives and excitements, whilst these motives and ** excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, *' growing less sensible, i. e. are continually less and less " sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthened. And " experience confirms this : for active principles, at the ve- *' ry time they are less lively in perception than they were, " are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly in- " to the temper and character, and become more effectual " in influencing our practice. The three things just men- ** tioned may afford instances of it. Ptrcepiioii of danger *' is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution : *' and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are " gradually wrought, at the same time that the former ** gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others, *' is a natural excitement passively to pity, and actively to ** relieve it : but let a man set himself to attend to, inquire *' out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but " grow less and less sensibly affected with the various nnis- " eries of life with which he must become acquainted ; *' when yet, at the same time, benevolence, cons'idered not ** as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will ** strengthen : and whilst he passively compas&ionates the " distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively ** to assist and befriend them. So also, at the same time ** that the daily instances of men's dying around us, give *' us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of " our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to ** the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men ; " i. e. to forming a habit of acting with a constant v'ltw to " it." Butler's Analogy^ page 122. 3d edit. THE END. 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